Amsterdam University Press

Chapter Title: Concept - Meaning - Discourse. Begriffigeschichte Reconsidered

Chapter Author(s): HANS ERICH BOOEKER

Book Title: History of Concepts

Book Subtitle: Comparative Perspectives
Book Editor(s): IAIN HAMI’SIIER-MONK, KAIUN TILMANS, FRANK VAN VREE
Published by: Amsterdam University Press. (1998)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt45kdhv.8

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 CHAPTER 4

Concept - Meaning - Discourse.

Begriffsgeschichte reconsidered'
HANS ERICH BOOEKER

I.

'Begriffigeschichte in a narrow sense', as Reinharr Kcselleck, one of the leading protagonists

of the history of concepts, once succinctly stated, 'is a historiographic achievement. It is
concerned with the history of forming. using, and changing concepts."
Begriffigeschichte - the history of concepts - deals with the synchronic and diachronic in-
terpretation of words viewed as 'concentrations of multiple meanings" and 'lead concepts
of historical movement".' Their analysis generates structures and greater contexts of events.
These 'basic concepts' are viewed simultaneously as indicators of extra-linguistic objects -
such as changing social structures - and as Factors or promoters of historical development -
such that in society they carry out actions. Begriffigeschichte aims to identify the social scope
of concepts, makes an issue of the binding, influencing power that concepts exert on politi-
cal and social groups, and deals with epochal changes in social and political structures to
the extent they can be grasped in linguistic terms as a shifting in experience, expectations,
and theory.'
Only in this dual interpretation oflanguage as both indicator and factor does the meth-
odology of Begriffigeschichte constitute a research field of its own.
Different dimensions of Begriffigeschichte can be worked out under these premises.' First
of all, it is a complementary subject to the (historical) social sciences and linguistics in that
it offers a specialized method of source criticism which analyzes the meanings of central
concepts. Second, it is very closely tied to social history, representing as it were the 'condi-
tio sine qua non of social history issues'." Begriffigeschichte supplements its synchronic
analyses, which focus on situation and time frame, with diachronic analyses, which follow
changes over time in the meanings of concepts, bringing this all together in the history of
the concept. The various diachronic layers of a concept alone serve to derive long-term
structural changes. It would be inadmissible to be too quick to equate analyses of
Begriffigeschichtewith those of social history.

. Translated from German by Allison Brown.

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 Finally, Begriffig($c!Jichte constitutes itself to the extent that it methodologically main-
tains its assumptions through a subsidiary function as a separate branch of science, the sub-
ject of which is the linguistic expression of changes in experience and theory.
Begriffigeschichte can make structural statements on the basis of the temporal relationship
between event and structure, and the non-simultaneity of the simultaneity of concepts and
objects. These statements, in the form of hypothetical inquiries and challenges, can be
aimed at a social history that has always been concerned with structures, time periods, and
simultaneity.
Begriffigeschichte, as founded by Koselleck, makes use of the same methods as hisrorico-
critical textual analysis, hypotheses in a traditional history of ideas and (social) history, and
sernasiological and onomastic analyses taken from linguistics." The 'method' used by
Koselleck's Begriffigeschichte was conceived as a critique of traditional philosophical and
philological forms of Begriffsgeschichre. In 'Social History and Begriffigeschichte' (I972),
Koselleck developed two central elements of the new approach:

Criticism of the uncritical transfer of present and temporally fixed expressions of

constitutive life to the past' and 'criticism of the history of ideas, insofar as these are
introduced as constants."

Modern Begriffigeschlchte emerged in contrast to a history of events and politics oriented

merely toward a chronological series of events, to posirivistic, 'antiquated' historiography
that rejects even the heuristic use of theories and hypotheses, and to a history of ideas void
of its socio-political context, i.e., a shrunken form of historicism to which it certainly can-
not be reduced. It would thus also be wrong to equate Begriffignchlchte oriented toward
structural history with a critique of historicism.
The concept of Begriffigeschichte is closely tied to the joint work Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffi (Basic Concepts of History).') The starting hypothesis of the book is a so-
called bridge period from 1750 through 1850, W during which - accompanied by the disso-
lution of corporauvely structured society - the socio-political world of concepts also under-
went fundamental changes leading up to modern times. This hypothesis has definitively
influenced considerations on the method used in Begriffigeschichte. It is then specified fur-
ther by the assumptions that: (1) concepts previously known only among the educated are
gaining access to other social classes (democratization); (2) that basic concepts are serving
more and more as polemical weapons, thus becoming ambiguous (ideologizabiliry). and
(3) that - at the expense of the experiences they comprise - they are assuming more and
more expectations and goals, thus having become future-oriented 'concepts of movement'
(remporalizarion' and 'poliricizarion'}. The working hypotheses are merely heuristic
anricipaticns and results of efforts for and on Geschichtliche Grundbegriffi, sub-tided 'His-
torical Dictionary of Sociopolitical Language in Germany'. 1I
'The dictionary is related to the present', as Koselleck explains its purpose, 'insofar as it
deals with the linguistic record of the modern world, its becoming conscious, and its creat-
ing consciousness through concepts that include our own';'! Research on Begriffigeschichte

