3. Joseph vs.

Bautista
170 SCRA 540
Facts: Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and passengers for a
consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. The said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on
its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan. Luis Joseph, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo
truck at Dagupan City to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway
proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the
same direction. At about the same time, a pickup truck, supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson
and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which
was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the
shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, Jospeh sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.

Issue: Whether or not two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, one based on quasi-delict and
the other one is breach of contract of carriage.

Ruling: If only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the case at
bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single
cause of action.

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved although the
bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily Identical since
the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one
remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our
law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule
against unjust enrichment.

There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner

Judgement of lower court AFFIRMED.

8. NPC vs. CA
G.R. No. 102442
Facts: At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam, causing
deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless
and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the
vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a safe
level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of its
employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no
direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents
assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of the nature
of damnum absque injuria.

Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon is a fortuitous event
(2) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria

Held:
(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, a
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there was no
contractual relation between themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law on quasi-
delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of God or force majeure, by
definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle
embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of
nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When
the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or
neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to
the acts of God. In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners cannot escape
liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.

(2) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage caused by the opening
of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although there was physical
damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events. There is no question that petitioners have
the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their
negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end does not justify the
means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening the spillways to
such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.

13. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. CA

G.R. No. 138569
Facts: Petitioner Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws.
Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPA’s, is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of
accounting.

In March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its
cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings (checks) deposit
slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with
Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook.

Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. The teller
acknowledged the receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips.
Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words “DUPLICATE” and “SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK
HEAD OFFICE.” Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with
Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to
Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that “somebody got the passbook.” Calapre
went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.

Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of P200,000. Macaraya and
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and check. The teller stamped the
words “DUPLICATE” and “SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE” on the duplicate copy of the deposit
slip. When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but
she could not remember to whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the
passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook. Calapre was then
standing beside Macaraya.

The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before (14 August 1991) of
P300,000 from its savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the
authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied
signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.

L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for
Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank. The trial court absolved Solidbank. L.C. Diaz appealed to the
CA. CA reversed the ecision of the trial court. CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank. But it
modified its decision by deleting the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.

Ruling: Yes. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. The bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the
fiduciary nature of their relationship.

This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe “high standards of integrity and
performance” is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The
fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of
a family.

Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to
the depositor or his authorized representative. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of
diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same.

In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant
was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In
contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. In the
present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the
passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that Solidbank was
at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to
prove that there was no negligence on its part or its employees. But Solidbank failed to discharge its burden.

Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or
command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana. The bank must not only
exercise “high standards of integrity and performance,” it must also insure that its employees do likewise
because this is the only way to insure that the bank will comply with its fiduciary duty.

18. Austria vs. CA

G.R. No. 133323
FACTS:
• The accused Alberto Austria was driving a Ford Fiera owned by Noceda along the Olongapo-Gapan road in
Pampanga coming from the Airport headed for Bataan. There were 10 passengers aboard. The information
stated that Austria was speeding.
• The vehicle’s tire hit a stone lying on the road which caused Austria to lose control of the vehicle and
subsequently collided with the rear of an improperly parked cargo truck trailer driven by Rolando Flores, his
co-accused.
• The accident caused injuries to 4 of Austria’s passengers and caused the death of another passenger Virginia
Lapid. Flores, remained at large during the course of the trial.
• The lower court found Austria guilty of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Serious Physical
Injuries. The CA affirmed the LC’s decision.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:

W/N Austria is guilty of Negligence?
• Austria contends that he was driving at a moderate speed and on the lane properly belonging to him and
that Flores, by parking his vehicle improperly without any warning device, caused the collision.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI: YES

• The findings of the CA concerning Austria’s negligence are factual in nature and hence cannot be reviewed
by the SC in a petition for review on certiorari and this case does not come within the exceptions.
• The case of Phoenix Construction vs IAC, although similar in facts with the case at bar is not applicable in
this case. In Phoenix, the SC held that the driver of the improperly parked vehicle was the liable and the
colliding vehicle was contributorily liable.
• The SC however agreed with the CA in the latter’s observation that “ That Austria had no opportunity to
avoid the collision is his own making and this should not relieve him of liability.” Patently, the negligence of
Austria as the driver is the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.
• Austria’s contention that the award of damages was error on the part of the CA since the medcerts and
receipts presented did not directly reveal the relation of the documents to the accident is flawed. SC said that
these docments are amply supported by the evidence on record and again factual findings are binding on
the SC.

