2004 Summer PDF

SUMMER 2004 - Volume 51, Number 2
The Luftwaffe and its Allied Air Forces in World War II:
Parallel War and the Failure of Strategic and Economic Cooperation
James S. Corum 4
Before the D-Day Dawn:
Reassessing the Troop Carriers at Normandy
Daniel L. Haulman 20
Richard K. Smith: An Appreciation
R. Cargill Hall with David Alan Rosenberg 30
Open Skies Policy and the Origin of
the U.S. Space Program
Lester F. Rentmeester 38
Book Reviews 46
Milestone of the First Century of Flight
by F. Clifton Berry, Jr. Reviewed by William A. Nardo 46
Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign
by Lt Col Robert P. Givens Reviewed by Martin L. Rothrock 46
Early Cold War Overflights 1950-1956: Symposium Proceedings Vol. I & II
by R. Cargill Hall and Clayton D. Laurie, Eds. Reviewed by Thomas Wm. McGarry 47
Airwar: Theory and Practice
by Philip S. Meilinger Reviewed by Curtis H. O’Sullivan 48
Arabs at War
by Kenneth M. Pollack Reviewed by Jim Gates 49
Like Sex with Gods: An Unorthodox History of Flying
by Bayla Singer Reviewed by Bruce Ashcroft 50
Forgotten Fields of America, Volume III: World War II Bases and Training, Then and Now
by Lou Thole Reviewed by Tom Alexander 52
They Marched into Sunlight: War and Peace, Vietnam and America October 1967
by David Maraniss Reviewed by George M. Watson, Jr. 53
Women Who Fly
by Lynn M. Homan, and Thomas Reilly Reviewed by Jordan S. Goldberg 54
Lighting the Flame: The Turbojet Revolution Comes to America
by James O. Young Reviewed by Scott A. Willey 54
The Day We Bombed Switzerland: Flying with the US Eighth Force in World War II
by Jackson Granholm Reviewed by William A. Nardo 54
Books Received 56
Coming Up 58
History Mystery 61
Letters, Reunions 62
COVER: An Atlas-Agena missile lifts off. The Atlas-Agena was a workhorse launch vehicle in the early space program.
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2 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2004

From the Editor
The lead article, by James S. Corum, examines the failure of Nazi Germany’s
Luftwaffe, to cooperate, on strategic and economic levels, with its allied air forces, espe-
cially Italy, Finland, Rumania, and Hungary. He asserts that the consequence of this
failure to lead an effective “coalition,” contributed to Germany’s defeat.
Daniel L. Haulman takes afresh look at the performance of the U.S. Army Air Forces’s
carriers in delivering the airborne troops at dawn on D-Day, June 6, 1944. He system-
atically reviews the reasons for their less than perfect record. Yet, the results were much
better than what some historical accounts have led us to believe.
Historian Richard K. Smith is memorialized by two other outstanding historians, R,

Cargill Hall and David Alan Rosenberg. Although he was not widely known, Smith con-
tributed to aviation history by introducing the role of weight-ratios and structural load-
ing in aircraft performance. And as the authors note, he proved correct in many other
areas.
We continue to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Air Force in space and mis-
siles. 1954-2004. Col. Lester F. Rentmeester, USAF (Ret.), reminisces about the origins
of the United States’s space program and his role in it, while he was a project officer on
the Air Staff in the Pentagon. His concentration was in intelligence and reconnaissance
and he especially highlights President Eisenhower’s the Open Skies program.
Eleven book reviews cover the gamut from air power theory to warfare and technolo-
gy. Also included is an aviation “juvenile nonfiction book,” which (of course) is reviewed
by a juvenile. (See page 54.)
The departments section, covers upcoming events, reunions, letters, notices, news,
and the ever-popular, “History Mystery.”
Air Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation disclaim responsibility for statements,
either of fact or of opinion, made by contributors. The submission of an article, book review, or other
communication with the intention that it be published in this journal shall be construed as prima facie
evidence that the contributor willingly transfers the copyright to Air Power History and the Air Force
Historical Foundation, which will, however, freely grant authors the right to reprint their own works,
if published in the authors’ own works. In the case of articles, upon acceptance, the author will be sent
an agreement and an assignment of copyright.
AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2004 3

The Luftwaffe and its Allied A
Parallel War and the Failure of S

Air Forces in World War II:
Strategic and Economic Cooperation
James S. Corum
T
(Overleaf) Romanian Air he coalition aspect of conducting aerial war- the Third Reich’s inability to effectively lead a
Force fighters over an air-
field, December 1, 1941. fare is one of the less explored subjects in the coalition war.
(All photos courtesy of the history of the Second World War. The U.S.-
author.) British relationship in conducting the strategic The Luftwaffe’s Understanding of Coalition
bombing campaign is the one subject written Warfare
about in great detail. Other aspects of coalition air
war are beginning to receive appropriate atten- Several factors affected the Luftwaffe’s relation-
tion. For example, Mark Conversino’s Fighting ship to its wartime allies and inhibited the
with the Soviets provides an in-depth study of U.S. Luftwaffe from developing an effective relation-
Army Air Forces (AAF) and Soviet Air Force rela- ship with allied air forces. First of all was the influ-
tions in World War II and Air Marshal Probert’s ence of Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht culture. Before
book, The Forgotten Air War, does a fine job in the war, Luftwaffe officers failed to seriously study
describing the U.S. and British air cooperation in coalition operations and the Wehrmacht as a whole
Southeast Asia.1 suffered from a lack of interest in coalition opera-
The Luftwaffe had several important allies in tions within the senior military leadership.
the air war. In particular, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Another factor that inhibited Germany’s ability to
and Rumania made great sacrifices and took heavy exploit the capability of coalition allies lay in the
losses fighting alongside the Luftwaffe. Yet, despite Nazi concept of Mitteleuropa that guided German
the thousands of aircraft Germany’s allies put into foreign relations. Germany’s long-term ambition
combat, from the far north to the Mediterranean, was to fully control the economy of Central
the relationship between the Luftwaffe and its Europe, and this vision had no place for technolog-
coalition allies has received little attention.2 This ically advanced allies with aviation industries that
article is a contribution towards understanding could compete with Germany. Finally, the
this aspect of the history of aerial warfare. Germans fought under the concept of parallel war,
A full list of Germany’s allied air forces, the each allied nation would largely fight its own war
forces that flew alongside the Luftwaffe or under in its own sector with little strategic coordination
THE Luftwaffe command, would include Slovakia, or common direction.
LUFTWAFFE Croatia and Bulgaria alongside the Italians, In the 1920s, the German army established a
HAD Rumanians, Finns and Hungarians. However, this three-year general staff course that provided a
article will concentrate on the latter four air forces thorough education for officers in the operational
SEVERAL and their relationship with the Luftwaffe. These art, and at the operational level of war. The army
IMPORTANT four nations not only had moderately large air general staff course covered tactics from battalion
ALLIES IN forces but also had indigenous aircraft industries to army levels, military history, operational plan-
THE AIR WAR and significant industrial potential to produce air- ning, and joint operations. It was arguably the best
craft. On the other hand, the Bulgarian, Slovakian education in the world in the operational art of
and Croatian contribution to the aerial war was combat command. However, very little emphasis
insignificant and none of those nations had an avi- was placed on logistics or the industrial-economic
ation industry that could have made an impact on side of warfare in the general staff course, and
the war. In this article, I will concentrate on the grand strategy—including coalition warfare—was
relationship between the Luftwaffe with its major scarcely mentioned. When the Luftwaffe estab-
allies (Italy, Finland, Hungary and Rumania) to lished its general staff academy in 1935, its
include the an overview of the battle performance emphasis—like that of the army’s general staff
of allied air forces, German assistance to its major training—was on the operational side of aerial
allies and the Luftwaffe’s policy towards the avia- warfare, with little time devoted to grand strategy.
GERMANY’S tion industries of its allies. Germany’s allies had War Minister Werner von Blomberg and Luftwaffe
DEFEAT IN the potential to deploy significant forces and pro- Chief of Staff Walter Wever recognized the defi-
duction capability to support the German war ciency of both the army and air force general staff
THE AIR, WAS effort. For the most part, the actual and potential curricula in educating officers to serve as strate-
DUE TO THE force of Germany’s allies was ignored or misused gists and staff officers for the Wehrmacht. At the
THIRD by the Luftwaffe throughout the war. Indeed, one urging of both generals, the war ministry estab-
REICH’S of the primary causes for German defeat, and lished the Wehrmachtakademie in 1935 to educate
INABILITY TO specifically Germany’s defeat in the air, was due to officers for service on a joint strategic staff. The
EFFECTIVELY
LEAD A James S. Corum is professor of comparative military studies at the USAF School of Advanced Air and
COALITION Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Dr. Corum holds graduate degrees from Brown and Oxford
WAR Universities and a Ph.D. in history from Queen’s University, Canada. He teaches air power history and
low intensity conflict courses and is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve where he is on the
faculty of the Army War College. His publications include: The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt
and German Military Reform (University Press of Kansas, 1992), The Luftwaffe: Creating the
Operational Air War, 1918-1940 (University Press of Kansas, 1997) and his latest book, with Wray
Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, (University Press of Kansas, 2003). Dr. Corum’s articles have
appeared in Air Power History, Airpower Journal, The Journal of Military History, and the Journal of
Strategic Studies.

There was little subtlety in the German policy
of asserting its dominance in Central Europe.
From the time Hitler took power the Rumanian
and Hungarian governments were highly suspi-
cious of Germany. Rumania had been closely
linked with France after World War I and main-
tained its alliance into the 1930s.7 Hungary had a
strong democratic tradition and valued its trade
links with Britain. Nevertheless, from the perspec-
tive of the Rumanian and Hungarian govern-
ments, Britain and France were far away while
Germany was next door. The small nations had to
make realistic accommodations with Germany in
order to survive so, in 1940 when the Soviet Union
occupied the Rumanian province of Bessarabia,
the Rumanians had no alternative but to turn to
Germany for help in regaining their territory.
Italian Air Force Macchi Hungary could only turn to Germany to adjudicate
one-year course, which was intended for a select
200, February 1939. a return of territory stripped from Hungary by
group of experienced general staff officers drawn
Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the
from all services, would emphasize grand strategy,
aftermath of World War I.
war economics, and politics. From 1935 to 1938,
In the prewar period, the Wehrmacht and the
only a handful of officers were sent to the course.3
IN THE The death of Wever in 1936, and the dismissal
air ministry devoted virtually no effort to coalition
war planning or to discuss coordinated military
PREWAR of von Blomberg in 1938, eliminated the German
production with coalition partners. After the Nazi
PERIOD, THE military’s strongest advocates for creating a true
accession to power in 1933, fascist Italy was
WEHRMACHT Wehrmacht strategic staff. The Wehrmachtaka-
viewed as a natural ally and in 1933-1934 a group
demie was shut down in 1938, largely as a result of
AND THE AIR interservice rivalry, and of Hermann Goering’s dis-
of senior German officers visited Italy to discuss
MINISTRY like of any staff that might interfere with the
the possibility of standardizing some equipment
DEVOTED between the two countries. Yet nothing came of the
direction of “his” Luftwaffe and air ministry. When
discussions and the Germans never pressed the
VIRTUALLY the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) was
issue.8 Thus, when Italy went to war as Germany’s
NO EFFORT formed in 1938, it would not be a staff to coordi-
ally in June 1940, none of Italy’s major equipment
nate grand strategy, but rather a small, personal
TO COALI- staff for the Führer. In short, the Wehrmacht never
items or their means of communication were com-
TION WAR developed a program to produce strategists or any
patible with Germany’s. Since the Luftwaffe failed
PLANNING coherent vision of grand strategy.4
to plan for a coalition war with its largest and most
obvious ally, there was bound to be even less effort
A central goal of Nazi foreign relations was to
to develop Germany’s military relationship with
ensure German domination of the economies of
smaller powers. Indeed, prior to the outbreak of
Central Europe to include Czechoslovakia, Hun-
the war the Air Ministry’s primary interest in the
gary, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.
small nations of Central Europe was as a market
Through its foreign trade and investment policies
for obsolete or surplus German aircraft. Germany
of the 1930s Germany made a conscious effort to
THE AIR push out British and French trade and influence in
urgently needed foreign exchange for its rearma-
ment program and became a major aircraft
MINISTRY’S the region and supplant it with German domina-
exporter by the mid-1930s. Hungary and Ruma-
PRIMARY tion. From the German viewpoint, countries like
nia, then rebuilding their air forces, were eager to
INTEREST IN Hungary and Rumania that were mainly agricul-
buy the latest German aircraft models and to
tural lands should produce food for Germany. The
THE SMALL Central European nations were also seen as
obtain licenses to build German equipment.
NATIONS OF providers of raw materials to German industry.
However, before 1938 the air ministry refrained
CENTRAL either from selling front-line Luftwaffe aircraft or
The Central European nations had many of the
from allowing license production of its latest mod-
EUROPE WAS vital resources that Germany lacked. For example,
els.9 As a consequence, Rumania was offered
AS A MARKET Rumania was a major oil supplier to Germany and
Heinkel He 51 fighters in 1935. As the He 51 was
Hungary developed its oil fields in the 1930s.
FOR Hungary was, as well, one of the world’s major pro-
already known as one of the Luftwaffe’s least suc-
OBSOLETE ducers of bauxite.5 Besides providing Germany
cessful aircraft and was in the process of being
OR SURPLUS replaced so the Rumanians sensibly rejected the
with food and raw materials, the small Central
German offer and bought better fighters from the
GERMAN European states were also seen as a market for
Italians.10 Yet the Rumanians kept trying to buy
AIRCRAFT German industrial goods and machines. Before the
modern aircraft from Germany and finally in 1939
outbreak of the war, the German strategy for the
the Luftwaffe allowed the Rumanians to buy 24
economic domination of Central Europe was quite
modern Heinkel He 112 fighters since it was a
successful. Austria and Czechoslovakia were
model that the Luftwaffe had little interest in and
absorbed into the German Reich and by 1938
was thus approved for export.11 However, a Ruma-
Germany had become the dominant economic
nian request to buy 50 Ju 87Bs was turned down
influence in both Rumania and Hungary.6

allies had little in common with the Third Reich
and each nation allied itself with Germany in
order to fulfill very limited war aims. For example,
Finland aligned itself with Germany in order to
regain the territory it had lost to Russia in the
1939-1940 Winter War. Rumania sought to regain
the province of Besserabia, annexed by Russia in
1940. Hungary served the German cause in repay-
ment for Germany’s ensuring the return of for-
merly-Hungarian territories seized by Rumania,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia at the end of World
War I. Italy wanted to become the dominant power
in the Mediterranean and to expand its empire at
the expense of France, Greece, and Albania. Since
the Italians believed that Germany was likely to
defeat Britain and France in 1940, their best
chance to realize Mussolini’s ambitions would be
Italian and German airmen to join the war on Germany’s side.
by the Air Ministry that same year.12 The story
in August, 1940. In contrast to the British-American alliance
with the Hungarians is similar. Between 1934 and
and other allied commands formed during World
1940 several Hungarian missions to buy German
War II, in which the allied nations jointly crafted
aircraft resulted in the purchase of some older air-
strategy and closely coordinated their efforts,
craft considered surplus to the Luftwaffe’s needs.
Germany never formed a combined staff with its
In 1939 Rumanian overtures to license-build the
allies. Germany and its allies never coordinated
Me 109 fighter and Junkers Jumo 211 aircraft
efforts through conferences such as the Allies held
engine were rebuffed.
at Casablanca, Quebec, Teheran and Yalta.
GERMANY As a result of German arms sales policies,
Throughout the war, Hitler and the Wehrmacht
NEVER Rumania and Hungary turned to Italy, France,
staff dealt with each ally on a purely bilateral
and the United Kingdom to purchase and to
DEVELOPED license-build aircraft for outfitting their fighter
basis. Hitler met with Mussolini and the leaders of
A CLEAR and bomber units. Hungary and Rumania consid-
Rumania, Hungary, and Finland on several occa-
sions, and the Wehrmacht exchanged military rep-
GRAND ered Germany an unreliable aircraft supplier and,
resentatives with coalition partners, but that was
STRATEGY faced with the German attitude, Hungary,
the extent of German strategic coordination.
TO FIGHT A Finland, and Rumania all took steps to improve
Unlike the U.S.-UK alliance, no German forces
the capability of their indigenous aircraft indus-
COALITION tries in order to become as self-sufficient as possi-
served under the command or strategic direction of
WAR ble. The Hungarian and Finnish governments
a foreign commander. Hungarian and Rumanian
forces served on their own fronts in Russia under
opted to license-build fighter planes and some
the direction of German army groups. The Finns
bombers. Hungary started licensed production of
conducted their war alongside the Germans, but
the Italian Regianne 2000 fighter and the Caproni
without German direction or command. The
Ca 135 bomber before its entry into the war.
Italians discussed the possibility of providing
Finland’s state aircraft factory entered into an
forces to serve under German direction against
agreement to license-build the Fokker D XXI
France during the campaign of 1940, but the
fighter in 1937. Rumania took a different tack by
Wehrmacht saw an Italian army in the Rhineland
developing a modern fighter plane, the IAR 80, for
as more trouble than it was worth. When Italy
production by the Rumanian state aircraft com-
finally joined the war, it was agreed that Germany
IN CONTRAST pany. Hungary and Rumania also took steps to
and Italy fought parallel wars, each nation com-
design and build their own trainers along with
TO THE light liaison and reconnaissance aircraft. Hungary
manding its own forces on its own front.13
BRITISH- and Rumania worked to adapt foreign airframe
Given their size and limited contribution to the
war effort, Rumania and Hungary could not expect
AMERICAN designs to their own engines, usually variations of
to be anything but subordinate junior partners.
ALLIANCE … license-built French aircraft engines although
The status of Italy was different. Italy was the
GERMANY none of the domestic-designed or license-built air-
major power in the Mediterranean in 1940 and
craft or engines made by Rumania, Hungary or
NEVER Finland were equal to the German aircraft or
basically saw itself as an equal partner to
FORMED A engines available in 1939 or 1940. However,
Germany. On several occasions, Italy proposed the
COMBINED creation of a combined staff or headquarters in
German sales and licensing policy combined with
which some German forces in the Mediterranean
STAFF WITH a distrust of Germany ensured that, for the small
theater might serve under Italian command or
ITS ALLIES nations, self-sufficiency took precedence over effi-
direction but this was consistently opposed by the
ciency in the prewar rearmament programs.
Germans and command arrangements in the
Mediterranean remained separate.14 Italian forces
Parallel War and Germany’s Allies
sent to other theaters, such as the air corps sent to
Flanders in 1940 to assist the Luftwaffe in the
Germany never developed a clear grand strat-
Battle of Britain and the Italian army and air
egy to fight a coalition war. Indeed, Germany’s

corps sent to Russia in 1942-1943, served under duction methods were outdated. When the air
German command. force ordered a large number of different aircraft
From the start of their wartime alliance, the models, the planes had to be built, virtually by
open distrust between the Germans and Italians hand, in small quantities. Unlike the other major
at the strategic level was palpable. Neither gov- powers, that had progressed to building bombers
ernment kept the other informed of major strate- with all metal, stressed-skin fuselages, the pri-
gic plans or operations. As late as three weeks mary Italian bomber, the SM-79, still used a steel-
before the German invasion of Russia, the German tube frame covered with wood and fabric.26
foreign ministry informed Count Galeazzo Ciano, One of the greatest weaknesses of Italian air-
the Italian foreign minister, that there were no power was the state of their engine industry.
imminent plans to invade Russia.15 On the Italian Italian engines were generally radials, largely
DISTRUST side, Mussolini refrained from informing his adapted from French designs, but Italy was unable
BETWEEN German ally in 1940 of his plan to invade Greece.16 to produce large in-line engines equal to those of
THE Mutual mistrust was apparently the foundation the Germans or French. Indeed, Italy had trouble
GERMANS for Germany’s military relations with its allies. producing aircraft engines exceeding 1,000 horse-
power. This inability to produce powerful engines
AND ITALIANS The Italian Air Force: The Luftwaffe’s forced the Italians to adopt the trimotor design as
AT THE Strongest Ally the only means of obtaining adequate speed for
STRATEGIC their bombers.27 The lack of large, robust engines
LEVEL WAS In 1939-1940 the Italian armed forces were doomed the 1939-1940 Italian dive-bomber pro-
PALPABLE unprepared to go to war. The Italian navy, which ject: the Breda 88. This twin-engine aircraft was so
possessed some modern battleships, cruisers, and underpowered and so unreliable under North
destroyers as well as a sizable submarine fleet, African conditions, that production was halted
was the best-prepared service. The Italian army of after only 105 aircraft had been produced.28
67 divisions, poorly-trained and very poorly- Because the Italian aircraft industry could not
equipped, was the service least prepared for war. produce a dive bomber, in 1940 the Italians negoti-
The Italian air force, the Regia Aeronautica, was a ated a deal with the Germans to buy Ju-87 dive
significant force on paper—in reality, however, bombers.29 The German air ministry then sold the
scarcely more fit than the army to fight a modern Italians well-worn, early-model Ju-87B aircraft,
war against major powers.17 In June 1940 the considered surplus since the Luftwaffe was being
Italian air force had 1,796 combat aircraft in the re-equipped with the Ju 87 D and R models.
Mediterranean: 783 bombers, 594 fighters, and The aircraft industry remained a weak link in
THE 419 reconnaissance aircraft.18 There were 84,000 the Italian war effort. There was a significant dis-
LUFTWAFFE total personnel, including 3,040 officer pilots and connect between the grandiose plans of the Fascist
GENERAL 3,300 NCO pilots. Though impressive, the total leadership and their inability to acquire sophisti-
STAFF IN MAY numbers belie the true state of the Regia Aero- cated equipment. In late 1938, the Italian leader-
nautica. Most of the aircraft available in 1940 were ship called for 12,885 aircraft and 22,542 engines
1939 obsolete and inferior to the air forces of Britain to be produced for 1939 yet the actual production
ASSESSED and France. The primary fighter in 1940 was the figures were 1,750 aircraft and 4,191 engines. In
THE ITALIAN CR 42 biplane, a good aircraft for the mid-1930s — 1940 production increased to 3,257 aircraft and
AIR FORCE but too slow and lightly-armed to face the modern 5,607 engines, but this was only a quarter of the
AS “INFERIOR monoplane fighters of France and Britain.19 Some equipment required.30 Of all the major powers,
of the Italian fighter force consisted of Fiat CR 32 Italy had, by far, the weakest aviation industry.
TO THE biplanes, an early 1930s design that was long out- The condition of the Italian industry and infra-
BRITISH AND dated.20 The only modern monoplane fighters structure also assured a very low serviceability
FRENCH AIR deployed by the Italians as of June 1940 were 118 rate for aircraft because the aircraft industry could
FORCES Fiat G 50 fighters and 156 Macchi MC 200 fight- not provide an adequate supply of spare parts and
BY A WIDE ers.21 Although these were adequate aircraft, they the air force possessed few facilities for aircraft
MARGIN.” were unlikely to confront British Hurricanes and repair. Moreover, the air force suffered from a
Spitfires on even terms. The Italian bomber force severe shortage of trained mechanics and an inad-
still contained many long-obsolete SM 81 trimotor equate training program. Owing to these factors,
bombers—276 as of 1939.22 Other bombers, such the squadrons committed to combat—especially
as the Fiat BR 20, were clearly inferior to the the squadrons fighting at the end of a long supply
German and British medium bombers of the line in North Africa or Russia—normally had less
time.23 Only in the Savoia-Marchetti SM 79—of than half of their aircraft in flyable condition.
which they had 594 available in June 1940—did The weakness of the Italian air force and air-
the Regia Aeronautica have an effective bomber.24 craft industry was well-known to the Luftwaffe
The Italian aviation industry was in no state to leadership when Italy entered the war. A study by
manufacture aircraft of the quality, or in the quan- the Luftwaffe general staff in May 1939 assessed
tity required for a major war. The Italian aircraft the Italian air force as “inferior to the British and
industry consisted of some twenty-four aircraft French air forces by a wide margin.”31 Italian aer-
firms and four major engine firms.25 Even the ial rearmament was proceeding very slowly and,
largest manufacturers suffered a lack both of although their fighter pilot training was rated to
working capital and of capacity. In addition, pro- be good, but Italian bomber pilots were mediocre

and had poor night and bad-weather flying and level, the Regia Aeronautica showed a willingness
navigation skills. In addition, the Italian anti-air- to work with the Germans. Although the courage
craft force was thoroughly obsolete. Essentially, and fighting ability of the Italian army and navy
the Luftwaffe viewed Italy as a weak nation that were often disparaged by German accounts of the
would likely hinder the German war effort. Never- war, the courage and aggressiveness of Italian air
theless, Italy served two strategic purposes: first, force pilots in aerial combat was often praised.39
the Italians could disrupt British and French The Italian problem was equipment. It was not
transport in the Mediterranean; secondly, the until November 1941, when the Macchi Mc 202
Italians could help divert French and British sea fighter was deployed to North Africa, that the
power. Little more could be expected.32 Perhaps Italians had an aircraft capable of meeting the
THE because of Italy’s weak position, the Luftwaffe gen- RAF Hurricanes and P–40s on equal, even supe-
LUFTWAFFE eral staff devoted no effort to plan to work with the rior terms.40
INSISTED Italians if war broke out. Thus, when Italy joined In any event, the Italian aircraft industry could
THAT … the war there were no arrangements for liaison or not supply enough of the new fighters, such as the
ITALIAN AIR cooperation between the two air forces. Three Macchi Mc 202 or Fiat G 55, to make a difference
UNITS BE months after Italy became a German ally, the against the ever-increasing Allied air superiority.
Luftwaffe sent General Ritter von Pohl to serve as The low production levels of Italian aircraft firms
PLACED liaison officer between the two air staffs. The first could not meet the demand posed by heavy combat
UNDER instance of coalition air operations came in attrition. On 2 March 1943, with the situation in
GERMAN October 1940, when the Italians committed an air North Africa rapidly approaching catastrophe, the
DIRECTION corps to the Battle of Britain, placing their force Italian High command sent Hitler a long message
under the command of General Kesselring’s outlining Italy’s precarious position and demand-
Luftflotte 2. It was a short and disappointing cam- ing a large quantity of modern equipment from the
paign for the Italians. Though the Italian air corps Germans, to include modern aircraft for the air
flew only a few raids, they suffered heavy losses force. Hitler replied the next day promising large
when their bombers and fighters proved no match quantities of German material to include reequip-
for British defenses. ping the hopelessly obsolete Italian bomber force
The Italian air force proved no match for the with Ju 88 bombers.41 As usual, Hitler’s grandiose
RAF in North Africa, either. In late 1940 the promises meant little. In the six months before the
Italian army in North Africa was virtually Italian surrender, the Luftwaffe managed to pro-
THE destroyed by the British. Although the Regia vide only 40 Ju 88s to reequip one Italian bomber
GERMANS Aeronautica outnumbered the RAF, with 327 com- group. By the time of the Allied landings in Sicily
DID NOT PRO- bat aircraft to 197 in the theater, the RAF won air in July 1943, the Regia Aeronautica had a paper
VIDE THE superiority because its two Hurricane squadrons strength of 1,042 aircraft. Official strength returns
were superior to the Italian fighters.33 With the belied the reality. The Italian bomber force of 400
ITALIANS situation in North Africa collapsing, Germany planes was considered so inferior to the Allies that
WITH RADAR, decided to aid its ally by sending the Tenth Air it could not be used in combat. Much of the fighter
OR RADAR Corps to the Mediterranean. Throughout 1941 the arm was obsolete and, of the 530 modern fighters
OPERATORS German effort in the Mediterranean broadened. (Macchi 200s, 202s and 205s), only 130 were oper-
One primary mission of the Tenth Air Corps was ational when the Allies landed.42 The Italians
providing air escort for the ships that brought could only play a minor role in defending their own
reinforcements and supplies to the Afrika Corps homeland. By Italy’s surrender in September
and the Italian forces in Libya. Axis shipping suf- 1943, the Regia Aeronautica possessed only 1,306
fered heavy losses from British air and naval units combat aircraft, less than half the number with
based on Malta. The Luftwaffe insisted that a sin- which they had started the war.43
gle air command be created for convoy protection, Italian-German cooperation was hampered by
and that Italian air units be placed under German other factors. For instance, since German and
direction. The Italian air force refused, promising Italian radios were incompatible, Italian aircraft
to cooperate with, but not to serve under the flying missions with the Luftwaffe could not com-
Germans.34 The lack of a unified command municate with their partners.44 In North Africa, no
resulted in mediocre protection of the convoys.35 system existed for joint control of fighter opera-
From 1940 through Italy’s surrender in 1943, tions, partially due to Luftwaffe reluctance to
cooperation between the German and Italian air share technology with the Italians. For example,
forces remained fairly ineffective. While the the Luftwaffe in North Africa had Freya radar
German and Italian higher air force staffs in the units for early warning and aircraft control, but
Mediterranean theater had liaison officers, there the Germans did not provide the Italians with
were no liaison officers at the wing or group radar, or radar operators, until the Tunisian
level.36 German and Italian air units that shared Campaign of 1943.45
airfields or were stationed in close proximity
worked out arrangements for mutual support. German-Italian Production Cooperation
Italian fighters often flew escort for German
bombers.37 In the battle for Tobruk in June 1942, The Italian aircraft industry had some very
Italian Stuka units flew alongside German Stuka capable aircraft designers but the problem with
units to support Rommel’s attack.38 At the tactical the Italian aircraft industry was its inability to

