The Mongols: A Very Short Introduction

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AFRICAN HISTORY John Parker and Richard Rathbone
AGNOSTICISM Robin Le Poidevin
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION David A. Gerber
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS L. Sandy Maisel
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY Charles O. Jones
ANAESTHESIA Aidan O’Donnell
ANARCHISM Colin Ward
ANCIENT EGYPT Ian Shaw
ANCIENT GREECE Paul Cartledge
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Julia Annas
ANCIENT WARFARE Harry Sidebottom
ANGELS David Albert Jones
ANGLICANISM Mark Chapman
THE ANGLO - SAXON AGE John Blair
THE ANIMAL KINGDOM Peter Holland
ANIMAL RIGHTS David DeGrazia
ANTISEMITISM Steven Beller
THE APOCRYPHAL GOSPELS Paul Foster
ARCHAEOLOGY Paul Bahn
ARCHITECTURE Andrew Ballantyne
ARISTOCRACY William Doyle
ARISTOTLE Jonathan Barnes
ART HISTORY Dana Arnold
ART THEORY Cynthia Freeland
ATHEISM Julian Baggini
AUGUSTINE Henry Chadwick
AUTISM Uta Frith
THE AZTECS Davíd Carrasco
BARTHES Jonathan Culler
BEAUTY Roger Scruton
BESTSELLERS John Sutherland
THE BIBLE John Riches
BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY Eric H. Cline
BIOGRAPHY Hermione Lee
THE BLUES Elijah Wald
THE BOOK OF MORMON Terryl Givens
THE BRAIN Michael O’Shea
BRITISH POLITICS Anthony Wright
BUDDHA Michael Carrithers
BUDDHISM Damien Keown
BUDDHIST ETHICS Damien Keown
CANCER Nicholas James
CAPITALISM James Fulcher
CATHOLICISM Gerald O’Collins
THE CELL Terence Allen and Graham Cowling
THE CELTS Barry Cunliffe
CHAOS Leonard Smith
CHILDREN’S LITERATURE Kimberley Reynolds
CHINESE LITERATURE Sabina Knight
CHOICE THEORY Michael Allingham
CHRISTIAN ART Beth Williamson
CHRISTIAN ETHICS D. Stephen Long
CHRISTIANITY Linda Woodhead
CITIZENSHIP Richard Bellamy
CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY Helen Morales
CLASSICS Mary Beard and John Henderson
CLAUSEWITZ Michael Howard
THE COLD WAR Robert McMahon
COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN LITERATURE Rolena Adorno
COMMUNISM Leslie Holmes
THE COMPUTER Darrel Ince
THE CONQUISTADORS Matthew Restall and Felipe Fernández-Armesto
CONSCIENCE Paul Strohm
CONSCIOUSNESS Susan Blackmore
CONTEMPORARY ART Julian Stallabrass
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY Simon Critchley
COSMOLOGY Peter Coles
CRITICAL THEORY Stephen Eric Bronner
THE CRUSADES Christopher Tyerman
CRYPTOGRAPHY Fred Piper and Sean Murphy
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION Richard Curt Kraus
DADA AND SURREALISM David Hopkins
DARWIN Jonathan Howard
THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS Timothy Lim
DEMOCRACY Bernard Crick
DERRIDA Simon Glendinning
DESCARTES Tom Sorell
DESERTS Nick Middleton
DESIGN John Heskett
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY Lewis Wolpert
THE DEVIL Darren Oldridge
DICTIONARIES Lynda Mugglestone
DINOSAURS David Norman
DIPLOMACY Joseph M. Siracusa
DOCUMENTARY FILM Patricia Aufderheide
DREAMING J. Allan Hobson
DRUGS Leslie Iversen
DRUIDS Barry Cunliffe
EARLY MUSIC Thomas Forrest Kelly
THE EARTH Martin Redfern
ECONOMICS Partha Dasgupta
EGYPTIAN MYTH Geraldine Pinch
EIGHTEENTH - CENTURY BRITAIN Paul Langford
THE ELEMENTS Philip Ball
EMOTION Dylan Evans
EMPIRE Stephen Howe
ENGELS Terrell Carver
ENGINEERING David Blockley
ENGLISH LITERATURE Jonathan Bate
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS Stephen Smith
EPIDEMIOLOGY Rodolfo Saracci
ETHICS Simon Blackburn
THE EUROPEAN UNION John Pinder and Simon Usherwood
EVOLUTION Brian and Deborah Charlesworth
EXISTENTIALISM Thomas Flynn
FASCISM Kevin Passmore
FASHION Rebecca Arnold
FEMINISM Margaret Walters
FILM Michael Wood
FILM MUSIC Kathryn Kalinak
THE FIRST WORLD WAR Michael Howard
FOLK MUSIC Mark Slobin
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY David Canter
FORENSIC SCIENCE Jim Fraser
FOSSILS Keith Thomson
FOUCAULT Gary Gutting
FREE SPEECH Nigel Warburton
FREE WILL Thomas Pink
FRENCH LITERATURE John D. Lyons
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION William Doyle
FREUD Anthony Storr
FUNDAMENTALISM Malise Ruthven
GALAXIES John Gribbin
GALILEO Stillman Drake
GAME THEORY Ken Binmore
GANDHI Bhikhu Parekh
GENIUS Andrew Robinson
GEOGRAPHY John Matthews and David Herbert
GEOPOLITICS Klaus Dodds
GERMAN LITERATURE Nicholas Boyle
GERMAN PHILOSOPHY Andrew Bowie
GLOBAL CATASTROPHES Bill McGuire
GLOBAL ECONOMIC HISTORY Robert C. Allen
GLOBAL WARMING Mark Maslin
GLOBALIZATION Manfred Steger
THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL Eric Rauchway
HABERMAS James Gordon Finlayson
HEGEL Peter Singer
HEIDEGGER Michael Inwood
HERODOTUS Jennifer T. Roberts
HIEROGLYPHS Penelope Wilson
HINDUISM Kim Knott
HISTORY John H. Arnold
THE HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY Michael Hoskin
THE HISTORY OF LIFE Michael Benton
THE HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS Jacqueline Stedall
THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE William Bynum
THE HISTORY OF TIME Leofranc Holford - Strevens
HIV/AIDS Alan Whiteside
HOBBES Richard Tuck
HUMAN EVOLUTION Bernard Wood
HUMAN RIGHTS Andrew Clapham
HUMANISM Stephen Law
HUME A. J. Ayer
IDEOLOGY Michael Freeden
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Sue Hamilton
INFORMATION Luciano Floridi
INNOVATION Mark Dodgson and David Gann
INTELLIGENCE Ian J. Deary
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION Khalid Koser
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Paul Wilkinson
ISLAM Malise Ruthven
ISLAMIC HISTORY Adam Silverstein
ITALIAN LITERATURE Peter Hainsworth and David Robey
JESUS Richard Bauckham
JOURNALISM Ian Hargreaves
JUDAISM Norman Solomon
JUNG Anthony Stevens
KABBALAH Joseph Dan
KAFKA Ritchie Robertson
KANT Roger Scruton
KEYNES Robert Skidelsky
KIERKEGAARD Patrick Gardiner
THE KORAN Michael Cook
LANDSCAPES AND GEOMORPHOLOGY Andrew Goudie and Heather Viles
LATE ANTIQUITY Gillian Clark
LAW Raymond Wacks
THE LAWS OF THERMODYNAMICS Peter Atkins
LEADERSHIP Keith Grint
LINCOLN Allen C. Guelzo
LINGUISTICS Peter Matthews
LITERARY THEORY Jonathan Culler
LOCKE John Dunn
LOGIC Graham Priest
MACHIAVELLI Quentin Skinner
MADNESS Andrew Scull
MAGIC Owen Davies
THE MARQUIS DE SADE John Phillips
MARTIN LUTHER Scott H. Hendrix
MARX Peter Singer
MATHEMATICS Timothy Gowers
THE MEANING OF LIFE Terry Eagleton
MEDICAL ETHICS Tony Hope
MEDIEVAL BRITAIN John Gillingham and Ralph A. Griffiths
MEMORY Jonathan K. Foster
MICHAEL FARADAY Frank A.J.L. James
MODERN ART David Cottington
MODERN CHINA Rana Mitter
MODERN FRANCE Vanessa R. Schwartz
MODERN IRELAND Senia Pašeta
MODERN JAPAN Christopher Goto-Jones
MODERN LATIN AMERICAN LITERATURE Roberto González Echevarría
MODERNISM Christopher Butler
MOLECULES Philip Ball
THE MONGOLS Morris Rossabi
MORMONISM Richard Lyman Bushman
MUHAMMAD Jonathan A.C. Brown
MULTICULTURALISM Ali Rattansi
MUSIC Nicholas Cook
MYTH Robert A. Segal
NATIONALISM Steven Grosby
NELSON MANDELA Elleke Boehmer
NEOLIBERALISM Manfred Steger and Ravi Roy
THE NEW TESTAMENT Luke Timothy Johnson
THE NEW TESTAMENT AS LITERATURE Kyle Keefer
NEWTON Robert Iliffe
NIETZSCHE Michael Tanner
NINETEENTH - CENTURY BRITAIN Christopher Harvie and H. C. G. Matthew
THE NORMAN CONQUEST George Garnett
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green
NORTHERN IRELAND Marc Mulholland
NOTHING Frank Close
NUCLEAR POWER Maxwell Irvine
NUCLEAR WEAPONS Joseph M. Siracusa
NUMBERS Peter M. Higgins
THE OLD TESTAMENT Michael D. Coogan
ORGANIZATIONS Mary Jo Hatch
PAGANISM Owen Davies
PARTICLE PHYSICS Frank Close
PAUL E. P. Sanders
PENTECOSTALISM William K. Kay
THE PERIODIC TABLE Eric R. Scerri
PHILOSOPHY Edward Craig
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW Raymond Wacks
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Samir Okasha
PHOTOGRAPHY Steve Edwards
PLAGUE Paul Slack
PLANETS David A. Rothery
PLANTS Timothy Walker
PLATO Julia Annas
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY David Miller
POLITICS Kenneth Minogue
POSTCOLONIALISM Robert Young
POSTMODERNISM Christopher Butler
POSTSTRUCTURALISM Catherine Belsey
PREHISTORY Chris Gosden
PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY Catherine Osborne
PRIVACY Raymond Wacks
PROBABILITY John Haigh
PROGRESSIVISM Walter Nugent
PROTESTANTISM Mark A. Noll
PSYCHIATRY Tom Burns
PSYCHOLOGY Gillian Butler and Freda McManus
PURITANISM Francis J. Bremer
THE QUAKERS Pink Dandelion
QUANTUM THEORY John Polkinghorne
RACISM Ali Rattansi
THE REAGAN REVOLUTION Gil Troy
REALITY Jan Westerhoff
THE REFORMATION Peter Marshall
RELATIVITY Russell Stannard
RELIGION IN AMERICA Timothy Beal
THE RENAISSANCE Jerry Brotton
RENAISSANCE ART Geraldine A. Johnson
RISK Baruch Fischhoff and John Kadvany
RIVERS Nick Middleton
ROMAN BRITAIN Peter Salway
THE ROMAN EMPIRE Christopher Kelly
ROMANTICISM Michael Ferber
ROUSSEAU Robert Wokler
RUSSELL A. C. Grayling
RUSSIAN HISTORY Geoffrey Hosking
RUSSIAN LITERATURE Catriona Kelly
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION S. A. Smith
SCHIZOPHRENIA Chris Frith and Eve Johnstone
SCHOPENHAUER Christopher Janaway
SCIENCE AND RELIGION Thomas Dixon
SCIENCE FICTION David Seed
THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION Lawrence M. Principe
SCOTLAND Rab Houston
SEXUALITY Véronique Mottier
SHAKESPEARE Germaine Greer
SIKHISM Eleanor Nesbitt
SLEEP Steven W. Lockley and Russell G. Foster
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY John Monaghan and Peter Just
SOCIALISM Michael Newman
SOCIOLOGY Steve Bruce
SOCRATES C. C. W. Taylor
THE SOVIET UNION Stephen Lovell
THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR Helen Graham
SPANISH LITERATURE Jo Labanyi
SPINOZA Roger Scruton
STATISTICS David J. Hand
STEM CELLS Jonathan Slack
STUART BRITAIN John Morrill
SUPERCONDUCTIVITY Stephen Blundell
TERRORISM Charles Townshend
THEOLOGY David F. Ford
THOMAS AQUINAS Fergus Kerr
TOCQUEVILLE Harvey C. Mansfield
TRAGEDY Adrian Poole
THE TUDORS John Guy
TWENTIETH - CENTURY BRITAIN Kenneth O. Morgan
THE UNITED NATIONS Jussi M. Hanhimäki
THE U.S. CONGRESS Donald A. Ritchie
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT Linda Greenhouse
UTOPIANISM Lyman Tower Sargent
THE VIKINGS Julian Richards
VIRUSES Dorothy H. Crawford
WITCHCRAFT Malcolm Gaskill
WITTGENSTEIN A. C. Grayling
WORLD MUSIC Philip Bohlman
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION Amrita Narlikar
WRITING AND SCRIPT Andrew Robinson
Available soon:
AUSTRALIA Kenneth Morgan
OBJECTIVITY Stephen Gaukroger
ANXIETY Daniel Freeman and Jason Freeman
MAGNETISM Stephen Blundell
LANGUAGES Stephen R. Anderson

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 Morris Rossabi

The Mongols
A Very Short Introduction
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Rossabi, Morris.
The Mongols: a very short introduction / Morris Rossabi.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-984089-2 (pbk)
1. Mongols—History. I. Title.
 DS19.R67 2012
950′.2—dc23 2011041803

135798642
Printed in Great Britain
by Ashford Colour Press Ltd., Gosport, Hants.
on acid-free paper
 For Mary, my fellow adventurer in Mongol studies,
and to Ambassador Enkhsaikhan and all my Mongol friends
Contents

List of illustrations and maps

Acknowledgments

A note on Romanization and pronunciation

Genealogical chart of prominent Mongol khans

1 Life on the steppes

2 Chinggis Khan emerges

3 Conquest and governance

4 The Mongols and the world: part

5 The Mongols and the world: part

6 The Mongols and arts and culture

7 Decline, fall, and legacy

Further reading

Index
List of illustrations and maps

1. Chinggis Khan’s battle standard

Photo by Ganzorig Lhamsuren

2. Map of Chinggis Khan’s Campaigns in Central and West Asia, 1219–1225

3. Ögödei Khan greeting officials

From ‘Jami al-Tawarikh, Bibliothèque nationale; Photo Credit: Scala White
Images/Art Resource ART396557

4. Map of Mongol invasion of Russia and Eastern Europe, 1237–1242

5. Tortoise at Khara Khorum

Photo by Ganzorig Lhamsuren

6. Hülegü conquering Baghdad in 1258

From ‘Jami al-Tawarikh; Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Stiftung Preussischer
Kulturbesitz; Art Resource ART183976

7. Map of Mongol Khanates, 1280

8. Khubilai Khan meeting the Polos

The British Library Royal 19D. lf. 59v.

9. Paiza (passport) with ‘Phags-pa inscription

Iron inlaid with silver; H:. 7 ⅛ in.; W: 4½ in., Courtesy of the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, bequest of Dorothy Graham Bennett, 1993.256

10. “The Mountains between India and Tibet”

MSS 727: folio 22a; Portion of ‘Jami al-Tawarikh (“Compendium of Chronicles”)
by Rashid al-Din, Iran, Tabriz, dated AH714 (A.D. 1314–15); ink, watercolor,
gold, and silver on paper, 15 x 25.5 cm; Courtesy of The Nasser D. Khalili
Collection of Islamic Art
Acknowledgments

As a young researcher, I had the good fortune to meet and converse with a fine group
of scholars of Chinese and Mongol studies. After four decades of research, this book is
a synthesis of my current understanding of the Mongol empire, and I wish to
acknowledge a few of the scholars who influenced my thinking. They ought not to be
blamed for any faulty interpretations in this work, and indeed probably some would
surely have disagreed with my views. Many of those I will mention are gone, but they
have left a lasting impression on me.

Professor Joseph Fletcher Jr., of Harvard University, was my closest friend and
colleague in the field. Although our scholarly interests did not necessarily coincide, we
often discussed our research, which deepened our understanding of Inner Asian history.
He devoted considerable effort and time to mastering a slew of foreign languages,
including Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Manchu, Mongolian, Arabic, French, German,
Spanish, and Persian. Succumbing to a virulent form of cancer in 1984, he did not
write the important works for which he had prepared so assiduously. Yet his teaching
and encouragement of younger scholars had a significant impact on the field of Mongol
studies.

Owen Lattimore and Professor Denis Sinor, of Indiana University, were pioneers in the
field and deserve immense credit for bringing Mongolia to the attention of educated
readers. Although I did not know Lattimore well, in our few meetings from 1969 on, I
recognized that he held a fountain of ideas about the Mongol empire. I knew Denis
Sinor quite well, and his enthusiasm for Mongol studies was infectious. He
commissioned me to write several articles early in my career and generously provided
careful evaluation of these papers.

A number of people trained me in Chinese history and in writing. Professor L.

Carrington Goodrich, of Columbia University, employed me at the Ming Biographical
History Project to write about prominent Central Asians and Mongols of the Ming era.
A wonderful gentleman, he taught me to be more careful and precise in my writing and
thinking. Professor Hans Bielenstein, also of Columbia, insisted (and still insists) on
accurate translations of Classical Chinese texts, an emphasis that has been helpful
throughout my career. Sheila Levine, of the University of California Press, taught me
much about writing for a general educated reader.

Others to whom I owe much include the late Professor John Langlois, formerly of
Bowdoin College, the late Sherman Lee, formerly director of the Cleveland Museum of
Art, and the late John Pope, formerly director of the Freer Gallery of Art. I have also
benefited from friendships with Professor Leonard Blusse of Leiden University, Dr. Stan
Czuma, retired curator of South Asian Art at the Cleveland Museum of Art,
Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan, ambassador of Mongolia to Austria, the late Professor
Herbert Franke of the University of Munich, Professor Michael Gasster of Rutgers
University, Professor Ralph Kauz of Bonn University, Dr. Yuki Konagaya of the National
Museum of Ethnology in Osaka, Professor David Morgan of the University of Wisconsin,
Professor Roderich Ptak of the University of Munich, Professor Carl Riskin of Queens
College and Columbia University, Professor Jonathan Spence of Yale University, and
Professor John Wills of the University of Southern California.

The book has been improved through Nancy Toff’s careful editing and Sonia Tycko’s
technical expertise concerning maps and other illustrations. Ms. Toff’s queries about
unclear passages and obtuse phrasing in the original text have prompted revisions that
have, I hope, resulted in a clearer narrative. I am truly grateful for her assistance.

On a personal level, I would like to thank the undergraduate and graduate students in
my courses on Mongol History at Queens College and Columbia University for asking
penetrating questions and demanding clear responses. Most significant, I have learned a
great deal from my wife, Mary, in our collaboration on three books. I thank her for this
and for much else. Others who have facilitated my work include Amy Rossabi, Tony
Rossabi, Howard Sterinbach, Sarah and Nathan Sterinbach, Anna Zhivotovsky, and
Julia Rossabi. I am grateful to them all.
A note on Romanization and pronunciation

For the convenience of the general reader, I have eliminated diacritical marks except
for the umlaut, which has become fairly standard in English-language works. I have
used the pinyin system of Romanization for all Chinese terms and names, and I have
adopted Antoine Mostaert’s scheme for the transliteration of Mongolian, as modified
by Francis W. Cleaves, except for these deviations:

č is ch
š is sh
γ is gh
q is kh
ĵ is j

I have used a standard system of transcription, but without diacritical marks, for the
very few Iranian names (e.g., Rashid al-Din).
A guide to pronunciation of pinyin for speakers of English includes the following:

q: an aspirated ch as in chin
zh: j as in jar
c: ts as in its
x: sh as in shore
z: ds as in moods
ai: sounds like eye
ao: ow as in how
ia: yah
ian: yen
ie: yeah
io: yo
i: ee as in see
i: (after c, ch, s, sh, zh, z): er as in her
 e: uh
ei: ai as in stay
en: en as in happen
eng: ung as in sung
ong: oong
ou: o as in toe

A guide to pronunciation of Mongolian for speakers of English includes the following:

gh: a guttural hard g

kh: a guttural ch as in Loch Ness
Genealogical chart of prominent Mongol khans

*Names in capital letters denote Khaghans or Great Khans, rulers of the whole empire.
Chapter 1
Life on the steppes

Two contemporary observations of the Mongols at their height in the thirteenth

century convey divergent views. The Iranian historian Juvaini describes how the
Mongol unifier Chinggis Khan (more commonly known in the West as Genghis Khan)
attacked the Central Asian cities of Bukhara, a center of Islamic learning, and
Samarkand, a great emporium and a vital halting place along the Silk Roads that
traversed Eurasia. Mongol troops surrounded the towns and unleashed a barrage of
arrows, fire arrows and fire lances, pots of naphtha (or perhaps incendiary bombs), and
huge boulders and arrows hurled from catapults. Fires engulfed the cities, prompting
the defenders to surrender. Mongol soldiers then torched the mostly wooden buildings
in Bukhara. Thirty thousand people in Bukhara, who were taller than the butt of a
whip, were killed. Mongol troops in Samarkand then destroyed the principal mosque,
killed many inhabitants, raped numerous women, and virtually enslaved the remaining
women and children, although Chinggis Khan ordered them to spare the lives of thirty
thousand craftsmen.

This savagery and allegedly animal-like behavior was reinforced by the Mongols’
lifestyle. Their dependence on animals for food, clothing, shelter, fuel, and medicines
contributed to this image. Foreigners also noticed their seemingly special relationship
with their horses. Their identification with their animals, which were essential for their
very survival, and their aversion to washing their clothes, due to unwillingness to
waste water and a traditional fear that washing would prompt Heaven to unleash
thunderstorms on their settlements, were perceived as evidence of their barbarism.

On the other hand, the Venetian traveler Marco Polo writes about the concern of
Chinggis Khan’s grandson Khubilai Khan for the welfare of the Chinese people whom
he had subjugated, a concern that the Chinese dynastic history also documented.
Khubilai sent agents in summer throughout China to assess conditions in the
countryside. If they found peasants whose land had been ravaged by storms, wind, or
locusts and other pests, Khubilai would grant them grain from his storehouses and
would relieve them of their tax burdens. Similarly, he dispatched officials in winter to
determine whether herds had suffered or, in some cases, perished because of heavy
snow or lightning or insufficient fodder. Marco Polo also portrays Khubilai as a sage
and often benevolent ruler who appreciated beauty and supported the building of such
well-planned cities as Daidu (modern Beijing) and Shangdu (Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s
“Xanadu”), and patronized the native arts and crafts. Naturally, he also depicts
Khubilai’s brutal suppression of rebel leaders and his destructive campaigns against
South China, Japan, and Southeast Asia, but he generally offers a positive image of the
Mongol emperor.

The Mongols’ conquests and the governments they established initiated the first
stirrings of contacts between Europe and East Asia, via the Silk Roads that had
traditionally facilitated trade between China and the Middle East, and generated
economic and cultural advances in the civilizations they ruled. To be sure, the
subjugated populations themselves often developed the economic institutions, the
technological innovations, and the literary, religious, and artistic texts and works that
characterized their civilizations during the era of Mongol governance. Yet Mongol rule
and the stability they brought paved the way for such remarkable developments. They
also contributed by facilitating travel and trade along the Silk Roads, prompting
interactions among far-flung civilizations. Splendid Iranian histories, beautiful Chinese
textiles and porcelains, and exquisite Russian gold vessels were some of the products of
such cultural interrelationships. Summer palaces at Takht-i Sulaiman (in Iran) and
Shangdu (in Inner Mongolia) attested to the Mongols’ patronage and grandiose
aspirations.

How can these two differing and contradictory images of the Mongols be reconciled?
Were they bloodthirsty murderers, rapists, and destroyers who simply sought booty
from civilizations they conquered? Were they avengers of the Mongol Sky God
Tenggeri, who allegedly entrusted them with the mission of conquering the world?
Were they getting even with states that had denied them trade for essential goods? Or,
after the initial invasions, did they seek to stabilize the areas they ruled? Did they
contribute to peace by unifying such countries as China, which had suffered from
having been broken up for centuries? Did the unity the Mongols imposed on much of
Asia have salutary effects on culture?

The records on the Mongol Empire frequently impede attempts to answer these
questions. Because the only Mongol primary source is The Secret History of the Mongols,
a semi-mythical and semi-accurate work, nearly all accounts of their outburst on the
world were written by those whom they had subjugated. The Secret History principally
records Chinggis’s rise to power, and it ends before the most important far-flung
campaigns and invasions. Armenian, Syriac, Latin, Russian, and other foreign sources
often portray the Mongols as murderous marauders who undermined development in
regions they subjugated.

Massacres and devastation of regions were part of but not the whole Mongol story.
Recent developments in the archaeology of various areas of the Mongol Empire, studies
of artifacts produced or commissioned by the Mongols, and a careful re-reading and
evaluation of foreign sources have provided alternative narratives. Russian
archaeologists in the 1930s and 1940s and German researchers over the past decade
have dug in the ruins of the ancient Mongol capital of Khara Khorum, and Japanese
archaeologists in the 1930s and Chinese specialists during the past twenty years have
excavated Shangdu, Khubilai Khan’s summer capital. They have found exquisite
Buddhist statues, jade belt ornaments, gold bracelets, temple frescos, and blue-and-
white porcelains, confirming the sophisticated tastes of the Mongol rulers. Similar
excavations of the Mongol summer capital of Takht-i Sulaiman in Iran and of many
Mongol sites in Russia have uncovered beautiful tiles, Chinese porcelains, silk fabrics,
and gold belts and goblets, offering a different and less negative perspective on Mongol
appreciation of culture.

Similarly, the Chinese and Korean dynastic histories, as well as histories written by
individual Chinese, offer a more nuanced appraisal of Mongol rule. Juvaini and Rashid
al-Din, the great Iranian historians who served as officials at the Mongol court in the
city of Tabriz, present a balanced evaluation of Mongol influence in the Middle East.
Franciscan missionaries and, especially, Marco Polo, who wrote accounts of their
travels and stays in Mongolia and China, were impressed by the Mongol rulers and
their administration of China and provide readers with more positive views.

Land of the Blue Sky

The Mongols’ traditional territories are landlocked and far enough from the ocean to
block its moderating influence. The resulting extreme continental climate, with its cold
temperatures and strong winds, pose severe challenges to human habitation. Long
winters, with below-freezing temperatures from November through March and freezing
temperatures in October and April, an elevation considerably above sea level, a short
growing season, and brief summers, with unreliable and often relatively limited
precipitation, preclude agriculture, except in specific circumscribed areas. About 1
percent of the land is arable, 8–10 percent is forested, and the rest is pasture land or
desert. Half the land is subject to permafrost, and the lakes and rivers freeze over in
winter, still another impediment to agriculture and human life. The Gobi, which covers
most of southern Mongolia, is classified as a desert steppe region, but its heat and
aridity have meant that only the camel, of the five animals that the Mongols have
relied on, can comfortably survive in this environment. A few herders have raised
sheep and goats in this difficult terrain, but most have eked out a living in the pasture
lands north and west of the Gobi. Even they faced perils in this fragile ecosystem.
Winter blizzards have plagued the country every few years and have created the
devastating and dreaded zud, or severe weather when the ground is covered with snow
and ice, preventing the animals from reaching the life-saving grass and plants.

