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Perception Theories

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Perception Theories

Andrej Démuth
Edícia kognitívne štúdia
Perception Theories

Andrej Démuth
Edícia kognitívne štúdia
Peer reviewers
Content
Doc. PhDr. Ján Rybár, Ph.D.
PhDr. Marián Špajdel, Ph.D.

Editorial Board

Doc. Andrej Démuth ∙ Trnavská univerzita

Prof. Josef Dolista ∙ Trnavská univerzita
Prof. Silvia Gáliková ∙ Trnavská univerzita
Prof. Peter Gärdenfors ∙ Lunds Universitet
Dr. Richard Gray ∙ Cardiff University
Doc. Marek Petrů ∙ Univerzita Palackého ∙ Olomouc 1. The theories of perception
Dr. Adrián Slavkovský ∙ Trnavská univerzita — what, why and how to study? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.1 What do the theories of perception study? . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 Why study the theories of perception? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Who and how studies perceptions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4 The task of philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Recommended literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2. Basic theories of perception

and processing of information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1 The bottom–up theories
of perception explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.1 Gibson’s theory of direct perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.2 Pros and cons of the theory of direct perception . . . . 28
2.2 The top–down indirect perception theories . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.1 Constructivist theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
The publication of this book is part of the project Innovative Forms of Education in Transform- 2.2.2.1 Gregory’s theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
ing University Education (code 26110230028) — preparation of a study program Cognitive Stud- 2.2.2.2 Evaluation of Gregory’s theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
ies, which was supported by the European Union via its European Social Fund and by the Slovak
Ministry of Education within the Operating Program Education. The text was prepared in the
2.2.3 Computational theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Centre of Cognitive Studies at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy in Trnava. 2.2.3.1 Marr’s model of perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.3.2 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2.4 Synthesizing theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
© Andrej Démuth ∙ 2013 2.2.4.1 Neisser’s analysis–by–synthesis model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
© Towarzystwo Słowaków w Polsce ∙ Kraków ∙ 2013
2.2.4.2 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
© Filozofická fakulta Trnavskej univerzity v Trnave ∙ 2013
ISBN 978-83-7490-606-7 2.3 Recommended literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

5
3. Philosophical problems of perception . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Introduction
3.1 Metaphysical status of objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Perception beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 The issue of quale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4 Recommended literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

4. Individual differences and cultural influences . . . 56

4.1 Presumption of individual distinctions . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Cultural influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3 Recommended literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
“Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?
5. Interspecial comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 You say here it is just as with the eye and the field of vi-
5.1 Why do  we actually perceive? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 sion. But you do not  really see the eye. And nothing in the
5.2 How to study the sensory world of other beings? . . 69 field of vision allows the conclusion that it is seen by an eye.“
5.3 What is the subject of the world of other species? 70
5.4 Recommended literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein:
Tractatus Logico–philosophicus, sentence 5.633
6. Perception and artificial inteligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.1 Why improve the possibilities of perception? . . . . . . 77
6.2 How to improve perception possibilities? . . . . . . . . . . 79 The reason for writing this text was the fact that although our
6.3 Possible applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 knowledge is based on a collection of the most elementary facts
6.4 Recommended literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 and experiences, we usually start being aware of them and begin
to study them only when something stops functioning. Perception
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 after all is one of the basic ways of meeting reality and for many
it actually is the reality. Despite this, it is usually the last thing we
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 think of in our research.
If we want to learn something about the reality we meet, we
should know something about the way we capture it or how the
meeting with reality is constructed. This work, however, doesn’t
just look at a neuroanatomical, cognitive–psychological descrip-
tion of receptors and mechanisms of sensory reception, but also
offers deeper thoughts about the conditions and mainly about the
consequences of higher cognitive processes tied to perception. The
text thus walks a line between general and cognitive psychology

6 7
and philosophical epistemology while trying to map not only the see is not the same and seeing contains in itself a belief that real-
origins of percepts, what influences them, but mainly where and ity is what I’m seeing.
how our perception convictions originate and the total concept of
reality we live in. In Trnava, July 2012 Andrej Démuth
The obvious intention of this exploration is not only to present
a package of basic facts and theories, but also to encourage the
reader to think about and to problematize the perception processes
and consequences. Individual chapters are, therefore, divided with
the intention to gradually walk the reader through the subject
starting from basic facts (while learning key terminology and con-
cepts) and continuing to broader problems. This should encourage
the reader to individually and creatively think about the problems
and solutions to the problems. The work with recommended litera-
ture, which offers more detailed information on a specific subject
or provides a different view of the problem (listed after each chap-
ter) corresponds with this system.
There are undoubtedly many books dealing with the study
of sensory and cognitive abilities of humans. Therefore, I chose
only the most recognized and the most accessible ones. The work
of P. Rookes and J. Willson Perception. Theory Development and
Organisation seemed to me specifically inspirational by its struc-
ture, scope and approach. It became the core of argumentation as
well as the basis for structuring several chapters. The same ap-
plies to the often revised and re–published Eysenck’s and Kean’s
work Cognitive psychology (Psychology Press, 2010). I thank Pe-
ter Gärdenfors and Richard Andersson from LUCS for inspiration
with their version of Human Labs in humanities and philosophi-
cal sciences and to Richard Gray for his ideas about the extension
of dimensions in philosophical aspects and non–visual forms
of perception. Special gratitude goes to both peer reviewers Ján
Rybár and Marián Špajdel, to the graphic Ladislav Tkáčik and to
my students who helped me clarify and refine the terminology so
that what should be heard, will be heard and helped me see what
I didn’t see in my own words. Because I know that to look and to

8 9
1. The theories of perception
— what, why and how to study?

Key words: internalism, externalism, phenomenalism, the subject

of the theories of perception

1.1 What do the theories of perception study?

Cognition may be studied from many diverse points of view. We

can ask what cognition is, what its conditions, validity and limits
are, what the mechanisms by which we acquire it are, or what de-
termines it, etc. One of the weightiest questions in epistemology is
the question of the origin and sources of cognition. What are the
sources of our cognition?
Most thinkers are convinced that the sources of cognition can
be divided into two basic groups according to whether the sources
exist within the subject or outside of it. Proponents of the first ap-
proach are called internalists. The internalists are convinced that
pieces of knowledge or their sources and principles can be found
within the subject, and cognition is nothing else but discovering
them or developing already existing (a priori) pieces of knowledge.
For example, Descartes who believed in innate ideas, is the propo-
nent of this approach, as well as Plato, who asserted that knowl-
edge is nothing else but recollecting already acquired contents.
Internalism postulates an approach which enables us to explain
the existence of intuitive and innate cognition, but at the same time
it does not clarify how, from where and why the ideas themselves
get into the mind, why we all do not have the same knowledge, why

11
we are not aware of it already at birth and why we have sensibility the starting point and the source of any sensual or intellectual cog-
at our disposal, although the pieces of knowledge or their princi- nition will therefore be the subject of our thoughts.
ples do not necessarily require the influence of sensibility.
In contrast to internalism, there is an opposite approach; au- 1.2 Why study the theories of perception?
thors who adhere to it, are convinced that all our knowledge has
an external source — experience. The externalists assert that the To study the world means to study perceptions and ideas we creat-
mind is more or less a blank sheet of paper (tabula rasa) and all ed, and the world is mainly the world of perceptions, images or ide-
knowledge is being inprinted in us from external reality. The main as. Thus, when we want to study something, first we should know
problem of this approach is (besides problems of existence of ne- where, when and how to meet and learn it. But that is not enough.
cessity and universality in cognition) the explanation of how ex- John Locke and the entire epistemological tradition following
ternal reality is being perceived and imprinted in the subject. This him was convinced that if we can find the answer to the question
problem, in fact, is the main determinant of whether something about sources and procedures of cognition, we will be able to rel-
will be the subject of cognition, how and in which way it will pre- evantly answer the questions about its legitimacy, validity, nature
sent itself to us and how it is possible to comprehend it. And this is- and limits. Actually, the certainty of any statement is based on the
sue of “meeting” with information which represents the substrata trustworthiness of the authority that postulates it. Thus, if we
of knowledge is in fact the key question of the theories of cogni- want to believe our knowledge, we must know, where it is coming
tion sources. from, how it was being formed and how it was subsequently being
Both basic theories — externalism and internalism — face the proliferated. As said in Descartes style: we must verify the knowl-
question of how to explain the awareness of new reality in our con- edge principles themselves.
sciousness, how information (external or internal) is elicited or, in In the first meditation of Meditations on first Philosophy,
other words — how we meet the world. Some critical philosophers Descartes indicates that our senses sometimes lie to us. As an ex-
are actually convinced that the world is a sum of information sur- ample, he talks about a stick dipped in water or objects in the dis-
rounding the subject. What we call the world is nothing else but tance. But how do we know the senses are lying to us? We do this
a set of various perceptions, feelings and ideas. For example, phe- again only by senses, either the same ones (when I take the stick
nomenalists adhere to such a point of view. They believe that only out of water, using my eyesight I can see it is not broken) or through
our perceptions are the subject of our cognition. What we perceive other senses (for example touch). But may I trust them now? How
are only perceptions and there is nothing else accessible to us ex- do I know they are not lying right now? After all, if they lied to
cept perceptions. What we assume is behind our perception and me once, they can do it again. But is there a safer authority than
what allegedly causes it, is just a rational construct. Besides per- one’s own senses? One may claim that the human brain is such an
ceptions, we thus possess images, rational constructs and ideas we authority. But the problem is, that the brain and its thinking about
create ourselves. The question, however, is what we created them the world is based on data which arrived via senses. Then, if we
from, on what basis and how we perceive these ideas, how we un- want to build on someone else’s testimony, there is nothing we can
derstand them. These cornerstones of knowledge — perceptions as do but to trust or to verify it. But how may the testimony of senses
objects which form the content and diversity of the world, but also be verified?

12 13
 It seems, there are at least three ways of verifying testimonies. and by verifying if he had really seen (perceived) what he described
The first one is: I verify data myself. But in situations when I have in his testimony. By this process we paradoxically satisfy require-
to substitute my senses by a certain device this is not fully pos- ments of all three above mentioned possibilities.
sible. One may argue that if I want to ascertain the existence of Firstly, step by step, by observing the chronology of the testi-
objects which are so small, that it is not possible to detect them by mony’s formation, we figuratively move into a position of a witness
the naked eye, I can use a microscope. Similarly: if I am not able to and we experience the matter being assessed as if by our own mind.
measure the temperature of liquid by touch, I use a thermometer. The testimony of (for example another person’s) senses places the
However, this argument doesn’t hold its ground because although matter right in front of us so that we can experience it by our con-
such devices could help us to extend the scope of our sensory pos- sciousness as if by “inner sight”.
sibilities and render them more accurate, consequently they again Since senses offer us the possibility to view facts by “inner
present the collected data to senses — either for the same ones sight” they, at the same time, enable us to confront individual
(I see with a microscope), or via their transformation into a differ- sensory experience with our own perception. In this step, we are
ent sensory form (I see a thermometer scale or hear its signal). As it cross–examining the submitted testimony by our own perception.
seems, there is no way to “step out of myself” and perceive objects We verify the evidence and trust it only if we can see/hear/feel (by
directly without using my senses. Again we have to rely on some inner sight) that such evidence produced by senses is true. Actu-
senses which we might or might not trust. ally, we compare what was seen with what we are seeing ourselves
A second possibility is to test the testimonies of senses by their in this conveyed place. We verify what we see and what anybody
mutual confrontation. If the testimonies are inconsistent, evi- else sees, we verify the validity of the testimony in comparison
dently, some of them will most likely be wrong. On the contrary, if with the testimonies of other senses. Thus we move towards the
testimonies of mutually independent witnesses are consistent, in third step. That means we verify the trustworthiness of the wit-
all probability they are true. The problem is, that not even the tes- ness itself (senses) by means of confrontation with other sensory
timonies made by a relatively large number of witnesses can rule experiences, individual specifications and personal history.
out the possibility, that they are all wrong and it is just an induc- If we want to study the trustworthiness of our testimonies,
tive sensory mistake. While taking no account of the possibility, we must study the circumstances of their formation, but also the
they are all wrong or are lying, just imagine that none of our wit- nature and personality traits of the witness that offers the testi-
nesses can give a complete and doubtless testimony of surveyed mony. This can be done by studying the structure and abilities of
phenomenon and that all the witnesses describe what they saw, the witness and the mechanisms, by which it acquires, evaluates,
but unfortunately, there is no one who saw what is essential. and later conveys information. In order to know these factors, it
We are thus left with just the third possibility and that is to crit- is necessary to know the anatomy of our receptors, the way they
ically reassess the reliability and competence of each witness and work, their limits and functional determinants as well as the way
their testimonies. As in the judicial system, where the sincerity and of evaluating acquired data via higher cognitive processes. Moreo-
truthfulness of witnesses and the possibility to verify it are impor- ver, it is necessary to know the conditions in which senses are able
tant, cognition must, also have reliable foundations. This we can to receive information, that is later contained in their testimony
achieve by observing how the witness arrives at his own testimony and if or to what extent the truthfulness of information is limited.

