II. B.

Picart Vs Smith (Definition & Elements of Quasi-delict/Culpa Aquiliana and Factors in Determining Negligence-
Foreseeability)
FACTS:
 In 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, Amado Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge.
Before he had gotten half way across, Frank Smith Jr. approached from the opposite direction in an automobile,
going at the rate of about 10 or 12 miles per hour.
 As Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him
that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
 Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left.
 As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
machine. In so doing Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet
exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
 Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or
slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
 When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, Smith
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was then
standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened
and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
 In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The
horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
 As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE: WON Smith is guilty of negligence.

RULING: YES
 As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider would pass over
to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety
in front of the moving vehicle.
 In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and
from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place
of greater safety.
 The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car
to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran
straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
 When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the
law.
 The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
o The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would
be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.
  FORESEEABILITY (Factors in Determining Negligence, Part 5 of the Syllabus):
 The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the f facts involved in the particular case.
 Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern
their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them.
 They are not, and are not supposed to be, take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn
of danger.
 Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist.
 Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
 A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would, in our opinion, have recognized that the course
which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and rider as
a reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty
to guard against the threatened harm.

DISPOSITION:
 From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here
rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of both
instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the
plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of -his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date
of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to
be recoverable. So ordered.

NOTES:
 It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence
in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent;
and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and f ails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

II. C. Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co.

Facts:
 Jose Cangco was a clerk of the Manila Railroad Co. with a monthly wage of P25
o He comes to office using a pass supplied by the company which entitled him to ride upon the company’s
trains free of charge
 On January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the
station in San Mateo the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second-class car where he was riding and, making his
exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right
hand for support
 On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins
to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said
office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches
  As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zufiiga, also an employee of the railroad company,
got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground
 When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his
feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell
violently on the platform
o His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated
o It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before
it came to a full stop
o The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted
dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred
were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car
 It was the customary season for harvesting watermelons, and a large lot had been brought to the station for
shipment to the market
o They were piled on the platform in a row, one upon the other
o Row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons
and the edge of the platform
 He was then brought to a hospital were his arm was amputated (Total expenses were P790.25)
 Cango filed a case against the company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees
of the company in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace
to the security of passenger alighting from the company’s trains
 Railroad company’s defense:
o Involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of
approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was
his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before
alighting
o Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence,
no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned.
 CFI ruled in favor of the railroad company, stating that:
o Although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were
so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had
failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering
Issue no. 1:
Whether or not the railroad company can be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiff

Ruling:
 YES, the railroad company is liable based on culpa contractual, not culpa contractual
 The SC ruled that it cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in
piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as
he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned
unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
 It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and
that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance
 That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in the legal viewpoint from that presumptive
responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted
by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision
  Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extracontractual
obligations—or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual
 The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and
that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with
the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is
imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority
existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the
cause of it.
 On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or
agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon
a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost
diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Application:
 The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and
to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, article 1258)
 That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof
that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants

Issue no. 2:
Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff

Ruling:
 In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the
fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight
from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its
platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any
injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to
provide a safe alighting place.
 We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on
Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
o The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to
alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether
an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not
the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
 Or, if we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may
say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted
from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the
conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so
to desist was contributory negligence.
 As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping
off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable
and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
 manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would
have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such
act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition
of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such
conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be
noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at
this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step
which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized
by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

Damages awarded:
 The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and
that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant
has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the
standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for
the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover
of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental
expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries

II. D. RAKES vs ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC CO.

Tracey, J.
NATURE: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
DOCTRINES:
 In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action
be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.
 The responsibility of an employer to his employee arises out of the contractual relations between them and is
regulated by article 1101 and the following articles of the Civil Code.
 The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through
the negligence of a fellowservant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
 The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the
principal accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each party is
chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.

FACTS:
 M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s.
 A gang of eight negro laborers, including Rakes, were working in the company’s yard and they were transporting
heavy iron rails using two hand cars from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the Malecon in Manila.
o Each hand car carrying the opposite ends of the rails.
 The hand cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind.
 The plaintiff was walking alongside the hand car.
 There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes.
 The track where the hand cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon.
o It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left
unrepaired.
  While the hand cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes
was beside one of the hand cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it
to be amputated.
 The plaintiff sought for damages against the defendant alleging that the accident happened through the
negligence of the latter.
o Rakes won against Atlantic Gulf.
o He was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages.
 The trial courts found the defendant liable.
o Implied that by the relation between the parties, the employer is bound to provide safe appliances for the
use of the employee.
o That
 Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking
only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them
in case the rails would slip.
 Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks
repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to
work.

ISSUE # 1: Is plaintiff liable for contributory negligence?

RULING # 1: NO
RULING:
 Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate
causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury,
between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.
 For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages—that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding
of the iron rails.
 To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an
element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his
act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which
he would have been responsible.
 Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his
own imprudence.

ISSUE # 2: Whether or not the plaintiff’s injury is a risk incident to his employment.
RULING # 2: NO
 It is evident that this cannot be the case if the occurrence was due to the failure to repair the track or to duly
inspect it, for the employee is not presumed to have stipulated that the employer might neglect his legal duty.
Nor may it be excused upon the ground that the negligence leading to the accident was that of a fellow-servant
of the injured man.
 It is not apparent to us that the intervention of a third person can relieve the defendant from the performance of
its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the consequences of an act or omission not his own. Sua cuique culpa nocet.
 This doctrine, known as "the fellow-servant rule," we are not disposed to introduce into our jurisprudence.
RE PLAINTIFF’S CARELESSNESS (That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work)
 There is nothing in the evidence to show that the plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath the
sleeper. The claim that he must have done so is a conclusion drawn from what is assumed to have been a probable
condition of things not before us, rather than a fair inference from the testimony.
 While the method of construction may have been known to the men who had helped build the road, it was
otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked at this job less than two days. A man may easily walk along a railway
without perceiving a displacement of the underlying timbers. The foreman testified that he knew the state of
the track on the day of the accident and that it was then in good condition, and one Danridge, a witness for the
defendant, Working on the same job, swore that he never noticed the depression in the track and never saw any
bad place in it.
 The sagging of the track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported in his hearing to the foreman who neither
promised nor refused to repair it. His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression
of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe
American rule.
 On this point we accept the conclusion of the trial judge who found as facts that "the plaintiff did not know the
cause of the one rail being lower than the other" and "it does not appear in this case that the plaintiff knew
before the accident occurred that the stringers and rails joined in the same place."

RE PLAINTIFF’S CARELESSNESS (That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it)
 While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding that the car was pulled by means of a rope
attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the circumstances in evidence make it clear that
the persons necessary to operate the car could not walk upon the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it
was necessary for the employees moving it to get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding upon
the instruction given by the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the necessity of
the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to get hold upon the car.
 Therefore the findings of the judge below leave the conduct of the plaintiff in walking along the side of the loaded
car, upon the open ties, over the depressed track, free to our inquiry.
 While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen
testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side
of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
 On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the
extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing
himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.

DISPOSITIVE: Judgment Modified

NOTES:
 The distinction is thus clearly set forth by Manresa in his commentary on article 1093:
o "We see with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different
senses; either as culpa, substantive and independent, which 011 account of its origin arises in an
obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the
performance of an obligation which already existed, which cannot be presumed to exist without the other,
and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation.
o "Of these two species of CII?/MI the first one mentioned, existing by itself, may be also considered as a
real source of an independent obligation, and, as chapter 2, title 16 of this book of the code is devoted to
it, it is logical to presume that the reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto and that it does
 not extend to those provisions relating to the other species of culpa (negligence), the nature of which we
will discuss later." (Vol. 8, p. 29.)
 And in his commentary on articles 1102 and 1104 he says that these two species of negligence may be somewhat
inexactly described as contractual and extra-contractual, the latter being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman law
and not entailing so strict an obligation as the former.

II. E. Corliss vs Manila Rail Road (Definition & Elements of Quasi-delict/Culpa Aquiliana, AND Ordinary diligence)

Facts:
 Ralph Corliss, 21 years old, died when the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of defendant-appellee
Manila Railroad Company at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga in front of the Clark Air Force
Base
 Lower court dismissed the complaint for recovery of damages filed by Preciolita V. Corliss, the wife
o after summarizing the evidence, lower court concluded that the deceased “in his eagerness to beat, so
to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but
unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation."

 there is no dispute as to the following: “In December 1956, plaintiff, 19 years of age, married Ralph W. Corliss, Jr.,
21 years of age, x x x; that Corliss, Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base; that at the time of the accident,
he was driving the fatal jeep; that he was then returning in said jeep, together with a P.C. soldier, to the Base;
and that Corliss, Jr. died of serious burns at the Base Hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious
physical injuries and burns."