Only the hardiest of herders have survived under these conditions, and the population
in this vast domain is tiny, compared to that of China, Mongolia’s closest neighbor. The
total population was probably less than a million while China’s population reached
seventy-five million during the Mongol invasions. Present-day Mongolia, not to
mention Inner Mongolia, Buryatia, and Tuva, where the Mongols traditionally
nomadized, is at least three times the size of France. Thus distances between various
groups and confederations on the eve of the Mongol onslaughts of the thirteenth
century were often vast, and the Mongol peoples faced almost insurmountable
obstacles in attempting to achieve unity. Despite these impediments, Mongolia had
about 250 cloudless days a year, more than almost any territory so far to the north, and
earned it the sobriquet of Land of the Blue Sky.
A key to survival in this vast terrain was mobility. Although most groups moved
principally from summer quarters to winter encampments, they would sometimes
migrate considerable distances to avoid a zud. When a zud hit, they needed to move
their herds quickly, to far-flung locations to find sufficient water and grass for their
animals. Indeed, their lives centered on the drive to feed and water their animals. In
short, this was a demanding lifestyle in one of the world’s most perilous environments.
Physical strength was essential, but skills and knowledge were also critical. A herder
had to be familiar with the different plants each species required, to spot unusual
animal behavior, to gauge the weather and its implications, to be aware of areas with
lush vegetation, and to evaluate the sustainability of his quarters, not to mention
knowledge of the market for his animals and animal products in order to obtain the
optimal bartering arrangement for the products he needed.

Herders and their animals

Most important, herders needed to know about and have affection for their animals.
The very first section of the Secret History bolsters the identification of Mongols with
animals. It asserts that the union of a bluish wolf and a doe produced Chinggis Khan’s
ancestors and then proceeds to provide a lengthy genealogy, leading ultimately to
Yisügei, Chinggis’s father and a member of the Borjigin (or Gold) lineage.

The Mongols, as nomadic pastoralists, relied upon five principal animals. Sheep, both
the most numerous and most valuable, provided food, clothing, and shelter. Mutton,
which was often boiled and then carved with daggers at mealtime, was integral to the
Mongol diet; the pastoralists obtained wool and animal skins to fashion their garments,
collected sheep dung for fuel, and pressed wool into felt, which was used both for
clothing, rugs, and blankets, and for the gers, the tentlike structures in which the
Mongols resided. Though less plentiful than sheep, goats were also vital. Mongols
consumed goat meat, milk, and cheese, and the poor among them wore goat skins.
Because goats were not as tough as sheep and needed more solicitous care, they could
not survive in more demanding terrains. Their value was also diminished by their
consumption to the very root of plants and grass, and thus their ensuing contribution to
desertification. Yaks and oxen required excellent grazing grounds for survival and
could not endure in desert or other marginal regions. They flourished only in the
steppes or in the mountains and were less able to fend for themselves than sheep or
goats. The Mongols not only ate yak meat and drank yak milk but also employed yaks
and oxen to transport their belongings during their seasonal moves to new pasture
areas.

The economic value of the remaining two animals, the camel and the horse, is at first
glance less obvious, but both contributed to and influenced Mongol society. The
Bactrian or two-humped camel permitted the Mongols to transport heavy loads through
the desert and other inhospitable terrains because it could carry more weight than any
other pack animal. It was ideally suited to lands in which water and grass were not
always available. Camels could drink enormous quantities of water at a watering hole
or lake and then continue for days without liquid. They required less pasture than other
animals and could extract food from the scruffiest shrubs or blades of grass. Camels
enabled the Mongols to carry goods for trade or to move their household belongings as
they migrated to new pastures or to convey supplies or siege engines for their troops.

The horse had economic value but was also vital to the Mongols’ military capabilities.
Mongols ate horse meat and drank airagh (also known as koumiss, comos, or fermented
mare’s milk), and employed it in ceremonies and sacrifices. Horses offered them the
mobility to let their animals loose to seek pasture during the day and to round up the
herds in the evening. Perhaps even more important, war horses and their cavalry gave
them a tactical advantage in conflicts with sedentary civilizations. While on campaign,
their saddlebags contained cooking pots, dried meat, yoghurt, water bottles, and other
essentials for lengthy expeditions. A wood-and-leather saddle, which was rubbed with
sheep’s fat to prevent cracking and shrinkage, allowed the horses to bear the weight of
their riders and their equipment for long periods, and also permitted the riders to
retain a firm seat. A sturdy stirrup enabled Mongol horsemen to be steadier and thus
more accurate in shooting from horseback. Before combat, leather coverings were often
placed on the head of each horse, and its body was frequently covered with armor.

Recognizing the value of their horses, Mongols were solicitous of their steeds. Each
Mongol cavalryman normally had four or five horses, so that each horse he rode was,
at one time or another, given a lengthy rest during a journey. Others carried
equipment, while one or two had no load and were thus fresh for combat. The horses
were small but strong and sturdy. The Mongols preferred geldings and mares, which
were easier to manage than stallions, and mares had the advantage of producing milk.
Horses also could, on rare occasions, provide sustenance to their riders on long trips
during which all the food had been consumed. A rider would then cut the horse’s veins
and drink the blood that spurted forth. The Mongols’ esteem for their horses was
reflected in their burial practices. When a leading Mongol nobleman died, his horse
was sacrificed and buried with him because he would need his trusted steed in the
afterlife.

Despite their long associations with pastoralism, Mongols were originally not herders.
Chinese sources indicate that the Mongols’ ancestors inhabited the Siberian and
Manchurian forests and survived by hunting and fishing. By the late tenth or early
eleventh century, they moved to Mongolia, where they developed a nomadic pastoral
society, but they maintained hunting as a subsidiary pursuit. Hunting provided them
with additional food and sharpened their military skills. A few herders tilled the land in
areas suitable for cultivation, supplementing their meager food resources. No matter
how skillful the individual Mongol herder, a nomadic pastoral economy was
precarious. The spread of disease among animals or a prolonged or hard winter or a
summer drought could spell disaster. Most families had few reserves of food or other
necessities because of their frequent migrations, which precluded accumulation of
surplus resources. Constant travels also prevented the development of an artisan class.
A craftsman found it difficult to move the sometimes numerous or bulky tools and
machines that he required for his work. Thus the Mongols had few potters, weavers,
and ironworkers; yet they needed pots, clothing, and simple iron tools.

The fragility of their economy and their need for products they themselves could not
produce prompted the Mongols to seek commerce with China and Central Asia, their
neighbors. They received craft articles and in return offered animals and animal
products. In times of great distress, they sought and sometimes received grains or
vegetables. They desperately needed products from the sedentary civilizations. If their
neighbors denied them commerce, their only recourse was to raid to obtain the
products they required. Initially, they traded for necessities, but as their leaders learned
more about the sedentary civilizations, they began to crave such luxuries as silk.

Before the desire for extravagant and elegant foreign goods intruded, the Mongols lived
modestly. Their food was simple, mostly meat and dairy products, and their clothing
was fashioned for comfort and simplicity; they dressed either in tunics made of
buckram and other coarse cloth or garments made of furs and generally wore leather
boots with upturned toes. Their shelters known as gers were ideally suited to their
lifestyles as they could easily be dismantled, moved by cart to another location, and
then set up again. The ger had a round, domelike shape with a wall about ten feet high,
on top of which was a roof, with an opening at its highest point. The wall consisted of a
number of sticks laced together in a criss-cross pattern and then attached to the door
frame. The opening at the roof permitted the smoke from the fireplace at the center of
the ger to escape. A series of wooden poles supported the roof. Felt coverings were
spread across the whole ger and tied down to the framework. Furs could then be added
to the framework in winter, and both felt and furs could be removed in summer.
Wooden beds with fur coverings, chests, and tables comprised the simple furnishings.
Men traditionally occupied the left side of the ger, while women kept their belongings
on the right side.

Groups and confederations

Simplicity also characterized the organization devised by the Mongols. Because they
traveled in small groups, they did not need more than a rudimentary system of
administration nor did they require a written language. Organization centered around
frequently hereditary leaders, with the same surnames, who had control over people
and territory. Beki, or shamans, conducted religious and ritual ceremonies, but
leadership was generally in the hands of the patriarch, one of whose principal functions
was to determine water and grazing rights for the individual families under his
command. His other duties included preserving order and stability, leading his people
in battle, and commanding men in hunts.

Some clans prospered while others floundered, and the prosperous ones absorbed
weaker ones. These larger units, which thus encompassed more than blood relatives,
necessitated a more complicated social organization, with a small “aristocracy” of clan
leaders at the apex of the social hierarchy. The loyalty of these “aristocrats” to their
leaders was based upon an individual and personal relationship. There was no abstract
concept of loyalty to a leader. He earned his support by his achievements, by securing
booty, and by maintaining close relationships with the clan leaders. As his group grew
in size and power, his own income was based on regular tribute offerings from herders
and extraordinary levies, often about 1 percent of the herds, in emergencies. He also
organized hunts, partly to obtain food but also partly to refine the herders’ fighting
skills and to promote their physical conditioning.

As these units increased in size, the larger scale of warfare led to changes in social
organization. A new group, known as nököd (“companions”), broke away from their
original units and joined major leaders simply as individuals. They served as a ready
reserve of armed soldiers for the leader. As his authority developed, the power of clans
as political organizations eroded, and affiliation with the new group took precedence.

The religious practices of the early Mongols were also simple, but they too underwent a
transformation in the late twelfth century. Because they were frequently on the move,
they did not construct buildings for worship or create grandiose statues. Many
worshipped or performed sacrifices on hills or mountains where oboo, or piles of stones,
had been carefully arranged. They prayed to natural wonders such as mountains, stars,
trees, fires, and rivers. These phenomena were viewed as physical representations of
the supreme deity Tenggeri (“Sky God”), the Mongols’ patron and protector. By the
twelfth century, shamans conducted ceremonies and acted as intermediaries between
the dead ancestors and Tenggeri and the living. Playing the drums, chanting, and
performing dances, they made a symbolic ascent to the sky, where they communicated
with the Sky God and the ancestors. They brewed up potions and recited incantations
designed to cure a variety of physical ailments, and they were also reputed to be
proficient in astronomy and fortune telling.

The Mongols had developed martial skills and powerful military forces before the
ascendancy of Chinggis Khan. Because the women could, with little effort, assume the
men’s herding duties, most of the men could be mobilized for warfare. Women thus
played a crucial indirect role in the Mongols’ military successes. Of even greater import
to the creation of a powerful Mongol military was the continuous training offered to
and required of all males. Boys took part in athletics and in contests, which required
endurance and physical skills, and learned how to ride horses and to shoot with a bow
and arrow at a very early age. They accompanied their elders in the hunts that were
designed, at least in part, as military exercises, and they learned that tight control and
absolute subservience to their leaders were rigidly enforced. A typical hunt, known as a
nerge, entailed surrounding animals over an extended distance, closing in on the
animals and then shooting them. Anyone who retreated or fled was punished and often
executed. This provided optimal training for battlefield discipline: retreat in this case
would immediately result in execution for the soldier and sometimes for his
compatriots.

When Mongols reached adulthood and were ready to join in combat, they were well
equipped. They had their mounts, but they also had bows, sabers, helmets, iron-plate
coverings, axes, armor, and ropes. The composite bow they used had a range of about
75 meters (246 ft.), which gave them a distinct advantage over all their rivals whose
bows had a range of about 40–50 meters (131–164 ft.). On the other hand, they were
not as adept in close hand-to-hand combat because they were not as skilled swordsmen
as, for example, the Japanese samurai and other East Asian forces.

Mongol strategy and tactics

Mongol strategy and tactics had also become more sophisticated on the eve of Chinggis
Khan’s appearance as a powerful leader. One clever ploy they used was designed to
give a misleading impression of Mongol strength. They placed felt puppets on horses,
duping the enemy into believing that they had a much larger force than their actual
number. Another successful ploy was the feigned retreat. A detachment of troops
pretended to withdraw from the battlefield, and as the enemy’s forces pursued them,
they fell into a trap. The other detachments, which had been hiding, now suddenly
appeared and surrounded and annihilated the enemy.

Some Mongol commanders added the use of psychological terror. Their forces would
devastate an enemy fortress or town, massacring hundreds or thousands of people in
order to frighten other enemies or cities into submitting without fighting. They would
place captured enemy forces in the front lines when they initiated combat, still another
devastating tactic meant to intimidate civilians into surrendering. Perhaps as important
was their excellent system of intelligence. They sent agents, merchants, and native
defectors to towns and oases, marketplaces and bazaars, and hostelries and
caravanserais to seek information about their opponents, and hardly ever initiated a
campaign without as much knowledge as they could obtain about their enemies.
Eventually, they organized yams or postal stations every twenty miles or so to convey
important military information rapidly. Maintenance of the yams, with provisions of
horses, food, and lodgings for the riders, imposed severe burdens on the local Mongol
populations. Nonetheless, riders were prepared to travel rapidly from one postal station
to another to transmit vital messages. The Mongols always prepared carefully before
undertaking a campaign. Supply lines, logistics, and even rudimentary medical care for
the wounded were meticulously organized.

The Mongol cavalry was probably unsurpassed in its time. Both males and females had
ridden horses since early childhood. They had learned to shoot a bow and arrow with
deadly accuracy while riding at full speed. The endurance of both horse and rider was
legendary. Cavalrymen and their beloved horses could travel quickly for days on end,
either to flee a pursuing army or to conquer additional lands. They were well trained;
their commanders demanded absolute obedience and expected them to follow orders
conveyed by drums and other instruments during battles. The image of their galloping
horses and men would eventually terrorize many countries.

What actually provoked the Mongols to initiate what turned out to be the greatest
conquests in world history? One explanation is the precariousness of their economy.
Droughts, cold winters, or diseases among their animals threatened their survival.
Under these circumstances, they either had to trade or raid for essential goods. In
addition, as they saw more of the sumptuous products of the sedentary civilizations,
they began to yearn for luxuries. If they were denied commerce, they were vulnerable
and might attack to obtain the products they required or coveted. By the late twelfth
century, the Mongols had developed so rapidly that such attacks could devastate the
settlements they chose to plunder.
The diverse groups in Mongolia were also developing and becoming more unified. The
Uyghurs, a Turkic people who had resided in Mongolia until the ninth century, had
migrated and created a flourishing culture in the oases of modern Northwest China.
They were the first of the nomadic pastoralists in the region to develop a written
language and to establish a capital city. Some had converted to the Iranian mystery
religion of Manicheism and others to Buddhism. The Naimans, who inhabited the
region between the Altai and the Khangai mountains in western Mongolia and thus had
close contact with the Uyghurs, adopted the Uyghur alphabet and, via the Uyghurs,
learned about and converted to the heretical Nestorian Christian faith. This faith
asserted that Christ had two distinct identities—one as Son of God and, then, as a
human son of Mary, a challenge to the central role of the Virgin Mary—and denied a
co-equal Trinity because God was the progenitor and had to be superior to the Son and
the Holy Ghost. The Kereyid, who inhabited the areas around the Selenge and Orkhon
rivers in north-central Mongolia, had also become more organized, and many of the
women had converted to Nestorianism.

In the late twelfth century, these and many other groups were fragmented. Despite
similarities in their backgrounds and economies, they were not united and fought
among themselves. They differed not just in their religious beliefs and their
sophistication but also in their acquaintanceship with foreign cultures. Yet they faced
many of the same problems, and there were sufficient similarities among them so that
unity under one group or leader could make it easier to cope with these difficulties. A
new force or leader was needed to end the chaos and to stabilize conditions in
Mongolia.
Chapter 2
Chinggis Khan emerges

According to the Secret History, the last decades in twelfth-century Mongolia were
often chaotic. Conflicts among different groups were bloody and damaging to the
terrain. One leader after another arose to try to become the dominant figure, but no
confederation developed. Divisions wracked the various regions of the country. No
singular vision or ruler prevailed, leading to considerable turbulence. A disciplined,
charismatic, and visionary leader was required to bring unity.

Temüjin and Mongol unity

Yisügei’s son Temüjin would be that leader. The Secret History’s first anecdote about
Yisügei is not flattering. He and several of his associates kidnapped Hö’elün, a woman
affianced to a man of the Merkid people. They scared off her fiancé, and Yisügei took
Hö’elün as his own wife. They subsequently conceived five children, four sons and one
daughter, of whom Temüjin was the oldest. When Temüjin was eight or nine years old,
his father escorted him to the encampment of Börte, the young girl to whom he had
been betrothed. On his return trip, Yisügei chanced upon an encampment of Tatars, a
group whom he did not recognize but who knew him, for he had killed one of their
leaders. Inviting him to partake of some food and drink, they poisoned him, and he
died on the way back to his own camp.

Temüjin’s prospects did not seem very promising after his father’s death, which
prompted a return to his original household. His father’s subordinates fled and left
Temüjin and his family to survive on their own. At only nine years old, he could not
fend for himself, but his mother, according to the Secret History, was the first of a
remarkable group of influential women in early Mongol history. The sources portray
Hö’elün as a heroic figure who saved her family and taught them the skills needed for
survival, including formation of alliances with more powerful groups and rulers, in the
unforgiving steppelands and the adjacent Onon River region of Mongolia. They also
depict Temüjin’s courageous exploits, including a hair-raising escape from captivity.
However, the history does not ignore his unsavory behavior, such as the murder of his
half-brother, who apparently challenged his leadership of the family. A dispute
between the two brothers allegedly about the food supply escalated into a brutal and
treacherous act. While his half-brother tended the family’s horses, Temüjin crept
behind him and shot him dead with his bow and arrow. His mother, who guessed what
he had done, called Temüjin a killer and compared him to a jackal for his cowardly
conduct. The Secret History thus presents him with blemishes, perhaps confirming its
reliability as a source.

His ability to forge anda or blood brother relationships with wealthier or more
powerful leaders was critical to his success. For example, when the Merkid captured his
wife Börte, he turned to his father’s anda, the Ong Khan of the Kereyid people, to help
him recover her. In the early 1180s, their combined forces rescued his wife, who
shortly thereafter gave birth to Jochi, meaning “guest,” implying that the Merkid had
raped and impregnated her. Nonetheless, Temüjin accepted him as one of his sons.
Temüjin’s anda Jamukha also participated in the campaign, a victory that inspired
other tribes to join with Temüjin. The boost provided by this assistance from andas and
patrons prompted him, sometime in the mid-1280s, to assume the title of Khan. He
continued to collaborate with the Ong Khan against other rivals, in particular defeating
the Tatars, the tribe that had murdered his father, in 1196. Around 1202, Temüjin and
the Ong Khan became enemies. The two men perceived each other as threats in their
aspirations for power in the Mongol world, and the Ong Khan’s son also distrusted his
father’s “ally” and opposed a marital alliance proposed by Temüjin. Indeed, disputes
with friends and andas were recurring patterns in Temüjin’s career. The sources often
blame his former andas for these ruptures, a scenario that cannot always be believed.
More than likely, his shifting alliances reflected his own perceptions of his position and
power. He joined together with others when he needed them but dispensed with them
when his forces became more powerful. He even severed his bond with Jamukha, his
closest ally who had come to his rescue on several occasions.

Temüjin’s struggle with the Ong Khan reveals that his drive toward total domination
over the Mongols was neither preordained nor inexorable. In an initial battle in 1203,
Temüjin was defeated, and he retreated to a lake where his remaining men took an
oath of loyalty to him. His career appeared to be at an end. Even in these desperate
circumstances, according to the sources, he insisted on sharing the limited food
supplies equally with his men. After this perhaps apocryphal incident, he gathered his
loyal troops, as well as men opposed to the Ong Khan, and launched a surprise attack
on his previous patron, overwhelming his former benefactor’s army. He then
incorporated some of the Kereyid into his army. If the Ong Khan had followed up after
defeating Temüjin and pursued his campaign when his rival was at his weakest, the
outcome might have been different: Temüjin would not have emerged as a major figure
on the Eurasian stage. This victory spurred Temüjin to challenge and then crush the
Naiman people, his last opponents in Mongolia. During these battles, he captured and
executed Jamukha, his most intimate anda, who had fought alongside the Naiman.
Even so, he honored Jamukha by having him killed without the shedding of blood, a
“consideration” offered only to the most esteemed enemies. Instead he had him
suffocated.

As Temüjin overcame opposition, he attracted more and more men to his side. In 1206
the chiefs of the leading Mongol groups gathered together at a khuriltai, or assemblage
of the nobility, on the banks of the Onon River to endorse Temüjin as their ruler and to
grant him the title of Chinggis Khan (“Fierce ruler”). After this enthronement, Kököchü,
the leading shaman among the Mongols, was to be Chinggis’s sole challenger for
supremacy. He wished to share power with Chinggis and sought to carve out specific
realms in which he would dominate. The Secret History notes that Chinggis’s wife Börte
saw through the shaman’s plans and persuaded her husband that his shaman supporter
was attempting to undermine and eventually to oust him. Börte’s warning doomed the
shaman; Chinggis ordered his loyal aides to catch the shaman unawares and to execute
him by breaking his back.

Biographers have provided a variety of explanations for Chinggis’s success in unifying

the Mongols, perhaps his greatest achievement. No doubt he had extraordinary
charisma, which attracted many adherents. His skills as a military commander were
obvious, but his administrative and political acumens were also vital. He repeatedly
allied himself with more powerful commanders, offering him great credibility, and then
eventually turned against them. He allegedly insisted on sharing the spoils of victory
with his men. Although he was not ascetic or celibate, and indeed often took his
defeated enemies’ wives or concubines for his own harem, his campaigns were not
motivated by a desire for an opulent lifestyle.

The organization he established contributed to unity. He divided his forces into groups
of one thousand, each of which constituted a specific unit, which was then
incorporated into a tümen or a group of ten thousand. The tümen served to subvert the
power of the old leaders, who would be superseded by commanders loyal to and
chosen by Chinggis. These commanders were not necessarily part of the old elites.
Chinggis selected them on the basis of their merit and loyalty, occasionally choosing
commoners who owed their positions to him and were thus even more loyal. The
commanders divided up the various groups, assigning individual members to different
tümen. They did not necessarily eliminate all earlier kinship and group allegiances, but
this system certainly eroded them. Instead, individual commoners in the revised and
stable units would become familiar with each other and would develop loyalty to the
new groups. In return for grants of pasture land and for provision of herders to tend
their animals from Chinggis, the commanders were required to collect taxes and other
levies, to maintain peace in their domains, to keep their forces in fighting trim through
hunts and other military exercises, and to serve in Chinggis’s military campaigns when
called upon to do so.

Commanders usually recruited and trained one soldier from households with two to
three men, two soldiers from households with four to five men, and three soldiers from
households with six to seven men. Later, censuses provided them with information for
military recruitment and taxation. Most important, they were to obey Chinggis’s
dictates because he was the supreme ruler. Although they had jurisdiction within their
own domains, they were required to accede to the tight discipline demanded by
Chinggis, who did not tolerate disobedience or misbehavior. He imposed harsh
punishments, including execution, on commanders and commoners who did not abide
by his rules. With this system, he established centralized control over all the Mongols.
Finally, as he ventured out of Mongolia, the number of non-Mongols grew and formed
a vital part of his forces, still another explanation for his success.
In essence, Chinggis created a new nobility that was loyal to him. He overcame many,
but not all, group and clan loyalties, and persuaded the nobles to attach themselves to
the Khan. Trying to ingratiate himself, he consulted with them before undertaking
large-scale military campaigns. He convened a khuriltai whenever he conceived of a
military expedition, setting the stage for this body to assume the responsibility of
ratifying or electing a new Khan. A keshig or new elite force of bodyguards, which he
organized, further bolstered his power. Starting with a detachment of a few hundred
men, the keshig evolved into about ten thousand who not only guarded the Khan but
also cooked for him, took charge of his clothing, and prepared his weapons. Chinggis
deliberately recruited some sons of the commanders for the keshig. This policy provided
him with capable and skilled men in addition to hostages to prevent their commander
fathers from contemplating rebellion.

Chinggis was also able to control Mongolian commoners and to mobilize them for his
campaigns. But some of the burdens he imposed on them appeared to be excessive.
They were required to leave their animals at a moment’s notice to serve in military
expeditions or to take part in annual hunts designed to sharpen their skills in combat.
Chinggis also demanded that they pay a portion of their produce in animals or food to
their overlords. Similarly, the commanders demanded extraordinary levies in times of
crisis. When Mongolian leaders were about to undertake a campaign or were
confronted with the need for emergency supplies in parts of their domain, they called
upon commoners to contribute. Despite these impositions, most commoners remained
loyal to Chinggis, who gained their support partly by providing them with booty from
his conquests and partly by their fear of the consequences of not fulfilling their
obligations to him.

He also sought to secure the services of foreign craftsmen, either through capturing
them or enticing them through ample rewards. Because the Mongols were frequently
on the move and could not count on a steady supply of raw materials, they had not
developed an artisan class. However, the commanders’ desire for luxuries and the
construction of more permanent buildings necessitated a large group of craftsmen.
Chinggis was compelled to recruit foreigners as artisans and to treat them well, often
exempting them from taxation and forced labor. Later, as the territory under Mongol
control expanded, he and his descendants were also required to seek the advice and
assistance of foreign interpreters, engineers, and financial administrators. Like the
craftsmen, these foreigners were lavishly rewarded for their services to the court.

The first group of foreigners of great importance was the Uyghur Turks, who had a
written language, had settled in oases along the Silk Roads, and had thrived as
merchants and craftsmen. They thus had administrative, commercial, and artistic skills
that the Mongols needed. Once the Uyghurs had submitted to him in 1211, Chinggis
had assistance in ruling newly subjugated domains. When he gained control over a new
region, a special military unit known as a tamma would guarantee the peace, and a
darughachi, or civilian governor, was assigned to administer the area. Most of the
darughachi employed Uyghurs or other literate, capable, and experienced foreigners to
help them govern. Without these foreign experts and advisers, Chinggis and his
descendants would not have been able to establish a Mongol Empire.

Chinggis’s foreign campaigns

A precarious economy in a demanding environment and a Chinese dynasty’s denial of
trade for vital products are a few of the general conditions that gave rise to the Mongol
eruption from their homeland, but the specific motivations for the Mongol assault on
the rest of the world are in doubt. Their military superiority is often used as an
explanation for their emergence. The toughness of steppe life, according to some
scholars, compelled the Mongols to be aggressive, and their aggressiveness spilled over
into attacks on neighboring states. Other scholars assert that the Mongols’ hunger for
booty inevitably caused them to raid and assault the sedentary civilizations. Their
military advantages and circumstances certainly enabled them to succeed spectacularly
in the thirteenth century, but they do not explain the motives for the Mongol
migrations into other lands. They tell us how the Mongols conquered much of Asia, but
not why.
1. This black battle standard, one of a limited number of Mongol Empire–era
articles that has survived, was used by Chinggis Khan and other Mongols on the
battlefield to intimidate the enemy.

Another set of explanations relates to Chinggis himself. To prove himself to the Mongol
peoples whom he had just recently subdued, he reputedly needed to embark upon far-
flung campaigns against the sedentary civilizations. He allegedly believed that the Sky
God Tenggeri had charged him with the responsibility of unifying and ruling the world.
Yet this interpretation clashes with his policies in his three main foreign campaigns.
Only in Central Asia did he maintain a large occupation force. Once he had secured his
economic objectives, he withdrew from the other regions. If he had had a grand vision
of world conquest, he ought to have retained total control of the other two regions in
which he led military expeditions. But like other Mongols of his era, he focused on
booty and trade, not on conquering and occupying land. He demanded tribute and, if
necessary, troops to support him on other campaigns. His initial lack of interest in
acquiring additional territory belies the conception of his fulfilling Tenggeri’s
command.

Another, more recent explanation is based upon climate. The proponents of this theory
assert that the mean annual temperature of Mongolia declined throughout the late
twelfth century. This fall in temperature probably translated into a reduction in the
height and the amount of grass in the steppe land. The animals that depended on the
grass were endangered, and the Mongols, who relied on their herds, were similarly
threatened. Survival dictated migration out of Mongolia. The hypothesis is appealing,
but it rests on premises that cannot at this time be verified. Data on the effects of low
temperatures on grass are not available, nor is evidence on the relationship between
declines in temperature and levels of precipitation.

In sum, the unification of the Mongol peoples, new developments in military

technology, and climate may all have contributed to the Mongol onslaught. They each
created conditions, which Chinggis capitalized on to become the Khan of a unified
Mongol people. Chinggis himself, of course, organized the Mongols and impressed them
with his vision of conquering, not merely raiding, the territories of the sedentary
civilizations.

As he moved out of Mongolia to attack other regions, he invariably sent envoys to

foreign rulers with so-called orders of submission. He demanded that they acquiesce to
his rule, and if they did, he often allowed them to retain their own leaders as long as
they offered taxes and performed the services he required. If the foreign group resisted,
he initiated military campaigns. In short, he did not always thirst for war, and his
successive conquests were not premeditated.

