Canadian Military History

Volume 8 | Issue 3 Article 2

1-24-2012

The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8

July 1944: A Case Study in Tank/Infantry Doctrine
and Practice
David A. Wilson
Royal Military College of Canada

Recommended Citation
Wilson, David A. (1999) "The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case Study in Tank/Infantry Doctrine and
Practice," Canadian Military History: Vol. 8: Iss. 3, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
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 Wilson: The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case S

The Canadian Role in Operation

''Charnwood, '' 8 July 1944
A Case Study in Tank/Infantry
Doctrine and Practice

David A. Wilson
n the morning of 8 July 1944, soldiers of participating in the close infantry battle. The
O the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (9 CIB)
left their startlines near the Norman village of
fighting on 8 July indicates that in this instance
at least, Canadian troops won in spite of the
Vieux Cairon heading for Buron and Gruchy; two prevailing doctrine and not because of it.
villages nearly 2,000 yards across open ground
to the south. Their advance was part of Operation Doctrine figures prominently in the
"Charnwood," British I Corps' final assault on continuing debate over the Canadian Army's
Caen. By the end of the day most objectives were battlefield performance in Normandy. In his
secured, and on 9 July Caen north of the Orne concluding remarks on the Normandy campaign,
River and Canal was captured. General Dempsey, C.P. Stacey clearly stated that the Germans
General Officer Commanding (GOC) British 2nd achieved tactical superiority over the Allies. 2
Army expressed his satisfaction, saying that the Stacey's conclusions have been echoed and
operations of 8 and 9 July were "well and cleanly amplified in more recent works. Writing in 1991,
carried out."' Troops of the 3rd Canadian John A. English offered a more detailed
Infantry Division (3 CID) and the 2nd Canadian explanation for the Canadians' lacklustre
Armoured Brigade (2 CAB) shared in the victory performance, listing doctrine as a partial
no less than the British divisions that took part. explanation along with inadequate commanders,
inferior weaponry and lack of fighting skills. 3
"Charnwood" stands apart from other David Bercusson added superb German NCOs,
Canadian operations in Normandy because it was junior officers, small-unit tactics, and training
the only operation of its type undertaken by 3 as reasons why the fighting went on so long. 4 Jack
CID and 2 CAB as complete formations. After Granatstein, although writing specifically of
"Charnwood" II Canadian Corps became Canadian generalship, also noted the flaws in the
operational, and the scale, tempo and British doctrine followed by Canada. 5
expectations of operations altered considerably.
The capture of Caen, therefore, affords insights Interest in the Normandy campaign and the
into tactical doctrine that are obscured by later nature of the fighting there has not abated over
large-scale operations with more ambitious time. In recent articles, not all have been willing
objectives. In particular, in this operation the to grant the Germans total superiority on the
Canadian armour and infantry defeated the battlefield. Oliver Haller clearly demonstrated
Germans by employing tanks as direct-fire close- that the 12th SS could be outfought, most notably
support weapons. In fact, such intimate support in their counterattacks from 7-10 July 1944. 6
had not been a part of Canadian tank/ infantry His account of the fighting carries an implicit
doctrine since the introduction of the Sherman message: the Canadians won because their small-
tank in 1943. Instead, since the fall of 1943 unit tactics were superior to those of the Germans
armoured units were told specifically to work to in this particular battle. Marc Milner has recently
the enemy's flanks and support by fire, not by added to this argument the observation that the

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 Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 2

open ground the Canadians were constantly the blueprint for future battles, outlining in
attacking was ideally suited to the German particular frontage, density, pace of advance and
penchant for defending with fire. Milner also the ratio of tanks to infantry.
factored in the inadequate tanks, and concluded
by reminding readers that it was the Germans In 1939 when Canadian troops began to
who were ground down in Normandy. 7 Set against study how tanks and infantry divisions worked
Milner's analysis must be Roman Jarymowycz's together they received their information from
argument that the source of tactical frustration British manuals. Basic to British thinking was
was primarily doctrinal, a point of view he the primacy of infantry who were considered the
reinforced in a response to Milner. 8 backbone of the attack. However, the manuals
informed the infantry that any success depended,
The literature to date, however, has not among other things, on the "aid of tanks" to break
directly addressed the central core of the issue: into a position. 11 Royal Tank Regiments
the failure of Canadian tanks and infantry to conformed to this view of their role, holding that
coordinate their actions effectively on the they were a "supporting weapon" whose principle
battlefield. That failure may legitimately be task was "to assist the infantry to gain and hold
attributed to the inadequate tank/infantry the objective." 12 In contrast to armoured brigades,
cooperation doctrine adopted from the British the manuals specifically noted that army tanks
despite considerable evidence that it did not were "not designed to act independently," and to
work. 9 This returns us to the question, just what that end they were organized in battalions
was this tank/infantry doctrine, how did it intended for close cooperation with the infantry
develop, and how was it applied at the divisional in the attack. 13
level in Operation "Charnwood"?
According to doctrine in 1939, attacks
arrived on the objective in echelons, with tanks
The Doctrine moving at tank speed forming the Assault
Echelon. More tanks, accompanied by infantry
1\ ny discussion of tank/infantry doctrine must and moving at infantry speed followed in the
.rlbegin with the disclaimer that it is not the Support Echelon. 14 Recognition of the power of
doctrine developed for armoured formations. the "modern establishment of anti-tank weapons"
Tanks and infantry in armoured divisions studied led to the principle of concentrating even army
an entirely separate set of manuals with its own tanks in time and space. Thus, the 1939
lineage. Intended for the breakout and pursuit pamphlet warned against using less than one
phase of operations, armoured forces in army tank battalion in an attack, and elsewhere
armoured divisions focussed on coordination it noted that in open country and reasonable
with infantry formations rather than cooperation visibility one such unit was able to neutralize the
with infantry units. As a rule, either "other frontage which could be attacked by one infantry
formations" or the armoured division's infantry battalion. 15 Foreshadowing later actions in
brigade created the breach in the enemy line "Charnwood," the tanks were specifically warned
through which the tanks were launched. 10 In against bypassing villages as long as fire from
contrast, brigades of "army tanks" - e.g., the them was holding up the infantry. 16 For army
Royal Tank Regiments - were specifically tanks, close support meant close support.
developed to support infantry divisions on the
battlefield, primarily in the direct-fire role. Employing tactics in these training pamphlets
the British enjoyed initial success on the
The tank/infantry doctrine that guided battlefields ofNorthAfrica. Indeed, the attacks
Canadian troops in Operation "Charnwood" on the Italian fortified camps by 7th Royal Tank
belonged - in theory - to the army tank brigade Regiment (7 RTR) have been characterised as
tradition and did not, of course, spring up representing the tank/infantry attack in its classic
overnight. A body of doctrinal literature existed form. 17 Actions in North Africa seemed to indicate
that extended back as far as the First World War, that the doctrine worked and the was reflected
although recent manuals reflecting wartime in subsequent manuals. When the War Office
experience were of more obvious tactical value. issued The Employment of Army Tanks in Co-
These Second World War training pamphlets were operation with Irifantry in March 1941 much of