Witness for plaintiff-appellant #1 – Ronald J. Ennis:

 that at the time of the accident, he was awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was about
40 to 50 yards away from the tracks and that while there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base.
 He said that said jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing, that it made a brief stop but that it did not
stop— dead stop. Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss, Jr. shifted into first gear and
that was what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified that he could see the train coming from the direction
of San Fernando and that he heard a warning but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident.

Witness for plaintiff-appellant #2 – Virgilio de la Paz:

 he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the
direction of Clark Field. He stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep,
which caught fire, was pushed forward. He helped the P.C. soldier. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast
and heard the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him.

Main witness for defendant-appellee – Teodorico Capili:

 “who was at the engine at the time of the mishap and who “testified that before the locomotive, which had
been previously inspected and found to be in good condition, approached the crossing, that is, about 300
meters away, he blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep
suddenly spurt, and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25 kilometers an hour and
although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks.''

Issue #1 (in relation to definition): How is negligence defined?

Ruling #1:
 Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and United States v. Barias.
 Cooley’ formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions.
o Thus: “Judge Cooley, in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be:
“The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.”

 There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co.

o Thus: “Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care
and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of
care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.”

 To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to defendant-appellee, and the action of plaintiff-
appellant must necessary fail. The facts, being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to be
fastened on defendant-appellee had not arisen.

Application:
 This action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done. Unless it could be
satisfactorily shown, therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable.

 The crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.

 The above Civil Code provision, which is a reiteration of that found in the Civil Code of Spain, formerly applicable
in this jurisdiction, had been interpreted in earlier decisions. Thus, in Smith v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co.,
Manresa was cited to the following effect:” ‘Among the questions most frequently raised and upon which the
majority of cases have been decided with respect to the application of this liability, are those referring to the
determination of the damage or prejudice, and to the fault or negligence of the person responsible therefor. These
are the two indispensable factors in the obligations under discussion, for without damage or prejudice there can
be no liability, and although this element is present no indemnity can be awarded unless arising from some
person’s fault or negligence'."

Plaintiff argument:
 Plaintiff-appellant, in her brief, however, would seek a reversal of the judgment appealed from on the ground that
there was a failure to appreciate the true situation.
 Thus the first three assigned errors are factual in character. The third assigned error could be summarily disposed
of. It would go against the evidence to maintain the view that the whistle was not sounded and the brakes not
applied at a distance of 300 meters before reaching the crossing.

Issue #2 (Ordinary diligence): Did Corliss Jr observed ordinary diligence in this case?
Ruling #2: NO

 The first two assigned errors would make much of the failure of the lower court to hold that the crossing bars not
having been put down and there being no guard at the gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of Corliss to
 stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that Teodorico Capili, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the
time of the accident.

 For one cannot just single out a circumstance and then confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance.
Considered separately, neither of the two above errors assigned would call for a judgment different in character.
Nor would a combination of acts allegedly impressed with negligence suffice to alter the result. The quantum of
proof required still had not been met.
 The alleged errors fail of their desired effect. The case for plaintiff-appellant, such as it was, had not been
improved. There is no justification for reversing the judgment of the lower court.

 It cannot be stressed too much that the decisive considerations are too variable, too dependent in the last
analysis upon a common sense estimate of the situation as it presented itself to the parties for us to be able to
say that this or that element having been isolated, negligence is shown.
 The factors that enter the judgment are too many and diverse for us to imprison them in a formula sufficient of
itself to yield the correct answer to the multi-faceted problems the question of negligence poses.
 Every case must be dependent on its facts. The circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in
the light of what could reasonably be expected of the parties.
 If the objective standard of prudence be met, then negligence is ruled out.

 In this particular case, it would be to show less than fidelity to the controlling facts to impute negligence to
defendant-appellee. The first three errors assigned certainly do not call for that conclusion.

 Considering the purposes and the general methods adopted for the management of railroads and railroad
trains, we think it is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing and
hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do
everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track.”

 What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize what was set forth earlier that each and every case
on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present
themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee acted. It is undeniable then
that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it.

 What commends itself for acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the lower court: “Predicated on the
testimonies of the plaintiff’s witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of
the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or
whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss, Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of
the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident—and this consisted simply in
stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on.
 A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr.
failed to do."

Decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint is affirmed.

II. I. Jarco Marketing Corporation v CA
G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

 In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek the reversal of the
17 June 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 and the resolution denying their motion
for reconsideration.
o The assailed decision set aside the 15 January 1992 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati
City, Branch 60 in Civil Case No. 7119 and ordered petitioners to pay damages and attorneys fees to
private respondents Conrado and Criselda (CRISELDA) Aguilar.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels Department Store, Makati City.
o Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the stores branch manager, operations
manager, and supervisor, respectively.
 Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
 In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store,
Makati City.
 CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of
wind and heard a loud thud.
 She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the
bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter/structure.
 ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the
people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor.
 ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on.
 The next day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic
slate.
 The injuries she sustained took their toil on her young body.
o She died fourteen (14) days after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years
old.
o The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
 After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred.
o Petitioners refused to pay.
o In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any liability for the injuries and consequent death
of ZHIENETH.
o They claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing
her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH too, was guilty of
contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her.
 Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages.
 In its decision the trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after finding that the preponderance of
the evidence favored petitioners.
o It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on ZHIENETH was her act of clinging to it.
o It believed petitioners witnesses who testified that ZHIENETH clung to the counter, afterwhich the
structure and the girl fell with the structure falling on top of her, pinning her stomach.
o In contrast, none of private respondents witnesses testified on how the counter fell.
o The trial court also held that CRISELDAs negligence contributed to ZHIENETHs accident.
o In absolving petitioners from any liability, the trial court reasoned that the counter was situated at the
end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary measure hence, it could not be considered as an
attractive nuisance.
 o Its structure was safe and well-balanced. ZHIENETH, therefore, had no business climbing on and clinging
to it.
 Private respondents appealed the decision.
o They contended negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it was reasonable for her to have
let go of ZHIENETH at the precise moment that she was signing the credit card slip.
o And vigorously maintained that the proximate cause of ZHIENETHs death, was petitioners
negligence in failing to institute measures to have the counter permanently nailed.
o The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private respondents and reversed the appealed
judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Zhieneth, a minor, is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence?
RULING:
 Yes, Zhieneth is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
 Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below
nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.
o In his book, former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated: In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is
conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability.
o The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over
nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.
o Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability,
either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be
incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in
the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law.
 The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Application:
 Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no
injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners theory that the counter was stable and sturdy.
 For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse.
 The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence
on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all.
 Shaped like an inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica.
 It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals of 17 June 1996 in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO
ORDERED.
NOTES:
DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISSANCE
 “One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith
or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises”.
o The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is
apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to
 approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children. (Hidalgo
Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, et al., 91 Phil. 488, 490 [1952]).
ACCIDENT- An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is “a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or
partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom
it happens.”

Negligence- Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do. Negligence is “the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree
of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.”

Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person
concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented
by any means suggested by common prudence.