build the Daimler Benz 605 A engine. As with the
Mc 202, engine production and import problems
ensued. Only 262 Mc 205s were produced before
Italy’s surrender.54 Only in 1943 did the German
air ministry begin to seriously examine the possi-
bility of producing aircraft for the Luftwaffe in
Italy. In early 1943, the Luftwaffe ordered eighty-
five Caproni Ca 313s, a variation of the Caproni Ca
310 light bomber designed in the late 1930s.55 The
Luftwaffe envisioned the Ca 313 as a multi-engine
trainer and light transport aircraft and it was suit-
able for both roles. Production arrangements broke
down, however, and of the 905 Ca 313s ordered by
the Luftwaffe, the Italian factories produced only
271.56
When Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen
arrived in Italy in mid-1943 to assume command
Italian and German pilots at keep up with the British, Americans, and Germans of Luftflotte II he reported that the Italian avia-
dinner, December 1, 1941.
in the production of large, powerful engines.46 The tion industry was underutilized and recommended
best Italian fighters in 1940 were the Macchi Mc that the Luftwaffe obtain Italian-designed and
200 and Fiat G 50. These modern, maneuverable produced aircraft. One aircraft he had in mind was
metal monoplanes were handicapped by their Fiat the Fiat G 55, another Italian airframe married to
A.74RC38 engines, capable of only 840 horse- a German engine, that approximated the perfor-
power, while their contemporary, the Me 109E, was mance the American P–51. In early 1944, von
AFTER THE powered by the Daimler Benz DB 601, an engine Richthofen wrote to the Air Ministry of the possi-
capable of 1,050 horsepower. The Alfa Romeo 126 bility for Italian production of spare parts, attack
SURRENDER R3 34 engines in the SM 79 bomber produced only aircraft and trainers for the Luftwaffe.57 Von
OF ITALY THE 780 horsepower, while the Junkers Jumo engines Richthofen’s sensible recommendations met with a
LUFTWAFFE in the Ju 88 produced 1,200 horsepower.47 remarkable lack of interest. The Luftwaffe’s
SEIZED SOME The initiative to employ German technology in response was to send an officer to Italy to serve as
SAVOIA Italian fighters came from the Italian engineers. a contact point between Richthofen and the
MARCHETTI One of Italy’s top aircraft designers, Mario Castoldi Luftwaffe staff on issues of Italian aircraft produc-
of Macchi, arranged in 1940 for a DB 601 A-1 inline tion but little came of this effort.58 After the sur-
SM 82 TRANS- engine to be bought from Germany and installed in render of Italy the Luftwaffe seized some Savoia
PORTS an Mc 200 fighter. The Italian airframe was tested Marchetti SM 82 transports (SM 81 converted
with the German engine in August 1940, and the bombers) and Fiat G 12s as transport aircraft and
resulting aircraft was such an improvement over by May 1944 the Fourteenth Air Corps had four
the Mc 200 that it was ordered into immediate transport groups equipped with 143 Italian air-
mass production as the Macchi Mc 202 (Folgore).48 craft.59 By all accounts, Italian aircraft served the
Italy finally had an aircraft that could match the Luftwaffe effectively as transports.
Me 109. Alfa Romeo obtained a license to produce
the DB 601 engines, but ran into numerous pro- The Rumanian Air Force
duction problems. By early 1942, Alfa Romeo was
still unable to deliver more than 50 engines per By 1940-1941, the Rumanians had developed
month and Germany was willing only to provide a one of the most advanced aviation industries in
few engines surplus to its own needs.49 The lack of Eastern Europe. The Rumanian national military
adequate engines was so serious that the Regia strategy was to develop self-sufficiency in arma-
Aeronautica continued production of the Mc 200, an ments production. To this end, three aircraft com-
aircraft already recognized as obsolete.50 The panies were set up, with government support, in
Macchi Mc 202, with a maximum speed of 372 the 1920s and 1930s. IAR, (Industria Aeronautica
mph, finally went into service in November 1941. It Romana), which also manufactured aircraft
RUMANIA … had little impact on the air war, since its production engines, was a state-owned company. SET and
BUILT levels remained low and only 1,100 Mc 202s were ICAR also produced a variety of aircraft. During
SEVERAL produced between 1941 and 1943.51 By Italy’s sur- the 1920s and 1930s, the Rumanians had pro-
FRENCH render in 1943, only 122 Folgores were on the books duced various trainers, observation planes and
of the Regia Aeronautica, and of these, only 53 were fighters. Rumania was allied with France in the
MILITARY operational.52 interwar period and IAR built several French mil-
AIRCRAFT Combining Italian airframes with German itary aircraft under license. More importantly,
UNDER engines proved a winning formula in developing Rumania obtained the rights to build the Gnome-
LICENSE other aircraft. In 1942 Mario Castoldi mated an Rhône 14K engine, which developed over 700
Mc 202 fuselage with a German DB 605 1,475- horsepower. During the 1930s the Rumanians
horsepower engine, creating the Macchi Mc 205 would modify and develop the Gnome-Rhône
Veltro: a maneuverable fighter with a top speed of engine as the IAR 14K 1000 A engine, which would
more than 360 mph.53 Fiat obtained the license to attain 1,000 horsepower.60

In the late 1930s, the Rumanians developed ground support and communications.65 Before the
light bomber-reconnaissance biplanes: the IAR-37, war in the east started, the Luftwaffe had essen-
IAR-38 and IAR-39. The Rumanian-designed and tially assumed control of Rumanian air defense.
built IAR-37 series aircraft were slow and obsolete, The other part of the mission, training the
even by the standards of the 1930s, but would Rumanians, went less smoothly. Rumanian resent-
remain in production until 1944, seeing service ment of the Germans was never far below the sur-
first in combat roles and later, as liaison aircraft. face. After all, Rumania, which had been
WHEN In 1938, in order to build up its bomber force, Germany’s enemy in World War I, had been over-
RUMANIA Rumania obtained a license to build redesigned run and occupied by German troops in 1916.
ENTERED THE twin-engine versions of the Italian Savoia- Luftwaffe officers who wanted to visit Rumanian
WAR Marchetti SM 79 bomber, known as the JRS.79B. air bases or to observe training were regularly
AGAINST The JRS.79Bs turned out to be inferior to the denied access.66
RUSSIA IN Italian version and, by 1941, was already obsoles- When the war broke out in June 1941, relations
cent. However, it remained in production until with the Rumanians improved and the Luftwaffe
1941, IT 1944.61 The greatest accomplishment of the mission to Rumania came under the command of
FIELDED AN Rumanian aviation industry was the design and Luftflotte IV. The two Rumanian army corps in
AIR FORCE production of the IAR 80 fighter plane, which first Russia were provided with Luftwaffe liaison offi-
OF OVER 400 flew in 1939. The IAR 80 was a fairly advanced air- cers, who passed information gained from
AIRCRAFT craft powered by a 930 horsepower Rumanian Rumanian reconnaissance and battle reports to
engine. A low-wing metal monoplane with Luftflotte IV, and passed Luftwaffe intelligence to
retractable landing gear, the IAR 80 was fairly fast the Rumanians.67 The Rumanian army came
for its time, about three hundred miles per hour. under the strategic direction of the German army
The IAR, however, was lightly-armed, unarmored, and several squadrons of the Rumanian air force
and underpowered. By the standards of the deployed to Russia and flew in support of the
Eastern Front in 1941, the IAR 80 was an effective Rumanian army. Generally, the two air forces flew
aircraft. It was, nevertheless, inferior to the new in their respective zones of the front. The
Russian fighters by 1942. Since the Rumanians Rumanian air force, however, did receive some fuel
had no reliable source of supply for modern air- and support services from Luftflotte IV.68 As the
craft, the IAR 80 and its variants remained in pro- campaign in Russia progressed, Rumanians flew
duction until 1944. From 1939 to 1944, approxi- more often in combined operations with the
mately 450 IAR 80s were built, making it one of Germans, at times supporting German troops. In
the most numerous Rumanian aircraft.62 1942 Field Marshal von Richthofen, commanding
RUMANIA When Rumania entered the war against Russia Luftflotte IV, reinforced the Luftwaffengruppe
REQUESTED in 1941, it fielded an air force of over 400 aircraft. Kaucasus with the 20th Rumanian Reconnais-
THE RIGHTS It was an eclectic mix of modern and obsolete air- sance Squadron and the 43rd Rumanian Fighter
TO BUILD THE craft, including not only Rumanian-built and Squadron.69 At the tactical level, co-located
designed aircraft but also Italian, British, German and Rumanian units worked out direct
ME 109 AND German, and French aircraft. The Rumanian air coordination procedures. The Luftwaffe had a
WAS TURNED force had also absorbed ninety-three planes of the group of seaplanes and flying boats stationed on
DOWN Polish air force, which had taken refuge in the Black Sea coast for search and rescue and
Rumania during the German invasion of 1939. The naval patrol. The Rumanian naval air units,
combat force included IAR 80s, twelve British equipped with Italian and German seaplanes and
Hurricanes, thirty-eight British Bristol Blenheim flying boats, willingly supported German naval air
bombers and twenty-one French Potez 63 operations.70
bombers.63 The Rumanian air force suffered from The Rumanians were well aware that their own
deficiencies in training, aircraft armament, com- aircraft designs could not hold their own in battle
munications equipment and ground infrastruc- with a major power. In 1939, Rumania requested
ture. While potent on paper, it would be hard- the rights to build the Me 109 and was turned
pressed to carry out its two primary missions — down. As Rumanian aircraft engines were mostly
supporting the Rumanian field army in Russia variations on the Gnome-Rhone 14 cylinder radial
and air defense of the homeland. and could not be developed to produce more than
The Rumanian air force was firmly drawn into 1,000 horsepower, Rumania asked the Luftwaffe
the German orbit in Fall 1940, when a large for rights to build the BMW 801 radial engine that
Luftwaffe military mission headed by Lt. Gen. powered the FW 190 fighter—and was turned
Speidel arrived. Speidel’s mission was to ensure down again. Even a 1940 request to build the
the air defense of the Rumanian oil fields, vital to small Fiesler 156 “Storch” was turned down. Only
the German war effort and to train and reorganize when the war started to turn against Germany did
the Rumanian air force.64 Speidel initially the Reichsluftministerium (Reich Air Ministry)
reported directly to the commander of the revise its policy and in March 1942 Rumania was
Luftwaffe and by 1941 the Luftwaffe force in granted a license to build the Fiesler “Storch”. In
Rumania had grown to approximately 50,000 men, November of that year the German air ministry
including a reinforced flak division, two flak regi- sold the Rumanians the rights to build the
ments, one Me 109 fighter group (III/JG 52), and Daimler Benz DB 605 engine, which was rated at
special units for fighting oil fires, and providing over 1,400 horsepower. Finally, in 1943, Germany

granted the Rumanians a license to build the Me Finland
109, with the first 75 to be assembled in Rumania
using German-made components.71 Legally speaking, Finland was never a formal
All of these licensing agreements came too late ally of Germany during world War II. As a democ-
in the war to have much of an effect on Rumanian ratic nation, the Finns viewed the Nazi regime
THE production. The shortage of machine tools in with distaste and never signed a formal alliance
SHORTAGE Rumania delayed production of German aircraft with Germany. The Finns entered into the war
OF MACHINE and engines. Some Me 109 components were deliv- against Russia determined to regain the territory
TOOLS IN ered in 1944 but local production broke down and lost to the Soviets during the 1939-1940 Winter
RUMANIA none were assembled before the Rumanian War. Finland allowed the Germans to place mili-
DELAYED armistice of August 1944. Production of the DB tary units in their territory but refrained from
605 engine was scheduled for 1944 but never putting Finnish army or air units under German
PRODUCTION began.72 Although the Fiesler Storch license was command. Neither did the Germans and Finns
OF GERMAN granted in May 1942, two years later only 10 had ever form a formal command relationship, nor
AIRCRAFT been built.73 The Rumanians were forced to adapt develop a common strategy. German troops in
AND ENGINES in various ways in order to cope with the German Finland were referred to as “comrades in arms”
policies. When Germany refused Rumania a rather than as “allies.”
license to build the Ju 87 in 1939, the Rumanians Finland was important to Germany for its
initiated a program to modify the IAR 80 fighters exports of copper, nickel and lumber. Finland also
as dive bombers and fifty of the modified fighters, offered strategic advantages to Germany with its
the IAR 81, were delivered in 1941 and 1942. The proximity to the vital Soviet port of Murmansk
IAR 81, not a very good dive bomber, saw service and the industrial center of Leningrad. Yet, despite
with two squadrons at the front.74 Only when the the common strategic interests, the German-
Rumanian-German alliance was formalized did Finnish relationship only began after Finland’s
DESPITE THE the Germans sell the Rumanians some first line defeat in the Winter War. Significantly, the earlier
COMMON aircraft. In 1940-41 the Rumanians received 30 He Finnish experience with a German alliance had
111s that became the backbone of their bomber not been especially positive. German troops had
STRATEGIC force and enough Ju 87s in 1941 to equip three helped the Finns defeat and expel the Soviets from
INTERESTS, squadrons. Like the Italians, the Rumanians Finland during the war for independence in 1918
THE GERMAN- received the “B” model that was going out of ser- but the Germans soon began to act more as occu-
FINNISH vice with Luftwaffe squadrons.75 piers than allies and the Finns were happy to see
RELATION- In 1941, Rumania’s primary defense force for the the German army depart in 1919.81 In the 1920s,
SHIP ONLY oil fields was a squadron of Hawker Hurricanes. the Finns established the State Aircraft Factory in
Lieutenant General Speidel, chief of the Luftwaffe Tampere. It was a small, modern facility capable of
BEGAN mission to Rumania, requested that the Reichsluft- manufacturing small series of foreign designs
AFTER ministerium send the Rumanian Air Force the under license. During the 1920s, the State Aircraft
FINLAND’S Hurricanes and spare parts that the Luftwaffe had Factory manufactured several French models
DEFEAT IN just captured in Yugoslavia. In a letter of July 5, under license as well as the British Gloucester
THE WINTER 1941, Speidel noted that the Rumanian Hurricanes Gamecock fighter.82 The aircraft produced at the
had excelled by shooting down 18 Russian bombers State Aircraft Factory contributed greatly to the
WAR attacking the oilfields with no losses to themselves. Finnish air strength. In the years before the 1939
The Rumanians, Speidel said, needed reinforcement Winter War the State Aircraft Factory acquired
and support for their premier fighter unit and that, the rights to build the Dutch Fokker D XXI fighter
as the captured equipment cost Germany nothing, and the Bristol Blenheim bomber—both fine air-
the Hurricanes should be immediately turned over craft for their time. For trainers, the Finns relied
considering the importance of the oilfields.76 The on their own designs.
German Air Ministry held firm to the policy of pro- During the Winter War with Russia in 1939-
GERMANY viding no equipment except for payment.77 As the 1940 the Finns received considerable aid from the
REMAINED war worsened on the Eastern Front, Germany loos- Western powers. Britain, France, Sweden and even
ALOOF AND ened its policy about selling modern equipment to Italy donated aircraft and military equipment.
the Rumanians. In 1942, Germany agreed to sell 64 Germany remained aloof and refrained from
REFRAINED Me 109s to Rumania and in 1943, Germany sold the exporting arms to Finland in compliance with the
FROM Rumanians enough Me 109Gs to equip four German-Soviet pact of 1939. The small but well
EXPORTING squadrons.78 The Rumanian ground attack group trained Finnish Air Force had a superb combat
ARMS TO was able to replace its ineffective IAR 80 fighter- record during the Winter War. With fewer than 200
FINLAND bombers with Henschel 129B attack aircraft in combat aircraft, the Finns had faced thousands of
1943.79 That year Ju 88 bombers were sold to Soviet aircraft and made 200 confirmed air to air
Rumania to replace the worn out Blenheims and kills for a loss of 67 aircraft. The Finns destroyed
SM 79s of its bomber fleet. However, the flow of air- another 105 Soviet aircraft on the ground while
craft to Rumania in 1943 could not replace the 314 soviet planes were shot down by flak.83 At the
heavy attrition of the air units at the front. The Me end of the Winter War, the Finnish Air Force was
109 losses were so heavy in 1943 and 1944 that by equipped with a diverse collection of aircraft from
1944 the four Me 109 squadrons had been reduced Britain (Hawker Hurricanes, Gloster Gladiator
to one.80 fighters, Bristol Blenheim bombers), Italy (Fiat G

50 fighters) and the United States (Brewster 239 also built 55 Bristol Blenheim bombers, one of the
fighters). France had donated 30 Morane Saulnier better medium bombers of its day, under license
MS 406 fighters and Britain 30 Gloucester between 1941 and 1944.92 The inability of the
Gladiators. A variety of aircraft from the Finns to produce large aircraft engines led to some
Netherlands, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and exercises in ingenuity to keep the force flying. A
Germany made up the training, reconnaissance shortage of the Mercury engines used by the
and liaison aircraft. In March 1940 the Finns had Blenheims and D XXIs was solved by modifying
FINNISH 196 combat aircraft (fighters, bombers, reconnais- the D XXIs to take the 825 horsepower Pratt and
INDUSTRIES sance).84 Rearming and enlarging the air force Whitney Twin Wasp engines that could be impor-
WERE CON- became a high priority for the Finnish high com- ted from Sweden.93
mand. Germany was willing to sell the Finns air-
TRACTED TO craft that had been captured in France and Finnish-German Cooperation
DESIGN AND Norway during 1940-41. Germany supplied 44 U.S.
BUILD -built Curtis Hawk 75 fighters along with 4 The Finnish and German air forces conducted
WOODEN Dornier Do 22 Flying boats, 15 Do 17 bombers and combined operations on only a few occasions dur-
PROPELLERS 30 Focke Wulf FW 44 Steglitz trainers.85 ing the course of World War II. The war waged by
During 1941 and 1942 the Finns bought 57 the two nations was kept highly separate. In the
… RATHER French Morane Saulnier MS 406s from the far north, where the German army advanced on
THAN RELY German stock of war booty. The MS 406 was one of Murmansk, the air operations were conducted by
UPON PUR- the mediocre fighters of the day and in the 1940 the German Luftflotte 5 with its headquarters in
CHASING campaign the plane proved clearly inferior to the Oslo, Norway. South of Finland, on the Baltic and
PROPELLERS Me 109. Although the Finns wanted better equip- on the Leningrad Front, the air operations were
FROM ment they took what they could get. Thus, the MS carried out by the German Luftflotte 1. The
406 became one of the primary fighter planes of Finnish air force operated between the two
GERMANY Finland. In 1943 the State Aircraft Factory German air fleets, mostly in southern Finland.
embarked on a program to rebuild and redesign Occasionally German and Finnish ground units
the MS 406s in order to maintain an effective were intermixed but, in general, it was truly a par-
fighter force against a Soviet air force that was allel war.
quickly improving in the quality and quantity of Marshal Mannerheim, the Finnish commander
aircraft. Forty MS 406s were modified to accept a in chief, repeatedly requested Luftwaffe support for
larger Soviet Klimov engine, which was readily Finnish operations as the Finnish Air Force was
available from stocks of captured Soviet equip- usually overtasked with too few aircraft for too
ment. The rebuilt MS 406s were delivered in 1944 much front. However, the Luftwaffe was reluctant
and were known officially as the Myrsky I and II to provide support to the Finns because the
although the Finns also nicknamed then the German air fleets were also stretched thin.
Morko-Moranes. As Finland’s involvement with Reluctant support was provided by the Luftwaffe
the war ended just as the Morko-Moranes were for the Finns only after intervention by
delivered, a combat test of the aircraft was never Mannerheim at the top levels of the German com-
IN MARCH made.86 Finland took other measures to ensure mand.94 Indeed, the only liaison that existed
self-sufficiency and reduce dependence upon between the two air forces was at the general staff
1942 … THE German purchases. For example, Finnish indus- level and no Luftwaffe liaison officers were
FINNS ASKED tries were contracted to design and build wooden assigned to the Finnish air groups or army corps.
THE propellers for their air force rather than rely upon This practice of parallel war resulted in many lost
LUFTWAFFE purchasing propellers from Germany.87 opportunities for an effective use of airpower on the
FOR AIR SUP- The Finnish aerial rearmament program after battlefield. One case of non-cooperation that infuri-
PORT AND the Winter War was fairly successful, considering ated Marshal Mannerheim was the Luftwaffe’s
the small monetary and industrial resources of the refusal to interdict Russian forces retreating from
WERE DENIED Finns. By June 1941 the Finnish air force had 471 the Finns by boat across Lake Ladoga in August
aircraft; approximately half of these were combat 1941. The chance to destroy large Russian forces
aircraft.88 The Finns were able to design and pro- was passed up by the Luftwaffe.95
duce several basic and advanced trainers includ- In March 1942 the Finns mounted an air and
ing the Tuiska (31 made), the Viima I and II (24 ground operations to capture islands held by the
made), and the Pyry I and II (41 made).89 The Russians in the Gulf of Finland. Again, the Finns
Finnish air force went to great lengths to maintain asked the Luftwaffe for air support and were
as much self-sufficiency as possible. One example denied. After Mannerheim intervened with the
is the Fokker D XXI fighter. In 1936 Finland German headquarters some Luftwaffe assistance
acquired seven of the Fokker D XXI fighters along was finally provided and the Finnish offensive was
with a license to manufacture the model.90 The D successful.96 One of the primary concerns of the
XXI was a good fighter by late-1930s standards Finnish Air Force was defense of the homeland
but was clearly obsolete by 1941. However, with from Soviet air attack. Helsinki and other Finnish
modern combat aircraft difficult to procure and cities had been heavily bombed during the Winter
Germany unwilling to provide Me 109s or Me War and the Finns had made strengthening their
110s, the Finns kept the D XXI in production and air defenses a top priority after the conclusion of
delivered 50 to the air force in 1941.91 The Finns the first peace with Russia in 1940. The Finns

operations could not hold off the Soviet ground
forces and in September 1944 the Finns concluded
a separate peace with the Russians and expelled
the Germans from their country.
Hungary
After World War I, Hungary was virtually dis-

armed by the Allied powers and, like Germany,
was not allowed to have an air force. However, dur-
ing the 1920s, Hungary developed a small aircraft
industry capable of producing light civilian air-
craft and trainers. When Hungary began to rearm
in the mid-1930s the government planned to build
an air force by purchasing the best available for-
eign aircraft. An important consideration was the
possibility of licensed aircraft production by
A Finnish Air Force Hungarian firms. A Hungarian Defense Ministry
acquired 700 anti-aircraft guns from Germany and
Brewster in December delegation visited the Reichsluftministerium in
1941. built up their fighter force.97 The Soviets were in no
1935 to discuss aircraft purchases. When the
position to bomb the Finnish cities in 1941 but by
Germans offered to sell the Heinkel He 51 fighter,
1942, a revitalized Soviet air force was able to
a thoroughly mediocre aircraft already being
mount increasingly larger bombing raids against
pulled from Luftwaffe service, the Hungarians sen-
Helsinki and other cities.98 The Soviet air attacks
sibly declined. However, the Hungarians concluded
were severe enough that Mannerheim appealed
GENERAL directly to Goering and the Luftwaffe staff for radar
a deal to buy 67 Junkers Ju 86 bombers—a good
aircraft but also seen by the Germans as approach-
LUNDQUIST equipment to protect the Finnish cities.99 The
ing obsolescence. Unhappy with the German Air
… WON A Finnish demand, coupled with a realistic fear that
Ministry’s attitude towards sales, the Hungarians
GERMAN the Finnish resolve to continue the war was weak-
turned to Italy to obtain fighter planes. In 1936 the
ening, convinced the Luftwaffe to supply the neces-
COMMITMENT sary equipment to the Finns. The Finnish air force
Royal Hungarian Air Force (RHAF) ordered more
TO SUPPLY commander, General Lundquist, visited Goering
than 70 Fiat CR 32 biplane fighters. The CR 32
THE FINNS was a good aircraft for its time but, like the Ju 86,
and the Luftwaffe staff in Berlin in January 1943
it was verging on obsolete when delivered.106
WITH RADAR and won a German commitment to supply the
Eager to build up their air force, the Hungarians
AS WELL AS Finns with radar as well as with Me 109G fighter
bought a large number of short and long-range
planes to replace the worn out and obsolete
WITH ME 109G Brewster Buffaloes and Fokker fighters.100
reconnaissance aircraft from Germany before the
FIGHTER Between March 1943 and August 1944, the
outbreak of the war. In 1936 the RHAF bought 36
PLANES Heinkel He 46 tactical reconnaissance planes.
Reichsluftministerium sent 162 Me 109s to the
Some He 45 tactical observation biplanes and 18
Finnish Air Force, enough aircraft to fully equip
Heinkel He 70 long-range reconnaissance aircraft
more than two squadrons and assure replacement
were also ordered in 1936.107 None of these aircraft
aircraft.101 Twenty-four Ju 88s were provided in
were considered first-line Luftwaffe material when
1943 to reequip the Finnish bomber units.102 The
sold.
infusion of new material revitalized the Finnish Air
Faced with the German reluctance to sell cur-
THE FINNISH Force, which was having an increasingly difficult
rent fighter and bomber models the RHAF turned
ME 109 time facing a larger and better-equipped Red Air
to Italy. The RHAF began receiving the Fiat CR 42
SQUADRONS Force with its collection of old Moranes, Fokkers
fighter in 1939 and ordered 36 Caproni Ca 310
and Brewsters. The combat record of the Finns as
DESTROYED they faced overwhelming odds in 1943 and 1944 is
light bombers in 1938. Given the competition with
663 SOVIET impressive. The Finnish Me 109 squadrons
Italy, in 1939 the German Air Ministry finally
AIRCRAFT allowed the sale of more modern equipment to
destroyed 663 Soviet aircraft against combat losses
Hungary. The Hungarians ordered 16 Heinkel He
AGAINST of 27 aircraft.103 Only in 1944 did the Luftwaffe
112 fighters and the defense ministry wanted to
COMBAT make a significant attempt to support the hard-
purchase the rights to manufacture the plane but
pressed Finnish air force. From June to August
LOSSES OF 1944 an experienced Luftwaffe ground attack force
the Germans declined the offer.108 Again, Hungary
27 AIRCRAFT of 23 Ju 87s and 23 FW 190s was deployed to the
turned to Italy in order to obtain a modern fighter
for licensed production and in 1939 concluded a
Finnish front in Karelia to support the Finnish
deal to buy 70 Reggiane RE 2000 fighters and to
army which was facing a massive Soviet offensive.
build the model in Hungary. Production of the
The Luftwaffe’s “Battle Group Kuhlmey” provided
Hungarian version, known as the Heja (Hawk)
valuable support to the Finns by interdicting and
began late in 1941. The Hejas were adapted to take
destroying whole Soviet motorized columns.104
Hungarian-made K-14 Gnome-Rhone radial
However, even at this late stage of German-Finnish
engines.109 The RE 2000 was essentially an Italian
relations the two air forces would not fly together.
copy of the American Seversky P-35 with a maxi-
Only once did the Finns provide fighter cover for a
mum speed of 329 mph and an armament of two
Luftwaffe operation.105 Yet, even successful air

