MSO-001 Sociological Theories and Concepts (WWW - upscPDF.c

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ESO-001-Ch1 Social Theory and its Context.pdf
ESO-001-Ch2 Concept and Theory.pdf
ESO-001-Ch3 Theory and Paradigm.pdf
ESO-001-Ch4 Social Construction of Reality.pdf
ESO-001-Ch5 Concept and Theories of Structure.pdf
ESO-001-Ch6 Structure and Function.pdf
ESO-001-Ch7 Structure Function and Neo-Functionalism.pdf
ES510D~1.PDF
ESO-001-Ch9 Class and Legitimacy.pdf
ESO-001-Ch10 Power- Functional Perspective.pdf
ESO-001-Ch11 Power and Institutions.pdf
ESO-001-Ch12 Power-Knowledge.pdf
ESCA05~1.PDF
ESO-001-Ch14 Rationality Work and Organisation.pdf
ESO-001-Ch15 Entrepreneurship and Capitalism.pdf
ESO-001-Ch16 Freedom and Liberty.pdf
ESO-001-Ch17 Alienation.pdf
ESO-001-Ch18 Sovereignty.pdf
ES1283~1.PDF
ESO-001-Ch20 Citizenship.pdf
ESO-001-Ch21 Civil Society and Democracy.pdf
ESO-001-Ch22 Conceptualising Ethnicity.pdf
ESO-001-Ch23 Construction of Identities.pdf
ESO-001-Ch24 Boundaries and Boundary Maintenance.pdf
ESO-001-Ch25 Concepts of Difference and Inequality.pdf
ESO-001-Ch26 Class.pdf
ESO-001-Ch27 Gender and Social Stratification.pdf
ESO-001-Ch28 Theories of Origin of Caste System.pdf
ESO-001-Ch29 Theories of Modernisation and Modernity.pdf
ESO-001-Ch30 Tradition and Modernity.pdf
ESO-001-Ch31 Post Structuralism and Post Modernism.pdf
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Unit 1
Social Theory and its Context
Contents
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Prominence of Socialism
1.3 Individual vs Collectivity
1.4 Comte and The Enlightenment
1.5 Durkheim and The Enlightenment
1.6 The Marxian Ideology
1.7 Weberian Ideology
1.8 The British Sociologists
1.9 Spencer’s Evolutionism
1.10 Conclusion
1.11 Further Reading
Learning objectives
After you have studied this unit you should be able to
describe the context of social theory
discuss the role of Comte, Marx Weber, and Durkheim
describe some early British social theorists
assess the role of context in the rise of social theory.
1.1 Introduction
Sociological theories are embedded in a particular social context, and are
deeply influenced by them. Each sociological thinker or theorist has to respond
to the social situation in which he or she exists and to try and make sense
of the enveloping culture. That is to say that sociological theory is the
sociologist’s response to the context in which he lives and works. This
truism will become increasingly apparent as you study the unit. However, it
needs to be pointed out that there is an inner context and an outer context.
The interplay between these two interrelated arenas of living creates
sociological theory. The inner context is the background and mind-set of the
theorist and also the strong influences and ideas that motivate a thinker to
become a social theorist. The outer context is the overall environment,
social and physical that the society is embedded in. However this is not to
say that similar contexts cannot or do not produce competing theories.
Social Theory and its Development thus take place in a particular social and
psychological setting. We now give a description of the overall social context
in which sociological theory developed. As is well known sociology developed
first in the west and it was in the 20th century that it percolated to India.
The French Revolution in 1789 created such an urgent context that it became
an important element to create a need for sociological theorising. Thus the
French Revolution gave rise to many changes in that society. These changes
were beneficial in the main but these were also problematic. One of these
problems was the law and order maintenance in France. Some thinkers even
advocated that law and order in France after the revolution was worse than
what existed in the Medieval Ages. Not surprisingly the major theorists like
Comte and Durkheim were deeply concerned with law and order. 9

Approaching Sociological Apart from the revolution in France we find another source of stimulation
Theory
to the thinkers. This was the industrial revolution of the 19th and early 20th
centuries. The industrial revolution was a series of developments that changed
the mainly agrarian based economies to those depending on the factory or
industrial system. Factory jobs were readily available in the town and there
was a shift away from the countryside into industrial jobs. Not only this we
find that everything had begun being influenced by rapid technological
changes. These, themselves required large bureaucracies to control and give
direction to the emerging capitalism, with a premise of free trade or laissez
- faire. The problem with this situation was that social inequality began to
become extremely disparate and while the factory owners (or capitalists)
earned large profits the workers got painfully low wages. The fact of low
wages led to the creation of trade unions and also to movements trying to
overthrow the capitalist system itself. Thus the industrial revolution, the
related capitalist structure, and the reaction against them, were enormous
and these affected social thinkers greatly and we find that Marx, Weber and
Durkheim were preoccupied with the problematics they unleashed.
1.2 Prominence of Socialism

Another series of factors which created a great deal of reaction was the
coming into prominence of socialism. This was a direct critique of capitalism
and was supported by some thinkers while a majority of them were suspicious
indeed hostile to it. The main figure who supported socialism among the
sociologists was Karl Marx who was not only an effective writer but also a
political activist. In his political activism he was different from the armchair
social theorists who were against socialism. That is they wanted to improve
and streamline the capitalist systems defects, like the creation of alienation
among factory workers (masterfully depicted in Charlie Chaplin’s Modern
Times). They did not feel that socialism was in any way an answer or solution
to the ills of capitalism. It has been pointed out that Marx’s socialism was
often seen as a counterpoint from which to develop different theories.
Now, due to the industrial revolution there were great movements of people
from the rural to urban locales. These phenomena of migrations partly due
to the opening up of jobs in urban areas yet this meant adjusting to the
new lifestyle urban areas also saw negative factors entering into the picture,
such as pollution, overcrowding, inadequate transport systems, disparities
in income and so on. As a matter of fact this impacted on the religious
system also with a plethora of cults coming up and some of these even
predicted the ‘end of the world’ in the last years of the 20th century, but
this did not happen. It was not surprising that early sociologists wanted to
emulate the physical and biological sciences in order to get them recognition,
prestige and create popularity for sociology.
Box 1.1: Context of Social Theory

We have seen something of the outer context of social theory and we would
do well to see how and in which ways the thinkers who were affected by
these massive changes began to start theorising within the ambit of the
social environment. We now turn to the role of ideas and the relationship
these have in the development of social theory. We begin with the impact
of ideas during the Enlightment in France first. During the Enlightment many
new ideas were introduced and replaced existing ideas. Philosophy of the
17th century and science were the major moving factors which influenced the
thinkers/intellectuals of France. Some names associated with this included
10

Social Theory and
thinkers like Descartes and Locke. Later thinkers did not reject the grand its Context
systems of these thinkers but sought out ground reality instead so that ideas
could have social relevance. This was very important if sociology itself was
to have relevance and a presence in the analysis of society and social
concerns, and bring about changes leading to social benefits spreading out
to all segments of society. However, the liberalism of the Enlightenment had
its own critics or what is called the ‘Counter- Enlightenment’ and it was the
interplay between the Enlightment and the Counter–Enlightment which made
possible all the ideas and theorising of early sociology.
Thus for example the counter Enlightenment ideologues, like De Bonald

wanted a return to medieval times where they felt life and living was far
more harmonious than the Enlightenment. Such writers were against any
progressive ideology and felt that both the Enlightenment and the Industrial
Revolution were forces that destroyed peace, harmonies, law and order
(Ritwer 1996, pp:1-36). In other words De Bonald was against anything that
disturbed patriarchy and the monarchy in France.
1.3 Individual vs Collectivity

Thus while the thinkers of the Enlightenment emphasised the person/
individual the reaction of those who opposed these thinkers wanted to
emphasise the collectivity. Thus these thinkers wanted to point out that
there was more to existence than the individual, and this was society itself.
Society was viewed as one long flow from past to present and onward to the
future. Further, we find that roles and relationships along with organisations
were the important aspects. Again “wholeness” was vital aspect emphasising
that the parts of a society were interrelated. Further, the conservative
reaction abhorred social change which it felt was disruptive and could lead
to societal disorder. Thus the view of institutions was wholly uncritical.
Therefore, while change was leading forward to a new world the conservative
reaction supported hierarchical structures, and felt it to be essential for the
system of status and remuneration. These were some of the essential features
that existed and had to be faced by the ‘liberals’(those with the
Enlightenment, that is laving a positive view of both the French Revolution,
and the Industrial Revolution). Let us now turn briefly to some of the
sociologists of the Enlightenment.
1.4 Comte and The Enlightenment

Comte’s (1798-1857) pioneering work in Sociology (a term he coined) comprised
partly an analysis and reaction to the Enlightenment and the French
Revolution. Thus Comte’s “positive philosophy” was aimed at what he felt
to be a counter to that he considered to be the ill effects of the
Enlightenment. His own approach was influenced by various
counterrevolutionary thinkers such as De Bonald. Comte was, however,
different from these counterrevolutionaries and he ruled out a regression to
the medieval times because science had advanced too much to make that
possible. On the other hand the developed an excellent theoretical system,
much better than anyone else at that time.
Thus Comte’s sociology of “social physics” or what he called sociology was

developed as a counter to the social anarchy unleashed in France after the
Revolution. He wanted to build sociology after the rigorous approach of 11

Approaching Sociological science especially physics. Comte’s was an evolutionary theory which
Theory
comprised a law which has three ascending steps or ‘stages’ which have a
claim to universality that is they apply to all societies.
Thus in this theory we have first the

1) Theological stage (circa 1300) in which supernatural powers, and religious
icons are the most important factors impacting on society, and even the
world is believed to be a product of God
2) The metaphysical stage (circa 1300-1800) was one in which “nature” was
held to explain everything about man and society.
3) The positivistic stage (1800-) came next and was fundamentally influenced
by science, and the laws that it discovered. Thus there was no God or
nature in this stage so far as explanations are concerned. Comte’s position
is that it is intellectual confusion that leads to social anarchy. According
to him to positivistic stage dominates only when even the traces of the
theological and metaphysical stages have been finally reduced if not
completely eliminated from society. Only then would order prevail and
the evolutionary scheme be proved correct.
Since Comte’s position was evolutionary it is clear that he did not believe
in violent type of revolutions (Lenzer, 1975).
Reflection and Action 1.1

Discuss and describe Comte’s evolutionary scheme for the progression of
society.
We can mention some other aspects of his work and this includes his
observations on social structure and social change. Comte stressed the inter-
relatedness of all the components of a society. He also believed that consensus
in society was a major requirement. Further he did not believe in the
exploitative view of the production processes i.e. capitalists and workers.
Comte further recommended that there was a need for theorising and also
of research. Finally Comte as a sociologist believed that sociology would
ultimately emerge as a dominant force due to its excellence in understanding
social processes.
1.5 Durkheim and The Enlightenment

We now turn to Durkheim (1858-1917) as the sociologist who took on the
mantle from Comte who was his predecessor. Durkheim believed unlike Comte
that the Enlightenment was not all negative but in fact did have some
position aspects such as emphasis on scientific method. Durkheim was against
anarchy and social chaos, and large positions of his work deal with studies
of social order which he felt was the need of the hour.
Durkheim was a prolific writer and wrote many classical works in sociology.
Thus in The Rules of Sociological Method (1895) he stressed that sociology
is the study of “social facts.” These social facts are such that they are
external to and coercive of individuals in society. This emphasis of study had
a great influence on other sociologists. He demonstrated the usefullness of
this approach in his study of Suicide (1897) in which he showed how social
forces have an impact on individuals and their actions within society. His
emphasis however, was not on the individual but the social causes behind
12 it. He was keen to study differences in the suicide rate in different social

categories and groups (e.g. groups, regions, countries). According to Durkheim Social Theory and
its Context
it was the variations within the social facts which explained different rates
of suicide in different groups. Durkheim enunciated two types of social facts
(a) material and (b) non material. Material facts (bureaucracy, law) differ from
non material facts (social institutions and culture) and it was the latter that
Durkheim focused upon in most of his work.
Box 1.2: The Division of Labour

In The Division of Labour in Society (1893) Durkheim tried to pin down the
various factors which acted as the binding glue of society. He felt that early
or nascent societies had a moral basis for being integrated, and this was
what he called the collective conscience. However, the more advanced society
had a relatively weak collective conscience and was held together through a
complex division of labour which interconnected members of society. This
was, however, not without its problems and was at best a measure that had
an interim effect. Nevertheless Durkheim’s solution to the problems inherent
in the division of labour was to suggest social reforms which could redress
imbalances and keep the system going on functioning.
In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 1912/1965 Durkheim studied

a primitive society so that he could find religion in a primitive form. In doing
this the research would also shed light on religion in the modern world. For
Durkheim society itself is the basis for religion itself. This insight implied
that Durkheim was for the status quo so far as society is concerned for
“society as God” is sacred and cannot be over thrown only ameliorated.
Durkheim’s work ensured that sociology had made a place for itself in France
by the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Durkheim
in 1898 set up a scholarly journal called “L’annee Sociologique” which was
very successful in promoting the Durkheimian brand of sociology to the
other schools and academics. Thus the context of the French Revolution and
the rise of industrialisation met with an academic response in the shape of
Durkheim’s analysis of society. After Durkheim there was a plethora of his
students and disciples who carried on the work. Thus with Durkheim and his
disciples sociology rose in stature and had begun to be widely accepted in
France, as a distinctive discipline.
1.6 The Marxian Ideology

Let us now turn to sociology in Germany in the same span of time. In
Germany there was since the beginning a distinction between Marx and
Weber and other sociologists. Thus Karl Marx (1818-1883) was himself deeply
influenced by Hegel (1770-1831) but was to later contradict him. While some
disciples remained with Hegel’s ideas others began to criticize his system.
Hegel’s philosophy emphasised the ‘dialectic’ and ‘idealism’ of which the

latter was a second concept. Thus dialectic itself provides a view of the
world as well as an ‘image’ of the world. Thus the dialectic stresses the great
importance of processes including those of conflict. Similarly, the image or
idea of the world is also dynamic while Marx accepted the use-value of the
dialectical processes he wanted to apply it in the study of economics rather
than to leave it as a concept applied to ideas alone. Further Hegel’s “idealism”
stressed the mind and ideas, and not the material world. That is the say it
is the mind that is significant, and that the mind and psyche alone that
exist. This is admittedly an extreme position and Feurbach tried to ameliorate 13

Approaching Sociological it by saying that Hegel had overemphasised “consciousness” and the sprit of
Theory
a culture. In order to critique Hegel Feurbach pointed out that it was
society that projected God and put him in a hallowed position above
themselves, getting separated/distanced from God himself but nevertheless
imbuing God with various uplifting attributes.
Marx though aware of Hegel’s and Feurbach’s positions was critical of these
theories. For Marx everything could be reduced to a material base not to the
mind and its processes. For Marx capitalism was the problem which led to
alienation, polarisation and revolution. And for Marx revolution by the
proletariat was the answer to this “evil”. Marx’s approach led him to the
work of Ricardo and Smith who use political economists and it was these
studies which finalised Marx’s approach which pointed out that the profit
of the capitalist was at the expense or exploitation of the wage earners/
labourers. Thus the ‘surplus value’ was the very basis of exploitation and the
root of the capitalist system. In fact the fast growth rate of the capitalist
systems siphoned off profits large enough to reinvest into the economic
system (Marx, 1862).
Box 1.3: Marxian Ideology

There is a sociological theory within Marx’s economic works, but Marx’s
radical ideas also fit into politics and it is perhaps this reason that his ideas
were questioned even as he had questioned Hegel and Feurbach. That Marx’s
work was ideological created much opposition to it especially by the scholars
with conservative learning. It was Marx’s polemical style that created
problems not simply the presence of ideology perse.
Marx’s sociology created many critics in its wake and many works focused on
the type of activist orientation that was part of his approach. There were
other reasons that led to an eclipse of Marx’s dialectical materialism but his
ideological aspect was a major area of difficulty for other sociologists and
thinkers. This radical approach was not appreciated by the conservative
sociologists who had been bred to hate traces of anarchy in the social fabric
— not just the disruptions of the Enlightenment or the industrial revolution.
Instead Marx was fueling through his studies a mood of hostility and aggression
which Marx felt would lead to a “polarisation” of classes and the poor
exploited proletariat would violently dispossess the capitalist class of their
factories, industries, banks and so on. Thereafter a period of social harmony
would begin in which there was a societal/community ownership of the
means of production. There would be an end to exploitation of the ‘have-
nots’by the ‘haves’.
This thumbnail sketch indicates the kind of radical approach that Marx had
was basically oriented to a violent overthrow of the exploiting capitalists by
the exploited proletariat. Marx’s emphasis therefore was on the exploitative/
oppressive nature of capitalism. His theoretical analysis was aimed at removing
this aspect of capitalism. This according to Marx meant a violent, bloody anarchic
kind of overthrow of capitalism. Such a revolution would by itself remove
the alienation and other negative aspects of the capitalist social formation.

We can turn now to another major German sociologist that of Max Weber
14 (1864-19 20). It has often been observed that Max Weber developed his ideas

and theories keeping Marxian thought as a counterpoint or point of reference/ Social Theory and
its Context
departure to begin his theorising. According to Weber Marx had developed
a uni-causal theory in which every social aspect was driven or propelled
forward by the economy and the economic factors. This criticism can be
expressed by pointing out that Marx’s theory of “economic determinism” did
not go down very well with Weber, who in contrast pointed out that were
several factors or causes which are at work simultaneously in a society and
make it operate. In short Weber’s idea was that any aspect of social process
had several causes that made it operate and no single complex of factors
(e.g. the economy) could be given primacy so far as social processes are
concerned.
For the materialists who believed in economic determinism it was the material
factor that determined ideology. However, we find that in the case of Max
Weber the sequence is held to be the other way round — that is it is the
ideas that determine what is done with the economy. Weber was especially
concerned with the effect of religions ideas on economic development.
Thus in his study on Protestantism he showed how ideas themselves are
capable of generating economic development. Weber also studied other
religious than Protestantism, including Hinduism of which he felt that its
lower rate of economic development was due to a constricting segmentation
of society into a large member of castes or jatis. This meant that once again
the landlord or person with land holdings began to exploit the lower castes
with unfair sharing of the produce if it was sharecropping and many related
demands if it was possible to exploit them further. This however does not
bear great depth because sociologists in the fifties conducted studies and
came to the conclusion that Hinduism does not create economic impediments
and caste adapts to a new economic challenge, in a positive manner. Weber
was interested in how the process of rationalisation led to economic
development and to the creation and existence of large bureaucracies and
other social institutions (Weber, 1904). Weber was concerned with how a
social actor makes decisions regarding his goals. He pointed out however,
that these decisions were themselves influenced by the rules and regulations
that exist in the society.
Box 1.4: Formal Rationality

Weber was concerned with what is known as formal rationality, was thus
enveloped by the development of bureaucratisation. Thus Weber pointed out
there are three types of authority in political structures. These are the 1)
traditional, 2) charismatic, and 3) rational legal systems of authority. While
the traditional systems and charismatic authority have been witnessed
historically it is the rational legal system which was involved with the
development of bureaucracy in the modern sense. Traditional authority derives
from a sanctity of belief patterns, like that in monarchy where succession
is in a line of kings. Thus the prince who becomes king by succession is an
example of traditional authority. On the other hand charismatic authority is
based on something “extraordinary” which the incumbent has which creates
leadership. The belief among the adherents of the Charismatic leaders powers
is enough for the phenomenon to exist. Thus these two types of authority
are historically embedded we find that rational-legal authority is the basic
modern modality of leadership. Most political systems derive leaders from
a rational legal procedure e.g. the President; Prime Minister etc. of modern
states generally adopt a rational legal procedure.
15

Approaching Sociological Ultimately Weber’s theories proved more acceptable than those of Marx,
Theory
especially the political and economic applications. They were liberal in some
ways and conservative in other ways and unlike Marx he did not espouse
total radicalism and violent revolutions in order to find a solution to the
“problems” of capitalism. Weber in fact was quite against such “solutions”.
Thus the western sociologist found Weber reassuring after the polemical
writing of Marx. Weber’s writing was formal and academic and this made it
easier to understand and holistic in the outlook. It is little wonder than that
Weber was the most prominent German sociologist of his time. At the same
time in Britain the Sociologists were also busy responding to their social
context in which they were embedded. British sociologists tended to study
the individual and his role in societal existence and development. Thus here
sociology was built around the factors of political economy, social reform,
and that of the social-evolution theory.
As regards political economy, it was a theory of capitalism which had been

discussed by Adam Smith who spoke of an “invisible hand” that controlled
the market forces. The market was over and above the individual and regulated
his behavior. Thus the market forces were viewed as a source of social order
and cohesion in society. Following this perspective the sociologist was not
involved in criticizing market forces on society at large. Rather his job was
to study societies, primitive and contemporary and draw out reports for use
by the government to fulfill societal goals.
1.8 The British Sociologists

At this point of time British sociologists collected field based data and then
combined these findings into a collective picture. The emphasis was on
statistical presentation with little or no theorizing. However, the need for
theorising was clearly felt by many sociologists. The statistically oriented
sociologists were also extremely close to the government and therefore
failed to see any flaw in the overall political and economic system.

Which were the most important early British Sociologists. Give their theories
in brief.
Now there was another basic characteristic in British sociology and this was
the concern for reforming individuals and then keeping them to fulfill the
larger goals of society. Although these sociologists saw the flaws in the social
system of the time they were nevertheless still interested in solving problems
by laying the blame on individual behavior and attitudes. In following this
approach these sociologists showed a high degree of respect to the society
in which they were members. This was clearly a conservative stand, yet it
was felt to be necessary to ward off the ogre of Marxian Socialism.
There were some paradoxes in the situation that the British sociologists
found themselves in. Thus even problems such as poverty were not held to
have systematic basis. Instead it was the individuals themselves, alone or in
groups who were blamed for their poverty. This is a somewhat circular
argument and put the individual at the centre of any kind of social ills or
problems. Individual problems of many types were analysed, including factors
such as ‘ignorance’, ‘crime’ or ‘alcoholism’. These were all aspects of the
individual especially alcoholism which was regarded yet again as an individual
16 condition or pathology and not in any way connected to the whole of

society. As can be seen here was once again an extreme position. However, Social Theory and
its Context
it was a matter of time that social structure became more prominent especially
in the theories of social evolution. This was forwarded by Herbert Spencer
(1820-1903). Spencer was a relative liberal and believed that the state should
not interfere with the market. That is Spencer believed in laissez faire. This
indicated that he was not an advocate of social reform but wanted social
dynamics to be without external interventions.
1.9 Spencer’s Evolutionism

Spencer was a ‘Social Darwinist’ and was of the opinion that society would
progress by itself and that this evolution should not be interfered with.
Spencer went to the extent of comparing social institutions with plants and
animals. Thus he felt that social institutions would progressively adapt to
their environment by themselves without any definite impetus. Spencer
took Darwin’s premise of “survival of the fittest” where those people who
could adapt to the social and natural environment would live while those
who could not so adapt met with their end (Buttel, 1990).
Spencer also saw society as an organism, in which different parts or ‘organs’

were interconnected and each had a role or function to perform in the
overall working of the organism. Thus unlike Comte whose evolutionism was
in terms of ideas, Spencer had the real material world which he wanted to
explain analyse and interpret.
The evolutionary focus of Spencer is at least twofold. In the first instance

Spencer speaks of the “size” factor in social evolution. Thus as the size of
the society increases so do the various infrastructural and institutional need
and requirements. Differentiation and specialisation begin to manifest in
every sphere and the fact is that both the size and complexity of a town
is very different from a metropolitan. According to Spencer the size of a
society increases by various groups amalgamating and bonding to form larger
societies. Thus Spencer viewed increase in size from that of a simple
community to that which is complex or “compound”.
Another evolutionary schema that Spencer offered was that of militant to

industrial societies. Militant societies are early forms of organisation meant
mainly for defense of a society or aggression towards another society. Such
violent attitudes were in themselves responsible for increase in the size of
a society which was so important for social evolution. Yet when industrial
societies are established and warfare becomes dysfunctional and obstructs
evolution. Industrial societies are noteworthy for their human interaction
and high specialisation. The state is simply a monitoring agency and its basic
role is to keep law and order. This is because industrial society represents
in Spencer a quantum leap from militant societies and such societies move
towards their own perfection. Provided a society is strongly bonded and
harmonious it will survive. But if there is weak bonding and internal social
fissures it would, according to Spencer, die out.
1.10 Conclusion
The early ideas of sociologists were very important indications of how the
context creates an impact of the mind of the sociologist. The sociologists
we have discussed were all affected by their social and psychological
environment. However, as we have seen that each one of them tended to
17

Approaching Sociological interpret the social world in their own individualistic ways. However it
Theory
would be clear to you by now that the context of theory is essentially
society and culture at a particular time and place. It can then be said that
social theory is in itself a reflection of the social environment and the time
in which it was developed also put its stamp on the theory. Therefore, each
era, each ‘Age’ responds with newer and more different theoretical
interpretations which are the most apt for that time. There is then an
‘inner’ and an ‘outer’ context from which social theory derives. As noted in
our introduction to this unit the ‘inner context has to do with the individual
himself and his personal way of analysing developments in the ‘outer’ or
encapsulating society. This is not to say that is any seriality from the ‘outer’
to the ‘inner’ context. Rather they exist in an interrelationship between
the individual mind and the societal developments and societal consciousness.
Only when this interrelationship is clearly explained and analyzed by a thinker
does social process ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ create a theory of society as a whole.
It might then be said that the early social theorists and theories which they
developed was a clear headed response to the social upheavals and
developments, e.g. the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution and so
on. Finally there is a feed-forward and a feedback effect in each situation
which can partly help explain the rising of early social analysis and their
implications.

Seidman, Steven 1983, Liberalism and The Origins of Eureopean Social Theory.
Berkeley : University of California Press.
Bryant, Christopher GA, 1985. Positivism in Social Theory and Research. New
York: St Martins
Lovell, David W. 1992, “Socialism, Utopianism and The ‘Utopian Socialists’”,
History of European Ideas.14: 185-201.
References
George Ritzer 1996, Sociological Theory. New York: Mc Graw Hill.
Lenzer, Gertrud (ed) 1975, Anguste Comte and Positivism : The Essential
Writings. Mass Smith.
Karl Marx 1862, Theories of Surplus Value, Part 1. Moscow :Progress Publishers.
Marx Weber 1904, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism. New
York : Saribners.
Buttel, Frederick H.(ed), “Symposium Evolution and Social Change”.
Sociological Forum 5:153-112.
18

Unit 2
Concept and Theory
Contents
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Words and Language
2.3 The Nature of Concepts
2.4 Concepts in Sociology: Some Illustrations
2.5 Concepts to Theorems: Natural Sciences
2.6 Towards Social Science: Durkheim, Weber and Beyond
2.7 Conclusion
2.8 Further Reading
Learning objectives
After having read this lesson you should be able to,
Link concept and theory
Learn about concept and sociological theorems
2.1 Introduction
Common day experiences provide the starting point for understanding
words by a group of speakers in the same sense; as knowledge grows
more technical, the words are defined for their properties and examples
of how a scientific vocabulary develops are given.
Technical meaning of words is commonly understood and we call them concepts.
Concepts are then used to signify a relationship with one an other like
various measurements of medical tests that ultimately lead to a conclusion
— normal or pathological state.
Such concepts are used in physics, chemistry and biology as well and they
help in the measurement of things/forces, formation of equation and
conduct of experiments.
Social sciences have limited scope for experiments, but indirect
experiments through comparative method are used.
Differences in societies and groups are significant for explaining their
effects on human actions.
At times universality of explanations works, at others uniqueness and
historical setting becomes significant.
There is greater use of history on social sciences than of natural science
for the conduct of fresh studies.
Concepts in interaction lead to the formulation of theory, that needs
constant revisions.
Examples have been given from Durkheim and Weber; Parsons and Merton.
Students are advised to enrich examples from own experience and related
lesson units.
2.2 Words and Language

As human beings we use language to describe analyse and evaluate our 19

Approaching Sociological actions and convey our ideas, feelings and concerns. We interact through
Theory
words and a group of words we call sentences, there are other persons who
do the same. We understand the words they use. Gradually, we begin to use
a word that means or signifies same objects to all in a community. Language
is a social product. Words are given a meaning and that meaning is commonly
accepted by others. Thus, social interaction gets facilitated. A story is fold
about nine different lineages living in separate valleys of the Naga in the
north eastern India. They sat down to take a thing (in local dialect). Others
did not understand which thing was wanted. Then each of them opened a
small packet. It contained salt; but salt was described in nine different
words. So we can understand the value of one word meaning or signifying
the one chosen object. Two more examples will help. The word chair indicates
a piece of furniture used for being seated. At a time in the Parliament,
members used to sit on benches. Those who were in the government and
controlled the finances were said to occupy ‘Treasury Benches’, those on
the other side were seated on ‘opposition benches’ and the person who
was addressed as ‘The Chair’. Here objects are associated with positions
and the meaning understood by persons occupying those seats. In the court
‘The Bench’ signifies the judges. The lawyers are separated by a bar from
the dias. Lawyers are thus said to belong to the ‘bar’. Here again objects
: the bar and the bench, get associated with their respective position of
persons who are differentiated from each other, in cricket the white coat
used to indicate the umpire. Different dress codes are laid down for different
ranks in the army and the police.
When one word is used many times to convey the same meaning, it becomes
possible for other persons to share it and thereby to communicate with
each other. Even signs can be used to convey ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In Andhra
Pradesh, if one move the head or the neck from left to right, it means ‘yes’;
in northern India that means ‘no’, whereas for ‘yes’ the movement has to
be up and down. Showing ‘thumb up’ in the west means ‘ready to go’; in
the traditional Indian setting, it stands for discarding the other. In Hindi
‘thenga dikha diya’ means ‘I damn care for you’. These few examples show
there is a need for a shared meaning of words/signs to be able to communicate
with each other. Human beings are distinguished from animals for possessing
the capacity to have language for interaction.
Box 2.1: Consensual Meaning

This is most effectively done when words have the same meaning that is
understood by all at least in a defined group. It has to be understood that
the choice of a word for describing is a human activity. Things are described
through an agreed meaning of words. Some writers refer this as an inter-
subjectivity agreement among persons. They deny any objectivity to things.
In this sense reality is a social construct. This view has been put forward
by philosophers from Vienna and carried forward through their influence.
Karl Popper and Wallerstein’s names are among of the foremost among than,
as scholars from that significant academic centre got spread over to English
speaking countries making their mark in Philosophy Economics, and Sociology,
and might of them brought up in the classical trends of music continue to
illustrate the argument from the same. Be it recalled that German as a
language linked the scholarly traditions of Austria and Germany.
20

2.3 The Nature of Concepts Concept and Theory
When scientists use a word, it gets a technical meaning. It becomes a

concept. In referring to a human being, biologists use the phrase
‘homosapiens’ or ‘wise man’ to describe the modern man. If a person falls
ill, in common language people say he / she has got fever. As discoveries get
advanced, words like ‘malaria’ ‘influenza’ indicate the nature of the fever.
They also describe which parts or insects have affected the body. Then we
understand the nature and causes of the disease. The next step is finding
the care for the same through the use of tablets or injections. So when
fever or disease is described in terms of its components and their behaviour
or misbehaviour is known, we begin to know how things or bodies associated
and recognised get inter related. Each measurement helps the physician to
analyse the nature of the disease. Thus, temperature, blood pressure, ‘sugar’
or blood sugar content is urine can be measured. Each of these words and
their measurements have a definite meaning, thus tests can be carried out
by persons other than physicians; the words that describe each measurement
become concepts and are commonly understood is the same sense by
technicians. A common understanding helps locate the normal and pathological
distribution of the bodies or anti-bodies and their particular combinations
tell how they lead the physician to determine the disease and where to look
for a cure.
Chemistry as a science came into its own when the atom was discovered as
the smallest particle of matter that could take part in a chemical reaction.
Atomic Weight of Hydrogen was taken to be 1 and of Oxygen 2; thereby
weights for 92 elements were calculated. These were arranged in a table
called the Atomic table. Further, researchers on unstable elements carried
their number to 110. The elements could mix up in a reaction soon it was
found that there was no loss of weight in a chemical reaction. This was a
theoretical statement. Atomic weight was a concept. The inter relations
among concepts that could be proved to hold is a number of trials or
experiments became a theoretical proposition. Further, inter relation among
such theoretical conclusions became a part of theory. The chief characteristic
of theory is that it constitutes a series of conclusions stated in terms of
concepts and their inter relations. Thus theoretical proposition gets linked
to others and one/all taken together constitute the theory in a subject.
The process of theory formation then requires the following steps:

i) Identification of the smallest unit and its characteristics.
ii) The interactions among these units that lead to the formation of
compounds and complexes in determinate ways.
iii) Statements that use concepts and their interrelations to indicate the
nature of interactions and their results.
iv) Frequent experimentation to arrive at the stated results; and if results
show a difference. Then, explain the difference and arrive at a revised
statement.
Box 2.2: Conceptual Abstraction

A little further explanation of a concept is in order. We do not see a concept.
We arrive at a concept. It is an abstract. When we see a person and come
to know his/ her name, it is described as a proper noun. Som Nath or Abul
Kalam are proper names but when they refer to the speaker of the Lok
21

Approaching Sociological
Theory Sabha or the President of India, we are referring to their characteristics.
Thus speaker, or president are abstractions. Pushpa may be the name of
teacher and Shashi the name of a student. Here again, teacher and student
are abstractions. We arrive at abstractions by converting proper nouns into
common nouns. Sachin and Kaif are cricketers, and Gulam Ali a musician
and so on. Can you try to convert the following places into their
characteristics. Delhi, Mumbai, Bhopal; choose from among the following :
a port city, a national capital a state capital. Match the characteristics. The
second list is of abstractions.
2.4 Concepts in Sociology: Some Illustrations

Now let us look at some concepts that sociologists use frequently.
We use one word to signify one object or a meaning. We use different words
to signify other objects. Thus we try to have same meaning for describing
similar things; different words to make differences clear. Human beings can
be put into different categories eg. Male, female. Brother and Sister belong
to the same generation. Father and son to different generations; So do
mother and .....(You try).. and add your own example.... mother-in-law and
(1) .......... in law (2) .........in law. Thus we begin to describe a relationship
among two persons. These relations are found among many such units of
two persons. Relations among two persons are called dyadic (di means two);
the unit of two persons is called a dyad. Radcliffe Brown, a British social
anthropologist suggested that the first social relationship is dyadic in nature.
When we talk of a relationship, we ask a question: Is the relationship limited

to one event or is it repeated time and again? Then we raise a second
question: Is the relationship limited to two persons only, or many people in
similar situations are involved in it. ‘A student-teacher’ relationship is found
among two persons, but then there are many teachers and many students.
There is a common acceptance that students will get related to teachers in
some defined way. Here let us introduce a few concepts : A student in
getting related to the teacher performs a Role. It gets defined when repeated
time and again it acquires a pattern. This pattern is expected to be
performed, An individual performing the role has been defined as a person
by Nadel. Let us go ahead. The role of a student is performed by many
students. Hence Nadel says one role is performed by many individuals: or a
person is many individuals. Now our individual enters into more than one
interrelationship every day. In the family he may be a brother or a sister of
some one else. Next he may a son related to father, a son related to mother,
and in a three generation family, a grandson related to the grandparents
....... and so on. This situation is described (or conceptualised) by saying
that one individual is many persons.
2.5 Concepts to Theorems: Natural Sciences

It is useful to recall the difference between arithmetic and algebra. In the
first case, we try to solve every question that is posed to us. Add two sums,
three sum and so......on, or exercises 1, 2, 3 is subtraction; or to go further
to multiplication and division. Each exercises is solved individually. In algebra,
we have a formula or a method of solving a problem. If (a + b) is multiplied
by (a + b), we start with a in the first set and get the following results:
22 a × a + a x b = a2 + ab. Then we start with b of the first set and multiply

with each letter, we get b × a + b b or ba + b2. Now we add both the Concept and Theory
results. We get a2 + 2ab + b2. So we have a formula (a+b)2 = a2 + 2ab + b2 and

likewise we can go to (a + b)3 to get further results. But let us remain with
the first sum. (a + b)2 = a2 + 2ab + b2. This formula will be valid for all the
values of a & b; it can be that a = 2 and b = 3; and our results will be 22
+ 2.2.3 + 32 = 4 + 12 + 9 = 25. We can go on increasing the value of a or b
and get the desired results. Here we need not calculate each exercise, but
use this formula to answer various values of a or b, be they 4 and 5; or 7
and 9......and so on. The algebraic exercise applies to many cases. This is
something like discovering a principle or a common method for doing each
calculation individually. The discovery of a method common to several cases
of a type is a step forward in evolving a formula, something like a theorem.
Let us now move to a set of theorems. Remember our school days learning
geometry. We learn about a point, a line, an angle, a triangle — then say a
triangle has three angles and their sum is 180º. If one angle is of 90º, the
other two have to share the remaining 90º in any combination – say 60º and
30º or 45º and 45º. In the latter case two sides will be equal in length. If all
the three angles are of 60º each, each side of the triangle with also be equal
in length. Here a relationship is posited between the degree of the angle
and the length or size of a side. We can go on further to read about triangles
and quadrilaterals..... and reach the connected 28 theorems. The inter
connection of theorems then leads to theory in general, or an all bracing
theory.

Read section 2.5 and give your explanation, interpretation and commentary.
In the example last given words like a point, a line or a straight line, and
angle are concepts, Their interconnection a theorem. The interrelation among
them a theory.
In natural sciences, say in Physics and Chemistry, we come across words

(Concepts). Their interrelations and then inter connections among concepts
(expressed in quantities) that lead to theory or better ‘laws’. We take an
example of an apple. It fell down from the tree, a normal occurrence. But
Newton asked the question why did the apple fall to the ground. He
propounded the theory of gravity. not apple alone, but all objects fall towards
the ground. If the earth is round then why do people on the other side of
the earth do not fall away. This doubt was expressed by our villagers — why
do the Americans on the other side of the globe do not fall away. Newton
had an answer. All things fall towards the centre of the earth. This explained
all falls. Thus the theory of gravity came into being; The explanation come
with Newton — though apples or other objects had been falling that way
ever since the creation of the earth. Here we can sum up the process of
theory formation.
Theory is an explanation of recurring even to and is a valid explanation
universally in space and time.
The condition under which the theoretical statement would hold true
need to be spelt out.
The theory can be modified if subsequent experiments create new
situation that have to be considered afresh. The theory is a revisable
23

Approaching Sociological proposition. Examples are the theory of the atom being indivisible part
Theory
of matter had to be revised after the splitting of the atom. The case of
discovery of elements beyond 92 has earlier been stated. The theory of
gravity was given a new look when a non-matter or a force like light was
found to be subject to gravity by Einstein.
Science is impersonal in the sense that the laws and theories do not
depend for their truth value on the status of a person, be he a king, a
prime minister, priest or even the scholar himself/ herself.
When an inquiry is conducted or a problem solved on the basis of existing
knowledge about concepts and theory and illustrated as a case of a more
general application, it is called a deductive approach. We move from
theory to facts.
When we move from facts and arrive at an explanation that process is
called induction.
The inter-play between inductive and deductive processes constitutes
the method of science, or sciencing. Here conclusions are only provisional,
and are under consent testing and revision. As a process body of science
consists of revisable propositions.
Some authors are of the opinion that science grows double, say every 10
years, and after 50 years quite a few conclusions or theoretical statements
need modification.
2.6 Towards Social Science: Durkheim, Weber and

Beyond
There has been a lot of discussion whether social sciences can follow the
method of natural sciences. These need separate discussion. Comte
‘Durkheim, and Radcliffe-Brown answered ‘yes’. Dilthey, a historian took the
other view. Weber tried to follow the middle path. On different occasions
systems of explanation have been tried and these have been called ‘grand
theories’ which could be applied to several inquiries / cases. At least that
is the claim. Marxism and Parsonian systems belong to that category. Then
there are descriptions at an empirical level — facts gathered and put into
tables, without any explanation. These are not theories per se but theories
can be made through proper analysis. Durkheim’s study of suicide rates and
explanation of their variations is the best example of theory formation from
the existing data. It will be helpful to understand his method:
Firstly, Durkheim clarified the term, and located three (or four) types of
suicides and their nature.
For each type, the existing data available in official records were classified
in terms of their distribution in various social categories. This classification
needed intelligence and brilliance of the author.
Each type of suicide rate varied according to the data on social facts,
and comparisons were made.
Explanations were given for each type.
A theory of suicides was formulated in terms of the variations of the
degree of integrated (solidarity) in society.
Let us recall how Max Weber formulated his theories:

The key words: ‘The protestant ethic’ and ‘capitalism’ were defined
after going through the literature. Their ideal types were defined.
24

Cases where both were present, and not present were identified. Concept and Theory
Comparisons in the historical settings were attempt and existing data on

the type of education prevalent in each religious group were compared.
A conclusion on the coincidence of the rise of capitalism in protestant
dominated regions was confirmed.
Why this inter relationship holds is examined.
How is the explanation of this case related to the general history of
civilizations is attempted.
Path breaking studies such as these continue to receive attention among

scholars from related subjects as well as the main discipline over a period of
time. It happens that certain parts of a theory receive greater attention is
subsequent studies. Durkhiemian studies on suicide received attention at
the hands of psychologists and social psychologists in particular and they
began re-examining the loss of sense of security as a possible explanation,
besides others. One of the types of suicide was classified as ramomic. A
group of writers considered this concept as central to the analysis of modern
societies. In turn they began to de-link the concept from that of solidarity,
introduced more psychological variables in it; while Merton retained the
social component as control. Thus succeeding social scientist find an
alternative relevance of the concept and try to look problem of a different
age through it (with some modifications).
a) Max Weber
The second example refers to Max Weber. His treatment of the protestant
ethic gave rise to the counter-point at the hands of writers treating the
Catholic, Hindu, Shinto and Confucian faiths suggesting a sort of ‘negation
of negation’. Marxaist scholars prin pointed on ‘structural’ factors as being
more decisive than the ‘cultural’ as propoureded by Weber. Yet most of the
Asian dialogue on entrepreneurship kept alive the debate with Weber within
the cultural frame. Mario Rutten in the article on the ‘Study of
Entrepreneurship in India’ ….. neatly summarizes the position and calls for
greater interaction among the two major approaches (2003 : 1319-41). There
have been ample discussion on Weber v. Marx, and a sort of convergence
signifying Marx and Weber as complements of each other. Yet other variations
of Weber are found in the conceptualisation of ethno-methodology and
phenomenology wherein actor’s point of is being given primacy over ‘others’.
Within Marxism one comes across increasing emphasis on empirical studies
of the sub-altern as well as other political forms of dominance. The classical
writers who developed ways of looking at social facts, currents, and actions,
in their own times, are being increasingly discovered for their relevance to
addressing the problems of the new societies, or our contemporary periods.
This dynamism constitutes the process of science linking concepts and theories
of the classical writers and modern situations.
b) Parsons and Merton

Among the twentieth century writers Talcott Parsons is the most significant
for conceptualising human actions and connecting economy, polity, institutions
and pattern maintenance. This exercise required contribution from economics
anthropology, psychology and sociology, and their integration into a general
theory of action. As Parsons grew mature, he examined economy, polity,
family and professions, specially medicine, as sub –systems and in cooperation
with valued colleagues looked into specifics of the American society. In 25

Approaching Sociological discussing writers of significance spread over a life time, with some
Theory
contributions appearing posthumously, a question is raised about the
continuity of the academic effort involved. Critics at times find that ‘the
young’ author was different from the ‘mature’ ‘one; the ‘younger’ being
more general and the ‘mature’ being more specific. This is what one gets by
looking at Marx with 1848 serving as the dividing line, more or less. The
Philosophical manuscript and the communist Manifests belong to that period,
the Capital to the next. A similar exercise on Parsons suggests that the
publication of Towards a General Theory of Action’, (1936) and to an extent
Social System mark the first phase.
c) Theories of Society
Thereafter specifics gained currency, and the treatment got manifestly
grounded in the empirical situation of the American Society. We have hinted
at the influence Parsons had on Indian scholarship in a different unit. Some
critics commented upon Parsons as if he was guilty of using too many concepts
to state his position and synthesize the effects. Their use earned him more
critics than supporters. Yet from among the galaxy of his students and co-
workers. We get more and more specific studies of various aspects of society.
Merton was among the most serious of the students who attempted a fresh
combination of empirical studies and grand theory taking some aspects
selectively at a time. Harry M. Johnson passed on the gains of the entire
approach in a test book entitled Sociology, which get translated in Hindi by
Yogesh Atal who had spent a semester with Merton. Other writers studies
the family, religion, economy and polity. Merton is important for having
coined the phase ‘theories of the middle range’ — middle between grand
theory and pure description. He thought at that level, theory had a heuristic
purpose i.e. acting as a guide for further research (including field studies).
Accordingly, he systematised classical explanation for use as tools of research
of modern societies and to an extent modified old concepts giving them a
new relevance and vibrancy. He did this for ‘function’ by pin pointing three
categories, function, dysfunction and non-function and to look for a’ balance
of consequences’ of the three. He devised a protocol of for observation’
that would permit gathering of information with a potential for being
understood in the functional perspective. At the conceptual level, he had
a fresh look at the analysis a comparison between the sociology of knowledge,
and at the level of nature cosmopolitan and local press. He clarified social
aspects of anomie, the conflict between the accepted goals of a society and
the use of rather open means for achieving the same; and then the
specification of the Theory of the ‘Role-Set’’ and the ‘Reference Group’ as
examples of middle range theory developed at different stages of the inquiry.
Merton’s other contribution lay in attempting some questions set by financing
agencies; and using the opportunity for developing concepts that would
acquire explanatory power in the broad frameworks of Social Theory and
Social Structure. In the preface to a volume an social problems, he
distinguished between social problems and sociological problems, a point
well taken by M.S. Gore in most of his presentations and deliberation in the
Indian setting.
Conceptualising for studying special features of the Indian society has been
attempted by M.N. Srinivas through ‘SANSKRITIZATION’ and ‘Dominant Caste’.
Adrian C. Mayer found it useful to study municipal elections in Dewas town
of Madhya Pradesh through the operation of quasi-groups (half formed groups)
26

for a specific situations in the nature of ‘actions sets’. There is an increasing Concept and Theory
trend in sociology in India for showing the limits within which some of the
concepts made popular in the west can help us grasp the nature of social
processes operating in India. ‘Little community’ and ‘Peasant society’ are
some of the examples and others can be added.
2.7 Conclusion
Words and concepts are products of mind, and when their meaning is shared,
communication of ideas takes place in daily life as well as in academic circles.
The development of science made the meanings more and more specific, as
also grammar and logic. Natural sciences connect concepts with experiments,
and conclusions affect the inter connection among various concepts, and
their combinations. Science keeps on growing and doubling itself faster than
social sciences or humanities. History of ideas is more significant for the
latter, as old formations and theories are discovered to provide insight into
current problems. Yet, refinements keep on happening. This has been
illustrated chiefly with respect to the methods and approaches used by
Durkheim and Weber; and the nature of the middle range theories initiated
by Merton over the grand theories of Parsons. In the body of the Unit, the
manner in which words like structure and function have developed has been
briefly touched upon. Students are advised to study the related material
supplied in specific unit. Merton also developed ‘protocols’ for observation,
and paradigms for studying questions in a theoretical or structural perspective.
The next lesson deals with the Paradigms and Theories.
2.8 Further Reading

Lefebvre, Henri 1968 The Sociology of Mar. New York: Vintage.
Lachman, L.M. 1971 The Legacy of Max Weber. Barkeley, California: Glendessary
Press.
References
Durkheim, Emile Suicide, translated by J.A. Spaulding and G. Simpson, glencoe
Ill. The Free Press 1951, (Original ‘in French : 1897)
Merton, R.K. 1968, Social Theory and Social Structure, New Delhi, Amerlnd
Publishing Co.
Parsons, Talcott, 1965, Theories of Society Foundations of Modern Sociology
Theory, Complete in 1 Vol., New York, The Free Press.
Veena Das ed. 2003, The Oxford Indian Companion to Sociology and Social
and Social Anthropology, (sp. att. ‘The Study of Entrepreneurship in India,
by Mario Rutten.
Weber, Max 1930, Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Translated
by Talcott Parsons, London, Allen and Unwin (original in German: 1920-21).
27

Unit 3
Theory and Paradigm
Contents
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Sociological Theories
3.3 Classical Sociological Theories
3.4 Law of three Stages
3.5 Marxian Ideology
3.7 Parson’s Action Theory
3.8 Recent Advances in Sociological Theories
3.9 The Concept of Paradigm
3.10 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After having studied this unit you should be able
discuss the meaning of theory
compare the contributions of Marx Durkheim and Weber to social theory
describe classical and contemporary theories.
3.1 Introduction
In simple words theory refers to the explanation of general principles of an
art or science which is constructed with practice. It is true that on the basis
of practice we derive certain rules and at times we are able to separate
these rules from whatever we have seen in practice. Thus we begin to
differentiate between theory and practice. Theory is generally helpful in
explaining practice, theory refers to the much higher level of abstraction
whereas practice to the empirical situation. If we look at the relationship
between theory and practice then broadly speaking there emerge two
possibilities like: (i) theory and practice might be seen as quite distinct from
each other and (ii) theory and practice might be conceived as complementary
to each other. According to the first point of view it seems necessary to
make a distinction between theory and practice. Thus we come across the
statements like it is a very good idea in theory but in practice it just might
not work. According to this point of view theory and practice are two quite
different things. According to the second point of view it appears that
theory and practice are not two different things but can help in understanding
each other. From our point of view although it is important to understand
the difference between theory and practice, but there is a need to see the
relationship between the two. In fact both theory and practice constitute
a whole which could well be examined in its own right. However, all this
concerns with the general understanding of the term theory, which is often
contrasted with practice. But in the area of logic and philosophy the term
theory has been treated in a slightly different way. Accordingly, theory refers
to a set of interrelated propositions. Proposition refers to the statement
which could be proved either true or false. Here the emphasis should be
28 given to the nature of the statement itself which bears the quality of being

proved true or false. In our daily life — experiences we come across such Theory and Paradigm
statements which could neither be proved true nor false. Such statements
are to be kept out of the preview of proposition as well as theory. In the
process of theory-building it seems necessary to formulate propositions
carefully. Hence the proposition must be formulated in such a way so that
it bears the quality of being falsified. Such an approach is very much helpful
in formulating not only sociological theories but also reflects its required
scientific status. The basic quality of scientific research is that it progresses
forward through the process of falsification, it means that in the light of
new data, the existing theories are tested again and again. Till these existing
theories are found capable of explaining the data, they don’t face any kind
of challenge to them. But if these theories fail to explain the new data, they
begin to be questioned. The community of scientists is busy in continuously
examining these existing theories in the light of the new data. The moment
these existing theories fail to explain the new data, these theories are put
under a question mark and sometimes these theories can be rejected — also
paving the way for new theories to take their place. Rejection of the existing
theories is known as ‘falsification’ and scientific research proceeds ahead
through this process. Here we would like to return back to our original
question concerning the structure of theory itself. As discussed earlier any
theory is composed of a certain number of interrleated propositions. These
propositions normally display the conditions that they could be falsified and
this very condition of propositions bring them on the track of scientific
research. Thus before constructing any proposition we must ensure that it
fulfills the conditions of falsifiability so that it could be accommodated well
in theory. After this we shall try to understand the nature, meaning and
types of sociological theories.
3.2 Sociological Theories

Broadly speaking, the discussion on the nature, meaning and types of
sociological theories could be divided into five parts. In the first part we
shall try to understand the nature and meaning of the sociological theories
during its classical age or period. Considerable amount of work was done by
the pioneers of sociology during this period to establish the credentials of
the discipline. Sociology could well emerge as a separate discipline only due
to the great efforts made by prominent scholars in its classical age. Next, in
the second part we shall discuss about the nature and types of contemporary
sociological theory. In fact, this period reflects to the time when the subject
sociology could come out of its classical period both chronologically as well
as conceptually. During this period certain important advances were made in
sociology and some of the shortcomings of the classical period were also
addressed to. In the third part there is a discussion on the recent advances
made in sociological theories. Here we come to see of sociology not only
emerging as a new discipline but also maturing as a subject. During this
period sociology got established as an important mature and independent
subject having its own identity. Next, in the fourth section, we shall come
to know about theories and perspectives in sociology that characterise the
subject with some new efforts and rigour and here we shall see how several
doubts over the nature and types of sociological theories were clarified.
After this, in the fifth part we shall examine how certain challenges were
put forward before the sociological theory and how it responded to such
problems and challenges. But one point can be added here that although
sociological theory as it exists today has been able to overcome many
obstacles and problems in its own way, but nevertheless this has never been
an easy task to do so. 29

Theory 3.3 Classical Sociological Theories
The period of classical sociology belongs to the era when sociology emerged
as a new discipline with the one central assertion that the scientific study
of society is possible. Prior to that period philosophers, intellectuals as well
as layman thought of and conceived of society in their own ways but the
science of society could not emerge out. Philosophers’ reflections, literary
romanticism and criticism and people’s own individual conceptions about
society had been the characteristics of the era prior to the emergence of
sociology. Although intellectuals belonging to different streams of thought as
well as common people have had reflected upon the nature of society but
their efforts were primarily individual efforts. On the other hand society had
existed for a longer duration which displayed its own internal statics and
dynamics. How does society behave as an entity in itself? How can it be
studied scientifically? Can it be done? If yes then how? All such questions
dominated the earlier era in the development of sociological theory. This era
belongs to what is today known as classical sociological theory. The following
discussion refers to the same.
The term sociology was coined by Auguste Comte (1798-1857) a French

sociologist and philosopher. He is also known as father of sociology. Although
he has made some significant contributions to the subject — a part of which
shall be discussed here too, but the most creditable work done by him
related to his efforts in establishing sociology as a scientific as well as an
independent discipline. Before him instead of sociology, we rather had
philosophy, literature and art through which reflections on society were
used to be made. Thus, in other words how society could be conceived of
philosophically, literally or through art had been the only available ways and
tools to reflect upon society. The modern method of scientific-analysis of
society as suggested by Auguste Comte was not just available before him.
Therefore, the contributions of Auguste Comte must be seen as the
pathbreaking ones helping to establish sociology as a new and independent
discipline in its own right. Auguste Comte, in short discussed at length, of
course philosophically to argue that the scientific study of society is possible
and when such efforts succeeded the new subject would be known as
sociology. What we must realise at the moment is the simple fact that this
had never been an easy task. After establishing sociology as a new and
independent scientific discipline, Auguste Comte had made some of his own
contributions to it. Auguste Comte’s own contributions to the subject
sociology are referred to, although briefly, in the following discussion.
3.4 Law of Three Stages

Having established sociology as a separate and independent discipline, Auguste
Comte divided sociology into two parts known as social statistics and social
dynamics, former dealing with the questions of equilibrium in society and
letter with the problems of change in society. Auguste Comte has also referred
to hierarchy of sciences like : astronomy, mathematics, physics, chemistry,
biology and sociology. He was of the opinion that sociology can’t be reduced
to other sciences be it mathematics (especially statistics), biology or political
economy. Auguste Comte has also talked about the law of three stages
namely theological, metaphysical and scientific. According to him, every
society passes through these three stages. In the theological stages all the
explanations concerning the events happening in nature were attributed to
God who was supposed to be in full command of the situation. The second
30

state i.e. metaphysical refers to the transitional stage where neither as the Theory and Paradigm
events taking place in nature were considered neither as a supernatural act

nor as based upon scientific explanations. This sort of transitional stage
existed somewhere around fourteenth century. The third stage is known as
scientific stage, where neither theological nor metaphysical sort of
explanations about society are considered sufficient. In the scientific stage
of society the explanations are examined rigorously and no explanation is
considered as a final one. Each explanation is considered as valid explanation
only for the time being until a better explanation arrives on the scene.
Auguste Comte believed that scientific methods could be applied for the
study of society as well. The assertions like that one although look simple
but it actually contains an important philosophy, widely known as positivism.
It was the philosophy of positivism which dominated the academic scene
not only in France but over the entire Europe. In fact the name of Auguste
Comte has been associated with the philosophy in such a way that it is
sometimes considered as the only important contribution that he had made
as it cut across the geographical boundaries of France and the academic
limits of the discipline of sociology. The scholars from some other disciplines
have commented widely on the notion of positivism. Auguste Comte suggested
that his scientific method for the study of society would be based upon
comparison, observation and experiment. Auguste Comte has explained these
and allied concepts in detail, but in short it could be said that he was able
to establish sociology as a new scientific as well as an independent subject.
Although it was Auguste Comte who had made the earlier but essential
beginnings, it was Emile Durkheim who carried forward the fate of sociology
by providing it new strides. His contribution to sociological theories is
discussed next.
Box 3.1: Durkhermian Approach

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), a prominent sociologist from France continued
with the tradition of positivism established by his predecessor fellow
countryman and sociologist Auguste Comte. In a sense we can say that Emile
Durkheim continued from where Auguste Comte had left. Durkheim was still
grappling with the questions like whether it was possible to apply the laws
of natural sciences for the scientific study of society or not and his answer
to this question was surely in the affirmative. Emile Durkheim went ahead
and virtually demonstrated how could it actually be done. He elaborated his
sociological approach in his book, The Rules of Sociological Method.
Although his book deals with some of the complicated details regarding what
according to him would be the sociological approach in future, but one
illustration might be given here, Durkheim’s method of social analysis
emphasises on the study of what he calls it, ‘social facts’. His discussion on
social facts not only clarifies his methodological as well as theoretical
formulations but also helps in establishing sociology as a new, important and
independent scientific discipline. In fact we can say that the first serious
sociological formulation in the history of the subject begins with Durkheim’s
detailed treatment of the idea of ‘social fact’. His other formulations like
the division of labour in society, the study of suicide, the notion of elementary
forms of religious life and views on education and sociology are all concerned
with the formulations built around social facts. We shall briefly attempt to
understand some of the issues related to the notion and methodology
concerned with the formulation of social facts. According to Durkheim, “social
facts are ways of feeling, thinking and acting commonly spread among the
31

Approaching Sociological people, external to individual and exercising a constraint upon him”. This
Theory
quite compact notion might appear difficult to understand and comprehend.
But we shall attempt to explain some of the complex issues related with it.
These social facts are different from facts concerning us at the individual or
the psychological level. Additionally, Durkheim has also clarified that these
social facts are ‘external’ and exercise constraints upon individuals. According
to him we can identify these social facts when we attempt to go against
them. Some of the social facts identified by Durkheim himself in his various
research works are like: rate of crime, rate of suicide, division of labour in
society and religion. How to use these social facts for the purpose of social-
analysis? In this context Durkheim has given two clues: one, he suggests
that social facts should be treated as ‘things’ and two, one social fact must
be explained with another social fact preceding it. In this, way Durkheim has
tried to achieve mainly two objectives : one, to ensure that sociology
virtually becomes a scientific discipline and two, to take care that sociology
remains as an irreducible subject and doesn’t split into several parts belonging
to other subjects. Durkheim has also referred to ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’
aspects of society in this context. Durkheim’s approach regarding how to
deal with various theoretical and methodological issues could be seen in his
book. The Rules of Sociological Method in detail. After understanding the
theoretical contributions of Emile Durkheim, we shall try to explain the
efforts of yet another pioneering scholar Karl Marx.
Karl Marx (1818-1883) was a philosopher, social scientist as well as a sociologist

from Germany. The academic scholarship of Karl Marx is widely known
throughout the world. Although Marx attempted to solve several academic
problems, he never claimed to be a sociologist. What is today known as the
Marxist sociology is based upon his various formulations that are basically
sociological in nature. In other words, we have to find out or make out the
sociological contents from his writings. This additional task has been done
by the sociologists at later stages. Marx’s theoretical formulations that were
basic for him and useful for sociologists are referred here. Some of the basic
formulations of Marx include : historical materialism, classes and class-struggles,
theory of surplus value and alienation. Marx’s formulations provided a
departure from the earlier discussed engagements for sociological analysis.
Marx’s theory was also used as a political ideology by various Leftist political
parties of the world and a sizable part of the world had been under the rule
of the communist parties of the world till recently. In and around 1989
several political — systems in different countries belonging to the ‘Second
World’ collapsed at the end of the cold war period between the two then
existing superpower countries. All such countries had practiced Marx’s
theoretical formulations as their political guidelines.
Marx’s theoretical formulations reflect a departure from the ones by the

previously discussed authors by exhibiting one major point. Marx’s method
includes the principles of ‘dialecties’ which was not discussed by any of the
sociologist earlier. As in principle the use of the notion of dialectics was not
an entirely a new discovery by Marx, it was used earlier by his fellow
countryman G.W.F. Hegel. What was significant and new in Marx’s theoretical
formulation was materialistic interprelation of society with the help of
dialectical method. As in the case of Hegel, he saw the progress of society
through idealism, achieved through dialectics, in the case of Marx the progress
of society was possible through materialistic dialectics. Another significant
departure in the writings of Marx was his emphasis on the historical method.
32 When the principle of dialectics was applied for the study of history, it was

called historical materialism. Materialistic interpretation of society mainly Theory and Paradigm
includes the social situation, which helps in shaping-up the ideas of people.
At some places the notion of historical materialism has been used
interchangeibly with that of dialectical materialism. Marx’s emphasis on history
and dialectics was also related to his formulations on classes and class-
struggles. Karl Marx alongwith his academic collaborator and lifelong friend.
Friedrich Engels, had clarified that all the known periods of history upto
present time could be seen as having class-struggles. For example, according
to Marx and Engels in the slave society we have classes like masters and
slaves, in the feudal society there are feudal lords and serfs and in the
capitalist society we have capitalists and workers. These are the main classes
struggling against each other for the sake of ownership and control over
means of production.
Box 3.2: Working Class

Marx and Engels could however, foresee the victory of the working class
which was struggling against the capitalist class. There are several other
issues that are discussed by Marx and Engels especially in the context of
capitalist society like exploitation, theory of surplus-value, alienation and
the revolutionary potential of the working class. With the victory of the
working class Marx and Engels could foresee the emergence of the socialist
society, which would be the society without any class and finally coming of
the communist society. In the writings of Marx we can see a lot of clarity
of thought, new interpretations about society, progressive ideology and a
call for the emancipation of people in general. Although Marx has written
extensively, his ideas have been coherent as well as precise. The importance
of his ideas and its application has been important to such an extent that
almost no sociological interpretation of the existing reality was considered
complete until and unless it has examined the phenomenon from the Marxist
perspective.
After understanding the theoretical formulations of Karl Marx, we shall try to

know about the contributions of yet another scholar namely Max Weber.

Max Weber (1864-1920) was a prominent sociologist from Germany who
belonged to the era of classical period in sociology. Max Weber is known in
sociology for his brilliant writings on a variety of topics. Max Weber gave a
new direction to sociology to which he offered, different as well as new
ways of thinking and research. His ways of thinking and analysis were different
from Auguste Comte or Emile Durkheim. In our opinion Max Weber presented
his ideas which were basically concerned with the German sort of
understanding but still reflecting the European and the Western flavour. Max
Weber has written on a variety of topics from social action to bureucracy
and also contributed in the vital areas like methodology of social sciences.
Although Max Weber attempted to define sociology in his own terms and
ways, certain formulations made by him like Verstehen still require
clarifications. Sociologists are still struggling with the idea of how exactly to
proceed on the lines of thought developed by Max Weber.

Outline the ideologies of Marx and Weber. What are the commonalities in
these sociologists.
33

Approaching Sociological How to go for experimentation with some of the formulations developed by
Theory
Max Weber like social action, Verstehen or phenomenology ? It still remains
an area where much remains to be understood and subsequently done.
However, some success has been achieved for example around the conceptions
like bureaucracy. Max Weber’s concepts of course carry higher values in
terms of its theoretical contents, but its actual operationalisation has largely
remained a problematic area. Max Weber for example defined sociology as an
interpretative understanding of social action. Max Weber continued to speak
of social as having two qualities : one, while doing such an action, the actor
must take into account the presence of another actor and wholly or partially
be guided by it and two, the actor must attach a subjective meaning to it.
Max Weber has also written about the subjectivity versus objectivity issues
in social sciences. His ideas about the importance of Verstehen and ideal-
types are brilliant and excellent in terms of its theoretical value and rigor.
But how to make them operational at the practical and empirical level still
remains a problematic area. On the one hand the subject sociology has been
widely enriched by the writings at the theoretical level but otherwise not
much has been achieved at the experimental level as Max Weber during his
own lifetime worked on different topics without clarifying much on the
topics on which he himself had worked earlier. However, Max Weber’s
formulations on the Protestant ethics and its relationship with the rise of
capitalism are widely accepted and acclaimed. Max Weber was able to
demonstrate in his study that there was a positive relationship between the
Protestant ethics and the development of capitalism. We must ensure making
before any sort of a sweeping generalisation that Max Weber had presented
it as a unique case in the context of Western Europe only. In spite of his
brilliant ideas, Max Weber’s work has to some extent remained unexposed
due to various reasons. But in spite of all this there is no doubt that Max
Weber’s formulations have contributed to a large scale in the area of
developing sociological theories. Thus after examining the theoretical
contributions of some of the classical authors like Auguste Comte, Emile
Durkheim, Karl Marx and Max Weber, here we come to the end of the
contributions made by these scholars in the classical era of the development
of sociology. After this we shall attempt to see the contributions made by
the sociologists in the contemporary period.
The contemporary period of modern sociological theories could be seen as

an important departure from its classical period. During the classical period
the central question has been to establish sociology as an independent
discipline but during the contemporary period the main concern has been
not only to come out of that classical image, but also to carry on the subject
further. During this contemporary period the scholars tried to learn from
some of the previous shortcomings in the works of the scholars who did
some researches after Durkheim, Weber and Marx. During this period, learning
from the mistakes of the immediate past, taking the inspirations from the
works of the classical sociologists and rebuilding the subject have been the
main concerns. In this context, it seems relevant to mention the names of
two important sociologists who have made their significant contributions.
Their works have also been accepted and recognized as important ones after
the classical period. These two scholars are Talcott Parsons and Robert K.
Merton. Although the works of these scholars from the U.S.A. have been
accepted internationally, but here only some of their important contributions
are being discussed.
34

3.7 Parson’s Action Theory Theory and Paradigm
Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) was an important sociologist from U.S.A. who had
contributed on the theory of social action, discussed about the action frame
of reference and social-system and lately on evolution. His contribution on
what he calls it AGIL — Paradigm and Pattern-Variable Scheme are also well
known. We shall discuss about them briefly. Talcott Parsons had the advantage
of reviewing several scholars from classical sociology and some other social
scientists as well. He believed that he could present an integrated theoretical
point of view where all the formulations of previous social scientists would
lead to. His theoretical constructions, later integrated the points of view of
psychologists like Sigmund Freud, economists like Alfred Marshal and sociologists
like Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber to name a few. He also
believed that all the contributions made by various social scientists lead in
one direction to arrive at or rather converge at one single notion of what
he calls it ‘social action’. Parsons also wanted to understand how social and
cultural values are internalised into personality system. In his later work The
Social System (1951), Parsons said that the three essential components of
action are ‘personality system, ‘social system’ and ‘cultural system’, although
each one being a part of action, but none being reducible to the other. In
yet another work, Working Papers in the Theory of Action (1953), Talcott
Parsons alongwith his colleagues like Robert Bales and Edward Shills has
explained about what he calls it the ‘AGIL Paradigm’. Accordingly, A refers to
Adaptation, G to Goal — Attainment, I to Integration and L to Latency. Thus
AGIL — Paradigm developed by Parsons provided him much higher respect as
he ascended towards formulation of sociological theories at a much higher
level. His another important theoretical formulation has been what he called
it, the “Pattern Variable Scheme”. It suggests that either an individual or
community as an actor has important choices to make against two polar
opposite categories. For example, whether an individual or community in
general promote ascription or achievement, alternatively universalism or
particularism. Talcott Parsons has referred to five sets of such alternative
choices. Additionally, within these five sets of choices, some permutations
and combinations could also be made out. For example, from the earlier
referred choices mentioned here, it could be ascertained whether the choices
made are for universalist achievement or alternatively particularistic ascription
sort of orientations. A detailed discussion on these issues could be seen in
his book The Social System (1951). As stated earlier Talcott Parson has also
written on medical profession and theories of evolutionism. In general the
theories of Parsons are also seen as his contribution to developing the
theories of functionalism. But regarding the theories developed by him,
several scholars from the Western societies as well as from elsewhere have
expressed the opinion that his formulations are difficult to understand and
there is a need to present it all in the simpler form. There is another
criticism which is associated with his work. It has been stated by several
scholars that the works of Talcott Parsons are too much theoretical in nature,
sometime they appear as ‘grand theories’ and generally have very little to do
with the existing life of today or with the empirical reality. Agreeing with all
such criticisms that it is true that Parsons theoretical formulations might
appear difficult to comprehend, might not refer to the empirical material but
nonetheless, they could be considered as important contributions. In the
views of the preset author, such theoretical formulations are required in
sociology and the learners of sociology must attempt to comprehend such
rigorous material. Talcott Parsons himself clarified that his works had remained
concerned with the tasks of providing theoretical schemes only. According 35

Approaching Sociological to him then it remained the task of some other scholars/sociologists to
Theory
verify and test his theories. But in order for sociology to grow as a subject,
it was necessary to strike a balance between theoretical formulations and
factual informations. Another sociologist namely Robert K. Merton has tried
to move exactly in that direction. His contributions to sociological theory
are discussed in what follows.
Box 3.3: Mertons Contributions

Robert K. Merton (1910-), another prominent sociologist from the U.S.A. has
tried to strike a reasonable balance between theory and fact. He was somehow
convinced that neither theory nor facts alone would suffice to move in the
desired direction. Basically, he argued to develop research methodology in
such a way as it not only included a meaningful balance between theory and
fact but also attempted to improve the quality of both. For example, on the
one hand Merton never accepted the formulations of his predecessor
sociologists as such and on numerous occasions he has tried to make
corrections in the writings of various scholars including Radcliffe – Brown
and Malinowski. Robert K. Merton, who attempted to rebuild and reformulate
“functional theory” has identified several mistakes committed unknowingly
by earlier scholars and later he attempted to reconstruct functional theory.
Robert K. Merton firmly believed that the whole of functional theory could
not be abandoned or discarded because some of the mistakes were committed
by some of the contributors to it at the earlier stages. His approach was to
learn from the mistakes, identify them, try to remove them and make
functional theory as a viable approach for research investigations in sociology.
Regarding social research he explained it as an interplay between theory and
facts. Merton’s views on social research could be found in his book, Social
Theory and Social Structure (1968). his views on the functional theory could
also be seen in the same book. While reconstructing functional theory, Merton
has referred to three postulates one, the postulate of functional unity of
society; two, the postulate of universal functionalism and three, the postulate
of indispensability. He later suggested that such postulates which once upon
a time guided the works of some earlier sociologists were no longer necessary.
Additionally, Merton has explained about what he calls it, “Middle Range
Theories” and its necessities in the contemporary period. Merton has also
clarified in detail about what he calls it “Reference Group Theory”. In this
way we could see that in his own way, Robert K. Merton tried to build-up
the much required ground and created the environment for the development
of sociology as a scientific discipline. From the above discussion it is now
clear that both Talcott Parsons as well as Robert K. Merton made great
efforts to carry forward the discipline of sociology and in this endeavor they
were quite successful too.
3.8 Recent Advances in Sociological Theories

Recent advances that were made in sociology are quite important and
meaningful. Besides the works of Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, A.R.
Radcliffe – Brown, Branislaw Malinowski, Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton
which were mainly influenced by and to a large extent remained concerned
with the philosophy of positivism, there was another stream of thought
emerging out during the same period. The development of sociology has
witnessed, apart from the philosophical background of positivism another
stream of thought initiated and encouraged by the German sociologists like
36 Max Weber.

Theory and Paradigm
Provide an outline of recent advances in sociological theories. Write down
your answer in your notebook.
It was Max Weber who defined sociology as an interpretative understanding

of social action. Max Weber initiated the debate on why the elements of
subjectivity, subjective understaning and Verstahen should be included in
sociology. Max Weber, never impressed by the formulations centered around
positivism wanted to give a new direction to the formulations in sociological
theory. In fact the whole debate centered around the issues of subjectivity
versus objectivity was initiated and inspired by Max Weber. In fact, sociology
as a subject has been strengthen by the efforts made by Max Weber. Here
a reference to only two such new areas of research namely phenomenology
and ethnomethodology shall be made. These two topics represent the main
areas concerned with the recent advances made in sociological research.
Two other topics require a mention here as they have emerged in the recent
times, they are postmodernism and globalisation. We hope that at various
stages of learning sociology all such concepts shall be discussed. Although
sociological theories initially developed to strengthen the subject and
establish it as a core discipline in itself, but with the advancement of the
subject certain perspectives clearly emerged in the process. Here a reference
shall be made to only such perspectives which have had a direct bearing
upon the development of sociology. Sometimes the terms like theories and
perspectives have been used interchangeably also. Some of the popular
perspectives developed in sociology are known as functional perspective,
conflict perspective, exchange perspective and symbolic interactionist
perspective. Although several scholars in one or another way have been
associated different perspectives but here only those thinkers shall be
mentioned whose names are generally familiar to us. The names of Emile
Durkheim and Robert K. Merton have been associated with the functional
perspective, Karl Marx represents the conflict perspective, B. Malinowski
discussed the material related to the exchange perspective whereas Herbert
Blumer discussed about symbolic interactionist perspective. Here it might be
advised that while discussing about sociological theories it would be relevant
to keep in mind the role of thinkers, as well as that of various perspectives
to which they were associated.
3.9 The Concept of Paradigm

It was Kuhn, who first suggested that development within a discipline,
especially science is not a gradual process but in fact takes place quite
suddenly. Hence, Kuhn’s books entitled the structure of scientific revolution.
Kuhn calls these sudden charges as “paradigm shifts”.
According to Kuhn, science and by extension social science undergoes its

process in three phases which are discernible.
i) Prescientific phase
ii) Normal science
iii) Paradigm shift
In the initial phase theories of explanation are incomplete and completing

with one another. At some point one of the theories establishes itself bringing
in the phase of normal science. In this phase a single theory or a set of
theories emerge dominant which Kuhn calls a paradigm.
37

Approaching Sociological When there is a paradigm shift the situation is one where the previous
Theory
theories have proved to be redundant. For Kuhn this a natural process and
it repeats itself over time as the new and established theories themselves
become incomplete as knowledge expands. At this point the solution lies in
modifying the theories or to abandon them for another set of dominant or
competing theoretical explanations which offer more complete and better
explanation for both science, social science and world-view as whole.
We can give an example of paradigm shift by referring to Copernicus who

pointed out that it was the earth that revolved around the earth rather
than the sun revolving around the earth as was Ptolemy’s position. Copernicus
gained adherence to his views with scientific data to prove them. A sudden
shift in terms of theories concepts and perspectives emerged with great
speed and there was a paradigm shift. A new theoretical explanation emerges
and establishes itself ushering in the new set of theories and perspectives.
Another example of paradigm shift occurred when Einstein’s theory of
relativity replaced Newton’s theory of gravity.
We must point that according to Kuhn the paradigm shift implies a rather
drastic if not total replacement of the previously established theories of
science and social science. In short the earlier theories are non comparable.
The shift is total. The way language is used, the development of new
concepts, words and meanings is part of a paradigm shift so are norms,
values and mores.
To put it differently a paradigm shift implies a new view of the world, its
perception, perspective, and overall attitudes of the world community charges
and charges with great speed. In the era, of globalisation which witness the
postmodern paradigm shift in which the local context is considered to be
the focus of study and the consideration of general or mega theories is not
considered either wise or practical.
Thus the concept of paradigm has two aspects to it. The first is that which
engulfs the whole and subsumes its various parts on subsets. It comprises
all the procedure of science or social science. This is a global paradigm. At
the second level me find there are theories and practices which bolster the
existing paradigm of the society/globe.
We must clarify it here that although some efforts have been put in to make
sociology a distinct, independent and a scientific discipline, by some great
scholars included, but the sociological theories thus produced have also
been challenged on several grounds. This once again highlights the scientific
nature of sociology where every theory can be put to test and liable to be
rejected if found wrong. Thus, in sociological theories, as in other sciences
as well, there is nothing like an eternal a universal truth that remains a truth
under all the conditions and at every moment of time. Sociological theories
should also not to be confused with something like religious or meta-physical
assertions. Nor sociological theories are comparable to philosophical guidelines
to be followed. Sociological theories have come out of such problems and
the challenges faced by them today are of another nature and most of them
are of scientific type. And in order to achieve that scientific nature, sociology
has travelled a longer path since the writings of Auguste Comte who had
established it as a positivist science. The first challenge to sociological
theories has come from the huge amount of data that have been generated
38 throughout the world, especially after the World War II. For example, data

generated in the area of demography has led to several new innovations at Theory and Paradigm
the theoretical level. Similarly data concerning Human Development Index

has helped in making transnational comparisons. The second challenge to
sociological theory has come from the processes of change that are taking
shape at various levels of society. To put it in simple words it could be said
that the processes of social change keep on going in society, independently
of the fact whether sociologists study them or not. In fact in the
contemporary world the processes social change are not only complex in
nature but they are taking shape at a much faster pace today. As a result of
it, many a times sociologists are not actually in a position to study them all.
There are several such phenomenon which require some serious sociological
studies like for example, the consequences of AIDS and that of terrorism.
Much remains to be done in these areas. The third challenge to sociological
theories came when society at large had undergone some significant periods
of time. These important periods include the end of the World War II, end
of the colonial rule at various places in the world and the emergence of
various independent nation – states. The sociological theories have had to
accommodate itself several times when such important changes were taking
shape in the world. The fourth challenge to sociological theory has come due
to some misconceptions about sociology as a subject that is basically meant
to solve the current problems of society. In fact sociology is quite capable
of solving the problems of society too, but so far it has kept itself limited
upto their scientific study only. But at the level of response to some of
these problems and challenges faced, sociologists have attempted to address
some of them. As a consequence of the efforts of the sociologists we have
seen the emergence of certain theoretical formulations centered around the
conceptions like rationality, postmodernism, globalisation and civil society.
At the level of sociological theory, intellectuals and academicians from the
subject have also responded meaningfully on the topics like democracy,
socialism and secularism. Sociologists to some extent through their writings
have made their presence felt in the area of the reconstruction of society.
3.10 Conclusion
We have seen what comprises a theory and what a paradigm means. We have
taken an analysis of classical sociological theories, and seen how Comte
enunciated the law of the three stages, Marxian ideology, Weberian ideology,
Parson’s action theory and some recent advances in sociological theory. Finally
we turned to the concept of paradigm and explained what it means in terms
of the intellectually violent stuff’s in the dominance of theories, which have
been termed paradigm shifts by Thomas Kuhn. We have adequately indicated
the subject to which we addressed ourselves to.