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 Wilson: The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case S

~
C,)

~
~
~
E
--,,~_-'\_,-~
6:

A Sherman tank of the 1st Hussars moving up in support of the irifantry, Normandy, France, 28 June 1944.

the doctrine remained the same. Both infantry were a necessary adjunct to success and that a
and army tank manuals continued to stress the favourable outcome depended upon the close
need for a common doctrine without falling into cooperation between troops of tanks and
routine methods. 18 The closest cooperation was platoons ofinfantry. 21 Battalion attacks were to
demanded of both arms, the infantry being be on a narrow two-company frontage of possibly
informed that an attack against organised 600 yards. There would still be three echelons,
resistence must be supported by army tanks, and with the tanks of the first echelon moving at top
that the tanks needed engineers and infantry to speed crushing initial resistance by velocity and
cross tank obstacles. 19 Also continued was the weight of numbers. Unusually, this Canadian
system of attacking in echelons, the tanks in the training pamphlet called for the second echelon
Assault Echelon moving at tank speed and the tanks to also move at tank speed although the
tanks in the Support Echelon moving at infantry echelon as a whole moved at infantry speed. 22
speed. Unchanged was the ratio of tanks to That this approach might present problems
infantry against organized resistance one appears to have been neglected or dismissed.
battalion of tanks was to work with one battalion
of infantry. Within that allotment, the distribution Meanwhile back in Britain, the War Office
might be one leading squadron with each leading issued The Co-operation qf Infantry and Tanks,
company of infantry, followed in the next echelon proclaiming that it superseded The Employment
by troops working with individual platoons. 20 of Army Tanks in Co-operation with lf!:fantry of
1941, and that "the doctrine here stated will be
Two years later in 1943, with rather limited accepted as the basic teaching governing the
battle experience, Canadian troops continued to employment of tanks and infantry in
follow British doctrine. By this time though the co-operation. "23 In this manual, for the first time
Canadian Army was producing manuals written anti-tank mines were given serious consideration.
in Canada. One such manual, from the Canadian It was now accepted that they restricted the
Battle Drill Training Centre in Vernon, BC, freedom of manoeuvre of tanks, a freedom which
displayed only minor differences from those of could only be restored by the infantry first
1941. It impressed upon infantry that army tanks clearing paths through the minefields or by the
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 Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 2

use of specialized devices such as flails. 24 Attacks Part III had to say about the Sherman effectively
were still mounted in echelons, with no less than negated all that had been said in the first 25 pages
one squadron per echelon. Maintained also was ofthe 33-page document.
the employment of complete army tank battalions
for specific operations. 25 As for frontages of In Part I ratios and frontages were unchanged
attack, the pamphlet suggested that 300 yards from previous manuals. The best results were
should seldom be exceeded by a tank squadron. obtained by concentration, with one armoured
From that figure, it deduced that an infantry regiment to one battalion of infantry still in favour.
division attacking with two battalions and two Further, the tanks were warned against splitting
tank battalions would normally operate on a squadrons between echelons, now renamed
1,200 yard frontage. Although it cautioned that Assault, Support and Reserve. That ratio would
these figures were "purely for training purposes," be maintained even when the allotment of tanks
what is important. here is the implied one-to-one to an infantry brigade might consist of only one
ratio of infantry to tank units in the deliberate regiment. In such a case it explicitly stated that
attack. 26 Taken as a whole, there was still not the one regiment would be employed on the
much new in this document, the primary frontage of one infantry battalion. The only cloud
exception was the increasing recognition of the on the horizon was a caveat against the infantry
serious problem anti-tank mines presented. expecting the immediate physical presence of the
Sooner than expected, this equation was to tanks. They were informed that being in
change. communication with tanks was a more vital
factor. 31
Canadian troops barely digested even these
minor alterations to tactical doctrine when the In Part III the cloud on the horizon became a
Headquarters of 21 Army Group intervened. In downpour. There, the implications of the
July 1943, their monthly Training Letter stressed changeover to Sherman tanks were clearly
the limitations of tanks in the face of minefields spelled out. Thinner armour on the Sherman
and anti-tank guns. Overturning the doctrinal (compared to the Churchill tank usually found
beliefs of 20 years, they now claimed that infantry in army tank brigades) meant it was more easily
attacks could succeed without tanks. penetrated by lieavy anti-tank guns and could not
Consequently, the infantry would now lead the carry out the infantry tank role in the deliberate
attack with the tanks supporting from hull-down attack. Thus, the infantry were informed that
positions, where their fire was "more effective tanks were no longer partners in the assault, but
than close contact. "27 Advice such as this is rather (in an unhappy phrase) the "backers up"
reminiscent of the doctrine followed by armoured to the assaulting infantry. 32 Driving home the
formations on those rare occasions when the message carried in Part II, it admitted that
tanks of the armoured brigade moved to the flank occasions would arise when tank squadrons
to support the motor battalion by fire. 28 More would be allotted one to a battalion. In those
detailed instructions soon followed. cases, the infantry were expected to lead as one
tank squadron was not strong enough to support
The Co-operation of Tanks with Infantry a two-company frontage. 33 Effectively, Canadian
Divisions in Offensive Operations, issued by 21 infantry had not only lost their intimate tank
Army Group in November 1943, effectively drove support but might have to attack with fewer than
a wedge between the infantry and their supporting expected tanks in support. Thus, the advent of
tanks. Documents such as this provide a written minefields and the increased number and
basis for English's comments on the doctrinal lethality of anti-tank weapons had separated the
tendency of armour to hang too far back in the infantry from the intimate support of the tanks.
Normandy campaign. 29 Although the manual
claimed that it was based on The Co-operation Some infantry formations were not long in
of Irifantry and Tanks of May 1943, that was asking pressing questions about what "backers
t.rue only in the most limited sense. 30 While Parts up" meant exactly. The British 49th Division
I and II were about the employment and tactical worried that it might result in the tanks being
formations of infantry tanks cooperating with too far back. 34 Twenty-First Army Group soon
infantry, Part III dealt with the implications of responded with another apparent shift of
using the Sherman in the army tank role. What emphasis. Within two weeks of assuming