Explanations for Chinggis’s and his descendants’ remarkable successes are elusive. With
a force initially numbering less than a million people, they carved out the largest
contiguous land empire in world history. At its height, the empire stretched from Korea
to Russia in the north to China to the Middle East in the south. Part of the Mongols’
success was due to the decentralization and dissension that plagued many Eurasian
countries. For example, three distinct and hostile, often warring, dynasties ruled China.
The Southern Song, the native Chinese dynasty, governed the lands south of the Yangzi
River. The Jurchens, a Tungusic people who were ancestors of the Manchus, had
occupied North China in 1126, compelling the Song to abandon their capital in Kaifeng
and to migrate to the southern city of Hangzhou. Establishing the Chinese-style and
Chinese-influenced Jin dynasty, the Jurchens ruled much of North China but did not
attract the unquestioning loyalty of their Chinese subjects. The Tanguts, a people who
had affinities with the Tibetans and the Turks, had founded the Xia dynasty in
Northwest China, thus dividing China into three separate regions and weakening it.

Farther to the west in Central Asia was the land controlled by the Khwarazmian shah,
who faced a restive population. He and many of the rulers were Türks, but many of the
inhabitants were Iranians, a source of tension and conflict. Much of the populace did
not support the shah. A variety of ethnically diverse peoples inhabited modern eastern
Russia and had no central government. Western Russia consisted of a number of city
states, which had distinct and occasionally conflicting commercial interests. Such
divisions, as well as problems with corruption and demoralization of their armies,
plagued nearly all the states that the Mongols subjugated. Chinggis and his descendants
simply took advantage of their weaknesses to vanquish them.

In 1209 Chinggis started his campaigns against the Tanguts and their Chinese-style Xia
dynasty, partly to create a buffer zone to the west and partly because their land had
great value due to its location along the trade routes to Central Asia and Iran. Claiming
that the Tanguts had assisted one of the Mongol groups in its struggle with his forces,
he initiated a campaign against them. However, his troops had not developed the
techniques of besieging and capturing towns. When they sought to divert the Yellow
River so that it would flood and cause the collapse of the walls of the Tanguts’ capital
city, they found, to their dismay, that their own positions were flooded as well, and
they had to flee to higher ground. After several inconclusive battles, the two sides
devised an unstable peace, by which the Tanguts reputedly submitted. The Tangut ruler
gave his daughter to Chinggis and pledged to support the Mongols, but the Tanguts
were not completely subdued.

With some control over trade routes to the west due to the alleged submission of the
Tanguts, Chinggis now turned his attention to North China. In 1211, he started a four-
year campaign against the Jurchen Jin dynasty, which had imposed limitations on
trade with the Mongols. He defeated Jurchen troops along a wide front, and in 1214
the Jin emperor finally acquiesced and pledged to submit tribute of silk and horses to
the Mongols. Shortly thereafter, the emperor moved from his capital in Zhongdu (in the
area of modern Beijing) south to Kaifeng and seemed to renege on his pledge. The
Mongols returned with a large force to besiege the city, a lengthy and arduous effort.
Nonetheless, assisted by Chinese defectors who were experts in siege warfare and
provided catapults that hurled huge rocks into the city, they finally occupied Zhongdu,
the scene for a month of considerable plundering and massacres. Chinggis stationed a
few troops in the Jin areas he had subjugated but could not capitalize on his victories
to occupy North China.

2. Chinggis Khan’s campaigns in Central and West Asia, 1219–1225.

Instead he had to turn his attention to Central Asia. A local governor in the city of
Otrar had killed a large group of Mongol and Muslim merchants, accusing them,
probably accurately, of spying, and the Khwarazmian shah, ‘Ala’ al-Din Muhammad,
had killed one of Chinggis’s envoys who had demanded that the governor be turned
over to them for execution. The Mongols regarded the murder of an envoy as one of the
most heinous crimes. These deaths had to be avenged. After elaborate and detailed
preparations, in 1219 Chinggis, according to the sources, organized an army of two
hundred thousand troops for a campaign against the shah and his domains. It remains
unclear how the Mongols obtained the necessary provisions for such a large force and
for the attendant number of horses in traveling through daunting deserts and lofty
mountains. The shah and his forces retreated into their walled towns and awaited the
Mongol army, confident that they could withstand attacks on their enclosed
“fortresses.” However, the Mongols had, by this time, become adept at besieging towns
by using catapults and other projectiles. A five-months’ siege of Otrar ended with a
Mongol rout of the inhabitants. By February 1220, Chinggis had entered and razed
much of the town of Bukhara. A month later, his forces, overcoming considerable
resistance, moved into and destroyed part of Samarkand and deported thirty thousand
artisans toward China.
If the cities had surrendered without opposition, would Chinggis have unleashed such
destruction on them? It appears unlikely, though he may have deliberately wreaked
havoc on the inhabitants in order to terrorize other Central Asians and to deter further
opposition. Reports of these incidents intimidated the population and contributed to
the Mongols’ image as cruel and brutal barbarians. The Iranian historian Juvaini wrote
that the Mongols “came, they sapped, they burnt, they slew, they plundered and they
departed” and “with one stroke a world which billowed with fertility was laid desolate,
and the regions thereof became a desert, and the greater part of the living dead, and
their skin and bones crumbling dust.” Another writer asserted that they killed the
whole population of Herat, a major town in Afghanistan. The Iranian accounts
undoubtedly inflated the number of those killed and overstated the actual destruction
of cities and towns, but Central Asia had been devastated, and ‘Ala’ al-Din Muhammad
died in 1221 while fleeing from his native land.

The Mongol army dealt a death blow to the Khwarazmian government and annexed the
greatest amount of territory of any of Chinggis’s campaigns. Chinggis’s troops occupied
cities in eastern Iran and modern Afghanistan including Balkh, Merv, and Nishapur,
plundering Bamiyan and Herat as well, the first time that the Mongols had actually
seized territory and sought to rule it. In his other campaigns, Chinggis had simply
sought booty or favorable economic relations; his foray into Central Asia was the first
indication that he wanted control over and governance of other states, a major
development. Further indication of this desire was his initial efforts to build bridges,
roads, and granaries, and to ensure sufficient pasture in his new domain.

Even after the Khwarazmian shah’s death, his son Jalal al-Din continued to harass the
Mongols until his own death in 1231. Meanwhile Chinggis had achieved his objective
and in this campaign went even farther and dispatched one detachment that reached
all the way to the Caspian Sea. At the same time, his other armies initiated their first
assaults on Korea and cooperated with the Southern Song dynasty against the Jin rulers
who controlled North China.

Chinggis himself headed toward Northwest China for his last campaign. The Tanguts,
the first foreign group he had defeated, had refused to provide assistance in his
struggles against the Khwarazmian shah and thus had to be punished. He arrived in
Ningxia, the Tanguts’ central location, but died shortly thereafter in August of 1227. A
few months later, his troops overwhelmed the Xia dynasty and massacred many of the
Tanguts. Chinggis had probably succumbed to old age and a demanding life, but like
other great historical figures, his death and burial have become enshrouded in myths
and legends. One later source attributed his death to the effects of an arrow wound
during the battle with the Tanguts. Another report was that he died of injuries suffered
during a hunt the previous winter. A more bizarre account states that the captured wife
of an enemy leader hid a knife in her vagina and stabbed Chinggis to death during
sexual intercourse.

According to later accounts, Chinggis’s body was carried all the way to the Burkhan
Khaldun (“Buddha Cliff’) or the modern Khentii aimag (province) and was buried in a
secret location there, along with forty young virgins and a number of prized horses
sacrificed at his grave. The Mongols deliberately concealed the precise location of his
burial site to stymie grave robbers. However, many scholars question this account and
argue that he was buried in the Ordos region of Northwest China, right where he died,
and that only a few relics were carried back to Mongolia. They assert that the Mongols
had not developed techniques of embalming and could not have transported Chinggis’s
body for several months, in summer heat, to the reputed grave site. Recent excavations
in the supposed site in northeast Mongolia have not produced any significant results. A
Japanese archaeological team found a building, grains probably from local agriculture,
and evidence of a thriving iron and ceramics industry, but thus far these discoveries
cannot be linked to Chinggis himself.

In addition to his administrative changes and the enlargement of territories under

Mongol control, Chinggis Khan introduced other innovations, perhaps one of the more
important was his policy of toleration toward foreign religions. He sought to ingratiate
himself to religious leaders who might then influence their people to accept Mongol
rule. His principal interest was to use religion to help him govern; he did not appear to
be devoted to a specific foreign religion. He also attempted to obtain tangible benefits
from religious leaders. Learning of the Chinese Daoists’ efforts to develop an elixir of
immortality, he invited Changchun, a Daoist sage, to accompany him on his expedition
to Central Asia. However, Changchun neither dabbled in alchemy nor sought means of
achieving immortality. Despite this disclaimer, Chinggis respected and consulted with
Changchun, who had the temerity even to urge the Mongolian khan to refrain from
taking part in hunts because heaven abhorred killing. It seems likely that Chinggis
sought, through his cultivation of the Daoist sage, to win over Daoists in China. For
example, he exempted Changchun’s pupils and Daoist monks in general from taxation.
Although he was not as generous with other religions, he did not condone any religious
persecution. His descendants generally, with a number of notable exceptions, persisted
in this policy of religious toleration, but the attitudes of ordinary Mongols toward
foreign religions is difficult to fathom. A few began to practice Buddhism and some
converted to Islam. However, the Mongols who returned to their homeland in Mongolia
after the collapse of the Mongol Empire retained the traditional shamanic rituals.

Another of his policies, which his sons and grandsons would later adopt, was the
recruitment of foreign advisers and administrators to help in governing his domains. In
1204, he ordered a literate Uyghur Turk to adapt the Turkic script for its use as the first
written language for Mongolian, a major step in developing a proper administration to
govern the Mongol lands and other territories they would subjugate. During his
expeditions in China and Central Asia, he recruited foreign soldiers, administrators, and
interpreters. Yelu Chucai, one of his early recruits, assisted in devising institutions to
administer the new domains brought under Mongol control. This sinicized foreigner
advocated the creation of a Chinese-style administration, which Chinggis was not
prepared to accept but which his sons and grandsons ultimately adopted. Nonetheless,
Chinggis became a staunch supporter of greater contact with foreigners, which led his
successors to recruit non-Mongols and to seek trade with foreign lands.

Still another of his policies that had profound implications was the gradual
development of the Jasagh, guiding principles and laws that regulated the military and
commoners. Chinggis continued to add to the Jasagh throughout his lifetime, and his
decisions began to be written down while he was still alive. Because the original
Mongol version has not been preserved, its contents are known only through inclusion
in the works of Islamic writers. The laws concern a herding economy; an agricultural
economy would require a different set of laws. There are no provisions dealing with
ownership of land, the rights and duties of tenants, and the inheritance of property, the
critical components of the sedentary societies Chinggis had subjugated.

Chinggis was also an ardent supporter of trade and craftsmanship. Before they erupted
from Mongolia, he and fellow Mongols had needed commerce with the sedentary
societies for survival. Thus he had a favorable attitude toward and fostered commerce
as much as possible. His successors pursued the same policy, leading to the greatest
contacts among civilizations up to that time. Similarly, the Mongols’ traditional paucity
of artisans prompted Chinggis to adopt supportive and benevolent policies toward
them. He and his successors prized essential manufacturing items and then began to
seek such luxuries as silks using gold threads or so-called cloths of gold. This patronage
resulted in decorative arts explosions throughout the Mongol empire.

Chinggis’s last legacy was a large and powerful military force and an astonishingly high
level of violence, which turned out to be double-edged swords. His army was superior
to most other contingents of troops in Eurasia. Yet its size and successes created an
almost inexorable drive toward additional conquests and a yearning for more booty
and greater control over more lands. What else could be done with such a large force
that was primed for warfare? Its use of violence was intimidating, and it also marked a
heightening of destruction during and after combat. Foreign observers and writers no
doubt exaggerated the brutality of Chinggis’s campaigns against the Tanguts, the
Jurchens, and the Central Asians. Nonetheless, he bequeathed a tradition of violence,
which accelerated as the Mongols initiated new campaigns. His attacks resulted in the
indiscriminate and brutal killing of at least tens of thousands of people and in the
maiming of hundreds of thousands, and the recent depiction of him as a great heroic
figure and as a believer in democracy and in international law clashes with historical
reality.

Chinggis’s greatest accomplishment was the unification of the Mongols. He brought

together herders who migrated from one area to another and roamed around a vast
terrain in Mongolia, Siberia, and adjacent lands. These Mongols were accustomed to
smaller units and believed that an organization of perhaps several dozen households
was optimal. Chinggis expended considerable effort to persuade or compel them to
form larger confederations, which proved to be the basis for their military and political
successes.
Chapter 3
Conquest and governance

Before his death in 1227, Chinggis had thought about the succession to the throne. The
Mongol domains, which had been expanded to include Northwest China and Central
Asia, now required unified rule to foster peace and prosperity and thus riches for
Chinggis’ forces. He was determined that the Khanate remain in the hands of his own
descendants, a judgment with which the Mongol nobility concurred. But he did not
devise a structure that would facilitate a conflict-free transition from one ruler to
another. He chose his son Ögödei as his successor but did not leave specific
instructions for future choices, an omission that led to destructive conflicts and civil
wars, which, in turn, weakened the Mongol empire.

Western campaigns
In 1227 Chinggis selected his son Ögödei to be his successor, preventing a possible
struggle for rule of his domain. Yet, after his death, the Mongols did not develop a
standard or orderly system of succession. They did not opt for elder brother or
youngest son (ultimogeniture) succession, the traditional Mongol customs. Instead,
after some initial experimentation, a khuriltai, whose members were the most important
Mongol commanders, selected successors from the Chinggisid line. Such a procedure
proved to be disastrous because different groups in the khuriltai supported different
candidates, leading to conflict and eventually to violence. Even after endorsement by
the khuriltai, the new ruler still had to elicit the loyalty of the nobility in order to rule.
After Ögödei’s death in 1241, selection by an assemblage of the Mongol nobility
created fissures that weakened the empire that they had subjugated. Indeed his death
may have marked the end of the empire.

All four of Chinggis’s sons from his principal wife received leadership positions in his
domains. Jochi, the oldest, who actually predeceased Chinggis by a few months, was
granted territory north of the Khwarazmian domains stretching to the Volga River and
was progenitor of the Golden Horde, which eventually ruled much of Russia.
Chaghadai, Chinggis’s second son, assumed control over the oases and towns of Central
Asia. Tolui, the youngest son, is portrayed as the ablest military commander, but he
lacked the diplomatic skills of his older brother Ögödei. Thus he was placed in charge
of the Mongol homeland. All three received the title of “khan,” but the supreme leader
would be granted the title of “Khaghan” or “Khan of Khans.”

Contemporary observers and writers, almost without exception, lauded Ögödei. The
Chinese dynastic history portrayed him as considerate and generous, and as having a
loyal and good heart. The Iranian historians cast him in a favorable light, noting that
debtors pleaded that he cancel their debts, and he often did. They asserted that he was
generous to merchants and tolerant toward Islam, Nestorianism, and other religions in
his domain. He lacked the military dash of his brothers Chaghadai and Tolui, but he
compensated by his abilities as a conciliator of antagonistic viewpoints and by his
tolerance for different religions and groups. Yet, unlike his father, he inherited his
position and did not create the kinds of personal bonds that Chinggis had developed
and needed in his rise to power. Nonetheless, he was recognized as the legitimate ruler
because Chinggis had chosen him, and like his father, he continued to expand into new
territories. The more territories the Mongols conquered, the greater the opportunities
for taxes, booty, or grazing land. In addition, the army Chinggis had set in motion
required new lands to attack.
3. Ögödei, an unusually gregarious Great Khan, greets guests from his throne in
this Rashid al-Din manuscript illustration.

Ögödei would satisfy his armies’ needs. In 1230 his forces in Central Asia would cross
the Amu Darya River and head toward the eastern borders of Iran. Even closer, he
initiated a campaign against the Jin dynasty, which still controlled much of northern
China. With some assistance from the Song dynasty, Mongol forces compelled the Jin
emperor to flee from his capital at Kaifeng in 1233; they then surrounded his troops,
causing the emperor to commit suicide early in 1234. Ögödei thus occupied and had
access to the material and human resources of China north of the Yangzi River, and he
quickly capitalized to overwhelm both Manchuria and Korea. Another of his
commanders headed toward Tibet and succeeded in compelling the Sa-skya Pandita, an
important Buddhist monk, to come to his encampment. However, Tibet remained
outside of Mongol control at Ögödei’s death.
The Mongol campaigns farther west were the most spectacular and had the most
distinguished leadership of any of the expeditions during Ögödei’s reign. Chinggis’s
sons or grandsons took part, giving the second and third generations an opportunity to
test their mettle. The hostilities and alliances generated during these campaigns in
Russia and eastern Europe shaped the course of Mongol history and, in part, caused the
decline and collapse of the Mongol empire. The expeditions revealed the dissension
among the princely houses, with the lines of Ögödei and Chaghadai generally
cooperating against those of Jochi and Tolui. Leadership was now in the hands of
Jochi’s son Batu, but Ögödei’s oldest son, Güyüg, Chaghadai’s son Büri, and Tolui’s
oldest son, Möngke accompanied him. The most renowned non-Chinggisid commander
was Sübötei, who was perhaps the ablest military leader. According to the sources, the
combined forces totaled 150,000 troops, and many were Turkic peoples, Iranians, and
other subject populations—a true multiethnic army, which became characteristic of
future “Mongol” troops.

The initial campaigns were resoundingly successful. The invaders from the East first
crushed the Bulghars, who had established a base at the junction of the Volga and the
Kama Rivers; they then overwhelmed the Kipchaks in the lower Don region, compelling
the latter to flee westward to Hungary; and finally they advanced toward the Russians.
In campaigns in 1237 they turned their attention to the north because they wanted to
protect their northern flanks in later expeditions. The strategy that caught their
enemies by surprise was their willingness to campaign in the brutal Russian winter.
Mongol troops, who originated in a land plagued by even worse wintry conditions,
were accustomed to the cold, and their horses were similarly inured. They surprised the
Russians who believed that the weather would deter them. In fact, the Mongols
capitalized on the wintry conditions. Frozen lakes and rivers enabled them readily to
transport their horses and equipment.

In December 1237 Batu crossed the Volga and sent an ultimatum to the prince of
Riazan, demanding one-tenth of his horses and valuables. The prince resisted,
prompting Batu to lay siege to the city. Other Russian cities did not come to Riazan’s
assistance, leaving it vulnerable. Within a week, Batu’s forces overwhelmed the
defenders and plundered the city. Three months later, Mongol forces subjugated the
area around Moscow and Vladimir-Suzdal and burned down the wooden buildings,
facilitated by the dryness of the climate and by the lack of river or lake water, most of
it iced over, to combat the flames. They then headed toward Novgorod, but the
approaching spring thaw, which made the roads impassable, deterred them. After a
year or two of consolidating their gains, they moved toward the major prize of Kiev.
Möngke, the commander of this campaign, dispatched an envoy to Kiev to demand its
submission. The Kievans responded by killing the envoy, a disastrous decision. The
Mongols, in turn, responded with a devastating attack and siege, culminating in the fall
of Kiev on December 6, 1240. Recent excavations of the site reveal the horrors of the
campaign. One particular heart-wrenching discovery was the bodies of two young girls
hiding near a stove but buried with the collapse of the city walls. Kiev, the dominant
city of the pre-Mongol period, was heavily damaged, and Russia entered a new period
in its history.

Having defeated Kiev, the Mongols were emboldened to campaign farther west.
Novgorod, the other major commercial center of the period, had already made an
accommodation with them. In 1240, its ruler Alexander had defeated the invading
Swedes and the Teutonic Knights in a major battle on the frozen Neva River, from
which he earned his second name of Nevsky (the Soviet director Sergei Eisenstein
immortalized him in the 1938 film Alexander Nevsky). He did not challenge the
Mongols and, in fact, permitted trade with them. In the south, by 1239, Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan had submitted to the Mongols, who then conceived of an
expedition against Hungary, the westernmost extension of the steppes, which could
provide pasture for their horses and which had provided the Mongols with a pretext by
providing sanctuary for their Kipchak enemies. Having access to the life-giving grass
for their animals, the Mongols could use Hungary as a base to gain control over central
Europe and then threaten western Europe. They also needed to neutralize Poland,
which could, from the north, attack their troops heading toward Hungary.

Sübötei, the chief strategist for these campaigns, planned a two-pronged assault on
eastern Europe. He divided his troops into five columns. Two were poised to attack
Poland, two to Hungary, and one to the area of the modern Czech Republic. All five
would eventually converge in an attack on Hungary. Learning about the impending
invasion and of the Mongols’ awesome military power, King Béla IV of Hungary
appealed to the pope and the European monarchs for help, but the Europeans were
divided, with Pope Gregory the IX and the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (r. 1220–
50) especially in conflict, as Frederick challenged the papal political authority. Neither
Gregory nor Frederick offered more than perfunctory assistance. Bela was on his own
except for support from Polish leaders, who sought to defend their native land.

4. Mongol invasion of Russia and Eastern Europe, 1237–1242.

The Mongols seemed to be at the height of their power, but appearances were
deceptive. Hostilities had plagued the leadership from the start of the Western
campaigns. Batu, supported by Tolui’s sons, and Chaghadai’s son Büri, supported by
Ögödei’s son Güyüg, were the principal antagonists. Güyüg, naturally resented Batu,
who had been invested with the leadership of the campaign. Because these conflicts on
occasion slowed the campaign’s momentum, when Ögödei received word of this
discord he recalled the principal princely commanders and allowed Batu a free hand,
and Batu, in turn, sought to implement Sübotei’s strategy.

One Mongol force rapidly occupied Sandomir and Cracow in Poland, prompting a
reaction from the Polish leader, Duke Henry of Silesia. A Polish chronicler reports, no
doubt apocryphally, that as Henry passed by the Church of the Blessed Virgin to meet
the invading Mongol forces, a stone fell from the top of the church, an omen of the
disaster to follow. On April 9, 1241, Henry encountered the Mongols near the town of
Legnica. The two sides seemed evenly matched, with each consisting of about seven
thousand to eight thousand soldiers. Knowledge of the terrain and support from the
local population could have been significant advantages for Henry, but the battle
actually favored the Mongols. The Polish-German forces anticipated hand-to-hand
combat, but the Mongols instead flooded them with a barrage of arrows. With scant
armor for protection, the troops were vulnerable. The Polish sources attribute the
Mongol victory to their use of divination and witchcraft. Henry himself suffered a
wound from a lance, fell off his horse, and was quickly surrounded and decapitated.
Also according to the Polish sources, the Mongols cut off the ears of the enemy dead
and filled up nine large bags. The Mongols then headed toward Legnica, whose
inhabitants refused to surrender and mounted a stiff resistance, which caused the
invaders to withdraw. The Mongols later initiated half-hearted punitive campaigns in
1259–60 and 1287–88, but were unable to conquer Poland.

Having defused the threat from Poland, Batu could now concentrate on Hungary, the
real prize of his eastern European campaign. On April 11, 1241, Batu himself led his
army on a successful surprise attack against Béla at the town of Muhi. Béla’s troops
were utterly vanquished, and he barely managed to escape. Mongol forces pursued the
Hungarian king into Dalmatia but were unable to capture him. In December 1241 the
Mongols swept southwestward, seized Pesth, and traversed the frozen Danube to
capture and destroy the town of Buda.

Once the Mongols had occupied much of Hungary, an attack on western Europe
seemed inevitable. Moreover, the secular and religious authorities in the West were too
busy squabbling among themselves to consider concerted action against the marauders.
A divided Europe seemed to be ripe for conquest. Yet the Mongols halted in eastern
Europe and, in fact, began to withdraw. In May 1242 Batu led his troops back to Russia
where he established his capital in Sarai on the lower Volga. One possible motive for
Batu’s precipitous withdrawal may have been the dearth of grasslands for the
Mongolian horses, as western Europe offered little pasture for his steeds. His animals
had consumed much of the grass in the Hungarian steppes, which needed to recover
and to be replenished after the demands made on it by the invaders from the East.
Another motive may have been the death of the Great Khan Ögödei on December 11,
1241. Ögödei’s death meant that the Mongol nobility needed to convene a khuriltai in
its ancestral homeland to select a new Great Khan. Batu, as the oldest member of the
second generation of Mongol rulers, ought to attend these meetings and to participate
in the deliberations. However, he did not return to Mongolia and did not take an active
part in the election. Still another motive may have been that the Mongolled forces had
suffered substantial casualties in the Western campaigns and did not have the
resources, both in manpower and supplies, to advance any farther.

Ögödei’s death may have saved Western Europe from the wrath of the Mongol
invaders, but his reign nonetheless witnessed a remarkable expansion of territory. The
Mongols seized most of China north of the Yangzi River, imposed their authority over
Korea and Manchuria, subjugated Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, and made their
first foray into Iran. They conquered much of Russia and campaigned successfully in
Hungary and Poland. Their military successes terrorized Asia and Europe and helped
create the largest contiguous land empire that the world had ever seen.

Governing an empire
Territorial expansion was not the only achievement of Ögödei’s reign. He overcame
great pressure from Mongol traditionalists from North China to convert these territories
into grasslands and establish the kind of economy to which they were accustomed.
Instead, the Great Khan began to set up institutions to rule his vast domain. He
recruited the able official Yelu Chucai, who had also served his father, to assist him in
devising a rudimentary administration. Yelu, who became chief minister for a time,
prevented the devastation of the Chinese countryside and its conversion to grazing
areas, arguing that revenues derived from promotion of agriculture would exceed any
income derived from herding in unsuitable land.

Then he revised the Mongol system of taxation to fit the requirements of the sedentary
civilization in China. Recognizing that peasants needed regularity in the determination
of their financial obligations, he proposed a head tax on male adults, a tax on land
based on size and fertility, and a levy calculated on the number of oxen and farm tools;
in order to satisfy the Mongols’ demands for tangible items other than grain, the taxes
would often be paid in silver and silk. He pledged that significant amounts of grain,
silver, and silk would accrue to the Mongols if the Great Khan implemented this
system. Finally, his proposed tax on commerce, which the Mongols labeled tamgha,
promised additional revenue. In 1235 Ögödei ordered that a census be conducted,
facilitating the imposition of these taxes, as well as providing information used for
military recruitment. By 1236 a fairly reliable census, the first in the newly subjugated
lands of North China, provided Ögödei with the tools required for the new state’s need
for revenue and an army. Because Ögödei had just commissioned the campaign against
Russia and eastern Europe, an accounting, via Yelu’s proposed census of resources at
his command, was essential.

Yelu proved unable to impose his system of tax collection. He proposed the
establishment of tax collection bureaus manned by government officials, but his
opponents, who recognized that Ögödei’s campaigns and construction projects were
costly, advocated a system of tax farming. Under this system, merchants, many of them
Central Asian Muslims, would be granted licenses to collect taxes. As private
entrepreneurs, the merchants’ primary interest would be to maximize profits. Eager for
this added income, Ögödei eventually sided with the advocates of tax farming, at the
risk of alienating the native, mostly Chinese, population.

Yelu’s proposals for an administrative structure were also not accepted. He sought to
restore a regular Chinese-style organization, with officials chosen through the
traditional civil service examinations, which emphasized knowledge of Confucianism.
Ögödei permitted a civil service examination, but most of the successful candidates
served principally as advisers or were appointed to minor posts. Yelu then tried to
persuade Ögödei to have Confucian scholars tutor their Mongol overlords. The Great
Khan agreed, but it is hard to believe that many of the Mongol princes and nobles
grasped the concepts to which they were exposed. Yelu’s efforts to devise a system of
local administration also failed. Instead Ögödei granted lands for the maintenance of
his relatives and the nobility, which permitted them to govern local regions throughout
the empire. He also transformed darughachi, originally a military title, into a civilian
title for administrators of newly incorporated territories. Opposition to Yelu’s
attempted accommodations to the subjugated Chinese population mounted among
some Mongols, Uyghur Turkic government officials, and Muslim tax collectors and
merchants. At last, Turkic officials, allied with Muslim tax collectors, finally eclipsed
his influence in government.