52 HISTORY Of CONCEPTS

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cannot be reduced to these hypotheses. Koselleck himself recently said that 'hypotheses
about the existence of such a period play no part in the method used in Begri./figeschichte',13
The work was received positively as a programme of a historical view of language, but
was criticized in that in some respects it was not on a par with the original prospectus."
The lexical organization was criticized as being neither optimal nor adequate in differenti-
aring hypotheses of Begri./figesc/;irhte according to social and communicative references. I';
At the core of the criticism, again and again, was also the issue of the selection of sources in
the articles, namely that these 'basic concepts' lead to 'lofty notions on the history of ideas'
that prefer the great 'canonized' theorists from Aristotle to KarI Marx, without proving that
they were representative of society and without their making their way into the everyday
language of politics." With that, critics felt the level of a traditional history of ideas was not
surpassed and, by not having socially representative sources, socio-historical standards were
not met.
Objections to a limitation on 'representative' philosophical texts were directly connected
to criticism of the essentially diachronic trend expressed by the Begri./figeschichte studies.
In addition to reservations regarding research methods, criticism was fired with respect
to the theoretical, methodological approach of Begri./figeschichte. From a linguistic perspec-
tive, the partly intuitive methodological foundations that fluctuated between linguistic and
historical premises, such as the conceprualizarion of the relationship between history of the
word and that of the concept, were criticized. Parallel to that is the basic objection that the
socio-historical relevance of Begri./figeschichte could not be convincingly justified 111 theo-
retical terms. Aspects of this criticism have been taken up by the new variant of
Begri./figeschichte as conceived, and to some extent realized, by Rolf Reichardt. 17
In order to measure the options and limitations of hypotheses pertaining to the history
of concepts, it is necessary to explore the structure of'meamog' (III); the question of how a
'word' refers to an 'object' (IV) and the possible relationships between Begriffigeschichte and
discourse history (V) must also be discussed. However, this examination must start with
the 'concept' (II), the central object through which to access Begriffigeschichte. Some of the
criticism of theory formation in Begri./figeschichte has evolved from claims that the theory of
the 'concept' is inaccessible, since it remains unexplained in terms of linguistic philoso-
phy." This essay aims to take us yet a step further, even if it is not possible in many respects
to entirely explain open questions and methods of a potential Begri./figeschichte.

n.
Research in the field of Begri./figeschichte has its basis in words; terms; in general. linguistic
signs. It does not deal with words as singular graphemes, however, but as symbols for cat-
egories of similar words, or words of a special kind. A constitutive property of
Begriffigeschichte is the distinction between word and concept - a distinction that is by all
means problematic in linguistics, epistemology, and a theory of signs. In concise terms,
Koselleck regards conceprs as nothing more than words with a special historical meaning."

CONCEPT _ Mr.AN1N<; _ DISCOURSE BEGRlffSGESCH1CHTE RVC:ONS1DlfU'.\) 53

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Thus the subject of Begriffigeschichte emerges only as an outcome of the research process it-
self.
Koselleck has repeatedly tried to grasp the difference between word and concept in theo-
retical terms. He Fundamentally sees the distinction as qualitative, as one of different sign
types seen from the same perspective. "The meaning of the word', he once wrote
paradigmarically,

always refers to that which is meant, whether a train of thought or an object, etc. The
meaning is therefore fixed to the word, but it is sustained by the spoken or written con-
text, and it also arises our of the situation to which it refers, A word becomes a concept if
this context of meaning in which - and for which ~ the word is used, is entirely incorpo-
rated into the word itself. The concept is fixed to the word, but at the same time it is
more than the word."