Agger, Ben (ed.) 1978, Western Marxism: An Introduction, Santa Monica,
Calif: Goodyear
Alford, Robert R. and Friedland, Roger 1985, Powers of Theory: Capitalism,
the State, and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Blumer, Herbert 1959, “What is Wrong with Social Theory?” in H.Blumer,
Symbolic Interaction. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall
Kuhn, Thomas 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago University
of Chicago Press
Ritzer, George 1996, Sociological Theory Us. Mc Graw-Hill 39

Unit 4
Social Construction of Reality
Contents
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Construction of Reality
4.3 Phenomena of Social Reality
4.4 Everyday Social Reality
4.5 Language and Social Reality
4.6 The Objective Reality of Society
4.7 Legitimation and Social Reality
4.8 Socialisation and Legitimation
4.9 Social Reality and The Symbolic Universe
4.10 Maintaining Social Reality and Language
4.11 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
Once you have studied this unit you should be able to
define “reality” and “social construction”
describe construction of reality
indicate the relation between language legitimation socialisation and reality
describe social reality and the symbolic universe.
4.1 Introduction
In this lesson we are going to try and understand what exactly is meant by
the “social construction” of “reality”. What do we mean by these words?
Unless we understand each of these interrelated concepts it would be difficult
to proceed with our presentation of this most important aspect of social
reality. Social reality indicates quite clearly that what we are referring to
is in fact basically the capacity of society to develop different ways of
looking at the constituents of the visible aspects of reality. Thus in fact as
we will see that there are many societies and many cultures, but what is
common among them is that social reality tries to perpetuate itself through
the younger generation, but this does not usually succeed and the social
reality of each generation has several points of departure from the preceding
generation.
What is being said is that members of any society live by certain beliefs and
principles but these were not always there and there have been significant
shifts in each generations point of view and perspectives. The points of
importance in discussing the social construction of reality is that in most
societies the version of reality is not a single monolithic construct but
rather consists of several layers of meaning and existence. That is to say
that there are many social constructions of reality which differ from category
to category. So we must point out that while the method of social construction
of reality remains similar in most societies it is also very clear that there are
40 “multiple synchronic realities”, that is many versions of culture and reality

are available especially in plural societies where these realities then intermesh Social Construction
of Reality
and interact and influence each other in various ways. Thus it is clear that
“reality” is constructed in a specific way but this does not mean that all
versions of reality are the same. There is often much difference in their
expression. Society which creates reality, as we will see, provides many
different points of ingress and is responsible for creating a socially intermeshed
reality. What we are saying then is that there are plural indeed multiple
reality systems available for us to observe in our daily life which is really the
very root of any social constructions and sustains the same even through
periods of lawlessness and disruptions.
Once we have read and understood the points made above it should be clear
that what we are discussing concerns the secure and integrated way in
which society perpetuates its attitudes and beliefs. It is also clear that each
generation brings with a whole lot of perceptual expectations and a minimum
acceptable standard of living so that it can lead a meaningful existence. So
it has to be noted that society as a whole contains and keeps in balance
that entire social process from cradle to the tomb.
4.2 Construction of Reality

Now it would be natural to ask how is all this construction of multiple and
synchronic realities are achieved. What are the ways and the mechanism in
which we as members together create a perception of the world process.
Surprisingly social realities are created as soon as the new members of society
are ready a particular imprinting is begun to be ingrained in them. Among
the important areas of life include the economic, political, psychological,
and so on and each of them is put together by training the new generation
to act and behave in some particular manner which they deem to be fit and
worthy of them.
The social fabric of any society is a fragile construct which has to be constantly
renewed through ritual and sustained interactions. Thus reality itself is
“fragile”so that any disturbing or conflictual situations lead to a breakdown
of order and mayhem rules. After such social breakdowns which occur in
interaction, in times of war with another nation or even chronic lawlessness.
It takes much time to recover from such breakdowns of reality and the time
they take to repair the social fabric may last many years or even make a
lifetime impact on some of the members. Thus as we introduce the lesson
we have to point out that culture is many faceted and the construction of
reality though similar in many societies does in fact differ from individual to
individual and from nation to nation. There is doubt that in the mind of the
young and impressionable that has to develop certain capacity to be bounded
say by religious or economic status. Thus there is different life style created
by the different castes and classes which have a full blown ideology and
interaction in everyday life. These are not mere ways of looking at things
out of curiosity. Rather it is a critical situation where the constructed reality
has to be continuously fed and bolstered so to speak into the social system
or systems.
As such when we discuss how social reality is constructed then it becomes

very clear to us that in order to perpetuate itself society takes recourse to
both socialisation and education and continues to control the individual to
some extent and even bring within him a sense of responsibility to further
perpetuate his reality. 41

Approaching Sociological We are going to explain in this lesson how social process constructs reality
Theory
and thereby goes further to establish that very pattern of culture and ideology
which they themselves were taught and learnt to make the appropriate
judgments and decisions within that very frame work. Thus in such a
delicate and precise operation it becomes obvious that not all members
would be able to fit in fully into the social fabric, and these are deviant
individuals and society attempts through various other therapies to bring
the deviant back into the centre or the “mainstream” of society.
We have pointed out in various ways that our reality and experience are all
constructed by human beings in communities, large groups, nation states,
and at times by much larger concerns than the nation state itself. The task
of the sociology of knowledge is to indicate how precisely these constructions
of social reality are evolved by human beings and groups and community of
human beings. Thus the interrelationship between knowledge and the social
context in which it has evolved is an important ingredient in understanding
how society is able to create and recreate itself over the ages.
According to some social scientists it is believed that the societal context

was the basis of the existence of ideas but not the precise ideas themselves,
and therefore gave the individual some critical degree of voluntary actions
and freedom of action. On the other hand there are other social scientists
who believe that human thought per se is never safe from ideology and the
intellectual climate prevailing in the environment as a whole. It is thus clear
that, as the social scientists have pointed out that the acquisition of
knowledge is accretional and it gathers relatively slowly, and only when
sufficient aspects of the knowledge sought are examined does the view of
any reality become focused and clear. Thus knowledge is accumulated over
time and it is not possible for it to be given full blown to the new members,
and existing members are continually given fresh inputs through media,
institutions, family and work environment and so on to keep them abreast
of the events that are happening in society as a whole.
4.3 Phenomena of Social Reality

Berger and Luckmann feel that to study the phenomena of social reality
implies that we use everyday common sense reality as a point of departure.
This is what knowledge ultimately comprises: the interaction and participation
in social life and process. Thus “commonsense ideas” are the most important
ingress into understanding the sociology and phenomena of individuals, groups
and society. Thus it is clear that society has at the very least two sides to
its existence and ontology- one is subjective and the other is objective.
Together these facts give rise to the understanding that while there is a
group life for an individual there is in fact an objective reality , rules and
regulations which have to be adhered to, unless the individual or group
wants to be ostracized. Thus first of all the reality of social life is sui
generic that exists over above and beyond any single individual. Thus Berger
is interested, as are we, in finding out how humans produce and perpetuate
social life in all its manifold facets and aspects. Thus by attempting to
understand social reality we are really asking how it was constructed, because
this is what will give us the cues to proceed further with our line of enquiry.
4.4 Everyday Social Reality

Berger and Luckmann point out that everyday life and its basis is such that
42 it is best apprehended by the method of phenomenological analysis, which

happens to be a descriptive method. Thus we observe that consciousness Social Construction

of Reality
has the basic property of existing in several dimensions and several types of
reality. Thus human beings are aware to a greater or lesser extent that the
social world comprises of many or “multiple realities” in everyday life. These
multiple realities are themselves well ordered and more or less fully developed
and quite capable of influencing each other. Thus phenomena are, such that
a particular pattern can be discerned by human beings, and these social
facts are imposed upon them. In other words a new entrant into a society
sooner or later finds that he or she has a particular social order which is
imposed upon him or her. Thus we find that common sense knowledge is
what human beings share intersubjectively through interaction with other
human beings. This becomes very clear in the structure of routine that
human beings follow in the course of their daily life. Pursuing an enquiry
into common sense knowledge and its social context is relatively simple, but
Berger and Luckmann point out that the difficulty exists in the comprehension
and “translation” of those areas which are not classifiable as common sense
knowledge but are in fact non everyday reality.
Box 4.1: Indexical Constructions

The entire social world….. is a set of indexicalities, which are taken for
granted. They are rarely called into question, and when they are, the
questioning stays at a superficial level, accepting fairly quick and easy
classifications instead of pursuing the search for objectivity to its end. For
there is no end: the search for objectivity definable reality is a bottomless
pit. (Randall Collins 1988, Theoretical Sociology. Onlando : Harcourt Brace
p: 277).
To understand the social construction of reality we have to be aware of the

time-structure of daily life since this sheds an important insight on the
overall social order. As Berger and Luckmann point out that temporality
reflects and is a basic property of consciousness itself. Again we find that
the temporal structure of daily life is an extremely complicated matter. This
is because consciousness exists and interacts at many different level and all
these different levels of reality have to be seen as interrelated and arranged
in a specific pattern. Thus the temporal structure existing in society indicates
clearly defines the situation for members of the particular society they
belong to.
Let us consider the question of daily interactions between human beings in

any particular society. In these interactions it is the direct or face to face
situations which define much of the structure of reality in everyday life.
This is because when there is face to face interaction the self and the other
an inter subjective understanding by each of the other. Self reflection is
also an outcome of the behaviour with others, as it makes us conscious of
what we are and stand for in society, since it creates or even “gives” us our
attitudes and subsequently our behaviour, which in turn is the basis of
human social reality, or “realities”.
It may be pointed out however that everyday reality itself has many
components and these itself could generate specific situations and attitudes.
It is therefore clear on observation that while there are basic similarities in
social reality there are also areas that create rules of their own and impose
them on the members of a given reality. This reality again although it is so
43

Approaching Sociological clearly present in social situations is in fact influenced and bounded by the
Theory
rules of social reality.
4.5 Language and Social Reality

Another area where social reality is present is that of the area of language.
All languages have a particular grammar and syntax, and is the most significant
and important sign system of all societies. It helps to create a fund of
knowledge which is continuously going expansion and contraction as different
words and ideas which enter into the overall fund of knowledge and ideas.
And there are some aspects of knowledge and understanding which ‘fall out’
of the overall system of ideas and knowledge. Thus for example the English
language has compiled vast dictionaries which are revised, edited and
updated, and in these social procedures many new words and concepts
enter into the language. There are also words and ideas that become
defunct and are removed from the dictionary and language.
So we can say that language as a social reality accumulates knowledge and

transmits it to other members of the human system, which in turn create
a socially ordered environment.
It may be pointed out here that language itself is a highly complex aspect
of social reality and research into how a human being leans and adapts to
the social order or reality. Thus it is pointed out that language is symbolic
and therefore capable of apprehending social reality. Therefore, it is a social
fact which exercises control or restraint over human members, and yet
remains an externalisation, and outside the individual. This is because the
ontological reality of language is such that it is the backbone of social order
and its main artery of communication.

Is society socially constructed or is it a divine religiously raised structure?
Reflect and comment.
We can therefore say that language is a vast repertory of knowledge, reason,

morality, politics and social attitudes. It can then be added that if the
language is changed the particular ideological leaning of a linguistic framework
would also be deeply affected. Thus social reality can be apprehended by
a study of language and its application to varying situations within the
societal context. Related to this is the idea that not only does language
provide us an ingress into the overall structure of society, it is basic to
human progress and the shift in the prominent features of social reality form
a basic component on the history of theories and ideas so far as sociology
and the sociology of knowledge is concerned.
4.6 The Objective Reality of Society

Let us now consider the objective reality of society. By objective reality we
mean that society exercises control over the individual, and is beyond the
control of any single individual. Let us see how this happens in society with
the specific focus on institutions. How does an institution direct and control
the behaviour of its members, and how is it that while individuals are born
live and die, institutions can exist indefinitely in time. This is why we are
choosing this area for the exemplification of the social reality which exists
and how it continues to exist.
44

Let us look at the phenomena of institutionalisation, a procedure that creates Social Construction
of Reality
a space and certain goals and aims that would be reached through various
rules that define institutional behaviour. It has been pointed out that every
institution exists in both a physical environment and a social environment.
The fact is that both these are “given” and cannot be altered at will. In fact
it is his overall social and physical environment that makes man a human
being. It is this interaction with the physical and social environment that
creates the existence of all human activity. This is because no human
activity can be begun or completed without the due impact of the overall
or “total” environment.
Now the question arises regarding how institutions themselves begin continue
and establish themselves. In short we are now asking the origin of human
institutions. It may be pointed out that institutions arise when there is
the “reciprocal typifications” of the habitualized behaviour that make for
strictly patterned behaviour which should not go out of the limits of the
overall control pattern. Thus the various different tasks that members carry
on lead to an institution taking over social control of its members. When
this has happened we may say that the institutions has “arrived” or has
become crystallized. Thus institutions which were initially humanly created
over time soon develop a socially objective reality of their own.
Box 4.2: Experience and Interpretation

…We cannot claim that this embedded ness is absolutely universal… the
world is not always taken as ordinary by all people and all occasions. Buddhist
mediators and other mystics have devised deliberate methods for withdrawing
the mind’s assent to ordinary assumptions about reality and have claimed
to experience an illumination by looking at whatever transpires without
putting any interpretation upon it. (Randall Collins 1988, Theoretical Sociology,
p:279 Orlando : Harcourt Brace).
Berger and Luckmann point out that the relation between man and his social
world is dialectical, that is each phenomena acts, interacts and reacts to the
other. Thus man and nature cannot be separated as each has an effect on
the other which can be beneficial or detrimental. Thus we can say that
social reality has three interrelated aspects. These are the facts that society
is produced by human beings; further it becomes clear that society is an
objective reality; and that as a consequence of these factors man becomes
a social product himself.
Now society requires to be accepted or realised, that is to say it is in need

of legitimation, which is done by socialising the new generation of members
into the preexisting patterned ways of interaction. Socialisation it may be
pointed out is done steadily and almost continuously during the growing
years, and it never ends even unto death and attitudes towards the beyond.
That is to say institutions provide for rules of birth, life and death and how
these processes can be made more efficient. However socialization is never
wholly able to keep all members in the line of control and as such there are
some percentage of deviants in any society.
The inner control or the control of attitudes is what makes the institution
such a powerful force. However social reality, shared experiences, and
common compliance lead to an inner and outer congealing of experience
45

Approaching Sociological which settles down in the subconscious and exercises control and this is
Theory
what makes socialisation firm , steady and perpetual. It is through institutions
like the family that we learn to become human beings and to exhibit
behaviours that are socially beneficial. However again there is no perfect
correlation between legitimation socialisation and overall behaviour. And
there are “lapses” in socialisation which can sometimes lead to a tear in the
social fabric in the form of riots or other violent disturbances just because
the social control of institutions and how it is passed on sometimes break
down, and such a situation could be dangerous for social harmony.
Apart from the above we find that human beings have to enact a particular
learned role behaviour which is essential to the wellbeing of the fabric of
society. Roles set up mutual obligations and reciprocal links. When these
roles are repeated often enough an elaborate role structure develops. This
is so even if a role play is relatively simple, and much more so as the role
has wider implications and much greater social control.
Thus a role defines the social self and the other way round. Roles have their
origin in reciprocal typifications, just as do institutions. Roles create a social
fabric that is linked both in time and space, and has further to conform to
the role limits and thereby forming the very backbone of institutions and
social life as a whole.
This is to say it is institutions that shape the individuals and then start
depending upon them. Therefore to play a role properly the player or member
must know the wholeness of the role, and realise it in its many intricacies,
including the cognitive and the behavioral aspect. This implies that there
is a social distribution of knowledge in society which occurs as the members
play and enact their social roles, leading to a basic understanding of how a
member is supposed to respond to some other social person in interaction
or reflection. It has been pointed out that the study of roles is very
important in the sociology of knowledge since that is what leads us to learn
about how the macroscopic institutions impact upon the individual and the
group and create “real” experiences which are part of the construction of
social reality. Thus as we go along we find that construction of social reality
is in fact an elaborate cooperative effort of all the members of society, and
is not something that any one individual can undertake.
If a society is relatively coherent and orderly it will have institutions that are
respected and shared by members of a society. On the other hand if there
is much conflict and disorder in society it is clear that the institutions
within society are breaking up or at least not being subscribed to in any
great measure. In other words if there is a society that is highly balkanized
its institutional base will also have multiple synchronous societies, or
subcultures. In fact it is the existence of subcultures which indicate quite
clearly that we cannot talk about “reality” in the singular and it must be
realised that “reality” is not the same throughout a society or a nation
state. In fact there are plural perceptions of society depending on the
precise position that a member is located within his or her community. This
is because knowledge is the product of interaction between its knowledge
base and the social context. However we need to point out here that there
are such institutions which become so powerful, that they indeed become
“reified” and take on an almost independent course sometimes disturbing
the given arrangements in society in anomic situations where social order
46 breaks down temporarily.

4.7 Legitimation and Social Reality Social Construction

of Reality
Let us now turn to another aspect of the social construction of reality, and
this is the process of “legitimation” which provides an institution within
society its overall rationale and rules of conduct. It provides the society
with a set of rules and regulations which are taken to be the actual or true
meaning of the purpose or ideology of an institution. By being legitimated
the institutions in society are able to provide guidelines of the work
conditions that members of each institution are supposed to follow or face
sanctions which could range from the nominal to the extreme forms of the
same existing rules that apprehend conduct that is not in the interests of
the organisation.

Why does social institution need legitimation? Reflect and comment.
Thus legitimation provides a total rationale regarding what the actor or

actors are supposed to do, could do and even want to do. In short we
cannot say that institutionalisation is relatively successful unless all actions
are legitimated by the ideology of the institution which is normally an
extension of the overall national or globe society. However we need to keep
in mind that the theoretical-ideological axis that upholds most institutions
is often a fragile one and the indifferent or different behaviour within an
institutional context can make it breakdown and cease to exist effectively.
At this point we must indicate that another dimension of legitimation concerns
the symbolic universe. These symbolic universes take the social construction
of reality to another level, which help to make society cohere. The symbolic
universe is a matrix of total meaning both objective and subjective and it
is actually the apprehension of the symbolic universe is necessary to be able
to be a member of society and thereby living within the prescribed social
order and be a member of any specific society. Thus it is the symbolic
universe which is a cognitive tool to apprehend, be a member of, or even
to subvert the process of social construction which as we pointed out
earlier suffers from being in a fragile condition and therefore has to be
bolstered by various institutional modalities to give it continuity and to go
on from generation to generation, all the while adapting and reordering
itself to meet the challenged of a new generation, which has grown up with
different values. As such no matter how legitimate an institution within
society is, it definitely undergoes changes and new legitimation links have
to be brought in to explain new , even threatening situations. As such the
process of legitimation may be spread out over time ns that may prove to
be much greater than even the total life of any of its members. Thus it is
the symbolic universe which is of prime importance in the overall “hierarchy”
of a human being can experience.
Box 4.3: Mind and Society

The symbolic universe is what arranges a society in the mind of the members
so that what is perceived through the senses, in fact all possible experience
is filtered down through the cognitive process both objective and subjective.
It is thus the binding glue of society and we have briefly indicated that it
takes control of all the discrete bits of knowledge and social procedure and
is able to combine and resolve it within the given frame work of societal
membership. As Berger and Luckmann put it that “it makes sense of the
entire universe”. By this we mean the social and cultural states of being
47

Theory that exist in any culture have to be apprehended as cognitive aspects of
gaining membership. This is so because each group of members who share
similar situations will be coerced into trying a finding meaning in the world
of everyday life, because it is in part a projection of the desires, fears
and expectations of other members within an institution or institutions in
society.
Thus it becomes clear that the symbolic universe is a method for not only
apprehending reality but creating it also, and thus what we are talking
about is the fact that there is an intermesh between the subjective and the
objective side of reality, both of which are perceived by human beings who
are members of any institution or group of institutions in any society.
Thus it is pointed out that “placement” within a symbolic order or symbolic

universe is really very important and the very basis of the perception that
will be available to any member in society. Thus we can clearly see how
members of any society are keenly engaged in the task of socially constructing
a reality that is able to cope with all unforeseen situations. However such
total control is very difficult and in every society we find that there are
problems which cry for a solution. Further it is also absolutely clear since
Durkheim that any socially constructed system “leaks”, that is there are
always some people or groups of people which see reality in a way different
from the majority of the members. This is what often causes “tears” in the
social fabric of society with no matter how much care the members have
helped to construct or build it up. In short human beings have not only to
be apprehending legitimate structures but maintaining their continuity.
Indeed there are some groups or institutions like family, polity, commerce
and so on which also find similarities among them but they are also quite
different in their scope and spread in any group no matter how large or small
it is.
4.8 Socialisation and Legitimation

Let us now turn to how the human mind uses various concepts to uphold
the symbolic universe that is related to and is a part of societal processes.
Thus if an institution is to be a part of the members existence it has to be
appropriately legitimated, by being located or placed in some particular part
of the symbolic universe. This is what gives it meaning and power to social
reality. If the symbolic universe undergoes a shift over time then new
legitimating structures and discourses are invented by the human mind, to
bolster the social reality that has been disturbed or “shaken”, and make it
whole again. This happens in times of great stress political, economic or
social, but the symbolic universe remains even though in a somewhat
attenuated form.
Now further if the symbolic universe is confronted with a pattern of

socialisation that is paradoxical or even contradictory to it then a problem
of lack of meaning arises and has to be dealt with the establishment of a
new ideological framework or concepts that can deal with the altered reality.
When this happens the societal forces and institutions begin to repress the
groups who are perceived as threatening for the symbolic universe, in an
attempt to retrieve all that can be kept from the old symbolic order into the
new, and thereby salvage something from the past or the social order which
48 has readjusted itself to deal with the new situations in social processes.

Thus we find that the construction of social reality is also dependent on the Social Construction
of Reality
precision of the concepts that are there to deal with it. If these concepts
are traditional they will usually require a new or modern interpretation. On
the other hand the concepts and attitudes that are retained will now be
placed differently in the new ideology that has been both created and
accepted by members of a society. Thus this process requires cognitive and
normative bolstering or legitimation.
We may say then that mythology itself provides the conceptual apparatus for
the symbolic universe, and this functions as a adaptive mechanism so far as
the society is concerned. It has been pointed out that mythology itself was
created to overcome paradoxes and inconsistencies in the overall
environment. Berger and Luckman point out to maintain the symbolic universe
there are several types of conceptual equipment including:
1) Mythology
2) Theology
3) Philosophy and
4) Science
Now while mythology is associated with the mass construction of social

reality we find that the other three elements mentioned become increasingly
the domain of the specialists and the elites. Such a body of knowledge is
quite different than what the specialists in theology, philosophy and science
are concerned with. That is to say that the relation between the lay person
and the expert becomes very different from each other as the latter are a
specialised activity of the social elites
We may ask at this point that what are the implications and applications of
the creation and maintenance of the symbolic universe. There are in fact
two features of the symbolic universe maintenance. These are:
1) Therapy and
2) Inhalation.
In the case of the therapeutics of symbolic universe maintenance what

happens is that the attempt of the concepts that form the symbolic universe
are used to re-socialise members so that they can play their role in society.
Yet it may be noted that therapy itself does not claim or reclaim all the
members. In such a case the symbolic universe and its implications have not
been properly understood, if they have been understood at all.
In the case of the concept of inhalation we find that all areas of meaning
and existence that are not subsumed under the symbolic universe have to
be erased or eliminated so that they do not start challenging the legitimacy
of the same.
Thus in both these approaches or applications we find that the aim of the
exercise is to ensure integration and incorporation into society. If this is
not done the society will undergo anomic disturbances, and the social order
will become dysfunctional. Thus a truly representative symbolic universe is
one that covers conceptually each and every aspect of reality and leaves
nothing out whatsoever. It is obvious that such a system does not exist and
in practice each member is basically approximating the concepts of the
symbolic universe. In doing this the members of a society come to have
many ideas in common but there is still room for individuation of the members. 49

Theory 4.9 Social Reality and The Symbolic Universe
Now what is the implication for social organisation and the maintenance of
the symbolic universe? We have already made the point that reality is
socially defined, and that it is human beings and human groups that define
its contours. Thus we find that the specialists in a society provide complete
legitimation of the social reality. Such experts usually hold very different
views from lay members on definitions of reality. Thus we may point out
again that there can be differences of view and opinion between the experts
and the laymen. There is thus a sort of competition on whose definitions and
concepts are going to be beneficial and become operative in social interaction.
As we can see there are different ways of apprehending and perceiving

social process. Which way is seen as the best course of action depends on
the ideology which is invoked and which concepts are used to explain any
aspect of the symbolic universe that has become the area of concern, eg.
societal conflict over the distribution of resources. Groups often subscribe
to an ideology which will benefit them and invoke theories which will help
them achieve their goals, social, economic or political.
Box 4.4: Pluralism and Reality

It may be noted that most modern societies are pluralistic comprising many
races ethnicities and religions. In such pluralistic societies the room for
conflict is much reduced and outright conflict is rare. Pluralism itself arises
in times of rapid change and erodes the strong foundations of traditions and
make them form new structures and patterns of interaction, and new theories
are invented to legitimate the new social structures in society.
Such legitimations are necessary as we have pointed out, because without

them no new ideology can be formed or if formed it cannot be successful
in maintaining and propagating it. On the other hand we find institutions
themselves are changed or altered in some way to fit into the existing social
reality, and there is thus a dialectic between institutions and social reality.
Again the definition of reality itself projects that reality and these definitions
often have a self fulfilling aspect to them and begin to change the contours
of reality itself in social process. Thus social change can only be understood
as a dialectical process between the new theories that legitimate new
institutions.
These institutions are also affected and themselves change to have a closer
correlation between themselves and the theories and ideologies used to
legitimate them. It may be added here that the social construction of reality
is a human product and has been realised by the efforts of human beings
alone and is experienced by them as a set of complete experiences. The
sociology of knowledge maintains that the existence of the symbolic universe
is reflected in the lives of the members of the society. As a corollary to this
we may add that the existence of a symbolic universe has its base in
individuals and has no existence apart from their lives. In short although we
are saying that man produces the reality within which he then lives, procreates
and expires, he is not quite capable of altering it alone and requires a group
or community to do the same.
Let us now turn to the description of society in relation to subjective

50 reality. We shall first dwell on primary and secondary socialisation as ways

in which human beings create their own reality. Thus society exists both as Social Construction
of Reality
objective and subjective reality. To understand this fully we need to appreciate
that society is an ongoing process which comprises the elements of:
1) Externalisation
2) Objectification and,
3) Internalisation
As the human externalises social reality it acts back upon him and he
internalises it. This means that the existing social situation has been
apprehended and subscribed to in such great measure that certain actions
and interactions become most mechanical and their existence is never called
into question. Thus there is a time sequence involved in the imparting of
certain basic and essential points of social reference, which means it takes
time to become a fully fledged member of any society. Being a fully fledged
member of a society means that the member has acquired membership, and
is able to make decisions, interpretations and even plan and pursue an
objective or a goal over time. Thus as Berger and Luckmann put it that the
individual becomes a member “through a temporal sequence” and as the
social reality is apprehended more and more the members of a society are
able to predict the outcome of certain actions and interactions. This is to
say as social reality is apprehended more and more the human being is able
to be an aware member of society, being able to realize and live up to his
expectations within limits set by society itself.
It may thus be pointed out that primary socialisation comprises the

understanding of roles of the personal others and the generalised other. In
short such socialisation proceeds from the inner circle or close circle of a
human being to wider and wider circles until it encompasses the whole of
society. Now this does not happen in a majority of cases and primary
socialisation in some cases does fail to bring about the desired uniformity
within the society. This type of deviance within the society however is not
a matter of alarm but of serious concern. Thus when the gestalt of the
generalised other has been learnt we find that both the objective and the
subjective sides of social reality balance and successful primary socialisation
has been completed.
Secondary socialisation in fact is a necessary aspect of the division of labour,

and how knowledge has been distributed within the society. At this point
we find that the institutional sub worlds have been internalised and role
specific knowledge has been generated, concerning the social activity and
output that any role required. Thus secondary socialization adds new layers
of data and knowledge which in some cases even supercede some aspects
of primary socialisation. However to establish overall consistency we find
that secondary socialisation presumes conceptual clarity to bring together
different bodies of knowledge under a single umbrella. We may point out
here that while in primary socialisation of the members or group that is
acting upon a human being is relatively small.
In the case of secondary socialisation the people who act and influence ones
mentality and behaviour are very many numerically speaking. One has entered
the ocean from the pond and in secondary socialisation one is in the midst
of society at large. There is inevitably a formality and lack of personal depth
in the secondary socialisation, which is there because of the complex division
of labour, which in itself demands that the institutional reality is not disturbed 51

Approaching Sociological too much and there are institutions like marriage which have been there in
Theory
human society since time immemorial and continue to be with us.
As can be readily seen both primary and secondary socialization are delicate
procedures and have to be carefully imparted and acquired. Thus socialisation
is a process that occurs as part of every human society, but to maintain the
objective and subjective structures does not always happen. There is a
certain level of deviancy in every community. To contain this deviancy society
has to develop some control procedures to protect its disruption and eventual
disintegration. Thus reality maintenance procedures such as mass media or mass
contact programmes become part of the overall attempt to perpetuate social
reality and to make the human perception of it be integrated and coherent.
In this regard it can be pointed out that usually it is primary socialisation

which has a greater durability and is much more strongly ingrained than the
procedures of secondary socialisation whose layers of gloss of meaning often
do not stand up to scrutiny and start breaking apart. Well established rules
of conduct may be challenged and a new set of rules may take their place
or at least effect some part of their existence. Thus secondary socialisation
is more “artificial” by nature, and is less deeply lodged in the human than
the primary socialisation. As we shall now discuss it is casual conversation
which is what is responsible for the continuation of both the objective and
the subjective states of reality.
Thus we now turn to a description of the role language plays in reality

maintenance.
4.10 Maintaining Reality and Language

It may be pointed out here that the language that a society uses is a strong
foundation and process for the maintenance and perpetuation of socially
constructed reality. In language society finds an institution so to speak,
and maintains social reality through its incessant use both in formal and
informal settings. In fact there are prominent theories which indicate
that language itself may be at the base of reality and helps greatly in
constructing it. It needs to be indicated just as language is a social fact
then the reality and conceptualisation of social reality is an aspect of ongoing
social reality.
Box 4.5: Paradigms of Social Reality

Language needs to be modified over time and this itself indicates that
social reality is malleable to a certain state and undergoes changes especially
in the dominant ideology, as a whole of the society under consideration.
This in itself implies that over a process of time new paradigms of social
reality emerge and posit their own challenges to the members of society.
Such new paradigms of social reality however take time to settle down into
the consciousness of the members, and we can have two or more paradigms
working at the same time in a society. Thus as we pointed out earlier there
is in fact a multiple social reality, rather than one single overarching model
of society. It is then obvious that such a complicated and delicate man
oeuvre as constructing reality is an ongoing process and can be subverted
only to an extent by rival groups in the society or community who give
different versions and different choices to the members. In terms of life
options and work options so that the relationship is dialectical.
52

Thus if language structures and usage help construct realty, it is also clear Social Construction
of Reality
that life experience and life situations also feedback into language structures
effectively modifying them and influencing their overall content. It needs
to be kept in mind that language is indispensable in creating compatible
consensual social constructions, and that it is what connects people. We
need to mention here briefly that when we consider language and we are
entering into the realm of a vast system of symbols , gestures, hints, clues
and even moral prescriptions, and the fields of semiotics and kinesthetics,
all of which are an aspect of societal process., and are central to human
communication. Thus the role of language in the construction of reality
cannot be undermined or minimised. In fact without effective communication,
sharing of information, ideas and knowledge, there is no culture in a society.
Language in it widest sense is a tool par excellence in the hands of society,
and with its help both the subjective and objective aspects of socially
constructed reality come together and cohere. It can also provide alternative
models for reality construction. And in plural societies different communities
or groups do have the capacity to raise appropriate models of reality, which
then act back on that community creating a two way bridge for
communication.
4.11 Conclusion
The whole question then is that of the internalisation of the social reality,
both objective and subjective, and this happens as a dialectic between
man and his social structure. In fact the entire idea is to strike a balance
between nature and culture if the persistence of the social reality is not to
be disrupted. Thus successful socialisation is that in which there is a high
degree of consonance or adjustment. Between the outer and inner realities,
so that the human is an active participator in social process rather than
being simply at the mercy of societal procedures and rules.
At this point we reach a caveat and this is the fact that often socialisation
is not effective. This happens when the phenomena of individualism takes
root in a society and creates humans who do not subscribe wholly to the
social order and social reality. In such instances we find that there are
various socially available procedures to bring the deviants from the overall
ideology back to the common fold. Such is the role of counselors, psychiatrists,
shamans saints and others.
We may ask at this point why socialisation does not work in many cases?
One reason could be the fact that the concerned human child is being
subjected to two different discourses on the social reality. Thus if husband
and wife are not consonant in their behaviour it the child or children which
are now unable to adopt in to any existing discourse on reality and may have
two or more systems in their consciousness. Such instances may often turn
so serious, and the deviance is so disruptive of social process that such
members may have to be isolated in a hospital to help them get over their
conflict and confusion regarding the apprehension of one single reality, usually
backed by the dominant version of reality.
This is a fascinating area of research, and we find that problems of internalising

the social structure by members is becomingly increasingly difficult in the
modern and postmodern worlds, where the stress on individuality is very
great. Individuality implies putting ones own perspective in the place of the
given perspective of social reality. This usually causes a rupture in the socially 53

Approaching Sociological accepted definition of reality where all members are supposed to be
Theory
integrated and cohere and cooperate with each other. Instead in present
day global society what is valued above all is creative integrity, and this
implies evolving some basic model or paradigm which is not really subscribing
to the total paradigm but to a very specific and important part of it. This
implies that we can study the social construction of reality in different
ways, and modern man is realizing increasingly that individual or community
interpretations of social reality and social order, are not to be rectified,
except in extreme situations, where it is not a dissonance with society but
a breakdown of the entire edifice of social reality. However as all plural
societies indicate plural versions of reality will dominate so long as the social
structure is capable of taking the strain. In fact now-a-days the move is
away from monolithic models of societal explanation to micro models of
social behaviour.

Berger, Peter, and Thomas Luckmann 1967, The Social Construction of Reality.
New York : Doublesay.
Garfinkel, Harold 1967, Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs :
Prentice Hall.
Goffman, Erving 1959, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York:
Doubleday.
Schutz, Alfred 1932/67, The Phenomenology of Social World. Evanston, Hl:
Northwestern University Press.
54

Unit 5
Concept and Theories of Structure
Contents
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Organic Analogy and Structure
5.3 Social Structure is a Reality: A.R. Radcliffe-Brown’s Contribution
5.4 Social Structure Refers to Relations between Groups:
The Contribution of E.E. Evans-Pritchard
5.5 Social Structure is a Model:
Contributions of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Edmund Leach
5.6 Conclusion
5.7 Further Reading
Learning Objectives
After going through this unit you will be able to
explain the concept of social structure
compare the theoretical contribution of Radcliffe-Brown and Evans Pritchard
critically discuss lrvi-strauss’s concept of structure.
5.1 Introduction
The term ‘structure’ (Latin structura from struere, to construct) was first
applied to ‘construction’. Later, during the classical period, it was used in
the scientific field of biology. To grasp the meaning of this oft-used concept
in sociology and social anthropology (and now, in other social sciences), let
us begin with the analogy of a house.
Irrespective of the type of community to which a house belongs, it is divided

into rooms, with each room set apart for conducting a particular set of
activities. For instance, one room may be used for cooking foods and keeping
raw ingredients and utensils for cooking, and it may be called the kitchen.
Another room may be used for housing the idols and pictures of sacred
deities and ancestors, and stacking sacred books and objects (such as lamps,
incense sticks, peacock feathers, etc), and it may be called the place of
worship, while another room may be used for spreading the bed, keeping
clothes, money and jewelry, storing grains, as happens in rural communities,
and it may called the bedroom. In this way, depending upon the purpose(s),
the other rooms of the house may be set aside, given some sort of
specialisation and name. Terms like ‘study room’, ‘store’, ‘guest room’,
‘toilet’, ‘bathroom’, ‘pantry’, ‘anteroom’, ‘children’s room’, etc, all indicate
the purpose for which a particular portion of the land is marked, and thus
designated. Where the tract of land is less, many of these ‘rooms’ may not
be there, but rather different corners of the same room may be associated
with different tasks and activities, so one of its sides may be used for
cooking, while another, for keeping deities.
Different rooms of a house are all interconnected. Passages, alleyways, and

corridors link different rooms, thus facilitating mobility from one part to the
other. Entry to rooms is through doors and their connection with the outside
world is through doors, windows and ventilators. When all of them are shut, 57

Social Structure as a the room becomes a well-demarcated and closed unit, bearing little interaction
Sociological Concept
with the external world, and when open, it is constantly interacting with
the other parts of the house. Each room has its own boundary, its
distinctiveness, which separates it from other rooms. At the same time, it
is not an ‘isolated entity’, for it is defined (as a bed room or study room)
as a distinct entity in relation to the other rooms, which are also defined
distinctly. In other words, the ‘wholeness of the room’, looking from one
point of view, by stationing oneself in the room, is juxtaposed to ‘its being
a part of the house’, when one looks at it by situating oneself outside it.
Pursuing this analogy further, a village or a neighbourhood may be described

as an aggregate of houses, where each village or neighbourhood maintains
its ‘wholeness’, at the same time, it is a part of the larger units. Each village
or neighbourhood maintains its boundary, its identity, and also, has several
connections (quite like the passages, alleyways, and corridors) with other
villages or neighbourhoods. The relevant concepts that emerge from this
analogy are of the ‘whole’, the ‘interconnections’, the ‘boundary-maintaining
mechanisms’, the ‘aggregation’, and the ‘vantage point of the observer’.
Like a house (or a village or a neighbourhood), a society may be conceptualised

(or imagined) as consisted of parts. One needs to begin with this analogy,
because society does not have the kind of concreteness one finds in a house,
village, or neighbourhood. In fact, the method of analogy is useful for trying
to know the unknown through the known. One knows what a house is, what
it looks like, and by extending its model, one tries to formulate a tentative
idea of society. However, it should not be forgotten that analogy is not
homology: the idea that society is like a house does not imply that society
is a house. Thus, after drawing similarities between a society and a house,
one should also look at the differences between them, for such an exercise
will direct us to the uniqueness of society – the distinct properties of society.
In their attempts to formulate the idea of society, different scholars have

adopted different analogies. Herbert Spencer (1873) is one of the first ones
to use the analogy of building, with which we have also begun. But of all the
analogies that were used in the formative stage of sociology to comprehend
the idea of society, the most frequently used analogy has been of the
organism: Society is like an organism (Rex 1961). In addition to the analogy
of building, Spencer also develops the organic analogy, believing that this
analogy will be greatly valid if we are able to show not only that society is
like an organism but also that ‘organism is like society’ (see Barnes, H.E.
1948; Harris 1968). Why organic analogy is used more than other analogies –
such as of the solar system, and later, of atomic and chemical systems – is
because an organism is far more concrete than other systems, and is easy
to understand, comprehend, and explain. This analogy was basic to the
understanding of the concept of social structure, a term used for the first
time by Spencer.
In this unit, we will explore the meaning of the term structure and then go
on to examining the contributions of Radcliffe-Brown, Evans Pritchard and
Levi-Strauss to the understanding of social structure.
5.2 Organic Analogy and Structure

The principal unit of an organism is a cell, which combines with others of
58 its kind to form a tissue. An aggregate of tissues is an organ, and an aggregate

of organs is an organism. Thus, an organism can be broken down into organs, Concept and
Theories of Structure
an organ into tissues, a tissue into cells, and from the latter, one of them
can be taken up for study. In a similar fashion, the basic unit of society is
a ‘socialised individual’, one who has internalized the norms and values, and
the ways of meaningful social behaviour. A collectivity of individuals is a
group, and several of them combine together to form a community. An
aggregate of communities is called society. As in the case of organism, a
society can be broken down into communities, which in turn can be divided
into groups, and groups into individuals.
Organic analogy is quite useful as a starting point, but it should not be

regarded as an end in itself, for it breaks down at many levels. For instance,
a single cell can survive; there are organisms made up of single cells. But no
individual can survive alone; the most elemental unit of human society is a
dyad, i.e., a group of two individuals. Aristotle had said long time back: ‘One
who lives alone is either a beast or god.’ Organic analogy helps us to
understand the concepts of society and its structure, but it should not blind
us to the specificities of society, not found in other systems of natural and
biological world.
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (1999) gives three meanings of the
term structure: 1) the way in which something is organised, built, or put
together (e.g., the structure of the human body); 2) a particular system,
pattern, procedure, or institution (e.g., class structure, salary structure);
and 3) a thing made up of several parts put together in a particular way
(e.g., a single-storey structure). When a sociologist speaks of structure, he
has all the three meanings in his mind. By structure, he means an
‘interconnectedness’ of parts, i.e., the parts of a society are not isolated
entities, but are brought together in a set of relationships to which the
term structure may be used.
Everything has a structure. Unless it is there, the entity will not be able to
carry out any tasks; it will not be able to work. When its structure breaks
down, or is jeopardized, it stops working, becomes inert, thereby affecting
the activities of the other systems because they are all interconnected. Why
the parts are connected in particular manner is because of the logical and
rational relationship between them. For those who regard structure as an
important analytical concept, the world is an organized entity; it comprises
interconnected parts, where each part is to be studied in relationship with
other parts. To sum up: ‘Structure refers to the way in which the parts of
an entity are interconnected so that the entity emerges as an integrated
whole, which for the purpose of analysis can be broken down into individual
parts.’
No dispute exists in sociology with respect to the idea that structure means
an ‘interconnectedness of parts’, but it exists as to the identity of these
parts – whether these parts are individuals, or groups, or roles, or institutions,
or messages. In other words, the question is: Which of these parts should
receive our primary attention? Second, a difference of opinion exists whether
the structure is an empirical entity, something that can be seen and observed,
or is an abstraction, arrived at from the regularity and consistency of human
behaviour. Around these two ideas are built different theories of social
structure. Robert Merton (1975) is quite right in saying that the notion of
social structure is ‘polyphyletic and polymorphous’, i.e., it has many meanings
and ideas. 59

Social Structure as a
Sociological Concept 5.3 Social Structure is a Reality: A.R. Radcliffe-
Brown’s Contribution
As said earlier, Spencer coined the term social structure, but did not offer
a theoretical perspective on it, except for advancing the analogy between
societies and organisms, which influenced later scholars in developing the
concepts of structure and function. For instance, Émile Durkheim (1938
[1895]), although a staunch critic of Spencer, was greatly attracted to organic
analogy, and said that the idea of function in social sciences was based on
analogy between the living organism and society. He used the term ‘social
morphology’, by which he meant what we mean by the term ‘social structure’.
Durkheim’s sociology exercised an indelible impact on the British social

anthropologist, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, who was a student of the diffusionist
W.H.R. Rivers, and had carried out his first-hand fieldwork with the Andaman
Islanders from 1906 to 1908. The findings of this field study were first
submitted in the form of an M.A. dissertation in 1910. Subsequently, it was
reworked for a book published in 1922 titled The Andaman Islanders, which
is regarded as one of the first important books leading to the foundation of
the functional approach. Besides his contribution to what he called the
‘structural-functional approach’, one of his important contributions was to
the understanding of the concept of social structure. As said previously,
there are scholars prior to Radcliffe-Brown who had used the term social
structure, but it was Radcliffe-Brown (1952) who not only defined this concept
but also initiated a debate on it. Throughout his teaching, he emphasised
the importance of the study of social structure. This submission of Radcliffe-
Brown was closely linked to his notion of social anthropology, which he was
quite willing to call after Durkheim, ‘comparative sociology’.
a) A Natural Science of Society

For Radcliffe-Brown (1948), social anthropology is the ‘theoretical natural
science of human society’. That is to say, social phenomena are investigated
by methods similar to those used in natural and biological sciences. Each of
the sciences has a subject matter that can be investigated through our
senses. Thus, the subject matter is empirical, which can be subjected to
observation. Radcliffe-Brown pursues the analogy of the natural science: all
natural sciences systematically investigate the ‘structure of the universe as
it is revealed to us through our senses’. Each branch of science deals with
a ‘certain class or kind of structures’ — for instance, atomic physics deals
with the structure of atoms, chemistry with the structure of molecules,
anatomy and physiology with the structure of organisms. Then, it moves
further with the aim to ‘discover the characteristics of all structures of that
kind’. Each science endeavours to understand a structure with which it is
concerned, and then, all the structures of that type are compared to discover
their common characteristics. All sciences move from particular to general,
from understanding a structure to understanding the structure.
If social anthropology is a natural science of society, then its subject matter

must be amenable to observation and empirical enquiry. Social structure is
what social anthropologists study; it is the province of their enquiry. It is
observable; it has a concrete reality. Radcliffe-Brown (1952) writes: ‘Social
structures are just as real as are individual organisms.’ It is clear that Radcliffe-
Brown’s concept of social structure is tied to his natural science conception
of social anthropology.
60

b) The Content of Social Structure Concept and

When we speak of structure, we have in mind, as said earlier, some sort of
an ordered arrangement of parts or components. A piece of musical
composition has a structure, and its parts are notes. Similarly, a sentence
has a structure: its parts are words, so does a building, the parts of which
are bricks and mortar. The basic part of social structure is the person. Here,
Radcliffe-Brown (1952) makes an important distinction between an ‘individual’
and a ‘person’. As an individual, ‘he is a biological organism’, comprising a
large number of molecules organised in a complex way, which keeps on
carrying out a multitude of physiological and psychological functions till the
time he is alive. This aspect of human beings — the ‘individual’ aspect — is
an object of study for biological and psychological sciences.
As a ‘person’, the human being is a ‘complex of social relationships’. It is the

unit of study for sociologists and social anthropologists. As a person, he is
a citizen of a country, a member of a family, a supporter of a political party,
a follower of a religious cult, a worker in a factory, a resident of a
neighbourhood, and so on. Each of these positions the person occupies
denotes a social relationship, because each position is related to another
position. A person is a member of a family in relation to other members and
the set of interrelationships of the members of a family constitutes its
structure. Each person occupies, therefore, a ‘place in a social structure’.
Radcliffe-Brown uses the term ‘social personality’ for the ‘position’ a human
being occupies in a social structure. It however does not imply that the
position remains the same throughout the life of an individual, for it changes
over time. New positions are added; old are deleted. We study persons in
terms of social structure and we study social structures in terms of persons
who are the unit of what it is composed.
Society is not a ‘haphazard conjunction of persons’, rather an organised

system where norms and values control the relationships between persons.
A person knows how he is expected to behave according to these norms and
values, and is ‘justified in expecting that other persons should do the same.’
Radcliffe-Brown includes the following two aspects within the social structure:
1) All social relations of person to person, i.e., interpersonal relations. For
example, the kinship structure of any society consists a number of dyadic
relations, such as father and son, mother and daughter, mother’s brother
and sister’s son, etc.
2) The differentiation of individuals and of classes by their social role. For
instance, the relation between men and women, chief and commoners,
employers and employees, etc, are aspects of social structure, for they
determine social relations between people.
In both cases, we are in fact concerned with relations between persons,

which norms and values of that society condition.
Bringing these together, Radcliffe-Brown says that social structure is that

concrete reality that comprises the ‘set of actually existing relations at a
given moment of time, which link together certain human beings.’ We can
conduct direct observation on social structure – we can see the ‘actually
existing relations’, describe and classify them, and understand the relations
of persons with others. Social structure is observable, empirical, and fully
amenable to study by methods of natural and biological sciences.
61

Social Structure as a c) Structural Type
When a social anthropologist carries out his fieldwork in a particular,
territorially defined, society, what he actually investigates is its social
structure, i.e., ‘an actually existing concrete reality, to be directly observed.’
But from what he observes, he abstracts a general picture of that society.
In this context, Radcliffe-Brown makes a distinction between ‘social structure’
and ‘structural type or form’. This distinction is also related with Radcliffe-
Brown’s conception of science, and of social anthropology as a ‘natural
science of society’. He says that as distinguished from history (or biography),
science is not concerned with the particular or unique. It is concerned,
rather, with the general, with propositions that apply to the entire
phenomenon. We are concerned with, he says, ‘the form of the structure’.
Say, in the study of an Australian tribe, an anthropologist is concerned with

the relationship between the mother’s brother and sister’s son. He observes
several instances of this relationship in their actual context, from which he
abstracts its ‘general or normal’ form, which is largely invariant. If social
structure is bound by factors of time and space, varying from one context
to another, structural type is general and invariant.
Social structure continues over time, a kind of continuity that Radcliffe-

Brown calls ‘dynamic continuity’. It is like the ‘organic structure of a living
body’. As a living body constantly renews itself by replacing its cells and
energy level, in the same way, the actual ‘social life renews the social
structure.’ Relations between people change over time. New members are
recruited in a society because of birth or immigration. While the social
structure changes over time, there remains an underlying continuity and
relative constancy, which designates its structural form.

What does Radlliffe-Brown mean by dynamic continuity?
This certainly does not imply that the structural form is static — it also
changes, sometimes gradually, sometimes with suddenness, as happens in
cases of revolution. But even then, some kind of a continuity of structure
is maintained. Our job as sociologists and social anthropologists is to discover
the structural form of society. It is to move from particular to general, or in
the language of Radcliffe-Brown, from ‘ideographic’ to ‘nomothetic’. While
the former designates a specific social structure, the latter is the structural
form. While the former requires an intensive study of a single society, the
latter is an abstraction of the form of that society. Also, the study of a single
society needs to be compared with similar studies of other societies. This
process, systematically carried out, can lead us to the discovery of general
laws that apply to human society as a whole.
For Radcliffe-Brown, the various steps of reaching the general laws are:
1) Intensive study of a social structure using the standard anthropological
procedures.
2) Abstraction from this its structural type.
3) Comparing the structural type of a social structure with the structural
types of other social structures, by rigorously using the comparative
method.
62

4) Arriving at the laws of society, the invariant propositions that explain Concept and
human behaviour in diverse social situations.
For Radcliffe-Brown, there is only one method of social anthropology, i.e.,

the comparative method, for it helps us to move from the particular to the
general. Social structure is what we study, but what we arrive at is the
structural type.
d) Society and Social Structure

Radcliffe-Brown’s attempt was praiseworthy, for it was the first rigorous
attempt to define the concept of social structure, rather than just taking
its meaning for granted. However, it led to many questions and confusions.
If social structure is a collectivity of interpersonal relations, real and
observable, then what is society? Do we study society and find its structure?
In his letter to Claude Lévi-Strauss, Radcliffe-Brown gave the following
example: ‘When I pick up a particular sea-shell on the beach, I recognize it
as having a particular structure’ (see Kuper, ed., 1977). The question that
immediately comes in our mind is: What do I study? The seashell or its
structure? Pursuing the example further, Radcliffe-Brown says: ‘I may find
other shells of the same species which have a similar structure, so that I can
say there is a form of structure characteristic of the species.’ Here, do I
describe the structure of each of these shells and then subject their structures
to comparison? Or, do I assume that since they all happen to be seashells,
they will have a similar structure?
Further, Radcliffe-Brown writes: ‘By examining a number of different species,

I may be able to recognize a certain general structural form or principle, that
of a helix, which could be expressed by means of logarithmic equation.’ Do
I compare different species of seashells to arrive at their general structural
form? Or, do I compare the structural forms of each of the species of seashells
to reach at a structural form that is common to all? These questions clearly
show that while there is no confusion between the categories of particular
and general, confusion prevails with respect to the distinction between
‘society’ and ‘social structure’, ‘social life’ and ‘social structure’, and the
‘structural form’ of a social structure and the ‘structural form’ of social
structures. One more observation: what Radcliffe-Brown understands by the
term ‘structural type’ is what many understand by the term ‘social structure’.
And, what Radcliffe-Brown calls ‘social structure’ is what many would call
‘society’.
5.4 Social Structure Refers to Relations Between

Groups: The Contribution of E.E. Evans-
Pritchard
Radcliffe-Brown’s paper on social structure, originally the Presidential Address
to the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland in 1940,
referred to Evans-Pritchard’s idea of social structure. While Radcliffe-Brown
did not disagree with Evans-Pritchard’s use of social structure, he found it
more useful to include under the term social structure a good deal more than
what Evans-Pritchard had included. Evans-Pritchard delineated his concept
of social structure in the last section of the last chapter of his book, The
Nuer (1940).
Evans-Pritchard carried out a piece of intensive fieldwork with the Nuer of 63

Social Structure as a the Sudan. In his first monograph on them, he tried to describe Nuer society
on a more abstract plane of analysis than was usual at that time because of
a lack of a proper theory. Evans-Pritchard looked for such a theory in his
work on the Nuer, although many of his ideas that exercised impact on
sociology and social anthropology developed later.
In his monograph on the Nuer, he first gives an account of the importance

of cattle for the life of the people he had studied. The ecological system in
which they find themselves conditions their territorial distribution and
transhumance. The Nuer concepts of time and space arise largely from their
patterns of livelihood. Then, Evans-Pritchard examines the territorial sections
which form their political system, in the absence of a centralised political
authority. The Nuer are a good example of a stateless (or, acephalous) society.
Their discussion has given rise to the concept of segmentary political system,
where social order is largely a function of the opposition and balance of
different sections of society.
Evans-Pritchard’s description of the elements of Nuer society and their

interrelationship guided him to the concept of social structure. Instead of
beginning with the idea of person, as did Radcliffe-Brown, he began with
viewing social structure in terms of groups. To quote him (1940: 262):
By social structure we mean relations between groups which have a high

degree of consistency and constancy.
Structure is an ‘organised combination of groups’. Individuals come and go,

they are recruited and eliminated over time, but the groups remain the
same, for ‘generation after generation of people pass through them’ (1940:
262). The processes of life and death condition individuals, but the structure
of society endures. It is clear that for Evans-Pritchard, social structure deals
with units which are largely invariant, i.e., groups. What Radcliffe-Brown
means by ‘structural form’ is what Evans-Pritchard means by ‘social structure’.
The groups considered for describing social structure may be called ‘structural
groups’ – the examples of which among the Nuer are territorial groups,
lineages and age-sets.
Evans-Pritchard does not consider the family as a ‘structural group’. It is

because he thinks that the family does not have the kind of consistency and
constancy which other groups have. A family disappears at the death of its
members and a new family comes into existence. However, it does not imply
that the family is less important, for it is ‘essential for the preservation of
the structure’ (1940: 262). New members are born into family, which maintain
the system and its continuity. This formulation of structure, Evans-Pritchard
clarifies, does not imply that the groups — consistent and constant — that
constitute the structure are static. Territorial, lineage and age-set systems
do change, but slowly, and ‘there is always the same kind of interrelationship
between their segments.’
Reflecting on the example of the Nuer, Evans-Pritchard says that the tribe
is not a haphazard congregation of residential units. Every local group is
segmented, and these segments are fused in relation to other groups. Because
of this, each unit can only be defined in terms of the whole system. One
may conceptualise a society as a ‘system of groups’ in which relations exist
between ‘groups of persons’, and these relations are structural relations.
64 Thus, structure is a ‘relation between groups’. These relations can be spoken

of in terms of a system. Evans-Pritchard considers kinship relations as a Concept and

kinship system; or, one may speak of political relations as a political system.
This brings us to the issue of defining a group. For Evans-Pritchard, a group

is a congregation of people who consider themselves as a distinct unit in
relation to the other units. The members of a group have a discernible sense
of identity and they are defined so by other groups. Among the members of
a group exist reciprocal obligations. They are expected to fuse together
whenever they encounter an issue pertaining to their group or one of its
members. The ‘vengeance groups’ are formed on this basis. Their aim is to
avenge the death of one of their members. In a case of homicide, the
members of the group of the slain become one as opposed to the members
of the group of the slayer, thus emerge two ‘structurally equivalent and
mutually opposed groups’. In this sense, the segments of a tribe, a lineage,
and an age-set are all examples of groups. However, a man’s kindred does not
constitute a group, and so do the members of a neighbouring tribe or the
strangers.
To sum up: for Evans-Pritchard, the parts of social structure, among which
structural relations are to be described, are groups that endure over time.
Social structure is not an empirical entity for him. From the study of the
social relations of people, we move on to an understanding of their groups.
When we describe the relations between groups, we are already on our way
of describing their social structure. Therefore, social structure is an
anthropologist’s abstraction from the existing reality. It should be kept in
mind here that for Evans-Pritchard (1951), social anthropology is not a branch
of natural science, as it is for Radcliffe-Brown, but it is a kind of historiography.
Its kinship is with history, and not natural and biological sciences.
5.5 Social Structure is a Model: Contributions of

Claude Lévi-Strauss and Edmund Leach
Perhaps the most provocative and debatable contribution to the concept of
social structure was that of Claude Lévi-Strauss, the French structuralist,
who is famous for his ingenious cross-cultural analysis of myths and kinship
systems. If for functionalism, society is a ‘kind of living creature’, consisting
of parts, which can be ‘dissected and distinguished’, for structuralism, it is
the analogy from language that helps us in conceptualizing society. From the
study of a given piece of language, the linguist tries to arrive at its grammar,
the underlying rules which make an expression meaningful, although the
speakers of that language may not know about it. Similarly, the structuralist
from a given piece of social behaviour tries to infer its underlying structure.
In structuralism, the shift is from observable behaviour to structure, from
organic analogy to language (Barnard 2000).
Further, structuralism submits that the set of relations between different

parts can be transformed into ‘something’ that appears to be different from
what it was earlier. It is the idea of transformation — of one into another
— that lies at the core of structuralism, rather than the quality of relations.
Edmund Leach (1968: 486) has given a good example to illustrate this. A piece
of music can be transformed in a variety of ways. It is written down, played
on a piano, recorded on a phonographic record, transmitted over the radio,
and finally played back to the audience. In each case, the piece of music
passes through a ‘whole series of transformations’. It appears as ‘printed
notes, as a pattern of finger movements, as sound waves, as modulations of 65

Social Structure as a the grooves on a piece of bakelite, as electromagnetic vibrations, and so
on.’ But what is common to all these manifestations of music, one different
from the other, and each conditioned by its own rules, is their structure. In
a similar fashion, while different societies vary, what remains invariant (and
common) to them is their structure. Lévi-Strauss (1963) aptly showed this in
one of his studies where he compared the totemic society of the Australian
Aborigines with Indian caste system, and found that both of them had the
same structure. If for Radcliffe-Brown, structure is observable, for Lévi-
Strauss, it is an abstract concept. If for Radcliffe-Brown, what persists is the
‘structure’ of a particular society, at a particular point of time and place, for
Lévi-Strauss, what persists is the ‘structure of the entire human society’
(Barnes, R.H. 2001).
In his celebrated essay of 1953 in A.L. Kroeber’s Anthropology Today, titled

‘Social Structure’, Lévi-Strauss says that social structure is not a field of
study; it is not a ‘province of enquiry’. We do not study social structure, but
it is an explanatory method and can be used in any kind of social studies.
In opposition to Radcliffe-Brown, Lévi-Strauss says that the term ‘social
structure’ has nothing to do with empirical reality. It refers to the models
that are built up from empirical reality. He writes: ‘…the object of social-
structure studies is to understand social relations with the help of models’
(1953: 532). Social structure is a model; it is a method of study.
Here, Lévi-Strauss distinguishes the concept of social structure from that of

social relations. The latter are the ‘raw data of social experience’ – they are
the relations between people, empirical and observable. It is from social
relations that models comprising the social structure are built. Although the
models are built from raw, empirical reality, they cannot be reduced to it.
The ensemble of social relations in a given society can be described, but
social structure is an anthropologist’s construction, built for the purpose of
analysis.

How does Levi-Strauss distinguish between the concept of social structure
and social relations?
Lévi-Strauss makes three distinctions: first, between observation and

experimentation on models; second, the conscious and unconscious character
of the models; and third, between mechanical and statistical models. The
observation of social relations and the construction of models after these
facts need to be distinguished from ‘experiments’ on models. By
experimentation, Lévi-Strauss means the ‘controlled comparison’ of models
of the same or of a different kind, with an intention to identify the model
that accounts best for the observed facts. In a structural analysis, the first
step is to observe the facts without any bias, then to describe them in
relationship to themselves and in relation to the whole. From this, models
are constructed, and in the final analysis, the best model is chosen. This
distinction is with reference to the anthropologist who studies society.
By comparison, the distinction between conscious and unconscious models

is made with reference to the society under study. Conscious models, also
known as ‘homemade models’ and ‘norms’, are the “insider’s models”: they
are those according to which the society views itself. Underneath these
66

models are ‘deeper structures’, the unconscious models, which the society Concept and
does not perceive directly or consciously. Anthropologists principally work
with the models that they construct from the deeper lying phenomena,
rather than with conscious models. It is because, Lévi-Strauss says, the aim
of conscious models is to ‘perpetuate the phenomena’ and not to ‘explain’
it. But, from this, we should not infer that conscious models could be
dismissed, for in some cases, they are far more accurate than those that
anthropologists build. Even when conscious models are inaccurate, they
guide us to deeper structures.
Let us now come to the last distinction. The classic formulation of mechanical
models is that they are those models which lie on the same scale as the
phenomenon is. And, when they — the model and the phenomenon — lie on
a different scale, they are called statistical models. Unfortunately, as critics
have noted, Lévi-Strauss does not explain the meaning of the ‘same scale’.
But from the example he has given, it seems that he is concerned with the
quantitative differences between ‘what people say’ and ‘what they do’. To
make it clear, Lévi-Strauss gives the example of the laws of marriage. When
there is no difference between marriage rules and social groupings — the
two are placed on the same scale — the model formed will be mechanical.
And when several factors affect the type of marriage and people have no
option but to deviate from the rule, the model formed will be statistical.
Box 5.2: Edmund Leach on Social Structure

The British anthropologist, Edmund Leach (1954, 1961), also made a
significant contribution to the idea of social structure as a model, although
there are many significant differences between the approaches of Lévi-
Strauss and Leach to structuralism. For instance, whereas Lévi-Strauss is
interested in unearthing the ‘universal structures’ – structures applicable to
all human societies at all point of time — Leach applies the method of
structuralism to understand the local (or regional) structures. Because of
this, some term Leach’s approach ‘neo-structural’ (Kuper 1996 [1973]).
Leach has formulated a conception of social structure that is “essentially the

same as Lévi-Strauss’s” (Nutini 1970: 76). Like Lévi-Strauss, Leach divides the
‘social universe’ into different epistemological categories: the raw data of
social experience (i.e., social relations) and the models that are built from
it. Models are not empirical; they are the ‘logical constructions’ in the mind
of the anthropologist. Like Lévi-Strauss, Leach also arrives at the distinction
between the mechanical and statistical models, i.e., models built respectively
on ‘what people say’ and ‘what people do’, but he calls mechanical models
‘jural rules’ and statistical models ‘statistical norms’. The meaning Leach
gives to ‘jural rules’ and ‘statistical norms’ is essentially the same which
Lévi-Strauss gives to mechanical and statistical models.
But two important differences stand out. First, for Lévi-Strauss, both
mechanical and statistical models are of roughly equal analytical value and
they complement each other. For Leach, jural rules and statistical norms
should be treated as separate frames of reference. In an analysis, the
statistical norms should have priority over the jural rules. We should begin
our study with the actual behaviour of people, the deviations that occur and
the conformity they achieve. Second, Leach points out that mechanical
models or jural rules are qualitative rules of behaviour. Sanctions support
67

Social Structure as a them and they have the power of coercion. Statistical models or norms are
only ‘statistical averages of individual behaviour’. They do not have any
coercive power.
5.6 Conclusion
The concept of social structure has been a ‘pleasant puzzle’, to remember
the words of A.L. Kroeber (1948), to which, at one time, almost every
anthropologist and sociologist tried to make a contribution, either by drawing
attention to the part (or parts) of society that seemed important to the
author, or by lending support to an already existing idea or theory of social
structure. As noted in the beginning, the debate concerning social structure
has centered around two issues: (1) Among which parts of society are there
structural relations? And, (2) is social structure ‘real’ or a ‘model’ which the
investigator constructs? Of the two major opinions on social structure, Lévi-
Strauss’s is closely connected to his method of structuralism – social structure
is a ‘model’ devised for undertaking the study of social behaviour (relations
and experiences). For Radcliffe-Brown, social structure is an ‘empirical’ entity,
constituting the subject matter of social anthropology and sociology. In his
letter to Lévi-Strauss, Radcliffe-Brown expressed his disagreement with the
former’s concept of social structure and the confusion clouding the idea of
social structure as a ‘model’. Radcliffe-Brown also thought that what meant
by the term ‘structural type’ was what Lévi-Strauss’s term ‘model’ implied
(see Kuper, ed, 1977).
A concept of social structure that the Australian anthropologist, S.F. Nadel,

proposes tries to combine the views of both Radcliffe-Brown and Lévi-Strauss.
In his posthumously published The Theory of Social Structure (1957), Nadel
disagrees with Radcliffe-Brown’s idea that social structure is an observable
entity, but an abstraction from it. At the same time, he rejects Lévi-Strauss’s
view that social structure has nothing to do with empirical reality. From
Radcliffe-Brown, he borrows the idea that each person occupies a position
in the social structure, but from an empirical level of inter-personal interaction,
he moves to a level of abstraction where the person becomes the actor who
plays a role with respect to the others. This abstraction, however, does not
imply that it loses touch with reality. Nadel (1957: 150) writes:
I consider social structure, of whatever degree of refinement, to be still the

social reality itself, or an aspect of it, not the logic behind it…
For Nadel, the components of social structure are roles and the pattern (or
design) of interconnected roles constitutes the social structure of a society.
His definition of social structure is as follows (1957: 12):
We arrive at the structure of a society through abstracting from the concrete

population and its behaviour the pattern or network (or ‘system’) of
relationships obtaining ‘between actors in their capacity of playing roles
relative to one another’.
Besides Nadel, some other sociologists have also emphasised the importance
of roles in defining social structure. Parsons (1961), for example, says that
the structure of a social system is defined with respect to the ‘institutionalized
patterns of normative culture’. Norms vary according to, first, the position
of actors in interactive situations, and second, the type of activity. Norms
68 define roles, with the corresponding rules of behaviour, and they also

constitute the institutions. The aim of social structure is to regulate human Concept and
behaviour. In his conception of social structure, Peter Blau (1977) also speaks
of the ‘social positions among which a population is distributed.’ Some of
these concepts of social structure have been put to test in empirical situation.
For instance, Blau and Schwartz (1984) applied Blau’s ideas to understand
real life.
5.7 Further Reading

Barnard, Alan. 2000. History and Theory in Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Harris, Marvin. 1968. The Rise of Anthropological Theory, A History of Theories
of Culture. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.
Merton, R.K. 1975. Structural Analysis in Sociology. In P.M. Blau (ed),
Approaches to the Study of Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
Nadel, S.F. 1957. The Theory of Social Structure. London: Cohen & West Ltd.
References
University Press.
Barnes, H.E. 1948. Historical Sociology: Its Origins and Development. New
York: Philosophical Library.
Barnes, R.H. 2001. Structuralism. In N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (eds),
International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Elsevier
(pp. 15222-15225).
Blau, P.M. 1977. Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social
Structure. New York: Free Press.
Blau, P.M. and J. Schwartz. 1984. Cross-cutting Social Circles. Orlando, CA:
Academic Press.
Durkheim, Émile. 1938 [1895]. The Rules of the Sociological Method. New
York: Free Press.
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1940. The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood
and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
_________________, 1951. Social Anthropology: The Broadcast Lectures.
London: Cohen & West.
Kroeber, A.L. 1948. Anthropology. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Kuper, Adam. 1996 [1973]. Anthropologists and Anthropology: The Modern
British School. London: Routledge.
Kuper, Adam (ed). 1977. The Social Anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Leach, Edmund R. 1954. Political Systems of Highland Burma. Boston: Beacon
Press.
_________________, 1961. Rethinking Anthropology. London: Athlone Press.
_________________, 1968. Social Structure. In International Encyclopedia of
Social Sciences, Volume 14. McMillan Co. and Free Press (pp. 482-489).
69

Social Structure as a Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1953. Social Structure. In A.L. Kroeber (ed.), Anthropology
Today. Chicago: Chicago University Press (pp. 524-553).
_________________, 1963. The Bear and the Barber. Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 93: 1-11.
Merton, R.K. 1975. Structural Analysis in Sociology. In P.M. Blau (ed),
Approaches to the Study of Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
Nadel, S.F. 1957. The Theory of Social Structure. London: Cohen & West Ltd.
Nutini, Hugo G. 1970. Some Considerations on the Nature of Social Structure
and Model Building: A Critique of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Edmund Leach. In
E. Nelson Hayes and Tanya Hayes (eds.), Claude Lévi-Strauss, The
Anthropologist as Hero. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press (pp. 70-122).
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. 1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parsons, Talcott. 1961. An Outline of the Social System. In Talcott Parsons, E.
Shils, K.D. Naegele, and J.R. Pitts (eds), Theories of Society, Foundations of
Modern Sociological Theory. New York: Free Press of Glancoe (pp. 30-79).
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. 1922. The Andaman Islanders. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
_________________, 1948. A Natural Science of Society. New York: Free Press.
_________________, 1952. Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays
and Addresses. London: Cohen & West.
Rex, John. 1961. Key Problems of Sociological Theory. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Spencer, Herbert. 1873. The Study of Sociology. New York: D. Appleton.
70

Unit 6
Structure and Function
Contents
6.1 Introduction
6.2 From Positivism to Functionalism
6.3 The Premises of Functionalism
6.4 Functionalism in Social Anthropology: Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski
6.5 Functionalism of Talcott Parsons and Robert K.Merton
6.6 Conclusion
6.7 Further Reading
Learning Objectives
After going through this unit, you will be able to
explain the premises of functionalism
discuss the relevance of the concept of function in understanding society
compare and contrast the theoretical approach of Radcliffe-brown,
Malinowski and parsons.
6.1 Introduction
Functionalism is the name of an approach in social anthropology and sociology
according to which a society is a whole of interconnected parts, where each
part contributes to the maintenance of the whole. The task of sociology is
to find out the contribution of each part of society and how society works
together as an ordered arrangement of parts. Literally, the word ‘function’
(from Latin, fungi, functio, to effect, perform, execute) means ‘to perform’
or ‘to serve’ (a purpose). In the field of architecture, it implies that a form
should be adapted to usage and material. In areas such as politics and
management, it means ‘getting things to work’. The word is used in
mathematics (in the sense of ‘A is a function of B’); it is used in everyday
conversation, where it may mean ‘job’ or ‘purpose’ (for instance, ‘What is
your function in the office’?). In fact, what I am asking in the latter question
is ‘what do you do in your office’, and for the act of doing I am using the
word ‘function’. This word is also used for celebrations and festal occasions,
such as ‘inaugural function’, ‘marriage function’, etc. In other words, ‘function’
is a multi-meaning and multi-usage term. Levy, Jr. (1968: 22) writes: ‘Perhaps
the major difficulty associated with the general concept of function has
been the use of a single term to cover several distinctly different referents.’
As a distinct approach, as a way of looking at and analysing society,

functionalism emerged first in social anthropology in early twentieth century,
and later in sociology, beginning in the 1930s. However, its roots are as
ancient as the concept of organic analogy, used in the philosophy of Antiquity
by Plato (B.C. 428/7-345/7) and Aristotle (B.C. 384-322). The concept of
‘purpose’ or ‘end’ goes back to Aristotle’s reference to the telos (purpose)
of things as their final cause. The idea of a latent telos is also found in Adam
Smith’s metaphor of the ‘invisible hand’ as the automatic mechanism that
maximises wealth, individual welfare, and economic efficiency through the
increase in labour. It is from telos that the word ‘teleology’ has come, which
means that ‘everything is determined by a purpose’ and the scholars should
find out what that purpose is. 71

Social Structure as a Some writers regard Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century scholar, writing after the French Revolution, as the
‘father of sociology’, because in his writings, one finds a coexistence of two
ideas — one from which a scientific study of society emerged, and the other
which contributed substantially to the growth of Marxian theory (Giddens
1973). The first idea is that ‘scientific methods’ should be used for the study
of society, and the second is that each society contains in it the germs of
its contradiction, because of which it changes over time. Saint-Simon also
recognises revolution as an important process of change.
It is the first thought of studying a society scientifically that Auguste Comte

(1789-1857), the collaborator of Saint-Simon and the person who has coined
the term ‘sociology’, fully develops under the rubric of what he calls
‘positivism’ or ‘positive philosophy’. In this view, the methods for the study
of society come from natural and biological sciences. The aim of the study
is to discover the ‘laws of evolution’ as well as the ‘laws of functioning’ of
society, i.e., ‘how has the society evolved with the passage of time and
what are the various stages through which it has passed’ and ‘how does the
society function (or work) at a particular point of time.’ The knowledge thus
generated, Comte thinks, will help us to bring about desirable changes in
society, in carrying out the tasks of social reconstruction and amelioration.
Comte’s aim is to make sociology a ‘science of society’, quite like the
natural and biological sciences, and assign it a place in the hierarchy of
sciences. For Comte, being the most general and most specific subject,
sociology occupies the summit of the hierarchy of sciences: it is the ‘queen
of sciences’.
In this unit we expose the concept of function in sociological writings. We

begin with the basic premises of functionalism and them look into the
theoretical contributions of Radcliffe-Brown, Malinowski, and Parsons.
6.2 From Positivism to Functionalism

The thesis of functionalism lies in the philosophy of positivism. Comte also
makes use of the analogy of society as an organism. Organic analogy has
aided the viewing of society as a system of interrelated parts, a view basic
to the functional approach. The immediate forerunner of functionalism in
sociology is Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), who is a sharp critic of Comte as
well as influenced by his ideas, for which he has earned in the words of Alvin
Gouldner (1973) the distinction of being ‘uneasy Comtean’.
Like Comte, Durkheim is keenly interested in defining the subject matter of

sociology as distinct from that of philosophy or biology. For him, sociology
is a comparative and an objective study of ‘social facts’, which are the
‘ways of thinking, acting and feeling’ that have the ‘noteworthy property’
of existing outside the ‘individual consciousness’. Social facts do not originate
in the individual but in the collectivity, in the ‘collective mind’ (l’ âme
collective). Because they exist outside the individual, they can be studied
in the same way as one studies the material objects. Social facts are comme
des choses, i.e., they are ‘things’, perceived objectively and outside the
individual. This however does not mean that they are as tangible as are the
‘material things’. Instead, for their study one uses the same frame of mind
which one uses for the study of natural and biological objects that constitute
the subject matter of natural and biological sciences. Like Comte, Durkheim
72 also believes that the methods of natural and biological sciences can be used

for the study of social facts. But, these methods are not to be used as they Structure and Function
are, rather their suitable application to the science of social facts should be
thoughtfully and critically investigated. Durkheim’s book titled The Rules of
the Sociological Method (1895) was basically concerned with these issues.
Box 6.1: Sociological Explanations

From the study of social facts, sociologists offer what Durkheim calls
‘sociological explanations’. Each sociological explanation is consisted of two
parts: to quote Durkheim (1895: 123) here: ‘…to explain a social phenomenon
the efficient cause which produces it and the function it fulfills must be
investigated separately.’ The first component of the sociological explanation
is the ‘causal-historical explanation’: to delineate the cause(s) which produce
a phenomenon by examining historical sources rather than indulging in what
Radcliffe-Brown calls ‘conjectural history’. The second component is
‘functional’, i.e., the contribution that a part makes to society ‘in the
establishment of…general harmony’ (Durkheim 1895: 125).
Durkheim’s definition of function has tremendously influenced the writings

of later functionalists, both in social anthropology and sociology. For him,
function is the ‘contribution’ a part makes to the whole for its ‘maintenance
and well being’. Thus, function is a ‘positive contribution’: it is inherently
good for society (the whole), for it ensures its continuity and healthy
maintenance. By making its contribution, each part fulfills one of the needs
or needs (besoin) of society. Once needs have been fulfilled, society will be
able to survive and endure. Durkheim applies this framework of social function
in all his studies.
For instance, in his doctoral work, which was on the division of labour,
Durkheim (1893) rejects Darwin’s idea that once the size of a human
population increases, there will be a struggle for existence and those who
happen to be fit will survive, while the rest will be eliminated. Instead of
lending support to the theory of competition, conflict and elimination,
Durkheim shows that as human population increases, society becomes more
and more differentiated with the division of labour moving towards the
specialisation of jobs. Rather than competing with others for survival, human
beings are able to depend on one another, for each specialises in a particular
work. Specialisation makes each one of the beings important for society.
Durkheim also rejects the explanations of the division of labour that

economists and psychologists had advanced – such as ‘the division of labour
increases economic efficiency and productivity’, or ‘it induces happiness’,
or its opposite, ‘it makes people bored with their jobs’. He is critical of the
utilitarian (i.e., economic) and individualistic (i.e., psychological) explanations,
because according to him none of them actually explains the real function
of the division of labour, the contribution it makes to society. For him, the
function of the division of labour is sociological: it contributes to social
solidarity. Modern industrial society is integrated because of the
interdependence that comes into existence with the specialisation of jobs.
In his study of Australian totemism, he shows that the function of religion
is to produce solidarity in society, ‘to bind people in a moral community
called church’ (Durkheim 1915).
Durkheim is particularly interested in showing that the function of social

facts is moral. Social institutions work to produce the goal of integration. 73

Social Structure as a With this perspective, he is able to account for the phenomena that to
many may appear ‘unhealthy’ for society. For example, he regards crime as
a ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ feature of all societies, because it reinforces collective
sentiments and works towards the evolution of morality and law. He argues
that the existence of criminal behaviour constitutes an index of the flexibility
of society. A normal rate of crime indicates that the society lacks the total
authority to ‘suppress’ all ‘divergences’ of the individual. Crime shows the
existence of social conditions that enable individuals to express them as
‘individuals’. However, if crime exceeds the normal limits, then it becomes
unhealthy (or ‘pathological’), jeopardizing the normal functioning of society.
As is clear, Durkheim distinguishes between the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’
forms of social facts. What is general in a society is normal and what is not
is pathological. The former performs the function of integrating society,
whereas the latter, thwarts the process of integration. Therefore, it needs
to be brought under control with the help of concerted collective action.
Durkheim is also in favour of undertaking the attempts towards social
amelioration, but they should follow a rigorous sociological study of the
phenomenon.
6.3 The Premises of Functionalism

Durkheim is not a ‘functionalist’ in the sense in which this term has come
to be used for the approach that the British social anthropologists, A.R.
Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), have
espoused. Durkheim does not use the term ‘functionalism’, although he
defines the concept of social function, as we noted previously, and the
second part of his sociological explanation deals with the functional
explanation. One comes across in Durkheim’s works a fine coexistence of
the diachronic (genetic, evolutionary, and historical) and the synchronic
(society ‘here and now’) approaches to the study of society, but it is quite
clear that the study of the contemporary society occupies a preferred place
in his writings. For instance, in his celebrated study of religion, he begins
with a consideration of Australian totemism as the most elementary form of
religious life, but he does not start speculating it as the earliest form and
then, as his predecessors had done, offering theories to explain it. He is
rather more concerned with the structure and function of totemism and
how its study can help us in understanding the place of religion in complex
societies. This emphasis on the study of synchronous (or ‘present’) societies
exerted a tremendous impact on later scholars.
The beginning of the twentieth century saw the continuation of the old
evolutionary approach and also, its gradual decline. It also witnessed the rise
of functionalism. Adam Kuper (1973) thinks that 1922 was the ‘year of wonder’
(annus mirabilis) of functionalism, for in this year were published two
monographs that substantiated the functional approach. One was by Radcliffe-
Brown titled The Andaman Islanders, and the other, by Malinowski, titled
Argonauts of the Western Pacific. The impact of anthropological functionalism
was felt in other disciplines, particularly sociology. Although there were
scholars — such as Kingsley Davis (1959) — who saw nothing new in functional
approach because they thought that sociologists had always been doing
what functionalists wanted them to do, there were others (such as Talcott
Parsons) who were clearly impressed with the writings of functional
anthropologists. As a result of the writings of these people, functionalism
emerged as an extremely important approach, holding its sway till the late
74 1960s and the early 1970s. In its history of about 150 years, first in the

positivism of Comte, then in the ‘sociologistic positivism’ of Durkheim, and Structure and Function
then, in the works of the twentieth-century functionalists, functionalism

has come to comprise a number of variants and foci. Pointed differences
exist between different functionalists — in fact, some of them happen to be
archrivals, like Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski. Notwithstanding their
differences, it seems that all functionalists share the following five
propositions:
1) Society (or culture) is a system like any other system, such as solar
system, mechanical system, atomic system, chemical system, or organic
system.
2) As a system, society (or culture) consists of parts (like, institutions,
groups, roles, associations, organisations), which are interconnected,
interrelated, and interdependent.
3) Each part performs its own function — it makes its own contribution to
the whole society (or culture) — and also, it functions in relationship
with other parts.
4) A change in one part brings about a change in other parts, or at least
influences the functioning of other parts, because all the parts are
closely connected.
5) The entire society or culture — for which we can use the term ‘whole’
is greater than the mere summation of parts. It cannot be reduced to
any part, or no part can explain the whole. A society (or culture) has its
own identity, its own ‘consciousness’, or in Durkheim’s words, ‘collective
consciousness’.
6.4 Functionalism in Social Anthropology: Radcliffe-

Brown and Malinowski
The first approach in social anthropology for the analysis of society was
evolutionary, which though present earlier, in the writings of Comte and
Spencer, was almost firmly established after the publication of Charles Darwin’s
On the Origin of Species (1859). During the second half of the nineteenth
century, almost every anthropologist was concerned with two issues. First,
how was the institution (or, cultural practice, trait) established in the first
place? What has been its origin? Second, what are the various stages through
which it has passed to reach its contemporary state? Both the questions
were important and relevant, but in the absence of authentic data, the
early (or, ‘classical’) evolutionists extravagantly indulged in speculations and
conjectures, imagining the causes (or, the factors) that gave rise to
institutions and the stages of their evolution. Most of the evolutionists —
barring a few possible exceptions, such as Lewis H. Morgan and Edward B.
Tylor — had not themselves collected any data on which they based their
generalisations. They almost completely relied upon the information that
travelers, missionaries, colonial officers, and soldiers, who were in touch
with non-Western societies, provided, knowing full well that much of these
data might be biased, exaggerated, incomplete, and incorrect. Because they
themselves did not carry out any fieldwork, they earned the notorious title
of ‘arm-chair anthropologists’.
Both the founders of the British functional approach (Radcliffe-Brown and

Malinowski) were vehemently critical of the nineteenth-century evolutionism.
Radcliffe-Brown (1952) said that it was based on ‘conjectural history’, a term
we used earlier, and not ‘authentic history’. It was ‘pseudo-historical’, thus
75

Social Structure as a devoid of a scientific value. For Malinowski (1944), classical evolutionism was
a ‘limbo of conjectural reconstructions’. With the works of these scholars
came a shift from:
1) Arm-chair anthropology to fieldwork-based studies;
2) The study of the origin and stages of evolution of society and its
institutions (diachronic studies) to society ‘here and now’ (synchronic
studies);
3) The study of the entire societies and cultures (macro approach) to the
study of particular societies, especially the small-scale societies (micro
approach); and
4) An understanding of society confined to a theoretical level to putting
the knowledge of society ‘here and now’ to practical use, to bring
about desired changes in society. Rather than remaining just an ‘academic
study of the oddities of society’ — different and bizarre customs and
practices — the knowledge we have acquired should be used for improving
upon the conditions of people, for improving upon the relations of local
people with the outside world. Incidentally, Malinowski called this concern
of anthropology ‘practical anthropology’.
The scholars who later came to be known as ‘functionalists’ sought to shift

the focus of their study from ‘what society was’ to ‘what society is’, and
this study should be carried out not by speculative methods, but by living
with people in their natural habitats and learning from them, from the field.
It was not against the processes of evolution and diffusion that the
functionalists leveled their criticism, for they knew that they were important
processes of change. In fact, both Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski thought
that after they were through most of their important fieldwork-based studies,
they would take up the study of the processes of evolution and diffusion.
What they were against was a study of the past through ‘imaginative history’
rather than one based on facts. If authentic documents were available about
societies, they must readily be used for some insights into change. But the
functionalists noted that these documents were not available about ‘primitive
and pre-literate’ societies, therefore we would not have any knowledge of
the development of social institutions among them. Instead of speculating
how they have evolved, we should study ‘what they are’, using the scientific
methods of observation, comparison, and arriving at generalisations.
a) Structural-functional Approach of Radcliffe-Brown

Abandoning the search for origins and the pasts of institutions, and the
ways in which cultural traits have diffused from one part of the world to the
other, Radcliffe-Brown (1952: 180) defines each society as a ‘functionally
interrelated system’ in which ‘general laws or functions operate’. He accepts
that Durkheim offered the first systematic formulation of the concept of
function and that this concept is based on an ‘analogy between social life
and organic life’. However, with reference to Durkheim’s use of the term
‘need’ for the conditions that must be satisfied for a system to continue,
Radcliffe-Brown thinks that this term would direct us towards a postulation
of ‘universal human or societal needs’. As a consequence, the theory
according to which events and developments are meant to fulfill a purpose
and happen because of that will trap us. Known as the theory of teleology,
as we said earlier, Radcliffe-Brown suspects that functionalism might become
teleological. He thus substitutes for the word ‘need’ the term ‘necessary
76

conditions of existence.’ He believes that the question of which conditions Structure and Function
are necessary for survival is an empirical one, and the study of a society will
tell us about this. Radcliffe-Brown recognizes the ‘diversity of conditions
necessary for the survival of different systems.’ Once we have recognized
this, we shall avoid asserting that each item of a culture must have a function
and that ‘items in different cultures must have the same function’ (Turner
1987: 48).
Radcliffe-Brown dislikes the use of the word ‘functionalism’, which Malinowski

propagated with enthusiasm. His objection is that ‘-isms’ (like functionalism)
are ideologies, schools of thought, philosophies, and realms of opinions.
Science does not have either of them. What it has are the methods of study,
opting for those methods that are regarded as the best for study. A scientist
does not have any passionate relationship with any methods. For him, they
are all of equal importance and worth, but their operational value lies in
carrying out a satisfactory study of a phenomenon according to the canons
of scientific research.
Moreover, Radcliffe-Brown also looks at the distinction between an organism

and society. For instance, an organism dies, but a society continues to
survive over time, although it may be changed and transformed. An organism
can be studied even when its parts have stopped working. In other words,
the structure of an organism can be studied separately from its function,
which is not the case with society. Social structure is observable only when
it functions. Structure and function are inalienable concepts in social
anthropology; that is why Radcliffe-Brown calls his approach ‘structural-
functional’, rather than ‘functional’, as many have done. He writes (1952:
180):
The concept of function…involves the notion of a structure consisting of a

set of relations amongst unit entities, the continuity of the structure being
maintained by a life-process made up of the activities of the constituent
units.
Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functional approach comprises the following

assumptions:
1) A necessary condition for survival of a society is a minimal integration
of its parts.
2) The concept of function refers to those processes that maintain the
necessary integration or solidarity.
3) And, in each society, structural features can be shown to contribute to
the maintenance of necessary solidarity.
For Durkheim, the central concept is of solidarity, while for Radcliffe-Brown,

it is the ‘structural continuity’ of society. For example, in an analysis of the
lineage system, according to Radcliffe-Brown, one must first assume that
some minimal degree of solidarity must exist for it to continue. Then, one
must examine the processes associated with the lineage system, assessing
their consequences for maintaining social integration. One of the processes
the investigator would come across is the role of lineage systems in
adjudicating conflicts in societies where they are land-owning groups. They
define who has the right to land and through which side of the family it
would pass. In these societies, lineage is a ‘corporate group’. Descending
through these steps, one will explain the integration of the economic system. 77

Social Structure as a Then, one will move to the other systems of society, analyzing at each level
the contribution a part will make to the structural continuity of the whole.