23. Phoenix Construction vs. IAC

G.R. No. 65295
Facts: At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home
from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he
saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early
warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the
petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical
injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionisio filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix
Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own negligence in
driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue: W/N Phoenix should be held liable for the damage incurred by Dionisio, notwithstanding the allegation
that the latter had no curfew pass and thus drove speedily with his headlights off?

Held: YES. The collision between the dump truck and the Dionisio's car would in all probability not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General
Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible.
• Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of
causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris
vinculum of liability.
• We hold that Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of
the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may
recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Art. 2179 Civil Code of the
Philippines)
• Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer
Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect
found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence.
• Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent
Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, we believe that the
demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of
the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the
balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to
the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. We see no sufficient reason for
disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

28. Estacion vs. Bernardo

G.R. No. 144723
FACTS: On October 16, 1982 in the afternoon, respondent Noe Bernardo was going home to Dumaguete from
Cebu. He boarded a Ford Fiera jeepney driven by Quinquillera and owned by Bandoquillo. He was seated on
the extension seat at the center of the Fiera. From San Jose, an old woman wanted to ride so Noe offered his
seat and hung/stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. The Fiera slowed down and stopped to pick up
more passengers.

Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck owned by the petitioner Larry Estacion and driven by Gerosano, which was
travelling in the same direction, hit the rear portion of the jeepney. The Fiera crushed Bernardo’s legs and
feet, and he was brought to Silliman University Medical Center where his lower left leg was amputated. Police
report showed that there were 10 more who were injured by the accident.

On February 18, 1993, Bernardo, and his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo, filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete a complaint for damages arising from quasi-delict against petitioner as owner of the truck and
his driver. RTC ruled that Gerosano was negligent and it was the direct and proximate cause of the incident. It
also held petitioner liable as employer. CA affirmed in toto the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable and whether or not Bernardo was guilty of contributory negligence

HELD: YES. From the way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it can be shown that Gerosano
was driving at a fast speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 ft. as shown in the sketch of the police.
There was also only one tire mark which meant that the brakes of the truck were not aligned properly,
otherwise, there would have been 2 tire marks. It is the negligent act of the petitioner’s driver of driving the
cargo truck at a fast speed coupled with faulty brakes which was the proximate cause of the respondent
Bernardo’s injury. As employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solitarily liable for the quasi-delict
committed by the former. He is presumed to be negligent in the selection of his employee which petitioner
failed to overcome. He failed to show that he examined driver Gerosano as to his qualifications, experience
and records.

Bernardo is guilty of contributory negligence by standing at the rear portion of the jeep. Contributory
Negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
Bernardo’s act of standing on the left rear portion showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act
could cause him harm or put his life in danger. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must
be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an
impending danger to health and body. Quinquillera (jeepney driver) was also negligent because there was
overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and regulations. He also allowed Bernardo to stand on the left
rear of his jeep. There is also a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner of the jeep, Bandoquillo, to
which she did not rebut.

33. Exconde vs. Capuno

101 Phil. 843
Facts: Dante Capuno was a student of the Balintawak Elementary School. He attended a parade in honor of
Rizal upon instruction of the city school supervisor. From the school Dante with other students boarded a
jeep and when the same started to run he took hold of a wheel and drove while the driver sat on his left side.
The jeep turned turtle and two passengers died. This action was brought against Dante and his father Delfin
Capuno for damages.