Therefore, a concept is a word that has 'incorporated the full extent of the context of mean-
ing in which the word is used'. Words thus have 'potential meanings'. Concepts inherently
bring together a 'wealth of meanings' and, 'in contrast to words, they are always ambigu-
ous' .21 A 'wealth of meanings that cannot be divided into different potential meanings' - if
this is an accurate expression of Koselleck's intended understanding of the terminology,
then his concept of 'concept' coincides with the use of the term III the philosophy of lan-
guage to describe second degree predicates, the meaning of which is obtained by abstrac-
rion."
This distinction exists largely due to evidence offered by empirical examples. At the
same time, according to Koselleck, words and concepts should also be distinguishable in
terms of definition." And on top of that, for both, the 'ambiguity' that always emerges
should facilirare smooth transitions between the categories. It is obvious that the concept of
ambiguity is in fact indispensible in explaining shifts and new relations in historical argu-
ments.
Koselleck sees concepts, in contrast to words as 'concentrations of multiple meanings
that are incorporated into the word from the historical reality, which is different in every
case (..). PUt succinctly, the meaning of words can be defined more exactly, concepts can
only be inrerprered.?" A multiplicity of interpretations is Koselleck's criterion for a concept
as a way of perceiving and as a schematic for interpreting historical reality. This concept of
'ambiguity' or 'multiple meanings'," which can in part be traced to linguistic features of
some words, should make it possible to draw methodological links to questions of social
history and ideology criticism.
The 'concepts' of Begriffigeschichte cannot be explained using the methods of linguistic
semantics," as the premises of BegriffigcschidJtc allow neither a generally accepted defini-
tion of a concept not its cxrensional determination. Consensually indisputable meanings
can serve neither as indicators of nor as factors in the social process. They remain incon-
spicuous, giving no reason for a conflicting iurerpreraeion and ruling out any conceptual
dynamics. Only that which is uncertam as a name and potentially controversial according

54 HISTORY Or CONCFl'TS

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to its assignment to 'objects' offers grounds for discursive turbulence, thus becoming his-
torically conspicuous.
Begrlffsgeschichte views a concept as a collection of experiences and expectations, per-
spectives and explanations, of historical reality.Therefore, from the outset, a concept exists
within a theoretical constellation or conceptual diagram. A single concept can hardly be
understood without reference to other concepts." Begriffigeschichte seen as a history of
knowledge conveyed through language must always keep the relational structure of the
concepts in the field of vision. It is not an individual concept that forms the subject of con-
sciousness in Begriffigeschlchte, but the whole of a mutually self-supporting concepcualiry
Concepts organized into structured aggregates define each other reciprocally. From the
start, then, the subject of Begriffigeschichte is the classification of the concepts. In other
words, Begriffigeschichte analyzes concepts as elements in a semantic or linguistic field. In
this sense it follows, as Koselleck states, that 'the investigation of a concept cannot be car-
ried out purely semasiologically; it can never limit itself to the meanings of words and their
shifts in meaning'. ,8 Research in Begriffigeschichte goes beyond the history of the word, de-
termining semantic structures. In particular, opposite, related, and parallel expressions
must be analysed in detail in their relation to the term under investigation. In addition to
synonymous and equivalent expressions, attention must also be paid to related judgmental
concepts (Wertungshegriffi). Judgments, and generally the potentially competitive or strate-
gic character of expressions or definitions of concepts, must also be examined.
These 'intentional components'," which need to be put in concrete terms, generally also
with respect to individual utterances and speakers, are what is meant when attempts at
conceptualization in Begriffigeschichte continually demand conrextualizarion. Only then
will discursive strategies be incorporated into contexts of social action.
Different types of concepts appeat in passing in Koselleck's continued efforts to deter-
mine a concept of Begriffigeschichte, though he never explains them. In his 'Introduction',
for example, he mentions constitutional concepts (Verfassungsbegriffi), key words, self-
namings (Selbstbenennungen), lead concepts (Leitbegriffi), core concepts, etc.-10 More mean-
ingful from a Begriffigeschichte perspective, however, are concepts such as 'struggle concepts'
(Kampfbegriffi), 'future concepts', 'goal concepts', and 'expectation concepts'." These
words name possible functions that concepts can assume in argumentative contexts. All of
them indicate that the concepts do nor serve theoretical knowledge alone. A 'struggle con-
cept" for example, describes the pragmatic function that a word has in political confronta-
tion. 'Staacsburger' (citizen) was a struggle concept used by Prussian reformers around
1800, since it indicated a 'polemical goal' directed against the 'traditional, corporattvely
structured society' and 'corporative inequality of rights' ..l2 'Sraatsburger'. as a new word,
was a 'struggle concept', since any use of it demanded as it were the aspired equality from
all those who refused to relinquish their traditional privileges.
Again and again, Koselleck stresses that a 'should' can also be included within the con-
cepts. In writing about the word 'Sraarsburger'. he says that it refers, before the fact, 'to a
constitutional model yet to be implemented' ..l·l This type of wording can often be found in
Koselleck's works, for example, when he speaks of 'future concepts' serving 'to linguistically
pre-formulate positions (to be achieved in the furure}'?', Ot when he later speaks of democ-

