Revenue Generating
Revenue Generating
Revenue Generating
OF
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS:
LEGAL ISSUES
April 4, 2006
2:00 to 5:30 p.m.
Presented by:
Robert A. Wexler
Stephanie L. Petit
I. Introduction.
V. Special Topics:
A. Corporate Sponsorship
B. The Internet
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
INTRODUCTION
Before the mid-1990’s, phrases and concepts such as social entrepreneurship, venture
philanthropy, social return on investment, affinity credit card deals, corporate sponsorship
opportunities, public/private partnering, and branding were rarely uttered by influential
individuals in the nonprofit sector. Now these concepts, as well as other more entrepreneurial
notions, are part and parcel of everyday philanthropic vocabulary in the United States. No
longer are innovative, entrepreneurial ideas dismissed out of hand by the Board of Directors
when considering ways to make charitable programs self-sustaining or ways to raise funds to
support charitable programs.
Why the sea change? We believe that there are at least three trends that have emerged,
and that continue to evolve, among the clients with which we have had the opportunity to work
and among other organizations that we have observed:
2. Other organizations have sought to profit commercially from the goodwill that
they have already created through their charitable good works; thus the now
accepted practice of credit card companies and other corporations willing to pay
for the use of the charity’s good name in selling their own products or by
sponsoring a charity event.
While some may view these three trends as distinctly separate, there is an important
intersection between the legal issues involved. Each of these trends involves an analysis of
whether the underlying activity is consistent with the tax exempt status of the exempt
organization, and each of these activities involves a consideration of unrelated business income
tax issues.
This paper is intended as a basic guide to assist charities that seek to engage in income-
generating activities in focusing their thinking about legal issues, after they have already
developed their ideas about how to further their charitable mission by generating revenue.1
While charities should by no means shape their vision based on the legal framework, they need
to understand the basic legal principles in order to be able to know what will work and what will
not work within the context of a charitable organization.
To address these issues, this article is divided into the following parts:
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Every nonprofit organization contemplating a revenue generating activity should consult with its own legal
counsel, with its own certified public accountant and with any other advisors and consultants that it deems
appropriate before proceeding.
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I. DEFINITION OF TERMS
A. Nonprofit Organization
The term “nonprofit organization” generally refers to the legal (not tax) status of an
organization. It could refer to a nonprofit corporation, association, or trust. The entity could, of
course, be organized in any state, even if it is doing business in another state. For purposes of
simplicity, we will focus this Article on nonprofit corporations.
B. Nonprofit Corporation
C. Tax-Exempt Organization
A nonprofit corporation is usually, but not always, tax-exempt. There are at least 27
different categories of tax exemption at the federal and state levels. In this Article, however, we
assume that we are talking about a nonprofit public benefit corporation that is tax-exempt under
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC” or “Code”) Section 501(c)(3) and its California counterpart,
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 23701d.
D. “Foundation” Status
E. “Charity”
In this paper, therefore, we use the word “Charity” to refer to a California nonprofit
public benefit corporation that is tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) and that is not a private
foundation. All of the tax concepts discussed in this paper would apply equally to nonprofit
corporations organized in other states.
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II. INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH
EXEMPT STATUS
1. Organizational test
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2. Operational test
The operational test forms the heart of the discussion in this paper. IRC Section
501(c)(3), taken literally, requires an organization to be operated exclusively for exempt
purposes. The Regulations, however, add some flexibility to what is known as the operational
test. They make clear that a charity may qualify as such if it is operated primarily for exempt
purposes. An “insubstantial part” of the charity’s activities may be devoted to non-exempt pur-
poses. (Reg. Sec. 1.501.(c)(3)-1(c)(1).) Thus, a charity may operate a trade or business whose
conduct is not related to the achievement of its exempt purposes without losing its charitable
status under the tax law. (IRC Sections 511-515, generally; Reg. Sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(2).) And
private interests may benefit from the charity’s activities if that benefit is an unavoidable incident
of the charity’s otherwise proper activities. However, the operational test requires a charity to
“establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as
designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.” (Reg. Sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).)
3. Prohibition of inurement
IRC Section 501(c)(3) specifically requires that “no part of the net earnings of [the
organization] inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual . . . .” The IRS Chief
Counsel’s office has written that “[i]nurement is likely to arise where the financial benefit repre-
sents a transfer of the organization’s financial resources to an individual solely by virtue of the
individual’s relationship with the organization, and without regard to accomplishing exempt
purposes.” (Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,459 (July 31, 1980).)
The IRS takes the position that “all persons performing services for an organization have
a personal and private interest [in that organization] and therefore possess the requisite
relationship necessary to find private benefit or inurement.” (Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (June
17, 1987).) The Tax Court, however, does not cast its net quite this broadly. Rather than assume
that all employees are insiders when testing for inurement, the Tax Court has stated that an
insider is one who has a unique relationship with the organization by which the insider, by virtue
of his or her control or influence over the organization, can cause its funds or property to be
applied for the insider’s private purposes. (American Campaign Academy v. U.S., 92 T.C. 1053
(1989).)
IRC Section 4958 provides the IRS with the ability to impose intermediate sanctions,
short of revocation of exempt status, on insiders who engage in excess benefit transactions. As
the law under Section 4958 evolves, it is likely that the definition of insiders or “disqualified
persons” under Section 4958 will also be used to define insiders for purposes of the inurement
prohibition. It is also likely that given the right to impose intermediate sanctions on insiders who
profit from a Charity improperly, the IRS is less likely to pursue revocations on grounds of
inurement.
4. Prohibition of electioneering
A charity may not support or oppose candidates for public office. The IRS considers this
prohibition to be absolute. The Chief Counsel’s office has stated that “an organization described
in IRC Section 501(c)(3) is precluded from engaging in any political campaign activities.” (Gen.
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Couns. Mem. 39,694 (Jan. 22, 1988) (emphasis added).) Some activities that initially appear
overtly political may not, however, constitute prohibited electioneering. Where students in a
political science course were required to participate in political campaigns of their choosing as
part of their course work, or where the college provided facilities and faculty advisors for a
student newspaper that published student-written editorials on political matters, the IRS has ruled
that the college was not itself breaking the rules against supporting or opposing candidates.
(Rev. Rul. 72-512, 1972-2 C.B. 246; Rev. Rul. 72-513, 1972-2 C.B. 246.) A charity is also
allowed to register voters, to urge registered voters to vote, and to educate voters, so long as its
activities are nonpartisan. (IRC Section 4945(f); Reg. Sec. 53.4945-3(b); Rev. Rul. 78-248,
1978-1 C.B. 154.)
A charity may not devote a substantial part of its activities to attempting to influence
legislation. However, charities that are neither churches nor private foundations may quite
properly engage in legislative lobbying without risking their tax-exempt status, so long as
lobbying remains an insubstantial part of their overall activities, by taking advantage of the
provisions of IRC Sections 501(h) and 4911. The former defines substantiality with reference to
a charity’s expenditures on lobbying, and the latter defines precisely what is and is not lobbying.
Even under the “insubstantiality” test, much advocacy commonly conducted by charities
does not rise to the level of lobbying. A charity can attempt to influence the actions of
government officials aside from legislative decisions, advocate its views through public interest
litigation, convene conferences on public policy issues even if those issues are controversial, and
express its views on those issues through advertisements, all without engaging in lobbying as the
IRS understands the term.
For purposes of this paper, we assume that the Charity is properly organized and
therefore satisfies the organizational test and that the Articles of Incorporation contain a broadly
written purposes clause that permits the particular income-generating activity being
contemplated. If the Articles do not contain a broad purposes clause that would cover the
activity being contemplated, they should be amended before engaging in the activity in
question.2
We also assume that the Charity is not engaging in impermissible activities such as
excess lobbying, candidate activity, private inurement, or private benefit transactions. That is
not to say that private inurement and excess compensation issues do not arise in situations
involving “ activities, particularly where a related for-profit corporation or business is involved.
Rather, we assume for purposes of this paper that the Charity will take appropriate steps to
2
State law charitable trust rules, however, may limit the ability of a public benefit corporation to use assets that
were received for one purpose, prior to an Articles amendment, for a new purpose.
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ensure that any compensation paid to insiders or to related for-profit entities is reasonable in
amount and is approved using procedures outlined in Internal Revenue Code Section 4958.3
We focus then on the operational test. Does the operation of the contemplated activity
fall within the range of activities permitted under Section 501(c)(3). If it does, then the activity
is permitted, and the Charity pays no tax on the income from the activity. If it does not, the
Charity may still be able to engage in the activity and possibly pay the unrelated business income
tax, or the activity may be so substantial that the Charity needs to relocate the activity into a
separate legal entity, such as a subsidiary corporation.
In analyzing whether a particular activity is operated for exempt purposes, we must first
identify the exempt purpose that the activity purports to further. The exempt purposes
recognized by the IRS include:
(a) Religious
(b) Charitable
(c) Scientific
(d) Testing for public safety
(e) Literary
(f) Educational, or
(g) Prevention of cruelty to children or animals
While one can potentially identify income-producing activities in connection with any
valid exempt purpose, the purposes most likely to be relevant to income-generating activities are,
in no particular order, scientific, educational, and general charitable.
3
IRC Section 4958 provides excise taxes for transactions which result in excess benefits being paid to certain
insiders. Charities can follow certain disclosure and abstention procedures in order to qualify for a presumption of
reasonableness.
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1. Scientific
Charities have the ability to make money from developing marketable patents or actual
goods that result from scientific research. The Regulations (1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5)) provide that
“since an organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) only if it serves a public
rather than a private interest, a scientific organization must be organized and operated in the
public interest. Therefore, the term scientific, as used in section 501(c)(3), includes the carrying
on of scientific research in the public interest.”
The Regulations tell us that scientific research will be regarded as carried on in the public
interest:
(a) If the results of such research (including any patents, copyrights, processes, or
formulae resulting from such research) are made available to the public on a
nondiscriminatory basis;
(b) If such research is performed for the United States, or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, or for a State or political subdivision thereof; or
The Regulations further provide some examples of research that is in the public interest
and therefore exempt in nature:
(1) Scientific research carried on for the purpose of aiding in the scientific education
of college or university students;
(2) Scientific research carried on for the purpose of obtaining scientific information,
which is published in a treatise, thesis, trade publication, or in any other form that
is available to the interested public;
(3) Scientific research carried on for the purpose of discovering a cure for a disease;
or
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Scientific research described above will be regarded as carried on in the public interest
even though such research is performed pursuant to a contract or agreement under which the
sponsor or sponsors of the research have the right to obtain ownership or control of any patents,
copyrights, processes, or formulae resulting from such research.