14 15
Understanding of these factors enables us not only to recognize the domain of epistemologists (epistemology = philosophic theory
the validity and reliability of sensory data, but also to better under- of knowledge), but as the thinkers started to see the differences
stand the limits of our sensibility and thus helps to improve it (for between sensed entities and real ones very soon, gradually they
example by increasing its range and sensitivity) and even to form were forced to integrate mathematical knowledge (mainly geom-
new — artificial perceptive systems, which are able to replace miss- etry — Euclid, Ptolemy), optics and physics into their explanations.
ing or damaged receptors, or make the activity of already existing Later (especially in the Middle Ages — Ibn al Haytham — Alhacen),
human sensorial systems more effective and automatic. Only by the focus of the study of perceptions shifted to geometry and phys-
studying the way we perceive, can we recognize our own mistakes ics (conversed physiology — sight as the light of a reflector) in or-
and imperfections and eventually eliminate them from our cogni- der to become in the early years of modern science an individual
tion. This can be applied at the perception level as well as at the branch of scientific exploration but at the same time still be a part
level of ideas and constructs which are derived from perceptions. of naturo–philosophical thoughts of mainly those philosophers
Besides the pragmatic and the noetic reasons, there are many who were trying to reshape the modern age of science (F. Bacon, R.
different motives to study the issues of perception. One of the rea- Descartes, W. Snell, I. Newton). Despite the fact that in the 17th cen-
sons can be sincere interest in understanding why things seem the tury, the original antique theories of perception were brought back
way they seem, why illusions, hallucinations or sensorial defects and turned into more psychological ones (J. Locke, W. Molynaux, G.
exist. Another reason is an aesthetic motive (Blake, Sekuler, 2006) Berkeley, D. Hume), generally we can say that philosophers of mod-
and last but not least — a desire to understand oneself and the ern times (from R. Descartes to I. Kant) studied mainly the relation
world in which one lives. On one hand, to study perceptions means between sensory perception and intellectual knowledge.
to study the world which is made of them, on the other hand, it A real interest in systematical and experimental study of re-
also means to study oneself, one’s cognitive apparatus and sensory ceptors and sensory physiology came into existence much later
perception as well. — towards the end of the 19th century. This was connected mainly
with the creation of experimental psychology and with the appli-
1.3 Who and how studies perceptions? cation of physical tools and methods of studying and describing
perception–receptive mechanisms. G. T. Fechner and M. Weber
Perceptions and sensing represent a unique source of how to ex- tried to focus their attention on the study of stimulus increase
perience something at all. Since cognition was at first the domain and its modifications in perception, as well as on the analysis of
of philosophy, it is obvious philosophers were also the first group basic conditions, scopes and capacity of perception. At this period
of people to study the issues of perception. Antique thinkers such we may encounter the birth of attempts to experimentally verify
as Democritus and others developed mainly speculative theories most psychological and philosophical theories of perception pos-
(about atomic structures — eidolon — being received by our senses), tulated by W. Wundt, H. Von Helmholz, E. Hering and others. Thus
on the basis of which they tried to explain how we perceive some- psychology was separated from philosophy and it was established
thing. Aristotle chose a similar way of thinking, although a less ma- as an individual discipline with the primary domain of studying
terialistic one (the shapes entering our mind) and the stoics had psychics (and thus perception as well) in scientific ways. The for-
their own conception as well. The theories of perception became mation of experimental psychology as a university discipline and

16 17
publication of ground–breaking work by Robert Woodworth (Ex- The beginning of the second half of the last century can be
perimental Psychology 1938) may be regarded as the height of this characterized by divergence from behaviorism, by a synthesis of
emancipation effort. the two main directions and by a turning to a so–called “cognitive
In the second half of the twentieth century, due to the influence revolution”. As a result of rapid development of new research tech-
of behaviorism and the arrival of neuropsychological approaches, nologies and of interdisciplinary studies, a whole area of sciences
attention was turning to scientific testing of sensory discrimination and disciplines with a common interest in cognition came into
abilities and to studying the neuroanatomical correlation of per- existence, and both receptivity and perception play a crucial role
ception (A.R. Lurija). As the knowledge of neuroanatomical, physi- in this area. Along with concentration, memory, language, prob-
ological and functional dependencies as well as the new display lem–solving and other abilities, they represent the core of cogni-
and examination processes and mainly of the electrophysiological tive sciences which include philosophy, psychology, neurosciences,
records which were developing, the neuroanatomical “substrata” of linguistics, education, artificial intelligence and anthropology, but
receptivity became one of the best analyzed fields of perception also many other studies (biological, evolutionary ones, etc.). The is-
and as a result of this the structure and function of individual re- sue of perception thus becomes the central question in the theo-
ceptors as well as their functional connections with neural centers ry of communication, in modern design as well as in the newest
were becoming relatively well mapped. However, a one–sided em- advanced, so called “smart” technologies. Therefore we might say
phasis on the study and description of “external” mechanisms of that it is now an inter–disciplinary and multi–aspectual study. It
perception resulted in a deficiency of learning about “the contents” seems that while at the beginning, the theories of perception used
of perception. to be mainly the domain of philosophers trying to explain their
In the 1930s, many thinkers (philosophers, psychologists) own knowledge, today the center of research is shifting away from
turned their attention from studying basic elements of perception a purely human dimension (development of artificial retina, auto-
to studying entire patterns (mental ones mainly). The holists be- mated perception — security systems, separation of stimuli — Pi-
lieved that studying such a complex matter as perception cannot casa etc.), and they are becoming more and more a scientifically–
be done by just studying the individual qualities which can be usu- technological utilitarian matter which involves various scientific
ally described only from the outside (by a third party). Therefore approaches and methodologies of study.
the mentalists, the representationalists and the gestaltists looked
for the essence of perception “from within” by searching for the 1.4 The task of philosophy
patterns of perception organization and of the sensory field and its
structure. Phenomenal experience and mentalistic concepts which It may seem that with gradual specialisation of individual science
are able to describe it, became the main object of their study. De- disciplines and with their orientation to certain aspects or prob-
riving from the works of a brentanist Christian von Ehrenfels and lems of perception, the issue of sensory reception has become al-
from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, they did not under- most solely the domain of science. Over the course of history phi-
stand perception as just a physiological and mechanical process of losophy has gradually lost its competence in this subject (as well
acquiring data, but they considered its subjective understanding as in other areas). Philosophers used to play an important role of
and interpretation as the key point. valuable sources for perception theories, staring with Democritus’

18 19
mechanistic teachings through Alhacen’s unconscious inferences, examine the accuracy of new theories and test them in not very
Descartes’ optics, the Boyle — Lock separation of primary and probable or not quite possible conditions.
secondary qualities, Descartes’ and Berkeley’s perception of dis- It is a special task of philosophy not to ask “How?” as science
tance (Hatfield 2009) or Kant’s theory of knowledge. Also Goethe’s does, but to enquire “Why?”. It poses totally different types of ques-
or Schopenhauer’s inspirations for Hering, suggestive Brentano’s tions. A philosopher is interested not only in the process of percep-
thoughts as well as phenomenology, plus many other philosophi- tion but also in the character of perceived data, reasons for exist-
cal ideas found their place in later scientific theories. ence of this mechanism, conditions and consequences. This puts
Philosophy, however, used to enrich science not only via con- the philosopher into a meta–scientific position and forces him/her
cepts and ideas, but also through distinctive methodology and to synthesize and guess the information produced by concrete sci-
ways of thinking.  As good examples we can mention the introspec- entific disciplines. One of the biggest problems of contemporary
tive method as well as the phenomenological reduction and the de- science is the issue of compatibility of individual scientific findings
scription of phenomenological experience. which are a result of different scientific methods, theories and ap-
Even more inspirational than the methods are questions that proaches. Philosophers are thus able to function as some sort of
philosophers used to formulate. The most dramatic example of this a link between individual theories and place them into accurate
is the historical search for the answer to the „What is colour?“ ques- circumstances while, of course, using scientific knowledge.
tion.  What we actually see often depends on how we ask the ques- Philosophy possesses another crucial role and that is to work
tion. The question pre–determines what we concentrate on, what with language. Philosophers are able to clean and linguistically
we consider important and how we could approach the problem. stabilise terminology and the meaning of certain concepts. Phi-
Philosophy is implicitly present in every perception theory in ex- losophy tries to clarify and unite different terms used by different
planatory background, which is the building block of each of these sciences and at the same time it seeks to dispose of deep deposits
theories. Besides this, it is present there especially through things of shady and unclear notions.
it asks about or things it doesn’t ask. Things we do not debate be- In addition, philosophy is also left with a whole other group of
cause we don’t know about them or, on the contrary, because they uniquely philosophical queries concerning the issue of perception.
are so obvious are often more essential than those we explicitly One of them is whether it is possible to separate perception from
enquire about. And philosophers, most of all, are those who dare to higher cognitive functions or whether it is inseparably joined to
ask things that leave others untouched.  them.  Most thinkers distinguish between sensory and post sen-
The philosopher’s task is to ask obscure questions in places sory processes of information. It is questionable however, in what
where scientists see no problems. These are not just questions of way do higher sensory functions influence the discrimination and
metaphysical, epistemological or methodological character of the processing of information on a sensory level. In other words: Does
problem being researched. These questions often cause a whole our previous experience influence whether and how we perceive
area of new unsuspected issues to arise, as was the case with the something? In what way does the structure and function of the
birth of Mind Philosophy (mind–body problem) or with the ques- receptor determine the quality of the reception? Is it even possible
tion of quale. This type of question, questions using mind ex- to grasp raw sensory data? How does a random group of stimuli
periments (for example Mary and quale) allows us to thoroughly turn into a united sensory experience? Do we perceive the world

20 21
directly or do we create our own pictures and interpretations? 2. Basic theories of perception and processing
How does it happen? (Rookes, Willson 2007) Why don’t we all per- of information
ceive the same objects in the same way when we have typologically
identical receptors? Does culture, language and education have an
influence on our perception? Why is our knowledge and our abil-
ity to see or not see something changing if our receptors are stay-
ing the same? Is sensory perception merely a biological process?
(Blake, Sekuler 2006)
This text attempts to focus on perception theories from a philo-
sophical point of view. Besides a terminology definition and a short Key words: realism, constructivism, computationalism.
introduction to anatomy and physiology of specific receptors, it will
try to focus on the overall complex of sensibility and receptivity Most relevant theories and explanations of perception as a process
and will try to introduce basic (up–to–date) theories of perception. of acquiring and processing of information may be divided into
It will at the same time take into account ontological, epistemologi- two basic groups, according to the direction of information flow.
cal, and methodological aspects of perception and questions tied to The first is a group of theories which suppose using only bot-
its teleology, evolution and further development. tom–up processes when acquiring and processing sensory data. By
bottom–up processes, we mean processes that start at the lowest
1.5 Recommended literature: sensory levels — that means( from the cortex’s point of view) at the
most distant levels of cognitive apparatus — and then they gradu-
Audi, R.: Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. ally lead to more complicated and complex processes which take
London : Routledge, 1998, 15 — 54.
place in higher (cortical) structures which are responsible for more
Hatfield, G.: Perception & cognition. Oxford Press, 2009, 1 — 35.
Gepshtein, S.: Two psychologies of percepction and the prospect of their synthesis.
global and abstract ways of thinking.
In Philosophical Psychology. Vol 23, No 2, April 2010, 217 — 281. On the contrary, the top–down theories suppose that in the
Hamlyn, D. W.: Perception, sensation and non–conceptual content. In The Philo- process of discrimination, but mainly when processing sensory
sophical Quarterly. Vol 44, No 175, April 1994, 139 — 153. stimulus, we start by “feeling” sensory data on receptors, but their
Locke, D.: Perception. Routledge, 1967, 13 — 15.
processing presumes a downward influence of higher cognitive
contents which organize and later determine them. Such influence
we can call the top–down effect. The core of this approach is the
fact that in order to process sensory stimulus, one needs to have
prior experience or knowledge, or other influences which help to
organize and form cognitive contents.

22 23
2.1 The bottom–up theories of perception explanation regarded as some sort of structures or patterns of light in the en-
vironment. The visual terminology he was using is not important
The characteristic feature of bottom–up theories of perception is since, analogically, it can be used for auditory or tactile compo-
the fact that the content and quality of sensory input play a de- nents of perception.
terminative role in influencing the final percept. Sensory input, in Gibson believed that a human perceives objects (their sensory
their view, represents the cornerstone of cognition and by its own qualities) in a way by which packets of information — arrays deter-
nature it determines further sensory data processing. For example, mined (structured) by objects, enter his sensors. The beams of light
when perceiving a tree, our sensors collect the basic data (such as reflect off the surface of objects and thus carry the information
points, horizontal or vertical lines) as the main individual char- about their shape, size, texture, etc. Similarly, our ears are impacted
acteristics of the object which are later connected to build more by arrays of vibrating waves or by the influence of tangible objects.
complex, assembled surfaces and shapes in order to create complex These information beams — arrays — form an extremely broad set
perception of the object we identify as a tree. Therefore we call this of information flows, as in our environment there are billions of
data–driven processing perception. With respect to the emphasis beams impacting our receptors from the entire perception field we
these theories put on the nature of sensory input, it is no surprise happen to be in.
that most of them significantly correlate with philosophical real- It may seem that in Gibson’s view an observer is more or less
ism, which suggests that our percepts are directly induced by ex- a passive space into which the information coming from the envi-
ternal objects and more or less correspond to them. A typical proto- ronment is being imprinted. However, the opposite is true. Gibson
type of such direct realism is Gibson’s theory of direct perception. realized that, to some extent, our perception is effected by our active
approach. And it doesn’t mean only focusing our attention and per-
2.1.1 Gibson’s theory of direct perception ceptual accommodation. For perception the most significant thing
is movement. For example, when we are sitting at a table in a room,
J. J. Gibson believed that our cognitive apparatus was created and there are beams which strike the retina from the perception field of
formed by a long evolutionary influence of external environment our eyes and which carry some information. Thus, for example, we
which is apparent in its structure and abilities. We learned to ex- can see a book we are reading, the table, but not many other objects
tract precisely the information which is necessary for our survival. that are out of our visual field. If we change our position, for exam-
In accordance with Darwin’s assumption, the pressures of the en- ple, if we stand up (or if we just turn our head slightly), the group of
vironment caused our receptors to be created and formed so that optical arrays falling on our receptors will change. This allows us to
they became sensitive to relevant stimulus from the environment see some other objects or the same objects from a different angle.
and they adapted to the environment. Such interpretation of per- And exactly this change of position of our body or position of our
ception is called the ecological one because it attributes the deter- receptors is the key matter for environment mapping. Only by this
minative role to the environment and to its influence on the whole change can we catch surrounding information beams and acquire
process of perception. or be aware of the information present in our environment.
The basis of Gibson’s theory is the conviction that our percep- Nevertheless, Gibson thought, the main part of information
tion is determined by optical flows — optic arrays, which Gibson contained in information beams around us is invariant. This is