machine guns. By the standards of 1939 it was an manufactured in 1944: 213 Me 210s, 720 Me 109s,
acceptable combat plane but the Heja was limited and 27 Ju 52s.
by the light armament and the lack of engine Given its small size and lack of experience at
power. None of the engines available to the the start of the war, the Hungarian aircraft indus-
Italians or Hungarians could provide more than try did a credible job of producing airplanes from
1,000 horsepower. By the time the Heja went into 1941 to 1944. The Hungarians built 128 WM 21
combat in 1941, it was underpowered and under- reconnaissance bombers and 87 indigenous train-
armed compared to the average contemporary ers during the war and 180 RE 2000s in 1942-1943
fighter.110 although there were constant production prob-
The Manfred Weiss Company was the primary lems. For example, due to the difficulty of redesign-
THE ME 109 producer of aircraft in Hungary and during the ing the RE 2000 to accept Hungarian engines and
AND ME 210 1930s the company obtained the rights to manu- adapting an Italian design for Hungarian-made,
AGREEMENTS facture French Gnome-Rhone engines. The guns, radios and landing gear, the first Heja did
Hungarians developed and manufactured some not come off the assembly line until three years
STIPULATED light civilian aircraft as well as a few military air- after the licensing agreement had been ratified.117
THAT MOST craft. A series of trainers, including the Levente, a By the time the Hejas were in full production, the
AIRCRAFT high-wing monoplane, was developed in Hungary aircraft was already obsolete.
BUILT UNDER but production capacity was very small and only During 1941, the RHAF’s primary mission was
LICENSE IN 70-80 Leventes were built.111 The only combat air- to support the army corps that Hungary commit-
HUNGARY craft to be designed and manufactured in Hungary ted to the Russian campaign. With its RE 2000 and
was the WM 21 reconnaissance plane/light bomber Fiat CR 42 fighters, W 21 reconnaissance planes
WERE TO BE and the WM 21 was unimpressive even by the and its Ju 86 and Ca 135 bombers, it was a weak
DELIVERED standards of the 1930s. The WM 21 was made by and obsolete force. However, the RHAF performed
TO THE the Manfred Weiss Company in Budapest as well adequately in the first year of the war as the
LUFTWAFFE as the MAVAG (Hungarian Rail Coach and Soviet Air Force also had mostly obsolete aircraft
Machinery) factory in Gyor. Production of the WM and in 1941 the RHAF managed to shoot down
21 began in 1939 and 128 were delivered by most of the Soviet aircraft that it encountered.
1942.112 The Hungarian aircraft firms also modi- After the start of the war, the RHAF received a
fied foreign aircraft, such as the He 70, to take few modern German aircraft such as Do 17
Hungarian-built engines. bombers and He 111s for long-range reconnais-
When Hungary allied itself with Germany for sance. In 1942 the air battle intensified when the
the war against Russia, the Germans finally Hungarians committed their Second Army to the
granted the Hungarians permission to build late- campaign in Southern Russia. By late 1942, the
model Luftwaffe aircraft. In 1941 the Hungarians RHAF no longer faced a weak Soviet air force.
bought the rights to build the Focke Wulf FW 58 as With the enemy air force growing stronger, re-
a twin-engine bomber/trainer. The most important equipping the RHAF became an urgent matter.
production agreements reached were licenses to During 1943 the RHAF received JU 87s, Me 109s
build the Me 109 fighter and the Me 210 fighter- and Ju 88s from Germany and was able to send its
bomber. In 1941 the Hungarian defense ministry surviving WM 21s, CR 42s and Hejas back to
IN APRIL concluded a deal with the German air ministry to Hungary to serve as trainers or in the air defense
1944, THE build the Me 109 at the MAVAG plant. At first the role. By the Spring of 1944 the American bombing
GERMANS Hungarians would produce the fuselage and land- offensive reached Hungary and the RHAF did
OCCUPIED ing gear while the Germans provided engines, what it could to oppose the American onslaught.
radios, armament and instruments and eventually Me 109s, Me 210s and even the hopelessly obsolete
HUNGARY IN all components of the Me 109 would be made in Hejas were thrown into the battle against the U.S.
RESPONSE Hungary.113 In June the Hungarians agreed to bombers and their escorts.118
TO build the Me 210, the Luftwaffe’s replacement for The last stages of the war were a hopeless strug-
HUNGARIAN the Me 110.114 The Me 109 and Me 210 agreements gle for the RHAF. In April 1944, the Germans occu-
ATTEMPTS TO stipulated that most aircraft built under license in pied Hungary in response to Hungarian attempts to
Hungary were to be delivered to the Luftwaffe negotiate a separate peace. The RHAF came under
NEGOTIATE A with the Hungarians retaining approximately one- German command for the rest of the war and was
SEPARATE third of production for the RHAF. Other licensing quickly decimated in the attrition battle against the
PEACE agreements were concluded, including a program U.S. bomber offensive. The attrition was far worse
to build Ju 52 transports at the PIRT factory in than had been experienced in the worst days in
Budapest.115 Me 109 production began in late 1942 Russia. On one day in June, 1944 28 RHAF fighters
and by late 1944 approximately 800 had been built attacked the U.S. bombers and escorts for the loss of
in Hungary although production was disrupted by 13 fighters and five pilots killed.119 In the end, there
U.S. AAF bombing raids in 1944. In addition to the was little that the RHAF could do. By late 1944, it
Me 109, the Hungarian firms built 27 Ju 52s, 271 was an ineffectual force.
Me 210s and 70 FW 58 trainers.116 Total produc-
tion of Hungarian and licensed foreign aircraft Conclusion
during the war was 1,556. It took a long time for
Hungary to achieve serial production of any air- The Luftwaffe’s relationship with its coalition
craft. Of the military aircraft produced, 960 were allies illustrates the lack of any coherent strategic

Milch and Valle in Berlin factured components. Canadian military aircraft
during the summer of 1939.
production from 1939 to 1945 totaled 15,828.122
Rumania and Italy both started the war with
larger aircraft industries than Canada. With a
small amount of German assistance, those coun-
tries could have easily doubled or tripled their air-
craft production.
It is notable that the Luftwaffe paid little atten-
tion to the state of its allied air forces before 1942
and 1943 when the war situation began to obvi-
ously deteriorate. Licensing agreements were
GERMANY’S finally forthcoming but had little effect. Only in
ALLIES HAD A 1943 when the political will of its allies started to
CONSIDER- collapse did the Luftwaffe find supplies of modern
ABLE POTEN- vision or ability to plan for a long war. All of aircraft to ship to its allies. As with the licensing
Germany’s allied air forces performed well with agreements, the shipments of Me 109s and Ju 88s
TIAL FOR AIR- the resources they had, although they entered into to allied nations were too small and applied too
CRAFT PRO- the war with air forces composed of mostly obso- late to reverse the downward trend.
DUCTION lete aircraft and weak infrastructures. For Germany’s allied air forces consistently fought
THAT THE Finland, Hungary and Rumania, flying on the well. Rumanian units flew direct support for the
LUFTWAFFE Eastern Front, their generally obsolete aircraft German army and Hungarian and Rumanian air
sufficed for the first year and a half of the Russian force units aggressively defended their homeland
… NEVER campaign when the Red Air Force was weak. The against Allied bombers. The Finns put up probably
SERIOUSLY Italian Air Force, flying mostly in the Mediter- the best sustained performance of any small air
CONSIDERED ranean, was outclassed from the start. In 1941, the force in history. Armed with a small number of
USING Luftwaffe took over the brunt of the air war in that mostly obsolete aircraft, the Finns accounted for
theater and the large, but poorly-equipped Regia thousands of Soviet aircraft. Even the Italian air
Aeronautica, was generally relegated to secondary force did well considering its equipment and infra-
missions. structure. The German Air Ministry’s relationship
Germany’s allies had a considerable potential with its allied air forces illustrates the “short war”
for aircraft production that the Luftwaffe high mentality that prevailed in the German leadership
command never seriously considered using. until the debacle at Stalingrad. The relationship
Rumania produced fewer than 1,000 aircraft from with the German allies indicates that the
1941-1944 and its primary aircraft factory was Luftwaffe leadership was obsessed with fighting a
underutilized. Italy, which started the war with ‘war on the cheap”. Actions such as selling obsolete
one of the world’s largest air forces, produced only captured aircraft to German allies for a high price
13,253 aircraft from 1939-1943.120 In its best year, as well as a reluctance to share technology such as
1941, the Italians managed to manufacture only radar contributed to an attitude of distrust among
3,503 aircraft—about what the British aviation Germany’s partners. Reichsmarshal Goering and
industry could make in a month.121 The problem State Secretary Erhard Milch seem to have been
GERMANY’S for all of Germany’s allies was a lack of machine oblivious to any requirement to maintain cordial
ALLIED AIR tools and technical assistance. The Italian, relations with coalition partners. This level of dis-
FORCES CON- Rumanian and Hungarian programs to license- trust helped push Germany’s allies into maintain-
SISTENTLY build German engines were slow to get started ing production lines of locally-designed aircraft or
and suffered from low production due to a lack of obsolete licensed aircraft rather than accept too
FOUGHT machine tools, capital and technical assistance— much German control or influence in their defense
WELL all things that the German Air Ministry could industries.
have provided fairly easily. By means of compari- The Luftwaffe’s greatest problem from 1941 on
son, one can look at Canada’s aircraft production was a severe shortage of pilots. Although Ger-
during World War II. In 1939 Canada had a many’s coalition partners represented a reserve of
minuscule aircraft industry which produced 60 thousands of trained pilots, the Reichsluftminis-
light military aircraft that year. With a massive terium demonstrated little interest in exploiting
infusion of British and American capital and tech- this valuable resource. If coalition air forces had
nical assistance, Canada became a major aircraft been equipped with first line German equipment
producer by 1942 when 3,622 aircraft were manu- early in the war, it would have made a major dif-
factured (more than Italy that year). The ference in the Mediterranean and Russian the-
Canadian aircraft companies mass-produced a aters. One need only to look at the very effective
variety of American and British aircraft to include use of aviation manpower of the Western powers in
thousands of trainers but also Lancaster and which Free French and Polish pilots along with
Mosquito bombers, Hurricane fighters and thousands of British Commonwealth pilots were
Helldivers for the U.S. Navy. In 1939, Canada had organized into units and flew into battle with the
no means to produce large aircraft engines, pro- first rate British and Americans equipment.
pellers or instruments. By the middle of the war, In summary, the relationship of the Luftwaffe
aircraft built in Canada had all Canadian manu- with Germany’s coalition partners indicates not

only the lack of a strategic vision in the and to provide more support to the coalition part-
Luftwaffe’s senior leadership but also a lack of ners in the form of equipment and infrastructure.
understanding of basic economics. The Luftwaffe’s The Luftwaffe’s senior leadership repeatedly
operational commanders at the front, men like ignored such advice. In ignoring the combat poten-
Speidel and von Richthofen, consistently argued tial of its allied air forces, the German Air
for better relations with Germany’s partners. The Ministry committed a huge strategic error. Given
Air Ministry was urged to consider purchases of the nature of the Nazi regime and mentality, it
suitable foreign aircraft, such as some Italian air- was a case of arrogance and ideology that over-
craft that met Luftwaffe requirements admirably, rode common sense. ■
NOTES
1. Mark Conversino, Fighting with the Soviets, 12. Mark Axworthy, “On Three Fronts: Rumania’s
(Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1996). Aircraft Industry During World War II, Air Enthusiast,
VON Henry Probert, The Forgotten Air War, (Washington, D.C.:
Brassey’s, 1994).
Issue 56 (Winter 1994) 15.
13. Walter Ansel, Hitler and the Middle Sea, (Durham,
RICHTHOFEN, 2. For the best general overview of the Luftwaffe’s rela- NC: Duke University Press, 1972), p. 14.
CONSIS- tions with its allies see R.J. Overy, “The Luftwaffe and the 14. A good overview of the command arrangements in
TENTLY European Economy 1939-1945” Militärgeschichtliches
Mitteilungen, No. 21 (1979), 55-78. This article provides
the Mediterranean is found in Gen. Hellmuth Felmy, Die
Deutsche Luftwaffe auf dem Mittelmeer-
ARGUED FOR information about the aircraft production of Germany’s Kriegsschauplatz, in US Air Force Historical Research
BETTER allies. However, the main thrust of the article is about the Agency Doc. K 113.106-161 (1956).
Luftwaffe’s use of captured industrial assets. Another 15. See Malcolm Muggeridge, ed., “Conversation with
RELATIONS useful article on this subject is Richard DiNardo, “The Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, 2 June 1941” in Ciano’s
WITH Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Diplomatic Papers, (London: Odhams Press, 1948), pp.
GERMANY’S Eastern Front in World War II,” Journal of Military 441-42.
History (Oct. 1996), 711-30. DiNardo discusses the 16. Maj. Gen Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Germany
PARTNERS … German coalition command relationships in detail but and Her Allies in World War II, part I, p. 114.
THE his emphasis is on ground operations. 17. For a good overview of the state of the Italian armed
LUFTWAFFE’S 3. Hans-Georg Model, Der deutsche Generalstabsof-
fizier, (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard und Graefe Verlag, 1968),
forces in 1939-1940, see MacGregor Knox, “The Italian
Armed Forces, 1940-3,” in Military Effectiveness, vol. 3,
SENIOR pp. 105-7. eds. Allan Millet and Williamson Murray, (Boston, Mass.:
LEADERSHIP 4. See James Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Unwin-Hyman, 1988), pp.136-79.
REPEATEDLY Operational Air War 1918-1940, (Lawrence, Kans.: 18. Schreiber, p. 83.
University Press of Kansas, 1997), pp. 253-54. 19. Jonathan Thompson, Italian Civil and Military
IGNORED 5. On German-Hungarian economic relations see Aircraft 1930-1945, (Los Angeles, Calif.: Aero Publishers,
SUCH ADVICE Mario Fenyo, Hitler, Horthy and Hungary: German 1963), p. 150.
Hungarian Relations, 1941-1944, (New Haven, 20. Ibid., p. 149.
Conn.:Yale University Press, 1972) 93-95. In 1937 21. Ibid., pp. 167-69, 183-84.
Hungary produced 13.3 % of the world’s bauxite and in 22. Ibid., p. 271.
1942 exported 962,123 tons to Germany. See Fenyo, p. 92. 23. The Italians sent 80 BR 20 bombers to Belgium in
6. For a good overview of the Mitteleuropa concept and 1940 to take part in the Battle of Britain. In fewer than
German strategy see Gerhard Schreiber, “Political and 300 hours of combat missions, the Italian air corps lost
Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939- more than 20 BR 20s. Its slow speed and poor armament
1940”, 5-302 and “Germany, Italy and South-East made it very easy prey for defending British fighters and
Europe: From Political and Economic hegemony to flak. See Enzi Angelica and Paolo Matricardi, Combat
Military Aggression”, 302-448 in Germany and the Aircraft of World War II 1938-1939, (New York: Orion
Second World War, vol. 3, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Books, 1987) p. 38.
Forschungsamt, (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1995). The 24. Ibid., pp. 265-69.
influence of Germany on the Hungarian economy grew 25. C.G. Grey and Leonard Bridgman, eds. Jane’s All the
steadily through the 1930s. In 1937 54% of Hungary’s World’s Aircraft 1940, (London: Low Marston and Co.,
exports went to Germany, Austria, and Italy. By 1939 the 1941).
percentage of both imports and exports to Germany 26. Philip Jarrett, ed., Aircraft of the Second World War:
exceeded fifty percent. See Fenyo p. 82. The Development of the Warplane 1939-1945, (London:
7. See Martin Thomas, “To Arm an Ally: French Arms Putnam Aeronautical Books, 1997) pp. 19-20.
Sales to Romania, 1926-1940,” Journal of Strategic 27. Ibid, p. 19.
Studies, vol. 19, no. 2 (June 1996) 231-59. 28. Thompson, p. 38.
8. Maj. Gen Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Germany 29. Peter Smith, Into the Assault, (Seattle, Wash.:
and Her Allies in World War II: A Record of Axis University of Washington Press, 1985) p. 65.
Collaboration Problems, parts I and II, Historical 30. Schreiber, p. 82.
Division, U.S. Army Europe (1954). reprinted in World 31. Chef des Generalstab der Luftwaffe, Gedanken zur
War II German Military Studies, vol. 20, (New York: Luftlage in Europe (early 1939), in US Air Force
Garland Publishing , 1979), part I, p. 102. Historical Research Agency K113.3111, vol. II, p. 34.
9. On the German Air Ministry policy of restricting 32. Ibid.
sales to the Central European nations, see Edward 33. Bernd Stegemann, “The Italian-German Conduct of
Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe, (Lincoln, Neb.:University the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,” in
of Nebraska Press , 1976), pp. 205-8. Germany and the Second World War, vol. II, ed.
10. William Green, Warplanes of the Third Reich, (New Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, (Oxford:
York: Galahad Books , 1970), p. 271. Clarendon Press, 1995) p. 646.
11. Ibid., p. 314. 34. Stegemann, p. 688.

35. Ibid., p. 659. 72. Ibid., pp. 9,20.
36. Mueller-Hillebrand, part II, pp. 35-36. 73. Ibid., p. 14.
37. The best overview of German and Italian air opera- 74. Ibid., p. 12.
tions in the Mediterranean is Karl Gundelach, Die 75. Ibid., p. 15.
deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940-1945, Vols. 1 and 76. William Green, Warplanes of the Third Reich, p. 432.
2, (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1981). 77. Lt. Gen. Speidel, Letter to General Luftzeugmeister (5
38. Peter Smith, The Stuka at War, (New York: Arco July 1941), in NARA T 405, Reel 49.
Publishing, 1971), pp. 80-82. 78. Reichsmarschal Goering, Letter to Lt. Gen. Speidel
39. Mueller-Hillebrand, pp. 68-69. (13 May 1942), in NARA T 405, Reel 55.
40. The Macchi MC 202 had a top speed of 372 mph. and 79. Green, Warplanes of the Third Reich, pp. 548 and
was highly maneuverable. See Enxo Angelucci and Paolo 565.
Matricardi, Combat Aircraft of World War II 1940-1941, 80. Mark Axworthy, “On Three Fronts,” p. 14.
vol. IV, (New York: Orion Books, 1988), p. 56. 81. Green, pp. 439, 565.
41. General Paul Deichmann, ed. Die deutsche Luftwaffe 82. Richard Watt, The Kings Depart, (New York: Simon
in Italien, Monograph, April 1956. U.S. Air Force and Schuster, 1968), p. 381.
Historical Research Agency Doc. K113.310-8 1943-1945 83. Christopher Shores, The Finnish Air Force 1918-
Kapitel 1, 25. 1968, (New York: Arco Press, 1969), pp. 5-6.
42. Ibid., part II, p. 7. 84. Ibid., p. 7.
43. Thompson, p. 299. 85. Ibid., p. 2.
44. Mueller-Hillebrand, part II, p. 35. 86. Kalevi Keskinen, Kari Stenman et al., Suomen
45. Ibid., pp. 35-36 Ilmavoimien Lentokoneet 1939-72, (Helsinki: Tietoteos,
46. Lucio Ceva and Andrea Curami, “Luftstreitkräfte 1975), pp. 117-19.
und Luftfahrtindustrie in Italien, 1936-1943,” in 87. Shores, pp. 11-14.
Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Horst Boog, 88. Ing. E. Wegelius, “Entwicklung von Schichtholz-
(Herford: E.S. Mittler, 1993), pp. 113-36. Luftschrauben in Finnland,” in Deutsche Luftwacht;
47. Philip Jarrett, ed., Aircraft of the Second World War: Luftwesen, Band 10 (October 1943) pp. 273-79.
The Development of the Warplane 1939-45, (London: 89. Ibid., p. 9.
Putnam Aeronautical Books, 1997), p. 21. 90. Kalevi Keskinen, et al, p. 199.
48. William Green, Famous Fighters of the Second World 91. Ibid., 117.
War, vol. II, (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1962), p. 54. 92. Shores, p. 8.
49. Ibid., p. 57. 93. Kalevi Keskinen, et al., p. 118.
50. Ibid. 94. Shores, 8.
51. Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardi, Combat 95. Mueller-Hillebrand, part II, pp. 113-14.
Aircraft of World War II 1940-1941, vol. IV, p. 56. 96. Ibid., p. 114.
52. William Green, Famous Fighters of the Second World 97. Ibid., pp. 114-15.
War, vol. II, p. 59. 98. The Germans sold the Finns 700 Bofors 37mm anti-
53. Ibid., p. 58. aircraft guns that they had captured from the Poles in
54. Ibid. the 1939 campaign. See Mueller-Hillebrand, part II, p.
55. Ibid., p. 59. 110.
56. Generalluftzeugmeister, Amtschefsbesprechung (13 99. Waldemar Erfurt, Der Finnische Krieg 1941-1944,
April 1943), in US Air Force Historical Research Agency (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1950), p. 104-105.
K 113.82, vol. III, 4. On the Caproni Ca 310 see also David 100. Ibid., p. 134.
Donald, ed., The Complete Encyclopedia of World Aircraft, 101. Ibid., p. 147.
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1997), pp. 231-32. 102. Kalevi Keskinen, et al., p. 117.
57. Donald, 231-232. 103. Ibid., p. 118.
58. GL, Amtsbesprechung (18 January 1944), in US Air 104. Kari Stenman, “Finland’s Front Line,” in Air
Force Historical Research Agency K113.82, vol. III, 3. Enthusiast, Issue 50 (1993), p. 59.
59. Ibid. 105. Kari Stenman, “The Short Saga of Battle Unit
60. Alfred Price, The Luftwaffe Data Book, (London: Kuhlmey,” Air Enthusiast, Issue 37 (1987), pp. 1-6.
Greenhill Books, 1997), pp. 127-28. 106. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
61. For the best overview of the Rumanian aircraft 107. George Punka, Hungarian Air Force, (Carrolton,
industry, see Mark Axworthy, “On Three Fronts,” pp. 8, 9. Texas: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1994), pp. 20, 35.
62. Ibid., pp. 10-11, 21-22. 108. Ibid., pp. 44 and 48-49.
63. Ibid., pp. 114-20. 109. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
64. Martin Thomas, “To Arm an Ally: French Arms Sales 110. William Green and Gordon Swanborough, “RE 2000:
to Rumania, 1926-1940,” Journal of Strategic Studies The State of the Art Reggiane,” in Air Enthusiast, Issue
(June 1996) p. 252. 41 (1989), pp. 54-69. See also Chris Szabo, “Hungary’s
65. General der Flieger a.d. Hellmuth Felmy, Die Hawk: The Story of the Heja Fighter,” Air Enthusiast,
Deutsche Luftwaffe auf dem Mittelmeer-Kriegsschauplatz Issue 71 (Sept./Oct. 1997), pp. 36-41.
(1956), in US Air Force Historical Research Agency K 111. Green and Swanborough, pp. 55-66.
113.106-161, 36. 112. Punka, p. 54.
66. Ibid. 113. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
67. Mueller-Hillebrand, part II, p. 169. 114. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
68. Ibid., p. 164. 115. Ibid., p 41.
69. Joel Hayward: Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe 116. Ibid., p. 61.
and Hitler’s Defeat in the East, 1942-1943, (Lawrence, 117. Figures from George Punka, Hungarian Air Force.
Kans.:University Press of Kansas, 1998), p. 248. 118. Ibid., pp. 67-68
70. See Bezw. Kuban, Erfolge der Luftwaffengruppe 119. Chris Szabo, “Hungary’s Hawk,” p. 41.
Kaukasus (25 November 1942 to 6 February 1943), in 120. Punka, p.15.
BA/MA RL 8/59. 121. Schreiber, p. 82.
71. For a history of this subject see J.L. Roba and C. 122. Ibid. See also R. J. Overy, The Air War 1939-1945,
Craciunoiu, Seaplanes Over the Black Sea: German- (Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House, 1980), pp. 40-42.
Romanian Operations 1941-1944, (Bucharest: Editura 123. Figures drawn from K.M. Molson and H.A. Taylor,
Modelism, 1995). Canadian Aircraft Since 1909, (London: Putnam, 1982).

Before the D-Day Dawn:
Reassessing the Troop
Carriers at Normandy
Daniel L. Haulman
T
(Overleaf) 53d Troop he first invaders of Normandy, on June 6, There were eight primary reasons the airborne
Carrier Wing-Troop Carrier-
Airborne Maneuver, 1944, did not arrive by sea during the day troops were scattered. First of all, the paratroopers
December 1943. (All photos but by air at night. Part of Operation and some of the gliders dropped at night. There
courtesy of the author.) were no night vision goggles in 1944. Darkness
Neptune, the channel-crossing phase of the larger
Operation Overlord, some 820 C–47 troop carrier obscured the visibility of key landmarks. However
airplanes dropped more than 13,000 U.S. para- skilled the pilots and navigators, they could not
troops of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions on manufacture the light needed to see what they
the Cotentin Peninsula. Their mission was to were looking for. They had to depend on what little
strike the German Utah beach defenses from the moonlight was available and a few lights set up on
820 C–47 rear, block enemy counterattacks on the beach- the ground by pathfinders. Besides that, they had
TROOP CAR- head, take key communication centers, and seize only the light from enemy antiaircraft artillery fire
bridges and causeways over rivers and marshes. and from the crashes of their burning comrades.
RIER AIR- Approximately 100 additional C–47s dropped glid- Some of the pilots mistook flooded fields on the
PLANES ers laden with more troops and equipment before Cotentin peninsula as the English Channel and
DROPPED the first amphibious forces landed.1 dropped their troops too early. Others waited too
MORE THAN How well did the pre-dawn troop carriers do? long and dropped their paratroopers into the
13,000 U.S. The common impression is that they did very English Channel because they could not see they
PARATROOPS poorly.2 The troops seemed to have been scattered had re-crossed the coast.3
all over the peninsula. In this paper, I want to Secondly, there were unexpected clouds. As
OF THE 82D explore that impression and raise some other most of the troop carrier airplanes crossed the
AND 101ST questions. Why were the troops so separated from coast of France, they entered a thick cloudbank. To
AIRBORNE each other? Just how scattered were the drops avoid colliding in the haze, the pilots instinctively
DIVISIONS after all? Were there other reasons the airborne spread out the tight nine-plane V formations into
divisions took so long to assemble? In short, has which they had been packed, the ones on the left
history been fair to the troop carrier pilots? going farther left and the ones on the right going
Pathfinder equipment,
Troop Carrier-Airborne
Maneuver, December 1943.
THE PARA-
TROOPERS
AND SOME
OF THE
GLIDERS
DROPPED AT
NIGHT …
THERE WERE
UNEXPECTED
CLOUDS Dr. Daniel L. Haulman is a historian at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, at Maxwell AFB,
Alabama, where he has worked since 1982. He earned his Ph.D. in history from Auburn University in
1983 after earning previous degrees from the University of Southwestern Louisiana and the
University of New Orleans. In the course of his degree work, he taught high school history for five
years. Since 1982, Dr. Haulman has taught several history courses as an adjunct professor at
Huntingdon College, Auburn University in Montgomery, and Faulkner University. He is the author of
two books, four Air Force pamphlets, and ten published historical articles and has presented papers at
twelve historical conferences.