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 Wilson: The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case S

Privates Harry Parker (top) and Gus McKinnon of

the Highland Light Infantry following the battle for
Buron, 9 July 1944.

command of 21 Army Group, General

Montgomery advised the War Office that he could
not accept the doctrine from the previous
November. Moreover, he promised that it would
be replaced or modified to a large extent,
presumably before the anticipated invasion of
France. 35

While 21 Army Group was re-writing their

doctrine, the War Office released a new Infantry
Training manual that addressed some of the
battlefield problems associated with tank/
infantry cooperation. Issued in January 1944,
this pamphlet contained information that
contradicted itself. There were references to the
importance of The Co-operation of Infantry and
Tanks while acknowledging that cruiser tanks
(the British term for the tanks contained in an
armoured brigade) would be confined to
supporting with fire in the deliberate attack. 36
Further, tank support was effectively halved; a
tank squadron now expected to cover 600 rather
than 300 yards. Moreover, that squadron would
be "handled" by its commander according to the
ground and not invariably beside the infantry. 37
The separation of tanks and infantry appears
complete and the shape of future operations in
Normandy more explicable.

Before Canadian units were committed to

battle, 21 Army Group finally weighed in with
their last advice on the problem of tank/infantry
cooperation. Two aspects of Notes on the
Employment of Tanks in Support of Irifantry in
Battle are worthy of mention. First was the return
of tanks as the sole element of the Assault
Echelon immediately following the engineers of
the Gapping Force. 38 Second was the inclusion
of other arms of service further forward in the
attacking force. 39 This short and idealized booklet
gave a precise view of the defences likely to be
found, mentioning minefields, wire, anti-tank detail, for the attacks in Operation "Charnwood"
ditches, section posts, crawl trenches, anti- faced almost the classic form of German
personnel mines and booby traps. 40 Despite its defences. The War Office pamphlet on that topic
attention to detail it contributed little to providing informed that the German intention was to
instruction in tank/ infantry cooperation, and by "destroy the enemy by fire." 41 Ground was chosen
differing from concurrent doctrine may have according to its suitability for such purposes, and
added to the doctrinal confusion. the fortified ring of villages north of Caen fit that
description well. Mines and wire certainly existed
Having mentioned above the types of defences but they took second place to what the pamphlet
to be encountered it may be helpful to add more called the "co-ordination of fire of high- and low-

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 Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 2

,,,,.,,.,,,,, U'l
8
,\!1':";~"~'/tJ.'•'I'I ~
....

Canadian irifantry advancing near Gruchy, France, 9 July 1944.

trajectory weapons," that is mortars and machine The Operation

guns. 42 The theoretical employment of German
armoured troops in defence also corresponded A!Jeration "Charnwood" began on 8 July 1944,
to the situation north of Caen. Their defences V~hen the British I Corps, strongly reinforced
were usually built around anti-tank guns acting to a strength of 115,000 personnel, opened its
as a cover for the divisional artillery, with the drive to clear Caen as far as the Orne River. 45
tanks kept as mobile reserve. 43 This arrangement Three infantry divisions were to attack on an
looks very much like the tactical situation of 8 eight-mile front, the 3rd Canadian on the right,
July 1944. It was also noted that given several the 59th British in the centre and the 3rd British
weeks the Germans would systematically on the left. 46 The infantry were supported by the
construct continuous trenches and permanent fire of656 guns ofvarious calibres, 350 tanks in
dugouts, and they had certainly been allowed that two armoured brigades plus specialized armour
time in Normandy. 44 such as flails, flame-throwers and AVREsY Some
of the artillery had begun firing a series of
A summing up of tank/infantry doctrine to concentrations at 2300 hours the night before,
this point in the war reveals elements of both targeting some 15 German-held villages around
continuity and change. Frontage of attack and Caen. 48
pace of advance had remained constant
throughout as they were keyed to infantry tactics. As an operation, "Charnwood" was cast in
The ideal ratio of combat arms was maintained the mould of the British way of warfare in the
at one tank regiment to one infantry battalion mid-twentieth century. Limited in its aims, this
despite circumstances when this rule could be was a "set-piece" battle, the kind the British had
broken. In 1944, defensive elements such as anti- been fighting for two years. Thus, its ultimate
tank mines and anti-tank guns brought more objectives were in the range of 4,000 yards; to
integration of other supporting arms and the be accomplished in four phases each with their
relegation of tanks to further back in the attack. own objectives. In Phase I the two British
From leading the assault they were now found divisions would capture Galmanche, la Bijude
supporting with fire from the flank or rear. It and Lebisey Wood. Once these objectives were
remained to be seen whether this arrangement achieved, all three divisions would continue the
was workable under battle conditions. advance in Phase II. This would see the