24 25
a result of the fact that we perceive reality which is independent the size of the picture on retina changes according to their distance
of us and our position is only a slight determinant of what we are from the observer.
able to capture from the world. So, if we change our position, we On the basis of these findings, Gibson arrived to a conclusion
are changing a set of information that is available to us, but we are that by detailed analysis of data collected from the environment
not changing reality itself. Information structures such as texture we may acquire all the essential information about objects — by
gradient, optical array and horizon–ratio relation are some of the direct perception of their perceivable qualities. And this is not
key points of our environment. only information about their size or structure, but also about
The texture gradient is created, if there are elements which, by their importance and potential application. In his work (1979) he
gradual increase of distance from the observer, gather in his vi- introduced a thesis — it is possible to perceive, using senses, the
sion field into more and more compact formations. An example of potential use of particular objects the same way as it is possible to
such grouping can be a cluster of trees, a large cornfield or a peb- perceive the structure of these objects. Affordance is the quality of
bled beach. The larger the distance, the less we perceive particular an object or it is the thing we might be able to do with this object.
stones and the more we perceive the texture of this background. Gibson was convinced that if we take a look at a ladder we
Gibson regards texture gradient as an important matter because of might also see the possibility to climb up or down. Similarly, we
the information it brings, especially information about the depth can see the use of a hammer for driving nails or the possibility that
or the distance between elements. Wherever we look, the texture a certain object can be thrown or vice versa — that it might have an
of individual elements increases with their increasing distance and aesthetic function only. This can be applied to all common activi-
becomes more and more dense. ties we do with objects, but also to atypical, original or highly ab-
Another informatively important invariant is an optical flow. If stract ways of use. Gibson used an example of a post box which can
the observing subject is moving, it seems to it as if all the objects be used for receiving letters and at the same time serve as a com-
close to it are moving faster than those in the distance. Gibson munication point (Gibson, 1979, 139). What’s interesting, though, is
believed that an optical flow of information beams grows as their the fact, that to uncover what an object might be used for doesn’t
distance decreases. Such effect can be viewed during piloting (de- require any learning about or any prior experience with the object,
termining distances according to the position of other objects), for but rather to learn to pay attention and to see. In this context we
example when landing an airplane, when the point we are heading can see certain similarities between Gibson (Gibsonians) and the
to (focus of expansion) is seemingly still, whilst the objects in its phenomenological approach.
periphery are flowing in direct proportion to their distance from The core of Gibson’s concept is a conviction that our percep-
the visual field center. This enables pilots to get fairly explicit in- tion is based on information volume of sensory inputs, which we
formation about height, distance and speed of movement (Gibson, further process only via revealing and explaining the available
1950). information. Therefore, from the point of view of processing in-
Similarly, when we determine the distance according to the pro- formation it is not necessary to operate with images of sensory
portion of the objects height to the horizon, Gibson found, that two representations or with some mental objects. Gibson believed all
objects of the same height are divided by the horizon in the same necessary information is already contained in optic arrays, that is,
proportion, which indicates their equal height despite the fact that directly on the retina — which in fact makes him to be a proponent

26 27
of direct perception. Similar to Losskij, he also believed that we environment. This means, Gibson belongs among critical realists
view objects directly, in their original form. He also points out and pragmatic advocates of cognition.
that sensory stimuli provide us with more information than we An important feature of his approach is a reminder that both
are usually aware of and therefore, we must learn to simply scan sensory field and sensory apparatus contain much more informa-
them. This process of learning, however, is not some sort of learn- tion than we normally acquire from them. Gibson believes that
ing about how to use objects or any other type of learning or mem- sensors are able to extract and register all the relevant data and
ory. It is a process of careful tuning to things and resonating with its evaluation is more or less automated and intuitive. According to
them. By resonating we mean that we let the object influence our Gibson, the higher cognitive processes are not fundamentally nec-
sensors and subsequently we are able to decode the qualities of ob- essary for perception. This idea corresponds with Fodor’s modular
jects directly from the feelings and perceptions they evoke in us. theory which presumes that perception processes are informative-
Learning plays no important role here, since our cognitive appa- ly encapsulated and even reflexively automated.
ratus is tuned evolutionarily to be able to extract such data from The great advantage of Gibson’s theory is that it is able to ex-
the world and then evaluate it correctly. An example of such eco- plain the accuracy but also the speed of perception operations.
logically caused intuitive data evaluation is a perception (except During information detecting experiments it was found that visual
the perception of texture gradient and other physical structures) processing of information took some time, but it was just a few mil-
and assessment of mental states such as happiness, sadness or an- liseconds. The fact that it is an automated and fast process makes
ger, but also a „reading“ of physiological processes such as hunger, Gibson’s theory advantageous in comparison with some compu-
thirst or tiredness. We don’t learn to interpret them by learning tational models which require relatively dense and complicated
and experience, but rather they are just an immediate response to mathematical operations.
inner states or sensory data. In spite of the fact that Gibson did not attach any great impor-
tance to higher cognitive operations and cortex centers, on the
2.1.2 Pros and cons of the theory of direct perception basis of later experiments it has been proven that some of these
centers are functionally specialized, e.g. for processing of vertical
Gibson’s theory of direct perception represents one of the most in- or horizontal lines or face recognition in the extrastriate cortex
teresting, but also one of the most controversial concepts in the (Bruce et al., 1981). Similarly, some experiments imply innate sen-
history of interpretation of perception. Not surprisingly, it often sory reactions (reflex), which could support Gibson’s statements.
becomes the object of critics and wide scientific testing. However, the theory of direct perception faces many serious
From the philosophical point of view, we can appreciate that problems. By a series of experiments it has been proven, that start-
Gibson’s ecological approach considers a human as well as any oth- ing first with rodents, it is necessary and quite effective to form
er animal to be an inseparable part of the environment, in which mental representations and involve memory tracks when integrat-
it came into existence, lives and exists, what is then reflected in its ing with the world. Rodents, mammals and mainly all the primates
sensory and cognitive equipment. Thus, it is quite natural that he reach better results in an environment they had lived before, which
trusts the senses and the nature of sensory data, which he finds points out the importance of mental maps. Gibson’s theory is also
not only true, but sufficient for relevant data evaluation in the unable to explain the plethora of visual illusions such as the Ames

28 29
room, which prove the importance of previous experience for as- computation or creating a picture of a given reality. Sensory data
sessing visual stimuli. must be organized and captured by cognitive apparatus and then
The most significant shortcoming of the herein presented the- interpreted on the basis of available knowledge. The philosophical
ory is the concept of affordance. The statement that a visual field basis for this approach to perception is The Critique of Pure Reason
can offer us a sufficient amount of information about the usage by Kant. According to this work, thoughts without content (Inhalt)
of objects independent of our previous experience is very prob- are empty (leer), intuitions without concepts are blind (A50–51/
lematic. If it is so, why can’t we see most of the meanings before B74–76). Only by understanding (begreifen) the image (e. Anschau-
someone teaches us to do so? Another serious question is — where ung) via a concept (r. Begriff) one realizes, what he is experiencing
does the originality and genius of a certain view come from, if our and only then can we call this cognition.
cognitive apparatus is more or less identical and we all have all the Participation of higher cognitive functions is characteristic for
significant information in our field of vision? And if our sensory interpretation of viewed sensory inputs. According to the way we
apparatus is developed ecologically and our perception is being led arrive at this interpretation, we can divide the theories into con-
by stimulus, why is this resonance (in the sense of forgetting about structivist, computational and synthesizing ones.
other forms of evaluation) necessary and why isn’t such a huge
amount of information utilized? 2.2.1 Constructivist theories
Besides being limited to some visual problems, the distinctive
issue of Gibson’s theory is the fact that it doesn’t discriminate be- Constructivist theories assume that the process of perception is
tween seeing and understanding stimuli. The theory of direct per- a highly active process of extracting sensory stimuli, their evalua-
ception does not address the question of visual field organization, tion, interpretation and backward organization of sensory stimu-
to gestalt figures and it completely ignores the difference between lus. Perception is the end product of the interaction between stim-
seeing the object and understanding it as a particular object. This ulus and internal hypotheses, expectations and knowledge of the
is precisely the moment that may be considered as one of the most observer, while motivation and emotions play an important role in
significant differences between the ecological theory of J. J. Gibson this process. Perception is thus influenced by a wide range of indi-
and constructivist theories. vidual factors that can lead to an inadequate interpretation. (Ey-
senck, Keane, 2008, 74).
2.2 The top–down indirect perception theories While behaviorist background is typical for the theory of direct
perception, constructivists accepted Helmholz’s principle of sen-
The key feature separating the top–down theories and the bottom– sory data processing by means of unconscious inference (inference
up theories is the participation of higher cognitive functions in the of color constancy). They also took into account the knowledge of
process of perception in the form of support of discrimination and Gestalt Psychology, which enabled them to look for unconscious
interpretation of perceived contents. While top–down theories pre- patterns of perception as well as to study the influence of conscious
fer direct perception without participation of knowledge and pre- experience on irreversibility or reversibility of perceived shape.
vious experience, according to the theories of indirect perception,
perception is possible only by means of mental representation,

30 31
2.2.2.1 Gregory’s theory close to each other, there must be a connection (the law of closure).
It means that the cortex is searching for an appropriate explana-
One of the most popular constructivist theories of perception is tion of what the retina is offering. We do not know exactly how
Gregory’s theory. While Gibson integrated the phylogenetic flow of and by what principles the cortex does this. It is, however, obvious
time (the influence of evolution on cognitive apparatus) into the that it concerns the rule of similarity and association, and thus it is
process of perception, Gregory used also the flow of ontogenetic based on previous experience. When searching for the appropriate
time. He claims that sensory data found on receptors are just some answer, the cortex is forced to use already existing contents and
sort of energy samples, but they are of no great importance them- knowledge. Among them it tries to pick and choose the best and
selves. Their importance is based on our previous experience. Data the most likely one, consequently it tries to subject the sensory
„have the past and the future; they change themselves and they stimulus to this hypothesis.
influence each other. They have some hidden aspects that emerge Verifying particular hypotheses is considerably constructivis-
only if influenced by various conditions. (Gregory, 1990, 219). tic. When talking about constructions we mean that when grasp-
What Gregory is trying to suggest is what we call the impor- ing sensory data on receptors we do not accept them as they are,
tance vagueness of sensory data. Similarly to Gibson, he does not but we try to construct a sensory object — to organize it — accord-
doubt the importance of receptors for acquiring data but he disa- ing to hypotheses that should describe it. Ultimately it means we
grees that sensors possess the ability „to read“ the meaning of par- ignore data, which do not support the hypothesis (e.g. an incom-
ticular data (e.g. affordance). Gregory believes this process, just like plete object and its imperfection) and we emphasize those which
any other similar process of reading, requires higher cortex centers agree with the hypotheses. If we succeed in doing this and sensory
activity and learning. Perception is a matter of receptors as well as data do not oppose the hypothesis, it is certain the hypothesis is
of brain. The name of his book Eye and Brain follows this idea. correct.
Material acquired by sensory organs is non–specific and raw, so Many psychological experiments have proven that when we
we must approach it by higher cognitive functions. In this contexts search for hypotheses we are very sensitive to either slight sim-
Gregory talks about searching for a hypothesis that would be able plifications leading to a clear conclusion (an oval as a circle) or vice
to grasp and interpret sensory data in the most pertinent way. Sub- versa, to tiny obstacles which violate the ideal shape which leads to
sequently, we test the given hypothesis (e.g. this is the letter A) and a search for totally different hypotheses (an unclosed circle with
if it seems to be congruent with the model, we accept it. So sensory the gap on the top we interpret as the letter u, with the gap on the
data are only clusters of physical stimuli and our brain tries to in- right side as letter c). It is quite interesting, however, that to find
terpret them in the most meaningful and the most likely way. the right interpretation, neither the perfection or completeness of
A typical example of such a procedure are various optic illusions sensory data nor the ratio of these data to those that contradict
or gestalt figures. Many of these figures are based on our endeavor the hypothesis are important. In fact, only a small amount of in-
to grasp some non–specifically outlined shapes in the most mean- formation and its correspondence with the whole idea is sufficient.
ingful way. The model itself is neither a duck, nor a rabbit, only Taking this into account, Gregory thinks, that a subject needs con-
a group of some points we tend to connect and interpret as lines tents and ideas more than a great sum of sensory information. Ex-
that are somehow connected. We believe, if there are two points perience is the key point of interpretation.

32 33
 Gregory often points out that for interpretation of sensory phenomenon applies mainly when evaluating visual stimuli (for
data, experience is more important than sensory image. Our con- the tactile ones it is less significant) and it may be attributed to the
clusions about stimuli such as the Müller–Lyer Illusion or the fact that we are trying to perceive the contrast and the context at
Ponzo Illusion prove that. We perceive both by using our experi- the same time.
ence with spatial perception, which we apply to two–dimensional Research has shown (Bruner, Goodman, 1947) that overestimat-
outlines. We suppose that two parallel lines of the same size are ing the size of an object relates also to attributing specific values
not of the same length because they are bordered by opposite ori- to a larger object. Poor children, for example, tend to overestimate
ented arrows. Gregory believes, we interpret this illusion (drawing) the size of coins, while more affluent ones (perhaps because of a lot
through our experience with the distant corner of a room versus of experience) do not trust this illusion so much. The context, the
the near corner of a building. Also in a Ponzo Illusion, we use the motivation and the expectations are some of the key theorems of
rules of perspective to interpret the size of objects. Gregory’s theory. From our own experience we know that when
A distinctive example of using perspective for identifying stim- evaluating stimuli we are often led by what we are mostly expect-
ulus is the Necker Cube. The cube portrayed in a two–dimensional ing. We do not take into account atypical features and we see what
surface is a slightly illusionary object. In fact, we should see and we want to see, or on the contrary what we don’t want to see; it
identify some sort of polygon rather than a spatial object. But our means what we are afraid of, but are convinced, we are in danger of
previous experience with representing perspective forces us to in- it. Allport and other constructivists in this context talk about per-
terpret this object as a three–dimensional one, portrayed according ceptual sets and setting. Gregory, therefore, says that to see means
to the rules of the Renaissance perspective. What’s peculiar about to believe, that the given object is what it is, but also, that our per-
this cube is the fact that it immediately offers at least two equally ception is determined by attitudes, emotions and expectation.
correct interpretations and those are the top–view as well as the One of the most significant examples is operating with incom-
view from below. Both views are reversible and we can switch be- plete objects. And this applies to completing pictures as well as to
tween them according to our approach to object organization we more abstract objects such as the letters. If we look at a written
happen to adopt at that particular moment. There are some other text, we focus not as much on the structure and visual aspect of
similar unreal or infinite objects (the Penrose Triangle, Escher’s In- a particular letter, but rather try to integrate it into a meaningful
finite Staircase). unit consisting of other letters — into a word. According to the
It is quite remarkable that these illusions are somehow forcing holistic reading method, it is possible to apply this strategy even
us to spontaneously interpret them the wrong way even after we when reading whole words in sentences. What we are attempting
had just realized that the first hypothesis was wrong. It is the same here is to identify a letter according to the already read context and
with the Ebinghaus Illusion. In this experiment we incorrectly expectations arising from the following letters. Psychologists car-
identify the size of circles based on context in which we see them. ried out a wide range of experiments, in which they used incom-
If there are two identical circles surrounded by circles of differ- plete letters and found out that this obstacle does not necessarily
ent size (one is surrounded by smaller circles, the other by larger play a major role in reading and identifying the content. Similarly,
circles), we tend to think that the one surrounded by smaller sat- if we use a letter font, which makes it impossible to identify dif-
ellites is larger than the one surrounded by the larger ones. This ferences between some letters (e.g. cl and d), despite the fact, that