IV. ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR vs COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES, INC.
Nature: This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the death of a participant in an
organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on the route of the race
FACTS:
 To promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with Intergames, organized an endurance
running contest billed as the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" scheduled to be held on June 15, 1980
 The organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the premises of the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP
for brevity), through public roads and streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle
 Plaintiffs' son Rommel applied with the defendants to be allowed to participate in the contest and after
complying with defendants' requirements, his application was accepted and he was given an official number
 Consequently, on June 15, 1980 at the designated time of the marathon, Rommel joined the other participants
and ran the course plotted by the defendants.
 As it turned out, the plaintiffs' (sic) further alleged, the defendants failed to provide adequate safety and
precautionary measures and to exercise the diligence required of them by the nature of their undertaking, in
that they failed to insulate and protect the participants of the marathon from the vehicular and other dangers
along the marathon route.
 Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along the route of the marathon on Don Mariano
Marcos Avenue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of medical treatment given to him at the Ospital ng Bagong
Lipunan, he died later that same day due to severe head injuries.
 On October 28, 1980, the petitioners sued the respondents in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal to recover
various damages for the untimely death of Rommel. Cosmos denied liability, insisting that it had not been the
organizer of the marathon, but only its sponsor;
o that its participation had been limited to providing financial assistance to Intergames;
o that the financial assistance it had extended to Intergames, the sole organizer of the marathon, had
been in answer to the Government's call to the private sector to help promote sports development and
physical fitness;
o that the petitioners had no cause of action against it because there was no privity of contract between
the participants in the marathon and Cosmos; and
o that it had nothing to do with the organization, operation and running of the event.
 Intergames asserted that
o Rommel's death had been an accident exclusively caused by the negligence of the jeepney driver;
 o that it was not responsible for the accident;
o that as the marathon organizer, it did not assume the responsibilities of an insurer of the safety of the
participants;
o that it nevertheless caused the participants to be covered with accident insurance, but the petitioners
refused to accept the proceeds thereof;
o that there could be no cause of action against it because the acceptance and approval of Rommel's
application to join the marathon had been conditioned on his waiver of all rights and causes of action
arising from his participation in the marathon;
o that it exercised due diligence in the conduct of the race that the circumstances called for and was
appropriate, it having availed of all its know-how and expertise, including the adoption and
implementation of all known and possible safety and precautionary measures in order to protect the
participants from injuries arising from vehicular and other forms of accidents; and,
o accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed

RTC RULING:
 Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs-spouses Romulo Abrogar and Erlinda Abrogar and against defendants
Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc.
 The RTC observed:
o that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the marathon had fallen short of
the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as called for by and appropriate under the
circumstances;
o that the accident had happened because of inadequate preparation and Intergames' failure to exercise
due diligence;
o that the respondents could not be excused from liability by hiding behind the waiver executed by
Rommel and the permission given to him by his parents because the waiver could only be effective for
risks inherent in the marathon, such a:s stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack during the race, severe
exhaustion and similar occurrences;
o that the liability of the respondents towards the participants and third persons was solidary, because
Cosmos, the sponsor of the event, had been the principal mover of the event, and, as such, had derived
benefits from the marathon that in turn had carried responsibilities towards the participants and the
public;
o that the respondents' agreement to free Cosmos from any liability had been an agreement binding only
between them, and did not bind third persons; and
o that Cosmos had a cause of action against Intergames for whatever could be recovered by the
petitioners from Cosmos.

CA RULING:
 From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the role of the appellant Cosmos was limited to providing financial
assistance in the form of sponsorship. Appellant Cosmos' sponsorship was merely in pursuance to the company's
commitment for spo1is development of the youth as well as for advertising purposes. The use of the name
Cosmos was done for advertising purposes only; it did not mean that it was an organizer of the said marathon.
As pointed out by Intergames' President, Jose Castro Jr., appellant Cosmos did not even have the right to
suggest the location and the number of runners.
 To hold a defendant liable for torts, it must be clearly shown that he is the proximate cause of the harm done to
the plaintiff. The nexus or connection of the cause and effect, between a negligent act and the damage done,
must be established by competent evidence.
 In this case, appellant Cosmos was not negligent in entering into a contract with the appellant Intergames
considering that the record of the latter was clean and that it has conducted at least thirty (30) road races.
  Also there is no direct or immediate causal connection between the financial sponsorship and the death of
Rommel Abrogar. The singular act of providing financial assistance without participating in any manner in the
conduct of the marathon cannot be palmed off as such proximate cause. In fact, the appellant spouses never
relied on any representation that Cosmos organized the race. It was not even a factor considered by the
appellants-spouses in allowing their son to join said marathon.
 In view of the fact that both defendants are not liable for the death of Rommel Abrogar, appellants-spouses are
not entitled to actual, moral, exemplary damages as well as for the "loss of earning capacity" of their son.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the conduct of
the marathon (ORDINARY DILIGENCE)
RULING:
 Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place."
 The Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.
 A careful review of the evidence presented, in accordance with the foregoing guidelines reasonably leads to the
conclusion that the safety and precautionary measures undertaken by Intergames were short of the diligence
demanded by the circumstances of persons, time and place under consideration. Hence, Intergames as the
organizer was guilty of negligence.
 The Court considered the "safeguards" employed and adopted by Intergames not adequate to meet the
requirement of due diligence. The circumstances of the persons, time and place required far more than what
Intergames undertook in staging the race.
 Due diligence would have made a reasonably prudent organizer of the race participated in by young,
inexperienced or beginner runners to conduct the race in a route suitably blocked off from vehicular traffic for
the safety and security not only of the participants but the motoring public as well.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not Intergames had foreseen the harm posed by the situation but had not exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the risk (FORSEEABILITY)

RULING:

 A careful review of the evidence presented, particularly the testimonies of the relevant witnesses, in accordance
with the foregoing guidelines reasonably leads to the conclusion that the safety and precautionary measures
undertaken by Intergames were short of the diligence demanded by the circumstances of persons, time and
place under consideration. Hence, Intergames as the organizer was guilty of negligence.

 It is relevant to note that the participants of the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon were mostly minors aged 14 to 18
years joining a race of that kind for the first time.
 The combined factors of their youth, eagerness and inexperience ought to have put a reasonably prudent
organizer on higher guard as to their safety and security needs during the race, especially considering
Intergames' awareness of the risks already foreseen and of other risks already known to it as of similar events in
the past organizer.
 There was no question at all that a higher degree of diligence was required given that practically all of the
participants were children or minors like Rommel; and that the law imposes a duty of care towards children and
minors even if ordinarily there was no such duty under the same circumstances had the persons involved been
adults of sufficient discretion. In that respect, Intergames did not observe the degree of care necessary as the
organizer, rendering it liable for negligence. As the Court has emphasized in Corliss v. The Manila Railroad
Company, where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances.
  The circumstances of the persons, time and place required far more than what Intergames undertook in staging
the race. Due diligence would have made a reasonably prudent organizer of the race participated in by young,
inexperienced or beginner runners to conduct the race in a route suitably blocked off from vehicular traffic for
the safety and security not only of the participants but the motoring public as well. Since the marathon would be
run alongside moving vehicular traffic, at the very least, Intergames ought to have seen to the constant and
closer coordination among the personnel manning the route to prevent the foreseen risks from befalling the
participants. But this it sadly failed to do.

IV. Test of Negligence/Standard of Care

c. Presumption of Negligence

i. Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V. vs. Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 143133. June 5, 2002
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Nature of the Case: This case is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

Doctrine in relation to PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE for COMMON CARRIERS:

Proof of the delivery of goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination
constitutes prima facie fault or negligence on the part of the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the
loss, the destruction or the deterioration of the goods happened, the carrier shall be held liable therefor.

FACTS:
 On June 13, 1990, CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the M/V ‘Anangel Sky’ at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils of
various Prime Cold Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the Philippine Steel Trading
Corporation (consignee).
 On July 28, 1990, M/V Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and, within the subsequent days, discharged the
subject cargo.
 Four (4) coils were found to be in bad order B.O. Tally sheet No. 154974.
 Finding the four (4) coils in their damaged state to be unfit for the intended purpose, the consignee Philippine
Steel Trading Corporation declared the same as total loss.
 Despite receipt of a formal demand, defendants-appellees refused to submit to the consignee’s claim.
 Consequently, Phil. First Insurance Co. (plaintiff-appellant) paid the consignee P506,086.50, and was
subrogated to the latter’s rights and causes of action against defendants- appellees.
 Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant instituted this complaint for recovery of the amount paid by them, to the
consignee as insured.
 Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V and Jardine Davies Transport Services, Inc. (defendants-
appellees) impugned the propriety of the suit against them

Arguments of defendants-appellees (petitioner):

 That the damage and/or loss was due:
o To pre- shipment damage,
o To the inherent nature, vice or defect of the goods, or
o To perils, danger and accidents of the sea, or
o To insufficiency of packing thereof, or
o To the act or omission of the shipper of the goods or their representatives.
  That their liability, if there be any, should not exceed the limitations of liability provided for in the bill of lading
and other pertinent laws.
 That, in any event, they exercised due diligence and foresight required by law to prevent any damage/loss to
said shipment.
 In their attempt to escape liability, petitioners further contend that they are exempted from liability under
Article 1734(4) of the Civil Code.
o That the notation “metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented” printed on the Bill of Lading as
evidence that the character of the goods or defect in the packing or the containers was the proximate cause
of the damage.

RTC Ruling:
 Dismissed the Complaint because respondent had failed to prove its claims with the quantum of proof required
by law.
 It likewise debunked petitioners’ counterclaim, because respondent’s suit was not manifestly frivolous or
primarily intended to harass them.