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 Wilson: The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case S

Canadians capture Buron, Gruchy, the Chateau in line. A second complication was the inter-
St. Louet and Authie while the 59th Division divisional boundary with 59th Division that
pushed south on their left flank, moving through narrowed around Cussy before widening again
St. Contest and Epron. Phase III called for the closer to Caen.
Canadians to capture Cussy and the Abbey
d'Ardenne, pushing the Germans back to the line Operating under these constraints, 3 CID
Franqueville-Ardenne. In Phase IV, all formations decided on a plan that entailed 9th Canadian
would exploit to the final objectives. 49 Infantry Brigade (9 CIB) capturing Buran, Gruchy
and Authie, with later exploitation to Chateau St.
The villages attacked by I Corps were on the Louet and Franqueville. Once 9 CIB had secured
last high ground before Caen, including some of Authie, Major-General Keller would swing his axis
the highest ground between that town and the of advance 90 degrees, 7th Canadian Infantry
coast. Once the Germans gave them up they Brigade (7 CIB) attacking southwest toward
would have to move back to the high ground to Cussy and Ardenne. Only in the exploitation of
the south of Caen. That alone might have dictated Phase IV would 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
defending the ground they presently held, but in (8 CIB) join in the advance.
any case, Hitler had forbidden withdrawal. To
defend this critical ground the Germans could To support the infantry, 3 CID assigned the
spare but two divisions in the front line, 16th three armoured regiments of 2 CAB to the three
Luftwaffe Field Division on the right and the 12th infantry brigades: the Sherbrooke Fusiliers
SS Panzer Division on the left. The former, with Regiment (SFR) to 9 CIB, the 1st Hussars to 7
aid of a tank battalion from 21st Panzer Division, CIB and the Fort Garry Horse (FGH) to 8 CIB. At
held the line from the Canal de Caen west to the brigade level this process continued, with
railway near Cambes. From that point, the 12th individual squadrons placed in support of
SS continued the line through Galmanche, infantry battalions. Even 8 CIB, though not
Buron, Gruchy and then south to Carpiquet participating in the initial phases, followed this
airfield and finally crossing the Odon near form, allocating its armour to individual
Verson. 50 According to Kurt Meyer, commanding battalions. 54 This arrangement, while providing
the 12th SS, there were "eleven dazed battalions" good direct support, was too weak and too
defending this ground the Allies wanted so much, dispersed according to earlier doctrine.
a serious imbalance of forces by any measure.s'
To lessen the odds. the Germans had made their On the frontage that 3 CID would be attacking
usual clever use of ground, creating in the words Kurt Meyer had placed his 25th SS Panzer
of the British Official History, "mutually Grenadier Regiment, reinforced by elements of
supporting positions based on what were by now the divisional tanks and artillery. Although Meyer
virtually tank-proof villages." Ellis listed the had referred above to 11 defending battalions.
villages of Lebisey, Galmanche, Gruchy, that figure reflected the total of combat units
Franqueville, Cussy and Couvre-Chef as within the division as a whole. Hubert Meyer,
belonging in this category; four of these six were principal staff officer of the 12th SS, spoke more
to be taken by the Canadians. 52 realistically of"four punch-drunk battalions" as
holding the line. 55 He was obviously referring to
the three infantry battalions of the 25th Panzer
The Canadian Attacks Grenadier Regiment and the single battalion from
the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Rifle
anadian troops began to move at 0730 hours companies of the regiments (supported by the
C on 8 July, an hour after General Crocker,
GOC of I Corps, ordered Phase II to commence.
mortars and machine guns of the machine gun
companies) were deployed along the front,
Objectives for 3 CID in this phase included the occupying some villages and in front of others.
villages of Gruchy and Buran, while on their left Meyer had 60 tanks operational, most held in
the 59th Division attacked St. Contest, Malon and reserve or in ambush positions. Despite being a
Epron. 53 On their assigned four-mile frontage naturally strong position to defend by fire it
Canadian planners made their dispositions as lacked depth. As Michael Reynolds has noted, it
best as its convex shape allowed. That shape was certainly not the "classic" defensive position
seemed to preclude attacking with two brigades of the manuals with Battle Outposts, Advance

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 Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 2

Operation "Charnwood"
8 July 1944
- Phasell
•••••• Phase Ill
- - Brigade boundary
Divisional boundary
German positions
Scale: 1 em = 250 m
(approximate)

~
sera
.(alt.q~y)

Carpiquet
and Main Positions. 56 In the sector attacked by Once assigned his brigade objectives,
the Canadians it was no secret where the Brigadier Cunningham of 9 CIB decided on a plan
Germans were. Defence overlays prepared for that involved attacking two battalions up. On the
"Charnwood" more or less accurately plotted the left, the Highland Light Infantry (HLI) supported
location of troops, trenches, suspected minefields by "A" Squadron of the Sherbrookes would
and support weapons. 57 The weight of the initial assault Buran, while on the right the Stormont,
attack by 9 CIB would fall primarily upon the Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (SDG),
3rd Battalion of the 25th with its three rifle backed by "B" Squadron of the Sherbrookes,
companies, mortars and machine guns. would capture Gruchy. Once Buran was secured,
the North Nova Scotia Highlanders (NNS) would
mount their attack on Authie and the SDGs move