34 35
typographically it will be the same object, the reader often, based hypotheses, where do they come from, because in early childhood
on context, has no problem to distinguish them and reads the text we possess mainly sensory data and hypotheses (experiences) are
as if these were two totally different letters. This means that the created via grasping and interpretation of this data.
way we identify stimuli is not “literal“, but it is driven by most like- To express this in a lighter way we can say, that while Gibson
ly context. studies correct perceptions in optimal conditions, Gregory’s theory
is based on analyses of incorrect perceptions and perceptions in
2.2.2.2. Evaluation of Gregory’s theory borderline or limited conditions. This allowed him to demonstrate
that perception is a more complicated and complex phenomenon
One of the main features of Gregory’s concept is the fact that it is than Gibsonians had thought, and that besides mere collection of
able to clarify the reasons of our errors and inaccuracies quite well. information, it involves also active participation of higher cogni-
It seems that contrary to Gibson, Gregory found mechanisms for tive functions responsible for constructing.
explaining illusions and reasons why our perception is so complex
and holistic. One of the greatest advantages of his approach is that 2.2.3 Computational theories
when speaking of the process of perception it takes into account
our personal history and that he understood that to operate with Another example of the bottom–up theories are computational
sensory data does not necessarily mean to perceive, but to perceive theories. The core of their approach is the expansion of Helmholz’s
always means to integrate feelings into a broader context of our belief in unconscious inference and evaluation of sensory stimuli.
beliefs and opinions. Proponents of computational theories are trying to solve the issue
On the other hand, it is necessary to add, that there are some of perception by eliminating the question of conscious experience,
shortcomings to be found in Gregory’s theory. One of them is its while at the same time utilizing some of Gregory’s premises. They
inability to satisfactorily explain the relative correctness and uni- believe that perception is not determined by conscious intention-
versality of most of our daily perceptions. Despite having quite dif- ality or motivation, but that it is being operated by relatively easy
ferent personal histories, motivations, expectations and emotional mechanical rules which can be applied to unconscious entities as
statuses, our perceptions are nearly identical. If our perception is well.
determined by construction of internal hypotheses and mental A typical example of developing computational theories is the
models, it is surprising that they are so universally widespread and field of applied informatics and artificial intelligence. Although
that they are so similar, almost identical when dealing with the the area in which they study perception is not totally conscious or
same stimuli. alive in the biological sense, in their theories they often utilize biol-
Another problem is that most of our hypotheses are relatively ogy or comparisons of different cognitive apparatuses. By studying
correct, although the probability that we would be just „guessing“, particular systems, by which organisms acquire and evaluate sen-
and almost always getting the correct hypotheses, is very low. Of sory data, they find the fundamental patterns — algorithms which
course, we can say that if our experience confirms the accuracy can be applied to apprehend human perception as well as in the
of a particular hypothesis, we tend to use it in all subsequent area of inanimate nature. The example of such procedure may be
similar situations. The question, however, is how we acquire these the analysis of scent tracks by a snake’s vomeronasal organ.

36 37
 In their environment, snakes acquire information about food visual system should do in order to make the perception success-
using their sense of smell, that is using their tongue. The tongue of ful. Marr called this level computational since it assumes that each
a snake works as a device, by which a reptile collects information function (perception is a function) can be understood as a compu-
from the environment. In order to optimize this process, Nature tational operation (consisting of sequenced steps) leading to a de-
has developed a special mechanism and a tool — a forked tongue, sired outcome. A fundamental feature of this sequence of steps is
which can be flicked out quickly. The speed of this movement has the fact that it contains hidden analytic — computational process-
a special task. The faster the tongue is flicked, the larger number of es — and the aim of computational analysis is to describe a strate-
air molecules (and thus smell molecules, too) it acquires from the gy, by which we ensure the achievement of a result (Marr. 1982, 23).
environment into its oral cavity directly to the vomeronasal organ. Marr’s second level specifies a representation system which
Snakes, in fact, gather air samples to evaluate them. Due to the fact, identifies inputs with algorithms, which transform inputs into
that the tongue is forked, the snake can gather samples from two representations. A second level of solving a problem is a detailed
different parts of the environment. Then, the snake „knows“, if the analysis of specific actions which we must take when transform-
intensity of scent is increasing or decreasing in comparison to the ing physical stimuli into mental representations. At this algorith-
previous sample, but also whether the scent is stronger on the left mic level we study formulas — algorithms as well as representa-
or on the right side. This urges it to turn its head in the direction, in tions (representational level) which enable us to achieve the result.
which the scent is more intensive until it finds the right direction A third problem is the analysis of the means enabling us to car-
of its source. On the basis of a simple evaluation of two pieces of ry out a specific operation. This level is called the hardware level
data, it is precisely able to find hidden prey. (Rookes, Willson 2000, 34) or implementation level. In the case of
Wilson’s studies of ants (The Ants, 1990) moving pieces of for- living systems, it includes neural network analysis, in the case of
est according to predetermined rules as well as Reichert’s studies AI (artificial intelligence) it is the description of functional connec-
of spiders’ aggression (1978) by using explanation mechanisms of tions described in the language of a specific material base.
game theories prove wide use of computational theories to explain The core of Marr’s concept was a belief, that receptors are able
perception and processing sensory data in living nature . More and to detect sensory data by each receptor cell itself. Since Marr’s ex-
more, computational models are finding their application in the planation is based on the description of visual perception, it as-
creation and development of artificial intelligent systems. sumes that each photoreceptor detects an amount of light impact-
ing it and consequently stimulates it or not. Accuracy of detection
2.2.3.1 Marr’s model of perception is given by the number of receptor cells and their connections.
Gray level description is the first level of data processing. At this
Despite the fact that we have mentioned computational models in level, our cognitive apparatus evaluates light intensity in every sin-
the context of color perception and determining the final color (e.g. gle point of the model we are looking at. It means we are evaluating
in Land’s Retinex Theory), we must also say that Marr’s model of lighter and darker spaces or points which the model consists of.
seeing is an excellent representative of computational theories. This level represents just a preliminary stage (early vision). Based
David Marr approached perception as problem solving. Accord- on the perception of edges, stripes, endings and points, we are form-
ing to him, to find a solution, it is important to analyze what the ing the first rough sketch of the perceived model. Due to constant

38 39
variability of sensory cells’ excitation, we evaluate and update the looks at a map, for him it is difficult to read, because he does not
rough sketch according to the principles of flocking and merging understand its three–dimensional representation.
into graphics. Because the image we are perceiving is projected
on the retina as a two–dimensional object, which is characterized 6.2.3.2 Evaluation
by various colored or black and white spaces, we must process it
implicitly in order to grasp it. Such process involves merging ad- Marr’s theory arouses a wide range of polemics and interpretations
joining points and similar or contrasting spaces and leads to a de- among philosophers, psychologists and mathematicians as well.
velopment of some sort of primal two–dimensional object. Marr Owing to Marr’s theory, philosophers such as Robert Audi and
thought, while mapping brightness takes place mechanically as Dan O’Brien distinguish between raw data and their cognitive in-
a bottom–up process, at the level of the first primal sketch we take terpretation. They also open up questions of existence and the na-
into account also hidden patterns of field organization, although ture of perception beliefs, and thus the question of reality and be-
the main part of this process is still regulated by stimulus. Thus lief in cognition. We will deal with these problems in later chapters.
a two–dimensional picture of the object comes into being, although Marr’s model had a great influence over informatics and found
we are not aware of it. its application in machine evaluations of visual stimuli. Both Marr
In the next stage, we read a given model according to previous ex- and Hildreth developed a program which analyzes sensory data
perience. Thus, Marr calls it 21/2D sketch of the scene. In this stage, and creates an analogy of a raw primal sketch (Rookes, Wilson 2000,
we interpret various textures, shadows, colorations and brightness 36). This is based on the mechanism of identifying simple outlines
by forming a picture of the object according to perspective rules, of a visual field (for example horizontal lines). This also inspired
as we experience them in daily life. We suppose, the objects seem computer experts to develop artificial intelligent systems, which
different from different angles and we ascribe them a certain plas- would be able to recognize, notice and evaluate given models. The
ticity. 21/2D dimension means that objects seem more–than–two– height of their effort is the development of an artificial retina and
dimensional, at the same time it documents that we realize this “as intelligent observation systems.
if” and we don’t possess full 3D understanding. Without any doubt, the great advantage of the theory intro-
Full 3D vision assumes a high level of conceptualization. While duced here is that it enables us to distinguish between particular
in 21/2D, a sketch we suppose the plasticity of the object, under- levels of cognitive processes and mathematize them as well. This
standing of the 3D vision also involves what we do not see. If we way, Marr used the advantages of Gibsonian process because it
are looking at a sphere or a cube, we never see the front and the finds sensory data more dominant at the first levels — as the data
back part at the same time. The fact, that it is three–dimensional, by its nature pushes the retina to transform experienced data into
or it has the back part as well, is just our belief — our understand- primal sketch. However, unlike Gibson, Marr considered the pro-
ing of the object as a 3D geometrical entity. Such understanding cess of physical invariants’ detection to be identical with processing
is not based on visual experience (we never see the back part), but of information, although it is more complicated than Gibson sup-
on logic — on our understanding of things as three–dimensional posed. Recognizing areas of light and dark on a model involves not
objects. It follows that 3D sketch is a fully top–down process which only identification of borders and shades, but also a whole range
assumes a specific kind of comprehension. So if a native Indian of unmerged outlines and their mutual organization. However, at

40 41
a higher level he takes into account the positive aspects of Grego- and at the same time it uses principles described by Gibson. What
ry’s approach, which assumes the influence of learning and of data is special about it, though, is that the great part of our sensory pre–
stored in our memory. What’s happening when using 21/2D sketch conditioning behavior uses this information without any further
is then a calculation of the most likely possibility on the basis of processing. We detect but don’t think about given information or in
one of the available variants. Thus, Marr created a basis for a com- other words it doesn’t enter our consciousness, if it isn’t necessary.
bined concept of theory of perception, which is well represented But if important information occurs during the data preliminary
by Ulric Neisser. sampling process, for example movement, great contrasts etc., an
observer directs his attention to it.
2.2.4 Synthesizing theories By means of this mechanism Neisser pointed out that a great
amount of acquired sensory stimuli is left unnoticed or conscious-
Similar to the two–level theory of color perception as well as to ly unprocessed, though it can influence our behavior (unconscious
a general theory of perception, the existence of contradictory and avoidance of objects, squinting of the eyes against high intensity
partially satisfactory theories led scientists to attempts of reconcil- light etc.). Only data that somehow draws our attention, either by
ing them. One example of such projects is Ulrics Neisser’s analysis– its evolutionary importance (innate mechanisms) or by our own
by–synthesis model. deliberate intentionality (we focus our attention to it because we
are searching for it) enter our consciousness. So, if we don’t want to
2.2.4.1 Neisser’s analysis–by–synthesis model see, we are only looking.
When directing our attention to interesting or important data,
Neisser, an author of the first textbook of cognitive psychology we may feel as if we were attracted by it. It is only spontaneous at-
(1967) and a specialist in memory processes (a case study of Dean’s tention caused by bottom–up processes. But there may also exist
testimony for the Watergate Scandal), defined „cognition“ as a set a purposeful attention — then we deal with the top–down process-
of all processes by which sensory input is transformed, reduced, es. Neisser believes that directing attention involves a combination
stored, recorded and used. Thus, he illustrates his behavioristic of both processes.
understanding of cognition as a transformation of inputs into be- The main feature of this second phase of information process-
havior in S–R scheme. However, he is aware of the fact, that per- ing is that stimuli which are neutral in their importance are sub-
ception involves all the complex and dynamic processes such as sequently gathered and organized by image–conceptual schemas.
mechanisms used to perceive patterns, mechanisms of figurative They come out of “storage” via learning, experience and through
syntheses, visual memory, concentration, perception of speech etc. classification schemas collected by language and they help in de-
(Hatfield, 2009, 116). The basics of perception process are physical veloping a perception model which represents some sort of mental
stimuli we are exposed to in the environment. The process of their representation of the stimulus. This is illustrated by a dorsal direc-
detection in his view is a pure bottom–up process that goes on in- tion of processing.
side the cells of sensory receptors, but it is only a process of so– While Gregory’s conception is known for characteristic construc-
called preliminary sampling. According to Neisser, the process of tion of objects, Neisser’s model is somehow more about re–con-
preliminary sampling is unconscious and more–or–less automatic struction and re–presentation of an object. This is also an indirect

42 43
perception, but the difference is, that the mental object is constantly top (knowledge and experience). Neisser focused his attention to
being reconstructed and compared with preliminary sketch or with work with classification schemes and to research made by Eleonor
data acquired on receptors. Thus preliminary mental representa- Rosch, but he didn’t manage to offer a satisfactory explanation. The
tion, which is the object of mutual (dorsal and ventral) influence, question of how we identify an object we see for the first time and
comes to existence. have no knowledge about remains a serious problem. Are we even
The third stage includes comparison and potential modification able to identify it, and if so, aren’t we in this identification being led
of the mental representation in order to suit the sensory data, but more by sensory data than the concepts? On the other hand, if we
at the same time to be part of the context of already gathered expe- are led by sensory data scanning as they are being received by our
rience and knowledge. Neisser calls it the modification stage. If we receptors, how is it possible that we succumb to lies and illusions?
find an interpretation model, that suits the perceived experience Even though Neisser’s answer is a compromise, it offers a wide
and our knowledge, it is validated and then there is no need to look range of new questions, mainly about the nature and the status
for a different model. But if our preliminary interpretation is not of perceived objects (about their reality and relative independence
validated, we try to modify it until it is accepted. Neisser thinks our of higher cognitive functions), but also about the patterns and de-
memory and recalling works like this. terminants of organizing sensory field and mental representation,
which refers to an object or interprets it.
2.2.4.2 Evaluation
2.3 Recommended literature
Neisser’s model represents a cycling model of perception inter-
pretation. It does not necessarily start with acquiring raw data, Rookes, P., Willson, J.: Perception. Theory development and organisation. London
and New York : Routledge, 2007, 13 — 38.
although without it and without sensors being present there is no
Matlin, M.: Cognition. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 2005, 44 — 52.
cognition. Neisser noticed that cognition may start with the top– Eysenck, M. W., Keane, M.T.: Cognitive psychology. Psychology Press 2010, 121 — 152.
down processes by means of intentional focusing and paying at-
tention. If we pay attention to something, our conscious attention
makes stimuli detection faster and better, although, on the other
hand, it may have a negative impact on the process of applying
schemes to sensory data. On the other hand he considers the de-
tection of physical information to be a bottom–up process which
leads to higher cognitive functions and to memory, and then back
to sensory representation.
However, the problem of his research is, that it does not offer
quite a precise explanation of why and how preliminary represen-
tation comes into existence. The problem of preliminary interpre-
tations is the fact that they are supposed to manage both the data
from the bottom (sensory data) as well as the concepts from the