Issue: Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante,
for damages... caused by the ... negligent act of minor Dante Capuno

Held: Yes. Defendants Dante Capuno and his father Delfin Capuno held jointly and severally liable to plaintiff.
“The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
for any damages that may be caused by the minor child who lives with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents ‘duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educate them and instructing them in proportion to their
means”; while, on the other hand, gives them the ‘right to correct and punish them in moderation’ (Article
154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage (Article 1903, last
paragraph, Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.”

38. Dela Llana vs. Biong

G.R. No. 182356
Facts: March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon
City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat Juan stopped the car across the
Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck
containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car's rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the
impact, the car's rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing
Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any
other visible physical injuries.

The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. Joel later
revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of
"Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.

first week of May 2000:

Dra. dela Llana's condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy Dr. Flores, a
neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her
nerve. The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the
practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.

May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC)
She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident... medical expenses... an
average monthly income of P30,000.00 since June 2000.

In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no reasonable
relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana's injury.

Dra. dela Llana's illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the vehicular accident.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana's whiplash
injury to be Joel's reckless driving. A whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in
the neck area.

The CA reversed the RTC ruling. Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the
vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. The interval between the date of
the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy. This
interval raised doubts on whether Joel's reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela
Llana's injury.

Issue: W/N Joel's reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. Dela Llana’s whiplash injury

Ruling: Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain
became more intense as days passed by.
Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became
more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe... petition unmeritorious
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel's negligence and Dra. dela
Llana's whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana.
She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel's negligence, in its natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken... by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which
her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between... the vehicular accident and the whiplash
injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts
by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed... below.
These pictures... indeed demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that
the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures.
he medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be considered in resolving this case for
the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical certificate has
no probative value for being hearsay.
it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate. However, she was not
presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and affirm the contents of the medical
certificate.
the medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joel's reckless
driving and Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury was a
result of the vehicular... accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical
condition, i.e., that she was suffering from whiplash injury.
Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we
cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel's reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without violating the
rules on evidence.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence.
Principles:
the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act
or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection... of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before
we determine Rebecca's liability as Joel's employer. She should show the chain of causation between Joel's
reckless driving and... her whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that
Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel -
arise.
Once negligence, the damages and the... proximate causation are established, this Court can then proceed with
the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
n civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the burden of proving
his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.
courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
This proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions.

43. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
G.R. No. L-25142
FACTS: Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders] along the national
highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL bus driven by Pangalangan. As a result, Pangalangan
suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of
earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders.
PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American Forwarders, Balingit, and Pineda.
Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda’s employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be
dismissed on the ground that PRBL and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI dismissed the
complaint against Balingit, on the ground that he is not the manager of an establishment as contemplated in
NCC 2180.

ISSUE: WON the terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise” embrace
the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from which the damage arose.

RATIO: NO. Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of
NCC 2180 that the term “manager” (“director” in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of “employer”.
Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, in connection with the vehicular accident in question, because he himself may be regarded as
an employee or dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders. CFI AFFIRMED

48. Carticiano vs. Nuval

G.R. No. 138054
FACTS: Plaintiff Zacarias Carticiano was on his way home to Imus, Cavite. He was driving his father’s Ford
Laser car. On the same date and time, defendant Nuval’s owner-type Jeep, then driven by defendant Darwin
was traveling on the opposite direction going to Parañaque. When the two cars were about to pass one
another, Darwin veered his vehicle to his left going to the center island of the highway an occupied the lane
which plaintiff Zacarias was traversing. Zacarias’ Ford Laser collided head-on with Nuval’s Jeep. Darwin
immediately fled from the scene. Zacarias suffered multiple fracture. He underwent a leg operation and
physical therapy. Nuval offered P100,000.00 as compensation for the injuries caused. Plaintiffs refused to
accept it. Plaintiffs filed a criminal suit against Darwin and a civil suit against defendants for damages. Trial
court ruled infavor of plaintiffs. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: W/N employer Nuval can be held liable.