CA Ruling:
 Ruled that petitioners were liable for the loss or the damage of the goods shipped, because they had failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on common carriers.
 Petitioners’ claim that the loss or the deterioration of the goods was due to preshipment damage was
inadequately proven.
 The notation “metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented” placed on the Bill of Lading had not been the
proximate cause of the damage to the four (4) coils
 As to the extent of petitioners’ liability, the CA held that the package limitation under COGSA was not applicable,
because the words “L/C No. 90/02447” indicated that a higher valuation of the cargo had been declared by the
shipper.
 CA, however, affirmed the award of attorney’s fees.

 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE 1: Did the petitioners overcome the presumption of negligence of a common carrier?

RULING 1:
 No. The petitioners did NOT overcome the presumption of negligence of a common carrier.
 Well-settled is the rule that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance with respect to the safety of the goods and the
passengers they transport.
 Thus, common carriers are required to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and “to use all
reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of the goods tendered for shipment, and to
exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.”
 The extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of
and received for transportation by the carrier until they are delivered, actually or constructively, to the
consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them.
 Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to
have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed.
 That is, unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods.
  In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they
observed such diligence. Also, there are exceptions to the presumption of fault or negligence for common
carriers [refer to Notes below]
 Corollary to the foregoing, mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their
arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier.
 If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the destruction of the goods
happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.

Application:
 In this case, the petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of negligence. This was revealed by a
review of the records and more so by the evidence adduced by respondent
o First, as stated in the Bill of Lading, petitioners received the subject shipment in good order and
condition in Hamburg, Germany.
o Second, prior to the unloading of the cargo, an Inspection Report prepared and signed by
representatives of both parties showed the steel bands broken, the metal envelopes rust-stained and
heavily buckled, and the contents thereof exposed and rusty.
o Third, Bad Order Tally Sheet No. 154979 issued by Jardine Davies Transport Services, Inc., stated that
the four coils were in bad order and condition.
 Normally, a request for a bad order survey is made in case there is an apparent or a presumed
loss or damage
o Fourth, the Certificate of Analysis stated that, based on the sample submitted and tested, the steel
sheets found in bad order were wet with fresh water.
o Fifth, petitioners—in a letter addressed to the Philippine Steel Coating Corporation and dated October
12, 1990—admitted that they were aware of the condition of the four coils found in bad order and
condition.
 All these conclusively prove the fact of shipment in good order and condition and the consequent damage to
the four coils while in the possession of petitioner, who notably failed to explain why.
 Further, petitioners failed to prove that they observed the extraordinary diligence and precaution, which the
law requires a common carrier to know and to follow to avoid damage to or destruction of the goods entrusted
to it for safe carriage and delivery.

 While it is true that the words “metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented” were noted on the Bill of
Lading, there is no showing that petitioners exercised due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss.
 Having been in the service for several years, the master of the vessel should have known at the outset that
metal envelopes in the said state would eventually deteriorate when not properly stored while in transit.
 Equipped with the proper knowledge of the nature of steel sheets in coils and of the proper way of transporting
them, the master of the vessel and his crew should have undertaken precautionary measures to avoid possible
deterioration of the cargo.
 BUT none of these measures was taken.
 Having failed to discharge the burden of proving that they have exercised the extraordinary diligence required
by law, petitioners cannot escape liability for the damage to the four coils.

(In relation to Issue 1)

ISSUE 2: Were the petitioners exempted from liability under Article 1734(4) of the Civil Code?

RULING 2:
 No. The petitioners were not exempted from liability under Article 1734(4) of the Civil Code.
 From the evidence on record, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the damage to the four coils was due to
the condition noted on the Bill of Lading.
  The aforecited exception refers to cases when goods are lost or damaged while in transit as a result of the
o Natural decay of perishable goods or the
o Fermentation or evaporation of substances liable therefor,
o The necessary and natural wear of goods in transport,
o Defects in packages in which they are shipped, or
o The natural propensities of animals.
 None of these is present in the instant case.
 Further, even if the fact of improper packing was known to the carrier or its crew or was apparent upon ordinary
observation, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom, once it accepts the goods
notwithstanding such condition.
 Thus, petitioners have not successfully proven the application of any of the aforecited exceptions in the present
case.

OTHER ISSUES:
Other arguments of petitioners:
 That pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), respondent should have
filed its Notice of Loss within three days from delivery.
 They assert that the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, but that respondent filed its Notice of Claim only on
September 18, 1990

ISSUE 3: Was there a need to file a notice of loss in this case?

RULING 3:
 No. There was no need to file a notice of loss in this case.
 The above-cited provision of COGSA provides that the notice of claim need not be given if the state of the
goods, at the time of their receipt, has been the subject of a joint inspection or survey.
 As stated earlier, prior to unloading the cargo, an Inspection Report as to the condition of the goods was
prepared and signed by representatives of both parties.

ISSUE 4: Will recovery be barred upon failure to file notice of loss within three days?

RULING 4:
 No. Recovery will not be barred upon failure to file notice of loss within three days.
 As stated in the same provision, a failure to file a notice of claim within three days will not bar recovery if it is
nonetheless filed within one year.
 This one-year prescriptive period also applies to the shipper, the consignee, the insurer of the goods or any legal
holder of the bill of lading.
 In the present case, the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, while the Complaint was filed by respondent on
July 25, 1991, within the one-year prescriptive period.

ISSUE 5: Is the package limitation of liability applicable?

RULING 5:
 Yes. The package limitation of liability is applicable.
 A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting to a certain sum the common carrier’s liability for loss or destruction
of a cargo—unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value—is sanctioned by law
  There are, however, two conditions to be satisfied:
(1) The contract is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and
(2) It has been fairly and freely agreed upon by the parties.
 The rationale for, this rule is to bind the shippers by their agreement to the value (maximum valuation) of their
goods.
 The provisions on limited liability are as much a part of the bill of lading as though physically in it and as though
placed there by agreement of the parties
 However, in this case, there was no stipulation in the Bill of Lading limiting the carrier’s liability.
 Neither did the shipper declare a higher valuation of the goods to be shipped.
 This fact notwithstanding, the insertion of the words “L/C No. 90/02447 cannot be the basis for petitioners’
liability.

 The Civil Code does not limit the liability of the common carrier to a fixed amount per package.
 In all matters not regulated by the Civil Code, the right and the obligations of common carriers shall be governed
by the Code of Commerce and special laws
 Thus, the COGSA, which is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code, supplements the latter by establishing
a statutory provision limiting the carrier’s liability in the absence of a shipper’s declaration of a higher value in
the bill of lading

 In light of the foregoing, petitioners’ liability should be computed based on US$500 per package and not on the
per metric ton price declared in the Letter of Credit.
o Considering, therefore, the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines and the fact that the Bill of Lading clearly
disclosed the contents of the containers, the number of units, as well as the nature of the steel sheets,
the four damaged coils should be considered as the shipping unit subject to the US$500 limitation.
[Refer to Notes below for further discussion]

Disposition: Petition is partly granted and the assailed decision modified. Petitioners’ liability is reduced to US$2,000
plus interest at the legal rate of six percent from the time of the filing of the Complaint on July 25, 1991 until the finality
of this Decision, and 12 percent thereafter until fully paid.
____________________
NOTES:
As to the EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE required for COMMON CARRIERS:
 This strict requirement is justified by the fact that, without a hand or a voice in the preparation of such contract,
the riding public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers.
 Even if it wants to, it cannot submit its own stipulations for their approval.
 Hence, it merely adheres to the agreement prepared by them. [Contract of adhesion]

EXCEPTIONS to the PRESUMPTION OF FAULT or NEGLIGENCE:

 The presumption of fault or negligence will not arise if the loss is due to any of the following causes:
1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
2) An act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3) An act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or the container; or
5) An order or act of competent public authority.
 This is a closed list.
 If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is
liable therefor.
Re: Prescription:
 In Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that a claim is not barred by prescription as
long as the one-year period has not lapsed.
 Thus, in the words of the ponente, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.:
o “Inasmuch as the neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Commerce states a specific prescriptive period
on the matter, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)—which provides for a one- year period of
limitation on claims for loss of, or damage to, cargoes sustained during transit—may be applied
suppletorily to the case at bar.”