In one cooperative venture, Yelu and the Turkic officials persuaded the khan to build a
permanent capital city, an indication that the Mongols would actually seek to rule from
an administrative center rather than simply engage in plunder. Ögödei chose Khara
Khorum, in the center of the old Mongol domains, as the site for his capital. After
ordering workmen to build a wall and watchtowers surrounding the city, Ögödei had
his own relatively elaborate palace, known to the Chinese as the Wanangong, built
within the walls and then constructed palaces for the imperial princes adjacent to his
own. Several decades elapsed before the construction of this elaborate city in the
grasslands was completed. A north–south road leading to the center of Khara Khorum
reveals the importance of trade to the city. Ögödei’s subjects also built two mosques,
Buddhist and Daoist temples, and a Nestorian Christian church within the city.

5. A statue of a tortoise, a Chinese motif, is one of the few remaining objects

from the ancient Mongol capital of Khara Khorum. A Chinese army destroyed the
capital in the fourteenth century.

Craftsmen from China, Central Asia, Iran, and as far away as Europe fashioned essential
as well as luxury products. Khara Khorum’s ethnic diversity has been documented
through the discovery of Chinese roof tiles, roof ridge ornaments, a gold bracelet and
ceramics, silver coins and cenotaphs with Arabic inscriptions, Indo-Nepalese Buddhist
figures, and a silver drinking fountain built by a Frenchman. Archaeologists have
recently discovered the site of a Buddhist temple with fragments of a wall painting
adorned with Indo-Nepalese, Chinese, Tibetan, and Tangut motifs, further evidence of
the diverse ethnicity of its inhabitants. They have also excavated areas for production
of glass, gems and precious stones, and bone carving, as well as furnaces for smelting of
metals, especially bronzes. Although William of Rubruck, a European missionary to the
Mongols, was not impressed and compared it unfavorably to the small Parisian section
of St. Denis, Khara Khorum was a remarkably cosmopolitan site, particularly for a city
in the grasslands.

Yet William proved somewhat prescient in recognizing that Khara Khorum was not
ideally situated as the capital of a great empire. The city and the neighboring regions
could not provide basic provisions for its increasing population. The inhabitants also
devoted considerable effort to water management. Although Khara Khorum was near
the Orkhon River, a growing population placed enormous strains on the city’s water
supply. It was indeed an artificial city because it did not lie along a major trade route,
had little arable land, and was not near a vital source of raw materials. The city was
also distant from the key economic centers of Ögödei’s domains. China, Central Asia,
and Russia were more productive than this relatively isolated location on the empire’s
fringes. William of Rubruck writes that four hundred carts arrived daily to supply the
city, a costly and inefficient system. In short, its location was an albatross on the
Mongol empire. The Mongols had chosen the site because it symbolized their
attachment to their homeland, but it was simply unsuitable as a capital city for a
growing empire, which required an ever increasing bureaucracy. Three decades elapsed
before a Great Khan moved the capital to a more tenable site.

Two women and the Great Khanate

Ögödei’s reign witnessed major developments for the Mongols but also revealed
problems that would bedevil them. The Mongols devised a tax system, began to set up
governmental institutions, and built a capital, all of which were required if they were
to govern the lands they had subjugated. They laid a firm foundation for the efforts of
the third generation of the Chinggisid clan to rule a diverse multiethnic domain.

However, a telling indication of the Mongols’ problems was a five-year interregnum

between Ögödei’s death in 1241 and the enthronement of his successor. Unlike his
father, Ögödei had not chosen a successor, thus permitting an assemblage of the
Mongol nobility to select the most meritorious leader in the Chinggisid line. Ögödei’s
descendants would surely have an advantage, particularly since the lines of his brothers
Chaghadai and Jochi and their progeny were preoccupied with maintaining control
over Central Asia and Russia respectively. Based on the principle of ultimogeniture, the
descendants of his youngest brother Tolui’s descendants had legitimate claims to the
position of Great Khan. Tolui’s widow, Sorghaghtani Beki, was determined to place one
of her sons on the throne. Chinggis had captured her after defeating the Ong Khan and
had given her in marriage to his son.

Foreigners from within and beyond the Mongol empire lauded Sorghaghtani Beki for
her extraordinary abilities. The Iranian historian Rashid al-Din, for example,
proclaimed her to be the most intelligent and able woman in the world. Married to
Tolui, who died at an early age, she turned her attention to the territory in North
China, which Ögödei had granted for her support. She recognized that ravaging of the
mostly agricultural land and plunder of the area’s resources would be disastrous
policies. Tax revenues would increase if she fostered the native agrarian economy
instead of imposing a Mongolian-style pastoral economy.

Her other policies and activities reveal a similar farsightedness. For example, although
she was a fervent Nestorian Christian, she provided help to the major Chinese religions,
Buddhism and Daoism, in order to ingratiate herself with the Chinese in her new
domain in North China. The Iranian historians also note approvingly that she offered
alms to poor Muslims, rewarded their leaders, and contributed funds for the building of
mosques and madrassahs or theological colleges. She recognized that support from
clerics would facilitate her efforts to rule. Equally important was her supervision of the
education and training of her four sons, for all of whom she had lofty ambitions.

Like Eleanor of Aquitaine, Sorghaghtani Beki reared four sons who became monarchs.
She was determined that they first learn about and follow the dictates of the traditional
Mongol customs and codes. All four learned to ride and shoot with bows and arrows,
and found great pleasure in hunting; hunting continued to be an important motif
throughout their lives. In addition, Sorghaghtani was determined that they be literate.
For example, she recruited a Uyghur named Tolochu to teach her son Khubilai to read
and write the recently developed Mongol written language. She also sought a
multiethnic group of advisers to tutor her sons and to expose them to the concerns of
the sedentary world. In short, her sons were well equipped to become rulers.

Ögödei’s widow, Töregene, barred the way to the succession. Both she and
Sorghaghtani Beki had legitimate claims for the Great Khanate for one of their sons.
Töregene’s husband had been the Great Khan and could claim a father-son succession,
while Sorghaghtani was the widow of Tolui, Chinggis Khan’s youngest son, and, by the
traditional Mongol custom of ultimogeniture, ought to have been selected as the Great
Khan. Now Tolui’s children could, based on their father’s claims, contest the succession.
Töregene sought to place her son Güyüg on the throne, while Sorghaghtani was equally
determined to enthrone her oldest son Möngke. Ögödei’s widow initially had the upper
hand because her husband had been the Great Khan. Capitalizing on her status as the
Great Khan’s widow, she assumed the position of regent for four years until Güyüg,
who had participated in the campaigns in Russia, was ready to assume the title of Great
Khan.

The struggle for the Great Khanate in the 1240s reflected a conflict between two
conceptions of governance. Töregene represented the traditional Mongol customs and
appeared primarily interested in exploitation of the conquered regions. She sought to
enrich herself and her fellow Mongols, and granted domains to Mongol commanders
without devising new institutions to govern the recently subjugated sedentary
populations. On the other hand, Sorghaghtani Beki recognized that success required an
accommodation with her subjects, who were mostly Chinese peasants, and was willing
to use their institutions to govern them. The conflict interrupted the Mongols’ military
campaigns, except for their defeat in 1243 of the Seljuk Turks, their first encroachment
into Anatolia.

Töregene had her way: her son Güyüg was enthroned as the Great Khan in 1246. More
than four thousand envoys from all corners of the Mongol domains, as well as a
European papal emissary named John of Plano Carpini, attended the coronation. As
soon as he took power, Güyüg swept away most of his mother’s cohorts, torturing and
killing, in particular, many of her Muslim associates. He relied instead on Nestorian
Christians to help him rule his vast domains. Unlike his father, he established his
residence in the steppelands instead of in Khara Khorum, the capital his father had
constructed. This step signaled the beginnings of a rupture between the Mongols who
espoused the traditional values and those who recognized the need to accommodate to
the sedentary societies of the conquered populations in order to rule them, a conflict
that would weaken the Mongols.

Güyüg’s reign witnessed the first direct contact between a Great Khan and Europeans;
several of the European monarchs and the pope, concerned about the Mongols’
conquests reaching all the way to Hungary, sought to defuse the possibility of a Mongol
attack. The Europeans had also been dazzled by the myth of a benevolent and
magnanimous Christian monarch named Prester John, who allegedly had once ruled
the Mongols. However, the Europeans themselves were divided, with the Holy Roman
Emperor and the pope the chief antagonists. Nonetheless, at an Ecumenical Council
convened in Lyons in 1245, the pope and the secular leaders decided to dispatch an
embassy to the Mongols. The Franciscan monk John of Plano Carpini led this mission
and delivered two papal letters demanding that the Mongols abandon their military
campaigns in the West and urging them to convert to Christianity. Infuriated by these
haughty letters, Güyüg, in turn, demanded that the European monarchs and the pope
submit to the Mongols. Neither side gained anything from this diplomatic
confrontation.

Meanwhile the tensions that had been brewing in the Mongol imperial family erupted.
Güyüg and his cousin Batu, the khan of the Golden Horde in Russia, had been at odds
for many years, and in 1247 Güyüg, claiming that he was heading for the more
healthful climate of Central Asia, set forth with his troops to attack Batu’s camp.
Learning of Güyüg’s intentions, Sorghaghtani Beki saw an opportunity to ingratiate
herself with the ruler of Russia and warned Batu, a dangerous move that could have led
to her execution. Fortunately for her, Güyüg died en route, and she thus won over a
valuable ally in Batu.

The houses of Tolui and Ögödei, with the Chaghadai Khanate in Central Asia
supporting Ögödei, now officially contended for the throne in the first violent
confrontation between the descendants of Chinggis Khan. Both sides feverishly rallied
for the support of the Mongol nobles who would shortly assemble in a khuriltai to elect
a new ruler. For some years, Sorghaghtani Beki had been ingratiating herself with these
notables by providing them with gifts and honors, and she had Batu’s undying support.
In February 1251 the Mongol nobility compensated her for her efforts and enthroned
Sorghaghtani’s son Möngke as the Great Khan. Sorghaghtani Beki lived long enough to
enjoy her victory, but not enough to obtain personal profit from her efforts. In the first
month of 1252 (February 12–March 11), she succumbed. She had provided her four
sons, Möngke, Khubilai, Hülegü, and Arigh Böke, with the training necessary to rule
sedentary civilizations. Their consorts, whom she had helped to select, were generally
clever and supportive, and their religious toleration, which she had helped to nurture,
would serve them well in governing the diverse peoples in the Mongol lands. To
demonstrate their gratitude, her sons erected a number of tablets in her honor both in
Daidu (the name of the eventual Mongol capital in Beijing) and in Zhendingfu, the seat
of her first domain. In 1335 her portrait was hung in a Nestorian church in the North
Chinese town of Ganzhou. But the portrait was lost, destroyed, or stolen, and no image
of this remarkable woman has survived.

The house of Tolui emerges

Möngke had become the Great Khan, but his opponents had not renounced their
claims. A bloody conflict would ensue, leading to imprisonment, purges, and murders.
These struggles marked the end of a unified Mongol empire. The various territories
subjugated by the Mongols would begin to fragment into autonomous, occasionally
warring states. Because the available primary sources (the Chinese official history of
the Mongol dynasty and Rashid al-Din’s universal history) represented the interests of
the winners in this struggle, it is difficult to reconstruct the events in an unbiased way.
These accounts portray Möngke’s adversaries as disloyal schemers bent on personal
profit.

Möngke’s reprisals for disloyalty were swift and terrible. His officials wrapped Güyüg’s
widow in felt and drowned her. Two of Möngke’s cousins were decapitated. In short,
many of Ögödei’s descendants and their supporters were executed, exposing the first
real fissures in the Chinggisid line. Surprisingly, Ögödei had been extremely helpful to
his nephew Möngke. He had assisted in selecting Möngke’s principal wife and had
chosen his nephew specifically to participate in the Western campaigns. Yet Möngke
turned against his patron’s relatives in his rise to power, fulfilling his mother’s
ambitions to groom a Great Khan.

Möngke’s policies were, in many ways, modeled on those of earlier Mongol rulers. Like
his predecessors, Möngke was tolerant of the religions in his domains, though he
himself probably remained a believer in shamanism. And like his uncle Ögödei, he
recruited an international coterie of advisers and officials. In 1252 he ordered his
scribes to conduct a census of the population throughout his domains. Over the next
few years, he authorized other censuses. Once these registrations were completed, he
began to develop a tax system that provided sufficient revenue but was regular and not
as onerous and capricious as those of the earlier khans. These stable and fixed taxes
would lessen the individual burdens, particularly on peasants. Möngke also restricted
the exactions imposed by Mongol nobles, demanding that only the court impose
military service, taxes, and forced labor. The need for registration of the population
was prompted by his drive for a planned renewal of expansionist campaigns. With
proper resources, his armies were poised for expeditions as far-flung as the Russian and
eastern European campaigns. The censuses would facilitate the recruitment of men for
the military, the imposition of forced labor—especially ensuring a corps of attendants
at postal stations, which dispatched messages speedily to the various armies—and
funds to supply the expeditions. Finally, Möngke tried to prevent disunity by
demanding that the other Chinggisid lines transmit taxes from their domains and
provide troops for military campaigns, but this objective proved to be elusive. His three
brothers acquiesced, but his other relatives did not abide by his orders, although no
major civil war erupted during his reign.

With such relative tranquility, he could pursue the expansionism that had become
characteristic of the Mongols. He assigned his brothers to the primary operations,
Hülegü to conquer West Asia and Khubilai to participate in a campaign against China’s
Southern Song dynasty. Möngke instructed his brothers to avoid unnecessary violence
and destruction. He had learned from his mother that annihilation of conquered
peoples and disruption of their economies were unsound policies. The Mongols could
collect more taxes from a flourishing economy that produced considerable revenue.

When the Great Khan Möngke assigned his brother Hülegü to attack West Asia, did he
intend occupation, control, and establishment of a new government, which the Mongol
rulers of Central Asia and Russia could perceive to be a threat? Or was Hülegü
commissioned merely to subjugate the region including Iran, to the west, and then
return to East Asia? He would actually start his own dynasty, a step that resulted in
conflicts with the Mongol dynasties in both Russia and Central Asia. The Golden Horde
and the Chaghadai rulers believed that Chinggis had provided them with jurisdiction
over the areas to the west of China, including Iran and the other Middle Eastern lands.
They considered Iran and West Asia as part of their potential spheres of influence.
These differing perceptions set the stage for battles among the various Mongol
khanates, conflagrations that would contribute to the collapse of the Mongol domains.

Hülegü’s campaigns suggest that he had received Möngke’s blessing to create a new
khanate in West Asia. First, he was deliberate in his preparations. His slow pace and
the considerable attention he paid to intelligence and logistics indicate that he did not
perceive this foray as a hit and run raid. Such elaborate groundwork bolsters the view
that he intended to occupy, not just plunder, the regions he conquered. Second, his
successful efforts at recruiting Turks and Iranians into his military forces offer
additional proof that he did not seek simply to devastate West Asia and then retreat to
East Asia. He must have recognized that a goal of total destruction would alienate his
multiethnic forces. Third, he constructed bridges and roads, with the assistance of local
inhabitants, as his troops traveled westward and after they seized Iran and parts of the
Middle East, an indication that he attempted to build, rather than totally ravage, the
lands he seized. To be sure, these transport improvements facilitated the army’s march
westward. Yet Hülegü repeatedly ordered renovation or construction of buildings after
pacification of a region was complete.

With Möngke’s instructions in mind, Hülegü prepared cavalry and Chinese engineers
and other specialists in siege warfare for the campaign in the Middle East. Ignoring
accusations of laxity and lugubriousness, he devoted considerable effort to training his
troops, gathering information about his enemies, and ensuring his supply lines for both
men and animals. Because his wife was an ardent Nestorian Christian, he courted the
Christians en route. King Het’um I of Lesser Armenia, who had just returned from a
visit to Khara Khorum during which he kept an invaluable diary of his travels, was
impressed with the Mongols’ apparent commitment to Christianity and sent auxiliary
troops for the campaign. In fact, Hülegü never became a Christian and instead had
specific political objectives. He aimed to expand the territories under Mongol control,
and his expeditions were not crusades against Islam. Nonetheless, Het’um I instructed
his son-in-law Bohemund VI of Antioch to assist the invaders from the East.

Hülegü’s first campaign was directed at the Nizari Ismaili order of Shi’i Islam, which is
misleadingly known as the Order of the Assassins. The Ismailis, who claimed descent
from Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali, occupied parts of eastern Iran and had established a
secure base at the fortress of Alamut, in the Elburz Mountains south of the Caspian Sea,
from which they withstood attacks from Sunni enemies and from the Abbasid Caliphate
in Baghdad. Their secretiveness and their support of violence had alienated large
segments of the western and Central Asian populations and had aroused much
opposition. A relatively small group, they occasionally relied on assassinations of their
adversaries’ leaders. Pledging entrance to paradise to recruits who undertook such
suicide missions, their leader had developed a negative image in Asia. The Ismailis
could not and did not receive assistance when Hülegü reached Alamut. In fact, the
Iranian historian Juvaini praised Hülegü and the Mongols for their attack on the
Ismailis. Although he recognized the value of their library and helped to save it, he still
reflected the prevailing antagonism toward the Ismailis. In 1256 the Mongol troops
bombarded the seemingly impregnable Ismaili fortress with stone missiles, primitive
rockets, and explosive devices, finally breaking down its defenses and causing its Grand
Master, Rukn al-Din, to surrender. According to Islamic sources, Hülegü exacted a
terrible price on the Ismailis. Many were slaughtered, and Rukn al-Din and his entire
family were killed.

Similarly, many in the declining Abbasid domains, which controlled Iran and much of
West Asia, had turned against the caliphate in Baghdad because of what they perceived
to be political oppression and corruption. It is perhaps too much of an overstatement to
assert that they viewed Hülegü as a savior and welcomed him as a king, but no doubt
dissatisfaction with the Abbasids attracted many Turks, Iranians, and Arabs to his side
and somewhat facilitated his conquests.

The same fate befell the Abbasid capital at Baghdad. The Abbasid caliphate, the
dominant Islamic dynasty after about 750, had declined precipitously since its heyday
at the time of Harun al-Rashid and could not resist the invaders from the East. The
Mongol invaders received considerable assistance from Iranians who wanted to subvert
Arab supremacy in the caliphate. Iranian experts assisted with the catapults and other
siege engines located along the city gates. After ten days of battle early in 1258,
Baghdad submitted and was sacked, and the Abbasid caliph was killed. The sources
differ about the circumstances of his death. One version has him locked in a prison
surrounded by his gold and starved to death. Another version is that molten gold was
poured down his throat. The likeliest scenario is that he was wrapped up in a felt rug
and his body was crushed by the Mongols’ horses to prevent the spillage of blood, the
Mongols’ “honorable” and usual method of executing enemy rulers.

Parts, but not all, of the city were devastated. One source estimated that the dead
numbered eight hundred thousand and another at two million, undoubtedly
exaggerated figures. Still another account refers to twelve thousand ears submitted to
Hülegü as well as massacres of unarmed civilians after they had surrendered. It adds
that the dead could not be buried for some time because of the lack of space in the
makeshift cemeteries and the insufficient number of men available to carry and dispose
of the corpses. With the warm weather of spring and summer arriving, the stench from
the putrefying bodies enveloped the city. A cholera epidemic, affecting both the
inhabitants of Baghdad and the Mongol invaders, contributed to the losses incurred
during the campaign. However, within a decade or so, travelers again referred to
Baghdad as a great commercial center, challenging the reports about the Mongols’ total
devastation of the city. The Mongols had been brutal but not self-destructive. They
would not totally devastate an area that could be a valuable source of income.

On the one hand, Hülegü’s capture of Baghdad, the Abbasid capital, and his continued
march westward persuaded the Mongol rulers in Russia and Central Asia that he
intended to remain in the West, opening a rift in the Mongol world. On the other hand,
the Mongols’ destruction of the caliphate, a devastating blow for the Islamic world,
revived European hopes of a better relationship with the conquerors from the East who
had dealt a death blow to the caliphate, one of the crusaders’ Muslim enemies. The
initial contacts, however, were not successful. The Franciscan monk William of
Rubruck, an unofficial emissary sent by King Louis IX of France, had traveled to
Mongolia in 1253 not only to cement good relations but also to gather as much
information as he could. He succeeded in learning a great deal about the Mongols,
which he set forth in one of the best accounts about them. However, like John of Plano
Carpini, he failed in his other task of establishing more cordial relations. Möngke gave
William a letter setting forth the Mongol claim of universal rule and demanding that
the French monarch send official envoys to indicate his acceptance of a subordinate
status.

6. Hülegü Khan’s attack on Baghdad shows the powerful siege engines required
to overwhelm the city. Such sieges reveal the Mongols’ increasing reliance on
sophisticated weaponry rather than simply on cavalry.

Nonetheless, Hülegü’s campaigns against the Ismailis and the Abbasids inspired
European hopes of an alliance against the Muslims who still controlled the Holy Lands.
Several European monarchs, as well as the pope, continued to envision another Crusade
to recapture these important Christian sites. They faced a formidable obstacle in the
Mamluks, a newly arisen Turkic dynasty based in Egypt, and hoped to collaborate with
the Mongols against this Islamic force. But a year after Hülegü’s victory in Baghdad, the
Mongol world was plunged into still another succession crisis. This turning point in
Mongol history was shaped by the relationship between the Great Khan and his two
younger brothers, Khubilai and Arigh Böke.
Chapter 4
The Mongols and the world: part 1

By the end of Möngke’s reign and the accession of Khubilai Khan as the Great Khan in
1260, the Mongols had carved out a vast east–west empire stretching from Korea to
Iraq and Russia. The khans in all these regions had decided to rule rather than to
devastate and extort goods from the territories they had subjugated. The various
regions would fragment into four, occasionally warring, khanates, but communication
and commerce among them persisted. The Mongols’ original homeland and north
China and Korea constituted one khanate, and Central Asia, Russia, and West Asia
were the three others. The four shared some policies, but each also adopted and
adapted practices and government agencies from the people they ruled.

Despite their differences and conflicts, the various khanates controlled much of Asia
and fostered economic, technological, and artistic relations among the continent’s
regions. The array of travelers lends credence to the view that the Mongol period was
the onset of global history. A number of these voyagers wrote invaluable accounts of
the regions in Eurasia they visited. Marco Polo was the most famous of these travelers,
but the Muslim jurist Ibn Battuta, the Nestorian Christian Rabban Sauma, the Armenian
King He’tum, the Franciscans John of Plano Carpini and William of Rubruck, and the
Chinese Confucian Zhou Daguan, among others, described sites from Angkor Wat to
Hangzhou to Tabriz to Paris. These travelers journeyed along the traditional land-based
Silk Roads, which the Mongols revived after a lapse of several centuries, as well as the
sea routes from West, South, and Southeast Asia to southern Chinese ports.

The early career of Khubilai Khan

Khubilai Khan is the ruler most often associated with the cosmopolitanism that began
to prevail among some of the Mongols. While his younger brother Hülegü expanded the
Mongol-controlled territories in West Asia, Khubilai asserted himself in East Asia.
Almost nothing is known of his early life except for a seemingly stereotyped account of
his first successful kill of an animal during a hunt in which he had accompanied his
grandfather Chinggis. In the 1240s, Khubilai had focused on ruling the territory in
North China he had been granted as his domain. Chinese, Muslim, Mongol, and Tibetan
counselors and officials helped him to govern these lands. Like his mother
Sorghaghtani Beki, he gradually recognized that stable rule over China required
accommodation with Chinese institutions and practices. Thus he fostered the agrarian
economy, by constructing irrigation works and providing improved tools and seeds,
rather than imposing a pastoral economy on the Chinese, and he ordered his officials to
devise a regular and stable tax system for the peasants.

In July 1252, his brother Möngke gave him an order that required further involvement
with Chinese affairs. The Great Khan commanded him to bring the kingdom of Dali, in
the present-day province of Yunnan, under Mongol control. Dali was fortuitously
located along the trade routes to Burma and South Asia and could also be a strategic
base from which to launch an attack on Southern Song China, the Mongols’ principal
enemy in East Asia. Khubilai made elaborate preparations for the campaign. Before
setting forth, he dispatched three envoys to demand the submission of Dali. Instead, the
leading minister executed the emissaries.
7. Mongol khanates, 1280.

Khubilai assumed that a bloody war would be needed to compel Dali to capitulate, but
Yao Shu, a Confucian scholar who accompanied him, may have prevented such loss of
life and severe damage. To try to prevent further bloodshed, Yao proposed that the
Mongols send a detachment to Dali with banners proclaiming that they would not
wantonly kill and loot. For some decades, the Mongols had used the tactic of pledging
not to destroy a town if its inhabitants surrendered peacefully. Dali submitted, and
Khubilai fulfilled his pledge: only those who executed his envoys were put to death. He
did not alter the system of government and simply demanded taxation and an
opportunity to use Dali’s territory as a base for an eventual campaign against the
Southern Song.
After returning to his lands in North China, he planned to set up a regular
administrative system. With the counsel of Chinese and foreign advisers, he supported
agriculture and commerce, fostered education, devised a tax system, and recruited his
own forces. He turned for assistance to Liu Bingzhong, a Buddhist monk well versed in
Confucianism and talented in mathematics, astronomy, calligraphy, and painting. Liu
had earlier prepared a lengthy memorandum consisting of specific recommendations
for governance, which presumed a return to a traditional Chinese system. He advocated
the restoration of ancient Chinese rituals and ceremonies, and the institution of regular
legal and tax structures that did not overburden Khubilai’s subjects, and the nurturing
of scholar-officials through the reintroduction of the civil service examinations.
Khubilai adopted all these proposals except for the restoration of the civil service
examinations, which would result in overreliance on Chinese officials.

The most important signal of his intentions was his construction of a capital city, which
identified him with the sedentary lifestyle of the Chinese and attested to his desire to
govern his Chinese domains. The capital, situated in Inner Mongolia, was known
originally as Kaiping but eventually renamed Shangdu (Upper Capital); Khubilai
selected it as the center of his government by the use of the ancient Chinese principles
of fengshui or geomancy—a divination scheme designed to find the most propitious
location for construction of residences, tombs, and other structures. The capital, which
Marco Polo dubbed “Ciandu” and became “Xanadu” in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poem
“Kubla Khan,” was well planned. A walled city on the Chinese model, it supported a
population of approximately one hundred thousand people. The Outer City boasted
Buddhist and Daoist temples, and the Inner City’s most distinctive building was the
marble Imperial Palace, which Marco Polo described in detail. He wrote that “the halls
and rooms … are all gilded and wonderfully painted … with pictures and images of
beasts and birds and trees and flowers … so well that it is a delight and a wonder to
see.” These various structures, in design and in use of motifs, were similar to those
found in earlier Chinese cities. The main addition was a park outside the Outer City
that was used for hunting and falconry, and represented the principal Mongol touch.

Khubilai’s policies and his apparent Chinese orientation aroused the concern of Mongol
traditionalists, but Möngke, after a few initial misunderstandings, trusted his younger
brother and commissioned him to deal with disputes between Buddhist and Daoist
monks, one of the knottiest problems facing the empire in North China. Violence had
erupted between the two religions, as each side attacked the other’s vulnerable
monasteries. Power and status rather than doctrinal disputes generated hostility. The
two religions shared some beliefs, and indeed the earliest translators of the Buddhist
writings into Chinese had used Daoist terminology to identify important Buddhist
concepts. Buddhists and Daoists came into conflict over land, tangible property, and a
desire for government patronage, and the arguments each used against the other had
scant relation to ideology. The Buddhists claimed that the historical Buddha predated
Laozi, the reputed founder of Daoism, and that the Indian sage’s earlier birth signified
his superiority over the Chinese philosopher. The Daoists countered that Laozi had
traveled to the “Western Regions,” the Chinese term for Central Asia and India, after
expounding the pure form of his teaching in China. He then transformed himself into
one of his many emanations, became known in India as the Buddha, and developed the
Buddhist doctrine, a corrupt and simplistic form of his teachings for the less
sophisticated peoples of the Western Regions.
In 1258 Khubilai convened a conference of the leading Buddhists and Daoists in East
Asia to debate the contentious issues that separated them. By this time, Khubilai leaned
toward Buddhism. The Great Khan had been impressed by the Tibetan Buddhist monk
‘Phags-pa, who was instructing Khubilai’s wife Chabi, and Khubilai had himself
received religious instruction from the twenty-three-year-old Tibetan monk. From the
beginning, he sided with the Buddhists, but he offered the Daoists one chance to
redeem themselves. He demanded that they perform such magical and supernatural
feats as curing illnesses, changing the weather, and foretelling the future, in which they
reputedly claimed to be proficient. Unable to demonstrate any otherworldly powers,
the Daoists could not meet the challenge. Khubilai then declared that they were the
losers in the debates and ordered his retainers to shave the heads of seventeen
prominent Daoists and compel them to convert to Buddhism. The Buddhist temples
occupied by the Daoists and the property they confiscated were to be restored to their
rightful owners. These penalties were relatively mild; Khubilai did not proscribe
Daoism, nor were any Daoists imprisoned or executed.