53d Troop Carrier Wing
Crew-Pathfinder-Troop
Carrier-Airborne Maneuver,
December 1943.
THERE WAS
HEAVY FLAK
… THE DIS-
PERSAL WAS
[CAUSED BY]
THE LACK OF
NAVIGATION farther right. Some of the airplanes climbed and cons set up by the pathfinders on the ground, so
EQUIPMENT others descended. By the time the airplanes they limited their use. Only a small minority of the
emerged from the clouds, some seven minutes airplanes had special navigation equipment such
later, they were too far apart to see each other in as GEE, which relied for guidance on radio beams
the darkness. They could no longer use each other transmitted from ground stations.9 The great
to determine where and when to drop.4 majority of the troop carrier pilots depended on
Thirdly, there was heavy flak, especially for seeing neighboring airplanes, but those airplanes,
later formations. The Germans threw up tremen- despite their zebra stripes, were no longer visible
dous amounts of antiaircraft fire when they heard because darkness, clouds, blinding air defenses,
the hundreds of aircraft flying just a few hundred and the breakup of the formations. Left without
feet overhead. Searchlights and tracers illumi- their visual guides, most of the pilots dropped by
nated the sky, further blinding the pilots and illu- estimating how far they had gone in a given time
minating airplanes no longer obscured by clouds. since crossing the French coast.10 It is no wonder
Three quarters of the troop carrier pilots had that they were often wrong. A few airplanes that
MANY PILOTS never been under fire before. Many instinctively had sped up because of flak found themselves over
changed course, going to the right or left, climbing the English Channel on the other side of the
EXPECTED or descending. Some C–47 pilots, to avoid being peninsula when their heavily laden troops
TO SEE hit, increased speed more than 50 knots over the dropped.11
LIGHTED 100 knots prescribed for the drops.5 Despite these Fifthly, many pilots expected to see lighted tees
TEES ON THE maneuvers, many C–47s fell to flak, although not on the ground that the pathfinders were supposed
GROUND … as many as British Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh- to have set up. Many of the tees did not appear
THE Mallory had predicted.6 Of the troop carrier air- because enemy troops were nearby. Illuminating
planes that were shot down before dawn on D-Day, the tees would have given away the pathfinder
PATHFIND- the great majority unloaded their paratroopers positions and alerted the Germans as to where the
ERS THEM- before crashing.7 Their pilots were determined to drop zones were. To avoid ambushes, some of the
SELVES HAD keep their planes level as long as possible. 450 of pathfinders did not illuminate their tees.12
LANDED IN the troop carrier planes returned with damage, The fact that many of the pathfinders them-
THE WRONG and 41 failed to return.8 selves had landed in the wrong place was a sixth
A fourth reason for the dispersal was the lack of reason for the scattered drops. Although they were
PLACE navigation equipment aboard most of the air- the most experienced of the paratroops, the combi-
planes. Only the lead airplanes of each formation nation of darkness, clouds, and flak had also put
or serial carried a navigator or the navigation them off course. Even if the troop carriers that fol-
equipment needed to find the drop and glider land- lowed the pathfinders had flown precisely, they
ing zones. Only two of every five troop carrier air- might have dropped in error because the pathfind-
planes in Operation NEPTUNE carried naviga- ers on whom they guided were in error in many
tors. Planners did not want to overload the cases. Only 38 of the 120 pathfinders landed
Eureka-Rebecca systems that depended on bea- directly on their targets, and they had less than an

Paratroops board a 53d
Troop Carrier Wing C–47
during practice maneuvers
in late 1943.
ORDERS
COMMAND-
ING RADIO
SILENCE FUR-
NISHED A
SEVENTH
REASON FOR
hour to reach the proper zones to mark before the wind from the northwest. This wind, often more
THE arrival of the bulk of the troop carriers.13 “The than 20 knots, pushed the C–47s faster than they
SCATTERED blind could not lead the blind.“ were supposed to go and sometimes diverted them
DROPS Orders commanding radio silence furnished a from the prescribed route. Pilots moving faster
seventh reason for the scattered drops. To preserve than they intended because of the wind sometimes
the element of surprise, pilots were ordered to stay dropped their paratroopers beyond the intended
off the radio. If the troop carrier pilots had been drop zones if they were dropping a set number of
able to communicate with each other, they might minutes after crossing the coast. The same wind
have been able to reestablish their formations or would later affect the paratroopers themselves.15
at least let each other know when they were drop- Paratroopers who took very long to assemble
ping so that they could drop together.14 naturally blamed the troop carriers for scattering
An eighth reason the paratroop drops were so them badly. Of course, the more separated the
scattered was the wind. Part of the same front that paratroops were on landing, the longer it took
delayed the D-Day operation brought with it high them to gather into effective fighting units. By
Paratroops on June 5,
1944.
THE D-DAY
OPERATION
BROUGHT
WITH IT HIGH
WIND

Paratroop practice for
D-Day, March, 1944.
GENERAL
MAXWELL
TAYLOR …
REMARKED,
“NEVER
WERE SO
FEW LED BY dawn of June 6, only about one-sixth of the 101st miles of their zones, and eighty percent within five
SO MANY” Airborne Division had assembled.16 General miles. If the paratroopers had been able to travel
Maxwell Taylor, 101st Division commander, was even one mile per hour toward their objectives,
able to gather only his staff and a few lower-rank- eighty percent of them would have reached those
ing soldiers at first. He remarked, “Never were so objectives in the six hours they had between the
few led by so many.”17 Both the 82d and 101st drops and H-Hour at 0630.19
Airborne Divisions took about three days to fully Intelligence officers calculated that 74 percent
unite. By midnight of D-day, only some 4,500 of the of the 216 airplanes in the first D-Day mission
13,000 airborne troops had concentrated.18 dropped accurately.20 The 435th Troop Carrier
How much were the troops really scattered? Group dispatched 45 C–47s for the paratroop
According to official records in a study by Dr. John drops. Intelligence officers later estimated that at
Warren, 35 to 40 percent of the paratroops landed least 37 of the airplanes dropped within two miles
within a mile of their intended drop zones. More of the drop zone and 25 transports dropped within
than half the paratroopers landed within two one mile. The 435th lost only three transports on
Maneuvers of combined
British and American air-
borne forces, March, 1944.
35 TO 40
PERCENT OF
THE
PARATROOPS
LANDED
WITHIN A
MILE OF
THEIR
INTENDED
DROP ZONES

Scores of C–47s and glid-
ers, loaded with airborne
infantrymen, are shown
marshaled on a Ninth
Troop Carrier Command
field shortly before takeoff
to Normandy.
A GREAT
DEAL OF THE
TERRITORY
WAS
FLOODED
the mission.21 Of the 2d battalion of the 505th mander of the IX Troop Carrier Command, com-
Parachute Infantry Regiment, 27 of 36 sticks mended his three wing commanders for “the very
either hit their designated drop zone or landed high degree of efficiency exhibited in this opera-
within a mile of it.22 Both the division comman- tion.”25
ders, General Matthew Ridgway and General In the face of all this evidence, how do we
Taylor, landed so close to the places where they account for the impression that the troop carriers
were to set up their headquarters that they were did a poor job?26 If the drops were more accurate
well in place by dawn.23 Brig. Gen. James M. than many veterans remembered, why did the
Gavin, commanding a regiment of the 82d paratroopers take so long to assemble? Were there
Airborne Division, remarked in a June 9 letter of any other reasons besides the scattered drops that
thanks to the 50th Troop Carrier Wing comman- contributed to the failure of the troops to unite
der: “every effort was made for an exact and pre- quickly? I want to suggest eight other reasons.
cise delivery as planned. In most cases this was First there was the terrible terrain. A great deal
successful.”24 Brig. Gen. Paul L. Williams, com- of the territory was flooded. The dry land was com-
Gliders of the Ninth Troop

Carrier Command speckle
the Normandy landscape
on D-Day. Many have
landed, with more coasting
toward the ground.
OPEN
GROUND
WAS OFTEN
STUDDED
WITH ENEMY
OBSTACLES

Gliders, packed with
American infantry troops,
and towed by C–47s of the
Ninth Troop Carrier com-
mand have reached French
soil where earlier in the
day American paratroops
had landed.
A SECOND
REASON THE
PARATROOP-
ERS DID NOT
ASSEMBLE
RAPIDLY partmentalized by hedgerows with imbedded could the troops not see each other very well, they
AFTER LAND- trees. Open ground was often studded with enemy could also not see landmarks very well.
ING WAS obstacles to discourage glider landings. Even if the A fourth factor was drowsiness. The paratroops
ENEMY FIRE troop carriers had dropped precisely, the para- were tired. They had been waiting for the opera-
troops and glider troops would have had difficulty tion to launch for some time in England before
assembling rapidly because of the need to cross General Dwight D. Eisenhower had given the word
hedgerows, swamps, and obstacles.27 Even for the to go. They began taking off around midnight, and
minority of paratroops who landed where they dropped after a dark, droning flight across the
were supposed to, gathering into effective fighting English Channel. Even if they had been rested
DARKNESS units was a challenge. What they found on the before the flight, they would have had trouble stay-
ground was not always what they expected to find. ing awake, especially if they had taken pills given
WAS A … The location of landmarks did not always match to them to fight airsickness on the flight. Many
MAJOR the maps. Troops were often confused because so had taken the medication, and found themselves
FACTOR many of the hedgerows, fields, and swamps looked extremely sleepy when they dropped.30 Their
alike. In the largely flat country, they had difficulty drowsiness slowed down their assembly.
telling one from another. A shortage of radios for communication was a
A second reason the paratroopers did not fifth factor that delayed troop assembly. Most
assemble rapidly after landing was enemy fire. No paratroops did not carry radios. Those who did
A SHORTAGE less than three German divisions occupied the often lost them on the way to the ground, or the
Cotentin peninsula, outnumbering the airborne radio was damaged on impact. An estimated sixty
OF RADIOS troops by at least three to one in the predawn percent of the radios dropped with the paratroop-
FOR COMMU- hours of D-day.28 The Germans had heavy artillery ers were lost. Gliders that were supposed to
NICATION … and tanks not immediately available to the para- deliver larger radios for communication beyond
DELAYED troopers. One of the divisions lay in the immediate the local area often crash-landed, resulting in mal-
TROOP vicinity of the drops, and individual paratroopers functioning equipment and the inability of officers
often landed among enemy troops. Even if the to communicate with other units.31
ASSEMBLY paratroopers had known exactly where to go to A sixth reason the paratroopers had difficulty
assemble, obstacles much more dangerous than assembling on the ground was the heavy loads
hedgerows and swamps lay in their paths. they carried. Many soldiers dropped with more
Darkness was a third major factor delaying than 100 pounds of equipment.32 Lugging such
troop assembly on the ground. Members of the 82d equipment across the ground slowed movement
and 101st Airborne Divisions used a variety of because vehicles did not arrive until the first glider
sound and light devices and passwords to identify landings around 0400.33 Many of the vehicles on
each other because they could not easily see each the gliders did not land without damage, and were
other in the night.29 The same darkness that con- not available for use in any case.
tributed to the inability of troop carrier pilots to Wind was a seventh factor that affected the air-
see their proper drop zones also prevented para- drops. Although the paratroopers generally exited
troops from seeing each other. Daylight would the airplanes from an altitude of only about 600
have accelerated assembly considerably. Not only feet, they drifted slowly to the earth on a huge

A glider floats behind a
C–47.
THE FIRST
MEN TO
JUMP
WALKED IN
THE DIREC-
TION OF THE wind catcher. Unlike parachutes today that allow morning of D-Day.36 General Kurt Student, the
AIRPLANE the trooper to guide his descent, the paratroopers foremost German authority on airborne operations
of 1944 landed wherever gravity and wind took in World War II, acknowledged that the U.S. air-
them. Many of the troops intending to land on drop borne operations substantially speeded the Allies’
zones outside of the French town of Ste. Maire taking of initial objectives and significantly
Eglise, for example, were blown directly into the reduced the U.S. casualty cost of the Utah beach
U.S. center of town where they were easy prey for the landings.37 The airborne operation succeeded, not
AIRBORNE German defending garrison. Wind blew one of the only because of what the paratroops did on the
OPERATIONS parachutists into the church steeple. Even if an ground after landing, but also partly because of the
airplane dropped troops exactly over an intended drops themselves.
SUBSTAN- zone, strong winds could blow the parachutes con- The scattering itself, even if it were not as bad as
TIALLY siderably off course on the way down.34 some imagined, was a sort of blessing in disguise.
SPEEDED THE An eighth reason for the delay in paratroop Faced with American troops descending all around
ALLIES’ assembly was the very nature of a World War II them, the German 91st Division was confused.
TAKING OF paratroop drop. Even if all had gone ideally, and Paratroops were able to sever enemy communica-
the troop carrier airplanes had dropped exactly tions over a wider area. The Germans overesti-
INITIAL when and where they were supposed to, the para- mated the number of paratroops they were facing.
OBJECTIVES troops would have been scattered.35 As each para- They could not find a center of gravity to counterat-
AND SIGNIFI- trooper jumped, he knew he would not land with tack. Some German officers even imagined that the
CANTLY the man who just jumped or the man who would scattered drops were part of a deliberate saturation
REDUCED jump next. For a time he would be on his own. He drop to overwhelm the defenders from above.
THE U.S. would be even farther from the men who jumped Scattering the troops surely did not do as much
a few ahead of him or a few behind him. The good as harm, but it provided certain benefits.38
CASUALTY paratroops dropped from each plane in a line In the final analysis, the troop carriers suc-
COST called a “stick.” By “rolling up the stick,” they ceeded. They dropped more than 13,000 troops
attempted to assemble. The first men to jump behind enemy lines, more than half of them within
walked in the direction of the airplane, the last two miles of their designated zones, and four out of
men walked in the opposite direction, while the five of them within five miles.39 Of the 925 troop
men in the middle stayed put. Some of the men carrier airplanes launched, only 23 did not return.
did not even know exactly what the course of the The invasion of Utah beach succeeded more than
airplane was, because they could not see it as its that of Omaha partly because of the airborne oper-
noise faded away. ation behind Utah.40
The scattering of the paratroops in the predawn The airborne invasion was successful not only
hours of D-Day was worse than planned but better because of the heroism of the paratroops, but also
than many of the paratroopers themselves imag- because of the troop carrier pilots who delivered
ined. Even given the scattered drops and the slow them. History should remember the troop carriers
assembly, the paratroops were able to accomplish at least as much for their successes as for their
most of their objectives. The 82d Airborne Division failures. To them, as much as to the ground troops,
captured the town of Ste. Maire Eglise by the early belongs the glory of victory. ■

Glider columns of the 53d
Troop Carrier Wing pass
over landing zones on the
Cherbourg peninsula.
NOTES
1. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants 25 Jun 1944 (Air Force Historical Research Agency) pp. 1-
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 75. 2. Warren, p. 60.
Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. 10. Ryan, p. 136.
W. Norton, 1972), p. 77. Samuel T. Moore, Tactical 11. Ibid., Gavin, p. 104.
Employment in the U.S. Army of Transport Aircraft and 12. Weigley, p. 76. Warren, p. 60. Moore, p. 13.
Gliders in World War II (Air Force Historical Research 13. Ryan, pp. 105-106. Weigley, p. 76.
Agency, call number 546.04), pp. 12, 14. Cornelius Ryan, 14. Ambrose, D-Day, p. 198. Warren, p. 59.
The Longest Day: June 6, 1944 (New York: Simon and 15. IX TAC Report no. 47.
Schuster, 1959), pp. 130, 135. Charles H. Young, Into the 16. Ryan, p. 181. Ridgeway, pp. 11, 13. Warren, p. 58.
Valley (Dallas: Printcomm, 1995), pp. 111, 118. John C. 17. Taylor, p. 80.
Warren, Airborne Operations in World War II, European 18. Warren, p. 58.
Theater, USAF Historical Study no. 97 (Maxwell AFB, 19. Ibid.
Ala.: Air University, 1956), p. 64. 20. “Percentage of Accuracy in Neptune Serials,” IX
2. Martin Wolfe, Green Light! (Washington, D.C.: Troop Carrier Command, contained in history of the 50th
Center for Air Force History, 1993), pp. 114, 120; David Troop Carrier Wing (WG-50-HI) for May-Jun 1944.
McCullough, editor, The American Heritage Picture 21. 435th Troop Carrier Group history, June 1944 (Air
History of World War II (New York: American Heritage Force Historical Research Agency, call no. GP-435-HI
Publishing, 1966), p. 483; Gordon A. Harrison, Cross- June 1944).
Channel Attack (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of 22. Ambrose, D-Day, p. 206.
Military History, 1951, republished by the Center for 23. Weigley, p. 76. Taylor, p. 80. Ridgway, p. 8.
Military History in 1993), pp. 288-89. 24. Ltr, Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin to Brig. Gen. Harold
3. Moore, p. 13. Warren, p. 65. L. Clark, June 9, 1944, found in the history of the 50th
4. Stephen E. Ambrose, D-Day: The Climactic Battle of Troop Carrier Wing, May-June 1944.
World War II (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 25. Message, Brig. Gen. Paul L. Williams, IX TCC, to
199. Stephen E. Ambrose, Band of Brothers (New York: commanders of 50, 52, 53 Troop Carrier Wings and com-
Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 66-67. Young, p. 111. manding officer of Pathfinder School, June 6, 1944.
Taylor, p. 77. James M. Gavin, On to Berlin: Battles of an 26. Wolfe, pp. 114, 120; McCullough, p. 483; Harrison,
Airborne Commander, 1943-1946 (New York: Viking pp. 288-89.
Press, 1978), p. 105. Warren, pp. 32, 59. Matthew B. 27. Ryan, p.133. Gavin, p. 106. Taylor, p. 79. Warren, p.
Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway 58. Ridgway, p. 6.
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 4. 28. Ryan, p. 134.
5. Ambrose, Brothers, p. 67. Ambrose, D-Day, p. 198. 29. Weigley, p. 76. Warren, p. 58. Taylor, p. 79. Gavin, p.106.
Gavin, p. 102. Warren, p. 59. 30. Ambrose, D-Day, 199. Dr. Daniel Mortensen of the
6. Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education
Eisenhower’s tactical air chief, predicted at least 50% at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, also
losses for the airborne forces. Gavin, pp. 92-94. Weigley, mentioned this to the author after his conversations with
p. 75. Bill Newton Dunn, Big Wing: The Biography of Air D-Day veterans.
Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory (Shrewsbury, 31. Ryan, p. 135. Ridgway, p. 9. Warren, p. 63. Gavin, p. 102.
England: Airlife, 1992), pp. 120-21. 32. Ryan, p. 105.
7. Mark Bando, 101st Airborne: The Screaming Eagles at 33. Ibid, p. 135. Moore, p. 14.
Normandy (Osceola, Wisc.: MBI Publishing, 2001), p. 61. 34. Ryan, 130. Young, pp. 110-11. Gavin, p. 103.
8. IX Troop Carrier Command Statistical Control 35. Ambrose, D-Day, p. 205. Ridgway, p. 7.
Office Consolidated Tactical Operational Summary, 36. Ryan, p. 181. Ridgway, pp. 8, 10. Weigley, p. 93.
Operations Neptune, Dragoon, Market (Air Force 37. Moore, pp. 20-21.
Historical Research Agency, call no. 546.308B). Moore, 38. Weigley, pp. 76, 93. Ambrose, Brothers, p. 75.
p. 16. Ridgway, p. 8. Warren, p. 59.
9. Ambrose, Brothers, pp. 66-67. IX Tactical Air 39. Warren, p. 58.
Command Operational Research Section Report no. 47, 40. Wolfe, pp. 97, 111.

Richard K. Smith
An Appreciation

R. Cargill Hall with David Alan Rosenberg
(Overleaf) Richard K. orn on November 2, 1929 in Joliet, Illinois, four When, in the face of atomic attack, Japan sur-
Smith, in his
World at Sea, c. 1952.
(All photos courtesy of
Cargill Hall.)
B days after the “Black Tuesday” stock market
crash precipitated a collapse of economies
around the world, Richard Kenneth Smith grew up
rendered in September 1945, the family returned
to Joliet, Illinois. Dick Smith returned to high
school full time, and graduated in the spring of
a true child of the “Great Depression.” The first of 1947. That fall he entered the University of Illinois
two children born to Raymond K. and Loretta at Champagne-Urbana, where he matriculated for
Cunningham Smith (a sister, Barbara, followed in two years. Uncertain about an academic major or
1931), he spent his first years in Joliet while his a career, in 1949 he abruptly left university and,
father, a mechanical engineer and “steam locomo- emulating his father a generation before, enlisted
tive man par excellence,” traveled widely finding in the United States Merchant Marine. Smith
temporary employment with firms that sold equip- spent the next six years on board various
ment to major railroads. In 1937, Raymond rented American merchant ships hauling all manner of
SMITH the home in Joliet and moved the family to Mexico, goods from port to port around the world. As a
BECAME where he had obtained work with the Mexican mariner, he chose engineering. It meant shifts
FASCINATED state railway system. The family returned briefly worked far below decks, in engine rooms where
WITH AERO- to Joliet in 1938, then back to Mexico and its rail- temperatures rarely dipped below 100 degrees
roads for another year in 1939-1940. The family Fahrenheit. Engineers in the 1950s, he recalled,
NAUTICS AND lived mostly in Mexico City, but eventually moved worked in a hive of pipes and valves, “in a noisy
ITS HISTORY “up country” to the railroad town of Aguas- asbestos world,” and he loved it. Smith took and
calientes. While in Mexico, Dick Smith attended passed maritime exams that advanced him to
local public schools, where he became fluent in Engineer Second Class, which at that time com-
Spanish. manded a salary of $10,000-$12,000 a year—a
December 7, 1941, marked America’s entry into princely sum. His travels at sea took him to
World War II and found the Smith family living in numerous ports of call including Yokohama,
IN 1949 HE Los Angeles, California, where it remained for the Singapore, Colombo, Bombay, Alexandria, Cadiz,
ABRUPTLY duration of the war. Located in the heart of Lisbon, Brest, Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, New
LEFT UNIVER- America’s burgeoning airplane industry, with all of York, New Orleans, and San Francisco.1
SITY AND … the nation’s military and civil airplanes swarming All the while, in his many off-duty hours at sea,
ENLISTED IN noisily through the sky overhead, Smith became Smith read books and journals. He learned
fascinated with aeronautics and its history. German, consumed the “great books” in literature
THE UNITED Already a voracious reader and inveterate movie- and history, fell in love with the works of Rudyard
STATES goer at age twelve, he would eventually turn his Kipling, and maintained and kept annotated cal-
MERCHANT fascination with aeronautics into a vocation. His endars that allowed setting himself easily in time
MARINE father, a veteran chief engineer in the merchant and place many years afterward. But with or with-
marine during and after World War I, enlisted in out records, Dick Smith possessed the remarkable
the United States Navy in 1943 and served as a faculty of near-total, encyclopedic recall. I don’t
reserve officer in the Pacific for the next two years. know whether he developed that ability at sea or,
Ray returned to Seattle, Washington, in early 1945 as I suspect, had it all along. Friends and profes-
where his ship was to be refitted for Operation sional acquaintances could question him about an
Olympic (the invasion of Japan). Needless to say, obscure movie, an airplane, or aeronautical event
the family moved to Seattle and, at age sixteen, and he would have an answer and an explanation
SMITH POS- Dick Smith found a job at the Boeing Airplane of its importance or unimportance in history, most
SESSED THE Company riveting on inboard wing sections of B- often citing a source where you could look up the
REMARK- 29 bombers at 85 cents an hour. details. In my own experience, I have known only
ABLE
FACULTY OF R. Cargill Hall is Emeritus Chief Historian of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an
NEAR-TOTAL, intelligence arm of the Department of Defense. He previously held a variety of posts in the U.S. Air Force
ENCYCLO- History Program including, among other assignments, tours as Contract Histories Manager at the Air
PEDIC Force History Support Office (1989-1998) and as Chief of the Research Division and (concurrently)
RECALL Deputy Director of the USAF Historical Research Agency (1981-1989). Earlier, Hall served as a NASA
historian at Caltech’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Hall is the author of Lunar Impact: A History of
Project Ranger (now online at http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4210/pages/Cover.htm), and is the editor of
Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment; The U. S. Air Force in Space; Early Cold War Overflights,
1950-1956, and Lightning Over Bougainville: The Yamamoto Mission Reconsidered.
Dr. David A. Rosenberg is a Senior Strategic Research Professor at the Naval War College. He
directed Task Force History collecting Navy historical documentation for the Global War on Terror and
Operation Iraqi Freedom for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations in 2003-2004. Rosenberg held the Navy
civilian chair of maritime strategy at the National War College from 1996 to 2003. In 1990-2000, he
helped found the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy while a tenured professor of history at
Temple University, where he remains a Professorial Lecturer. He has served as chair of the Secretary of
the Navy’s Advisory Subcommittee since 1995. He received a B.A. in history from American University,
an MA and Ph.D in history (1983) from the University of Chicago, and has taught at the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the University of Houston.