On the other hand, the Regulations tell us that an organization will not be regarded as
organized and operated for the purpose of carrying on scientific research in the public interest
and, consequently, will not qualify under Section 501(c)(3) as a scientific organization, if:
(a) Such organization will perform research only for persons which are
(directly or indirectly) its creators and which are not described in section
501(c)(3), or
The Regulations clarify that for purposes of this subdivision, a patent, copyright, process,
or formula shall be considered as made available to the public if such patent, copyright, process,
or formula is made available to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis. In addition, although
one person is granted the exclusive right to the use of a patent, copyright, process, or formula,
such patent, copyright, process, or formula shall be considered as made available to the public if
the granting of such exclusive right is the only practicable manner in which the patent, copyright,
process, or formula can be utilized to benefit the public.
In the example above, then, University A could conduct research to develop medical
technology as long as it is made available to the public. In addition, the University and Dr. X
could participate in marketing and selling the technology. There are a series of more specific
rulings and cases that one should consult before engaging in any scientific research projects.
2. Educational
The Regulations (1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i)) provide that the term “educational” relates to:
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Schools must also demonstrate that they operate in a non-discriminatory
manner.
There are many examples of organizations that generate revenue through educational
activities. Two areas of educational activities that can generate income and border the realm of
for-profit activity are publishing and the operation of conference centers. These are but two
examples, but let’s explore what the law has said about these.
The Rulings further provide that the methods used in preparing and presenting the
abstracts should conform to methods traditionally accepted as “educational” in character. Among
other things, the charges for the publication should recover only a portion of the costs of
producing the publication.
The 1966 and 1967 Revenue Rulings were applied in Rev. Rul. 79-369. That Ruling
examines an organization that was created to stimulate, promote, encourage, and sustain interest
in and appreciation of contemporary symphonic and chamber music. Some additional relevant
facts were:
• The music selected for recording had a limited commercial market and was not
generally produced by the commercial music publishing and recording industry
for sale to the public.
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• The organization sold its recordings primarily to libraries and educational
institutions. Some records were provided free to radio stations operated by
educational institutions. The organization also made some sales to individuals.
• The records were not made available for sale through commercial record dealers
except in a few specialty shops, but were sold through mail orders.
• The organization did not engage in any advertising, but relied upon those who
were interested in this type of music to communicate the availability of the
records.
• All sales were facilitated by the use of a catalog published by the organization.
• The catalog contents included information about the compositions and the
composers.
• This information was retained in the catalog so that the catalog served as an
archive with respect to these compositions and recordings.
• The liner notes on the album covers contained a biography of the composer and a
description of the composition by its composer.
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The IRS determined, based on these very favorable facts, that the “the recording
and sale of musical compositions, not generally produced by the commercial recording
industry, is similar to the publication and sale of educational material in a noncommercial
manner. (Rev. Rul. 67-4, 1967-1 C.B. 121.)
In Rev. Rul. 77-4, 1977-1 C.B. 141, the IRS reviewed the publication of an ethnic
newspaper. It found that a nonprofit organization, whose only activities were preparing and
publishing a newspaper of local, national, and international news articles with an ethnic
emphasis, soliciting advertising and selling subscriptions to that newspaper in a manner
indistinguishable from ordinary commercial publishing practices, was not operated exclusively
for charitable and educational purposes and did not qualify for exemption.
The Court found that “the principal issue this Court must address is at what point the
successful operation of a tax-exempt organization should be deemed to have transformed that
organization into a commercial enterprise and thereby to have forfeited its tax exemption.” This
case helped lay the groundwork for the current understanding that it is acceptable for a nonprofit
corporation to be successful.
The Court noted that “[i]t is doubtful that any small-scale exempt operation could ever
increase its economic activity without forfeiting its tax-exempt status . . . “ if it were not allowed
to make a profit. The Court decided that assuming there is no undue private inurement or
benefit, the question is “what is the purpose of an organization claiming tax-exempt status.”
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. . . . We do not read § 501(c)(3) or its legislative history to define the purpose of
an organization claiming tax-exempt status as a direct derivative of the volume of
business of that organization. Rather, the inquiry must remain that of determining
the purpose to which the increased business activity is directed. As the Tax Court
itself observed, “the presence of profit making activities is not per se a bar to
qualification of an organization as exempt if the activities further or accomplish
an exempt purpose.” Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 202, 211
(1978). Despite the long history of § 501(c)(3) and the numerous organizations
that have claimed its coverage, no regulation or body of case law has defined the
concept of “purpose” under this provision of the Tax Code with sufficient clarity
to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc decision-making. [Footnotes omitted]
The publishing rulings and cases help us understand that a nonprofit corporation can
make a profit as long as it operates in a non-commercial manner; that means, among other things,
it selects its books for publication based on content, rather than salability, and it sells its books
through non-commercial channels. Also any profits would have to be directed back towards the
charitable or educational activity.
Publishing issues can become particularly complex where a nonprofit wants to publish
some titles that would satisfy the above tests and some titles that would be purely commercial.
Those situations present a challenge for the practitioner thinking about when it is necessary to
split the activities into two corporations.
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b. Conference centers. A recent case provides the IRS’s current thinking on
situations involving the operation of an exempt conference center. In Airlie Foundation v. IRS
D. D.C. No. 02-0785 (EGS), (9/24/03), the Court laid out the following facts:
• Airlie carries out its mission principally by organizing, hosting, conducting, and
sponsoring educational conferences on its facilities.
• It has played a role in the development of programs in areas as diverse as civil and
human rights, international relations, public policy, the environment, medical
education, mental health and disability.
• Airlie sponsors events such as lectures, concerts, and art shows free of charge and
provides meeting space for non-profit organizations, overnight accommodations
for participants of its cultural programs, and public use of its grounds for large-
scale charitable events.
• On average, Airlie hosts about 600 groups per year. It derives approximately 85%
of its operating revenue from fees paid by these clients and approximately 8%
from its endowment. An average of 20% of Airlie’s conference events are for
government clients, 50% from nonprofit and/or educational clients, and 30%-40%
for “other” users.
• At most, 10% of Airlie’s clients use its facility for private events and another 10%
at most represent private commercial clients pursuing their private interests.
According to industry data from 1999, Airlie’s average daily rate was almost 20%
lower than the average rates for nearby conference centers.
• The expected operating pre-tax profit margin for a commercial conference center
should be approximately 20% of gross revenues. Airlie’s actual operations during
the years 1995-1998 reflected a pre-tax profit margin of barely 4% after excluding
grants, investment income and unusual items.
• In other words, the Foundation uses the investment income from its endowment to
subsidize its conference and its other public benefit activities.
The Court noted that “only the operational test is at issue in this case.” The operational
test requires both that an organization engage “primarily” in activities that accomplish its exempt
purpose and that not more than an “insubstantial part of its activities” further a non-exempt
purpose. (citing Treas. Reg. (26 C.F.R.) §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).) Though an incidental non-
exempt purpose will not automatically disqualify an organization, the “presence of a single
[nonexempt] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption, regardless of the
number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes.” (Better Business Bureau of Washington,
D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283, 66 S. Ct. 112 (1945); Airlie, 826 F. Supp. at 549.) In
cases where an organization’s activities could be carried out for either exempt or nonexempt
purposes, courts must examine the manner in which those activities are carried out in order to
determine their true purpose. (See, e.g., Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352, 356-57
(1978).)
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The Court further noted that in applying the operational test, courts have relied on what
has come to be termed the “commerciality” doctrine. In many instances, courts have found that,
due to the “commercial” manner in which an organization conducts its activities, that
organization is operated for nonexempt commercial purposes rather than for exempt purposes.
The Court pointed out that “[a]mong the major factors courts have considered in assessing
commerciality are competition with for profit commercial entities; the extent and degree of
below cost services provided; pricing policies; and reasonableness of financial reserves.
Additional factors include, inter alia, whether the organization uses commercial promotional
methods (e.g., advertising) and the extent to which the organization receives charitable
donations.”
In revoking the exempt status of the conference center, the Court reasoned as follows:
It is clear from the facts that plaintiff engages in conduct of both a commercial
and exempt nature, the question whether it is entitled to tax-exempt status turns
largely on whether its activities are conducted primarily for a commercial or for
an exempt purpose. Parties are correct in asserting that BSW Group, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352, 358 (1978), provides the most relevant case authority.
BSW Group involved the operation of a business purportedly formed for the
purpose of providing consulting services primarily in the fields of rural-related
policy and program development. Petitioner’s consulting clients were to be tax-
exempt organizations and not-for-profit organizations that were to become aware
of petitioner’s services through word of mouth rather than traditional
advertisement. BSW Group, 70 T.C. at 354-55. Petitioner’s general policy was to
provide its consulting services at or close to cost, but fees were to be sufficiently
high as to enable petitioner to retain at least a nominal administrative fee over and
above the amount payable to individual consultants. Id. at 355. In concluding,
“with reluctance,” id. at 360, that BSW Group was not an exempt organization,
the Tax Court focused on the fact that the organization’s “overall fee policy [was]
... to recoup its costs and ... realize some profit,” that the organization competed
with commercial firms, that it had not received or solicited voluntary
contributions, and that it had failed to limit its clientele to organizations which
were themselves exempt under Section 501(c)(3). Notably, while petitioner’s fee
structure in that case reflected ability to pay, it did not appear that the
organization planned ever to charge a fee less than cost. Id. at 358-60.
In the present case, plaintiff admits that its primary activity is the operation of a
conference center. Like petitioner in BSW Group, plaintiff acts as an intermediary
and does not directly benefit the public. As was the case in BSW Group, plaintiff’s
conference patrons are not limited to tax-exempt entities. According to the
booking report for 1999, the year in which plaintiff applied to the IRS for tax
exempt status, in fact, approximately 30%-40% of plaintiff’s patrons were of a
private or corporate nature. While plaintiff in the instant case has made profits
ranging from an average of 4% up to 10%, unlike petitioner in BSW Group, it
provided more than 17% of its 1999 conferences for fees covering less than total
costs. As the Tax Court correctly stated in the case of IHC Health Plans, Inc. v.
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Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003), cited by defendant, “there is a
qualitative difference between selling at a discount and selling below cost.” IHC,
325 F.3d at 1200. The fact that plaintiff’s conference center derives substantial
income from weddings and special events and competes with a number of
commercial, as well as non commercial, entities constitutes strong evidence,
pursuant to BSW Group, of a commercial nature and purpose. Furthermore,
though plaintiff contends that most of its bookings are the result of word-of-
mouth referrals, it maintains a commercial website and has paid significant
advertising and promotional expenses.