RULING: Petition granted. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for damages
caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The facts established in the case at
bar show that Darwin was acting within the scope of the authority given him when the collision occurred.
That he had been hired only to bring respondent’s children to and from school must be rejected. True, this
may have been one of his assigned tasks, but no convincing proof was presented showing that it was his only
task. His authority was to drive Nuval’s vehicle. Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law
presumes the vehicle owner equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving proper
selection of employee as a defense. Respondent failed to show that he had satisfactorily discharged this
burden.

53. Del Carmen vs. Bacoy

G.R. No. 173870
Facts: Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a jeepney driven by a certain Allan
Maglasang. The jeepney was owned by Oscar del Carmen Jr. Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in a criminal case while the father of the late Mrs.Monsalud, Geronimo Bacou filed an independent civil
action againt the former in behalf of the minor children left by the Monsalud spouses. Del Carmen Jr. claimed
he was a victim as well as Allan stole the jeep and was not hired as a driver by the former; he was a conductor
(and had been released from employment lately) and it was the brother of Allan, Rodrigo who was hired as a
driver. Del Carmen Jr. filed a carnapping case against Allan but was dismissed by the court for insufficient
evidence. RTC held del Carmen Jr. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.The CA adjudged
Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is
directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such
vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed
against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is
deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle because the brothers were
assigned to said jeep. After a day’s work, the jeepney would be parked beside the brothers’ house and not
returned to del Carmen’s residence; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key;
the said parking area was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be
started even without the ignition key.

Issue: W/N owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries caused by the operation of such

Held: Del Carmen Jr. was held to be primarily liable and not merely subsidiary liable. Del Carmen Jr.’s own
evidence cast doubt that Allan stole the jeepney. Given the dismissal of the carnapping case filed by del
Carmen Jr. against Allan, the former also admitted to such dismissal in the SC. Under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, “where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who
had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence – in the absence of a sufficient,
reasonable and logical explanation by defendant – that the accident arose from or was caused by the
defendant’s want of care. All three are present in the case at bar.

58. BPI vs. Casa Montessori Internationale

G.R. No. 149 454
FACTS: CASA Montessori International opened a current account with BPI with CASAs President Ms. Ma.
Carina C. Lebron as one of its authorized signatories. In 1991, after conducting an investigation, plaintiff
discovered that nine (9) of its checks had been encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos since 1990 in the total
amount of P782,000.00. It turned out that Sonny D. Santos with account at BPIs Greenbelt Branch [was] a
fictitious name used by third party defendant Leonardo T. Yabut who worked as external auditor of
CASA. Third party defendant voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature of Ms. Lebron and encashed
the checks.

The PNP Crime Laboratory conducted an examination of the nine (9) checks and concluded that the
handwritings thereon compared to the standard signature of Ms. Lebron were not written by the latter.

On March 4, 1991, plaintiff filed the herein Complaint for Collection with Damages against defendant
bank.

ISSUE: W/N BPI is liable as the drawee bank for allowing payment on the checks to a wrongful and fictitious
payee?

HELD: YES. BPI -- the drawee bank -- becomes liable to its depositor-drawer for allowing payment on the
checks to a wrongful and fictitious payee. Since the encashing bank is one of its branches, BPI can easily go
after it and hold it liable for reimbursement. It may not debit the drawers account and is not entitled to
indemnification from the drawer. In both law and equity, when one of two innocent persons must suffer by
the wrongful act of a third person, the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the proximate
cause of the loss or who put it into the power of the third person to perpetrate the wrong.

A bank is bound to know the signatures of its customers; and if it pays a forged check, it must be
considered as making the payment out of its own funds, and cannot ordinarily charge the amount so paid to
the account of the depositor whose name was forged.

63. Amadora vs. CA

160 SCRA 315
FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon
resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victim’s
parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors,
high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students.
Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and
reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of
learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the
semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event,
defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining
discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to
school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD: The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the
school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a
general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-
charge of particular classes.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had
earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary
action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof
was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the
head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the
facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his
death.