Once Khubilai had dealt with the Buddhist-Daoist dispute, he received an assignment to
assist in the conquest of the rest of China. His brother Möngke had devised a plan to
attack the Southern Song dynasty. He would deploy his forces along four fronts,
preventing the Song from concentrating their armies in one location. The troops under
Möngke’s personal command would head south from his base in Northwestern China in
order to capture the province of Sichuan and then march eastward. His brother
Khubilai’s forces would move south from his newly constructed town of Kaiping and
cross the Yangzi River into Song territory. They would there rendezvous with a third
army marching northward from the province of Yunnan. The fourth detachment would
move eastward toward Xiangyang and at that location join Khubilai’s army. Möngke
intended to isolate the western and eastern sections of the Song, and hoped that a quick
victory in the west would compel the Song to capitulate.

Möngke’s own forces faced stiff resistance, but he continued to march into Song
territories until his death on August 11, 1259. Once again, a khuriltai of the Mongol
nobility needed to select a new Khan of Khans, leading to a cessation of the campaign
against China. Khubilai himself ended his attack on Song China and headed north to
champion his drive for leadership.

Khubilai and his brother Arigh Böke struggled for the succession, and each received
support from other Mongol khanates, an indication of the fracturing of the Mongol
empire. Arigh Böke represented Mongols who wished to uphold the traditional Mongol
ways and values. He and his allies were concerned about Khubilai’s and Hülegü’s
increasing identification with the sedentary civilizations. Moreover, they were
perturbed that Hülegü and Khubilai sought advice and assistance from the subject
populations, spent most of their time outside Mongolia and resided either in Iran and
China, and married women who had turned away from their ancestors’ shamanism to
Nestorianism and Buddhism.

In 1260, Khubilai and Arigh Böke each convened khuriltais and had themselves elected
as Great Khan, setting the stage for civil war. Khubilai relied on China for success in
this struggle and appealed to his Chinese subjects for assistance in reunifying China.
His main strategy was to capitalize on the plentiful resources available in the sedentary
world and to deny them to Arigh Böke. Based in Khara Khorum in the Mongolian
steppes, Arigh Böke needed to import most of his provisions, prompting Khubilai to
initiate a blockade over the territories from which his brother sought supplies.

After several significant defeats, Arigh Böke’s options were limited, and in 1264 he
surrendered. Khubilai reputedly treated his brother magnanimously, despite his
underlings’ calls to punish or execute him. However, Arigh Böke saved Khubilai from
greater anguish by contracting an illness and dying early in 1266. His demise was
convenient for Khubilai, and this very convenience has cast doubts on the
circumstances of his death.

Khubilai governs China

Once he became the uncontested Great Khan, Khubilai began to develop a hybrid
administration, which would appeal to and incorporate both Chinese and Mongol
elements. He was unwilling to turn over too much authority to his Chinese advisers nor
was he eager to adopt the whole administrative apparatus from those of traditional
Chinese dynasties. The most telling indication of his eagerness to modify the Chinese
system was his refusal to reinstitute the civil service examinations. Restoring the exams
would limit him to Confucian Chinese officials, and he could not afford to limit himself
to a bureaucracy composed almost exclusively of the Mongols’ subjugated population.

He also deviated from traditional Chinese dynasties by dividing the population into
three and, later, four groups. The Mongols occupied the most prominent positions,
followed mostly by Muslims and other foreigners who would be recruited for important
posts in government. The Chinese of the North and the Chinese of the South constituted
the lowest-ranking groups and were excluded from some of the most important civil
positions. High military positions were even more difficult for the Chinese to attain or
to aspire to. Khubilai and other Mongols decidedly discriminated against Chinese of the
official class.

Khubilai adopted these policies principally because the Chinese vastly outnumbered the
Mongols in China. One source estimates that the Chinese in the North amounted to
about ten million, and the Chinese in the South accounted for another sixty million
while the Mongol population did not exceed one million. The Mongols needed to retain
control of the leading positions in government and the military if they were to survive
and avoid being engulfed by the Chinese.

Yet Khubilai wanted to establish an administrative structure that the Chinese would
find familiar. Thus he restored the traditional body known as the Secretariat to take
charge of civilian matters and established the Privy Council to supervise military
matters. He also restored the six functional ministries that had implemented policy in
China. These ministries oversaw the civilian officials, conducted censuses and collected
taxes and tribute, managed court ceremonies and religions and dealt with foreign
envoys, trained the military, enforced the laws and administered prisons, and
maintained the infrastructure. Similarly, local administration resembled that of earlier
Chinese dynasties, with China divided into provinces, circuits, and districts.

The principal difference between the Mongol and the Chinese dynasties was the greater
emphasis on control. Fearing that officials, many of whom were Chinese, might be
disloyal and corrupt, Khubilai delegated more power to a government body—known as
the Censorate—than had any earlier Chinese dynasty. Censors, who could be crudely
described as spies on the bureaucracy and the local elites, would periodically tour the
country to ferret out financial abuses by the court, the military, or local government
and would report directly to the Mongol emperor. However, the Mongols often allowed
local Chinese elites considerable leeway to govern their regions as long as they paid
taxes and performed the police, judicial, and military services required of them.

Khubilai and the Chinese economy

Having established their political system by the early 1260s, the Mongols now had to
tackle major economic problems. The Mongol invasions of North China in the early
thirteenth century had resulted in the destruction of some towns, the razing of
residences and government and religious buildings, and the massacre of hundreds of
thousands of inhabitants, with some Chinese sources, including several later historical
accounts, citing a vastly inflated figure of a 50 percent decline in population. Numerous
cities would have had to be abandoned if half the population had been killed. Despite
such exaggerations, the loss of population in the North and ultimately in the South
after its conquest in 1279 was debilitating. Chinese peasants were uncertain about the
intentions of their Mongol rulers. Would these new overlords simply expropriate their
land and convert it into pasture for their animals? Would they devise arbitrary and
exorbitant taxes on the peasants? Before embarking on a planned and orderly economic
and social program, Khubilai needed to relieve this misery. During his first years in
power, he responded with tax exemptions and relief efforts, and he prohibited his
officials and his army from making exploitative demands on the Chinese.

Even more significant, in 1262 he established an Office for the Stimulation of

Agriculture. This was an indication of the value he placed on agriculture. His most
lasting contribution was the founding of she, self-help organizations intended to
stimulate agricultural production, introduce new technology, improve flood control and
irrigation, provide assistance for orphans, widows, and the elderly, and conduct
censuses.

Artisans were still another group he sought to protect. Like earlier Mongol khans, he
recognized the need for craftsmen. Because they had few of their own artisans, the
Mongols relied on foreigners, particularly Chinese, Iranians, or Central Asians, for such
basic goods as pots, dishes, and textiles. Infrastructure projects such as the building of a
capital city also demanded the services of highly skilled craftsmen. Khubilai thus
offered substantial pay and food and clothing rations to artisans, and relieved them of
the burden of forced labor.

Merchants also prospered during Khubilai’s reign, becoming a significant factor in

global interconnections and history. The Chinese dynasties had imposed numerous
restrictions on merchants because Confucian Chinese scholar-officials disapproved of
trade, asserting that merchants did not produce anything of value and simply
exchanged goods, a parasitic pursuit. Like his grandfather Chinggis, Khubilai elevated
the status of merchants and issued more paper currency, offered loans for merchants
engaged in long-distance trade, built roads and canals to facilitate travel, and
established a postal station system, which merchants were permitted to use on their
journeys. Such Mongol assistance led to considerable commerce across Eurasia, both by
land and by sea, and, perhaps as important, led to technological, cultural, religious,
and artistic interrelations among civilizations.

Indeed, unprecedented contact between East and West was one of the most important
Mongol contributions. The Pax Mongolica, or Mongolian peace, facilitated the
exchanges of people, ideas, and technologies. The various Eastern and Western
civilizations, which were exposed to foreign techniques and views, chose and modified
whatever they borrowed from others to suit their own needs. Iranians introduced
chickpeas, carrots, eggplants, and pasta to China; they translated Iranian medical texts
into Chinese while a Chinese agricultural text was translated into Iranian, and Chinese
motifs and techniques in porcelain influenced Iranian pottery. The Mongols themselves
prized craftsmen and experts, and moved them from one part of their domains to
another to produce high-quality textiles using gold thread, blue-and-white porcelains,
and gold artifacts.

Doctors were still another group who fared better under the Mongols than under the
Chinese emperors. During earlier Chinese dynasties, doctors, many of whom had little
training, were relegated to low social positions. The pragmatic Mongol rulers valued
medicine and emphasized it as a suitable and attractive profession. Khubilai, who was
himself afflicted with gout and other ailments, was a particularly strong supporter of
the profession. In 1285, 1288, and 1290, he dispatched envoys to South India to seek
not only precious goods but also skilled doctors. Throughout his reign, he invited
Nestorian and Muslim physicians from Central Asia and Iran, as well as doctors from
Korea, to his court. In 1262 he ordered that medical schools be founded in circuits
throughout China. Such strong support from the government induced a few sons of the
Chinese elite to study medicine. Because young Chinese men had been blocked from
taking the civil service examinations, which traditionally provided entrance into the
bureaucracy, medical careers became more attractive. The founding of intellectually
demanding medical schools, a dramatic increase in the publication of medical
textbooks, and higher status for physicians motivated many Chinese to enter the
previously lowly regarded profession.

Similarly, Khubilai and other Mongol khans esteemed astronomers for their practical
advice about when to begin and end activities, and thus recruited Chinese and foreign
experts, eventually founding an Office of Muslim Astronomy at the court. They invited
the Iranian astronomer Jamal al-Din to bring diagrams of astronomical instruments
from Iran to China and to assist in constructing them. Jamal al-Din also offered
diagrams and calculations, which helped the Chinese scientist Guo Shoujing in devising
a new and more accurate Chinese calendar. The Chinese generally preserved their
theories of astronomy, but the Yuan court adopted and modified specific Iranian
instruments. Similarly, exposure to Iran helped the Chinese to devise better maps, with
color coding and grids.

Khubilai and legitimacy

These policies of Sino-Mongol cultural and scientific accommodation helped the
Mongols and Khubilai in particular gain support and legitimacy as rulers of China, but
Khubilai’s claim to universal rule as Great Khan had been seriously eroded. Both the
Golden Horde in Russia and the Mongol khan in Central Asia had supported Khubilai’s
brother in their struggle for power and thus would not accept his supremacy. The
Mongol rulers of Iran and West Asia were his only reliable allies, but they were
entangled in conflict with the Golden Horde, further dividing the Mongol world.
Although West Asia was virtually autonomous, the Mongol rulers in Iran acknowledged
a symbolic status as vassals of the Great Khan. Such amicable relations translated into
trade and, perhaps as important, cultural, religious, and artistic interchanges.

Khubilai’s attempts to assert his legitimacy as ruler of China met with better results. In
1267 he began the construction of a capital city in the heart of the sedentary world, an
important signal to his Chinese subjects. Khara Khorum had proved to be an inadequate
location for a great empire because it simply did not have a hinterland that could
readily supply the city’s burgeoning population with food and other necessities.
Khubilai ordered the building of Daidu (or Great Capital) near modern Beijing and
recruited a multiethnic group of craftsmen and laborers to work on it. The location of
the city, which was farther north than most Chinese capitals, attested to his desire to
have a base to control his native land in the North while continuing to rule China. Its
only drawback was the lack of sufficient grain for a large population, which Khubilai
resolved by extending the Grand Canal from the more fertile South almost to Daidu.

He ensured that the city would be familiar to the Chinese in order to ingratiate himself
with them. The layout of the city in symmetrical east–west and north–south axes, the
eleven gates with three-story towers on each that permitted entrance, and the divisions
between the Imperial City, the residence of the Imperial clan, the inner wall within
which officials lived, and the outer wall where ordinary inhabitants resided were all
Chinese in conception and architectural form. The buildings within the Imperial City,
such as the hall for reception of foreign envoys and the khan’s own quarters and those
of his consorts and concubines, resembled those of a Chinese capital. Lakes, gardens,
and bridges crisscrossed the Imperial City, still another feature of traditional Chinese
capitals. Yet Mongol touches were also evident. Curtains and screens of ermine skins
hung in Khubilai’s sleeping quarters, a tangible reminder of the Mongols’ hunting and
pastoral lifestyle. Khubilai and his sons often lived in gers, or tents, adjacent to the
palaces. When one of Khubilai’s wives was in the last stages of pregnancy, she moved
to a ger and gave birth there.

As Daidu became more of a Chinese-style city, Khubilai’s original capital was converted
to other uses. Shangdu became an outlet for continuance of the Mongol rituals. It
would serve as a resort and a hunting park. By the time Marco Polo visited in the mid-
1270s, Shangdu had become a hunting preserve (with, according to one source, five
hundred birds of prey), a means by which Khubilai could retain his connections with
nature and the traditional rustic activities of his Mongol heritage.

A drive for legitimacy in China shaped others of his early policies. He constructed
temples for his ancestors and performed the ceremonies associated with Chinese
ancestor worship. Following the advice of his Chinese advisers, he constructed a shrine
to Confucius. Needing to cultivate his image as a Confucian emperor, he chose a
Chinese name, “Yuan” or “origin,” for his dynasty. He also restored the Confucian
rituals of court music and dance, accepting the view that omission or inadequate
performance of these ceremonies would lead to floods, earthquakes, droughts, and
other natural catastrophes. An even more telling signal was his recruitment of a
Confucian tutor to teach Jingim, his young son and designated successor.

Khubilai also sought legitimacy with his own people. Like his forebears, Khubilai
recognized that he had to persist in territorial expansion in order to remain a credible
Mongol khan. Given the sizable Mongol army and its even more numerous contingents
of foreign recruits, he needed to keep his forces occupied. Moreover, he would not be
accepted as ruler of China without defeating the Southern Song and becoming master
of China south of the Yangzi River.

Yet he had to be concerned with his northern borders. In the North, his ancestors had
been frustrated in efforts to pacify Korea, but Khubilai succeeded in persuading the
Korean crown prince to submit. Later he sent one of his daughters in marriage to the
Korean king, forming the first in a series of marital alliances with Korea. He was not as
successful in Central Asia. The threat derived from his cousin Khaidu, a fellow member
of the Mongol imperial line, a grandson of the Great Khan Ögödei, Because Central Asia
was the crossroads in commerce linking China, India, West Asia, and Europe, instability
in the region would subvert Khubilai’s efforts at trade and intercultural contacts. The
struggle between the two cousins wound up at a standstill, and Khubilai eventually
acknowledged that he could not control Central Asia. Despite this failure, caravans
continued to travel from West Asia, especially Iran, to China and vice versa, often
circumventing territories where Khubilai and Khaidu fought. Relations across Asia thus
persisted and laid the foundations for global interconnections.

Conquest of southern China

Khubilai’s most important frontier was to the south. He needed to conquer the
Southern Song dynasty to avoid a Chinese nativist movement to expel the Mongols
from North China, but such an effort would be demanding. Mongol armies and cavalry
had been successful primarily in northern climates and terrains, and were
unaccustomed to the heat and the more forested lands in the South. Their horses could
not readily adjust to the punishing high temperatures of the semitropical regions of
South China, nor could they count on much grass for their animals because the Chinese
planted crops on all available land. Mongol troops needed to develop a naval force,
which was essential in crossing the Yangzi River to reach the Southern Song
strongholds and to attack cities along China’s southeastern coast. Sophisticated siege
weapons and tactics were also required to overcome the resistance of some of the
world’s most populous cities.

Although it faced political and economic difficulties, the Southern Song was a
formidable foe. With rich fertile lands and extensive trade networks both within China
and abroad, the dynasty was prosperous and could command considerable resources in
a struggle against the Mongols. However, the Song government was riddled with
corruption; its landlords often evaded taxes, leading to revenue shortfalls for the
dynasty; and the empress dowagers (mothers of the emperors) or court officials
controlled the emperors, the last three of whom ascended to the throne as infants.

Control over Xiangyang and Fancheng, two cities on the Middle Yangzi basin, was
crucial for attempts to cross the Yangzi River. Seizure of the two towns would offer the
Mongols a base for assaults on the rest of the South. In 1268 the Mongols surrounded
the cities, but they soon recognized that they required supremacy over the nearby Han
River to block supplies sent by ship. Moreover, they would have to storm the walls to
overcome the well-entrenched defenders, an effort that might entail heavy losses. They
thus needed artillery support to avert huge casualties, and Khubilai recruited two
skilled West Asian Muslim engineers to provide such support. The two men sent by the
Mongol rulers of Iran built a catapult, which devastated the town. After five years of an
intermittent struggle, Xiangyang submitted in 1273, and Fancheng succumbed shortly
thereafter.

From 1273 on, Mongol forces moved inexorably forward. In 1275 they occupied the
wealthy and commercially important town of Yangzhou. They then were prepared for
an attack on the Song capital of Hangzhou, one of the greatest of the world’s cities. The
Song court was confused and chaotic, with a five-year-old emperor allegedly ruling, but
his grandmother was the real wielder of power. Recognizing the weakness of the Song’s
forces, the empress dowager negotiated with the Mongols, and in January 1276 she
submitted. Khubilai, seeking to gain favor with the southern Chinese, did not harm the
imperial family. Meanwhile loyalist officials fled from Hangzhou and enthroned one of
the emperor’s half-brothers, an infant himself, as the new emperor. Mongol troops
pursued the loyalists all along the coast. In May 1278 the young, somewhat sickly
emperor, overwhelmed by the pressures and rugged life, died. The loyalists then
enthroned the emperor’s half-brother, still another child. However, they were no match
for the pursuing Mongol forces. Recognizing that the Mongols were about to capture
him and the emperor, the leading Chinese official picked up his young charge, dove
into the water, and drowned. The last Song emperor had perished at sea, and the Song
dynasty had at last fallen to the Mongols.

By 1279 Khubilai had destroyed the remnants of the Song dynasty. However, he now
faced the more difficult task of gaining the allegiance of the people of South China. As
soon as the Song fell, he sought to prevent his forces from alienating local people. He
warned against expropriation of their property or any other kind of exploitation. His
policies turned out to be effective because few insurrections are recorded. It is
remarkable that he was able to institute Mongol rule, with as few difficulties as he had,
over the land with the largest population in the world.

Il-Khanate: instability and ingenuity

Like Mongol governance in East Asia, Mongol rule in West Asia was full of paradoxes.
The Mongol khans stabilized the region after ending the turmoil of the later Abbasid
caliphate in Baghdad. Yet political infighting and succession struggles among the
Mongol leaders led to considerable disruptions in the approximately eighty years of
their dynasty.

Hülegü, Khubilai’s brother and conqueror of the Abbasid caliphate, did not end his
campaigns after his occupation of Baghdad; instead his forces advanced to Syria. His
troops occupied Aleppo and Damascus, and were poised to campaign farther west,
although Syria may not have had sufficient pasture for the Mongol horses. After these
striking successes in challenging the Mamluks, the last remaining significant Islamic
dynasty in the Middle East, he learned of the death of his brother, the Great Khan
Möngke. He halted the campaign and began to travel back to his native land to join the
khuriltai, which would elect the new Great Khan. A small and vulnerable Mongol
detachment remained in Syria, awaiting Hülegü’s return.

Like the death of Ögödei in 1241, which ended Mongol expansion into Europe,
Möngke’s death had far-reaching consequences. The Mamluks’ leader saw a tactical
advantage in attacking the relatively minor Mongol army that Hülegü had stationed in
Syria before departing to the East. In February 1260, the Mamluk forces, under their
great commander Baybars I, engaged and then defeated the Mongol troops in the area
of Ayn Jalut, capturing and then beheading the Mongol commander. The battle was not
a major clash of two powerful armies, but it proved to be significant because it
subverted the Mongol forces’ aura of invincibility, a psychological blow that
undermined Mongol efforts to terrorize enemies into voluntary submission.

Hülegü himself halted in Iran on learning that his brothers Khubilai and Arigh Böke
were at war over the position of Great Khanate. He assumed the title of Il-Khan (or
“Subordinate Khan”) to the Great Khan and established the Il-Khanate as a semi-
autonomous segment of the Mongol domains, a political act sure to elicit hostility in
the Mongol khanates in Russia and Central Asia. Ignoring the obvious discomfort of his
Mongol neighbors and deciding to settle in West Asia, he confronted serious difficulties
in ruling in Iran and the Middle Eastern areas the Mongols controlled. The Mongol
invasions had reduced the population and damaged the cultivated land. Yet Hülegü and
his successors required increased revenues to support military operations, in part
because of conflicts with many of their neighbors, and they began to impose irregular
and capricious levies on the population.
They maintained harmonious contacts with only one of their immediate neighbors, the
Byzantine Empire. Hülegü’s wife (and stepmother) Dokhuz Khatun was a staunch
Nestorian Christian and sought good relations with the Christian world. Negotiations
with the Byzantines led eventually to the dispatch of Emperor Michael VIII’s
illegitimate daughter Maria Palaiologina as an additional wife for Hülegü. By the time
of her arrival, Hülegü had died; his son and successor then took her as his wife.
Michael VIII was not necessarily an ally, as he proved when he sent another of his
illegitimate daughters to Prince Noghai of the Golden Horde, the Il-Khan’s enemies.
The Il-Khans were often at war with neighbors other than with the Byzantines.

Their conflict with the Golden Horde centered initially on competing narratives. The
Golden Horde claimed that Chinggis had granted the Western Regions of the Mongol
Empire to his son Jochi. In this scenario, although Jochi had died before his father, his
sons Batu (r. 1237–56) and Berke (r. 1257–66) had inherited these territories, which
included at the very least modern Azerbaijan and Iran. Azerbaijan, with its lush
grasslands and its strategic location along the trade routes, was especially appealing to
the Golden Horde. The founding of the Il-Khanate naturally challenged their claims and
set the stage for war, with Azerbaijan as a significant prize. By 1262 the Il-Khanate’s
and the Golden Horde’s troops battled along their borders, subverting Mongol
brotherhood and spelling the end of the Mongol Empire.

At the same time, Chaghadai’s descendants in Central Asia opposed the Il-Khanate. The
Chaghadai khanate feared the Il-Khanate’s growing power and knew that Hülegü and
his successors supported Khubilai in his struggle with them. Thus the Mongol Empire
bifurcated into a union of the Chaghadai khanate and the Golden Horde in opposition
to the Yuan dynasty in China and the Il-Khanate. Sporadic conflict between the Il-
Khans and Central Asia persisted until Khubilai’s cousin Khaidu’s death in 1301. These
divisions confirmed the view that the tremendous size of the Chinggisid empire would
inevitably lead to dissension and splits.

The Il-Khans confronted not only political infighting among the Mongols but also
continued struggles with the Mamluks, who appeared, on occasion, to collaborate with
the Golden Horde. After his forces’ defeat at Ayn Jalut, Hülegü was determined to
avenge himself on the Mamluks and their new leader Baybars I. Border sparring, raids,
skirmishes, and assassinations characterized his relations with the Mamluks. In 1262 he
dispatched embassies to King Louis IX of France to propose an alliance against the
Mamluks, but the envoys and their letters apparently did not reach their destinations.
After his death, wars with the Mamluks erupted in 1281, 1299, 1303, and 1312. The Il-
Khans could not overcome the Mamluks who had a strong esprit de corps and an ever
increasing military force. By 1291 the Mamluks had overpowered the city of Acre, the
last remaining Western Christian presence in the Middle East, which had been a
stronghold since the earlier Crusades. They could thus portray themselves as
“Defenders of Islam,” which elicited support from the Muslim world.

The political infighting from Hülegü’s death in 1265 until Ghazan Khan’s accession in
1295 generated considerable instability in West Asia. Abakha, Hülegü’s son (r. 1265–
82), succeeded to his father’s throne without incident and, like his father, sought to
create a multireligious and multiethnic bureaucracy to rule a largely Muslim
population. Thus he recruited Nestorians, Buddhists, and Jews as administrators.
Abakha also selected Tabriz as the site for his capital, still another indication of his
desire to rule his newly subjugated domains. Its abundant water supply and moderate
climate made it an ideal locale for the Mongols and their animals. Perhaps as critical,
the city was on the main east–west caravan routes, offering lucrative opportunities for
merchants and for the Khanate.

Tegüder (r. 1282–84), Abakha’s brother and successor, converted to Islam, assuming
the name Ahmad when he became a Muslim. His conversion prompted fears that he
would end the conflict and ally with the Mamluks. Thus Arghun (r. 1284–91), Abakha’s
son, rebelled, defeated, and executed Tegüder. After his death, the succeeding two Il-
khans were murdered; only with the accession of Ghazan did some stability recur.
These irregularities not only revealed the disunity that had plagued all the Mongol
domains but also the damage imposed upon top officials. In the almost eighty years of
Il-khanate rule, only one of the viziers or chief ministers died of natural causes; the rest
were executed or assassinated, an alarming sign of the seemingly uncontrollable
infighting in the Il-khanate.
The Il-khans needed allies to cope with threats from the Mamluks and the Golden
Horde. Because the Yuan dynasty was too far away to assist them, they turned to the
Europeans, who still wanted to regain the Holy Lands from the Muslims. The Il-khans
and the European monarchs and popes exchanged embassies in order to collaborate
against their common enemy but proved unable to forge an alliance. The most
renowned emissary was Rabban Sauma, a Nestorian Christian who was born in Daidu
and had traveled westward on a pilgrimage to the Holy Lands only to discover that he
could not fulfill his dream because of Mamluk control over these territories. He decided
to remain in West Asia and lived among a large Nestorian community. In 1287 Il-khan
Arghun, perhaps assuming that Rabban Sauma’s belief in Christianity would ensure a
cordial reception in the West, sent him to propose still another joint military campaign
with the Europeans against the Mamluks.

Rabban Sauma had audiences with the Byzantine Emperor in Constantinople, King
Edward I of England in Bordeaux, King Philip IV (the Fair) of France in Paris, and Pope
Nicholas IV in Rome, and Rabban believed that he had an entente for a Crusade against
the Mamluks. However, he turned out to be overly optimistic. Edward I faced unrest in
Wales while Philip IV confronted hostilities with the Holy Roman Empire and Aragon,
together with unsettled relationships with the papacy and Edward I, which led to a war
with the king of England from 1294 to 1298. The Europeans also did not entirely trust
the Mongols. Rabban Sauma, whose mission could have influenced the course of world
history but did not, did write a valuable work about his journeys, which yields one of
the few early Eastern conceptions of Europe.

The Il-khans persisted in maintaining excellent relations with the Yuan dynasty, a
relationship that proved to be vital for global interchanges. The two segments of the
Mongol domains traded with each other by sea and land. They exchanged silk, copper,
and pearls among other goods, and they each dispatched official envoys to the other’s
court. Even more important, Iranians and Arabs reached China, and a few Chinese
arrived in the Il-khanate. The ensuing cultural diffusion was striking. Chinese
physicians arrived in the Il-khanate and treated several members of the Mongol court.
Il-khanate ministers ordered the Iranian translation of a Chinese medical text. Some
West Asians learned about the reputedly curative powers, mostly for gastrointestinal
disturbances, of Chinese rhubarb (dahuang or “big yellow”), a plant destined to become
a vital commodity in the seventeenth- to nineteenth-century Sino-Russian trade.
Chinese seeds and plants, including rice, were introduced into West Asian agriculture
and contributed to Iranian and Middle Eastern cuisine. Conversely, West Asian maps
appear to have influenced Chinese and Korean conceptions of Eurasia. Yuan court
officials recruited Muslim and Nestorian Christian doctors, and Khubilai established an
Institute of Muslim Astronomy to secure Iranian and Muslim expertise. Yet Chinese and
Iranian astronomy, medicine, and agronomy retained their own native identities and
did not become replicas of the theories and practices of the other culture.