While plaintiff was organized for an exempt purpose, the Court cannot find, under
the totality of the circumstances, that it is operated similarly. Having considered
the facts before it, the Court is not persuaded that plaintiff has met its burden of
demonstrating that an incorrect determination was made by the Internal Revenue
Service. While certain factors-including plaintiff’s fee structure and subsidization
practice-are indicative of non-commercial characteristics, others-such as the
nature of its clients and competition, its advertising expenditures and the
substantial revenues derived from weddings and special events on the premises,
strongly suggest that the agency was correct in revoking the foundation’s tax
exempt status.
The Airlie case may still be appealed, and so it is difficult to know whether the Court’s
thinking will stand, but this case is interesting in that it illustrates the IRS’s position and at least
one court’s position on the commerciality of conference centers, under the facts of the case.
3. Charitable
The Regulations tell us that the term “charitable,” as used in Section 501(c)(3) in its
generally accepted legal sense, can include activities that might also be described as educational,
religious, or scientific. The term “charitable” includes: relief of the poor and distressed or of the
underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or
maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of government;
and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the above
purposes or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination;
(iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration
and juvenile delinquency.
There are many examples of charitable income generating activities – too many to
consider for purposes of this paper. Let us examine four areas: (a) helping a charitable class by
providing skills training, (b) low-income housing, (c) credit counseling, and (d) management and
other consulting.
a. Job skills and training. The IRS recognizes that a Charity can further an
exempt activity by being organized and operated to help a disadvantaged class of individuals
learn how to perform a job skill. The disadvantaged class could be based on the poverty, a
physical or mental disability, and other factors.
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In Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T. C. 202 (1978), the U.S. Tax Court
considered the exemption of a charity that purchased and sold handicrafts from disadvantaged
craftspeople. The charity in that case sold the handicrafts to museums and other nonprofit shops
and agencies. The Tax Court found that the sale of these items was related to the exempt
purpose of the organization because the activity alleviated economic deficiencies in communities
of disadvantaged artisans, and the crafts themselves served to educate the public in the artistry,
history, and cultural significance of handicrafts from these communities. A similar conclusion
was reached in Industrial Aid for the Blind v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 96 (1979), in which the
corporation purchased products manufactured by blind individuals and sold them to various
purchasers.
In Rev. Rul. 73-128, 1973-1 (1973), the IRS determined that a business conducted for the
primary purpose of providing skills training to the disadvantaged was operated for charitable
purposes. In Rev. Rul. 75-472, 1975-2 C.B. 208 (1975), a charity directly employed
disadvantaged persons in its business. That business involved the production and sale of furniture
made by residents of the corporation’s halfway house for alcoholics. We see modern-day
examples of this type of program in the Bay Area today with Delancey Street, Juma Ventures,
and Pedal Revolution, to name a few.
Revenue Procedure 96-32, 1996-1 C.B. 717 (the “1996 Rev. Proc.”), sets forth some of
the safe harbors that a low-income housing organization may follow in order to qualify for
exemption. It also describes the facts and circumstances that the IRS will consider if the
organization cannot satisfy the safe harbor.
Relief of the poor and distressed. In a 1970 Revenue Ruling, 70-585, 1970-2 CB 115, the
IRS described three situations in which an organization qualified for exemption and one in which
it did not. In Situation 1, the organization provided new and renovated homes for sale to low-
income families on long-term, low-payment plans. The activity of providing homes to low-
income families who could not otherwise afford them was deemed to relieve the poor and
distressed. In Situation 4, the organization provided rental housing to moderate-income families.
This activity was not deemed to relieve the poor or distressed, because the families were of
moderate income. These two situations clearly turn on the income level of the family receiving
the housing. What is most notable about this revenue ruling is the omission of any discussion
about what constitutes low income or moderate income, except a general statement that “the
4
These categories are described as “charitable” in Regulation Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).
17
determination of what constitutes low income is a factual question based on all of the
surrounding facts and circumstances.”5
Between 1970 and 1991, the IRS issued several rulings describing situations in which
furnishing low-income housing serves to relieve the poor, but there was no attempt to articulate a
comprehensive standard. For example, in GCM 36293 (May 30, 1975), the Chief Counsel found
that an organization formed to aid low- and moderate-income families that qualified for
assistance under a state mortgage loan program was insufficient to establish the relief of poverty.
The organization in GCM 36293 was to provide housing in a predominantly white, non-
contiguous suburb of a large metropolitan area. The organization proposed to offer 15 of its 60
units, representing 25% of its units, to low-income persons and between 20 and 30 of its units,
representing 33% to 50% of the units, to moderate-income persons. The remainder of the units
would be offered to others in order to support the fiscal viability of the project. There was no
definition of low-income, other than to state that a local housing authority would help select the
low-income tenants. The IRS found that the percentage offered to low-income persons was too
low to qualify for relieving the poor and distressed, and the project failed to serve any other
charitable purpose.
In Rev. Rul. 76-408, 1976-2 CB 145, the IRS held that an organization that provided
loans in a badly deteriorating area to persons who qualified as “low-income” under standards
promulgated by a government agency and who could not obtain loans elsewhere was engaged in
the relief of the poor.
In October 1991, the IRS published its annual Exempt Organizations Continuing
Professional Education Technical Instruction Program Textbook (“CPE”), a book which
contains articles designed for the continuing education of IRS field personnel. One of the
articles, authored by one of the principal draftsman of the 1996 Rev. Proc., describes the then-
current state of the law on “Low Income Housing as a Charitable Activity.”6 In this article, the
authors summarize the outstanding rulings and cases and articulate, once again, an overall facts
and circumstances approach, without the benefit of a safe harbor.
5
Page 115.
6
Louthian and Friedlander, “Low-Income Housing as a Charitable Activity,” page 93.
7
1996 Rev. Proc. Section 5.01(1), citing Rev. Rul. 68-17, 1968-1 CB 247, Rev. Rul. 68-655, 1968-2 CB 213, Rev.
Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 CB 115 (Situation 3), and Rev. Rul. 76-147, 1976-1 CB 151.
18
In GCM 36293, the Service reaffirmed that an organization that combats actual or even
potential deterioration in a community can qualify for exemption. “Any systematic and
reasonably effective program that is carried on for the sole purpose of helping the low-income
victims . . . move into better living quarters, and thereby reducing or eliminating municipal
squalor, would thus appear to come within . . . [the definition of charitable] which refers to
combating community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.”
In an article in its 1994 CPE (October 1993), the IRS listed some factors it has relied
upon in some exemption applications that adequately demonstrated the presence of community
deterioration. These include: the income level of the residents; the age of the housing stock;
unemployment in the area; location of the project in relationship to parks or other areas for
diversion; comparative housing costs (because declining housing costs help identify an area in
decline); the amount of crime in an area; the level of drug trafficking; the presence and amount
of graffiti; the percentage of homes below city code standards.8
Lessening neighborhood tensions. The 1996 Rev. Proc. indicates that lessening
neighborhood tensions is generally identified as an additional charitable purpose by
8
1994 CPE, page 133.
9
1996 Rev. Proc. Section 5.01(2), citing Rev. Ruls. 85-1 and 85-2, 1985-1 C.B. 178. See also Louthian and Henchey,
“Lessening the Burdens of Government,” Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education Technical
Instruction Program Textbook for FY 1992 (1991), p. 18.
10
1996 Rev. Proc. Section 5.01(3), citing Rev. Rul. 68-655, 1968-2 C.B. 213, and Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115
(Situation 2).
19
organizations that fight poverty and community deterioration associated with overcrowding in
lower income areas in which ethnic or racial tensions are high.11
Relief of the distress of the elderly or handicapped. The 1996 Rev. Proc. indicates that
some organizations provide housing specifically for the elderly or physically handicapped, and
these organizations generally seek exemption under the standards set forth in Rev. Rul. 72-124,
1972-1 C.B. 145, Rev. Rul. 79-18, 1979-1 C.B. 194, and Rev. Rul. 79-19, 1979-1 C.B. 195.
In order to make it easier for low-income housing organizations to qualify for exemption,
the IRS issues a safe harbor:
The safe-harbor. Under the 1996 Rev. Proc., an organization will be considered
charitable if it satisfies each of the following four requirements:
1. An Income Test.12 The organization must establish for each project that:
(a) at least 75% of the units are occupied by residents that qualify as
low-income. Low income is defined in accordance with the
income limits computed and published by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) in Income Limits for
Low and Very Low-Income Families Under the Housing Act of
1937. The term “low income” is defined by that Act as 80% of the
area median income. And
(b) either at least 20% of the units are occupied by residents that also
meet the very low-income limit for the area or 40% of the units are
occupied by residents that also do not exceed 120% of the area’s
very low-income limit. The term “very low income” is defined
under the Housing Act of 1937 as 50% of area median income. In
addition, up to 25% of the units may be provided at market rates to
persons who have incomes in excess of the low-income limit.
2. An Occupancy Test. The project must actually be occupied by those poor and
distressed residents described under the income test. With new construction, a reasonable
start-up period is allowed before an organization must meet this requirement. For acquisition
transactions, the transition period to satisfy this requirement will be assumed to be reasonable if
the transition is completed within one year. If a project operates under a government program
that allows a longer transition period, then this longer period will be used to determine
reasonableness.
11
1996 Rev. Proc. Section 5.01(4), citing Rev. Rul. 68-655, 1968-2 C.B. 213, and Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115
(Situation 2).
12
The 1996 Rev. Proc. does not use headings to describe the tests; headings have been supplied by the author.
20
follows government-imposed rental restrictions or a rental policy that otherwise provides for the
relief of the poor and distressed. Typical government programs require that rents be set at 30%
of the applicable income limit.
4. Multiple Buildings. If the project consists of multiple buildings, they must share
the same grounds.
In addition, the IRS will, in applying this safe harbor, follow these guidelines:
(1) The IRS will apply HUD guidelines on income limits for low-
income and very low-income families. Recognizing the current
climate in Congress, the 1996 Rev. Proc. provides that if HUD’s
program terminates, the Service will use income limits computed
under such program as is in effect immediately before such
termination. Although the 1996 Rev. Proc. does not so state,
presumably these limits would be inflation-adjusted.
(2) The retention of the right to evict tenants for failure to pay rent or
other misconduct will not, in and of itself, cause the organization
to fail to meet the safe harbor.
Finally, the 1996 Rev. Proc. states that even if an organization satisfies the safe harbor, it
may nevertheless fail to qualify for exemption because private interests of individuals with a
21
financial stake in the project are furthered.13 For example, the IRS will examine the role of a
developer or management company in the organization’s activities, as well as any private benefit
resulting from property sales, development fees, and management fees. Interestingly, there is no
discussion at all in the 1996 Rev. Proc. about a nonprofit’s involvement in a limited partnership
that provides housing but that also offers tax credits and other tax benefits to its limited partners.