Lt. JG Smith, 1955. one other historian who shared this remarkable which defied rebuttal. Best known in this regard,
ability. No antiquarian, however, Smith could mar- perhaps, is his seminal article on the interconti-
shal, distill, and synthesize vast amounts of data, nental airliner that appeared in Technology and
and fashion it into compelling generalizations sup- Culture in 1983. It summarily overturned the
ported with insightful illustrations. Employing an cherished historical interpretation of a “DC
engineer’s rigor, he introduced into aeronautical Revolution” in American aeronautics.2
history the mathematics of an airplane’s weight In 1955, at the age of 26, Smith left the
and all-important weight-ratios and structural Merchant Marine and, based on his engineering
loading that compass a vehicle’s performance, and credentials, joined the United States Navy as a

lieutenant, junior grade. He thought at first to go States Naval Institute Press published it as a book
“regular” and make of it a career, but soon changed in 1965—one year before the university awarded
his mind. As he reflected, “the rational operations him his Ph.D. In fact, the University of Chicago
of merchant ships had spoiled me for the Navy and History Department’s maroon edition of his disser-
all its stilted hocus-pocus . . . .” Moreover, “I was a tation is a rebound copy of the Naval Institute
grubby [below decks] engineer and the Navy was book.4 It remains a standard reference on the his-
‘deck officers’ company. For another, I was older tory of the Navy’s dirigibles.
SMITH LEFT than my fellow junior officers and some of them In 1967, Smith signed on as a curator at the
THE NAVY asked me, ‘How did you get to be an officer without Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space
INTENT ON having a college degree?’ as if I had somehow Museum, in Washington, D.C., when it still shared
cheated. My answer was, ‘I brought the Navy six a corner of the brick building next door to the “red
EARNING A years of steamship experience, sonny; and what castle.” He remained with the museum until 1971,
COLLEGE did you bring?’ However, this question of theirs when the non-appropriated funds for his position
DEGREE nagged at me. It was a reminder that the damned expired. During that time he began work on what
college degree was the great loose end of my life.” he hoped would be a multi-volume history of avia-
After his two year tour was up, Smith left the navy tion’s greatest achievement of the 20th century: the
intent on earning a college degree, though he North Atlantic Airway. His second book he envi-
remained in the Naval Reserve. Despite his frus- sioned as the first volume in that series.
trations with the service’s aristocracy, the United Combining his interests in the navy and aviation,
States Navy and its modern history remained a it assayed the United States Navy’s NC-4 transat-
subject of continuing fascination. Smith had first lantic flight of 1919, and won the 1972 history
become interested in the subject as a boy, on learn- manuscript prize of the American Institute of
ing the story of a small table that his father had Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA).5
purchased that contained timbers from the frigate Smith next went to work for the Milton S.
USS Constitution.3 In the years that followed, he Eisenhower Library at Johns Hopkins University.
studied naval history in depth and could expound Working out of Washington, D.C., with support
at length on naval matters with the same com- from Eugene Emme and Walter Bonney at the
pelling narrative and incisive commentary as he NASA History Office, he collected, ordered, and
could on matters of aviation. catalogued the papers of Hugh L. Dryden.6 An
Smith reentered the University of Illinois at eccentric life-long bachelor, he lived in a book-filled
Champagne-Urbana in the fall of 1957, and a year basement apartment in a house he had purchased
later pocketed a Bachelor of Arts degree, and, in on Capitol Hill. The two upstairs floors he rented
1959, a Master of Arts degree, both in history. At to Congressional staffers and government bureau-
SMITH Champagne-Urbana, he studied under the diplo- crats. His lifestyle permitted him to travel exten-
matic historian, Norman Graebner, and the sively in Ireland, England, France, and Germany
SIGNED ON American historian, J. Leonard Bates. He next pursuing research in airline records of transat-
AS A taught at Illinois for a year as a graduate instruc- lantic flight. His bachelor days ultimately ended in
CURATOR AT tor before entering the University of Chicago in 1975, when he married Maria Tursky, a supervi-
THE 1961. At Chicago, William H. McNeill, the brilliant sory librarian at the Library of Congress, and the
SMITHSONIAN historian of global human affairs who would soon two moved upstairs in the house on E Street.
win the National Book Award for The Rise of the After his stint at Johns Hopkins, Smith spent
INSTITU- West, became his advisor. McNeill soon came to two years with a defense contractor. Solicited to
TION’S admire Dick’s intellect, his “active, synthetic write a history of the Cold War Navy, the study
NATIONAL mind,” which, he told him in a note, was “the first was personally commissioned by then Chief of
AIR AND and most important requirement for the study of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
SPACE history.” When his savings ran short, Smith Armed with a security clearance, he was one of the
MUSEUM returned to sea for one year in 1963, then back to first historians to exploit the collection of official
the University of Chicago to finish his Ph.D. command histories at the United States Navy’s
Smith chose as his dissertation topic “The Operational Archives. The resulting 400 page
Airships Akron and Macon: Flying Aircraft unclassified study (of which less than a dozen
Carriers of the United States Navy.” The topic copies were printed) covered the navy’s global
allowed him to combine his two historical pas- activities from World War II through the Gulf of
sions, aviation and naval history. He began Tonkin and provided insight on naval operations
researching the story of United States navy dirigi- still not found in books published since.7 Hoping to
bles after becoming frustrated with the lack of bring the study up through the 1970s, he found
details on them in John Toland’s popular 1950s himself stymied by navy reluctance to grant him
book, Ships in the Sky. Navigating what he called access to critical files and by the service’s lack of a
“the salty vineyard of ships, aircraft, National declassification program that sealed “classified”
Archives, L.C. [Library of Congress] and the Eller records even from the 1920s and 1930s. It led him
Empire [the Navy’s Naval History Division and to testify before Congress in the mid 1970s on the
Operational Archives headed at that time by need to declassify and open government records
retired Rear Admiral Ernest M. Eller],” he com- twenty-five years old and older.
pleted the first draft of his dissertation before he In the late 1970s and early 1980s Dick Smith
entered the University of Chicago. The United taught the history of aeronautics in the engineer-

ing department at the University of Maryland in the World War II exhibits of any aviation museum.
College Park, before retiring to Wilmington, North The reader will find instead “the stuff of ‘aces’ and
Carolina, in 1986. To accompany his course at airplanes and almost no end of sentimental
Maryland, Smith wrote and distributed to his stu- ephemera.” There is not “a word about, much less
dents brief monographs and case studies on vari- a sample of, this dramatically simple invention
ous aspects of flight, each one insightful, almost all that . . . carried American combat aviation to the
of them unpublished. (Assembled with his other ends of the earth.” 10
published articles and ordered chronologically and Smith’s contribution that compassed airplane
topically, they would comprise in print a formida- performance, “The Weight Envelope: An Airplane’s
ble textbook on the history of aeronautics.) In Fourth Dimension . . . Aviation’s Bottom Line,”
Wilmington during the 1980s, Smith served as the appeared in Aerospace Historian in 1986, and was
American editor of Flight International, main- quickly picked up and reprinted as a feature tech-
tained an extensive correspondence with aeronau- nical article by the International Society of Allied
tical pioneers he had met and with historians and Weight Engineers in 1987.11 It summed up ideas
students who sought his counsel, while continuing he had been fashioning since the early 1960s,
to produce aeronautical history of the first order. when United States aeronautical firms controlled
His articles on transatlantic flight for the the market for subsonic airliners, and the British
SMITH American Aviation Historical Society Journal and French signed a treaty to jointly develop a
TAUGHT THE remain expository classics that explained how and supersonic Mach 2.2 airliner, eventually known as
HISTORY OF why American airliners dominated their European the Concorde. The Soviet Union responded with its
AERONAU- counterparts in international traffic from the own supersonic transport (SST), the Tupolev
TICS IN THE 1930s until the arrival of the Anglo-French A300B Tu–144. The United States briefly joined in “the
Airbus in 1974—with World War II the catalyst for SST race,” with Boeing winning a design competi-
ENGINEERING intercontinental air travel.8 Between 1919 and tion for a Mach 3 giant that weighed nearly twice
DEPARTMENT 1939, Smith observed, aircraft, including dirigi- that of its competitors. But the enormous national
AT THE bles, had flown the North Atlantic but a few dozen cost to subsidize its development prompted the
UNIVERSITY times, and in the latter year scheduled commercial United States Congress to decline the honor, and
OF airline service had just begun operating two flights Boeing’s effort ended later in the decade. This fol-
a week via the Azores. “When Germany surren- lowed a national debate in which historians
MARYLAND dered on 7 May 1945 the Atlantic was literally Richard Smith and Ronald Davies at the air and
being criss-crossed by more than a dozen routes, space museum, and Robert Perry at the RAND
and with more than a dozen organizations—civil Corporation, among others who “ran the numbers,”
and military—operating hundreds of aircraft daily argued at AIAA meetings that a commercial SST
. . ..”9 The same explosion in international aerial could not be built to operate economically, much
movement occurred in the Pacific Theater of war, less recoup its cost of development. In the event,
with Hawaii serving as the stepping-stone on the they were absolutely right. When in February 1973
way to Australia and Japan. the sleek, pencil-thin delta-winged supersonic
If World War II catalyzed intercontinental aer- Concorde production model became ready for the
ial navigation and conclusively demonstrated the airlines of the world to exercise their options, none
might of military air power, what logistical miracle did. Carrying only 125 passengers, each seat per
created overnight the airfields that permitted flight cost thousands of dollars; only the British
these thousands of new, heavier airplanes to take and French national airlines could be dragooned
off, land, and be serviced all around the globe? into operating these airplanes. Catering to the rich
AERONAUTI- Smith turned to that question in research at the and famous, they would fly on transatlantic routes
CAL AND United States Air Force Historical Research Agen- and charter runs for the next thirty years.12
cy in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1987-1988. He Beside his extensive correspondence, and
NAVAL HIS- answered it in “Marston Mat: Footprint of Air- because of his contributions to the literature, aero-
TORIANS IN power,” which appeared in Air Force Magazine in nautical and naval historians in this country and
THIS COUN- 1989. Bull dozers and novel pierced steel planking abroad often referred graduate students or col-
TRY AND had quickly provided runways for American mili- leagues to Smith for advice, especially in his retire-
ABROAD tary airplanes everywhere they went: “It was ten ment at Wilmington. And he always took time to
feet long, fifteen inches wide, covering 12.5 square reply, often with multi-page letters that outlined
OFTEN feet with a surface resembling Swiss cheese research needed for significant thesis topics, or the
REFERRED stamped out of steel, and it weighed 66.2 pounds. best methods to secure an historical publication. In
GRADUATE Locked together, 60,000 of them created a durable one instance, the person charged with organizing
STUDENTS all-weather surface 5,000 feet long and 150 feet and producing an anniversary history in three
OR COL- wide that routinely accepted punishment from air- years for the International Federation of Auto-
LEAGUES TO planes weighing up to 60,000 pounds thumping matic Control (IFAC) contacted Smith, described
down at speeds of ninety miles an hour.” He his plans, and asked him whether he could recom-
SMITH FOR ranked this innovation “as one of the most subtle, mend an accomplished graduate student who
ADVICE versatile, and ultimately devastating ‘secret might manage it for the federation. Smith replied:
weapons’ of World War II.” But however vital to the
success of wartime air power, Smith observed I’ve . . . come to the conclusion that you’re not going
tartly, a Marston mat “will not be found . . . among to find any ONE person to put together a satisfac-

Smith at home in
Wilmington, with Boeing
XB–47 test pilot Robert M.
Robbins (at left) in 1993.
SMITH WAS tory literary product within the next three years. Auburn University,14 Tom Crouch and Von
ALMOST Least of all capable of producing what you desire is Hardesty at the NASM, and Joe Guilmartin at The
ALWAYS a graduate student of any description. You want a Ohio State University, to name a few. For those
Rolls Royce but the best a grad student might be who knew him and appreciated his work, his intel-
OUTSPOKEN, able to produce is a gold-plated skateboard framed lectual mastery of aeronautics more than compen-
OFTEN IRAS- in neon with a lot of rhetorical bells and cheap sated for his eccentricities. His periodic evening or
CIBLE, AND philosophical whistles. weekend phone calls to his “students,” often run-
WITHOUT ning on for an hour or more, were always an enter-
FAIL ACERBIC Along with his single-spaced, seven-page letter, taining and sagacious experience.
IN HIS COM- Smith enclosed electrostatic selections from two In the 1990s, under contract to the Air Force
successful anniversary history volumes, one by the History and Museums Program, Smith researched
MENTARIES British Institution of Naval Architects and the and wrote a history of inflight refueling. A much-
other by the American Society of Naval Architects condensed version of the manuscript appeared in
and Marine Engineers, and his recommendation 1998 on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the first
that the IFAC could achieve what it wanted in the aerial refueling.15 Based on previous work, he could
time available only by inviting and ordering explain how and why the Europeans, especially the
papers in an anthology. His reasoned letter wasn’t British in the late 1930s, fixed on this technique as
the answer wanted. After several months passed the most reasonable way to extend the range of
without the courtesy of a reply, Smith sent along a overweight commercial airliners. American aero-
copy of his response upon which he had penned: nautical firms, on the other hand, extended the
“I’ve not heard a whisper from him. I get weary of range of their airliners by reducing tare weight and
these FREELOADERS!” increasing engine horsepower, among other meth-
In person, Dick Smith was almost always out- ods, before World War II intervened. Not until the
spoken, often irascible, and without fail acerbic in late 1940s, when leaders of a newly formed United
HIS INTEL- his commentaries. He had zero tolerance for those States Air Force contemplated the task of striking
LECTUAL who, by virtue of their publications, he judged fatu- the Soviet Union with manned bombers in the
MASTERY OF ous and feckless members of the academy. His own event of another war, did this method of range
AERONAU- contributions were of substance, the stuff of classi- extension come into its own. The development and
TICS MORE cal history via the University of Chicago, leavened introduction of inflight refueling of military air-
THAN COM- with an engineer’s careful analysis, devoid of the planes, orchestrated by General Curtis E. LeMay,
fads and fancies that beset American history Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air
PENSATED departments later in the twentieth century. In the Command, became so successful that it essentially
FOR HIS 1980s a newly minted Ph.D. had published a pré- disappeared from view. As Smith phrased it, those
ECCEN- cis of his dissertation in Technology and Culture, who daily flew air force and navy aerial tankers on
TRICITIES which attempted to explain how and why metal vital refueling missions in Southeast Asia, and,
had replaced wood in primary aero structures. later in Operation Desert Storm, became “invisible
Asked to comment on the work, Smith, who would men in invisible airplanes.” But, he was quick to
briefly cover the subject for the National Air and add, the United States Air Force’s proud claim of
Space Museum,13 replied mordantly: “He had only “Global Reach, Global Power” rested entirely on
to build a canoe in his garage to answer that ques- invisible inflight refueling.
tion.” But those he judged worthy of praise At the end of the 1980s, after a protracted delay,
received it: James Hansen and William Trimble at the Department of State released documents on

his petition, and Dick Smith finished one other our death.” For Dick Smith in Wilmington, North
manuscript, a biography of Frank G. Tinker, Jr. A Carolina that date fell on 2 October 2003—four
1933 Naval Academy graduate at the depth of the weeks shy of his seventy-fourth birthday and just
Great Depression, Tinker found himself, among ten weeks before the centennial he wished to cele-
numerous other members of his class, without a brate at Kitty Hawk on the nearby Outer Banks.
commission because the required naval billets In Europe, meanwhile, officials of the British and
were not funded. He subsequently qualified as a French national airlines announced that the
naval aviator, was dismissed, and, later in the supersonic Concorde, technological marvel and
decade flew for the Republicans during the economic white elephant, would be retired from
Spanish Civil War commanding a squadron of service. The last of them touched down, to be
Soviet aviators. Tinker died later under mysteri- towed away to aeronautical museums, not long
ous circumstances in Missouri during World War after Smith’s death. With their passing, an era in
II. The volume, using German and Spanish aeronautics drew to a close. ■
sources replete with maps, sheds considerable
light on the air war in Spain, but at the end of the The Historiographical Dictum
WITH THE 1990s it sat on a shelf in Smith’s library.16 During
According to Smith:
TURN OF THE a visit, I inquired of him why he hadn’t pursued
MILLENNIUM, publication. “By the time I finished it,” he replied, If you can measure
SMITH’S “I found that I didn’t care for the man.” Typical That of which you speak
Smith. After some prodding, he released the work And express it in numbers,
HEALTH AND and it is now in the hands of Joe Guilmartin,
EYESIGHT pending publication.
You will know something
BEGAN TO With the turn of the Millennium, Smith’s Of your subject;
DETERIO- health and eyesight began to deteriorate sharply, But if you cannot measure it,
RATE and he steeled himself for “the end.” His one goal: And cannot express it in numbers,
living to celebrate the centennial of powered flight
in December 2003. Over a cup of hot tea he looked Your knowledge will always
up with a wry smile, fixed me with dark eyes, and be unsatisfactory.
said, “Each of us unknowingly passes a major William Thomson, Lord Kelvin of Largs
milestone in our lives every year. It is the date of
(1824-1907)
NOTES
1. Smith avoided maritime assignments that would 9. “Fifty Years of Transatlantic Flight,” Part 1, p. 99.
take him to Australia. The Australian longshoremen’s 10. “Marston Mat,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 72, No. 4,
union, he said, had exceptionally arcane work rules and April 1989, passim. The USAF Museum in Dayton, Ohio,
would strike without notice if any of them were judged it must be said, has since included pierced steel planking
abridged. Merchant vessels could be delayed for days and in one of its World War II displays.
even weeks, while labor negotiations were conducted, dis- 11. “The Weight Envelope: An Airplane’s Fourth
rupting shipping pickup and delivery schedules so badly Dimension . . . Aviation’s Bottom Line,” Aerospace
that it sometimes caused the loss of planned business. Historian (now Air Power History), Vol. 33, No. 1, Spring
2. Richard K. Smith, “The Intercontinental Airliner 1986; and Weight Engineering, Vol. 47, No. 1, Summer
and the Essence of Airplane Performance, 1929-1939,” 1987.
Technology and Culture, Vol. 24, No. 3, July 1983. 12. In addition to its passengers and luggage, on each
3. The U.S. Navy had approved the sale of tables and transatlantic flight the Concorde carried 100 tons of fuel,
desks containing the timbers in a fundraising campaign about 80 tons per passenger if the airplane was full, and
to preserve this War of 1812 veteran for posterity. it frequently was not. Elsewhere, in the absence of any
4. The Airships Akron & Macon: Aircraft Carriers of the plutocrat customers in the USSR, the unfortunate TU-
U.S. Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1965). 144 never entered airline service, and, after some limited
5. First Across! The U.S. Navy’s Transatlantic Flight of freight runs between Moscow and Alma Ata, these SSTs
1919 (Naval Institute Press, 1973). were mothballed or consigned to museums at the end of
6. Dryden served as director of research for the the 1970s.
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) 13. See R. K. Smith, “Better: The Quest for Excellence,”
1947-1958 and deputy administrator of the National in John Greenwood, ed., Milestones of Aviation;
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) from Smithsonian Institution National Air and Space Museum
1958 until his death in 1965. Johns Hopkins University (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1989), which sketches significant
Press published Smith’s finding guide to the Dryden improvements in the airplane, 1908-1989.
papers in 1973: The Hugh L. Dryden Papers, 1898-1965. 14. Auburn University received as a bequest Smith’s
7. Cold War Navy (Falls Church, Virginia: Lulejian and extensive papers and library collection, which, it is safe to
Associates, Inc., Contract N00014-75-C-1001, March say, will occupy graduate students for several years
1976). A copy is available at the Operational archives, ordering and cataloguing them.
Naval Historical Center, in the Washington Navy Yard. 15. 75 Years of Inflight Refueling: Highlights, 1923-1998
8. “The Superiority of the American Transoceanic (Washington, D.C., USAF History and Museums
Airliner 1932-1939,” American Aviation Historical Program, U.S. GPO, 1998). Smith’s complete inflight refu-
Society Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2, summer 1984, and “Fifty eling history remains to be printed.
Years of Transatlantic Flight,” Parts 1 and 2, AAHS 16. Ace of Chaos: Frank G. Tinker and the Air War in
Journal, Vol. 35, Nos. 2 and 3, summer/fall 1990. Spain.

Open Skies Policy
and the Origin of the
U.S. Space Program

Lester F. Rentmeester
I
(Overleaf) The SR–71 n a 1946 speech at Fulton, Missouri, Britain’s
Blackbird, fastest of the
airborne reconnaissance Winston Churchill declared that an “iron cur-
platforms. tain” had descended over Europe to separate
(Right) George W. the East and the West. Indeed, by 1948, the USSR
Goddard, shown here as a achieved control of Eastern European countries.
colonel.
When the Soviets exploded their own atomic bomb
in 1949, it caused many in the U.S. to fear that
they might use this weapon to achieve their expan-
sionist ambitions. The period of mutual distrust
and antagonism between the two nations could
properly be called the forty-five-year Cold War.
Early in this period, President Harry Truman
implemented the Truman Doctrine, asserting that
Soviet aggression would be stopped at the north-
ern boundaries of Greece and Turkey. My role in
implementing this national policy was as an advi-
sor to the Turkish Air Force, in developing their
reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities.
In April 1950, President Truman ordered the
IN 1951, … I National Security Council (NSC) to prepare NSC-
68, a policy paper authorizing major military force
LEARNED OF and expending up to 20 percent of our GNP, to
THE HIGH meet a Communist threat anywhere in the world.
PRIORITY Two months later, North Korean forces invaded Detection devices of all types were gradually
PLACED ON South Korea. In his usual firm manner, Truman established around the Soviet Union. The National
DEFINING rallied United Nations forces to defend South Security Agency was created in 1952, to gather
Korea. communications intelligence (COMINT). Aircraft
SOVIET Upon my assignment to the Air Force head- equipped with electronic gear gathered intelli-
STRATEGIC quarters in 1951, with responsibility for develop- gence to determine the Soviet Union’s air defense
CAPABILITIES ment of reconnaissance and intelligence systems, I radar order of battle. Cameras, with very long focal
AND learned of the high priority placed on defining Soviet lengths were installed in high-flying aircraft to
INTENTIONS strategic capabilities and intentions. That winter, photograph deep into the Communist bloc. Maj.
the Air Force had procured the Beacon Hill Study in Gen. George W. Goddard, the “father of aerial
Project Lincoln at the Massachusetts Institute of reconnaissance,” who had survived five aircraft
Technology. Among the outstanding scientists at crashes since his pilot training in World War I, suf-
that time were James Killian, James Baker, and fered his first injury, a broken leg, when he fell off
Richard Leghorn. Issued in June 1952, the Beacon a huge camera installed in a C–97.
Hill study reported on intelligence future forecast- In 1952, the U.S. exploded a hydrogen bomb
ing. In research and development, the Reconnais- device; the USSR tested their version the following
sance Working Group was established in 1952. Its year. The Air Force’s Strategic Air Command
members worked closely with Beacon Hill. Because (SAC), which had been established in 1946, had to
of the Air Force’s major role in ICBM development be modernized and expanded. However, the Air
and in strategic reconnaissance, the group’s report Force did not have the resources for this until the
was regarded highly. It stressed the fact that every Korean War liberated funding.
nation’s skies should be open for inspection of their In response to the USSR atomic bomb, the Air
military capabilities; their conclusions were stated Force needed intercontinental ballistic missiles
in an Open Skies report. (ICBMs) to destroy strategic targets. However, U.S.
EVERY Many other activities were aimed at divining knowledge of the number and location of enemy
NATION’S USSR intentions. In 1947, the Air Force had estab- targets, the input to ICBM guidance systems, and
SKIES lished its Long-Range Detection Program to moni- USAF charts were found to be grossly deficient. In
SHOULD BE tor the Soviet nuclear program. Its air-sampling March 1954, the Air Force Secretary Harold
capability discovered that the USSR had exploded Talbott directed that the missile program receive
OPEN FOR all necessary funding. Development of the Atlas
a nuclear bomb in August 1949.
INSPECTION
OF THEIR
MILITARY Col. Lester F. Rentmeester, USAF (Ret.) was born in Green Bay, Wisconsin. He attended St. Norbert
High School and College, the University of Wisconsin at Madison, the Air Force Institute of Technology,
CAPABILITIES the Army War College, George Washington University, and NOVA University. Colonel Rentmeester
earned the B.S., M.B.A., M.P.A., and D.P.A. degrees. During his thirty-one-year military career, which
included thirty combat missions as a B–17 pilot over Europe in World War II, he was chiefly involved
in research and development of intelligence programs. He initiated the first U.S. satellite program. In
retirement, he has taught graduate courses at NOVA University and the Florida Institute of
Technology. He has written eight books, including seven in collaboration with his wife, Jeanne. He has
also written a dozen articles in various journals, such as American Heritage.

Maj. Gen. Goddard, as a
lieutenant, prepares to
photgraph an eclipse in
1925.
FEAR OF A
SURPRISE
ATTACK WAS
SO GREAT
THAT USAF
COMMAN-
DERS
CONDUCTED
RECONNAIS- and Titan ICBMs, both with a 5,000-mile range, In our efforts to develop long focal-length
SANCE was stressed. The Thor, a 1,500-mile intermediate lenses, we had to create a new production process.
OVER- range ballistic missile (IRBM) was developed and Our best optics had been produced at an optical
FLIGHTS OF tested rapidly – in less than four years— for use glass works in West Germany, but even they could
THE USSR’S against closer targets. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, not provide the huge long-focal length optics that
BORDERS SAC’s commander-n-chief, insisted that the we wanted. This required a continuous flow-cast-
Pentagon provide the means to identify and locate ing process involving close temperature control
ALMOST the targets necessary to carry out his mission. over a long distance. The major U.S. optics produc-
CONTINU- Fear of a surprise attack was so great that ers cooperated with the Air Force and other gov-
ALLY USAF commanders conducted reconnaissance ernment agencies to solve the problem. During one
overflights of the USSR’s borders almost continu- step in the project, we borrowed a million dollars
ally. When Gen. Nathan Twining was Air Force worth of platinum, needed for temperature control
chief of staff, he claimed that he had forty-seven from the U.S. Treasury and transferred it to the
planes fly over the USSR at one time.1 However, Bureau of Standards for prototype testing.
this type of reconnaissance (even if it was true) Col. Joseph J. Pellegrini, who managed the
would not have provided the necessary intelligence reconnaissance research and development at the
on a possible Soviet missile and bomber in that Air Research and Development Command (later
nation’s interior. called Air Force Systems Command), was the key
Some of our efforts to obtain information on figure in developing new programs. In August
Soviet capabilities and intentions bordered on the 1953, he initiated study contracts with Bell,
desperate. The Air Force took over a Navy research Martin, Lockheed, and Fairchild for designs of a
THE TWO balloon project and attached to it a 1,400-pound very high-altitude photo-reconnaissance aircraft.
MOST camera package, so that it could take aerial pho- In an effort to keep the other military services
PROMISING tographs, while floating over the Soviet Union. When from competing with us, he tied up all of the wind
PROJECTS my boss, Maj. Gen. Donald Yates, was briefed on the tunnel facilities in the United States with con-
FOR PHOTO- project, he said that he thought that we were crazy, tracts to the Air Force. His office pursued an
but authorized the $5 million to initiate the project. aggressive course with the major aircraft compa-
RECONNAIS- We soon found that winds at altitudes over 100,000- nies to produce designs for aircraft, satellite and
SANCE WERE feet blew from east to west, instead of the westerlies component systems, even before we had sufficient
A VERY HIGH found at lower altitudes. On our first flight to the funds and authority for hardware development.
ALTITUDE west from Japan, the automatic timer released the It was a heady time for dreaming and schem-
AIRCRAFT camera package too soon and it fell in downtown ing of ways to counter the Soviet threat. Col.
Warsaw. However, enough of the 500 balloons used Richard “Dick” Leghorn, a key figure in the USAF
AND A in the project blundered over some Soviet targets to Open Skies group and Dr. Duncan MacDonald,
RECONNAIS- make the project worthwhile. There were many another member, were gathering ideas from mem-
SANCE other projects like this, some not as haphazard as bers of the scientific community. Those that we
SATELLITE the balloon program, as we in research and develop- considered useful, we turned over to RAND
ment tried to satisfy the SAC’s need to define the Corporation, a USAF-funded think tank that had
Soviet threat. The two most promising projects for been studying the concept of an Experimental
photo-reconnaissance were a very high altitude air- World-Circling Spaceship, since 1946. One of our
craft and a reconnaissance satellite. primary concerns during this period was the legal-

The author, in uniform.
(Photo courtesy of the
author.)
WHEN THE
USSR
ORBITED THE
FIRST
SATELLITE, ity of using the skies over other sovereign nations Gardner. When President Eisenhower was briefed
NOBODY for our purposes. We asked our think tanks, plus in November 1954, he liked the concept but didn’t
WORRIED the experts at the Air Command and Staff School want it to be a military project. Our Air Force
and the Air War College to produce studies on briefer, Col. Paul Gremmler, told us that Ike said
ABOUT space law to justify our position. that he didn’t want a blue-suiter (Air Force) pilot
SPACE LAW As it turned out, when the USSR orbited the flying any missions and asked Allen Dulles, head
ANY LONGER first satellite, nobody worried about space law any of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) whether
longer. The Soviets did protest in November 1960, his outfit could do the job. That’s how CIA got into
that satellite photographs were illegal, no matter the project and, incidentally, thwarted Pellegrini’s
what the altitude from which they were taken. plan to freeze out other agencies by tying up all of
However, they soon developed their own electro- the wind tunnels. (Generals Twining and LeMay
optical system, with real-time imaging capability.2 were so sure that the Air Force would take over the
Colonel Pellegrini’s request for proposals U–2 program that they furnished the $22 million
(RFP) for a one-man, high-altitude reconnaissance dollars and 30 Pratt and Whitney J57 engines for
aircraft, which could operate at 70,000-feet alti- the initial 20 aircraft.)4
tude, went to four different aircraft manufacturers Meanwhile, Col. Victor Genez in Pellegrini’s
in August 1953. The competition resulted in the office, worked with us in going to manufacturers to
Bell X–16. determine how the five subsystems, such as,
THE AIR Meanwhile, in early 1954, the Air Force propulsion, airframe, cameras, etc., could provide
FORCE accepted the proposal submitted by Kelly Johnson us with a workable reconnaissance satellite.
ACCEPTED of Lockheed because it would produce an accept- Because of the constraints, we selected a television
THE PRO- able aircraft in the shortest possible time. The U–2 camera that would transmit its signal to three
POSAL … OF (U for utility) aircraft was 63-feet long, had a 104- ground stations in the United States. This system
LOCKHEED foot wing span, weighed 17,000 pounds, and could led to the first project name, Feedback. Because of
cruise at 430 miles-per-hour at an altitude over the low resolution of the images, the system was
BECAUSE IT 70,000 feet for a 4,000-mile range. The photo- later discarded for this program although it was
WOULD PRO- graphic package in an interchangeable nose of the used a decade later in NASA’s RANGER program.
DUCE AN airplane was a 36-inch folded-lens camera The Feedback name for the project was changed
ACCEPTABLE designed by James Baker. Other interchangeable often: SENTRY, SAMOS, and PIED PIPER; KEY-
AIRCRAFT IN noses contained receivers of electronic intelligence, HOLE was the name for various photographic sys-
signal intelligence, etc. Although the wing-span of tems, KH-1, KH-2, etc.
THE the U–2 was similar to the B–17 that I flew over We used the RAND people to collect the ideas
SHORTEST Germany in World War II, its powerful J57 engine, from people concerned with the project. In October
POSSIBLE its light weight and its immense wing area were 1954, they briefed my boss, Maj. Gen. James McCor-
TIME designed to take it to altitudes out of reach of the mack, and others in the Pentagon. With General
Soviet surface-to-air missiles.3 McCormack’s approval, I wrote a formal directive for
This high-altitude proposal was approved by the program, as Weapon System 117L, Advanced
Lt. Gen. Donald Putt, who was in charge of USAF Reconnaissance System, requesting $12 million
development, Generals LeMay and Twining, and immediately and designating October 1956 as target
Air Force Assistant Secretary for R&D Trevor date for the launch of the first United States satellite.