When Ghazan became Il-khan in 1295, he developed new policies that altered his
commercial, cultural, and technological relations with the Yuan dynasty. Having
converted to Islam, Ghazan assumed the title of “Sultan” and ordered that Arabic script
be used on coinage, an important concession to his subjects. He maintained contact
with the Mongol rulers of China, but his new titles indicated that he no longer
perceived himself to be subordinate to the Great Khan. His destruction of some
Nestorian churches and Buddhist monasteries and his growing dependence on Muslim
bureaucrats charted a policy that differed from the Yuan’s multiethnic and
multireligious officialdom. On the other hand, his conversion to Islam did not end the
conflict with the Mamluks, his co-religionists. Each side presented itself as the true
defender of Islam, and the Mamluks questioned Ghazan’s true faith.

Because Rashid al-Din’s history, the most important contemporary source, portrayed
Ghazan in an extraordinarily positive light, a balanced assessment of his reign is
difficult. Depicted as a reformer, Ghazan first instituted a campaign against corruption.
Differing from traditional Mongols who favored nomadic pastoralism, he sought to
support Iranian peasants by providing useful information on agriculture, by
construction of irrigation works, and by devising reduced and regular taxes rather than
the capricious and oppressive taxes levied in earlier reigns. He also attempted to
promote trade by standardizing the coinage system and weights and measures. Whether
these reforms were actually implemented is difficult to determine.

Ghazan was compelled to abandon an attempt to adopt the Chinese system of paper
money, which would have required merchants to turn over their precious metals to the
government in return for paper currency. Merchants, who believed that this policy was
a transparent government effort to confiscate truly valuable gold and silver and thus
give worthless paper to them, rebuffed the Il-khanate and actually forced the court to
abandon this policy. The Il-khanate’s lack of success attests to the power of Iranian
merchants, who played a vital role in linking Europe to East Asia.

Although Rashid al-Din probably overstates the originality and impact of Ghazan’s
reforms, the sultan was no doubt an ardent supporter of Islam, including the Sufi
orders. He built mosques, emphasized Islamic law and the Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca,
and advocated the public reciting of the Koran. He also constructed an Islamic
mausoleum for himself in a complex that housed two schools, a law center, a mosque, a
hospital, a library, and a fountain and pool. According to Rashid al-Din’s hagiographic
account, Ghazan was well versed in astronomy, medicine, and natural history.
However, he achieved lasting fame by commissioning Rashid al-Din to write a history
of the Mongols, which grew in to the first attempt at global history.
Chapter 5
The Mongols and the world: part 2

Although the Golden Horde was the longest-lived of the Mongol khanates, few
Mongols actually reached Russia. Mongol khans depended on their Turkic military
forces and underlings to conquer Russia and administer the domain. Many of the
Mongol invaders wound up in the southern Russian steppes and retained their pastoral
nomadic society. Turkic commanders, Russian leaders, and the settled population were
granted considerable freedom as long as they sent taxes and provided laborers for the
Mongol khans. The relatively small footprint of the Mongols in the Golden Horde
territories would appear to signify limited impact on Russia, but their influence, both
deliberate and inadvertent, turned out to be significant. However, most Russians
considered Mongol rule as the era of the Tatar yoke, a disastrous epoch in their
history.

Russia under the Golden Horde

From 1237 to 1241 Mongol forces plundered and devastated cities in Russia, but the
traditional Russian narrative of total destruction of these towns is exaggerated. The
large number of wooden buildings in Russia led to great damage during the initial
Mongol assaults and contributed to the image of the Mongols as destroyers who caused
havoc. But by the time of their attack on Russia and eastern Europe, many Mongol
leaders had recognized that indiscriminate razing of towns and cities was
counterproductive. They began to realize that maintenance and reconstruction of these
centers would generate significant revenues once trade and the rest of the economy had
recovered from the initial assaults. Thus a balanced appraisal would acknowledge great
destruction in some cities that resisted the Mongols but would also notice that other
towns and cities did not suffer significant damage. Estimates of the numbers killed are
generally unreliable.

Batu, Jochi’s son and Chinggis Khan’s grandson, was the supreme commander of the
Russian campaign and was recognized as a great leader. However, Sübötei, a renowned
general, was often in charge of the campaigns and led the forces in battle. Much of his
success was based on the lack of unity in Russia, which consisted of various states and
peoples without a central governing authority. The Mongols faced weaker small and
independent principalities, which facilitated their conquests. Batu established a capital
city in Sarai, not far from the mouth of the Volga River. He was determined to rule his
new territories in the upper Volga lands, the territories west of the Ural Mountains, the
eventual dividing line between Western Russia and Siberia, and the northern Caucasus,
among other areas.

Once he settled in Sarai in 1245, he started to register the population in order to levy
taxes and tribute, and to impose other obligations. However, it was an abbreviated and
incomplete registration because he did not have a sufficient number of skilled
administrators to devise an accurate and reliable system. Although most of his troops
remained in the steppelands, outside the Russian centers, and did not impose
themselves on their Russian subjects, Batu dispatched resident representatives (basqaq)
to the important towns and cities to ensure the regular transmission of taxes to the
Mongol leadership.

Nonetheless, two years elapsed before the relatively less experienced officials, facing
considerable opposition from the Russian principalities, completed the registration. The
census turned out to be more comprehensive than Batu’s initial registration, and only
the clergy received tax-exempt status. The Golden Horde could now levy appropriate
taxes on agriculture, crafts, and commerce, recruit soldiers, and allocate corvée (forced
labor) obligations, including the staffing of postal stations. Although the Golden Horde
khans initially employed private tax collectors who sought to extract as much revenue
as they could, they eventually determined that this policy antagonized the population.
They then started to use government officials to collect taxes.

Berke, who succeeded his brother Batu as khan, shaped the Golden Horde’s policies for
many years. He had converted to Islam, one factor that led to wars with the Mongols in
Iran. Territorial and economic disputes were more critical than differing religions in
explaining Berke’s conflict with the Il-khanate, but their differing religions cannot be
discounted as a factor. They competed over Azerbaijan, and Berke resented the
establishment of the Il-khan’s presence in an area he considered part of the lands
Chinggis Khan had granted to his father, Jochi. Thus he often allied himself with the
Mamluks, his fellow Muslims, who had been in conflict with the Il-khans since 1259.
His own successor also remained hostile to his Mongol cousins in Iran and the Middle
East.

While the conflict with the Il-khanate persisted, the Golden Horde rulers in Russia
started to promote commerce in their lands. Their capital in Sarai revealed their
support for an urban economy, not merely the pastoral nomadic lifestyle to which they
were accustomed. They accorded merchants greater respect than in earlier times and
started to mint their own coins. The cities of Kaffa, based upon Genoese trade; Tana,
based upon Venetian trade; Urgench; and eventually Moscow grew and prospered as
well. By the early fourteenth century, about 140 towns had been established.

The policies the Golden Horde adopted resembled those of the Mongol domains in East
Asia and the Middle East. By supporting commerce, they obtained silk, porcelain, and
glass, among other goods, and exported their own manufactured products, including
golden objects. Such commerce placed them in a Eurasian network, leading to trade
with peoples in northern Europe, Poland, the Italian city-states, and southern Europe,
and as far away as China. Like Mongol rulers elsewhere, the Golden Horde recruited
native and Iranian craftsmen, and artisans catered to the tastes of the rulers. As a
result, craftsmanship in gold and other metals, ceramics, jewelry, and tile work reached
a high standard.

The Golden Horde also tolerated and assisted foreign religions. Batu’s grandson
Möngke Temür (r. 1267–80) recognized the Russian Orthodox Church and exempted its
abbots and priests from taxation. Even with the conversion of numerous Mongols to
Islam in the early fourteenth century, the government did not discriminate against the
Church. Despite such Golden Horde support, the Church opposed Mongol rule.

By the early fourteenth century, the growing number of Muslims among the Golden
Horde leaders and the similar conversions of Ghazan and other Il-khans laid the
foundations for a brief period in which the conflict between the two Mongol domains
ended. The Golden Horde khan Tokhta (r. 1291–1312) and Öljeitü, his counterpart in
Iran, cemented a peaceful relationship, although they each claimed Azerbaijan as part
of their own domains. The two rulers did not necessarily create a totally harmonious
relationship, but the temporary cessation of hostilities benefited both. In the Golden
Horde, it set the stage for the height of Mongol rule with the accession of Tokhta’s
nephew Özbeg (r. 1313–41). An ardent Muslim, Özbeg fostered trade, patronized the
arts, and built new cities, resulting in prosperity for officials, merchants, and artisans.
However, conflicts with the Il-khanate resumed during his reign, and commercial
disputes with the Genoese marred the previously amicable relations.

Tumult in Central Asia

The khanate in Central Asia, which Chinggis Khan bequeathed to his son Chaghadai
Khan, is the least well studied of the Mongol-ruled regions, and, in some ways the least
stable and most contentious. Consisting of pastoral nomads and urban dwellers in
oases, supported by a rudimentary agricultural economy, the region played a vital role
in Silk Roads trade. Throughout the era of Mongol rule, more and more of the area’s
inhabitants converted to Islam. Chinggis had conquered the area, but Ögödei and
Chaghadai sought to administer this domain. Ögödei appointed a Muslim named
Mahmud Yalavach to restore the region’s economy, which had been devastated during
the Mongol invasions. Mahmud Yalavach fixed the irrigation networks along the Amu
Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, which were the lifeblood of the Central Asian oases and
towns. Once Samarkand, Bukhara, and other towns had been restored, trade along the
Silk Roads, via Central Asia, could be regenerated. By the mid-1230s, with agriculture
and commerce reviving, Mahmud Yalavach began to impose regular taxes and to
provide a steady stream of revenues for the khanate. Despite his success, he aroused the
Chaghadai Khan’s enmity because he was Ögödei’s representative. In 1239, Ögödei,
reacting to his brother Chaghadai’s objections, dismissed Mahmud Yalavach. Yet
Ögödei then appointed Mahmud’s son Masud Beg as his representative in Central Asia.
The new appointee maintained a relatively low profile and served in a variety of
positions until his death in 1289, continuing the valuable economic policies initiated by
his father.

However, the same success did not characterize the Chaghadai khanate’s other policies.
By the 1270s, its leaders were at war on a number of fronts. Ögödei’s grandson Khaidu
persuaded the weak reigning khan to challenge Khubilai Khan over grazing and
camping rights in modern Xinjiang, the border between the two khanates. A three-
decades struggle persisted until Khaidu’s death in 1301. Because Khubilai had the
resources of China at his command, the wars did not devastate his dynasty. The
Chaghadai khanate did not have the same resources and was indeed harmed by the
wars.

The khanate was also bedeviled by internal conflicts among various claimants to the
title of “Khan,” including the descendants of Chaghadai and Khaidu. Nonetheless, by
the 1320s, it compelled the Yuan dynasty to abandon parts of Xinjiang. But it had
incurred extraordinary expenses in the campaigns. Simultaneously, it fought over
territory with the Il-khans of West Asia, contributing to additional difficulties for itself.
The almost continuous warfare harmed the agriculture that sustained the towns and the
Silk Roads trade, which also relied upon the oases in the region. A series of weak and
ineffective khans added to disarray in the Central Asian khanate. By the 1370s, the
khanate was vulnerable, a vulnerability which the great conqueror Tamerlane
capitalized on to conquer the region in the latter part of the fourteenth century,
although he retained the khan as a figurehead.

The Mongols and Europe

Western Europeans, including the monarchs, the pope, and merchants, learned quickly
about the Mongol invasions in Russia, Hungary, and Poland from 1237 to 1241 and
were concerned about a possible strike against their own lands. In 1245, Pope Innocent
IV convened the Council of Lyons to devise a unified European response. After
discovering from Europeans in the Middle East that the invaders from the East would
not harm official envoys, the assembled leaders dispatched several embassies to the
Mongols. The pope sent two letters, via the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini, leader of
one of the embassies, to implore the Mongols to refrain from attacking Christian lands
and to convert to Christianity. John first reached the Golden Horde’s capital in Sarai
and then set forth on a long journey to the newly enthroned Great Khan Güyüg’s court
in Mongolia.
Güyüg, who was offended by the pope’s missive, responded with a letter of his own,
rejecting conversion to Christianity and demanding that the pope and the European
monarchs submit. He wrote that “thou in person at the head of the kings, you must all
together at once come to do homage to Us. … And if you do not accept God’s command
and act contrary to Our command We shall regard you as enemies.” John’s mission did
not produce the desired results; the Mongols did not convert to Christianity nor did
they pledge to make peace with the Europeans. However, the report he submitted to
the Vatican more than compensated for the failure of his mission by providing
information about the Mongols’ military and culture. The pope and the European
monarchs were interested in his accounts of Mongol tactics and weaponry, which he
gleaned from his own observations and the reports of others, and later historians have
appreciated his descriptions of Mongol customs, lifestyle, and rituals. His
condescending report revealed that the Mongols did not use tablecloths or napkins and
did not wash their dishes, which he found uncouth and barbaric. He wrote that his
Mongol hosts were quick to execute their own people or foreigners who poured out or
wasted milk or food, or who killed young birds.

European monarchs and leaders, some of whom, like the earlier Crusaders, were eager
to recapture the Holy Lands, continued to exchange embassies with the Mongols in
Russia and Iran in the late 1240s and early 1250s, and the Franciscan William of
Rubruck was the most prominent European to reach the Mongol court. With support
from King Louis IX of France, William arrived in the Mongol capital, but he scarcely
secured a pledge from the Mongols not to persist in their military campaigns. Indeed
his conversations with Möngke were not entirely amiable. He even debated clerics
representing other religions in Möngke’s court and was the first European to write
extensively and derisively about the Nestorians among the Mongols.

Portraying these “heretical” Christians as ignorant and unduly influential over Mongol
policies, he accused them of prescribing and dispensing probably harmful potions to
the khan and his court. The account he brought back to Europe and offered to King
Louis provided valuable information about Mongol food, religions (including
shamanism and Buddhism), and clothing. He described, in some detail, the process of
making comos (in Mongolian airagh) and expressed his disgust with the enormous
quantities of liquor the Mongols consumed. Yet he was impressed with Mongol women
who drove the wagons, milked the yaks, made shoes and clothing, cared for the
animals, and produced felt. Similarly, he commented positively on the beautiful objects
at the court, including the khan’s elaborate throne overlaid with gold.

Hülegü’s invasions of 1256 to 1259 and his occupation of West Asia meant that the
Mongols needed only to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. The Mamluk
defeat of the small force that Hülegü left behind in Ayn Jalut when he traveled
eastward to participate in the election of a new Great Khan persuaded him and later Il-
khans that they needed allies in their struggle with the Mamluk rulers of Egypt.
Exchanges back and forth between Hülegü’s Il-khanate and the Crusader states in the
Holy Lands and Syria did not lead to an alliance because the Europeans did not trust
the invaders from the East. Images of the Mongols as anti-Christ and as barbarians
caused them to reject any entente against the Mamluks. Yet the Il-khans, particularly
Hülegü’s son Abakha, turned to Europe, dispatching several embassies to propose a
concerted attack against their common Islamic enemy. His immediate successors
persisted in the policy of seeking an alliance, but their efforts did not translate into a
specific agreement.

Later Il-khanate missions met the same fate. The unenthusiastic response for an entente
reflected, in part, the lack of European unity. Conflicts among the various European
leaders subverted calls for a Crusade, which would cooperate with the Mongols in a
sustained campaign against the Mamluks. The Holy Roman Empire’s hostility toward
the popes, a rebellion in Wales against King Edward I of England, and ongoing tensions
between the English monarch and King Philip IV all precluded joint alliances against
the most important Muslim state in the region. Nor were European leaders persuaded
of the Mongols’ trustworthiness. Some believed that the Mongols would turn against
them once the Mamluks had been defeated. After all, the Eastern invaders had earlier
encroached upon Poland and Hungary and had invaded much of Russia. They seemed
bent on continual conquests. What would prevent them from unleashing an assault on
their erstwhile allies? The fear of betrayal caused Europeans to be cautious about any
collaboration with the Mongols. Without such Mongol assistance, however, the
Crusader European states in Palestine and Syria were vulnerable. In 1291 the Mamluks
overwhelmed Acre, ending European control, though not presence, in the region.

The debacle at Acre did not exclude Europeans from the area and did not totally
undermine European relations and contact with the Mongols. Europeans, including the
Venetians and the Genoese, continued to trade with the Mongols, a commerce that had
become important starting in the middle of the thirteenth century. By the 1260s, these
European traders had reached all the way to China. Because contemporaries paid scant
attention to merchants’ activities, firsthand reports about commercial transactions—
quantities, prices, and conditions—are scarce. But Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, a
fourteenth-century Florentine merchant who never set foot in Asia, wrote a fine
description of voyages from Europe to China, which provided information about
commodity prices, the specific numbers of men and animals required for a caravan, and
the distances between towns and oases. Marco Polo and other travelers reported that
merchants could find silk, spices, cloth of gold (nasij,) furs, mercury, precious stones,
and aromatics en route. Venetian and Genoese traders continued to trade with China
until the middle of the fourteenth century, when the Il-khanate ended and the Yuan
dynasty faced rebellions. Despite occasional conflicts, Genoese merchants continued to
trade with Russia for furs, hides, and slaves until the early to mid-fifteenth century
when the Golden Horde declined and the Black Death engulfed Europe.

Marco Polo was the most famous traveler and merchant to journey to China. Marco’s
father, Niccolo Polo, and his uncle, Maffeo Polo, had reached Khubilai Khan’s court in
the early 1260s. Before they returned home to Venice, Khubilai requested that they
bring back oil from the Holy Sepulcher and one hundred learned Christians.
Supposedly, they were to assist in converting his people to Christianity, although a
likelier motivation is that he wanted these educated Christians to serve as officials in
ruling China. Instead, in 1275 they returned with Marco, who, in fact, served the khan
during the next sixteen years.

Marco’s account of his adventures and observations, which he recounted while in a

Genoese prison to a storyteller named Rusticello who transcribed it, is one of the most
renowned books in world literature. His work spurred Samuel Taylor Coleridge to write
the poem “Kubla Khan,” which included a fantastic version of the khan’s “pleasure
dome” in Shangdu or what the poet called “Xanadu.” Marco’s descriptions of Shangdu,
the use of coal for heating, paper money, the well-maintained roads, the military
campaigns in Manchuria and Southeast Asia, and trade and merchants tally with those
found in the Chinese histories. His awestruck portrait of Hangzhou, the world’s most
populated city, was especially noteworthy. Its canals, its spectacular location on the
West Lake, and its restaurants offering the finest in Chinese cuisine captivated him.
Although Marco inflated his own role at Khubilai’s court and failed to mention such
distinctive aspects of Chinese culture as the Chinese written language, tea, and bound
feet in his account, he did indeed reach China.

The tangible and immediate impact of Marco’s and other merchants’ and clerics’ trips
to the Mongol world may have been limited, but the cumulative influence over a longer
period of time was more substantial. Many Europeans initially did not believe Marco’s
descriptions of his voyages, but his account stimulated European adventurers and
explorers to seek seaborne routes to East and South Asia. Indeed, Christopher Columbus
had a copy of the text on his momentous journeys and believed that his ships were
headed toward the East.

8. Khubilai Khan, portrayed with Western features, meets with Marco Polo’s
father and uncle in this European depiction. Like nearly all Europeans, the artist
had never seen an East Asian.
Because Europeans wanted to obtain East and South Asian products transmitted by the
Mongols, they sought and eventually discovered a sea route to Asia. Even before this
discovery and just as ships began to reach South and East Asia, Islamic states, which
were even closer to Europe, had an artistic impact on the West. In the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, Middle Eastern motifs and technology influenced Venetian
glassware and painting. Both the Islamic world and Europeans cherished Chinese
porcelain, which started to reach the Middle East during the Mongol era.

By the sixteenth century, the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul housed a collection of about
twelve thousand Chinese porcelains. Simultaneously, European demand for Chinese
porcelains grew, and the wealthy began to crave and decorate their houses with such
export ware. European paintings confirm both the presence and the value accorded
Chinese porcelains.

The interchanges between the Mongol world and the West may also have had a
devastating effect on Europe. Some historians assert that the Mongols, who may have
been exposed to the plague in Southwest China and Southeast Asia, may have
transmitted it westward, leading to the Black Death in Europe. Evidence for this claim
derives from a description of what appears to have been the plague in a Mongol
encampment in Turkey. Commerce along the Silk Roads, the diseased rodents
accompanying travelers, and the ensuing relations among civilizations, which the
Mongols encouraged, may have contributed to the spread of the plague. Yet more
specific textual accounts are needed to definitively link the Mongols to the plague and
the Black Death.

Within three generations, the Mongols had engaged with the principal Eurasian
civilizations. They had conquered China, Russia, Central Asia, and much of the Middle
East, had failed to vanquish Japan, Java, and Egypt, and had established generally
amicable relations with Europe. Granting paizas (or passports granting safe passage
through the vast Mongol domains), made of silver, gold, or other metals, to foreign
merchants, missionaries, and envoys, they facilitated travel and interactions among
civilizations.
Chapter 6
The Mongols and arts and culture

The Mongol rulers not only promoted relations among civilizations, but also supported
specific aspects of the cultures of the lands they conquered. They championed Tibetan
Buddhism and the Sufi orders of Islam, and acted as patrons for Chinese painters and
playwrights, Iranian historians, and Russian goldsmiths. To be sure, such support often
accompanied a political agenda. The Mongol rulers rapidly recognized that the
Chinese, Persians, Russians, and the other peoples they governed demonstrated great
pride in their religions and cultures. Mongol patronage would offer a patina of
legitimacy among their subjects. It could also win over clerics, artisans, and artists and
could establish a link with earlier, native rulers. The khans and the Mongol elites also
craved beautiful and luxurious products. Even in their relatively simple households in
the steppes, they had appreciated adornments for themselves and for their horses,
including Chinese silks and their own gold objects. Naturally, their destruction of
Russian churches, mosques in Baghdad, and Chinese imperial tombs have not and
cannot be ignored, but their contributions to art and culture have not generally
received much attention.

Yuan renaissance in culture and arts

In his domain, Khubilai first made efforts to cement relations with Muslims because he
needed them to assist in administering China. They had invaluable skills as tax
collectors and financial administrators, and Khubilai attempted to recruit Central Asian
and Persian Muslims by offering them special privileges, including rule by their own
leaders and judges. He provided funds for the construction of mosques and even
appointed Saiyid Ajall Shams al-Din, a Muslim from Central Asia, as the governor of
the newly conquered province of Yunnan. Muslim merchants, whom he needed to
maintain trade along the Silk Roads, physicians, astronomers, and craftsmen flocked to
China as a result of these favorable policies.
Khubilai was entranced by Buddhism, although he never practiced any specific religion.
A Chan (or, in Japanese, Zen) monk had instructed him in the precepts of Buddhism,
and Khubilai had given his first son a Tibetan name, probably due to his contacts with
Tibetan Buddhists. He quickly recognized that Tibetan Buddhism was the optimal form
of the religion for the Mongols. Its emphasis on magic and esoteric transmission of its
message and, most important, its approval of political involvement could provide
justification for his accession to power. Khubilai had also invited ‘Phags-pa Lama, a
Tibetan Buddhist, to join his court and instruct his wife Chabi. In 1260 he appointed
the Tibetan cleric to a new position as State Preceptor, or teacher, and early the
following year he named ‘Phags-pa as the head of the Buddhist clergy. ‘Phags-pa
recompensed his benefactor by proclaiming him to be a reincarnation of Manjusri, the
Boddhisattva of Wisdom, and offering him the title of Chakravartin, or “Universal
King,” a post vital for Khubilai’s standing with Buddhists. Later ‘Phags-pa proposed the
initiation of court rituals associated with Buddhism, and Khubilai himself sought to win
over Buddhists by not only providing them with tax-exempt status and donating
substantial sums for the construction of monasteries and temples but also the
production of ritual objects and sculptures.

The Mongols had always prized the works of good craftsmen. Their appreciation of
beautiful and useful objects provided Khubilai with the opportunity he needed to
support the arts in China. Yet he had to sponsor cultural projects that transcended any
specific land within the Mongol-governed territories. Too close an identification with
Chinese culture could be as damaging as overly enthusiastic promotion of his Mongol
heritage.

His approach toward the official written language to be used in his empire revealed his
effort to portray himself as a universal ruler of a multicultural and multilinguistic
domain. He recognized that a serviceable written language was essential for the
operations of a great civilization. His grandfather Chinggis Khan had commissioned the
development of a Mongol written language based on the Uyghur script. However,
Khubilai, with his aspirations for universal rule, needed a script that could also be used
to transcribe Chinese, among other languages, and to represent the Chinese sounds of
the names, titles, and offices in China. The Uyghur script was simply unsuitable for the
accurate transcription of Chinese. Moreover, Khubilai planned to use the official script
to help unify his realm and sought to employ it to transcribe diverse languages.

He commissioned the ‘Phags-pa Lama to develop a new script, which the Tibetan cleric
presented to the court in 1269. Delighted with this alphabet, which was, in truth,
ideally suited to transcribe numerous languages in his domain, Khubilai ordered that it
be used in court documents and as the main written language in his empire, referring
to it as the “State Script.” Despite his efforts and his repeated admonitions, the ‘Phags-
pa alphabet never replaced the Uyghur script or the Chinese characters. It proved to be
difficult to induce the Chinese or the Mongols, for that matter, to use the script. Thus
most of the surviving ‘Phags-pa writings are inscriptions on paizas or passports, paper
money, seals, and porcelains.

The Mongols and Khubilai were also ardent patrons of Chinese drama. Theater
blossomed during this time, with the growth of cities in the Song and Yuan dynasties
providing a propitious environment for a golden age of drama. Theatrical troupes
mounted performances consisting of singing, dancing, pantomime, and acrobatics,
which appealed to a mass audience, including the Mongols. Khubilai himself invited
several of these troupes to perform at court and provided support for some playwrights.
However, he and his Mongol underlings ought not to be credited with the development
and successes of Yuan theater. The Chinese playwrights were responsible for their own
artistic creations. Yet the Mongols offered financial assistance to theatrical productions,
and Khubilai built stages in the imperial palace compound.
9. This passport, made of iron with silver inlay, permitted unhindered travel
throughout the Mongol domains. It was written in the new script developed by
the Tibetan monk ‘Phags-pa.

The Mongols also offered considerable support to Chinese painters. Some painters,
especially in South China, resolutely refused any collaboration with their Mongol
overlords and became recluses, and a few turned to the acceptable Confucian outlet of
painting. A few, such as the revered Zheng Sixiao, employed symbols in their painting
as a means of indirectly criticizing the Mongols. Some painters and calligraphers
received Mongol patronage, though, and had the leisure time to produce splendid
works. Khubilai appointed Zhao Mengfu, the greatest Yuan painter, to a position in the
Ministry of War and chose Li Kan, a renowned painter of bamboo, to be Minister of
Personnel. Both were permitted considerable free time to paint and to produce fine
calligraphy. The reign of the Renzong emperor (1312–20) witnessed the height of court
patronage and the commissioning of imperial portraits.
Another Mongol influence on painting was in the choice of subjects. Animals, in
particular, often served as motifs in paintings. It is no accident that one of Zhao
Mengfu’s most famous works is the Sheep and Goat (now in the Freer Gallery of Art in
Washington, D.C.). Zhou sought, in part, to appeal to his patrons, and his numerous
depictions of horses gained him devotees among the Mongol elite. Zhao’s son Zhao
Yong and grandson Zhao Lin, who both served as government officials, followed their
brilliant forebear into careers or sidelines as painters and used horses as symbols of
good governance.

Greater opportunities for women also played a role in Chinese painting. When the
Mongols occupied China, a few elite women artists capitalized on the conquerors’ more
liberal attitudes toward women to come to the fore with their work. Guan Daosheng,
Zhao Mengfu’s wife, was the best loved of these painters, and thirty-three works
attributed to her have been preserved in such major collections as the Osaka Municipal
Museum, the Yale University Art Gallery, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the
Museum of Fine Arts in Boston. Her exquisite and detailed paintings of birds and
flowers appealed to the Mongol khans who often idealized nature and the countryside.
Sengge Ragi, one of Khubilai Khan’s great granddaughters, was an ardent admirer of
Chinese painting and contributed quite a number of art works to the Imperial Palace
collections.