(3) Limitation of rents to ensure that they are affordable to low-income and
very low-income residents.
(6) The provision of additional social services affordable to the poor residents.
13
1996 Rev. Proc. Section 6.
22
(8) Acceptance of residents who, when considered individually, have unusual
burdens, such as extremely high medical costs, which cause them to be in
a condition similar to persons within the qualifying income limits in spite
of their higher incomes.
There is nothing surprising or unusual about these facts and circumstances. It was
important, however, for the IRS to set forth these facts and circumstances, because they do
provide organizations that are trying to qualify for exemption with a clearer idea of how to
structure their projects in situations in which they cannot meet the safe-harbor guidelines.
In the 1996 Rev. Proc., the IRS provides some concrete examples applying these facts
and circumstances. In the six examples provided, three demonstrate facts and circumstances that
qualify the organization for exemption:
23
35% will exceed the low-income limit but will not exceed 115% of the area’s
median income.
In 1960, a credit counseling service (agency) was recognized as exempt under IRC
501(c)(3) in Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1969-2 C.B. 115. This agency limited its services to low-income
individuals and families with financial problems. Its board of directors was comprised of
representatives from religious organizations, civic groups, labor unions, business groups, and
educational institutions. The IRS changed its mind in the mid-1970’s and decided that credit
counseling was not a 501(c)(3) activity, although it did enhance social welfare and could qualify
under Section 501(c)(4).
In two court cases, the courts upheld the 501(c)(3) status of two organizations and
rejected the IRS’s arguments for revocation. Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Alabama
v. United States, 78- 2 U.S.T.C. 9660 (D.D.C. 1978) and Credit Counseling Centers of
Oklahoma, Inc. v. United States, 79-2 U.S.T.C. 9468 (D.D.C. 1979).
In these cases, the IRS argued that the two agencies were not organized and operated
exclusively for charitable or educational purposes; the debt management services were not
limited to low-income individuals or families; fees were charged for the services rendered. The
courts did not agree with the IRS, and held that the two organizations were charitable and
educational in nature as described in IRC 501(c)(3). Providing information regarding the sound
use of consumer credit is charitable because it advances education and promotes social welfare
within Reg. 1.501(c)(3)- 1(d)(2). These programs are also educational because they instruct the
public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(3)(i)(b).
The direct customer counseling assistance programs were likewise charitable, the court
found, and educational in nature. The court also looked at the debt management and creditor
intercession activities as an integral part of the two agencies’ counseling function.
More recently, however, the IRS is once again challenging credit counseling agencies’
tax-exempt status. The IRS feels that the industry has evolved and agencies are spending
significantly less time on counseling and education and significantly more time on negotiating
down debt of individual clients with credit card companies and taking a fee for that service.
This, the IRS believes, is too commercial. It remains to be seen in the near future how these
cases evolve.
24
management center may develop expertise in counseling charities on fundraising, governance,
and management issues. When can such an organization offer these services on a fee-for-service
basis, consistent with the organization’s tax exemption?
For an excellent article on this subject, see Management and Consulting Services: The
Impact on Exempt Status and UBIT, by Loren D. Prescott, Jr., The Exempt Organization Tax
Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, page 209 (November 2003). In this article, Professor Prescott indicates
that courts and the IRS will look at a series of factors in evaluating whether an activity is
consistent with a Charity’s exempt purpose, and we se these factors for purposes of analyzing the
issue in this paper:
• Whether the fee charged is substantially below the Charity’s cost of providing the
service; in other words, whether the Charity looks to charitable contributions to
support the activity or whether it is self-supporting.
• The nature of the services provided. How commercial seeming are the services?
• Who are the recipients of the services – other nonprofits and/or others?
The relationship of the service provider to the recipient – the Integral Part Test. A
Charity can provide services to certain legally related or commonly controlled organizations
consistently with its exemption. For example, three hospitals that are part of a common
nonprofit hospital chain might establish a new Charity whose sole purpose is to provide
administrative support to each of the hospitals on a fee-for-service basis. Under the “integral
part” test, this organization is easily exempt.14
The IRS recognizes that where the activities of an organization bear a close and intimate
relationship to the functioning of one or more charities, and the service provider is engaged in
services that are necessary and indispensable to the operations of the charities, the organization
will take on the tax-exempt status of the charities receiving the services.15 If the service
provider engages in other exempt activities, so that the issue is not one of losing exemption but
of incurring UBTI, the same analysis applies; i.e., if the service activities can be shown to be an
14
See IRC Section 502 and accompanying regulations; HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1 (1981)
(although this case is specific to a cooperative hospital service organization); Geisinger Health Plan v. Commr., 100
T.C. 394 (1993), aff’d 20 F.3d 494 (3rd Cir. 1994) articulates the test.
15
See, e.g., Squire v. Students Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1951) (recognizing corporation that
operated a college book store as tax-exempt because, among other things, its business enterprise bore a close and
intimate relationship to the functioning of the college). Similarly, the Section 502 Regulations acknowledge that a
service provider may be exempt because it functions as an integral part of another charity. This principle is illustrated by
the example of a subsidiary organization operated for the sole purpose of furnishing electric power used by its exempt
parent in carrying out the parent’s exempt function, in which case the subsidiary would be recognized as exempt. The
integral part analysis can be applied to other tax-exempt entities in addition to charities exempt under Section
501(c)(3), and Section 502 applies more generally to entities exempt under Section 501. However, for purposes of
this discussion, we only discuss the integral part test in connection with Section 501(c)(3) service providers and
recipients.
25
integral part of the recipient charity’s exempt activities, they will not be treated as an unrelated
trade or business and thus will not generate UBTI.16
The IRS recognizes that most charities are nonstock entities, making it difficult to apply
technical parent-subsidiary tests. In Revenue Ruling 68-26, the IRS found that even though a
technical parent-subsidiary relationship may not exist, a parent-subsidiary relationship can be
present if “a substantially similar relationship does in fact exist through the control and close
supervision of its affairs.”
Furthermore, in some rulings the IRS has appeared to be somewhat flexible about the
relationship test between the recipients of the services. In Revenue Ruling 75-282, an
organization formed and controlled by an exempt conference of churches made mortgage loans
of less than the commercial rate of interest to churches that were members of the conference. It
was held to be operating under the close supervision and control of the parent church conference,
was considered to be carrying out an integral part of the activities of the parent (aiding churches
in obtaining facilities), and was recognized as exempt. However, the IRS does not clarify the
exact relationship between member churches and the conference of churches. In Private Letter
Ruling 9617031, five charities were outgrowths of Y, an exempt domestic fraternal society. The
five charities were member organizations. Current and former directors, officers, and/or
members of Y were involved in selecting the boards of the five charities, but no direct control
relationship existed. Y supported the charities by coordinating many of their fundraising,
program service and administrative activities. Y planned to charge for support services provided
to the charities at the lower of cost or fair market value. The IRS found that Y’s performance of
the services for charitable organizations unrelated to itself would constitute an unrelated trade or
business. However, the IRS found that in this case Y and the charities were related within the
16
See, for example, UBIT analysis in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9617031.
26
meaning of the 502 Regulations, even though in this ruling Y, the service provider, was itself the
“parent” organization, and the charities did not appear to be directly controlled by Y.17
Whether the fee charged is substantially below the Charity’s cost of providing the
service. In cases in which the integral part doctrine does not apply, the IRS seems to focus
primarily on this factor. If the fee charged is substantially below the Charity’s cost and the
activity is subsidized by charitable contributions, the Charity can successfully argue that the
activity furthers its exempt purpose. “Substantially below cost” is not defined, but rulings
suggest that 75% of cost or even 85% of cost may be sufficient. Rev. Rul. 71-529 says that 15%
below cost is acceptable. In PLR 9347036, the IRS seems to say 10% below cost is also feasible.
This means that it is difficult for a Charity to sell services, even below market but above cost and
have those services considered as part of its exempt activity.
The IRS developed the “substantially below cost” analysis in two Revenue Rulings. In
Revenue Ruling 71-529, an organization was formed to aid other charities by assisting them in
managing their endowment or investment funds more effectively. The member organizations
paid only a nominal fee for these services; the organization’s operating expenses were primarily
paid by grants from independent charitable organizations. The fees for the services represented
less than 15% of the total costs of operation. The IRS found that the entity was exempt given
that it performed an essential function at substantially below cost. In Revenue Ruling 72-369, an
organization provided managerial and consulting services to charities to improve the
administration of their charitable programs. The organization entered into agreements with
unrelated charities to furnish the services on a cost basis. The IRS found that furnishing these
services on a cost basis did not constitute a charitable activity, because the organization lacked
the donative element necessary to establish the activity as charitable.
A key factor in showing that services are being offered at substantially below cost is to
show that the service provider raises funds from other independent charities or other donors, as
in Rev. Rul. 71-529, to subsidize the services. In effect, the service provider is making a grant,
in the form of donated services, to the service recipient.
BSW Group, Inc. v. Commr., 70 T.C. 352 (1978), is the leading case. In that case, a
Charity provided consulting services to a small number of organizations for a fee. The Court
found that even though the fee was below market, it was above cost and, therefore, was not
sufficient to establish the charitable nature. See also Private Letter Rulings 200036049,
200332046, and 9414003 as other examples citing BSW. The IRS and the Tax Court recently
confirmed this line of thinking in At Cost Services v. Commr. 80 TCM 573 (2000), where job
17
See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9849027, in which the service provider (“A”) was a graduate educational institution that
operated a college and provided central programs to a group of colleges, including A, that coordinated their
operations. Each college was a separate legal entity, but the colleges were located around a common library and
other facilities and shared many programs. The group had a constitution setting out the legal relationship among the
colleges. It provided that each college was represented on the Board of Fellows that governed A. Whenever a
Board of Fellows vote affected a member of the group other than A or one of the central programs carried on by A,
an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the members could be required. The presidents of all the colleges
approved the budget for A’s central programs. Many intercollegiate committees existed to coordinate activities.
The IRS found that the colleges had enough control over A through the Board of Fellows to satisfy the control and
close supervision required by Rev. Rul. 68-28. The IRS did not specifically address the relationship among the
colleges receiving the services, but they did not appear to be subsidiaries of a common parent.
27
training and placement fees equal to cost were not considered to be charitable. See also TAM
9232003 (management for a fee equal to cost plus a percentage of management fee not
charitable).
The nature and scope of the services – the presence of competition. Both for purposes of
analyzing the extent to which an activity is too commercial to be consistent with exempt
purposes and for purposes of assessing UBIT, the IRS and courts look to the type of services and
the commercial hue of the services. Neither the courts nor the Service regard the mere existence
of competition as determinative of the tax treatment of a particular activity.
