Flores V Drilon
Flores V Drilon
Flores V Drilon
104732
Flores v. Drilon
June 22, 1993
Bellosillo, J
Doctrine:
Sec.94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13,
par. (d), of RA 7227 for no legislative act prevail over the fundamental law of the
land.
The phrase “shall be appointed “ unquestionably shows intent to make the
SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo
City.
The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those
who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
Respondent Gordon’s appointment pursuant to a legislative act that
contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. His acts as SBMA official are
not necessarily null and void, he may be considered a de fact officer.
Facts: The Congress enacted R.A. 7227, otherwise known as “The Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992. Under Sec.13, par. (d) of the said law,
respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City is appointed as Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).
Main Issue: Whether or not Sec 13, par. (d), of R.A.7227, violates Sec. 7, first
par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution or the proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
Ruling: The subject proviso directing the President to appoint an elective official
i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of SBMA is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent.
The court has held that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public
officer “should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the
distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded
from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.” 1
Although it is argued that Sec.94 of LGC permits the appointment of a local
elective official to another post if so allowed by law, it must be stressed that no
legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
It must also be noted that Congress did not contemplate making the subject
SMBA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of
Olongapo City without need of appointment. Otherwise, the word “ex-officio”
would have been used, instead of the word “appointed”.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has
the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment,
deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary
qualifications and eligibilities. 2
In the case at bar, the proviso limits the appointing authority to only one
eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. The President is precluded
from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. The proviso limiting his
choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of
SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that
contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained.
The proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: "Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional;
consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City,
respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
1
22 February 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 339
2
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court