44 45
3. Philosophical problems of perception and independent from our minds or whether they are just our
creation.
The history of philosophical thinking about perception can be
seen as a history of the basic metaphysical argument between re-
alism and idealism. According to Hegel’s dialectics it is only obvi-
ous that by their mutual confrontation these two concepts have
smoothed out unacceptable attitudes, modified and gone through
a process of looking for new variants. Starting with Aristotle who
had realized that an object doesn’t enter the mind in real terms but
Key words: ontology, reality, quale only through its picture (eidos aestetos), through the stoics and the
middle ages (species sensibilis), we come to British sensualists who
Basic types of perception theories problematize mechanisms of (even in the case of Hume’s empirism and associanism), take into
creation and the task of specific centres for the formation of a per- account also the active role of the subject in the process of sensory
cept. Besides describing bottom–up or top–down processes (dorsal object construction. 
or ventral schemes) they open up a question of metaphysical sta- Realism not only assumes a certain level of direct or indirect
tus of perceiving objects as well as the problem of the origin of per- view of things as such but especially the fact that perceptions are
ception convictions and beliefs. The question of the source of real- a result of their direct influence on us. This is the basis of each
ity and fiction in our perception seems an interesting one as well. causal theory which explains the mechanism of perception in real-
ism. Nevertheless, the fundamental problem of this attitude is that
3.1 Metaphysical status of objects it doesn’t show how to prove the existence of independent objects. 
What we usually encounter is not the thing or its causal influence
The problem of metaphysical status of objects being perceived but its result, which means the reaction of the receptor on the
is an ancient philosophical problem. Democritus was convinced stimulus which (because of the reaction) we suppose. 
that the atomic structure of things or of things that come out An important milestone in this aspect was Kant’s differentiation
of things (by separation or emission) is the object of our percep- between the thing and the object or his differentiation between
tion. On the other hand, even Plato was aware of the difference noumen and phenomenon. Even if we take no account of the prob-
between the sensory object and the subject of our knowledge. Ac- lem of how we even know about the existence of (thing, per se) Ding
cording to him the subject of knowledge is clearly idealistic which an sich, the perception of the phenomenon is problematic in itself.
he documents by giving it the name “idea”. An idea is something Kant supposes that a thing somehow appears to our cogni-
which is principally intangible and it is available only to our mind tive apparatus and just this thing (the way it appears) he calls the
which according to other Greeks (Pythagoras’ heritage) is percep- phenomenon. Phenomenon, therefore, is a collection of qualities
tible by an internal view. Eidos therefore points to this untouch- which our (human, not individual) cognitive apparatus is able to
able but visible object and the only thing that remains question- grasp. This causes the difference between the knowledge about
able is the issue whether these objects are actually objective a thing (in itself) and our image of it. 

46 47
 Phenomenalists (J. S. Mill, E. Mach) (, therefore, identified physi- the forms of perception but also by the overall architecture of our
cal objects with phenomena and they point out that if we want to cognitive apparatus. That means that perception really starts with
say something about things, we should limit our statements only to a stimulation of senses, the final sensation is, however, influenced
the description of our sensory statuses. According to them, percep- by the structure of the cognitive apparatus (for example the struc-
tual phenomena or sensory stimuli are the objects of knowledge. It ture of the organisation of a sensory field), but also by its content.
is not possible to step beyond the border of feelings. So, if I’m looking We can name a few of these: subject–object structure, the unifica-
at an object, I’m perceiving it as, for instance, red (but I’m not sup- tion of perception, space and time issues, etc. In other words, if we
posing it is also materially so). Similarly, when I’m feeling the tem- had different cognitive devices, we would see objects differently.
perature of a certain object, what I’m perceiving is the collection of Adverbalists, while speaking of this issue, say that we don’t
qualities that are being presented, for example, on a mercury scale know what objects really are like, we only know how we see them. 
of a thermometer. An object can therefore be identified by sensory We can see an object as red although theoretically it doesn’t have
data (sense data). The problem of phenomenalism is whether it is to be red at all. What we have here is just our representation of
even possible to map sensory data. Sensory data as objects of recep- the object. Adverbalists think that color is not part of the object
tors are actually not the object of perception. Perceptions them- (or at least there is no way to find out), but (similarly to objects as
selves which are supposed to arise from data are in fact the objects a whole) we just plant color into objects ourselves. In this way, ad-
of perception. How can we actually recognise the congruity between verbalists are similar to social contructivists. They question the
sensory data and perceptions? And how do we know that we have existence of any independent objects and believe that we create all
any sensory data at all if they are not the object of perception? Can objects in our minds. Objects are products of the architectonics of
we connect the activity of receptors with sensory data? our mind/brain. However, if we doubt the existence of things or
There is another solution to this problem and it is the approach sensory data and believe in the construct of objects, how can we
of phenomenology. Phenomenologists believe that things are explain the remarkable match of perceived objects?  Where does
identical to how they are presented to us. The trouble is that our the unity of our perceptions come from, if we don’t have identical
knowledge is marked by incorrect interpretations of things (cul- experiences and knowledge and our sensory organs and our brains
ture, education, illusions). Phenomenologists are convinced that are unique and in a certain sense different?  
this can be eliminated (it’s called phenomenological reduction) and On the other hand, the fact that our mental representations are
that things can be seen (as objects) in their reality and nakedness. just a construct also necessarily means that they are not as real as
What they are trying to get to is the thing and the actual struc- things that cause stimulation in realism. Isn’t realism, while refer-
ture of self–representation of the object. But, is it really possible to ring to causal influence of physical stimuli, working with the same
see things in a way they present themselves to us independently ideal constructs, which are sensory data and causality?
from our language, experience and previous knowledge? Isn’t this
request for complete phenomenological reduction at the same 3.2 Perception beliefs
time a request for elimination of the subject? Or should a result of
this reduction be a type of perception that is without any object? Several philosophers such as Audi and O’Brian believe (following
Kant pointed out that all we perceive is determined not only by the example of Russell’s sensory data) in the existence of primary

48 49
raw stimuli (seeing raw). They explain their beliefs by pointing out of the apple, although we somehow naturally assume it. But where
that subjects must have some building blocks that act as a basis for from? Previous experience? What we saw in our previous encoun-
their convictions. Raw data in their opinion corresponds with the ter with an apple, for example when someone took a bite of it or
birth of a belief that something exists. Thanks to vagueness of its when it was cut in half, wasn’t actually the inside, it was again only
significance and structure, raw data is unable to inform the subject a surface of this partial object. How do we know then that things
about any particular content, but it can at least draw attention to have their inside?
itself. Similar reasoning applies to a closed book. Sellars points out the
Audi, while using Marr’s and Gregory’s model of seeing, suggests difference between these statements:
that raw data is the initiator of the process of organization or re– a) I see a book
organization of stimuli and of the grasping of it through the search b) the book has pages inside / cover in the back
for a hypothesis of what this object could be. Organizing the object c) I see a book as having pages inside / back cover
of perception into a meaningful unit he calls „seeing as“. Identify- d) I don’t see inside pages / cover in the back (Sellars, 1978, 15)
ing an object as an object is a key moment. The question is how While with the first statement we are able, with a certain
that happens. Audi postulates that it happens through aspectual amount of tolerance, to accept Gibson’s claim about affordance,
perception which breaks up raw data into individual details and if while with the second it is evident that the content of our percep-
some of them remind us of something from previous experience, tion had been mined from our memory and previous experience
we then reorganize and assemble them in order to create a mean- and with the last statement even from the understanding of the
ingful entity. This seems similar to sorting by features or compar- meaning of the object as a specific, three dimensional identity (I’m
ing of patterns. seeing what I am not seeing).
One of the key points of Kant’s theory is precisely this linking of Sellars therefore reasons that perceptual consciousness in-
sensory images with some meaning. Whether we identify an object vokes construction of a sensory–pictorial model of an external ob-
as a book is, according to Kant, a matter of determining judgment, ject (Sellars 1978, 25). And not only that. It reaches all the way into
which (via schematism) chooses from the sensory material (image) a decision process about reality and non–reality.
what is important for it. Kant, however, does not offer a satisfac- The third type of perceptual belief is a belief that a specific
tory explanation as to how this happens and suggests that this object really exists. In this type of conviction, we know whether
problem actually belongs to the 13th chamber of the theory of a certain perception is real or not and we come to the problem of
knowledge. dreams, illusions or hallucinations. A perception, in its essence, is
Willfrid Sellars (Sellars, 1978) in his analysis of sensuality (in his always trying to convince us that something is one way or another.
work The Role of Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience)(enu- Perception is therefore more or less affirmative and that applies
merates) several important aspects. Firstly, he says that perception even in cases when it claims that a thing, a characteristic or an
is a matter of productive imagination. Sellars documents this fact event is there or isn’t.
with an example of a book or an apple. When we look at an apple In epistemology we tend to believe that the issue of reality is
we see an object that we identify as an apple. We see its shape, size, a matter of judgment. But judgments draw their reality or non–re-
surface but all of it only partially. What we don’t see is the inside ality from perceptions and their mutual harmony or disharmony.

50 51
I think that in principle, perceptions always claim that what they 3.3 The issue of quale
are seeing is true reality, therefore they are so convincing. Even if
we encounter a sensation we don’t trust, it is either because it con- The above example with colors, but also a perception of any model
tradicts other sensations which we trust or because it is not clear in general, suggests that a mental reality which we believe relates
enough and that’s why we question it. to a certain external reality is the object of our perception. Because
A classic example of vivacity or lifelessness of perceptions is dis- of the difference between recipients and conditions of their recep-
crimination between an on–line and off–line system. Current per- tions, we need to also consider the question of subjectivity as well
ceptions (on–line) are considered clearer and livelier while mem- as individuality of perceptions.
ories and artificially produced images are just their faded prints Previous chapters have shown that perception of any object
(Hume) although from the time of Descartes, we have known that is determined mainly by the composition and functionality of in-
even dreams can be so alive that it becomes too hard not to call dividual receptors and by the organization of the sensory cortex.
them reality. Then, what is the difference between fiction and real- This raises the question whether percepts acquired by different
ity? Productive imagination is indeed part of both the on–line per- types of receptors are in fact the same perception process or it is
ception and the fantasy. And memories are mental representations an altogether different type of perception (echolocation of a bat vs.
similar to current perceptions. Moreover, as it has been shown, the seeing, thermo–detection of a viper vs. seeing — Gray, 2005), but
production of memories or often fantasies activates the same ar- also whether receptors offer identical contents. Philosophers are
eas of the sensory cortex as if they were produced by a signal from looking for criteria for evaluation of identity of processes and con-
concrete sensors. In addition, numerous experiments have shown tents (for example, the criterion of the stimulus, representation,
that for creation of a convincing sensation, no activation of a sen- phenomenological character and sensory organ — Gray, 2012) and
sor is needed, it could be validly substituted by the activation of the they are aware of the potential difference in the perception content
cortex using, for example, an electrode. To what object or to what of various perception processes and types. Inter–species compari-
place is this thing which we call reality tied to? sons lead some of them to accept differences between perception
We have shown that perception of colors is a matter of estab- worlds of different species. However, what about the experience
lishment of a special quality of psychological sensation which usu- contents of identical types of perceptions (for example within the
ally happens by a transduction of the energy of photons impact- same species)? Are our perceptions identical?
ing retinal cones. Our sensations, however, often convince us that While examining biological conditions of perception, we have
things appear in one way or another. The Ishihara pseudo–isochro- stated that each individual possesses a unique number and sensi-
matic plate tests suggest that what one subject sees as a red num- bility of receptors which causes for example that not all of us see
ber eight, another subject can perceive in a very different way. On the same shade of color or actually that all of us would probably see
certain plates some subjects see nothing, while others see some- colors in a unique way, depending on the unique structure of his/
thing specific. How do we decide which observations are correct? her receptors. It is even clearer when we consider that the cortex of
Who is right and what is the real color of shown objects? What de- each of us is constantly being formed by each new experience and
termines the reality? by each stimulus. This in fact means that even identical twins’ cor-
texes would not be the same (they have different experiences if for

52 53
no other reason than just their different place in space) and there- 3.4 Recommended literature
fore their interpretation of sensory stimuli might not be identical.
The problem of quale (subjective aspects of experience) is con- Locke, D.: Perception. Oxon : Routledge, 1967, 47 — 67, 92 — 112, 126 — 134.
Keeley, B.: The early history of the quale and its relation to the senses. In: Symons,
sidered an important issue of philosophy (Gáliková, 2013). It seems
J., Calvo, P.: The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge
(if the opinion of those who claim their existence is accurate) that 2009, 74 — 89.
there is something in the interpretation of perceptions which can Hatfield, G.. Perception & cognition. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2009, 297
not be reduced or expressed and the unique organization and qual- — 352.
ity of specific subjective sensation (how it is according to me) is the
very thing. There is a problem with this attitude and that is that
if it really applies it is principally unprovable (because there is no
way to perceive the world using the sensors and cortex of someone
else), although it seems highly logical.
To sum up this reflection, we can say that our perception is most
likely unique. It is unique in what stimuli we detect, but mainly
in how we process them. That explains why, when looking at the
same thing, not all of us see it the same way. But, is it really so?
Methodologically it is extremely hard to find out what is the con-
tent of specific subjective perception. Mainly with colors, sounds,
feelings and tastes (or in general with so called secondary qualities),
we realize that we are not able to share their contents. It seems that
the only way this can be done is via the use of language which gives
these qualities some objective meaning, but which does not give us
any certainty that the terms we choose to express our perceptions
really describe what we imagine. While analyzing so called primary
qualities of objects, we usually don’t encounter such problems.
If recipients are asked to draw, count or express the amount,
shape, size, and structure of a perceived object in a different way,
they do so with a high rate of consistency. That means that despite
unique characteristics of our cognitive apparatus, expression of
perception of a certain object is extremely consistent. How is it pos-
sible that while being unique we in fact perceive many things in the
same way? On the other hand, how do we know that we see a thing
in the same way if just one confrontation of my perception with the
sensation of another person is again adjusted by my own optics?

54 55
4. Individual differences and cultural influences individuality. We thus encounter an uneasy problem troubling also
proponents of quale existence and that is — how do we even know
that our perception is different from or the same as the perception
of another individual.