What are the assumptions of Radcliffe-Brown’s structural functional approach?
Radcliffe-Brown is far from being dogmatic in his assertions. For him, the
functional unity (or integration) of a social system is a hypothesis. That we
look for integration and structural continuity of society does not imply that
it does not change. Radcliffe-Brown believes that the states of ‘social health’
(eunomia) and ‘social illness’ (dysnomia) constitute two ends of the
continuum, and the actual society seems to lie somewhere in between.
b) The functionalism of Malinowski

By comparison to Radcliffe-Brown, it is Malinowski who claims the creation
of a separate ‘school’, the ‘Functional School’. The aim of functional analysis
for him (1926: 132) is to arrive at the
explanation of anthropological facts at all levels of development by
their function, by the part they play within the integral system of
culture.
He (1926: 132-3) assumes that

in every civilization every custom, material object, ideas and belief
fulfills some vital function, has some task to accomplish, represents
an indispensable fact within a working whole.
Whereas Radcliffe-Brown begins with society and its necessary conditions of

existence (i.e., integration), Malinowski’s starting point is the individual,
who has a set of ‘basic’ (or ‘biological’) needs that must be satisfied for its
survival. It is because of the importance that Malinowski gives the individual
that the term ‘psychological functionalism’ is reserved for him, in comparison
to Radcliffe-Brown’s approach which is called ‘sociological functionalism’
because in this society is the key concept.
Malinowski’s approach distinguishes between three levels: the biological,

the social structural, and the symbolic (Turner 1987: 50-1). Each of these
levels has a set of needs that must be satisfied for the survival of the
individual. It is on his survival that the survival of larger entities (such as
groups, communities, societies) is dependent. Malinowski proposes that these
three levels constitute a hierarchy. At the bottom is placed the biological
system, followed next by the social-structural, and finally, by the symbolic
system. The way in which needs at one level are fulfilled will affect the way
in which they will be fulfilled at the subsequent levels.
The most basic needs are the biological, but this does not imply any kind of
reductionism, because each level constitutes its distinct properties and
needs, and from the interrelationship of different levels that culture emerges
as an integrated whole. Culture is the kernel of Malinowski’s approach. It is
‘uniquely human’, for it is not found to exist among sub-humans. Comprising
all those things — material and non-material – that human beings have made
right from the time they separated from their simian ancestors, culture has
been the instrument that satisfies the biological needs of human beings. It
is a need-serving and need-fulfilling system. Because of this role of culture
in satisfying biological needs that Malinowski’s functionalism is also known
78 as ‘bio-cultural functionalism.’

One more difference between Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski may be noted Structure and Function
here. A concept fundamental to Malinowski — the concept of culture — is a

mere epiphenomenona (secondary and incidental) for Radcliffe-Brown. He
believes that the study of social structure (which for him is an observable
entity) encompasses the study of culture; therefore, there is no need to
have a separate field to study culture. Further, whilst social structure is
concerned all about observations, what anthropologists see and hear about
the individual peoples, culture is in the minds of people, not amenable to
observation in the same way as social structure is. Radcliffe-Brown wants to
make social anthropology a branch of natural science, which would be possible
when there is an empirically investigable subject matter.

What are the major differences between the theoretical approaches of
Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski?
The basis of Malinowski’s approach is a theory of ‘vital sequences’, which

have a biological foundation and are incorporated into all societies. These
sequences number eleven, each composed of an ‘impulse’, an associated
physiological ‘act’, and a satisfaction which results from that act (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1
Impulse Act Satisfaction

1. Drive to breathe; Intake of oxygen Elimination of CO2 in
gasping for air. tissues Satiation
2. Hunger Ingestion of food Quenching
3. Thirst Absorption of liquid Detumescence
4. Sex appetite Conjugation Restoration of
muscular and nervous
energy
5. Fatigue Rest Satisfaction of
fatigue
6. Restlessness Activity Awakening with
restored energy
7. Somnolence Sleep Removal of tension
Abdominal relaxation
8. Bladder pressure Micturition Relaxation
9. Colon pressure Defecation Return to normal state
10. Fright Escape from danger
11. Pain Avoidance by
effective act
Permanent Vital Sequences Incorporated in All Culture

For instance, the impulse of somnolence accompanies the act of sleep,
resulting in satisfaction by ‘awakening with restored energy’ (Malinowski
1944: 77; Barnard 2000: 68). Malinowski follows this eleven-fold paradigm
with a set of seven biological needs and their respective cultural responses
(see Table 6.2).
79

Social Structure as a Table 6.2
Basic Needs Cultural Responses
1. Metabolism Commissariat
2. Reproduction Kinship
3. Bodily comfort Shelter
4. Safety Protection
5. Movement Activities
6. Growth Training
7. Health Hygiene
For example, the first need is of food, and the cultural mechanisms are
centered on the processes of food getting, for which Malinowski uses the
term ‘commissariat’, which means the convoy that transports food. Similarly,
the second need is of reproduction (biological continuity of society) and the
cultural response to which is kinship concerned with regulating sex and
marriage. From this, Malinowski goes on to four-fold sequences, which he
calls the ‘instrumental imperatives’, and associates each one of them with
their respective cultural responses. The four-fold sequence is of economy,
social control, education, and political organisation. From here, he shifts to
the symbolic system — of religion, magic, beliefs and values — examining its
role in culture.
6.5 Functionalism of Talcott Parsons (1902-1979)

and Robert K. Merton (1910 - 2003)
In 1975, in an important article, Parsons labels his student, Robert Merton
and himself ‘arch-functionalists’. He also explains here why he has abandoned
the term ‘structural functionalism’, which, at one time, he used for his
approach. For him, structure refers to ‘any set of relations among parts of
a living system’. On empirical grounds, he says, it can be assumed or shown
that these relations are stable over a time period. By process, which is the
correlative concept with structure, one refers to the ‘changes’ that occur
in the state of the system or its relevant parts. With respect to structure,
the key concept is of stability, and with respect to process, it is of change.
Thus, by structure, we refer to a pattern of relationships in a social system,
and process refers to the changes occurring in that system. A significant
characteristic of ‘structural functionalism’ has been that it has stressed
‘structure’ more than ‘process’.
In the article mentioned above, Parsons states that the concept of function
stands at a ‘higher level of theoretical generality’. It is far more analytical
than the concept of structure, or even process, although function
encompasses the latter. It is because the concept of function is concerned
with the ‘consequences’ of the existence and the nature of structures that
can be empirically described. And, it is also concerned with the processes
that take place in these systems. Parsons thinks that his original formulation
under the rubric of ‘structural functionalism’ tends to analyze society as if
it is static, but the new formulation, where stress is laid on the concept of
function than structure, in the name of functionalism, takes much more
account of change and evolution. The new formulation sets out to examine
80 the functions of ‘processes’ and their consequences for ‘static’ structures.

For example, one may examine in the American context, the function of the Structure and Function
process of education of women on ‘static’ structures like family.
Parsons’ functionalism is best known in terms of the ‘functional imperatives’,

the essential conditions required for the enduring existence of a system
(Parsons 1951). Also known as the ‘AGIL model’ (based on the first letters of
the four functions that Parsons has devised) or the ‘four-function paradigm’,
it evolved from Parsons’ collaborative work with Robert F. Bales in experiments
on leadership in small groups (Rocher 1974). These four functions help us to
explain how a state of balance (i.e. equilibrium) emerges in a system. One
of the important problems in sociology for Parsons is what he has called the
‘Hobbesian problem of order’ — he calls it so after the famous political
philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, one of the founders of the theory of ‘social
contract’, who was concerned with the question of how order comes in
society. Parsons explores the role of these four functions in giving rise to
equilibrium in a system.
Earlier it was noted that the functionalist’s model of society as one of

‘interdependence and self-equilibrium’ is similar to the biological model of
an organism. Parsons traces his interest in equilibrium to W.B. Cannon’s idea
of homeostatic stabilization of physiological processes and to his training in
biology at Amherst College where he had studied. Also, the impact of
Malinowski on him was unmistakable, especially the idea of the primacy of
the biological system. In the case of society, Parsons submits that the
institutions (or structures) maintain (or re-establish) equilibrium by fulfilling
the ‘needs’, which must be satisfied if the system has to persist. Institutions
(or structures) also solve the recurring problems in a manner similar to the
way in which the units of the organism comparable to the institutions (or
structures) of societies do in their natural environment. The system ensures
that these institutions (or structures) work appropriately on everyday basis,
satisfying the needs. For achieving equilibrium, society requires the processes
of socialization, the internalization of societal values, and the mechanisms
of social control so that deviance is checked.
All ‘action systems’ — and society is one of them — face four major ‘problems’
(or have four major ‘needs’), namely Adaptation (A), Goal Attainment (G),
Integration (I), and Pattern Maintenance, or, as Parsons later renamed it,
Latent Pattern Maintenance—Tension Management, or simply, Latency (L).
Parsons pictures society (or the social system) as a large square, which he
divides into four equal parts. These parts are the four functional problems,
represented by the acronym, AGIL (see Diagram 1). The underlying idea is
that all systems need to accomplish these four functions in order to survive.
The meaning of these four ‘functional imperatives’ is as follows:
1) Adaptation: By this is meant the problem of securing sufficient resources
from the society’s external environment and distributing them throughout
the system. Each society needs certain institutions that perform the
function of adaptation to the environment – which is an external function.
Adaptation provides the means — the instrumental aspects — to achieve
goals. Biological organism performs the function of adaptation in the
general system of action. In the context of society, economic institution
performs this function.
2) Goal Attainment: This function is concerned with the need of the system
to mobilize its resources to attain the goals and to establish priorities
among them. It mobilizes motivations of the actors and organises their 81

Social Structure as a efforts. In the general system of action, personality performs this function,
while in case of society this task is given to the political institution,
because power is essential for implementation and decision-making. Goal
attainment is concerned with ends — the consummatory aspects. Since
goals are delineated in relation with the external environment, it is, like
adaptation, an external function.
3) Integration: It is regarded as the ‘heart’ of the four-function paradigm
(Wallace and Wolf 1980: 36). By integration is meant the need to
coordinate, adjust, and regulate relationships among various actors (or,
the units of the system, such as the institutions), so that the system
is an ‘ongoing entity’. According to the general theory of action, the
social system performs this function, whereas in society, legal institutions
and courts are entrusted with this task. Integration is concerned with
ends, and the internal aspects of the system.
4) Latency (Pattern Maintenance and Tension Management): This function
pertains to the issues of providing knowledge and information to the
system. In the general theory of action, culture — the repository of
knowledge and information — accomplishes this function. Culture does
not act because it does not have energy. It lays hidden, supplying actors
(who are high in energy) with knowledge and information they require
for carrying out action. Because culture exists ‘behind’ the actions of
people, it is called ‘latent’. Integration takes care of two things: first,
it motivates actors to play their roles in the system and maintain the
value patterns; and second, to provide mechanisms for managing internal
tensions between different parts and actors. The problem that every
society faces is of keeping its value system intact and ensuring that the
members conform to the rules. It will be possible when societal values
are properly transmitted and imbibed. The institutions that carry out
this function are family, religion, and education. Latency gives means to
achieve ends; it is internal to the system.
AGIL Model
Means (Instrumental) Ends (Consummatory)
External A Adaptation Goal attainment G
Internal L Latency (pattern

maintenance and
tension-relieving
mechanisms) Integration I
General Level of Action Theory
Organism Personality
Culture Social System
AGIL Functions in the Social System
Economy Polity
Fiduciary System Societal Community
Fig. 1
82

With this four-function paradigm in mind, Parsons (1973) jointly carried out Structure and Function
(with Gerald Platt) a study of higher education in America, by conducting a

survey of members of American colleges and universities. An important
conclusion of this study was that American universities and colleges specialise
in furthering the rational (or ‘scientific’) approach to knowledge. The central
shared value within the American system of higher education is of cognitive
rationality. This value is of paramount significance to contemporary American
society. The American system of higher education, therefore, transmits and
maintains values central to its society (of which it is a part), thus performing
the function of pattern maintenance.
For the purpose of analysis, Parsons identifies sub-systems corresponding to

the AGIL model in all systems and their sub-systems (see Diagram 1). As we
have seen, at the general level of action theory, the biological organism
performs the function of adaptation, the personality system, the function of
goal attainment, the social system integrates different units, and the cultural
system is concerned with pattern maintenance. Then, the social system is
broken down into the four AGIL functions. We noted earlier that economy
performs the function of adaptation, whereas, polity (or political institution),
the function of goal attainment. For the sub-system that carries out the
function of integration, Parsons uses the term ‘societal community’, which
reminds one of Ferdinand Tönnies’s ideas of gemeinschaft (‘community’).
‘Societal community’ produces solidarity, unity, cohesiveness, and loyalty to
norms, values, and institutions. The function of pattern maintenance, Parsons
says, is the task of what he calls the ‘fiduciary system’, which pertains to
the nature of a trust or a trusteeship. This system produces and legitimizes
moral values, beliefs, and expressive symbols.
Each of the sub-systems of the system can be taken up for analysis by

treating it as a ‘system’, and then, breaking it down into four parts looking
for its components that respectively perform the functions of adaptation,
goal attainment, integration, and latency. This way of analyzing society is
known as the systemic approach.
6.6 Conclusion
Parsons’s AGIL model is an ideal type, applicable more to differentiated
societies than simple societies. In the latter case, institutions may collapse
into one, with the result that the same institution may perform different
functions. The example of family may be cited here, which carries out
economic, political, and religious functions, in addition to the functions
traditionally assigned to it, like socialization of the young. In communist
societies, the party may decide the aspects of economy – the processes of
production and distribution – and thus, adaptation and goal attainment may
appear indistinguishable.
Parsons’ theory is popularly known as a ‘grand theory’ – an all-encompassing,

unified theory – which is believed to have a large explanatory power. However,
Parsons’ student, Robert Merton, is skeptical of such a theory, for it is too
general to be of much use (Merton 1957). Instead, he expresses his preference
for mid-level (middle-range) theories, which cover certain delimited aspects
of social phenomena (such as groups, social mobility, or role conflict). Partially
because of this middle-range strategy, Merton’s functionalism is quite different
from that of Parsons.
83

Social Structure as a For instance, Merton abandons the search for any functional prerequisites
that will be valid in all social systems. He also rejects the idea of the earlier
functionalists that recurrent social phenomena should be explained in terms
of their benefits to society as a whole. For criticism, Merton identifies the
three postulates of earlier functionalists given below:
1) Postulate of the functional unity of society. It is an assumption that
there is unity in society, which comes about because of the contributions
that parts make to the whole.
2) Postulate of the universal functionalism. It is an assumption that all
social or cultural forms have positive functions, which are for the
maintenance and well being of society.
3) Postulate of indispensability. It is an assumption that the function that
a social or cultural form performs is an indispensable precondition for
the survival of society.
Merton notes that none of these postulates are empirically justifiable. For
instance, there is no reason to suppose that particular institutions are the
only ones to fulfill the functions. Empirical research shows that there may
be a wide range of what Merton has termed ‘functional alternatives’ that
may be able to perform the same function.
With a critical look, Merton tries to attempt what he calls a ‘codification of

functional analysis in sociology’, a functional paradigm (or perspective) (which
is not a grand theory) that takes into consideration the actual dimensions
of social reality, of conformity and deviance, understanding and explaining
them. Like other functionalists, he views society as a system of
interconnected parts, where the functioning of a part has implications for
the functioning of other parts and the entire system. Like his predecessors,
he is interested in the concepts of equilibrium and integration, and the
contribution of customs and institutions to the persistence of societies. His
definition of function is also in terms of the ‘positive contribution’ of a part
to the whole: functions are those contributions or consequences that
‘make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system.’ For the
working of society and its institutions, it is important that all share a set of
common values and norms, which is another distinguishing property of
functionalism.
While agreeing with other functionalists on certain points stated above,

Merton has made a distinct contribution to a set of two typologies, namely,
the distinction between ‘function’ and ‘dysfunction’, and between ‘manifest’
and ‘latent’ functions. Most functionalists think that all contributions are
inherently good or ‘functional’ for society, a proposition Merton finds difficult
to accept. He thinks there are acts that have ‘consequences which lessen
the adaptation or adjustment of the system’. Such acts have harmful
consequences, the technical term for which is ‘dysfunction’. It is, therefore,
expected that the sociologist will always ask the following question: ‘For
whom are the consequences functional or dysfunctional?’ The same institution
can be functional in one context and dysfunctional in another. All social
institutions are expected to have some mix of functions and dysfunctions.
Whether the institution tilts to the pole of function or dysfunction in a
continuum will depend upon the net balance between the functional and
dysfunctional consequences.
84

Structure and Function
Box 6.2: Manifest and Latent Function
The distinction between manifest and latent functions has its roots in the
writings of the founders in sociology. In his study of religion, for example,
Durkheim (1915) makes a distinction between ‘what people do of which they
are aware’ and ‘what emerges from their collective acts which they had not
intended and anticipated.’ When people assemble for collective totemic
rituals, their explicit aim is to honour their totem, but what these rituals
produce is a sense of we-ness, which is an unintended, unrecognised, and
unanticipated consequence. Following this, one can say that manifest functions
are those consequences people observe or expect, while latent functions are
those consequences that are neither recognised nor intended.
Merton was able to advance four types of explanations in terms of the two
dichotomies (function and dysfunction; manifest and latent functions). The
earlier functionalists put forth only one explanation and that too with respect
to latent functions. Merton’s conceptual scheme guided empirical research,
rather than remaining a theory with several explanatory claims, like the
‘grand theory’ of Parsons.
6.7 Further Reading

University Press
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1973. For Sociology. London: Allen Lane
Turner, Jonathan H. 1987. The Structure of Sociological Theory. Jaipur: Rawat
Publications
References
University Press.
Davis, Kingsley. 1959. The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in
Sociology and Anthropology. American Sociological Review, 24: 757-72.
Durkheim, Émile. 1893. The Division of Labour in Society. Glencoe: The Free
Press.
________________, 1895. The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York:
The Free Press.
________________, 1915. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. London:
Allen and Unwin.
Giddens, Anthony. 1973. The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies.
London: Hutchinson.
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1973. For Sociology. London: Allen Lane.
Kuper, Adam. 1973. Anthropologists and Anthropology: The Modern British
School. London: Routledge.
Levy, Jr., Marion J. 1968. Functional Analysis: Structural-Functional Analysis.
International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. McMillan Co. and Free Press.
Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1922. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. London: George
Routledge & Sons.
________________, 1926. Anthropology. Encyclopedia Britannica. First
Supplementary Volume. 85

Social Structure as a ________________, 1944. A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Merton, Robert K. 1957. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The
Free Press (Revised and Enlarged Edition).
Parsons, Talcott. 1951. The Social System. New York: The Free Press.
________________, 1975. The Present Status of Structural-Functional Theory
in Sociology. In Lewis A. Coser (ed), The Idea of Social Structure: Papers in
Honor of Robert K. Merton. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Parsons, Talcott and Gerald M. Platt. 1973. The American University. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. 1922. The Andaman Islanders. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
________________, 1952. Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays
and Addresses. London: Cohen & West.
Rocher, Guy. 1974. Talcott Parsons and American Sociology. London: Nelson.
Turner, Jonathan H. 1987. The Structure of Sociological Theory. Jaipur: Rawat
Publications.
Wallace, Ruth A. and Alison Wolf. 1980. Contemporary Sociological Theory.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
86

Unit 7
Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
Contents
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Criticism of Functionalism
7.3 The Thesis of Neo-Functionalism
7.4 Merits and Demerits of Neo-Functionalism: Conclusion
7.5 Further Reading
Learning Objectives
explain the major criticism of functionalism that led to they rise of neo-
functionalism
discuss the premises and basic of orientations of neo-functionalism
critically evaluate the merits and demerits of neo-functionalism.
7.1 Introduction
Without exaggeration, one may say that in the history of social anthropology
and sociology, no theory has generated so much of interest, enthusiasm, and
response as did functionalism. Known by different names (such as ‘functional
approach’, ‘structural-functional approach’, ‘structural-functionalism’,
‘Functional School’, etc.), functionalism emerged as some kind of a unified
methodology and theory in the 1930s. Earlier, right from the beginning of the
nineteenth century, it was a body of scattered ideas and propositions. Until
the 1960s, its reputation was unassailable, as its adherents were scholars of
outstanding merit, who were known (and are still known) for various other
contributions besides developing it both in terms of theory and method. For
example, the famous American functionalist, Talcott Parsons, is well known
for his contribution to family sociology, the school as a social system, role
analysis in medical institutions, professions and problems of the blacks,
evolutionism, etc. Similarly, Robert Merton’s contribution to social structure
and anomie, deviance and conformity, dysfunctions of bureaucracy, sociology
of science, survey methods, role-set, etc, will always be referred.
During this period from the 1930s to the 1960s, when functional approach
was virtually unchallenged in the United States of America and the other
parts of the world, some of its criticisms were undoubtedly surfacing. For
instance, the British social anthropologist, Sir E.E. Evans-Pritchard, rejected
the idea of social anthropology as a science (held by the protagonist of the
structural-functional approach, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown) and viewed it rather as
a ‘comparative history’. Although Evans-Pritchard began as a functionalist,
he transformed into a humanist. Sir Edmund R. Leach also started his career
in social anthropology as a functionalist, he then moved to the ‘processual
analysis’, i.e., looking at society as a ‘process in time’, as it is evident from
his 1954 book on political systems. Later, under the influence of Claude Lévi-
Strauss, he became a structuralist, and came to be known as a neostructuralist
(Kuper 1973). His 1961 publication of Rethinking Anthropology offered a
challenge to structural-functionalism. In spite of these criticisms, functionalism
continued to survive with glory. 87

Social Structure as a But by the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the criticisms
of the functional theory increased manifold. Parsons’s attempts to merge
theories based on action with those based on structures were unconvincing
to many critics. The rehabilitation of Marxian approach in sociology and the
successful emergence of the conflict theory was a big blow to functionalism.
Several new theories and approaches, each trying to bring in the aspects
that functionalism had ignored, became the focal points. It seemed clear to
many critics that sociology had entered a post-functional, a post-Parsonian
phase in its development.
Gradually, after a brief hiatus, during the 1980s, there was a revival of interest
in Parsons’s work – some call it a phase of a ‘rediscovery’ of Parsons. Initially,
it had little to do with structural-functionalism, but with Parsons’s ability to
synthesize the works of the classical thinkers (such as Émile Durkheim, Max
Weber, Vilfredo Pareto) to explore a theory of social action in his The Structure
of Social Action (1937), which he ably used to advance fields like economy
and society, family and industrialisation, etc. Following this was a resurgence
of interest in Parsons’s functionalism, first in Germany and then, America. In
1985, Jeffrey C. Alexander introduced the term ‘neofunctionalism’ with an
aim to reconsider and revise Parsons’s theory. Neo-functionalism offered a
critique of the fundamental propositions of the original theory of
functionalism. It examined the aspects of several other theories – some of
which had conflicting relations with functionalism, for example, Marxism – in
order to integrate them with neofunctionalism. Because of this, neo-
functionalism does not manifest itself in one single theory, rather as several
variants put together under the same rubric. Against this background,
Alexander (1985) emphasizes that neofunctionalism should be considered to
a lesser extent as a theory and more as a ‘wide-ranging intellectual tendency
or movement’.
This unit centers around the critical evolution of functionalism and the
emergence of neo-functionalism. We will explore the concept of neo-
functionalism is n sociological writings and examine its merits and limitation.
7.2 Criticisms of Functionalism

One of the main criticisms of functionalism is that it does not adequately
deal with history. In other words, it is inherently ahistorical (but not anti-
historical). It does not deal with the questions of past and history, although
the advocates of functionalism have considered evolution and diffusion as
important processes of change. Functionalism in social anthropology in the
1930s emerged as a reaction to the nineteenth century ‘pseudo-historical’
and ‘speculative’ evolutionism and diffusionism. It also tried to overcome
the ethnocentric biases of the earlier approaches, which regarded the
contemporary pre-literate societies, popularly known as ‘primitive societies’,
and certain customs and practices found among them as remnants of past.
Edward Tylor unhesitatingly regarded the ‘contemporary primitives’ as ‘social
fossils’ and ‘survivals’ of the past, assuming that their study would guide us
to an understanding of the cultural traits of the societies of prehistoric
times (Harris 1968: 164-5). This would help us in reconstructing the history
of humankind.
Closely related with this is another criticism of functionalism: it does not

effectively deal with the contemporary processes of social change. Thus, in
88 essence, because it is neither able to study the pasts of societies nor the

contemporary change process, it is more suited to the study of ‘contemporary Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
static structures’, if there are any. Or, perhaps, it portrays the societies it
studies as if they are static, which, in reality, may not be so. The picture
of a society that functionalists present is like the picture of a ‘frozen river’
that tells nothing about its ebb and flow. By analogy, functionalists ‘freeze
society’ in the same manner as a still camera ‘freezes’ people and locations
in its frame.
There are two views on this issue. First, the problem is believed to lie with
the theory of functionalism, because when the parts of a society are seen
as reinforcing one another as well as the system, when each part fits well
with the other parts, then it is difficult to explain how these parts can
contribute to change (Cohen 1968). Or, why should the parts change or
contribute to change when they are all in a state of harmony? The second
opinion is that there is nothing in functionalism which prevents it from
dealing with the issues of history and change. For instance, Parsons’s 1966
book titled Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives reflects
the ability of structural-functionalism to handle the dimensions of change.
So does Smelser’s work of 1959 on industrial revolution. The problem lies,
according to some, not with the theory of functionalism, but its practitioners,
who rarely address the issues of change and even when they do, it is in
developmental and adaptive terms than in revolutionary (Turner and Maryanski
1979). Whether the problem of functionalism has to do with the theory or
its practitioners, ‘the fact remains that the main contributions of structural
functionalists lie with the study of static, not changing, social structures’
(Ritzer 2000: 115).
Another criticism of functionalism is that it is unable to deal effectively with

conflict. Functionalists have overemphasized harmonious relationships. They
tend to exaggerate consensus, stability, equilibrium, and integration,
disregarding the forces of conflict and disorder, and changes emerging from
them. For them, conflict is necessarily destructive and occurs outside the
framework of society. One may remember here Durkheim who regarded
‘anomie’ (the state of normlessness) as a ‘social sickness’. Both Comte and
later, Durkheim were staunchly critical of the Marxist and socialist thoughts,
for they believed that the need of that time (when they were writing) was
social reconstruction and order. Society had already become quite
disintegrated, Comte said, because of the French Revolution and any support
rendered to the idea of revolution would further accentuate disorder. Thus
Comte’s positivism and Durkheim’s ‘functional explanations’ paid scant
attention to the issues of conflict.
Box 7.1: Early Twentieth Century Functionalism

The early twentieth-century anthropological functionalism certainly inherited
the legacy of the past, the theory of social order, but there was another
reason why it consistently ignored the aspects of conflict and change. It
received its empirical substantiation not from philosophical premises (as it
did in case of Comte) or from secondary data (as was the case with Durkheim),
but from first-hand, observation-based studies of simple societies, like that
of Andamanese or Trobriand Islanders. The societies the anthropologists
studied were largely cut off from the outside world. By comparison to other
societies of the world, a higher degree of normative consensus prevailed
among them because they were largely homogeneous. They had by and large
one culture. Social sanctions were undisputed among them, contra-normative
89

Sociological Concept actions were negligible, conformity to rules and tradition was higher and
valued, and relatively speaking, the extent and magnitude of change was
definitely less. It however did not mean that they were ‘changeless’, but
they were changing slowly, at a snail’s speed.
In the words of Robert Redfield (1955), these societies were ‘past-oriented’

in comparison to modern societies which were ‘future-oriented’. The ‘past-
oriented’ societies were proud of their tradition, which for them was
sacrosanct; they wanted to keep it intact and therefore, any attempt to
assail it was strongly dealt with. The ‘future-oriented’ societies were not
satisfied with their lot; they looked forward to changing their lifestyles,
technology, and norms and values. Since the substantiation of anthropological
functionalism came from the empirical study of ‘past-oriented’, technologically
simpler, pre-literate, and non-civilized societies, it was obvious that the
characteristics of these societies would find their conspicuous presence in
the theory.
Because functionalism does not deal with the issues of conflict, disorder,
and change, many critics note that it has a conservative bias. In his critical
assessment of functionalism, Gouldner (1970) says that for Parsons, one of
the leading functionalists, a ‘partly filled glass’ is ‘half full’ rather than ‘half
empty’. The point here is that for those the ‘glass is half full’ are emphasising
the positive aspects of a situation in comparison to those who lay emphasis
on the negative side, seeing the ‘glass as half empty’. The conservative bias
in functionalism is not only because of what it ignores (history, change,
conflict, disorder) but also what it emphasises (society ‘here and now’,
norms and values, consensus, order). Functionalists are overwhelmingly
preoccupied with the normative order of society.
The individual in functionalism is devoid of dynamism and creativity. He is

simply a product of society and its forces constrain him at every juncture.
The opposite view is that it is the individual who in fact initiates change
in society. Individuals as much use the system as the system uses them.
Those who subscribe to the interactional approach argue that functionalism
has failed to conceptualise adequately the complex nature of actors and the
process of interaction. One of the reasons of why functionalism ignored the
role of the individual in society was that it was solely interested in explaining
the survival of society. It was interested in the ‘collectivity’ and not the
‘individual’, and even when it was interested in the individual, as was the
case with Malinowski, it was only till the point of the satisfaction of its
biological needs. It was not to look at and analyze the attitudes and
sentiments of the individual, and the role these psychic dimensions play in
initiating social changes.
The functionalists’s search for order led them to lend justification to the
existing norms and values, ideological and hierarchical structures, institutions,
and rules of power distribution prevalent in a society. They did not realize,
as Marxists had done, that the normative system in a society was a creation
of the ruling elite, and there may be several opposing forces to it. By looking
for order, they in fact were justifying the system, the established order, and
thus were helping in the maintenance of the status quo. Functionalism was
charged for supporting the dominant elite and the system as it was.
90

In addition to these, there were some important methodological and logical Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
criticisms of functionalism. The belief of functionalism that there is a ‘single
theory’ that could be used in all situations was an illusion. Many scholars
found that it was difficult to apply functionalism to complex societies, which
were not only fast changing but were also conflict-ridden. The ideas of
relativism – i.e., things are meaningful in their respective cultural contexts
— to which functionalists gave support, made a comparative analysis difficult.
If ‘things’ can only be understood in the context of the social system of
which they are a part, then how can we compare it with similar ‘things’ in
other systems? If polyandry, for example, makes sense in the context of the
community of the Todas, how can we compare it to polyandry in Jaunsar-
Bawar? Some scholars have tried to deal with this matter of the lack of
comparability in functionalism. Walter Goldschmidt (1966) has argued in favour
of an approach he has called ‘comparative functionalism’. According to this
approach, there is a universality of functions to which institutions are a
response. All cultures require the same functions; however the institutions
that fulfill these functions vary from one society to another.
One of the important criticisms of functionalism is that it is inherently

teleological, i.e., explanations are given in terms of ‘purposes’ or ‘goals’.
With respect to this, Turner and Maryanski (1979) submit that teleology per
se is not a problem. As a matter of fact, social theory should take into
account the ‘teleological relationship between society and its component
parts’ (Ritzer 2000). The problem comes when teleology is stretched to
unacceptable limits, when it is believed that only the given and specific part
of society can fulfill the needs. Teleology becomes illegitimate when it fails
to take into consideration the idea that a variety of alternative structures
can fulfill the same needs. Why certain structures come up and why certain
structures become irreplaceable needs to be explained. The later functionalists
— such as Parsons and Merton — were aware of this problem and in their own
ways tried to overcome it. Merton, for example, proposed the concept of
functional alternatives. In his analysis of the family system, Parsons was able
to show that in the contemporary industrial society, nuclear family performed
the functions of primary socialisation and the stabilization of adult personality
and no other institution could carry them out. These functions were non-
transferable to any other institutions.
Functionalism has also been criticised for making explicit what is implicit in
the premise; the technical term used for this kind of reasoning is ‘tautology’.
For example, if religion exists, it must be functional, otherwise, it will cease
to exist, and its function must be to contribute to social solidarity, because
without it, society will not be able to survive. Many critics have pointed out
that functionalism suffers from ‘globular or circular reasoning’. Needs are
postulated on the basis of the existing institutions, that are, in turn, used
to explain their existence. For instance, society as a ‘social fact’ explains
the division of labour, and in turn, division of labour contributes to the
maintenance of solidarity in society. What is happening here is that the
whole is being defined in terms of its parts and then, parts are being defined
in terms of the whole. Because one is being defined in terms of the other,
in fact, none of them – neither the whole nor its parts – is actually being
defined. As we noted earlier, here also there is a debate whether tautology
is inherent in the theory or has come into existence because of the deeds
of its practitioners.
91

Sociological Concept Reflection and Action 7.1
Discuss the major criticisms of functionalism that led to thee emergence of
neo-functionalism.
7.3 The Thesis of Neo-functionalism

A revival of interest in Parsons’s work, first in Germany and then, the United
States of America, led to the emergence of neo-functionalism. The basic aim
has been to merge certain aspects of functionalism, those which have
withstood the test of time, with other paradigms that have better developed
critical perspectives. The aim has been to build a ‘hybrid’ that combines the
strong points of the other perspectives so that one can deal with the so-
called opposite issues (such as, consensus and conflict, equilibrium and
change, collectivity and individual) in a balanced manner.
a) Revival in Germany
Those associated with neo-functionalism in Germany are Niklas Luhmann and
Jürgen Habermas, who initially collaborated on a theory of social engineering
in modern society, but later worked separately. Although formally trained in
law, Luhmann has been a student of sociology and in 1960, spent a year at
Harvard where he had a chance to be in contact with Parsons. He developed
a sociological approach that combined certain aspects from Parsons’ structural
functionalism with general systems theory. He also introduced in it concepts
from cognitive biology and cybernetics (Ritzer 2000: 185). However, he
disagreed with Parsons about the options available to individuals as concrete
human beings. Parsons placed emphasis on value consensus, also believing
that because the social system penetrates the personality system, the options
available to the individual for social relationships and behaviour are limited.
But that is, Luhmann thinks, not simply correct. He moves the individual out
of the social system into the ‘society’ — what may be termed the ‘societal
environment’ — which is far more complex and less restrictive. It accords
people more freedom, especially freedom for carrying out ‘irrational and
immoral behaviour’ (Abrahamson 2001: 148).
Abrahamson (2001: 148) says that if Luhmann moved from Parsons, and then
discovered the problems with the concept of value consensus, Habermas
moved toward Parsons. Habermas’s early writings were strongly critical of
Parsons, but later, he accorded a place to cultural, social, and personality
systems in his theory. His conceptualisation of the relationship between
these systems was quite consistent with Parsons’s views. He also gave place
to Parsons’s concept of ‘self-regulating system’, which comes into existence
when societies become complex as a consequence of which structural systems
are separated from ‘lifeworld’, i.e., the inter-subjective realm for experiencing
and communicating about culture, society, and personality.
b) Revival in the United States of America

The main spokespersons of neofunctionalism in America are Jeffrey Alexander
and Paul Colomy. In one of their joint publications of 1985, they define
neofunctionalism as ‘a self-critical strand of functional theory that seeks to
broaden functionalism’s intellectual scope while retaining its theoretical core’
(p. 118). Under the rubric of ‘neo-functionalism’, they have made an effort
to extend structural functionalism by overcoming its difficulties. Structural
92 functionalism envisions a single, all embracing conceptual scheme that is

supposed to be applicable for all societies at all points of time. By comparison, Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
neofunctionalism is a ‘loosely organised package’ built around a general logic.
It possesses a number of autonomous ‘proliferations’ and ‘variations’, which
work at different levels and in different empirical contexts (Alexander and
Colomy, eds., 1990).
The goal of neo-functionalists is to create a more synthetic theory. There is

no doubt that Parsons was an unparalleled synthesizer of grand theory and
structural functionalism has a strong synthetic core from the beginning. In
his variety of structural functionalism, Parsons tried to integrate a wide
range of theoretical inputs. He was also interested in drawing an
interrelationship between different systems that constitute the social world
— such as, cultural, social, and personality systems. So, Alexander and Colomy
say, the beginning of structural functionalism was quite promising, but
gradually, Parsons’s approach became overly narrow and deterministic. He
started viewing the cultural system as determining the other systems. Also,
his overwhelming preoccupation with the ‘problem of order’ led to insufficient
attention being paid to conflict and strain.
Alexander and Colomy think that the deficiencies of structural functionalism

are not irreversible. Its synthetic orientation can be recaptured. The concepts
of conflict and subjective meaning can be introduced. One can regard the
integration of the system and the interpenetration of its various subsystems
as a ‘tendency’, to be investigated rather than as a ‘given’ or ‘assumed’
fact.
Box 7.2: Neo-Functionalism: Problems that need to be Surmounted

In neo-functionalism, the problems that need to be surmounted are:
1) Anti-individualism — the individual in structural functionalism is passive
and lacks creativity, and is simply a product of the social forces, which
he neither checks nor controls;
2) Antagonism to change — structural functionalism is a theory of social
order rather than of change;
3) Conservatism — structural functionalism has worked toward offering a
justification of the system and its practices, often justifying inequality,
exploitation, and oppression.
4) Idealism — structural functionalism speaks in terms of an ideal society,
where everything is in order and stability.
5) Anti-empiricist bias — structural functionalism is more concerned with
abstract social systems instead of real societies.
Neo-functionalism can be seen as an ‘effort’ or ‘tendency’ to overcome

these problems. Alexander was skeptical of calling this a developed theory
and more an orientation sensitive to the criticisms of structural functionalism.
The basic orientations of neofunctionalism may be outlined. Neofunctionalism

operates with a descriptive model of society. For it, society comprises elements
that are constantly in interaction with other elements, and together they
form a pattern. Because of this pattern, society is differentiated from its
environment, with which it has its ceaseless interaction. Parts of a system
are symbiotically connected – one contributing to the other. However, there
is no overarching force that determines their interaction. Neofunctionalism
rejects any monocausal determinism; it is open-ended and pluralistic.
93

Social Structure as a Neo-functionalism allocates equal attention to action and order. According
to Alexander (1982: 65), these concepts constitute the ‘true presuppositions
of sociological debate.’ Structural functionalism has a tendency to focus
almost exclusively on the macro-level sources of order in social structures
and culture. It gives little attention to micro-level actions — actions that
take place at the local level. In its analysis, neo-functionalism includes rational
as well as expressive actions. It is far from viewing that human actions are
only rational, gain-multiplying, profit-oriented, and ‘scientific’. One of the
main functions of culture is that it allows people to express themselves,
sometimes aesthetically.
Like structural functionalism, neo-functionalism retains interest in integration,

but it is not an accomplished fact. Rather, it is a social possibility. It recognises
that deviance is a ubiquitous social reality, and to check it, each system
must have the instruments of social control, forcing the deviants to subscribe
to rules lest punishments to their actions become cumulatively stringent.
Social control tries to restore some sort of stability in the system. Neo-
functionalism is concerned with equilibrium, but it is broader than the concern
of structural functionalism. Neo-functionalism does not believe that any
system can ever be in a state of ‘static equilibrium’; it is always moving and
partial. Moreover, the concept of equilibrium is to be regarded as a reference
point for functional analysis. It does not describe the lives of individuals in
actual social systems, which is perennially in action. It brings us once again
to the point about neofunctionalism mentioned earlier – it is concerned
equally with order and action.
Of all the functionalists, it was Parsons’s structural functionalism that exercised

the maximum impact on later scholars, some of whom later became famous
as neo-functionalists. The latter accept the traditional Parsonian emphasis
on culture, social, and personality systems, which are vital to any society.
These systems interpenetrate one another, because of which they produce
tension, which is one of the important sources of change and control.
Further, change occurs when cultural, social, and personality systems are
differentiated over time. This change does not occur because of conformity
and harmony, but because of the rise of individualism and institutional strains.

What are the major similarities and differences between structural
functionalism and neo-functionalism?
Neo-functionalism submits that in order to enrich our understanding of the

processes of order and action in society, we should think of borrowing from
other theories and perspectives in sociology and other social sciences.
Alexander and Colomy have tried synthesizing structural functionalism with
other theoretical traditions. To overcome the idealist bias in structural
functionalism, neo-functionalism encourages materialist approaches. To
counter the structural functional tendency to emphasize order has led neo-
functionalists to explore the theories of culture. Insights from approaches
such as exchange theory, symbolic interactionism, pragmatism, and
phenomenology are being drawn to compensate for macro-level biases of the
traditional functional approach.
The future of neo-functionalism has been cast into doubt by the fact that
94 Alexander in his book Neofunctionalism and After (1998) has stated that he

has outgrown a neo-functionalist orientation in his career. He says that one Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
of his important goals was to show the importance of Parsons’ theory. Parsons
had built a theoretical scheme that was potentially capable of overcoming
the contradictions inherent in classical sociology, but neither he nor any of
his collaborators and students was able to take full advantage of the theory.
Alexander saw his aim as that of developing the theoretical strands that lay
incipient in Parsons’s work. Since he thinks that he has succeeded in this
venture, his project of neo-functionalism is over. It will however, Alexander
says, keep on influencing his later thoughts, and his present work on civil
societies.
7.4 Merits and Demerits of Neo-functionalism:

Conclusion
Although some of the traits of what has come to be called ‘neo-functionalism’
are found in the German interest in Parsons’s works, this theoretical
‘tendency’ is principally associated with an American sociologist, Jeffrey C.
Alexander, and later, his younger collaborator, Paul Colomy. A restricted use
of the term ‘neo-functionalism’ is also found in ecological studies where it
basically means assigning primary importance to techno-environmental forces
in an analysis of the processes of cultural adaptation (Bettinger 1996).
Alexander does not seem to be happy with the use of the term ‘neo-
functionalism’. He also thinks that ‘functionalism’ was not really an appropriate
term to describe Parsons’s approach. Parsons himself tried to discard the
term ‘structural functionalism’ for his approach, but he knew that it would
continue to be used for his sociology. Some of his associates preferred to call
his theory ‘action theory’. Alexander (1985) also thinks that notwithstanding
the inappropriateness of the term ‘functionalism’, Parsons’s sociology will be
known in future by this name. Thus, not much will be gained by discarding
the term; rather one should cling to it, and redefine it. Instead of being a
unified theory, neofunctionalism is a ‘tendency’, characterised by the
following propositions (Alexander 1985: 10):
1) An open and pluralistic description of society as a whole.
2) An even-handed apportionment when it comes to action vs. structure
(or action vs. order).
3) Integration is viewed as a possibility; deviance and social control are
considered realities.
4) Discernment between personality, culture, and society.
5) Differentiation is viewed as the central driving force producing social
change.
6) The development of concepts and theory is considered to be independent
of all the levels involved in sociologic analysis.
There have been marked variations in the responses to the efforts of Alexander
and others to revive functionalism. Some have found Alexander’s account of
the functional tradition as extremely vague. They also question the purported
continuity between functionalism and neo-functionalism, because ‘neo-
functionalism seems to include everything functionalism has been criticized
as lacking’ (Fauske 2000:245). There are limits to the length to which any
theoretical perspective can go in accommodating incompatible notions and
yet retain its name and lineage. For some critics, the changes introduced in
structural functionalism are more cosmetic than real. Neo-functionalism is 95

Social Structure as a still imbued with the features that distinguish functionalism. For instance,
the view that societies can be studied objectively continues to predominate.
Individuals are still regarded as ‘reactors to the system’ rather than ‘dynamic
and creative actors’. Conflict is recognised but remains at a secondary place
in the theory (Abrahamson 2001). And, revolution is certainly not considered.
So, isn’t neofunctionalism old wine in new bottles?
Alexander suggests that sociology should be based on a post-positivistic

understanding of science, which means that we can understand the world
around us as much through theoretical explanations as through empirical
enquiry. This view opposes positivism because it reduces theory to empirical
data; in other words, for it, there cannot be a theory divorced from empirical
facts. Positivism makes a sharp distinction between empirical observations
and non-empirical propositions. The latter constitute the realm of philosophy
and metaphysics, thus deserving no place in empirical science.
Post-positivism submits that a theory can be discussed, examined, verified,

and elaborated with reference to other theories rather than empirical
research. In other words, the referent for a theory might be another theory
rather than an ensemble of facts. Theories are viewed as if they represent
the ‘empirical observations’. Alexander is critical of empirically-based
inferences in social sciences. One of the fundamental differences between
social sciences and natural sciences is that theoretical perspectives always
permeate every work that social scientists do. Sociological theory, therefore,
can be scientifically significant irrespective of its ability and capacity to
explain empirical observations.
In future, Alexander thinks, there will be a ‘grand theory’, built on the

premises of post-positivism. This theory will be multidimensional with respect
to various polarities in classical sociological theory, such as micro-macro,
order-conflict, equilibrium-stability, structure-agency, etc. But even after its
‘hybridization’, drawing upon different theoretical perspectives, neo-
functionalism will not be a ‘distinct paradigm’, much less a grand theory. In
other words, skepticism prevails about the future of neofunctionalism.
7.5 Further Reading

Alexander, Jeffrey C. (ed). 1985. Neofunctionalism. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage
School. London: Routledge
Ritzer, George. 2000. Modern Sociological Theory. McGraw Hill Higher Education
References
Abrahamson, Mark. 2001. Functional, Conflict and Nonfunctional Theories. In
George Ritzer and Barry Smart (eds), Handbook of Social Theory. Sage
Publications (pp. 141-51).
Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1982. Positivism, Presuppositions and Current
Controversies. Theoretical Logic in Sociology. Vol. 1. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
_________________, 1998. Neofunctionalism and After. London: Blackwell.
Alexander, Jeffrey C. (ed). 1985. Neofunctionalism. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage.
Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Paul Colomy. 1985. Toward Neo-functionalism.
96 Sociological Theory, 3: 11-23.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Paul Colomy (eds), 1990. Differentiation Theory Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
and Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspectives. New York: New
York University Press.
Bettinger, Robert. 1996. Neofunctionalism. In D. Levinson and M. Ember
(eds), Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology. Henry Holt Reference Book
(pp. 851-3).
Cohen, Percy. 1968. Modern Social Theory. New York: Basic Books.
Fauske, Halvor. 2000. Neofunctionalism. In Heine Andersen and Lars Bo
Kaspersen (eds), Classical and Modern Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers (p. 235-50).
Goldschmidt, Walter. 1966. Comparative Functionalism. An Essay in
Anthropological Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.
School. London: Routledge.
Leach, Edmund R. 1954. Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of
Kachin Social Structure. London: The Athlone Press.
_______________, 1961. Rethinking Anthropology. London: The Athlone Press.
Parsons, Talcott. 1937. The Structure of Social Action. New York: McGraw-Hill.
_______________, 1966. Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Redfield, Robert. 1955. Peasant Society and Culture. Chicago: Chicago
University Press.
Ritzer, George. 2000. Modern Sociological Theory. McGraw Hill Higher
Education.
Smelser, Neil. 1959. Social Change in the Industrial Revolution. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Turner, Jonathan and A.Z. Maryanski. 1979. Functionalism. Menlo Park, Calif.:
Benjamin/Cummings.
97

Unit 8
The Conceptual and
Theoretical Issues of Power
Contents
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Concept of Power
8.3 Theoretical Considerations
8.4 The Concept of Elite
8.5 Power Elite and Veto Groups
8.6 Power in Local Communities
8.7 Conclusion
8.8 Further Reading
Learning Objectives
After going through this Unit, you will be able to
understand the meaning and concept of power
explain the articulation of power among the elite and in local communities
critically discuss the works of major thinkers on power
8.1 Introduction
In simple terms power refers to the ability of a person to influence the
behaviour of another person or a group of persons in accordance with his /
her own wish. In the words of Tawney (1931: 229), “Power may be defined
as the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to modify the
conduct of other individuals or groups in a manner in which he desires, and
to prevent his conduct being modified in the manner in which he does not”.
Power heralds a relationship of subordination and superordination between
people. Many social scientists, particularly sociologists, are chiefly interested
in the consequences of the play of power in social relationships. In this
Unit, we begin with the meaning and concept of power and go on to the
major theoretical approaches to the understanding of power in sociological
writings. Here, we briefly review the viewpoints of six sociologists who
explain the different dimensions of power. Later in the Unit, we discuss the
articulation of power in two mutually opposed contexts: the elite on the
one hand and the local communities on the other.
8.2 Concept of Power

Power always entails a social relationship between at least two actors. It
cannot be an attribute of one person. To say that an individual has power
is meaningless unless it is stated over whom this power is exercised. An
individual or group of individuals who hold power is / are able to get others
to do what they want them to do. If those on whom the power is exercised
resist or refuse to obey those who are powerful, they are punished in one
way or the other. Power always gives rise to asymmetry in relationships.
Those who have greater access to limited resources e.g., control over
finances, ownership or control over means of production and / or means of
distribution are more powerful than those who do not have the means or 101

Understanding Power the opportunity to control such resources. The use of sanction in imposing
one’s will is an important constituent of power and it is on this count that
power differs from influence.
Coser (1982), delineated two major traditions in the conceptualisation of

power that can be distinguished in sociological writings. The first one
focuses on power as the imposition of the will of actor A (who may be an
individual or a collectivity) upon actor B despite B’s resistance. Here, actor
B is dominated by actor A. This approach may be traced in Max Weber. The
second tradition focuses on power as a resource at the disposal of
collectivities and used for their benefits allowing them to make use of it to
attain their objectives. Here power is conceptualised as a collective facility.
This approach may be traced to Talcott Parsons.
Two questions assume relevance at this stage, why do some people weild
power while others do not? Why do some people command and others obey?
At the outset one tends to think in terms of physical might and strength.
The stronger person wields power and commands while the weak person
does not wield power and obeys. This, however, does not hold true always.
It may be said that inequality of resources leads to inequality of power, so
if the resources within a specific sphere were equally balanced, there would
be no power relation between two parties.
The answer to the twin questions is far more complex. It is important to

know the basis on which the one who holds power claims obedience and the
obedient one feels obliged to obey. Gerth and Mills (1953) explain that in
itself power is simply the probability that one person will act as another
person wishes. The obedience may rest upon fear, rational calculations of
advantage, lack of energy to do otherwise, loyalty, or any other reason.
Dennis Wrong (1968: 679) comprehensively explains, “If an actor is believed

to be powerful, if he knows that others hold such a belief, and if he
encourages it and resolves to make use of it by intervening in or punishing
actions by others who do not comply with his wishes, then he truly has
power and this power has indeed been conferred upon him by the
attributions, perhaps initially without foundation, of others”. A group, which
is unorganised, lacks common goals or common interests, and is not ready
to exercise power, is not treated as powerful. Often people who are in
power are able to avoid the surfacing of issues that are of significance to
the powerless. They are able to keep at bay the complain of the powerless
people that they are not cared for.
At this stage it is important to distinguish power from related concepts:
a) Power and Authority

When power acquires legitimacy or justification it is understood as authority.
It may be noted that authority receives voluntary obedience. A person who
has authority may exercise command or control over other persons. Take
the example of a senior bureaucrat who assigns tasks to his/her subordinates
and may even transfer some of them to another city. This is because, the
bureaucrat has the authority to do it by virtue of his/her position and status
in the government machinery. In formal organisations authority is clearly
specified, and dispensed through rules and laws, of the organisations. It may
be understood at this stage that the exercise of authority does not necessarily
imply the superiority of the person who commands. A teacher may be a
102

better scholar than the Principal of the school who dismisses him/her. It is The Conceptual and
Theoretical Issues
simply because of the authority, which vests with the Principal that he/she of Power
may suspend a teacher. Power may, therefore, be executed in formal
organisations as institutionalised authority and as institutionalised power in
informal organisations.
b) Power and Prestige

E.A. Ross (1916) drew attention to prestige as the immediate cause of the
location of power. It was said that the class which has more prestige will
have most power. Prestige, therefore, is an important source of power. It
is not appropriate to associate prestige with power because prestige is
usually not accompanied with power. In itself power becomes the basis of
prestige i.e., when a person has power, he / she has prestige but when a
person has prestige he / she may not have power.
c) Power and Influence

There is a close connection between power and influence. Power commands
obedience and submission; influence is persuasive rather than coercive.
Power calls for intended control, which is usually executed through sanctions
while influence does not involve the use of sanctions or punishment.
Influence, is not essentially accompanied with power. Newton, for example
was a man of influence but not power. A policeman may have power but not
influence. In the same vein, the Prime Minister of the country is a person
with both power and influence.
d) Power and Dominance

Power exists and expresses itself in inter-group relations. It is associated
with status that people occupy in formal organisations while dominance is
associated with one’s personality and may be treated as a psychological
concept. Power, on the other hand, is associated with the structure of
society itself and may be treated as a sociological concept (Bierstedt, 1982).
8.3 Theoretical Considerations

The major theoretical considerations in the context of power focus on (i)
its potential to achieve goals, (here power is treated as equivalent to
domination enfolding the strategy of exercising power over someone) and
(ii) its potential to generate solidarity and collective autonomy (here power
is understood in the larger framework of pursuing collective action as enfolded
in the strategy of exercising power to achieve common goals). Against this
backdrop, the major currents in the sociological conception of power are
discussed here.
a) Max Weber: Power and Domination

According to Weber (1914, 1920) ‘power’ (macht) as a general concept is
distinct from ‘domination’ (herrschaft) as a specific phenomenon. Power is
defined as an actor’s chance to impose his/her will on another (even against
the resistance of the latter) in social relationship. What is interesting to
note is the proposition that the degree of power is dependent on the
nature of submission over the one on whom it is being exercised. Stated
simply, power is more if the probability of submission to the will of the one
who holds it is higher. It may be safely said that the power of an individual(s)
is measured in terms of the chance(s) of imposing the will. Here, the basis
of power or the basis on which imposition of will is called for is not important. 103

Understanding Power Scott (1996:22) explains that power is a potential that is realised through
the actions in which an actor engages. This potential is determined by
accidental or fortuitous circumstances (eg. individual has power over others
because of better physique or because he/she has information that is not
available to others) as much as by structurally defined opportunities and
capacities (e.g. when social distribution of resources improves or worsens
the chances of realising his or her will) at the disposal of an individual.
Domination or herrschaft, on the other hand, presumes the presence of a
herr or master. The chief difference between power and domination is
that the former does not imply the right to command and the duty to obey
while the latter implies the probability of gaining willing obedience.
There are two contrasting types of domination. The first kind of domination
is one that involves a rational and calculative maneuvering of interests in
one’s favour. Often the individual who exercises domination of this kind is
able to convince the subordinate actors that it is their interest which is
being served by allowing him/her do what he/she is doing. This often happens
when small companies sell their goods to a monopoly retail outlet. In doing
so they subject themselves to the power of the retailer since their livelihood
depends on his/her goodwill. The second type of domination is the one
which is exercised by virtue of authority. Here, domination is exercised by
an individual or group because it is legitimised as authority. Those on whom
domination is exercised accept the commands and demands of those who
dominate as basis of their own behaviour.
Box 8.1: Power and Domination

‘Weber gave particular attention to those forms of power that involve stable
and enduring relationships, and when power is structured in this way he
learned it ‘domination’. Power is structured in this way he termed it
‘domination’. Power is structured into distinctive forms of domination through
processes of rationalisation: Power relations that were formerly matters of
unreflective custom and habit become more conscious and deliberate social
practices. The rationalisation of action involves replacing the unreflective
patterns of customary and habitual action by actions that are oriented
towards calculations of self-interest and commitment to ultimate values.
Weber seems to imply two forms of rationalisation, which may be called,
respectively, ‘instrumental rationalisation, and ‘value rationalisation’.
Customary or habitual forms of social order evolve through instrumental
rationalisation into forms of social order that are sustained by calculations
of expediency. Through value rationalisation they become forms of social
order that are sustained by the conception of legitimacy (Weber, 30, cited
here from Scott 1996: 22-23).
The Power in this kind of domination emerges from the probability that the
command will be obeyed. In addition, Weber distinguished between three
kinds of authority, rational-legal authority which is based on norms, ordinances
and legality of the offices of those who exercise authority e.g. the authority
exercised by the tax collectors, policemen, bosses in the office; traditional
authority which is based on a belief in the sacred quality of long-standing
traditions and in the legitimacy of those who exercise authority e.g. the
domination of the eldest person the family; and charismatic authority which
is based on devotion to the sacred quality, heroic strength or exemplary
character of a person, e.g. authority of god-men (see Aron 1967).
104

b) Karl Marx: Class and Power The Conceptual and

Theoretical Issues
Marx (1954, 1955) is known for his conception of class and class struggle. of Power
More specifically, he identifies two classes: the bourgeoisie (or the ruling
class) and the proletariat (or the working class) in the capitalist society. He
says that the proletariat rules and commands obedience from the bourgeoisie.
The basis of the power of the bourgeoisie is control over the capital on the
one hand and its hold over the military force and production of ideas. In
the words of Bottomore (1964: 24-25), “The lines of conflict are most sharply
drawn in the modern capitalist societies, because in such societies the
divergence of economic interests appears most clearly unobscured by any
personal bonds such as those of feudal society, and because development of
capitalism brings about a more radical polarisation of classes than has existed
in any other type of society by its unrivalled concentration of wealth at one
extreme of society and of poverty at the other, and by its gradual elimination
of the intermediate and transitional social strata”. The proletariat, on the
other hand seek to increase the capital for the ruling class. The relationship
between the two classes is one of exploitation in which the ruling class
gains at the expense of the wage labourers constituting the proletariat.
Workers produce commodities for the bourgeoisie for which they receive
wages. The wages are just enough for their subsistence. Surely, there is
a vast difference between the value of the commodity the workers produce
and the wages that they get this difference appropriated by the ruling
class. The proletariat class is perpetually engaged in struggle over its wages
and conditions of work. Earlier the struggle was disorganized and ineffective.
Modern industry and factory system of production ushered an era of political
organisation of class struggle. The class conscious political organisation
emerged. Marx opines that some day, the proletariat will overthrow the
bourgeoisie and get liberation from the long standing domination and
exploitation.
c) Robert Michels: The Iron Law of Oligarchy

Michels believed that the craving for power is inherent in the nature of
human beings. Those who acquire power, seek to perpetuate it. Against
this backdrop, he propounds that democracy calls for organisation, which
leads to oligarchy. The trend towards oligarchic rule in party organisations
is better known as the Iron Law of oligarchy. He agreed that the “democratic
currents of history” often “break ever on the same shoal”. They are, however,
“ever renewed”. One of the reasons for the renewal of democracy is that
oligarchies were felt to be oppressive and were overthrown. Michel insists
that democratic currents will always break the Iron Law (Michels 1959).
It may be understood that the large collectivity of people in an organisation

cannot govern or administer their common affairs. Over the period of time,
specialisation develops and division of labour evolves. Organisations become
increasingly complex. Some people are chosen to represent the masses and
execute their will. According to Michels (1927) every organisation however
democratic in the beginning develops an oligarchic character. He was
convinced that masses await leaders to govern them and take care of their
concerns. The leaders derive power from the incompetence of the masses
in the domain of political life. The incompetent masses submit to the leaders
of whose expertise they are convinced. Oligarchies preserve the stability
and longevity of leadership. More importantly, the oppressive conditions in
themselves, do not lead to unrest. It is the awareness of those conditions
that generates class struggle. The struggles and revolts are often suppressed. 105

Understanding Power Michels maintains that it is appropriate to ascertain the limits imposed by
oligarchies over individuals. He says that decentralisation does not necessarily
give way to enhanced liberty in the hands of individuals; neither does it
enhance the power of the rank and file. Usually, it serves as a mechanism
by which weak leaders seek to get away from the dominion of the stronger
ones. The weaker leaders, however, may establish a centralised authority
within their own domains. One oligarchy gives way to many smaller oligarchies
each powerful in its own sphere. He laid thrust on developing the spirit of
free inquiry, criticism and control of the leaders among the masses. It may
be noted that these are imperative in the process of strengthening democracy
(Zeitlin 1987).
d) Steven Lukes: Power and Human Agency

Lukes affirms that all power is attributed to individual or collective human
agents. Often human agents have several options or alternatives before
them from which they choose their course of action. “Human agents exercise
their characteristic powers when they act voluntarily on the basis of wants
and beliefs which provide them with reasons for so acting. Such an exercise
of the power of human agency implies that the agent at the point of action
has the power to act otherwise, that is, at the least the ability and the
opportunity both to act or not to act, it is in his power to do either; there
is ‘an openness between performing or failing to perform the action’, and
there is no set of external circumstances such that in those circumstances
the agent will necessarily so act’ (Lukes 1977, rpt. 1982: 159). Two conclusions
emerge from this perspective: the one who exercises the power had the
option or the alternative to act differently; and those on whom the power
had the option or the alternative to act differently, if power was not exercised
over them.
Luker’s proposition of power accepts that despite the fact that actors operate
within “structurally determined limits”, they have a certain degree of
autonomy and could act in a degree of autonomy and in a different way.
In other words, there would be no place for power in a condition of total
structural determinism and imposed constraints that determine the options
of human agents. He cites the example of an employer who declares some
of his workers redundant because he wants to cut costs. In another case,
an official government liquidator declares an insolvent company bankrupt
which throws the workers out of work. While the first case is a case of
simple exercise of power, the second is not because we assume that the
liquidator had no alternatives before him. Lukers conclusively says that
social life may be properly understood as a dialectic of power and structure,
a web of possibilities for agents to make choices and pursue strategies
within given limits.
e) Anthony Giddens: Power as Dependency and Domination

Anthony Giddens’s concept of power in the context of interaction is rooted
in terms of domination. He distinguishes between power in the broad sense
and power in the narrow sense. In the broad sense, power is explained as
the transformative capacity of human agency. Here, the term capacity refers
to the capability of an individual to bring about a change in the course of
a series of events through intervention. On the other hand, power in the
narrow sense is largely relational. It is the capability to effect results when
these outcomes depend upon the agency of others. The basic difference
between the two lies in the agency. While use of power in the broad sense
106

is grounded in the capability of an individual to effect outcomes directly, the The Conceptual and
Theoretical Issues
use of power in the narrow sense is grounded in the capability to effect of Power
outcomes in situations when they depend upon others (Stewert 2001).
More specifically, in the narrow sense, power implies dependency upon the
agency of others and the capability of an individual to prevail upon them.
The thrust is on domination on the part of the individual who may be said
to hold power and compliance on the part of others over whom the individual
exercises control. This relationship then, may be understood as one of
domination. Thus Giddens (1976; 111) writes, ‘It is in this sense that men
have power over others; this is power as domination’.
Giddens’s basic conception of power has to do with acquisition and use of

resources or capabilities expressed in struggles and subordination. In Giddens’s
own words (1976:111), ‘Power in either the broad or restricted sense, refers
to capabilities. Unlike the communication of meaning, power does not come
into being only when being ‘exercised’, even if ultimately there is no other
criterion whereby one can demonstrate what power actors possess. This is
important because we can talk of power being ‘stored up’ for future occasions
of use’. Later Giddens (1984) suggests that reproduction of structures of
domination leads to generation of power. Power, therefore, depends upon
the distribution of resources and the capability of individuals to make the
most of them effectively. He upholds that in actual situations everyone
does have possibilities of exercising power. An individual in a subordinate
position is never completely dependent and is often able to convert the
available resources ‘into some degree of control over the conditions of
reproduction of the system’ (Giddens 1982: 32). Giddens opines that power
is not always oppressive. In fact, power may best be understood as the
capacity to achieve outcomes. In fact, power flows smoothly in processes
of social reproduction in the larger matrix of structures of domination. More
importantly, despite the fact that constraints of power cannot be ignored,
power is often a medium for attaining freedom or emancipation.
f) Michael Foucault: Power as Domination

Michael Foucault identifies power with domination in conceptual,
methodological and political terms. He distinguishes between the character
of modern and classical power within the framework of domination.
Disciplinary power as modern form of domination stands out in sharp contrast
with sovereign power as pre-modern domination. Firstly, while disciplinary
power is constant and completely pervasive, sovereign power is periodic
(therefore not constant) and of low social penetration (therefore not all
pervasive). Secondly, while domination in the disciplinary model makes the
required action happen through political rationalities and technologies of
power that seem to be inescapable, domination in the sovereignty model is
expressed through prohibition, and if that fails, the punishment for the
action which should not have been performed. Thirdly, while in the disciplinary
model there is contrasting constitution of actors (subjectivisation in the
sense of control and dependence) the sovereignty model is based on the
givenness of the actors involved (Stewart 2001).
In the words of Foucault (1982:212) himself, “This (modern) form of power

applies itself to everyday life which categories the individual, marks him by
his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of
truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise
107

Understanding Power in him. It is a form of power, which makes individuals subjects. There are
two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control and
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.
Both meanings suggest a form of power, which subjugates and makes subject
to. This implies that the law of truth constitutes the defining criterion of
modern form of power. Further, modern form of power is based on relations
of domination, hierarchy, asymmetry and control. He maintains that new
forms of domination develop and he argues that liberation or freedom (both
at the individual level and at the collective level) from the constraints is not
possible. According to him, global public-oriented emancipatory politics is
not possible. Surely, Foucault has been charged with a kind of fatalism,
inherent in the conception of power.
8.4 The Concept of Elite

In a general sense, the term ‘elite’ was employed to refer to commodities
of particular excellence. This restricted usage of the term in the seventeenth
century was broadened later to include social groups such as higher ranks of
mobility and others that could be treated as superior to the rest of them.
It was only in the latter part of the nineteenth century that the term gained
currency in sociological writings in Europe. In 1930s sociological theories of
elite developed in Britain and America particularly in the writings of Vilfredo
Pareto.
Pareto (1935) explained the concept of elite the terms of a class of people
with highest indices (referring to sign of capacity e.g a successful lawyer
has highest index, one who does not get a client has the lowest index in
their branch of activity). This class of people is referred to as the elite. In
more simple terms, Pareto defined elite by reference to facts which an
outside observer is able to verify. Elite class, therefore, comprises of all
those who have succeeded and are considered by their peers and the public
as the best. When he spoke of the elite consistently, Pareto did not mean
all those who have succeeded but those who exercise the political functions
of administration or government and those who influence or determine the
conduct of governing machinery though they are nor officials or ministers
(see Arnon 1966). There are two categories: the non-elite (who may or may
not have a role to play in the government) and the elite. The latter category
i.e., the elite is divided into governing elite and non-governing elite. The
elite class is divisible into two classes: the governing elite (constituted of
people who have some say or who directly or indirectly play a part in the
government) and the non-governing elite (constituted of the rest of the
elite i.e., those who have to say or no role to play in the government).
Pareto argued that the same individuals occupy the same rank in hierarchy
for wealth as for other criteria (such as musical talent, level of intelligence
and so on) and for the degree of political and social influence. This implies
that the upper classes are also the richest and it is these classes that
represent the elite. Later Pareto concerned himself with those who have
power i.e., governing elite and the masses.
Pareto, however, recognized the element of mobility in the elite class i.e.,
he did not insist that the elite was a static category, which was constituted
once and for all. He propounded the idea of ‘circulation of elite’. There are
atleast two channels through which the idea of circulation of elite may be
explained. Circulation of elite refers to the process in which individuals
108 circulate between the elite and the non-elite groups. It also refers to the

process in which one elite is replaced by another. Pareto’s work does The Conceptual and
Theoretical Issues
incorporate both the conceptions but the former conception referring to of Power
the circulation of individuals between elite and non-elite groups predominates.
In the context of decay and renewal of aristocracies, Pareto observes “the
governing class is restored not only in numbers but — and it is that the more
important thing — in quality, by families rising from a lower classes”. Apart
from this he also makes mention of showing down of this circulation which
leads to increase of degenerate elements in the classes which still hold
power and increase in the elements of superior quality in the subject classes
(i.e., non-elite class). In such a situation social equilibrium becomes unstable.
Even a mild shock may be enough to crumble it. A new elite comes to power
and establishes a new equilibrium after a conquest or a revolution. Pareto
also repeatedly refers to circulation of individuals between the elite and
non-elite classes. He suggested that the governing class constituting the
elite might induct those people in the lower classes from whom they perceive
threat or danger. When such people are inducted into the elite group they
change their character completely and adopt the attitude and interests of
the established elite.
Marie Kolabinska (a student of Pareto) identified circulation which takes

place between different categories of the governing elite itself, and circulation
which takes place between elite and the rest of the population (individuals
from lower strata may manage to enter the existing elite class or individuals
in the lower strata may from new elite groups which engage in a struggle for
power with the existing elite). Kolabinska’s work largely devoted to the
study of circulation of elite in French society focused between the eleventh
and eighteenth centuries (cited from Bottomore 1964).
Gaetano Mosca was the first to draw a distinction between elite and the
masses. He explained that in all societies there are two classes of people:
one that rules and the other that is ruled. The class which rules performs
all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys all the advantages and
privileges that accompany power. The class, which is ruled larger in terms
of numerical composition and is governed and controlled by the former class
through legal, sometimes arbitrary and violent means. Like Pareto, Mosca
was also concerned with elites as groups of people vested with political
power. Mosca explained that between the elite and the masses is the
category of the sub-elite constituted of the ‘new middle class’ of civil
servants, managers and white-collar workers, scientists, engineers, scholars
and intellectuals. The sub-elite provides new recruits to the elite class. The
sub-elite itself is a vital element in the government of society. Mosca
suggested that the stability of any political system largely depends on the
level of morality, intelligence and activity that this second stratum has attained.
He accounted for the rise of new elite in part by the emergence of social
forces, which represent new interests (e.g. technological or economic
interests) in the society (see Bottomore 1964).
8.5 Power Elite and Veto Groups

In the context of power in America, C. Wright Mills (1956) proposed the
concept of power elite (explained in terms of a unified power group
composed of top government executives, military officials, and corporation
directors) while David Riesman (1953) proposed the concept of veto groups
(explained in terms of a diversified and balanced plurality of interest groups,
each of which is primarily concerned with protecting its jurisdiction by
blocking actions of other groups which seem to threaten that jurisdiction). 109

Understanding Power Kornhauser (1966) compares Mills and Reisman on power in America along five
dimensions:
i) Structure of Power including how power is distributed among the major
segments of present-day American society: Mills proposed that pyramid
of power may be conceived as formed of three layers. The apex is
occupied by power elite, the second layer is occupied by middle levels
of power (constituted of diversified and balanced plurality of interest
groups) while the third layer is occupied by mass society (constituted
of powerless mass of unorganised people who are controlled form above).
Riesman, on the other hand, proposed a pyramid formed of two rather
than three layers. Riesman did not recognize the presence of power
elite. The upper layer is occupied by veto groups. Here, instead of
decisive ruling group is an amorphous structure of power centering in
the interplay among interests groups that form the veto groups. The
lower layer of the pyramid comprises more-or-less unorganised public
which cooperates with (and is not dominated) the interest groups in
their maneuvers against actual or threatened encroachments on the
jurisdiction each claims for itself.
ii) Changes in the structure of power including how the distribution of
power has changed in the course of American history: Mills lays emphasis
on increasing concentration of power and the ascending of power elite,
while Riesman lays emphasis on increasing dispersion of power and the
tendency toward the dispersal of power among a plurality of organized
interests.
iii) Operation of the structure of power including the means whereby power
is exercised in American society: According to Mills, the power elite lays
down all important public policies particularly foreign policy. The power
elite manipulates the people at the bottom. Riesman, on the other
hand, denied what Mills asserted. He said that who determines the
policy largely depends on the issue about which policy is being laid out.
Groups constituting veto groups are largely inoperative on several issues.
Most of them become active in making decisions and laying out policies
about issues that concern them or are of interest to them. This implies
that there are as many power structures as the spheres of policy.
iv) Bases of the structure of power including how social and psychological
factors shape and sustain the existing distribution of power: It is
understandable that power is shared among who share common interests:
For Mills, the power elite represents a body of people with common
interests, for Reisman, the veto groups have diversity of interests.
v) Consequences of the structure of power including how the existing
distribution of power affects American society: Mills said that, (a) the
interests of the major institutions (corporations, armed forces, executive
branch of government) whose leaders constitute the power elite are
greatly enhanced in the existing power arrangements; (b) because of
concentration of power in the hands of select few and manipulation for
exercising power, there is decline of politics as public debate; (c)
concentration of power has taken place without a corresponding shift
in the bases of legitimacy of power. Power is supposed to reside in the
hands of public and its elected representatives while in reality it lies in
the hands of those who direct the key bureaucracies. Consequently,
men of power are neither responsible nor accountable for their power;
and (d) if power trends to a small group which is not accountable for its
power, and if politics no longer involves genuine public debate then
110

there will be a severe weakening of democratic institutions. Conversely, The Conceptual and
Theoretical Issues
Riesman said that no one group or class is favoured in a major way over of Power
others; politics has declined in meaning for many people which is not
essentially due to the ascending of veto groups; there is growing
discrepancy between the facts of power and images of power. Power is
more widely dispensed than is generally believed; and power in America
is situational and mercurial, it is amorphous because of which there is
decline of effective leadership.
8.6 Power in Local Communities

The focus of community power is on decisions that are crucial to the people
in a community. The basic question, therefore, is who wields the power to
say about things which are important to many people in the community. The
concern is with the ability to and/or the practice of deciding what is to be
done in, for, by the community. (Spinrad 1965, rpt. 1966).
Box 8.2: Motivation for Decision-Making

‘In the relatively pluralistic American Community, power over decision is not
an automatic reflection of a prescribed hierarchal role description. A
significant variable that emerges from the literature in the motivation to
intervene in a particular decision-making process. Such motivation is simply
a product of the extent to which that decision is salient to the group and
/ or the individual (Spinred, 1965).
Two scholars who have contributed significantly to the subject of community,

power are Delbert Miller and Robert Dahl (see D. Anotnio and J. Ehrlich
1961). They have initiated a debate based on their own studies and research.
The basic issue of contention is, who holds power on local communities.
Miller asserts that the business elite makes decisions in local communities.
Dahl, on the other hand, argues that rather than being monolithic, power
structure is pluralistc. We will discuss the critical features of the two points
of view in some detail now.
Delbert Miller chose knowledgeable informants from the community. He

asked them to select out of a prepared list of important, well-known people
belonging to different organisations and institutions those whom they thought
were powerful in getting things done. Now, Miller interviewed the people
who were selected by the knowledgeable informants. He also asked them
whose help they would seek if they wanted to get something done. This
was referred to as the ‘reputational technique’. Miller concluded that most
of the knowledgeable informants said businessmen were the ones who could
get things done. They do influence policy making in local communities to
a large extent. Here, local governments are not strong bodies and elected
officials are often businessmen, lawyers and politicians of the community,
itself. This was true of the ‘Pacific City. A study of the ‘English City’ however
suggested on Miller that not businessmen but labour is significant as also
leaders from the domain of education, religion, and welfare and status groups.
Based on two of the above-mentioned studies, Miller concluded that power
pattern is not essentially identical in all American Communities.
Robert Dahl studied New Haven. His methodology of research differed sharply
from that of Miller. Dahl found out the specific decisions on specific issues.
What is more important is that he looked for specific decision makes in
111

Understanding Power specific situations two. This Technique was referred to as ‘event analysis’.
He concluded that the role of businessmen in decision-making was minor in
contrast to the assertion of Miller. He explained that while there is no
denying that businessmen have lot of resources of their disposal but it in
equally true that they have several liabilities by which they are constrained
and because of which they cannot emerge as the major contributors in
decisions making process. Therefore, not one centre of power but many
loci of power exist. Dahl believes that mayors and their staff have increasingly
by become the initiators and organisers of important community decision.
Miller insists that the political leaders are uncertain about themselves and
wait for the cues from others, while businessmen have a clearly defined
image and act with more assertion (Spinnad 1965, rpt. 1966).
Apart form Milleer and Dahl, Edward Banfield (1961) made significant
contribution in the domain of community power by studying six specific
community problems in Chicago. He reached to the conclusion that surely
the businessmen in Chicago occupying top positions in national corporations
and regional commercial and banking institutions are endowed with resources
that give them unlimited power. Yet, the businessmen do not dominate
critical community decisions. The chief reasons for abstaining from this sphere
is lack of unity and of interests; and cost entailed in making interventions.
They seem to be satisfied and let go of situations if their vested interests
are not at stake. On the other hand if their personal interests are threatened
or jeopardized, they become excessively involved and use their influence in
effecting decisions. Banfield agrees with Dahl in upholding that the chief
decisions in Chicago are taken by mangers of large organisations, few civic
leaders, and the chief elected officials.
Banfield seems to consider the political leaders as potentially omnipotent

when they go all out on any question. This calls for using up their limited
working capital; and coming into confrontation with other power groups
besides national government, businessmen other strong community elements
that may be affected and take an opposite stand. They, therefore, are
slow to take up issues and often look for compromises (Spinrad 1965, rpt.
1966).
8.7 Conclusion
It is evident that the notion of power so commonly used in day-to-day
parlance has many dimensions and operated in many different ways.
Sociologists have conceptualised power in terms of domination, as a
repressive and oppressive force as also an enabling resource. Power, has
we have noted rests both with the elite and with the local community.
Power enfolds a dynamism of sorts in its very nature and regulates nearly all
relationships in society which makes it of special interest to sociologists.
8.8 Further Reading

Biertedt, R, 1982, (org 1950), An Analysis of Social Power in Sociological
Theory: A Book of Readings edited by Lewis A Coser and Bernard Rosenberg,
New York, Macmillan
D’Antonio, William V and Howard S. Ehrlich (eds.) 1961, Power and Democracy
in America, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press
112

References The Conceptual and

Theoretical Issues
of Power
Aron, R, 1966 (Orig. 1960), ‘Social Class, Political Class, Ruling Class’ in Class,
States and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective edited by
Reintardt Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul
Banfield, Edward C.1961, Political Influence, New York: The Free Pres of
Glencoe
Biertedt, R, 1982, (org 1950), An Analysis of Social Power in Sociological
Theory: A Book of Readings edited by Lewis A Coser and Bernard Rosenberg,
New York, Macmillan
Bottomore, I.B. 1964, Elites and Society, New York, Penguin Books
Coser, Levis A. 1982, ‘The Notion of Power: Theoretical Developments’ in
Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings edited by Lewis A Coser and Bernard
Rosenberg, New York: Macmillan
D’Antonio, William V and Howard S. Ehrlich (eds.) 1961, Power and Democracy
in America, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press
Foucault, M. 1982, ‘The Subject and Power’ in Michel Faucault: Beyond
Structuralism and Hermenties edited by H. Drefus and P. Rabinow, Brigton:
Harvester
Gerth, H and C. Wright Mills, 1953, Character and Social Structure, Harcourt
Brace Jovanvich
Giddens, A. 1976, New Rules of the Sociological Method, London: Hutchinson
Giddens, A, 1982, ‘Power, the Dialectic of Control and Class Structuration’ in
Social Class and the Division of Labour: Essays in Honour of the Ilya Neustadt
Giddens, A, 1984, The Constitution of Society, Cambridge: Polity Press,
A. Giddens and G. Mackenzie, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Kornhauser, W. 1966 (orig. 1961) “Power” Elite or “Veto Groups”? in Class,
Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective edited by
Reinhardt Bendix and Segmour Martin Lipset. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul
Lukes, S. 1977 (rpt. 1982), Essays in Sociological Theory, New York: Columbia,
University Press
Mills, C. Wright, 1956, The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University Press
Pareto, V, 1935, The Mind and Society, New York: Har court Brace Jovanovich
Riesman, D, 1953, The Lonely Crowd, New York: Doubleday Anchor Edition.
Ross, E.A. 1916, Social Control, New York, Macmillan
Spinared, W, 1966, (Orig, 1965), ‘Power in Local Communities’ in Class,
Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective edited by
Reinhardt Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, London: Routledge and Kegam
Paul
Steward, A. 2001, Theories of Power and Domination: The Politics of
Empowerment in Late Modernity, New Delhi: Sage Publications
Tawney, R.H. 1931, Equality, London: Allen and Unwin
113

Unit 9
Class and Legitimacy
Contents
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Capitalism, Class Relations and Development
9.3 Concept of Legitimacy
9.4 Why Legitimacy ?
9.5 Bases of Legitimacy: Traditional, Legal-Rational and Charismatic
9.6 Traditional Authority
9.7 Legal-Rational Authority
9.8 Charismatic Authority
9.9 Legitimacy and Social Changes
9.10 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After reading this unit you should be able to
locate the various types of legitimacy
outline the bases of legitimacy
describe the fluid bases of legitimacy
9.1 Introduction
In this unit, we shall be discussing to important concept of sociology that
is class and legitimacy. In the first part of this unit, we shall be concentrating
on the concept of class as elaborated by Karl Marx. In the second part, we
shall be dealing with the notion of legitimacy as propagated by Max Weber.
Let us begin with the concept of class.
Class in conventional sense is a collectivity or a group of people who have

some characteristics in common. Several scholars have identified several
characteristics in identifying classes. They have also located the position of
class in the society in different ways. For Marx, economic position is the
prime in locating class position of a group of people in the society. To put
it very simply, class to him is a category of people, who have a common
economic interest against those of other class in the society. These to him,
are the objective economic condition for the formulation of classes in the
society. To him, however, class is not only an economic category, but also a
social force to bring about changes in the society. Here, he emphasises on
the issue of subjective consciousness as the key factor for the transformation
of the economic categories of the class as the change agents to bring about
revolution in the society. Thus, to him a category of people with a common
economic interest viz – a – viz other form class-in-itself. And when this class-
in-itself is mediated by subjective class consciousness, it emerges to be
class-for-itself. Indeed, it is the revolutionary class who is ready for action
and change in the society.
It is important that class is not static social category: rather is undergoes a

114 process of transformation of the society. In each of the economic stage of

every society, class is distinctly placed with distinctive social and historical Class and Legitimacy
roles. We have to understand, this in detail Marxian concept of class relation

and change.
Class Relation and Change

In all the stages of economic transformation of society, there have been
specific forms of class struggles. Social classes according to Karl Marx are the
main agents of social change. The change is however based on class conflict.
Thus to him “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of
class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf,
guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in
constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden,
now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-
constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending
classes.”
Classes, to Marx, are formed based on objective material conditions. These

are groups of people with a common economic position vis-a-vis those of
other class. In essence this economic interest is conflicting and contradictory
to each other’s class position. These class relations get transformed for
hostile action against each other with the intermediation of class
consciousness. The objective material conditions form the basis for the
formation of ‘class-in-itself which get transformed in ‘class-for-itself’ in the
process of transversing of subjective class consciousness.
To Karl Marx, though the class relation was very complicated in the earlier
epochs of history, in the modern stage of capitalism this has been simplified.
In the modern capitalist society new classes however have emerged with
new condition of operation and new form of struggle between the bourgeoisie
(the owners of the of production i.e., the ‘haves’) and the protetariat (i.e.
the ‘have-nots’).
According to Marx, under capitalism wage labourers are paupers who grow
more rapidly than the population and wealth. The essential conditions both
for the existence and sway of the bourgeoisie class is the formation and
augmentation of capital. “The advance of industry, whose involuntary
promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourer, due to
completion, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The
development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the
very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products.
What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, is its grave diggers. Its
fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable (119)
9.2 Capitalism, Class Relations and Development

Modern industry has established the world market that has given immense
scope of development to commerce, navigation and communication by land.
These developments again have paved the way for the extension of industries
and free trade.
The bourgeoisie class constantly maximises its profit through the expansion
of new markets, introduction of new technology, extraction of surplus value
and exploitation of the proletariat. However, along with these developments
there emerge new forces of contradiction within the capitalists system.
Notwithstanding the emergence of new forces of contradiction, the 115

Understanding Power bourgeoisie was very revolutionary in their outlook and action. According to
Marx “The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part…..
the bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and
with them the whole relations of society.”
Through the exploitation of the world market the bourgeoisie has given the
production and consumption process a cosmopolitian character. The old
industries got destroyed. The old national industries got dislodged. Industry
in the capitalist system no longer worked only on indigenous raw material
but raw materials drawn from the remotest zones, whose product are
consumed in every quarter of the globe. “In place of old wants satisfied by
the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their
satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local
and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every
direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also
in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations
become common property. National one sideness and narrow mindedness
become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and
local literatures there arises a world literature”(112).
The capitalists according to Marx also subjected nature to the force of man
and machinery through the application of chemistry to industry and
agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraph, canalisation of
rivers etc. All these facilitated the scope of free commodification of the
economy at world scales. There also emerged free competition accompanied
by social and political institutions to adopt to it.
The modern capitalist however, according to Marx, has inherited and nurtured
the seeds of its destruction in its own womb. In proportion to the growth
of the bourgeoisie there has emerged the modern working class — the
proletariat “These labourers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a
commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently
exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the
market.” (114)
For Marx the essence of the captor is to maximize profit through

commodification of the production process. As long as capitalism is based on
private ownership the means of production, it maximizes profit of the private
producers. This profit is again maximised by exchange proceeding from money
to money by way of commodity. Gradually the proceed from many to money
by way of commodity end up with more money than one had at the outset
(Aron, 1965 : 128). To explain the sources of profit Marx talked about the
theory of value, wage and surplus value. To him the value of any commodity
is roughly proportional to the quality of human labour contained in it. The
wage capitalists pay to the workers as the compensation for the labour
power the worker rent to the capitalist is equal to the amount necessary for
the existence of the workers and their family to produce the merchandise
for the capitalist. Under the capitalist system, workers receive the wage
which is less than the actual duration of the work; that is less than the value
of the commodity he or she produces. Here comes the notion of ‘surplus
value’ which refers to ‘the quality of value produced by the workers beyond
the necessary labour time’. Under the capitalist system the workers do not
get the wage for the quality of the value produced beyond the necessary
116 labour time.