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 Wilson: The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case S

on to capture Chateau St. Louet. Failure to infantry fighting in Buron continued until 1430
capture Buron quickly would impose subsequent hours and the SFR did not report consolidating
delays on both brigade and divisional plans. on the high ground southeast of Buran until1512
hours. 62
When the HLI moved from their startline
around Vieux Cairon they attacked with two In their attack on Gruchy the SDGs also
companies up, "D" on the right and "B" on the moved tactically two up, "B" Company on the
left. Supporting them, the tanks of "A" Squadron right supported by No.2 Troop, and "A" Company
moved tactically with two troops up and two on the left supported by No.1 Troop. 63 With the
back: No.1 Troop supporting "D" Company, No.2 remaining tank troops grouped on the left flank,
Troop with "B" Company, and No.4 and HQ the intention had been to support by fire from a
Troop following in the rear. 58 As the Canadian position 600 yards south of Vieux Cairon.
infantry and armour approached Buran they Accounts vary slightly but it appears that the
came under machine gun and mortar fire just SDGs came under heavy mortar fire at 0745
before 0800 hours. On the right, No.1 Troop hours and machine gun fire by 0754 hours. From
quickly lost three of its four tanks to mines and that point the attack progressed rapidly. At 0805
88 mm anti-tank guns firing from the southwest hours the SDGs reported that the supporting
and had to be replaced by No.4 Troop. On the tanks were going into Gruchy, by 0812 hours the
left the situation was initially more favourable, enemy were observed leaving the far end of the
but there too Panzerfausts and 88s soon village and by 0830 hours the tanks were
accounted for all of No.2 Troop. These casualties mopping up between Buron and Gruchy. 64 Once
occurred while the tanks were supporting from again, success came from the intimate support
the flank, according to current doctrine. of the tanks.

Squadron Headquarters then moved up to It was only after this tactical success that "B"
support "B" Company of the HLI, but fear of yet Squadron's casualties mounted. The enemy
more minefields kept them from supporting the infantry disposed of, Nos.1 and 2 Troops moved
infantry closely enough to clear the enemy from south of the village while No.3 and HQ Troops
their trenches. It took considerable time for the moved north. The southern pair of troops came
HLI to contact the tanks. The first message was under fire from German tanks and anti-tank
passed at 0801 hours but at 0940 hours the weapons firing from the Chateau St. Louet, losing
infantry were still telling Brigade that there were several vehicles. North of Gruchy the remaining
no minefields northwest of Buron. 59 Finally, troops encountered "very stiff resistance" from
Lieutenant Campbell of the HLI made several German infantry, and there too long-range anti-
trips out to the tanks to inform them that the left tank fire accounted for all of No 3 Troop.
flank approaches to Buran were clear of mines.
Once the tanks were convinced that this was the By 0950 hours the SDGs reported they were
case they proceeded to assist "B" Company in ready to take Chateau St. Louet, and five minutes
cleaning out the enemy machine gun posts one later General Keller ordered Brigadier
by one. 60 This was very definitely intimate Cunningham to do so. 65 However, "C" Company
support, the sort that the Sherman tank could did not close up to the Chateau until1445 hours
not provide. and accompanied by the armour went into it at
1510 hours. This time squares with the SFR
Having cleared out the German infantry the account that reported all three squadrons were
tanks moved to the high ground southeast of the employed in putting the infantry into the Chateau
village, but their day was far from over. Joined at 1515 hours. 66
by two troops of British 17 -pounder M -10 tank
destroyers from 62nd Anti-Tank Regiment, "A" The varying fortunes of the two infantry
Squadron now fought a defensive battle against battalions reflected a tactical anomaly that could
counterattacking Panthers.Together they defeated not have been anticipated. The 1Oth Company of
the German tanks, the M-10s claiming 13 tanks 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was in position
at a cost of six of their own. 61 "A" Squadron began forward of Buron but its 11th Company between
this battle at half strength and by the end of the Buran and Galmanche had already been attacked
day was reduced to four vehicles. However, the by the British 59th Division in Phase I. In

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 Wilson: The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case S

Above: An example of Gennan defensive positions around the town of Galmanche, typical of those encountered
during Operation "Charnwood." Galmanche was one of the main obstacles in the path of the British 59th
Division (attacking just to the east of the Canadians) during Operation "Charnwood." This groundcheck,
compiled three days before the start of "Charnwood" by the Aerial Photography Interpretation Sections
(APIS) of 59 Division and 2nd Anny, is based on details obtained from interpretation of the aerial photo and
intelligence gathered from patrols and the capture of prisoners.. The photograph was taken by an aircraft
from 39 Wing, Royal Canadian Air Force.

Left: A composite air photo of the Charnwood battlefield (Phase II objectives).