While competition with for-profit entities is not a determinative factor, the presence of
for-profit entities engaging in similar services is one factor used by the courts and the IRS to
assess whether or not an activity furthers the charitable purposes of an organization. See, e.g.,
B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352 (consulting services provided primarily to other
charities in the area of rural-related policy and program development were of the sort ordinarily
carried out by commercial businesses such as banks, personnel agencies, and trash disposal
firms; court found that competition with commercial firms is strong evidence of the
predominance of nonexempt commercial purposes); Rev. Rul. 69-528 (providing investment
services on a regular basis for a fee is a trade or business ordinarily carried on for profit); Rev.
Rul. 72-369 (providing managerial and consulting services to charities to improve their
administration for a fee intended to recover costs is a trade or business ordinarily carried on for
profit).
On the other hand, if a charity can differentiate its services from those offered by for-
profit providers, it strengthens its claim that its services are related to its exempt purposes. See
Rev. Rul. 69-572 (charity created to construct and maintain a building to house member agencies
of a community chest is distinguishable from for-profit landlord because, among other things, the
charity offered a large central meeting room for free use of the lessees and other interested
community chest agencies; providing housing for a number of member agencies at one
convenient central place enabled the agencies to make frequent use of volunteer labor on a
efficient basis; and there was a close connection between the charity and the charitable functions
of the tenant organizations); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 934703318 (a charity operating as a community
foundation and also providing grant-making services to other charities for a fee intended to
recover costs was engaging in related activity; its grant-making services could be distinguished
from services that are commercial in nature, such as management consulting, accounting,
bookkeeping, and legal services).19
18
While private letter rulings do not constitute precedential authority, we cite them here as an example of the IRS’s
analysis of these issues.
19
The grant-making services included (i) coordination and response to all inquiries related to a particular
organization’s grant-making activities; (ii) provision to potential applicant/donees of the particular organization’s grant-
making guidelines; (iii) communication with potential applicants/donees regarding the status of applications and funding
proposals; (iv) conduct of site visits, interviews, or other pre-grant inquiries necessary to obtain information to evaluate
funding proposals; (v) creation of proposal screening and evaluation processes; (vi) presentation of grant-making
recommendations to a particular organization; (vii) assessment of grant impact.
28
Instead of basing a conclusion solely on competition with for-profit entities, a more
careful analysis of the size and extent of the activities in relation to the nature and extent of the
exempt function that they purport to serve is important in determining relatedness. If the
organization conducts the activity on a scale larger than reasonably necessary for the
performance of exempt functions, the excess may be treated as unrelated to accomplishing an
exempt purpose or function.20 For example, in Revenue Ruling 57-313, an organization that
conducted and supported medical and scientific research also operated a medical illustration
department and an electroencephalography clinic for its own use, as well as for the use of
hospitals and other medical and educational organizations. The Service ruled that those activities
were unrelated trades or businesses, because they were conducted in a manner disproportionate
when compared with the size and extent of the organization’s other activities.
Similarly, in Iowa State University of Science & Technology v. United States,21 the court
evaluated whether the operation of a commercial television station by a state university was a
related trade or business. The court observed that “the method for determining and weighing the
purposes of the activity in question is a comparison of the nature and size of the commercial
television operations with the extent and scope of [the university’s] educational operations.”22
The court then focused on the degree to which the radio station was integrated into the
educational program of the university and concluded that the radio station was unrelated.
Who are the recipients of the services – other nonprofits and/or others? The IRS will not
recognize as exempt management and consulting services that are provided to non-exempt
entities.
****
We have now examined several areas in which the IRS and the courts permit a Charity to
generate income from providing exempt services or products under certain conditions. There
are, of course, as many examples as there are creative minds. As the nonprofit sector becomes
more and more entrepreneurial, we are likely to see more and more interesting cases and rulings
on this topic.
20
Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9636001 (Jan. 4, 1996) (scope of publishing activities of an otherwise
exempt school held to exceed the size and extent necessary to educate the organization’s students and thus does not
contribute importantly to the organization’s exempt purposes).
21
Iowa State Univ. of Science & Tech. v. United States, 500 F2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1974). See also Tech. Adv. Mem.
9636001 (Jan. 4, 1996) (manner of carrying on publishing activities held to be consistent with a profit motive and to
otherwise have characteristics of a trade or business within the meaning of Section 513).
22
Iowa State Univ. of Science & Tech. v. United States, 500 F2d 508, 517 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
29
III. UNRELATED BUSINESS TAXABLE INCOME
A. Introduction
If a Charity’s activities are not in furtherance of an exempt purpose, then we have two
related questions to address: First, do the activities generate taxable income (this Section III),
and second, do the activities jeopardize the exempt status of the entity (Section IV). Remember
Section 501(c)(3) tells us that an organization must be operated exclusively for exempt purposes,
but the Regulations clarify that “exclusively” really means “primarily” generating and that
exempt organizations are permitted to engage in some level of
Let us begin with a basic overview of how the unrelated business income tax (“UBIT”)
works.
Organizations that are tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
generally do not pay taxes on the income that they generate. There are two significant
exceptions: private foundations pay a 2%, or sometimes 1%, tax on their investment income,23
and any Section 501(c) organization with UBTI pays UBIT on that income at the regular
corporate tax rates.24
1. Three requirements
A Section 501(c) organization generates UBIT when it recognizes net income from:
If any one of these elements is absent, we need look no further – there is no UBIT.25
23
Code Sec. 4940.
24
Code Sec. 511.
25
This paper presents a quick review of some of the key cases and rulings defining each of the three elements of
the test. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see CEB Advising California Non-Profit Corporations,
Chapter 15 – “Taxation of Investment and Business Activities of Tax-Exempt Corporations,” J. Patrick Whaley.
26
Code Sec. 513(c); Reg. 1.513-1(b).
27
Code Sec. 1.513-1(b).
30
there have been cases that analyze the “trade or business” element of the test, and although it is
possible to have an income-generating activity that is not a “trade or business,” as a practical
matter, most potential UBIT matters that come to the attention of a practitioner are going to
satisfy the “trade or business” element of the test.
• An activity carried on one or two weeks a year is not likely to be regularly carried
on, especially if other taxable entities engage in the same activity on a more
regular basis. (Reg. 1.513-(c)(2)(i).)
• Annual or semi-annual fundraisers are typically not regularly carried on, even
though they occur every year.
• In NCAA v. Commissioner 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990), the Court held that
advertising in the NCAA program was not a regular activity, because the
tournament had a very limited two- to three-week duration, even though the
NCAA spent much of the year selling the advertising space. The IRS does not
follow this case, and it is probably not prudent to rely on this case, especially
outside of the 10th Circuit.
28
Reg. Sec. 1.513-1(c).
31
acquiesced in this decision (AOD 1249, March 22, 1984), but it is not clear that
the IRS would reach a similar conclusion today.
There are far too many cases and rulings addressing the “substantially related” test to
summarize in this short outline, but some interesting ones include:
• In United States vs. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986), the
Supreme Court examined the sale of advertisements in a medical journal. The
Court held that the manner of selection and presentation of the ads was not
substantially related to the organization’s exempt purpose. The organization had
argued that the purpose of the ads was to educate the readers, for example, about
the products of pharmaceutical companies.
• The examples set forth in the recently issued final regulations on travel tours
provide insight into when the IRS considers travel tours to be substantially related
to an organization’s exempt purpose.
• The museum gift shop rulings go to the heart of the substantially related test.
They also illustrate the “fragmentation rule”; namely, that the IRS can look at a
series of items sold in a gift shop (for example) and determine that some items,
such as posters or cards depicting paintings, are substantially related and do not
generate UBIT while other items, such as souvenirs of the city in which the
museum is located, are not substantially related and do generate UBIT.29
• In PLR 200021056, the Service ruled that the operation of a gift shop and tea
room by an organization established to aid deserving women to earn their own
living through their handiwork was not substantially related to the particular
organization’s exempt purpose.
29
See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 95550003 (1995) examining an array of related and unrelated items in a museum gift
shop; see also Rev. Rul. 73-105, 1973-1 C.B. 264, which holds that the sale of scientific books and city souvenirs by
a folk art museum is not related business.
32
• In PLR 200032050 the Service considered a question which exempt organizations
pose from time to time: Can an organization rent real estate (debt financed) to
other nonprofit organizations without being subject to UBIT? The ruling
indicates that one must examine whether the rental arrangement and the activities
of the lessee further the exempt purpose of the organization. An organization
whose mission is economic development – to improve the quality of life of
individuals and families in the inner city – can rent to organizations such as
childcare providers and social service agencies that help it carry out those
purposes. The logic of the ruling also suggests, however, that if this organization
were to rent to a qualified (c)(3) organization whose mission was, for example,
preserving the environment or religious study, the rental arrangement would not
be substantially related.30
There are, of course, many other rulings and cases in this area. Some areas, such as the
relatedness of associate member dues or insurance programs provided to members, have led to
the development of significant bodies of law, while many issues that arise are supported by
minimal precedential guidance.
Even if each of the three elements above is present, there are a variety of exceptions and
modifications that can transform a UBIT activity into a non-taxable transaction. These
exceptions and modifications include (but are not limited to):
• Rents derived primarily from real estate and a limited amount of personal
property leased with the real estate. (Code Sec. 512(b)(3).) This exception does
not apply if a lease involves more personal property than real estate, if the rental
income is based at all on the net income or profits of the tenant, or if the lease
involves the provision of significant services, other than those that are customary
in a landlord-tenant relationship.
30
See also Rev. Rul. 69-572, 1969-2 C.B. 119.
33
• Activities conducted entirely by volunteers. (Code Sec. 513(a)(1).) This is an
important exception because an activity that might otherwise clearly generate
UBIT can be “cleansed” if it is conducted as an all-volunteer operation.
• Income from certain trade shows and state fairs. (Code Sec. 513(d).)
An activity that satisfies each of the three UBIT tests, but appears not to be subject to
UBIT because it qualifies under one of the exceptions, may nonetheless be subject to UBIT if
one of the following exceptions to the exceptions applies:
• Interest, rent, and royalties received from a controlled corporation. (Code Sec.
512(b)(13).) While an exempt organization can normally receive interest, rents,
and royalties from another entity without UBIT, the current law provides that
these items, when received from an entity that the exempt organization “controls,”
are taxable. This section, which was amended during the last few years to
redefine control, has been the subject of controversy. Many practitioners feel that
the law puts exempt organizations on an uneven footing with taxable entities and
that only rents, royalties, and interest that exceed fair market value should be
subject to UBIT. This rule may ultimately be changed.31
• A portion of the income derived from property acquired with debt financing can
result in UBIT. These rules are set forth in Code Sec. 514. This issue most
typically arises in the case of real estate acquired with debt, which is subsequently
rented or sold for a purpose that is not substantially related to the organization’s
exempt purpose. It can also arise, however, in the case of securities acquired with
debt, for example, on margin or in other situations.