The Mongols prized and supported the Chinese porcelain industry, partly because it
was a source of revenue. Mongol officials acted as superintendents of the blue-and-
white porcelain center at Jingdezhen, and acted as intermediaries between Chinese
potters and their West Asian consumers. Both Chinese and Middle Easterners offered
markets for these ceramics. The Mongols ensured that the porcelains exported to West
Asia catered to the Middle Eastern clientele, as they alerted Chinese potters to West
Asian tastes, conveying information about the shapes and decorative motifs that would
appeal to potential customers from these distant lands. They instructed the Chinese to
produce massive plates because Middle Easterners characteristically placed their food
on such large plates, from which each diner ladled his repast to his own bowl. Mongol
managers in porcelain factories also described Middle Easterners’ preference for
elaborate depictions of plants, fish, animals, fruits, and even the quintessential Chinese
motif of a dragon rather than unadorned plates and jars. As a result, the Topkapi
collection in Istanbul has forty blue-and-white porcelains deriving from the fourteenth
century, and the Ardebil Shrine in Iran houses thirty-two.

In addition, the Mongols contributed to the renaissance of Chinese textiles. Mongol

khans compelled Central Asian communities of weavers to move to China and its
borders to interact with Chinese weavers, leading to the production of the “cloth of
gold” (nasij) textiles that the Mongols prized. Weavers catered to Mongols’ taste and
used gold thread to produce clothing, banners, Buddhist mandalas, and tent ornaments.
The Mongols themselves took steps to foster the development of luxury textiles. More
than half of the agencies they founded in the Ministry of Works supervised the
production of textiles, and the foreign weavers introduced Central Asian and Islamic
motifs into Chinese textiles. Both male and female weavers had numerous privileges
and enjoyed a higher status than in any other previous dynasty. It is thus no accident
that the Mongols influenced and contributed to the technical and aesthetic advances in
textiles during this era.

The Mongols’ major construction projects, such as the building of the cities of Shangdu
and Daidu, also invigorated crafts. Khubilai recruited numerous foreign artisans, one of
whom was Aniko, a talented Nepalese whom the ‘Phags-pa Lama recommended to the
Mongol emperor. Aniko constructed Buddhist and Daoist temples, a White Stupa in
Daidu, and a variety of astronomical instruments. He also may have painted portraits of
Khubilai and his wife Chabi.

In short, the Mongols had more than a passive role in the efflorescence of Yuan art.
Because Mongols were consumers of some of the products, artists and craftsmen needed
to cater to their tastes, which in turn influenced their motifs and subjects (such as
horses). The Mongols’ control over much of Asia and their movement of artisans from
one region of their empire to another resulted in considerable diffusion of motifs and
technologies. Aware of foreigners’ tastes, they also provided guidance to craftsmen who
wished to trade their objects with the outside world. The Yuan government offered tax
exemptions and freedom from forced labor for artisans, and established numerous
official agencies for the promotion of crafts. It offered official appointments for artists
and craftsmen in order to support their work. And the Mongols preserved the objects
that were produced—in part, through the Imperial Palace Collection.

Iranian arts and culture under the Mongols

Despite the threats from the Golden Horde and Chaghadai khanates, the Mamluks, and
a sometimes restive Iranian population, the Il-Khan Hülegü was an ardent patron of
cultural developments. Like his brother Khubilai, he recognized the importance of
learning and especially provided support to a new astronomical observatory at
Maragha. His court was receptive to Iranian poetry and art, leading to considerable
cultural and artistic development.

Iranian art of the Il-khanate era displayed the impact of Mongol rule. The Mongols
themselves were not the calligraphers and painters whose writings and images adorned
the Iranian illustrated manuscripts, and nor were they the weavers who fashioned the
Central Asian and Chinese textiles. All of these beautiful works were produced by the
native inhabitants. However, the Mongols played significant roles in their creation, for
they transmitted Chinese textiles and paintings and introduced West Asians to Chinese
motifs. Such typical Chinese designs as the dragon and phoenix began to appear in
Iranian tile work and in illustrated manuscripts.

The scenes portrayed in many of the manuscripts, including the Shahnama (Book of
Kings), the Iranian national epic; the Jami al-tavarikh (Compendium of Chronicles), the
world history written by Rashid al-Din; and natural histories all derived from Chinese
landscape painting. The depictions of trees, so-called cloud collars, and mountains
resemble Chinese depictions of nature. Decorative motifs on the ceramic star and cross
tiles from the Il-khanate’s summer palace, the Takht-i Sulaiman, reflect Chinese
influence in the form, once again, of dragons and phoenixes, which reflect royal power
and symbols.

Yet the tiles portray stories from the Shahnama, which thus links the Mongols to their
Iranian subjects and was significant in bolstering Mongol legitimacy to rule in Iran.
Several surviving Iranian ceramics imitate Chinese celadon ware and incorporate such
Chinese motifs as lotuses and peonies, plants not indigenous to Iran. The horse
trappings and belt ornaments produced by Iranian artisans surely catered to Mongol
clients, and even brass candlesticks and incense burners, used in religious ceremonies,
had images of Mongols. The frequent use of blue, which represents the Mongols’
Eternal Sky, in tiles and illustrations reveals the conquerors’ influence. In short, Il-
khanate art reflects the globalization of the Mongol empire and simultaneously the
Mongols’ adoption of Chinese, pre-Islamic and Islamic Iranian, and Mongol symbols to
legitimize themselves and to facilitate rule over a diverse population.

Rashid al-Din is doubtless the chief representative of this extraordinary Il-khanate

culture. A Jewish apothecary’s son, he became a physician. As a relatively young man,
he converted to Islam. Recruited into government, he climbed up the bureaucratic
ladder to become the vizier or Chief Minister. However, it was his extrapolitical
activities that revealed remarkable talents and skills. Rashid al-Din had multiple
interests and wrote essays on subjects ranging from theology to agriculture. His
fascination with Chinese culture prompted him to support translations of a Chinese
medical text into Persian and to learn about Chinese calligraphy and painting.
However, the Compendium of Chronicles was his most notable enterprise. The Il-khan
Ghazan, concerned that his Mongols subjects’ distance from the center of Mongol
culture had begun to erode their link with their heritage, had ordered Rashid al-Din to
write a history of the Mongols. With the encouragement of a later Il-khan, Rashid al-
Din expanded this assignment to include histories of the Turks, pre-Islamic Iran, the
rise of Islam, the Jews, the Franks (that is, Europeans), the Indians, and the Chinese, as
well as a section on geography. On completion of his manuscript, he provided funds to
his charitable endowment to produce one copy in Iranian and one in Arabic every year,
which helped to preserve various sections of his text. Commissioned illustrations of the
manuscript complemented and enriched his text. No doubt he had failings, as some
sources accuse him of nepotism and corruption. Yet his contributions to Iranian and
global culture cannot be discounted.

Russian and Central Asian crafts

The original invasions of Russia devastated some cities and resulted in the collapse of
such crafts as cloisonné work. Yet, like other parts of the Mongol domains, the Golden
Horde rapidly showed its interest in a revival of crafts. The khans, princes, and
merchants sought everyday utensils as well as elaborate clothing, headgear, and
jewelry. Their desire for lustrous and sparkling objects, including everything from belts
to goblets, mandated the use of gold and silver. Moreover, emblems and symbols on
objects served to legitimize their rule while specific Mongol motifs, the Eternal Blue
Sky and symbols of the universe, helped preserve Mongol traditions. As the economy
revived and towns developed in the Golden Horde territories, the inhabitants built
mosques, churches, public baths, houses, and markets. Some artisans, influenced by
their Islamic faith, fashioned mosaics in yellow, red, and blue with Arabic calligraphy,
glass windows, and tiles. Özbeg Khan, a convert to Islam, ordered construction of a
palace that used blue tiles and mosaics, and had a wooden throne covered in silver and
precious stones.

The pace of craft production accelerated with the development of towns. Artisans
rapidly catered to the tastes of Mongols and their Turkic subordinates by creating
elaborately decorated saddles and belts, leather pouches, bags, and baskets, and rings,
bracelets, and earrings. They also fashioned ceramic cups, plates, and pitchers, as well
as objects made of bone.

Again, like other parts of the Mongol domains, the Golden Horde profited from the
travels of artisans and objects throughout Eurasia. Craftsmen readily assimilated
Chinese, Byzantine, Iranian, Arabic, and Central Asian motifs into their works. Potters
painted lotuses, peonies, and fantastic and real animals—symbols that were
quintessentially Chinese—on ceramics. Treasure troves of Chinese silk have been found
along the Don and in the Northern Caucasus. Weavers borrowed a variety of Chinese,
Iranian, and Central Asian motifs, attesting to the globalization and artistic diffusion of
the Mongol era. The images of the cloud collar, the dragon chasing a fiery pearl, the
peony, the goose, and the phoenix derived from China while the deer and does, the
gazelle, the parrot, and the feline predators originated in Central Asia and Iranian arts.

The Chaghadai Khanate inherited a long-standing tradition of artisanship and a large

group of talented craftsmen in Central Asia. These artisans were proficient in metal
work and mural painting, but the Mongols prized especially their skills as weavers.
Textiles were portable and could thus easily fit into the Mongol lifestyles of continuous
mobility. Mongol rulers and patrons were therefore particularly solicitous of weavers
and offered special benefits and a higher status. To improve the quality of the Chinese
textiles and to introduce new motifs and forms, they moved weavers from Western
Central Asia, modern Afghanistan, and eastern Iran to China or adjacent to the Chinese
border. They also recognized that the Uyghurs residing in modern Xinjiang were
excellent weavers and recruited them as well to fashion the textiles they coveted.

10. Excellent renditions of architecture and dress in India and Tibet illustrate
the section on geography in Rashid al-Din’s great universal history. Illustrations
of manuscripts, including Rashid al-Din’s work and the Iranian national epic, the
Shahnamah (Book of Kings), developed as one of the great arts during Mongol
rule of Iran.

The Mongols’ generally tolerant attitude toward foreign religions, their love of
beautiful objects, and their patronage of playwrights, artists, and historians challenge
the image conveyed of them in both East and West. Depictions of them as barbaric
soldiers dedicated almost exclusively to conquest and pillaging require modification.
Their murderous rampages and rampant destruction cannot be denied, but neither can
their contributions to artistic and cultural advances in the lands they dominated for a
century or more.
Chapter 7
Decline, fall, and legacy

Since his emergence on the historical stage, Khubilai Khan had had one success after
another. He had triumphed against Dali in Yunnan, successfully presided over a
Buddhist-Daoist debate, defeated his brother Arigh Böke, devised governmental
institutions and a tax structure based on Chinese models, built two capital cities,
gained favor with numerous religious leaders, encouraged the arts, and, perhaps most
impressively, overwhelmed Southern Song China, the area with the largest population
of any of the Mongol conquests. However, starting in 1281 with the death of his
favorite wife Chabi, he started to face serious problems. The Mongols had dispossessed
the Confucian scholar-elite, which had governed China in the past, and was hostile to
Mongol rule. The four-class system instituted by the Mongols discriminated against the
Chinese, who were placed in the third and fourth class, and resented such lowly
positions.

Perhaps even more critical was the empire’s finances. The expenditures on the
construction of Daidu, the extension of the Grand Canal to supply the capital’s
inhabitants, the organization of postal stations, and the numerous military campaigns
were enormous. Khubilai needed to raise revenue, and he chose a Central Asian named
Ahmad to be his finance minister. Ahmad recognized that the more funds he raised, the
greater his power, prestige, and income. Thus his first step was to enroll taxable
households that had not been included in earlier tax lists. He increased the number of
households in North China liable for taxation from 1,418,499 in 1261 to 1,967,898 in
1274. Imposing higher taxes on merchants, he also squeezed out additional income
from the government monopolies on salt, iron, tea, liquor, gold, and silver.

Chinese officials and some Mongols despised Ahmad, accusing him of profiteering,
cronyism, and embezzlement. When Khubilai’s son Jingim joined the opposition,
Ahmad’s fate was sealed. On April 10, 1282, a cabal of Mongol and Chinese officials
assassinated Ahmad and, perhaps by planting incriminating evidence in his house,
persuaded the court that he had stolen state funds. Khubilai ordered his body exhumed,
had carts run over it, and then had dogs attack the corpse.

But Khubilai still needed revenue, and he now turned to a Tibetan named Sangha, who
faced the same difficulties that confronted Ahmad. He sought to increase taxes and was
accused of corruption, favoring non-Chinese residents, and theft of state property.
Chinese sources criticized Sangha in particular for sanctioning the pillaging of the
Southern Song emperors’ tombs. A Buddhist monk opened some of the tombs and stole
jade, gold, and silver objects to pay for the construction of Buddhist temples. His
underlings also desecrated the corpses of the Song imperial family, a more serious
transgression. They exhumed the body of one of the last emperors, which was still well
preserved, and hung it from a tree for three days. These abuses reflected badly on the
Buddhist monk’s patron, Sangha. Such misdeeds compelled Khubilai to arrest Sangha in
March 1291 and to execute him a few months later. Despite Sangha’s death, financial
problems persisted.

Similarly, many of the Mongols’ foreign expeditions in the 1280s failed. It became
increasingly difficult to achieve stability as the Mongol court careened from one
reckless foreign policy to another. The most renowned of these expeditions was
directed at Japan. The Japanese shogun had rejected the Mongols’ orders of
submission, resulting in a failed and disastrous Mongol invasion in 1274. The Japanese,
recognizing that the Mongols would return, erected stone walls stretching from
Hakozaki to Hakata on the Japanese island of Kyushu, a project that took five years, to
protect against an assault. In turn, the Mongols recruited Korean sailors and Chinese
and Korean shipbuilders, and amassed a sizable military force. The Chinese sources
report that the expedition consisted of 140,000 troops, which some scholars believe to
be an exaggerated number. In June 1281, a flotilla of ships from North China sailed
toward Kyushu, and a larger armada from Quanzhou in southern China departed later
for a rendezvous at Hakata. For several weeks, the Japanese soldiers prevented the
Mongols from breaching the defensive wall, and then, on August 15 and 16, a typhoon
struck and sank many Mongol ships with their valuable supplies and reinforcements.
The Mongol troops who had landed on Kyushu had to fend for themselves, and
Japanese samurai forces surrounded and killed them.
The 1281 battle would have important implications for both sides. The Japanese
asserted that the typhoon had been a “Divine Wind” or “Kamikaze,” and believed that
the gods protected their land and would not permit a conquest of the Japanese islands.
The Mongols suffered a disastrous blow, for the expedition’s failure shattered their
mantle of invincibility in East Asia. The psychological edge of terror they held over
their enemies was badly shaken.

The Mongols’ campaigns in Southeast Asia also resulted in devastating reversals. They
made the disastrous mistake of not taking into account the terrain and the environment
into which they would venture. They failed to undertake the vaunted intelligence
efforts for which they were famous. They apparently did not realize that their troops
needed to hack their way through the forests to crush the resistance of many Southeast
Asian groups. Moreover, because horses were unsuited to such terrain, their cavalry,
perhaps their most important advantage in combat, scarcely played a role.

In a famous passage, Marco Polo describes the Mongol army’s most significant success.
As he notes, in an attack on the kingdom of Pagan in Burma, the Mongol commander
faced a contingent of two thousand elephants in the battlefield. The Mongol horses
panicked and would not advance against the elephants. The commander ordered his
troops to dismount and tether their horses in the adjacent forest. He then instructed his
archers to take aim at the elephants, who were totally unprotected. The wounded
elephants panicked and retreated, in some cases trampling their own masters. Neither
side emerged as a clear-cut victor.

The other Mongol campaigns met considerable resistance and did not fare well.
Guerrilla warfare, heat, and disease often took their toll on the Mongol armies and
caused them to withdraw. An attack on Annam (modern Vietnam) harmed both sides,
leading the Annamese king to send an envoy to present tribute and pledge loyalty to
Khubilai’s court. Campaigns against Champa (modern South Vietnam) had the same
ambiguous results. One positive outcome was the dispatch to Cambodia of an envoy
named Zhou Daguan, who wrote the first account of Angkor and its massive, twelfth-
century Hindu temples (which began to be used by Buddhists in the thirteenth
century). Even more disastrous was a naval expedition against Java in 1292. After
initial successes, guerrilla attacks, the duplicity of Javanese allies, and the tropical heat
forced the Mongol troops to retreat to their ships and to return to China.

The 1280s also witnessed a major rebellion in Manchuria. In 1287, Nayan, a Nestorian
Christian who descended from one of Chinggis Khan’s half-brothers, challenged
Khubilai’s control over Manchuria, a threat that Khubilai considered to be serious
enough that he himself led his troops in combat. Khubilai’s forces emerged victorious
and captured Nayan. Because Nayan was of royal blood, he had to be executed in a
bloodless manner. He was wrapped up tightly in a carpet and was trampled to death by
horses and carts.

The death of Chabi, Khubilai’s favorite and most influential wife, in 1281 initiated a
cycle of disappointments and failures. Crown Prince Jingim, who had received
considerable training for governance of a multiethnic empire, died in 1285, almost a
decade before his father. Khubilai turned more and more to drink and food for comfort,
and court banquets became increasingly lavish. His health deteriorated, and his diet
contributed to the onset of gout, among other ailments. The Chinese sources reveal that
in his last years he was extremely depressed and relied more and more on one of his
wives to rule the empire. On February 18, 1294, in his eightieth year, he died and was
buried in an elaborate tomb.

Post-Khubilai decline
After Khubilai’s death, the Yuan dynasty went into a slow but steady decline. To be
sure, economic, dynastic, and military problems had plagued the last years of
Khubilai’s reign. However, the later emperors exacerbated these difficulties while also
subverting Khubilai’s accomplishments. Although they succeeded, in 1303, in
negotiating a peace agreement with the Chaghadai Khanate and Ögödei’s descendants,
which ended a three-decade conflict along China’s northwestern borders, political
turbulence in other areas accelerated, leading to declines in foreign trade and in
relations with Central Asia, West Asia, and Europe. The Yuan dynasty became
increasingly isolated, and no longer benefited from the commerce and the cultural
interchanges that had characterized the earlier Mongol era.
Struggles for succession to the imperial throne repeatedly generated disruptions.
Potential emperors needed to be Chinggisids, but by the fourth or fifth generations,
there were numerous descendants of the patriarch. Like the war between Khubilai and
Arigh Böke, these struggles pitted the defenders of the traditional Mongol ways of life
and values against Mongols, who respected and were attracted by the sedentary
Chinese agricultural society and by Confucian civilization and its extraordinary culture.

After the death of Khubilai’s grandson and successor Temür in 1306, assassinations of
emperors and murders of claimants to the throne hobbled the court for the next thirty
years. The struggles for succession, on occasion, led to purges, undermining and
weakening Mongol rule in China. The emperors’ extraordinarily short life spans added
to the instability. Temür was an alcoholic who died at age forty-one. Excluding those
who met untimely deaths, succeeding rulers lived to the ages of thirty-one, thirty-five,
and twenty-eight. His descendants and successors scarcely compared to Khubilai’s
almost eighty-year life span and thirty-four-year reign, and the brevity of their rule
contributed to chaotic conditions.

Court policies also fueled the instability bred by the violence afflicting the imperial
family. The dynasty subsidized the lavish lifestyles of princes and officials, a significant
imposition on the court’s finances. Court officials increased administrative costs by
appointing friends and supporters to an already bloated bureaucracy. Bribery, graft,
and other forms of corruption accelerated in the fourteenth century. Powerful and
wealthy individuals bribed government officials to secure special privileges and
exemptions. Such evidence of graft alienated the Chinese population and lowered the
esteem in which the court was held. A number of officials attempted to curb these
excesses and deal with the dynasty’s fiscal problems by limiting grants to princes and
by increasing taxes and fees. However, princes and other officials evaded the new
regulations and continued to receive oversized court grants. Several of the emperors
paid scant attention to combating corruption and to bolstering the military, further
weakening the dynasty. Perhaps the greatest failure was poor maintenance of public
works, which resulted in more floods and droughts, although the unusually cold
winters of the fourteenth century also contributed to natural catastrophes. Disease,
including outbreaks of the plague, further undermined the Yuan dynasty. Less
abominable conditions could have prolonged the dynasty’s life, but its political and
economic difficulties would have persisted and created conditions for decline and
collapse.

Disunity, as evidenced in the succession struggles, was a critical factor in the dynasty’s
fall. Like the earliest Mongol confederations stretching back to Chinggis Khan’s era, the
Yuan rulers could not bring together the various Mongol and Chinese factions. Mongols
in the steppelands and their cousins in China were often the principal enemies,
although the Central Asian Muslims, the Tibetan Buddhists, and other foreigners
contributed to these conflicts.

Reformers were repeatedly stymied. One frustrated reformer facetiously suggested the
execution of those surnamed Li, Wang, Lin, and Zhou, which would have killed off
much of the Chinese population. A few competent officials proposed more serious
reforms to save the dynasty. The Renzong emperor (r. 1312–20), following the advice
of one of his officials, reestablished the Chinese civil service examinations, but he did
not mandate that they be the sole criterion for an official position. Toghto, a renowned
and capable Mongol official, tried to restore the army to its earlier glory, to rein in
local officials, and to generate a regular flow of revenues. However, he aroused
considerable opposition from other officials; the last Yuan emperor, who scarcely
devoted much attention to his official duties and was irritated by Toghto’s growing
fame, forced him out of his position.

Disastrous floods in the late 1340s were the last crushing blow. Numerous people died
in the initial floods or succumbed to the ensuing epidemics. Millions lost their lands to
the floods, and the government, riddled with corruption and mismanagement, could
not cope with this disaster. Bandit gangs, millenarian religious sects, and ordinary
peasants, reacting to the appalling economic conditions, official graft and bribery, and
repression by both Mongol and Chinese officials, began to attack estates and
government offices to obtain basic necessities. From simple banditry, some started to
move toward rebellion. By the 1350s numerous Chinese groups challenged Yuan rule.
Zhu Yuanzhang, a rebel leader who had spent his formative years in a Buddhist
monastery, coerced the submission of other groups and then turned against the Mongol
rulers. In 1368 his troops drove toward Daidu, forcing the last Yuan emperor to
abandon the capital. However, Zhu did not crush the Mongols. They withdrew,
returning to their ancestral homeland and, over the next three centuries, limiting their
relations principally to the Chinese and other peoples in East Asia. Zhu and his
successors would continue to fear a resurgence of Mongol power, a misguided view
because the Mongols were unable to unite and pose a serious threat. The Mongols
became increasingly isolated, and their relations with other Mongol-ruled areas in Asia
withered away.

Dissolution of the Il-khanate

In Iran, events following Il-khan Ghazan’s death in 1304, after a rule of only eight
years, reversed his successes and ultimately resulted in disruptions, which led to the
demise of Mongol rule within four decades. His brother Öljeitü (r. 1304–16), a
Christian convert to Islam who had adopted the name Muhammad, constructed a new
capital in Sultaniyya and an extraordinary mausoleum for himself with eight minarets
and a blue-glazed and double-skinned dome (it still survives). Öljeitü patronized the
Shi’a form of Islam and supported Rashid al-Din in his efforts to write a global history.
His support for Islam naturally bolstered the Mongols’ legitimacy with their Iranian
subjects. Excellent commercial and diplomatic relations with regions to his west
prompted him once again to try for an alliance with the European monarchs. First,
Genoese merchants traded with the Il-khanate, and then Öljeitü negotiated a
commercial agreement for Venetian trade. Second, the Byzantine emperor Andronicus
II gave his daughter in marriage to Öljeitü in return for Il-khanate assistance against
the Ottoman Turks who threatened Anatolia. Believing that such cooperation offered
genuine opportunities for close collaboration, Öljeitü sent two embassies to the
European monarchs and the pope to propose an alliance against the Mamluks. Like
Rabban Sauma’s mission, these embassies did not translate into an agreement.

Öljeitü’s death at an early age and the accession of his son Abu Said (r. 1316–35)
resulted in the dynasty’s collapse. Assuming the throne at the age of ten, Abu Said was
ill prepared to rule, and his reign proved to be chaotic. Ministers took advantage of the
Il-khan’s youth to advance their own interests. One official falsely accused Rashid al-
Din, the greatest figure of the Il-khanate period, of poisoning Öljeitü, and he was
executed in 1318. Before his death, Rashid al-Din was forced to witness the killing of
one of his own sons. The government confiscated his charitable endowment (waqf),
which consisted of mosques, a library, a hospital, an elementary school for orphans,
and farmlands to support the inhabitants. As he grew into maturity, Abu Said himself
tried to be a good leader, and in 1322, for example, succeeded in negotiating a peace
treaty with the Mamluks. However, the resumption of war with the Golden Horde
overshadowed the cessation of hostilities with the Mamluks. Peace appeared to be
elusive during the Il-khanate. Domestic policies were also unstable. Chupan, a minister
who relished power, dominated government during Abu Said’s youth, but he himself
was killed in 1327 during a campaign in Herat; Abu Said executed one of Chupan’s
sons, and another son had defected to the Mamluks, who eventually beheaded him.

Violence, struggles within the government, and inordinately high taxes characterized
Abu Said’s reign, and his inability to produce a male heir at his death at the age of
about thirty led to the Il-khanate’s downfall. The Il-khanate came to an inglorious end,
and over the next three decades Mongol, Turkic, and Persian leaders set up petty states,
each with relatively limited authority. The areas formerly ruled by the Il-khanate had
no centralized administration until the rise of the Central Asian leader Tamerlane (or
Temür [the lame]) in the late fourteenth century. The Il-khanate’s fall diminished the
steady flow of merchants, missionaries, adventurers, and craftsmen, although a few
voyagers continued to travel along the Silk Roads until the mid-fifteenth century.
Mongol rule in China and Iran withered away, subverting earlier interactions among
Europe, West Asia, and China.

Collapse of the Golden Horde

Similar problems plagued the Golden Horde in the fourteenth century. Disunity in the
Mongol elite flared up, leading, on occasion, to killings and assassinations. Even in
1299 Noghai, who dominated the government from the 1260s on, and Tokhta (r. 1290–
1312), direct descendants of Chinggis Khan, fought a bitter war over leadership. Such
succession struggles persisted, and a devastating conflict erupted in 1359, which
further weakened the Mongols. From that year until 1380, some twenty-one different
Khans occupied the throne, with one murder and assassination after another.
Meanwhile native princes in northern Russia, supported by boyars, or aristocrats, arose
and capitalized upon the dissension among the Mongols to collect taxes and to become
increasingly more independent.

After defeating the principality of Tver in 1327, the Muscovite principality, in

particular, became the center of the most powerful indigenous groups and began to
challenge the rule of the central government. The battle of Kulikovo Pole in 1380
provided evidence of this challenge. Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich (“Donskoi”) defeated
government forces, although each side attracted adherents from the other side. The
battle was not a clear-cut struggle between purely Mongol and purely Russian
contingents. Some Mongols sided with the principalities while others remained loyal to
the central authorities. Nonetheless, it symbolized the rise of regional powers and the
threats to Golden Horde dominance. In 1382 Tokhtamish, a capable Golden Horde
ruler, avenged himself, overwhelmed the Muscovites, and burned down the city.

Tamerlane, the conqueror of Central Asia and parts of West Asia, had been
instrumental in placing Tokhtamish, a direct descendant of Chinggis Khan, in power.
The two men cooperated for a time, but by 1385 had severed relations and by 1387
were at war. In 1391 Tamerlane roundly defeated his Chinggisid opponent and actually
occupied and sacked Sarai. Undeterred, Tokhtamish continued to challenge Tamerlane,
and in 1395 the Central Asian conqueror once and for all crushed his previous protégé,
reaching Moscow and also allowing his troops to loot Sarai. Trade in the cities,
including Sarai and Azov, diminished considerably. Tokhtamish lost his throne, and the
Golden Horde began a long decline. The Orthodox Church, with a center in Moscow
from 1322 on, also began to challenge the Mongols.