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 Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 2

Sherman tank advancing through Buran, France, 9 July 1944.

retrospect, it appears that this company, faced Like the SDGs, the North Nova Scotia
with a breakthrough by British tanks and Highlanders had their plans upset by the
infantry, retreated towards lOth Company. The continuing fighting in Buran. Their Forming Up
identical situation obtained between Gruchy and Place (FUP) was supposed to be in Buran from
Buran where the 9th Company, attacked by the where they would advance southeast towards
SDGs and "B" Squadron, moved toward battalion Authie. "D" Company would attack frontally as
headquarters. In effect, this concentrated the Fire Company supported by "A" on the left flank
whole of the 3rd Battalion in Buran supported and "B" on the right. Once they secured Authie,
by its own mortars and machine guns plus tanks "C" Company was tasked with the exploitation
and artillery from divisional assets. While not to Franqueville. 68 The NNS reported they were at
actually outnumbering their attackers in the their FUP at 1045 hours, but they had already
Highland Light Infantry, the Germans were received fire from St. Contest in getting there and
considerably better off with regard to supporting worse was to follow. There were still Germans in
weapons. This situation at Buran occurred in a trenches at the far side of Buran and their fire
position believed at the time to be the key pinned down "D" Company. "B" Company
controlling other objectives and thus the most discovered the same tactical situation on the west
heavily defended. 67 Thus, despite all the side of Buran. There were still Germans in the
resources at the disposal of I Corps, at the sharp orchard on Buran's southern limits that had to
end a single battalion of infantry supported by a be cleared out by infantry and tanks before the
single squadron of tanks was attacking another battalion could move on. Consequently, it was a
battalion defending from prepared positions. A "badly battered battalion" that jumped off at 1515
careful reading of the doctrinal manuals indicates hours. 69 Fortunately, the NNS found no Germans
that this weak and dispersed assault was in the first houses in Authie and the regiment
definitely not "by the book." Little wonder that reported the village captured by 1530 hours.
the battle lasted all day in the ruins of Buran. Buoyed by this relatively swift victory and

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 Wilson: The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case S

supported by the remnants of "A" and "C" by Canadian tanks. 76 By 2300 hours Cussy was
Squadrons of the Sherbrookes, "C" Company firmly in Canadian hands. 77
advanced towards Franqueville, reaching it by
1600 hours. 70 The Regina Rifles encountered many of the
same difficulties as the CSR in reaching their
While 9 CIB's attacks were clearing Buron, startline, their attack being delayed until1800
Gruchy and Authie, 7 CIB was moving forward. hours. Their plan was for "B" Company to first
At 1000 hours they were in position northeast of capture the small mounds 400 yards east of
Vieux Cairon, at 1245 hours they had moved to Authie, after which "C" and "D" Companies would
a position between Buran and Gruchy, and by pass through to capture the Abbey. 78 German
1800 hours they were at their startlines southeast anti-tank gun fire destroyed the majority of their
of Authie. From their startlines on the Buron- supporting tanks, however, and when the attack
Authie road, the Regina Rifles supported by "A" went in it was without tanks or artillery. As a
Squadron of the 1st Hussars would attack on consequence, at 2100 hours they were just over
the right, first capturing the gun site at the point halfway to the Abbey and tenacious German
where two tracks converged northwest of the resistance caused heavy casualties in "B" and "C"
Abbey d'Ardenne and then the Abbey itself. Companies. 79 Nightfall found the Abbey still in
Simultaneously, the Ca..11.adian Scottish supported German hands; the Canadian attacks were
by "C" Squadron of the Hussars, and keeping to finished for the day. 80
the north of the Authie-Cussy road, were to
capture defensive works several hundred yards
northwest of Cussy and then the village. 71 Having Conclusion
suffered substantial casualties in Operation
o how did "Charnwood" compare to the
"Windsor," the Royal Winnipeg Rifles (RWR) with
"B" Squadron of the Hussars in support were in
reserve for this phase of operations.
S infantry/tank doctrine that the Canadians
had studied? In certain fundamentals, the battles
north of Caen were very similar to those
The Canadian Scottish, supported by "C" described in the training pamphlets. The
Squadron of the 1st Hussars, attacked with "A" frontages assigned to the infantry battalions and
Company on the right and "C" Company on the companies were close to those they had practised
left, advancing in extended line for their "walk" and the pace of advance equally so. Also expected
to Cussy. 72 They too had their difficulties, being was the physical separation of the tanks and
shelled while moving to their assembly area near infantry that had followed from the introduction
Gruchy and then receiving fire from Buron. of the Sherman in 1943.
Consequently, H-Hour was set back to 1740
hours. 73 "A" Company was tasked with reducing However, there were two areas where the
the strongpoint 300 yards short of Cussy while battle varied from accepted doctrine. The first
"B" and "C" took Cussy itself in a pincer was the diminished level of tank support. Thus
movement. Soon after they began to advance an far in the war the ideal had usually been
"unforeseen eventuality" complicated matters - maintained at one tank regiment to one infantry
both flanks were open. On their left, the British battalion. Despite occasional references in the
59th Division had not taken Bitot, and the Abbey manuals to individual squadrons supporting
had not yet fallen to the Reginas. By 2000 hours infantry battalions this level of armoured support
they reported to Brigade that tanks were on "both invariably contained mitigating circumstances.
sides of us. " 74 In response, "B" and "D" In "Charnwood" the level of tank support was
Companies and the anti-tank section of the Royal reduced without any compensatory factors, and
Winnipeg Rifles were sent forward. One company the fighting clearly shows that earlier cautions
proceeded to Cussy filling the gap between "B" about the tank squadron being too weak to
and "C" Companies of the Regina Rifles with the support a two-company attack were well-
other held in reserve. 75 Meanwhile, a German founded.
counterattack failed, losing six tanks to the
supporting armour and prompting the CSR War In the attacks on both Buran and Gruchy the
Diary to refer to the "excellent service" performed supporting tank squadrons were swiftly reduced
in numbers with some troops being eliminated