In return the wage received by a workman is restricted only to the means Class and Legitimacy
of his subsistence and survival. Marx calculated that the price of a commodity
and therefore “also of labour is equal to its cost of production”. In proportion,
therefore, as the repulsiveness of work increases the wage decreases. With
the increase in the proportion of the use of machinery and division of labour
the burden of toil of the labour also increases in terms of increase in the
working hours, and increase in the quantum of work. “The proletariat is
without property. His relation to his children and wife has no longer anything
in common with the bourgeoisie family relations; modern industrial labour,
modern subjugation to capital, the same in England, as in France, in America
and Germany, has tripped him of every trace of national character. Law,
morality, religion are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk
in ambush just as many bourgeois interest,” (118).
Gradually the number the proletariat also increases to gain more strength
and awareness. The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, artisans,
peasants also join the army of the proletariat in their fight against the
bourgeoisie. To Marx “All previous historical movements were movements of
minorities, or in the interests of minorities. The proletarian movement is
the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the
interests of the immense majority.” And again Marx writes: In depicting the
most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the
more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point
where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent
overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the
proletariat
9.3 Concept of Legitimacy

Legitimacy refers to lawful and regular activity which could be justified on
one or the other reasonable ground. For example, the use of public money
for some legitimate purposes, legitimate reasons for one’s absence from
office or work and being born of persons legitimately related / married are
such cases that give us some initial ideas about the use of this term legitimacy.
in our daily life-experiences we come across several such cases when we
accept the actions of others as correct, acceptable and justified. We normally
do not question such actions of others. But sometimes we come across such
instances when we think that the action of the others are not justifiable.
When we begin to question the action of others, we get some vague idea
of the term legitimacy. What right one has got to speak to us like this ? Who
is he to order us to do certain things ? These are the questions that arise
in our minds when we are not ready to accept other’s actions, judgements
or orders as such. It could be understood like what is the legitimate ground
on which one is asking us to do certain favours. This question is related to
the action of others, but sometimes questions are raised about one’s status
as well. A reference to the questions like this has already been made. People
born out of the legimate relationship like marriage are known as legitimate
children. In this way the notion of legitimacy covers much wider area than
with which we are normally concerned.
9.4 Why Legitimacy?

Throughout the world – in modern times as well as in history, the people or
governments in power have attempted normally to justify their occupation
of power over the people over whom they have ruled. The people in power
117

Understanding Power must be in a position to demonstrate that their occupation of power is
legitimate as well. For example, in democratic countries the people who
govern are elected on a regular basis. In such countries elections are held
after a certain period of time and only the elected representatives can
govern over the people. The people in power have always attempted to
somehow justify their hold on certain privileged positions which includes
rewards as well. They have been able to develop certain mechanisms through
which they were able to justify their claims over their subordinates and the
people in general. On the other hand, these subordinates also require some
basis on which to accept the claims of their superiors. In this way legitimacy
could resolve the possibilities of conflict between those who govern and
those who are being governed. Legitimacy thus resolves the conflict between
differing claims of people as it is important specially in those cases that are
related to the distribution of power in society. As stated earlier, the scope
for the issues centered around legitimacy is much wider that it apparently
appears. A meaningful and scientific analysis of some of these issues is
discussed in the sociological discourse.
9.5 Bases of Legitimacy: Traditional, Legal-Rational

and Charismatic
The credit must go in favour of Max Weber a prominent sociologist from
Germany, who not only identified the importance of the issues like legitimacy
but also attempted to make a scientific analysis of it. After establishing
legitimacy as an important issue for sociological analysis, Max Weber attempted
to clarify the important bases of legitimacy. Max Weber identified three main
bases of legitimacy namely, what he calls it, traditional, legal-rational and
charismatic, Max Weber has also distinguished between power and authority.
According to Max Weber, power refers to the capacity of the actor to carry
out his will inspite of resistance. According to him legitimate power is called
authority.
9.6 Traditional Authority

One could derive legitimacy on the basis of traditional grounds. Not very
long back in history, several kings throughout the world ruled over the people
on the basis of traditional authority. If the authority was derived on the
traditional basis (as in the case of kings) then it was not generally questioned
by the people. Several traditional legends and epics also supported the rule
of the king as he was considered to be the representative of God. The basic
understanding behind the rule of the king was like this: the king has been
ordered by God to look after the welfare of its people.
Box 9.1: Ascribed Status

Apart from the king several village – chiefs in India also enjoyed this traditional
authority. In India, traditional village–panchayats as well as caste-panchayats
have displayed ample scope for traditional authority to flourish. Similarly
there have been numerous cases of the tribal-chiefs in several poets of Asia,
Africa and Latin America. All such examples address to one central question.
Why the rulers in earlier societies were able to rule over people without
much problems and resistence from them ? The answer is that these rulers
used traditional basis of legitimacy to derive power and were able to morally
justify their actions in the name of the welfare of the subordinate and
disadvantaged categories of people. Traditional authority is also associated
118

with the ascribed status of most of its people in society. Who actually Class and Legitimacy
appointed one to occupy such a privileged position ? On what basis one

issues certain orders that are to be followed by the most of the people ?
These type of questions are generally avoided by the people and a major
source of such a form of resolution of conflicts generally happens to be the
prevalent traditional authority. Thus, if the power structure derives its
legitimacy on traditional grounds, it is understood as a case of traditional
authority.
9.7 Legal-Rational Authority

According to Max Weber, the second base of legitimacy is legal – rational.
This type of authority has been found in almost all the modern societies of
the world. It is also known as legal-rational authority. The most appropriate
expression of such legal-rational authority could be what is now a days
known as bureaucracy. Max Weber himself had identified bureaucracy as an
important and emerging phenomenon throughout the world and himself made
a conceptual analysis of it. Although some other scholars from other social-
sciences as well later tried to understand the notion of bureaucracy in the
changing scenario of the world, but due to the intellectual craftsmanship of
Max Weber his formulations on bureaucracy still enjoy a commandable respect.
In fact Max Weber’s discussion involves much more than what is generally
attributed to his formulations on bureaucracy. For example, Max Weber’s
formulations on bureaucracy includes what he calls it “ideal-type”, modern
organisations and his overall methodology of social-sciences. The basic idea
here has been to understand how does bureaucracy get legitimacy in modern
organisations on the grounds of legal-rational authority. Before proceeding
further it seems necessary to clarify some opinions regarding bureaucracy.
Box 9.2: Ideal Type Bureaucracy

The notion of bureaucracy has been hailed as well as condemned by various
scholars, academicians and political strategists. The discourses on bureaucracy
also go beyond the academic discussions and several times its role has been
questioned on political and moral grounds. On the basis of his understanding,
particularly in the U.S.A., Max Weber constructed an ideal-type of bureaucracy
which included eleven characteristics attached to it. A clarification seems
necessary at this stage. Although Max Weber’s notion of ideal-type is not
being discussed here as such, but certain points about it must be kept in
mind, since he discussed about ideal-type of bureaucracy.
First, it must be kept in mind that ideal-type has nothing to with the ideal
conditions that are supposed to be achieved by any individual or organisation.
Second, it was suggested by Max Weber that all the characteristics as they
are stated to comprise bureaucracy are not to be found in any actually
existing bureaucratic organisation. Third, the opposite of ideal-type is real-
type which might actually be found in society. But as ideal-type received
importance in the sociological literature, its counterpart real-type neither
received importance nor it was used as such in the discipline at later stages
of research. But then what was the need to construct the ideal-type. Max
Weber believed that ideal-type is useful and could be constructed whenever
we are dealing with unknown or less familiar situations.
119

Understanding Power
What is the difference between charismatic and rational-legal authority.
Note down your answer in your notebook.
Max Weber has clarified the notion of legal-rational basis of legitimacy in

detail. This legal-rational basis of legitimacy is realised through bureaucracy
in modern organisations. At this stage the readers are advised to keep in
mind, compare the contrast this type of legitimacy with its other types. The
main characteristics of bureaucracy could be discussed in the following way.
1) In any bureaucratic organisation there are written rules which are
followed by everyone from top to the bottom in a defined way. The
work and orders related to it are given from those who are at the top
of the organisation and are to be followed by those at the lower level.
Bureaucracy involves a lot of work on paper, which means that no verbal
orders could be given. Similarly only such orders could be given which
are appropriate according to the rules. Meaning thereby that wrong
orders could neither be given nor they are to be followed. The work and
orders on paper reduce the chances of personal biases against each
other. The idea behind such an organisation and style of work is that if
the issues are correct and correspond to the existing state of laws then
they should be completed. The aims of the perfect bureaucratic
organization include the cases and not the people.
2) As bureaucratic organisations do their work on paper, it is done by its
permanent employees. Rules of the office regulate recruitment of the
staff and its promotions. The nature and working of such an organisation
happens to be different from the individuals who comprise it. The idea
behind such an organisation has been to ensure complete non-
interference from any quarter, completely transparent and impersonal
working.
3) Although Weber’s work was concerned with the public bureaucracy his
emphasis on rationality associated with it extended the use of this
concept in the private sectors as well. Since Weber believed in the
rational basis of legitimacy for both i.e. bureaucracy as well as the then
emerging enterprises, it was to be hoped that bureaucracy might finally
find a place in the private business organisations as well.
4) There seems to be a need to understand and examine this legal – rational
form of legitimacy as it expressed through bureaucracy. In practice,
however, certain characteristics which were contrary to the formulations
of Max Weber were noted by some scholars. For example, the issues like
misgovernance, incompetence, unnecessary paper work and frustration
of people in bureaucracy have been referred by several scholars. These
dysfunctions of bureaucracy have been referred in the case of capitalist
as well socialistic type of governance – systems. But the credit of
highlighting the legal-rational form of legitimacy and its analysis goes to
Max Weber.
9.8 Charismatic Authority

Max Weber has defined it as the third basis of legitimacy. These grounds of
acquiring legitimacy are quite different from the previous bases. Charismatic
authority is based neither on traditional nor legal-rational basis. It is quite
different form the two previously discussed bases of legitimacy. Charisma
refers to certain qualities in a person which provide him something like a
120

spiritual grace or capacity to inspire others and fill in enthusiasm among the Class and Legitimacy
people. These are certain qualities that are not found in every type of
personality–systems, they appear rarely among the people. Those who possess
these qualities are generally able to garner support without much difficulty.
They are able to lead the people on the basis of these rare qualities located
within their personality–system and also due to their unique approach to
tackle the problems of society. In this sense each Charismatic leader has got
not only a unique personality system to convince others but also an approach
that looks different from other previous approaches to solve the problems
of society. If we attempt to analyse the relationship between a Charismatic
leader and his followers, then we realise that this sort of a relationship itself
is quite different from others.
Box 9.3: Personal Traits and Qualities

As a Charismatic leader thinks and delivers, his followers simply work
deliberately according to the whims and wishes of their leader. On this basis
the leader derives legitimacy for his words and action as people simply
follow him without questioning him. We can understand it in other words as
well. The personal traits and qualities in Charismatic leaders happen to be
such that in a majority of cases they are capable enough to overpower the
others particularly those who are his followers. It is like, if the Charismatic
leader proposes something his followers are likely to second it immediately
without asking for much. The followers of the Charismatic leader in fact
keep him in high esteem and his personal qualities influence the followers
in such a way that they generally agree to do anything for him. It reflects
an unending, enduring and permanent sort of faith of the followers in their
leader. The Charismatic leader on its part also seems capable of solving any
problem, at least his followers believe it.
The followers believe in the Charismatic leader and don’t generally attempt
to distinguish between what is right or wrong about his approach. The
Charismatic leader is actually able to inspire others who in turn develop a
sort of faith in him which to a great extent is like a permanent one. Weber
has expressed the optimistic point of view about the Charismatic sort of
leadership. Accordingly, Charisma has been considered as a force which could
challenge or question bureaucratic rigidity. For example, in the context of
modern society a Charismatic leadership might critically examine the role of
bureaucracy on particular issues like the child labour or human rights.
Charismatic leadership presumes a set of belief – system which keeps intact
the relationship between the leaders and his followers.

Outline the notion of charisma. How does charisma get reutilized? Write
down your answer in a notebook.
Max Weber was of the opinion that it is possible for a leader to show his
Charisma once, but it is not enough. Since the expectations of the followers
gain new heights, the leadership in question gets compelled to show its
Charisma once again. In fact the followers expect their leader to show his
Charisma more than once. Once is not enough sort of situation generally
engulfs the leader. These higher expectations of the followers compell the
leader to think again and again and to work out for something new which
could be considered as a functional equivalent to his own Charisma shown
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Understanding Power earlier. And since his personality – system has certain unique attributes,
sometimes he becomes able to show his Charisma again. Max Weber has
identified process this ‘routinisation of Charisma’. Without it one fails to
remain and occupy the status of a Charismatic leader. T.K. Oommen has
studied one such case of leadership in the context of the Indian society.
According to him the role of Vinoba Bhave in the Bhoodan-Gramdam movement
could be identified as that of a Charismatic leader. It was found in the study
that the Charismatic leadership of Vinoba Bhave resulted in favour of the
stability of the system but change in the approach, especially when certain
powerful people donated their land willingly in favour of the poor people.
Thus Charismatic authority refers to a unique sort of basis for legitimacy
which is different from earlier discussed traditional and legal-rational bases
of legitimacy.
9.9 Legitimacy and Social Changes

Although Max Weber referred to three bases of legitimacy, but society has
undergone several changes since then. Max Weber’s characterisation of
legitimacy into three types resembles with his others conceptualisations as
well and in a sense they could be considered as ideal or pure types. Max
Weber’s formulations, although included important bases of legitimacy, but
his list of such bases might not be an exhaustive one. For example, in
modern society another important base for legitimacy has been identified
which is related to professional authority. There are people like doctors,
engineers, chartered accountants, computer personnel and lawyers who
specialise in their own jobs and undergo rigorous training and study for
longer years to learn about their jobs. As a result of it, these professionals
have a say of their own, they are free to take decisions in their specialised
areas and for such an action they are quite competent to do so. Thus, the
power acquired in such a way is known as professional authority and it
derives legitimacy on the basis of specialisation achieved after a longer
period of training. One example might be given here, it is the doctor who
is capable to decide the type of treatment to be given to the patient. Such
decision can’t be taken by the people having traditional, legal-rational or
Charismatic authority.
Now a days societies of the world are changing at a much faster pace than
before. This period of change is also referred to as the period of
transformation of societies. During this process of change, sometimes it
becomes difficult for the people to understand various claims for legitimacy.
At times we come across conflicting claims about legitimacy. For example,
who must be the appropriate person to decide about the marriage of a boy
in the Indian society happens to be one such important question. If the
parents take the decision about the marriage then it is the case for traditional
authority and if the boy himself takes the decision and decide to marry in
the court of law then it is a case for legal-rational authority. A married couple
could derive legitimacy of their relationship to each other either on traditional
or on legal-rational basis. In the empirical situation sometimes we come
across conflicting claims based upon different grounds for legitimacy. For
example, regarding the decision of marriage conflicting claims might be seen
between traditional and legal-rational basis of legitimacy. In the rapidly
changing societies, sometimes it becomes difficult to really identify the real
basis for legitimacy. The rapid changes that are taking place in the societies
of the world have created such conditions where sometimes it becomes
122 difficult to decide the grounds or bases of legitimacy. In the classical

sociological literature itself we come across discussions where societies could Class and Legitimacy
not really enjoy the fruits of development. Development of societies alongwith

it have brought some undesirable conditions as well. For example.
Emile Durkheim has referred to ‘pathological conditions of society’. Karl

Marx has talked about ‘alienation’ in the capitalist society. These conditions
provide the grounds for the crisis of legitimacy. Under such conditions
sometimes one fails to decide on how to decide the legitimate grounds for
actions. In modern societies, particularly in the case of the U.S.A., C. Wright
Mills referred to the prevailing ‘uneasiness’ and ‘indifference’ in society
which has emerged as a result of the threat on the existing values which
itself are eroding fast. In simple words, whenever we come across some
assertions like “Who are you to say so ?” or “Who is he to issue orders like
that”, we could see the beginning of the emerging crisis of legitimacy.
Whenever the older and known bases of legitimacy are questioned and new
bases have not yet emerged, it could be identified as the situation referring
to crisis of legitimacy. This crisis of legitimacy has been seen particularly in
the case of the western countries, but some developing countries of the
world might also see such conditions as emerging. Although the older grounds
for legitimacy have been challenged in the modern society, but this resultant
crisis of legitimacy could well be managed on the newer grounds of legitimacy.
But one trend which could be seen as emerging throughout the world at the
moment is that the area of legal-rational basis of legitimacy is increasing
everyday.
9.10 Conclusion
The notion of legitimacy has got much wider applications than as it appears
from its conceptual usages. In the changing era and in the new world order
the notion of legitimacy has acquired newer meanings and wider applications.
Some countries of the world have democratically elected governments and
they derive legitimacy on the grounds of being elected by the people. Non-
elected governments might face some problems at home and abroad as it
might become increasingly difficult for them to derive the sort of legitimacy
required to rule over the people. On the other hand people who wage an
armed struggle against the state and terrorists groups do not enjoy legitimacy
even though they claims like fighting for the cause of the people. In recent
times all the terrorist – groups throughout the world have lost public support
or sympathies and the public opinion has been built-up against their violent
actions. In the modern political analysis, one significant question that has
come up is concerned with the issues related with elections. Elections have
acquired a new meaning and new dimensions in modern society. The issues
like terrorism and organised violence are losing grounds in the modern polity.
People in general and intellectuals in particular have been asking the questions
like : Why these terrorist organisations can’t contest elections ? In this way
elections and elected governments have acquired the sort of legitimacy of
which even the thought or idea was not possible just a century ago. Some
international organisations like the Common wealth of Nations accept the
participation of only democratically elected governments as its legitimate
member – states. The war against terrorism has acquired international
dimensions. In modern political – analysis, thus the issues concerning
legitimacy have acquired a new scope, meaning and dimensions. Similarly the
international agreement on human rights and the establishment of various
national human rights commissions in different nation states have given a
new meaning to the quality of life. It sounds like that these human rights 123

Understanding Power should become the legitimate possession of the people and any violation
against it whether it is by any individual, group or even state could be
judged as a crime which is an illegitimate action. Such issues provide us an
opportunity to understand the changing dimensions of the issues concerning
legitimacy.

Weber, Max 1958, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, New
York: Saribrers
Weber, Max 1968, Economy and Society 3 Vols Totawa, NJ.: Bedminster Press
124

Unit 10
Power: Functional Perspective
Contents
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Early Writers: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau
10.3 Nineteenth Century
10.4 Twentieth Century Writers
10.5 Max Weber and Talcott Parsons
10.6 Talcott Parsons
10.7 Polity as a Subsystem
10.8 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After reading this unit lesson you should be able to
Grasp the meaning of power
Understand the praxis of power
10.1 Introduction
We begin by grasping the meaning of ‘power’ in day to day use and
dictionaries.
Then we turn to the way three political philosophers of 17th and 18th
centuries reflected upon its need for society, and the nature of power
acceptable to people.
A political scientist and another turned as a sociologist gave their views
on limits of power and sovereignty, thereby introducing the significance
of other associations and groups in society. Their orientations are
presented briefly.
Two major sociologists – Max Weber and Talcott Parsons contributed to
the discussion on the nature of power and its legitimacy. Their scope for
power holders as discussed by the former; and the capacity of the social
system to realise common goals and increase its capacity as brought out
by Talcott Parsons are explained.
In understanding the unit, the student will find it useful to refer to units
on function and others on power.
To make the concepts and situations clearer an effort has been made to
illustrate a few points from the Indian setting and such material is not
based on examples drawn from the classical authors.
The word ‘Power’ has its roots is Latin ‘potis’ ‘posse’ or ‘pot-ere’ which
signify ‘to be also’. The word has been used in several senses in daily life
like ‘horse power’ that measures energy, ‘power-loom’ as distinct from the
hand-loom, conveying the idea of mechanical energy. In mathematics when
we write x3, that means x is multiplied by itself three times. If the value of
x is 2 than 23 is 2 raised to the power 3, that is 2 x 2 x 2 = 8. Here ‘power’
is used for making a small number larger. These examples give a general idea
that power implies a capacity to increase energy and to enable a person or 125

Understanding Power a thing to enlarge its scope. It is a good idea to learn how we come to such
an understanding. We recommend the use of a standard dictionary to get
first acquaintance with a word we want to learn about. In this paragraph,
two sources have been used : (i) The Concise Oxford Dictionary and (ii)
Chamber’s twentieth Century Dictionary. The larger volume of Oxford English
Dictionary also mentions how a word was used first and by whom. The curious
students may develop this as a habit for learning various meanings and usages
of a word consulting any standard dictionary. That is the beginning. Dictionary
of sociology and international encyclopedia are further advancements.
When a word is used many times, the dictionary also notes some words that
convey a similar sense. The Oxford Concise Dictionary for example uses
words like ability to do or act, influence authority under one’s control. This
question has been answered in another lesson unit. Now we reach the
second stage.
10.2 Early Writers: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau

Discussion of a few key words are found in general literature in the writings
of early scholars who expressed their view even before sociology was born.
In their writings we try to locate the meaning and significance of these
words. Here the word ‘power’ and its possible links with function are seen
through the contribution of three writers : Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.
By definition power relations relate to unequal positions and the inter

relations among persons placed therein. Here a serious question is raised
‘why should’ inequality to tolerated or accepted even at the philosophical
level? We have the other idea ‘Man was born free, every where he is in
chains. This idea was most vigorously talked about in France when it was
socially preparing for the French Revolution of 1789. The king claimed ‘divine
right’ so the struggle had to be targeted on both the king and the priest
who justified that right, there was a struggle for human secular forces to
became stronger. ‘Man is the measure of all things’ become the new dictum.
Secular knowledge was compiled in Encyclopedias.
Among political philosophers, Hobbes (1588-1679) had raised the question

about the nature of man. It appears that he talked about the primitive
persons who were equal to one another.
The difference between man and man is not so considerable, as that one
man can claim himself any benefit to which another man may not pretend,
as well as he if any two men desire the same thing, which they cannot both
enjoy, they become enemies, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another.
In the nature of man, we find three causes of quarrel : Competition,
Diffidence, and Glory. The first one leads men to use violence, to make
themselves. Mosters of other men’s persons wives, children and cattle’,
second to defend them; the third for trifles as a word a smile or by reflection
in their kindred friends nations or profession. (Ref. In Parsons et al., 1960).
‘Everyman is enemy to every man. No account of time, no arts, no letters,

no society…... and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’.
Hence, the need for the laws of nature and a common power to keep them
in awe and answer the need for maintaining order. His solution lay in agreed
reasoning and the institution of a ruler (king) for the purpose. Hobbes has
126 been considered a brilliant thinker for raising the problem of order in society,

though other thinkers disagree with the depiction of human nature and the Power: Functional
Perspective
solution. However, for our present purposes, it may be clarified that power
is seen to fulfill the function of maintaining order.
John Locke (1632-1704) agrees on the equality of man and confers a right on
him to punish the wrong doer such liberty could be misused; if the victim
is to be the judge also. Hence there need for the state that with common
consent will perform this role, and the advocacy of the civil government.
Rousseau (1712-1778) is the most famous of the three writers and had
tremendous influence on the ideas leading to the French Revolutions (1789).
He is associated with the remark ‘Man was born free, but everywhere he is
in chains from the state of nature, human beings moved to develop a general
will which could provide the rationale for exercise of power and even kings
and tyrants could not ignore the power of the general will, hence the rationale
for abolition of kingdoms and bringing in Republics. View of Hobbes, Locke
and Roussean were examined in critical details by political philosophers, but
the main reasons for referring to the three written are the following:
1) The need for having central authority to maintain order was emphasised;
and in this sense state was associated with a function.
2) Unequal distribution of power needs an explanation and a justification.
Here two aspects become important: who gets power over whom? What
is its legitimacy?
There two questions will be dealt with in relation to the individuals and the
state itself.
10.3 Nineteenth Century

The nineteenth century discussions on society were dominated by the ideas
and progress (August Comte). Herbert Spencer joined together ideas of
society as an organism with evolution, the former giving the state a prime
position in the functioning of the society. The near musical chair race was
the main feature of the French society, where the monarchy and the republic
continued to replace one another. Ultimately the Third Republic got stabilized
in 1871. The intelligentsia had a stake in its success. An army that was as
efficient as an emperor’s was created. Special institutions for training the
civil service, technicians and leaders came into being. The church still
controlled education. The education minister restricted opening of new
school, state sponsored schools were started. Yet, their efficiency had to be
maintained (In India, we are familiar with the difference in mission schools
and state run schools). The Minister consulted Durkheim, whose professional
advice was that the teachers had to be trained first for the new tasks. The
politician offered this task to Durkheim, and asked him to undertake the
responsibility. Durkheim;s first appointment was Professor of Education in
provincial town Bordeaux. Education was seen as a socializing force for a
secular society. The role of the Church in education and the state was
reduced; and educations was seen in a functional manner strengthening the
Republic. Education through the Church was functional for the monarchy,
after the revolution new education became functional for the Republic, and
dysfunctional for the Church and the monarchy in France.
10.4 Twentieth Century Writers

Among sociologists of the twentieth century, the name of Robert M. MacIver 127

Understanding Power in the USA is the most significant. He began as a professor of Political
Science and wrote the book ‘State’. This was a departure from those who
considered that sovereignty of the state was absolute and indivisible (Austin).
In his famous statement MacIver said “The state is not coeval and co-
extensive with society.” He re-examined the relations among different organs
of society and examined three possibilities:
1) Activities that the state alone could do
2) Activities that the state could perform better than other associations,
and
3) Activities that other organisations could perform better than the state.
In his view the state was one of the great associations in society. These
views were elaborated in a classical text book he wrote in collaboration with
Charles H. page under the title Society which has been read carefully in
India for nearly half a century by students of sociology.

Are state and society the same? Examine all sides of this question.
In the U.K. Harold Laski had a great influence on political movements and
in his work Grammar of Politics, he propounded the view that there were
plural centres of power in society, and the state was one of them. For
students who read Laski as well as MacIver, the plural sources of power
become important in discussing the nature of inter actions of the state and
other associations group in society. The overall effect is that the state and
polity began to be treated as dependent variables.
10.5 Max Weber and Talcott Parsons

Of the two questions mentioned earlier those regarding the nature of power
and its legitimacy, were centrally considered by the German classical sociologist
Max Webler and commented upon among others by Talcott Parsons who
advanced the view that the state represented the agency for realising the
collective goals of a social system. It is to these writers that we now turn
our attention.
Box 10.1: Max Weber: An Introduction

Max Weber, an eminent German sociologist was born on 29th April, 1864 and
lived and worked upto 1920. We invite your attention to the reference to
his works as given in the units for the Bachelor’s degree and other units for
Master’s programme of the IGNOU. It may be recalled that the period was
marked by economic growth and political consolidation of Germany as a
great power, with intense international competition and the first world war
(1914-1918), and Weber’s expert opinion was available at the time of signing
of the peace treaty at Versailles in France and later for drafting a constitution
for the Weimar, Republic. His family background of active politicians university
professors and religious schools had given him ample first hand experience
of the political processes capitalistic and bureaucratic working. As an eminent
thinker, he conceptualised and analysed these experiences and at the world
level of discussions tried to find why in Western Europe and Western Europe
alone, a series of events happened in the ninetieth century to make it a
globally significant entity. He had compared systems of different religions to
128

Power: Functional
find out the way ideas had a major influence on economic growth. This little Perspective
reminder reintroduced Max Weber to us; the German pronunciation of Max
is like Maax. The European scholars continue to refer to his works is original
in German. In India, we rely on the English translations which at times
disturb the European scholars. Among sociologists in India, Irawati Karve,
Ramkrishna Mukherjee, Chadrasekharaya and Surendra Munshi had acquired
competence in German and tried to help us imbibe the flavour of that
language in the study of the German sociologists i.e. sociologists choosing
to write their major works in German (Max Weber, Marx Simmel, Tonnies
and later Dahrendorf).
For Max Weber the organisation of social life on the basis of relational
calculations and rationality as a system of thought was the most distinguishing
feature of nineteenth century Europe. He viewed different aspects of life
like economy, polity and even music according to the way they expressed
rationality. Thus, he distinguished profit based on plunder and illegal practices
from rational capitalism. Likewise the performance of music in orchestra
with a number of instruments tuning together drew his attention. His
discussion on power is related to the use of legitimate power or authority.
He mentions three types of power based on three types of rationality or
rules :
a) Tradition
When power is acquired and passed on to the next person in traditional
societies from a king to the eldest son; it becomes a case of legitimation of
power through tradition. In a matrilineal society, it is the sister’s son who
becomes a king (Malayalam region). In the north-eastern part of India, the
youngest daughter’s husband, known as nokrom becomes the effective
manager. The king’s brother succeeded the king in other territories. These
differences are examples of tradition in their own societies. In an American
tribe power belonged to a person who destroyed or burnt the valued things
— in that case called potlatch one who burned the largest number of blankets
became the chief and retained his position until some one else broke the
record. The world over, in tribal setting or in chiefdoms, rules of acquiring
power were based on traditions of the region concerned. These examples
have been added by us, not by Max Weber, to illustrate the central idea. He
used the examples of feudal lords and their relations to a king to analyse
tradition as a source of legitimation of power.
b) Bureaucracy
The word bureau literally refers to a large table with a number of drawers.
Different papers dealing with a common subject can be placed in one drawer.
A number of drawers help in the classification of papers. Collectively, the
Bureau becomes an organisation dealing with classified information e.g. we
refer to the Press Bureau that provides official information to the public. In
the government a number of offices are so organised. They have rules for
recruitment, training, promotion and termination of services. The person is
separated from office and his powers are defined, as also those of the
seniors and subordinates. There is the hierarchy of office and rules govern
them, in their bases, they pass on papers or act or refuse to act. Merton has
noted that the bureaucrat is a link between decision makers on the one
hand and persons below the bureaucrat, and he acquires power because he
can decide which papers may be forwarded or held back. But from Weber’s 129

Understanding Power point of view bureaucracy is a rational legal system and works that way.
Bureaucracy is rationalised legal system and derives its legitimacy from it.
c) Charisma
The Persian (and Urdu) word Karishma is the root word that traveled to
European languages almost is the same sense. Karishma or charisma indicates
extra ordinary abilities of a person, and is used to describe the powers of
a saint as well; something like a divine element, that sustains itself performing
miracles. Its continuation depends upon its capacity to deliver goods. If a
person’s qualities do not remain effective, may be through age or infirmity,
he/she loses the charisma. The legitimacy of charisma does not flow from
tradition or rational bureaucracy. In fact the charismatic figure overrules
both and introduces personal extra-ordinary performance as its own
justification. Quite a few revolutionary personalities exercise such a power
in the secular setting as well. Here Weber adds that a charismatic leader may
come to power through extraordinary methods, but his continuation in power
needs legitimacy either through a recourse to tradition or relational
bureaucracy. That is how we find quite a few revolutionaries becoming
conservatives an assuming power. After taking the three ways of legitimations
of power together, we may point out that the modern democracies specialize
in constitutional ways of acquiring or getting replaced in power position,
mainly through the ballot, not the bullet. In fact the test of democracy is
the smoothness of transfer of power through elections and the continuation
of the political system. On this score the placement of countries on the
human development index is counted and at least here India gets more
favourable points than many of the Asian ad African countries, and a few
Latin American countries as well.
Max Weber’s formulation on power leads one to ask who has power on
whom? If A commands B even against his will, A has power over B. In this as,
A has positive power and B has negative power. Let us now think again —
if A can exercise 4 commands over B, we may as well say A has + 4 units of
power and B have -4. The sum total of power with A and B is + 4 — 4 = 0.
This concept is called zero sum of power.
10.6 Talcott Parsons

Talcott Parsons translated a few works of Max Weber from German into
English and made important contribution to the study of power and its
functions for society. Here power is see as a necessary condition of maintaining
a society, enabling it to realize a few collective goals of a society. In a
modern society, functions are differentiated, and interrelated. The
characteristics of a system are reproduced in subsystem. Polity is one of the
subsystems. How it is organized and works is stated briefly. Functional
approach does not mean absence of conflicts it in fact depicts the capacity
of the system to deal with problems and solve them written its resources,
you will thus get an idea of how in a modern society of differentiated
institutions, each institution fulfills the needs of the society, each gets
related to the others, and derives strength from others. This is the essence
of functional approach. Power is seen through this perspective mainly through
the manner in which famous sociologist Talcott Parsons clarifies issues keeping
American Democracy on the center of attention. Some examples will be
given from India to make a few points clearer.
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Power: Functional
Reflection and Action 10.2 Perspective
Is conflict functional? Explain your position and discuss with friends.
Parsons has reexamined this position on two counts. Firstly, zero sum can
happen as a special case. Generally, however, we come across cases where
the gains and losses do not cancel out. A may issue 4 commands over B. B
follows them, then on the future occasion it may happen that B gets his will
carried out by A. In our daily life we come across such situation, when a
son’s will has to be carried out by the father or an officer has to agree with
a subordinate clerk’s opinion. In village life relation among the patron and
client also follow such a course. In a Rajasthan village a drummer beats the
drum to mark the close of a wedding ceremony. He stands firm and does not
beat the drum. This is a tactic to make the patron pay the dues respectably.
When the drummer is satisfied with proper payment, he sounds ‘the last
post’. A carpenter by tradition supplies a wooden board to decorate a welcome
design. He keeps the entire proceedings halted until his rightful claim is
accepted. Here, the public performance, or delay in performance, adds to
the power of the otherwise lowly placed artisan. Examples can be multiplied
to cover many rituals in pilgrim centres and other secular situations. One of
the reasons for continuation of the jajmani relations has among others,
been the capacity of the artisan or the serving group to exercise his ‘vcto’
as it were, on such chosen occasion, where the roles of domination are
reversed. We are using these examples from our society to clarify that
distribution of power that appears to have one direction from the high to
the low can have the reverse flow as well. In such cases power equation
could be +4 units for the patron and —4 with the serving group, yet on 2
other occasions the latter may wield the upper hand. Then the sum total of
A’s power could be +4 in favour and —2 in other cases; may be a zero sum
case +4-4 and —2+2 = 0, yet if we add both that would be +4 for A and +2
for B. This is described as Non-zero sum power. Parsons asserts that non-
zero sum is a normal feature, and if it happens that the becomes zero, that
is a special case covered under the more general non-zero sum case.
The second aspect of power is that it be discussed not for individual cases,
but for the total social systems, its needs and part played by different
agencies in that regard. It will be helpful here to recall the functional requisites
of a system and use the paradigm thus:
A G
L I
A stands for adaptation of the system to nature and the environment. For
the society as a whole this function is performed by Economy.
G stands for goal attainment, this means that the collective of the society
are realized. The agency charged with this function is the Polity. Here the
Polity acts on behalf of the society to realise the goals common to all.
I stands fort integration, society has different units with their own interests.
At times may be in conflict with each other. There is a conflict theory which
suggests that conflict is also a normal phenomenon in society. The functional
point of view does not deny this proposition but it asserts that the social
131

Understanding Power system, if it exists, has to have a mechanism or capacity to resolve these
conflicts. The term ‘conflicts resolution’ precisely states that process. In a
modern society, the legal system tries to perform this role. The contesting
parties put forward their claims and counter claims, and the judiciary settles
the case. So long as this mode works, we say ‘integration’ is maintained in
the system. In the field of games and sports, there is intense competition,
we have laws of the game, and a referee or an umpire to give decisions that
have to be accepted by both the parties. There may be a few
disappointments, yet so long as the decision makers role is duly accepted,
we say that the system works or exists.
L refers to latency or pattern maintenance. They define the basis for making
laws in terms of or in consonance with the values of the society. There have
been societies where birth or order of birth qualified a person to become
the prince or the chief. Such societies were based on the principal of
ascription. Modern democratic societies insist on achievements as the basis
for gaining status. In the past religion provided the justification for status
allocation. In the new situation secular values of achievement are considered
valuable. In case of modern democracies e.g. the preamble to the constitution
of India specifies such values which are common knowledge — yes, you guess
correctly: these are liberty, equality, fraternity etc. you can fill in the rest.
The four aspects of a system are arranged in a specific order. Adaptation is

related to boundary maintenance of the system, helps define the place of
the system with regard to other systems and determine where it stands.
Society has to define its relation with external environment, nature and its
resources. Economy acts as an organized efforts to make use of those
resources and energies. In this sense economy is treated as a sub-system.
Analysis of economy as a subsystem was undertaken by Neil J. Smelser in
collaboration with Parsons. Smelser had studied economics in the U.K. and
when he joined Parsons at Harvard in the U.S.A., economy began to be
linked to social systems. The two great authors thus produced the major
work Economy and Society (1956).
Box 10.2: Parsons and Mills

A few years later Parsons wrote another work under the title structure and
process in modern societies (1960). Parsons by that time had had begun to
write in a simpler language to a writer had been hired for him to put his
ideas in simpler form, Parsons gave a lecture based on that book at the
University of Berkeley where smelser had started teaching. I was present at
that time, After the lecture students talked among themselves Look, I could
understand what Parsons said’!; the other said’ but what was new in it!’
I had read comments on that book given by the authors of Power Elite’ C.
Wright Mills, and brought the same to his notice. Parsons vigorously
maintained his position, and pointed out that defects indicated by the
critics of American democracy were unfounded. The American judiciary
(system) was strong, and could take care of cases of violation of the
democratic procedure. This anecdote serves one more purpose : it emphasises
how Parsons considered the system as a going comcern – that is a system
that was active and vigorous; secondly that it had the capacity to take care
of mistakes, and finally that the people had faith in the judiciary. These
views clarify how a system exists against those of critics who say that the
system does not exist, hence any approach for studying it was itself mistakes.
132

We may now summarize the points that make functional analysis possible: Power: Functional
Perspective
A social system exists and is capable of handling conflicts within it.
A social system consists of parts.
The parts are active and through their activity contribute to the
maintenance and continuation of the system.
The system has a tenure and working longer than the life of the incumbents
to positions and the life span of a generation.
The method of studying parts of a system, their interrelations and
contribution for the maintenance of the system is characterised as
functional approach.
The basis for functional analysis was laid by spencer. Durkheim, Malinowski
and Radcliffe–Brown. For more details, see earlier units in analysing modern
societies through this approach we recall the names of Parsons and Merton
who are referred to by some analysis as neo-functionalists. Malinowski
and Raddiffe-Brawn had basically studied the primitive societies. Durkheim
had used this approach along with two others—the evolutionary and
explanatory in terms of comparative approach. Merton had extended the
ideas to modern societies and coined phrases like function and dysfunction,
manifest and latent functions and related these to the study of anomie
in which he discussed the inter relations of goals and means. Parsons was
associated with the study of social system. His main points have been
briefly pointed in this unit in the AGIL paradigm and functional requisites
of the system. This approach has been further extended to each part
like economy, polity and religion by various writers.
Power as a concept belongs to the area of polity. The functional analysis
of power treats it at two levels;
i) Who has power over whom? The sum is zero. This is a traditional answer.
In the other hand the functional approach to power treats it as a non-
zero sum, which as a special case may also be a zero-sum, that is the
zero-sum is included in the more comprehensive case of non-zero sum.
ii) Power is the generalised capacity of a system to realise its collective
goals. This approach goes beyond the competitive aspect of power over
some one else. Functional approach treats power of the system, not
merely struggle for power within a system. The power of the system can
grow and enable the system both to continue and strengthen itself. In
this sense again the power of the system is not a zero-sum concept, but
one that keeps on adding to its capacity to face collective challenges.
10.7 Polity as a Subsystem

Now, we shall turn to the analysis of polity as a sub system of society. Such
academic exercises have their parallel in India. When, we study caste in
India, we also refer to sub-castes and are reminded of G.S. Ghurye’s famous
statement ‘sub-caste is the real caste’ Later Indian and American sociologists
began using the indigenous term jati to refer to sub-castes. Our main concern
here is how a system and a sub-system are analyzed at a general level. Does
the sub-system behave like a system? Parsons and Smalser agree, say: yes,
thus economy is a sub-system; polity is a sub-system they act that way, what
does this mean? We shall see next.
133

Understanding Power Higher Level and Generality
Diagram : Political complex
A Means : Goal specification : G

Regulation Authority
Values : Primary Norms :

L organisational Leadership I
effectiveness
Each of the four reveal internal characters of a sub-system — for example

Authority in second cell (g):
Lower Level and Generality (Authority)
Allocation of Allocation of organisational

budgetary resources responsibilities
Valuations of control General powers of

of membership making bonding
contributions decision
The other 3- regulations, leadership and valuation are similarly grouped in

other diagram by Parsons. Ref.: (Parsons 1960: 167-168.)
A sub system reproduces the characteristics of a system and acquires its

properties. We have referred to the case of a caste, likewise in a family
cycle, a joint family gets the shape of several nuclear families on the death
of a father as his two or four sons set up their own units. Later they beget
sons, who get married and the household again becomes joint the addition
of children confirms if further. The sons of one generation become parents
in the next and grand parents for the third generation. Such tendencies are
seen in plenty in rural areas. In the process of growth of an economy, a
company or a bank may set up a branch office, which soon acquires the
status of a full unit. In the educational sphere in Punjab and neighbouring
states, we a university opening a new campus, which for all purposes becomes
an autonomous unit. In the sphere of polity, we see a federal (central)
government, many state governments, and a few union territories. All of
them are cases of representative government with some differences in power
distribution. Next steps through decentralization carry forward this pattern
to district, panchayat samitis and village panchayat. At all these levels in
varying degrees, exercise of power has to be functional for the units
concerned and if the system has to continue, the four requisites have to be
attended to recall the four as AGIL.
1) Each political unit has to define its boundaries and get adapted to
external situations. It has its natural and other resources to be used for
the common good.
2) The common goals are attended to through the polity. Thus there are
rules of governance that spell out who gets what and how if there is a
dispute or a conflict.
134

Problems like anomie, bureaucracy, relative deprivation have been examined Power: Functional
Perspective
in the context of accepted values and alternate means for satisfying them
by Merton (1968).
The agency for resolving the conflict is activated. Finally, agencies act is
accordance with the value patterns of the system — for example education,
health for all, as reflection of the rights of all citizens. These functions have
to be performed by every sub system of the polity — in the Indian case by
the central (federal) government, the states, Zila Parishads and Municipal
governments, the Panchayat Samiti and the Gram Panchayat. Details will be
different, the scope too varied, yet the functional requirements will have to
be attended to. This example clarifies how a sub-system reproduces the
characteristics of a system and at each level our understanding of the way
these requirements are met proceeds along functional analysis of the system
(sub system).
Parsons had analysed political process involved in the American democracy.

It needs be emphasized that the functional approach takes note of conflicts
in power; is fact as Coser pointed out there is a function of social conflict.
What does this mean? It suggests that when a conflict occurs say between
two political parties that are in power in different states or the party at the
state level is different from the one at the centre, such a difference promotes
a competition among the parties to do better than other. Secondly, the
conflict leads to assertion of one’s rights against the other, and shows how
both the opposing parties are actively involved in maintaining the system
from which each derives its legitimacy. The goals are enshrined in the
Constitution, powers too defined and in its exercise the little vigilance on
the part of each promotes the total solidarity. The generality and its strength
grows through this conflict, or competition.
In the context of the two contending parties or two combinations of parties,

the situation of a conflict leads to internal solidarity of the otherwise disparate
sub-groups, thereby creating a functional unity among them to fight for a
common cause. The definition of a common adversary leads to a process of
integration within a society or groups so obliged.
10.8 Conclusion
Normally, functional approach is considered also be most suitable for the
undertaking the study of simpler society. Merton brought forth a fresh
paradigm of functional studies to cover problems of industrial societies at
the middle level. At the macro level the most generalized in scope as a
‘grand theory’ Parsons extends the approach to the study of modern societies
marked by increasing differentiation among institutions. Polity, like economy
is seen fulfilling the needs of society. Polity represents collective organisation
of society for attaining common goals and the product is power. It is a non
zero-sum concept. It is exercised through authorisation by a legitimated
leadership and is used to minimize dissent, exercise control and realise
common goals. In a modern society like the USA, power in combination with
a strong legal system and economy derives strength from the value system
of success through competition i.e. achievement not by ascription, birth or
tradition (leadership and authority basically reflect bureaucratic legal processes
combined with bits of charlsmatic effect, though the office is separated
from the individual who holds it). In turn these aspects strengthen one
another and the social system persists. Problems arise but are seen in the
total systems perspective. 135

Understanding Power
Abrahamson, Mark Functionalism (1978) Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice Hall
Brubaker, Rogers 1984, The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social and
Moral Thought of Max Weber, London: Allen and Uriwin
References
Coser, Lewis 1956, The Functions of Social Conflict. New York. The Free
Press.
MacIver, R.M. 1926, The Modern State, Oxford Clarendon Press.
Charles H. Page 1949, Society, an Introductory Analysis, New York, Rinehart.
Parsons, Talcott, 1960, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, Glencoe
The Free Press.
Parsons, Talcott et al., 1965, Theories of Society, 1 Vol. ed. New York, The
Free Press 1960-2 Vols.
Weber, Max 1947, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated
by A.M.
Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York Oxford University Press.
Reference to Hobbes 1965, Locke and Rousseau and Comte and Spencer from
the ed. work of Talcott Parsons (ed.).
136

Unit 11
Power and Institutions
Contents
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Instruments of Power
11.3 Sources of Power
11.4 Contexts of Power
11.5 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After reading this Unit, you will be able to understand
concept of power and related concepts
the various institutions of power and its uses
instruments of power
sources of power
contexts of use of power
11.1 Introduction
Social power is a universal phenomenon in human societies and social
relationships. It is possessed by both individuals and social groups. It is, in
fact, the basic common element in all social relationships, politics and
economics. Social power is generally experienced in an unbalanced situation.
These power imbalances are the root causes of most of the social problems.
Power can be understood in two main ways. One way of understanding

power that has gained prominence in recent academic discussion is the idea
of power as a simple quantitative phenomenon. This type of conception of
power pins at a kind of generalised capacity to act. The approach considers
power as enhancing the capacities of those who possess it, and thereby
impinges to those persons who do not possess as an imposition on their
freedom and liberty. The writings of Hobbes, Locke inter alia on the discourse
of power may be considered under this general approach.
The other and more complex conception of power is that power which
involves both capacity and a right to act which derives from the consent of
those over whom power is exercised. This approach looks at the effects of
power as generally identified by reference to ‘counterfactual conditions’. In
other words, the approach holds that power in the hands of others prevents
its victims from doing what they otherwise would have attained, or ‘even
from thinking what they otherwise would have thought’. Foucault’s analysis
of power is a good representative (Foucault et al 1980) of this approach. This
second conception of power is often implicit rather than explicit. The concept
is central to much modern social and political thought today.
Power has also been viewed in various ways. Some scholars (Mills 1959) would
consider power as a ‘zero-sum’ concept. Here, power is defined in a mutually
exclusive manner. The concept would mean that if one person or party wins,
the other necessarily loses. In other words, the approach conceives power 137

Understanding Power as to be possessed by only one person or group in such a way that a second
person or group over whom power is wielded does not possess. There are
others who opine that power should be looked at as a kind of a ‘non-zero-
sum’ concept (Parsons 1961). According to them, each person or party shares
power to the extent that both the parties (‘share-holders’) gains. In this
approach, power is defined in terms of mutually inclusive objectives.
Thus, social power is defined in different ways. However, for our purpose,
we generally define power as the ability of an individual or group to carry
out its wishes or policies to control, manipulate, or influence the behaviour
of others, whether they wish to cooperate or not. Social power is also the
capability to influence others or resist influence from others. The agent who
possesses power has resources to force his/her will on others. People with
great wealth, muscle, status, intelligence, competence, etc. have more
chances to influence other people.
Power has been invariably used as synonyms for the closely related concepts,
such as, prestige, influence, eminence, competence, ability, knowledge,
dominance, rights, force, coercion, authority among others. But they are
not identical concepts per se. We shall therefore examine the differences
of these terms.
Let us first of all differentiate between the independent variables of power

and prestige. The relationship of the two terms may be understood in a way
that power can occur without prestige while prestige would not occur without
power. For instance, a scientist would have prestige but no power; whereas,
a policeman would have power, but little prestige. In the same way, we
could establish relationship between power and closely related terms such
as competence, ability, knowledge, eminence and so on. These concepts
can be accompanied or may not be accompanied by power.
The concept of power is very closely related to the concept of dominance.

Basically, power is in essence a sociological concept whereas dominance is
a socio-psychological concept. In other words, power is located in groups
and it manifests in inter-group relations, whereas dominance is essentially
located in the individual and it is expressed in inter-personal relationships.
Again, power manifests in the statuses that people occupy in formal
organisation, whereas dominance appears in the roles people play in informal
organisation. Power is a function of organisation of associations, of the
arrangement and juxtaposition of groups, and of the structure of society
itself. On the contrary, dominance is a function of personality or temperament;
it is a personal trait (Bierstedt, 1969). However, this distinction in terms of
sociological and psychological discourses, and also group vis-à-vis personality
need not be in a strict sense. Because nowadays, we often talk about
collective dominance and hegemony and so much so, we also talk of power
relations even in the inter-personal levels.
Likewise power and influence may be distinguished by an important feature,

viz., power is by and large coercive, whereas influence is persuasive. In this
context, we could consider that Karl Marx, the philosopher has a great
influence exerted upon the 20th century; but he was not a powerful man. In
almost the same manner, right, like privilege, is not power itself, but one of
the perquisites of power. But then we can pose the question as whether
force and authority are power? The answer would be that they are not, even
138 though they are very closely related terms. In a simplistic way, then, we may

distinguish them by mainly considering that power is a latent force; force is Power and Institutions
manifest power; and authority is institutionalised power (Hindess, 1996).

Power is potential, so that when it is used, it becomes either force or
authority. For example, the threat of a minority to withdraw from an
association would effectively wield power, but once the minority group
withdraws from the association, it is no longer power, but force.
11.2 Instruments of Power

There are three main institutions or traits that accord the right to use of
power. In other words, there are three instruments for wielding or enforcing
of power. They are coercive or condign, compensatory and conditioned power.
These three instruments need not be strictly compartmentalised. They overlap
each other at one point of time or another. We shall deal with them in brief
before we get on to other aspects of power.
Coercive or condign power wins acceptance by threatening, intimidating

and/or inflicting on others with dire consequences. It includes power
exercised by any form of adverse action or its threat in the form of fines,
resource or property expropriation, rebuke, and condemnation by any
individuals or the community concerned. The process of such power takes
place in a situation where power is gained by attaining submission from
others to abandon their preferences or desires through the capacity to
impose an alternative to those preferences of the individual or group that
are unpleasant or painful.
We could understand coercive power in two levels: First, a situation where

a person or a group who undergo a very painful experience would still opt
for the defacto condition as the alternative provided appear to be either no
better or even worse than what they have been experiencing at a given
point of time; Second, a situation where the individual or group withdraws
from acting against certain impositions or refrains from speaking his/her
mind and opts to submit to the view of others in order to avoid unpleasant
implications. In other words, the person or group just accepts the dictat of
others and would not speak up because of the impending rebuke and harsh
consequences that would come upon him/her or them.
Box 11.1: Comparing Condign and Compensatory Power

The most distinctive feature of both condign and compensatory power is
their objectivity- or visibility. Those accepting the will of others are conscious
of doing so; they are acting in consequence of a fairly deliberate calculation
that is the better course of action. It has become so because of the offer
of some specific quid pro quo for their submission. Those exercising the
power are also purposefully aware of what they are doing.
The difference between condign and compensatory power is the difference

between negative and affirmative reward. Condign power threatens the
individual with something physically or emotionally painful enough so that he
forgoes pursuit of his own will or preference in order to avoid it. Compensatory
power offers the individual a reward or payment sufficiently advantageous
or agreeable so that he (or she) forgoes pursuit of his own preferences to
seek the reward instead. In less abstract language, condign power wins
submission by the promise or reality of punishment; compensatory power
wins submission by the promise or reality of benefit.
Source: Galbraith, 1984.
139

Understanding Power Compensatory power attains submission from others by offering affirmative
action in the form of rewards to the individual or group who submits to the
coercion. In economic terms, compensation in rural areas could be in various
forms, such as, payments in kind or cash for services rendered, the right to
work a plot of land, or sharing the product of the landlord’s fields. In socio-
economic and political sense, the affirmative rewards, be it, economic package
for development inter alia provided to certain communities or regions infested
with socio-political unrest could be another example of compensatory power
in the modern situation.
In the above two cases, viz., coercive power and compensatory power, the
individual or group is aware of his/her submission to the coercing agent
through compulsion and persuasion and/or inducement respectively.

How would you define power? Can you differentiate power from dominance,
prestige and influence?
The third instrument of power- conditioned power in contrast to condign

and compensatory power (which is visible and objective) is subjective. In
this case, neither those exercising the power nor those who are subject to
it, need not necessarily be aware of its exertion. This kind of power is
achieved by changing the attitude and belief of the individual or group. In
this situation, a person or group accepts the will of another or others
because they feel that the initiative taken seems to be right, by way of
persuasion, education, social commitment, or promises. They submit to the
initiative because they feel that it is in a preferred course or track. In such
situation, submission is not necessarily acknowledged. Conditioned power
is, in fact, the most crucial and pervasive kind of power to the functioning
of modern society, whether it be in the aspects of economy and polity, and
in capitalist and socialist countries as well.
11.3 Sources of Power

There are several sources or institutions of power. These sources or
institutions of power differentiate those who wield power on others from
those who submit to them. Scholars have identified different sources of
power according to their perceptions. For instance, Bierstedt (1969) identifies
three sources of power, namely, numbers of people, social organization, and
resources. He includes various components in the third source of power,
such as, money, property, prestige, knowledge, competence, deceit, fraud,
secrecy, and natural resources. Mann (1986) would identify four sources of
power, namely, ideological, economic, military, and political relationships.
Tumin (1992) opines that there are five sources of power, namely, role-
specific authority, goods and services, skills and abilities, personal qualities,
and coercive power. Galbraith (1984) classifies three sources of power-
personality, property and organisation. There are also many other scholars
who classify them in many different ways. Therefore, it is difficult to follow
one single classification of the sources of power. But all of these classifications
have more or less similar elements of the sources of power. For our purpose,
we shall consider the following main sources of power: personality, numbers
of people, resources or property, skills abilities and knowledge, media,
coercive force, and organisation.
140 Personality or leadership is the quality of physique, mind, speech, morality,

competence and other personal traits that enables a person to have access Power and Institutions
to the instruments of power. Personality also means personal qualities such

as beauty, charm, or charisma that paves way to persuade others to get
one’s favour. In modern times, personality has its primary association with
conditioned power, viz., the ability to persuade or change the attitude and
belief of others.
Numbers of people is yet another important source of power. In other

words, majorities constitute a residual locus of social power. Given the same
organisation and the same resources inter alia, the larger number can always
control the smaller and obtain its compliance. We can see the number game
of power in various contexts. In simple societies, the access to power was
usually through physical strength and coercion. Families with large youths
and muscular males would have advantage of wielding power on others. In
other words, the muscular male youths in these families would be great
sources of power. This does not, however, mean that diplomacy and
intelligence does not work in these societies. There are many instances
where intelligent people wield powers in the simple societies.
In the modern societies, we can also understand the number factor of power
as seen in elections of all kinds, where the majority is given the right to
institutionalise its power as authority. This kind of power is observed in all
associations, be it democratic, autocratic, or otherwise. The power of a
majority as found in both formal and informal associations is beyond doubt
the key to either threat or sustaining the stability of the association
concerned.
Skills and abilities is one source of power which enables people to provide
services that others need or desire. These skills could be in terms of craft
skills, military acumen, economic expertise, medical knowledge, and literary
artistry. It also includes knowledge and media power, among others. These
skills give the possessors the advantage to have power over those who
desire the benefits of their skills and expertise. Knowledge becomes power
because it is an asset to comprehend circumstances, to predict and plan,
and to create effects, especially by knowing how to use other forms of
power.
Media in the modern world has become one of the great sources of power.
Its contribution is most significantly manifested in influencing or controlling
information and communication by having access to the media and through
controlling and manipulation. For example, the projections that the columnists
make in the print media or television reporters on important but controversial
and important issues have great impacts on the readers and viewers.
Resources or Property is one of the important attributes to wield power.

Resources may be of many kinds. It includes property, money, prestige,
knowledge, competence, skills and abilities, deceit, fraud, secrecy and all
the things pertaining to natural and also supernatural resources. In the later
case (viz., supernatural resources), we can understand of religious associations
which, as agencies of a celestial government, apply supernatural sanctions as
instruments of control. A wealthy person commands respect and authority.
In the process of its activities, a wealthy person can attain conditioned
submission by way of submission or otherwise. The possession of goods and
services enables the possessors to purchase and acquire what they want.
141

Understanding Power However, property-wealth, income, etc. is mainly associated with
compensatory power.
In coercive force, power is derived from coercion, be it, psychological,

social, or physical that one possesses. Through this coercive force, the
possessor of the force can threaten others to submission and carry out one’s
intention and objective. People out of fear for torture or any kind of
punishment—physically, mentally, or otherwise, and the fear of the loss of
their freedom and resources yields to the force. They thus become victims
of coercion. These threats could be real or imaginary perception.
Organisation is said to be the most important source of power in modern

societies. A well organised and disciplined body of army or police can control
a much larger number of unorganised majority. In many instances, we also
experience an organised minority control an unorganised majority. This simply
speaks largely of the power of organisation. Organisation is associated with
all the three instruments of power, namely, conditioned power, coercive
power, and compensatory power.

What are the sources of power? Describe at least four sources.
Role specific authority is also an important component of organisation power

by virtue of the authority sanctioned by the organisation or position that
one holds. For instance, the president of an organisation has the power or
authority of the office. Similarly, power is also possessed by judges, police,
employers, teachers and others in a formal relationship in which one partner
has the legal or customary right to command or control some or all aspects
of the relationship. These powers may be seen within the limits of the
formal relationship. It is specific to the status relationships one is associated.
An organisation usually has the ability to persuade others towards realisation

of their objectives. Organisation has also the access to coercive or condign
power like in the case of the state. The kind of access of an organisation
to compensatory power would however depend on the quantity and value
of the property it possesses.
Box 11.2: Distinguishing Legitimate and Illegitimate Sources and Uses

Legitimate and acceptable powers must be distinguished from those that
are deemed illegitimate and unacceptable. Yet all illegitimate powers rest on
the same bases as those which yield legitimate power. Gangsters, thieves,
terrorists, prostitutes, gamblers, and others in the illegitimate world are
able to exert power because of their role-specific authorities in that world,
or because of their material resources, skills, personal qualities, and
psychological and physical coerciveness. Moreover, those who secure resources
from the illegitimate world, that is, money from stealing, gambling, or drug
peddling, can use such illegally acquired assets as a source of power in both
the legitimate and illegitimate world. Money secured in legitimate ways,
such as through work, can be used for either legitimate or illegitimate ends,
such as to purchase illegal drugs or to gamble illegally, or to secure a
position or contract through bribery. In the same vein, a person with superior
role authority can use the power of his position, such as the ability to fire
another person, to coerce the subordinate, illegally, into desired forms of
behavior.
Source: Tumin, 1992.

142

The sources of power would also have quite a number of combinations Power and Institutions
among and between them. They also include both legitimate and illegitimate
sources of power (Talcott Parsons et al, 1967). They are also combined in
various strengths. Due to the variation of combinations, varied results are
also yielded for enforcement of power.
11.4 Contexts of Power

There are four main contexts where power can be exercised. They may be
seen in the contexts of political affairs, institutional patterning, ensuring
life chances, and personal relations (Tumin, 1992).
In the milieu of political affairs, it is essential to set the structure and

mechanism of the affairs and conduct of political communities, such as towns,
cities, states, nations and/or international community. In this context, power
has bearing with both realms of individuals and groups. The groups would
include associations, political parties, whole communities, inter alia. Such
collectivities derive power mainly from their positional roles. For instance,
we have a situation where the federal governments have more powers than
the local governments as provided by the constitution of the respective
states. In the context of the Indian state, the Union government has greater
powers than its federal states.
Institutional Patterning is also an important context of power appropriation.

Power is relevant in the interplay of roles in the basic institutions, such as
the family, polity, the educational system, religious institutions and the
economy. In these institutions, we find some kind of relations, be it between
employers and employees, teachers and pupils, priests and laymen and so
on. Even in our everyday life, we all have some position and role in these
basic institutions which govern our life. Because of our involvement in such
relationships, we do experience differential power relations, the patterns of
dominance and submission which are important elements in determining the
pattern of conduct. In such patterning of institutions, role-specific authority
is a crucial component and role-player.
Power is also exercised in ensuring life chances in one’s life. It operates in

the competition for share of valued life chances. It could be in terms of the
chance for surviving the first year of life, maintaining good health, securing
good opportunities for schooling and jobs, and living a reasonable long life
span. These valued life chances are important factors to control one’s destiny
because they are contributory attributes for enhancing one’s position and
role and the ability to shape and control one’s future.

Discuss the various contexts in which power is exercised.
Personal relations outside the purview of the institutional roles are relevant
to the appropriation of power. These relations could be of many forms and
would take place at different situations. We meet people in the market, in
stores, on the street, in buses, sub-ways, trains, planes, parks, stadiums,
seminars and conferences. We do make friendships and love relationships at
one time or the other. We also meet people in the neighbourhood and other
people who are not formally bound to us. But we know with whom we must
network with for realizing our interests, desires and movements. All these 143

Understanding Power relationships are good examples where power plays important role in personal
relations.
We also have situation where people are attracted and so won their friendship
through one’s personal charm and beauty. The same quality can influence
other people in winning their love and confidence. These situations are
some of the instances where power works through personal relations.
All these powers discussed above are not equally relevant nor are they
relevant at all situations. But one or more of these forms of power will be
relevant in all the four contexts of power.
Box 11.3: Measurement of Amount of Power

The amount of power exercised by an individual may be measured either by
the ratio of his successful power acts to all of his attempted power acts or
by certain criteria …. These measures may be used as a basis of comparison
between different power-holders. The two “amounts” represent not
alternative techniques of measurement but differences in what is measured.
Amount in these cases does not mean the same thing. Most investigations
of power, in so far as they deal with the amount of power, utilise “amount”
in the second sense.
Two principal criteria may be used to measure the amount of power exercised
by a power-holder: the number of actions of any given person in each of any
number of selected types of behavior, over which control is realised (or
potential); and the number of persons so controlled. The definition of
dictatorship as “a form of government where everything that is not forbidden
is obligatory” indicates complete power in terms of the spheres of behavior
over which control is exercised.
Source: Goldhamer and Shils, 1969.
There is no necessary relationship either of the amounts of power of an

individual or group in one context and their power in the others. A person
may be very powerful in one context and may be powerless in quite the
other. For instance, a person may be powerful in the family, but he may be
a subject to the will of everyone outside the family. Likewise, one may be
powerful in national affairs and yet be relatively powerless in personal
relationships.
11.5 Conclusion
Social power is a universal phenomenon that transcends all human societies.
It is experienced in everyday social relationships in one way or another.
Power may manifest as a generalised capacity to act and/or as involving both
capacity and a right to act. Generally, power may be understood as the
ability of an individual or group to carry out its wishes or policies to control,
manipulate, or influence the behaviour of others, whether they wish to
cooperate or not.
Social power is also the capability to influence others or resist influence

from others. The concept of power is often considered as synonymous to its
closely related concepts such as dominance, prestige, influence, force and
so on. But they are not the same.
144

There are three main institutions (instruments) for enforcing power. They Power and Institutions
are coercive or condign, compensatory and conditioned power. These three

instruments are however not strictly compartmentalised. Again, there are
several sources of power such as personality, numbers of people, resources
or property, skills, abilities and knowledge, media, coercive force, and
organisation.
Power is manifest in various contexts, be it political affairs, institutional

patterning, ensuring life chances, or personal relations. The amounts of
power of an individual or group are not necessarily the same for different
contexts. A person may be powerful in one context and may be powerless
in another.

Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge. Brighton: Harvester Press
Gerth, H. and Mills, C. Wright (trans. and eds.). 1966 From Max Weber:
Eassays in Sociology. New York: Free Press
Lukes,S. 1974. Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan
Parsons, Talcott. 1967. On the Concept of Political Power. In Sociological
Theory and Modern Society. London: Free Press
References
Atlee, John and Atlee, Tom. 1992. Democracy: A Social Power Analysis. Think
Peace (Issue 37138, July 24). http://www.iea-macro-economics.org/index.html
Bierstedt, Robert. 1969 (1957). An Analysis of Social Power. In Sociological
Theory: A Book of Readings. (3rd Ed.). Eds. Lewis A. Coser and Bernard
Rosenberg. London: The Macmillan Company and Collier- Macmillan Limited
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish. London: Allen Lane
Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge. Brighton: Harvester Press
Foucault, Michel. 1988. The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom.
In J. Bernauer and D. Rasmussen (eds.), The Final Foucault. Boston: MIT
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1984. The Anatomy of Power. London: Hamish
Hamilton
Gerth, H. and Mills, C. Wright (trans. and eds.). 19...From Max Weber: Eassays
in Sociology. New York: Free Press
Goldhamer, Herbert and Shils, Edward A. 1969. Power and Status. In Lewis A.
Coser and Bernard Rosenberg edited, Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings.
Third Edition. London: The Macmillan Company & Collier-Macmillan Ltd
Hindess, Barry. 1996. Discourses of Power: from Hobbes to Foucault. Oxford;
Cambridge (USA): Blackwell Publishers
Hobbes, T. 1968 (1651). Leviathan. London: Penguin
Kornblum, William. 1988. Sociology in a Changing World. New York et al: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
Locke, J. 1988 (1689). Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Lukes,S. 1974. Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan
145

Understanding Power Mann, Michael. 1986. The Sources of Social Power. Vol.1. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Mills, C. Wright. 1959 (1956). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University
Press
Parsons, Talcott. 1967. On the Concept of Political Power. In Sociological
Theory and Modern Society. London: Free Press.
Powers, Charles H. 1987. Vilfredo Pareto. Newbury/New Delhi et al.:Sage
Publications
Stewart, Angus. 2001. Theories of Power and Domination. London, New
Delhi et al: Sage Publications
Tumin, Melvin M. 1992. Social Stratification: The Forms and Functions of
Inequality. New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India Pvt. Ltd
146

Unit 12
Power/Knowledge
Contents
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Definition of Power
12.3 Power Knowledge and Discourse
12.4 Foucault’s Archeological Writings
12.5 Foucault’s Genealogical Writings
12.6 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After you have read this unit you should be able to
define and discuss power
discuss the relationship of power/knowledge
outline what is Foucault’s Archeology and Genealogy
12.1 Introduction
Sociologists usually define power as the ability to impose one’s will on others,
even if those others resist in some way. “By power is meant that opportunity
existing within a social relationship which permits one to carry out one’s
own will even against resistance and regardless of the basis on which this
opportunity rests”(Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology). Power manifests
itself in a relational manner. That is, one cannot meaningfully say that a
particular social actor ‘has power’ without also specifying the other parties
to the social relationships. Also power almost always operates reciprocally,
but usually not equally reciprocally.
The understanding and analysis of power has been critical to sociological

thought. One of the prominent delineations of power has been provided by
Michel Foucault (1926-1984). His works analyse the link between power and
knowledge. Foucault began his intellectual pursuits in philosophy but became
disillusioned by its abstractions and “naive truth claims” and turned to
psychology and psychopathology. This resulted in his early writings, ‘Madness
and Civilisation’, ‘The Birth of Clinic’ and initiated his lifelong interest in the
relationship between power and knowledge.
The main influences on Foucault’s thought were German philosophers Frederick

Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. Nietzsche contended that truth, knowledge
and power are inextricably associated. He maintained that human behavior
is motivated by a will to power and that traditional values had lost their
power over society. Heidegger criticized what he called ‘our current
technological understanding of being’. Foucault’s thought explored the shifting
patterns of power within a society and the ways in which power relates to
the self. He investigated the changing rules governing the kind of claims that
could be taken seriously as true or false at different times in history. He also
studied how everyday practices enabled people to define their identities
and systematize knowledge; events may be understood as being produced
147

Understanding Power by nature, by human effort or by God. Foucault argued that each way of
understanding things had its advantages and its dangers.
12.2 Definition of Power

Foucault never attempts at any definition of power but gives a definition of
power relations at best. “The exercise of power is not simply a relationship
between partners, individuals or collective; it is a way in which certain
actions modify others. Which is to say, of course, that something called
power with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally
in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist.”
Foucault goes on to insist that knowledge and power are always and necessarily
interdependent. A site where power is enforced is also a site where
knowledge is produced and conversely, a site from which knowledge is derived
is a place where power is exercised. In ‘Discipline and Punish’ he sees prison
as an example of just such a site of power, and as a place where knowledge,
essential to the modern social sciences, was formed. Reciprocally the ideas
from which the social sciences were formulated were also the ones that
gave birth to the prison. The belief that a scientist can arrive at an objective
conclusion, Foucault argues, is one of the greatest fallacies of the modern,
humanist era.
“Modern humanism is therefore mistaken in drawing this line between
knowledge and Power. Knowledge and power are integrated with one
another, and there is no point in dreaming of a time where knowledge
will cease to depend on power; this is just a way of reviving humanism
in a utopian guise. It is not possible for power to be exercised
without knowledge. It is impossible for knowledge not to endanger
power.”
So instead of referring to power and knowledge separately, he prefers to

compound the term power/knowledge.
Box 12.1
The concept of “discourse” is central to many of Foucault’s ideas. He
describes discourses as ways of identifying truth and knowledge at historically
specific moments, thus providing set of rules that define realities.
This is especially pertinent to scientific discourses, which are legitimated by

the rationality paradigm. Discourses contain power because they establish
particular truths and knowledge, and their power is exercised through the
creation and sustenance of social norms, practices and institutions. In
Foucauldian analysis, power is not monopolised by any one subject through
its control of a predominant discourse; the discursive field comprises multiple
subjects who manipulate various discourses to some extent. For Foucault,
the issue is not origin of discourses, but the implications of their power
effects and the types of knowledge they produce and institutionalise. Since
power originates in discourses, it has no unitary source but is heterogeneous
and pluralistic, coming from everywhere and being everywhere.
12.3 Power Knowledge and Discourse

Foucault analyses the relationship between power, knowledge and discourse
that develops from the establishment of Enlightenment rationality which
148

presents itself as progressive and emancipatory. The hegemony of Power/Knowledge
Enlightenment rationality and its institutions, and the marginalisation of

other discourses, create and validate a social network of normative power
which disciplines and constrains the individual at the micro level. Foucault
studies the emergence of several kinds of rationalities in history. The
emergence of a particular kind of rationality, then, presupposes that the
field of knowledge is tightly linked with an empirical field. Due to its
instrumentality, a form of reason as well as any form of knowledge define a
set of possible practices and is thus an instrument of power. Further, being
embodied in an empirical field, a form of reason (or any form of knowledge
supported by it) has no ‘being’ beyond any set of practices. Therefore, the
field of knowledge defines a field of power and vice-versa.
Power, thus, is not to be considered as opposite to reason; but on the

contrary as the necessary condition for the construction of knowledge.
Moreover, because power produces knowledge, it can be, at least partially,
grasped by archaeology.

What is the relationship between power/knowledge. Does one always imply
the other? Discuss and write down your answer in a note book.
Foucault’s discussion of the nature of modern power is located within the

postmodern framework. In keeping with the postmodern perspective, he
critiques modernity and the universalising claims of modern rationality, and
emphasises multiplicity, discontinuity and fragmentation. Foucault calls for
a “theoretical production” (Foucault 1980:81) which is independent, localised
and free from traditional discourse, such as his own application of the differing
but overlapping perspectives of psychology, medicine, criminology and sexuality
in his exploration of modernity.
The two major approaches employed by Foucault in his analysis of power and
knowledge were Archaeology and Genealogy. His aim is to establish a genealogy
of how power is exercised in our own society basing his analysis on
archaeology of the discursive formations. Hence, his analysis is aimed towards
the ‘modes of functioning’ of power in our society.
12.4 Foucault’s Archeological Writings

Foucault’s early work provides an archaeology of knowledge, wherein he
deconstructs the underlying unconscious rationalities of historically specific
domains. In his first major work, Madness and Civilisation (original French
edition 1961; English edition 1965), Foucault traces the evolution of the
relationship between insanity and modern reason. He examines the historical
and discursive process whereby insanity is constructed as the opposite of
rationality and is systematically separated from reason through “discourses
of exclusion and institutions of confinement”.
Box 12.2
According to Foucault, the “scientific psychiatry” (Foucault1965:158) that
emerged in the nineteenth century was invested with morality, and the
scientific treatment of the insane was to occur through confinement. For
Foucault, the power mechanisms involved in the process were more repressive
than the shackles of the past.
149

Understanding Power Foucault’s most elaborate archaeological exposition occurs in his following
book, The Order of Things (original French edition 1966), in which he describes
the emergence of the human and social sciences as the product of “the
underlying rules, assumptions and ordering procedures of the Renaissance,
classical, and modern eras” (Best and Kellner 1991:41), and the creation of
“man” as a discursive construct of scientific knowledge and inquiry. In his
final archaeological writing, The Archaeology of Knowledge (original French
edition 1971), Foucault provides a reflexive critique and clarification of his
intellectual project: the development of a historical and theoretical
epistemological space.
Foucault’s archaeological writings have been criticized for an excessive focus

on discourse, to the exclusion of social institutions and practice. Nevertheless,
Foucault’s archaeologies clearly privilege the analysis of theory and knowledge
over social practices and institutions. An inquiry into the effect of discourse
on the social and political environment would require an evaluation of material
institutions. This principle guides Foucault’s next intellectual phase, in which
he borrows from the Nietzschean principle of genealogy to concentrate
explicitly on power effects and their relationship with knowledge (Best and
Kellner 1991:45).
12.5 Foucault’s Genealogical Writings

Genealogy signals a shift and broadening of Foucault’s focus, but not a
fundamental change in his vision. Like Foucault’s archaeological writings, his
genealogy explores discursive discontinuities and clarifies the historical
contexts of positions which are presented as absolute. Following from
archaeology, genealogy focuses on the multiplicities and pluralities within a
field of discourse; explicates the shifting, discontinuous undercurrents of
evolutionary history; and examines the role of reason in the production of
the human sciences. In contrast to archeology, genealogy aims at social,
political and economic institutions and practices; and the relations between
discursive and non-discursive domains.
Following from this position, Foucault began to theorize about power in the
1970s from a non-totalizing, non-subjective and non-humanist perspective.
His conception of power is radically different from earlier juridical, political
and economic macro perspectives. He suggests that power cannot be
observed in these apparatuses, and that it is diffuse, non specific and
polymorphous, shaping individual identities and bodies. Thus, unlike most
earlier explanations, he does not see power as inhibiting and negative, but
as productive and prescriptive, operating through the authority of social
norms (Best & Kellner 1991:48-49).

Reflect on Foucault’s genealogical approach. What are the advantages of
such an approach?
In his first genealogical work, Discipline and Punish (original French edition
1975; English edition 1979), Foucault describes “the historical formation of
the soul, body, and subject” within “disciplinary matrices of power” which
operate in schools, armies, hospitals, factories and prisons. He thus examines
the relationship between modern social institutions and the power relations
of rationality. In his later work, Foucault explicates the nature of rational
150 power.

Foucault critiques the ‘repressive hypothesis’ by stating that the idea of Power/Knowledge
sexual repression is a mechanism situated within “the regime of power-

knowledge-pleasure” (Foucault 1978:11), which creates and sustains the
discourse on sexuality and focuses on the body as the site of control. Thus,
Foucault reveals the ubiquitous and insidious operations of power;
problematizes rationality, subjectivity and knowledge; explores the links
between power and knowledge. Foucault’s vision has often been considered
oppressive. His archaeological and genealogical works reveal the colonizing
power of modern rationality and its dispersed presence throughout the social
field.
Nonetheless, Foucault’s theorising is grounded in the belief that knowledge

can be transformative. At the same time, although discourses reinforce power,
they also provide potential for resistance, whereby the disenfranchised can
extend oppositional discourses and demand legitimacy, frequently by
appropriating institutional categories.
12.6 Conclusion
Even if one does not agree with Foucault, at the very least, he reveals the
pervasive presence of power in human existence and critiques the
demonstrated validity of rationality, subjectivity and knowledge. His analyses
describe the extensive effects of power and its multiple operations: in
rational institutions such as schools, hospitals, factories, asylums and prisons;
in the production of scientific knowledge; and in the construction of
epistemological systems (Best and Kellner 1991:68-69). However, Foucault
also has clear limitations. His critique of modernity has been accused of
being one-sided, presenting only the negative results of rationality, which
limits his applicability. More significant is the startling neutrality of his
analyses. Although Foucault states that power operates through knowledge
and discourse, he ignores the reality that established epistemologies favor
certain groups or individuals to the exclusion of others. The discourse of
rationality itself has historically specific roots to white Western male
intellectuals: thus, its predominance has very real and specific effects.
Although he speaks of bringing subjected discourses into play, he does not
address the fact that subjected discourses are discovered among clearly
identifiable sections of the human population: among non-white, non-affluent,
non-West European, non-heterosexual men and women.
In spite of practical goals of his analysis, Foucault has been broadly

criticized by his adversaries on the ‘ backdoor determinism’ inherent to his
conception of power.
However Foucault has made an invaluable contribution to the study of power/

knowledge by opening new fields of understanding and interpretation.