There are a series of other UBIT issues that arise and that are not addressed in this
outline. For example, special rules apply to income distributed from a partnership or S-
corporation.32
31
See “TRA ‘97 Brings Charities a Little Relief . . . and Maybe a Lot of Grief,” Robert A. Wexler and Lisa R.
Appleberry, Journal of Taxation (December 1997), pp. 360-364.
32
See Code Secs. 512(c) and 512(e).
34
5. Mailing lists and affinity credit cards
In the past four or five years, the IRS has challenged several mailing list and affinity
credit card arrangements, arguing, on a number of different theories, that the income from these
arrangements did not qualify as royalty income, which is an exception to UBIT under Section
512(b)(3). Typically, the IRS has argued that the organization that had rented its mailing lists or
licensed its name and logo to a credit card company had also provided significant advertising, list
compilation, and/or other services, so that the payments received were more in the form of
compensation income rather than royalties. For the most part, the IRS has consistently lost these
cases. The leading cases, which now provide the relevant authority, in this area are the
following:
a. Mailing lists
• In 1981, the Court of Claims found for the IRS in one of the early mailing
list cases. In this case, the Service argued that an organization’s income
from the rental or sale of mailing lists was not (passive) royalty income,
because the organization provided significant services in connection with
the mailing list. (650 F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl. 1981).)
• Section 513(h) of the Code was enacted specifically to permit the rental of
mailing lists to certain exempt organizations.
• In 1996, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court and
determined that the Club’s income from the rental of mailing lists was
royalty income. 986 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996), affirming 103 T.C. No. 17
(1994).) The Court found that the Club had not provided too much in the
way of services, and therefore, it received royalties and not compensation
for services. The case left open the possibility that a particular
organization could provide too much in the way of services, such as
advertising, and change the character of the income.33
33
See, e.g., Texas Farm Bureau, 53 F.3d 120 (5th Cir 1995), in a different setting, where too many services
generated compensation income.
35
Common Cause v. Commissioner.
• Another favorable mailing list case for the taxpayer. (112 T.C. 332
(1999).)
• Another favorable mailing list case for the taxpayer. (T.C. Memo 1999-
206 (1999).)
As a result of these cases, the IRS will no longer pursue its position on mailing list cases
under facts comparable to the cases described above.34
• The Sierra Club case, discussed above, also dealt with the affinity credit
card issue. While the Ninth Circuit found for the Club on the mailing list
issue, it remanded the affinity credit card portion of the case to the Tax
Court for a finding as to whether the Club had provided too much in the
way of services.
• The Tax Court on remand found for the Club, and the case was not
appealed by the Service. (T.C. Memo 1999-86.)
• The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated these cases and
found for the schools. (193 F.3d. 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).) In this case, the
alumni associations had performed minimal services – less than 50 hours
over two years. The Court immediately rejected the IRS’s all-or-nothing
approach – that any services tainted the entire arrangement. Judge
Kleinfeld stated that “[v]iewed purposively, the royalty exclusion cannot
be an all-or-nothing proposition.” The Court further noted that “[t]he
Commissioner has not suggested, and could not with a straight face, that
commercial mailing list and promotion services would have been paid
over a million dollars by the bank for around 50 hours of mostly
secretarial and clerical work that the two alumni associations did during
34
See 28 Exempt Organization Tax Review, pp. 18-19 (Apr. 2000), discussing a December 1999 memorandum
from the IRS indicating its new position on the matter.
36
the two years at issue pursuant to the contracts with the bank.” The Court
noted that if the bank were paying for services, given the amount of
payment and the level of services, it would be paying $22,000 an hour for
services. Therefore, the bank must have been paying for the use of the
name.
The IRS has now indicated that, having lost several key court battles, it is no longer likely
to challenge affinity credit card arrangements.35 The IRS should now focus its efforts on
evaluating precisely what types of services would cause a mailing list or affinity credit card
arrangement to be partially taxable, how a payment might be allocated between taxable services
and a passive license, and when too many services will cause an entire payment to be taxable
UBIT.
6. Corporate sponsorship
In 1991, the Service issued a technical advice memorandum (“TAM”), TAM 9147007,
which is commonly referred to as the “Cotton Bowl ruling.” The Service determined that Mobil
Oil Company’s payment of more than one million dollars to the exempt organization that
produced the Cotton Bowl constituted UBIT. The IRS reached a similar conclusion several
months later in TAM 9231001 with respect to another football bowl game. The IRS determined
that the sponsor’s “contribution” was a payment in return for goods and services provided by the
exempt organization as part of a trade or business, and therefore UBIT.
Practitioners and the exempt organization community objected strongly to the rulings.
The IRS issued proposed audit guidelines which seemed to fortify the Service’s position in the
TAMs.36 Perhaps concerned in part that public opinion would cause Congress to pass legislation
in opposition to the Service’s position, the IRS issued a set of favorable Proposed Regulations
under Section 513 in early 1993 to draw a distinction between advertising and mere donor
acknowledgments.37 These regulations permit the type of activity that was found to be taxable in
the earlier TAMs.
b. The Code. In 1997 Congress added Section 513(i) to the Code to define
nontaxable “qualified sponsorship payments.” This Code section largely incorporated the
thinking of the 1993 Proposed Regulations.
35
See comments in 28 Exempt Organization Tax Review, pp. 18-19 (April 2000).
36
Ann. 92-15, 1992-5 IRB 51.
37
EE-74-92, Jan. 22, 1993.
37
Under Section 513(i), an exempt organization’s solicitation and receipt of qualified
sponsorship payments” (QSPs) is not an unrelated trade or business. A QSP is any payment
made by a person engaged in a trade or business where there is no arrangement or expectation
that the person will receive any substantial return benefit for the payment. The recipient
organization’s use or acknowledgment of the payor’s name, logo, or product lines is not a
substantial return benefit.
In addition, any payment that is contingent on factors indicating the degree of public
exposure to an event or events, such as the level of attendance at an event, or broadcast ratings, is
not a QSP under Section 513(i)(2)(B)(i).
Section 513(i)(2)(B)(ii)(I) excludes from the definition of a QSP any payment that
entitles the payor to acknowledgment of the payor’s trade or business in “regularly scheduled
and printed material” published by the recipient, other than material that is related to and
distributed in connection with a specific event (such as a program). Therefore, the Service
continues to apply the rule of the American College of Physicians case and related rulings to
periodical income.
B. Internet Issues
For several years now, the IRS and tax practitioners have been struggling with how to
treat income-generating activities that involve the Internet. As an example, in an Announcement
in the fall of 2000 (Announcement 2000-84; 2000-42 IRB 385), the IRS sought advice on several
topics, including (a) whether or not the IRS should issue guidance, (b) four general questions that
affect more than one legal issue, (c) seven questions on lobbying and political activity, (d) three
UBIT specific questions, and (e) three question dealing with substantiation and donor disclosure.
The IRS workplan indicates its intent to issue more formal guidance on Internet issues in
the near future, but in the meantime, we continue to look for help in thinking about Internet
issues. Consider some of the questions posed by the IRS in its 2000 Announcement:
38
One of the fundamental requirements for UBIT is that the
activity is regularly carried on.38 The analysis of whether a
particular activity is regularly carried on depends, of
course, on all of the facts and circumstances, and some of
the guidelines are set forth on pages 32-33 of this paper.
The Service should take the position that the mere presence of a potentially unrelated
business activity on a website for an extended period of time does not amount to regularly
carrying on the activity. Rather, the Service should look to the effort expended by the exempt
organization in maintaining the site, as compared to comparable efforts put into live activities or
commercial websites. In practice, most income-generating activities that continue for a period of
time on a website will require regular updating and maintenance and will be regularly carried on.
There are probably not many real-life examples in which an exempt organization puts an
income-generating activity on a website and then doesn’t have to work to maintain it on a regular
basis.
For example, a charity might operate a virtual storefront, on which it sells items to the
public, much like a gift shop that a museum would operate. If the storefront remains on-line on
an ongoing basis, it will almost always be regularly carried on. The UBIT question in these
situations will likely turn instead on a different test – whether the items sold are substantially
related to the exempt organization’s exempt purpose. The IRS should apply the same analysis
that it currently applies in the context of museum and other gift shops, including application of
the fragmentation rule, to determine whether particular items sold in a virtual storefront generate
UBIT.39
As another example, charities traditionally hold annual auctions to raise funds. Some of
these charities are now conducting those auctions on-line and on a continual basis. An on-line
auction should be considered regularly carried on if, when comparing the frequency and
continuity of the activity, it is comparable to activities being carried on by commercial entities.
(Reg. 1.513-1(c)(1).) If a charity really holds an auction for a limited number of days, it might
not be regularly carried on. If a charity operates an ongoing auction, year-round or for some
extended period of time each year, it probably would be regularly carried on.
38
Reg. 1.513-1(c).
39
See TAM 9550003 and TAM 9720002 discussing the UBTI characterization of items sold at a museum gift shop;
see also a discussion of this matter in the 1997 and 1999 CPE texts.
39
Because the same rules that apply in the non-Internet context could apply to websites, the
IRS does not necessarily need to offer specific guidance in this area.
In order for income to be taxable, the income must be from an activity that is trade or
business, that is regularly carried on (discussed above), and that is not substantially related to the
organization’s exempt purpose.40 Even if all three tests are satisfied, exceptions and
modifications under Section 512 and 513, such as the royalty exception or the corporate
sponsorship safe harbor, can apply to except the income from UBIT.
The Announcement poses a single narrow question. The answer to the narrow question is
“yes.” If an exempt organization refers customers to another website and receives a payment
from the owner of the other website based on a percentage of sales from the referred customer,
the payment should be substantially related if the product purchased by the customer is
substantially related to the referring organization’s exempt purpose. If environmental charity X
sends its users to Amazon.com to buy a book on clear-cutting practices, and receives a
percentage of the sales price, the income should be substantially related to X’s exempt purposes,
even though the income to X is based on a percentage of gross sales.
Many exempt organization websites feature books related to their mission and inform the
user that the books may either be purchased in the organization’s bookstore (if it has one) or on-
line through an e-retailer such as Amazon.com. If an exempt organization could sell a book
directly, in its own bookstore, it should be able to sell the same book through an Amazon.com,
because if the book is substantially related, it is always substantially related.
3. Are there any circumstances under which an online “virtual trade show”
qualifies as an activity of a kind “traditionally conducted” at trade shows
under section 513(d)?