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 Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 2

entirely. Simply put, there were not enough tanks Notes

operating on the frontages of the two infantry
battalions. By the end of the day all units of 2
CAB had seen action, suggesting that it might 1. General Sir Miles C. Dempsey Papers, WO 285/9-12.
have made better sense to use an armoured Personal Diary, 9 July 44, p.158.
2. C.P. Stacey. The Victory Campaign. Official History of
regiment with each battalion attack in 9 CIB, the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Vol. III,
including that of the NNS. This advice is tendered (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960), p.274.
with the knowledge that the final objectives of 3. John A. English, The Canadian Army and the
the operation were limited to roughly 4,000 yards Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High
Command, (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp.306, 312-
regardless of the success enjoyed on 8 July 1944. 313.
Saving a reserve of tanks made good sense if the 4. David J. Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against the Axis:
advance was to continue immediately, or a major Canada's Second World War, (Toronto: Stoddart
counterattack was expected. As to the first, this Publishing, 1995). p.219.
5. J.L. Granatstein, TheGenerals:TheCanadianArmy's
was simply not part of the plan. Once Senior Commanders in the Second World War,
"Charnwood" succeeded 21 Army Group (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), pp.264-265.
intended to mount another operation to clear 6. Oliver Haller, "The Defeat of the 12th SS: 7-10 June
Caen south of the river. Regarding the second 1944," Canadian Military History, Vol.3, No.1, (Spring
1994). p.24.
possibility, local counterattacks could logically 7. Marc Milner, "Reflections on Caen, the Bocage and the
be expected, but larger operations could not be Gap: A Naval Historian's Critique of the Normandy
contemplated by the Germans in the face of Campaign," Canadian Military History,Vol.7, No.3,
ULTRA intelligence and the massive air and (Spring 1998). pp.12, 16.
8. See Roman Jarymowycz, "Canadian Armour in
artillery superiority. In fact, employing the whole Normandy: Operation 'Totalize' and the Quest for
of 2 CAB might well have reduced the tank Operational Maneuver," Canadian Military History,
casualties of the units involved by swamping the Vol.7, No.2, (Spring 1998}, p.19; RomanJarymowycz,
German defenders. "The Naval Historian as Tourist: Comments on Marc
Milner's Critique of the Normandy Campaign,"
CanadianMilitaryHistory, Vol.7, No.4, (Autumn 1998),
The second departure from doctrine was the pp.7-8.
way tanks provided close support to the infantry. 9. See David A. Wilson, "The Development of Tank-
Analysis ofthe fighting reveals that the doctrinal Infantry Co-operation Doctrine in the Canadian Army
for the Normandy Campaign of 1944," MA Thesis,
tendency of the armour to hang back was not a
University of New Brunswick, 1992, passim.
viable technique. Any successes that the 10. Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence
Canadians enjoyed on 8 July 1944 followed from Headquarters [DHHI File 87 I 177, The Tactical
the intimate support of their accompanying Handling of the Armoured Division and its
Components, Military Training Pamphlet No 22, Part
tanks, not from tanks firing from the flank or
III, The Tactical Handling of Armoured Divisions,
rear. Buron was cleared of its German defenders (London: War Office, July 1943}, pp.5, 9.
only when the tanks used their machine guns at 11. DHH File 87/207, Operations. Military Training
close range just as infantry tanks had formerly Pamphlet No. 23. Part I. General Principles, Fighting
Troops and Their Characteristics. (London: War Office,
done. Contrary to what The Co-operation of
September 1939). p.18.
Tanks with Irifantry Divisions in Offensive 12. DHH File 89/258, Tactical Handling of Army Tank
Operations had claimed, the tanks were Battalions, Military Training Pamphlet No 22; Part III,
"partners in the assault." Employment, (London: War Office, September 1939),
5. This pamphlet asserted that tank speed was usually
200 yards per minute over "good going" and 50 yards
Fresh battlefield evidence existed that per minute if the ground was difficult and there were
employing the Sherman tank as a direct-fire machine guns to neutralize. These speeds work out to
close-support weapon was viable. On 6 June approximately 7 and 2 miles per hour.
1944 Canadian tanks had performed in that role, 13. DHH File 89/258, p.3; DHH File 87/207, p.22.
14. DHH File 89/258. pp.9, 13.
a role that was planned for from the start. In 15. DHHFile89/258,pp.10,17.
General Keller's opinion, the overwhelming 16. DHH File 89/258, p.13.
success of the seaborne assault, with less than 17. Bryan Perrett, Through Mud and Blood: Irifantry!Tank
half the expected casualties, was largely explained Operations in World War II, (London: Robert Hale,
1975), p.43.
by the presence of the tanks. 81 Canadian 18. DHH File 86/435, Army Training Instruction No.2. The
commanders ignored this evidence in the post- Employment of Army Tanks in Co-operation with
assault period to the detriment of operations. Irifantry, (London: War Office, March 1941), pp.3, 7.

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 Wilson: The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case S