4.1 Presumption of individual distinctions

The basic reason for presumption of individual distinctions in the

perception of objects is frequently occurring inconsistencies in the
Key words: universality, genetic and empiric uniqueness, linguistic description of individual experiences. We assume that our percep-
relativism tion is realistic and that we grasp objects as they really are. We
start doubting this assumption only when we encounter a conflict
Previous chapters have called attention to the significance and task between perceptions or if someone calls our attention to this con-
of existing experiences and individual peculiarities of perception flict. How can we explain the existence of these distortions? How
as well as to the presence of universally valid mechanisms. It seems is it possible that individual percipients acquire different percep-
that our environment determines the way in which we perceive as tions if they are induced by the same stimuli?
well as its content. On the other hand, individual differences of our One of the possible answers is that we are not alike. Previous
sensory and cognitive apparatus, specifics of personal history and chapters show that perception is largely influenced by education
uniqueness of our location in space and time open up a question of and by past experiences. And this experience is not always (or nev-
subjectivity or objectivity of perception and the problem of indi- er) the same. Francis Bacon, in his study of idols, calls attention to
vidual dissimilarities or universality of perceptions. the “idols of the cave” (idola specus) whose influence results in the
One of the key problems of subjectivity and individuality is the fact that our individual histories, progression of obtaining infor-
fact that if we try to express exactly what is unique about our per- mation and experiences are never the same and therefore they de-
ception, the thing that is characteristic only for us — quale — then, termine our perception. Many authors thus refer to psychological
strictly speaking, that is exactly the thing which is impossible to and educational peculiarities.
express. Expressing anything in language presumes objectivisa- It is quite evident that in top–down processes, age and the pro-
tion and taking no account of the specifics and thus the problem gression of learning are key elements of consequent organization
of quale becomes more or less academic and resembles mysticism. and interpretation of stimuli. It may seem that individual differ-
Any science can exist only on the level of something that is some- ences are more or less psychological and cultural. However, that is
how general. It is impossible to talk about something that is unique not the case.
— about individuality of an individual himself. Submitted theories, With respect to the fact that individual receptors are tied to
therefore, face a compelling dilemma. On one hand we are trying the sensory cortex, it is apparent that if, how and when our recep-
to study individual specifics of perception compared with their tors are stimulated ultimately results in the formation and malle-
universal aspects, on the other hand we will want to describe this ability of the sensory cortex itself. In other words — each sensory

56 57
experience evokes establishment of synaptic connections in our Despite being unique, we can still observe certain common fea-
brain and forms the cerebral cortex by forming new connections. tures of perception based on specific characteristics. With respect
This means that the chronology of individual experiences influ- to the receptor and brain sensory centers development, children
ences all following experiences because latter ones adjust to the are likely to see (perceive by eyesight) differently than adults be-
former. Two uniovular twins have identical DNA. However, with cause they are just learning to focus. Their lens is thicker, cones are
each experience they differ more and more not only in terms of not developed which results in different discrimination of green,
experience or psychologically, but also morphologically. Despite blue, yellow or white. Similarly, with increasing age we can observe
developing in the same womb, asynchrony of their sleeping and a change in taste, sensitivity and preference (starting with sweet–
waking times, different position toward some sensory stimuli from salty and later preferring more spicy tastes). Likewise, tactile or
the beginning determines the uniqueness of their brains. By being hearing sensitivity develops and decreases with age. Gender is an-
born and by taking a different place in space, this difference deep- other specificity.
ens with each new experience and despite having the same geno- Gender itself is discreetly outlined by the presence or absence
type, the environment and external conditions of perception form of the X chromosome. However, in an individual’s psyche, we can’t
their cortex into a unique shape. This is the reason why there are clearly differentiate male or female behavior; in fact it is more of
no two identical brains (Brodmann’s map is a useful illusion) and a fluid continuum of features and behavioral patterns that distin-
all individuals are morphologically unique. In fact the shape of our guishes typically male or female characteristics. One of the impor-
brain is not finalized at birth, but by each perception and by each tant determinants of formation of a male brain is the level of testos-
individual experience it is being shaped each day. terone or estrogen in the first trimester (from day 36) of the fetus’
A specific question is uniqueness not caused by conscious expe- life (Démuthová, 2012, 44). This level influences not only what ex-
riences. The fact that we have unique finger prints, structure of the periences we seek, but other behavioral patterns as well. In general,
optic iris or different number of rods and cones in our retinas, etc., we can say that men prefer mainly serial processing of stimuli, their
is not just a result of our unique DNA. As František Koukolík states, logical analysis and spatial imagination. They achieve markedly
what makes us truly unique beings, starting with our somatic better results in spatial imagination as well as in mental rotations
equipment all the way to complex psychological abilities, which are (Démuthová, 2006, 40). To what extent they perceive differently is
called temperament or personality, is the impact of a huge number not fully charted. We know that male eyesight is more productive in
of factors such as level of sugars and hormones in the blood streams good light (cone vision), whilst the female sight performs better in
of our mothers during prenatal development, many various ions or faster adaptation to darkness and is better at color evaluation. Like-
cations, current temperature, pH levels of the surrounding environ- wise, it is well known that men tend to process visual entirety, while
ment as well as something which is simply called chance (Koukolík, women prefer seeing details. Probably it is a result of gender needs
2003, 146 — 147). From this point of view it is quite clear that each because women — gatherers — had to specialize in fruit recogni-
individual is a biologically unique organism with certain sensitivity tion and food preparation (Kimura, 2000, 15), while men — hunters
and number of sensors, a specifically and individually developing — needed to map the surroundings and be sensitive to spatial rela-
cortex and generally unique cognitive apparatus and whole organ- tions (Kimura, 1992). Men and women also differ in sensitivity to
ism. This results in certain specific differences of perception. smells and tastes with different preferences in the area of bitter and

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spicy tastes. Similarly, we can expect differences in auditory and One of the basic findings of comparative studies is the fact that
tactile sensitivities. Paradoxically, men have a lower tolerance to previous experience enables us mainly to organize and interpret
pain despite being less sensitive to touch than women. Differences our sensory experience. Segal and his team (1963) showed that our
between genders are, however, relative and vary with age, exhaus- perception of the retinal image is marked by three–dimensional
tion as well as with hormonal cycles (differences in results during interpretation. In a series of experiments, they demonstrated
the menstrual period and outside the period, Parlee, 1992). In gen- that percipients of the “western” world are susceptible to visual
eral, we can thus say that universalistic understanding of sensory illusions, for example Müller–Lyer’s illusion, but the members of
perception and rationality ignore irrefutable gender specifics of our primitive nations from various corners of Africa or Indonesia are
receptors and brains, but despite this differences between individu- not susceptible to these illusions or only to a limited extent. Like-
als are most likely greater than gender variances. wise, Escher’s illusions are relevant only to members of the “Es-
Other individual determinants of perception are physiological cher” — western culture. One of the basic differences of perception
states of a subject. Our perception is influenced by our emotional- is the understanding of three–dimensional drawings on a two–di-
ity, expectations, personal preferences as well as by current status mensional surface. It seems that methods of representation and
and current physiological processes. Tiredness, infection, bad mood interpretation of visual stimuli are to a certain extent influenced
and sadness inhibit our ability to differentiate stimuli similarly to by culture and by the technique of visual display, which can be doc-
illness or the influence of narcotics and analgesics. On the other umented by the history of visual art as well as by the use of certain
side, ecstatic states, barbiturates and stress sharpen and catalyze tools such as linear perspective, shadowing or placement. With
perception and attention to such an extent that they might spon- these methods of visual display, we shouldn’t talk just about crude-
taneously produce hallucinations and illusions. With respect to ness of the display technique, but rather about a totally different
the varying physiological and emotional situation of an individual, concept of spatial and surface organization of viewed pictures.
emotionality and mood alter conditions for perception and influ- Another serious problem is the sensitivity to certain sensory
ence it in either a positive or negative direction (Démuth, 2003). stimuli. It has been proven that the surrounding environment
teaches us to be sensitive to relevant stimuli which are part of this
4.2 Cultural influences environment. Inhabitants of snowy plains as well as African na-
tives perceive the depth and distances quite differently than in-
Analysis of top–down processes showed that learning and experi- habitants of rain forests. Since their horizon is permanently cov-
ence built on learning are among the most important determinants ered by trees and other objects close to them, they are reliant on
of perception. We have mentioned the influence of language and perception of relatively short distances. If they happen to be in
the problem of categorization as well as the importance of linear an open area, they are unable to distinguish far away objects and
or aerial perspective, etc. To analyze cultural and social effects on they have absolutely no idea about their distance. Their eyesight
a specific individual’s perception, we must be able to eliminate indi- is adjusted to perception of nearby objects and they are unable to
vidual differences and to identify only those influences which are “read” the plasticity of the horizon, atmospheric perspective and
characteristic for the whole group of percipients. Cross–cultural faraway objects. On the other hand, their eyesight is well adjusted
studies serve as good tools in this area. to the differentiation of details and textures, perception of colors,

60 61
especially in the green–red color spectrum, etc. Numerous experi- cultural influences can be found mainly in rhythmics and sensitiv-
ments of Gregor and McPherson (1965), Jahoda (1966) and Segall ity to specific auditory stimuli, but here, too, we should point out
(1963) showed that Aborigines as well as Africans who have no ex- that although inter–cultural differences exist and influence our
perience with western architecture don’t perceive vertical illusions perception, the differences on an inter–personal level are episte-
and are sensitive to perception of horizontal objects. Likewise, Af- mologically greater than social ones just because cultural differ-
rican Zulus, living solely in rounded huts don’t succumb to Müller– ences can be eliminated by learning.
Lyer’s illusion (Gregory, 1968). Learning plays the principal role mainly in more complex and
Another example is sensitivity to colors, graininess or textures. interpretatively tuned perceptual operations. Therefore, some of
According to SWH (Sapir — Whorf linguistic–relativistic hypoth- the greatest differences can be seen in imagining three–dimen-
esis), perception of colors is influenced by a classic inventory of sional objects and in their sketching. People usually see what they
language. Sapir and Whorf assumed that Eskimos differentiate expect they should be seeing with regard to the global context of
more shades of white because they have more names for them. interpreting the world. Science historians, therefore, doubt if peo-
Their concept is based also on an evolutionary explanation and ple living in different epochs, while looking at a certain occurrence
that is that life on snowy plains requires the ability to distinguish saw it as the same thing and they also argue about the extent to
color and the complex structure of snow and ice as a means of sur- which these visual experiences might have differed. We can think
vival and orientation in the environment. Similarly, we can expect about Egyptian visual arts preferring the profile view of a face
higher sensitivity of Nomads to ochre and earthy shades, which with the second eye showing (although it wouldn’t be seen from
form the basis of their visual color surroundings. Although Davis’ this point of view) the same way as we can think about drawings
studies confirmed different merging of colors, they didn’t confirm of objects by using perspective versus using split objects. It turned
unequivocally differences in their discrimination. Also Holden’s re- out (Deregowski, 1972) that some aboriginal societies, similar to
search (2005) finds more arguments for the existence of universal children, tend to draw objects in the form of a cut and using per-
perception principles, but as Debi Robertson (2005) states, the de- spective is a question of experience. It means that our experience
bate on this subject is far from finished. influences not only behavior, but perception itself. Isn’t that just
It is quite a different case when speaking about the influence a question of expression technique?
of culture on differentiation of phonemes. Chomsky’s thesis about Whatever the answer might be, many so called perceptions
generative grammar is based on a finding that the character of which we intuitively use to conclude important information from
auditory stimuli in the environment forms the sensitivity of an our environment, are not culturally universal and neither do their
individual to differentiate them. If there is a lack of certain audi- color connections carry an important message independent of the
tory stimuli in our environment, our brain doesn’t learn to recog- experience. It has been proven by a series of experiments involving
nize them and an individual becomes deaf toward specific stimuli a perception of pictograms in different cultures which resulted in
or is unable to differentiate them correctly. That’s the reason why ambiguous interpretation (Deregowski, 1972). If we want to con-
members of certain language groups (for example Japanese) are template the universality of perceptions and potential expression
unable to differentiate “r” or “l” or vice versa, the Europeans are not and intermediation of perceptions or their contents, it might be
sensitive enough to certain Asian phonemes or accents. Social and necessary to study things that are culturally unconditioned and

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uniform and thus attempt something which is a vision for many 5. Interspecial comparisons
phenomenologists. To study things themselves and forget every-
thing we know about them from previous experiences and learn-
ing. But is this phenomenological reduction really possible? Isn’t
perception, after all, (in any of its specific form) just some sort of
previous experience conditioned by the experience of an individu-
al with the stimuli of his environment?

4.3 Recommended literature

Key words: ethology, epigenetics, comparisons
Segall, M. H, Campbell, D. T., Herskovits, M. J: The influence of culture on visual per-
ception. Bobbs–Merrill Co., 1966.
The analysis of developmental, individual and cultural determi-
Berry, J. B., Poortinga, Y. H, Seggall, M. H., Dasen, P. R. (eds): Cross–cultural Psychol-
ogy: Research and Applications. New York : Cambridge University Press, 201
nants of perception showed changes in individual’s perception
— 220. despite negligible or minimal developmental changes in one’s cog-
Keith, K. D: Cross–Cultural Psychology: Contemporary Themes and Perspectives. nitive apparatus. It is thus evident that significant changes of cog-
Wiley–Blackwell, 2010, 131 — 180. nitive apparatus should lead to a relatively significant change in
Holden, C: Color: In the Eye of the Beholder? Science, 6/3/2005, Vol. 308 Issue 5727,
perception.
1406 — 1406, 1/4p.
One of the most important subjects of cognitive research is the
comparison of cognitive apparatuses of specific animals and com-
paring pictures of the world, which these apparatuses enable them
to perceive. Comparative cognition or the study of inter–species
differences in cognition, enables us to a) understand the cognition
process as a product of searching for, processing and interpreting
information in conditions of human cognitive apparatus, b) find
and become familiar with other types of detecting, processing,
and interpreting information through other cognitive systems (in
other conditions), c) think about cognition as a general mechanism
of interaction of an intelligent system with its surroundings and
about adjusting the system to the stimuli.
Previous chapters addressed mainly examination of percep-
tion in conditions of human cognitive apparatus. In this chapter,
we will thus concentrate on answering questions about processing
stimuli by other sensory mechanisms and examining perception
via the prism of developmental and evolutionary biology.

