REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW – MIDTERM CASE DIGESTS

1. People vs Aruta, G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998

FACTS:

P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant named Benjie, that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be arriving from Baguio
City the following day, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, Abello assembled a team. Said team
proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon 1988 and deployed themselves near
the Philippine National Bank building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station.

While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the
same day from where two females and a male got off.

It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team “Aling Rosa” who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was “Aling Rosa,” the team approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “Aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “Cash Katutak.”

The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature.
Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was
prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves. Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a “Demurrer to
Evidence” alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant’s
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence. RTC convicted
accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to
Olongapo City in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

ISSUE/S: WON the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the latter’s constitutional rights.

HELD/RATIO:

Yes. In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the
warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under
Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides that:

Sec. 5: Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she
just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a
crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-
appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record,
there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the
pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any
compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-appellant’s
bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise,
 the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not
incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce
operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-
appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of
the Constitution.

2. People vs Manago (NO DIGEST)

The Issue Before the Court:

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Manage's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
9165 should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling The appeal is meritorious.

Section 2, Article III[32] of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or
on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search
and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. To protect the people
from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III[33] of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should
be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.[34]

One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed.[35]

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be complied with:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These
are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of
the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.[36]

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element of personal knowledge must be
coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded
through the search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the
1987 Constitution. In Pestilos v. Generoso,[37] the Court explained the requirement of immediacy as follows
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been
committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested; committed it"
depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstance" under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, "circumstances
are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions." Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within
the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even
though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on
his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause
and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order
to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element
acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within
a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause
finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest
widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors,
interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would
necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very
limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the
standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless
arrest.[38] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, records reveal that at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Din personally witnessed a
robbery incident while he was waiting for his turn to have a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor. After his brief
shootout with the armed robbers, the latter fled using a motorcycle and a red Toyota Corolla. Through an
investigation and verification made by the police officers headed by PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan, they were able to: (a)
find out that the armed robbers were staying in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os; and (b) trace the getaway vehicles to
Manago. The next day, or on March 16, 2007, the police officers set up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait where, at
around 9:30 in the evening, the red Toyota Corolla being driven by Manago passed by and was intercepted by the
police officers. The police officers then ordered Manago to disembark the car, and from there, proceeded to search
the vehicle and the body of Manago, which search yielded the plastic sachet containing shabu. Thereupon, they
effected Manago's arrest.

The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of personal knowledge under Section 5 (b) above was
present - given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007 robbery incident and even engaged the armed robbers
in a shootout - the required element of immediacy was not met. This is because, at the time the police officers
effected the warrantless arrest upon Manago's person, investigation and verification proceedings were already
conducted, which consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects of the March 15, 2007 robbery
incident. As the Court sees it, the information the police officers had gathered therefrom would have been enough for
them to secure the necessary warrants against the robbery suspects. However, they opted to conduct a "hot pursuit"
operation which - considering the lack of immediacy - unfortunately failed to meet the legal requirements therefor.
Thus, there being no valid warrantless arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in ruling that Manago was
lawfully arrested.

In view of the finding that there was no lawful arrest in this case, the CA likewise erred in ruling that the incidental
search on Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In fact, the said search was made even before he was arrested and
thus, violated the cardinal rule on searches incidental to lawful arrests that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made.
For another, the Court similarly finds the RTC's ruling that the police officers conducted a lawful warrantless search of
a moving vehicle on Manago's red Toyota Corolla untenable.

In Caballes v. People,[39] the Court explained the concept of warrantless searches on moving vehicles:

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality.This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described
to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We
might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or "constructive borders" like
checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.[40] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setup of military or police checkpoints - as in
this case - which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the
exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.[41] Case law further states that
routine inspections in checkpoints are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable searches,
and thus, permissible, if limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks into a vehicle; (c) flashes a light therein without
opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the
inspection of the Vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (e) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area.[42]

It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not give police officers carte blanche discretion to conduct
warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search - as opposed to a mere routine inspection - such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as
the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.[43]

In the case at bar, it should be reiterated that the police officers had already conducted a thorough investigation and
verification proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a) the identities of the robbery suspects; (b) the place where
they reside; and (c) the ownership of the getaway vehicles used in the robbery, i.e., the motorcycle and the red
Toyota Corolla. As adverted to earlier, these pieces of information were already enough for said police officers to
secure the necessary warrants to accost the robbery suspects. Consequently, there was no longer any exigent
circumstance that would have justified the necessity of setting up the checkpoint in this case for the purpose of
searching the subject vehicle. In addition, it is well to point out that the checkpoint was arranged for the targeted
arrest of Manago, who was already identified as the culprit of the robbery incident. In this regard, it cannot,
therefore, be said that the checkpoint was meant to conduct a routinary and indiscriminate search of moving
vehicles. Rather, it was used as a subterfuge to put into force the capture of the fleeing suspect. Unfortunately, this
setup cannot take the place of - nor skirt the legal requirement of - procuring a valid search/arrest warrant given the
circumstances of this case. Hence, the search conducted on the red Toyota Corolla and on the person of its driver,
Manago, was unlawful.

In fine, Manago's warrantless arrest, and the search incidental thereto, including that of his moving vehicle were all
unreasonable and unlawful. In consequence, the shabuseized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant
to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated shabu is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Manago must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal
 liability.[44]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2013 and the Resolution dated November 6, 2013
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB-C.R. No. 01342 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Gerrjan Manago y Acut as hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165.