Foucault Michel, 1973. Birth of the Clinic N.4. Pantheon
Foucault Michel, 1972. The Archaeology of Knowledge N.4. Pantheon
Foucault Michel, 1965. Madness and Civilization N.4. Pantheon
151

Unit 13
Evolution, Development and
Function of Capitalism
Contents
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Historical Interpretations of Capitalism
13.3 Development and Function of Capitalism
13.4 Commodity Production and Capitalist Production
13.5 Expansion of Markets and Production
13.6 Monopoly Capitalism and Imperialism
13.7 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
This unit is aimed at contributing towards an understanding of
the evolution, development and function of Capitalism
also provide different theoretical standpoints on Capitalism through
historical writings
13.1 Introduction
Capitalism was used by economists in a purely technical sense to refer to the
use of methods of production, and has been largely associated with a particular
view of the nature of capital. This definition of capitalism has no reference
to the way in which the instruments of production are owned. It refers only
to their economic origin and the extent of their use. According to another
conception, capitalism is identified with a system of unfettered individual
enterprise. That is a system where economic and social relations are ruled
by contract, where men are free agents in seeking their livelihood, and
where legal compulsions and restrictions are absent. Thereby capitalism is
made virtually synonymous with a regime of laissez-faire or free competition.
13.2 Historical Interpretations of Capitalism

Broadly speaking, historical research and historical interpretation have
influenced three separate meanings assigned to the notion of capitalism.
a) Capitalism as a Spirit of Enterprise

This idea has been popularised by the writings of Werner Sombart. He has
sought the essence of capitalism, not in any one aspect of its economic
anatomy or its physiology. But in the totality of those aspects as represented
in the geist or spirit that inspired the life of a whole epoch. This spirit is
a synthesis of the spirit of enterprise or adventure with “bourgeois spirit”
of calculation and rationality. Believing that at different times different
economic attitudes have always reigned, and that it is this spirit which has
created the suitable form for itself and thereby an economic organisation.
Thus he traced the origin of capitalism in the development of states of
mind. And hence, human behaviour is conducive to the existence of those
economic forms and relationships which are characteristic of the modern
world. 155

Theory of Capitalism The pre-capitalist man was “a natural man” who conceived economic activity
as simply catering to his natural wants. And in pre-capitalist times “at the
centre of all effort and all care, stood living man”: he is the measure of all
things. By contrast, the capitalist, turned topsy-turvy the natural man - his
primitive and original outlook and all the values of life, and saw the amassing
of capital as the dominant motive of economic activity. And in an attitude
of sober rationality and by the methods of precise quantitative calculation,
subordinated everything in life to this end.
More simply, Max Weber defined capitalism as “present wherever the industrial
provision for the needs of a human group is carried out by the method of
enterprise”. Weber used the spirit of capitalism to describe that attitude
which seeks profit rationally and systematically”.
b) Capitalism as a Commercial System

This is the meaning more often found implicit in the treatment of historical
material than explicitly formulated. This notion virtually identifies capitalism
with the organisation of production for a distant market. However, the
regime of the early craft gild, where the craftsman sold his products retail
in the town market, would presumably be excluded by this definition.
Capitalism could be regarded as being present as soon as the acts of production
and retail sale came to be separated in space and time by the intervention
of a wholesale merchant. This merchant advanced money for the purchase
of wares with the object of subsequent sale at a profit. To a large extent
this notion is a lineal descendent of the scheme of development employed
by the German Historical School, with its primary distinction between the
“natural economy” of the medieval world and the “money economy” that
succeeded it. Money economy emphasized that the `market’ defined the
stages in the growth of the modern economic world.
In the words of Bucher, the essential criterion is “the relation which exist
between the production and consumption of goods. To be more precise,
the length of the route which the goods traverse in passing from producers
to consumers. This is not uncommonly found in close conjunction with a
definition of capitalism as a system of economic activity that is dominated
by a certain type of motive or profit motive. The existence in any period
of a substantial number of persons who rely on the investment of money
with the object of deriving an income, whether this investment be in trade
or in usury in production being taken as evidence of the existence of an
element of capitalism. Prof. Naussbaum defines Capitalism as “a system of
exchange economy” in which the orienting principle of economic activity is
unrestricted profit. To which he adds an additional characteristic, saying
such a system is marked by a differentiation of the population into “owners
and property-less workers”.
c) Capitalism as a Particular Mode of Production

We have the meaning originally given by Marx, who sought the essence of
capitalism neither in a spirit of enterprise nor in the use of money to
finance a series of exchange transactions with the object of gain, but in a
particular mode of production. By mode of production, he did not refer
merely to the state of technique, what he termed as the state of productive
forces. But to the way in which the means of production were owned and
to the social relations between men which resulted from their connections
with the process of production. Thus capitalism was not simply a system of
156

production for the market — but a system of commodity of production as Evolution, Development
and Function of Capitalism
Marx termed it. And also it is a system under which labour-power had “itself
become a commodity” and was bought and sold on the market like any other
object of exchange.
The historical prerequisite of capitalism was the concentration of ownership

of the means of production in the hands of a class, consisting of only a minor
section of society. As a consequence of this, a large-scale property-less class
emerges, for whom the sale of their labour power was their only source of
livelihood. Accordingly, productive activity was accomplished by the property-
less class not by virtue of legal compulsion, but on the basis of a wage-
contract. It is clear that such a definition excludes the system of independent
handicraft production where the craftsman owned his own petty implements
of production and undertook the sale of his own wares. However, here
there was no divorce between the ownership and work; and except where
he relied to any extent on the employment of journeymen, it was the
purchase and sale of inanimate wares not of human labour-power that was
his primary concern.
What differentiates the use of this definition from others is that the existence
of trade and of money lending and the presence of a specialised class of
merchants or financiers. Even though they may be men of substance, it
does not suffice to constitute a capitalist society. Men of capital, however
acquisitive are not enough; their capital must be used to yoke labour to the
creation of surplus value in production.
d) Reflections on the origin of capitalism

Both Sombart’s conception of the capitalist spirit and a conception of
capitalism as primarily a commercial system share in common certain lacunae.
These conceptions focus acquisitive investment of money.
These conceptions are insufficiently restrictive to confine the term to
any one epoch of history.
And that they seem to lead inexorably to the conclusion that nearly all
periods of history have been capitalist, at least in some degree.
The further difficulty attaches to the idealist conception of Sombart and

Weber and their school, that if capitalism as an economic form is the creation
of the capitalist spirit, the genesis of the latter must first of all be accounted
for before the origin of capitalism can be explained. If this capitalist spirit
is itself an historical product, what caused its appearance on the historical
stage? To this riddle, no satisfactory answer has been propounded to date,
other than the accidental coincidence in time of various states of mind.
Box 13.1: Protestantism and Capitalism

The search for a cause has led to the unsatisfactory and inconclusive debate
as to whether it is true that Protestantism gave rise to the capitalist spirit
(as Weber and Troeltsch have claimed). There seems to be scarcely more
reason to regard capitalism as the child of the reformation than to hold,
with Sombart that it was largely the creation of the Jews. However, if the
emergence of a new economic system is to be explained in terms of an idea,
this idea must embody in its “embryo” the essence of the future system in
advance, which has to be explained. On the other hand, the definition of
capitalism in actual use in historiography has moved increasingly towards
that which was first adopted and developed by Marx.
157

Theory of Capitalism Emphasis has increasingly come to be placed on the emergence of a new
type of class differentiation between capitalist and proletariat rather than
on profit as a motive of economic activity. And attention has increasingly
been focussed upon the appearance of a relationship between producer and
capitalist, analogous to the employment relation between master and wage
earner in the fully mature industrial system of the 19th C. On the whole, this
is because the material which research has disclosed, has forced this emphasis
upon the attention of historians in their search for the essential
differentiation of the modern age, than because they have been predisposed
towards it by the writings of Marx. Thus Mr Lipson in claiming that the
essentials of capitalism were present some centuries before the industrial
revolution, states that “the fundamental feature of capitalism is the wage-
system under which the worker has no right of ownership in the wares
which he manufactures. The worker sells not the fruits of his labour but the
labour itself, a distinction which, is of vital economic significance.
13.3 Development and Function of Capitalism

a) Stages of Capitalism
The development of capitalism falls into a number of stages characterised by
different levels of maturity. Each of them is recognizable by fairly distinctive
traits only when we seek to trace the stages and to select one of them as
marking the opening stage of capitalism. If we are speaking Capitalism as a
specific mode of production, then it follows that we cannot date the dawn
of this system from the first signs of the appearance of large-scale trading
and of a merchant class, and we can not speak of a special period of merchant
capitalism. We must look for the opening of the capitalist period only when
changes in the mode of production occur, in the sense of a direct
subordination of the producer to a capitalist. This is not just a point of
terminology, but of substance.
The Main work of Marx carries the title: “Capital”. Marx spent many years
of his life on the analysis of capitalism, because he was convinced that a
thorough theoretical understanding was needed in order to facilitate the
practical critique of capitalism, its overthrow by the proletariat. As the sub-
title puts it, “Capital” is “A Critique of Political Economy”. Political Economy
stands for the economic theory developed by the classical bourgeois
economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Marx studied their theories
in minute detail. Starting their theories and subjecting their categories such
as value, commodity, money, capital, etc, to a sharp critical analysis, Marx
proceeds to expose the true nature of capitalism. In the process he breaks
down the powerful scientific legitimation of capitalist economy and not only
provides a new scientific model for the analysis of capital, but lays the
foundations for a fundamental critique of the totality of capitalism.
b) Political Economy of Capitalism

There are two ways to study capitalism and to get to know its specific
character and both ways we need in order to get a full understanding. The
first way is to study its history, how it was born, how it developed, under
which circumstances, and with what results. This requires a study not only
of the economic process but of the development of the whole bourgeois
society. It is wide field, as each country has its own history in this respect.
But such studies presuppose the second way to study capitalism, namely the
systematic analysis of the economic structure of capitalist society. In that
158

case one has to start not from the historical origins, but from the capitalist Evolution, Development
system as a totality. That is the approach, which Marx follows in “Capital”.
Box 13.2: Dialectical Logic

Historically one would have to begin with agriculture and the category of
ground-rent. By taking capital as starting point and finishing point Marx
follows the path of dialectical logic. This method presupposes the concrete
totality of the system, but for the sake of analysis it takes one part after
the other till it is able to conceive and present how all aspects, all relations,
all categories, function as parts of totality. Marx calls it the method of
rising from the abstract to the concrete. The isolated part may look real
and concrete, but it is an abstraction from the more complex reality. It is
the “rich totality of many determinations and relations” which forms the
concrete reality.
Capital is constructed according to this dialectical logic. Volume I is devoted

to the analysis of “The process of production of capital”. We can neither
discuss all the theories forwarded by Marx in “Capital” nor can we go into
the specifics of the historical development of capitalism. We can only highlight
some of the main theoretical statements and refer to some of the main
aspects of the historical process.
13.4 Commodity Production and Capitalist Production

A first characteristic of capitalist economy is that it is a form of commodity
production i.e. production for sale, production for the market. That is why
Marx starts his analysis of the capitalist mode of production with the analysis
of “commodities”. But not all commodity production is already capitalist
production. Commodity production emerged thousands of years back in human
history whereas capitalism is only a few hundred years old. In primitive
society all production is for direct use, there is no production for exchange
on the market. Production of commodities, of goods for exchange, developed
slowly. For a long time, it plays only a subordinate role. Only in capitalist
society commodity production becomes the completely dominant form of
production, it becomes generalised.

Ls commodity production a recent phenomenon? Give some of its
characteristics.
Analysing the mode of simple commodity production, Marx characterises the

purpose as : to sell in order to buy. The peasant wants to sell some grain
in order to buy grain. The weaver comes to sell some cloth in order to buy
grain. The operation can be presented as C-M-C. i.e. Commodity – Money
– Commodity. One sells one commodity in order to buy another commodity.
Money is a means of exchange, just to make the transaction easier. The
value of the two commodities, of C and C, is the same, is equivalent.
However, on the market place we find not only the peasant and the artisan,
but also the merchant. His economic operation is a different one: he buys
in order to sell. He comes to the market not with commodities but with
money. With that money he buys some product in order to sell it a higher
price. This operation can be presented as M-C-M i.e. Money-Commodity-
Money with increased value. This money which has been increased by a
159

Theory of Capitalism surplus-value is called capital. Capital has been there long before capitalism,
in the form of merchant capital or usurer-capital, money-lender capital. The
difference is that these forms of capital derive their profit from their role
in the exchange of commodities, in the sphere of distribution, of circulation,
of the market. The usurer and the merchant appropriate part of the surplus-
value which has been produced, but they don’t control the production
itself.
The capitalist mode of production comes into being when capital moves into
the sphere of production, when it gets hold of the means of production and
starts controlling and directing production itself. This is a long historical
process, which starts in Medieval Europe. Its basic characteristics are:
The separation of the producer from his means of production;
The concentration of the means of production in the hands of one class,
the bourgeoisie;
The formation of another class, which has no means of subsistence other
than the sale of its labour power, the proletariat.
Capitalist production is impossible as long as the producers still own or

control the means of production. As long as an artisan, a weaver or a
carpenter, has his own tools and workshop, he will not voluntarily go and sell
his labour-power and start working in a factory. As long as a peasant possesses
some land he will prefer to work on it rather than get hired as a labourer.
Capitalist production needs workers, people who sell their labour-power.
Therefore, it needs the separation of producers and means of production,
so that the producers are forced by economic compulsion to sell their labour-
power.
This separation has taken place in various ways, usually in a very brutal and
bloody manner. “In actual history, it is notorious that conquest, enslavement,
robbery, murder, briefly force, played the greater part”. Marx has documented
this for England in capital I, part VIII, ch.26., showing that the “so-called
primitive accumulation” is “nothing else than the historical process of divorcing
the producer from the means of production”.
The result of this process of separation is the formation of two classes,

which form the two poles of capitalist society. On the one side we find the
bourgeoisie as the class of owners in whose hand the means of production
are concentrated. On the other side we find the proletariat as the class
which has to find its subsistence by the sale of its labour power. Bourgeoisie
and proletariat are the basic classes of capitalist society but not necessarily
the only ones. Other classes such as intermediate sections, in various
combinations may exist. But capitalism is possible only if there is a class of
owners on the one hand, and a class of non-owners on the other hand.
Secondly, it is the relationship to the means of production, which
characterises these classes: ownership/control and non-ownership. It is not
simply a question of rich and poor. Not all poor people are workers. They
may be petty artisans, or hawkers, or peasants who still own some piece of
land. An industrial worker may earn more, and yet he is a member of the
working class whereas the poor peasant-owner is not.
The working class is not homogeneous. It consists of various sections, skilled

and unskilled, on daily wages or on monthly pay, under the poverty line and
160 well above it. What unites them is that they are all forced to sell their

labour power, be it under different conditions. A working class crosses the Evolution, Development
border-line of the working class only when his salary allows him to set up his
own shop, to become a petty money-lender or to start living or renting out
houses etc.
13.5 Expansion of Markets and Production

A further pre-condition for the development of capitalism is the expansion
of the market. Pre-capitalist small-scale commodity production works for a
limited market. In the 16th C, a commercial revolution took place in Europe.
Discoveries of new trade routes opened the Vasco-da-Gama era of world-
wide trade under colonial conditions. The expansion of the market encouraged
large-scale production and thus the growth of capitalism.
The capitalist entrepreneurs can emerge only when a certain scale of

production has been reached. The guild master and his limited number of
journey-men and apprentices do not produce enough for setting the master
free to do only the directing and supervising work. The capitalist as director
of an enterprise emerges with the scale of production growing larger.
a) The Production of Surplus Value

With the market for commodity-production expanding and with a minimum
of capital in the hands of a class of owners of the means of production and
with a sufficient number of workers ready to be hired on the labour market,
capitalist production can develop. Once it has gathered momentum it has
its own internal dynamism to expand further and further. Marx calls it the
“restless never-ending process of profit-making”. How does it work? The
key answer of Marx is his theory of the production of surplus value.
Box 13.3: The Capitalist Entrepreneur

Capital is formed when money ceases to be only a means of exchange, which
facilitates the exchange of commodities and when the increase of money,
adding new value, becomes the aim of economic transactions. The usurer
and the merchant try to achieve this in the sphere of the market. The
capitalist entrepreneur does it by subordinating the process of production
itself to this purpose. He buys raw materials, means of labour, etc., and he
buys labour-power. The labourers are paid for the use, for the consumption
of their labour-power by wages. The owner of the means of production
appropriates heir products. After selling them, he has made a profit. Where
does this additional money come from? Has money the power, to create
more money? Is it the shrewdness of the capitalist? Of course, occasionally
there may be a windfall through a shrewd operation. But that does not
explain the general process of profit-making. There are occassional set-
backs as well for various reasons. Marx finds the course of profit hidden in
one particular commodity which the capitalist buys on the market. The
commodity is labour-power.
For Marx the extraction of unpaid surplus-labour is the key to understand

the different forms of society: rent paid to the landlord in feudal society,
taxes paid to the state in Asiatic society. These forms are connected with
different political structures, needed to enforce this extraction. In capitalist
society the appropriation of surplus-value happens in a new way. It is no
longer the unpaid labour of slaves or serfs but the unpaid labour of wage-
labourers. Workers in capitalist society receive wages. It seems they are 161

Theory of Capitalism paid for their work. That is the great mystification in capitalism which covers
up the process of exploitation. Actually, they are paid not for their work but
for the use of their labour-power. What they produce is worth more than
their wages. The wages cover only the cost of necessary labour, that what
is needed to maintain the labourer. The value of what he produces is more
than that. The Capitalist appropriates the difference, which is the surplus.
This is possible because labour-power is a commodity, which can be bought
on the market.
b) The never-ending process of profit-making

Capitalist tries to increase the rate of surplus value all the time. Now we
raise the question why the capitalist has to be involved in such a restless
manner in profit-making. This can be attributed to the unlimited greed,
which is fostered by capitalism. But this greed should not be understood in
a moralistic manner. But as capitalists, the process of accumulating capital
will continue, otherwise they go bankrupt. This pressure comes from the
competition between the individual capitalists which is characteristic of
capitalism.
If a capitalist does not invest in new technology, if he does not expand

production, others will move ahead and conquer the market and he will be
left out in the cold. He cannot appropriate profit for his own consumption
only or spend it just for some unproductive purposes. He must take part of
it and put it aside for reinvestment. That part becomes new additional
capital. Thus he has to accumulate capital. This implies the trend towards
the concentration of capital in large-scale production. This concentration
again becomes the basis for the centralisation of the ownership and control
of capital in the hands of a few.

What is the role of new technology in capitalist production? Does it alter
ownership and control of capital?
The market is like the jungle with its law of survival of the fittest. The
general tendency is towards the elimination of the smaller one, to the
centralisation of capital. The bigger capitalists grow bigger and fewer. We
now consider what effect the law of accumulation of capital has on labour.
Accumulation of capital means an increased demand for labour-power. This
could lead to a rise in the price of labour. On a modest scale wages may rise
for a while. But this does not change the basic position of the labourer, who
is completely dependent on the capitalist. Capitalism does not only create
demand for labour, it also creates unemployment through the process of
mechanisation. In this way it creates an “industrial reserve army” of
unemployed whose existence makes it possible for the capitalists to keep
the wages of the employed under control. “The action of the law of supply
and demand of labour on this basis completes the despotism of capital”.
There is another reason why the capitalist has to expand production unlimited.
In the process of accumulation of capital the proportion of constant capital
increases and becomes greater in relation to variable capital. This is called
the growth in the organic composition of capital. Since the constant capital
increases in the process of mechanisation and the part of surplus value
producing variable capital becomes relatively less, Marx assumes a “tendency
162

of the average rate of profit to decline”. The more a capitalist expands the Evolution, Development
lower his rate of profit becomes. He can only make good for it by expanding
the scale of production.
But the ever increasing expansion of capitalist production leads to inevitably

to an economic crisis. That is the other law of capitalism which, Marx
establishes. These crises are the result of the basic contradiction between
capital and labour. In order to survive capital must accumulate and expand.
For its expanding mass-production it must find masses of buyers. These
masses consist to a large extent of workers. They can only buy if they
receive higher wages. But higher wages reduce the capitalists’ rate of profit.
Every individual capitalist, therefore, would like to keep his own workers
poor, and to see the rest of the workers rich enough to buy his products.
13.6 Monopoly Capitalism and Imperialism

The dynamism of capitalism, the permanent pressure to accumulate capital,
leads to a change in the character of capitalist economy. The era of free
competition brought about a tremendous expansion of productive forces
and of production on a mass scale. But this led simultaneously to the
concentration and centralisation of capital, and thus to a new situation in
which a decreasing number of big companies or groups of companies were
able to conquer monopoly positions in the market. Monopoly capitalism
developed through cartels, trusts, holdings and fusions, capitalists move to
protect the rate of profit against the effects of fee competition. Once the
market is under monopoly control higher profits can be achieved by limiting
production instead of increasing it, by holding back technological
improvements instead of introducing them, by lowering the quality of products
instead of rising it. Marx foresaw the rise of monopolies as the result of the
concentration of capital. But monopoly capitalism became dominant only
after Marx’s death.
Several Marxists tried to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of

this new phase of capitalism. The Austrian Marxist Rudolf Hilferding published
his study “Finance Capital — the latest phase of capitalist development” in
1910. The polish-German Marxist Rosa Luxemburg came out with her study
“The accumulation of Capital” in 1913. The Russian Marxist N Bukharin finished
his “Imperialism and World Economy” in 1915. And Lenin completed his
“Imperialism, the highest stage of Capitalism” in 1916.
Lenin made use both of Hilferding and Bukharin, though he differed on

certain points with them. For example, he did not agree with Hilferding that
monopolisation would eliminate all free competition within a national economy.
Box 13.4: Basic Features of Imperialism

The concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high
stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic
life.
The merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on
the basis of this ‘finance captial’, of a financial oligarchy;
The export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities
acquires exceptional importance;
The formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which
share the world among themselves; and
The territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist
powers is completed.
163

Theory of Capitalism The formation of international monopolist capitalist
13.7 Conclusion
The origins and development of capitalism has been traced and understood
by various social thinkers based on different parameters. However, Marx’s
understanding of Capitalism has influenced greatly than any other theories.
The main argument by Marx is that feudal mode of production has been
replaced by capitalist mode of production. And under capitalism, society is
divided into two main antagonistic classes — the class of capitalists or
bourgeoisie and the class of proletariats. The main economic law and the
stimulus of the capitalist mode of production is the creation of surplus value
by the workers and its appropriation. The unpaid labour of wage workers
is the source of surplus value.

Maurice Dobb 1963. Studies in the Development of Capitalism. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Giddens Anthony 1971. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. Cambridge
University Press.
McLellan, David, 1971. The Thought of Karl Marx. Macmillan.
164

Unit 14
Rationality, Work and Organisation
Contents
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Rationality
14.3 Organisation Theory and Sociology of Organisations
14.4 Work and Organisation
14.5 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
understand the concept of Rationality, Work and Organisation vis-à-vis
modern capitalist society
understand the concept of Organisations through theory of organisation
and Sociology of organisations
14.1 Introduction
In modern society, the significance of rationality, work and organisation is
implicit in our everyday life. The Classical Sociologists Karl Marx, Max Weber
and Emile Durkheim have conceptually dealt with these concepts in their
writings. In their quest to analyse the structure of capitalism and its
ramifications for a just and fair social order they explained these concepts
from different standpoints. The organization theory and sociology of
organizations provide comprehensive analysis of organisations.
14.2 Rationality
The world of modernity, Weber stressed over and over again, has been
deserted by the gods. Man has chased them away and has rationalized and
made calculable and predictable what in an earlier age had seemed governed
by chance, but also by feeling, passion and commitment, by personal appeal
and personal fear, by grace and by the ethics of charismatic heroes. Weber
attempted to document this development in a variety of institutional areas.
His studies in the sociology of religion were meant to trace the complicated
and tortuous ways in which the gradual “rationalisation of religious life” had
led the displacement of magical procedure by Wertrational systematisation
of man’s relation to the divine. He attempted to show how prophets with
their charismatic appeals had undermined priestly powers based on tradition;
how with the emergence of “book religion” the final systematisation and
rationalisation of the religious sphere had set in, which found its culmination
in the Protestant ethic.
In the sphere of law, Weber documented a similar course from a “kadi Justiz”,
the personalised dispensing of justice by wise leaders or elders, to the
codified, rationalised and impersonal justice of the modern world. He traced
the development of political authority from kings endowed with hereditary
charisma and thaumaturgical powers, to cool heads of state, ruling within
the strict limits of legal prescriptions and rationally enacted law. Even so
private an area of experience as music, Weber contended, was not exempt 165

Theory of Capitalism from the rationalising tendencies of western society. In his writings on the
sociology of music, Weber contrasted the concise notations and the well-
tempered scale of modern music — the rigorous standardisation and coordination
that governs a modern symphony orchestra — with the spontaneity and
inventiveness of the musical systems of Asia or of non-literate tribes.
a) The Spread of Secular Rationalism

Among the characteristics, in terms of which European development was
distinctive were the specific form of the state and the existence of rational
law. Weber attaches great emphasis to the significance to the heritage of
Roman law for the subsequent social and economic development of Europe,
and in particular for the rise of the modern state. ‘Without the juristic
rationalism, the rise of the absolute state is just as little imaginable as is the
(French) Revolution’.
The connection between this and the development of rational capitalism,

however was not simple and clear-cut. Modern capitalism first took root in
England, but that country was much less influenced by Roman law than other
continental countries were. The prior existence of a system of rational law
was only one influence in a complicated interplay of factors leading to the
formation of the modern state. The trend towards the development of the
modern state, characterised by the presence of a professional administration
carried on by salaried officials, and based upon the concept of citizenship,
was certainly not wholly an outcome of economic rationalization, and in part
preceded it. Nevertheless, it is true that the advance of the capitalist
economic order and the growth of the state are intimately connected. The
development of national and international markets, and the concomitant
destruction in the destruction of the influence of the local groups, such a
kinship units, which formerly played a large part in regulating contracts, all
promote the monopolisation and regulation of all “legitimate” coercive power
by one universalist coercive institution.

Discuss the characteristics of the modern state? Explain its relation to
rationality.
b) Modern Capitalistic Enterprise

Essential to modern capitalistic enterprise, according to Weber is the
possibility of rational calculation of profits and losses in terms of money.
Modern capitalism is inconceivable without the development of capital
accounting. In Weber’s view, rational book-keeping constitutes the most
integral expression of what makes the modern type of capitalist production
dissimilar to prior sorts of capitalistic activity such a usury or adeventures
capitalism. The circumstances which Weber details as necessary to the
existence of capital accounting is stable productive enterprises constitute
those which Weber accepts as the basic prerequisites of modern capitalism,
and include those factors upon which Marx placed more emphasis:
Box 14.1: Prerequisites of Modern Capitalism

1) The existence of a large mass of wage-labourers, who are not only
legally ‘free’ to dispose of their labour power on the open market, but
who are actually forced to do so to earn their livelihood.
166

Rationality, Work and
2) An absence of restrictions upon economic exchange in the market: in Organisation
particular, the removal of status monopolies on production and
consumption (such as existed in extreme form, in the Indian caste
system).
3) The use of a technology, which is constructed and organised on the basis
of rational principles: mechanisation is the clearest manifestation of
this.
4) The detachment of the productive enterprise from the household: while
the separation of home and workplace is found elsewhere, as in the
bazaar, it is only in western Europe that this has proceeded very far.
But these economic attributes could not exist without the rational legal
administration of the modern state. This is as distinctive a characteristic of
the contemporary capitalist order as is the class division between capital
and labour in the economic sphere. In general terms, political organisations
can be classified in the same way as economic enterprises, in relation to
whether the ‘the means of administration’ are owned by the administrative
staff or are separated from their ownership. The greater the degree to
which the ruler succeeds in surrounding himself/herself with a propertyless
staff responsible only to him, the less he is challenged by nominally
subordinate powers. This process is most complete in the modern bureaucratic
state.
14.3 Organisation Theory and Sociology of

Organisations
In practice, organisation theory and sociology of organisations are used
interchangeably, although the former has a slightly wider remit than the
latter as it also covers work by non-sociologists, including those who are
concerned to advice to management on how organisations should be designed
and operated. As various forms of organisation pervade social life some
difficulty also attaches to the definition of those, which are the subject-
matter of the sociology of organisations. In a useful discussion of this problem,
David Silverman has suggested that the ‘formal organisations’ with which
this branch of sociology is concerned have three distinguishing features:
They arise at an ascertainable moment in time;
As artifacts they exhibit patterns of social relations which are less taken
for granted than those in non-formal organizations (such as family) and
which organisational participants often seek to coordinate and control;
and
Consequently, considerable attention is paid to the nature of these social
relations and to planned changes in them.
Early organisation theory developed along two parallel tracks, reflecting in

dual sociological and managerial origins. The growth of industrial societies in
the nineteenth century involved the expansion of large-scale organisations
— especially those of the factory and the state. The former of these gave
rise to the doctrines of scientific management associated with Frederick
William Taylor, and the latter provided the exemplar which Weber had in mind
when developing his ideal typical account of the structure of bureaucracy.
Both these theories concentrated on analyzing the structures of organisations;
that is, the nature of the various positions occupied by organisational
167

Theory of Capitalism personnel, the powers and duties attaching to these positions, and their
relationship to the work required to carry out the explicitly stated goals of
the organisation. Both also viewed organisations as hierarchical structures,
essential for the managerial control of work.
However, in the 1930s and 1940s, a variety of studies (such as those of the
Human Relations Movement by Chester Barnard, and the now classic study
of the Tennessee valley authority by the sociologist Philip Seiznick) opened
up a second area for analysis: the study of the social processes occurring in
organisations, often with a particular emphasis on how informal, unofficial
social relations could constrain or even subvert the official goals of the
organisation, and with organisation as co-operative rather than hierarchically
controlled social institutions.
There now exists an immense variety of sociological studies of organisations

and theories about them. Indeed, most of the major schools of sociological
theory have contributed to this literature. Stewart Clegg and David Dunkerley
I their book Organisation Class and Control (1980) identify four major groupings
among the diverse approaches. These are as follows:
a) Typologies of Organisations
Typologies of organisations involve attempts to classify organisations according
to a variety of key characteristics, such as who benefits from their operations,
or how they obtain compliance from their members. Works by Peter Blau,
Amitai Etzioni, Robert Blauner and Tom Burns and G.M. Stalker are among
the best know such studies.
b) Organisations as Social Systems

This approach is particularly identified by Talcott Parson’s structural
functionalist theory of action and with Philip Selznick and Robert Merton’s
more focused work on organizations. Organisations consist of social systems
in interaction with other social systems (therefore open systems) whose
values and goals are oriented to those of the wider society. According to
Parsons, key requirements for organisational maintenance (which is seen to
be the overriding goal of any organisation) are those which apply to all social
system; namely adaptation, goal attainment, integration and pattern (or
value) maintenance.
c) Organisations as Empirically Contingent Structures

An approach particularly associated in the United Kingdom, with research at
the University of Aston. The typological and social systems approaches have
difficulty in clearly defining the organisation as a theoretical object. (Is it
defined solely by a set of typological characteristics? Or, if its is an open
system, where are the system boundaries to be drawn). The Aston programme
applies insights derived form psychology, together with statistical techniques
such as scaling and factor analysis to relate measures of organisational
performance to different dimensions of organisational structure (such as the
degree of specialisation of tasks and centralisation of authority). The latter
are then related to independent contextual variables such as size, technology,
and location of the enterprise. This essentially empiricist approach is subject
to all the usual criticisms which apply to such a methodology.
d) Organisations as Structures of Action

168 This approach focuses on the circumstances determining the actions of

individuals in organizations. An early contribution was made by Herbert A Rationality, Work and
Organisation
Simon’s work on satisficing. Later work, for example by David Silverman is
influenced by phenomenological sociology (especially ethnomethodology) and
interactionism. Instead of reifying the organization (referring to organisational
goals and needs as if the organisation, like a human being, could have such
things) organisations are here analyzed as the outcome of motivated people
attempting to resolve their own problems. They are socially constructed by
the individual actions of members having habituated expectations of each
other. This approach throws doubt on whether it makes sense to refer to
organisations as institutions, which pursue organisational goals. In any event,
there have been many studies, which show for example, that official goals
may bear no relationship to actual or operative goals; that organisations
frequently have multiple and conflicting goals and that goal displacement
may occur. The informal culture of work within organisations has been and
continues to be extensively studied by sociologists influenced by the Chicago
school of sociology. This tradition is illustrated in the work of, for example
William F Whyte (Human Relations in the Restaurant Industry, 1948), Donald
Roy (‘Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop’, American
Journal of Sociology, 1952) and Howard Becker (Boys in White, 1961).

Describe what is an organisation. Make a list of their basic charactrisics.
A great deal of organization theory has been criticized for its normative (in
this case pro-managerial) bias; for its individualistic analysis of the members
of organizations (that is, for being more informed by psychological, than by
relations of power and control in society affect and are affected by
organizations (in other words for concentrating mainly on the internal exercise
of managerial authority and attempts to subvert it).
14.4 Work and Organisation

a) Theoretical Perspectives on Division of Labour
In Marx’s analysis of bourgeois society, there are two directly related but
partially separable sources of alienation rooted in the capitalist mode of
production. The first of these is alienation in the labour-process, in the
productive activity of the worker. The second is the alienation of the
worker from his product, that is, from control of the result of the labour-
process. For the sake of convenience, Giddens refers to the former as
‘technological alienation’ and latter as ‘market alienation’. Both of these
derive from the division of labour involved in capitalist production. The
latter expresses the fact that the organisation of productive relationships
constitute a class system resting upon an exploitative dominance of one
class by another; the former identifies occupational specialisation as the
source of the fragmentation of work into routine and undemanding tasks.
For Marx, both types of alienation are integral to the expansion of the
division of labour: the emergence of class societies in history is dependent
upon the growth of the specialisation of tasks made possible by the existence
of surplus production. The formation of a classless society will thus lead to
the abolition of the division of labour as it is known under capitalism. In
Marx’s conception of both market and technological alienation are thus
inseparable from the division of labour: ‘the division of labour is nothing but
the alienated form of human activity...’ 169

Theory of Capitalism
Box 14.2: Division of Labour
Durkheim treats the growth of the division of labour is portrayed in terms
of the integrating consequences of specialisation rather than in terms of the
formation of class systems. Consequently, Durkheim treats class conflict,
not as providing a basis for the revolutionary restructuring of society, but
as symptomatic of deficiencies in the moral co-ordination of different
occupational groups within the division of labour. In Durkheim’s thesis, the
‘forced’ division of labour is largely separate form the ‘anomic’ division of
labour, and mitigation of the first will not in itself cope with the problems
posed by the second. According to him, the socialism of Marx is wholly
concerned with the alienation of the forced division of labour, which is to
be accomplished through the regulation of the market - the socialisation of
production. But in Durkheim’s stated view, which he opposes to this, the
increasing dominance of economic relationships, consequent upon the
destruction of the traditional institutions which were the moral backbone of
prior forms of society, is precisely the main cause of the modern ‘crisis’.
It is only through moral acceptance in his particular role in the division of

labour that the individual is able to ‘achieve a high degree of autonomy as
a self-conscious being, and can escape both the tyranny of the rigid moral
conformity demanded in undifferentiated socieities on the one hand, and
the tyranny of unrealisable desires on the other. However, the premises of
Marx’s conception was that not the moral integration of the indivdual within
a differentiated division of labour, but the effective dissolution of the division
of labour as an organising principle of human social intercourse.
b) The Problem of Bureaucratic Organisation

In Marx’s analysis of the extension of the division of labour underlying the
formation of capitalist enterprise, the expropriation of the worker from his
means of production is given pride of place. In Marx’s view, this is the most
essential condition for the emergence of bourgeois society, and identifies,
along an historical dimension, the formation of the class relationship between
capital and labour, which is implicit in the capitalist mode of production. It
is the intrinsic nature of the connection between the division of labour and
the class structure, which makes it possible for Marx to proceed to the
conclusion that the transcendence of alienation is possible through the
abolition of capitalism. Neither Durkheim nor Weber denies the possibility
of the formation of socialist societies: but both assert that the transition
to socialism will not radically change the existing form of society.
An important part of Weber’s writings consists in delineating the factors

promoting rationalization on the ‘level of meaning’. Weber always insisted
upon tracing the nexus of social relationships, which both influence and are
influenced by, the growth in rationalization. Thus for Weber, it is not only
the degree but the ‘direction’ assumed by rationalization in the west, and
more specifically, in capitalism, differs from that of the other major
civilizations. In modern western capitalism, there are various spheres in
which rationalisation has proceeded in a direction, as well as to an extent,
unknown elsewhere.
The first is the spread of science, a phenomenon of basic significance: not

only does it complete the process of ‘disenchantment’, but it makes possible
the progressive implementation of rational technology in production.
170 Moreover, ‘scientific work is chained to the course of progress… Every

scientific “fulfillment” raises “questions”; it asks to be “surpassed” and Rationality, Work and
Organisation
outdated’. Thus the institutionalisation of science weds modern life into an
implicit dynamic of innovation and change, which cannot in itself, confer
‘meaning’. The application of scientific innovation to technology is combined,
in the modern economy, with the introduction of methods of rational
calculation, exemplified in book-keeping, which promote that methodical
conduct of entrepreneurial activity which is so distinctive of contemporary
capitalism. The conduct of rational capitalism, in turn entails unavoidable
consequences in the sphere of social organisation, and inevitably fosters the
spread of bureaucracy.
Weber treats bureaucratic specialisation of tasks as the most integral feature

of capitalism. Thus Weber expressly denies that the expropriation of the
worker from his means of production has been confined to the immediate
sphere of industry. In Weber’s thesis any form of organisation, which has a
hierarchy of authority can become subject to a process of ‘expropriation’:
for the Marxian notion of the ‘means of production’ Weber substitutes the
‘means of administration’. Weber gives to the organization of relationships
of domination and subordination the prominence, which Marx attributes to
relationships of production. Any political association, according to Weber,
may be organised in an ‘estate’ form, in which the officials themselves own
their means of administration.
These developments were the most important factors promoting the

emergence of the modern state in which ‘expert officialdom’, based on the
division of labour’ is wholly separated from ownership of its means of
administration. The spread of bureaucratic specialisation is mainly promoted
by its technical superiority over the other types of organisation in co-
ordinating administrative tasks. This in turn is partly dependent upon the
filling of bureaucratic positions according to the possession of specialised
educational qualifications. ‘Only the modern development of full
bureaucratisation brings the system of rational, specialised examinations
irresistibly to the fore’.

Explain Weber’s concept of “disenchantment”. How does this affect economic
progress?
The expansion of bureaucratisation hence necessarily leads to the demand

for specialist education, and increasingly fragments the humanist culture,
which in previous times, made possible the ‘universal man’, the ‘thorough
and complete human being’ whom Durkheim speaks of. Weber expresses an
essentially similar point in holding that the ‘cultivated man’ of earlier ages
is now, displaced by the trained specialist. Since the trend towards
bureaucratisation is irreversible in capitalism, it follows that the growth of
functional specialisation is a necessary concomitant of the modern social
order.
c) Bureaucracy and Democracy

The growth of bureaucratic state proceeds in close connection with the
advance of political democratisation. This because the demands made by
democrats for political representation and for equality before the law
necessitate complex administrative and juridical provisions to prevent the
exercise of privilege. The fact that democracy and bureaucratisation are so
171

Theory of Capitalism closely related creates one of the most profound sources of tension in the
modern capitalist order. For a while, the extension of democratic rights in
the contemporary state cannot be achieved without the formulation of new
bureaucratic regulations, there is a basic opposition between democracy
and bureaucracy.
Box 14.3: Aspects of Rationality

This is, for Weber, one of the most poignant examples of the contradictions
which can exist between the formal and substantive rationality of social
action: the growth of the abstract legal procedures which help to eliminate
privilege themselves reintroduce a new form of entrenched monopoly which
is in some respects ‘arbitrary’ and autonomous than that previously extant.
Bureaucratic organization is promoted by the democractic requisite of
impersonal selection for positions, from strata of the population, according
to the possession of educational qualifications. But this in itself creates
strata of officials who, because of the separation of their position from the
external influence of privileged individuals or groups, possess a more inclusive
range of administrative powers than before.
The existence of large-scale parties is inevitable in the modern state; but

if these parties are headed by political leaders who have strong conviction
of the significance of their vocation, ureaucratisation of the political structure
can be partially checked.
d) Bureaucracy and Socialism

If the modern economy were bureaucra on a socialist basis, and sought to
attain a level of technical efficiency in production and distribution of goods
comparable to that of capitalism, this would necessitate ‘a tremendous
increase in the importance of professional bureaucrats’. The bureaucrati
division of labour, which is an integral characteristic of the modern economy
demands the precise co-ordination of functions. This is a fact which has
been at the root of the increase of bureaucratisation associated with the
expansion of capitalism. But the formation of a socialist state would entail
a considerably higher degree of bureaucratization, since it would place a
wider range of administrative tasks in the hands of the state.
Weber’s primary objections to socialism concern the bureaucratic

ramifications, which it would entail. Those offers another example of the
characteristic dilemma of modern times. Those who seek to set up a socialist
society, they act under the vision of the achievement of an order in which
political participation and self-realisation will go beyond the circumscribed
form of party democracy found in capitalism. But the result of the impetus
to bureauc his vision can only be in the direction of promoting the
bureaucratisation of industry and the state, which will in fact further reduce
the political autonomy of the mass population.
e) Modern Features of Bureaucracy

It is a singular feature of bureaucracy that once it has become established
it is, in Weber’s word ‘escape proof’. Modern bureaucracy, characterised by
a much higher level of rational specialisation than patrimonial organisations,
is even more resistant to any attempt to rise society from its grip. ‘Such an
apparatus makes “revolution”, in the sense of the forceful creation of entirely
172 new formations of authority, more and more impossible.

The spread of bureaucracy in modern capitalism is both cause and consequence Rationality, Work and
Organisation
of the rationalisation of law, politics and industry. Bureaucratisation is the
concrete, administrative manifestation of the rationalization of action which
has penetrated into all spheres of western culture, including art, music, and
architecture. Consequently, for Weber, the analysis of the growth of the
bureaucratic state provides a paradigm for the explanation of the progression
of bureaucratisation in all spheres. For Marx, on the other hand, the
‘systematic and hierarchical division of labour’ in the administration of the
state represents a concentration of political power.
14.5 Conclusion
For Marx, a primary factor underlying the early origins of capitalism in western
Europe is the historical process of the expropriation of producers form control
of their means of production. Capitalism is thus, in its very essence, a class
society. The basic contradictions inherent in the capitalist economy derive
directly from its character as a system based upon production for exchange-
value. The need to maintain, or to expand, the rate of profit, is in opposition
to the tendential law of declining profits; the separation of the producer
and consumer is the main factor lying behind the crises to which capitalism
is recurrently subject; and the operation of the capitalist market entails
both that labour-power cannot be sold above its exchange-value and that
there comes into being a large ‘reserve army’ destined to live in pauperism.
For Durkheim and Weber, the class structure is not integral to the progressive
differentiation in the division of labour. Both repudiates the notion that
these class divisions express its underlying nature. In Durkheim’s conception,
the ‘forced’ division of labour is an ‘abnormal form’, but it is not a necessary
consequence of the extension of social differentiation in itself. It is primarily
the use of economic power to enforce unjust contracts, which explains the
occurrence of class conflict. What distinguishes the modern form of society
form the traditional types is not its specific class character, but the prevalence
of organic solidarity. In Weber’s conception, rational calculation is the primary
element in modern capitalistic enterprise, and the rationalisation of social
life generally is the most distinctive attribute of modern western culture.
The class relation which, Marx takes to be the pivot of capitalism is in fact
only one element in a much more pervasive rationalisation, which extends
the process of the ‘expropriation of the worker from his means of production’
into most of the institutions in contemporary society. The existence of
contradictions within capitalism generates no historical necessity for such
contradictions to be resolved. On the contrary, the advance of rationalisation,
which certainly creates a hitherto unknown material abundance, inevitably
stimulates a further separation between the distinctive values of western
civilization (freedom, creativity, spontaneity) and the realities of the ‘iron
cage’ in which modern man is confined.

H.H. Gerth and C.Wright Mills. 1981. From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology.
OUP
Giddens, Anthony. 1994. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. OUP
Raymond, Aron. Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol.I, Penguin
173

Unit 15
Entrepreneurship and Capitalism
Contents
15.1 Introduction
15.2 Meaning of Entrepreneurship
15.3 Theoretical Background of Entrepreneurship with
Special Reference to Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter
15.4 Contribution of Max Weber
15.5 Contribution of Schumpeter
15.6 Studies on Entrepreneur other than Weber
15.7 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
provide the meaning of entrepreneurship
discuss the contributions of Weber and Schumpeter
describe other attempt to study the phenomena of entrepreneurship
15.1 Introduction
In this unit entrepreneurship and development of capitalism as analysed by
social scientists to the theoretical understanding has been discussed briefly.
Effort has been made to analyse that how social sciences can provide new
and fresh ideas about the theory of entrepreneurship and development of
capitalism. While analyzing this, theoretical foundation of the classical
thinkers, Weber and Schumpeter, has been identified. When classical theory
of economics on its strength was rejected by the German Historical School,
Weber’s theoretical assertation had become meaningful on its theoretical
ground, it has been described in section 1.3. Weber’s idea on entrepreneurship
is generally identified with the theory of Charisma, the perspective to which
this theory is able to demonstrate the development of capitalism in the
primitive stage of society is appeared in the sub-section 1.3.1. Also, this
section presents how protestant ethos has provided such a social condition
where entrepreneur achieved social acceptance, and led development of
capitalism which was not available before the reformation. While sub-section
1.3.2 of this unit dealing with Schumpeter’s contribution on entrepreneurship
with reference to the theory of economic development and his economic,
psychological and sociological perspectives have also been identified. How
for Durkheim’s idea can be useful to understand entrepreneurship has been
tried to develop in sub-section 1.3.3. And some ideas of modern sociologists
have also been incorporated in this section. Finally summary of this unit is
given.
15.2 Meaning of Entrepreneurship

There is some unresolved controversy in the meaning of entrepreneurship.
Although, there is some consensus also about the entrepreneurship which
includes a part of administration and its function in decision making process
174 for regulating some types of organisation. Some scholars refer to the term

for strategic or innovative decisions while others apply it for business Entrepreneurship and
Capitalism
organisations. The term can be clarified in the historical context. The genesis
of the word is French which appeared long back particularly to denote “to
do something”. During early sixteen century, those who were engaged in
leading military expeditions were lebelled as entrepreneurs. After 1700, the
word was frequently referred to by the French for government road, bridge,
harbour and fortification contractors and later to the architects. By 1800,
the word appeared in the academic discipline as it had been used by a
considerable number of the French economists, who treated the word in a
specific sense in the field of economics that has given special meaning to
entrepreneur and entrepreneurship, with differences emerging mostly from
the features of the sector of economy. And those economists who were
interested in Government treated the entrepreneur as a contractor,
agricultural specialist (farmer) and industrialist as a risk taking capitalist
(Encyclopedia of Social Science, 87-88). However, entrepreneur and
entrepreneurship have been used in various contexts by the scholars at
various points of time.
15.3 Theoretical Background of Entrepreneurship

with Special Reference to Max Weber and
Joseph Schumpeter
Max Weber and Schumpeter though they belong to sociology and economics
respectively, have contributed to develop theory to analyse entrepreneurship
and its role in the development of capitalism in society. Both theorists with
respect to their ideas and theories have some consensus and some
differences. Schumpeter paid attention on identifying prescientific vision,
hence, he made the task rather easier and assumed entrepreneur merely a
manager, circular flow development system. So far as Weber’s ideas are
concerned, it is a difficult task to make an identification as his thoughts on
entrepreneurship are often scattered in his all works. Nevertheless, The
protestant ethic and spirit of capitalism can be identified a point of departure
where he built up some theoretical foundation to understand the development
of capitalism. Both scholars, varying in their interests, have formulated social
theories and economic sociologies which, up to some extent, are similar in
scope and theoretical conclusions. Many analogies can even be attributed
Marx and many are yet to be explained (Macdonald, 1971: 71). Schumpeter
though took the idea of Marx in analysing social aspect of entrepreneurship
and tried to link with the development of capitalism, but his approach and
conclusions are very much non-Marxian. Weber also in this context is not an
exception whose treatment of social phenomena is not different with
Schumpeter. Weber’s conception, on attack on Marx’s idea of materialistic
explanation of history, was too a challenge to the economics as an autonomous
scientific discipline. This situation has been explained by Bendix as “Weber
has demonstrated…. economic conduct was inseparable from the idea with
which men pursued their economic interests, and these ideas had to be
understood on their own term” (1960: 52).

Is Webers and Schumpter analysis on entrepreneurs similar or different note
down your answer.
At that time scholars of German historical school had been involving in

asserting it for many years, and rejecting classical economic theory on its 175

Theory of Capitalism strength. The new situation which emerged was Weber’s assertation of
entrepreneurship and development of capitalism on theoretical ground.
Schumpeter (1980) stated that his exposition on entrepreneurship and
development of capitalism rests on the fundamental distinction between
static and dynamic situations. Both have formulated the theoretical structure
at about same points of time, Schumpeter was trained in Austrian tradition
of economic theory and Weber in German historical school.
15.4 Contribution of Max Weber

Weber’s idea on entrepreneurship and development of capitalism is
contradictory with Marx. Weber’s attack on Marx’s view was that the
capitalist, equipped by new techniques and driven by rational procurement,
had always neglected the old traditional method and attitudes, and had
imposed on society his own ethos and a specific mode of production. Weber
never accepted this and said that this was never a realistic situation for the
process of capitalistic development. Even some situation had occurred in
Weber’s life span where a new man broke into a totally adopted
traditional environment, and mode of production was specially capitalist
therein. Apparently, here, new man neither was equipped by a new
invention nor was capable of revolutionizing industry, however, he had a
new spirit. Weber afterward takes a turn by emphasising to capitalist
form of an organisation with capital turn over, entrepreneurial business
activity and rational bookkeeping. Nonetheless, it was also traditionalistic in
every way.
Box 15.1: Weber and Economics

Weber is always treated as a scholar of sociology, but during the last span
on his career, when he was a mature Weber, he devoted nearly a decade in
developing of perspective which was, no doubt, sociological but blended with
economics (Swedberg, 1988). As a matter of fact, Weber was trained in the
field of legal history, thus, the area in which he may have been much
renowned could have been history of law. He also devoted about two years
in teaching economics at two leading universities of Germany where he
imparted the topics which were a combination of historical economics and
marginal utility economics.
Apart from this, Weber through out his academic career worked for
propagating philosophy of social sciences, economic history and political
science. All these aspects can be observed in his idea about the
entrepreneurship and development of capitalism.
Weber’s theoretical propagation of entrepreneurship is generally identified

with the theory of Charisma, which can be observed in Weber’s analysis of
exceptional type of human being, the Charismatic man, who by virtue of
extraordinary personality influences others to follow him/her. Unfortunately,
Weber’s treatment of Charisma was misunderstood by many scholars. In fact,
Weber treats Charisma as a significant agent of change of primitive phase of
the society. And it has no relevance in modern capitalist society, where
economic changes occur due to the enterprises which generate opportunities
to make profit in market situation. Rationalisation of society begins with
the replacement of myth and religion by science and Methodism. However,
Charisma has a bit scope in development of capitalism in modern society.
Weber’s theory of entrepreneur and development of capitalism has two
176

important aspects: (1) as he says entrepreneur can be found in economic Entrepreneurship and
Capitalism
system and (2) entrepreneur will have to do much more with the direction
of economic action in a collective perspective viz. enterprise which certainly
is not an economic operation of an individual. At elementary stage of his
work on entrepreneurship, Weber says, “Entrepreneurship means the taking
over and organisation of some part of economy, in which people’s needs are
satisfied through exchange, for the sake of making profit and at one’s own
economic risk ([1898], 1990:57). His work, ‘Protestant Ethic and Spirit of
Capitalism’ is significant to understand the theory of economic development
from two aspects: (1) it brings out the reality of change in attitudes to
words entrepreneurship that had been generated due to the reformation
of western society, either one would be hostile or alienated for accepting
or promoting it actively and (2) it brings out the fact that a certain kind of
religious ethos namely Protestantism contributed a favourable condition for
the development of capitalism as well as work culture which had given a
scope for broader changes in the attitude of the society towards
entrepreneurs. Prior to reformation, there was no social acceptance for
money lending, trade and commerce as well as entrepreneurship.

Outline the role of Calvinism in reinterpreting religious ideology.
Religious sanctions did not allow to accept them, not only in western, but
through out the societies around the globe. These endeavors, in fact, were
at the best tolerated but never be embraced. A certain form of Calvinism as
well as some sects of Christians during sixteen and seventeen centuries
setup a movement of reforms by reinterpreting religious ideology which
brought major changes in the ethos of business and industry as well as
having its impacts to the people who had accepted the modified ethics of
religion in particular and society in general. At this point of reference, a
positive condition for entrepreneurial works had emerged which led the
capitalistic development. Henceforth, religious constrains gradually begun
with lasting their luster and control over the society, soonly, in persuasion
of economic action, religious grip had been weakening. Hence, such a social
condition had emerged where entrepreneurship to generate capital had
become independent variable. Hear, Weber demonstrates changes in cultural
values and belief as the key of the development of capitalism among various
social groups with their own world views (Bendix, 1960: 258-62). In early
work, Weber gives much stress on entrepreneurship as the skillful direction
of enterprises which corresponds to opportunities in market situation for
making profit than the personality of an individual entrepreneur.
Box 15.2: Entrepreneurship and Capitalism

Interestingly, Weber’s contribution on entrepreneurship and development of
capitalism, which appeared in his political and sociological writings from
1910 onwards, clearly indicates that Weber shifted his idea of entrepreneurship
to bureaucrats. Weber, in this context, argues that as soon as society becomes
more rationalized, bureaucracy dominates both enterprise as well as state.
In case, political bureaucracy succeeds in handling all of the economic activities,
viz. by socialist kind of revolution, capitalistic development will be struck
out and democratic system will be turned down by dictatorial system.
In a capitalist society, economic sector operates in coordination with political

sector. Nevertheless, economy can be also shifted within, in a situation
177

Theory of Capitalism when bureaucratic notions within the individual enterprises are permitted
to takeover. In this respect, Weber had personal dilemma if it crystallizes,
which is very likely, rent would replace profit, the economy will fall down
and soonly, repressive political condition would emerge in the society.
According to Weber entrepreneur is the only person in economic sector who
can force to keep the bureaucracy at its proper place as entrepreneur has
an extensive knowledge and experiences of the business organisation rather
than bureaucrats. The above discussion raises a question: How to identify
the routes by which entrepreneurial groups are guided into the business
endeavors and capitalistic development in society? According to Weber, whose
centre was protestant Europe, the Calvinist notion of the advisability to
justifying one’s faith in cosmic endeavors, with no exception, strengthened
the choice of business as a profession. Nevertheless, at this juncture, Weber
also felt a major influence of ascetic Protestantism was transformed leisurely,
satisfying traditional capitalists who happened to acclimatize new beliefs
into perpetuating, ever extending modern capitalists.
15.5 Contribution of Schumpeter

Schumpeter had looked different theoretical aspects of entrepreneurship at
different points of his life span. He, in fact, used a variety of approaches
including psychology, economic theory, economic history and sociology. It is
worthy to note here that Schumpeter first propagated competent history of
entrepreneurship in the economic theory. And in this regard, the history of
economic thought has been influenced greatly by his approach which still
dominates the academic field.
Although, Schumpeter followed versatility and multi-disciplinary approach,

nevertheless, as evident by his writings, he never produced a concrete
guidance for the behaviour of entrepreneurs as business schools have been
formulating it. It is worthy to note here that Schumpeter repeatedly had
pointed out that when ordinary economic behaviour is more or less automatic,
the entrepreneur has always to think seriously over his/her action which is
to be taken as entrepreneur is involved in doing something that is
fundamentally new. This is such insight which seems to be very significant
as when someone does something extraordinary new does not know how to
proceed further, hence needs fresh guidance.

What is Schumpeters vision of an entrepreneur? Write down your answer.
The idea of capitalist process which is the key point in the Schumpeter
economic theoretical analysis can be stated that circular flow, as developed
by Schumpeter, is disturbed and transformed by the innovators and their
imitators. Given to certain technical economic conditions, the business begins
to make profit, even when the market prices fall as a consequence of increased
output. Here it is important that aggressive entrepreneur breaking into the
placid circular flow, armed with nothing will, strengthen the idea of
innovation, his/her success against obstacles of established firms, their forced
liquidation or adaptation, is the key point on which Schumpeter interacted
to a versatility through out his career. Schumpeter’s first effort to develop
the theory of entrepreneur can be traced out in the theory of economic
development. In this pioneer work, he tried to formulate a completely new
economic theory and paid a bit little attention what earlier economists had
178

accomplished. In this respect, his argument was that all significant changes Entrepreneurship and
Capitalism
in the economy are initiated by the entrepreneur, and that changes then
gradually work at their own through the economic system, that is the business
cycle. Schumpeter also regarded that his idea of endogenously generated
change, as opposed to change induced from exogenous forces, not only
applicable to economic, but to all social phenomena and they could be
conceptualised as consisting of two types of activities, on the one hand
there were creative and innovative activities, while on the other repetitive
and mechanical activities. The second edition of the theory of economic
organization was published after the one and half decades later, in which
Schumpeter made his argument more logical, systematised it and broaden its
implications. After thirteen years, an other his work “Business cycle” came
up in which the carried further and here he had described entrepreneurship
in much technical sense. When we think of Schumpeter theory of
entrepreneur, we simply mean entrepreneurship as innovation. And perhaps
the point on which Schumpeter speaks rather directly of the entrepreneur,
his main bulk of his work represents an attempt to develop many economic
theories viz. interest, capital, credit, profit and business cycle by
interconnecting them to a theory of entrepreneurship. By doing so, he
asserts that entrepreneurship can be defined as the making of a new
combination of already existing materials, and forces; that entrepreneurship
related of making of innovations, as opposed to inventions; and that no
one is an entrepreneur forever, only when he/ she is doing the innovative
activity.
Box 15.3: Schumpeter’s Typology of Entrepreneurs

The typology given by him in the theory of economic development related
to the practical implications, among them, the first has gained much popularity
due to its operationalisation ability of the behaviour of entrepreneurs. These
three typologies can be summarised as follow: (1) the introduction of new
goods; (2) the introduction of new mode of production; (3) the initiating of
new market; (4) innovating a new source of supply of raw materials; and (5)
the creation of a new industrial organisation. Schumpeter’s second typology
is also very much popular as it is related with the motivation of entrepreneur
and there are three important elements which motivates the entrepreneur:
first, the dream and will to find out a private kingdom; secondly, the will to
conquer; and thirdly, the joy of creating something (Schumpeter, (1934)
1961: 93).
Only money is not sufficient to motivate an entrepreneur, as he expresses

that entrepreneurs are definitely not economic men in theoretical sense
([1946] 1991: 408). He goes to the extent by saying in the theory of economic
development; that his idea related to the motivation of the entrepreneur
easily comes in the field of psychology and thus has no scope in economic
theory. During the last decade of his career, Schumpeter’s views, as evident
in his writings, shifted from economic theory to sociology and economic
history. His work on Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) is a sociological
contribution, as in this work, his focus of inquiry is on the institutional
structure of society where he analyses the entrepreneurial function and
concludes that a number of institutional factors are weakening
entrepreneurship and contributing to stagnation of capitalism as a social
system. And people are more prone to change resulting lesser opposition to
entrepreneurship. As a routine, the big enterprises, through a specialised
team are beginning to develop innovative technology. Hence, capitalism has 179

Theory of Capitalism such notion where society rationalizes and demystifies along with
entrepreneurship.
15.6 Studies on Entrepreneur other than Weber

The studies on entrepreneurship have not much attracted the attention of
practitioner of the discipline, nonetheless, a few studies have been extended
in this direction over a period of time. As it is an established fact that
sociology has been influenced very much with its theory of social change
and innovation. And as such, this theory might be meaningful to analyse
entrepreneurship in sociological frame. Durkham’s notion about change of
society can be stated in generalised form: more the population density,
more the demand, more the division of labour and specialisation occur in
the society to fulfill its demand ([1912] 1965). What specialisation of work is
meant for, it can best be explicated that an entrepreneur throughout his/
her carrier innovates the avenues for professionalisation and expertisation
of work to succeed in the field of its own. In this respect Durkham’s idea
of specialisation of division of labour itself hints a theoretical genesis of
entrepreneurship. And perhaps, this social condition during eighteen century
might have led French revolution and industrial resolution which seemly was
a beginning phase of the development of capitalism in European society.
Analysis of entrepreneurship appeared even in the writings of modern
sociologists. In this context, mention can be made to the work of Merton,
in which he states that most of the discoveries had taken place accidentally.
In this connection, it is difficult to elicit the causes, further in another
article, he suggests there may be inadvertent interrelation between
entrepreneur and crime. In a society where much stress is given to the
direction of achieving desirable goal and people struggle for it, however,
there also would be an avenue for goal attainment. This kind of social
situation, as Merton says, compels to its member to render efforts in searching
out new avenue to succeed. Here, innovation is unavoidable phenomenon,
but there is also another situation, the members who do not succeed in goal
attainment, they are likely to adopt unfair means to succeed which will lead
the crime and deviance in the society (1968). In contrast to other discipline,
sociologists have looked entrepreneurship in comparative frame (Cardoso,
1967). Such kind of analysis has been done by Lipset (1967), he finds out
that intensity of economic development depends on cultural values and
entrepreneurship in a given society. He compares two cultures of Latin
America and North America. In Latin America Iberian, culture is dominating
through its notion of discouragement of manual labour practices, commerce
and industry. While the situation of North America, is such where Puritan
values laid emphasis on work and money making as a vocation and was
predominated in most of the parts of United States and hence resulted
the economic development. In Latin America when Iberian values was
replaced by the landed property and it had become the symbol of
success, at this juncture also economic development had taken place in
Latin America.
15.7 Conclusion
What does the idea about entrepreneurship and theory of capitalism, as
given by different scholars in preceding pages, lead upto? Now it is time to
review the main thrust of the theoretical contribution and its applicability.
There is nothing doubtful that the contribution of Weber is of immense in
the theoretical sense but it seems weaker in its practical implications. It
180

represents just social science as sciencing. In spite of this weakness, Weber’s Entrepreneurship and
Capitalism
idea can be taken as point of departure for developing and shaping its
practical applicability to entrepreneur with reference to the capitalist
development. And Weber’s initial definition of entrepreneurship may facilitate
in extending Schumpeter’s individualistic entrepreneurship into a sociological
perspective. The idea, for survival of entrepreneurship; modern enterprise
or an organization which is able to generate chances of profits; is essential
condition, can be commented as that only creative personality loaded with
bundles of ideas is not sufficient for survival. Weber’s notion of methodical
work and money making as vocation as they have been demonstrated in The
Protestant Ethic raises an important question: How far elements of methodical
work and money making articulate in the present dynamic situation of
globalisation and liberalisation? This is such a question which perhaps needs
modification of the theory of entrepreneurship and capitalism.

Swedberg, Richard, 2000, Entrepreneurship: The Social Science View, (ed.),
Oxford University Press, New Delhi
Kilby, Pater, 1971, Entrepreneurship and Economic Development (ed.), The
Free Press, New York.
Casson, Mark, 1983, The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory, Martin Robertson,
Oxford.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1949) 1989, Economic Theory and Entrepreneurial
History, in Essays, Transaction Publishers, Brunswick.
References
Bendix, R., 1960, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, Garden City, New York.
Durkheim, Emile, 1893, De La division du Travail Social, Alcan, Paris Trans by
G. Simpson, 1933, The Division of Labour in Society, Macmillan, New York.
International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Entrepreneur, ed. by, David H
Sills, The Macmillan Company and Free Press, USA, pp.67-93.
Lipset, S.M., 1967, “Value Education and Entrepreneurship”, in (ed) SM Lipset
and Solari, Elite in Latin America, New York.
Macdonald, Ronan, 1971, “Schumpeter and Max Weber: Central Vision and
Social Theory”, in (ed) Peter Kilby, Entrepreneurship and Economic
Development, The Free Press, New York.
Merton, Robert, 1968, Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press,
New York.
Schumpeter, Joseph A., (1946) 1991, “Comment on a Plan for the Study of
Entrepreneurship”, The Economic and Sociology of Capitalism, Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
_____________, (1950) 1976, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper,
New York.
_____________, (1934) 1961: The Theory of Economic Development, Oxford
University Press, New York originally appeared 1911 but second edition came
in 1926.
Swedberg, Richard, 1988, Max Weber and Idea of Economic Sociology, Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
181

Theory of Capitalism Weber, Max, (1898) 1990, Grundriss zu den vorlesungen ube Allegemeine
(theretische) Nationalokonomice, Tubingen, Mohr, JCB.
_____________, 1930, The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by
Talcott Parsons, Allen and Unwin, London.
_____________, 1947, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans.
by Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Oxford University Press, New York.
_____________, 1947, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and edit
by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Oxford University Press, New York.
182

Unit 16
Freedom and Liberty
Contents
16.1 Introduction
16.2 Berlin’s and The Republican Theory
16.3 The Value of Freedom
16.4 Free States and Free Citizens
16.5 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
Once you have studied this unit you should be able to understand
the concepts of Liberty and Freedom from the early thinkers
also provide different theoretical standpoints on Liberty and Freedom as
a political value
assess the debate on freedom and liberty
16.1 Introduction
Before we discuss Liberty, it will be useful to distinguish the value of liberty
from other closely associated terms — ‘Liberalism’ and ‘Libertarianism’.
Liberalism signals a cluster of political ideals advocated (and put into practice)
within a tradition of political thought and political activity. Major contributors
to the literature of liberalism include thinkers as diverse as Locke,
Montesquieu, the Federalists, Constant, de Tocqueville, J S Mille, T H Green,
Karl Popper, P Hayek and latterly, John Rawls and Joseph Raz. Probably the
only thing that unites members of this list is that they all subscribe to a
strong value of individual liberty. For some, the heart of liberalism is captured
in Locke’s claim that all men are born free and equal; others shudder at the
commitment to equality. For still others, liberalism requires the opportunity
to participate in democratic institutions; some liberals discount this, insisting
that democracy represents a separate or subordinate value, or no value at
all, or even a threat to liberty.
Key liberal themes include the right to private property and advocacy of the
rule of law as well as defence of the traditional freedoms — freedom of
speech and artistic expression, freedom of association, religious freedom,
freedom to pursue the work of one’s choice and freedom to participate in
political decision procedures.
Libertarianism is the theoretical stance of one who strictly limits the

competence of government to collective defence, the protection of negative
rights, rights of non-interference, and enforcement of contracts.
Liberty in one sense can be focussed as a political value. It is also claimed

that liberty is not a value-neutral concept, it is always normative, always
accompanied by a positive ethical charge. Thus to describe a condition as
one of liberty is to attribute a positive value to it and hence to begin making
out a case for it. The distinction between liberty and freedom is also
important. The concept of freedom is thinner than that of liberty and carries
less evaluative baggage
183

Theory of Capitalism John Stuart Mill begins his essay, On Liberty, with a disclaimer in the first
sentence: “The subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will,
so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of philosophical
Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty”.
Box 16.1: Democracy and Civil Liberty

Mill may be right to separate these philosophical questions. His specific
objective limits the range of the concept of liberty, since it ought to be an
open question whether the question of liberty is exhausted when we have
investigated ‘the nature and limits of the power, which can be legitimately
exercised by society over the individual’. Mill imposes this latter restriction
deliberately because he believes that, in his day, democracy poses sharp
threats to civil liberty. He has in mind the possibility of majority tyranny
and the levelling spirit of democracy, which may lead to an intolerance of
social experimentation and personal eccentricity. He believed in de
Tocqueville’s reports of democracy at work in America; give a measure of
power to everyone at the town meeting and conformity will soon become a
parochial priority. These dangers are real, but liberty may require democratic
institutions just as surely as democratic institutions requires strong liberties.
16.2 Berlin’s and The Republican Theory

We will now turn to an analysis of liberty and freedom.
Isaiah Berlin : Negative and Positive Philosophy

Isaiah Berlin’s Inaugural Lecture, “Two Concepts of Liberty’, has proved to
be one of the seminal contributions to political philosophy in the 20th C.
Berlin distinguishes negative and positive liberty and, on his account, these
different senses of liberty are elicited as the answers to two different
questions.
If we ask ‘what is the area within which the subject — a person or group
of persons — is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be,
without interference from other person?” we characterize an agent’s negative
liberty. ‘Political liberty’ in this sense is simply the area within which a man
can act unobstructed by others’. If we ask instead, ‘what or who, is the
source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be,
this rather than that? We aim to describe the agent’s positive liberty. This
is summarized later as ‘the freedom which consists in being one’s own
master.
Negative Liberty
The clearest exponent of the simplest version of negative liberty was Thomas
Hobbes, who defined a free man quite generally as, ‘he, that in those
things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to
do what he has a will to’. Negative liberty is often glossed as the absence
of coercion, where coercion is understood as the deliberate interference of
other agents. Negative liberty of the Hobbesian kind that is compromised
by coercive threats as well as other modes of prevention, is often contrasted
with theories which imply that mere inabilities inhibit liberty. This point is
made clear by this phrase: ‘It is not lack of freedom (for people) not to fly
like an eagle or swim like a whale’.
184

Freedom and Liberty
Outline the concept of “negative” liberty. Discuss its shortcomings and make
notes in your dairy.
Berlin insists that we should distinguish between the value of (negative)

liberty and the conditions, which make the exercise of liberty possible.
Thus there may be freedom of press in a country where most citizens are
illiterate. For most, the condition, which would give point to the freedom
— literacy — does not obtain. In these circumstances, Berlin would insist
that illiteracy does not amount to lack a lack of freedom. Clearly, something
is amiss in a society, which fails to educate its citizenry to a level where
they can take advantage of central freedoms, but that something need not
be a lack of freedom. A basic education, which includes literacy may be an
intrinsic good, or it may be a human right. Its provision may be a matter
of justice, its denial, transparent injustice. But however this state of affairs
is described, we should distinguish a lack of freedom from conditions under
which it is hard or impossible to exercise a formal liberty.
The important point Berlin wants us to recognize is that different fundamental

values may conflict. The demands of justice or security may require truncation
of liberty, or vice versa, in circumstances of moral dilemma or irresoluble
tragedy.
Box 16.2: Berlin and Positive Liberty

Isaiah Berlin defines positive liberty as follows: the ‘positive’ sense of the
word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his
own master. I wish my life an decisions to depend on myself, not on external
forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of
other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved
by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own, not by causes which
affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody;
a doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon
by external nature or by men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave
incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies
of my own and realizing them. This is at least part of what I mean when
I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason that distinguishes me as
a human being from the rest of the world. I wish above all, to be conscious
of myself as a thinking, willing active being, bearing responsibility for my
choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes.
I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true and enslaved to the
degree that I am made to realize that it is not.
The analytical summary of Berlin’s historical sketch of liberty is as given

below:
a) Self-Control and Self-Realisation

This involves my working on my own desires – ordering, strengthening,
eliminating them – in line with a conception of what it is right or good for
me to do or be. This is a complex notion, with its heart in a sophisticated
account of freedom of action. In modern times the development of this
account can be traced through Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. It has re-
emerged in the recent work of Harry Frankfurt and Charles Tylor. We are well
185

Theory of Capitalism used to the idea that we exhibit self-control when we resist temptation.
Freedom of action consists in our ability to appraise the desires which we
prompt us to act and to decide whether or not to satisfy them. On this
account, the paradigm of freedom consists in our going against what we
most want, doing what we think best. But as Hegel pointed out, the best
of all worlds for the free agent is that in which what, after due reflection,
we believe is the right thing to do is also what we discover we most want.
b) Paternalism
Suppose I am not able to exercise this self-control. I may be ignorant of
what is best for me. I may not understand the full value of alternatives. I
may not understand the full value of alternatives. Like the child who does
not wish to take the nasty-tasting (but life-saving) medicine, I mistake my
real interests. In such circumstances, the wise parent will not be squeamish.
She will force the medicine down. Might it not be justifiable, then, for you
to exercise the control over me that I am unable to achieve or sustain?
Might not freedom require whatever control over me that you can exercise
– absent my own powers of self-control? This thought is particularly apt
where your paternalistic intervention creates for me or sustains conditions
of autonomous choice that my own activities thwart.
c) Social Self Control

But if I exercise my freedom through self-control, and if you promote my
freedom by appropriate paternalistic intervention, may not my freedom be
further enhanced by institutional measures that I endorse? In the Republic
of Rousseau’s Social Contract, citizens achieve moral and political liberty by
enacting laws, backed by coercive sanctions, which apply to themselves as
well as to others. If, as an individual, I cannot resist a temptation, which
will likely cause me harm, wouldn’t it be a wise stratagem to devise some
social mechanism, which will bolster my resolve? If I realise that the threat
of punishment against me will keep me on the straight and narrow path
which wisdom alone cannot get me to follow, shouldn’t I institute and
accept social restraints which are more forceful than my unaided moral
powers? And in doing so, don’t I expand my true freedom?
d) State Servitude
An unwise citizen, unable to exercise immediate self control and insufficiently
far-seeing to enact or endorse devices of social coercion, can nevertheless
attain freedom indirectly and at second hand if the state effects the
necessary control, notwithstanding his disapproval or lack of participation.
The state can control us in the service of our real interests – and thereby
make us free.
16.3 The Value of Freedom

Marx’s conception of ‘freedom’ is in fact quite close to the notion of
autonomous self-control taken by Durkheim, and is definitely not to be
identified with the utilitarian view. The words ‘free’ and ‘rational’ are as
closely associated in Marx’s writings as they are in that of Hegel. Hegel
dismissed the notion, implicit in utilitarianism, that a man is free to the
degree that he can do whatever his inclination lead him to desire. The man
in the street thinks he is free if it is open to him to act as he pleases, but
his very arbitrariness implies that he is not free. Freedom is not the exercise
of egoism, but is in fact opposed to it. A course of action is ‘arbitrary’
186

rather than ‘free’ if it simply involves irrational choice among alternative Freedom and Liberty
courses of action with which the individual is liberated. An animal, which

chooses, in a situation of adversity, to fight rather than to run from an
enemy, does not thereby act ‘freely’. To be free is to be autonomous, and
thus not impelled by either external or internal forces beyond rational control;
this is why freedom is a human prerogative, because only man, through his
membership of society is able to control not only the form, but also the
content of volition. In Hegel’s view, this is possible given the identification
of the individual with the rational ideal. For Marx, it presupposes concrete
social re-organization, the setting up of a communist society.
Box 16.3: Individual and Society

The position of the individual in society will be analogous to that
characteristic, for instance of the scientists within the scientific community.
A scientist who accepts the norms, which define scientific activity is not less
free than one who deliberately rejects them; on the contrary, by being a
member of the scientific community, he is also to participate in a collective
enterprise which allows him to enlarge, and to creatively employ, his own
individual capacities. In this way, acceptance of moral requisites is not the
acceptance of alien constraint, but is the recognition of the rational.
This is not to say that there are no important differences in the respective
standpoints of Marx and Durkheim which can be regarded as of ‘ahistorical’
signficance. Durkheim is emphatic that the individual personality is
overwhelmingly influenced by the characteristics of the form of society in
which he exists and into which he is socialised. But he does not accept a
complete historical relativism in this respect: every man, no matter whether
‘primitive’ or ‘civilised’, is a homo duplex, in the sense that there is an
opposition in every individual between egoistic impulses and those which
have a ‘moral’ connotation. Marx does not adopt such a psychological model;
in Marx’s conception, there is no asocial basis for such an implicit antagonism
between the individual and society. For Marx, ‘The individual is the social
being... Individual human life and species life are not different things. The
egoistic opposition between the individual and society which is found in a
particularly marked form in bourgeois society is an outcome of the
development of the division of labour. Durkheim’s identification of the
duality of human personality, on the other hand is founded upon the
supposition that the egoism of the infant, deriving from the biological drives
with which he is born, can never be reversed or eradicated completely by
the subsequent moral development of the child.
Both Marx and Durkheim stress the historical dimension in the conditioning
of human needs. For Durkheim, egoism becomes a threat to social unity only
within the context of a form of society in which human sensibilites have
become greatly expanded: ‘all evidence compels us to expect our effort in
the struggle between the two beings within us to increase with the growth
of civilisation.

Describe the egoistic opposition between individual and society. Can this be
reversed or eradicated?
Unless what we want is itself of some value, the freedom to pursue it is just
about worthless. So, freedom of thought and discussion is valuable because
187

Theory of Capitalism thought and discussion is valuable. In the most impressive recent work on
freedom, Joseph Raz suggests that freedom is of value since it is defined as
a condition of personal autonomy.
a) Freedom of Action
To act freely, reason must be brought to bear on my desires. Important
elements of free action can be traced in Locke, Rousseau, Kant and most
thoroughly in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. It captures one strand of thinking
about autonomous action – we are free when we are in control of what we
do, acting against what, phenomenologically, are our strongest desires; when
this is called for, by reason or morality or the ethical demands of communities,
we recognize as authoritative.
b) Autonomy
The value of freedom can be swiftly inferred. It is the value of getting what
we want, doing as we please. Thus the value of freedom is instrumental;
it amounts to the value of whatever we want, which our freedom is
instrumental in enabling us to get. If we are unfree in a given respect, we
either cannot get, or can get only at too great a cost or risk (of punishment,
generally) whatever is the object of our desire. This account of the value
of freedom has the great virtue of being simple and straightforward. Moreover,
it enables us to rank freedoms in respect of their value to us. This will be
a function of the value of the activities that freedom permits. The more
important is the object of desire, the more important the freedom to get
it, the more serious the restriction in cases where we are made unfree.
We can grant the Kantian autonomy is exercised under conditions of freedom,

which permit agents significant opportunities to work out what is the right
thing to do, but if this is the core value of freedom we may find that
freedom does not provide the best circumstances in which autonomy may
be developed.
c) Moral Freedom
On Rousseau’s account, this is the freedom, which is attained by those who
can control their own desires. It is developed further in Kant’s account of
autonomous willing which stresses how we bring to bear our resources of
rational deliberation in the face of our heteronomous desires, those desires
which we are caused to suffer by the nexus of our (internal) human nature
and (external) nature. If we follow reason’s guidance we shall act freely,
willing actions which it must be possible in principle for all to accomplish
laws which all must be able to follow.
The laws, which keep us and our fellow citizens on what we recognize to
be, the straight and narrow path of duty do not infringe our liberty. This
is a dangerous argument, and the danger comes from two different quarters.
First, there is the obvious threat that others may determine what our duty
requires and then regiment us to perform it. This danger is avoided so long
as we insist that the moral liberty, which is achieved by state coercion be
the product of political liberty, of democratic institutions. The second threat
is that democratic majorities may get it wrong, proscribing under penalty of
imprisonment and like measures of punishment activities, which are innocent.
Since the decisions of democratic bodies do not of themselves constitute
verdicts on what is or is not morally acceptable, this is a permanent possibility.
188 The pursuit of moral liberty may land us in political chains.

Freedom and Liberty
Box 16.4: Limits on Democracy
There are a number of complimentary answers…. The first is that we should
buttress our specification of the institutions, which promote political liberty
with some condition that sets limits on the competence of the democratic
decision procedures. The second, an explicit implication of Mill’s principle,
is a public recognition that the wrongs which may be prohibited consistently
with liberty do not include wrongs which citizens may do to themselves alone
— that is the issue of paternalism.
d) Toleration
If there is a such thing as a liberal virtue, it is toleration. But as one commentator
said ‘it seems to be at once necessary and impossible’. Toleration is necessary
because folk who live together may find that there are deep differences
between their moral beliefs, which cannot be settled by argument from agreed
premises. It is impossible because of the circumstances of deep conflict which
call for the exercise of toleration are all too often described in terms of the
obtuseness and stubbornness of the conflicting parties. These differences,
historically have been of a kind that causes savages conflict. The point of
disagreement may seem trivial to a neutral observer. Toleration requires one
not to interfere in conduct which one believes to be morally wrong.
For instance, think of a state with majority and minority religions, or more
generally, one with religious divisions and where the power to legislate is in
the hands of one religious community alone. Should the state tolerate those
who do wrong in the minds of the legislators by breaking the dietary laws
their religion prescribes? Briefly it may be argued that morality has a universal
dimension, which is belied by one who conceives its source to be an
authoritative religious texts. Of course, the believer will affirm the universal
authority of the prescriptions – one can’t expect such problems to be so
swiftly settled - but the direction of liberal argument can be easily grasped.
16.4 Free States and Free Citizens

Rousseau says that in the state of nature, our freedom derives from our free
will, our capacity to resist the desires which press us, together with our
status as independent creatures, neither subject to the demands of others
nor dependent on them to get what we want. As contractors, we shall be
satisfied with nothing less than that social state, which best approximates
to this natural condition. Natural freedom is lost, but the thought of it gives
us a moral benchmark by which we can appraise the institutions of
contemporary society. In society, a measure of freedom can be recovered
along three dimensions: moral freedom (we have already discussed),
democratic freedom and civil freedom.
a) Democratic Freedom
The essence of the case for democracy as a dimension of freedom is simple:
democracy affords its citizens the opportunity to participate in making the
decisions, which as laws, will govern their conduct. For Kant, autonomous
action consists in living in accordance with the laws, which one has determined
for oneself as possible for each agent to follow. Democracy represents a
rough political analogue of this model: freedom consists in living in accordance
with laws one has created as applicable to all citizens, oneself included.
Berlin argued that democracy is a very different ideal to liberty — major

decisions can threaten liberty, as J.S Mill argued. It is a mistake to view this 189

Theory of Capitalism consideration, plausible though it may be, as decisive. Any system other
than democracy will deny citizens the opportunity to engage in an activity
that many regard as valuable. Democratic activity gives us the chance to
assert that we are free of claimants of authority. Democracy may be necessary
to freedom, but it carries its own distinctive threats.
b) Civil Liberty
Citizens who value liberty and express this through their participation in
democratic institutions which liberty requires will, in all consistency, be
reluctant to interfere in the lives of their fellows, whether by law or less
formal mechanisms. Their deep concern to establish institutions, which
empower every one will make them cautious about introducing measures
which constrain individual choice. Accepting the necessity of democratic
institutions and their associated freedoms, valuing strongly the opportunities
these offered for citizens to embody their various conceptions of the good
life in constitutional and prescriptive laws, they will be hesitant to constrain
their own pursuit of these values. To the rational man, it is a miserable
thought that others may defy the canons of rationality. Just as we are
prepared to approve external constraints on our decision-making, recognising
our vulnerability to temptation, so, too, must we be prepared to adopt
institutions, which guard against the worst of human folly.
16.5 Conclusion
Berlin’s work on liberty represented a notable advance on the prevailing
standards of philosophical correctness. He showed that an important ethical
concept is susceptible of (at least) two, and possibly two hundred, different
analyses. There is no one coherent way of thinking about liberty; there are
at least two — and these amount, each of them, to rich traditions; each
tradition dissolving into disparate components which challenge fellow
contenders for the torch of ‘the best way of thinking about the value of
liberty’. If there are many ways of thinking clearly about liberty, as about
democracy or justice, the important question concerns which way we are
to select as most apt to characterise judgements about the importance of
liberty as a political value. The accounts of selection are complex and following
are the chief characteristics.
Basically agents are free when they are not hindered in their pursuit of what
they take to be the good life. Hindrances are to be construed widely. In
a political, or more widely social context, they will include laws backed by
sanctions as well as the coercive instruments of positive morality. But
individuals can also claim to be unfree when governments in particular fail
to empower them in sufficient measure to attain levels of accomplishment
which are the necessary preconditions of a life which is authentically their
own. Political institutions can foster liberty on this capacious understanding
in a range of ways. A sound theory of liberty should recognise the Janus-
face of the criminal law in particular. It can serve as a protection, demarcating
with the force of sanctions the boundaries which freedom requires if the
pursuit of the good life is to be safe within them. Governments and citizens
individually should be modest in respect of both their ambitions and
effectiveness concerning the likelihood of their interference promoting the
good of their helpless and obdurate fellow citizens.

Giddens, Anthony. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. CUP, 1994.
John Lechte (2004). Fifty Great Contemporary Thinkers – From Structuralalism
190 to Postmodernity.