19. DHH File 90/38, Operations, Military Training 54. WD, FGH, 9 July 1944, NAC RG 24, Vol.l4234.
Pamphlet No. 23, Part IX:- The Infantry Division in 55. Hubert Meyer, 12 SS Panzer Division "HitlerJugend",
the Attack, (London: War Office, 1941), pp.24, 26-27. June to September 1944, MS # P-164, (Historical
20. DHH File 86/435, pp.7, 9: DHH File 90/38, p.29. Division, United States Army, Europe, 23 June 1954),
21. DHH File 367.064 (01), Training Precis, Canadian p.83.
Battle Drill Centre, Vernon, BC, 27 January 1943, 56. Michael Reynolds, Steel Inferno: ISS Panzer Corps in
p.l95. Normandy, (New York: Sarpedon, 1997), pp.l52, 119.
22. DHHFile357.064(Dl),p.l95. 57. WD, 3 CID, NAC RG 24, Vol.l3766. "Trace 'A' Showing
23. Army Training Instruction [ATI] No. 2, The Co- Dispositions of 25th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment
operation of Infantry and Tanks, (London: War Office, as at 062359."
May 1943), p.5. 58. WD, SFR, NAC RG 24, Vol.l4287, "Report by 'A'
24. ATI No 2, p.6. Squadron 27 CAR on Operation "Charnwood" 8 July
25. ATI No 2, pp.9-10. 44,"pp.l1-12.
26. ATI No 2, p.l7. 59. WD, 9 CIB, 8 July 1944, NAC, RG 24, Vol. 14153.
27. 21 Army Group Monthly Training Letters, National 60. Snowie, pp.68-69.
Archives of Canada [NACI RG 24, Vol.9754. 61. Tony Foulds, "In Support of the Canadians: A British
28. DHH File 87 I 178, The Tactical Handling of the Anti-Tank Regiment's first five weeks in Normandy,"
Armoured Division and its Components, Military Canadian Military History, Vol 7, No 2 (Spring 1998),
Training Pamphlet No 41, Part 3, The Motor Battalion, p.78.
p.l7. 62. WD, 9 CIB, 8 July 1944, NAC, RG 24, Vol.l4153.
29. English, p.222. 63. WD, SFR, NAC RG 24, Vol.l4287, "Report by 'B'
30. War Diary [WDJ. SDGs, NAC RG 24, Vol.l5270, "The Squadron 27 CAR on Operation "Charnwood," 8 July
Co-operation of Tanks with Infantry Divisions in 44," pp.l3-14.
Offensive Operations, 21 Army Group, 30 November 64. WD, SDG, 8 July 1944, NAC RG 24, Vol.l5271.
1943,"p.l. 65. Stacey, III, p.l61.
31. "The Co-operation of Tanks ... ," pp.2, 5, 10, 15. 66. WD, SFR, 8 July 1944, NAC RG 24, Vol.l4287; WD,
Canadian Army Tank units were re-named in mid- SDG, 8 July 1944, NAC RG 24, Vol.l5271.
1943. 67. Snowie, p.56.
32. "The Co-operation of Tanks ... ," p.28. 68. WD, NNS, 8 July 1944, NAC RG 24, Vol.l5122; Will R.
33. "The Co-operation of Tanks ... ," p.25. Bird, No Retreating Footsteps: The Story of the North
34. WD, 3 CID, NAC RG 24, Vol.15270, "Extract from 49 Nova Scotia Highlanders, (Hantsport NS: Lancelot
Br Inf Div re Shermans." Press), p.l20.
35. WD, BRAC, 9 January 1944, NAC RG 24, Vol.l4186. 69. Bird, pp.123-126.
36. DHH File 83/388, Infantry Training, Part I: The 70. WD, SFR, 8 July 1944, NAC RG 24, Vol.l42877.
Infantry Battalion, pp.32, 34. 71. WD, 7 CIB, July 1944, NAC RG 24, Vol.l4129.
37. DHH File 83/388, p.34. 72. WD, CSR, 8 July 1944, NAC RG 24, Vol.l5037.
38. DHH File 86/466, pp.4, inside back cover. 73. "Summary of Operations," 3 Cdn InfDiv 1-31 Jul44,"
39. DHH File 86/446, "Notes on the Employment of Tanks CMHQ, 19 August 1944, p.5.
in Support of Infantry in Battle," p.3. What the manual 74. WD, 3 CID, 8 July 1944, NAC RG 24, Vol.l3766.
termed a "suitable composition" for an assaulting force 75. "Summary of Operations," 6: Bruce Tascona and Eric
included a battalion of infantry, a regiment of tanks, Wells, Little Black Devils: A History of the Royal
three Field Regiments of artillery, a proportion of Winnipeg Rifles, (Winnipeg: Royal Winnipeg Rifles,
medium artillery, an anti-tank battery, the troops of light 1983), p.l60.
AA, two companies of engineers and one company of 76. WD, CSR, NAC RG 24, Vol.l5037.
Vickers. 77. Ellis, p.315.
40. DHH File 86/466, p.1. 78. Gordon Brown, "The Capture of the Abbaye D'Ardenne
41. DHH File 86/344, Tactics of the German Army, vol. I, by the Regina Rifles, 8 July 1944," Canadian Military
Defence and Withdrawal, (London: War Office, April HistoryVol.4, No.1, (Spring 1995), p.91.
1944}, p.2. 78. Brown, p.95; WD, RRR, 8 July 1944, NAC RG 24,
42. DHH File 86/344, p.5. Vol.l5199.
43. DHH File 87 I 177, p.55. 80. Stacey, Ill, p.l61.
44. DHHFile86/344,pp.ll-12,25. 81. DHH File 235C32.013 (D8), "The Technique of the
45. L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol. I, The Battle of Assault," p. 2.
Normandy, (London: HMSO, 1962), p.310.
46. Stacey,III,p.l57.
47. Reginald H. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, David A. Wilson received his Ph.D from the
(Ottawa: Canadian War Museum/Macmillan), pp.51-52. University of New Brunswick in 1997. He has
48. G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, Volume II,
(Toronto: McClellan & Stewart, 1972), pp.288.
taught at UNB, Mount Allison and St. Thomas
49. Stacey, III, 160; Allan J. Snowie, Bloody Buran: The University and is currently teaching part-time
Battle of Buran, Normandy- 08 July 1944, (Erin, Ont.: for RMC's Office of Continuing Education. He
The Boston Mills Press, 1984), p.56. is concurrently working on an article on
50. Ellis, I, p.311.
51. Kurt Meyer, Grenadiers, (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz
Harry Crerar, an article on the Globe & Mail's
Publishing, 1994}, p.l46. wartime coverage of operations and a short
52. Ellis, I, p.311. monograph on black powder warfare.
53. Stacey, III, p.l60.

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