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racy as an 'expectation concept', which then gradually forces all other constitutional forms
'into a state of illegaliry?", or when he once said that in the course of historical develop-
ments, the 'demand for implementation' inherent in many concepts continuously growS..16
With that, Koselleck expresses an awareness that a word that seems to simply name the es-
sence of objects or things can actually at the same time be used to express a 'should'. This is
especially noticeable in Kosellcck's use of the German gerundive (zu ienoirldichende - to be
implemented; zu errineende - to be achieved), such as in the words 'illegality' and 'de-
mand', the meaning of which Koselleck says could be contained in the concepts. He thus
makes it cleat that the virtual aim and function of historical concepts is especially to express
a 'should'. In doing that, Koselleck takes not only the descriptive part of a word's meaning
into account, but its prescriptive part as well; in other words, the deontic (i.e., referring to
moral obligation) meaning oflexemes. By virtue of the 'should'ccomponenrs of the mean-
ing that are inherent in and also intended by the words themselves, words serve as the vehi-
cles or abbreviations of thoughts, nor only with respect to what is, but also to what should
be.
'Movement concepts' are for Koselleck typical, strongly programmatic surpluses in the
conceptual content, combined with a nominative lack of clarity."
This makes tangible a dimension of Begriffigeschichte that Koselleck never explicitly
theorizes on, but often expresses. It is a dimension in which concepts function as struggle
concepts, goal concepts, etc. in such a way that they stand for, and are used for thoughts
that are condensed, so to speak, in them. The word always calls the thought to mind; it is
coined in the context of the thought and in order to express it succinctly. Hence the word is
a reference cipher or abbreviation for the thought. Without the thought, the word cannot
be at all understood. Every time the word IS repeated, the thought is revived, since - as that
which is presupposed - it must continually be made real in the present in order for the
word to be understood in the context in which it is uttered. It is true to the same extent for
struggle concepts as for future, goal, and action concepts that through them, the respective
thoughts subsumed under them are rehearsed and inculcated every time they are actively
spoken, or even heard or read. Every time a word is used, it contributes to the reinforce-
ment or abandonment of one language usage or another. This competition among words
and their meanings is of historical interest precisely because the difference in language us-
age is accompanied by a difference in thought usage. 'Every concept serves to set certain
horizons and limits of potential inquiry and imaginable theory:" If, in agreement with
Koselleck, one understands [he concept, or word, as a reference cipher, a vehicle used by
thoughts, then it is obvious that regarding the habitual use of certain words - such as 'class' -
habitual thinking of commonplace thoughts is implied and, over and over again, induced.
This is often indicated by historians in particular.
Later efforts at conceprualizarion within the scope of Begriffigeschichte have been able to
continue along the lines of these approaches, which view a concept as a function that is filled
with changing arguments, thereby acquiring its predicative character. This is how Rolf
Reichardt attempts to classify ~ using the headword 'Basrille' - the semantic field that is
staked OUt by words connected with this word in a text. He divides the associated words into
four categories. The paradigmatic field of reference includes concepts and phrases that 'di-

56 HISTORY Of CONCEl''I'S

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reedy define' the concept under examination. The symagmaric field of reference is comprised
of words connected to the concept under examination that 'give it content, describe it, and
dearly delimit it'. A third category is made up of''conceprs and names that describe the causes
and creators of the 'Bastille' and its intended practice', and, finally, the fourth category in-
cludes all systematic opposites (functional antonyms) of the examined concept. I')
Reichardr carefully distinguishes the different practical realms of communicative utter-
ances. Their analysis, as well that of the supporting layers of the concepts, are essential ele-
ments of a Begriffigeschichte based on a history of consciousness. His analyses approach his
study on everyday consciousness and the related linguistic constitution and its conditions.
The associated fields at the core of the analysis, here, are actual 'head-words', the sole pur-
pose of which is to indicate the formation and changes in episremic networks, without im-
parting any consciousness-constituting force to the headwords themselves. This also applies
for Koselleck. For him, roo, a concept viewed as a linguistic or cognitive structure has as lit-
tle immanent dynamics as does a word: 'It does not move, it is moved'," and by that he
means in its usage.

Ill.