Re: Bill of Lading:

 A bill of lading serves two functions:
o First, it is a receipt for the goods shipped.
o Second, it is a contract by which three parties—namely, the shipper, the carrier, and the consignee—
undertake specific responsibilities and assume stipulated obligations.
 In a nutshell, the acceptance of the bill of lading by the shipper and the consignee, with full knowledge of its
contents, gives rise to the presumption that it constituted a perfected and binding contract.
 Further, a stipulation in the bill of lading limiting to a certain sum the common carrier’s liability for loss or
destruction of a cargo—unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value—is sanctioned by law.
 There are, however, two conditions to be satisfied:
o (1) The contract is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and
o (2) It has been fairly and freely agreed upon by the parties.
 The rationale for, this rule is to bind the shippers by their agreement to the value (maximum valuation) of their
goods.

V. Helen Palsgraf, Respondent vs The Long Island Railroad Company, Appellant.

-Motion for Reconsideration.

Court of Appeals of New York
Argued February 24, 1928
Decided May 29, 1928

FACTS:
• Mrs. Helen Palsgraf was standing on a platform of a (Long Island Railroad Company’s) railroad after buying a
ticket to go to a beach (Rockaway Beach).
• A train stopped at the station, bound for another place. Two men ran to catch it.
• Although the train was already moving, one of the men reached the platform of the car.
• The other man, carrying a package, jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady as if about to fall. A guard
on the car, who had held the door open, reached forward to help him in, and another guard on the platform pushed
him from behind. In this act, the package was dislodged and fell upon the rails.
• It was a small package (15 inches long and covered by a newspaper) which contained fireworks, but there
was nothing in its appearance to give notice that they were fireworks.
• The fireworks when they fell exploded. The shock of the explosion threw down some scales at the other end
of the platform, many feet away.
• The scales struck Mrs. Palsgraf, causing injuries for which she sues.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Palsgraf can sue the company for the unforeseeable injury caused the negligence of
their guards.
 RULING (summarized):
• NO.
• It was held that the Long Island Railroad Company was not liable to Mrs. Helen Palsgraf (claimant).
• In this respect, it was held that a claimant must, in order to bring a claim in negligence, demonstrate that
there has been some violation of her personal rights.
• While it was acknowledged that the guards who caused the package of fireworks to fall were negligent in
doing so, it was not considered that they were negligent to the claimant. There was no indication that the content of
the package was fireworks or that dropping it would cause it to explode.
• Furthermore, the claimant was standing some distance away from the package. Therefore, it was considered
that if the defendant was held liable to the claimant in these circumstances, a defendant would be liable in any
circumstance for almost any loss. APPLICATION: In this case, the conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its
relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to Helen Palsgraf standing far away. Relatively to
her it was not negligence at all. The “rights” that are said to have been violated and should have been complained of
in relation to the acts of the guards is of the man carrying the package. Even here, the man was not injured in his
person nor even put in danger. The purpose of the act, as well as its effect, was to make his person safe. If there was a
wrong to him at all, which may very well be doubted, it was a wrong to a property interest only, which is the safety of
his package.

RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:

• The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong
in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all.
• Nothing in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus
removed. Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a
right.
• "Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do”

• If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at least to outward
seeming, with reference to her, did not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong, though
apparently not one involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with reference to some one else.

• "In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and
found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which would have averted or avoided the injury.”
• "The ideas of negligence and duty are strictly correlative”. The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong
personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another.

• Here, by concession, there was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel
wrapped in newspaper would spread wreckage through the station. If the guard had thrown it down knowingly and
willfully, he would not have threatened the plaintiff's safety, so far as appearances could warn him. His conduct would
not have involved, even then, an unreasonable probability of invasion of her bodily security. Liability can be no greater
where the act is inadvertent.

• Negligence is not a tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong, and the commission of a wrong
imports the violation of a right.

• One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action by showing without more that there has
been damage to his person. If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger
so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the harm was unintended.
 • Liability for other damage; The victim does not sue derivatively, or by right of subrogation, to vindicate an
interest invaded in the person of another. Thus to view his cause of action is to ignore the fundamental difference
between tort and crime. He sues for breach of a duty owing to himself.

• The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us. The question of liability is
always anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences that go with liability.
• If there is no tort to be redressed, there is no occasion to consider what damage might be recovered if there
were a finding of a tort.
• We may assume, without deciding, that negligence, not at large or in the abstract, but in relation to the
plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all consequences, however novel or extraordinary.
• There is room for argument that a distinction is to be drawn according to the diversity of interests invaded by
the act, as where conduct negligent in that it threatens an insignificant invasion of an interest in property results in an
unforseeable invasion of an interest of another order, as, e. g., one of bodily security. Perhaps other distinctions may
be necessary. We do not go into the question now. The consequences to be followed must first be rooted in a wrong.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:The judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term should be reversed,
and the complaint dismissed, with costs in all courts.

DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE ANDREWS:

(summary):

• Justice Andrews finds the concept of the court to be narrow. as he explains in an illustrative examples: 1.
“Should we drive down Broadway at a reckless speed, we are negligent whether we strike an approaching car or miss
it by an inch. The act itself is wrongful. It is a wrong not only to those who happen to be within the radius of danger
but to all who might have been there— a wrong to the public at large. Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us
to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B or C alone.”. The proposition is this. Every one owes to
the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an
act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact
injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone.

• 2. an overturned lantern that may burn all of the city We may follow the fire from the shed to the last
building. We rightly say the fire started by the lantern caused its destruction. When a lantern is overturned the firing
of a shed is a fairly direct consequence. Many things contribute to the spread of the conflagration—the force of the
wind, the direction and width of streets, the character of intervening structures, other factors. We draw an uncertain
and wavering line, but draw it we must as best we can. We trace the consequences—not indefinitely, but to a certain
point. And to aid us in fixing that point we ask what might ordinarily be expected to follow the fire or the explosion.

3. It’s like building a dam, but are negligent as to its foundations. Breaking, it injures property down stream. We
are not liable if all this happened because of some reason other than the insecure foundation. But when injuries do
result from our unlawful act we are liable for the consequences. It does not matter that they are unusual, unexpected,
unforeseen and unforseeable. But there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with the negligence that
the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former.

• There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to
him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all
those in fact injured may complain. We have never, I think, held otherwise.

• Indeed in the Di Caprio case we said that a breach of a general ordinance defining the degree of care to be
exercised in one's calling is evidence of negligence as to every one. We did not limit this statement to those who might
 be expected to be exposed to danger. Unreasonable risk being taken, its consequences are not confined to those who
might probably be hurt.

• There is no such thing as a plaintiff (in relation to Palsgraf) suing by "derivation or succession." Her action is
original and primary. Her claim is for a breach of duty to herself—not that she is subrogated to any right of action of
the owner of the parcel or of a passenger standing at the scene of the explosion.

• The right to recover damages rests on additional considerations. The plaintiff's rights must be injured, and
this injury must be caused by the negligence.

• Negligence may be defined roughly as an act or omission which unreasonably does or may affect the rights of
others, or which unreasonably fails to protect oneself from the dangers resulting from such acts. Here I confine myself
to the first branch of the definition. Nor do I comment on the word "unreasonable." For present purposes it
sufficiently describes that average of conduct that society requires of its members.

• There must be both the act or the omission, and the right. It is the act itself, not the intent of the actor, that is
important. In criminal law both the intent and the result are to be considered. Intent again is material in tort actions,
where punitive damages are sought, dependent on actual malice— not on merely reckless conduct. But here neither
insanity nor infancy lessens responsibility.

• There are some hints that may help us. The proximate cause, involved as it may be with many other causes,
must be, at the least, something without which the event would not happen. The court must ask itself whether there
was a natural and continuous sequence between cause and effect. Was the one a substantial factor in producing the
other? Was there a direct connection between them, without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of cause on
result not too attentuated? Is the cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to produce the result? Or by the
exercise of prudent foresight could the result be foreseen? Is the result too remote from the cause, and here we
consider remoteness in time and space. Clearly we must so consider, for the greater the distance either in time or
space, the more surely do other causes intervene to affect the result.