Unit 17
Alienation
Contents
17.1 Introduction
17.2 De-humanisation of Labour
17.3 Alienation as a Process
17.4 Division of Labour
17.5 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After you have studied this unit you will be able to
understand the concept of alienation and how it is applied in analysing
the modern society
study explain aspects of alienation like objectification
17.1 Introduction
The concept alienation describes the estrangement of individuals from one
another, or from a specific situation or process. It is central to the writings
of Karl Marx and normally associated with Marxist sociology. There are
philosophical, sociological and psychological dimensions to the argument.
Hegel provided the philosophical means to overcome the Kantian dualism of
‘is’ and ‘ought’ since for Hegel, the actual was always striving to become the
ideal. The passage of self-creating, self-knowing idea through history, its
alienation through externalization and objectification and its reappropriation
through knowledge, provided Marx with his revolutionary imperative. Turning
Hegel on his head and rooting his own ideas in a “materialist vision, Marx
argued that humanity is lost in the unfolding historical epochs. Thus Marx
argued that with the advent of communism, there would be a complete
return of individuals to themselves as social beings.
Sociological dimension of the term relates more to his argument that

estrangement is a consequence of social structures which oppress people,
denying them their essential humanity.
17.2 De-Humanisation of Labour

We will now outline how labour is ‘de-humarized’ in the process of production
a) Theory of Surplus Value

Following Adam Smith, Marx distinguished in a commodity, two aspects: they
have a use-value and an exchange value. A commodity is an article, which
can satisfy one or the other human need, is a use value. But a commodity
is not just a useful article, which is to be produced and sold in the market,
but to be exchanged with other commodities. How to measure the exchange-
value of commodities which have different use-values? What do wheat and
linen have in common? One is produced by a peasant, other by a weaver.
They are the products of different types of useful labour. What they have
in common is that they are both products of human labour in general, what
Marx calls “abstract human labour”. On both products a certain amount of 191

Theory of Capitalism human labour has been spent. That determines their exchange-value. The
exchange-value or simply the value, as distinguished from the use-value,
consists of the abstract labour incorporated in the commodity. The measure
is not the time which the individual labourer may have spent which may be
above or below average, but the average time needed on a given level of
productivity, what Marx calls the “socially necessary labour-time”.
Capitalist production becomes possible when along with other commodities

labour-power can be bought as a commodity. As any other commodity labour-
power has a use-value for the buyer and an exchange-value for the seller.
For the buyer, (the capitalist), it has the use-value that it can work (produce).
He uses, he consumes it for this purpose and pays the price — strange
enough only afterwards – in the form of wages. For the worker his labour
power has only an exchange value. He cannot use it for his own purposes,
because he has no means of production. But he can sell it in order to make
a living. The exchange value is determined as in the case of every other
commodity by the labour-time necessary for its production or reproduction;
that means, in this case by the cast of the “means of subsistence” needed
to maintain the worker and his children, the future workers. The level of
subsistence and of essential needs varies from situation to situation according
to the level of development and other factors.
The wage covers only what is needed to maintain the labourer, his value.
But what he produces is more than that. The difference is called the
surplus-value. The capitalist appropriates the surplus. To understand this
concept of surplus-value, it may be helpful to have a look at the historical
development. In early history people produced hardly enough for their own
subsistence. As soon as they were able to increase their productivity and
to produce a surplus — i.e. through cattle breeding instead of hunting — the
question arose how this surplus was going to be used. In course of time,
it released a section of the people from work for their own subsistence like
chiefs, and priests. They became the ruling class. Thereafter, one can
analyse the labour of the producers as partly “necessary labour”, i.e. labour
for their own subsistence, and partly “surplus-labour”, i.e. labour to maintain
the ruling class. In the middle-ages, the serfs worked three days on their
own lands for their own subsistence and three days on the lands of the
feudal lord without being paid for it. With that surplus-labour they produced
a social surplus which was appropriated by the ruling class. This appropriation
can take place in different forms, in the form of kind – as in the case of
share-cropping or in the form of money (rent). In the case of money, it is
surplus value.
The capitalist tries to increase the rate of surplus value, which can be
achieved in two ways: absolute and relative surplus value. Absolute surplus
value is produced by “prolongation of the working day”. By such prolongation
the time of surplus-labor is expanded. This method is especially applied in
the earlier stages of capitalism. We find it still in the unorganised sector of
industry in India.
Box 17.1: Relative Surplus

Relative surplus value arises from the “curtailment of the necessary labour-
time, in other words from the increase of productivity. If a worker produces
more in one hour than he did before, then the time needed to cover the
supply of his means of subsistence (necessary labour-time) is shortened.
192

This increase of productivity is pursued in many ways, including increasing Alienation
supervision and discipline, piece-rate wages, and above all technological

innovations. Relative surplus value becomes dominant in fully developed
capitalism. It presupposes the accumulation of capital, which is needed for
further mechanisation and expanding scale of production.
In the early stages of capitalism we find the extraction of surplus value

without the impressive and conspicuous technological revolution which
characterises the later stage of capitalist development. The level of technology
is still more or less the same as in pre-capitalist society. Most other aspects
of society are yet un-changed or only slowly changing. But one decisive
thing has changed: the labour process is subordinated to capital. The labourer
is no longer an independent producer or a serf tied to the soil. He is under
the control of the capitalist in one way or the other. Marx calls this the
“formal subsumption of labour under capital”. Once capital has established
its hold and has accumulated sufficiently it may proceed to the “real
subsumption of labour” when it starts transforming the process of labour, re-
organising it and bringing it on a new technological level.
It may be noted here that this distinction is relevant to the on-going debate
about the dominant mode of production in India. Whereas capitalist farmers
in the Punjab get their crops sprayed with pesticides from small aeroplanes,
there are sharecroppers in other parts of India making out a meagre existence
in ways, which seem to belong to a pre-capitalist form of society. But the
appearance may be misleading. Even where no technological changes have
taken place and where the old society still is alive culturally and ideologically,
capital may already be in charge economically, through the formal subsumption
of labour, extracting absolute surplus value.

What mode of production is used in the Indian state: discuss and make
notes in your dairy.
The key to Marx’s critique of capitalism is his theory of surplus-value which

explains how capital grows by consuming living labour. Because only labour
power produces surplus value, its exploitation is the basis of the capitalist
system. But labour power is not only an economic factor, as it appears in
the calculations of the capitalists. Labour is not only “variable capital”.
Labour power is provided by living human beings who have their own needs
and aspirations. Capitalism has separated labour and the satisfaction of human
aspirations. Labour-power is treated as a commodity in exchange for which
workers may satisfy some of their most immediate needs. But for Marx
labour itself is the most essential characteristic of human life. Without it,
human kind not only cannot survive, it even cannot become human. Human
labour is imaginative, it is conscious and not instinctual. “We presuppose
labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts
operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many
an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the
worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises its
structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every
labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of
the labourer at its commencement”.
Human labour is social. It is self-realisation through the production for

193

Theory of Capitalism others and with others. Isolated individuals cannot survive on their own.
Productive interaction with nature requires co-operation, division of labour
and exchange. In the process, the human species realises itself. One might
even say that the meaning of labour lies in this self-realisation of the human
species. As a social process human labour creates society in its various
forms. But as such it is also conditioned by society in its different forms.
In the course of history the development of class societies threatens the
human quality of labour. The climax of this threat is reached in capitalism,
the main target of Marx’s critique.
Box 17.2: Concept of Alienation

The capitalist mode of production has increased the productivity of human
labour on a gigantic scale. But it has done so at the cost of the producers.
They are forced to sell their labour-powers to the capitalist. The meaning
of all his productive activity lies for the worker no longer in the activity
itself but in the wage which, he receives at the end of a day. Life is being
active, creative, and productive. But the activity of the workers does not
belong to himself, but to the capitalist. His life starts only when the work
is over. He works only for getting the means of life, not for life itself. That
is what Marx calls Alienation.
b) Emergence of Classes
When humanity first developed fire, it took thousands of years to complete
the process — being able to turn heat back into motion. The same kind of
process can be seen in the development of classes. When humans began to
organise themselves in accordance with their relations of production (the
division of labour), classes in society formed based on the different positions
and roles humans found and created themselves in. What once was a society
with little or no class structure, i.e. tribal or nomadic society, became a
society that split and divided itself into a diversity of classes fufilling a broad
range of productive roles.
The motion of nature, dialectics, applies in class development as it applies

in all things. As the productive forces of humans increased, and class
distinctions deepened and divided further, soon the advancement of the
productive forces reached such heights that certain classes were no longer
necessary. The small craftsperson and shop owner were pushed out of
existence by the advancement of modern industries that could produce a
much greater quantity at much lower cost.
Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels explained the processes of change brought
forth by Industrial revolution just beginning to unfold in a particular direction:
“Modern Industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master
into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of laborers, crowded
into the factory, are organized like soldiers. As privates of the industrial
army, they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers
and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the
bourgeois state; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the
over-looker, and, above all, in the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself.
The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the
more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is”.
194

“The increasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, Alienation
makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between
individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character
of collisions between two classes. Thereupon, the workers begin to form
combinations (trade unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in
order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in
order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and
there, the contest breaks out into riots.
“Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit
of their battles lie not in the immediate result, but in the ever expanding
union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of
communication that are created by Modern Industry, and that place the
workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this
contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of
the same character, into one national struggle between classes (Marx:
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts).
This “alienation” [caused by private property] can, of course, only be

abolished given two practical premises. For it to become an “intolerable”
power, i.e. a power against which men make a revolution, it must necessarily
have rendered the great mass of humanity “property-less”. And at the same
time should have produced, the contradiction of an existing world of wealth
and culture. Both these conditions presuppose a great increase in productive
power, a high degree of its development.
17.3 Alienation as a Process

In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (EPM) published in 1844, Marx
analyses various aspects of alienation.
1) Firstly, the worker is alienated from the product of his labour. The
product in which he expresses and realises himself does not belong to
him. It is appropriated by the capitalists and sold on the market. With
realisation of surplus-value capital grows, and with capital the alien
power which controls and dominates the life of the worker. The more
he works, the better he produces, the stronger becomes this alien
power of capital.
2) Under the capitalist conditions the worker is alienated from the act of
producing itself. The most human activity does no longer belong to the
producer himself. It has become a commodity sold and bought on the
market, the commodity of labour power. The buyer of this commodity,
the capitalist, determines what the worker does and how he has to do
it.
3) Capitalist production alienates the worker from his being a member of
the human species and from his humanity, as being a fellow being with
other human beings. His social activity, production turns into a means
for his individual existence, for earning a wage. This implies his alienation
from other human beings with whom he competes for scarce jobs.
Box 17.3: Wages price and profit

Marx documents in detail how alienation takes place, both in the extraction
of absolute surplus-value and in the extraction of relative surplus-value,
both in the lengthening of the working day and in the technical division of
labour and mechanisation pushed forward by capital. Time is the room of
195

human development, as Marx puts it in “Wages, Price and Profit”. Being
forced to sell his labour-power the worker has not time to be and to develop
himself as a human being.
a) Features of Alienation
Marx’s exposition of the functioning and prospects of capitalist economy
cannot be studied in isolation from his anthropological ideas and his philosophy
of history. His theory is a general one embracing the whole of human
activity in its various interdependent spheres. His successive writings
culminating in capital itself are more and more elaborate versions of the
same thought which may be expressed as follows:
“we live in an age in which the dehumanisation of man, that is to say the
alienation between him and his own works, is growing to a climax which
must end in a revolutionary upheaval; this will originate from the particular
interest of the class which has suffered the most from dehumanisation, but
its effect would be to restore humanity to all mankind”.
The fundamental novelty of capital consists in two points, which entail

wholly different view of capitalist society from that of the classical economists:
a) what the worker sells is not his labour but labour power, and that labour
has two aspects – abstract and concrete. Exploitation consists in the
worker selling his labour power and thus divesting himself of his own
essence; the labour process and its results become hostile and alien,
deprivation of humanity instead of fulfillment.
b) Marx, having discovered the dual nature of labour as expressed in the
opposition between exchange value and use value, defines capitalism as
a system in which the sole object of production is to increase exchange-
value without limit. The whole of human activity is subordinated to a
non-human purpose, the creation of something that man cannot as such
assimilate for only use-value can be assimilated. The whole community
is thus enslaved to its own products, abstractions which present
themselves to it as an external, alien power. The deformation of
consciousness and the alienation of the political superstructure are
consequences of the basic alienation of labour – which, however, is not
a ‘mistake’ on history’s part but a necessary precondition of the future
society of free beings in control of the vital process of their own lives.
In this way, Capital may be regarded as a logical continuation of Marx’s

earlier views.
1) Alienation is nothing but a process in which man deprives himself of
what he truly is, of his own humanity.
2) Marx unlike Hegel did not identify alienation with externalisation, i.e.
the labour process whereby human strength and skill are converted into
new products. It would be absurd to speak of abolishing alienation in
this sense, since in all imaginable circumstances, men will have to expend
energy to produce the things they need. Hegel identified alienation
with externalisation and could therefore conceive man’s final
reconciliation with the world by way of abolishing the objectivity of the
object.
196

Alienation
Explain the phenomenon of alienation in the production process. Can this be
reduced or eliminated? Think and comment on your dairy.
To Marx however, the fact that people ‘objectivize’ their powers does not
mean they become poorer by whatever they produce; on the contrary,
labour in itself is an affirmation and not a denial of humanity being the chief
form of the unending process of man’s self-creation. It is only in a society
ruled by private property and division of labour that productive activity is
a source of misery and dehumanisation. And labour destroys the workman
instead of enriching him. When alienated labour is done away with, people
will continue to externalise and ‘objectivize’ their power, but they will be
able to assimilate the work of their hands as an expression of their collective
ability.
17.4 Division of Labour

The other aspect of alienation is the de-humanisation of labour itself. This
happens in the course of the new division of labour promoted by capitalism.
Division of labour is not invented by capitalism. It developed at an early
stage of history. It is at the same time the source of material and cultural
progress and of human alienation. It increases the productivity of human
labour, it make it possible to produce a surplus, which again is the necessary
condition for the development of culture, art, politics, and also religion.
The existence of philosophers and artists, priests, and kings is possible only
on this fundamental principle of division of labour. But the progressive
development of culture takes place at the cost of the direct producers.
Their horizon narrows down, they get specialised and lose their relation to
the process as a whole. The same philosophers, priests and kings monopolise
the control over society as a whole. They enjoy the freedom, which is
based on the understanding and control of the total process. The others
lose this freedom. They are no longer responsible members of a tribe, but
isolated villagers in a huge empire, or slaves without rights, or serfs in a
feudal set-up. Their life gets more and more dominated by alien forces
beyond their control. In this way all division of labour lead to alienation.
Box 17.4: Capitalist Mode of Production

There is a fundamental difference between the division of labour in pre-
capitalist societies and the new forms developed by capitalism. In pre-
capitalist societies we can speak of a social division of labour. Various
social and economic activities are divided between various crafts. It
specializes the social production so that different crafts produce different
commodities. But the capitalist mode of production while intensifying the
social division of labour introduces also a technical division of labour which
divides one particular craft, the production of one commodity into as many
detail functions as possible and profitable. The weavers, carpenters, peasants
of old produced different commodities. The industrial workers in capitalism
have become detail labourers who individually no longer produce commodities
but only collectively as part of a whole assembly of machines and workers.
This process started with the co-operation of individual artisan, in one
workshop under the control of an owner-capitalist. They still worked as
before, producing the whole commodity. But it was the beginning of direction,
control, management.
197

Theory of Capitalism In the next stage of manufacture the technical division of labour begins.
Each worker is assigned to a few operations on which he specialises. Out
of this a hierarchy of labour-power develops from most skilled to unskilled.
Management becomes more important. Apart from control it assumes more
and more the function of planning and conceptualisation of the work. The
workers have to execute the task assigned to them. But as long as they are
skilled they have still a certain freedom and control within the limits of their
function.
Thus in this period — 16th to 18th C — three fundamental changes in the

character of productive work took place:
1) Capitalist management imposes strict discipline of labour through means
of despotic control. The artisans of old had the freedom to choose their
own rhythm and style of work. Once forced into workshop and
manufacture they have to subordinate themselves to the will of the
managing capitalist. To manage originally meant to train a horse in his
paces, to cause him to do the exercises of the manager. And control is
the central concept of all management.
2) Under capitalist management also that fundamental division develops
which separates the conceptualisation and execution of the work. This
is given with the development of the detail workers who is no longer
related to the production of the whole.
3) The Capitalist drive for profit creates for the first time a large scale
unskilled labour i.e. workers who for their lifetime are condemned to do
cheap unskilled labour.
In the social division of labour, the producers may have been alienated from
the whole society, but there is still a possibility of meaningful self-realisation
in the work. In the technical division of labour, alienation involves the process
of labour itself. The social division of labour, subdivides society, the technical
division of labour subdivides humans.
Braverman shows that it is capitalism which first creates this scarcity of

skills:
“Every step in the labour process is divorced, so far as possible, from
special knowledge and training and reduced to simple labour.
Meanwhile, the relatively few persons for whom special knowledge
and training are reserved are freed so far as possible from the
obligations of simple labour. In this way, a structure is given to all
labour processes that at its extreme polarizes those whose time is
infinitely valuable and those whose time is worth almost nothing.
This might even be called the general law of the capitalist division of
labour.”
a) Objectification
Marx analyses the impact of machinery and modern industry on labour in ch.
XV of Capital I. He shows how the development of technology under
capitalism is geared towards the maximum production of surplus value and
how it transforms the worker on the basis of the capitalist division of labour
in to a living appendage of a lifeless mechanism.
“In handicrafts and manufacture, the workman makes use of a tool, in the
factory, the machine makes use of him. There the movements of the
198

instrument of labour proceed from him, here it is the movements of the Alienation
machine that he must follow. In manufacture the workmen are parts of a

living mechanism. In the factory we have lifeless mechanism independent
of the workman, who becomes it mere living appendage”.
The fundamental characteristic of machinery is that it removes the tool from

the hands of the worker and fits it into a mechanism, which is moved
independently from the worker. This opens new avenues for exploitation.
And above all it leads to the further degradation of the worker by completing
the “separation of the intellectual powers of production from the manual
labour, and the conversion of those powers into the might of capital over
labour”. Thus machinery becomes:
“for most the working population, the source not of freedom, but of
enslavement, not of mastery, but of helplessness, and not of the broadening
of the horizon of labour but of the confinement of the worker within a blind
round of servile duties in which the machine appears as the embodiment of
science and the worker as little or nothing”.

Discuss the process of “objectification”. What effect does this have on the
production process? Think and note down your answer in your dairy.
Technically speaking it is the transformation of labour from processes based

on skill to processes based upon science. That this process led to the
degradation of the workers is not an unavoidable result of the development
of science and technology, but it is the consequence of the subordination
of science and technology to the purpose of capital. Marx repeatedly
characterised the alienation of the worker who faces the gigantic machinery
of modern, capitalist, industry, and who experiences his powerlessness in
front of it, as the rule of dead labour over living labour. The worker does
not see it like this. He sees the machinery as representing the wealth, the
capital of the capitalist and the superior knowledge of the scientists compared
to which he himself is poor and ignorant and doomed to remain so.
What confronts him is in fact “objectified labour”, the result of labour in the
past. In pre-capitalist society the producer was not confronted with means
of production dominating and threatening him as alien power.
“Hence the rule of the capitalist over the worker is the rule of things over
man, of dead labour over the living, of the product over the producer.…
what we are confronted by here is the alienation of man from his own
labour. To that extent the worker stands on a higher plane than the capitalist
from the outset, since the latter has his roots in the process of alienation
and finds absolute satisfaction in it. Whereas right from the start the
worker is a victim who confronts it as a rebel and experiences it as a process
of enslavement”.
Box 17.5: Marx’s Work Ethic

According to Marx, work should be the expression of man and his creativity.
Work should be one which he loves and enjoys doing it. Capitalist mode of
production has distorted the meaning and nature of work. Work ceases to
be an expression and becomes a yoke under which the labourer groans. The
human being (the subject) is treated lower or valued lower than the commodity
199

(object) that he himself would contribute to what is called as objectification.
In a capitalist society, the wealth generated by the mode of production is
appropriated by one class i.e. owners of land and capital. Thus as capitalism
progresses, the devaluation of the worker also increases. This leads to
objectification, where the worker gets assimilated to the product (object)
and consequently loses his own identity. Marx summarizes the alienation of
labour in the following words:
First, the fact that, labour is external to the worker i.e. it does not belong
to his essential being. That in his work, therefore, he does not affirm
himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not
develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and
ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work,
and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when is not working
and when is working he is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary,
but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a
need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character
merges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion
exists, labour is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which
man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Lastly,
the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it
is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong to him, that in
it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the
spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the
human heart, operates independently of the individual – that is, operates on
him as an alien, divine or diabolical activity – in the same way the worker’s
activity, is not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss
of his self.
Alienation is inevitable in modern society because with the demand for

better technology, and rising consumerism, men will continue to be alienated
in one form or the other. Increasing division of labour and emergence of
specialists make men dependent on the product and it is not likely that this
phenomenon of alienation will stagnate and retrogress.
17.5 Conclusion
Alienation is an objective condition inherent in the social and economic
arrangement of capitalism. It is impossible to extricate Marx’s ideas about
alienation from his wider sociological discussion of the division of labour, the
evolution of private property relations, and the emergence of conflicting
classes. In the Marxian terminology, alienation is an objectively verifiable
state of affairs, inherent in the specific social relations of capitalist
production. For Marx, the history of mankind is not only a history of class
struggle but also of the increasing alienation of man.

Herbert Marcuse, 1967. Reason and Revolution. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul
Marx, Karl, 1977. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Progress
Publishers
Raymond, Aron. Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol.I, Penguin
200

Unit 18
Sovereignty
Contents
18.1 Introduction
18.2 The Rise of Sovereign States
18.3 Conceptions of Sovereignty
18.4 Legal and Political Sovereignty
18.5 Internal Sovereignty
18.6 External Sovereignty
18.7 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After studying this unit you will be able to
discuss the rise of sovereign stated
legal and political sovereignty
explain the difference between internal and external sovereignty
18.1 Introduction
Sovereignty is an important element of the state which distinguishes the
state from other political associations within a society and similar entities
in the international society. The origin and history of the idea of sovereignty
is intimately connected with the origin and development of the territorial
states in modern times. It is for this reason that the meaning of sovereignty
has undergone change across history. Despite the many meanings of the
concept, sovereignty has a core meaning. Hinsley, an eminent Political
Scientists, captures the core meaning of sovereignty when he says that it
is “the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the
political community…and that no final and absolute authority exists
elsewhere”.
Sovereignty, then, is an assumption about authority. We might say that

sovereignty is the basic assumption about authority of modern political life,
domestically and internationally. Authority is the right or title to rule.
Sovereignty is the assumption that the government of a state is both supreme
and independent. It is supreme over everybody who lives in its territorial
jurisdiction and it is independent from other governing authorities.
The concept of sovereignty has been controversial in academic discourse. To

a large measure this is because of the contrasting ways in which it is used-
to refer to independence and to autonomy. The former is a notion of authority
and right, but the second is a notion of power and capability. While historians,
international lawyers and political theorists tend to operate with the first
concept, political economists, and political sociologists tend to employ the
later concept. These two categorically different approaches to sovereignty
exist and must be borne in mind as we proceed to analyse the key concept
in political thought.

State Society From this starting point, this unit examines the rise of the modern territorial
states with which the concept is associated with. Thereafter we will proceed
to explain how the concept of sovereignty which was originally associated
with the rulers came to be liked with the people or the ruled. We will also
examine the two contrasting ways in which the concept has been used in
Political Science and International Relations.
18.2 The Rise of Sovereign States

Sovereignty is a constitutional arrangement of political life. It is thus artificial
and historical. There is nothing about sovereignty that is natural or inevitable
or immutable. In fact, the notion of sovereignty was absent before the
modern territorial states came into being in Europe between the 15th and
17th centuries. The idea of sovereignty was not part of the ancient classical
Greek world. There the city-states or polis did not differentiate between
state and society-ruled as it was by citizen governors. The citizen was both
a subject of state authority and also creator of public rules and regulations.
The Roman Empire that eclipsed the Greek city-states established a new
type of rule, rule by a single central authority. What pleased the emperor
had the force of law. While the idea of sovereignty as a distinct form of law
making power was established, it did not outlive the Roman Empire.
The idea of sovereignty was progressively submerged by the rise of Christian

faith when the Roman Empire was succeeded by a highly decentralised system
of feudal order. During this period, Christianity gradually came to depend on
two theocratic authorities, the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. The source
of authority and wisdom shifted from this worldly to the other worldly
representatives. At the core of the Christian worldview was the belief that
the good lay in submission to God’s will. Law of nature or religious rules came
to be regarded as superior to laws of the state. As Benn and Peters point out
“in the feudal world the primary concept was not the state but law- a law not
made by politicians but part of a universal and eternal order, to be discovered
by a study of custom and precedent. Kings, councils and judges found and
formulated it but could not make it; for to create new law would be to impose
a new obligation by an act of will, and only God could do that.”
Box 18.1: The Modern Age

That medieval order was weakened by two important movements that marked
the beginning of the modern age—the Renaissance and the Reformation.
While the Renaissance led to the rediscovery of the humanism as well as the
principles and precepts of Roman laws and thus led to new ways of thinking
about political authority, the Reformation challenged the papal jurisdiction
and authority across Europe. The weakening authority of the Church and the
Holy Roman Empire was exploited by princes who asserted their authority
over feudal lords and established centralised monarchies. In England this
was achieved under Tudor dynasty, in France under the Bourbons, in Spain
under the Habsburgs and so on. For the first time, secular rulers were able
to claim to exercise supreme power, and this they did in a new language of
sovereignty.
As the territorial state was occupying the European continent, piece by

piece, eventually forming the system that came to occupy the globe,
contemporary political philosophers embraced this form of polity and described
10 what made it legitimate. In the early years of the formation of territorial

states in Europe, two contemporary philosophers, Niccolo Machiavelli and Sovereignty
Martin Luther, provided legitimacy to the idea of sovereignty of the territorial

state. They did not write explicitly or consciously about sovereignty, yet
their ideas amounted in substance to important developments in the concept.
Observing the politics of city-states in his Renaissance Italy, Machiavelli (1469-
1527) described what a Prince had to do to promote a flourishing republic in
terms that conferred on him supreme authority within his territory. The
Prince, he advised, should not be bound by natural law, canon law, Gospel
precepts, or any of the norms or authorities that obligated members of
Christendom. The Prince instead should be prepared to ‘not to do good’ and
perform evil, not because evil is no longer evil, but because it was sometimes
necessary to further the cause of a strong and well-ordered state. The
obligation of the Prince was raison d’etat. The Prince was supreme within the
states territory and responsible for the well being of this singular, unitary body.
Martin Luther argued for sovereignty from a different perspective. His theology
of Reformation sought to strip the Catholic Church of its many powers, not
only its ecclesiastical powers, but temporal powers as well. Luther held that
under God’s authority, there existed two orders with two forms of
government. The realm of the spirit was the order in which Christ was
related to the soul of the believer. The realm of the world was the order of
the secular society where civil authorities ran governmental institutions
through law and coercion. Both the realms furthered the good of the believers,
though in different senses. Luther argued that these two realms need to be
separately organised, with the leaders of the Church performing spiritual
duties and the secular rulers, the princes, kings and magistrates would perform
temporal ones. Thus, even without discussing the doctrine of sovereignty,
Luther and his followers prescribed for princes all of its substance.
18.3 Conceptions of Sovereignty

The earliest scholar to espouse the doctrine of sovereignty explicitly is the
French philosopher and thinker, Jean Bodin (1529-96). Writing at a time when
France was rife with religious and civil conflicts, Bodin, like Machiavelli,
asserted that such conflicts could be solved if it was possible to establish
the existence of an unrestricted ruling power competent to overrule all
religious and customary authority. He then went on to develop this notion
into what is regarded as a classic statement of modern theory of sovereignty:
that there must be within every political community or state a determinate
sovereign authority whose powers are decisive and whose powers are
recognised by the community as the rightful basis of authority. In the Six
Books of a Commonwealth (1576), Bodin presented sovereignty as the
untrammelled and undivided power to make laws. Law is accordingly ‘nothing
else than the command of the sovereign in the exercise of his sovereign
power’. The sovereign power ‘cannot be subject to the commands of
another’, for it is the sovereign that ‘makes law for the subject’.
Bodin did not, however, advocate or justify despotic rule, but rather claimed
that the sovereign monarch was constrained by the existence of a higher
law, in the form of will of God or natural law. The sovereignty of temporal
rulers was therefore underpinned by divine authority.
Bodin believed that a sovereign authority could only be properly established

if, ‘body politic was regarded as being composed of both ruler and ruled,
integrated as previous beliefs and politics had failed to integrate them’
(Hinsley, 86). 11

State Society Bodin, preoccupied as he was with establishing the necessity of monarchical
sovereignty, did not focus on the tensions inherent in idea of a sovereign
power comprising both the ruler and the ruled. The three most important
members of the social contract school, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau dwelt
on this theme but they did not agree on the nature of sovereign power and
the criteria of legitimacy of government and state. At the one extreme was
Hobbes who provided a classic statement about state sovereignty and at the
other end was Rousseau who developed the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
Writing at a time of political instability, the civil war in England, Thomas

Hobbes (1588-1679), like Bodin, sought to establish the necessity of an all
powerful sovereign capable of securing the conditions of ‘peaceful and
commodious living’. But he went on to establish a unique relation of
authority—the relation of sovereign to the subject— and a unique political
power by arguing that an all powerful sovereign could be established only
when the individuals ‘lay down their right to all things’. Hobbes based his
sovereignty on a covenant of each member of a community with another
member to surrender all their rights and powers into the hands of one
person or body (the Leviathan, which represented the abstract notion of
the state) who thereby becomes the sovereign. Since the sovereign is not
himself a party to the contract it cannot be annulled by those who made it.
Moreover, this sovereign had the monopoly and the right to use coercive
power because ‘men’s ambitions, avarice, anger and other passions’ are so
strong that ‘covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength
to secure a man at all’. The authority of the sovereign is therefore permanent,
undivided and ultimately unlimited. Hobbes conception of sovereignty thus
provided a strong justification for state power.
If Hobbes had transferred sovereignty to the state and the rulers, Jean
Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) insisted on retaining sovereignty for the people.
In Rousseau’s view, sovereignty originates in the people. Citizens can only
be obligated to a system of laws and regulations they have prescribed for
themselves with the general good in mind. The sovereign authority is the
people making the rules by which they live. In this perspective, the ruled
should be the rulers: the affairs of the state should be integrated into the
affairs of ordinary citizens.
Rousseau did not posit any limits on the decisions of the democratic majority.
As Berlin (1969) pointed out the community could easily destroy the liberty
of the individuals. Thus, if Hobbes placed the state in an all powerful position
with respect to the community, Rousseau placed the community (the majority)
in a position to wholly dominate individual citizens.
John Locke (1672-1704) transcended the dualism between the ruler and the
ruled, state and community by reaffirming the location of sovereignty in the
body politic as a whole. In this conception of sovereignty, the community
is the source of sovereignty and the state is the proper instrument for its
exercise. In Locke’s scheme, the formation of the state does not signal the
transfer of all subjects rights the state. The subject transfers the law making
and enforcement rights, but the whole process is conditional upon the state
adhering to its essential purpose: the preservation of ‘life, liberty and estate’.
Thus supreme power remains ultimately with the people who retain the
right to dispense with the rulers and even with the existing form of
government.
12

Sovereignty
Comment upon the ideas of Rousseau and Locke with reference to sovereignty.
Write down your commands in a notebook.
The ideas of Rousseau and Locke had a powerful role in replacing dynastic
rule with representative governments in Europe and later in other parts of
the world. Though the subsequent history of the concept of sovereignty has
been marked dispute and complexity, there is a broad consensus that
‘sovereignty is the supreme law making and decision making power of a
community, that the ultimate source of sovereignty is the people, that
sovereignty is necessarily delegated by the people to the state and exercised
on their behalf through the government, and that constitutional arrangements
are necessary to safeguard these political goods (Held 84, p).
From the description of conceptions of sovereignty it is clear that while

there is a consensus on the need for a determinate authority, there are
differences on the nature of the supreme authority, whether it refers to
legal authority or unchallengeable political power. There are also differences
on its location, whether it lies with the state or with the people. In the
following sections, we will dwell on these aspects before proceeding to
examine external sovereignty or the independent and autonomous status of
the sovereign states in international relations.
18.4 Legal and Political Sovereignty

As we saw, Bodin argued for a sovereign who made laws but was not himself
bound by those laws. Law, according to Bodin, amounted to little more than
the command of the sovereign, and subjects were required simply to obey.
Hobbes, on the other hand, described sovereignty in terms of power rather
than authority. He defined sovereignty as a monopoly of coercive power and
advocated that it be vested the hands of a single person or body of persons.
This difference of emphasis on authority and power has led to the
development of two distinct notions of sovereignty— legal sovereignty and
political sovereignty.
Legal sovereignty is based upon the belief that that ultimate and final
authority resides in the laws of the state. This is de jure sovereignty, supreme
power defined in terms of legal authority. In other words, it is based upon
the right to require somebody to comply, as defined by law. By contrast,
political sovereignty is not in any way based upon a claim to legal authority
but is concerned simply about the actual distribution of power, that is, de
facto sovereignty. Political sovereignty therefore refers to the existence of
a supreme political power, possessed of the ability to command obedience
because it monopolises coercive force.
It should be noted that though one can analytically distinguish the two
concepts, in practice they are closely related in practice. There are reasons
to believe that on their own neither constitutes a viable form of sovereignty.
In a sense sovereignty always involves a claim to exercise legal authority, a

claim to exercise power by right and not merely by virtue of force. All
substantial claims to sovereignty therefore have a crucial legal dimension.
Nevertheless, law on its own does not always secure compliance. There will
be always some individuals and groups within a society who will disregard
13

State Society the laws of the state and commit crime. The state, therefore, has to have
the ability to secure compliance. Legal authority has to be underpinned by
the exercise of power.
Box 18.2: Political Conception of Sovereignty

All states seek a monopoly of coercive power and prevent or at least limit
their citizens’ access to it. But very few rule through the use of force alone.
Almost all states have sought to persuade citizens that they have the right
to rule. Such efforts to acquire legal sovereignty have, in part, contributed
to the establishment of constitutional and democratic governments. Some
states, such as Nazi Germany and Pol Pot’s Cambodia, came very close to
establishing an exclusive political form of sovereignty. They ruled largely
through their ability to repress, manipulate and coerce. But they did not
endure for long. Moreover, even these states have sought to acquire the
mantle of legal authority by building up vast ideological apparatus.
Thus sovereignty in practice has meant the presence of both legal and
political authority.
a) Characteristics of Sovereignty
Before we proceed to examine the external aspect of sovereignty, it will be
useful to list out the characteristics of sovereignty emerging from the
conceptions of sovereignty. The key characteristics of sovereignty are
explained below:
Absoluteness: The sovereign’s authority is absolute and unlimited vis a vis

other associations in a society. It is absolute in the sense of not being
subject to any restraints, legal or otherwise. Laws and decrees passed by
the sovereign are binding on all citizens. Social groups and associations such
as the family, village councils, clubs, trade unions, businesses can establish
rules which command authority, but only within the limits defined by law.
If the sovereign is subject to either internal or external control of some
other authority, that body ceases to be a sovereign.
Exclusive: The sovereign power of the state is exclusive, in the sense that
no association is in a position to compete with it. There can be only one
sovereign authority in a state which can legally command obedience of its
inhabitants. Sovereignty does not accept any rival or parallel authority within
the boundary of the state.
Permanence: Sovereignty is self-perpetuating. As long as the state exists, it

is the supreme form of authority. Despite changes of governments, the sovereignty
of the state endures. Once sovereignty is lost, the state ceases to exist.
Universality: The sovereign state exercises authority over all other individuals
and groups of individuals within its jurisdiction. No group or person can
claim immunity from its jurisdiction, as a matter of legal right.
Inalienability: The sovereignty of the state cannot be alienated. Since

sovereignty forms the essential personality of the state, the very act of
alienating it from the state would amount to the destruction of the state.
As Leiber put it: ‘Sovereignty can no more be alienated than a tree can
alienate its right to sprout or a man can transfer his life or personality to any
other without self-destruction’.
14

Indivisible: In a state there can be only one sovereign power. If sovereignty Sovereignty
is divided, it implies that more than one state exists. Even if the exercise
of sovereign power is shared among the branches of governmental machinery,
the supreme authority is indivisible, in terms of its pervasive coercive
command over other associations in the society. Agencies of government are
mere functionaries of the sovereign.
As we noted at the beginning of the unit, the concept of sovereignty has

been used in two contrasting ways. In the form of internal sovereignty, it
refers to the distribution of authority within a state and leads to questions
about the need for supreme power and its location within the political
system. In the form of external sovereignty, it is related to the role of the
state in the international order and to whether or not it is able to operate
as an independent and autonomous actor on the world stage. It should be,
however, noted that the two do not describe exclusive sorts of sovereignty,
but different aspects of sovereignty that are coexistent and omnipresent.
Sovereign authority is exercised within borders, but also, by definition, with
respect to outsiders, who accept its independence.
18.5 Internal Sovereignty

The preceding discussion on the concept of sovereignty has been largely in
terms of internal sovereignty. As we saw, much of modern political theory
has been an attempt to decide precisely where sovereignty should be located.
Early political thinkers such as Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes were inclined
to the belief that sovereignty should be vested in the hands of a single
person, a monarch. The overriding merit of vesting sovereignty in a single
individual was that sovereignty would then be indivisible; it would be
expressed in a single voice that could claim final authority. Locke, Rousseau
and the subsequent thinkers departed from this absolutist notion of
sovereignty. They rejected monarchical rule in favour of the notion of popular
sovereignty, the belief that ultimate authority is vested in the people
themselves. This doctrine of popular sovereignty is generally regarded as the
basis of modern democratic theory.
While these thinkers disagreed about who or what the ultimate authority
should be, they were united in their belief that sovereignty could be and
should be located in a determinant body. This is the traditional doctrine of
sovereignty which is also called as the monistic theory of sovereignty. Even
Rousseau, who espoused popular sovereignty, acknowledged that the ‘general
will’ was indivisible whole which could only be articulated by a single
individual, who he called ‘the legislator’.
This traditional doctrine of sovereignty has come under growing criticism in

an age of pluralistic and democratic government. John Friggs, Harold J Laski
and other pluralists have argued that the monistic theory is intrinsically
linked to its absolutist past and so is frankly undesirable. They emphasise
that political power in any given society does not rest only in the state
apparatus, but is shared by a number of groups and institutions other than
the state in that society. Moreover, they point out that it is no longer
applicable to modern systems of government, which operate according to a
network of checks and balances. For a pluralist, liberal-democratic principles
are the very antithesis of sovereignty.
While the pluralists caution against the danger of ‘elected’ or ‘majority’ and
call for restraining and influencing the exercise of the sovereign power of 15

State Society the state, all the same they seem to miss the point that the monist position
is that of legal theory of sovereignty. That is, state alone has compulsory and
universal jurisdiction in its territory. It alone legally can use coercive power
against those who break its law. This right of the state is recognised by all
the citizens. Other associations may use power, but their right may not be
accepted by all individuals. They may appeal against their actions to the
higher authorities. And the state is the highest authority. There can be no
appeal against the sovereign actions of state.
b) Locating Sovereignty
After the English and the French Revolutions in 1688 and 1789 respectively,
the representative and constitutional governments that were established
initially in the West and later in other parts of the world assumed different
forms. The task of locating sovereignty in representative governments is
particularly difficult. The English jurist, John Austin, investigating who in
the name of the people or of the state exercises sovereignty in Britain,
came to the conclusion that it is neither vested in the Crown nor in the
people but in the ‘Monarch in Parliament’. This was the supreme organ that
enacted laws binding on everybody else but that was not itself bound by the
laws of and could change these laws at will. However, as we shall see later,
this idea of legislative or parliamentary supremacy fitted only a particular
system of government that prevailed in Britain in the 19th century.
The idea of legislative supremacy does not fit well in federal states, such as
the United States, Canada, Australia and India, where government is divided
into two levels, each of which exercises a range of autonomous powers.
Federalism is often said to involve a division of power between these two
levels, between the centre and the states or constituent units. However, in
developing the notion of a shared or divided sovereignty, federalism moves
the concept away from the classical belief in a single and indivisible sovereign
power. It may, furthermore, be suggested that neither level of government
can finally be described as sovereign because sovereignty rests with the
document which apportions power to each level: the constitution. But then,
since the power to interpret the constitution lies with the Supreme Court
one can argue that sovereignty resides with the Supreme Court. However,
the Supreme Court cannot properly be portrayed as the supreme constitutional
arbiter since its interpretation of the Constitution can be overturned by
amendments to the original document. In this sense, sovereignty can be
said to reside with the institution empowered to amend the Constitution:
in the United States it is two-thirds majorities in both Houses of Congress
and three-quarters of America’s state legislatures, or in a convention
specifically called for the purpose; in India, it is two-third majorities in both
the Houses of Parliament and one half of the states. To complicate matters
further, it can be argued that sovereignty in India ultimately is vested in the
Indian people themselves. This is expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution
which opens with the words ‘We the people. . .’ In view of these complexities,
a polycentric concept of sovereignty has taken root in federal states.
It has long been argued that in Britain a single, unchallenge-able legal authority
exists in the form of the Westminster Parliament. In the words of John
Stuart Mill, ‘Parliament can do anything except turn a man into a woman’.
Being a unitary form of government, no rival legislatures exist to challenge
the authority of Parliament; all legislation derives from a single source.
However, it can be argued that in reality the British Parliament enjoys neither
16 legal nor political sovereignty. Its legal sovereignty has been compromised by

membership of the European Union (EU). As an EU member, Britain is obliged Sovereignty
to conform to European law and is thus subject to the jurisdiction of the

European Court of Justice in Luxemburg. In fact, the European Court in 1991
declared the Merchant Shipping Act of 1988 passed by the British Parliament
to be unlawful because it contravened European laws guaranteeing a free
movement of goods and persons within the European Community (as the EU
was then). If Parliament can any longer be described as legally sovereign it
is only by virtue of the fact that it retains the legal right to withdraw from
the EU. In political terms also, the Parliament has never enjoyed sovereignty
in the sense of acting as it pleases. Its behaviour has always been constrained
by a wide range of institutions, including the electorate, organised interests,
particularly those which possess financial or economic muscle, major trading
partners, suprana-tional organisations, international treaties and so forth.

Does sovereignty lie in the state or the Political Community? Discuss with
other students and friends.
To conclude, sovereignty resides in the state or political community as a

whole. Given the complex checks and balances that operate in democratic
states and the internal and external constraints that operate on these states,
questions relating to the precise location of sovereignty appear to have
become outdated. It is the issue of external sovereignty, that is,
independence vis a vis other states in the international order that has
become absolutely vital. Let us focus on this aspect of sovereignty.
18.6 External Sovereignty

Sovereignty, as seen from inside a state, is supreme authority and as seen
from outside, is self-governing authority. In other words, external sovereignty
refers to the state’s place in the international order and therefore to its
sovereign independence in relation to other states.
In international relations, sovereignty has become synonymous with state

power. It is useful to conceive of external sovereignty as constitutional
independence. The state possesses a constitution, written or unwritten,
democratic or otherwise, which makes it independent from other states.
State sovereignty, in the sense of constitutional independence, consists of
being apart from other similar entities. The moment a state establishes a
constitutional link with another state, it loses its sovereignty, for it is
contained within a wider scheme. External sovereignty, in other words,
implies that there is no higher political authority over the state. The sovereign
state has the exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, its occupants, resources
and events that take place there.
Box 18.3: Westphalian International Society

Westphalian international society was based on two principles. The first
principle was rex est imperator in regno suo (the king is emperor in his own
realm). This norm specifies that sovereigns are not subjects to any higher
political authority. Every king is independent and equal to every other king.
The second principle was cujus region, ejus religio (the ruler determines the
religion of his realm). This norm specifies that outsiders have no right to
intervene in a sovereign jurisdiction on religious grounds.
The practice of sovereignty underlying the contemporary state system is

generally traced to the Peace of Westphalia, the set of treaties that marked 17

State Society the end of Thirty Years War in 1648. While this is a gross oversimplification of
a complicated process that developed over centuries. However, by the 17th
century some of the features of the state system had solidified. In two broad
respects, the system of sovereign states triumphed at Westphalia. First, states
emerged as virtually the sole form of constitutional authority in Europe.
Secondly, it brought to an end intervention in matters of religion, up to then
the most commonly practiced abridgement of sovereign prerogatives.
The principle of exclusive jurisdiction over people and resources within its
territory has been codified by many agreements and treaties. The Charter
of the United Nations, for instance, incorporated the principle of territorial
integrity and political independence in Article 2 (4) thus: ‘Member shall
refrain in their international relations from the treat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.’
External sovereignty also establishes the basic condition of international

relations- anarchy, meaning the absence of a higher authority over the states.
There is no rule-making and rule-enforcing institution in international relations.
Anarchy or the absence of higher political authority above the states does not
necessarily imply chaos or absence of order. In fact, although there is no
international government, there exists a rule governed social order in
international relations. States, initially free of obligation to one another, have
accepted a whole body of formal and informal rules (for instance, international
law, rules governing diplomacy and recognition of spheres of influence, etc.
Many of the formal and rules accepted by the states restrict their freedom
of action in certain activities and spheres. Moreover, because of the uneven
distribution of power capabilities of states, the powerful states have greater
freedom of action than the weaker states. Some scholars, therefore, talk of
the erosion of state sovereignty or it being present only in great powers.
But it should be noted sovereignty is not autonomy or freedom of action but
constitutional independence. The distinction between autonomy and
independence is the distinction between political and legal sovereignty. The
states may be losing the ability to do what they want, but not their right
to do so. If sovereignty is understood in political terms, one can argue that
from the inception of the state system states had not much freedom of
action. But if sovereignty is understood to mean the basic organising principles
of international relations, that is, an order structured around sovereign
states, then nothing much has changed. International commitments that
place restrictions on states domestic polices are those that have been
voluntarily accepted by states as sovereign entities. In contemporary
international relations, the most basic norms, principles and practices continue
to rest on state sovereignty.
While the principle of external sovereignty is widely recognised and enshrined

as a basic principle of international law, it is not without its critics. There are
those who draw our attention to the sinister implications of granting each state
exclusive jurisdiction over its own territory, people and resources. Human rights
advocacy groups, for instance, provide abundant evidence of state capacity to
abuse, terrorise and even exterminate their own population and argue for
intervention in states. They insist that states should conform to a higher set
of moral principles, usually expressed in the doctrine of human rights.
Attempts have been made to embody such principles in international law,
18 notably in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948). (Eloberate?)

Then there are those critics who suggest that the classical argument for Sovereignty
sovereignty should go beyond national sovereignty. Thinkers such as Bodin

and Hobbes emphasised that sovereignty was the only alternative to disorder,
chaos and anarchy. Yet this is precisely what a rigorous application of the
principle of national sovereignty would turn international politics into. Just
as the absence of an internal sovereign leads to brutality and injustice in
interpersonal and intra-societal relations, so does the absence of a supreme
international authority leads to illegal interventions by powerful states and
disputes and armed conflicts (wars) between states. In this way, the classical
doctrine of sovereignty can be turned into an argument for world government
18.7 Conclusion
Sovereignty is a contentious concept in domestic and international relations.
As we saw, the concept developed as an instrument for the assertion of
royal authority over feudal lords in the construction of modern territorial
states. Political thinkers from Machiavelli to Rousseau believed that instabilities
and disorder were obstacles to a stable society and could only be overcome
by viable governments that could firmly establish sovereignty over territory
and population. While political thinkers differed on the location of sovereignty
and therefore the form of government, they were united in believing that
only a determinate authority had the capacity to maintain order. The concept
of sovereignty was then integrated into theories of international relations
through a set of ideas that evolved over a period of time, but got established
at Westphalia that ended the moral authority of the Church over secular
rulers. Though external sovereignty has undergone major changes as a result
of the international commitments made by sovereign stats as well as because
of growing interdependence of states, the basic international norms,
principles and practices continue to rest on state sovereignty that is
constitutional independence of states.

Bartelson, J. (1995). A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Benn S.I & Peters, R.S. (1959). Social Principles and the Democratic State.
London: Allen Unwin
Fowler, M. R., and J. M. Bunck. (1995). Law, Power, and the Sovereign State.
University Park: Penn State Press
Held, David. (1984). Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State,
Power and Democracy. (Indian edition) New Delhi: Maya Polity
Hinsley, F.H. (1986). Sovereignty. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press
James, A. (1999). The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary
International Society. Political Studies 47(3): 460-2
De Jouvenel, B. (1957). Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into the Political Good.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
Krasner, S. D. (1999). Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press
Philpott, D. (2001). Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern
International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Spruyt, H. (1994). The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press 19

Unit 19
State; Power as Elaborated by
Marx, Weber, Parsons and Others
Contents
19.1 Introduction
19.2 The Concept of State
19.3 Marx on State
19.4 Weber on State
19.5 Durkheim on State
19.6 The Concept of Power
19.7 Marx on Power
19.8 Weber on Power
19.9 Parsons on Power
19.10 Other Theoretical Models on State and Power
19.11 Conclusion
19.13 References
Learning Objectives
The concepts of state and power and their inter relationship
The conceptualisation of state as an institution by Marx, Weber and Durkheim
The conceptualisation of power in relation to state and society by Marx,
Weber and Parsons
The conceptualisation of state and power in other theoretical models
such as pluralist, elitist, neo Marxist etc.
19.1 Introduction
In this unit we are going to study the concepts of state and power as
elaborated by Karl Marx, Max Weber and others. Here we will look into the
definitions and components of state and power as enunciated by these
thinkers. They have interpreted the concepts according to the historical
and political necessities of the period they lived. They have adopted differing
methodologies and understanding for interpreting the universal concepts of
state and power. Karl Marx and Max Weber are two prominent social thinkers
who elaborated the features of modern state as well as the concept of
power in relation to state and society. There are also different theoretical
models (pluralist, neo-Marxist, elitist etc.) on state and power, most of that
are responses to Marxian and Weberian theories on state and on their
understanding of how centralised government uses power. Power relations
are normally elaborated in terms of the causal factors that enable one person,
or a group of persons, to determine the actions of others. And power is
usually explained in relation to governmental or state authority. An
examination of Marxian, Weberian and other theoretical models of state as
an institution has been done in the first half of the unit. An in-depth
analysis of the concept of power in relation to state and society has been
20 done in the second half of the unit.

19.2 The Concept of State State; Power as Elaborated

by Marx, Weber,
Parsons and Others
The term ‘state’ is commonly used as a synonym for nation, government,
society or country. One of the prerequisites of state is sovereign power,
which implies supreme authority, or power. Aristotle defined state as a union
of families and villages having, for its end, a perfect and self-sufficing life,
which means happy and honourable life. According to Mac Iver the state is
an association, which acting through law as promulgated by government
endowed to this end with coercive power, maintains within a community
territorially demarcated universal external conditions of social order. It can
otherwise be said that when a group of people are permanently settled on
a definite territory and have government of their own, free from any kind
of external control, they constitute a state and it has sovereign power
upon its people (Das and Chaoudhury 1999). State uses power as a mechanism
to keep the society bound together. The state uses power as legislative,
judicial, military and planning function. Through legislative function it
enforces the norms of the society. Judicial function uses power to exert
physical force for the protection of citizen’s lives and property. Military
function uses power to establish relations with other societies and planning
function is related to the allocation of scarce goods and resources. Now let
us examine the concept of state as elaborated in different theoretical
models.
19.3 Marx on State

Although Marx had no fully developed theory of state, he did discuss it in
various ways throughout his writings. Marx traces the development of the
state to the division of labour in the society. Primitive societies are simple
and less complex and marked by least division of labour. As the societies
grow from primitive to capitalist it becomes more and more complex and
there arises some central organising agency to control. This ultimately leads
to the formation of state. His views on state are closely related to his
classification of society.
For him the basis of state is force and the state exercises power and authority
for promoting the interests of the dominant class and suppressing and
exploiting the weaker classes who are collectively called as proletariat in the
context of capitalist society. He views state as a man-made institution rather
than a natural institution. The Marxists look at the state as a product of
class struggle and as an instrument of class rule. Thus, for Marx, the state
is essentially a class structure, an organisation of one class dominating over
other classes. He views that state as originated at a certain stage of economic
development in the history of humanity, when society was broken into two
classes, namely ‘haves’ and ‘havenots’.
In Marxist theory the most important activity of human beings is economic

activity. According to him understanding the way a society organises its
production is the key to understand the whole of its social structure. His
view is that the production of the means of subsistence forms the foundation
upon which various institutions, the legal conception, art and even the
ideas on religion of the people concerned have been evolved. Marx stresses
economic production as the key structural feature of any society and he
called the way it organises its production as its infrastructure. The rest of
its social organisation — its non-economic activities such as ideas, beliefs
and philosophies, legal system, the state etc. — he called superstructure
21

State Society (Jones 1991). The super structure of any form of society is affected by its
infrastructure i.e., the economic activities of the society. State according
to Marx is a non-economic institution and hence a part of superstructure.
The formation and functioning of the state is therefore depend on the way
the society organises its economic production. Marx called the different
ways of production of goods in the society as modes of production. And
based on the modes of production Marx distinguished five historical epochs
in the development of humanity. These in chronological order are primitive
communist, ancient, feudal, capitalist and communist, each depicting its
own characteristic state and government. Apart from the first and last
modes of production i.e. the primitive communist and communist mode,
each mode of production has one crucial characteristic in common. Each
of them produces goods based on class. In each of the historical epochs
there are two classes, one is the minority dominant class, the one which
owns the modes of production and the other majority subordinate class,
the class that does not own means of production or the exploited class
which do the productive work.
Those who own means of production control the state. Whenever there is
change in the mode of production in a society (see Box 19.1), the government
(the physical form of state) also undergoes simultaneous change. And
irrespective of the form of the society (ancient, feudal or capitalist) the
state invariably is, according to Marx, an instrument for exploitation in the
hands of dominant class.
Marx’s deliberation of state as an institution is mainly based on the capitalist

form of society. For him state is a centralised organising agency, which was
necessarily involved in the domination of one class over the others. The
prominent classes Marx talks about in relation to capitalist society are
bourgeoisie and proletariat. According to Marx, capitalism is an inherently
expanding system and the social class at its helm (bourgeoisie) is carried into
political power not because of any deliberate or conscious action but because
that is the way the society develops. It is argued that Marx believed the
state to be a sort of conspiracy against the working class, or that the wealth
of the bourgeoisie could be used to ensure that whoever is in power pursues
its interests (Miller 1991). For Marx, the concern of the state for individual
liberty could be seen as an attempt to enforce the right of the individual
property owner (bourgeoisie) against those without property (proletariat)
whose only power lay in their banding together to take collective action.
The political struggle for trade union rights represent the collective action
of proletariat.
Box 19.1: Dialectical Materialism

According to Marx, all history can be explained by the conflict between
opposing forces, thesis and antithesis. Every stage of history which falls
short of perfection carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction.
Each stage reached in the march to the classless society, the thesis, calls
into being its opposite or anti-thesis, and from the clash between the two
a new synthesis will become the thesis until the classless society has been
achieved. This philosophy of the inevitability of change resulting from the
struggle of opposites and determined by concrete realities rather than ideas
is called dialectical materialism. It is the basic philosophy of communism.
In dialectical materialism, evolution is the development of the matter from
within, environment helping or hindering, but neither originating the
22

State; Power as Elaborated
evolutionary process nor capable of preventing it from reaching its inevitable by Marx, Weber,
goal. Parsons and Others
According to Marx, capitalism had to be replaced because the evolution of

society’s institutions is a natural and inevitable process of history. Capitalism
itself is the product of the struggle between lords and serfs in feudal society.
The evolution into capitalism, instead of some other form of social contract,
was due to the arrival of machines and the factory system. This synthesis
in turn created two new contending forces: the capitalist class or bourgeoisie,
which owns the means of production, and the wage workers or proletariat
class, which has to sell its labor to survive.
From the writings of Marx one can decipher broadly three models of state,
the liberal, arbiter and functionalist. In his earlier writings it can be seen
that the bourgeoisie rule the state or manipulate the state machinery to
protect their interests or to put in Marx’s words ‘state is but a committee
for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ (Marx and Engles
1968). On this model, economic power is quite simply translated into political
power, by means of which the dominant bourgeoisie rules over subordinate
classes through liberal state.
In his later writings Marx made various modifications of and reservations

about these earlier views. In his later writings, which were more empirical,
he views and talks about different sections of bourgeoisie engaging in
political struggles through and over the state. Here he suggests a different
model of the state, the arbiter model. In The Eighteenth Brumair of Louis
Bonaparte he sketches the modern state in such a way as to suggest its
relative autonomy from the interests of bourgeoisie. The modern state has
grown so strong that in exceptional moments when bourgeoisie cannot
completely dominate the other classes against which it must struggle, the
state may become an arena for competing interests, an apparent mediator,
and may even act independently to limit the power of bourgeoisie (Nash
2000). For example the Factory Acts and the arguments over the Corn Laws
in UK in the 1840s can be seen as a struggle between industrial bourgeoisie
and the agricultural bourgeoisie. He also talks about the state being controlled
by people who do not belong to the dominant class (bourgeoisie) but
nevertheless exercise power in the interests of the dominant class. For
example in UK by the end of the 19th century though the central governing
body constituted by the landowning class, they exercised power in the
interests of industrial bourgeoisie. This reaches to the conclusion that whoever
comes to power, they represent the interests of dominant class in the capitalist
society. This is because for the economic development of the societies the
state has to protect the interests of the dominant class.
In his latest works, Marx suggested a third model of state, the functionalist
model. In ‘Capital’, volume 3, he depicts state as supernatural, determined
entirely by changes in the economic base in the society. He explains if
capitalism is to survive, it requires a reasonably healthy work force educated
to a level necessary to operate at the relevant level of technological
development and it needs to ensure that the next generation is raised in a
reasonable way to whatever standards are required. The state develops in
order to fulfil these needs. In Marxist view, in a class society, super structure
is indispensable to its survival. It represents the society’s cultural
characteristics and the institutions that promote these characteristics. Its 23

State Society infrastructure, its class based mode of production, survives so long as class
character of the society remains unrecognised, or is considered legitimate,
by those whom it subordinates. The superstructure (state as a prominent
institution) ensures this happens. That means the state essentially function
as a system integrator. This is how Marx views state as working in the
interests of the ruling class because it is working to reproduce the sort of
economic and social system that favours the class that rules. For Marx, in
any state, the dominant class try to promote and protect its own interests
as against the interests of other classes and formulates the laws. And thus
the purpose of the state is to protect private property and its function is
to oppress the non-possessing class in the interest of the possessing class.
Irrespective of the form of the state, whether democratic, republic or
monarchy, it is used as an agency for the oppression of one class by another.
It is only the class interests that are represented at the political level and
ultimately the economic power will determine how state power is to be
used.

Elucidate the different models of state depicted by Karl Marx.
Marx states that the system integration in capitalism is constantly threatened

by class conflict and is supported by the state and by ruling ideologies. He
predicts the class struggle in the capitalist society necessarily leads to the
dictatorship of the proletariat and through the dictatorship of the proletariat,
there would be the abolition of all classes through a revolutionary
transformation and the establishment of classless society, the communist
society. When the classless society is established and there is no suppressive
function for the state, it would be required only to perform the economic
functions. The abolition of class distinctions would also lead to the fulfillment
of the political functions of the state and the people will be accustomed to
the voluntary performance of their social responsibilities and the observance
of the rules of the socialist life. At this stage, there would be no necessity
of state and according to Marx the state would ‘wither away’.
Box 19.2: Marxism

Marxism as a theoretical system developed out of, and drew inspiration
from the writings of Karl Marx. However, ‘Marxism’ as a codified body of
thought came into existence only after Marx’s death. It was the product of
the attempt by later Marxists to condense Marx’s ideas and theories into a
systematic and comprehensive worldview that suited the needs of the growing
socialist movement. However, a variety of Marxist traditions can be identified,
including ‘classical’ Marxism (the Marxism of Marx), ‘orthodox’ Marxism or
‘dialectical materialism’, the mechanistic form of Marxism that served as
the basis for Soviet communism, and ‘Western’, ‘modern’ or ‘neo’ Marxism,
which tend to view Marxism as a humanist philosophy and are skeptical
about its scientific and determinist pretensions.The cornerstone of Marxist
philosophy is what Engles called the ‘materialist conception of history’. This
highlights the importance of economic life and the conditions under which
people produce and reproduce their means of substance, reflected,
simplistically, in the belief that the economic ‘base’, consisting essentially
of the ‘mode of production’, or economic system, conditions or determines
the ideological and political ‘superstructure’. Marxist theory therefore explains
social, historical and cultural development in terms of material and class
24

factors. The basis of the Marxist tradition is Marx’s teleological theory of by Marx, Weber,
histroy, which suggests that history is driven forward through a dialectical Parsons and Others
process in which internal contradictions within each mode of production are

reflected in class antagonism. Capitalism, then, is only the most technologically
advanced of class societies, and is itself destines to be overthrown in a
proletarian revolution which will culminate in the establishment of a classless,
communist society.The intellectual attraction of Marxism has been that it
embodies a remarkable breadth of vision, offering to understand and explain
virtually all aspects of social and political existence and uncovering the
significance of processes that conventional theory ignores. Politically, it has
attacked exploitation and oppression, and had a particularly strong appeal
to disadvantaged groups and peoples. With the collapse of communism in
former USSR and some East European countries some group of academicians
started arguing that the relevance of communism and Marxism came to an
end. However the fact of the matter is that the forms of communism as
practiced by those countries failed to deliver goods and the system itself
failed due to variety of reasons. This has nothing to do with Marxism as a
theory which is still one of the foremost theoretical formulations of class,
power, state and society.
19.4 Weber on State

Max Weber suggested in Politics as a Vocation that the state is a human
community or a special kind of institution that claims the monopoly of
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber 1948). By this
he meant not only that the state had the ability to ensure the obedience
of its citizens but also the acknowledged right to do so. A monopoly of
legitimate violence is therefore the practical expression of the state
sovereignty. He saw the state as the most powerful institution in modern
society since it has gained the legitimate monopoly of force over a given
territory (Weber 1948).
He elaborates four defining characteristics of modern state. First, it has a

legal and administrative order, which is subject to change by legislation only,
not by the whim of a lord or the dictate of a charismatic leader. Secondly
it has an administration which works in accordance with legislation. This
means that civil servants and judiciary do not make up their own rules but
implement those formed by the legislature. Thirdly the state has binding
authority on all its members and over the acts carried out in its territory.
And the membership is usually given by birth. Finally state can use force if
that is legally prescribed and permitted.
For Weber the 'political society' is one whose existence and order is
continuously safe-guarded within a given territorial area by the threat and
application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff. And a
political organisation becomes a 'state' where it is able successfully to exercise
a legitimate monopoly over the orgainised use of force within a given territory.
According to Weber legal, religious and political institutions and their inter
relationships has decisive significance to economic structures and economic
development not vice-versa as seen by Marx. Weber opposed to Marx's
economic determinism. He took concentration of the means of administration
as most important factor in the nation-state.
It can be seen that Weber's theory of state and authority are cordially
25

State Society associated. This in turn has close association with his typology of domination.
Weber talks about three types of domination: charismatic, traditional and
legal-rational. According to him these three types of domination coexist in
any situation but it is likely that one or other will be dominant. Weber says
legal-rational domination is more predominant in modern state.
According to Weber the modern state is legitimate if people believe in its

legitimacy. Any three kind of domination can exist in a modern state. We
cannot choose between the three on any rational ground, each can be
justified on its own ground. Each system justifies on itself; traditional
domination justified by tradition, charismatic domination by charisma and in
rational legal domination laws are legitimate if they are enacted according
to the law. There is no overall or superior set of values by means of which
we choose better or worse systems. Weber believed that in modern state
any norm could be enacted as a law with the expectation that it would be
obeyed; government and government apparatus are bound by the abstract
system that these laws comprise and justice is the application of this laws.
In such a system of governance people hold authority, doing so by virtue of
being temporary office bearers rather than possessing personal authority
and people obey laws not the office bearers who enforced them. The state
with a national legal authority could not interfere with individual rights
without the consent of the people through the duly elected representatives.

What are the salient features of Weber’s State? Compare and contradict the
views of Marx and Weber or State.
For Weber bureaucracy is the organisational apparatus of the modern state

and the modern capitalist state is completely dependent upon bureaucratic
organisation for its continued existence. Weber describes the state as gaining
its power in modernity by concentrating the means of administration in the
hands of an absolute monarch. Bureaucratic set up developed, for example
in ancient Egypt, when the monarch needed a permanent army, to ensure
supplies of arms and military equipment. According to Weber these
developments were the most important factors promoting the emergence of
the modern state in which the expert officialdom, based on the division of
labour is wholly separated from ownership of its means of administration.
Officials in modern, rational bureaucracies have little or no control over what
they do since the rules and procedures of bureaucracies take on a life of
their own, restricting the activities and decisions of those who work in
them to the functions of the offices they fill. The bureaucracy (see Box 2
for features of ideal type of bureaucracy) become the 'steel-hard housing' in
modern sate.
This growth of rational state, which has its corpus of bureaucratic officials,
is not wholly derivative of economic rationalisation, but to some extent
preceded the development of capitalism as well as created condition, which
promoted its rise. The head of the system of the legal authority or bureaucracy
is the head of the state. And it can hold a position through appropriation,
election or designated by succession. But even then his or her power is
legally limited.
26

Box 19.3: Ideal Type of Bureaucracy by Marx, Weber,
Parsons and Others
The characteristic features of the ideal type of bureaucracy according to
Weber are:
1) A continuous organisation of official functions bound by rules.
2) A specific sphere of competence. This involves (a) a sphere of obligation
to perform functions, which has been marked off as part of a systematic
division of labour. (b) The provision of the incumbent with the necessary
authority to carry out these functions. (c) That the necessary means of
compulsion are clearly defined and their use is subject to definite
conditions.
3) The organisation of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is,
each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one.
There is a right of appeal and of statement of grievances from lower
to the higher. Hierarchies differ in respect to whether and in what
cases complaints can lead to rulings from an authority at various points
higher in the scale, and as to whether chances are imposed from higher
up or the responsibility for such changes is left to the lower office, the
conduct of which was the subject of complaint.
4) The rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules
or norms. In both cases, if their application is to be fully rational,
specialised training is necessary. It is thus normally true that only a
person who has demonstrated an adequate technical training is qualified
to be a member of the administrative staff of such an organised group,
and hence only such persons are eligible for appointment to official
positions.
5) In the rational type it is a matter of principle that the members of the
administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership of
the means of production and administration. Officials, employees and
workers attached to the administration staff do not themselves owns
the non-human means of production and administration. These are
rather provided for their use in kind or in money, and the official is
obliged to render an accounting of their use. There exists, furthermore,
in principle complete separation of the property belonging to the
organistion, which is controlled within the sphere of office, and the
personal property of the official which is available for his own private
uses. There is a corresponding separation of the place which official
functions are carried, the ‘office’ in the sense of premises, from living
quarters.
6) In the rational type case, there is also a complete absence of
appropriation of his official position by the incumbent. Where ‘rights’
to an office exist, as in the case of judges, and recently of an increasing
proportion of officials and even of workers, they do not normally serve
the purpose of appropriation by the official but of securing the purely
objective and independent character of the conduct of the office so
that is oriented only to the relevant norms.
7) Administrative acts, decisions and rules formulated and recorded in
writing, even in cases where oral discussion is the rule or is even
mandatory. This applies at least to preliminary discussions and proposals,
to final decisions, and to all sorts of orders and rules. The combination
of written documents and continuous organisation of official functions
constitutes the ‘office’ which is the central focus of all types of modern
action. Source: Craib, 1997
27

State Society According to Weber, though rationalisation is evident in economic life, cultural
life etc. of a society it is fundamentally evident in the modern institutions
of administration, more especially bureaucracy. He says neither capitalism
with its connection with liberalism nor state socialism with its formal
commitment to social justice, can avoid the use of bureaucratic means of
administrative domination. The impersonality and calculability characters of
the bureaucracy are seen not only as constraining but also as extremely
efficient in securing the popular compliance with the structures of
domination. They are for Weber a key instance of the typical modern form
of legitimate domination that is replacing the appeal of tradition as society's
predominant legitimating principle.
19.5 Durkheim on State

Durkheim discusses the nature and features of the State in his work
Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (1957). According to him the opposition
of governing and the governed is central in political life. His views on state
are very much associated to his explanation of division of labour and types
of solidarity. Durkheim traced the development of the state to the division
of labour in the society, as societies became more complex there occurred
the distinction between governing and governed, which in turn results in
the formation of state. For Durkheim the function of state was to mediate
between different interests and in particular to protect the individual against
the power of smaller groups. That is how state protects individual and
balance group interests.
Mechanical solidarity is the trademark of less developed or primitive society

where division of labour is very little. Whereas societies with highly developed
division of labour are held together by organic solidarity. For Durkheim there
was no politics or state existed in primitive societies because there was no
or little division of labour and hence no grouping into government and
governed.
At the same time he argues that the division of a social group into governing
and governed do not only exist in states; there is a similar division in the
patriarchal household as well. Durkheim tries to make a distinction between
state and such organisation. The size and control of a determinate territory
will distinguish state from such organisation. But for Durkheim the crucial
feature of a state is that it controls not necessarily large numbers of people
but a number of different secondary social groupings. The state is the
organisation of officials concerned with governing these secondary groups.
It is not an embodiment of society as whole, but a specialised institution.
Durkheim next takes up the relationship of the state to the individual. This
according to Durkheim, is not an issue in societies where mechanical solidarity
dominated where individuals were absorbed into the social whole; But as
organic solidarity develops, the power of the state develops so also the
rights of the individuals. The growth of the state does not threaten but
enables the rights of individuals.

Compare the perspective of Marx and Durkheim on the state.
Durkheim makes a clear distinction between society and the state. Every
28 society is despotic, at least if nothing from within supervenes to restrain its

despotism (Durkheim 1957). As societies become more compelled, then there State; Power as Elaborated
by Marx, Weber,
is a need for individuals to move from group to group and need to prevent Parsons and Others
the secondary groups exercising despotic control over its members, it is the
function of the state to provide this need. Durkheim's argument was that,
given that individual members of society felt their commitment to society,
the function of the state was to create and protect the space where the
individuals could exercise such responsibility.
For Durkheim society is 'suigenerous'. His notion of society dominated

everything else; society exists over and above the individual over whom it
exercises an immense power. This notion of society reflects in his idea about
state also. For Durkheim State essentially is a mediator between secondary
groups. The secondary groups are developed in society, as the division
becomes more sophisticated as in modern societies. The secondary groups
mediate between society and the individual just as state mediates between
the individual and secondary group.
19.6 The Concept of Power

Although power is a universal phenomenon in human activities and social
relationships, there is no uniform conceptualisation of this concept. It is
highly abstract and overlearned concept deeply embedded in human society
and culture. Though the vast literate in social science on power is scattered
and heterogeneous, the concept has been discussed in these literature on
a conceptual framework based around power as characteristic of individual,
power as interpersonal construct, power as a commodity, power as causal
construct and power as philosophical construct. Each framework illustrates
unique dimensions of the concept of power (Kakabadse, 1984). The concept
of power is often expressed in this literature as the ability to bring about
the outcomes as one desire. The social significance of the exercise of power
is that it limits the range of choice open to individuals. Sociologists often
distinguish between two forms of power - authority and coercion. This unit
concentrates in elaborating power in relation to state and society.
19.7 Marx on Power

Marx does not give a clear definition of power, for him, power means coercion.
Marx views power to be held by a particular group in society at the expense
of the rest of the society. According to him the source of power in society
lies in economic infrastructure and those who own the modes of production
i.e. the dominant group uses power to further its own interest and there
by exploiting those who subject to power. Marx argues that although from
time to time dominant classes do have to resort to naked force to maintain
their power and supremacy, the absence of such obvious coercion should
not be taken to signify an absence of exploitation, a lack of naked oppression
does not indicate lack of oppression and the lack of any need of force. Lack
of naked oppression does not mean that domination is not taking place. It
is only that the dominated are unaware of their condition, because of the
effectiveness of the ideologies into which they have been socialised.
How do such dominant ideas, which hails the dominating power of the
dominant class and the exploitation of the subordinate class, gain such
general acceptance. Marxists argue that particular ideas come to prevail
through various key agencies of socialisation. Institution like the family,
education systems and the mass media play a crucial role in promoting generally
29

State Society held beliefs and values. For Marxists through these institutions of socialisation
the real character of class society is justified and thus it ensures social
inequality and domination and thereby the acceptance of the power structure
in the society. This is the key element in Marxist approach to the
superstructure, a society's non-economic institutions and the ideas and
beliefs they promote. The assumption is that they exist to prop up a class-
based mode of production. Thus the power inequality in the economic
infrastructure is reflected in the superstructure.
Dominance and Subordination

Marxist theorists argue that institutions like education, state and mass media
justify the stereotypical images of superiority and inferiority coinciding with
class position. Thus in terms of Marxian theory the relationship of dominance
and subordination in the infrastructure is justified and legalised by the
super structure. For example, in capitalist society the unequal relationship
between employees and employers will be reflected and legitimated in the
legal system. A range of legal status protect the rights of property owners
and in particular their right to a disproportionate share of the wealth produced
by their employees. Marxists argue that such an analysis of the relationship
between the infrastructure and super structure tells in great deal about
power in a class society. That means, for example, in capitalist society the
infrastructure produce particular kind of state, education system, family
structure etc, all institutions of super structure that reflect the domination
of class structure reinforce the power and privilege of the ruling class in the
society.
Marx views power as to be held by a particular group (dominant class) in

society at the expense of the rest of the society (subordinate class). This
is a constant sum concept of power since a net gain in the power of the
dominant group represents a net loss in the power of the next society. The
dominant group uses power to further its own interests and these interests
are in direct conflict with the interests of their subject to its power.
For Marx the source of power in society lies in the economic infrastructure.
The basis of dominance or power is the ownership of forces of production.
The ruling class, those who own the forces of production uses power to
exploit and oppress the subject class in all societies. The case of power to
exploit others is defined by Marx as coercion. It is seen as an illegitimate use
of power since it forces the subject class to submit to a situation which is
against its interests.
The only way to return power to the people is communal ownership of the
forces of production. Since everyone will now share the same relationship
to the forces of production, power will be shared by all members of society.
Here Marx's concepts of false consciousness and class-consciousness are of
importance. When the subordinate class subscribe to dominant ideologies
which obscure the real nature of class society from their gaze, their picture
of the world and their place in it is false. When the exploited class realises
their exploited status and start recognising themselves to belonging to the
same class, there originates class consciousness among them. In their
subjective view of themselves and their condition comes to match its
objective reality. It is the emergence of a class consciousness by a subordinate
class that is the key which unlocks the revolution which overthrows the
existing power structure of the society to replace it with one which suits
30 to the new economic arrangements.

19.8 Weber on Power State; Power as Elaborated

by Marx, Weber,
Parsons and Others
Weber deals power primarily in the context of society and state. Weber
defines power as the probability that an actor will be able to realise his own
objectives against opposition from others with whom he is in social
relationship (Weber 1994). This is a broad definition. His definition of
domination is more specific. It refers only to those cases of exercises of
power where an actor obeys a specific command issued by another. In making
the distinction between power and domination Weber put forward two
types of solution to the problem of order. Power represents action likely to
succeed even against the opposition and resistance of those to whom it is
applied. This solution is typically found in warfare and class conflict, but it
has the limitation of being unstable as long term source of order. Legitimate
domination, by contrast, involves an element of voluntary compliance from
those to whom it applied and therefore embraces the issue of meaningful
action. Domination can be legitimised in terms of the appeal to the different
principles, namely tradition, national legality as embodies in enacted law and
charisma (Turnner 1996).
Weber's concept of class, status and party along with his analysis of state
and bureaucracy are the centre of his concept of power. Each grouping is
focussed around or oriented towards power as an independent point of
conflict. Each represents an aspect of and a basis for power. Let us discuss
each of them in detail.
Weber's discussion of ‘class’, ‘status’ and ‘party’ are three dimensions of

stratification in society, each of which conceptually separate from the others,
and specifies that, on an empirical level, each may causally influence each
of the others. Weber did not ignore economic sources of power, and
considered these to be among the more important sources, especially in
capitalism. But, unlike Marx, he claimed that power did not emerge only
from economic sources, and he certainly does not restrict power relationships
to ownership or non-ownership of the means of production. Power can also
emerge from status or party (associations concerned with acquiring power)
or can also be pursued for its own sake. Among these different forms of
power, there are cross-cutting influences and effects, so that power obtained
in one of these spheres may lead to power or a change in situation in
another sphere.
For Weber class is an expression of economic order to be more precise it is

determined by a persons' market situation. Here a class denotes an aggregate
of individuals who share the same class situation. So as per the identification
of class situation with the market situation there could be as many class
divisions as there are minute gradations of economic position. But similar to
Marx, Weber also argues that the ownership versus non-ownership of property
is the most important basis of class division in a competitive market. Weber
distinguishes two types of classes, positively privileged class who are the
property owners and acquisition or commercial class. He also identifies middle
class, a group that can be placed between these two. For him property or
lack of property is the basis of all class situations. He also distinguished social
class which is composed of the plurality of the class statuses between which
an interchange of individuals on a personal basis or in the course of generation
is readily possible typically observable. For Weber power is associated
with property class in terms that they enjoy more status and privilege in
the society. The acquisition classes are in a negatively privileged situation
31

State Society and they are workers of the various principal types. They are less powerful
in the society. Social mobility is possible between different classes or strata
in the society. But this movement is possible only to a limited extent according
to Weber. He says moving into a wider range of position is blocked by power
differentials between different classes (Crib 1997).
Box 19.4: Characteristics of Status Groups

Since Weber rejects the notion that economic phenomena directly determine
the nature of human ideals, he distinguishes such conceptualisations
independent of class interests and hence the distinction of 'status' groups
from 'class' groups. By status situation Weber refers to that part of a
person's life chances, which are decided by the social esteem in which he/
she is held, such esteem might be positive or negative. The status situation
of an individual refers to the evaluations which others make of an individual
or her/his social position, thus attributing to her/him some form of social
prestige or esteem. A status group is number of individuals who share the
same status situation. They normally manifest their distinctiveness through
following a particular life-style, and through placing restrictions upon the
manner in which others may interact with them. It is a system of stratification
that may petrify at times into classes though they are clearly differentiated.
The status groups are amorphous though they are conscious in and of
themselves. Along with the social esteem there occurs a specific lifestyle
and restrictions and this becomes the characteristic of particular status
group. In Weber's view class distinction and status distinction remained
separable in analysis and in fact but they were also linked and they moved
across each other in patterned ways.
Weber consider both class and status group membership as basis of social
power. But the formation of political party has more influence upon power.
For Weber a party refers any voluntary association, which has the aim of
securing directive control of an organisation in order to implement certain
definite policies within the organisation. Parties are organisations, rather
than communities or groups, and they involve striving for a goal in a planned
manner. Weber notes that classes are in the economic order, status groups
in the social order, and parties in the sphere of power. In some senses,
power is not a separate order, in that classes and status groups are concerned
with power. The difference between parties on the one hand, and status
groups and classes on the other, is in the level of analysis. Parties are
organisations, whereas classes and status groups are groupings of people. If
status groups or classes become well organised, they may form parties, or
their parties may become the organisational wings of the class or status
group. Trade unions, professional associations, ethnic organisations, and
religious institutions are examples. Parties represent power at the macro
level. When it comes to his perception of power at macro level, his concepts
of power and domination are closely associated. He distinguishes between
these types of domination: charismatic, traditional and legal rational.
In charismatic leadership the basis of power is the charisma of the leader.

The term charisma is applied to certain quality of an individual personality
by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary individuals and treated as
endowed with supernatural or specifically exceptional powers and qualities.
In traditional domination the basis of power is age-old traditions.
Patriarchalism is a good example of traditional domination. The basis of
32 power in legal-rational domination is legitimate law.

For Weber all three — class, status and party are sources of power. Thus his State; Power as Elaborated
by Marx, Weber,
view on power is extensive cutting across economy, social and political Parsons and Others
parameters.
19.9 Parsons on Power

Parsons regards power as something possessed by society as a whole. As
such power is a generalised facility or resource in the society. It is the
capacity to mobilise the resources of the society for the attainment of goals
for which a general public commitment has been made. In this sense the
amount of power in society is measured by the degree to which collective
goals are realised. Thus, the greater the efficiency of a social system for
achieving the goals defined by its members, the more power exists in society.
This view is known as a variable sum concept of power (different from
Weberian and Marxian constant sum concept of power), since power in
society is not seen as fixed as contrast. Instead it is variable in the sense
it can increase or decrease (Haralambos 1980, Turner 1996).
Parsons' view of power is developed from his general theory of the nature
of society. He believes that order, stability and cooperation in society are
based on value concerns, that is a general agreement by members of society
concerning what is good and worthwhile. He assumes that this value consensus
is essential for the survival of social system. From shared values desire the
collective goals, that is goals shared by members of society. For example if
materialism is a major value of the Western Industrial society, collective goals
such as economic expansion and higher living standards can be seem to stem
from this value. The more able Western societies are also to realise these
goals, the greater the power that resides in the social system. Steadily rising
living standards and economic growth are therefore the indications of an
increase of power for the society as a whole.
Parsons' view of power differentials within society also derives from his
general theory of social system. He argues since goals are shared by all
members of society, power will generally be used in the furtherance of
collective goals. Thus, for Parsons, power is an integrative face in social
system just as social stratification. Parsons argues that as value consensus
is an essential component of all societies, it follows that some form of
stratification results from the ranking of individuals in terms of common
values. Thus those who perform successfully in terms of society, values will
be ranked highly and accorded high prestige and power sicken they exemplify
and personify common values. And Parsons, a functionalist, believes that this
differential distribution of power and prestige among the different strata of
society is just, right and proper since they are basically an expression of
shared values.
Parsons views relationship between the social groups in a society as one of

cooperation and interdependence rather than conflict and confrontation.
Particularly in complex industrial societies different groups specialise in
particular activities. As no one group is self sufficient it cannot meet the
needs of its members and hence each group enter into interaction with
other groups for exchange of goods and services which makes the relationship
between different social groups one of reciprocity. This relationship extends
top the strata in a stratification system. In individual societies, which exhibit
highly specialised division of labour some members will specialise in
organisation and planning (those who govern), others will follow their 33

State Society directions (those who governed). Parsons argues that this inevitably leads to
inequality in terms of power and prestige.
Box 19.5: Power and Prestige

Parsons argues that inequalities of power are based on shared values. Power
is legitimate authority in that members of society as a whole generally
accept it as just and proper. It is accepted as such because there are
positions of authority use their power to pursue collective goals, which
derive from society's central values. Parsons views power and prestige
differentials associated with social stratification is both inevitable and
functional for the society. It is inevitable because it derives from shared
values, which are necessary part of all social systems. It is functional because
it serves to integrate various social groups.
Parsons' later work on power involved a conscious modification of his previous

views (Giddens 1995). In his later works criticising C.W. Mills' power theory
Parsons viewed power as generated by social system in much the same as
wealth was generated in this productive organisation economy. The parallels,
which Parsons developed between power and money, were based upon the
supposition that each had similar role in the two of the four functional
subsystems of the social systems evolved by Parsons.
Power for Parsons is a direct derivative of authority; authority for him is

institutionalized legitimation which underlay power and was defined as the
institutionalisation of the rights of leaders to expect support from the
members of the collectivity (Parsons 1960). By speaking of binding obligation,
Parsons deliberately brought legitimation into the very definition of power,
so that for him there was no such thing as illegitimate power (Giddens 1995).