Section 513(d) of the Code exempts certain trade shows from UBIT. Some Section
501(c)(6) trade associations and other exempt organizations are attempting to replicate the trade
show in the virtual format. These organizations typically receive income from virtual exhibitors
as well as from other corporate sponsors of the event.
IRC 513(d) and Reg. 1.513-3(b) provide that certain traditional convention and trade
show activities carried on by a qualifying organization in connection with a qualified convention
or trade show will not be treated as UBIT.
A qualifying organization is one described in Section 501(c)(3), (4), (5), or (6), which
regularly conducts, as one of its substantial exempt purposes, a qualified convention or trade
show activity. A qualified convention or trade show activity is any activity of a kind
40
Reg. 1.513-1.
40
traditionally carried on by a qualifying organization in conjunction with an international,
national, state, regional, or local convention or annual meeting or show if:
(b) The show is designed to achieve its purpose through the character of
the exhibits and the extent of the industry products that are displayed.
If these requirements are satisfied, rental income from exhibitors at a trade show is not
UBIT. Qualified convention and trade shows are specifically excepted from the Section 513(i)
corporate sponsorship safe harbor because this separate set of rules applies. Presumably, an
“unqualified” trade show could still have elements, such as pure sponsorships, that satisfy the
corporate sponsorship safe harbor.
Any virtual trade show that satisfies the above criterion should qualify for the UBIT
exemption under Section 513. The current law, however, simply does not contemplate a virtual
trade show, and the rules are very much drafted with a view towards the traditional live trade
show that is conducted annually or periodically. The Code even refers to an “activity of a kind
traditionally carried on . . . .”
Ideally, Congress would amend Section 513(d) to conform with the current reality of on-
line trade shows. Tradition is changing, and income received during these types of shows should
be exempt. Working within the current legal framework, however, it would be helpful for the
IRS to acknowledge that a virtual trade show that meets the two tests described above would
qualify as a trade show exempt from UBIT.
Some of the other interesting issues that come up from time to time are the following:
Links and moving banners. The most significant ongoing question seems to be when
does a link that is included within an on-line acknowledgment that otherwise appears to be
corporate sponsorship, take the acknowledgment out of the corporate sponsorship safe harbor
because it constitute a substantial return benefit or more than an acknowledgment. Links may be
located in the logo of the corporate sponsor, in a banner atop the webpage, or in the text itself.
41
See “D.C. Bar Internet Discussion Featured IRS’s Bob Harper,” 5 EO Tax J. 36 (December 1999/
January 2000) (“EO Tax J.”).
42
Ltr. Rul. 9723046.
41
which is related to the exempt organization’s purposes or activities may not be advertising, and
one IRS official has indicated that unless a link generates income, it would probably not be
deemed to constitute advertising.43 Finally, yet another IRS official has since stated a refined
perspective, indicating that the agency may differentiate between a link which takes the user
directly to the main page of the sponsor and a link that takes the user to the sponsor’s e-
commerce page which services transactions.44
The Regulations provide two helpful examples. The first example describes a symphony
orchestra that acknowledges a sponsor on its website.45 The sponsor’s Internet address appears
on the symphony’s website in the form of a hyperlink to the sponsor’s website. The symphony’s
website does not promote the sponsor or advertise its merchandise. The regulation states that the
sponsor’s entire payment is a QSP. This means that the hyperlink must not constitute a
substantial return benefit. The example does not specify whether there is advertising content at
the sponsor’s linked site which, if attributed to the symphony, would constitute a substantial
return benefit. Presumably most sponsor sites would include such content, and the mere fact of a
link from the EO’s website will not result in attribution of the content at the linked site to the EO
for purposes of the QSP analysis.
The second example involves a health-based charity that receives funding from a
pharmaceutical company to produce educational materials.46 The sponsor’s Internet address
again appears on the charity’s website in the form of a hyperlink to the sponsor’s website. This
time, however, a statement appears on the sponsor’s website that the charity endorses the use of
the sponsor’s drug for a particular condition. The charity reviewed the endorsement and gave
permission for it to appear. The regulation states that the endorsement is advertising and
constitutes a substantial return benefit.
Many practitioners, including the author, believe that a link embedded in what otherwise
constitutes a valid acknowledgment of a corporate sponsor should not alter the character of the
sponsorship. A printed sponsorship acknowledgment may legitimately contain a phone number
of the sponsor, which requires the reader to dial the telephone and contact the sponsor. A link,
although easier to access, is conceptually just like a phone number. The user must take the
affirmative step of contacting the sponsor.
The IRS has indicated, at least informally, that it may not ultimately agree with this
conclusion, because it is easier for a user to click on a link than to pick up the phone and dial.
The IRS will likely focus instead, therefore, on the nature of the link. If the link, for example,
takes the user to the corporation’s home page, then the link will not change the nature of the
43
Exec. Assistant Jay Roots, 4 EO Tax J. 26 (July/August 1999).
44
EO Tax J, supra n. 6, at 31. Mr. Harper also cleared up a long-standing question regarding an earlier IRS
statement that “moving” banners would likely be considered advertising, noting that “Most moving banners are hot
links.”
45
See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(f), Example 11.
46
See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(f), Example 12.
42
sponsorship. If the link takes the user directly to a page on the sponsor’s website that affords the
user the ability to purchase a product, the IRS feels the link is more akin to advertising.47
In addition, the IRS had at one time informally indicated that moving banners might, per
se, be advertising. The IRS informal position now seems to be that we look to the content of the
banner to see if it satisfies the corporate sponsorship safe harbor. If it does, the fact that it moves
is irrelevant. Links in moving banners would be considered in the same way as links in other
sponsorship statements, as discussed above.
The preferred approach would be for the IRS to treat links just like the listing of a phone
number in a corporate sponsorship. The presence or absence of a link should not affect the
determination of whether the content of the statements on the exempt organization’s website
constitute advertising, rather than sponsorship.
Virtual storefronts. As indicated by the 2000 CPE Text, the approach of the IRS to
traditional sales activity of nonprofits, such as museum gift shops, will also apply to the sale of
merchandise from a website address which presents itself as an Internet store, or “virtual
storefront.” Generally, the IRS will look to the primary purpose of such sales, reviewing the
nature, scope, and motivation for the sales activities in question. Under the fragmentation rule of
Section 513(c), each item of merchandise would be evaluated separately as to whether its sale
merely generates revenue or furthers the organization’s exempt purposes.48
On-line auction activities. Typically, charities that conduct annual fundraising auctions
do not pay UBIT on the amounts that donors pay for items. This is in part because the auctions
are not “regularly carried on,” one of the requirements for UBIT, and also because in many
cases, the goods that are being auctioned are all donated, one of the exceptions to UBIT.
Charities which conduct their own online auctions may avoid the imposition of UBIT if
they are able to follow the usual charity auction fact patterns wherein the auction activities are
not regularly carried on or the merchandise is donated, or both, as is commonly the case.
However, in the Internet context, auctions are more likely to involve purchased goods, in
addition to donated goods, and on-line auctions are more likely to be carried on regularly, or
even continuously, rather than just once a year at the annual fundraiser. If charities want to
avoid UBIT from on-line auctions, they need to take special care to structure the auctions
correctly.
*****
This Section III has considered situations in which income from an activity might be
taxable or not taxable as unrelated business income. Section IV addresses the next logical
question.
47
See “Update on Internet Tax Issue for Exempt Organizations,” Robert Harper and Cherly Chasin. October 20,
2000, as part of a conference titled “Advising Nonprofit Organizations in Colorado,” sponsored by the Colorado and
Denver Bar Associations.
48
2000 CPE Text, supra n. 12, at 138.
43
IV. WHEN DOES TOO MUCH NON-EXEMPT ACTIVITY JEOPARDIZE TAX-
EXEMPT STATUS?
We know that organizations must have a core activity that is exempt in nature. (See
Section II.) If an organization operates a legitimate exempt activity, then it may also operate
even a substantial unrelated trade or business without losing its exempt status as long as its
primary purpose and activity is exempt. (Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(e).)
If an organization operates a core exempt activity, how do we know how much unrelated
activity it may engage in? Organizations are sometimes concerned that if they generate too
much money from an unrelated business activity, they will lose their exemption under Section
501(c)(3). Organizations sometimes report that they heard from their CPA that if their unrelated
business income exceeds a certain percentage, such as 25% or 33%, they will automatically lose
their exemption. The good news is that there is no automatic percentage rule.
Revenue Ruling 64-182, 1964-1 (part 2) C.B. 186, sets forth the “commensurate in
scope” test, which is still followed today. This ruling stands for the principle that an
organization may receive a significant amount of unrelated business income (whether taxable or
nontaxable under an exception) as long as it carries out charitable programs that are
commensurate in scope with its financial resources. In that ruling, the organization presumably
received 100% of its income from the rental of real estate, but it engaged in grant-making
activities that were commensurate in scope with its financial resources.
Other rulings expand on this concept to suggest that we do not look entirely at the
percentage of income from an unrelated activity, but rather the full scope of operations of the
Charity. How much time is the Charity spending on its exempt activities in relation to the time it
is spending on generating income from investments and non-exempt activities. 49
A leading Treatise on the Taxation of Exempt Organizations articulates the test very well:
49
See PLR 200021056 (this ruling reached the correct result through some unusual reasoning); see also
TAM 9711003 (charity retained exemption where 95 percent of its income was UBIT); see also PLR 8038004.
50
Taxation of Exempt Organizations, Hill and Mancino, Warren, Gorham & Lamont of RIA, pages 21-17 through
21-18, updated regularly.
44
As a practical matter, if it is a close call as to whether an unrelated activity is
beginning to overshadow the exempt purposes and activities of the organization, we
would recommend dropping the business activity into another organization, usually a for-
profit corporation. The next Section explores some of the options and the consequences
of those options.
45
V. OPTIONS FOR STRUCTURING A CHARITY’S NEW UNRELATED BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES
When a Charity has both exempt and non-exempt activities, it needs to consider the
advantages and disadvantages of keeping the activity within the Charity or dropping the activity
into another legal entity. The other legal entity might be a for-profit subsidiary of the Charity
(i.e., a corporation controlled by the Charity), a stand-alone corporation that is not technically
controlled by the Charity but has some affiliation with the Charity, or a limited liability
company. In this outline, we refer for simplicity to the unrelated business activity in question as
the “new activity.” Another very different model, using a limited liability company or
partnership, is discussed in Section VI.
Advantages:
• If Charity has a net loss form one unrelated business activity, and the new
activity in question will generate profits, Charity can use losses from one
to offset some profit; reverse is also true, if Charity has UBTI and new
activities will generate losses.
• New activities can freely use Charity’s name and goodwill, as well as
tangible assets and human resources, without the cumbersome complexity
of entering into licensing, rental, or resource-sharing agreements.