Tokhtamish’s defeat revealed the Golden Horde’s weakness, prompting regional leaders
to break away. In 1438 Kazan established its own independent Khanate, and in 1441
Astrakhan and Crimea also founded khanates. The Golden Horde’s authority became
increasingly circumscribed, and its people identified less and less with the Mongols. It
continued to retreat in the face of indigenous opposition and, to a certain extent, non-
Russians and so-called Tartars (Tatars), most of whom were Turkic, supported the
principalities. These struggles ought not to be portrayed as contests between colonists
(that is, Russians) and non-colonizers (Mongols or other non-Russian peoples); there
was considerable diversity, ethnic or otherwise, in each camp. In any event, in 1502
Mengli Girai of the Crimea crushed the Golden Horde, although the Mongol-ruled
domain had been fragmenting for more than a century.

Until recent times, most Russian historians have emphasized the baneful effects of the
Mongol invasions and rule. They stressed the Mongols’ initial destruction of cities,
which in some areas was indeed devastating. But the Mongols surely did not introduce
violence; the city-states and the various confederations in Russia had earlier engaged in
frequent conflicts. Some modern historians have blamed the Mongols for cutting Russia
off from the West. The arrival of papal emissaries and Italian merchants in Sarai belie
that assertion, as does the development of trade networks in the Baltic. The Golden
Horde’s conversion to Islam, as well as its toleration and support for the Orthodox
Church, also served to maintain links with the Middle East and with the Christian
world in Southeastern Europe. Thus Russia was not entirely divorced from the West.
Finally, some scholars attribute the despotism of the later tsarist governments to
Mongol influence, a view that recent studies have disputed. To be sure, the Mongols
emphasized service to the state in the form of taxes, tribute, and forced labor, and
recruitment into the military. Pre-Mongol Russia did not have the centralized
administration that the Mongols introduced, and perhaps the population was freer of
state control. Yet the Mongols’ domination of Russians was limited, and in most cases
they remained in the steppes, far away from the cities. They levied taxes and demanded
services, but otherwise they rarely intruded. They set the foundation for the concept of
unity and for the ensuing Muscovite state but not necessarily for the role of the tsar.

Other views of Golden Horde influence on Russia are less controversial. Mongol
organization, weapons, strategy, and tactics provided models for the Russian states,
which emerged in the sixteenth century. Their use of cavalry prompted the later states
to adopt some of their tactics. The boyar class gained power and privileged positions,
and would provide leadership in post-Mongol Russia. Although the initial Mongol
assaults caused great damage, Russia suffered no long-term devastation. Agriculture
recovered, but, more importantly, trade grew exponentially. Mongol support for
commerce led to Russia’s participation in the Eurasian trade networks. Russia traded
with West Asia, Northern and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and China, and recent
discoveries of Chinese porcelains and silks in Golden Horde sites attest to the wide
scope of this commerce. Russia became part of Eurasia and its history.

Russia’s own institutions were also affected by the period of the so-called Tatar yoke.
The Mongols offered a tax-exempt status to the Orthodox Church, allowing it to
accumulate considerable resources to construct churches and to produce beautiful
religious artifacts, including icons. The church also profited from the tremendous scale
of the Mongol domains to maintain contact with Christians in Western Europe and with
the Byzantine Empire. Similar Mongol support for crafts spurred production of
exquisite gold objects, ceramics, and textiles.

The Mongol legacy

The Mongols’ trajectory was truly remarkable. Within two generations, they
transformed themselves from pastoral nomads who, on occasion, raided sedentary
agricultural civilizations for booty and necessities into rulers of a far-flung and
multiethnic domain. With the indispensable assistance of foreign subjects, they devised
administrative institutions for governance and often fostered native religions and arts
and crafts.

The collapse of their empire was, in part, due to their own internal dissension. A
centralized administration proved to be impossible, partly because of the empire’s size
and the attendant transport and communications difficulties, but even more because of
the conflicts among the four principal khanates of China, Russia, Central Asia, and
West Asia. The lack of a regular, orderly system for succession to the Great Khanate
resulted in devastating struggles for power, often weakening the victors. The Mongols
were also accustomed to traveling from one pasture to another in relatively small
groups. Development of an effective confederation of a much larger population did not
overcome ancient splits among them. Struggles between those who espoused the
traditional values of steppe existence and those who assimilated into the sedentary
civilizations further accentuated these divisions.

The Mongols’ policies also provoked the populace they sought to rule. The influence of
the military in societies such as China, where civilian officials dominated, created ill
feelings. Their military campaigns and public works projects necessitated repeated
imposition of taxes on increasingly restive subject populations, especially in Iran and
China. Income shortfalls arose as the native inhabitants either evaded taxes or could no
longer afford the continual impositions. In addition, some of the expansionist
campaigns in Japan, Java, and Mamluk Egypt were ill-planned and costly, contributing
to more revenue problems. No doubt as colonizers, the Mongols aroused considerable
enmity, and their religious policies generated hostility. Although they professed to and
often adopted policies of religious toleration, on occasion they turned against specific
religions. The Il-Khan Ghazan initiated attacks against Buddhism and Nestorianism, and
Khubilai Khan imposed strict limitations on Daoism.

It would be inaccurate to deny the appalling loss of life and the razing of towns and
cities that the Mongol invasions engendered. They introduced a level of violence that
had scarcely been seen. Even if contemporary sources exaggerated some of the
purported devastation and killings, there is abundant evidence of considerable
murderous rampages.

Beyond the destruction and violence, what were the legacies of Mongol rule? Not
surprisingly, in every one of their domains, the Mongols affected weaponry, strategy,
tactics, and military organization. The so-called Pax Mongolica also brought about the
first direct relations between Europe and East Asia, leading to acceleration in the pace
of Eurasian travel and technological, artistic, and religious diffusion. Iranian astronomy
and medicine somewhat influenced China while Chinese arts and agricultural
knowledge had an impact on Iran. Chinese silks and porcelains attracted Europeans,
and Russia and Iran also became prime markets for a variety of Chinese products. To be
sure, the Umayyad caliphate (661–750) based in Damascus, and the Abbasid caliphate
(751–1258), based in Baghdad, had traded with the Tang dynasty (618–907) of China,
mostly by land, and with the Chinese Song dynasty (960–1279), mostly by sea, but the
number of voyagers, as judged by travel accounts, was far fewer than in the Mongol
era. In addition, China was exposed to Christianity. Europe learned, via Marco Polo’s
work, about Buddhism and Confucianism, and Iran. Yet each civilization adopted only
the foreign artifacts, ideas, or technologies that suited it. Moreover, each adapted or
often altered such borrowings to fit its own needs and its own society.
The major civilizations that the Mongols conquered and then ruled generally remained
true to their essences, albeit with some variations and additions, after the invaders
departed. The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) of China, which replaced the Mongols,
restored Confucianism and the civil service examinations, but it employed Mongols in
its security and police forces, spied upon and imposed greater control over officials,
established a Bureau of Muslim Astronomy, showed interest in Tibetan Buddhism, and
produced more accurate maps and geographical works, all of which reflected Mongol
influence. Iran and West Asia remained adherents of Islam, especially Sufism and
Shi’ism, but Nestorianism and other Christian sects survived as minorities. The
Muscovite state that emerged after the end of Mongol rule revealed scant Mongol
cultural influence. Orthodox Christianity was the dominant religion, although the
Turkic people who accompanied the Mongols in their invasions and settled in the south
were principally Muslims. Central Asia, which had served as a homeland for Buddhists,
became increasingly Islamic.

The political impact of Mongol rule varied in each region. The Ming dynasty allocated
greater authority and power to the Chinese emperor and state in order to avert another
Mongol invasion. Unaware that the Mongols had split into different groups and could
only raid but not invade China, the Ming court became increasingly despotic. In this
case, the Mongols inadvertently influenced China, and their continued presence along
China’s borders shaped court perceptions.

The Mongols’ political impact on Russia has been difficult to gauge. They have been
castigated for serving as the model for the tsarist despotism. Yet the Mongols had been
declining much before the establishment of the tsardom, undermining the view of a
specific Mongol influence on the new political institution. The Mongols’ political
impact on Iran is complicated to ascertain because Tamerlane, a Turkic descendant of
the Mongols, and his line of Timurids ruled the country for more than a century. The
ensuing Safavid dynasty (1501–1736), a native dynasty that championed the Shi’a form
of Islam, still had a large pastoral population, probably reflecting both the Mongol and
Timurid influence. However, Safavid political institutions differed from those of the
Mongol empire.
Perhaps the Mongols’ most lasting legacy was sustained East–West interrelationships.
From Mongol times on, events in Europe would have an impact on the Middle East and
East Asia, and Asian styles in art, dress, and religion would influence the West. The
Mongol invasions ushered in global interconnections and global history. The fact that
the Mongols are mentioned in contemporary sources in Chinese, Japanese, Uyghur,
Tibetan, Old Russian, Georgian, Armenian, Persian, Arabic, Syriac, and Latin attests to
their impact on much of the Eurasian world.
Further reading

Allsen, Thomas. Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2001.
Amitai, Reuven. The Mongols in the Islamic Lands. Burlington: Ashgate, 2007.
Atwood, Christopher. Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire. New York:
Facts on File, 2004.
Boyle, John, ed. The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 5, The Saljuq and Mongol Periods.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
Brook, Timothy. The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.
Colvino, Italo. Invisible Cities. Translated by William Weaver. New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1974.
DeBary, William Theodore, and Hok-lam Chan, eds. Yuan Thought: Chinese Thought
and Religion under the Mongols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
de Rachewiltz, Igor. Papal Envoys to the Great Khans. London: Faber & Faber, 1971.
de Rachewiltz, Igor, Hok-lam Chan, and Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing, eds. In the Service of the
Khans: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200–1300).
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1993.
Di Cosmo, Nicola, Allen Frank, and Peter Golden, eds. The Cambridge History of Inner
Asia: The Chinggisid Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Dunn, Ross. The Adventures of Ibn Battuta. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1986.
Fitzhugh, William, Morris Rossabi, and William Honeychurch, eds. Genghis Khan and
the Mongol Empire. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009.
Franke, Herbert, and Denis Twitchett, eds. The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 6,
Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994.
Gernet, Jacques. Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion, 1250–1276.
Translated by H. M. Wright. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
Halperin, Charles. Russia and the Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History: Golden
Horde. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.
Inoue, Yasushi. Blue Wolf: A Novel on the Life of Chinggis Khan. Translated by Joshua
Fogel. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
Jackson, Peter. Mission of Friar William of Rubruck. London: Hakluyt, 1990.
Jackson, Peter. Mongols and the West, 1221–1410. Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005.
Jagchid, Sechin, and Paul Hyer. Mongolia’s Culture and Society. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1979.
Juvaini. The History of the World Conqueror. Translated by John Boyle. 2 vols.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958.
Komaroff, Linda, and Stefano Carboni, eds. The Legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly Art
and Culture in Western Asia, 1256–1353. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art,
2002.
Lane, George. Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance. New
York: Routledge, 2003.
Langlois, John. ed. China under Mongol Rule. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1981.
Lattimore, Owen. Inner Asian Frontiers of China. New York: American Geographical
Society, 1940.
Lee, Sherman, and Wai-kam Ho. Chinese Art under the Mongols: The Yuan Dynasty
(1279–1368). Cleveland: Cleveland Museum of Art, 1968.
McCausland, Shane. Zhao Mengfu: Calligraphy and Painting in Khubilai’s China. Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011.
Morgan, David. The Mongols. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.
Moule, A. C., and Paul Pelliot, Marco Polo: The Description of the World. 2 vols.
London: George Routledge & Sons, 1938.
Olschki, Leonardo. Marco Polo’s Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960.
Ostrowski, Donald. Muscovy and the Mongols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998.
Rashid al-Din. The Successors of Genghis Khan. Translated by John Boyle. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1971.
Ratchnevsky, Paul. Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy. Translated by Thomas Nivison
Haining. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.
Rossabi, Morris, ed. Eurasian Influences on Yuan China. Singapore: National University
of Singapore Press, 2012.
Rossabi, Morris. Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1988.
Rossabi, Morris. Voyager from Xanadu. 2nd ed. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2010.
Secret History of the Mongols. Translated by Paul Kahn. San Francisco: North Point
Press, 1984.
Smith, Paul, and Richard von Glahn, eds. The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese
History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Vernadsky, George. The Mongols and Russia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1953.
Watt, James, ed. The World of Khubilai Khan: Chinese Art in the Yuan Dynasty. New
York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2010.

Websites
Asia for Educators, Columbia University. “The Mongols in World History.”
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/mongols/. Faculty consultant: Morris Rossabi.
Asia Society. “Homeland Afghanistan,” http://afghanistan.asiasociety.org/.
China Institute in America. “From Silk to Oil: Cross-cultural Connections along the
Silk Road.” http://www.chinainstitute.org/education/for-educators/curriculum-
resources/curriculum-guides-units/.
Index

A
Abakha, Il-khan, 80–81
Abbasid Caliphate, 77, 122
destruction of, 56–59
Abu Said, Il-khan, 117
Acre, 80
Ahmad, 109–10
airagh, koumiss, comos, 7, 92
Alamut, 55–56
Aleppo, 77
Altai Mountains, 14
Amu Darya River, 37, 89
Anda, 16–17
Andronicus II, Byzantine Emperor, 116
Angkor Wat, 61, 112
Aniko, 103
Annam, 112
Aragon, 82
Ardebil Shrine, 102
Arghun, Il-khan, 81
Arigh Böke, brother of Khubilai Khan, 52, 59, 67, 78
Armenia, 39, 44
Artisans, 9, 20, 32
Astrakhan Khanate, 119
Azerbaijan, 39, 44, 79, 87–88
Ayn Jalut, 78, 80
Azov, 119

B
Baghdad, 77, 97, 122
sack of, 56–57
Balkh, 29
Baltic Sea, 119
Bamiyan, 29
Basqaq, 86
Batu, son of Jochi and Khan of Golden Horde, 51–52, 79
campaigns in Russia, 42–43
construction of Sarai, 43
policies, 86–87
Baybars I of Mamluks, 78, 80
Beki, 10
Béla IV, King of Hungary, 39, 43
Berke Khan of Golden Horde, 79, 87
Black Death, 93, 96
Bohemund VI of Antioch, 55
Bordeaux, 82
Borjigin, 6
Börte, wife of Chinggis Khan, 16, 18
Boyars, 118, 120
Buda, conquest of, 43
Buddhism and Buddhists, 14
conversions among Mongols, 31, 67
and Marco Polo, 122
persecution by Ghazan, 83
recruitment by Hülegü, 80
support by Khubilai Khan, 98, 103
 support from Sorghaghtani Beki, 49
Buddhist-Daoist dispute, 65–66
Bukhara, 1, 28, 89
Bulghars, 37
Bureau of Muslim Astronomy, 123
Büri, son of Chaghadai Khan, 37, 42
Burkhan Khaldun, 29
Burma, 61, 112
Buryatia, 5
Byzantine Empire and Emperors, 78, 81, 120

C
Caspian Sea, 29, 56
Caucasus, 86, 107
Censorate, 69
Census, 44–45
Chabi, wife of Khubilai Khan, 65–66
death of, 113
portrait of, 103
Chaghadai Khan, son of Chinggis Khan, 35, 48
Chaghadai Khanate, 51, 79, 89–90, 107–8, 113
Chakravartin, 98
Champa, 112
Chan (Zen) Buddhism, 98
Changchun, 30
Chinese-Iranian exchanges, 71, 82
Chinggis Khan (or Genghis Khan), 1, 12, 71, 87
attack against Jin, 24–26
attitude toward trade, 32
campaigns against Tanguts, 29
 capture of Sorghaghtani Beki, 48
conquest of Central Asia, 27–29
death and burial, 29–30
and defeat of Tatars, 16
enthronement, 18
grants to Jochi, 18
and Jasagh, 31–32
and Khubilai Khan, 61
and Mongolian script, 99
organization of forces, 18–20
sons of, 35
toleration of religions, 30,
and written language 31, 99 See also Temüjin
Christopher Columbus, 94–95
Chupan, 117
civil service examinations, 45, 64
restoration of, 68, 115, 123
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 2, 64, 94
Confucianism, 45, 74, 122–23
commanders, duties of, 19
commoners, duties of, 19
Council of Lyons, 90
Cracow, 42
Crimean Khanate, 119
Crusades, 80, 81
Czech Republic, 39

D
Daidu (modern Beijing), 2, 109
construction of, 73–74. 103
 Ming conquest of, 116
tablet for Sorghaghtani Beki, 52
Dali, 61–63
Dalmatia, 43
Damascus, 77, 122
Daoists and Daoism, 30, 47, 49. See also Buddhist-Daoist dispute
Darughachi, 21, 45
Dmitri Ivanovich (Donskoi), 118
Dokhuz Khatun, 79
Don region, 38, 107

E
Edward I, King of England, 82
Eisenstein, Sergei, 39
Elburz Mountains, 55
Eleanor of Aquitaine, 49

F
Fancheng, 76
feigned retreat, 12
fengshui, 64
foreign advisers, Mongol policy toward, 31, 61
Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor, 39
Freer Gallery of Art, 101

G
Ganzhou, 52
Genoa and Genoese, 87–88, 93–94, 116
Georgia, 39, 44
Gers, 6, 9, 73–74
Ghazan, Il-khan, 81, 122
policies, 83
and Rashid al–Din, 105
support of Islam, 84, 88
Gobi Desert, 5
Golden Horde, 35, 51, 72, 90
and arts and crafts, 106–7
Islam in, 88
rule over Russia, 85–88, 118–120
struggle with Il-khanate, 54, 79–81, 104
and trade, 93
Grand Canal, 73, 109
Gregory IX, Pope, 39
Guan Daosheng, 102
Guo Shoujing, 72
Güyüg, son of Ögödei Khaghan and Khaghan, 37, 42, 50–51

H
Hajj, 84
Hakata, 111
Hakozaki, 111
Han River, 76
Hangzhou, 61
capital of Southern Song, 24
submission to Mongols, 76
Harun al-Rashid, 56
Henry, Duke of Silesia, 42
Herat, 28–29, 117
Herders, 6
He’tum I, King of Lesser Armenia, 55, 60
Hö’elun, mother of Chinggis Khan, 15–16
Holy Roman Empire, 82
Hülegü, Il-khan, 61, 67
campaigns in West Asia, 52–59
and Il-khanate, 78–80
and Order of Assassins, 55
Hungary, 38–39, 42–44, 51

I
Ibn Battuta, 60
Imperial Palace Collection, China, 104
Inner Mongolia, 5, 64
Innocent IV, Pope, 90
Institute of Muslim Astronomy, 82
Islam, 31, 35, 68, 81–83, 106

J
Jalal al-Din, 29
Jamal al-Din, 72
Jami al–tavarikh (Compendium of Chronicles), 104–5
Jamukha, 16–17
Japan, invasion of, 111, 121
Jasagh, 31–32
Java, attack against, 112, 121
Jews, 80
Jin dynasty (Jurchens), 32
downfall of, 37
Mongol attack against, 24–25
Jingdezhen, 102
Jingim, son of Khubilai Khan, 74, 110
 death of, 113
Jochi, son of Chinggis Khan, 48
birth of, 16
father of Batu, 37
lands of, 35, 79, 87
John of Plano Carpini, 51, 59–61, 90
Juvaini, 1, 4, 28
praise for Hülegü, 56

K
Kaffa, 87
Kaifeng, 24–25, 37
Kama River, 38
Kamikaze, 111
Kazan Khanate, 119
Kereyid, 14, 16–17
keshig, 20
Khaidu, 79, 89–90
Khangai Mountains, 14
Khara Khorum, 50, 55, 67, 73
construction, of 46–47
excavations in, 4
Khentii aimag (province), 30
Khubilai Khan, 2, 4, 79, 109
attack against Java, 112, 121
attack on Southern Song, 66–67
attitude toward merchants, 70
campaign in Dali, 61–63
campaigns in Southeast Asia, 111–12
and Chinese art, 99–104
 and class structure, 68
conquest of Southern Song, 75–77
death of, 112
and doctors, 71
early life, 61–64
financial problems of, 109
and government, 69
invasion of Japan, 110–11
literacy of, 49
and Muslims, 98
and Nayan, 112
and peasants, 70
and Polos, 94
portrait of, 103
support of culture, 98–101
khuriltai, 18
and military expeditions, 19
selection of Khaghans, 34–35, 43, 52
and succession struggles, 67, 78
Khwarazmian Shah, 24
death of, 28
Mongol campaign against, 26
Kiev, campaign against, 38–39
Kipchaks, 38–39
Kököchu, 18
Korea and Koreans, 82, 84, 71, 111
intermarriage with, 75
pacification of, 37, 44
Kulikove Pole, 118
Kyushu, 111
L
Laozi, 65
Legnica, battle of, 42
Li Kan, 101
Liu Bingzong, 64
Louis IX (Saint Louis), King of France, 58, 80, 91–92
Lyons, 51

M
Mahmud Yalavach, 89
Mamluks, 59, 87, 116–17
wars with Il-khanate, 77–81, 83, 104, 121–22
Manchuria, 37, 44, 112
Manicheism, 14
Manjusri, Boddhisattva of Wisdom, 98
Maragha, 104
Masud Beg, 89
Mecca, 84
Mengli Girai, 119
Merkid, 15–16
Merv, 29
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 102
Michael VIII, Byzantine Emperor, 79
Ming dynasty, 123
Möngke, Khaghan, 50–52, 61, 65
attack on Southern Song, 66–67
campaigns in West Asia, 54–59
death of, 66
domestic policies, 53–54
in Russian campaign, 37–38
Möngke Temür, Khan of Golden Horde, 88
Mongolia, environment of, 4–5
Mongols
and animals, 6–8
attitude toward artisans, 9, 20
and Black Death, 93, 96
causes for invasions, 13–14, 21–23
and Chinese porcelain, 102
influence of, 119–21
military tactics of, 12–13
and textiles, 102–3
Moscow, 38, 87, 123
Muhi, battle of, 43
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 102

N
Naimans, 14, 17
nasij (cloth of gold), 32, 93, 103
Nayan, 112
nerge (hunts), 11–12
Nestorian Christianity, 67, 71, 123
attitude of Khans, 35, 50
description of, 14, 91
and Il-khans, 55, 79, 80
in Khara Khorum, 47
Nayan and, 112
persecution of, 83, 122
Neva River, 39
Nevsky, Alexander, 39
Nicholas IV, Pope, 82
Nizari Ismailis, 55–56, 59
Noghai, Khan of Golden Horde, 79, 118
nököd, 10–11
nomadic pastoralism, 6–8
Novgorod, 38–39

O
oboo, 11
Office for the Stimulation of Agriculture, 70
Office of Muslim Astronomy, 72
Ögödei Khaghan, 53, 113
and Central Asia, 75, 89
character of, 35–36
death of, 35, 43, 78
domestic policies, 44–47
foreign campaigns, 37–43
succession to Khaghanate, 34
Öljeitü, Il-khan, 88, 117
Ong Khan, 16, 17
Onon River, 16, 18
orders of submission, 24, 111
Ordos region, 30
Orkhon River, 14, 47
Osaka Municipal Museum, 102
Otrar, 26, 28
Ottoman Turks, 116
Özbeg Khan of Golden Horde, 88, 106

P
Pagan, 112
paizas (passports), 96, 99, 100
Palaiologina, Maria, 79
paper money, 83
Paris, 61, 82
Pax Mongolica, 71, 122
Pegolotti, Francesco Balducci, 93
Pesth, conquest of, 43
‘Phags-pa Lama, 98, 103
‘Phags-pa script, 99
Philip IV (the Fair), King of France, 82
Poland, campaign against, 39, 42–44
Polo, Maffeo, 94
Polo, Marco, 60
account of his travels, 94, 122
description of Shangdu, 64–65, 74
observations on Khubilai Khan, 2
on Pagan campaign, 112
source on Mongols, 2, 4
and trade items, 93
Polo, Niccolo, 94
Prester John, 51
Privy Council, 69
psychological warfare, 12–13

Q
Quanzhou, 111

R
Rabban Sauma, 60, 81–82, 116
Rashid al-Din, 4, 52
 execution of, 117
and Ghazan, 83
life and career, 105–6, 116
on Sorghaghtani Beki, 48
Renzong Emperor, 101, 115
rhubarb, 82
Riazan, attack on, 38
Rome, 82
Rukn al-Din, 56
Russia, campaigns in 37. See also Golden Horde
Russian Orthodox Church, 88, 119–20, 123
Rusticello, 94

S
Sa-skya Pandita, 37
Safavid dynasty, 124
St. Denis, 47
Saiyid Ajall Shams al-Din, 98
Samarkand, 1, 28, 89
Sandomir, 42
Sangha, 110
Sarai, 43, 86–87, 90, 118–19
The Secret History of the Mongols, 3, 6, 15–16, 18
Secretariat, 69
Selenge River, 14
Seljuk Turks, 50
Sengge Ragi, 102
Shahnama (Book of Kings), 104–5
shamans and shamanism, 11
Shangdu (Xanadu), 2–3, 66
 account of Marco Polo, 94
construction of, 64–65, 103
excavations in, 4
hunting park in, 74
she, 70
Sheep and Goat and Zhao Mengfu, 101
Shi’a Islam (Shi’ism), 116, 123–24
Sichuan, 66
Silk Roads, 2, 61
decline of, 117
link to Black Death, 96
trade along, 89–90, 98
Sorghaghtani Beki, mother of Khubilai Khan, 48–49, 51–52, 61
Southern Song dynasty, 24, 109
description of, 75–76
Mongol attacks on, 54, 61–63, 74–76
and pillaging of tombs, 110
Sübötei, 37, 39, 42, 80
succession to throne, 34, 114, 121
in Il-khanate, 80–81
and Khubilai Khan, 77, 78
and two women, 48, 52
Sufism, 84, 97, 123
Sultaniyya, 116
Swedes, 39
Syr Darya River, 89

T
Tabriz, 4, 61, 80
Takht-i Sulaiman, Mongol palace of, 3–4, 104
Tamerlane (Temür the Lame), 90, 117, 119, 123
tamgha, 44
tamma, 21
Tana, 87
Tang dynasty, 122
Tatar yoke, 85, 120
Tatars, 15
tax farming, 45
Tegüder (Ahmad), Il-khan, 80–81
Temüjin, 15
defeat of Kereyid, 16–17
early life, 15–16
marriage, 15–16
murder of half–brother, 16 See also Chinggis Khan
Temür, Emperor of China, 114
Tenggeri, 3, 11, 23
Teutonic Knights, 39
Tibetan Buddhism, 97–98
Timurid dynasty, 123–24
Toghto, 115
Tokhta, 88, 118
Tokhtamish, 111–19
Tolochu, 49
Tolui, father of Khubilai Khan, 31, 37, 42, 48–49
Topkapi Palace, Istanbul, 96, 102
Töregene, wife of Ögödei Khan, 49–50
tümen, 18
Tuva, 5
Tver, 118
U
Umayyad Caliphate, 122
Ural Mountains, 86
Urgench, 87
Uyghur script, 31, 99
Uyghurs, 14, 49
service to Mongols, 21, 46
as weavers, 108

V
Venice and Venetians, 87, 93–95, 116
Viziers, 81, 105
Vladimir-Suzdal, 38
Volga River, 35, 38, 43, 86

W
Wales, 82
Wanangong palace, 46
waqf, 117
West Lake (Hangzhou), 94
White Stupa, 103
William of Rubruck, 47, 58, 61, 91–92
women, role of, 11

X
Xia (Tanguts), 24, 32
Xiangyang, 66, 76
Xinjiang, 89–90, 108

Y
Yale University Art Gallery, 102
yams (postal stations), 13
Yangzhou, attack on, 76
Yangzi River, 24, 37, 44, 74–76
Yao Shu, 62
Yellow River, 25
Yelu Chucai, 31
policies of, 44–46
Yisügei, father of Chinggis Khan, 6, 15
Yuan dynasty, 72, 79, 90, 93
decline of, 113–16
name of, 74
relations with Il-khanate, 81–83
Yunnan, 61–62, 66, 98

Z
Zhao Lin, 101
Zhao Mengfu, 101–2
Zhao Yong, 101
Zhendingfu, 52
Zheng Sixiao, 101
Zhongdu (modern Beijing), 25
Zhou Daguan, 61
and Angkor Wat, 112
Zhu Yuanzhang, 115
zud, 5