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M.V Estonia Disaster

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M.V.

ESTONIA DISASTER

CHAPTER 1 THE ACCIDENT

The Estonian-flagged ro-ro passenger ferry ESTONIA (Figure


1.1) departed from Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, on 27
September 1994 at 1915 hrs for a scheduled voyage to
Stockholm, the capital of Sweden (Figure 1.2). She carried
989 people, 803 of whom were passengers.

Figure 1.1 The ro-ro passenger ferry ESTONIA.


Figure 1.2 The ESTONIA’s route and the site of the accident.

The ship left harbour with all four main engines running.
When she was clear of the harbour area full service speed was
set. The engine setting was maintained up to the accident. The
wind was southerly, 8-10 m/s. Visibility was good, with rain
showers.
At 2000 hrs the watch on the bridge was taken by the second
officer B and the third officer (The estonia had two second
officers, here designated second officer A and second officer
B).
The voyage proceeded normally. Sea conditions along the
Estonian coast were moderate, but became more rough when
the ship left the sheltered waters. The ship had a slight
starboard list due to a combination of athwartships weight
disposition, cargo disposition and wind pressure on the port
side.
As the voyage continued the wind velocity increased
gradually and the wind veered to south-west. Visibility was
generally more than 10 nautical miles. At midnight the wind
was south-westerly 15-20 m/s with a significant wave height
of 3-4 m. The rolling and pitching of the vessel increased
gradually, and some passengers became seasick.
At about 0025 hrs the ESTONIA reached a waypoint at
position 59°20´ N, 22°00´ E and from there headed true
course 287°. The speed was about 14 knots and the vessel
encountered the seas on her port bow. Due to increasing
rolling, the fin stabilisers were extended.
During his scheduled round on the car deck the seaman of the
watch heard shortly before 0100 hrs a metallic bang from the
bow area as the vessel hit a heavy wave.
The seaman of the watch informed the second officer B about
what he had heard and was ordered to try to find out what had
caused the bang. The seaman did so by waiting at the ramp,
listening and checking the indicator lamps for the visor and
ramp locking devices. He reported that everything seemed to
be normal.
At 0100 hrs the watch on the bridge was taken over by the
second officer A and the fourth officer. After being relieved
the second officer B and third officer left the bridge.
Further observations of unusual noise, starting at about 0105
hrs, were made during the following 10 minutes by many
passengers and some crew members who were off duty in
their cabins.
When the seaman of the watch returned from his round, soon
after the change of watches, he caught up the master and
entered the bridge just behind him. Shortly afterwards he was
sent down to the car deck to find out the cause of the sounds
reported by telephone to the bridge. He did not, however,
manage to reach the car deck.
At about 0115 hrs the visor separated from the bow and tilted
over the stem. The ramp was pulled fully open, allowing large
amounts of water to enter the car deck. Very rapidly the ship
took on a heavy starboard list. She was turned to port and
slowed down.
Passengers started to rush up the staircases and panic
developed at many places. Many passengers were trapped in
their cabins and had no chance of getting out in time.
Lifejackets were distributed to those passengers who managed
to reach the boat deck. They jumped or were washed into the
sea. Some managed to climb into liferafts which had been
released from the vessel. No lifeboats could be launched due
to the heavy list.
At about 0120 hrs a weak female voice called “Häire, häire,
laeval on häire” the Estonian words for “Alarm, alarm, there
is alarm on the ship”, over the public address system. Just a
moment later an internal alarm for the crew was transmitted
over the public address system. Soon after this the general
lifeboat alarm was given.
A first Mayday call from the ESTONIA was received at 0122
hrs. A second Mayday call was transmitted shortly afterwards
and by 0124 hrs 14 ship- and shore-based radio stations,
including the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC)
in Turku, had received the Mayday calls.
At about this time all four main engines had stopped. The
main generators stopped somewhat later and the emergency
generator started automatically, supplying power to essential
equipment and to limited lights in public areas and on deck.
The ship was now drifting, lying across the seas.
The list to starboard increased and water had started to enter
the accommodation decks. Flooding of the accommodation
continued with considerable speed and the starboard side of
the ship was submerged at about 0130 hrs. During the final
stage of flooding the list was more than 90 degrees. The ship
sank rapidly, stern first, and disappeared from the radar
screens of ships in the area at about 0150 hrs.
Rescue efforts were initiated by MRCC Turku. About one
hour after the ESTONIA had sunk, four passenger ferries in
the vicinity arrived on the scene of the accident. Rescue
helicopters were summoned and the first one arrived at 0305
hrs.
During the night and early morning, helicopters and assisting
ships rescued 138 people, of whom one later died in hospital.
During the day and on the two following days 92 bodies were
recovered. Most of the missing persons accompanied the
vessel to the seabed.
The wreck was found in international waters within Finland's
Search and Rescue Region, resting on the seabed at a water
depth of about 80 m with a heading of 95° and a starboard list
of about 120°. The visor was missing and the ramp partly
open.
The position of the wreck is 59°22,9´ N, 21°41,0´ E. The
visor, which has been recovered, was located at 59°23,0´ N,
21°39,2´ E, about one nautical mile west of the wreck.

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