The U–2, among the earli-
est strategic reconnais-
sance platforms.
BRIEFINGS
ON THE
RECONNAIS-
SANCE
SATELLITE,
U–2 AND A Today, school children know about spacecraft; Khruschev was cool to his proposal.
VARIETY OF their operation had to be explained to the five At that time I was stationed in Germany, fly-
OTHER COL- major generals, heads of directorates, whose ing some of the special reconnaissance aircraft.
approval was needed for the project because hun- Two aircraft from my unit were shot down over the
LECTION dreds of millions of dollars would be needed in USSR in 1958, a C–118 and a communications-
PROGRAMS future years. One asked me what held the satellite intelligence C–130.6
WERE PRE- up without wings. My answer used the example of Colleagues from the Pentagon, bent on such
SENTED the moon as a satellite of the Earth and planet tasks as briefing Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and
Earth as a satellite of the sun. When I was explain- the King of Norway, would keep me informed. The
ing to another about Keplerian motion and decay- Eisenhower administration viewed the Vanguard
ing orbits, he said, “Do you mean to stand there as a “stalking horse for the classified military
and tell me that thing will come back to Earth and reconnaissance satellites that were to follow. In
probably hit me in the back of the head when I’m July 1956, the first operational U–2 landed at my
not looking?” air base; friends accompanying the aircraft said
At last the project was off and running. that they were assigned to the 1st Weather
Lockheed had the most responsibility for the Reconnaissance Squadron, a statement accompa-
reconnaissance package and later replaced the TV nied with a grin. My squadron flew support mis-
camera with high resolution optics in a system sions for them to bases like Adana in Turkey,
with high-pointing accuracy. In March 1955, Col. Peshawar in Pakistan and Bodo in Norway.7
Gremmler wrote a General Operational Require- My wife, Jeanne, and I were on vacation in
ment that further refined the system require- Valencia, Spain, on October 5, 1957, when we came
IN JULY 1956, ments in my WS-117L directive. down to breakfast in our hotel to find the head-
THE FIRST Briefings on the reconnaissance satellite, U–2 lines proclaim the orbiting of a Soviet satellite, a
and a variety of other collection programs were technological first. We could feel the dramatic
OPERA- presented to escalating levels of the Department of change of attitude of Europeans toward
TIONAL U–2 Defense and the CIA during the latter part of Americans. The superman American who had con-
LANDED AT 1954. The CIA program director, who later was tributed so much to World War II, who had fur-
MY AIR BASE responsible for the Bay of Pigs operation, worked nished a generous Marshall Plan to resuscitate
in coordination with the Air Force and Lockheed, impoverished nations, who had produced hydrogen
resulting in the first U–2 flight in August 1955.5 bombs, and other technological triumphs, was now
Colonel Pelligrini briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff inferior to the Soviets in the minds of many peo-
in December 1954, and the National Security ple- This mood was reflected in a chagrined
Council received approval of the Open Skies Policy America. Eisenhower signed a National Defense
from Eisenhower in early 1955, following the Education Act, authorizing huge sums of money to
Killian Committee’s report in February. A few correct educational deficiencies. This act bolstered
months later, at a superpower conference in math, science, and foreign language training at all
Geneva in July 1955, Eisenhower proposed, as a levels. Many people thought that Sputnik was evi-
step to prevent nuclear war, that nations give each dence that the Russians had a superior school sys-
other the right to use their airspace in an Open tem which caused school children to stretch their
Skies Policy to prevent surprises. Nikita intellectual capacities to the utmost.

An artist’s rendering of a
Global Positioning System
satellite.
THE U–2 AIR-

CRAFT FLEW
TWENTY-
SEVEN SUC-
CESSFUL MIS-
SIONS FROM A congressional committee, chaired by Senator gap” that President Kennedy bewailed in his 1960
1956 UNTIL Lyndon Johnson, worked with the President to expe- campaign proved to not be as much of a threat as
ONE WAS dite numerous programs, all in the name of national the intelligence community had concluded.
SHOT DOWN defense. In fact, the Soviets helped the United States However, identifying Soviet ICBM sites was
ON MAY 1, program by flaunting their technological superiority. the first part of the problem. It was still necessary
1960 A cartoon in their Krokodil magazine showed golf- to provide navigational information to our ICBMs,
addict Eisenhower addressing his golf ball on a tee which would guide them with sufficient accuracy
with, “Now go into orbit!” It was true that the first to destroy a “hardened” target.
U.S. satellite, Explorer I, launched on January 31, The most needed information was the location
1958, was golf ball size compared to the Sputnik II, of the targets in relation to the ICBM launch point.
which carried a live dog. Explorer I found the Van An ICBM travels a parabolic arc, from launch site to
Allen radiation belt, which caused great concern at target. Since the North American continent was tied
first, until its properties were found to be less harm- to Europe with a single SHORAN measurement, a
ful than at first thought. World Geodetic System was required, locating three
The U–2 aircraft flew twenty-seven successful axes points on a mathematical model for the Earth.
missions from 1956 until one was shot down on The second item needed was a mapping satel-
May 1, 1960, disrupting a Khrushchev-Eisenhower lite, with special mapping cameras and photogram
conference. The resulting U–2 photographs soon metric lenses for the required accuracy measure-
showed no massive USSR buildup in their ICBM ments.
and bomber programs. In an attempt to quell Third, our ICBM’s required precision-pointing
interservice rivalry, development of the reconnais- accuracy and knowledge of gravity anomalies in
A RECON- sance satellite was transferred for awhile to a the Earth’s crust that could pull the ICBM off its
NAISSANCE research group, the Advanced Research Projects preplanned course. A collection program was initi-
SATELLITE Agency (ARPA) in the Department of Defense. ated to collect these data.
WAS Subsequently, a reconnaissance satellite was President Johnson had followed this program
LAUNCHED IN launched in 1959, and the program began in closely ever since he chaired the Senate committee
1959, AND THE earnest at the end of 1960. that was concerned with satellites. In a March 1967
Subsequently control of the reconnaissance speech at Nashville, he proudly reported on the suc-
PROGRAM satellite was tranferred to the National Recon- cess of the reconnaissance satellite. He said that the
BEGAN IN naissance Office (NRO). The two major reasons $35-40 billion dollars that the U.S. had spent on the
EARNEST AT why the photo reconnaissance satellite develop- program had resulted in information worth ten
THE END OF ment was delayed for four years were: first, the times as much. A couple of months later, as a repre-
1960 success of the U–2 aircraft in locating and identi- sentative of the Defense Intelligence Agency, I gave
fying targets for the Strategic Air Command, and a speech on a related subject to the American
second, the difficulty in selecting a booster to put Association of Geographers at Toronto, Canada. The
the first U.S. satellite in orbit. The Army’s Jupiter main theme of the speech was that it was now pos-
C, with strap-on rockets, won over the Navy sible to collect many types of geographic information
Vanguard and the Air Force Atlas. The “missile and store it in a universal cartographic data base in

An artist’s rendering of a
MILSTAR satellite.
TODAY,
SATELLITE
INTELLI-
GENCE
COLLECTION such a way to easily provide such products as inven- the most recent was by President George H. W.
IS AN tories of worldwide food crops, measurement of flood Bush during Desert Storm. It is now an agreed
areas, and plant disease detection and control. A upon requirement for nations living together in
ACCEPTED Canadian magazine asked permission to print the peace through major arms agreements, such as the
PROCEDURE, article. That the Soviets had a keen interest in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Strategic
ACKNOWL- subject was evident a couple of years later when a Arms Reduction Treaty, Intermediate-and
EDGED BY CIA colleague asked me to evaluate an article that Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Threshold
WORLD they had purchased from a Soviet source for Test Ban Treaty, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
$10,000. It was a copy of my 1967 Toronto speech, Treaty, three chemical weapons agreements, and
LEADERS which was printed in the magazine! the Open Skies Treaty.
Today, satellite intelligence collection is an In March 1992, twenty-six nations signed the
accepted procedure, acknowledged by world lead- Open Skies Treaty, which commits member
ers. Imaging techniques produce photographs nations in North America and Eurasia to open
capable of identifying small objects on the Earth’s their airspace, on a reciprocal basis, to permit the
surface, define heat sources with infrared lenses, overflight of their territory by unarmed observa-
find metal with magnetic detectors, use radar to tion aircraft. This is a breakthrough made possible
spot movements, and monitor maritime activity. because of the capabilities of both American and
Communications, including electronic emissions, Russia satellites. The constellations of military
are routinely intercepted and analyzed. An exam- satellites, now orbiting Earth, have a capability for
ple of the improvement in performance of recon- photo reconnaissance, radar reconnaissance, sig-
naissance satellites is the comparison between the nal intelligence, missile warning, military naviga-
objectives stated in the 1954 development direction and military communications. The orbiting
tive for a resolution of 50-foot objects by the televi- reconnaissance platforms deter aggression by
sion system from a 300- mile high orbit, to the cur- making it virtually impossible to hide military
rent Keyhole cameras that can detect objects as threats. The Open Skies policy can provide a model
small as six inches from a 150-mile high orbit. and a stepping stone during the formation of a new
Succeeding presidents cited the Open Skies policy to help define the role that the U.S. will play
Policy as an integral part of this nation’s agenda; internationally. ■
NOTES
1. Michael Beschloss, Mayday, New York: Harper and Operation Overflight by Francis Gary Powers, New York:
Row, 1986, p. 78. Holt Rinehart & Wilson, 1970.
2. Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives and 4. Michael Beschloss, op.cit., p.85.
Records Administration, Summer 1996, Vol. 28, No. 2. 5. Ben R. Rich, op .cit. Rich stated “to put an airplane in
3. Two books describing the aircraft development and the sky in 8 months was a tremendous achievement.” p. l32.
capabilities are Skunk Works by Ben R. Rich and Leo 6. See Michael Beschloss, Mayday, op. cit.
Janos, New York: Little Brown & Co., 1994, and 7. Ben R. Rich, op .cit. p. l32.

Book Reviews
Milestones of the First Century of taining beautiful photographs, would make Givens succeeds admirably in defining
Flight. By F. Clifton Berry, Jr. Charlottes- a nice gift for any aerospace buff. boundaries and key features for the elusive
ville, Virginia: Howell Press, Inc., 2002. Maps. concept of maneuver through these exam-
Photographs. Bibliography. Index. Pp.214. William A. Nardo, NASM Docent ples. The resulting definition of maneuver
$35.00 ISBN: 1-57427-076-1 warfare does not set up a strawman argu-
◆◆◆◆◆◆ ment tailor-made for historical examples of
Mr. Berry has been involved with avia- air power. On the contrary, inclusion of the
tion since he participated in the 1948-49 Turning the Vertical Flank: Air power requirements that a maneuver force must be
Berlin Airlift. Since then he has been an as a Maneuver Force in the Theater able to compel battle, establish a zone of
active pilot with land and seaplane ratings Campaign. By Lt. Col. Robert P. Givens, influence, and shock the enemy forces makes
and is also a master parachutist. He has USAF. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University proving his thesis far more difficult. It also
written hundreds of articles for magazines Press, 2002. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. makes his work far more effective at silenc-
and is the author or co-author of eight books Index. Pp. xi, 85. Paperback. ISBN: 1-58566- ing recent air power critics. The assertion
on international aerospace subjects. 108-2 that air power lacks shock, compellence, and
In honor of the first 100 years of flight, influence capabilities lies at the heart of the
the Aerospace Industries Association of In this monograph, Lt. Co.l Givens argument that air power is only a form of
America decided to convene a panel of aero- argues effectively that air power can be used precision fire, and not a maneuver force. The
space experts with the mission to select the as a maneuver force in a theater campaign. author’s choice of ancient and pre-modern
100 most important and influential events Some airmen might suggest he is merely historical examples also lends credibility to
in the aviation and space fields. Berry was stating the obvious. There appears to be the maneuver as a fundamental principle of the
selected to be one of the members of this assumption among airmen that air power’s operational art of war, rather than as a tem-
panel. The book is divided into nine chap- effectiveness as a maneuver force is so well porary benefit of technological advantage.
ters with the first chapter covering the established that it deserves little doctrinal The attention to effective definition of
years between 1903 and 1919, and the attention. After all, it is plain to see that air- maneuver warfare results in a coherent, well
remaining chapters covering each decade craft can maneuver better than surface organized argument of the thesis that air
thereafter. The author not only describes forces. However, the concept of maneuver power is an operational maneuver force. The
the milestone itself but also speaks to the warfare examined in this paper is a far more case studies used to illustrate the maneuver
men and women who made the event possi- complex concept than simple movement. In characteristics of air power include the 1973
ble. Milestones is richly illustrated with modern doctrine, maneuver is more a noun Arab-Israeli war, the 1972 Easter Offensive
over 200 black-and-white and color pho- than a verb. Air Force doctrine and future in Vietnam, and air war during the Norman-
tographs which aid greatly in the under- vision papers pay the least attention among dy invasion. Again, Givens has chosen his
standing of the text for the general reader. the services to articulating a future role in examples wisely. The selected case studies
The author allows approximately two pages the Joint Vision concept of dominant maneu- showcase air power in a variety of climatic
per milestone including both text and pho- ver—a central feature of proposed Army, conditions at various stages of technological
tographs. This is not a scholarly text in the Navy, and Marine approaches to future war. development. He elected, consciously, to
sense that Berry treats each milestone as Givens seeks to establish the relevance of air exclude Desert Storm because of continuing
an isolated event and does not try to power to these ascendant concepts of controversy about whether the war was an
explain how one event led to or influenced maneuver warfare. The task is important aberration, with exceptional conditions par-
another selected event in the book. because the main effort of operational com- ticularly suited to supporting Air Force
However, at the beginning of each chapter, bat in future wars may be largely based claims about the effectiveness of air power.
he does explain (to a degree) how the select- upon such concepts. In each case, Givens effectively presents air
ed events of that chapter influenced the To succeed, Givens must do far more power’s demonstration of positional advan-
growth of aviation or space development. than prove the obvious conclusion that air- tage, shock, compellence of battle, and zone
Events that the panel chose as mile- craft can maneuver through the air to estab- of influence. His arguments go beyond a
stones included Glenn Curtiss winning the lish a position of advantage against enemy machine-like application of these principles
Scientific American Trophy in 1908, and forces. He must also avoid making extrava- to his air power examples. He treats the four
the creation of the first scheduled airline in gant claims that exceed the demonstrated traits as aspects of an integrated whole. For
1914. In the 1920s, in-flight refueling capability of air power throughout history. example, he shows how the lethality of the
became a reality, and Goddard launched his He succeeds by defining maneuver in practi- Israeli Air Force limited maneuver options
first rocket. The 1930s saw the develop- cal terms. The paper begins by establishing outside of their SAM umbrellas for Egyptian
ment of radar and radio beacons to define the characteristics of a maneuver force and Syrian ground commanders in the 1973
airways. Swept-back wings, gas turbine through historical examples that should war. He then shows how the IAF doggedly
engines, and supersonic flight were devel- meet with the approval of any ground com- fought to establish air superiority over the
oped in the 1940s; while the 1950s saw mander. The phalanxes of ancient Greece Arab integrated air defense networks to cre-
America’s first ICBM (Atlas) and the serve to illustrate that a maneuver force ate a “vertical flank” position of advantage.
launching of the first U.S. satellite (Ex- comes in direct contact with the enemy for- Finally, he explains how the IAF exploited
plorer) in 1958. The 1960s brought the Har- mation and shocks it. The ancient Roman this hard-won position of advantage to com-
rier V/STOL aircraft, Apollo 11, and jumbo army shows that a maneuver force exerts a pel battle, leading to shock and disruption
jets. The 1970s followed with the F–14 Tom- zone of influence morally and physically, the enemy attack by both independent
cat and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. In affecting any enemy force within its range of action of air power and combined actions of
the 1980s, the Space Shuttle was devel- operations. The neoclassical armies of eigh- Israeli air and ground forces. The examina-
oped, and the Voyager circled the world teenth century Europe are used to show that tions of the Easter offensive and Normandy
non-stop without refueling. Lastly, the a maneuver force compels or denies battle receive similar effective treatment. Docu-
1990s witnessed the launching of the through superior mobility. The examples of mentation is excellent throughout the work,
Hubble Space Telescope and creation of the Napoleon’s campaigns demonstrate how a with appropriate and extensive use of sec-
Global Positioning System. maneuver force gains and exploits a position ondary, primary, and some statistical
Milestones of the First Century of Flight of advantage of the enemy. Finally, he uses resources to back up every detail offered.
is the history of planes and rockets “in a nut- Gettysburg to demonstrate the integration Turning the Vertical Flank ultimately
shell.” This book, being easy to read and con- of all four aspects in a campaign. succeeds because Givens does not bite off

more than he can chew. The author repeat- er, his effort carefully establishes air power’s Early Cold War Overflights 1950-1956:
edly emphasizes that his goal is to demon- place in maneuver warfare doctrine, effec- Symposium Proceedings Vol. I & II. By
strate that air power should be considered tively explaining the need for Joint Force R. Cargill Hall and Clayton D. Laurie, Eds.
as a maneuver force on a co-equal basis with commanders to establish a “vertical flank” in Chantilly Va., National Reconnaissance
surface forces. He asserts that air power’s battle that can team with surface power to Office, 2003. Photographs. Maps. Illustra-
superior mobility can help it compel battle create a paralyzing dilemma for enemy tions. Notes. Selected Readings. Vol. I., Pp.
with the enemy better than ground forces, defense. 654; Vol. II., Pp. 371 ISBN 0-9724322-0-5
but he concedes that ground forces ultimate- Air power history enthusiasts looking (Available for purchase from U.S. Govern-
ly deny battle through halting defense better for extensive treatment of strategy and ment Printing Office, Washington D.C. or
than the transitory effects generated by air political context, logistics and technology National Technical Information Service
attack. In each case study he points out that discussion, or narratives presenting the (NTIS), Springfield Va.)
air power has been used to engage surface human drama of air combat will be disap-
maneuver elements independently of sur- pointed. Givens’ writing is tightly centered These two thick volumes are essential to
face forces. However, he also provides even on proving his thesis through historical anyone writing about or studying the Cold
more examples showing the effectiveness of examples of operational level air campaigns. War, military reconnaissance, aviation histo-
air power as a maneuver element in a com- However, many readers not interested in the ry, and the history and contributions of the
bined arms team. He illustrates the effec- doctrinaire nature of the paper will nonethe- USAF, U.S. Navy, and Royal Air Force. They
tiveness of air power as a maneuver force in less appreciate the author’s brief and articu- are an immensely detailed, revealing, and
campaigns that vary by time, technology, late synopsis of the air operations in each authoritative accounting of the Anglo-
and condition. He doesn’t suggest that air campaign presented. Maps for each cam- American aerial effort to gather information
power is the panacea for all operational paign are indispensable. Those provided are about the Cold War Soviet Union and its mil-
maneuver problems. busy and complicated, but this is largely itary and technological resources and capa-
Only in one detectable instance does the inescapable due to the massive scope and bilities. Each chapter contains largely first-
author overreach himself. The argument complexity of the air campaigns described. person accounts by aircrews and technicians
that strategic attack of supply and logistics Considering the small size of the book, the involved in specific individual flights or larg-
targets in North Vietnam and interdiction bibliography is quite extensive and provides er projects. They are very readable and infor-
operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail an excellent jumping off point for those mative and, at times, chilling or even
represented “extending a zone of influence” wishing to study the intriguing air cam- humorous. Most read like a good novel you
over NVA forces attacking South Vietnam paigns discussed in greater detail. don’t want to end.
during the 1972 Easter offensive is not con- This work is really just the beginning of
vincing. This line of reasoning should have Maj Martin L. Rothrock, USAF—Student, the story, as there is much more to be told
ended with the much more coherent argu- U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff and known. But this is a solid step in accu-
ment Givens makes that interdiction College, Quantico, Va. rately telling a necessarily secretive and
attacks closer to the NVA maneuver ele- unknown history of British and American
ments immobilized them for subsequent air overflights (not peripheral reconnaissance
and ground counter-attack. Overall, howev- ◆◆◆◆◆◆ flights) of “denied areas” (the Soviet Union,
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN Frank Cass Publishers

Air Defence of Great Britain, Vol. II North American Orders: ISBS, 5824 NE Hassalo Street, Portland,
OR 97213 3644, USA Tel: 800 944 6190 Fax: 503 280 8832
T C G James
Edited and with an Introduction by Sebastian Cox, Head of the Air UK/RoW Orders: Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate, London
Historical Branch of the Ministry of Defence N14 5BP Tel +44 (0)20 8920 2100 Fax: +44 (0)20 8447 8548
Foreword by Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire Website: www.frankcass.com
there can be nothing but praise for such a majestic, seminal history
as this one. Air Pictorial
AIR POWER HISTORY
This volume offers the reader access to the RAFs detailed Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo
contemporary day-by-day account of the Battle.
Peter Gray, Director of Defence Studies for the Royal Air Force and
456 pages illus 2000 Sebastian Cox, Head of the Air Historical Branch of the Ministry of
0 7146 5123 0 cloth $62.50/£45.00 0 7146 8149 0 paper $26.50/£18.50
Defence (Eds)
Royal Air Force Official Histories
Contributors from academia and the services examine the theory and
practice of air power from its earliest inception.
288 pages 2002
COURAGE AND AIR WARFARE 0 7146 5291 1 cloth $64.50/£45.00 0 7146 8257 8 paper $26.50/£18.50
The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War
Mark K Wells, Deputy Head of the United States Airforce Academys
Department of History STRATEGIC AIR POWER AND THE GULF WAR
Winner-Society for Military History Distinguished Book of the Year 1997 John Andreas Olsen, Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy
Courage and Air Warfare is well written and well researched. Olsen provides a comprehensive examination of the origins, evolution
It is relevant especially to those who would aspire to the command and implementation of Operation Desert Storm using official military
of flying units. Give it a very high place on your reading list. and political documentation, interviews with US Air Force officers and
Dr David Mets, Maxwell AFB, Iraqis with experience of the inner workings of the Iraqi regime.
Alabama, Airpower Journal
256 pages illus 1995 repr. 1997, 2000 256 pages 2003
0 7146 4618 0 cloth $59.50/£42.50 0 7146 4148 0 paper $24.50/£17.50 0 7146 5193 1 cloth $62.50/£45.00 0 7146 8195 4 paper $26.50/£18.50

North Korea, Eastern Europe and the ing his own “war” against the Russians. Kenney, Spaatz, Eaker, Stratemeyer, Momyer,
People’s Republic of China) from 1950 Material presented here dispels that mythi- and Horner are prominent among practition-
through 1956. The volumes reveal, clarify, cal image. LeMay’s adherence to the chain of ers. George, Hansell, Kuter, Walker, Boyd, and
and document an incredible amount of command, both military and civilian, is doc- Warden warrant inclusion with the theorists
material including some previously appear- umented as well as his defined role in these and planners. Phillip Meilinger has a niche of
ing in various books and magazine and flights. His deep concern for the safety and his own having served as the Dean of the
newspaper articles only as tantalizing foot- welfare of his crews and his better known School of Advanced Air power Studies as well
notes or unsubstantiated reports. These insistence on exceptionally high and strict as authoring four books and about 40 articles
include the RF–100A “Slick Chick” activities standards of military behavior and technical on that subject.
in Europe and the RF–86A “Ashtray” flights aeronautical competence are also detailed. This work is intended to tell the story of
made from Okinawa and Korea during and President Truman’s role in authorizing the air power evolution. It is patched together
after the Korean War. Also documented are earliest overflights is also documented, a lit- from a variety of Meilinger’s books, articles,
the better known RB–45C flights made by tle recognized act of foresight and courage and lectures. All of the various chapters are
Royal Air Force “Special Duty Flights” crews taken by an under-estimated and appreciat- well prepared, interesting, and generally
in American aircraft wearing RAF roundels ed leader. worth reading. They were not, however,
and refueled by KB–29s. Also included are dozens of wonderful designed to be connected whole and, there-
If a reader wonders about the scope of and insightful anecdotes and flying stories fore, don’t add up to a cohesive entity. Even
these efforts, the list of aircraft types involved as well as several mind-teasing revelations. though all are written by the same author, the
is just one clue: RB–45B/C, RB–47B/E/H, An example is in Lt. Col. Arthur Andraitis’ book then suffers the usual limitations of any
RAF Canberra, RB–57A/D, RF–86A/F, and article about overflight imagery interpreta- collection of essays. A few are of limited value
RF–100A missions are highlighted. But the tion in the 1950s. He was with the 497th to a general reader—even an informed one.
author also mentions flights of RF–80A, Reconnaissance Technical Squadron in West The first chapter is about Douhet, who,
RF–84F, P2V–3W, RB–29, RB–50E, RB–17, Germany and compared human intelligence with Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu, is
A–26, RC–97, RC–118, RC–121, and RC–130 reports with satellite imagery to verify an more often quoted and misquoted than actu-
aircraft as well. Unfortunately, little is includ- agent’s accuracy. A member of his crew ally read. Another chapter covers Lord
ed about RB–36 activities. And the study’s couldn’t identify the type of helicopter in Trenchard who is rightly considered the
scope means that the work of RB–66, photo- U.S. Army markings appearing in a photo Father of the Royal Air Force. RAF doctrine
recon F9F, FH, and PB4Y aircraft is not taken along the Rhine River in West Ger- expanded and codified his beliefs, but those
included. The work of RAF photo-recon many when most of the photos they studied theories were unsuited for World War II.
Spitfires is just mentioned as is some materi- were of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. Jack Slessor is also covered and was one of
al on mainland China overflights by Republic Andraitis looked at the photo and realized Britain’s most brilliant thinkers and more
of China U–2, RB–57, and RF–84 aircraft. that he was seeing a Russian Mil Mi–1 light prescient about the role of air power in
Another aspect of these overflights still utility helicopter in American markings future war.
remaining largely untold and under recog- being flown up and down the Rhine around The chapter on the Fleet Air Arm brings
nized is the critical role of the USAF KB–29, American military installations! to mind our own “Revolt of the Admirals.”
KB–50, and KC–97 tankers in the success of The editors have also included an excel- The Geneva Disarmament Conference of
these missions. There seems to be so much lent appendix of suggested readings from a 1932-34 included an attempt to abolish aer-
history and so little time to document it. vast range of sources. As a very minor aside, ial bombing and, perhaps, all military air-
While the skills, courage, resourceful- it is unfortunate that Lt. Col. John Farqu- craft. Luckily or not, this was as successful
ness, and professionalism of flight crews and har’s research on overflights and other as the ban on unrestricted submarine war-
support staffs are finally publicly recog- reconnaissance missions is neither included fare.
nized, the reputations of several important nor generally available. The deputy head of “Air power and Joint Operations during
national figures are also appropriately military history at the Air Force Academy, WWII” does a good job in 20 pages of cover-
enhanced: Farquhar was among a distinguished group ing the evolution of multi-service doctrine.
This work dispels the image of President of authoritative experts who assisted in Armies and navies have had to fight togeth-
Eisenhower as a genial, somnambulant golf- organizing and chairing the symposium’s er for centuries and had achieved a certain
playing president. The strategic and organi- panels. modus vivendi (or combatare). Now there
zational vision and skills that made D-Day These two volumes are a significant was a new partner—and not one willing to
possible were applied to the problem of addition to the body of knowledge not only accept a junior share.
determining Soviet capabilities and intents about political, military, and aviation history The chapter on the B–29 concentrates
in some of the earliest and most frigid days and the technology of aerial reconnaissance, on several significant matters such as why
of the Cold War. “Ike” transformed national but also the larger paradigm of the still-to-be Arnold took command of the Twentieth Air
security for the Space Age. Among his signif- written history of the latter half of the 20th Force; how Wolfe, Hansell, and LeMay fit
icant decisions were authorization of U–2 Century. into the hierarchy; and the roles played by
development, approval of specific over- Nimitz, Hoover, and Harmon. The reason for
flights, and funding of reconnaissance-satel- Thomas Wm. McGarry, Aviation News the change of tactics for the Superfortress is
lite development. He also established a high- Service, Lake Oswego OR well explained.
ly compartmentalized program regarding Targeting for effect brings us to John
overflights and the processing, interpreta- ◆◆◆◆◆◆ Boyd’s “OODA Loop,” which seems so simple
tion, and dissemination of the gathered that there must be more to it (the colonel did
information. Vol. II presents (intelligently Airwar: Theory and Practice. By Philip have a lengthier presentation he insisted on
and, thankfully, chronologically) a range of S. Meilinger. London and Portland Ore.: giving). Basically, it means getting inside the
official documents related to overflights and Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. Tables. Dia- enemy’s decision cycle—though a recent
the security arrangements surrounding grams. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Pp. x, 234. pundit describes it as “Observe, Overreact,
their planning and conduct and use of the $27.50 Paperback. ISBN: 0-7146-8266-7 Destroy, Apologize.”
gathered information. The final chapters get into the future of
Some historians, authors, journalists The U.S. Air Force has several categories aerospace power, but inserted here are six
and at least one movie producer have of icons: Billy Mitchell, Hap Arnold, and Alex pages on “The Versailles Treaty and Iraq: On
delighted in Strangelovean depictions of de Seversky are high on the list of prophets of the Road to Munich.” This by itself is worth
Gen. Curtis LeMay as a “loose cannon” wag- independence and victory through air power. the price of the book.