As long as the relationship between concept and meaning is not clarified, the
historiographic Begriffigeschichte - in the sense of a history of consciousness - is constantly
in danger of remaining merely a history of ideas." Are concepts, as meanings of expres-
sions, language-immanent phenomena? In other words, does a word refer ro something ex-
tra-linguistic by the mere fact that it expresses a concept, or not until it becomes the term
(Bezeichnung) for manifestations included within the concept? Do we assume concrete or
abstract entities behind the meanings of an expression? Or is the meaning of an expression
asserted in the way it is used in language? These questions basically point to two opposing
explanations. On the one hand, 'meaning' is described as a characteristic of words or sen-
tences; on the other hand, as an event or process in which linguistic signs obtain a meaning
only if they take on a function in a communicative act. In that case, the meaning of an ex-
pression is the way it is used in language. The methodology in Gacbicbdiche Grundbegrifje
leaves the concept of meaning generally undefined. At the core of his discussion of meth-
ods used in Begriffigeschichte, Reinharr Koselleck said that:

The meal1lng of a word always refers to that which is meant, whether an idea or an
object. The meaning is therefore fixed to the word, but it is sustained by the content
intended by the thought, by the spoken or written context, and by a social siruarion.v

This distinguishes between the meaning of the word and the referential relarion. A word is
not used to refer to that which is meant; rather, the 'meaning' refers to ir." In addition to
the sign-to-object relation of a classical theory of signs, here Koselleck introduces the word-
to-thought relation. The thought, linking word and object as the third pole of the triangle,
was considered that which is described. The thought in that concept is replaced in
Koselleck's theory by the meaning. Meaning is thus no longer the relation of a sign to that

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which is described; instead, it is an episcemic entity not defined in detail that can itself, in
turn, be seen in relation to that which is described.
In this conceptualization, meaning becomes something sracically fixed to the word itself.
It seems as if scholars of Begriffigeschichte assumed that 'meaning' or 'sense' is to be under-
stood as object-like, or tangible. This as it were essentialistic conception of meaning views
the relation between linguistic signs and their meanings as more or less fixed relations of
two invariable mngnirudes. Acts of meaning-forming linguistic communication, in this
conception, are ascribed to the meanings - fixed, identical, and essential- of the individual
linguistic signs. The use of the concept is thus envisioned as something added accidentally
to the meaning of the word. The concept-critical model pays little attention to the poten-
tia! diversity of possible communicative meanings and to potential dependence, with re-
spect to situation and context, of linguistic use of signs. An understanding of concepts as
'words containing considerable meaning' rules out the cognitive function of the communi-
cative act in constructing the concept.
Behind the necessary link between semasiology and onomastics III practical
Begr~lfigeschlchte,'j4 however, as repeatedly asserted by Koselleck, is the view that abstract
objects can be known and analysed, independent of their being recorded in linguistic terms
- i.e. words that describe them. Yet this contradicts the proclaimed goal of hisroriographic
Begriffigeschlchte to attain the constitution of reality contained therein with the aid of an
analysis of meaning of linguistic communication about historical experience. The attempt
to situate hisroriographic Begriffigeschichte between semasiology and onomastics - or a his-
wry of words and a history of things, or experience and ideas';') - carries a risk that concept-
critical analyses will not achieve any of their episremic goals, either because they are too
rash to subordinate one to the other, or because they strongly bias one pole.
Conceptualization efforts in Begriffigeschichte have often not been able to avoid equating
'concept' and 'meaning' by considering them more or less static 'ideas'. This paved the way
in practical Begriffigeschichte for the traditional history of ideas to be revised, burying in-
sight into the specifically linguistic aspect in the construction of knowledge and reality.
However, conceptualizarions of Begriffigeschichte are also based on the possibility of
grasping a concept as a category that conceives cognitive achievements in connection with
linguistic acts of communication. KoseIleck posits this dimension in his introduction to
the Geschicbtliche Grundbegri./ft, stating: 'The Begriff(..) must retain multiple meanings in
order to be a Begr~ff( ..) The meaning of words can be defined mote exactly, concepts can
only be interpreted."?
Koselieck distinguishes between 'pure words' and 'concepts' with respect to their capac-
ity to have a fixed meaning. This distinction serves to assert that the history of use that is
called up assumes greater proportions for some concepts rhan for others. Even if linguists
do not agree with the claimed difference in the capacity of words to have a fixed meaning,
this does not change the fact that in conceptualizations in terms of a history of concepts,
the process of meaning formation is in principle incorporated at least to some extent in the
communicative interaction. This is demonstrated by Koselleck's insistence that the use of
concepts in historical contexts be examined, as well as through his desire to determine the
'social scope' of concepts."