Applying the principle of promixate cause:

• This last suggestion is the factor which must determine the case before us. The act upon which defendant's
liability rests is knocking an apparently harmless package onto the platform. The act was negligent. For its proximate
consequences the defendant is liable. If its contents were broken, to the owner; if it fell upon and crushed a
passenger's foot, then to him. If it exploded and injured one in the immediate vicinity, to him also as to A in the
illustration. Mrs. Palsgraf was standing some distance away. How far cannot be told from the record—apparently
twenty-five or thirty feet. Perhaps less. Except for the explosion, she would not have been injured. We are told by the
appellant in his brief "it cannot be denied that the explosion was the direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries." So it was a
substantial factor in producing the result—there was here a natural and continuous sequence—direct connection. The
only intervening cause was that instead of blowing her to the ground the concussion smashed the weighing machine
which in turn fell upon her. There was no remoteness in time, little in space. And surely, given such an explosion as
here it needed no great foresight to predict that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no
greater distance from its scene than was the plaintiff. Just how no one might be able to predict. Whether by flying
fragments, by broken glass, by wreckage of machines or structures no one could say. But injury in some form was
most probable.
Under these circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff's injuries were not the proximate
result of the negligence. That is all we have before us. The court refused to so charge. No request was made to submit
the matter to the jury as a question of fact, even would that have been proper upon the record before us.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and CARBONEL vs IAC
Feliciano, J.
NATURE: PETITION for review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
FACTS:
 November 15, 1975, at about 1:30 AM, Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner
meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation.
 Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when
his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.
o He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-½ meters
away from his car.
 The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc., was parked on the
right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic.
o The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic.
o There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck, front or rear.
 The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver,
with the permission of his employer Phoenix.
 Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck.
o He suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.
 Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck.
 Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights
on and without a curfew pass.
o They sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck
driver.
 TRIAL COURT: Ordered Phoenix and Carbonel to pay the plaintiff’s hospital bills, loss of expected income, moral
and exemplary damages, his attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.
o Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
 CA: Affirmed the trial court’s decision but modified the award of damages.

ISSUE # 1: Did Dionisio possessed a valid and effective curfew pass?

RULING # 1: NO
 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the
explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass.
 He also offered a certification (dated two years after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of
the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Campo Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to have
authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila.
o This certification was to the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This
certification did not, however, specify any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the
supposed curfew pass.
 We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night
of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night.
 o The relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed
on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had indeed purposely
put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in
the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass.

ISSUE # 2: Was Dionisio driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck?
RULING # 2: YES
 We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead
of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers
who happened to be around at that time.
 The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been
considered by the trial court.
 Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it could not,
have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was travelling just before impact
with the Phoenix dump truck.

ISSUE # 3: Did Dionisio’s headlights accidentally malfunctioned?

RULING # 3: NO
 The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the
intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so.
 It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the
intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area)
knew was not far away from the intersection.
 We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent
Dionisio—i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright"
split seconds before contact with the dump truck.

ISSUE # 4: Was Dionisio intoxicated during the incident?

RULING # 4: NO
 The evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent Dionisio
smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an
unconscious condition.
 This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of
liquor before dinner with his boss that night.
 We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor
as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence.
 There simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon
his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "one shot or two" of hard
liquor may affect different people differently.

ISSUE # 5: Was Dionisio negligent?

RULING # 5: YES
 The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was
negligent the night of the accident.
 He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his
headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump
truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
ISSUE # 6: Was the legal and proximate cause of the collision brought about by the way the truck was parked?
RULING # 6: YES
 The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and
that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause," and that consequently
Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier
negligence of Carbonel.
 We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various
jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity
for our jurisdiction.
 We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the
petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors Prosser and Keeton
make this quite clear:
o CAUSE and CONDITION: Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm
and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive
static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable.
o But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played
an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces
which have gone before.
o The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable
because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to
bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the
defendant will not escape responsibility.
o Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily
affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month
afterward.
o "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions,; but the distinction is now almost
entirely discredited.
o So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even
in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the nature
of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. "
 We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather
an indispensable and efficient cause.
o The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in all probability not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices.
o The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible.
o In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and
therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
o What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequence of
the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck.
o In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly
situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created.
o Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain
of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the
juris vinculum of liability.
 We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent
 Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil
Code of the Philippines).

ISSUE # 7: Should the “Last Clear Chance” Doctrine be applied in this case?
RULING # 7:
 The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio
had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take
that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone.
 The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is
a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law
doctrine or rule—that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff s negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the
plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and
utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so.
 Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence—the plaintiffs or the
defendant's—was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise
in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or
"immediate."
 The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff s and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is
only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature
of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community.
 The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for
his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had
become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To
accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must
respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission.
 Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
 Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix
in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly
in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence.
o The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever
there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort
on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from
company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
 Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent
Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, we believe that the demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.
o Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00
as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent
 Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be
solidarily liable therefor to the former.
o The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel.
o We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent
appellate court.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate amount
of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20%
of such amount. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

V. Factors in Determining Negligence

b. Time

i. Adzuara vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125134. January 22, 1999

Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Nature of the Case: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Xerxes Adzuara
Y Dotimas (petitioner) was found guilty by the trial court of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with less
serious physical injuries. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Through this petition for review on
certiorari, he seeks the reversal of his conviction.

Doctrine in relation to the DETERMINATION OF NEGLIGENCE as to TIME:

Ordinary care and vigilance would suffice while driving at half past 1:00 o’clock in the morning along an almost deserted
avenue, which may consist of keeping a watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on speed, right
of way and traffic light.

FACTS:
 Xerxes Adzuara y Dotimas (petitioner) was then a law student.
 On 17 December 1990, at half past 1:00 o’clock in the morning, petitioner and his friends Rene Gonzalo and
Richard Jose were cruising in a 4-door Colt Galant sedan with plate number NMT 718 along the stretch of
Quezon Avenue coming from the direction of EDSA towards Delta Circle
 Traveling at approximately 40 kilometers per hour.
 Upon reaching the intersection of 4th West Street, their car collided with a 1975 4-door Toyota Corona sedan
with plate number PMD 711 owned and driven by Gregorio Martinez.
 Martinez had just attended a Loved Flock meeting with his daughter Sahlee and was coming from the eastern
portion of Quezon Avenue near Delta Circle.
 He was then executing a U-turn at the speed of 5 kph at the north-west portion of Quezon Avenue going to
Manila when the accident occurred.
 The collision flung the Corona twenty (20) meters southward from the point of impact causing it to land atop
the center island of Quezon Avenue.
 The Galant skittered southward on Quezon Avenue’s western half leaving its left rear about four (4) meters past
the Corona’s right front side.
 The principal points of contact between the two (2) cars were the Galant’s left front side and the Corona’s right
front door including its right front fender.
  Both petitioner and Martinez claimed that their lanes had green traffic lights although the investigating
policeman Marcelo Sabido declared that the traffic light was blinking red and orange when he arrived at the
scene of the accident an hour later.

 Sahlee Martinez, who was seated on the Corona’s right front seat, sustained physical injuries which required
confinement and medical attendance at the National Orthopaedic Hospital for five (5) days.
 As a result she missed classes at St. Paul’s College for two (2) weeks.
 Petitioner and his friends were treated at the Capitol Medical Center for their injuries.
 On 12 July 1991 petitioner was charged before the RTC of Quezon City with reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with less serious physical injuries under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
 He pleaded not guilty to the charge.
 Before the presentation of evidence, private complainant Martinez manifested his intention to institute a
separate civil action for damages against petitioner.

RTC Ruling:
 Convicted petitioner after trial and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment and to pay fine

CA Ruling:
 Affirmed RTC decision, but deleted fine
 Denied petitioner’s MR

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

Petitioner’s arguments:
 That his post-collision conduct does not constitute sufficient basis to convict where there are no factual
circumstances warranting a finding of negligence, and
 That the medical certificate by itself and unsubstantiated by the doctor’s testimony creates doubt as to the
existence of the injuries complained of.
ISSUE: Was the petitioner negligent?
RULING:
 Yes. The petitioner was found to be negligent.
 NEGLIGENCE is the want of care required by the circumstances.
 It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
 WHAT DEGREE OF CARE AND VIGILANCE THEN DID THE CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE?
o At half past 1:00 o’clock in the morning along an almost deserted avenue, ordinary care and vigilance
would suffice.
o This may consist of keeping a watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on speed,
right of way and traffic light.

Application:
 In this case, the claim of petitioner that Martinez made a swift U-turn which caused the collision is not credible
since a U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight
ahead.
 Nonetheless, no evidence was presented showing skid marks caused by the car driven by Martinez if only to
demonstrate that he was driving at a fast clip in negotiating the U-turn.
  On the other hand, the speed at which petitioner drove his car appears to be the prime cause for his inability
to stop his car and avoid the collision.
 His assertion that he drove at the speed of 40 kph. is belied by Martinez who testified that when he looked at
the opposite lane for any oncoming cars, he saw none;
 Then a few seconds later, he was hit by Adzuara’s car.
 The extent of the damage on the car of Martinez and the position of the cars after the impact further confirm
the finding that petitioner went beyond the speed limit required by law and by the circumstances.