The only picture provided is of the information management, technical skills fluid situations. Incredibly, when the gods of
author. Some might prefer to see what Dou- and weapons handling, logistics, morale, war turned against the Arabs, these com-
het, Trenchard, or some of the other key training and cowardice—for Egypt, Iraq, manders often fled the battlefield!
players looked like. Also, a map would help Jordan, Libya, and Syria. What he finds is While general staffs received mixed rat-
clarify B–29 operations. But these aside, the surprising and informative. ings, tactical leadership failed. Small unit
wide range of subjects and their scholarly Regardless of country or political sys- leaders proved incapable of leading troops
analyses deserve the attention of any reader tem, the militaries all shared similar traits. and reacting to unpredictable situations.
interested in air power. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Arab Outflanked and surrounded Arab units sim-
armies were cohesive (at least at the compa- ply could not reorient to meet new threats.
Brig. Gen. Curtis H. O’Sullivan, USA (Ret), ny and battalion level) and their soldiers Moreover, Arabs often declined or rejected
Salida California brave. Arab units often fought to the death appeals from beleaguered neighboring units.
and disintegrated only when ordered to Instead, they stayed in their defensive posi-
◆◆◆◆◆◆ retreat under aggressive enemy pursuit. tions and waited for the enemy to roll up
While morale varied by army and war, sol- their flank.
Arabs at War. By Kenneth M. Pollack. diers’ resolve tended to stiffen when defend- Arab armies also suffered from informa-
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. ing their soil, as with Iraq during its war tion management deficiencies ranging from
Maps. Notes. Index. Bibliography. Pp. 698. with Iran. Further, with the exception of feeble signals protection to poor reconnais-
ISBN: 0-8032-3733-2 Syria, all nations had outstanding logistics sance and intelligence gathering to false or
support. Egypt and Libya, for example, exaggerated reporting. Among the most
This book examines why Arab militaries fought expeditionary wars in Yemen and egregious examples is Egypt’s claims to have
consistently performed poorly and provides Chad respectively and never wanted for sup- destroyed the Israeli Air Force on the first
an assessment of their strengths and weak- plies. day of the Six-Day War when the reverse
nesses—an increasingly important assess- Generalship received a barely passing was true. Egypt’s lies caused Syria and
ment as the U.S. increases its presence in grade. Senior staffs usually developed good Jordan to change their war plans and launch
the Middle East. Cannibalized from plans, as in Jordan’s 1967 West Bank de- different or accelerated offensives or—if
Pollack’s 1996 MIT dissertation, it is sur- fense; and, as long as the battles went accor- Jordan had known the truth—would not
prising a major press did not gobble up his ding to plan, armies performed well. But as have attacked Israel at all! False reporting
book sooner. It analyzes the traditional von Moltke observed, “No plan survives con- permeated the Arab military structure.
explanations for Arab weaknesses—unit tact with the enemy.” Senior field comman- Minor advances became enemy routs. Stale-
cohesion, generalship, tactical leadership, ders proved unable to adapt their plans to mates became victories. Friendly defeats

became enemy setbacks. By the time the Pollack has written a truly interesting trations. Photographs. Glossary. Timeline.
truth filtered to the decision-makers it was study that goes beyond why Arab militaries Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 219. $29.95.
too late to stop disaster. have failed to gain victories. Arabs at War ISBN: 1-58544-256-9.
Finally, education, training, and equip- validates the principles of combined arms
ment maintenance were abysmal. Concerned operations and joint and combined opera- The casual reader of aviation history is
more with political advancement than mili- tions. The keys to successful military effec- in for an unusual journey. Bayla Singer, his-
tary efficiency, officers rarely insisted on real- tiveness include well-educated and free sol- torian of technology and culture, has charted
istic troop training; most was highly scripted diers who support their government coupled an unorthodox approach to the subject by
and rarely deviated from the syllabus. This with realistic training stressing initiative looking at the diverse cultural threads that
lackadaisical attitude spilled over into other and ingenuity with accurate and timely compelled some societies to take to the skies
areas such as weapons maintenance where, reporting. Technologically superb weapons and others to remain grounded. The reader
for example, Saudi Arabia replaced equip- are worthless unless maintained and oper- can tell that Singer is a lecturer and profes-
ment every six months. ated by highly trained, motivated solders. sor by the tone of her book. It is not unusual
Arab air forces performed worse than Finally, nations should guard against the for her to ask the reader, “What do you
their armies. Training was so poor and wea- military becoming the purview of a single think?” and to challenge her audience to
pons so complicated that Arab nations found political philosophy. When that happens, think outside the box. The author’s discus-
it difficult to maintain enough pilots to fly all officers worry more about gaining the next sion of the sexuality of flight, encompassed
the modern aircraft. Some Arab nations position and accumulating more power and in the term “cockpit,” for example, is
resorted to hiring foreigners to operate their less about fighting war. Anyone interested in provocative. And I was absorbed by her tale
aircraft. Pollack underscores that although what impairs or enhances military effective- of the way in which you can make an Easter
Israeli air power actually destroyed relatively ness should read this book. egg float in the air. I suspect that less adven-
few tanks, the effect paralyzed or routed turous readers, however, may wonder at
enemy forces. He validates the statement of Maj. Jim Gates, USAF, Air Staff, Pentagon times how the disparate ideas relate to the
another desert fighter who lamented about attainment of manned flight.
Allied air superiority in World War II, “Anyone ◆◆◆◆◆◆ The narrative is divided into two parts.
who has to fight, even with the most modern The first examines the cultural “dreams and
weapons, against an enemy in complete com- Like Sex with Gods: An Unorthodox mythology” that led to flight while part two
mand of the air, fights like a savage against History of Flying. By Bayla Singer. College looks at the “theory and practice” behind the
modern . . . troops, under the same handicaps Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003. development of balloons, dirigibles, and
and with the same chances of success.” Number 3, Centennial of Flight Series. Illus- heavier-than-air craft. Some of the legends
Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature
Air Power History (along with its predecessor Aerospace Historian) is one of
nearly 350 publications indexed and abstracted in the bibliographic database
Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature. This information
is produced by Military Policy Research Ltd., of Oxford, England, and can be
found at www.mpr.co.uk. It contained over 90,000 citations and abstracts as of
the end of May 2002, and is increasing at the rate of around 10,000 per year.
The Lancaster Index database is primarily designed for information profes-

sionals in the defense and security sector, and can appear somewhat daunting
to the casual visitor. A look at the User Guide, downloadable from the site, is
recommended. Free access, using the global index, scans the whole database,
but returns literature citations that exclude the volume, issue, and page refer-
ences. Researchers who need these references for serious research purposes
will need to take out a paid subscription. Individual rates range from $9.95 for
a 24-hour pass to $99.95 for a 365-day pass.
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and myths found in the first section stray association I would have expected in this In this well-researched third volume
pretty far afield from the standard treat- examination of the significance of words, about America’s old World War II airfields,
ment, but that’s the way in which Singer dif- thoughts, and belief systems to the evolution author Lou Thole again provides a nostalgic
ferentiates her study. The second portion of of flight was the development of the Ezekiel yet fact-filled tour of these once mighty
the narrative is an abbreviated version of Airship in Texas, a contraption that most bases. With the sole exception of the still
the evolution of the hardware of flight with likely flew more than a year before the very vital Columbus AFB in Ohio, all of the
which most readers will be familiar. The Wrights became airborne at Kitty Hawk. fields in this book are no longer active mili-
glossary alerts us to the fact that the whole Finally, looking to find the works behind spe- tary installations.
vocabulary of aviation had to be negotiated cific passages in this book, I became frus- As the author illustrates, both in his text
once humankind took to the skies, and the trated at times with the sparse footnoting. and through excellent then-and-now pho-
Timeline helps pull together the threads of Singer’s celebration of the many streams of tographs, some of the old bases have become
Singer’s thesis. One of the many delights to culture that led to manned flight is notewor- municipal airports; industrial parks; or, per-
be found in this book is the rich illustrations, thy, and while Like Sex with Gods may be an haps most hauntingly, nothing but ruins that
many of which I had not seen before. unorthodox history of flying, it is an impor- can only echo the feverish activity of six
While fascinated with the disparate tant contribution to the literature of avia- decades ago. As he did so effectively in his
myths and stories strung together, there tion. first two volumes, the author weaves into his
were several aspects of the book I found chapters the personal recollections of some of
lacking. Like many lecturers, Singer hits the Bruce Ashcroft, HQ Air Education and the veterans who served on the fields during
high points but glosses over details. She Training Command History Office the war. It is through their words that today’s
pays due homage to George Cayley, but men- reader is able, at least in part, to experience
tions John Stringfellow and William Samuel ◆◆◆◆◆◆ those exciting days of yesteryear, filled as
Henson without describing their work with they were with thrilling adventure, hardship,
steam-powered aircraft. She also has an Forgotten Fields of America, Volume sheer boredom and, all too often, tragedy.
extensive passage about the Brazilian III: World War II Bases and Training, Included in this volume are the stories of
Alberto Santos-Dumont without mentioning Then and Now. By Lou Thole. Missoula the dedicated black pilots who struggled
that it was he who performed the first flight Mont: Pictorial History Publishing Co., against all odds, both civil and military, at
of a manned, controlled, heavier-than-air 2003. Photographs. Appendix. Pp. x, 178. Tuskegee Field, Alabama, as well as the
craft before an official sanctioning body. One $17.95 ISBN: 1-575510-102-5 adventures of those who endured the harsh

climates at Kingman and Williams in of the Vietnam War. Most arguments again- exhibit the nature of two classes in the
Arizona, and at Tonopah, Nevada. Also col- st the war became linked by the single uni- United States: those with connections and
orfully described are the fields at Dyersburg, fying tenet among the young men on cam- the means to avoid service by attending col-
Tennessee; Venice and Page in Florida; pus: fear of being drafted, wounded or killed lege, and those who did not and were gob-
Laurinburg-Maxton in South Carolina; and in the continuing war. Maraniss’ depiction bled up in the war machine. By contrasting
Lubbock Army Airfield (later Reese AFB) on of the third front, the Washington political the backgrounds of the participants on cam-
the High Plains of Texas. The final chapter scene, is not new. The tribulations and angst pus and in combat, the author emphasizes
provides a fascinating in depth look at of President Lyndon B. Johnson and his the privileges and handicaps of the “class
Wendover Field, Utah, which the late Bob Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara system” in the U.S. and the resulting conse-
Hope once dubbed “Leftover Field.” and others have been recorded elsewhere. quences.
Of all the chapters, the Wendover story The book’s uniqueness is the meshing of It was a tightrope on which the students
probably provides the most evocative memo- these three areas of conflict. of the mid-1960s walked. Getting into school
ry of the World War II experience. Home to Maraniss’s protest scenes take place on and staying there was wrought with angst.
the famed 509th Composite Group, com- the University of Wisconsin Madison cam- Failing grades surely meant a government
manded by Col. Paul Tibbetts, the field pus, on October 17 and 18, 1967. Dow sponsored one-year trip to the jungles and
played a crucial role in the preparation for Chemical, manufacturer of napalm for the nightmare of Southeast Asia. College accep-
the fateful bomb runs over Hiroshima and military, arrives to recruit prospective appli- tance and passing grades meant draft
Nagasaki. Now, where the legendary Enola cants. The students blame Dow and its exemption and deferment. Maraniss’s por-
Gay was once hangared, only desolation product for killing innocent civilians in trayal of the apprehensions of draft age men
dwells. Yet, according to the author, the geo- Vietnam. On October 17, an ambush and a on campus and the realities and horrors of
graphic isolation of the old field has provid- massacre northwest of Saigon became the war rings true. With the news media’s
ed it with a degree of protection that makes known as the battle of Ong Thanh. There, realistic assessment of the war in articles,
it perhaps the best preserved of all the World Alpha and Delta companies of the “Black stirring photographs and television, draft-
War II bases. It is somehow ironic to consid- Lions” Battalion, 2/28 Infantry Regiment, eligible students witnessed the war daily.
er that Wendover Field, the stateside home First Infantry Division, fought the Viet They did not want to die in a war of attrition
of the bomb group that launched the age of Cong’s First Regiment and a large contin- that was being sold by political and military
nuclear weaponry in order to bring the terri- gent of North Vietnamese Regulars. leaders.
ble war to a close, now sits more or less The student issues at the time were so Reading Maraniss’s battle accounts
intact in the bleak desert of western Utah. diverse that it proved difficult to find a com- raises sympathy for the young soldiers who
Every chapter in this book contains far mon ground. However, the war in Vietnam endured the gore and atrocities of war in a
more than just a nostalgic look back in time. consolidated these issues into a single cause “no-win” situation. With death all around,
Readers can learn much about the Army Air on which protesters focused. For example, and the battlefields strewn blood and body
Forces and its training regimen as well as the feminist movement obtained equal sta- parts, it is not surprising that many return-
gain insight into the civilians who were the tus such mundane concerns as re-inflating ing veterans suffered from physical and
hosts—willingly or otherwise—to the men basketballs in March, to permit students to psychological wounds. This book makes a
who, for a brief but exciting time, came their use indoor facilities in lieu of relinquishing strong case for the government’s obligation
way to learn the skills of war. them to the baseball team, whose “field of to provide everything possible for the veter-
There are a few geographical glitches dreams” remained frozen under layers of ans.
that spring up here and there in the book, melting snow. A focal point was required The author points out that the military
such as placing the Admiral Nimitz Museum and the war in Vietnam became the linch- leadership made serious miscalculations
in Virginia rather than in Texas and a dupli- pin. before the October battle ensued. Both the
cation in the otherwise excellent Appendix In the students’ drive for a common young soldiers and Lt. Clark A. Welch, who
that sites Sherman Field, Texas, one mile cause are found some essential elements of commanded Delta Company, were appre-
northeast of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. democracy. Throughout the caucusing hensive before the battle. They wanted
These are only minor distractions, how- efforts, certain students rose to leadership B–52 strikes and artillery barrages to hit
ever, and in all other respects, Forgotten positions; some followed, while others left in known enemy positions prior to leaving
Fields, Vol. III, is every bit as informative as disgust or lost interest. Still others pursued their night defensive lines. Maraniss’s
were its two predecessors. Hopefully, a practical endeavors, such as, studying, writ- description of the chaos and carnage that
fourth volume is nearly ready to take wing. ing term papers, and taking part time jobs followed the Red Lions’ advance into the
to retain their student status that warrant- Secret Zone compares to the battle portray-
Tom Alexander, President, The Alexander ed their draft deferment. But for thousands al in We Were Soldiers Once and Young. The
Company, Fredericksburg, Texas of other young Americans of lesser means, fears, cries of anguish and pain, the smell of
there was no choice — nothing but the real- death and sheer exhaustion of battle upon
◆◆◆◆◆◆ ity of dead bodies on the battlefields of one’s nerves and mind are descriptively
Vietnam. awesome, torturous, and terrible.
They Marched into Sunlight: War and An example of devotion to the cause on The author attempts to link the ambush
Peace, Vietnam and America October the campus was Richard B. Cheney, a two- of soldiers in Vietnam by the Viet Cong and
1967. By David Maraniss. New York: Simon time “flunky” from Yale, who returned to his North Vietnamese regulars with the sur-
& Schuster, 2003. Maps. Photographs. Notes. home state to attend the University of prise attack by the police against the stu-
Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvii, 572. $29.95 Wyoming on a six-year program. In 1967, he dents at the University of Wisconsin. But
ISBN: 0-7432-1780-2 was a second year graduate student at getting caught up in a student protest or
Wisconsin working on a Ph.D. in political demonstration that occasionally featured
Maraniss examines the closely contested science. Cheney was married and a parent, tear gas and police wielding batons hardly
and monitored clashes on three fronts dur- who had reached the magic draft exempt compares to terrors of the battlefield.
ing the fall of 1967: that of the soldier in age of twenty-six that year. Thus, he was Moreover, innocent bystanders who hap-
Vietnam, the University of Wisconsin stu- free to pursue his life’s goals, while younger pened to catch a blow at a demonstration
dents, and the Washington political scene. At men squirmed with their fears of combat cannot compare to the draftee’s encounters
this time, the many issues that sparked stu- and death. Timing is everything. with death and butchery in war.
dent protests and demonstrations were The book’s two main settings — the col- Maraniss admits to an obsession with
melded into a single cause under the banner lege campus and the battlefield — aptly the connections. He was himself a freshman

at the University of Wisconsin in the fall of American female to get a pilot’s license. The GE rolled its “Type I-A Supercharger” (a
1967, and witnessed the confrontation on book also focuses on Amelia Earhart, who in security cover) into the test cell only five and
campus. In 1970, he drew a low lottery num- 1932 became the first woman to fly solo a half months after getting the job to devel-
ber and was deemed 4F, following a physical across the Atlantic Ocean. Unfortunately, op the first U.S. jet engine. To say there were
examination that diagnosed his asthmatic she and her co-pilot, Fred Noonan, disap- major problems would be an understate-
condition. Perhaps another medical office, peared while trying to fly around the world. ment, but the company persisted. Mean-
another draft board, and an undetected ail- There are many theories about what hap- while, Bell was equally hard at work coming
ment in another part of the country might pened to them. You must read the book to up with an airframe (the XP–59A) to be pow-
have declared him draft eligible. find out what happened. ered by two of the new engines. All of the
Much like the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, of The book concludes by discussing crated aircraft and engine parts arrived at a
August 1964, gave impetus for the buildup of women in the space program. This includes little-known Army training base in
U.S. forces in Vietnam, the battle of Ong Jerrie Cobb, an astronaut who did not make California known then as Muroc in Septem-
Thanh and the rising tide of student it to space, but spent years flying medicine ber 1942. By October, the complete system
protests during the fall of 1967 provided the and supplies to poor areas in Central and had undergone taxi tests and was ready for
catalyst for the disenchantment with the South America. She was nominated for the its historic first flight on 2 October. America
war. These flames of dissent would be fanned Nobel Peace Prize in 1980. While Jerrie entered the Jet Age that day.
to disaster levels in three months by the Cobb did not make it to space, Sally Ride Young then relates the history of the
1968 “Tet Offensive.” did. She was the first American woman to fly flight test program of this inauspicious
During the protest years of the late in space, but not the first woman. Valentina weapon system. The appendix contains the
1960s and early 1970s many returning vet- Tereshkova, a Russian woman, flew in space flight test reports from the first five flights.
erans were not welcomed home with appre- in 1963. The piece of information I found most inter-
ciation for their service. Instead, many were Although the book focuses on successes, it esting—having given many hundreds of
spat upon and met with derisive remarks, also describes certain failures. This includes tours at NASM where I’ve noted the
such as, “baby killers” and “warmongers.” STS-51L and STS-107, otherwise known as German Jumo 004 engine’s maximum 10
This cold reception by an ungrateful nation the Challenger and Columbia. Sadly, these hours of operation until first teardown—is
cut deeply into the heart and the mind of the two space shuttle missions ended in disaster that our engines lasted three hours before
veteran who had seen his buddies suffer and when the shuttles exploded. removal for inspection and repair! We did
die in sacrificing all for their country. There I think this book would be interesting to better later. By late 1944, the improved I–16
were long-term negative affects for the vet- people that enjoy history, women’s accom- was going 10 hours, just like the Germans!
eran, but none for the protestors except for plishments, flight and space exploration. It As almost everyone realizes, the P–59
the guilt of having other Americans die in talks about both the past and the present. I Airacomet was not going to be an opera-
their place or perpetually wondering [per- liked this book and recommend it to other tional weapon system. It was a testbed; it got
haps the author as well] if they had served elementary and middle school aged kids. the US started in jet aviation. Young gives a
could they have survived the horrors of war short history of the development of Lock-
and continued to live sanely. Jordan S. Goldberg, age eight, Clarksville, heed’s beautiful XP–80 with its J33 engine
This is brilliantly written and spellbind- Maryland before finishing with what I believe is the
ing book that answers many questions in an volume’s best feature—lessons learned from
inspiring epilogue. A reader is in search of
an account of the most pressing issue of the ◆◆◆◆◆◆ the P–59 program and America’s late start
and, most important, the transformation
second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s that took place in R&D within the U.S.
in the United States of America, will not find Lighting the Flame: The Turbojet Revo- Government as a result. Again Arnold is a
a more comprehensive or better source with lution Comes to America. By James O. prominent character along with Theodore
which to begin. The Vietnam War divided Young. Edwards AFB, Calif.: Air Force Flight von Karman, General Bill Craigie, and oth-
this nation like no other issue since the Civil Test Center History Office, 2002. Tables. ers.
War. They Marched into Sunlight superbly Diagrams. Photographs. Appendix. Pp. iii, The dozens of photos and diagrams only
illuminates that period. 50. Paperback. add to the excellence of the text. For some-
thing so short, this is a superb read and will
Dr. George M. Watson, Jr., Chevy Chase, This is one of the most delightful books I enlighten anyone interested in the birth of
Maryland, and author of Voices from the have read in some time. Actually, it’s not so the Jet Age.
Rear: Vietnam 1969-1970. much a book as a monograph. Dr. Young has,
from his excellent vantage point at the Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret), Docent and
◆◆◆◆◆◆ Flight Test Center, set down not only the
story of America’s tenuous beginnings in jet
Volunteer, NASM’s Udvar-Hazy and Garber
Facilties
aviation but also how the country gained at
Women Who Fly. By Lynn M. Homan and least temporary preeminence in the field. ◆◆◆◆◆◆
Thomas Reilly. Illustrated by Rosalie M. He begins his story where any history of
Shepherd. Gretna, La.: Pelican Publishing jet aviation must begin: the work of Whittle The Day We Bombed Switzerland: Fly-
Co., 2004. [Juvenile Nonfiction, ages 8-12] in Great Britain and von Ohain in Germany. ing with the US Eighth Force in World
Pp. 103. $14.95 ISBN: 1-58980-160-1 While the efforts of these two men have been War II. By Jackson Granholm. Shrewsbury,
covered in great depth in many books, Young England: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 2000.
In 1911, women achieved something— in only six pages does a masterful job of get- Photographs. Index. Pp. 246. $16.95. ISBN:1-
that something was flight. The book, Women ting to the heart of early jet development 84037-371-7
Who Fly, by Lynn M. Homan and Thomas and then leading directly into “Hap” Arnold’s
Reilly, tells of those achievements. I enjoyed visit to the UK in 1941. The general was “The day we bombed Switzerland? I
reading this book because I found it very stunned at the advanced level of British thought Switzerland was neutral?” were my
entertaining and interesting. development. The author then presents the wife’s first words to me after she read the
Woman Who Fly tells about Harriet story of why America ended up in another title. “That’s right,” I told her. “We bombed it
Quimby who was the first woman to get her “not invented here” situation and the work by mistake.” Granholm decided to write his
pilot’s license. It describes how in 1921 undertaken by Arnold, Larry Bell, General book soon after he discovered that the tran-
Bessie Coleman became the first African Electric, and others to catch up. script of the court-martial that occurred

after the bombing had been declassified. Not where a U.S. airman accidentally shot and interesting, the court-martial was chaired by
that he really needed a transcript; he was killed an English civilian and the resulting none other than Col. James Stewart, the
there in person as one of the three defence court-martial. famed movie star.
counsels! The last part of the book addresses the Granholm’s book is absorbing and read-
Mr. Granholm has had a career in aero- bombing of Basel and Zurich in Switzerland able. Underneath the detailed descriptions
space, electronic physics, and engineering. and the courtroom drama that followed. The of the actions described, whether in the air
He is a contributing editor of Western Viking, two defendants were Lts. William Sincock or in the courtroom, one can feel the emotion
a Seattle weekly, and editor of Keystrokes, a and Theodore Balides. Granholm’s job for and tension of the people involved. Unlike
quarterly magazine. He has written over the defense, being a master navigator by novels, where the characters are fictitious,
1,000 magazine and newspaper articles, and that time, was to recreate the exact path the these were real events with real people
his work appears in three anthologies. errant bombers took when they bombed described in amazing detail. It was so
Twenty of his scripts have been produced as Basel and Zurich. Were there extenuating absorbing, especially at the end, that I could
motion pictures. circumstances which would exonerate the not put the book down. For World War II
The first half of the book is a series of pilots from wrongdoing? How did they get buffs, this book is a must read.
stories describing the author’s experiences separated from the main body of the bomber
as a B–24 navigator. He joined the Army in formation? How bad was the weather? How Bill Nardo, Docent at NASM’s Mall and
1942 in hopes of becoming a pilot but badly were the Germans jamming the radios Udvar-Hazy Facilities
washed out of flight training. However, his and navigation equipment? Was the radar
superiors saw potential and suggested he try
navigator school. His experiences there
working? To make this situation all the more ◆◆◆◆◆◆
range from flying in old and poorly main-
tained aircraft to a hilarious and amorous
“goodbye” which took place in the back seat
of a student’s car in the training school’s New from
parking lot, in full view of the guys in the
barracks!
From the States, Granholm was sent to
the 458th Bomb Group, U.S. Eighth Air Force
stationed at Horsham St. Faith in England.
Here the stories become more serious: flights
flown by “crazy” pilots who created imagi-
nary malfunctions and headed back to base
a half hour into the mission; his early rela-
tively tame flights to French targets which
ended quickly with his first mission over
Germany; a navigator’s job while Bf 109s Available at
hurled past the formation with guns blazing; WWW.GPO.GOV
what happened over the target area as flak
got much too accurate for comfort; seeing his
friend’s plane being hit and starting its slow
death spiral to the ground thousands of feet
below; what life was like at Horsham St.
Faith; and an unfortunate hunting accident