3. People vs FBronola

Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated 19 May 2014, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156
which affirmed the Decision[2] dated 18 April 2013, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Misamis Oriental (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 2011-671 finding Renante Comprado y Bronola (accused-appellant) guilty of illegal possession of
marijuana.
On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
Version of the ProsecutionOn 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a confidential informant (CI) sent a text message to
Police Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy Station Commander of Police Station 6, Puerto,
Cagayan de Oro City, that an alleged courier of marijuana together with a female companion, was sighted at
Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be
traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. At 9:30 in the evening, the CI called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that
the alleged drug courier had boarded a bus with body number .2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de
Oro City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet colors with the marking "Lowe
Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the evening, the police officers stationed at Police Station 6 put up a checkpoint in
front of the station
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant denied ownership of the bag and the marijuana. He maintains that on 15 July 2011, at around 6:30
in the evening, he and his girlfriend went to the house of a certain Freddie Nacorda in Aglayan, Bukidnon, to collect
the latter's debt. When they were about to leave, Nacorda requested him to carry a bag to Cagayan de Oro City
The RTC Ruling... the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. It held that accused-
appellant's uncorroborated claim that he was merely requested to bring the bag to Cagayan de Oro City, did not
prove his innocence; mere possession of the illegal substance already consummated the crime and good faith was not
even a defense.
premises considered, this Court finds the accused RENANTE COMPRADO y BRONOLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime defined and penalized under Section 11, [7], Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as charged in the
Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay the Fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00], without subsidiary penalty in case of nonpayment of fine.
The CA Ruling... the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It opined that accused-appellant submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court because he raised no objection as to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment
It added that while it was admitted by the arresting police officers that no representatives from the media and other
personalities required by law were present during the operation and during the taking of the inventory,
noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal and would not render inadmissible accused-
appellant's arrest or the items seized from him because the prosecution was able to show that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. The CA disposed the case in this wise
Issues:
I. Whether accused-appellant's arrest was valid;II. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence; andIII.
Whether accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling:
The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, any
evidence obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[14] This
proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) Search of
evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4) Consented warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop
and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.[15]
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled [to] the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him.
On the other hand, the Court found no sufficient justification in the stop and frisk committed by the police in People
v. Cogaed (Cogaed)[24] In that case, the police officers received a message from an informant that one Marvin Buya
would be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union, to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La
Union.
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the police that a
certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus terminal, the police officers
prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The
police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag contained
marijuana leaves.
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a genuine reason that
would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the records reveals that no overt
physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting
officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a lawful arrest must precede the search of
a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.[30] Thus, it becomes imperative to determine whether
accused-appellant's warrantless arrest was valid.
Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-appellant. Thus, an acquittal is warranted,
despite accused-appellant's failure to object to the regularity of his arrest before arraignment. The legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless
arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Renante Comprado y Bronola is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
from detention unless he is detained for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from
receipt.
4. Veridiano vs People of the Philippines

Facts:

Petition for Review on Certiorari... assails the Decision... of the Court of Appeal... which affirmed his conviction for
violation of Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165
Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna... did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
2.72 grams of dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged
7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves... informing him that
Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs
 Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay,
Nagcarlan, Laguna
The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.
At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna
The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.
PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials
Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights.
He was then brought to the police station.
At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his initials.
PO1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.[21] The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana
For his defense, Veridiano testified
Two (2) armed men boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano.[28] However, they found nothing on his person.[29]
Still, Veridiano was accosted and brought to the police station where he was informed that "illegal drug was . . . found
in his possession
Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested."
He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous
tree.'"
On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that
Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity in his arrest.
the prosecution argued that Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he
consented to the warrantless search
On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[39] affirming the guilt of Veridiano.
Issues:

Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested.
Veridiano further argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule on chain of custody.
the prosecution argued that Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he
consented to the warrantless search
Ruling:

In the Decision dated July 16, 2010,[31] the Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his possession.

Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity that may have attended his arrest when he entered his plea
and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court

5. People vs. Marti

Facts:

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before
being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an
inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a
suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and
invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious
package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and
was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right
of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue:

Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship
between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of
the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and
look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

6. Saluday vs People

CASE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari on the Decision and Resolution, CA-G.R. CR No. 01099, of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint to
check the presence of contraband, illegal firearms or explosives and suspicious individuals. A bag, small but too heavy
for its size, belonging to the Petitioner, Marcelo G. Saluday, was found by SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco). Petitioner
was arrested for failure to produce authority to carry firearms and explosives.

In an inquest conducted, the Prosecutor of Davao City found probable cause for violation of PD 1866 for carrying
firearms, explosives and ammunition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
A. TRIAL COURT
The trial court declared the Petitioner in actual or constructive possession of firearm and explosive without authority
or license and was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and
explosives under PD 1866.

B. COURT OF APPEALS

The Petitioner questioned the decision of the trial court on the ground on misappreciation of evidence and illegality
of the search.The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution for being pro forma.

C. SUPREME COURT
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court misappreciated the evidence against the Petitioner by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
2. Whether the search was illegal.
RULING:
Rule 45 under the Rules of Court applies only to question of facts. The finding of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, is accorded with great respect.

The elements of the crime committed, particularly the possession or ownership of the firearm, explosive or
ammunition, and lack of license to own or possess said firearm, explosive or ammunition, raises questions of fact.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court; hence, there was no need to disturb the latter’s findings.

On the issue on the illegality of the search, the Supreme Court disagrees with the Petitioner. Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution applies only to unreasonable searches or seizures.

The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure emanates from one’s right to privacy. When a person displays an
expectation of privacy, which the society is ready to recognize as reasonable, the State cannot violate a person’s right
against unreasonable search or seizure (Katz vs. United States). In addition, one’s expectation of privacy to be
reasonable, it must counter the safety and welfare of the people.

The Supreme Court did not agree to the Petitioner’s position that his failure to object to the search cannot be
construed as an implied waiver. Constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right that can be waived. However, the waiver should be voluntary, clear, specific and intelligently given, absent any
duress or coercion.