58 11IS](lRY OF (:(lNCFI'TS

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 Scholars of Begriffigeschichte see the contexts of meaning as tracing back to the use of in-
dividual (concepr'<Iwords. which are intended as such to be the focus and concentration of
diverse reference structures. In reconstructing these contexts of meaning, there is a constant
risk of overestimating rhe functions that individual words assume in the continuum of
communicarive actions and texts. This can result in idealizing linguistic units which do not
take on their understood existence until subjected to analysis, making them substantial fac-
tors in the construction of consciousness. Concepts do not acquire the significance for an
analysis of consciousness that Koselleck and other scholars of Begriffigeschichte attribute to
them until taking on this analytic function as an 'overview of the non-updated combina-
tion of semantic features' and as the 'structural composite of potential uses'. They are nor
seen as units of current language-use in which words always have a current meaning.
More than Koselleck, Reichardr emphasizes rhe linguistic construction of consciousness.
'Social history is the history of concepts', he expounded, in contrast to Kosellcck, 'not so
much because concepts mirror the material reality of the past in a more or less broken fash-
ion, but above all insofar as they are based on the social character of the language.':"
Reichardt, too, agrees in the end with the working hypothesis of Begriffigeschichte; that
history can expose a 'material reality' behind the linguistic construction of consciousness
(which as such is always historical and, consequently, relative). More precisely than in tra-
ditional Begriffigeschichte, he attempts to distinguish between the social reality of historical
times, on the one hand - which history can better access if it analyzes everyday sources that
participate In the historical process and do not 'merely' reflect on it - and the historically
relative consciousness of the respective contemporaries, on the other - which is influenced
by linguistically constructed knowledge. Reichardt is aware that the historical conscious-
ness of social institutions and processes of an epoch are at least as influenced by 'institu-
tional' sources as by social reflection. This is obvious when he states that,

by means of everyday experiences, the meanings of concepts (..) [form] sedimenred stocks
of 'social knowledge' put into language that participate in 'processes of meaning forma-
tion' from sensory perception, selection of subjects and motive structures, to action."

Thus Reichardr sees meaning-formation processes about social reality as being controlled
by the overall context of linguistic, social action. The social use of language to be analyzed
includes everyday actions in social institutions and processes, as well as reflections on real-
ity. Accordingly, the practical side of Begriffigeschichte looks beyond the analysis of indi-
vidual products of language to the language standards and conventions of society that sub-
stantiate them. Nevertheless, this variant of Begriffigeschichte, too, is not aimed at a 'con-
struction' of 'objects' in a comprehensive sense by means of spoken language; rather, it is an
attempt at a normative summary, standardization, and flexible differentiation of certain
potenrials for meaning and sense. 50 In other words, 'social communication constructs the
object as an object that is typically ordered and summarized in a certain way, but it does
nor construct the "material" organized in a standardizing manner'." Even this version of
hisroriographical Begriffigeschichtedoes not go so far as to grasp 'meaning' in Wingenstein's
sense as 'use'. 12

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 According to such an understanding, knowledge of the use of a word would be knowl-
edge of its communicative validity or, to be more precise. knowledge of the 'meaning'."

rv
The central theoretical claim in Koselleck's understanding of Begriffigeschichte is that 'exter-
nal history' is incorporated into Begriffigeschlchte, and that the two mutually refer to each
other. This makes the relation of 'words' to 'objects' a key problem for Begriffigeschichte. Ac-
cording to Koselleck, Begrijfigeschichte is 'concerned with the convergence of concept and
history'. 54 In contrast to the claims of linguistic methods, Koselleck declares precisely the
socio-political function of the relationship between word and object to be the subject of re-
search in Begriffigt'Schichte. jS Thus Begriffigeschichte encompasses the entire field of interac-
tion that exists between the subjecr areas that include concepts and the language through
which the concepts are articulated. Each of them, the subject areas and the language, has its
own history, which are held together by the demands of Begriffigeschichte. In this sense,
Koselleck sees 'concepts' as superordinare units that connect 'word' and 'object'. They have
two dimensions. On the one hand, they refer to something extra-linguistic, i.e., the context
in which they are used. On the other hand, this context, this historical reality, is perceived
in linguistic categories. 'Put metaphorically, concepts are like joints linking language and
the extra-linguistic world: 5!>
Koselleck has interpreted the relationship between word and object by generally describ-
ing the source language of a particular epoch as 'metaphors for history'. '7 However, his
many attempts to determine this relationship have been rather vague; for example, he has
said that word and object refer to one another reciprocally, correspond to each other, and
exist in a mutual tension, but they never merge into one.
In the methodological concept of Geschichtfiche Grundbegriffi, two perspectives typically
appear juxtaposed and unrelated: first, the relationship between words and objects as an ex-
ternal relation between two independently identifiable factors, and second, the interpreta-
tion that the existence and way of functioning of one is a prerequisite for the other.
Some of Koselleck's expositions on the concept of Begriffigeschichte give the impression
that a concept has referential qualities only. His thoughts that a hisrorico-semannc analysis
should expose the history of the object that lies behind the concepts can be interpreted in
this way. In his interpretation of concepts 'as indicators of historical movement', among
others, the danger of a problematic, realistic ontology appears, which fixes 'objects' as 'enri-
tidY But can historical objects even be seen as 'objects', as is the case with things of every-
day life?
On the other hand, Kosellecks project by no means assumes a thorough correspondence
of words, concepts, and objects. He correctly indicates that 'preserved (durchgchalrene)
words (..) rare] not in and of themselves sufficient indications of unchanging objects'. ") It is
precisely the discrepancies that comprise the essential epistemological interest of
Begriffigeschichte.