Outline the Parsonian view of state and power.
Parsons stressed that the use of power is only one among several different
ways in which one party might secure the compliance of another to a desired
course of action. Parsons says compliance can be secured by applying positive
(rewards) or negative (coercion) sanction. But in most cases when power was
being used, there was no overt sanction (either positive or negative) employed.
Parsons argues it was particularly necessary to stress that possession and use
of power should not be identified directly with the use of force.
19.10 Other Theoretical Models on State and Power

The state and power, both concepts essentially are contested concepts.
There are a number of sociological theories/models of state and power each
offering different accounts of its origin, development and impact. Liberal
theory, plural theory, elite theory, neo-Marxist and anarchist theory are some
of the theories explained here in brief.
The liberal theory of state dates back to the writings of the social contract
theorists such as Hobbes and Locke. These thinkers argued that the society
had risen out of voluntary agreement, or a social contract, made by individuals
who recoganised that only the establishment of a sovereign power could
safeguard them from the insecurity, disorder or brutality of the 'state of
nature'. Here the state is a neutral arbiter amongst competing groups and
34

individuals in society capable of protecting each citizen from the State; Power as Elaborated
by Marx, Weber,
encroachment of his or her fellow citizens. The state is therefore a neutral Parsons and Others
entity, acting in the interests of all and representing what can be called the
'common good' or 'public interest'.
The liberal theory has been elaborated by modern writers into a pluralist
theory of state. Pluralist theory argues that political power is dispersed
amongst a wide variety of social groups rather than an elite of ruling class.
It is decentralised, widely shared, diffused and fragmented deriving from
many sources. Arnold Rose, Peter Bentley, Robert Dahl, Talcott Parsons, Neil
Smelser are some of the key pluralist theorists. Robert Dahl, an advocate of
this theory who termed rule by many as ‘polyarchy’. According to pluralist
perspective competition between two or more political parties is an essential
feature of representative government. According to pluralists interest groups
and pressure groups representing various interests play a major role in
affecting the decision making process of state. Pluralists believe that a
rough equality exists amongst organised groups and interests in that each
enjoys some measure of access to government and government is prepared to
listen impartially to all. They claim that competition for office between political
parties provides the electorate with an opportunity to select its leaders and
a means of influencing government policy. Pluralist theory explains the origin
of liberal democratic state. For pluralists, state represents institutionalised
power, an authority and it is in the supreme guardian of representative
democracy in the modern society. The primary task of state is to balance
interests of a multitude of competing groups, represents interests of society
as a whole and coordinating other major institutions. They view the state
itself as a set of competing and conflicting institutions rather than a monolithic
entity which exerts its power over the rest of the society (Smith 1995). They
argue that power exists only in situations of observable conflict and that
people's interests are simply what these overt preferences reveal.
An alternative neo-pluralist theory of the state has been developed by writers

such as J.K. Galbraith and Charles Lindblom. They argue that the modern
industrial state is both more complex and less responsive to popular pressures
than the classical pluralist model suggests. According to them meaning of
democracy is changed from one of direct popular rule to that of competition
between and within elites to control the states. They argue the elites are
not single integrated group but multiple centres of political power. Neo-
pluralists see elites, especially corporate elites as having a greater degree of
influence than other groups on government/state policy and it may constrain
the effective influence of other interest groups.
The elite theory of state argues that all societies are divided into two main
groups the ruling and the ruled. The classical elite theorists such as Vilfredo
Pareto, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels argued that the political power
always lies in the hands of a small elite and the egalitarian ideas such as
socialism (Marxist theory) and democracy (pluralist theory) are a myth. Elite
theorists are concerned with the question of how and why it is that a
minority always rule over the majority, a fact which see as inevitable in any
society. According to them societal power is concentrated in elite groups
who control resources of key social institutions and regardless of how
democratic a society may be elites hold the bulk of power, use all or any
means of power and power becomes end in itself.
Pareto places particular emphasis on psychological characteristics as the basis 35

State Society of elite rule. He argues there are two main types of governing elite, which
he calls 'lions' and 'foxes'. Lions achieve power because of their ability to
take direct and decisive action and they tend to rule by force. Military
dictatorship provides an example of this type of governing elite whereas
foxes rule by cunning and guile, by diplomatic manipulation and wheel dealing.
Major change in society occurs when one elite replaces another a process,
which Pareto calls circulation of elites and he believes history is a never-
ending circulation elites. For him state is a tool in the hands of the ruling
elite. He saw modern democracies as merely another form of elite domination.
Box 19.6: Rule by a Minority

Gaetano Mosca believed that rule by a minority is an inevitable feature of
social life. He claims that in all societies two classes of people appear a
class that rule and a class that ruled. The first class, always the less numerous,
performs all political functions and monopolises power and the advantages
that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class is directed
and controlled by the first. He viewed that there are important differences
between democracies and other forms of rule. By comparison with close
systems such as caste and feudal societies the ruling elite in democratic
societies is open. There is, therefore, a great possibility of an elite drawn
from a wide range of social background. As a result the interest of various
social groups may be represented in the decisions taken by the elites. The
majority may therefore have some control over the government of society.
C.Wright Mills explains elite rule in institutional terms. He argues in his

sociological model of power, “the Power Elite” that the structure of
institutions is such that the top of the institutional hierarchy largely
monopolises power. According to him the American politics was dominated
by big business and the military, commonly referred to as the military industrial
complex, dictate the government policy. He claimed that the picture of the
United States of America as a democratic pluralist society, characterised by
decentralised decision-making and the separation of powers, was false.
Beneath the cover of constitutionality there was in reality a unified class or
power elite which could always get its way on important decisions. The
personnel of this elite were drawn from three interlocking elements in
American society; business, politics and military. Michels took the
concentration of power in the hands of an elite to be a necessary outcome
of complex organisations. His famous 'iron law of oligarchy' states that, in
modern societies, parties need to be highly organised and so inevitably
become oligarchic, being hierarchically run by party leaders and bureaucracy
such that the bulk of members are excluded from decision-making (Michels
1962).
The classical Marxists stressed the coercive role of the state. But neo-
Marxists took account of the apparent legitimacy of the bourgeoisie state
particularly in the light of the achievement of universal suffrage and the
development of the welfare state. Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser
influences post-Marxism to a great extend. According to Antonio Gramsci, in
the modern conditions it is the political party, which forms the state. He
was an advocate of arbiter theory of state. He emphasised that the degree
to which the domination of the ruling class is achieved not only by open
coercion but is also elicited by consent. He argued that the ideological and
36 political superstructures are relatively autonomous of the superstructure. He

believed that bourgeoisie had established hegemony, ideological leadership State; Power as Elaborated
by Marx, Weber,
or domination, over the proletariat and insisted that the state played an Parsons and Others
important role in this process. By hegemony, a key term propounded by
Gramsci, he meant the way in which the dominant class gains consent for
its rule through compromises and alliances with some class fractions and the
disorganisation of others, and also the way in which it maintains that rule
is a stable social formation. According to him hegemony is gained in the first
place in civil society where ideology is embodied in communal forms of life
in such a way that it becomes the taken for granted common sense of the
people. For him all relations of civil society involve issues of power and
struggle, not just class relations. The French Marxist Louis Althusser gives a
functionalist interpretation to the Marxian conception of state. Although he
viewed the state as relatively autonomous of the economic base, for him
the state is fully implicated in the logic of capitalism where it functions to
reproduce the mode of production. He adds, since the capitalist mode of
production requires the state to reproduce its conditions of existence,
there is a reciprocal determination between the economic and political levels
(Althusser 1971).

Examine how pluralists and elitists differ in their deliberations on state and
power.
Although the neo-Marxist theory echoes liberalism in seeing the state as an

arbiter is nevertheless emphasises the class character of the modern state
by pointing out that it operates in the long term interests of capitalism and
therefore perpetuate a system of unequal class power.
Anarchists condemned the state power and they believed that the state and
all forms of political authority are both evil and unnecessary. They view the
state as a concentrated form of oppression; it reflects nothing more than
the desire of those in power often loosely referred to as a ruling class, to
subordinate others for their own benefits.
19.11 Conclusion
This unit familiarised the conceptualisation of state and power as done by
Karl Marx and Max Weber and other thinkers. Marx has explained the concepts
of state and power on the basis of dialectical materialism and the antagonism
of classes. Economic activities like modes of production, means of production
and distribution formed the core idea of Marx for explaining state and power.
Marx emphasised the role of economic power and he argued those who control
the economic power do command the super structures of the society. Weber
defined state as a human community that claims legitimate use of physical
force within a given territory. He explained how the state acquired legitimacy
to use power. He gave primacy to bureaucracy for deciding the affairs of the
state and stressed rationalisation for the legitimate use of authority within
the state. Weber closely linked power with legitimacy. To him class status
and party are three dimensions of stratification in society. Unlike Marx,
Weber did not give much emphasis to economic phenomena. He distinguishes
between charismatic, traditional and legal rational types of domination.
The unit also briefly look into how the concepts state and power are
deliberated in functionalist and other theoretical models such as liberal,
pluralist, neo Marxist and elitist. 37

State Society
Hamilton Peter 1983. Talcott Parsons. Tavistock Publications: London.
Ian, Craib 1997. Classical Social Theory, An Introduction to Marx, Weber and
Simmel. Oxford University Press: Great Britain.
Reinhard, Bendix 1977. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. University of
California Press: U.K.
Weber, Max 1994. Weber: Political Writings. Cambridge University Press: U.K.
19.13 References
Das, Harihara and Chaoudhury 1999. Political Theory: Traditional and Modern
Theory. National Publishing House: New Delhi
Giddens, A. 1995. Politics, Sociology and Social Theory: Encounter with
Classical and Contemporary Social Thoughts. Polity Press: Oxford, U.K.
Goverde, Henri et al (ed.) 2000. Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories,
Practices and Globalisation. Sage Publications: London
Hamilton Peter 1983. Talcott Parsons Tavistock Publications: London
Haralambos, M. 1980. Sociology: Themes and Perspectives. University Tutorial
Press Ltd.:Cambridge
Heywood, Andrew 1994. Political Theory: An Introduction. Palgrave: New York
Ian, Craib 1997. Classical Social Theory, An Introduction to Marx, Weber and
Simmel. Oxford University Press: Great Britain
John P. Diggins 1999. Max Weber: Politics and Spirit of Tragedy. Basic Books:
U.K.
Jones, Philip. lip 1991. Theory and Method in Sociology. Billing and Sons Ltd.
London
Kakabadse. A and C. Parker (Eds) Power, Politics and Organisations: A Behavioral
Science View. New York: John Wiley & Sons
Kate, Nash 2000. Contemporary Political Sociology: Globalisation, Politics and
Power. Blackwell Publishers, U.K.
Lassman Peter 2000. The Rule of Men over Men: Politics, Power and
Legitimation. In
Marx, K. (1990). Capital: Volume I (B. Fowkes, Trans.). New York: Penguin.
Marx, K. and Frederic Engels, (1968), The German Ideology, Moscow: Progress
Publishers
Miller, Richard, Analyzing Marx, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,
1984.
Parsons, T. 1960. On the Concept of Political Power. In Turner, Bryan. S. 1999.
The Talcott Parsons Reader. Blackwell: U.K.
Parsons, T. 1960. The Distribution of Power in American Society. In Turner,
Bryan. S. 1999. The Talcott Parsons Reader. Blackwell: U.K.
Reinhard, Bendix 1977. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. University of
California Press: U.K.
Robert Alan Jones 1986. Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four Major
Works. Sage Publications: London
Robertson, Roland and Bryan. S. Turner (ed.) 1991. Talcott Parsons: Theorist
of Modernity. Sage Publications: London
38

Singer, Peter, Marx: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University State; Power as Elaborated
by Marx, Weber,
Press, 2000 Parsons and Others
Turner Bryan (ed.) 1996. Social Theory. Blckwell Publishers, U.K.

Turner, Bryan. S. 1999. The Talcott Parsons Reader. Blackwell: U.K.
Turner, Stephen (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Weber. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge
Weber, Max 1994. Weber: Political Writings. Cambridge University Press: U.K.
Wetherly, Paul. 1998. A Capitalist State? Marx's Ambiguous Legacy. In Cowling
Mark (ed.) The Communist Manifesto: New Interpretations. Edinburgh
University Press: Edinburgh
Wolff, Jonathan 2002. Why Read Marx Today? Oxford University Press: Oxford
39

Unit 20
Citizenship
Contents
20.1 Introduction
20.2 Historical Perspective
20.3 Definition
20.4 Global Citizenship
20.5 Dual Citizenship
20.6 State and the Citizen
20.7 Nation-state and the Citizenship
20.8 Rights and Duties of the Citizenship
20.9 Civil Society
20.10 Multiculturalism and the Citizenship
20.11 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After reading this unit you would be able to
define global and dual citizenship
outline the rights and duties as a citizen
describe the nation of civil liberty
20.1 Introduction
Citizenship is one of the most commonly used terms in a democracy. It is
used at all levels of politics; in formal legal documents, in laws, in
constitutions, in party manifestoes and in speeches. But what is citizenship?
Or, who is a citizen? A citizen is not anyone who lives in a nation-state.
Among those who live in a nation-state, there are citizens and aliens. A
citizen is not just an inhabitant. He or she does not merely live in the
territory of a state. A citizen is one who participates in the process of
government. In a democratic society, there must be a two-way traffic
between the citizens and the government. All governments demand certain
duties from the citizens. But, in return, the state must also admit some
demands on itself. These are called rights. A citizen must have political
rights. A person who is ruled by laws but who has no political rights is not
a citizen.
It is not possible to have citizens under all types of governments.

Governments, which are not democratic, cannot, strictly speaking, have
citizens. They have only rulers and subjects. In governments which are not
democratic, people who live in the country often have only obligations
towards the state and no rights. The government expects them to perform
their duties, to pay taxes, to obey laws, to do whatever else the government
wants of them. But they cannot question their rulers or ask them to explain
their actions. Politics in these societies is like a one-way traffic. The
government tells the people what to do and what not to, but does not
40

listen to them. Only the rulers have rights. The ruled or the subjects have Citizenship
duties laid down for them by the governors. Such undemocratic governments
have been much more common than democratic ones. Feudal states were
terribly undemocratic. There have been thoroughly undemocratic states in
modern times, too. Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy are examples of the most
brutal authoritarian state. So were the most colonial states. Democratic
governments are not necessarily associated with the advanced industrial
societies of the West. The British were reputed for their democratic system
of governance. But they maintained the worst autocratic governments in
their colonies. France is a democratic country, but fought a savage colonial
war in Algeria. Most colonial states practiced democracy at home but
authoritarianism abroad. Industrial societies like Germany and Italy produced
most brutal fascist governments during inter war period. Historically, the
term citizenship was linked with the rise of democracy. The demand for
democratic government came up first in the western societies like England,
France, and the United States of America.
Democracy means that everybody should have political rights. When one has
political rights, the right to vote, the right to participate in deciding about
important questions facing one’s society, one is a citizen. Universal suffrage
is a recent phenomenon. The ideas of democracy made people fight for their
rights. Many of the ideas which democracy is made up were accepted after
the great revolutions. For instance, after the revolution France became a
republic. All citizens were made equal and had the same rights. The
revolutionaries published a declaration of the rights of man. This became a
symbol of democratic revolutions in Europe. Initially, very few people had
the right to vote, or stand for election. But people fought for the universal
adult franchise. Finally, universal adult suffrage was accepted and everybody
came to have the right to vote.
The word citizen was made popular by the French Revolution in 1789. Later
on, this word was used whenever democratic governments were constituted.
At present it is common usage to treat people in democratic societies as
citizens. It means, above all, that in relation to his government, the individual
is active, not simply passive. He does not only obey and listen to what the
government says. The government must also listen to him in turn. He has the
right to express his views freely, to be consulted and to be involved in the
politics of his country. The citizen does not only enjoy rights. He also has
some duties towards his country, society and fellow citizens. A citizen is a
person who enjoys rights that the constitution provides; and enjoyment of
rights also imposes some duties upon him. A good citizen is one who is
conscious of his rights and duties.
One essential thing for a democratic state is that citizens must participate
in the governing process. The quality of democracy improves if citizens from
all walks of life can participate in its activities and if they take interest in
the basic processes of making important decisions for their society. Democracy
implies that the decisions affecting the whole society should be taken as far
as possible by the whole society. Participation of ordinary citizens makes the
government more responsive, and the citizens more responsible. Citizens’
participation is the basis of responsible, limited and constitutional
government.
41

State Society
Box 20.1: Idea of Citizenship
The idea of citizenship means that not only the government has some claims
on the citizen, the citizen too has some claims on the government. A
government is an association like many others in society. But it is an
association of a special kind, an association that one simply cannot escape
or be indifferent about. Democrats rightly feel that since the government
control the people, it is good that people must have some kind of control
over the government. The best government is one in which the largest
number of people participates in making decisions for the whole society.
This participation of ordinary people is precisely what is called citizenship.
The idea of citizenship is closely linked to participation of people in
government. This is how the ideas of democracy and citizenship are linked
to each other.
20.2 Historical Perspective

In modern times, three major issues have dominated the world. First, the
place of the church and various religions within the nation-state. Second
the admission of the lower strata, particularly the workers, to full political
and economic ‘citizenship’ through universal suffrage and the right to bargain
collectively. And third, the struggle for the equitable distribution of the
national income among the people.
The place of the church in society was fought through and resolved in most
of the nations in the 18th and 19th centuries. The citizenship issue has also
been resolved in various ways. The United States and Britain gave the workers
suffrage in the 19th century. In countries like Sweden, which resisted until
the first part of the 20th century, the struggle for citizenship became combined
with socialism as a political movement, thereby producing a revolutionary
socialism. In other words, where the workers were denied both economic
and political rights, their struggle for redistribution of income and status
was superimposed on a revolutionary ideology. Where the economic and
status struggle developed outside of this context, the ideology with which
it was linked tended to be that of gradualist reform. The workers in Prussia,
for example, were denied free and equal suffrage until the revolution of
1918 and thereby clung to revolutionary Marxism. In southern Germany, where
full citizenship rights were granted in the late 19th century, reformist,
democratic, and non-revolutionary socialism was dominant. In France, the
workers won the suffrage but were refused basic economic rights until after
World War II. The workers have won their fight for full citizenship in the
Western nation-states.
Representatives of the lower strata are now part of the governing groups.
The basic political issue of the industrial revolution, the incorporation of the
workers into the legitimate body politic, has been settled. The key domestic
issue today is collective bargaining over differences in the division of the
total product within the framework of a welfare state.
In the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa the situation is somewhat
different from the Western nation-state. In Western nations the workers
were faced with the problem of winning citizenship from the dominant
aristocratic and business strata. In Asia and Africa the long-term presence of
colonial rulers has identified conservative ideology and the more well to do
42 classes with subservience to colonialism, while leftist ideologies have been

identified with nationalism. The trade unions and workers’ parties of Asia Citizenship
and Africa have been a legitimate part of the political process from the
beginning of the democratic system.
20.3 Definition
Since antiquity, citizenship has been defined as the legal status of membership
in a political community. Under Roman jurisprudence, citizenship came to
mean someone free to act by law, free to ask and expect the law’s protection.
This legal status signified a special attachment between the individual and
the political community. In general, it entitled the citizenship to whatever
prerogatives and responsibilities that were attached to membership. With
the creation of the modern state, citizenship came to signify certain equality
with regard to the rights and duties of membership in the community. The
modern state began to administer citizenship; it determines who gets
citizenship, what the associated benefits are, and what rights and privileges
it entails. As a legal status, citizenship has come to imply a unique, reciprocal,
and unmediated relationship between the individual and the political
community. Citizenship, in short, is nothing less than the right to have
rights.
Full participating membership of a territorial state is citizenship. The term

implies a universal basis: either all adults or some general category of them,
for instance males or property holders, are citizens. It is a predominantly
western concept, originating in Greece and Rome, current in small city-
states in medieval Europe, then expanding enormously in capitalist societies
of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Given a central place by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall in Citizenship

and Social Class, an analysis of the development of class conflict in modern
states, which is a combination of Marxian and Weberian insights. Capitalism
increased the pervasiveness of class conflict in modern societies; citizenship
in the territorial state represented not its elimination, but its
institutionalisation, and the conversion of national into nation-states. In
Britain this occurred in three stages. (1) In the 18th century, civil citizenship:
equality before the law, personal liberty, freedom of speech, thought and
religion, the right to own property and make contracts. (2) In the 19th century,
political citizenship: electoral and office-holding rights. (3) In the 20th century,
social citizenship: a basic level of economic and social welfare, the welfare
state, and full participation in national culture. Subsequent research has
supported the general applicability of the model to advanced capitalist nation-
states, though with many particular qualifications. Bendix in Nation-Building
and Citizenship attempted to apply the model to third world countries.
In political and legal theory, citizenship refers to the rights and duties of the
member of a nation-state or city. In some historical contexts, a citizen was
any member of a city; that is an urban collectivity, which was relatively
immune from the demands of a monarch or state. In classical Greece,
citizenship was limited to free men, who had a right to participate in political
debate because they contributed, often through military service, to the
direct support of the city-state. Historians argue that citizenship has thus
expanded with democratisation to include a wider definition of the citizen
regardless of sex, age, or ethnicity. The concept was revived in the context
of the modern state, notably during the French and American Revolutions,
and gradually identified more with rights than obligations. In modern times 43

State Society citizenship refers conventionally to the various organisations which
institutionalise these rights in the welfare state.
In sociology, recent theories of citizenship have drawn their inspiration from

T.H. Marshall, who defined citizenship as a status, which is enjoyed by a
person who is a full member of a community. Citizenship has three
components: civil, political, and social. Civil rights are necessary for individual
freedoms and are institutionalised in the law courts. Political citizenship
guarantees the right to participate in the exercise of political power in the
community, either by voting, or by holding political office. Social citizenship
is the right to participate in an appropriate standard of living; this right is
embodied in the welfare and educational systems of modern societies. The
important feature of Marshall’s theory was his view that there was a
permanent tension or contradiction between the principles of citizenship
and the operation of the capitalist market. Capitalism inevitably involves
inequalities between social classes, while citizenship involves some
redistribution of resources, because of rights, which are shared equally by
all.
Marshall’s theory has given rise to many disputes. Critics argue that it is a
description of the English experience only, and it is not a comparative analysis
of citizenship. It has an evolutionary and teleological view of the inevitable
expansion of citizenship, and does not examine social processes, which
undermine citizenship. It does not address gender differences in the
experience of citizenship. It fails to address other types of citizenship, such
as economic citizenship; and it is not clear about the causes of the expansion
of citizenship. Some sociologists believe that Marshall’s argument can be
rescued from these criticisms if the original theory is modified.
There are very different traditions of citizenship in different societies. Active

citizenship, which is based on the achievement of rights through social
struggle, is very different from passive citizenship, which is handed down
from above by the state. There are also very different theoretical approaches
to understanding the structure of the public and private realm in conceptions
of citizenship. For some sociologists, such as Talcott Parsons, the growth of
citizenship is a measure of the modernisation of society because it is based
on values of universalism and achievement. These different theoretical
traditions are primarily the product of two opposite views of citizenship. It
is either viewed as an aspect of bourgeois liberalism, in which case it involves
a conservative view of social participation, or it is treated as a feature of
radical democratic politics. It is either dismissed as a mere reform of capitalism,
or it is regarded as a fundamental plank of democracy. Recently, sociologists
have gone beyond these traditional theories of democracy, liberalism, and
civil society, to ask questions about the changing relationships between
individuals, communities, and states, in a world in which the nation-state
is increasingly subject to influences from supranational institutions. Will
globalisation replace state citizenship with a truly universal conception of
human rights?
20.4 Global Citizenship

Citizenship is an obsolete concept since its cause, the nation state, itself
has become obsolete. In a globalised world where technology and trade are
creating transnational communities, global citizenship is the beginning of a
44 process that will obliterate boxed identities defined by blood and soil. This

will not just expand our consciousness as citizens of the world but also help Citizenship
us tide over tensions that have been the product of ethnic and national
histories. Nation states have the tendency to influence the course of history
by imposing on it feuds and rivalries from the past. These impulses of history
have been responsible for large-scale bloodshed. The holocaust was a result
of the Nazi quest for a racially pure national identity. Similar state-sponsored
mass murders have occurred in the Balkans and Africa in the twentieth
century. The long standing wars and border disputes all over the world—
Palestine, Kashmir, Rwanda, Chechnya— are all a result of our inability to
traverse the faultlines of regionalism, religion and ethnicity. Citizenship has
been the passport to partake in this dance macabre of violence. It does not
offer one the choice of identity but imposes an identity that brings with it
a history of prejudice and violence. Any measure that attempts to dilute the
influence of a narrow, national identity is welcome.
Box 20.2: The Information Age

Marshall McLuhan predicted the global village in the 1960s. That is now a
reality. As sociologists like Manuel Castells argue, we are in the information
age. Aided by the flow of people and capital, new social networks are
emerging. These seek to imagine a world without borders. Such a world is
obviously too cosmopolitan to entertain constricted visions of nationalism.
What is needed today is the option to explore multiple identities without
creating a hierarchy of them. Global citizenship endorses this view. It allows
people to be stakeholders in the future of more than one country and
culture. It takes us closer to the Upanishadic vision of vasudaiva kutumbakam
(entire world is a one family).
20.5 Dual Citizenship

Assimilation of a migrant community into their adoptive society is not about
giving up your own ethnic or cultural identity. Assimilation is all about making
your host country more comfortable with you, and you with it, to the
mutual benefit of both. The concept of dual citizenship is an anachronism
in today’s globalised world. It is contrary to the process of assimilation of
the migrant community into the host society. Those aspiring for it show a
parochial mindset. Such a mindset stands in the way of merging with the
mainstream and results in social and cultural ghettoisation. More importantly,
it is something that is likely to be resented by the locals of the adoptive
country and could lead to a backlash.
Dual citizenship is also likely to cause heartburn among the local residents,
who might feel that the migrants are being rewarded for having deserted
the homeland for greener pastures. In the context of India, the dual
citizenship gives the emigrant Indian the unfair advantage of having his cake
and eating it too. Indians who migrate should accept all that goes with
migration. Especially those who left India after independence and who are
the main beneficiaries of the dual citizenship scheme of the Government of
India. Unlike indentured labourers, they were not forced to migrate. They
were well-educated, well-off professionals who chose to go elsewhere because
it was more comfortable and lucrative. Why then should they continue to
seek a foothold in their country of origin? If it is the business in which they
are interested in, then why can not they trade and invest like other foreigners?
The truth is, dual citizenship is all about material benefit and convenience.
It confers the right and ability to Non-resident Indians to travel, study, work,
45

State Society and buy property anywhere in India. There is no emotional attachment to
homeland in it.
20.6 State and the Citizen

The state is an important political organisation that exists within society.
However, it is not the only social organisation. There are many other
organisations which exist in society, e.g., family, religious, cultural economic
and other organisations. All these organisations are established for the
achievement of some consciously defined objectives and thus limited
purposes. So, the purposes for which the state stands are not all the purposes
which man seeks in society. All the organisations pursue their goals in different
ways. The state pursues its objectives mainly through law and the coercive
force behind it. But that is only one of the ways in which men strive to
achieve their desired ends. There is no doubt, however, that the state plays
a exceedingly important and increasingly decisive role in the lives of the
individuals.
One of the reasons for its pervasive impact is its universality. All the people
in a territorial society come under the jurisdiction of the state. In their
relationship with the state, they are known as citizens. Another reason for
the predominant role of the state in the lives of the citizens is the expanding
scope of its activities. Still another reason is the use of coercive force,
which only the state can employ in the pursuit of its objectives. The police
and defence forces are coercive structures of the state. Another is
bureaucracy, a well organised army of government officials who in their
dealings with citizens, stand as organs of authority.
Because of its universality, the state’s dealings with the citizens become
peculiarly impersonal; as expressed in the bureaucracy. Since the state
includes all men, its prescriptions apply to all men without the many actual
distinctions of value-systems and separate interests. The same law applies
to all. So, whatever policies a government may pursue, there would be many
citizens and groups of citizens who would be opposed to the existing laws
and policies because they believe that a particular law or a particular policy
does not serve their interests but those of others.
Sometimes a law may compel a person to do what his conscience forbids him
to do and vice versa. And because the law is enforced by coercive power,
the citizen may carry the impression that the state or government is an
external force denying them the freedom and liberty which they value.
There may be issues of morality, private sentiments, high social values or
interests of mankind as a whole coming in conflict with the prescriptions of
the state. When the state extends its sphere of activity to hitherto excluded
areas of social life, this may be regarded as an expropriating attempt by the
state and, therefore, resented and opposed. Thus the issues of relationship
between the state and the citizen have been matters of genuine concern
and endless controversy.

Distinguish between State and Citizens. In what way is each the reflection
of the other?
46

20.7 Nation-State and the Citizenship Citizenship
Of late, assertion of ethno-religious identities has emerged as a dominant

global reality. This has, in turn, questioned the basic premises of the nation-
state, which was conceived as the most authentic expression of group life
and all encompassing political community. The strong faith reposed in the
idea of nation-state and citizenship as means of striking equality, protecting
liberty and promoting fraternity among the people of diverse social-economic
groups stands shattered. The neutrality of the state and disjunction between
ethnicity and state is under question. The basic assumptions of the hyphenated
concept of nation-state are contested by the emergent global reality of
ethno-national movements, assertion of minorities for their identity and
rights, and a strong politics of identity and politics of representation. Now
minority and disadvantaged groups are demanding their space in the structure
of governance. Autonomy and self-governing rights are major agenda of the
new social movement across the world. This has resulted into compounding
ethnic conflicts in different parts of the world.
Nation-state is Euro-centric construct, and in many situations and conditions

state has been conflated with nation in their conceptualisation. The conflation
of state and nation has given rise to many wrong policies of the state
towards its ethnic groups and minorities. The occurrences of ethnic violence
are not unconnected with the approach of the state towards different
ethnic groups. This is not confined only to the case of the developing world
which have attempted to emulate the model of the West for building their
own structure of state and society but also in the developed world of the
West which have been regarded as the citadels of the idea of nation-state.
The politics of identity and ethnicity has emerged very forceful. The concept
of nation and state has been the part of the grand narratives of modernity.
Consequently, the project of nation and state building in third world countries
has not been congruent with the European experience, for the societies in
these countries have been traditional and diverse. Multiple allegiances have
not been co-terminus with the loyalties to the nation-state of the western
construct.
Language and territory are main basis of nation formation. There are strong
tendencies to conflate state to nation and state building as the nation
building. This conflation has given rise to multiple and compounded problem
of programmes and policies of the state towards the ethnic groups. Religion
cannot provide authentic basis of nation formation and national identity.
Therefore, any effort to espouse nationalism by invoking religious exclusivity
is not only alienating but also exclusionary. Any such effort in the past has
not succeeded and it is bound to fail in the future also.
20.8 Rights and Duties of the Citizenship

Harold J. Laski asserts that every state is known by the rights that it maintains.
The state is not merely a sovereign organisation which is entitled to the
citizen’s allegiance and which has the power to get its will obeyed. The
citizen owes, and normally renders allegiance to the state and carries out its
commands. However, the citizen does not render allegiance and obedience
to the state merely for their own sake. On the contrary, he does so because
of his conviction that the state exists and functions for the achievement of
common welfare, which includes his own welfare. The citizen has his
obligations to the state. At the same time, the state has an obligation
47

State Society towards citizen, namely, the obligation to provide and maintain those
conditions and opportunities, which facilitate the fullest development of his
physical, mental and moral faculties. The citizen is entitled to these
conditions and opportunities. In other words, they are his rights.
Rights are closely related to duties. Rights imply duties. Rights and duties
are two aspects of the same coin. Rights represent a man’s ‘claims’ on
society while duties indicate what he owes to society so as to be able to
enjoy his rights. Thus, while society guarantees security and well being to
the citizen, the citizen owes to society the duty to make his contribution
to the security and well being of the community as a whole. In other words,
the citizen owes to society as much as he claims from it. His rights are not
independent of society. He cannot act unsocially.
There is a twofold relationship between rights and duties. In the first place,
every right implies a corresponding duty. A right belonging to one individual
imposes on others the duty to respect his right. His right, therefore, is their
duty. In the second place, a right is not only a means to the individual’s self-
development, it is also a means to the promotion of general welfare. Every
right of a citizen is accompanied by the duty that he should use it for the
common good. Rights, valuable and indispensable as they are, are not absolute
or unlimited. Rights and duties are correlative. As a citizen, man owes some
obligations and duties to his fellow citizens and to society is universally
recognised. As in the case of rights, the obligations of citizenship are also
equally applicable to all alike.
20.9 Civil Society

The term ‘civil society’ was used by writers such as Locke and Rousseau to
describe civil government as differentiated from natural society or the state
of nature. The Marxist concept derives from Hegel. In Hegel, civil or bourgeois
society, as the realm of individuals who have left the unity of the family to
enter into economic competition, is contrasted with the state, or political
society. For Hegel it is only through the state that the universal interest can
prevail, since he disagrees with Locke, Rousseau or Adam Smith that there
is any innate rationality in civil society, which will lead to the general good.
Marx uses the concept of civil society in his critique of Hegel. Marx uses civil
society in his early writing as a yardstick of the change from feudal to
bourgeois society. Civil society arose, Marx insists, from the destruction of
medieval society. Previously individuals were part of many different societies,
such as guilds or estates each of which had a political role, so that there was
no separate civil realm. As these partial societies broke down, civil society
arose in which the individual became all-important. The old bonds of privilege
were replaced by the selfish needs of atomistic individuals separated from
each other and from the community. The only links between them are provided
by the law, which is not the product of their will and does not conform to
their nature but dominates human relationships because of the threat of
punishment. The fragmented, conflictual nature of civil society with its
property relations necessitates a type of politics, which does not reflect
this conflict but is abstracted and removed from it. The modern state is
made necessary and at the same time limited by the characteristics of civil
society. The fragmentation and misery of civil society escape the control of
the state, which is limited to formal, negative activities and is rendered
impotent by the conflict, which is the essence of economic life. The political
48 identity of individuals as citizens in modern society is severed from their

civil identity and from their function in the productive sphere as tradesman, Citizenship
day-labourer, or landowner.
Box 20.3: Ideal of the State

In Marx’s analysis two divisions grow up simultaneously, between individuals
enclosed in their privacy, and between the public and private domains, or
between state and society. Marx contrasts the idealism of universal interests
as represented by the modern state and the abstractness of the concept of
a citizen who is moral because he goes beyond his narrow interest, with the
materialism of real, sensuous man in civil society. The irony according to
Marx is that in modern society the most universal, moral, social purposes
as embodied in the ideal of the state are at the service of human beings
in a partial, depraved state of individual egotistical desires, of economic
necessity. It is in this sense that the essence of the modern state is to be
found in the characteristics of civil society, in economic relations. For the
conflict of civil society to be truly superseded and for the full potential of
human beings to be realised, both civil society and its product, political
society, must be abolished, necessitating a social as well as a political
revolution to liberate mankind.
Although Gramsci continues to use the term to refer to the private or non-
state sphere, including the economy, his picture of civil society is very
different from that of Marx. It is not simply a sphere of individual needs but
of organisations, and has the potential of rational self-regulation and freedom.
Gramsci insists on its complex organisation, as the ‘ensemble of organisms
commonly called ‘private’ where ‘hegemony’ and ‘spontaneous consent’ are
organised. He argues that any distinction between civil society and the
state is only methodological, since even a policy of non-intervention like
laissez-faire is established by the state itself. The metaphors he uses to
describe the precise relationship between the state and civil society vary.
A fully developed civil society is presented as a trench system able to resist
the incursions of economic crises and to protect the state. Whereas Marx
insists on the separation between the state and civil society, Gramsci
emphasises the inter-relationship between the two. The state narrowly
conceived as government is protected by hegemony organised in civil society
while the coercive state apparatus fortifies the hegemony of the dominant
class. Yet the state also has an ethical function as it tries to educate public
opinion and to influence the economic sphere. In turn, the very concept of
law must be extended, Gramsci suggests, since elements of custom and
habit can exert a collective pressure to conform in civil society without
coercion or sanctions.
In any actual society the lines of demarcation between civil society and the
state may be blurred, but Gramsci argues against any attempt to equate or
identify the two. And while he accepts a role for the state in developing
civil society, he warns against perpetuating statolatry or state worship. Gramsci
redefines the withering away of the state in terms of a full development of
the self-regulating attributes of civil society. In Marx’s writings civil society
is portrayed as the terrain of individual egotism. Gramsci refers to Hegel’s
discussion of the estates and corporations as organising elements, which
represent corporate interests in a collective way in civil society, and the role
of the bureaucracy and the legal system in regulating civil society and
connecting it to the state.
49

State Society A reading of the concept of civil society in both Marxist and non-Marxist
thinkers leads to an examination of the concept of politics itself. It involves
the relationship between individuals, and between individuals and the
community, a view of society as organised or not, the delineation of public
and private.

Distinguish between multiculturalism and pluralism in social culture.
20.10 Multiculturalism and the Citizenship

The problem of multicultural accommodation is high on the global political
agenda. Accommodation refers to a wide range of state measures designed
to facilitate identity groups’ practices and norms. Due to the anti-ancient
regime legacy of standard conceptions of citizenship, individual rights generally
are prioritized over assertions of legal entitlements based on sub-national
group affiliation. Thus liberal, civic-republican, and ethno-cultural models of
membership all share in common a basic mistrust of ‘identity groups’ as a
relevant component of citizenship theory. The term ‘identity groups’ here
refers to a range of cultural, religious, or ethnic groups that are recognisable
by virtue of their nomos. ‘Identity groups’ are distinguishable by a unique
history and collective memory; a distinct culture or set of social norms,
customs, and traditions; or perhaps an experience of maltreatment by
mainstream society.
Proponents of a multicultural understanding of citizenship are concerned

with the power of the state and dominant social groups to erode identity
groups. This concern derives from a philosophical position that stresses the
role of culture in constituting a person’s understanding of who they are, of
their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being. Charles Taylor
in his famous essay The Politics of Recognition, argues that we form our
identities and our conceptions of ourselves as free and equal agents through
a dialogical process, using certain given cultural scripts. Culture, under this
view, is not just something that we use to understand and evaluate the
world; it also is a fundamental part of us.
Membership in an identity group combined with active participation in its

cultural expressions as distinct from mere blood ties can provide individuals
with an intelligible context of choice and a secure sense of identity and
belonging. This emphasis on the links among culture, identity, and group
membership stands at the core of the quest for a new multicultural
understanding of citizenship. Under this new understanding, persons stand
forth with their differences acknowledged and respected, and they participate
in the public sphere without shedding their distinct identities. This approach
departs from blindness to difference ideal and aims to carve out a
philosophical and legal rationale for recognising identity groups as deserving
of special or differentiated rights. The multicultural understanding of
citizenship therefore departs from the perception of all citizens as individuals
who are merely members of a larger political community. Instead it views
them as having equal rights as individuals while simultaneously meriting
differentiated rights as members of identity groups. Hence in legal terms,
the move toward a multicultural citizenship model raises potential conflicts
among three components: the identity group, the state, and the individual.
50

20.11 Conclusion Citizenship
In this unit, we have discussed the various aspect of citizenship. The concept
of citizenship has been defined in the legal and historical perspectives. Its
evolution has been delineated from Greek city-states to modern nation-
state. Earlier it was a rare privilege of few, now it is the legal political rights
of every human being residing in a territory called state. Citizenship refers
to the relationship between individuals and the state. Citizenship confers
certain legal and political rights and it is the duty of state to enforce and
protect these rights. Not only states, citizens also have certain duties towards
their fellow being, society, and the state. The concept of citizenship is
closely linked to the concept of democracy. In non-democratic societies we
have subjects but no citizens. Citizenship means active participation of the
people in the decision-making, and the process of governance.
With the emergence of globalisation, the concept of nation-state has become

obsolete and with it the concept of citizenship has also lost its sheen. Now,
in place of state citizenship, there is talk of global citizenship. Upnishidic
vision of vasudhaiv kutumbkam is on the verge of realisation. There is also
greater demand for dual citizenship in view of large-scale migration of
population from one country to another. India has recently granted dual
citizenship to people of Indian origin living in some countries.
Modern society has been described civil or bourgeois society by Marxist and
non-Marxist thinkers. Civil society refers to the realm of private sphere of
an individual. The economic competition and the independence of the
individual characterise civil society. Unity of the family and other medieval
associations is absent in the civil society. Civil society has emerged from the
destruction of medieval society. For non-Marxist thinkers, it is a rational
system, which ensures the social welfare. Marxist thinkers, however, don’t
agree with this thesis.
Contemporary society is a multicultural society characterised by the diverse

cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. Multiculturalism aims at
accommodating diverse identity groups into a homogeneous society, without
eroding their distinct identity. Multiculturalism promotes unity in diversity
and is opposed to assimilation of distinct identity groups. There exists a
links among culture, identity, and group membership. This is at the core of
the quest for a new multicultural understanding of citizenship.

T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (1950)
R. Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (1964)
Jack Barbalet, Citizenship (1988)
Bryan S. Turner (ed.), Citizenship and Social Theory (1993)
M. Bulmer and A.M. Rees (eds.), Citizenship Today: The Contemporary
Relevance of T.H. Marshall (1996)
Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, in Amy Gutmann ed.,
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (1994)
51

Unit 21
Civil Society and Democracy
Contents
21.1 Introduction
21.2 Civil Society: A Retrospection
21.3 Democracy: A Universal Appeal
21.4 The Scope of Civil Society
21.5 Relationship between Civil Society and Democracy
21.6 Functions of Civil Society in a Democratic Order
21.7 Civil Society as a Promoter of Democracy
21.8 The Democratic Dangers of Civil Society
21.9 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After you have read this unity you will be able to
explain what is civil society
outline the relationship between civil society and democracy
democractise of danger of civil society
21.1 Introduction
In the recent years the concept like ‘civil society’ and concern for democracy
has gained much of the space in academic discussions, debates and writings
around the world. In the world of ideas, civil society is hot. It is almost
impossible to read an article on foreign or domestic policy without coming
across some mention of the concept. Though the terminology ‘civil society’
and ‘democracy’ is as old as the social science is yet they have undergone
radical change in its meaning and essence. For our understanding of the
concepts, it would be desirable to have a look at the historical perspectives
of these concepts, where different intellectuals have placed their thoughts
in these directions.
21.2 Civil Society: A Retrospection

The rise in popularity of civil society was largely due to the struggles against
tyranny waged by resistance groups in Latin America, Africa and the former
communist world. The period of 1980s and 1990s witnessed the advent of a
global democratic revolution of unprecedented proportions, unions, women’s
organisations, student groups and other forms of popular activism provided
the resurgent and often rebellious civil societies in triggering the demise of
many forms of dictatorship. These developments encouraged the rise of the
complex notion that if an invigorated civil society could force a democratic
transition, it could consolidate democracy as well.
The term ‘civil society’ can be traced through the works of Cicero and other
Romans to the ancient Greek philosophers. In its classical usage civil society
was largely equated with the state. The modern idea of civil society found
expression in the Scottish and Continental Enlightenment of the late 18th
52

century. Here a range of political philosophers, from Thomas Paine to George Civil Society and
Democracy
Hegel, developed the notion of civil society as a domain parallel to but
separate from the state where citizens associate according to their own
interests and wishes. Hegel’s nineteenth-century notion of civil society
included the market in contrast to contemporary concepts of civil society as
a non-profit sector. This new definition reflected changing economic realities:
the rise of private property, market competition and the bourgeoisie. It also
resulted in the mounting popular demand for liberty, as manifested in the
American English and French revolutions.
The term, however, lost its concurrence in the mid-19th century as political
philosophers and sociologists turned their attention to the social and political
consequences of the industrial revolution. It bounced back into fashion
after World War II through the writings of the Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci
who revived the term to portray civil society as a special nucleus of
independent political activity, a crucial sphere of struggle against tyranny.
Although Gramsci was concerned about dictatorships of the right, his books
were influential in the 1970s and 1980s amongst persons fighting against
dictatorships of all political stripes in Eastern Europe and Latin America.
Czech, Hungarian, and Polish activists also wrapped themselves in the banner
of civil society, endowing it with a heroic quality when the Berlin Wall fell.
Understanding the importance of the given concept, recently David Held

tried to give shape to the concept of ‘civil society’ through a sociological
definition. In his words, “Civil society retains a distinctive character to the
extent that it is made up of areas of social life—the domestic world, the
economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction—which are
organised by private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups
outside the direct control of the state.”
Suddenly, in the 1990s, civil society became a mantra for everyone from
presidents to political scientists. The global trend toward democracy opened
up space for civil society in formerly dictatorial countries around the world.
In the United States and Western Europe, public fatigue with tired party
systems sparked interest in civil society as a means of social renewal.
Especially in the developing world, privatisation and other market reforms
offered civil society the chance to step in as governments retracted their
reach. And the information revolution provided new tools for forging
connections and empowering citizens. Civil society became a key element of
the post-cold-war zeitgeist.
21.3 Democracy: A Universal Appeal

Like ‘civil society’, ‘democracy’ has also been a fluid concept across the
times and places. Sharp contrast could be visualised between ancient Athenian
democracy and modern liberal democracy, representative democracy and
deliberative democracy, national democracy and cosmopolitan democracy.
Yet a common theme runs through all these conceptions of democracy that
it is a condition where a community of people exercises collective self-
determination. Through democracy, members of a given public demos take
decisions that shape their destiny jointly, with equal rights and opportunities
of participation and without arbitrarily imposed constraints on debate. Given
the paucity of space it would be sufficient to say that democracy is essentially
participatory, consultative, transparent and publicly accountable. By one 53

State Society mechanism or another, democratic governance rests on the consent of the
governed.
Emphasis added, democracy is constructed in relation to context and should

be reconstructed when that context changes. Contemporary globalisation
constitutes the sort of change of situation that requires new approaches to
democracy.
According to Schmitter and Karl, for purposes of clarity and consistency,

modern political democracy is defined as “a system of governance in which
rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens,
acting indirectly through the cooperation of their elected representatives”
Before, we attempt to make analysis of the relationship between civil society

and democracy, how far they could be complementary in promoting each
other, it would be imperative to have a view of the over-arching concept of
civil society.
21.4 The Scope of Civil Society

The much of the current enthusiasm about civil society is its fascination
with non-governmental organisations, especially advocacy groups devoted to
public interest and causes and its concern for environment human rights,
women’s issues, rights of the disabled, election monitoring, anticorruption,
etc. Such groups have been on the increase in recent years, particularly in
the countries under influence of democratic transitions. However, it would
be a misconception to equate civil society with mere NGOs. Whereas civil
society is a much broader concept, encompassing all the organisations and
associations that exist outside the state including political parties and the
market oriented organisations, it includes the plethora of organisations that
political scientists traditionally label— interest groups or pressure groups.
Apart from NGOs, labour unions, professional associations (such as those of
doctors and lawyers), chambers of commerce, ethnic associations and others.
The list is all comprehensive; it also incorporates many other associations
that exist for purposes other than advancing specific social or political agendas,
such as religious organisations, student groups, cultural organisations, sports
clubs and informal community groups.
Emphasise added, non-governmental organisations do play important role in

developed and developing countries. They help in formulating policy by
exerting pressure on governments and by furnishing technical expertise to
policy makers. They induce citizen participation and civic education. They
provide leadership training to young people who want to engage in civic life
but are apathetic towards political parties. In theocratic and dictatorial
countries NGOs are outweighed by more traditional parts of civil society.
Religious organisations, cultural organisations and other groups often have a
mass base in the population and secure domestic sources of funding. Here,
advocacy groups usually lack domestic funding.
The burgeoning NGO sectors in such countries are often dominated by elite-
run groups that have only weak ties with the citizens and for their functioning
they largely depend on international funders for budgets they cannot nourish
from domestic sources.
54 Apart from these positive contours of civil society formation, it is worth

pointing out that the mafia and militia groups are also as much as part of the Civil Society and
Democracy
civil society as the other humane organisations are. Some civil society
enthusiasts have propagated the one sided notion that civil society consists
only of noble causes and welfare action-oriented programmes. Yet civil society
everywhere is a mixture of the good, the bad, and the outright bizarre. A
random surfing through web pages on the Internet helps convey a sense of
that diversity where one gets through the real scope of civil society.
If one limits civil society to those actors who pursue higher humane aims,
the concept becomes, ‘a theological notion, not a political or sociological
one’, which could injure the notion of society itself.
21.5 Relationship between Civil Society and

Democracy
It is emphasised here that in certain conditions civil society can contribute
to the democratisation of authoritarian regimes and can help to sustain a
democratic system of governance once it is established. For example, in the
Eastern European countries, South Africa, Serbia, Philippines, and recently
in Georgia, citizens have used civil society organisations to wage struggle for
political independence by learning about democracy and by mobilising millions
of their fellow citizens against repressive regimes.
In democratic setup, civil society organisations provide basis for citizens to

pursue common interests in political, social, or spiritual domain; here they
participate freely, collectively and peacefully. By their involvement in civil
society, citizens learn about fundamental democratic values of participation
and collective action and they further disseminate these values within their
communities. Civil society movements that represent citizen interests can
considerably influence both government policy and social attitudes.
Independent activities of the civil society can pause a counterweight to
state power.
Box 21.1: People’s Power

The idea of civil society is largely associated in many Westerners’ minds
with ‘people power’ movements to oust dictators. The successful Western
democracy, programs to strengthen civil society in different parts of the
world have become a standard agenda for U.S. and European countries. It
is also known as the ‘democracy promotion tool kit’. Thomas Carothers and
Marina Ottaway provide two interesting contributions to the discussion on
the potential collaborative role of the international community and civil
society in consolidating democracy. “Aiding Democracy Abroad” is one of the
most comprehensive and important published work on current practices in
U.S. democracy promotion. Carothers without going into the international
relations debate over whether democracy promotion as a strategy, corresponds
to realist security interests or idealist, humanitarian motivations. He claims
that it is the blend of the two.
To substantiate his view point in a systematic manner, he discusses three

central aspects of democracy aid: electoral assistance, institutional reform,
and civil society assistance. He does this by elaborating on four case studies
of countries on the receiving end of various types of U.S. democracy
assistance: Guatemala, Nepal, Zambia, and Romania.
55

State Society Democracy aid, in Carothers’s view, is the byproduct of democratisation,
not the vise-versa. The political space created by democratising regimes has
made it possible for international assistance to pursue democracy promotion
in these countries. In his conclusive observation, he remarks that despite
variations in local context, U.S. democracy promotion activities follow a ‘one
size fits all’ democratic template, which is not a healthy promotion scheme.
This template of aiding democracy, he propounds, has developed in the
course of practice rather than by conscious application of academic theories.
The strengthening of civil society in different parts of the world is frequently

offered as the answer to the questions pervasive in Washington, How can
the Arab world democratise? And what should the United States do to help
democracy there?
Though one can not concur U.S. interference in the internal affairs of any
other country yet there is strong consensus among scholars that civil society
is uppermost to the incarnation of democracy. John Keane expresses this
view when he notes that “where there is no civil society there cannot be
citizens with capabilities to choose their identities, entitlements and duties
within a political-legal framework.”
21.6 Functions of Civil Society in a Democratic Order

Throwing light about the functions of a civil society in promoting democratic
polity, Larry Diamond in his article, ‘Rethinking Civil Society’(1996), says,
“Civil society plays a significant role in building and consolidating democracy.”
He opines: “The democratic civil society…the more likely it is that democracy
will emerge and endure”. In Diamond’s view, civil society performs following
important functions:
1) To limit state power—By checking its political abuses and violations of the
law and subjecting them to public scrutiny. Diamond maintains, “a vibrant
civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining
democracy than initiating it.”
2) To empower citizens by “increasing the political efficacy and skill of the
democratic citizen and promoting an appreciation of the obligations as
well as rights of democratic citizenship.”
3) To inculcate and promote an arena for the development of democratic
attributes amongst the citizens—Such as tolerance, moderation, a
willingness to compromise and respect for opposing viewpoints.” According
to Diamond, this is an important function as it allows “traditionally
excluded groups—such as women and racial or ethnic minorities—access
to power that has been denied them in the ‘upper echelons’ of formal
politics.”
4) To provide avenues for political parties and other organisations allowing
them to articulate, aggregate, and represent their interests- This enhances
the quality of democracy as “it generates opportunities for participation
and influence at all levels of governance, not the least the local
government.”
5) To function as a recruiting, informational and leadership generating agency
especially in economically developed societies—Where, Economic reform
is sometimes necessary, but often difficult to bring about if it threatens
vested economic interests. the massive economic collapse in Indonesia
56

unleashed mass discontent and made President Suharto suddenly Civil Society and
Democracy
vulnerable. This transformed the environment to allow civil society groups
and opposition parties to mobilize citizens in an unprecedented fashion.
6) A well founded civil society could act as a shock observing institution,
where wide range of interests that may cross-cut and mitigate the principal
polarities of political conflict.
7) To generate public and political support for successful economic and
political reforms—which require the support of coalitions in society and
the legislature.
8) A well-rooted civil society also helps in identifying and train new political
leaders—As such, it can “play a crucial role in revitalising…the narrow and
stagnant” party dominated leadership recruitment patterns.
9) Election monitoring— Many non-partisan organisations engage in election
monitoring at home and abroad. Such efforts, says Diamond, “have been
critical in detecting fraud, enhancing voter confidence, affirming the
legitimacy of the result, or demonstrating an opposition victory despite
government fraud.” The Philippines in the mid 1980s and Panama in 1989
6 are cited as examples.
a) Strengthening citizen attitudes toward the state— Civil society
enhances “the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness,
effectiveness, and hence legitimacy of the political system.” In so
doing it gives citizens respect for the state and positive involvement
in it. Here, civil society is crucial to the development and maintenance
of stable, quality sensitive democracy.
10) In addition to this, other scholars have also come out with their view
point on the subject. Borrowing from Robert Dahl’s classic work on
democracy, Alfred Stepan in his work, Problems of Democratic Transition
and Consolidation (1996), states that among the basic requirements for
democracy “is the opportunity to formulate preferences, to signify
preferences, and to have these preferences weighted adequately in the
conduct of government.” According to Robert Dahl for the proper
functioning of the government, it should ensure the following institutional
guarantees which include:
1) freedom of association and expression;
2) the right to vote;
3) run for public office;
4) free and fair elections;
5) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes;
6) alternative sources of information;
7) policy making institutions dependent on votes;
8) Other expressions of preference.
Box 21.2: Fundamental Liberties

However, while accepting the importance of these institutional guarantees,
Stepan considers them as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
functioning of democracy. Not sufficient, ‘because no matter how free and
fair the elections, and no matter how large the majority of the government,
the political society’ lacks quality unless it is able to produce a constitution
that provides for fundamental liberties, minority rights, and a set of
institutions and checks and balances that limit state power and ensure
accountability, necessary for any given democratic system.
57

State Society
21.7 Civil Society as a Promoter of Democracy
In an article, ‘Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance’, Dr. Jan
Aart Scholte Makes a comprehensive analysis of the concepts. She not only
visualises positive aspects of the relationship between civil society and
democracy, but also evaluates the unenthusiastic side of it too.
Taking a positive note of the civil society as promoter of democratic form

of governance, Scholte identifies six areas where civil society could advance
democracy.
1) Public education—Awareness is key to any democratic system. The civil
society might enhance democracy through educating the public. An
informed citizenry could sustain effective democracy, civic associations
can contribute a lot by raising public awareness and understanding of
world wide existing laws and regulatory institutions. To accomplish this
goal civil, society groups can prepare handbooks and information kits,
produce audio-visual presentations, organize workshops, circulate
newsletters, supply information to and attract the attention of the mass
media, maintain websites on the Internet, and develop curricular materials
for schools and institutions of higher education.
2) Voice to stakeholders—Civil society could promote democratic governance
by giving voice to stakeholders. Civic associations can opportune the
concerned parties to relay information, testimonial, and analysis to
governance agencies about their needs and demands. Civil society
organisations can give voice to neglected social circles like the poor,
women and persons with disability who tend to get a limited hearing
through other channels including their elected representatives in
executive and legislative bodies. In this way civic activism could empower
stakeholders and mould politics toward greater participatory democracy.
3) Policy inputs—Government policy formulation is considerably influenced
from the Inputs given by the civil society not only at home but also in
the international arena. For example, civic groups have been pioneer in
sparking debate about the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. They have
also constantly raised issues pertaining to ecological imbalances, made
qualitative assessments of poverty, and pressurised for the schemes of
debt reduction in the South.
4) Transparency of governance—Vigilant civic mobilisation can cause public
transparency in governance. Constant pressure from civil society can help
in bringing regulatory frameworks and operations into the open, where
they could be accessed for public scrutiny. Generally citizens do not have
the awareness about what decisions are taken by the government, by
whom, from what options, on what grounds, with what expected results,
and with what resources to support implementation. Civic groups through
their well lit networks can question the currently popular official rhetoric
of ‘transparency’ by asking critical questions about what is made
transparent, at what time, in what forms, through what channels, on
whose decision, for what purpose, and in whose interest.

What is civil society? What are its functions in a democracy?
5) Public accountability—Civil society can hold various concerned agencies

accountable to public. Civic groups can keep an eye on the implementation
58

and effects of policies regarding people and press for corrective measures Civil Society and
Democracy
when the consequences are adverse. For example, independent civic
agencies have impartial policy evaluation mechanisms for the World Bank
and the IMF. Whereby, they have more often criticised their policies
towards the Less Developed Countries. The Western countries, which
claim to be democratic in the behaviour, often while as a part of global
player some times become far more dictatorial than those whom they
criticize and put sanctions against them. Here, the civic agencies through
an accountability function can push authorities in global governance to
take greater responsibility for their actions and policies.
6) Legitimacy—The sum total of the preceding actions by the civil society
could lead to a legitimate democratic rule. Legitimate rule prevails when
people concede that an authority has a right to govern and that they
have a duty to obey its directives. As a result of such consent, legitimate
governance tends to be more easily, productively and nonviolently
executed than illegitimate and dictatorial authority.
Here, it is important to understand that democracy should not be understood

only in terms of national governance. The civil society should have a larger
agenda of democracy as a policy of global governance. The civil society not
only could promote democracy at home, their impact could be clearly seen
in the democratisation of global order. Civil society can offer a means for
citizens to affirm that global governance arrangements should guide and
where necessary, constrain their behaviour.
Apart from this, the international concerns for human rights, women rights,
rights of the disabled and concerns for environment have great impact on
the domestic policy formulation and its implementation too. For example,
various development related NGOs and think-tank,s who lobby for global debt
relief and socially sustainable structural adjustment, have gone on to scrutinize
public finances in national and local governments. In addition to this, women’s
movements have often used international laws and institutions in their favour
to democratise the state on gender lines. The rights of the persons with
disability also get impetus from international concerns for human rights.
21.8 The Democratic Dangers of Civil Society

Civil society’s contribution to democracy in domestic as well as global
governance is well placed in context. But here it must be noted that civil
society might in certain ways actually detract from democratic governance
of international relations. In these situations it is not that civic activities fail
to realise their democratising potential but that they, in fact, obstruct popular
rule. Seven general negative possibilities can be identified.
1) Civil society activities may not essentially pursue democratic purposes.
Though the term civil society at the outset seems to convey elements of
civility and virtue, but in practice, voluntary associations do not ipso
facto have the promotion of democracy on their agenda. On the contrary,
elements of such organisations may engage themselves in subverting
democracy. For example, some civic organisations can work to promote
their private petty interests and privileges. The destructive groups engaged
in promoting racism, ultra-nationalism and religious fundamentalism work
contrary to the democratic rights of others. Those parts of the Islamic
sector that are politically relevant, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have
not pushed for democracy in a comprehensive fashion.
59

State Society 2) Civil society might draw away from democracy if its efforts are poorly
planned and designed or executed—if the said activists function without
understanding the institutional arrangement of governance, they could
cause real harm to the very objectives of their organisation. Even
academicians may fail to link their theoretical models of universal
application of democracy to empirical evidence and political exigencies
of that particular area.
3) Ill-equipped government agencies can not handle civil society inputs—
Regulatory bodies may lack relevant staff expertise, adequate funds,
suitable procedures or the necessary receptive attitudes to take advantage
of the benefits on offer from civil society. Government officials may
consult civic associations only in the later stages of policymaking when
the key decisions have already been taken. Instead of promoting
democracy this could lead to friction in the society and cause turmoil.
4) The state funding and benefits could corrupt the volunteers of the civic
organisations.—Instead of focusing on there aims and objectives they
could run in short term gains.
5) Inadequate representation could seriously undermine the very fabric of
democracy—If civil society has to realise its promises fully, then all stratas
of civil society should be duly allowed to access authorities and more
over equality of opportunity in terms of participation otherwise civil
society can reproduce or even enlarge structural inequalities and arbitrary
privileges connected with class, gender, nationality, race, religion, urban
versus rural location and so on.
6) Civil society concern for global democracy could be insensitive towards
the local cultural practices.—Here, civil society may not respond to all of
the contexts of local population. In particular there is a danger that civil
society in the South and the former communist-ruled countries could
come under the strong influence of western-styled, western-funded NGOs
led by the westernized. Such campaigners might criticize prevailing
conditions of global governance; they have stronger cultural affinities
with global managers than with local communities. Thus NGOs and other
professionalised civil society bodies may perhaps quite unintentionally
marginalise grassroot circles that could give better voice to the diverse
life-worlds that global governance affects.
7) Civil society may lack internal democracy.—Civil society groups -including
those that specifically campaign for greater democracy, can fall short of
democratic behaviour in their own functioning. A lack of internal democracy
within civil society circles is not only objectionable in itself, but also
contradicts its very goal of bringing democracy to society at large. It is
an often realised situation, where civic associations offer their members
little opportunity for participation beyond the payment of subscriptions.
Civil society organisations may advocate on behalf of certain constituencies
without adequately consulting them. The leadership of a civic organisation
may suppress debate in the name of welfare. Civic groups may lack
transparency as some times they do not publish financial statements or
declarations of objectives of their organisation, let alone full-scale reports
of their activities.
Given these potential problems, we should balance our enthusiasm for civil
society as promoting agency for democracy in domestic as well as international
arena with due caution and care. One should not be swayed by much of the
60

alluring fantasies with civil society. Much can go right but much can also go Civil Society and
Democracy
wrong. Civil society can be a means to good ends, but it is not the end
itself. There are circumstances where civic involvement may detract from
democracy or sabotage the very fabric of democracy. It should be the first
demand of the society that civic associations should not merely assert but
also demonstrate their democratic legitimacy.

What is the relationship between civil society and democracy?
In addition to this it should be clearly inferred that those who propagate or

fund the very institution of democracy abroad are themselves democratic in
their behaviour. U.S. has aided several pro-democracy organisations in the
Middle-East since 1991. Majority of democracy aid for the Middle East from
1991 to 2001 had been around about $150 million. The projects were classified
as ‘civil society strengthening.’ In West Bank and Gaza the United States had
funded some Palestinian NGOs during the Israeli occupation—after the
Palestinian Authority was created in 1994. The United States expanded this
aid and categorized much of it as civil society strengthening. In 2000, US Aid
programme launched a $32 million project to support Palestinian NGOs (mostly
service NGOs). In Lebanon, U.S. Aid Programme spent several million dollars
to assist community-based service NGOs during the 1990s.
‘Aiding civil society’ was the leading element of U.S. efforts. Promoting
democracy was not the only rationale for these projects. In Egypt, the
United States believed that giving private groups an expanded role in
development would advance its larger policy goal of economic liberalisation.
In the West Bank and Gaza, the United States hoped to generate popular
support for the Oslo peace process by helping Palestinian NGOs improve
living conditions under self-rule. (In addition, NGOs were a key instrument
for channeling aid, because Congress had imposed a ban on direct U.S.
funding of the Palestinian Authority.)
In Lebanon, the United States wanted to help local communities rebuilt in

the aftermath of civil war. As government agencies were very weak,
community-based organisations and NGOs were better aid partners. During
the Clinton administration, political Islam became a factor, though not one
that was openly acknowledged. Some U.S. officials saw service NGOs as a
potential counterweight to the Islamic charities and other groups that were
a major source of grassroots’ support for Islamist opposition movements and
these officials wanted to direct resources to such groups for this reason.
However, when in 1991 and 2003 America attacked small countries Iraq and
Afghanistan, United States’s commitment for global democracy by
undemocratic means could be easily inferred. America’s liking for democracy
is not new, nearly two-dozen military invasions launched in the name of
democracy throughout Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean by American
presidents (most notably Wilson, president from 1913–21) did not produce a
single viable democracy. More instructive still are the most recent instances
in which the United States has forcibly removed dictatorial regimes with the
implicit promise of creating democracy—Panama in 1992, Haiti in 1994 and
Afghanistan in 2002. None of these experiences can be held up as examples
of successful democratisation.
61

State Society
21.9 Conclusion
After having done an in-depth study of the civil society in relation to
functional and promotional aspect of democracy both at national and
international level, we come across a jumbled up situation that those who
always propagate democracy as the best and universal system of governance
themselves detract from the same while coming to their own interests, even
some times petty interests. Still there cannot be two points on the issue
that civil society has largely helped to give convenient path to the functioning
of democracy. But the general perception that less developed World should
accept is that Western Model of civil society and democracy is equally
dangerous and self imposing.
There is so much of academic assertion on this point that some anthropologists

even question whether the concept of civil society even applies outside the
West. In a comparative study of China and Taiwan, for example, Robert P.
Weller writes, “I have studiously avoided the term ‘civil society’ while writing
about many of its core issues. The term ‘civil society’ comes with a set of
problematic theoretical assumptions and historical connotations, which have
strong roots in a particular European philosophical tradition.” Political theorists
Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani offer a more explanatory reason for the
advent of the concept of civil society: “With the arrival of European
colonialism, the state became an undeniable, unavoidable part of the business
of social living; and the institutional organisation of the modern state invites
a discourse in terms of a state/civil society distinction.” However, they
largely tried to unfold the debate regarding the advent of civil society and
State in the colonial context.
To further evaluate the subject in more theoretical context, the following

points could be of use for understanding the existing complexities in the
subject.
Firstly, advocates often depict civil society as wholly positive, even flawless.
For example, in an article, ‘Civil Society and Building Democracy: Lessons
from International Donor Experience’ Harry Blair says that civil society
organisations increase citizens’ participation in the policy-making process,
enhance the state’s accountability to its citizenry, and provide civic education
in democratic politics. This describes an ideal—an ideal that since 1989 has
helped motivate hundreds of millions of dollars in international grants to civil
society organisations in less-developed countries, with mixed results.
Secondly, those who idealise civil society often talk about citizen engagement
without mentioning citizen conflict. Yet conflict over resources, laws, policies,
influence is central and inherent to the plurality of interests is at the heart
of civil society. For this reason, fundamentalist societies that believe in a
single source of truth, such as the Soviet Union under Stalin and other
communist countries in the latter part of 20th century or Iran under the
leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, are much less tolerant of civil society than
societies that welcome plural points of view.
Third, from Tocqueville onward, Westerners have generally placed individualism

at the heart of civil society. Ernest Gellner, for example, describes the building
block of civil society as ‘modular man,’ an individual who is autonomous yet
willing and able to associate. In much of the world, however, individuals do
62 not consider themselves modular. They regard their identities as members of

particular communities (determined by family, religion, ethnicity, caste, race, Civil Society and
Democracy
or something else) as fundamental, not choices easily made and unmade. For
example, in Sakété Center, Muslims, Christians, and worshippers of local gods
live together and Muslims and Christians often sacrifice to local gods when
facing particularly vexing problems. Yet this openness to different practices
does not mean that individuals are modular and can easily exchange one
faith for another. Religion, like family and ethnicity, embeds the individual in
a web of social connections and cultural meanings that can be severed only
at significant cost. The basic thesis of civil society rests with the presumption
that man being social is challenged. If individuals are considered modular,
how do we fashion a definition of civil society that works trans-nationally?
Fourthly, the concept of civil society is placed with too broad parameters.
Some have argued that civil society consists of all forms of non-state
organisation other than the family which is unacceptable proposition because
it includes within civil society many social forms that are essentially private,
and thereby fails to distinguish civil society from society at large. To make
the concept more useful for the purpose, ‘civil’ aspect of civil society must
limit the category to those networks, movements and organisations that
have a public dimension.
Fifthly, here it is stressed that civil society is essentially two-fold in nature:

private in origins but public in focus. Civil society groups represent private
interests by employing more often non-violent public means, such as
association, education and demonstration to influence policy and polity,
whether at the neighborhood, city, regional, state, or national level. The
interests pursued can be individualistic, or they can be oriented toward
religion, race, or other social groupings. In a way that might generate pressure
on government.
To conclude our discussion on civil society with positive academic note the
essential idea that has been put into practice is that democracy requires a
healthy and active civil society. The international community, by providing
resources and training to different civic groups, can help to build up domestic
civil society in democratising countries. However, at the same time caution
should be duly taken in imposing one’s ideas and culture in the name of civil
society or as a matter of fact democracy. Though democracy is one of the
healthiest systems of governance both in domestic and international arena
yet there is no final word in social sciences. There are so many ancient
cultural systems and practices in the East which are far better than the
existing western way of life. They should not be discarded merely because
we have fantasies and and fondness for the West. More importantly, the
debate and enthusiasm for promoting better life style should continue in
order to benefit the people who are living in authoritarian societies with
abysmal poverty and sufferings.

Harry Blair, “Civil Society and Building Democracy: Lessons from International
Donor Experience” pp.65-80 in Bernard, Helmlich and Lehning, (eds) Civil
Society and International Development. North-South Centre of the Council
of Europe, Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 1998.
Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, “Introduction: Ideas of Civil Society” in
63

State Society Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2001).
D. Archibugi and D. Held (eds), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a
New World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1995)
David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1987).
Ernest Gellner, “Civil Society in Historical Context,” International Social Science
Journal (August 1991): 495-510.
Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization, and Development (I): Clearing
the Analytical Ground,” Democratization, vol. 1, no. 3 (autumn 1994).
Neera Chandhoke, “The ‘Civil’ and the ‘Political’ in Civil Society,”
Democratization, vol. 8, no. 2 (summer 2001): 1–24.
64

Unit 22
Conceptualising Ethnicity
Contents
22.1 Introduction
22.2 Class and Ethnicity
22.3 Construction of Ethnicity
22.4 Primordialist Approach
22.5 Instrumentalist Approach
22.6 Constructivist Model of Ethnicity
22.7 Jenkin’s Model of Ethnicity
22.8 Race and Ethnicity
22.9 Conclusion
22.10 References
Learning Objectives
After studying this unit you will be able to,
describe class and ethnicity
indicate the construction of ethnicity
outline the primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist models of
ethnicity
explain the relationship between race and ethnicity
22.1 Introduction
Being different is a construct that we have all somehow somewhere
internalised. We learn to be different as we are constantly told in the initial
stages of our primary socialisation that it is natural to be segregated. Constant
reckoning that boys are boys and girls are girls instill an element of gender
segregation and awareness of ‘self’ in terms of notions of ‘us’ versus ‘them’.
As one moves through various life cycle processes –construction of categories
of ‘us’ in contrast to ‘them’ acquires different contours. Cultural contents
are added to these reconstructions of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. These
reconstructions also often acquire prejudices and voluntary affirmation of
stereotypes. It is recognition of these repetitive behavioral patterns and
emergent consequences that is instrumental in sociological conceptualisation
of notions of ‘ethnicity’.
Ethnicity is derived from the ancient Greek word ethnos, which refers to ‘a
range of situations where there is a sense of collectivity of humans that live
and act together’ (Cf. Ostergard, 1992). The notion is often translated today
as ‘people’ or ‘nation’ (Jenkins, 1997:9). Its use in contemporary sociology
and in popular conception is relatively recent. The term was popularised in
common American usage with the publication of Yankee city series published
in 1941. The Social Life of a Modern City (1941) and The Status System of
a Modern Community (1942), two important books written by W.Lloyd Warner
and Paul S. Lunt that brought into focus various paradoxes and ambiguities
inherent in the concept. Warner was looking for a noun ‘to parallel the
categories of age, sex, religion and class’ (Sollors, 1981), when he came
67

The Contemporary Issues across the Greek noun ethnos used to refer to nation, people and ‘others’.
in Ethnicity and Identity
Warner used the term ethnicity as a ‘trait’ that separates the individuals
from some classes and identifies him with others’ (ibid, 1981). Located in
the context of America and numerous studies that followed search of American
Identity in the post world war–II America, ethnicity became a search for
American Identity versus ‘minority identities’ or ‘immigrant identities’.
Demonstrating this trend Philip Gleason wrote in his essay entitled ‘Americans
All: Ethnicity, Ideology, and American Identity in the Era of World War II’ in
the Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups (1980):
As a part of the broader American studies movement that grew up in the

postwar years — ethnic was conceptualised as a prototypically American
figure, not because of any distinctiveness of cultural heritage, but for
exactly the opposite reason, because ethnic exhibited in an extreme degree
the “character structure” produced by the American experience of change,
mobility and loss of contact with the past’ — a statement that was beautiful
chronicled years before Gleason’s analysis came to the fore, by Oscar Handlin
(1951) in the introduction to his fascinating work The uprooted, whereby he
wrote that ‘once I thought to write a history of the immigrants in America.
Then I discovered that the immigrants were American history’.
Whatever may be the limitations of innumerous studies on ‘ethnicity’, one

common denominator that stands out is that ethnicity studies are conducted
in relation to ‘others’ and focus on the external, (involuntary, objective) and
internal (voluntary, subjective). Ethnicity in sociological literature is often
construed in relation to concepts like ‘class’ and ‘modernity’.
22.2 Class and Ethnicty

The concept of class rooted in Marxian dictum of hierarchies and precepts
of social stratification also encompasses within its scope notions of ‘class
consciousness’— an idea that talks about building in-group solidarity. Ethnicity
as a social construct has also evolved on perceptions of ‘bonding’ and
‘collectivity’. Class theorists use ‘exploitation’ by the ‘others’ as an instrument
for strengthening ‘class solidarity’. In a similar vein those subscribing to
constructs of ethnicity focus upon ‘common experiences’ to develop a sense
of ‘ethnic consciousness’. Irrespective of these common features many in
sociological and social sciences would argue that ethnicity is not class.
However, at the same time none of them would deny the crucial relationship
that ethnicity has with class. Daniel Bell (1975) in his acclaimed essay on
‘Ethnicity and Social change’ argues:
The reduction of class sentiment is one of the factors one associates with
the rise of ethnic identification. He further submits that ethnicity has become
more salient because it can combine interest with an effective tie. Ethnicity
provides a tangible set of common identifications—in language, food, music,
names—when other social roles become more abstract and impersonal.
Glazer and Moynihan authors of one of the most popular writings on the
subject titled Beyond the Melting pot express similar sentiments. They write
in their 1975 publication of Ethnicity: Theory and experience:
As against class-based forms of social identification and conflict-which of

course continue to exist—we have been surprised by the persistence and
68 salience of ethnic based forms of social identification and conflict. In a

perceptive statement elsewhere (Atlantic Monthly, August 1968) they argue Conceptualising Ethnicity
our contemporary preoccupation with ‘issues such as capitalism, socialism,

and communism’ keeps us from seeing’ that the turbulence of these times
here and abroad has had far more to do with ethnic, racial, and religious
affiliation than with these other issues.
The term ‘ethnicity’ acquired enormous political implications in particular

after the disintegration of erstwhile nation-states like former Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia and events that followed the bombing of world Trade center in
New York on 9/11. The term came in frequent use in anthropological and
sociological writings only in early 70s. It is interesting to note that prior to
1970s textbooks in anthropology and sociology hardly ever defined ‘ethnicity’
(Cohen, 1978:380). There are some references to ‘ethnic groups’ in the
literature pertaining to early decades of the twentieth century.
Box 22.1: Rethinking Ethnicity

Richard Jenkins in his critically acclaimed work titled Rethinking Ethnicity:
Arguments and Explorations notes:
Since the early decades of this century, the linked concepts of ethnicity and
ethnic group have been taken in many directions, academically (Stone,
1996) and otherwise. They have passed into everyday discourse, and become
central to the politics of group differentiation and advantage, in the culturally
diverse social democracies of Europe and North America. With the notions
of ‘race’ in public and scientific disrepute since 1945, ethnicity has obligingly
stepped into the gap, becoming a rallying cry in the bloody often
reorganisation of the post-cold-war world. The obscenity of ‘ethnic cleansing’
stands shoulder to shoulder with earlier euphemism such as ‘racial hygiene’
and ‘the final solution’ (1997:9).
Two things emerge in Jenkins interesting interpretation of ‘ethnicity’. First

suggests that notions of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’ travel together. If
ethnicity emerged as a key sociological and political concept only in the early
70s it was in operation as a sociological reality much before that and was
commonly addressed in solidarities and differences that marked social and
cultural groups. The second point that is highlighted in the excerpt is that
the nomenclature ‘ethnic group’ appeared as a natural and neutral option to
the much beleaguered and abused notion of race. Jenkins also refers to
advantages that accrue because of ethnic affiliations. Sometimes these
advantages are granted to groups because they are perceived to be marginal
to the other groups in the societies. You are probably familiar with the
notion of protective discrimination or reservations, which is addressed as
affirmative action in favour of racially under-privileged groups in North
America. It is important to understand here that ‘being part of an ethnic
group’ provides a sense of belonging and an assertion of ‘identity’. This
sense of belonging and identity also accompany certain advantages and
disadvantages. We will discuss some of these issues in the following lessons
on ‘construction of identity’ and ‘boundary and boundary maintenance’.
In this lesson, we will essentially focus on ‘conceptualising ethnicity’—its
historical roots and various theories propounded by various scholars for its
sustenance.
69

The Contemporary Issues
in Ethnicity and Identity 22.3 Construction of Ethnicity
Some contributors to the theory of ethnicity trace back its origins to the
early works of Max Weber. Weber in one of his important contributions
namely Economy and Society first published in 1922 and reprinted in 1968
regards an ethnic group to be a group whose members share a belief that
they have a common ancestor or to put it differently ‘they are of common
descent’. He qualifies his statement by suggesting that:
Ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group

formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other
hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially
organised, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity (1968:389).
It is apparent from Weber’s statement that biology had little role to play in
cultivating ‘sense of belonging’. Weber perceived Ethnic group as a status
group. A status group may be rooted in perceptions of shared religion,
language or culture. Members of the group on the basis of shared communality
tend to form ‘monopolistic social closure’—that is they refuse to let others
enter their exclusive domain. Every member of the group knows what is
expected of him in situations of collective participation. They also function
together to protect each other’s honour and dignity. It is on these perceptions
that ‘suicide squads’ operate in political struggles. Weber also argues that
‘since the possibilities for collective action rooted in ethnicity are ‘indefinite’,
the ethnic group, and its close relative nation, cannot easily be precisely
defined for sociological purposes’. (for details refer to Jenkins, 1997:10).
This profound statement by Weber enables us to understand how political
acts of subversion under one regime are celebrated as heroic and patriotic
by those who are seeking political sovereignty; and are condemned as acts
of treason by those governing the nation states. You must be reading articles
in Newspapers about ongoing struggle between Israel and Palestine and
various other so called insurgent groups and the nation states. Ethnicity
forms complex equations and simple cultural or ethnological explanations are
not enough to unfold its mysteries.
Ethnicity as a theoretical tool for understanding complex questions of social

interaction and political formations holds equal interest not only for
sociologists but also for anthropologists and political scientists. In a broad
sense, three approaches to the understanding of ethnicity can be considered,
namely Primordialist, Instrumentalist and constructivist.
22.4 Primordialist Approach

The primordialist approach recognises biology as the fundamental for
establishing ethnic identity. The biological roots are determined by genetic
and geographical factors. These linkages result in the formation of close-
knit kin- groups. Kinship loyalties demand that near relatives are favored by
those in situations of command and controlling resources. In contemporary
terminology such favours are rebuked for being nepotistic. Nepotism is defined
as the ‘tendency to favour kin over non-kin’. This principle of kin-selection
based on conceptions of socio-biology is not acceptable in societies that
claim to be democratic and follow principles of meritocracy. Pierre Van den
Berghe explains that:
In general ethnicity is defined as a comprehensive form of natural selection

70

and kinship connections, a primordial instinctive impulse. Which continues Conceptualising Ethnicity
to be present even in the most industrialised mass societies of today.(1981:35)
Socio-biological interpretations of ethnicity assume that there are tangible

explanations for ethnicity. Some of the followers of this school are convinced
that genetic linkages by itself are responsible for accentuating ethnic ties.
Another group within the same school thinks that biological and kinship ties
evolve and are furthered by cultural influences. The explanations offered by
various scholars suggest that this school of though is primarily rooted in
evolutionary construction of human societies. Shaw and Wong(1989) argue
that ‘recognition of group affiliation is genetically encoded, being a product
of early human evolution, when the ability to recognise the members of
one’s family group was necessary for survival’.
Box 22.2: Concept of Ethnos

There are frequent references and endorsement of primordialist position in
Russian and Soviet anthropology. The concept of Ethnos in the works of
Russian scholars that was later developed by Y.U. Bromley(1974) among
others defines it as:
Ethnos as a ‘group of people, speaking one and the same language and
admitting common origin, characterised by a set of customs and a life style
which are preserved and sanctified by tradition , which distinguishes it from
others of the same kind’.
The socio-biological interpretations of ethnicity were critical in developing

a framework for the study of ethno genesis. According to the theory of
ethnogensis ‘ethnos emerged as a consequence of joint effect of cosmic
energies and landscape’. The primordial model of studying ethnicity has
received diverse reactions. Simple socio-biological explanations of ethnicity
that interpret ethnic groups as only ‘extended kin-groups’ were severely
critiqued by some scholars but found support in the writings of scholars such
as Clifford Geertz(1973). Geertz argued that ‘ties of blood, language and
culture are seen by actors to be ineffable and obligatory; that they are seen
as natural’— as members of society — most of you must have experienced
these sentiments yourself.
Important question in the understanding of ethnicity is how are these

sentiments rationalised in the context of empirical situations demanding
loyalties. Primordialists would argue that kinship bonds and cultural
attachments would always reign supreme and govern social and political
actions. Geertz extends this argument when he writes:
[the] crystallization of a direct conflict between primordial and civil

sentiments –this ‘longing not to belong to any other group’-…..gives to the
problem variously called tribalism, parochialism, communalism, and so on,
a more ominous and deeply threatening quality than most of the other, also
very serious and intractable, problem the new state face(1973:261).
It is this debate that dominates discussions in the construction of modern

day civil society in which equality is considered as the only legitimate
principle. Differences in terms of culture, language, religion and origins are
accepted and celebrated but perpetuation of any of these primary attributes
for establishing separate ‘political identities’ within any existing nation state
71

The Contemporary Issues are viewed with disdain. Students of ethnicity are constantly engaged in
debating whether ‘ethnicity’ is primordial or manipulated by individuals with
political intents.
22.5 Instrumentalist Approach

Students of ethnicity are constantly asking:
Is ethnicity an aspect of ‘human nature’? Or is it, to whatever extent,

defined situationallly, strategically or tactically manipulable, and capable of
change at both the individual and collective levels? Is it wholly socially
constructed? (Jenkins, 1997).
We have already reflected upon the first question and made you familiar
with different positions that scholars take on ethnicity being an integral
part of human nature. We will now discuss the second question, also discussed
as instrumentalist approach to ethnicity. The instrumentalist approach
became popular in sociological and political science writings in late sixties
and early seventy’s. Names of Fredrik Barth and Paul Brass are commonly
associated with popularising instrumentalist position in social science
literature. Also sometimes referred to as Situationalist perspective it
emphasises plasticity in maintaining ethnic group boundaries. It argues that
people can change membership and move from one ethnic group to another.
The change can take place either because of circumstances or as Paul Brass
says because of manipulation by Political elites. He regarded ethnicity:
As a product of political myths, created and manipulated by cultural elites

in their pursuit of advantages and power. The cultural forms, values and
practices of ethnic groups become resources for elites in competition for
political power and economic advantage. They become symbols and referents
for the identification of members of group, which are called up in order to
ease the creation of political identity (1985).
In his two books — Language, Religion and Politics in North India (1985),
Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (1991), Brass closely
examines issues of ethnicity and Nationalism in the context of India. Brass
borrowed De Vos’s definition of Ethnicity that viewed ethnicity as consisting
of ‘subjective, symbolic or emblematic use’ by a group of people…of any
aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from other groups’
and modified it replacing the last phrase to suggest ‘in order to create
internal cohesion and differentiate themselves from other groups’(1991).
In this explanation Brass is asserting the importance of symbols and the
need for internal cohesion for ethnicity to flourish. When we examine
these assertions in empirical context we can understand why political parties
constantly keep inventing and reinventing symbols attached to different
groups for commanding loyalty in situations of political realignments. Cow
slaughter, Muslim Personal law and dwindling importance of Urdu language
are some of symbolic issues that are frequently raised in political debates.
Fredrik Barth on the other hand was always convinced that the focus for
the investigation of ethnicity should be ‘the ethnic boundary that defines
the group’ adapting the definition that ethnicity is social organisation of
cultural differences. Barth in his symposium Ethnic groups and Boundaries
(1969) regarded ascription and self-ascription critical to the process of
72 establishing group boundaries.