General Rule:
 It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a U-turn.
Exception:
 BUT if the person making a U-turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that
he is already visible to the person on the thru-street, the latter must give way to the former.
 In this case, petitioner was on the thru-street and had already seen the Martinez car.
 He should have stopped to allow Martinez to complete the U-turn having, as it were, the last clear chance to
avoid the accident, which he ignored.
 In fact, he never stopped.
 Rather, he claimed that on the assumption that he was negligent, the other party was also guilty of contributory
negligence since his car had no lights on.
 The negligence of Martinez however has not been satisfactorily shown.
 Petitioner insists that the traffic light facing him at the intersection was green which only indicated that he had
the right of way.
o But the findings of the court a quo on the matter countervail this stance, hence, this Court see no reason
to disturb them.

 A perusal of the decision of the trial court shows that there are factual circumstances warranting a finding of
negligence on the part of petitioner. This was further elaborated upon by the CA in its decision [Refer to Notes
below]
 In this case, nothing on record shows that the facts were not properly evaluated by the court a quo. As such, the
Court finds no reason to disturb their findings.
 It bears to stress that the appreciation of petitioner’s post-collision behavior serves only as a means to
emphasize the finding of negligence, which is readily established by the admission of petitioner and his friend
Renato that they saw the car of Martinez making a U-turn but could not avoid the collision by the mere
application of the brakes.

Disposition: Petition denied. Judgment affirmed.

____________________
NOTES:
Findings of the Trial Court:
 The defense version cannot prevail against the prosecution version satisfactorily demonstrating that the subject
accident occurred because of Xerxes’ reckless imprudence consisting in his paying no heed to the red light and
making V-1 (Galant car) proceed at a fast clip as it approached and entered the intersection.
 Gregorio’s basic claim, substantially corroborated by Sahlee’s testimony—in sum to the effect that when he
made V-2 (Corona car) proceed to turn left, the left-turn arrow was lighted green or go for V-2 and it was red
light or stop for V-1—is the same basic version he gave in his written question-and-answer statement to the
police investigator on 13 December 1990;
  Certainly, the clear consistency of Gregorio’s posture respecting such crucial, nay decisive, material
circumstance attending the subject accident underscores the veracity of the prosecution version, even as it
tends to indicate the scant measure of faith and credence that can be safely reposed on the defense version.

Findings of the CA:

 Gregorio testified that when the arrow of the traffic light turned green, he turned left at the speed of five
kilometers per hour. While he was already at the middle of the western half of Quezon Avenue, his car was
smashed by appellant’s vehicle.
 This was corroborated by the testimony of Sahlee Martinez.
 Their declarations were confirmed by physical evidence: the resulting damage on Gregorio’s car as shown by the
exhibits. The dent on the main frame of Gregorio’s car attests to the strong impact caused by appellant’s car.
Such impact proves that appellant must have been running at high speed.
 At the time of the collision, the trial court found that the arrow for left turn was green and the traffic light facing
appellant was red. Given these facts, appellant should have stopped his car as Gregorio had the right of way.
There could be no debate on this legal proposition.
 Appellant testified that he was driving slowly, about 40 kilometers per hour.
 This is refuted by the fact that the colliding vehicles were thrown 20 meters away from the point of impact;
 In fact, Gregorio’s car rested on top of the center island of Quezon Avenue, while appellant’s car stopped at the
middle of the lane of Quezon Avenue facing towards the general direction of Quiapo

RE: Inconsistencies on minor points:

 To weaken the evidence of the prosecution, petitioner assails the testimony of Martinez as being replete with
inconsistencies.
 The records however reveal that these inconsistencies refer only to minor points which indicate veracity rather
than prevarication by the witness.
 They tend to bolster the probative value of the testimony in question as they erase any suspicion of being
rehearsed.

RE: Evidence; Medical Certificates:

 Finally, petitioner claims that the medical certificate presented by the prosecution was uncorroborated by actual
testimony of the physician who accomplished the same and as such has no probative value insofar as the
physical injuries suffered by Sahlee are concerned.
 Regretfully, this Court cannot agree.
 The fact of the injury resulting from the collision may be proved in other ways such as the testimony of the
injured person.
 In the case at bar, Sahlee Martinez testified that her injuries as described in the medical certificate were caused
by the vehicular accident of 17 December 1990.
 This declaration was corroborated by Gregorio.
 This, no less, is convincing proof.
HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
• On July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard,
Tondo, Manila.
• While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked
on one side of the road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other.
• As the car driven by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle
coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it and
thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused.
• To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a
consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from
south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney.
• The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead
of it.
• The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear
and front paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear.
• The body of the old man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.
• An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the above
incident. She entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.
• Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which the trial
fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner during the resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972.
The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the complaining witness to prosecute the case as
evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.
• The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the prosecution to
present its evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence.
• On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the of- offense charged.
• Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
• Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide thru simple imprudence and, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, she is
hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor and
to indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Pl2,000.00) without, however,
any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3

ISSUE: Whether or not The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling directly towards
her, she should have stepped on the brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to the right should have also stepped
on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the death of a pedestrian.

RULING: YES.
• The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results
to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so,
 the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. 5
• A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." 6
• Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence
resulting in Homicide.
• The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:
• The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite direction followed
by another which overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should not only have swerved the car she was driving
to the right but should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she would not bump into the pedestrian who
was crossing at the time but also the jeepney which was then parked along the street. 7
• The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such
suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it
is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation
confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to
herself and to others.
• Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect to the relative
distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that
petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the light
without stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the prosecution on this point is the petitioner's
statement to the police 8 stating::
• And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake sa sasakyan na aking
kasalubong kung kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit siya naman biglangpagtawid ng tao o victim
at hindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala ng magawa . Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang nasabing
aksidente.9 (Emphasis supplied)
• The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but deem its veracity to have
been admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking
too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate
herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could
not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. 10 The danger confronting petitioner
was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough
time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.
• Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We
therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently
absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under consideration.
• We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of the claim
due them, had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
• WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru
Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the
heirs of the victim.
McKee vs IAC (Factors in Determining Negligence; Emergency Rule)

FACTS:
 Between 9 & 10 o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway,
between Angeles City & San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo
truck, Loadstar owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose
Koh.
 The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George
Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
o Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George, Christopher and
Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of 1 1/2 year old Kim.
 At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of
the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
 Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice
weighing about 10,000 kilos, was travelling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was
bound for Manila.
 The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
 When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car.
o The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn
back.
o Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched
on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.
o Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck.
o The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
 An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges
in the information. The conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his
MR and the denial by the SC of his Petition for Review.
 Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and
her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were impleaded
against as the employers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict.
These cases were eventually consolidated.
 The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and attorney’s fees.
 On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it
was Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident.
 However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of the
trial court because the fact that Koh’s car invaded the lane of the truck and the collision occurred while still in
Galang’s lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was negligent.

ISSUE: WON Koh is guilty of negligence.

RULING: NO
 Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the
car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate
peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several
meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
  Under what is known as the emergency rule, “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required
to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.”
 Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the
best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that
he was not guilty of negligence.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE
while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the
indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee. Costs
against private respondents. SO ORDERED.

Valenzuela v CA
G.R. No. 115024; February 7, 1996
KAPUNAN, J.:

These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover
damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a
vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990.

FACTS:
 This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident.
 Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows:
o At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta
Avenue.
o Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted
place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
o Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her
home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her
emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the
left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was
suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the
name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
o Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which
was destroyed, and then fell to the ground.
o She was pulled out from under defendant's car.
o Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to
the rest of the body.
 Defendant’s version of the accident:
o Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent.
o He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and
the road was wet.
o He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the
direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San
Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights".
 o Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle,
and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking
lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted.
o He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a
standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer).
o He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff
swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk.
o Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not
a licensed driver.
 After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross
negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
o The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for
damages pursuant to Article 2180.
o It ordered the defendants to jointly and severally to pay.
 As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for
Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that
the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties' cars, appeared to be at the center
of the right lane of Aurora Blvd.
 The trial court denied the motion.
 Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals.
o In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the
evidence of record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly parked at the right,
beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's car."
o Dismissing the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the
center of the road, the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car
was at or near center of the right lane was never presented during the trial of the case.
o Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not
corroborated.
 In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the
Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any
liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00.
 Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate petitions before this
Court.
o Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be held liable for damages because the
proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence.
 Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such
negligence ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
o On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent court's decision
insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard
Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Richard Li is liable for the damages sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela?
RULING:
 Yes, Richard Li is liable for the damages sustained by Valenzuela.
 One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li’s disingenuous and patently self-serving
asseverations.
 The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at
the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a
principal metropolitan thorough fare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the
changing conditions of the road if he were alert—as every driver should be—to those conditions.
 Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
 Physiological “fight or flight” mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs,
alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.
  Li’s failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due
to either or both of the two factors:
o that he was driving at a “very fast” speed as testified by Rodriguez;
o that he was under the influence of alcohol.
 Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since
normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela’s car, rather than be in a situation forcing
him to suddenly apply his brakes.
 Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
accident.
 “Negligence, as it is commonly understood, is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others.”
 It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
 We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, that negligence is the want of care required by the
circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether Valenzuela is guilty of contributory negligence?