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5.1 Why do we actually perceive? Aristotelian terms, change can be seen as movement and thus with
a fairly substantial measure of analogy and simplification they can
One of the key questions of the theory of cognition and cognitive be generalized. Newton’s third law suggests that if an object is un-
systems is the question of what cognition is and why it actually ex- der the influence of a force, this influence causes a reaction which
ists. Analogically, we can ask what perception is and what its role in is equally strong, but oriented in an opposite way. From a combi-
cognition is. Proponents of evolutionary epistemology understand nation of the first and third laws of motion, we can conclude that
cognition as a general strategy of any system for successful sur- each object reacts to stimuli in its surroundings and, if possible, at-
vival in its environment, mainly through mapping of relevant char- tempts to resist them or find a way of least resistance. It means
acteristics of the environment and through searching for effective that every object is able to receive the influences of external forces.
mechanisms of its survival. The basis of this process is mainly the Newton doesn’t clearly explain how and by which means this is
ability to identify and differentiate stimuli. Without it, survival is done and the term “force” is in his concept marked by metaphysical
possible only if we are equipped with setup and structure which implications. Similarly unclear is consciousness or the beginning
are resistant to any negative effects. of life itself. And it is the information about how an object receives
Richard Dawkins claims that an entity such as Maternhorn and the influence of external forces that is the basis for explaining the
others are stable enough to withstand external influences. If they origins of perception.
hadn’t been like that, they would have ceased to exist long ago. As Leibniz states, we need to have some “windows” to be able to
However, not all entities are so durable and in order to survive they see (perceive) outside influences. But how do these windows come
had to find a different strategy of self–preservation and that was about? Darwin thought they occurred more or less by accident.
avoiding danger and utilizing appropriate stimuli. Mutation in gene replication results in the creation of entities with
While answering the question, why perception exists, we are be- a slightly different composition and selection forces and natural
ing led to old, theological ways of thinking. We perceive in order to selection decide whether, for a given entity and its replications,
survive. The theological approach, however, replaces the question certain mutation is beneficial or not. Lamarck’s version of evolu-
of cause with the vision of purpose, which is not totally correct. tion takes greater account of the environment’s importance and
Purpose supposes an effect and theology presumes intentional of the adaptation mechanism of an individual. In either case, how-
behavior, which is not fully justified. It seems significantly more ever, is the origin and formation of, or the survival of a given recep-
correct to use causal explanation, which doesn’t interchange the tor explained through reaction to conditions of the environment
existence of cause with the intention of purpose. surrounding the organism. It is the influence of the environment
Since in studying about reasons for perception we see only the which directly or indirectly forces the establishment of a specific
existence of effects (we see cognitive apparatus and not what had form of receptors and cognitive organs.
created it), we can only guess the real reasons or (in regards to re- Cognitive ethology and epigenetics study the influence of the
quired length of time) they could be (in unique cases) observed environment on perception. While ethologists study mainly envi-
directly in action, for example in laboratory conditions. The ba- ronmental influences on behavior and explain the development of
sic premise of a causal approach is the conviction formulated in specific behavior of different species, epigeneticists study heredi-
Newton’s laws. They apply to an explanation of movement, but in tary changes in the expression of specific genes caused by factors

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of the external or internal environment. The original focus of epi- can also be influenced by the type of care and social contact we are
genetics was connected to the study of factors and effects of stem exposed to. Szyfs’ research shows that mouse offspring exposed to
cell’s differentiation. These can differentiate practically into any great maternal care are significantly less predisposed to stress and
specialized cell of a body (totipotent status). Because ontogenesis their blood stream contains less stress hormone. Satisfactory gene
can be perceived as the analogy of phylogeny, the study of any en- methylation for the glucocorticoid receptor is responsible for this.
vironmental influences on the change of genomes, or an individu- The importance of epigenetic research lies not only in under-
al’s phenotype, including both external as well as internal factors standing what causes gene expression of a certain individual and
gradually became the subject of epigenetics. why, but also provides an important chance for fighting against in-
Epigeneticists proved that different environmental as well as ception and triggering of negative processing, like cancer. So, what
behavioral factors can cause activation or inhibition (switching on applies to the emergence of hidden predispositions (both positive
and off) of genes and a related cascade of processes, which dem- and negative), applies also to the morphology and possible emer-
onstrate themselves as different expressions of the gene. This fact gence or non–emergence of cytological structures and thus to
contradicts Mendeleyev’s rules of heredity and points to the fact formation and modification of receptors. El Slatery (2009) and his
that heredity can be influenced by food, behavior and environ- team studied the possibility to influence regeneration of hair cells
ment. Not in a sense of some sort of Lamarckian fluid or record- of the inner ear by activating a gene, which activated regeneration
ing of the experience — information from the environment into of (feathered) bird’s cells. Sophia Gaboyard and her team (2003)
the individual’s gene, but rather by activation or de–activation of proved that a change in gravitation causes a change in hair cells
the gene, which would have normally stayed inactive (or active). of the inner ear and alterations in development of retinal cones of
It’s strange that this activation might not show in an immediate rats. Thus it seems that the presence of an individual in a certain
generation, but can be trans–generational. influencing environment (and many other factors), eventually re-
A classic example of epigenetic influence is the methylation sults in the appearance or non–appearance of certain genes and
of fish, mouse as well as plant genes in a way that was described their expressions leading to formation and modification of sensory
by the epigenetics laboratory of Moshe Szyfs. Szyfs and his team receptors.
found that the lack or a radical change of food influences the color
of a mouse’s fur. In reality, fur color is just a visible expression 5.2 How to study the sensory world of other beings?
of other distinct characteristics. Offspring of a pregnant mouse,
which during pregnancy suffered from a lack of vitamin B12, folic Owing to the fact that we inhabit a sensory stimulating environ-
acid, choline, and betaine, changed fur color (from yellow to brown), ment, our sensors are adjusted to conditions, in which relevant in-
compared to other offspring of the genotype. Lack of nourishment formation is present and is being mediated to us. Although other
in the phase of the fetus’ development (also human) causes a whole species live in similar conditions, we can’t say that they possess
array of negative mechanisms, which are manifested in cardiovas- similar sensory apparatus. The structure of individual sensors is
cular and endocrine problems. Szyfs proved that nourishment can not and does not have to be identical in identical conditions. Evo-
block or initiate gene expressions, which wouldn’t otherwise be ex- lutionary biologists proved that the eye, for example, has already
hibited. What’s more surprising, inhibition or activation of a gene developed 50 to100 times and often completely while not further

68 69
developing phylogeneticaly older types of the organ. The insect not essential. What’s important is to monitor what this particular
eye is different from the eye of a bird or a man. That’s why it is eye could see.
difficult to say what this or that animal can see, as its sensory ap- One of the best charted fields of perception is the perception
paratus is diametrically different and can be a descendant of other of colors. We know that the existence of certain photosensitive
developmental lines of a specific receptor. pigments is directly responsible for processing of various wave
Apart from limited analogy which can’t be used on other phy- lengths of light radiation. Accordingly, we can presume that a bear-
logenetic developmental lines of a certain receptor, there is anoth- er of photosensitive cells containing these pigments is able to dif-
er problem of comparing the sensory world of other species and ferentiate between specific light stimuli and perceive colors of his
that is the holistic aspect of perception. We have shown that other color world. In his work, Ewan Thompson (1995), pointed out that
cognitive functions (learning and prior experience) take part in there are several color sensitive visual systems, monochromatic,
processing sensory information and thus it is difficult to evaluate dichromatic, trichromatic (including humans), but also tetrachro-
perception only through analysis of a receptor itself and through matic systems including, for example, pig or carp or even pen-
possibilities this receptor offers or doesn’t offer. tachromatic systems (turtle). Each of these systems divides the vis-
The third problem is the issue of the privacy of quale. As Thom- ible part of the spectrum individually and comparing them is only
as Nagel (1974) showed by the analysis of the cognitive apparatus illusionary. It may seem that possessing a larger number, or a big-
of a different individual, we can arrive at just an image of what it ger variety of specific types of photosensitive receptors might of-
might be like to perceive the world through its eyes and not what it fer to its bearer better discriminating conditions and a fuller color
means to it. To be able to understand what another being can see, world (Goldsmith, 1990). This is the very thing that is the basis of
we must forget our own way of seeing the world and thus stop be- Ewan Thompson’s evolutionary argument which ascribes an evo-
ing human. And that is principally impossible. lutionary advantage to the apes of the Old World over the apes of
Based on prior reasons, it is impossible to know what the sen- the New World, which are dichromatic. The Old World apes gradu-
sory world of a bat, monkey or a bee is like, but despite this, we can ally developed photosensitive sensors sensitive to shortwave light
analyze which elements might be present in their world and what — red color, which gave them an advantage to discriminate the
their function might be. We can ascertain this by analyzing their ripeness of fruits based on their color, while eliminating the risk
receptors and mainly by the analysis of their behavior, which pre- to get unnecessarily exposed to potential predator attack when
sumes reaction to the perception of given stimuli. testing fruits for ripeness. In this context we can, therefore, agree
with Goldsmith (1990, 300) that perhaps birds and turtles are the
5.3 What is the subject of the world of other species? future of further evolutionary development of perception. This
claim, however, applies only with limits, because a greater number
A good example of the analysis of a receptor’s functional abilities of photosensitive receptors enables its bearer only faster and more
is Darwin’s presentation of the evolutionary development of the precise identification of visual stimuli features, which can, how-
eye, starting from shellfish all the way to humans (Pitman, 2011). ever, be partially attained from other visual stimuli and structures,
It doesn’t enable us to see what the bearer of a certain type of eye for example texture, brightness etc. At the same time, it applies
can see, only what we might be able to see through it. However, it is that with a lower number of photosensitive pigments we can also

70 71
“read” the whole composition of the visible spectrum, although in turned out to be the most sensitive to this type of representation
a more rudimentary way, through fine shades of the same color. while chimps and apes didn’t demonstrate any difference between
Significantly more important in this regard is covering the spec- linear and point representation. Photographic representation of
trum of light rays. Some species can see beyond the boundary of a Ponzo illusion demonstrated a difference between perceptions of
UV rays, or in other words perceive also shorter infrared rays. For macaques and chimps, but proved human dominance.
example, a bee is similarly trichromatic as humans, but can also A completely different type of stimuli evaluation was revealed
perceive UV rays. It means that its “mixing” of colors covers differ- in amodal completion. Pigeons are the only species, which were un-
ent parts of the spectrum, which gives us reason to suppose that able to perceive objects sticking out of an overlapped background
there isn’t any specific conversion allowing us to decode the color (Kanizsa Triangle). Fujita and Vallortigara (2009) think that this is
world of species with a higher number of color dimensionalities a result of a specific type of food, which disallows perception of de-
or with shifted spectrum (Thompson, 1995, Démuth, 2005). Hilbert tails against the background. Chickens, on the other hand, which
(1992), therefore, thinks we should talk about colors exclusively in feed also on worms, possess this ability, as worms have a tendency
with the context of human perception and the question of what is to hide behind other objects. This would indicate the influence of
the “color” world of other species made of and how it is made is an the environment and experience on illusion perception. However,
incorrectly postulated question — or in other words it is a purely it is quite interesting that pigeons have experience with the over-
academic question. lapping of relevant stimuli. While studying their behavior, it turned
Another example of exploring the difference in visual worlds out that the head of a female partner is an important stimulus for
of humans and other species is a study of the sensitivity to visual courtship. When it is covered, a male pigeon limits its courting, but
stimuli, mainly illusions. Joel Fagot and Isabel Barbet (2009) proved covering of the lower part of the female’s body has no influence
that some primates are unable to perceive the global structure of on a male’s behavior. The pigeon thus “knows” that the head can
hierarchic objects and instead perceive the details (contrary to hu- see and therefore “he” wants the female to see “him”. When study-
mans). Baboons, for example don’t possess the ability to perceive ing the ability to identify partially covered stimuli in humans and
the depth of a depicted object, if the background of the picture, chimps, no relevant differences were observed, neither in the na-
from which they would have been able to read such information, ture of successfully identified stimuli nor in the time needed for
is covered. At the same time, if the background of the picture is their identification.
visible, they are able to perceive optical illusions, for example an Vallortigara’s research showed (2009) that chickens, too, manage
illusion of a corridor. similar tasks (identification of partially covered objects, determi-
Kazuo Fujita (2009) showed that besides humans, other pri- nation of the overlap direction, perception of completely covered
mates and birds also perceive visual illusions. Observation of reac- objects). Pigeons use identification of features, not global percep-
tions of pigeons, macaques, chimps and humans to a Ponzo illusion tion. Their world is more mosaic–like without the percept of a total
served as an example. It turned out that linear representation of picture. This enables them to differentiate grain from stones, but
this illusion brings out a perception of an illusion in all species, but they don’t practice picture completion. That’s why they lose inter-
that pigeons are more sensitive to it than primates. Differences can est in food which they can’t see entirely. The reasons for these dif-
be seen when the illusion is illustrated by using points. Humans ferences lie in different functional organization of the brain and

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the left hemisphere of chickens and pigeons resulting from the dif- environment. If the system manages to do so, the species survive.
ferent environment they live in (Vallortigara 2009). This raises questions whether certain perception convictions are
The most significant feature of this research is the finding that true or pragmatic as well as about possibilities and direction of cer-
despite many differences in perception, some principles of percep- tain sensory systems development.
tion field organization (like Petter’s rule) can be found in other forms
of perception, too. Similarly, the research of auditory perception of 5.4 Recommended literature
perfect pitch suggest that although in Nature we can encounter
different sensitivity abilities, if individuals possess the same type Shettleworth, S. J: Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior. Oford : Oxford University
Press 2010, 57 — 82.
of sensory apparatus (camera eye, inner ear) their perception can
Anderson, J.: Primates and the representation of self. In: Fagot, J. (ed.): Picture per-
differ in the degree but not in the type of perception (Weisman, et ception in animals. Psychology Press, 2000, 373 — 396.
al, 2009). This enables us to explain the possibilities of comparative Démuth, A.: Ako vyzerá farebný svet iných bytostí? In: Šikl, R. et al (eds): Kognice
and analogous approaches in the study of perception and find sur- 2006. Praha : PÚ AV ČR, 2006, 34 — 37.
prising homogeneity and analogy of mechanisms as well as of the Gaboyard, S.: Differential impact of hypergravity on maturating innervation in ves-
tibular epithelia during rat development. Developmental Brain Research; Jun
contents of perception and of the total cognition of related species
2003, Vol. 143 Issue 1, 15 — 24.
(monkeys weighing stones for breaking nuts, Visalberthi, 2011, but Slattery E., L; Speck J. D.; Warchol ME: Epigenetic influences on sensory regenera-
unable to identify a missing object, Liszkowski, 2009). tion: histone deacetylases regulate supporting cell proliferation in the avian
On the other hand, development of specific sensory apparatus- utricle. Journal Of The Association For Research In Otolaryngology: JARO 2009
es is not represented by an direct line of sensory receptors devel- Sep; Vol. 10 (3), 341 — 53.

opment, but rather by an intricate track of numerous trials and er-

rors leading to a wide palette of the most diverse sensory systems.
Many organisms possess totally different mechanisms of acquir-
ing information and of their processing dependent on the environ-
ment they move in. This enables them to be relatively successful
in their environment and to use strategies which couldn’t be used
in different environments. Diversity in this area is greater than we
could imagine.
The principal aim of this chapter was to show how rich and
diverse perception processes can be (even if talking about the
same types of sensory receptors) and that in addition to our way
of perceiving there is a plethora of fundamentally different ways
and preferences of mechanical–chemical–physical detectors, de-
pending on a specific environment. The human way of perceiving
is just one of many evolutionarily formed systems striving for the
most successful detection and interpretation of data in a given

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6. Perception and artificial inteligence To study perception might be, therefore, useful for at least three
reasons: 1) it enables us to discover and understand the nature and
boundaries of our knowledge and thus approach it accordingly, 2)
based on our knowledge of specific determinants and mechanisms
of perception, to intervene and make corrections in places where
specific percepts are failing, 3) consider possibilities of improving
existing forms and ranges of perception through application of al-
ready existing forms of perception, which are, however, present in
other places, as well as through development of completely new
Key words: extensification, intensification, substitution elements and mechanisms of perception.

