Case #149

IGNACIO ARROYO vs. JACOB GERONA

Doctrine:
Every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or intestate
succession may make must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not
in a separate action.

Descent and distribution; approval of agreement of partition; subsequent annulment. — The

FACTS:

On October 8, 1928, the court issued an order declaring the following as sole heirs of the late
Concepcion Gerona: Ignacio Arroyo, Victor, Jacoba, Patricia, Ciriaca, and Clara, also surnamed
Gerona; and in view of the agreement of partition and adjudication of the estate executed by said
heirs who were all of age, together with the express waiver made in favor of Ignacio Arroyo. On
the 9th of July, 1929, counsel for Jacoba, Ciriaca, Clara, and Patricia, surnamed Gerona, petitioned
the court, for the reasons stated, to annul the deed as being contrary to the law, and that as
having been surreptitiously and fraudulently executed, thereby rendering nugatory the order
issued on October 8, 1928, permitting the summary partition of the estate of the deceased Maria
Concepcion Gerona; and that a Luis Servando be appointed as judicial administrator. The lower
court held that in the course of the intestate proceedings of Concepcion Gerona, it could not
entertain a petition for the annulment of the agreements, for the reason that the question of the
nullity of the deed of partition comes within the jurisdiction of the ordinary and not the probate
court.

ISSUE:

WON that probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by fraud.

RULING:

Yes, the court that approved the partition and the agreement ratifying the same may annul both
in case such approval was obtained by deceit or fraud; and the petition must be filed in the
intestate proceedings, for the general rule is, that probate courts are authorized to vacate any
decree or judgment procured by fraud, not only while the proceedings in the course of which it
was issued are pending, but even during a reasonable time thereafter.
 Case #150
BENEDICTO VS. JAVELLANA
10 Phil 197 (1908)
Melgen J. Sarra

Doctrine:
Every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or intestate
succession may make must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not
in a separate action.
Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every
demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession
may make must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate
action.

FACTS:

Maximino Jalandoni, brother of the deceased Maximo Jalandoni, petitioned that the
administrator or executor, Julio Javellana, be directed to pay him the sum of P985 which he held,
in lieu of the land donated to him in his brother’s will. He alleged that one-half of the hacienda
“Lantad” had been bequeathed to him, subject to the payment of certain debts and expenses of
the estate; that one-half of said hacienda was sold, the sum of P985 remaining in the possession
of Javellana; that Javellana is no longer entitled to retain the P985 since, with the value of the
portion inherited by the heirs Francisco Jalandoni and Sofia Jalandoni, there would be more than
enough required to pay the other debts and expenses of the estate. Javellana alleged that it was
not proper to ask, by means of a motion, for the relief that Maximino Jalandoni claimed, but that
a complaint should have been filed and action brought against the other legatees or rather against
all the parties concerned in the estate, not against the administrator alone. The lower court judge
granted the motion.

ISSUE:

WON Maximino’s claim should be filed in the special proceedings or in a separate action?

RULING:

In the special proceedings. Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the
authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in
a testate or intestate succession may make must be acted upon and decided within the same
special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the
administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised.
 Case #151
QUIRINO V. GROSPE
169 SCRA 702 (1989)

Melgen J. Sarra

Doctrine:
A monetary claim against the administrator which has a relation to his acts of administration
may be presented for payment with the court where a special proceeding for this settlement of
the estate is pending.

FACTS:
In his last will and testament, Don Juan Castellvi gave the usufruct of his entire estate to his
widow, Carmen M. Castellvi. Upon Carmen's death, the probate court appointed Antonio
Quirino, as Special Administrator. Notice to creditors was duly published in the newspaper and
various claims were received. One of the contested claim was the claim for services allegedly
rendered to the Administratrix, Carmen N. Castellvi. According to petitioner, claims for services
allegedly rendered to the Administratrix, Carmen N. Castellvi, should have been charged to her
12% fees as Administratrix, and not directly against the estate of Don Juan Castellvi.

ISSUE:

WON services rendered to the administratrix, should be charged to her 12% fees as
administratrix.