7. People vs Hua

Rule 113 Sec. 11 An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided by
Section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he
refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose.
FACTS:
1. Based on the tip from a confidential informant that Peter Chan, Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee and Juang Zhen
Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking, police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime
(PARAC) conducted surveillance operations.
2. October 25, 1996 they (police) secured 2 Search Warrants:
a. for violation of PD 1866 (illegal passion of firearms and explosives)
b. violations of Sections 12, 14, and 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act)
3. October 25, 1996 at 11:00 pm, The police, accompanied by a Cantonese interpreter, enforced the warrant for
violation of PD 1866 at the Cityland Condominium. No persons were found inside however, the police found 2 kilos of
shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and machines and tools used for the production of fake credit cards.
4. Based on information that Lao and Chan would be delivering Shabu at the Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant, Manila,
police operatives rushed to the area.
5. October 26, 1996 at 2:00 am, as Chan and Lao alighted from the Lao’s Honda Civic car, one of the policemen
approached them and introduced himself, but Chan and Lao fired shots resulting in a shoot-out and death of the two
suspects. The policemen found 2 plastic bags of shabu.
6. On the same day, the policemen proceeded to the residence of Lao at No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, to
enforce the other warrant. When they arrived at the place, they coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the officer in
charge of security in the building.
7. One of the policemen (Anciro, Jr.) repeatedly knocked on the front door for 5 minutes but no one responded. Pangan
likewise knocked on the door. Lee, who is the girlfriend of Lao, peeped through the window beside the front door and
the policemen introduced themselves and even asked Pangan to communicate to Lee by sign language, who then
pointed their uniforms to her (Lee) to show that they were policemen.
 8. Lee then opened the door and allowed the policemen, Pangan and the security guards into the condominium unit.
9. The policemen brought Lee to the 2nd floor and asked where Lao slept. Lee pointed to the master’s bedroom and the
policemen proceeded to search the premise. The other policemen went to the other room where Huang Zhen Hua
was sleeping.
10. The policemen found 2 plastic bags, a feeding bottle, and a plastic canister inside a cabinet in the master’s bedroom
all containing shabu. Shabu was also found on the bed in the master’s bedroom.
11. Anciro, Jr. then asked Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were bringing her to the PARAC headquarters.
Lee then took some clothes from the cabinet in the master’s bedroom where the shabu was found.
12. The police officers then executed an affidavit of arrest and Pangan and the 2 security guards signed a certification
stating that nothing was destroyed in the unit and the search was orderly and peaceful.
13. Lee alleged failed in their duty to show to her the warrant, inform her of their authority and explain their presence in
the condominium. She further alleged that the policemen gained entry into the condominium by force while she was
sleeping and that the shabu was planted.
14. RTC: found both appellants guilty
ISSUE: WON the implementation of the search warrant was irregular? NO
RATIO
1. Lee failed to prove that the policemen broke open the door to gain entry into the condominium.
2. Lee failed to inform her counsel of the alleged planting of evidence by the policemen and she failed to charge the
policemen with planting of evidence before or after she was charge.
3. A lawful entry is the indispensible predicate of a reasonable search.
4. General Rule “knock and announce” principle: officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence,
identify themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to be searched,
and show to them the search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or
dialect known to and understood by them. The requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of essence of
the substantial provision which safeguards individual liberty. No precise for of words is required. It is sufficient that
the accused has noticed of the officers, their authority and the purpose of the search and the object to be seized.
5. Exception “no-knock” entry: Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when:
a. A party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand to open;
b. When such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons;
c. When the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and
d. When those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a
knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the
destruction of evidence is being attempted.
6. In determining the lawfulness of an unallowed entry and the existence of probable cause, the courts are concerned
only with what the officers had reason to believe and the time of the entry.
7. In Richards v. Wisconsin, In order to justify a “no-knock” entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it
would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing destruction of evidence.
DISPOSITIVE: Affirmed conviction of Lee; Acquitted Huang Zhen Hua
 8. Dio vs People (NO DIGEST)

Issue and Ruling

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ACCUSED'S ARGUMENT THAT THE PRESENT
CHARGES SHOULD BE QUASHED FOR FAILURE OF THE INFORMATIONS TO ALLEGE PUBLICATION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND QUASHING THE INFORMATIONS
WITHOUT GIVING THE PROSECUTOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND THE INFORMATIONS.[24]
RULING:

The Petition is denied.

If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of
power.[51] In People v. Sandiganbayan:[52

When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect may be cured by
amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a
defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an
amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the
prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue
delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only
result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.

More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court
in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the
prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and
affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.[53]
In this case, petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned; thus, Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies. If the
information is defective, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to amend it before it may be quashed.

Petitioner claims that Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies only to informations that can be cured by amendment.
She argues that before a court orders that an amendment be made, or otherwise gives the prosecution an opportunity to
amend an information, it must first establish that the defective information can be cured by amendment.

Petitioner relies on Agustin to argue the proscription of an amendment of an information in order to vest jurisdiction in the
court. This is misplaced.

In Agustin, the accused in the criminal case was already arraigned under a defective information that failed to establish
venue.[54] The Court of Appeals held that the defect in the information was merely formal and, consequently, could be
amended even after plea, with leave of court. Thus, this Court held:

We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any
allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were
allegedly committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court
cannot be allowed.[55]
In turn, Agustin cited Agbayani v. Sayo.[56] However, Agbayani does not involve the amendment of a defective information
before or after arraignment. Subsequent cases have cited Agustin as basis that amendment of an information to vest
jurisdiction in the trial court is impermissible. Thus, in Leviste, this Court cited Agustin and stated that certain amendments are
impermissible even before arraignment:

It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An
information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. An amendment which operates to
vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible.[57] It may appear that Leviste supports petitioner's contention
that an amendment operating to vest jurisdiction in the trial court is impermissible. However, the statement
in Leviste was obiter dictum. It cites only Agustin, which did not involve the amendment of an information before arraignment.