Interspecial comparisons highlight the limits of this or that type 6.1 Why improve the possibilities of perception?
of perception. Our cognitive apparatus, for example, is not adapt-
ed to perception of the level of radioactivity in our environment, An effort to improve possibilities of perception is not new at all.
because evolutionarily we weren’t present in an environment in People have been searching for ways of overcoming the limits of
which this type of information would be necessary. Similarly, we their own receptors for a long time. Glasses, telescopes and many
don’t possess receptors for determining the pH of the environment other gadgets are examples of such improvements. The telescope
or any sonars enabling us to identify objects in darkness or under lens works on the same principle as the natural lens of the eye and
water, because we were given eye sight, which enables us to see as thus when using a telescope or a microscope, we are talking about
a result of light. Despite this, the existence of radioactivity, of invis- multiplying our optical abilities. Thanks to these instruments, we
ible entities or of the level of environmental pH is important to us, can see things that are not normally accessible to our vision or, in
as not detecting them can have dire consequences. The question other words, we are increasing the efficiency of existing abilities.
of improving and expending an individual’s sensory possibilities is One of the main reasons for developing artificial receptivity is
thus a question of survival. thus an effort to obtain information in places where our receptors
We saw that many organisms are much better equipped in are unable to provide such information. Therefore, we are looking
the area of their abilities to detect relevant stimuli and not only for ways of expanding the extension — range of our own percep-
in sensitivity (shark, dog — smell, eagle — sharpness of eye sight, tion as well as intensity — quality of perception. Artificial instru-
dog — hearing, bee — UV radiation), but also in the type of recep- ments should thus serve as our receptors in places where our own
tors (bacteria — pH; dolphin, bat — sonar). Therefore, the question receptors can’t reach or where a receptor is missing altogether.
whether we can extend and improve the palette of our perception Another incentive can be the fact that we are conscious of the
is a relevant one. We can assume that the more information we risks and issues connected with the availability of data. In a dan-
have and the more precise it is, the more successful we might be gerous environment we welcome the possibility to avoid exposing
(provided we can use and process it correctly) in our integration our receptors and ourselves to danger, but rather collect important
with the world. information from the environment through technical instruments

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which, in case of problems, can be sacrificed. Therefore, it is not with the cosmetic industry all the way to the most sophisticated
surprising that development of artificial sensory instruments is electronic equipment and applications. An effort to achieve the
booming as it enables us to observe entities and occurrences which highest potential quality and complexity of perceptions, either in
are very important and at the same time to eliminate dangers stem- the area of communication technologies or in entertainment, are
ming from learning by trial and error. the driving forces behind this development. This uncovers another
The third important reason for thinking about creating artificial reason why we study perception and strive for its improvement via
sensory instruments is a need for permanent long–term collection artificial technologies.
of information. An existence of a large amount of data is quite rare. One of the most significant areas is the improvement or total
Its observation presumes long–term, targeted scrutiny and some sort substitution of failing or damaged sensory abilities. People lacking
of instruments are more suitable for this than a living human being certain sensory abilities are burdened with a limited number and
that is unable to remain concentrated for a long time or to satisfacto- insufficient quality of sensory inputs. The use of artificial applica-
rily distinguish stimuli during a relatively long time. Moreover, other tions enables them to return to normal life and live it more or less to
capacities of this being would remain unused during this time. the fullest, or to at least increase the capacity of existing abilities.
Another reason for creation of artificial sensory instruments is This effect can be also observed in the use of other technologies
the effort to eliminate data deformation caused by our own pres- enabling improvement of other cognitive abilities such as memory,
ence. Physicians, judges and psychologists know that a person be- counting etc., exactly in the spirit of Chalmers’ and Clarck’s thesis
haves differently when he knows he is being watched and that his about extended mind (1998).
behavior might be evaluated. Therefore, if we want to learn the real
mechanisms and causes, we must eliminate negative consequenc- 6.2 How to improve perception possibilities?
es of our own observation by studying objects while they behave
naturally. This applies not only to humans but also to animals (the It would be a mistake to think that AI is the only way to improve
need to study them in their natural habitats) and also, surprisingly, sensory possibilities. Another mistake would be to think that the
to most other entities. Based on the findings of quantum physics, effort to improve one’s own receptors is purely a domain of hu-
we know that a part of our observations can be influenced by the mans. Animals, too, utilize the potential of receptors of other indi-
presence of the observer even at the level of elementary particles. viduals to cover their own needs. That is one of the main reasons
Our temperature, energy, gentle vibrations or our presence itself why insects, rodents or mammals live in groups, which presumes
can have negative effects on observed occurrences and thus it division of labor (some watch so that others can work), often with
might be necessary to eliminate the observer’s presence (but at the a high degree of specialization based on individual abilities. How-
same time to facilitate data collection) if we want to achieve accu- ever, utilizing perception of another individual can be often seen in
rate and non–deformed data. inter–species behavior as well, when individuals belonging to cer-
From highly sophisticated reasons we can move to more pro- tain species react to the behavior of other species either by escap-
saic ones. Yearning for a higher quality of percepts and for better ing or other mob reaction.
entertainment might be some of those reasons. A big part of per- Since time immemorial, humans have been using guard dogs,
ception research is carried out by the consumer industry, starting because they know their exceptional sense of hearing and smell

78 79
and as a result use them to search for people or objects. Pigs can intelligent device according to organization of human cognitive
also serve as experts for drug search and the symbiosis of peo- apparatus. Balkenius’ work Natural Intelligence in Artificial Crea-
ple and cats is based mainly on their sociability and other ben- tures (1995), Beer’s Periplaneta computatrix (Beer, 1990) as well
efits stemming from their agility and good sense of observation. as the creation of haptic hands (LUCS) or of many other various
A guide dog to a certain extent substitutes a blind person’s miss- forms of artificial organisms and androids are just a few examples
ing eyesight. Humans, however, may improve their own perception of such an approach.
possibilities not only via symbiosis with other species, but also by Elimination of anthropomorphic features and the mechanism
applying their mechanisms of perception. and creation of artificial devices collecting information from the
Another possible way of extending our sensitive abilities is environment independently of the functional as well as formal
a transformation of (originally non–sensory) physical stimuli to similarity to humans or other living organism are different routes
stimuli, which can be perceived by senses. An example of this type to perception possibilities improvement. Aerospace devices or
of procedure can be detection of pH or of the degree of radioactiv- various detectors serve as just a few examples. The fundamental
ity by using the dosimeter. A fundamental feature of this process is feature of these entities is that although the contents of their “in-
the fact that the detection of entities, qualities or occurrences is be- formation world” is not directly accessible to human receptors, the
ing carried out based on physical principles, which are not detect- machines eventually modify them to human form. Otherwise they
able by our senses, but the total outcomes (litmus paper changes would be useless to us. What we are after is to use their abilities
color, digital or acoustic instrument shows data) can be perceived and to apply them in our own cognitive processes.
by senses. A large number of precise measurements connected to
almost all observation procedures (detection of an object, of quali- 6.3 Possible applications
ties, spontaneous observation, controlled observation, measur-
ing, scaling as well as experiments) use precisely this mechanism A variant connecting both previous approaches is the creation of
since the detection of many entities, occurrences and qualities is a system (half alive and half mechanical human) synergizing the
not possible via our senses alone as well as because our receptors positives of cognitive abilities of both humans and artificial devic-
possess no objective scale for scaling and measuring of saturation es. The core of this system lies in the extension or improvement
levels of given indicators. When detecting a certain occurrence, we of our own cognitive abilities through implantation or application
thus rely on creation of artificial entities or mechanisms and this is of new, originally non–human elements or applications and sys-
precisely the area for finding symbiosis between our natural abili- tems. The final product can be something which we call a cyber-
ties and artificial intelligence. netic organism (cyborg) as well as the everyday symbiosis of hu-
The use of different devices for improving the possibilities of mans and their common sensory and communication tools. In the
perception can be organized based on their functional similarity case of cyborgs, we tend to imagine various technological implants
or dis–similarity of mechanisms or of sensory outcomes they are reshaping the essence of a human itself, but in reality these are
offering. Many AI researchers are thus trying to use the metaphor just instruments and tools such as cardio stimulator, cochlear im-
about similarity of the human brain and sensory apparatus to plant or even an endo–prosthesis. Cochlear implants enable us to
a computer in order to create a “humanoid” variant of an artificial have percepts in places where they would be normally impossible

80 81
or insufficient. By artificial stimulation of the ear nerve (bypass- find a particular face among thousands of other faces via identifi-
ing the damaged parts of the cochlea) using sound from the exter- cation of basic facial features. The platform collects these features
nal environment, we can substitute a natural sound channel and from a single specified picture and subsequently searches for them
theoretically enable detection of such auditory stimuli which were in a given combination among various stimuli. Analysis of features
normally undetectable. Likewise, we can imagine a different stim- and patterns is the fundamental principle of a search engines’ func-
ulation of other parts of the sensory cortex which might lead to tion. They can find a desired text or object among millions of digi-
a different type of (for example osmatic or visual) stimuli. With re- tal entities. To find and recognize an object among many similar
spect to technological challenges connected with trans–humanism objects is actually one of the most complex perception operations.
and neuro–ethics, the research in this filed is still relatively young. Based on precisely set algorithms, it is possible to “teach” for exam-
It is substantially more interesting in the area of creating sen- ple an optical recording system to watch, find and record (mainly)
sory symbiosis between humans and various devices. We can con- moving objects. This becomes a suitable condition for building ful-
sider a diary or a book as a form of external memory. We can ap- ly automated intelligent traffic or security systems. They might be
proach various devices in a similar way and consider them as forms able to not only record an occurrence of a given object, but moni-
of externalization or of shifting the boundaries between a human tor (sharpen, activate other suitable instruments, sending signals
and its surroundings. Clark’s and Chalmers’ example with “alarm which change behavior of a monitored object) as well. Application
clocks” in the cockpit of a plane is a good demonstration of the cre- of these systems (making our lives more comfortable) has almost
ation of common boundaries of a machine and a person, substitut- no limits — it is in fact limited only by our imagination.
ing our sensors by devices and instrument platforms. Same as with Another area for application of these systems is the already
internet communication between distant on/off line users, when mentioned reconstructive medicine (for example prosthetics),
signing into the network (for example Skype) can be immediately which attempts to replace insufficient or non–functioning recep-
detected by another computer and announced to the other user. tors by artificial substitution. Understanding the rules and mecha-
The computer “knows” when another desired user “appears” online nisms of our perception behavior allows for correction or interven-
and announces this occurrence. It can, at the same time, perform tion in situations when individuals lose certain sensory abilities.
many processes fully automatically even without our presence This understanding also enables us to protect our receptors and
(sending messages about availability, intelligent home systems prevent future damage. In this point we are coming to problems
regulating temperature, reporting disruption of the system etc.), connected to ergonomics and design optimization.
which leads many philosophers to thoughts about the shape and A relatively large part of perception research concentrates on
content of the world of artificial intelligence devices. the analysis of information systems, on the search for criteria for
Taking no account of whether the sensory world of such devices the most precise and most effective discrimination of information
actually exists and what it might look like (Turing’s test, Chinese needed in the process of communication and in creation of commu-
room, thermostat etc.) it is clear that many devices can not only find, nication flows and channels. It seems that some characteristics of
identify and actively search for required objects or sensory inputs sensory stimuli are being detected (by a given system) first (such as
but thoroughly process and evaluate them as well. One of the pos- movement, shape, contrast) and others subsequently (such as color
sible examples is a software platform Picasa which enables users to versus text — Stroop’s test). That’s why it is important to identify

82 83
mainly those elements of the sensory field, which we identify most 6.4 Recommended literature
quickly and most precisely and connect these with the communi-
cation signal. This is the reason why we need to study the way in Zadeh, L. A.: A new direction in AI — Toward a Computational Theory of Perception.
AI Magazine. Volume 22, Number 1 (2001), 73 — 83.
which it is possible to secure stability and accuracy of discrimina-
Nilsson, N.: Artificial Intelligence: A New Synthesis. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers,
tion of the above mentioned elements and factors for example in 1998, 85 — 114.
traffic or in a common game of two soccer robots (RoboCup — the Russell, S–J.; Norvig, P.: Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.). Upper
problem of color stability — Balkenius, 2003). The knowledge of Saddle River, New Jersey : Prentice Hall, 2003, 537 — 581, 863 — 898.
perception can be also applied in many areas of industry and the
arts dealing with spatial organization, ergonomics of functional
products (for example communication and operating instruments)
and with design itself, which shifts the issue of perception to the
level of functional and cognitive aesthetics.
Last but not least we should mention the use of AI in an at-
tempt to achieve the best possible and the most realistic mapping
of external stimuli. In this context it is important to transform and
process sensory outcomes into a form most natural to our percep-
tion. An improvement of imaging technologies based on 3D projec-
tion or the synchronization of more sensory stimuli (home theater,
professional multimedia projections) for achievement of the most
realistic experience serve as a few examples. Building of systems
which: a) offer precise, realistic and complex sensory input most
natural for the given sensory apparatus and b) are able to ade-
quately substitute people in specific perception operations are just
a few challenges of AI in this area.
Successful creation of artificial sensory systems ultimately re-
quires transformation of sensory processes and operations into
a form adjusted for perception by human cognitive apparatus. Al-
though technical and computing solutions enable creation of artifi-
cial sensory systems, they can’t substitute for the study of human sen-
sory and cognitive apparatus. (However, they can make it easier for
us to understand.) In fact the opposite is true. To be able to design and
discover more ingenious technical sensory devices, we have to learn
about the workings of our own perception at least to an extent of be-
ing able to obtain the most information in the most accessible form.

84 85
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 Doc. Mgr. et Mgr. Andrej Démuth, Ph.D.

Perception Theories

Firs edition

Peer reviewers
Doc. PhDr. Ján Rybár, Ph.D.
PhDr. Marián Špajdel, Ph.D.

Translated by Ing. Danica Chames and Mgr. Stanislava Novotová

Graphic © Ladislav Tkáčik

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© Andrej Démuth ∙ 2013

© Towarzystwo Słowaków w Polsce ∙ Kraków ∙ 2013
© Filozofická fakulta Trnavskej univerzity v Trnave ∙ 2013
ISBN 978-83-7490-606-7

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