60 HISTORY OF CONCFl'"IS

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 The methods used by Begriffigeschichte, instead, break through the naive circular
argument leading from word to object and back (..). Rather, there is a tension precisely
between concept and object that can lift, can reappear, or can become virtually perma-
nent. Again and again, a hiatus between social objects and the language use aimed at or
transcending them can be registered. Changes in meanings of words and changes in
objects, siruationa] changes and pressure to rename objects correspond with each other
in respectively different ways.till

Hence there is no reason to assume that the end of changes in Begriffigeschichte are in sight,
at least not as long as 'language' and 'object' are in an ongoing process of change.
In the 1980s, Koselleck developed - in a series of attempts - what he believes should he
understood by 'object'. In 'Social History and Begriffigeschichte', he tries to explain an 'oh-
jeer' that transcends conceprualizarion:

There are thus extra-linguistic, pre-linguisnc (and post-linguistic) elements in all acts
that lead to a history. They are closely attached to the elemental, geographical, biologi-
cal and zoological conditions all of which affect occurrences in society by way of the
human constirution.v'

Consequently, 'objects' are for him 'comprehended and conveyed in linguistic terms'.
In the debate on structuralistic discourse theory, Koselleck recently explained his
conccptualization of the relationship between word and object, or, to put it in another way,
language and reality. Here, using the example of the French Revolution, he has worked out
three options:

(a) In principle language can be understood insrrumenrally and examined in socio-

linguistic terms in its function for political action groups. Language always remains an
epiphenomenon of so-called real history.
(b) Language and reality can he placed in a mutual relationship to each other by
determining differences, without their being entirely reducible to each other. For
Luckmann, for example, it has to do with a linguistic world of meaning formation that
both releases and limits - to the same extent - possible experiences in the real world. I,
myself, use a dual aspect for Begriffigeschichte, in which concept formations are both a
factor in historical movements and an indicator of those very movements. Reality is
always conveyed through language, which does not rule out its also having non-
linguistic constitutional conditions.
(c) The third possibility is sharply opposed to the first. Here, texts are taken as reality
itself, which is Poucault's position. By neutralizing the social classification of texts and
episremologically equating all potential textual statements, text is reduced to text only,
without its being able to he read as a source for something. This approach C.) is meth-
odologically consistent, though it leavessome questions open. This would mean that
history is tied only to language. It would then be just as consistent for German
hiscoriography about French texts to he impossible, and vice versa. History would then

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 face danger of being conceivable only as a history of consciousness. Texts would be
silent as it were in view of semantics, which always refers beyond itself, namely, to the
object concerned.s-

It is precisely the prerequisite of a meshing of diachrony and synchrony, and the 'precondi-
tion that historical change and duration be traced at the same rime'v' that would have to
prevent viewing the relationship between concept and object as identical simply because
the concepts ate identical.
Koselleck's warning against breaking down history into discourse corresponds to his
theory that 'no speech act is the act itself, which it helps to prepare, trigger and carry out'.(,4
The premise that there is a difference between occurring history and its linguistic facilita-
tion thus determines Begriffsgeschichte methods.
Later, however, he seems to accept both the active character and the meaning-formation
role of speech acts, though this is done with definitive theoretical reservations, as he warns
of linguistically reducing action: 'Even if every instance of speech comprises an act, every
action is nonetheless far from being an act of speech.'?'
Language's function In constructing meaning, despite some approaches In
hisroriographic Begriffigeschichte, has not found acceptance with respect to its full conse-
quences. This probably comes from the efforts of some scholars of Begriffigeschichte to find
'structures', 'movements', and 'contexts' with an (attributed) existence outside the history
of their being recorded linguistically.
Earlier, Koselleck had already presented objects to be explained in terms of a concept
analysis as extra-linguistic, even though at the same time he stressed that historical pro-
cesses and structures first emerge as conscious objects through the context of use of the de-
scriptive words. This would make it possible to reduce Begr~!fsgeschichte to the search for
appropriate word-use contexts for objects that already exist since they were prerequisites for
the analysis in the first place. To be more precise, there IS a risk of Begri./figeschichte losing its
cognitive function of recognizing historical reality as a structure of consciousness - tied to
language, which affords accessibility - and thus an object-construction as well.
Understanding the conceprualiry of past epochs is prerequisite to moving on to the 'ob-
ject' itself:

Research from a perspective of Begriffigeschlchte does not study unconceived historical

manifestations, but their linguistically graspable reflections in consciousness.
Begriffigeschichtl! thus does nor ask, for example, what 'domination' (Herrschnfi') is per
se, but what has been considered 'domination' generally and with respect to different
groups."