• If and when new activities terminate, any appreciated assets used in those
activities belong to Charity without a taxable transfer.
Disadvantages:
46
Option B: Forming a wholly owned or majority-owned for-profit subsidiary of
the Existing Charity.
Advantages:
Disadvantages:
47
Share Ownership and Control Issues:
• Charity must address who (other than Charity) will be allowed to own
shares in the new corporation and what Charity’s equity share will be, and
find other investors.
• If Charity owns less than 100% of the stock, allows use of stock incentives
for key employees.
• If Charity owns no more than 50% of the new corporation, then interest,
annuities, royalties, or rent paid by the new corporation to Charity are
shielded from UBIT; correspondingly, if Charity owns more than 50% of
the new corporation, then interest, annuities, royalties, and rents received
by Charity from the new corporation are subject to UBIT.
Advantages:
• Charity does not have to provide any capitalization to the new corporation;
no prudent investment standard applies because no investment.
48
Disadvantages:
*****
It is worth noting that in any case in which a Charity forms a for-profit subsidiary or a
stand-alone corporation, the goal is to make sure the subsidiary will hold up in court as a valid
separate legal entity and that the activities of the subsidiary will not be attributable to the
Charity. In order to accomplish this goal, the structure should follow some basic rules:
(2) The subsidiary needs to hold board meetings, at least annually, and
keep minutes of those meetings. The subsidiary should keep a
clean and clear set of corporate records to show that it is a
legitimate legal entity. The subsidiary needs its own bank
accounts, tax identification number, and records. It needs to be
current on its tax and other filings.
(3) The Charity, as shareholder, can elect the Board, and legally the
Board of the subsidiary could even be identical to the Board of the
Charity, but lawyers typically recommend keeping a majority of
the Board of the subsidiary different from the Board of the Charity.
There are at least three reasons for this suggestion. First, the
subsidiary is operating a business. There may be individuals with
business experience who can really help the subsidiary’s business
who are not already on the nonprofit board. Second, it allows the
disinterested Board members of the subsidiary to properly approve
transactions involving the Charity, and finally, it demonstrates to
the outside world, in case of challenge, that these are separate
functioning entities not to be collapsed into one for liability
purposes.
(4) The Charity and the subsidiary can share facilities and employees,
but there should be a proper resource-sharing agreement whereby
each entity pays its own share of expenses. Ideally, of course, the
subsidiary would have its own premises and its own employees.
49
VI. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND PARTNERSHIP
Limited liability companies (“LLC”) and both general partnerships and limited
partnerships are treated the same way for tax purposes. Unlike a corporation, that pays tax at the
corporate level, a partnership or LLC passes its income and expenses through to its partners or
members, and they pay tax on the income at the partner or member level.51 The shareholders of
a corporation are normally not liable for the activities of the corporation in which they own
shares. This, historically, has been a chief advantage of incorporating. The general partners of a
partnership are typically fully liable for the activities of the partnership. The limited partners of
a limited partnership are not liable, but they have only minimal voting rights. The LLC is, in a
sense, a hybrid vehicle that provides no liability to its members, who can be fully involved in
control and voting issues, but at the same time, allows for partnership, or pass-through, style tax
treatment.
In this Section, we explore, only briefly, when an LLC or partnership might or might not
be an appropriate vehicle for a business activity of a Charity.
First, it is worth noting that sometimes a Charity will consider forming a partnership or
an LLC to operate an exempt activity that could have been operated directly by the Charity. As
an example, Charities will typically form partnerships or limited liability companies to operate
low-income housing projects where the for-profit investors can take advantage of certain low-
income housing tax credits. Although the for-profit investors pay taxes on their share of any
income, the Charity does not, because the operation of the low-income housing project, if
structured correctly, is part of the exempt activity of the Charity.
There has been quite a volume of case law recently over when an activity with a limited
liability company that has both exempt and non-exempt members, particularly in the hospital
context, is considered an exempt activity for the Charity member. These issues are still being
litigated. For many years, the IRS took the position that a 501(c)(3) organization could not
participate as a general partner in a partnership having private investors as limited partners, even
if the underlying activity was charitable or educational in nature. The IRS believed that such
participation was per se incompatible with maintaining the organization’s tax-exempt status.
The IRS’s position has been evolving ever since the Tax Court decision in Plumstead Theatre
Society Inc., 74 TC 1324 (1980), aff’d per curiam, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982). In that case, a
nonprofit theater company was permitted to serve as the general partner of a limited partnership
that had private investors as limited partners without losing its Section 501(c)(3) status, because
the partnership’s primary activity (which was to finance the Theatre Society’s co-production of a
play) was considered to be substantially related to and in furtherance of the exempt participant’s
charitable, educational purposes.
51
Actually, partnerships and LLC’s can elect to be taxed either as partnerships or as corporations, but most elect
partnership tax treatment.
50
preserve the exempt participant’s tax-exempt status, first it must be determined that the
partnership is serving or furthering a charitable or other exempt purpose, and second, it must be
determined that the partnership arrangement permits the exempt participant to act exclusively in
furtherance of its own exempt, charitable purposes and not just for the benefit of private, for-
profit partners.52
In 1998, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 98-15 in response to a growing trend in the
hospital industry towards “whole hospital” joint ventures, which involve the contribution of an
entire hospital system to a new partnership or LLC, with a for-profit partner or co-member. In
Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, the IRS analyzed two situations. In Situation 1, the IRS
found that the organization continued to qualify for exemption. In situation 2, it did not. Many
of the factors in both Situation 1 and Situation 2 were similar. The key distinguishing factor was
control. In Situation 1, the nonprofit appointed more than half of the LLC governing body. In
Situation 2, the for-profit and the nonprofit each appointed half the governing body.
The IRS has also litigated at least two significant cases involving whole hospital joint
ventures. In Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm., 113 TC 47 (1999), aff’d per curiam, 242
F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001), focusing largely on the second prong of the “careful scrutiny” test
under which the exempt participant must be permitted to act exclusively in furtherance of its
exempt purposes, the IRS was able to persuade the Tax Court that the overall facts and
circumstances did not favor the nonprofit’s charitable mission.
Even more recently, in the case of St. David’s hospital systems, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas found, among other things, that the IRS’s “control” test
was not dispositive of the issue and that the 501(c)(3) in that case should maintain its tax-exempt
status. (89 AFTR2d 2002-2998 (Dist. Crt. Tex, 2002).) This case was very recently overturned
on appeal, however, on November 7, 2003, by the 5th Circuit, and so the future of this whole
issue is very much unclear.
The hot cases discussed above focus on the situation in which a Charity is dropping its
entire activity into an LLC that involves for-profit investors. If, on the other hand, a Charity is
not trying to claim that the LLC or partnership is furthering the exempt purposes of the Charity,
but rather is an ancillary money-making investment for the Charity, can a Charity use an LLC or
partnership to carry out this work, while still maintaining its core exemption? The answer should
be “yes,” but this area of law is still a bit unsettled, and we would normally recommend using a
corporate subsidiary, rather than an LLC. Consider some of the specific advantages and
disadvantages to using an LLC:
Advantages:
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GCM 39005, 6/28/83; GCM 39444, 11/13/85; GCM 39546, 8/15/86.
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• An LLC or partnership can liquidate with an entity level tax.
Disadvantages:
• Unlike with a corporate subsidiary, the IRS may attribute the activities of
the LLC or partnership to the Charity. Thus, it may not be a useful tool
for moving a substantial business activity out of the charity.
• All net income from the LLC or partnership will be passed through to the
Charity on a K-1 tax form, and Charity will pay UBIT on the income.
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VII. FORMING SUBSIDIARIES – THE MECHANICS
• An exempt organization can form a nonprofit subsidiary if the primary purpose and
activity of the subsidiary is a tax-exempt one. Formation of the nonprofit subsidiary
involves:
Tax-exemption applications
• An exempt organization can form a for-profit subsidiary. It can own 100% of the stock,
or it can sell shares to others. The sale of shares can be helpful for raising capital, but
involves securities law issues and other issues beyond the scope of this presentation.
Formation of a wholly owned for-profit subsidiary involves:
Adoption of Bylaw
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• Another form of for-profit “subsidiary” is the wholly owned, limited liability company
(LLC). An LLC is formed by drafting an LLC agreement and filing an appropriate
certificate with the Secretary of State’s office. When structuring an LLC, one must
consider at least the following issues:
What is the term of the LLC, which unlike a corporation has a specific
term?
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VIII. FLOW OF FUNDS
We have discussed throughout this paper the tax consequences of the funds flowing
between a Charity and entities in which it has an interest. The information below looks at three
major events: (1) capitalizing the new entity; (2) money coming back to the Charity during the
day-to-day operations of the entity, and (3) the liquidation of the entity.
In order to keep this information reasonably brief, we make the following assumptions:
• In the LLC model, we have the Charity and at least one other LLC
member, which could also be another Charity. We assume that the LLC is
electing partnership tax treatment, and therefore, this model applies also to
partnerships.
• In the Subsidiary or “Sub” model, the Charity owns at least 51% of the
stock.
• The Charity does not use debt to finance its investment in the entity.
• The activity of the entity is a trade or business, that is regularly carried on,
and that is not substantially related to the Charity’s exempt purposes.
The entity will need some combination of capital contributions and loans from the
Charity and other investors, if any. Normally, a Charity can make a capital contribution or loan
to a Sub, an IC, or an LLC with no immediate tax consequences. The Charity must make sure,
however, that it receives fair value in return for its contribution or loan. Therefore, if there are
other investors, the Charity must receive stock or LLC interest with a fair market value equal to
the amount it contributes. Since it is very difficult to value stock in a new entity, we would look
mostly to the relative value of what the Charity receives for its contribution versus what other
investors receive for theirs. With respect to a loan, we would look for a market interest rate and
other market terms.
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B. Income from ordinary operations
C. Liquidation of entity
At some point the entity will likely terminate and liquidate or sell its assets.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. Is the activity consistent with the Charity’s existing exempt purpose? Review the Articles
of Incorporation, donor restrictions, and the mission statements. If possible and
necessary, change the Articles to permit the contemplated activity.
2. Is the activity consistent with recognized IRS exempt purposes? See Section II, above.
3. If not, does the activity generate UBIT? See Section III above.
4. If the activity is not consistent with exempt purposes, then regardless of whether it
generates UBIT, is the scope of the activity significant enough to jeopardize exempt
status? See Section IV above.
5. If the activity is significant, could the activity reasonably be dropped into another
organization? See Section V above.
6. What is the correct form of new organization? See Sections V and VI above.
7. Mechanically, how do we set up the new organization? See Section VII above.
8. How will the flow of funds be taxed? See Section VIII above.
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