Aside from obiter dictum in jurisprudence, petitioner provides no legal basis to reverse the Court of Appeals' determination
that the defective informations may be amended before arraignment. Although the cases petitioner cited involved defective
informations that failed to establish the jurisdiction of the court over the libel charges, none involved the amendment of an
information before arraignment. Thus, these cannot be controlling over the facts of this case.

II

A defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not a ground to quash an information. In Sasot v. People:[58]

Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were
committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to wit:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the
complainant's capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.[59]
On the other hand, lack of authority to file an information is a proper ground. In Cudia v. Court of Appeals:[60]

With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority
to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his
jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides
that:

"Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall: . . . (b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his
assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.

....
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses
committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting
officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by
law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the information in
question is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's plea to an information
before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions,
questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein
petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack
of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the
complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could
not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to
file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy
does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.

Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the investigating panel and the same
should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the
mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees. To rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny
proper protection to the community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.

Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have been the remedy
sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals has ruled that even if amendment is
proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment,
an information may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.[61] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
However, for quashal of an information to be sustained, the defect of the information must be evident on its face. In Santos v.
People:[62]

First, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its face. The same cannot be said
herein. The Information against petitioner appears valid on its face; and that it was filed in violation of her constitutional rights
to due process and equal protection of the laws is not evident on the face thereof. As pointed out by the CTA First Division in
its 11 May 2006 Resolution, the more appropriate recourse petitioner should have taken, given the dismissal of similar
charges against Velasquez, was to appeal the Resolution dated 21 October 2005 of the Office of the State Prosecutor
recommending the filing of an information against her with the DOJ Secretary.[63] mFor an information to be quashed based
on the prosecutor's lack of authority to file it, the lack of the authority must be evident on the face of the information.

The Informations here do not allege that the venue of the offense was other than Morong, Bataan. Thus, it is not apparent on
the face of the Informations that the prosecutor did not have the authority to file them.
The proper remedy is to give the prosecution the opportunity to amend the Informations. If the proper venue appears not to
be Morong, Bataan after the Informations have been amended, then the trial court may dismiss the case due to lack of
jurisdiction, as well as lack of authority of the prosecutor to file the information.

III

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. - A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
Petitioner argues that at the time of the offense, emails were not covered under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner claims this is bolstered by the enactment of Republic Act No. 10175, otherwise known as the Anti-Cybercrime Law,
which widened the scope of libel to include libel committed through email, among others.[64]

Whether emailing or, as in this case, sending emails to the persons named in the Informations—who appear to be officials of
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority where Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium is found—is sufficiently "public," as required by
Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code and by the Anti-Cybercrime Law, is a matter of defense that should be
properly raised during trial.
Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through proper public authorities, partakes of a degree of protected freedom
of expression.[65] Certainly, if we remain faithful to the dictum that public office is a public trust,[66] some leeway should be
given to the public to express disgust. The scope and extent of that protection cannot be grounded in abstractions. The facts
of this case need to be proven by evidence; otherwise, this Court exercises barren abstractions that may wander into
situations only imagined, not real.

IV

Good faith is not among the grounds for quashing an information as enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
It is not apparent on the face of the Informations, and what is not apparent cannot be the basis for quashing them.
In Danguilan-Vitug v. Court of Appeals:[67]

We find no reason to depart from said conclusion. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the grounds
for quashing an information. Specifically, paragraph (g) of said provision states that the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information where it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification. Hence,
for the alleged privilege to be a ground for quashing the information, the same should have been averred in the information
itself and secondly, the privilege should be absolute, not only qualified. Where, however, these circumstances are not alleged
in the information, quashal is not proper as they should be raised and proved as defenses. With more reason is it true in the
case of merely qualifiedly privileged communications because such cases remain actionable since the defamatory
communication is simply presumed to be not malicious, thereby relieving the defendant of the burden of proving good
intention and justifiable motive. The burden is on the prosecution to prove malice. Thus, even if the qualifiedly privileged
nature of the communication is alleged in the information, it cannot be quashed especially where prosecution opposes the
same so as not to deprive the latter of its day in court, but prosecution can only prove its case after trial on the merits.
In People v. Gomez we held, inter alia:
"The claim of the accused . . . that the letter is privileged communication is not a ground for a motion to quash. It is a matter
of defense which must be proved after trial of the case on the merits."[68] (Citations omitted)
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in disregarding petitioner's purported good faith. This should be a matter of defense
properly raised during trial.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 29, 2013 is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated January
8, 2013 and Resolution dated July 10, 2013 are AFFIRMED.

9. People vs Delfin

Facts:

 On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a 51-year-old fisherman from Navotas City—was
killed after being gunned down at a store just across his home.
 On 13 March 2001, the Rael Delfin was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malabon.
 Part of the information reads: That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
with the said weapon one EMILIO ENRIQUEZ, hitting the victim on his chest, thereby inflicting upon the victim gunshot
wound, which caused his immediate death. CONTRARY TO LAW.4
 RTC FOUND HIM GUILTY, CA AFFIRMED
 In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Delfin assails the validity of the information under which he was tried and
convicted. He specifically points out to the discrepancy between the date of the commission of the murder as alleged
in the information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of November 2000" and the one actually established during the trial
i.e., 27 September 2000.
  Delfin protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the commission of the murder
violated his right to be properly informed of the charge against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare
an intelligent defense thereon.

Issue: Whether or not the discrepancy on the date of the commission of the murder would render the Information against
Delfin invalid.

Held:

 No. In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not necessary to allege such
date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of
properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be approximated.
 Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation in an information of a date
of commission different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an
error fatal to prosecution.
 In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented
during the trial or may even be corrected by a formal amendment of the information.
 The inaccurate allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere clerical error. This is obvious from the
fact that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder ashaving been committed on the 27th of
September2000, the information’s mistake is limited only to the month when the crime was committed. Such an error
is evidently not fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.
 The Court sustains the information for murder, under which Delfin was tried and convicted, as valid.