In this sense Begriffigeschichte seeks the self-image of past times, how that was reflected in
concepts, and how it was expressed. In a narrow sense it does not involve an examination of
connections between history of words and history of objects; instead, it is concerned with
how concepts become indicators of and factors in processes of meaning formation.
Begriffigeschichte in this sense, i.e., oriented toward social history, does not deal with the

62 HISTORY Of CO"CEi'T.'i

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mere reflection of social phenomena and their definition as concepts, but wirh rhe process
of coping wirh them intellectually.
Rcichardt's social historical semantics, with its basis in episremic sociology, expressed a
critical- albeit rentarive - distance from Koselleck's programme. He said that 'concepts and
their respective meanings [are not] mere indicators of the history of objects, but are a percep-
tive faculty, a collectiveconsciousness and action of given factors that have no less reality than
material relationships'." This depicts language and in particular socio-political conceprualiry
not primarily as an indicator of extra-linguistic objects, but rather as an essentiallyindepend-
ent social factor, an element capable of consciousness formation and action disposition.

v.
In strict opposition to viewing the traditional history of ideas as the history of 'immutable'
ideas, 'the history of concepts deals with the use of specific language in specific situations,
within which concepts are developed and used by specific speakers'r" Although
Begriffigeschichte studies generally start with an analysis of the relevant concept-word, it is
from the outset integrated into a larger word field. The orientation of a symbol toward spe-
cific linguistic signs essentially serves as a title in delimiting an area of research. In other
words, Begriffigeschichte semantically transcends the word level and the individual text
level. It does not, however, deal with individuallexcmes; rather, its focus is on a 'vocabu-
lary', an 'entire sector of language' .s" This means that Begriffigeschichte is not primarily con-
cerned with the study of individual linguistic signs, but with the episremic conditions and
discursive strategies enabling their meaningful use.
Thus Begriffigeschichtetries to make explicit the episremic and cognitive prerequisites for
use of a concept. Only in this way can it do justice to its task of explaining the processes of
historical consciousness formation by means of a historical analysis of meaning. Wotds and
their meanings in historical contexts can only be described adequately if their role in his-
torical contexts of expression is explained - including their institutional conditions and
protagonists, with all the related connections and references. Knowledge in hisrorical con-
texts can only be reconstructed or constituted if the relationships, structures, or semantic
proximity of concepts are first analysed. Relationships between individual concepts or
words can also become effective as relationships between statements, statement complexes,
or implicit semantic prerequisites for meanings of words, statements, or statement com-
plexes. At the same time, this exposing of conceptual contexts means uncovering effective
epistemic factors that are all too quickly taken for granted and thus do not become con-
scious. Begriffigrschichte as a history of consciousness aims to uncover even the deeper levels
of social experience, becoming a social history of experience.
In this sense, Begriffigeschichte was conceived to assume that concepts are always 'inher-
ently reflected upon from a social perspective'." and that they impact 'language in social
inreracrion'." This is contained in Koselleck's search for the 'intentions behind' word
meanings and their social and political contents, for the cui bono, and for the target groups
of concepts." Obviously, linguistic findings must be analyzed according to communication
situations and restrictions, group codes, and text pages.

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 Begriffigeschichte claims to represent a connection between the history of thinking and
speaking and that of institutions, facts, and events within the concept structure, which can
be viewed as discursive contexts."!
A type of semantics oriented toward contexts beyond the word level has, then, been re-
ferred to as 'discourse'. Discourse is seen as the site where linguistic signs become differenti-
ated and thus at the same time mutually interpreted. Koselleck recently responded to crit-
ics, with definitive reference to pragmatic-discursive dynamics that concepts can develop in
social communication. He stressed that a history of concepts and a history of discourse
mutually refer to one another:

Although basic concepts always function within a discourse they ate pivots around
which all arguments turn. For this reason I do not believe that the history of concepts
and the history of discourse can be viewed as incompatible and opposite. Each depends
inescapably on the other. A discourse requires basic concepts in order to express what it
is talking abour. An analysis of conceprs requires command of both linguistic and extra-
linguistic contexts, including those provided by discourses. Only by such knowledge of
context can the analyst determine what are a concept's multiple meanings, its content,
importance, and the extent to which it is conresred.?"

A more detailed analysis of these relations, however, still needs to be conducted.

64 HISTORY or CONCEPTS

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