De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
CAPTION
Title:
G.R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010
Parties:
DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
Citation:
Ponente: (Speaker)
BERSAMIN, J.:
SYLLABUS (Principles of Law / Legal Principles)
FACTS
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation
to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition
found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from
political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified
period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
ISSUES/s
Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
RULING (Ratio)
Yes. He can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno. Under the principle of verba legis, the framers could
have explicitly done and have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
The President was left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such
inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we
ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.
FALLO (Dispositive Portion)