10. Jaylo V. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 183152-54, January 21, 2015

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Petitioners also challenge the Resolution dated
29 November 2007 issued by the same court, which took no action on the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, and
the Resolution dated 26 May 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration of the earlier Resolution.

FACTS
Reynaldo (Jaylo), William (Valenzona) and Antonio (Habalo) were convicted by the Sandiganbayan for Homicide for
the killing of Estella, Franco and Rolando in a drug buy bust operation at the Magallanes Commercial Center on July
10, 1990. During the promulgation on April 17, 2007, none of the accused despite notice, appeared and thus the
decision was promulgated in absentia and the judgment entered in the criminal docket. Their bail bonds were
cancelled and warrants for their arrest issued.

On April 30, 2007, the accused thru counsel filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, but on
November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the implementation of the
warrants of arrest, holding that the 15-day period from the promulgation of the judgment had long passed without
any of the accused giving any reason for their non-appearance during the promulgation. Under Section 6 Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court, the accused have lost the remedies available under the Rules against the Sandiganbayan’s
judgment of conviction, including the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Their motion for reconsideration denied,
they filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, holding that Section 6 Rule 120 cannot
diminish, modify or increase substantive rights like the filing of a motion for reconsideration under P.D. 1606, and the
conditions set by Section 6 Rule 120 does not obtain in their case. They also appealed the merits of their conviction
for homicide by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUES
1. Whether accused on bail who failed to present themselves during the promulgation of judgment has any standing in
court and has the right to seek relief
 2. Whether pursuant to PD 1606, there is no provided situation as to when the right to file an MR is deemed lost and
thus, it is available at all times and the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court cannot operate to diminish or modify
the right of a convicted accused to file a motion for reconsideration

HELD
1. NO.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the said judgment.

Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of
the counsel for the accused or the latter’s representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date
of promulgation of judgment. Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall be made to the accused personally or
through the bondsman or warden and counsel.

The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused despite notice. The promulgation in
absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at
their last known address or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the accused ifthe judgment is for
conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the
remedies available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on
the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible remedies against the
judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from
the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).

The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of
conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing in court. Without any standing in court, the accused cannot
invoke itsjurisdiction to seek relief.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away substantive rights; itmerely provides the manner
through which an existing right may be implemented.

2. NO

According to petitioners, Section 7 of P.D. 1606 did not provide for any situation as to when the right to file a motion
for reconsideration may be deemed lost. Thus, it is available at all times and the Rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court cannot operate to diminish or modify the right of a convicted accused to file a motion for
reconsideration.Furthermore, they argue, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant, and not
merely a remedy "available in [the] Rules," as provided under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
according to them, their absence at the promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to
have resulted in the loss of their rightto file a motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners’ argument lacks merit.

Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the
filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a
party filing a motion for reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.

It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states that "[a] petition for reconsideration
of any final order or decision maybe filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or
judgment."In Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated that the term "may" denotes a mere
possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Those granted this opportunity may choose to exercise it or not. If they do,
they must comply with the conditions attached thereto.
 It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the remedy by which the accused who
were absent during the promulgation may reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the
judgment of conviction. In order to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1) surrender and 2)
file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons for their absence, within 15 days from the
date of the promulgation of judgment.

Petitioners did not surrender within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment of conviction.Neither did they
ask for leave of court to avail themselves of the remedies, and state the reasons for their absence. Even if we were to
assume that the failure of Jaylo to appear at the promulgation was due to failure to receive notice thereof, it is not a
justifiable reason. He should have filed a notice of change ofaddress before the Sandiganbayan.

11. People vs Manalo 1994

FACTS:

On June 21, 1990, Angelita Manalo was arrested for violation of sections 15 and 18 of Article III of the said law. A
surveillance of Manalo's illegal activities was conducted by operatives of the Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Divison.
They were able to establish that Manalo was conducting her illegal drug trade at Rotonda, Caniogan, Pasig. The Chief
of DDED formed a buy-bust team. PO2 Corpuz acted as the poseur-buyer while the other operatives served as his
back-up men. On January 24, 1992, the team proceeded to Rotonda, Caniogan, Pasig. At around ten o’clock in the
evening, Corpuz casually approached the accused and said: "Paiskor ng piso" and handed to her a previously marked
one hundred (P100.00) peso bill. Manalo reached out for the P100 bill and handed Corpuz a deck of "shabu." The
transaction having been consummated, Corpuz signaled his back-up operatives to apprehend Manalo.
After her arrest, Manalo was brought to the police headquarters where a policewoman bodily searched
her. Consequently, Angelita Manalo was charged with violations of Republic Act 6425, particularly: Section 8, Article
II for possession or use of prohibited drugs, and; Section 15, Article III for sale of regulated drugs without authority.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
unmindful of the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution which failed to prove the identity of the
methamphetamine hydrochloride alleged to be the object of sale and omitted to prove that the accused had no legal
authority to sell the alleged regulated drug.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution has the burden to prove the charge.

RULING:

The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or a negative averment is an
essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden to prove the charge. However, this rule admits of
exceptions. Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately
within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent on the
prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by
established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other
evidence within the defendant's knowledge or control.
In the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the sale of a regulated drug without authority, the fact that he
has a license is a matter which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer
conviction. The Court categorically ruled that although the prosecution has the burden of proving a negative
averment which is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution, in view of the difficulty of proving a negative
allegation, "need only establish a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable."

12. Tecson vs COMELEC and Fernando Poe 2004

FACTS

1. Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party.
2. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
 3. Fornier, initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy alleging that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national.
4. Granting that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being illegitimate.
5. In the hearing before the 3rd Division of the COMELEC, Fornier, in support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits while FPJ presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence.
6. COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of merit.
7. MR was denied by the COMELEC en banc so Fornier went to the SC.
8. The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G.
Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original
and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
ISSUE/S

1. W/N the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe might be accepted to
prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ

PROVISION

Rule 130

Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.

Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the
witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles
or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree.

RULING & RATIO

1. Yes.
1. Civil law provisions point to a bias against illegitimacy and this discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish
family and property laws which provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children.
2. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to
bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
3. These distinctions were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish
Civil Code became the primary source of our Civil Code.
4. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or
impinge on the domain of political law.
5. The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining citizenship status should thus be deemed independent
from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.
6. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive
effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern.
 7. The matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions.
8. For the rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree
of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and
the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
9. Given this, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted
before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship
with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including FPJ) in one house, and as one family.

13. Espineli vs People 2014

Facts:

 Espinelli was murder was filed before the RTC

Issue:

 Is circumstantial evidence enough to rule for the conviction of the accused?

Ruling:

 Yes. Truly, "direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding
of guilt." The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-
finder draws from the evidence established."Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict the offender "if i)there is more than one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the
inference is derived are proven; and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt." All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus,
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others as the guilty person.
In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.
The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to
render their verdict of conviction on circumstantial evidence as sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court. The central issue now confronting this Court is whether the prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial
evidence petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals sufficiently support petitioner’s conviction.

14.People vs Umapas, G.R. No. 215742, March 22, 2017 (NO DIGEST)

Issue and Ruling

I WHETHER THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON THE ALLEGED
DYING STATEMENT OF THE VICTIM GEMMA UMAPAS, ADMITTING THE SAME AS A DYING DECLARATION AND PART
OF RES GESTAE
II WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAIL
URE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

We affirm appellant's conviction.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused.25

In the instant case, the fact of Gemma's death is incontestable. The fact that Gemma died on December 5, 1998 was
established by witnesses from both the prosecution and defense. As additional proof of Gemma's demise, the prosecution
presented her Certificate of Death which was admitted by the RTC.26 Also, the spousal relationship between Gemma and the
appellant is undisputed. Appellant already admitted that Gemma was his legitimate wife in the course of the trial of the
case.27 In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim is their marriage
certificate. However, oral evidence may also be considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof
is not contested, as in this case. Thus, having established the fact of death and the spousal relationship between Gemma and
the appellant, the remaining element to be proved is whether the deceased is killed by the accused.

Conviction based on dying declaration:

While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own perception, a report in open court of a dying
person's declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule against hearsay if it is "made under the consciousness of an
impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case." It is considered as "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to
utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation."28

Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus: First, the declaration must concern the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to
matters both before and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of the
declarant's injury or the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or
motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the act are
admissible. Second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending
death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must
be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that
renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings
of the deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly
impending. Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a
competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Thus, in the absence of evidence
showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be a witness had he survived, the presumption must be
sustained that he would have been competent. Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.29

In the present case, all the abovementioned requisites of a dying declaration were met. Gemma communicated her ante-
mortem statement to SPOl Garcia, identifying Umapas as the person who mauled her, poured gasoline on her, and set her
ablaze.30 Gemma's statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of her
death and taking into consideration the severity of her wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that she uttered the same
under the belief that her own death was already imminent.31 There is ample authority for the view that the declarant's belief
in the imminence of her death can be shown by the declarant' s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the
nature of her wounds, statements made in her presence, or by the opinion of her physician.32 While more than 12 hours has
lapsed from the time of the incident until her declaration, it must be noted that Gemma was in severe pain during the early
hours of her admission. Dr. Tamayo even testified that when she saw Gemma in the hospital, she was restless, in pain and
incoherent considering that not only was she mauled, but 57% of her body was also bumed.33 She also underwent operation
and treatment, and was under medication during the said period.34 Given the circumstances Gemma was in, even if there was
sufficient lapse of time, we could only conclude that at the time of her declaration, she feared that her death was already
imminent. While suffering in pain due to thermal bums, she could not have used said time to contrive her identification of
Umapas as her assailant. There was, thus, no opportunity for Gemma to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
Moreover, Gemma would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had she survived. There is nothing
in the records that show that Gemma rendered involuntary declaration. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this
criminal prosecution for parricide in which Gemma was the victim. It has been held that conviction or guilt may be based
mainly on the ante-mortem statements of the deceased.35 In the face of the positive identification made by deceased Gemma
of appellant Umapas, it is clear that Umapas committed the crime.

Conviction based on circumstantial evidence:

Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can also
sufficiently establish his guilt. The consistent rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All these requisites, not
to mention the dying declaration of the deceased victim herself, are present in the instant case.36

In the instant case, the testimonies of: (1) SPO1 Belisario that during his investigation immediately after the crime was
reported, he went to the crime scene and was able to talk to Ginalyn Umapas, the daughter of the victim, wherein the latter
told him that Umapas was the one who set her mother ablaze inside their house, (2) Dr. Tamayo that a certain Rodrigo
Dacanay told him that Umapas was the one who mauled and set Gemma ablaze, and (3) SPOl Garcia that he took the
statement of Gemma which he reduced into writing after the same was thumbmarked by Gemma and witnessed by the
hospital nurse, can be all admitted as circumstantial evidence. While Ginalyn Umapas and Rodrigo Dacanay or the hospital
nurse were not presented to prove the truth of such statements, they may be admitted not necessarily to prove the truth
thereof, but at least for the purpose of placing on record to establish the fact that those statements or the tenor of such
statements, were made. Thus, the testimonies of SPO1 Belisario, Dr. Tamayo, and SPOI Garcia are in the nature of an
independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Ginalyn Umapas and Rodrigo Dacanay made such
statement, and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as
evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.

Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement
made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant
is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter
of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact
in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is the doctrine of independently relevant
statements. Thus, all these requisites to support a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, not to mention the dying
declaration of the deceased victim herself, are existing in the instant case.37

We, likewise, do not find credence in appellant's defense of alibi. It is axiomatic that alibi is an inherently weak defense, and
may only be considered if the following circumstances are shown: (a) he was somewhere else when the crime occurred; and
(b) it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.38 The requirements of
time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime happened.
They must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such
defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.39 A mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense
and constitutes self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.40 Under the circumstances, there is the possibility that appellant could
have been present at the locus criminis at the time of the incident considering that where he claimed to have gone fishing and
his residence are both in Kalakhan.41 Accordingly, appellant's defense of alibi must fall.

The court a quo also correctly accorded credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who are police officers.
Appellant failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the police officers who testified against
him. In fact, appellant did not even question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. When police officers have no motive
to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties.42 Thus, the testimonies of said police officers deserve full faith and credit.

This Court has consistently conformed to the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great
weight.1âwphi1 Factual findings of the trial court and its observation as to the testimonies of the witnesses are accorded
great respect, if not conclusive effect, most especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case. The reason for
this is that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and
having observed firsthand their demeanor and manner of testifying under grueling examination. In the absence of palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will
not be disturbed on appeal.43

All told, based on the foregoing, this Court finds the established circumstances, as found by the trial court and the appellate
court, to have satisfied the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.44 Indeed, the incriminating
circumstances, including the ante-mortem statement of Gemma, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain of
events enough to arrive at the conclusion that indeed appellant Umapas was guilty for the killing of his wife Gemma.

15. DST Movers Corp vs. General Movers, G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016

Facts:

In a Complaint for Sum of Money filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, PGIC alleged that at about 10:30
p.m. on February 28, 2002, along the South Luzon Expressway and in the area of Bilibid, Muntinlupa City, a Honda
Civic sedan with plate number URZ-976 (sedan)... was hit on the rear by an Isuzu Elf truck with plate number UAL-295
(truck). PGIC underscored that the sedan was on a stop position when it was hit. The sedan was then allegedly pushed
forward, thereby hitting a Mitsubishi Lancer. The driver of the truck then allegedly... escaped.[8]
In support of its recollection of the events of February 28, 2002, PGIC relied on a Traffic Accident Investigation Report
(Report) prepared by PO2 Cecilio Grospe Tomas (PO2 Tomas) of the Muntinlupa City Traffic Enforcement Unit of the
Philippine National Police.
Asserting that it was subrogated to Fidel Yuboco's rights and that the proximate cause of the mishap was the
negligence of the driver of the truck, PGIC, through counsel, sent DST Movers demand letters. PGIC demanded from
DST Movers the amount of P90,000.00, which represented... the difference between the P320,000.00 paid by PGIC to
Yuboco and the salvage price of P230,000.00, at which PGIC was supposedly able to sell what remained of the
sedan.[15]
Its demands not having been satisfied, PGIC proceeded to file its Complaint[16] for Sum of Money before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
In its Answer,[18] DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the truck. However, it claimed that the truck
did not make any trips on February 28, 2002 as it was undergoing repairs and maintenance.[
Following the submission of the parties' position papers, Branch 22 of the Metropolitan Trial Court Manila rendered
its Decision[21] favoring PGIC's version of events and finding DST Movers liable.
On appeal, the ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court was affirmed in toto by Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.[23]
DST Movers then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In its assailed September 8, 2011 Resolution,[24] the Court of Appeals denied DST Movers' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issues:

its liability was not established by a preponderance of evidence.

it faults the Metropolitan Trial Court for ruling in favor of PGIC despite how its version of events was supported by
nothing more the

Traffic Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this Report was misplaced as it was supposedly
"improperly identified [and] uncorroborated."

Ruling:
 Metropolitan Trial Court erroneously gave weight to the traffic accident investigation report presented by the
petitioner as proof of the proximate cause of the damage sustained by a motor vehicle.

while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the
same was not presented in court to... testify that he had sufficient knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he
acquired them personally or through official information. Neither was there any explanation as to why such officer
was not presented. We cannot simply assume, in the absence of proof, that the... account of the incident stated in
the report was based on the personal knowledge of the investigating officer who prepared it.

Principles:

Remedial Law Rule 133

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the... court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability... of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater... number.

civil liability for damages

Questions on whether or not there was a preponderance of evidence to justify the award of damages or whether or not there
was a causal connection between the given set of facts and the damage suffered by the private complainant or whether or not
the act from which... civil liability might arise exists are questions of fact.

Requisites of official records to be exempt from hearsay rule

(a)... that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b)... that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c)... that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.

Remedial Law - Summary Procedure

SECTION 9. Submission of Affidavits and Position Papers. — Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the
next preceding section,[49] the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual... issues
defined in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.

16. People vs Manalo, G.R. No. 107623 February 23, 1994 (SUPRA)
17. Republic vs Galeno, G.R. No. 215009, January 23, 2017

Facts:

On September 2, 2003, respondent Galeno (respondent) filed a petition for correction of the area of Lot No. 2285
covered by OCT No. 46417, Dingle Cadastre (subject property) before the RTC. She alleged that when she and her co-
owners had the subject property resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they discovered a discrepancy in the land
area of the subject property as appearing in OCT No. 46417 in that the title reflects an area of 20,948 square meters,
while the Certification issued by the DENR Office of the Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Services,
shows an area of 21,298 square meters.Hence, she sought to correct the area of the subject property in order to
avoid further confusion, and claimed to have notified the adjoining owners.
 Respondent offered in evidence the following documents: (a) the Certification issued by a certain Althea C. Acevedo
(Acevedo), Engineer IV, Chief of the Technical Services Section of the Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land
Management Services of the DENR in Iloilo City, which states that “the true and correct area of [L]ot 2285, Cad. 246
Dingle Cadastre is 21,928 square meters;” (b) the technical description of Lot No. 2285, a copy of which was certified
by Ameto Caballero (Caballero), Chief of the Surveys Division, while another copy was certified correct by Acevedo; and
(c) the approved subdivision plan of Lot No. 2258, certified by Rogelio M. Santome (Santome), Geodetic Engineer;
Alfredo Muyarsas (Muyarsas), Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, and Edgardo R. Gerobin (Gerobin), OIC, Regional
Technical Director of the Land Management Services, DENR.On the strength of these pieces of evidence, respondent
sought a reconciliation of the area of the subject property with the records of the DENR.
The RTC granted the petition upon a finding that respondent was able to substantiate the allegations in her petition
to warrant a correction of the area of the subject property. Hence, it directed the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Iloilo to correct such area in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 to 21,298 square meters.
CA affirmed the RTC’s order.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA was correct in upholding the correction of the area of the subject property in OCT No. 46417.
Held:

No. The respondent failed to prove that there was sufficient basis to allow the correction of the area of the subject
property in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 square meters to 21,248 square meters.
Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence presented by the respondent are not sufficient to warrant the
correction prayed for. SC cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the fact that the public officers who
issued the same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated therein.
In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, holding that:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: “Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. –
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of
the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.”
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public
documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.The certifications do not reflect “entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer,” such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in
the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The
certifications are not even records of public documents.
As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who issued respondent’s
documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft of probative value and cannot, by
their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. At best, they may be considered only as prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent’s sole witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea
Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their contents, as she did not prepare any of the
certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned government agencies. Notably, while it is true that the
public prosecutor who represented petitioner interposed no objection to the admission of the foregoing evidence in
the proceedings in the court below, it should be borne in mind that “hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not,
has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule,” which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent’s documentary evidence may
 have been admitted due to the opposing party’s lack of objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be
accorded any probative weight.

The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay testimony
may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that such declarations are
thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value.
Besides, case law states that the “absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance
because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Neither is the
Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this
case] if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.” Moreover, “in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.”

In fine, the Court holds that respondent did not present any competent evidence to prove that the true and correct
area of the subject property is 21,298 square meters instead of 20,948 square meters to warrant a correction thereof
in OCT No. 46417. Accordingly, respondent’s petition for the correction of the said Certificate of Title must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2013 and the Resolution dated September
17, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02085 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Carmen
Santorio Galeno’s petition for correction of area of Lot No. 2285 on Original Certificate of Title No. 46417 is
DISMISSED.

18. Unilongo vs Court of Appeals, April 5, 1999, G.R. No. 123910

FACTS:

Sto. Niño de Cul de Sac Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SNSNAI), was incorporated and registered by petitioners
(hereafter referred to as the Unilongo group) as a non-stock corporation with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Petitioners comprised SNSNAI's original Board of Trustees.

An issue as to who is the rightful Board of Trustees of the said association ensued between the petitioners (the
Unilongo group) and the private respondents(the Diño Group). Private respondents filed a complaint for Quo
Warranto with Damages against petitioners before the RTC of Makati (Branch 63). RTC denied after hearing.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the aforequoted order. The trial court denied. Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the CA raising practically the same issues set forth in their motion to dismiss.

CA dismissed. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners maintain the view that private respondents' complaint primarily
concerns matters pertaining to their homeowners association, so that it is the Home Insurance and Guarantee
Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over the dispute and not the regular courts pursuant to RA 580, conferring
upon the said administrative agency, among others, the power to regulate and supervise the activities and operations
of homeowners associations.

Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that the regional trial court properly took cognizance of their quo
warranto complaint in accordance with Rule 66 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 21(1) of B.P. No. 129 which vests the
RTC with original jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto.

ISSUE: Whether it is the ordinary courts or the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation which has jurisdiction over the
corporate controversy between the contending groups both of which claim to be the rightful officers of a homeowners
association.

RULING:
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
Jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the pleas and defenses set up by the defendant in a motion to dismiss or
answer otherwise jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the defendant.

On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts, the controversy between the parties is intra-corporate and, therefore,
not cognizable by the ordinary courts of justice. The dispute between the contending parties for control of the
corporation manifestly falls within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC in whom the law has reserved
such jurisdiction as an administrative agency of special competence to deal promptly and expeditiously therewith.

Furthermore, the intent to remove from the regular courts jurisdiction over actions against persons who usurp
corporate offices and quo warranto actions against corporations is crystallized in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. Section 2, Rule 66 of the old rules is deleted in its entirety, Section 1 (a), Rules 66 of the amended rules no
longer contains the phrase “or an office in a corporation created by authority of law” found in the old section.
Section 1, Rule 66 of the new rules now reads:

SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals.-- An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act.

Explaining the changes in the aforequoted provision, Justice Jose Y. Feria states:

This rule is now limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise;
public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally
incorporated.

Actions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules.

However, the jurisdiction of the SEC over homeowners associations has been transferred to the HIGC by EO 90 and
exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission
with respect to home owners association.

In this case, the entities involved are homeowners associations. Although the SNSNAI is registered with the SEC as a
non-stock, non-profit corporation, the purposes for which this neighborhood association was established correspond
to the requirements laid down in the HIGC rules.

Finally, private respondents have also raised the issue that petitioners are now estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the courts over the intra-corporate controversy because the trial of the case before the regional trial
court was already half-way through when the latter raised the issue of jurisdiction.

This is not true. Records bear out that the individual petitioners through their counsel had in fact filed a motion to
dismiss in the Regional Trial Court on the ground, among others, that the regular courts lack jurisdiction over intra-
corporate matters. The trial court, however, did not act on the motion. Instead, it proceeded to trial. In fact, the
allegations in the petition for certiorari and prohibitions filed by petitioners in the Court of Appeals were substantially
a reiteration of those contained in the said motion to dismiss.