RULING:
No. A monetary claim against the administrator or administratrix which has a relation to his or
her acts of administration may be presented for payment with the court where a special
proceeding for this settlement of the estate is pending, though such claim was not incurred by
the deceased in his lifetime and collectible after his death.
 Case #152
PAULA V. ECSAY
97 Phil. 617
Melgen J. Sarra

Doctrine:
Demands against administrators may be presented in the administration proceedings. This is
because the administration is under the direct supervision of the court and the administrator is
subject to its authority. When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against
whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court’s jurisdiction, the demand cannot be by
mere motion by the administration, but by an independent action against the third person.

FACTS:
The claim arose out of a contract of lease between claimant Jose Escay as lessee of Hacienda
Puyas and the administratrix, Rufina C. de Paula, as lessor. Under the original contract of lease,
the administratrix was obliged to deliver to Escay ten per cent of the sugar, rice and corn
produced from Hacienda Puyas until the full sum of P7,000, the estimated cost of property
transferred to the estate, was fully covered. Pursuant to the above agreement, Jose Escay filed
his claim showing that the administratrix is indebted to him. The administratrix opposed the
claim on the ground, that the court sitting in probate has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim,
especially as the same is being controverted.

ISSUE:

WON the claim was properly filed in the probate court.

RULING:

Yes, it can be seen, in the case at bar, that as the lease contract was entered into by the
administratrix with the approval of the court in the ordinary course of administration and with
the court's approval in the administration proceedings, to consider the claim in the same
administration proceedings may not be denied for the claim purpose to make the administratrix
comply with the obligations contracted in the course of administration with the court's consent
and approval. There is no question that the court has jurisdiction of the administrator in so far
as the property and the contract are concerned; as to the movant, he submitted himself to the
court's jurisdiction by filing his claim. The claimant is not prohibited from filing an independent
action to recover the claim, but the existence of such a remedy is not a bar to the remedy that he
had pursued in the case at bar. This is because the administration is under the direct supervision
of the court and the administrator is subject to its authority. When the demand is in favor of the
administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court’s
jurisdiction, the demand cannot be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent
action against the third person. For obvious reasons, the demand cannot be made because third
persons not under the jurisdiction of the court are involved.
 Case #153
DE LA CRUZ V. CAMON
16 SCRA 886, 888-889
Melgen J. Sarra

Doctrine:
Claims against the administrators may be presented in the administration proceedings but not
against third persons. For obvious reasons, the demand cannot be made because third persons
not under the jurisdiction of the court are involved.

FACTS:

The estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was owner of two-fourths (2/4) share
pro-indiviso of Hacienda Rosario in Negros Occidental. That whole hacienda was held in lease
by Emilio Camon since long before the present intestate proceedings were commenced. On
October 23, 1962 the administrator of the estate moved the court for an order to direct Emilio
Camon to pay the estate's two-forths share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario for the crop years
1948-1949 through 1960-1961, On December 3, 1962, Emilio Camon challenged the probate
court's jurisdiction over his person. The court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made
by mere motion by the administrator but by independent action. The administrator appealed.

ISSUE:

WON the demand cannot be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action
against the third person.

RULING:

Yes, for obvious reasons, the demand cannot be made because third persons not under the
jurisdiction of the court are involved. When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the
party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court’s jurisdiction, the demand
cannot be by mere motion by the administrator. The demand is for money due allegedly for
rentals. Camon is a third person. Hence, the administrator may not pull him against his will, by
motion, into the administration proceedings. We are fortified in our view by the more recent
pronouncement of this court that even "matters affecting property under judicial administration"
may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceedings, if the "interests
of third persons are prejudiced.

Accordingly, the right to collect the rentals is still in a fluid state. That right remains to be
threshed out upon a full-dress trial on the merits. Because of all of these, the money (rentals)
allegedly due is not property in the hands of the administrator; it is not thus within the effective
control of the probate court. Neither does it come within the concept of money of the deceased
"concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away", which would confer upon the court incidental
prerogative to reach out its arms to get it back and, if necessary, to cite the possessor thereof in
contempt. At best that money is debt to the estate — not against the estate. Recovery thereof,
we are persuaded to say, should be by separate suit commenced by the administrator. With
reason, because of the absence of express statutory authorization to coerce the lessee debtor into
defending himself in the probate court. And, we are confronted with the unyielding refusal of
appellee to submit his person to the jurisdiction of the probate court.