Books Received
Atkinson, Rick, In the Company of Soldiers: A Hoffmann, Peter. Stauffenberg: A Family History,
Chronicle of Combat. New York: Henry Holt and 1905-1944. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Co., 2004. Maps. Glossary. Index. Pp. 319. $25.00. Press, 2003 [2d ed.] Illustrations. Photographs.
ISBN: 0-8050-7561-5 Notes. Appendices. Glossary. Bibliography. Index.
Pp. xix, 424 $24.95 Paperback ISBN: 0-7735-2595-5
Burg, David F. and L. Edward Purcell. Almanac of
World War I. Lexington: The University Press of * Homan, Lynn M. and Thomas Reilly. Women Who
Kentucky, 1998. Maps. Illustrations. Photographs.. Fly. Gretna, La.: Pelican Publishing, 2004. [juvenile
Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 320. non-fiction] Illustrations. Pp. 103. $14.95 ISBN: 1-
$22.00 Paperback ISBN: 0-8131-9087-8 58980-160-1
Busby, Michael. Solving the Airship Mystery. * Maraniss, David. They Marched into Sunlight:
Gretna, La.: Pelican Publishing Co., 2004. Tables. War and Peace, Vietnam and America, October
Diagrams. Illustrations. Photographs. Notes. 1967. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Tables.
Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 398. $24.95 Diagrams. Illustrations. Photographs. Notes.
ISBN: 1-58980-125-3 Appendices. Glossary. Bibliography Notes. Index.
Pp. xxvii, 572. $29.95 ISBN: 0-7432-1780-2
Duncan, Stephen M. A War of a Different Kind:
Military Force and America’s Search for Homeland Prados, John and Ray W. Stubbe. Valley of Decision:
Security. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, The Siege of Khe Sanh. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
2004. Notes. Index. Pp. xx, 366. $28.95 ISBN: 1- Institute Press, 2004 [Original Ed, Houghton
59114-220-2 Mifflin, 1991,] Maps. Illustrations. Photographs.
Notes. Glossary. Bibliography Index. Pp. xxi, 551.
FAC History Book. [A CD by the Forward Air $21.95 Paperback ISBN: 1-59114-696-8
Controller Association, from Jungle Jim to the
Mayaguez Incident, 1961-1975.] $15.00. ISBN: 0- Record, Jeffrey. Dark Victory: America’s Second War
9703068-1-4 Distribution: citabriair@yahoo.com Against Iraq. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2004, Notes. Bibliography Index. Pp. xv, 203.
Gray, Colin S. The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the $24.95 ISBN: 1-59114-711-5
New World Order. Lexington: The University Press
of Kentucky, 2004. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. Roach, Kent. September 11: Consequences for
xi, 195. $29.95 ISBN: 0-8131-2315-2 Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2003. Illustrations. Photographs. Notes.
Haave, Christopher E. and Phil M. Haun, Eds. Appendices. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 272
A–10s over Kosovo: The Victory of Airpower over a $22.95 Paperback ISBN: 0-7735-2585-8
Fielded Army as Told by the Airmen Who Fought in
Operation Allied Force. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Uni- Ryan, Mike. Baghdad or Bust: The Inside Story of
versity Press, 2003. Maps. Diagrams. Illustrations. Gulf War 2. South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword
Photographs. Notes. Appendices. Glossary. Biblio- Books, Ltd, 2003. Maps. Photographs. Index. Pp.
graphy. Index. Pp. xxxiv, 332. Paperback ISBN: 1- 220, L 19.95 ISBN: 1-84415-020-8
58566-122-8
PROSPECTIVE REVIEWERS
Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substantively assess one of the new books listed
above is invited to apply for a gratis copy of the book. The prospective reviewer should contact:
Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.)

3704 Brices Ford Ct.
Fairfax, VA 22033
Tel. (703) 620-4139
e-mail: scottwille@aol.com
* Already under review.

Schlight, John. Help from Above: Air Force Close Air Trest, Warren. Missing in Paradise. [Fiction: A Jake
Support of the Army, 1946-1973. Washington, D.C.: Falcon Mystery] Montgomery, Ala.: Court Street,
Air Force History and Museums Program, 2004. 2003. $.00 Paperback ISBN: 1-58838-156-0
Maps. Tables. Diagrams. Illustrations. Photo-
graphs. Notes. Appendices. Glossary. Bibliography. Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics
Index. Pp. xv, 455. from Wallenstein to Patton. [Second Edition] New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Maps.
Sherwood, John D. Afterburner: Naval Aviators and Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 313. $70.00 ISBN:
the Vietnam War. New York: New York University 0-521-83744-8
Press, 2004. Photographs. Notes. Glossary. Biblio-
graphy. Index. Pp. x, 353. $32.95 ISBN: 0-8147-
9842-x
New from
Stueck, William, Ed. The Korean War in World
History. Lexington: The University Press of
Kentucky, 2004. Maps. Notes. Index. Pp. 203.
$35.00 ISBN: 0-8131-2306-2
Tomblin, Barbara Brooks. G.I, Nightingales: The

Army Nurse Corps in World War II. . Lexington:
The University Press of Kentucky, 1996. Map.
Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. viii, 254. $22.00 Available
Paperback ISBN: 0-8131-9079-7
at
WWW.GPO.GOV

June 21-23
The Netherlands American Studies Association
will host a conference entitled “The Story of World War
II: American Studies” at the Vrije Universiteit in
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Contact:
Dr Diederik Oostdijk
English Department
Vrije Universiteit
DeBoelelaan 1105
NL-1081 HV Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Compiled by George Cully e-mail: dm.oostdijk.let.vu.nl
June 22-27
The American Society of Aviation Artists will host
June 3-4 its Annual Aviation Art Forum at the Air Force Museum,
Siena College will host its annual symposium, World located adjacent to Wright-Patterson AFB, in Dayton
War II – A 60-Year Perspective, with presentations fea- Ohio. Contact:
turing the year 1944. Contact: John Sarsfield, ASAA Vice-President
Dr Karl Barbir 6541 St. Vrain Road
Dept. of History Longmont CO 80503
Siena College (303) 702-0707
515 Loudon Road e-mail: ASAAcontact@asaa-avart.org
Loudonville, NY 12211-1462 website: http://www.asaa-avart.org
(518) 783-2512 - FAX 518-786-5052
e-mail: barbir@siena.edu June 28-30
The 2004 IEEE Conference on the History of Electronics
June 3-6 is the fifth in a series of workshops co-sponsored by the
The Historical Society will hold its National Confe- IEEE History Committee and the IEEE History Center
rence in the Spruce Point Inn, near Boothbay Harbor, at Rutgers University. The conference will be held at
Maine. The theme of the conference is "Reflections on Bletchley Park, Oxfordshire, England. Contact:
the Current State of Historical Inquiry." Contact: Frederick Nebeker
2004 Conference Senior Research Historian
The Historical Society IEEE History Center
656 Beacon Street, Mezzanine Rutgers University
Boston MA 02215-2010 39 Union Street
e-mail: historic.bu.edu New Brunswick, NJ 08901
http://www.bu.edu/historic e-mail: f.nebeker@ieee.org
website:
June 7-10 http://www.ieee.org/organizations/history_center
The American Helicopter Society will host its 60th
annual forum and technology display at the Inner July 12-13
Harbor Convention Center in Baltimore, Maryland. The Centre for Metropolitan History at the Institute
Contact: of Historical Research will host a conference entitled
AHS Int’l – the Vertical Flight Society “Metropolitan Catastrophes: Scenarios, Experiences and
217 N. Washington St., Alexandria, VA 22314-2538 Commemorations in the Era of Total War.” The
(703) 684-6777, Fax 739-9279 Conference will be held at the Institute of Historical
e-mail: kim@vtol.org Research in London, England. Contact:
website: http://www.vtol.org Dr Stefan Goebel
Centre for Metropolitan History
June 15 Institute of Historical Research
The Military Classics Seminar meets for dinner-dis- University of London
cussion at the Ft. Myer, Virginia, Officers' Club. This Senate House
month's selection is Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Malet Street
Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and London WC1E 7HU United Kingdom
American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945, e-mail: stefan.goebel@sas.ac.uk
Princeton University Press, 2002. Speaker: Dr. Thomas website: http://www.history.ac.uk/cmh/war.html
Julian (Colonel, USAF (Ret.)). Contact:
Dr. Edward Marolda July 12-14
Naval Historical Center The U.S. Army’s Center of Military History will host
805 Kidder Breese Street, SE the 2004 Biennial Conference of Army Historians in
Washington Navy Yard, D.C. 20374-5060 Washington, DC. The theme of the conference is “Mili-
(202) 433-2331 tary Professionalization: The Quest For Excellence.”
e-mail: Edward.Marolda@navy.mil Contact:
US Army Center of Military History
ATTN: DAMH-FPF (Dr Rush)
103 Third Avenue
Ft. Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5058
(202) 685-2727
e-mail: rushrs@hqda.army.mil

July 15-17 August 19-22
To mark the 60th anniversary of the atomic bomb, the The American Institute of Aeronautics and
Center for the Study of War and Society and the Astronautics will host its 5th International Airship
University of Tennessee Press will co-host a conference Convention and Exhibition in Oxford,England. Contact:
to assess the impact of nuclear weapons development on AIAA
American society and culture. The conference will be 1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Ste. 500
held in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Contact: Reston, VA 20191-4344
Prof. G. Kurt Piehler, Director (703) 264-7551
Center for the Study of War and Society website: http://www.aiaa.org
220 Hoskins Library
University of Tennessee August 19-22
Knoxville, TN 37996-0128 The Mars Society will hold its annual convention in
(865) 974-7094 the Palmer House Hilton in Chicago, Illinois. Contact:
e-mail: gpiehler@utk.edu The Mars Society
website: http:// web.utk.edu/~csws P. O. Box 273
Indian Hills CO 80454
July 22-25 website: http://www.MarsSociety.org
The lst Annual Aircraft Engine Historical Society
Convention will be held at the Fanmarker Hotel in September 9-12
Rantoul, Illinois. Program will include speakers and vin- The Tailhook Association will hold its 47th Annual
tage aircraft engine ground demonstrations. Contact: Symposium at the Nugget Hotel and Casino in Reno,
AEHS Convention Nevada. Contact:
P. O. Box 278 The Tailhook Association
Brownsboro AL 35741-9998 9696 Businesspark Ave.
e-mail: officers@enginehistory.org San Diego, CA 92131
(858) 689-9223 / (800) 322-4665
August 3-5 e-mail: thookassn@aol.com
The Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems website: http://www.tailhook.org
Int’l will host its annual symposium and exhibition at
the Anaheim Convention Center in Anaheim, California. September 11-15
Contact: The Air Force Association will hold its annual
AUVSI National Convention and Aerospace Technology
3401 Columbia Pike Exposition in Washington, DC. Contact:
Arlington, VA 22204 AFA
(703) 920-2720, Fax x2889 1501 Lee Highway
e-mail: info@auvsi.org Arlington, VA 22209-1198
website: http://www.auvsi.org (703) 247-5800
website: http://www.afa.org
August 5-7
The quadrennial joint meeting of the History of September 15-18
Science Society, the Canadian Society for the The Society of Experimental Test Pilots will host its
History and Philosophy of Science, and The 48th Annual Symposium and Banquet at the Westin
British Society for the History of Science will be Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, California. Contact:
held in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Contact: SETP
History of Science Society Executive Office P. O. Box 986
P.O. Box 117360 Lancaster, CA 93584-0986
3310 Turlington Hall (661) 942-9574, Fax 940-0398
University of Florida e-mail: setp@setp.org
Gainesville, FL 32611-7360 website: http://www.setp.org
(352) 392-1677, Fax x2795
e-mail: info@hssonline.org September 24-25
website: http://www.hssonline.org The Belgian Luxembourg American Studies Asso-
ciation and the Centre for Historical Research and
August 6-8 Documentation on War and Contemporary
The Western Front Association will hold its annual Society will co-host a Conference on the 60th Anniver-
national seminar on the SUNY campus in Plattsburgh, sary of the Battle of the Bulge in Luxembourg City,
New York. Contact: Luxembourg. Contact:
Len Shurtleff William L. Chew III, Ph.D.
Western Front Association Professor of History
(352) 379-3200 Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel
e-mail: lshurtleff@aol.com Pleinlaan 2
website: http://www.wfa-usa.org B – 1050 Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: wchew@vub.ac.be
August 17-21
The International Committee for the History of September 28-30
Technology (ICOHTEC) will hold its 31st Symposium The American Institute of Aeronautics and
at Bochum, Germany. This year’s theme is “(Re)- Astronautics will host its Space 2004 Conference &
Designing Technological Landscapes.” Contact: Exhibition in San Diego, Calif. Contact:
Barton Hacker AIAA
Chairperson, ICOHTEC Program Committee 1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Ste. 500
150 12th Street, N.E. Reston, VA 20191-4344
Washington, DC 20002 USA (703) 264-7551
e-mail: hackerb@si.edu website: http://www.aiaa.org
website: http://www.icohtec.org

October 4-8 October 26-27
The American Institute of Aeronautics and The U.S. Naval Institute will host its 9th Annual
Astronautics will host the 55th Congress of the Naval Warfare Symposium and Exhibition in Virginia
International Astronautical Federation, the Inter- Beach, Virginia. Contact:
national Academy of Astronautics, and the International U.S. Naval Institute
Institute of Space Law in Vancouver, British Columbia. Beach Hall
Contact: 291 Woods Road
AIAA Annapolis, MD 21402
1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Ste. 500 (410) 295-1067, Fax x1048
Reston, VA 20191-4344 e-mail: frainbow@usni.org
(703) 264-7551 website: http://www.usni.org/
website: http://www.aiaa.org
October 27-30
October 8-9 The 2004 meeting of the Northern Great Plains
The McCormack Tribune Foundation and VMI’s History Conference will be held in Bismarck, North
Marshall Library will co-sponsor their third Confe- Dakota. Contact:
rence on the Cold War, focusing upon the years 1963- Joe Fitzharris
1975. Contact: Dept. of History – Mail #4018
Malcolm Muir, Jr. University of St. Thomas
Dept. of History 2115 Summit Ave.
Virginia Military Institute St. Paul MN 55105
Lexington VA 24450 e-mail: jcfitzharris@stthomas.edu
(540) 464-7447/7338
e-mail: murim@vmi.edu November 16-17
The American Astronautical Society will hold its
October 17-20 National Conference and 51st annual meeting at the
The Association of Old Crows will host its 41st annual Pasadena Hilton in Pasadena, California. Contact:
international symposium and convention in San Diego, American Astronautical Society
California. Contact: 6352 Rolling Mill Place, Suite #102
AOC Headquarters Springfield, VA 22152-2354
1000 North Payne Street, Suite 300 (703) 866-0020, Fax -3526
Alexandria, VA. 22314-1652 e-mail: info@astronautical.org
(703) 549-1600, Fax x2589 website: http://www.astronautical.org
e-mail: wood@crows.org
website: http://www.aoc.org
October 25-27
The Association of the U.S. Army will hold its annual
convention and symposium at the New Washington
Convention Center in Washington, D.C. Contact:
Association of the United States Army If you wish to have your event listed, contact:
2425 Wilson Blvd. George W. Cully
Arlington, VA 22201 230 Sycamore Creek Drive
(800) 336-4570 Spingboro, OH 45066-1342
(513) 748-4737
e-mail: ausa-info@ausa.org
e-mail: warty@woh.rr..com
website: http://www.ausa.org/
World War II Memorial Opens April 29, 2004

Dedication on May 29, 2004
Honoring the more than 16 million Americans who served,
the over 400,000 who died, and the millions who provided support.

History Mystery by Robert F. Dorr
The readers of Air Power History know their air- Mercury XX, and the Mk. III by a 745-hp. Pratt &
planes. Once again, readers correctly identified last Whitney R-1535 Twin Wasp Junior.
issue’s “What Is It?” flying machine. We received The Master Mk. III had a wingspan of 35 ft. 9
nineteen postcard entries from readers. No one in., a gross weight of 5,400 lb., and a maximum
guessed it wrong, but one entrant was disqualified speed of 214 m.p.h.
for omitting a telephone number (see “rules” below). The Master was a familiar sight at Royal Air
Our Spring 2004 mystery aircraft was Force training bases during the war years and
Britain’s Miles M.27 Master training plane, used immediately after the war.
during World War II for advanced pilot instruc- Eighteen readers in three countries sent post-
tion and as a glider tug. Our follow-up photo, by card entries in Air Power History’s plane-spotting
Robert A. Hadley, shows a Master Mk. III (serial readers. None was completely wrong, but several
DM112) shooting a landing at the American air- were vague as to which version of the Miles trainer
field at Glatton, Connington, Hunts. (Royal Air was shown.
Force station 130) in England in 1944, with the Our “History Mystery” winner is John
instructor eyeing his student carefully. Osbourne of Witchford-Ely, Cambridgeshire, Eng-
Frequent contributor Earl Lock of Tallmadge, land. John will receive an aviation book written by
Ohio, pointed out that the ubiquitous Master used this journal’s technical editor.
various engines. The Mk. I was powered by a Rolls- Thanks to all of our readers who joined in our
Royce Kestrel, the Mk. II by an 835-hp. Bristol “name the plane” exercise.
Once more, we present the challenge for our This feature needs your help. In that attic or
This ever- astute readers. See if you can identify this
month’s mystery aircraft. But remember, please:
basement, you have a photo of a rare or little-
known aircraft. Does anyone have color slides?
Issue’s postcards only. The rules, once again:
1. Submit your entry on a postcard. Mail the
Send your pictures or slides for possible use as
“History Mystery” puzzlers. We will return them.
Mystery postcard to Robert F. Dorr, 3411 Valewood Drive,
Oakton VA 22124.
Plane 2. Correctly name the aircraft shown here.
Also include your address and telephone number,
including area code. One contestant was disqual-
ified this time around for not providing a phone
number. If you have access to e-mail, include your
electronic screen name.
3. A winner will be chosen at random from the
postcards with the correct answer. The winner will
receive an aviation book written by this journal’s
technical editor.

ground and carried radio gear with 2002, Vol. 49, No.2, it shows Charles
Letters which they intended to report intelli-
gence data to U.S.-U.N. officials. The
Lindbergh standing beside the “Sprit of
St. Louis.” The lead article, by
SB–17s had been modified for the mis- Raymond H. Fredette is about Lind-
Reference my article, “Bombers and sions so that the agents could drop from bergh after he landed in Paris. I seem to
Boats: SB–17 and SB–29 Combat Opera- the bomb bays. Unfortunately, the recall other articles about Lindbergh in
tions in Korea,” APH, Vol. 51, No. 1, results of the mission are unknown but your publication and particularly a cri-
Spring 2004. given the conditions the loss rate was tique of a biography of Lindbergh that
probably high. [Source: General Order had been written earlier. My point is
The modified bombers performed sever- No. 287, 21 June 1951 (copy in author’s that in all of the biographies of
al classified missions as well. On the possession), courtesy of Col. Eugene A. Lindbergh, none of them ever men-
moonlit nights of September 22 and 23, Scalise, USAF, (Ret.) tioned his having a second family in
1950, two SB–17s each dropped “orien- Germany. No one ever knew about this
tal” agents by parachute at several sites Forrest L. Marion, Staff Historian, Air until 2003, when it came to light
located on sandbars along the riverbeds Force Historical Research Agency through the newspapers. Since then,
amidst the mountains close to the North ever so little has been published about
Korea-China border. The agents, most this bigamous life. With all this pub-
likely Koreans, were dropped in groups I’m looking at the cover of Air Power lished material by biographers, without
of four from only 500 feet above the History magazine dated September their ever mentioning this part of
Lindbergh’s life, isn’t there now a cer-
tain amount of “egg on their face” due
these biographers? Here is an entire
segment of their subject’s fife that is
never accounted for in their works. Or
did they know about this portion of
Lindbergh’s life and chose to leave it out
of their work? Do not we interested
readers deserve better?
William A. Rooney, Wilmette, Illinois
Editor’s reply: You would have a point

if the biographers knew but didn’t reveal
it. Mr. Fredette, who has researched
extensively Lindbergh’s papers at Yale,
found nothing on this subject. Neither
had any other biographer. This is hard-
ly surprising, since Lindbergh donated
the papers to Yale. Fredette observes that
this “bigamous” affair probably had
more to do with Lindbergh’s theories on
eugenics and superior beings, than it
did with infidelity.
In the Spring 2004 issue of Air Power

History (Vol. 51, No. 1), the article,
“Were There Oil Targets in Japan in
1945?” cites the Target Information
Sheet for Akita (Appendix 1). This was
omitted from the article and is repro-
duced here. (Above right)
Emanuel Horowitz, Johns Hopkins

University, Baltimore, Maryland
62 AIR POWER History / SPRING 2004

NOT TO BE TAKEN TARGET 90.6-1066
INTO THE AIR ON OBJECTIVE AREA 50.6 AKITA
COMBAT MISSIONS
TARGET INFORMATION SHEET
TARGET 90.6-1066
NIPPON OIL CO. REFINERY, AKITA
Latitude: 39° 45' N
Longitude: 140° 04' E
Elevation: Approx. 50'
1. LOCATION AND IDENTIFICATION: The target is located immediately north of and along
the northern bank of Omono River and on the northwestern outskirts of the port town of
Tsuchizaki. It is five miles northwest of the city of Akita and fourteen miles south-
east of a peninsula of land jutting out from the west coast of Honshu into the Sea of
Japan.
2. PLANT DESCRIPTION: The target area roughly describes a rectangle measuring 2250 ft.
northeast to southwest and 2000 ft. northwest to southeast. Facilities for refining
are confined to the southern part of the area. Tankage occupies the northern portion
of the area. Railroad spur running through southern limits of the compound connects
the plant with the mainline Railroad to Aomori. Bunkering facilities are believed to
exist.
3. IMPORTANCE: It is one of the most important targets in the Japanese Petroleum

Industry. Processes crude oil from the oil fields around Akita, which are the largest
natural petroleum producers in Japan proper. The annual crude, capacity was estimated
in late 1944 at 1,320,000 bbls. annually, representing 31 per cent of the inner Zone
oil refined. Cracking capacity was estimated as lower than that necessary to refine
the crude oil available. Capacity has increased in importance since It In not depen-
dent on imported petroleum as are next existing refineries In Japan proper. The plant
is believed to have tankage capacity in excess of operating requirements.
TARGET SECTION, A-2

5 September l945. TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
[Handwritten Note: Homeland wells produced a total of 1,441,000 bbls., further demon-
strating the importance of Akita. Akita produced 61 percent of Japan's total oil out-
put as of 1945.]
The 50th Fighter-Bomber Wing will Red Creek, WV 26289

Reunions hold a reunion June 10-12, 2004, at the
Marriott Hotel, Ogden Utah. All mem-
(304) 866-4415
e-mail: rclif@frontiernet.net
bers of the 50th FBW, from Clovis
The 27th Air Transport Group through the F-100 era at Hahn AB, The 303d Bomb Group (Eighth Air
(310th, 311th, 312th, 325th Ferrying Germany. Contact: Force) will hold its annual reunion in
Sqdns; 86th, 87th, 320th, 321st Jack Lowrey Savannah, Georgia, August 26-30,
Transport Sqdns.; 519th, 520th Service (801) 544-0315 2004. The unit was based in
Sqdns.).will hold its reunion September e-mail: JumpnJac@aol.com Molesworth, England during World
30-October 3, 2004, at Bossier City, War II, flying B–17s. Contact:
Louisiana. Contact: The 56th Fighter Group will hold its Lt. Col. Eddie Deerfield
Fred Garcia reunion in Fairfax, Virginia, June 17- 352 Landmark Trail
6533 West Altadena Ave. 19, 2004. Contact: Palm Harbor, FL 34684
Glendale, AZ 85304 Ron Brubaker e-mail: ED303fsra@aol.com
(623) 878-7007 P.O. Box 57
AIR POWER History / SPRING 2004 63

The 353d Tactical Fighter Squa- Pilot Training Class 54N will hold October 5-10, 2004, in Kansas City,
dron (Myrtle Beach AFB) will meet at its reunion in Nashville, Tennessee, Missouri, Contact:
on June 18-20, 2004 at the Hyatt September 9-12, 2004. Contact: Donna Lee
Regency Town Lake in Austin, Texas. Hall McCord Armed Forces Reunions
Contact: (850) 349-2453 P.O. Box 11327
Tim Black e-mail: hmccord@earthlink.net Norfolk, VA 23517-0327
3301 Barker Hollow Pass or (804) 515-8086; FAX (804) 515-8087
Austin, TX 78739 Dick Seigman
(512) 280-8436 (813) 681-9601 The Sampson AFB Veterans Asso-
e-mail: tangblack@austin.rr.com e-mail: plttrng54n@juno.com ciation seeks to contact all 3650th
Basic Military Training Wing mem-
Misawa Recall: 416th Tactical Pilot Class 56N All those interested bers, especially permanent party,
Fighter Squadron, 531st Tactical in having a reunion contact: Women’s Air Force, Basic Trainees, and
Fighter Squadron, (1959-1964) will Jack Fleck Special Training school personnel, from
meet October 4-6, 2004 in Austin, (858) 487-7255 1950 to 1956. Contact:
Texas. Polkadotters and 4th fighter e-mail: jifleck@aol.com Chip Phillips
pilots also invited. Contact: PO. Box 31
Les Frazier The C–7A Caribou Association will Williamsville, NY 14231-0331
702 River Down Road hold its reunion in Odessa, Texas, e-mail: chip34@aol.com
Georgetown, TX 78628 September 30 – October 2, 2004.
e-mail: FLoftus@mac.com Contact: SAC Airborne Command and
or les@Iesfrazier.com. Jim Collier Control (PACCS) personnel of all
5607 Jolly Ct. ranks will hold a reunion September
The 610th Air Control and Warning Fair Oaks, CA 95628 22-26, 2004, in Omaha, Nebraska.
Squadron (618th, 527th, and all (916) 966-4044 Contact:
Southern Japan Radar GCI sites). e-mail: jascoll@pacbell.net Jack Suggs
Proposed reunion at Branson, or 855 Crenshaw Loop No.
Missouri, in September 2004. Contact: Bill Avon Keizer, OR 97303
Marvin Jordahl (303) 878-7451 (503) 390-2435
(904) 739-9337 e-mail: veteran@tusco.net e-mail: jwsuggs@msn.com
e-mail: jordahlmarvin@attbi.com www.c-7acaribou.com
U.S. Navy readers are advised to
The Eighth Air Force Historical log on to www.navalinstitute.org
Society will hold its national reunion, and then click on reunions.
Guidelines for Contributors

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well-written and attractively illustrated. The primary criterion is that the manuscript contributes to knowledge. Articles
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SUMMER 2004 - Volume 51, Number 2

Gen. John P. Jumper, USAF

2 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2004

Historian Richard K. Smith is memorialized by two other outstanding historians, R,

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After World War I, Hungary was virtually dis-

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Gliders of the Ninth Troop

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THE U–2 AIR-

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46 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2004

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN Frank Cass Publishers

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48 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2004

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Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature

The Lancaster Index database is primarily designed for information profes-

Military Policy Research Ltd.

50 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2004

Draw from last issue, Page 53

Bleed to edge of paper

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