RULING:
 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
 Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to
have conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking
zone.
o We cannot agree.
 Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not
to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation
(emergency rule).
 The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not
require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes
threatening conditions.
 Under the “emergency rule” adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
 A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a
point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists.
 She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley
where she would likely find no one to help her.
 It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora
Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other
motorists.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alexander Commercial Inc. is liable for the damages sustained by Valenzuela based on pater
familias for failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees?
RULING:
 Yes, Alexander Commercial Inc. is liable for the damages sustained by Valenzuela based on pater familias for
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees.
  The employer’s primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art.
2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.
 His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its employees.
o Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in
selecting its employees, half of the employer’s burden is overcome.
o The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of employment.
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during
the performance of the latter’s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employee’s private activities or during the
performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee’s tasks.
 The case at bench presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies
with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
o Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan, require rigorous
tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car (subject of company
maintenance) to their representatives.
o In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are
satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for
company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company or to others.
o When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect
guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
 Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all
kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business
and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car,
the managerial employee or company sales agent.
 As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company’s
image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to
whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably
and responsibly.
 In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care aand
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li.
 No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain
the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.
 Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for
entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be
jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. SO ORDERED.

JUNIO vs Manila Railroad (Gravity of harm)

Facts:
 Consolacion Junio, a young woman, 22 years of age, and Beatriz Soloria, another young woman of 18 years,
represented by her father, Fausto Soloria, who was appointed her guardian ad litem, brought these actions in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to recover from the defendant, Manila Railroad Company, damages
suffered by them in an accident that occurred at the railroad crossing situated at the outskirts of the town of
 Calasiao, Pangasinan, when the automobile in which they were passengers collided with a locomotive belonging
to the aforementioned defendant.
o Consolacion Junio was a dancer earning from six pesos (P6) to eight pesos (P8) a day for two or three
days every week that she danced. She lost her right leg which was amputated, suffered a fracture of her
right arm and was wounded on her occipital region.

 At about 11:40 o'clock on the night of April 13, 1930, the plaintiffs herein with some other persons were
traveling in a PU-Car on the road between Calasiao and Santa Barbara.
 When they arrived at the intersection of the road and the defendant's railway, the car tried to cross the track
and collided with the engine of the night express which left Dagupan for Manila at 11 o'clock that same night
and which was then passing over the crossing in question at great speed.
 As a result of the collision, the car was thrown some distance, plaintiff Junio's right leg was amputated and her
right arm fractured, and Soloria received various injuries on her head.

 The aforementioned crossing is situated in the town of Calasiao and the same is presumed to be dangerous due
to the fact that gates were required at that crossing. (Section 83, Act No. 1459, as amended by Act No. 2100.)

 On the night of the accident, the gates were not lowered and there was no notice to the effect that they were
not operated at night or that they were temporarily out of order. However, a notice to the effect that that was a
railroad crossing was there.

 The gate in question was about 300 meters from the railroad station at Calasiao; that on each side of the
crossing there was a wooden bar operated only during the daytime by a woman employee of the defendant, and
that just before the crossing on one side of the road leading from the town of Calasiao there was a signpost
bearing the notice, "RAILROAD CROSSING", written crosswise.

Allegations:
 In the case under consideration, the driver alleges that he slowed down from 19 miles an hour, at which rate he
was then going, to 16 miles, and that he was on the lookout for any approaching train,
 while the engineer insists that he rang the bell and sounded the whistle before reaching the crossing.
 Both parties claim to be free from guilt, and if the defendant company were completely so, the plaintiffs would
have no cause of action against it.

Issue: Whether or not both the defendant Manila Railroad and driver of the car are negligent?

Ruling: Yes

 From the evidence, it is obvious that the defendant as well as the driver of the car in which the plaintiffs were
passengers were negligent, the former because, by installing the gates at the place or crossing where the
accident occurred, it had voluntarily imposed upon itself the obligation to operate them even at night and to
close them every time a train passed in order to avoid causing injury to the public. It has been said that the gates
constitute an invitation to the public to pass without fear of danger, and failure to operate them conveniently
constitutes negligence on the part of the company.

 The driver was, likewise, negligent because he did not comply with his duty to slacken the speed of the car and
to "look and listen" before crossing the intersection and, above all, because he did not maintain a reasonable
speed so as to permit him to stop any moment if it were necessary in order to avoid an accident. If, in the
present case, the car had been running at a reasonable speed, there is no doubt that he could have stopped it
instantly upon seeing the train from a distance of 5 meters.
  As a general rule, the rights and obligations between the public and a railroad company at a public crossing
are mutual and reciprocal. Both are under mutual obligation to exercise due care to avoid causing or receiving
injury. Each is in duty bound to exercise reasonable or ordinary care commensurate with the risk and danger
involved.

Notes:
 the negligence of a driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory negligence, cannot be imputed to a passenger
who has no control over him in the management of the vehicle and with whom he sustains no relation of master
and servant. This rule is applied more strictly when, as in the present case, hired cars or those engaged in public
service, are involved.
 There is nothing of record to show that the appellants herein have incurred in any negligence imputable to them
and we do not see any reason whatsoever why they should be made responsible for the driver's negligence. The
doctrine established in the cases cited should be applied to the case at bar and it should be held that the
appellants herein are entitled to recover from the appellee damages occasioned by the accident of which they
were victims.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and It is ordered that the appellee pay to Consolacion Junio
the sum of P3,000 and to Beatriz Soloria P300, with costs of both instances, So ordered.

US vs Clemente
Facts:
 On June 1912 in Manila, Enrique Clemente drove a street car driving at full speed (around 23 miles per hour)
 A mother was buying crude oil from a store across the street of their house, when she noticed that her 3-year old
child was crossing the street from their house (most probably to follow his mother)
 When the mother saw the car fast approaching, she signaled to the driver to stop the car
 Other bystanders who also noticed the car fast approaching also signaled to the car to stop
 However, the driver did not make any effort to stop the car
 He then hit the child, and it took a distance of 36.8M for the car to make a complete stop after the impact
 The child was dragged by the car, fracturing and destroying its skull and causing instant death
 An information was filed for homicide thru reckless negligence
 Trial court decision:
o Only found Clemente guilty of a violation of a city ordinance thru imprudence and negligence, and
sentenced to 5 months of arresto mayor
 Thus, prompting this appeal by the US

Issue:
WON the driver should be guilty for homicide thru reckless negligence

Ruling:
 YES
 It is the duty of any person driving a vehicle in the public thoroughfares to reduce the same to control, ready to
be stopped at any moment, if he sees a child below' the years of understanding in such place that it can, by any
reasonable chance, place itself in a dangerous position with respect to the vehicle
  In such case the vehicle must be under such control that, if the child, by some sudden or unexpected movement,
places itself in the way of the vehicle, it can be stopped in time to avert injury
 No one is able to determine what a child of that age will do, and it is incumbent upon the driver of a vehicle, on
seeing such child in the street, to take such care that, no matter what, within reasonable limits, the child may do,
it will nevertheless be safe
Application
 This defendant, so far as the great preponderance of the evidence is concerned, took no adequate precautions to
prevent the accident which occurred
 It is undoubted that he saw the child in the street, very probably making its way toward the street-car track; yet
he continued the car at its maximum speed, without regard to what the child might do
 Such conduct cannot be permitted. Vehicles cannot be driven in the public streets in such a way as to endanger
the life of a child below the thinking age who may have strayed upon the streets in search of its mother, or who
may be there for any other reason.
 Having no judgment of its own, the drivers of vehicles must substitute their judgment for its; not having the
intelligence to direct itself, men who drive cars or vehicles must exercise their intelligence.
 It may be true, as defendant claims, that the child by a sudden dart placed itself in front of the car, but that is no
excuse for the defendant
 He should have anticipated that very thing and should have acted accordingly