Fernando V ST Scholastica
Fernando V ST Scholastica
Fernando V ST Scholastica
Scholastica
EN BANC
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City,
JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELISTA, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, O0ce of the City
Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City Engineer of Marikina City,
petitioners, vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-
MARIKINA, INC., respondents.
MENDOZA, J:
FACTS:
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square
meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537.
Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine
Order, the formation house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters. The
property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting
the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192,entitled "Regulating the
Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance
Nos. 217 and 200 were enacted to amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192,
as amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in
excess of one (1) meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%)
see-thru
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area
allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and
industrial establishments and educational and religious institutions
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering
them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and,
at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to
park.
The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing
Ordinance No. 192, asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. That demolishing their fence and constructing it six (6) meters back would result in
the loss of at least 1,808.34 square meters, worth about P9,041,700.00, along West Drive, and
at least 1,954.02 square meters, worth roughly P9,770,100.00, along East Drive. It would also
result in the destruction of the property resulting in the permanent loss of their beneficial use.
The respondents, thus, asserted that the implementation of the ordinance on their property
would be tantamount to an appropriation of property without due process of law; and that the
petitioners could only appropriate a portion of their property through eminent domain.
The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police
power, by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of public safety,
health, morals, or the promotion of public convenience and general prosperity.
On June 30, 2000, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the petitioners from
implementing the demolition of the fence at SSC's Marikina property. In its December 1, 2003
Decision, the CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
45. Fernando v. St. Scholastica
ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in ruling that the aforementioned ordinance
is an exercise of the city of the power of eminent domain.
HELD:
The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 which requires the five-meter setback of the fence
to provide for a parking area. The petitioners initially argued that the ownership of the parking
area to be created would remain with the respondents as it would primarily be for the use of its
students and faculty, and that its use by the public on non-school days would only be incidental.
In their Reply, however, the petitioners admitted that Section 5 was, in fact, invalid for being
repugnant to the Constitution.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to make the
parking space free for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive
use of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public. Section 9 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title nor the total destruction of value is essential
to taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the title remains with the private owner that inquiry
should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or
amounts to a compensable taking. The Court is of the view that the implementation of the
setback requirement would be tantamount to a taking of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of the
respondents' private property for public use without just compensation, in contravention to the
Constitution.