Conceptualising Ethnicity
Box 22.3: Corporate Model of Ethnic Group
An ethnic group was biologically self-perpetuating; members of the group
shared basic cultural values and these values manifest it-self in overt cultural
forms; third the group was a bounded social field of communication and
interaction; and fourth its members identified themselves and were identified
by others as belonging to that group.
Barth in his critique of the corporate model argued that this elucidation of
ethnic group assumed that various groups in the society lived in relative
isolation ‘as an island in itself’. In his interpretation ethnic groups as
ontological collectivities are malleable. He argued that ethnic identity, and
its production and reproduction in social interaction is to be treated as
‘problematic’ feature of social reality. He recommended that the
ethnographer must examine the practices and processes whereby ethnicity
and ethnic boundaries are socially constructed and perpetuated. To arrive
at this understanding Barth asserted that this construction is possible only
when we acknowledge that ethnic groups are categories of ascription and
identification by the actors themselves (Barth, 1969). Barth’s model of
ethnicity highlights the following features:
Analysis of ethnicity begins by understanding the situation held by social

actors e.g. actors are being asked to ascertain their identity in a situation
of confrontation or cooperation. The shades that ethnic identity acquires
will be essentially determined by this perception.
Second, the focus of attention then becomes the maintenance of ethnic

boundaries. If it is a situation of confrontation, ethnicity attains center
stage. It expresses itself in far more assertive terms then it would do either
in a neutral situation or underplay differences in a situation asking for
economic or political cooperation. The structured interaction between ‘us’
and ‘them’ across boundary is defined by strategic situation.

Outline the features of Barth’s model of ethnicity.
Third and most critical of these criteria are notions of ascription-both by

members of the ethnic group in question and those outside the group.
Ethnicity acquires political impetus primarily because of this criterion of
ascription. In situations where an individual assumes himself to be a member
but is not so perceived by others, his own sense of belongingness carries
little or no weight at all.
Fourth, ethnicity is not fixed; it is situationally defined. Most interesting

example of this is observed in situations of trans-migration, wherein
individuals may ascribe themselves to different ethnic groups or attach
differential degree of importance to their sense of belonging –in other words
either overplay or underplay ethnicity situationally.
Fifth, ecological issues are particularly influential in determining ethnic

identity. If economic niches are constrictive and resources limited, it is
invariably seen that in such situations ethnicity becomes much more
pronounced.
73

The Contemporary Issues Commenting on Barth’s understanding of Ethnicity, Jenkins writes:
Barth emphasises that ethnic identity is generated, confirmed or transformed

in the course of interaction and transaction between decision-making,
strategising individuals. Ethnicity in Ethnic group and boundaries is, perhaps
before it is anything else, a matter of politics, decision making and goal
orientation…shared culture is, in this model, best understood as generated
in and by processes of ethnic boundary maintenance, rather than the other
way round: the production and reproduction of difference vis-à-vis external
others is what creates the image of similarity internally, vis-à-vis each other.
Sociologists and Social anthropologists have argued that this model of ethnicity
is essentially borrowed from the works of Max Weber. Barth facilitated its
understanding by differentiating it from notions of race and culture. According
to Vermeulen and Grovers (1994:2) ‘Barth presented ethnicity or ethnic
identity as an aspect of social organisation, not of culture’.
Wallman (1986 et al) furthered Barth’s understanding and argues that:
Ethnicity is the process by which ‘their’ difference is used to enhance the

sense of ‘us’ for purposes of organisation or identification…..Because it
takes two, ethnicity can only happen at the boundary of ‘us’, in contact or
confrontation or by contrast with ‘them’. And as the sense of ‘us’ changes,
so the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ shifts. Not only does the boundary
shift, but the criteria which mark it change.
This explanation makes it clear that ethnicity is transactional, it is essentially

impermanent and in that sense has nothing to do with biological inheritance.
It is this feature that distinguishes instrumentalist approach from primoridalist
perceptions of ethnicity. Ethnic identity is shifting. It is always two sided.
Our being Hindus or Muslims, Gujarati or Telgu is immaterial unless these
identities are locked in vis-à-vis situations. The key issue in these interactions
is manipulation of ‘perceived significant differences in their generation’.
Abner Cohen(1974) while analysing Barth’s contributions have differences

with his perception of ethnicity. Handelman believes that the ‘cultural
content of ethnicity is an important aspect of its social organisation: a
crude dichotomy between the cultural and social is misleading’. To this he
adds that ethnicity is socially organised or incorporated in differing degrees
of group-ness,—on which depends its salience and importance of individual
experience. Moving from ‘the casual to corporate’, Handelman distinguishes
the ethnic set, ethnic category, the ethnic network, the ethnic association
and the ethnic community. Ethnic identities can, for example, organise
everyday life without ethnic groups featuring locally as significant social
forms’(cf. Jenkins,1997:20)
22.6 Constructivist Model of Ethnicity

The constructivist model of ethnicity is located in the interpretive paradigm
based on postmodernism. In this interpretation emphasis has shifted to
negotiation of multiple subjects over group boundaries and identity.
Sokolovskii and Tishkov stress that
In this atmosphere of renewed sensitivity to the dialectics of the objective

74 and subjective in the process of ethnic identity formation and maintenance,

even the negotiable ethnic character of ethnic boundaries stressed by Barth Conceptualising Ethnicity
was too reminiscent of his objectivist predecessors tendency to reification.

It was argued that terms like ‘group’, ‘boundary’ still connote a fixed identity,
and Barth’s concern with maintenance tends to reify it still more (Cohen,
1978:386). The mercurial nature of ethnicity was accounted for when it was
defined ‘as a set of sociocultural diacritics [physical appearance, name
language, history, religion, nationality] which define a shared identity for
members and nonmembers’; a series of nesting dichotomisations of
inclusiveness and exclusiveness’ (Cohen, 1978:386-7).
22.7 Jenkins’ Model of Ethnicity

Jenkins has offered ‘a basic social anthropological model of ethnicity’ which
is equally relevant for sociological understanding. The model is summarised
as follows:
ethnicity is about cultural differentiation-although, to retrieate the main
theme of Social Identity (Jenkins,1996), identity is always a dialectic
between similarity and difference;
ethnicity is centrally concerned with culture-shared meaning—but it is
also rooted in, and to a considerable extent the outcome of, social
interaction;
ethnicity is no more fixed or unchanging than the culture of which it is
a component or the situations in which it is produced and reproduced;
ethnicity as a social identity is collective and individual, externalised in
social interaction and internalised in personal identification
(Jenkins,1997:13-14).
Jenkins cautions against ‘our tendency to reify culture and ethnicity’. It is

essential for us to remember that ethnicity or culture is not something
that people have or they belong but it is a complex repertories which
people experience, use, learn and ‘do’ in their daily lives, within which
they construct ongoing sense of themselves and an understanding of their
fellows (1997:14).
Jenkins is representing modern school of thinkers on ‘ethnicity’ who assume

constructivist position.
The fundamental of the concept defined above ‘emphasise social construction

and everyday practice, acknowledging change as well as stability, and allowing
us to recognise individuality in experience and agency as well as stability,
and allowing us to recognise individuality in experience and agency as well
as the sharing of culture and collective identification’(Jenkins, 1997:165).
This reconstruction of ethnicity holds the view that ethnicity is neither
inherited nor completely manipulable –positions that were assumed by
instrumentalist and primordialists respectively.
Box 22.4: The Plasticity of Ethnicity

—there are limits to the plasticity of ethnicity, as well as to its fixity and
solidity, is the founding premise for the development of an understanding of
ethnicity which permits us to appreciate that although it is imagined it is
not imaginary; to acknowledge its antiquity as well its modernity. Rethinking
demands that we should strike a balanced view of the authenticity of ethnic
attachments. Somewhere between irresistible emotion an utter cynicism,
75

in Ethnicity and Identity neither blindly primordial nor completely manipulable, ethnicity and its
allotropes are principles of collective identification and social organisation
in terms of culture and history, similarly and difference, that show little
signs of withering away. In itself this is neither a ‘good thing’ nor a ‘bad
thing’. It is probably just very human. It is hard to imagine the social world
in their absence (Jenkins, 1997).
22.8 Race and Ethnicity

Relationship between race and ethnicity is complex. Genesis of the term
race are traced to “Latin words ‘generatio’,‘ratio’,‘natio’, and ‘radix’ to
Spanish and Castilian ‘razza’, Italian ‘razza’, and old French ‘haraz’ with such
diverse meanings as generation, root, nobility of blood, patch of threadbare
or defective cloth, taint or contamination, or horse breeding” (Sollors, 1996).
The term race has been in popular use much before ethnicity was adapted
in popular and academic vocabulary. Race came into scientific academic
parlance as a classificatory feature. Physical Anthropologists used physical
features to classify what some may describe as ‘human types’. However
man’s lust to conquer his fellow beings and subordinate them resulted in
tremendous abuse of these so called classificatory studies that were prompted
to facilitate scientific research. Magnus Hirschfeld in 1938 described racial
abuse as ‘racism’. The genocide that was unleashed in World War II in the
name of protection of purity of races made academicians and politicians
equally shy of using it in public domain. The concept of ethnic group
introduced in the mid fifty’s was an acknowledged attempt to provide a
neutral system of classifying human groups on the basis of ‘cultural differences’
rather than distinguishing them on the basis of racial characteristic’. It was
argued that the terminology of ethnic group would provide a value neutral
construct and avoid prejudiced and stereotypical categorisation of people in
hierarchical and discriminatory categories. Many scholars believed in the
usefulness of this distinction but others thought there was hardly any merit
in this distinction as ‘race is only one of the markers through which ethnic
differences are validated and ethnic boundary markers established’ (Wallman,
1986). Those authors supporting the expediency of making this distinction
would argue that ‘while “ethnic” social relations are not necessarily
hierarchical and conflictual, ‘race relations’ would certainly appear to be’
(Jenkins, 1998:75).

Discuss the relationship between race and ethnicity and bring out the points
of comparison.
One may reason that even when race is often constructed and conceived in
terms of physical or phenotypical differences, prejudices and stereotypes
accompanying this perception are socially articulated and perceived. In this
sense, many would argue that ‘race’ is an allotrope of ‘ethnicity’. Jenkins
prefers to argue the other way suggesting that ‘ethnicity and race are
different kinds of concept; they do not actually constitute a true pair. The
most that can be said is that, at certain times and in certain places, culturally
specific conception of ‘race’-or more correctly, of ‘racial’ differentiation –
have featured, sometimes very powerfully, in the repertoire of ethnic
boundary-maintaining devices’ (ibid: 79). Banton (1967:10) has argued that
primary difference between race and ethnic group is that membership in an
76 ethnic group is voluntary whereas membership in a racial group is not’ and

this would imply that an ethnic group is all about inclusion whereas race is Conceptualising Ethnicity
all about exclusion’. We are once again returning to the basic categories of
‘us’ versus ‘them’ critical to our understanding of ethnicity as well as race;
but as perceived by Jenkins would argue ethnicity is about ‘group
identification’ whereas ‘race’ is about ‘social categorisation’.
Michael Omi and Howard Winant in their book, Racial Formation in the
United States (1986), take the position that opting a maxim incorporating,
race within the broader confines of ethnic group will encourage the ‘strategy
of blaming the victim’. Sollors summing up of these differing positions makes
perceptive reading:
Omi and Winant argue, partly on political grounds, that any ‘true’ sociological
concept could also conceivably be put to bad political ends. It is also necessary
to believe that scholars who see a family relationship between race and
ethnicity are therefore guided by an assimilations it bias. Omi and Winant’s
last point, however, is well taken. Gordon’s maxim that all races are ethnic
groups could be misunderstood as inviting a method of regarding all blacks
as only one ethnic group, because they are also ‘race’. Races may be, and
often are, ethnically differentiated (African Americans and Jamaicans in the
united states), just as ethnic groups may be racially differentiated (Hispanics-
who ‘may be of any race’—). Omi and Winant’s argument supports the need
for a careful examination of the relationships of ‘visible’ and ‘cultural’ modes
of group’s construction in specific cases, but not the assumption that there
is an absolute dualism between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’, and a deep rift between
them.
22.9 Conclusion
Pierre L.Van den Berghe is the one who offers systematic interpretations of
differences between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. Berghe’s much acclaimed work
Race and Racism written in 1996 suggests that four principal connotations of
‘race’ make it confusing. At the outset he rejects physical anthropological
construction of three or four races arguing that this outdated connotation
is no longer ‘tenable’. The second connotation of race that he prefers to be
used in terms of ‘ethnic group’ is when we speak of the ‘French race’ or the
‘Jewish race’ etc.etc. The third explanation argues race to be a synonym of
‘species’. It is only the fourth construction offered by Berghe that he
recommends we should use. According to this view:
Race refers to human groups that define itself and/ or is defined by other
groups as different from other groups by virtue of innate and immutable
physical characteristics.
It is important for the students to note here that sociological conceptions

of race takes specific note of ‘visible’ and ‘physical’ as suggested by Gordon
or as described by Berghe that of ‘innate’ and ‘immutable’ distinctions from
those described as ‘cultural’. The most discerning contribution made by
these scholars is that distinctions whether ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ are a matter
of both ‘physical’ and ‘verbal perceptions’. Qualifying this insight Berghe
reasons:
In practice, the distinction between a racial and ethnic group is sometimes

blurred by several facts. Cultural traits are often regarded as genetic and
inherited (e.g. body odor, which is a function of diet, cosmetics, and other 77

The Contemporary Issues cultural items); physical appearance can be culturally changed (by scarification,
surgery, and cosmetics); and the sensory perception of physical differences
is affected by cultural perception of race (e.g. a rich Negro may be seen as
lighter than an equally dark poor Negro, as suggested by the Brazilian proverb:
‘Money bleaches’). However distinction between race and ethnicity remains
analytically useful.
This rhetoric of making distinctions on the basis of ‘cultural content’ or

‘descent’ overlooks the fact that matters relating to descent accentuate
cultural crux on which cultural differences are constructed and boundaries
defined or redefined. Sollors sums up this admirably saying ‘it is a matter of
a ‘tendency’, not of absolute distinction. Mary Waters (1990) in her
distinguished work Ethnic options chronicle it as follows:
Certain ancestries take precedence over others in the societal rules on

descent and ancestry reckoning. If one believes one is part English and part
German and identifies as German, one is not in danger of being accused of
trying to ‘pass’ as non-English and of being ‘redefined’ English—But if one
were part African and part German, one’s self identification as German would
be highly suspect and probably not accepted if one ‘looked’ black according
to the prevailing social norms.
Without taking either or positions it is important for us to understand that

while constructing ‘ethnicity’- ‘identification’ based either on physical
features or cultural similarities becomes the key factor. It is this construction
of identity and the sociological process of how processes of identification
operate as markers of establishing boundaries that will be discussed in the
following lessons.
22.10 References
Anthias, F. 1992, ‘Connecting “Race” and Ethnic Phenomena’ Sociology, 26,
pp421-38
Banks (M.), 1996, Anthropological Constructions of Ethnicity: AN Introductory
Guide, London: Routeldge
Banton (M.), 1967. Race Relations. London : Tavistock
Barth, Fredrik, 1969(ed.). Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social
Organisation of Cultural Difference. London: Allen and Unwin
Bauman,Z. 1990, Thinking Sociologically, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Bell, Daniel 1975, “Ethnicity and Social Change.” In Nathan Glazer and Daniel
P. Moymihan (eds.), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. Cambridge et al:
Harvard University Press
Berge, Van Den Pierre (L). 1981. The Ethnic Phenomenon. New York: Elsevier
Brass, Paul 1985 (1974), Language, Religion and Politics in North India.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Bromley, Yu. 1974 (ed.), Soviet Ethnology and Anthropology Today. Netherlands,
The Hague: Mouton & Co., N.V. Publishers et al
Brass, Paul, 1991, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New
Delhi et al: Sage Publications
Cohen, Abner, 1974 (ed.), Two Dimensional Man: An Essay on Power and
Symbolism in Complex Society. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
Cohen, Ronald 1978, Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology “Annual
78

Review of Anthropology. Vol.7, Pp. 379-404 Conceptualising Ethnicity
Geertz, Clifford. 1973, The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books
Glaser, Daniel 1958, ‘Dynamics of Ethnic Identification’ In American Sociological
Review, 23 (1958), 31-40
Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel P. 1963, Beyond the Melting Pot.
Cambridge: MIT Press
Glazer, Nathan and Moymihan, Daniel P. 1978 (1975), Ethnicity: Theory and
Experience. Cambridge et al: Harvard University Press
Gleason, Philip, 1980, “American All: Ethnicity, Ideology and American Identity
in the Era of World War II”. Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups
(eds.) Stephan A. Thernstrom, Oscar Handlin and Ann Orlov. USA
Handlin, Oscar, 1952, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations
that made the American People. New York: Grosset and Dunlap
Hirschfeld, Magnu, 1938, Racism. Translated and edited by Eden and Cedar
Paul, London: Victor Gollancz
Jenkins, Richard, 1977, Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations.
Sage Publications
Merton, Robert K. 1972, ‘Insiders and Outsiders’ In The American Journal of
Sociology, 78(1) (July 1972), pp.9-47
Omi, Michael and Howard Winant 1989 (1986). Racial Formation in the United
States: From the 1960s to the 1980s. New York: Routledge
Ostergard, U. 1992, “Peasants and Danes: The Danish National Identity and
Political Culture”. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 34: 3-27
Shaw, R. P. and Wong, Y. 1989, Genetic Seeds of Warfare. Boston: Unwin and
Hyman
Sollors, Werner (ed.) 1996. Theories of Ethnicity: A Classical Reader. Honndmills
ital: Macmillan Press Ltd
Sollors, Werner 1981, ‘Theory of American Ethnicity’. American Quarterly,
33(3), pp. 257-83
Stone, John, 1996 “Ethnicity’’. In Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper (eds.), The
Social Science Encyclopedia. London & New York: Routledge (Second Edition)
Vermuelen, Hans and Grovers, Cora, 1994 (eds.). The Anthropology of Ethnicity:
Beyond “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries” Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis
Wallman, Sandra 1986, ‘Ethnicity and the Boundary Process in Context’, In
John Rex and David Mason (eds.), Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations.
Waters, Mary C. 1990, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America.
Berkeley: University of California Press
Weber, Max 1968 (1922.) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive
Sociology, 3 Vols., Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, (eds.) New York: Bedminster
Press
79

Unit 23
Construction of Identities
Contents
23.1 Introduction
23.2 The Search for Identity
23.3 Erikson’s Contributions to Identity Construction
23.4 Identity and Identification
23.5 Identity in Sociological Theory
23.6 Multiple Identities
23.7 National Character and Identity Studies
23.8 Conclusion
23.9 References
Learning Objectives
After you have studied this unit you will be able to
describe the search for identity
outline Erikson views on identity construction
explain identity and identification
discuss multiple identifies with reference to national character
23.1 Introduction
Identity is a quest, a vision and internalisation of an attitude. This attitude
provides us images of self and of others. It is with this standardised mode
of perception that we relate to others. Identity in other words refers to
generalisations that one evolves about ‘self’ and ‘others’. It is about
distinctions and similarities. The term is complex and is often interpreted
differently in varied contexts. Some may also argue that its usage in
sociological and anthropological texts is ambiguous. The term came into
popular sociological usage in early fifty’s. The International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences (1968) listed two separate articles on Identity titled
‘Identity, psychosocial’, and ‘Identification political’. This becomes significant
due to the fact that the Encyclopedia of the social sciences published in
1930 carried no mention of the term Identity.
Erik.H.Erikson (1959), who happened to be a ‘psychoanalytic theorist’

introduced the term identity and also focused on inherent ambiguities of
the term identity? Erikson’s contributions in this regard will be discussed in
the later part of the lesson but first we will make an attempt to locate the
origin of the term and its meaning in social science writings.
Identity is rooted in the Latin word idem. This is in common use in the
English language since the sixteenth century. Philip Gleason (1983) draws our
attention to the technical and philosophical use of the term Identity:
Identity has a technical meaning in algebra and logic and has been associated
with the perennial mind body problem in philosophy since the time of John
Locke (cf. Sollors, 1996)
80

The Oxford English Dictionary defines Identity as: Construction of Identities
The quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature,

properties, or in particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential
sameness; oneness-in social science writings this definition of identity is
commonly not adopted because of its focus on inseparable, impregnable
homogeneity. It is the second definition quoted as follows that is germane
to our understanding of identity and it states:
The sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the
condition or fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else;
individuality, personality.
23.2 The Search for Identity

Personal Identity in psychology refers to the condition or fact of remaining
the same person throughout the various phases of existence; continuity of
the personality.
Social historians trace the meaning of identity in Oxford dictionary to Locke’s

essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) and David Hume’s Treatise on
Human Nature(1739). The evolutionary theory in early anthropological writings
talked about psychic unity of mankind thereby denying notions of individuality
and identity. ‘The unity of the self’ was also the preponderant perception
in Christianity. Locke questioned the perception, when he argued that:
A man’s identity …..consists in nothing but a participation of the same

continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally
united to the same organised body’.
Langbaum has written a treatise documenting how writers and poets of the
ilk of D.H. Lawrence and William Wordsworth took up the challenge posed by
Locke to the notion of ‘unity of the self’. The review also documents the
seriousness with which questions of identity in relation to personality and
sense of individuality were taken up by the intellectual leadership of different
eras.
Immigration was identified as one of the important factors in strengthening

configurations of identity. Identity in a personalised sense referring to a
sense of alienation, uprooted ness, loneliness, loss of belongingness etc. It
was a metaphorical manifestation of how and the way an individual feels
separated from his kin group and immediate neighborhood in which he had
his primary socialisation. There were little or no hints of sociological
categorisation in terms of loss of identity or construction or reconstruction
of identity in terms of belonging to a particular group or community. The
uprooted by Oscar Handlin (1951) is regarded as a major work that used
identity or identification in ‘an unselfconscious manner as part of the ordinary
vocabulary of common discourse’ (Gleason,1983). In contrast Will Herberg’s
Protestant –Catholic Jew (1955) placed identity and identification as key to
locating oneself in a social context—in this case religion as the marker. Herberg
said religion had become the most important tool for ‘locating oneself in
society’ and thereby answering the most ‘aching question’ of ‘identity’:
‘who am I’.
Herberg’s work acquires strategic significance for later analysis of identity in

sociological literature as it argues that ethnic identities of ‘an immigrant- 81

The Contemporary Issues derived population had transformed themselves into religious identification
with organised Protestantism, Catholicism, or Judaism through the working
of Hansen’s Law that argued that what the son wants to forget, the grandson
wants to remember’. This may be said to be the beginning of what has
come to be called as ‘the search for identity’ in anthropological and
sociological literature.
Let us draw some works that appeared in the fifty’s and used identity with
relative ease as compared to many writers in the seventy’s and late eighty’s
who were particularly troubled by complexities of the term and its varied
use in different contexts to evoke loyalties that went beyond the personal
domain of identifying self in different religious, linguistic or ethnic categories.
Take for example W.L.Morton’s The Canadian Identity (1965) which regarded
the construct of identity as unproblematic. But soon it was recognised in
social science writings that ‘identity becomes a problem for the individual
in a fast changing society’. We must remember that context for majority of
these writings was United States of America that was being portrayed as the
‘Melting Pot’ within which numerous markers of identity assumed by people
before migrating were supposedly melted away and reconfigured to acquire
a new nationality camouflaged as ‘American identity’. By 1970s with onset
of Vietnam War the myth of an encompassing American identity was broken.
As is evident from the brief historical overview, the journey of constructing

identity has a long and established pathway. It is an altogether a different
matter as to how it was conceptualised in different decades of social
experiences by individuals for self and for locating themselves in social spaces
where they interacted with others.
Box 23.1: Construction of Identity

In one sense, the term refers to qualities of sameness, in that persons may
associate themselves or be associated by others, with groups or categories
on the basis of some salient common feature, e.g. ‘ethnic identity’. The
term may also be applied to groups, categories, segments and institutions
of all kinds, as well as to individual persons; thus families, communities,
classes and nations are frequently said to have identities.
I am deliberately not elaboration on the concept if ethnic identity per se in

this lesson as that is the subject matter of the lesson to follow. It will be
suffice to say following Jenkins that ‘ethnic identity, although every bit (and
only) a social and cultural construction, should be conceptualised as a basis
or first-order dimension of human experience’ (Jenkins, 1998:75). We
construct and reconstruct our ‘ethnic identities’ on the turf of our experiences
that may differ from situation to situation. In this lesson our focus will
remain on theoretical insights into identity construction (Byron, 2002).
23.3 Erikson’s Contributions to Identity Construction

Erikson was trained in the discipline of psychology. He primarily worked as
a clinical psychoanalyst with children. He lived in USA and his experiences
as a European refugee and polices of Adolf Hitler and Second World War
deeply influenced his writings. It was in the context of fallout of World War
II that Erikson started constructing notions of identity. His early writings
mostly published in the decade between fifty’s and sixty’s remained largely
confined to intellectual community. It was in 1963 that his book Childhood
82

and Society was reprinted and that brought him immense popularity and Construction of Identities
acceptance among the general reader. His most significant contribution was
his study of Mahatma Gandhi that won him both a Pulitzer Prize and a
National book award. In 1973 he was selected to deliver prestigious Jefferson
Lectures in Humanities that established him as an opinion leader and as
Gleason says ‘his ideas became something of a cultural phenomenon’ (1983).
According to Erikson Identity is located in the core of the individual and

also in the core of his communal culture. He elaborates this notion in the
context of developing American identity and writes:
The process of American identity formation seems to support an individual’s

ego identity as long as he can preserve a certain element of deliberate
tentativeness of autonomous choice. The individual must be able to convince
himself that the next step is up to him and that no matter where he is
staying or going he always has the choice of leaving or turning in the
opposite direction if he chooses to do so. In this country the migrant does
not want to be told to move on, nor the sedentary man to stay where he
is: for the life style (and the family history) of each contains the opposite
element as a potential alternative which he wishes to consider his most
private and individual decision (1963:285-286).
Construction of social identities that border the domain of political remained

pivotal to Erikson’s writings though his primary focus was on personality
formation during adolescence that essentially monitored future perception
of identity by the individual. In his opinion:
Adolescence is the age of the final establishment of a dominant positive

ego identity. It is then that a future within reach becomes part of the
conscious life plan. It is then that the question arises whether or not the
future was anticipated in earlier expectations. (Ibid) 1

To what extent is identity formed in the adolescent years? What are its
social components? Discuss and write down in your notebook.
Erikson’s construction of identity draws inspiration from Freudian perceptions.

In his article on ‘American identity’ he quotes Anna Freud at length and
argues:
—in terms of the individual ego, which appears to be invaded by a newly

mobilized and vastly augmented id as though from a hostile inner world, an
inner outer world. Our interest is directed toward the quantity and quality
of support to the adolescent ego, thus set upon, may expect from the
outer world; and toward the question of whether ego defenses as well as
identity fragments developed in earlier stages receive the necessary additional
sustenance. What the regressing and growing, rebelling and maturing youths
are now primarily concerned with is who and what they are in the eyes of
a wider circle of significant people as compared with what they themselves
have come to feel they are; and how to connect dreams, idiosyncrasies,
roles, and skills cultivated earlier with the occupational and sexual prototypes
of the day (ibid.250).
As you read through Erikson’s original text you will come to terms with
83

The Contemporary Issues intricacies of construction of identity as an individual and as an individual
located in social context among individuals. Gleason developing this frame of
reference for the construction of identity reasons that ‘identity involves an
interaction between the interior development of the individual personality,
understood in terms derived from the Freudian id-ego-superego model, and
the growth of a sense of selfhood that arises from participating in society,
internalising its cultural norms, acquiring different statuses, and playing
different roles’(1983: 465).
Erikson (1959) elaborated upon this notion of personal identity stating:
Personal identity was located deep in the unconscious as a durable and

persistent sense of sameness of the self, whatever happens, however
traumatic or dramatic the passage from one phase of life to another, the non
pathological individual does not normally consider himself to have become
someone else.
Largely drawing inspiration from the Freudian school as stated earlier Erikson
believed that identity was located in the deep psychic structure of the
individual. Our past experiences, our inhibitions and silent protests coupled
with the kind of socialisation processes one has been subjected to, the
adult constructs individual structures of identity accordingly. There is no
denying that these structures mould themselves in correspondence with
external social milieu. But inherent to it is an ‘accrued confidence’ in the
‘inner sameness and continuity’ of one’s own being.
23.4 Identity and Identification

It is important at this stage to examine a closely related notion of
identification. The term identification is in common use in different contexts.
It was formally used in psychology by Sigmund Freud to explain a process by
which a child relates and assimilate to itself external persons and objects.
The concept was used as the key tool in psychoanalytical explanations of
socialisation processes. For nearly two decades in the forty’s and fifty’s the
concept of identification remained confined to psychoanalytical
understandings. In 1954 Gordon W.Allport extended the notion of identification
to explore ethnicity in his popular work The Nature of Prejudice.
Box 23.2: Concept of Identification

One of the areas where identification may most easily take place is that of
social values and attitudes. Sometimes a child who confronts a social issue
for the first time will ask his parent what attitude he should hold. Thus he
may say, ‘Daddy, what are we? Are we Jews or gentiles; Protestants or
Catholics; Republicans or Democrats?’ When told what ‘we’ are, the child is
fully satisfied. From then on, he will accept his membership and the ready
made attitudes that with it (Allport, 1954: 293-294).
Contemporary social scientists recognise limitations of such assertions as we

all know that individuals do not necessarily accept membership of ‘ethnic
groups’ in this matter of fact manner that ‘dad said it’ and ‘I believe in it’.
In the later part of this lesson we will be discussing various modalities that
intercept social and psychological domains of individuals to provide them
markers for identification and identity assertions. However, it is important
to assert here that in the history of evolution of construction of identity
84

and identity theories, Allport’s contributions paved the way for relating Construction of Identities
notions of identity to popular sociological theories of role and reference

group propounded by Ralph Linton and Merton respectively. Foote (1951) felt
that Linton’s role theory lacked ‘a satisfactory account of motivation’ and
thus it will be better if theories of identification are mooted as explanations
for ‘motivation in social interactions’. Foote distinguished his use of the
term identification from that of Freud. Foote defined Identification as:
appropriation of and commitment to a particular identity or series of
identities’ on the part of an individual. Identification proceeds by naming
and it meant individual to whom that name was given accepted and committed
himself to that identity. In other words he accepts assignment to a category
given to him on the basis of family, lineage, kinship religion, work activity
or other attributes.
Identification thus construed provides for appropriation of these identities.

It promotes ascription to identified categories and evolves a sense of
‘selfhood’. A process of self-discovery and self-actualization is initiated-a
process that is voluntary and not enforced by society. It is a different matter
that as individuals grows they ‘combine and modify identities by conscious
choice more effectively then was possible for a child or a young person’
(ibid, 466).
J. Milton Yinger examines identification as a consequence of process of

assimilation. He argues that ‘individuals from separate groups may come to
think of themselves as belonging to the same society-a new society, blended
from their societies of origin’. The context for Identification theorists as
stated earlier remained United States of America. Numerous groups that
migrated to US in the last two hundred years have gone through various
phases of identification. Sometimes these groups surrendered to the dominant
‘white culture’ on others they asserted their traditional ethnic identities
refusing to identify with the dominant culture.
Theoretically speaking Yinger reasons that shifts in identification are not

really related to individual mindset but determined by cultural processes.
These ‘shifts may be one-sided, with members of group A identifying with
society B, or members of group B identifying with society A’. All these three
identification processes may go on simultaneously encouraging people to
identify ‘themselves simply as Americans’, as Hispanics, Africans or Asian
Americans. It is also equally true that throughout American history, some
people have gone about identifying themselves as Indians, opting to live in
traditional village settings and also accepting to become the village chief.
Yinger concludes that ‘identification is sometimes the major causal influence
in the ethnic order; at other times it is more neatly dependent on the levels
of integration, acculturation, and amalgamation’. (1997:137-139) It is important
to note here that self-identification and identification by others is not
necessarily correspondent to each other. Individuals or groups may ascribe
themselves to certain nationalities or regions but are not necessarily accepted
by others to be so. Ethnic conflicts in the North –East or displaced populations
in Kashmir can constitute examples that may fit into this model. Yinger
makes a very important point here, when he says that ‘group solidarity
among members of a group may block identification even with an open
society’ (ibid: 140).
85

in Ethnicity and Identity 23.5 Identity in Sociological Theory
Erikson’s intellectual dominance in developing notions of identity has often
paled contribution and importance of sociological theories in formulating
constructs of social identity. Linton’s contributions to the theory of status
and role put forward in his important work The Study of Man (1936) came
close to analyising notions of identity. Role theory developed by Linton
showed how individuals performed roles in correspondence with statuses
that they occupy. In doing so he demonstrated that individuals identified
themselves in specified role positions. The role theory focused on the
interactive nature of identity. People asserted their identities in response
to specific situations where there were designated roles accompanying
defined statuses that were perceived both by the actors and people in their
surroundings. It was this perception that was critiqued by Foote and later
modified by introducing elements of motivation paving way for constructing
notions of identity that were closer to its vernacular meaning then to
Erikson’s notion of personal identity.

Relate and compare reference group theory to the personal identity theory.
Also at the same time Robert Merton developed one of the classic sociological
theories called Reference group theory. The reference group was first brought
in academic usage in 1942 and once again was popularly used by social
psychologists. It was in 1950 that Robert Merton along with Alice S.Kitt
introduced the term in sociological writings in an essay titled ‘Contributions
to the theory of Reference group Behaviour’. The concept was critical to
the understanding of formation of identity as it highlighted the way a person’s
‘attitudes, values and sense of identity’ was shaped by ‘alignment with, or
rejection of, ‘reference groups’ that had significance for the individual,
either positively or negatively’ (Gleason, 1983). The concept of reference
group was further refined by Merton (1968) in his classic sociological text,
Social Theory and Social Structure. Merton’s primary concern was with
examining Social Structures. He did not directly write much on identity or
identification but emphasised on the need to place these concepts in the
context of reference group theory as the reference group was instrumental
in determining the core content of these constructs.
Box 23.3: Self and Identity

Identity acquired center space in sociological literature with the rise of
theoretical perspectives referred to as Symbolic interactionists. The school
that came into prominence in the forty’s tried to understand as to how
‘social interaction mediated through shared symbolic systems, shaped the
self consciousness of the individual’ (Merton, 1968: 467). The protagonists
of this school Charles Horton Cooley and George Herbert mead did not use
the term identity; instead spoke of ‘the self’. ‘The self’ remained popular
in sociological writings to connote what we have been discussing as ‘identity’
in this lessons till early sixty’s. Erving Goffman (1963) was responsible in
substituting ‘the self’ by ‘Identity’ in popular sociological writings. Goffman’s
work Stigma: Notes on the Management of spoiled Identity followed by
Berger’s Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Approach, the term identity
became virtually a permanent fixture in unfolding intricacies of ‘role theory
and reference group theory, dramaturgical sociology, and the
phenomenological approach’.
86

Sociological perception of Identity is an artifact of interaction between the Construction of Identities
individual and society-it is essentially a matter of being designated by a

certain name, accepting that designation, internalizing the role requirement
accompanying it, and behaving according to those perceptions (Gleason,1983).
As is apparent from this view of identity, identity in social settings
accompanies a sense of responsibility combined with commitment or loyalty
and perceived role requirements. It is formatted in social interactions and
manifests itself in social situations. Sociologists would argue that ‘identities
are socially bestowed’ and ‘must also be socially sustained, and fairly steadily
so’ (cf. Gleason, 1983).
23.6 Multiple Identities

All contemporary theories of identity acknowledge that an individual endows
himself with multiple identities. Some of these identities can be mutually
exclusive and also competitive. Others may be compatible, allowing one to
build on other- resulting in the formation of complex constructions of identity.
Yinger explains this complex creation of identity formation saying:
Although some identities clash-if one grows in strength the others become
less salient-others are nested into a compatible structure of identities. The
smaller, more intimate identities are surrounded by larger and more impersonal
ones. Think of the family, the community, the ethnic group, and society as
concentric circles of identity. At any given time, any one can be the most
salient, preferences varying, alternating sometimes on a calendrical rhythm
(at culturally regulated intervals) and sometimes on a critical rhythm (the
timing being determined by an event, perhaps a crisis, the occurrence of
which cannot be determine) (1997:144).
Mehta (1989) made similar assertions in a paper titled ‘Dilemma of Identity

assertion in a pluralistic society: A case study of Indian polity’ whereby a
case was made for examining ‘core’ and ‘peripheral identities’ while discussing
multiple identities experienced by people belonging to diverse communities
in India. She argued:
Various religious, cultural and linguistic diversities occupying the Indian

subcontinent are not crowds but specified communities to which every
member subscribed with a sense of belonging. They have their respective
histories and many other intra-community commonalities——the sense of
belonging which keeps the members of these communities together
irrespective of their geographical placements is termed as ‘core identity’.
However, members of these communities may not assert or even express
these inherent associations ordinarily. It is only under situations of stress
and on threat to their ethnic identity that they may express themselves
(ibid: 265).
Sociological theory would conceptualise these processes of identification

within the general purview of processes of assimilation. Yinger (1997) following
Stein and Hill (1977), Sandra Wallman (1986) interalia expresses similar opinion
—‘individuals from separate groups may come to think of themselves as
belonging to the same society—a new society, blended from their societies
of origin’. Accompanying this construction is fact of ‘identification by others
which is as important as ‘identification of the self within a group’ if not
more. Cultural anthropology for years has distinguished processes of
integration from those of assimilation, amalgamation and acculturation. 87

The Contemporary Issues Integration may not always mean acceptance of one group by the other. A
politically or numerically dominant group may not assimilate a minority or a
smaller group within its fold. At the same time a smaller group may be over
anxious to be accommodated and may assert larger group identity, rather
than acknowledging its ethnic roots. It is rightly argued that each person
having multiple identities may express ‘dominant identity’ either because of
the expectations of others, or as a ‘matter of personal choice’ or is forced
by ‘circumstances of the moment’.
In a general sense one may concur with Yinger (1997) that:
Identities can be inherited, chosen, assigned or merely inferred from some

bit of evidence. If one strengthens the definition of identification to make
it more than simply a label or category, one can with Royce, think of it as
a validated place in an ethnic group. It is not merely ascription. Some ethnic
identities have to be achieved, and they have to be maintained by behavior,
by ethnic ‘signaling’. “Adequate performance in an identity is much more
rigorously judged within a group than it is by outsiders. For the latter, a few
tokens of identity are usually sufficient.”.........That more commonly, or
certainly more visibly, coerced ethnic identity is produced largely by outsiders.
Opportunities denied, stereotypes, and legal and political definitions restrict
one’s ethnic options.
Nisbet also supports these contentions stating:
Throughout recorded history there is a high correlation between alienation

of individual loyalties from dominant political institutions and the rise of
new forms of community-ethnic, religious, and others- which are at once
renunciations of and challenges to these political institutions.
23.7 National Character and Identity Studies

In the post-world war II era construction of identity moved from the domain
of personal to constructing national identity as territories were being
redefined and new nationalities being created across the world. Semblance
of construction of these identities required that national character was
defined and ensured as a moral value to make citizens conform to restructured
boundaries with a sense of renewed passion and commitment. Large-scale
migrations also required realignments. Social scientists attempted to evolve
models that inculcated a sense of belonging among citizens prompting them
to acquire national characters considered imperative for laying the
foundations of nationalism. National character studies carried out by
anthropologists like Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict in the forty’s acquired
immense sociological significance, as it was in the background of these
studies that Erikson made his concept of identity popular.
Box 23.4: Eriksons Conceptualisation of Identity

Functioning American………bases his final ego-identity on some tentative
combination of dynamic polarities such as migratory and sedentary,
individualistic and standardised, competitive and cooperative, pious and
free thinking, etc’ (Erikson, 1963). Erikson goes on to talk about the
‘subliminal panic’ that accompanied large scale testing of ‘American identity’
in the war. ‘Historical change’, he said has reached a coercive universality
and a global acceleration, which is experienced as a threat to the emerging
88

Construction of Identities
American identity. (Cf. Gibbson, 1983) . Erikson expanded his ideas of in a
chapter titled ‘reflections on the American identity’ in which he almost
equated notions of American character with American identity. He wrote
what was true of national characters is true of national identities and that
it would be better to use the term identity instead of national character.
National character studies were brought in the sociological discourse with

the publication of Mead’s And Keep your Powder Dry (1942) and Ruth Benedict’s
study of Japanese society The Chrysanthemum and the sword (1946). The
focus in these studies was to explore how cultures influence individuals and
their personalities and impact formation of their national characters. A concept
that in modern day sociological analysis is often addressed in terms of ethnicity
studies as has been pointed out in the first lesson on ‘Conceptualizing ethnicity’.
It is important to note here that Erikson developed his ideas on ‘ego identity’
and ‘group identity’ while following ‘war time national character studies’.
Even though the concept of ‘identity’ was inspired by national character
studies, its popularity surpassed ‘character studies. ‘National character’ studies
are now invariably referred in a historical sense whereas ‘identity’ studies
are being reinterpreted in almost all branches of social sciences. Identity
construction is as much central to the disciplines of political science, History,
Psychology, Anthropology as it is in the discipline of sociology. One tends to
agree with Gleason’s observations with regard to popularity of identity
construction studies, when he says:
Identity promised to elucidate a new kind of conceptual linkage between

the two elements of the problem, since it was used in reference to, and
dealt with the relationship of, the individual personality and the ensemble
of social and cultural features that gave different groups their distinctive
character. (cf. Sollors, 1996).
Once linkages between construction of ‘personal identity’ and ‘social identity’

were firmly established, social scientists started looking at problems that
individuals confronted in keeping congruence between the two in situations,
where these two constructions of identity came in conflict with each other.
23.8 Conclusion
Alexis de Tocqueville was one of the first scholars to draw attention of the
academic community to the possibilities of individuals shrinking their
worldview and enclosing their spaces to confine themselves ‘in the solitude
of his own heart’ labeling this phenomenon as ‘individualism’. Tocqueville
analysed this problem while addressing issues emerging out of American
conceptions of democracy and did not use the term ‘identity’ or ‘identity
crisis’.
Questions relating to identity acquired critical dimensions in the post world

war period due to crumbling of citadel of colonialism and reconstruction of
national boundaries. Vagaries of war resulted in mass exodus and people
moved to different geographical zones seeking survival and sustenance for
the self and their families. In-migration made local inhabitants circumspect
and may individuals started realigning themselves on the basis of their
religious, linguistic and racial identities. This resulted in enclosures in which
in-group and out-groups were clearly defined and boundaries both psychological
and social were deliberately created and reinforced through oral histories. 89

The Contemporary Issues A peculiar situation emerged in what is often described as ‘nation building
process’. New nations along with established democracies like USA were
promoting what was described earlier as ‘national character studies’. This
model expected people to conform to prescribed principles of liberty, equality
and fraternity laying foundations for what is often described in sociological
literature as ‘mass societies’. ‘Assimilation’ was believed to be the natural
norm for all those who moved from outside into the domains of their new
habitats. National integration and national solidarities emanating from
geographical concepts of nation state were the key issues on which political
mandate was generated. In this process pursuits for seeking ‘self’ or
‘individual identity’ were either confined to the personalized domain of the
individual or philosophy. Social identity operated under the assumed
assumption of ‘identification’ with the larger social milieu that was
represented by a ‘mass society’. It is argued in sociological literature that
the threat of mass society becoming ‘totalitarian’ and subsequently
domineering to the extent of producing ‘authoritarian personalities’
susceptible to ‘fascism’ was first perceived by refugee intellectuals, many of
whom had migrated from Germany. Described as Frankfurt school, it was
related to two influential publications namely Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd
and Handlin’s The Uprooted. These two works were rooted in a theoretical
approach called Dialectical Method. Dialectic refers to a process of realising
contradictions and reconciling those contradictions in a more realistic frame
of reference. People who move from their homelands to other countries
often experience a sense of loss that they try to come to terms with,
through this process of idealist Hegelian philosophy.
It is important to reassert that ‘identity’ is a ‘higher order concept’ — a

general organising referent which includes a number of subsidiary facets
that include social identity, ego-identity, personal identity as other additional
components (Dashefsky, 1976). Identity is all about what is common and
what is specific. When interpreted in these dimensions it becomes the
critical factor in establishing boundaries. How these boundaries are
constructed and legitimized will be discussed in the next lesson.
23.9 References
Benedict, Ruth, 1946, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of
Japanese Culture. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Byron, Regnald 2002, ‘Identity’ In Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural
Anthropology ed. by Alan Barnard and Jonathan Spencer London: Routledge
Dashefsky, Arnold 1976, Ethnic Identity in Society. Chicago: Rand Mc Nally
Erikson, H. Erik, 1959, The Problem of Ego Identity. Psychological Issues,
1:101-164
Erikson, H. Erik, 1963, Childhood and Society New York: Norton (2nd edition)
Foote, N. Nelson, 1951, ‘Identification as the basis for a theory of Motivation’,
American Sociological Review, 16 (Feburary, 1951), pp 14-21
Gleason, Philip. 1983, ‘Identifying Identity: A Semantic history’ The Journal
of American history, 69 (4), March 1983, pp.910-31
Gordon W. Allport. 1954, The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley
Handlin, Oscar. 1951, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations
that made the American People. New York: Grosset and Dunlap
Herberg, Will 1955, Protestant, Catholic, Jew. New York: Anchor
90

Hume, David 1975 (1939) A Treatise of Human Nature. L.A. Ahelly Bigge (ed.) Construction of Identities
& revised by P.H. Nidditeh. Oxford: Clarendon Press

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968. David L. Sills (ed.)
USA: The Macmillan Company & Free Press
Linton, Ralph 1936, The Study of Man: An Introduction. New York: Appleton
Century
Locke, John. 1989 (1690), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Peter
H. Nidditch (ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press
Mead, Margaret, 2000 (1962), And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist
Looks at America. Berghahn Books
Mehta, Shalina 1989, ‘Dilemma of Identity Assertion in a Pluralistic Society:
A Case Study of Indian Polity’. In The Eastern Anthropologist. July-Sept.
1989, Vol. 42: 3.Pp 265-276
Morton, W.L.1965, The Canadian Identity. Madison
Riesman, David 1969, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of The Changing American
Character. Yale University Press
Stein, H.F. and R.F. Hill 1977, The Ethnic Imperative: Exploring the New
White Ethnic Movement. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press
Wallman, Sandra 1986, ‘Ethnicity and the Boundary Process in Context’, In
John Rex and David Mason (eds.), Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations.
Yinger, J.Milton 1997, Ethnicity. New Delhi: Rawat Publications
91

Unit 24
Boundaries and Boundary Maintenance
Contents
24.1 Introduction
24.2 Definitions of Ethnic Group
24.3 Frederik Barth—Ethnic Group and Boundaries
24.4 Ascription as the Critical Factor
24.5 Poly-ethnic Societies
24.6 Melting Pot and Beyond
24.7 Critique of Barth’s Model
24.8 Conclusion
24.9 References
Learning Objectives
After studying this unit you will be able to
give definitions of ethnicity
discuss ethnic group and boundaries
analyse polyethnic societies
describe the “melting pot” theory
24.1 Introduction
In the previous two lessons we talked about conceptualising ethnicity and
construction of identity. It must be apparent to you by now that the notion
of ethnic identity in the globalise world has emerged as the critical concept.
It translates itself sometimes as nationalism, on others is responsible for
creating sub nationalities within political nation states and determines notions
of citizenship. In this lesson we will try and unfold some dimensions of this
complex process of Boundaries and boundary maintenance.
24.2 Definitions of Ethnic Group

To begin with, we start with some simple definitions of ‘Ethnic Groups’.
Macmillan’s Dictionary of Anthropology (1986) defines an ‘Ethnic Group’ as:
Any Group of People who set themselves apart and are set apart from
other groups with whom they interact or coexist in terms of some distinctive
criterion or criteria which may be linguistic, racial or cultural. The term is
thus a very broad one, which has been used to include social CLASSES as
well as racial or national minority groups in urban and industrial societies,
and also to distinguish different cultural and social groupings among
indigenous populations. The concept of ethnic group thus combines both
social and cultural criteria, and the study of ethnicity focuses precisely on
the interrelation of cultural and social process in the identification of and
interaction between such groups.
Max Weber (1958) defined ‘Ethnic Group’ as:

Those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common
92 descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or

be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does Boundaries and
Boundary Maintenance
not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic
membership (Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group precisely by
being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the
latter. In our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only
facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere.
On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how
artificially organised, that inspires belief in common ethnicity. This belief
tends to persist even after the disintegration of the political community,
unless drastic differences in customs, physical type, or, above all, language
exist among its members. ………..Groups, in turn, can engender sentiments
of likeness which will persist even after their demise and will have an
‘ethnic’ connotation. The political community in particular can produce such
an effect. But most directly, such an effect is created by the language
group, which is the bearer of a specific ‘cultural possession of the masses’
(Massenkulturgut) and makes mutual understanding (verstehen) possible or
easier.( Weber,1958)
These definitions draw our attention to subsequent boundaries that ethnic

groups evolve to form ‘enclosures’. These enclosures are not defined by
geographical space or political identities but are distinguished by cultural,
linguistic or religious connectivity. Fredrik Barth, who can be called as the
original author of construction of this notion of boundaries in his famous
essay of 1969 titled ‘Ethnic groups and Group boundaries’ states categorically:
It is clear that boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them.

In other words, categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on the absence
of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion
and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite
changing participation and membership in the course of individual life
histories.
To this he adds another important dimension that we will be debating in this

lesson:
Ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and

acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on
which embracing social systems are built. Interaction in such a social system
does not lead to its liquidation through change and acculturation; cultural
differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence
(Barth, 1969).
It is often argued that boundaries are sustained because people remain

confined to cultural spaces. Even when they immigrate, they retain their
‘cultural stuff’ and do not surrender their individual cultural markers. It was
with these perceptions that Barth’s historic contributions shifted ‘focus of
investigation from internal constitution and history of separate groups to
ethnic boundaries and boundary maintenance’. Before I dwell any further on
Barth’s contributions in a separate section of this lesson, I want to emphasise
that the construction of boundaries as understood in sociological writings is
different from the way boundaries were construed by political scientists.
Territoriality certainly plays an important role in assertion and reassertion of
these diacritic but is not quintessential to the formation of these categories.
Political scientists would largely focus on the relationships that different
ethnic groups share with the state. Read with care the following paragraph 93

The Contemporary Issues by Paul Brass— a name to reckon with, in understanding processes of elite
formations and development of ethnic identities. Brass is often described as
proponent of Instrumentalist school. He writes in his 1991 publication,
Ethnicity and Nationalism:
Ethnic identity formation is viewed as a process that involves three sets of

struggles. One takes place within the ethnic group itself for control over its
material and symbolic resources, which in turn involves defining the group’s
boundaries and its rules for inclusion and exclusion2. The second takes place
between ethnic groups as a competition for right, privileges, and available
resources. The third takes place between the state and the groups that
dominate it, on the one hand, and the populations that inhabit its territory.
Elaborating on these concerns, Brass poses certain significant questions

such as:
Is the study of ethnicity a sub-branch of interest group politics or of class

analysis or a separate subject in its own right? Or, to put it another way, are
interest groups, classes and ethnic groups to be treated as analytically
separable and coequivalent or is one or another category primary?
Brass also has definite opinion about sociological analysis of ethnicity and
boundary maintenance. In his critical comments, he asserts:
Most sociological theories that are relevant to a discussion of ethnic groups

and the state focus on society as a whole and take as their main theoretical
issue the conditions for conflict or cohesion, national integration or internal
war and treat the societal units-interest groups, classes, or ethnic groups
—as givens rather than as objects for examination themselves. Too often
neglected is the issue of how identity and cohesion within groups are formed
and maintained in the first place, how political mobilisation of groups occurs,
and how and why both group cohesion and mobilisation often decline. (Brass,
1985).
Given these deliberations, one may argue that ethnic identities are political
positions, acquired and assumed through processes of cultural articulation
and re-enforced through repetitive calls to threat to survival of these
identities. They are primordial in the sense that people may be born as
Hindus, Muslims, Jew, Whites or blacks. But assertion of these inherited
categories of identification is dependent on situations in which individuals
are involved and what kinds of advantages they perceive for itself in the
given circumstances. One must also remember that these categories of
ascription are also negotiable. Boundaries that an individual draws are always
in inter-active situations. Boundaries are never drawn in social isolation. It
is often my boundary versus your line of demarcation. The process remains
the same irrespective of the fact whether it is a situation involving two
individuals or ethnic groups. Even when dialogue is pursued or positions of
confrontation adopted within the construct of a nation state, ethnic groups
often assume categories in which those in power are perceived to be as
status groups in control, thus different and domineering. Construction of
situations of minority-majority conflicts, religious or linguistic conflicts or
regional disparities are all construed in a patterned manner.
It is also interesting to underscore the fact that ethnicity is relative. In the

94 context of maintenance of boundaries between various groups, Jenkins

notes ‘ethnicity shifting with the contexts of its mobilisation’ and reasons Boundaries and
that ‘ethnicity is a function of inter-group relations; in the absence of such
relations and their concomitant group boundaries ethnicity is unthinkable’
(1997:90-91). The positions that are taken by Brass, Barth and Jenkins ethnicity
becomes a resource that is encashed, manipulated, negotiated both with
and between groups. But when it comes to talking about boundary
maintenance, we tend to focus on inter-group constructions and how identity
is manipulated within groups for assertion of differences.
24.3 Frederik Barth—Ethnic Group and Boundaries

Before, I dwell any further on the notion of manipulation and instrumentalities
of maintaining ethnic group boundaries; it is essential to repeat some of
assertions made in the seminal essay by Barth. To begin with, the definition
of ethnic group as given by Narroll (1964) and described as an ideal type
definition that essentially reviews ethnic group being viewed as =race=a
culture=language=society is repeated:
ethnic group is largely biologically self-perpetuating (Primordial)
shares fundamental cultural values, realised in overt unity in cultural forms
make up a field of communication and interaction
has a membership, which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as
constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same
order.
Barth’s discomfort with this definition emanates from his position that ‘it
allows us to assume that boundary maintenance is unproblematic and follows
from the isolation, which the itemised characteristics imply: racial difference,
cultural difference, social separation and language barriers, and spontaneous
and organised enmity’. Elucidating his point of view, Barth further asserts in
the same paragraph:
This also limits the range of factors that we use to explain cultural diversity:
we are led to imagine each group developing its cultural and social form in
relative isolation, mainly in response to local ecologic factors, through a
history of adaptation by invention and selective borrowing. This history has
produced world of separate peoples, each with their culture and each
organised in a society, which can legitimately be isolated for description as
an island itself.

Outline Barth’s position on boundary maintenance, and then discuss its
various aspects.
Barth in his analysis prefers to look at sharing of these important attributes

not as being primacy or definitional attribute but as ‘implied’ or ‘resultant’.
These attributes may be examined as repositories for ‘re-inventing’ oneself
and not necessarily as morphological attributes for establishing group
identities within contained geographical spaces. People may move away, yet
retain some if not all of their core cultural attributes. They may also live at
the same place but modify some of their cultural traits for ecological
adjustments or for social adaptation without allowing their sense of belonging
to their specific cultural group being invaded in any form. In Barth’s own
terms:
95

The Contemporary Issues It is thus inadequate to regard overt institutional forms as constituting the
cultural features, which at any time distinguish ethnic group — these overt
forms are determined by ecology as well as by transmitted culture. Nor can
it be claimed that every such diversification within a group represents a first
step in the direction of subdivision and multiplication of units. We have also
known documented cases of one ethnic group, also at a relatively simple
level of economic organisation, occupying several different ecologic niches
and yet retaining basic cultural and ethnic unity over long periods (cf; e.g.,
inland and coastal Chukchee (Bogoras, 1904-9) or reindeer, river, and coast
Lapps (Gjessing, 1954; Barth, 1969).
After asserting importance of retaining cultural features, and their importance

as building blocks of ‘identity formations’ within ethnic groups, Barth
highlights the most critical feature of ethnic group formation the fact of
‘ascription’.
24.4 Ascription as the Critical Factor

Ethnic groups are recognised as status categories. Within these categories
it is crucial that members of these groups ascribe themselves to these
formations and their membership is so recognised by the others. Processes
of interaction are thus determined by this concept of belongingness, which
is not only attributed by the self to the group but is also recognised by the
others. Denial of this ascription is problematic for the survival of the individual
in a group and that of group in any inter-ethnic situation. Cultural emblems
like dress, dialect, symbols play a significant role in the assertion of ascription.
Emphasising the criterion of ascription, Barth(1969) states:
When defined as an ascriptive and exclusive group, the nature of continuity

of ethnic units is clear: it depends on the maintenance of boundary. The
cultural features that signal the boundary may change, and the cultural
characteristics of the members may likewise be transformed, indeed, even
the organisation formation the group may change-yet the fact of continuing
dichotomisation between members and outsiders allows us to specify the
nature of continuity, and investigate the changing cultural form and content.
Box 24.1: Investigating Ethnic Boundaries

Barth argues that for researching that he terms ‘investigating’, the ‘ethnic
boundary’ that defines the group becomes critical for analysis and not the
‘cultural stuff’ that comprises the group. This is a position that is confronted
by various scholars in particular by Jenkins. The ‘cultural stuff’ in Barth’s
definition comprises of language, religion, laws, traditions, customs-infect
all the attributes that Tylor addressed in his famous definition of culture.
This definition of ‘ethnic group’ is said to be in direct line with the contention
of ethnic group’ held by Max Weber-as defined in the beginning of this
lesson. According to Jenkins this argument is partly justified and should
remain central to our understanding of ethnicity. But he also believes that
if we follow this in letter and spirit, we run the risk of considering ‘cultural
stuff’ as irrelevant to the process of boundary maintenance.
It is actually this ‘cultural stuff’ that outlines distinctiveness and sustains

differentiation. In Jenkins words:
In insisting that there is no simple equation between seamless tapestry of

96 cultural variation and the discontinuities of ethnic differentiation, it

prevents us from mistaking the morphological enumeration of cultural traits Boundaries and
for the analysis of ethnicity. However, this argument might also be construed
as suggesting that the cultural stuff out of which that differentiation is
arbitrarily socially constructed is somehow irrelevant, and this surely cannot
be true. For example, a situation in which As and Bs are distinguished, inter
alia, by languages that are mutually intelligible for most everyday purposes-
as with Danish and Norwegian (These were the communities that Jenkins
was analysing for constructing his model of ethnicity)—would seem to differ
greatly from one in which the languages involved are, as with English and
Welsh, utterly different. (1997:107).
One may infer then that in polyethnic societies, every ethnic group draws
boundaries using its ‘cultural stuff’ as critical in maintaining these cultural,
often political and economic categories. Yet, one need not forget that
‘boundaries’ may persist, even when there is ‘little cultural differentiation’.
As sollors would put it:
The cultural content of ethnicity (the stuff which Barth’s boundaries enclose)
is largely interchangeable and rarely historically authenticated.
24.5 Poly-ethnic Societies

Barth in his construction of ‘ethnic boundaries’ prefers to use the term poly
ethnic instead of more commonly used Greco-Roman term ‘multi-ethnic’. He
takes us back to the work of Furnivall (1944). Furnivall had said that in a
plural society –‘poly ethnic society integrated in the market place, under the
control of a state system dominated by one of the groups, but leaving large
areas of cultural diversity in the religious and domestic sectors of
activity………but what has not been appreciated by later anthropologists is
the possible variety of sectors of articulation and separation, and the variety
of poly-ethnic systems which entails’ (ibid,301).
We in India experience these differentiations in our day-to-day activities.

India with its diverse populations, regional differences, linguistic pot pouri
and multi religious character shares a unique political umbrella. Ethnic
differences are articulated and once accompanied by political ambitions often
emerge as strong movements. However, what has been remarkable about
these articulations is that homogeneity is never perceived as the common
plank against which dissidence is to be voiced. These movements may have
been symbolic of seeking representations that were largely ‘cultural’ but
were imbued with political meanings- something that Brass like to term as
instrumentalities for achieving political ends. Barth (1969) in this regard has
opted for a distinct position arguing:
Nothing can be gained by lumping these various systems (poly-ethnic, multi-

cultural systems) under the increasingly vague label of ‘plural society’…………
What can be referred to as articulation and separation on the macro –level

corresponds to systematic sets of role constraints on the micro-level. Common
to all these systems is the principle that ethnic identity allowed to play, and
partners he may choose for different kinds of transactions.
In other words, regarded as a status, ethnic identity is similar to sex and

rank, in that it constraints the incumbent in all his activities, not only in
some defined social situations. One might thus also say that it is imperative, 97

The Contemporary Issues in that it cannot be disregarded and temporarily set aside by other definitions
of the situation. The constraints on a person’s behavior which springs from
his ethnic identity thus tend to be absolute and, in complex poly-ethnic
societies, quite comprehensive; and the component moral and social
conventions are made further resistant to change by being joined in
stereotyped clusters as characteristic of one single identity.
Box 24.2: The Ethnic Nuclei

It is ironic, that even when we try to deny mostly as a patriotic gesture that
we are ‘Indians first and foremost and Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs
or Punjabis, Bengali, Gujarati etc. later, we do sustain and nurture with
enormous amount of jealousy our primary identities and subsequently
boundaries associated with these identities.. In an effort to remind ourselves
about our sub-conscious or conscious boundaries, we often pay ritualistic
tribute to cultural traits that tell us — ‘we are different’. It can be dress,
pride in our rational food or art form. Each of these is a symbolic and
essential attribute to assertion of our status in society that is essentially
poly-ethnic. We do this also to reorganize ourselves and to sustain what
some authors would like to call the ‘ethnic nuclei’.
Barth in his work has categorically stated that it is not only the marginalised
or ridiculed in the society, responsible for pronouncing the ethnic boundaries
but also all members of an ethnic groups in a poly ethnic society can act to
maintain dichotomies and differences—sometimes as in the case of Bourne
making what one may believe sound intellectual statements.
24.6 Melting Pot and Beyond

It was submersion of individual ethnic nuclei in a larger, somewhat abstract
perception of ‘national identity’ that dominated ethnic debates in America
in the post world war II period. A debate that assumed in the light of
statements made by Bourne that America was emerging as near perfect
example of a ‘melting pot of races’- an institution in which all races, groups
coming from various parts of the world to settle in America melt their
boundaries in a common pot of ‘American National Identity’-the trans national
Identity.
Milton Gordon (1964) in his book Assimilation in American Life made sustained
effort to distinguish pluralism from assimilations. The concept of Melting pot
implied assimilation at the expense of individual communities forgoing their
individual identities and evolving the nationalistic ‘American individual’. The
concept of ‘Melting pot’ rooted in notions of ‘Anglo-conformity’ ‘demanded
the complete renunciation of the immigrant’s ancestral culture in favour of
the behaviour and values of the Anglo-Saxon core group’, according to Gordon.

Explain the concept of the “melting pot” theory. Put your answer down in
your diary.
Newman has evolved a formula to explain this when he suggests that A+B+C=A.
In this case A is the dominant culture and others are expected to submerge
their differences in this encompassing identity. This may also imply that
A+B+C=D, that is, different cultures when put together in a Melting pot give
up their individual identities to evolve a different identity that is common
98

to all and symbolises the citizen in a democratic state. Werner Sollors in the Boundaries and
following discussion elaborates on some components of this debate among
the students deliberating on notions of ethnicity and boundary maintenance
in America:
In common usage, ‘melting pot’ could stand for both these concepts. The
resulting ambiguity –did melting pot translate into A+B+C=D or into A+B+C=A-
further contributed to make this image the perfect fall guy in maddeningly
circular debate about ethnicity. As ‘D’ it could be denounced from boundary
–constructing ethnic point of view. If the remainder of commitments to
what Orlando Patterson has referred to as ‘the universal culture’ made this
position embarrassing, the ‘A’: melting pot or amalgamation was denounced
as a mere smoke screen for Anglo-Saxon conformity (or, in a variant, for
racism). The most persistent rhetorical feature of American discussions of
the melting pot is therefore contradictory rejection that asserts ethnicity
against A+B+C=D and then recoils to defend universalism against A+B+C=A.
‘Refuting’ the melting pot-an activity American writers and scholars never
seem to cease finding delight in (some studies have termed these debates
as mushrooming of an anti melting pot industry)—allows us to have the
ethnic cake and eat universalism, and to denounce universalism as a veiled
form of ‘Anglo-conformity’ at the same time.
Inherent in these debates is the suggestion that cultures do not have

temperatures and predicting their malleability beyond a point where they
loose both form and content is a mere figment of imagination. In other
words the industry that grew up denouncing an ephemeral notion of melting
pot simply suggests that come what may, ‘boundaries somehow sustain
themselves’ and thus acquire significant dimensions in any study of ethnic
groups.
24.7 Critique of Barth’s Model

There is no denying that Barth’s model offers interesting insights into
processes of cultural configurations and their perseverance, irrespective of
forces demanding change and continuous pressures of accommodation. To
argue that there is no structure or to put it in Sollors words ‘there is no
emperor, there are only clothes’, is a proposition that some scholars find
difficult to comprehend. In his comments on Barth’s study of Swat Pathan,
Louis Dumont offers a subtle statement: ‘The main thing is to understand,
and therefore ideas and values can not be separated from “structure”.
Jenkins and Abner Cohen find Barth’s arguments restrictive. In their opinion
Barth fails to incorporate dynamic nature of ethnicity in his efforts to evolve
a model of ‘enclosures’ defined by ‘self ascriptive boundaries’. Cohen’s logic
is: (Barth’s) separation between ‘vessel’ and ‘content’ makes it difficult to
appreciate the dynamic nature of ethnicity. It also assumes an inflexible
structure of the human psyche and implicitly denies that personality is an
open system given to modifications through continual socialization under
changing socio-cultural conditions.
Talal Asad (1972) in his work ‘Market Model, Class Structure and Consent: A
Reconsideration of Swat Political Organisation’ want to maintain Boundaries’
places Barth in Hobbesian tradition.
99

in Ethnicity and Identity Box 24.3: Boundary Maintenance
Common arguments found in the literature that can be decoded as critique
of Barth’s model take the course that ‘barth’s theory leaves us guessing
about the reasons why people want to maintain boundaries. Is it a primordial
trait according to which human being s want to distance themselves from
others, create and maintain boundaries, even when the area that is enclosed
by these boundaries appears to be, at least from a structural view, identical?’
(Sollors, 1981). Or to put it in the words of Joshua A. Fishman-‘If there can
be no heartland without boundaries, however distant they may be, there can
be no boundaries unless there is a heartland’.
a) Sustenance of Boundaries
Critique not withstanding, there is evidence to suggest that ethnic groups
sustain boundaries and retain identity markers to distinguish categories of
ascription. We will briefly review some factors that support this process of
boundary sustenance. It is understandable that under different circumstances,
critical factors sustaining definitions and boundaries are likely to be different.
A crucial factor that impacts is the element of security. Barth argues:
In most political regimes, however, where there is less security and people
live under a greater threat of arbitrariness and violence outside their primary
community, the insecurity itself acts as a constraint on inter-ethnic contacts.
This sense of insecurity promotes a sense of enclosure within the community

and results in hardening of boundaries visa-vie other groups. It may further
be added that if there are historical and cultural factors that purport
differences , the pace at which boundaries are sustained may be accentuated.
Essays listed in Barth’s edited volume showed that in each case boundaries
were maintained by a limited set of cultural features. It may also be
remembered that ‘the persistence of the unit then depends on the
persistence of these cultural differentiae’. Barth in his concluding remarks
posits:
However, most of the cultural matter that at any time is associated with a
human population is not constrained by this boundary; it can vary, be learnt,
and change without any critical relation to the boundary maintenance of the
ethnic group through time, one is not simultaneously, in the same sense,
tracing the history of ‘a culture’: the elements of the present culture of
that ethnic group have not sprung from the particular set that constituted
the group’s culture at a previous time, whereas the group has a continual
organisational existence with boundaries (criteria of membership) that despite
modifications have marked off a continuing unit.
Within the precepts of notions of Nation-state, the Majority-Minority

situations further the process of ethnic distancing and segment boundaries.
Minority situations are often under pressure for fear of rejection by the
host population.
As an epilogue to these three chapters on ethnicity, Identity and Boundary

maintenance, and to provide a perspective on how relevant these concepts,
constructions and Boundaries are for understanding contemporary political
and social realities; a section on Nationalism, Citizenship and boundaries is
incorporated.
100

24.8 Conclusion Boundaries and

‘Nationalism is the political doctrine which holds that humanity can be divided
into separate, discrete units-nations-and that each nation should constitute
a separate political unit-a state. The claim to nationhood usually invokes the
idea of a group of people with a shared culture, often a shared language,
sometimes a shared religion, and usually but not always a shared history; to
this it adds the political claim that this group of people should, by rights,
rule themselves or be ruled by people of the same kind (nation, ethnicity,
language, religion etc.)’(Jonathan Spencer, 2002). This conception assumes
nations to be homogenous following classical precepts of ethnographic
explorations that argued that ‘people can be classified as belonging to
discrete, bounded cultures or societies’. The construct of a Poly-ethnic
society comes loaded with notions of multiple nationalities that are bounded
to each other by a common perception of loyalty, while retaining distinct
boundaries that do not disturb the precinct of internationally accepted
territoriality.
Some recent studies on the subject attempt to study the ‘nation-state from
the point of view of modern ethnicity theory….. equating regional
politics=ethnicity=building blocks of new nations in the post 1947 era, as
“self consciousness of a group of people united or closely related, by shared
experiences such as language, religious belief, common heritage or political
institutions”. Increasingly, it is now being perceived that the notion of
sovereign nation-state and an over arching concern with one’s own
nationalism is instrumental in generating violence within the confines of
‘legitimate perceptions’ of protection of defined national/ethnic boundaries.
If people in Kashmir, Bodoland or other parts of the Indian Nation state are
fighting for the protection of their perceived boundaries the ‘armed forces’
are struggling to keep ‘national boundaries’ intact.
‘Ethnicity emerges out of the cusp between the relation between the citizen
and those officially defined as outsider, stranger or Marginal. But, it emerges
not purely from the logic of citizenship and development, but from the
structure of electoral logic, from the normalcy of Majority-Minority politics’
(Visvanathan, 2003).
The world today is witnessing upheavals often rooted in notions of ‘self’. I

am referring back to first and second lesson talking about how individuals
perceive and construct ‘identity’ and it collective translation into ‘ethnicity’.
We often come across essays on ‘resurgence or revival of ethnicity’ and how
in the context of ‘nation-state’, these constructions pose problems of
‘instability’. I am not making any efforts in these concluding remarks to
answer any queries that may trouble your mind as you try and understand
these complex processes affecting our lives. I am closing these lessons by
repeating some questions that social scientists often pose to themselves
and to fellow students to get closer to empirical processes that are unfolding
before us.
By the sixteenth century.........the word nation expanded to include a people,

a population. National identity now derived from membership in a people
and finally nation referred to a “unique people” or a “unique sovereign people”.
And it is the trajectory of definitions that became problematic. The nation,
instead of being an open category, threatens to become an exclusionary
101

The Contemporary Issues process. The seeds of ambivalence and violence are rooted here and it steps
from
The idea of citizenship as a static entity
The problematic nature of identity
The positivism between territory and a people and the fixity of boundaries
The genocidal nature of the exclusionary process.
24.9 References
Asad, Talal. 1972, “Market Model, Class Structure and Consent: A
Reconsideration of Swat Political Organisation”. Man, 7(1): 74-94
Barth, Fredrik. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation
of Cultural Difference. London: Allen and Unwin
Bogoras, W. (1904-9) The Chickchee. Anthropological Memoirs, American

Museum of Natural history, Vol 11. New York
Brass, Paul, 1985, Ethnic Groups and the State. London: Croom-Helm
Dictionary of Anthropology. London: Macmillan (1986)
Furnivall, John Sydenham 1944, Netherlands, India: A Study of Plural Economy

Cambridge: University Press
Gans, J. et al. 1979 (eds.), On the making of Americans: Five essays in Honor
of David Riesman. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press
Gleason Philip 1964. ‘The Melting Pot: Symbol of Fusion and Confusion’.
American Quarterly, 16 (1964), 20-46
Gordon, Milton, 1964, Assimilation in American Life. New York: Oxford Press
Healey, Joseph, F. 1998. Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class: The Sociology of
Group Conflict and Change. London: Pine Forge Press
Jenkins, Richard 1997, Rethinking Ethnicity: Agreements and Explorations.

Sage Publications
Narroll, R. 1964. On Ethnic Unit Classification. Current Anthropology, 5(4):

283-312
Newman, W.N. 1973, A Study of Minority Groups and Social Theory. New
York: Harper and Row
Patterson, 1977, Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse. New York:

Stein and Day
Sollors, Werner 1981, ‘Theory of American Ethnicity’. American Quarterly,

33(3), Pp. 257-83
Visvanathan, Shiv 2003, Interrogating the Nation. Economic and Political

Weekly, (June 7), Pp: 2295-2302
Weber, Max 1958 (1922), Economy and Society. In H.Gerth and C.W.Mills
(Trans. & Eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford
University Press
102

Unit 25
Concepts of Difference and Inequality
Contents
25.1 Introduction
25.2 Difference and Inequality: Conceptual Understanding
25.3 Natural and Social Inequality
25.4 Major Theoretical Perspectives
25.5 The Debate
25.6 The Rise of Meritocracy
25.7 Conclusion
25.9 References
Learning Objectives
distinguish between natural and social inequality
explain the causes and consequences of social inequality
discuss the major theoretical approaches towards the understanding of
social inequality
25.1 Introduction
The concept of inequality lies at the root of some of the major theoretical
formulations in society. It constitutes the basic component of the
phenomenon of stratification in society which some of the senior and
established sociologists as also younger scholars have studied extensively
and on which they have written articles, monographs, and textbooks. In a
general sense, inequality refers to imbalance in quantity, size, degree, value,
or status. This often implies an imbalance in ability or resources to meet a
challenge. Inequality in societies in general is manifest in caste, class, gender,
and power relations. In simple societies based on kinship, stratification is
evident in status distinctions determined by age, sex, and personal
characteristics as among Australian aboriginal communities (see Sahlins, 1969).
In this unit, we will explore the twin concepts of difference and inequality
intensively. The major concern here is with finding out how and in what
conditions differences between people get transformed into inequalities.
Having determined the point of departure between difference and inequality,
we will explore the two broad types of inequality, i.e., natural inequality,
and social inequality. We will subsequently discuss the major theoretical
approaches towards the understanding of social inequality.
25.2 Difference and Inequality: Conceptual

Understanding
People in a society are divided into different categories based on one or a
set of criteria. Social stratification refers to the division of people into
different categories. These categories may simply reflect differences between
people grouped into them. The implicit assumption here is that the difference
105

Theories of between categories is important, however, no weightage is given to the
Social Stratification
difference between them, i.e., the categories are not assigned unequal
statuses or unequal rewards. The different categories of people are treated
alike and one is not treated as more significant than the other. This is the
concept of difference in social categories. When unequal statuses and rewards
are attached to social categories and these are ranked on the basis of one
or more defining factors, they are treated as unequal. According to Gupta
(2004), differences assume importance when ranking diversities becomes
difficult. Social stratification incorporates concepts of both difference and
inequality.
Box 25.1: Social Stratification: Difference and Inequality

“If instead of power or wealth one takes into account forms of stratification
based on difference then the geological model cannot be easily invoked. For
example, linguistic differences cannot be placed in a hierarchical order.
Looked at closely, neither should differences between men and women be
understood in terms of inequality. Sadly, however, such differences are never
always allowed to retain their horizontal status. They usually tend to get
hierarchised in popular consciousness. This is where prejudice takes over.
Men are deemed to be superior to women, certain linguistic groups are held
to be less civilised and cultivated than others, and religious bigotry prevails,
all because most of us are not conditioned to tolerate difference qua
difference.
The conceptual need to separate these two orders arises because in the
sociology of social stratification attention is directed to the manner in which
hierarchy and difference relate to each other. If hierarchy and difference
could hold on to their respective terrains then there would be no real need
to study stratification as a special area of interest. If it is hierarchy alone
that is of interest, then ‘social inequality’ would be a good enough rubric
within which to organise our study. If, on the other hand, it is only difference
that is of concern then the tried and tested term ‘social differentiation’
should do adequately. The term ‘social stratification’, however, is not a
synonym of either social inequality or of social differentiation” (Gupta,
2004:120-121).
Béteille (1969) suggests that two aspects of social inequality deserve mention.
The first is the distributive aspect which refers to the different factors (e.g.
income, wealth, occupation, education, power, skill) that are distributed in
the population. It provides the basis of inter-personal interactions in society.
The second is the relational of aspect which refers to the ways in which the
individuals differentiated by the different factors relate to each other within
a system of groups and categories. Here the thrust is on interaction of
people belonging to one group or category. He explains that the major forms
of social inequality that have been studied by sociologists intensively are
those that arise out of disparities of wealth and income; those that have a
bearing on unequal prestige or honour; and those that are born out of
imbalance in the distribution of power.
Unequal distribution of wealth and honour in society affords the following

widespread consequences,
1) ‘‘Differences in wealth will produce fairly distinct strata of people who
will be separated from each other by those differences and who may
come over time to form quite distinct social units.
106

2) Such segmentation of the society lessens the possibility of social solidarity Concepts of Difference
and Inequality
and, in turn, of societywide consensus on the most important issues,
such as the uses of public funds.
3) The unequal earnings of people in different positions may produce unequal
commitment to the society’s norms and laws and result in higher rates of
deviant behaviour, such as crime, than might otherwise occur.
4) Strata that are separated by unequal wealth and the unequal ability to
purchase basic life chances, such as education and health, are likely to
engage in hostile or conflictual encounters as they struggle for shares of
wealth.
5) Very low income and honour may produce high rates of pathologies, such
as mental disorder, physical illness, shortened life, crime, and high rates
of accidents.
6) The chances to achieve full equality of opportunity for all and, with that,
a high degree of fairness in the system will be lessened as wealthier
people use their wealth to give their children special advantages over the
children of poorer families.
7) Through such transmission of unequal advantage over generations, the
social divisions among people may become hardened.
8) The discovery of the full range of talent in society is likely to be less
effective when mobility is restricted by the transmission of advantages
from parent to child.
9) Low income may make it difficult to induce the less well rewarded people
to give their conscientious best to the tasks for which they are suited”
(Tumin, 1985: 158-159).
Welfare states intervene in order to supplement small incomes when they

are not enough to meet basic needs.
We often encounter inequality in our daily lives in terms of differentiation

and comparison of people based on wealth, power, and gender. At the
international level too, countries are compared and ranked on the basis of
economic and political power. Countries of the world are divided into three
categories, (i) the First World comprising of U.S. and its allies in the cold war,
these were the developed, capitalist nations, (ii) the Second World comprising
the U.S.S.R. and to its allies, these were the developed communist nations;
and (iii) the Third World comprising most of Latin America and recently
independent African and Asian states, these were the underdeveloped
countries that did not align with the west or the east in the cold war ___
many of them were members of the Non-Aligned Movement. There is no
denying that this terminology is being increasingly replaced with developed
and developing nations to refer to First World nations and Third World nations
respectively. Developed nations are those in which economy is based on
industrialisation and people’s standard of life is high as also their literacy
rate and life expectancy. Developing nations, on the other hand are those
in which the process of industrialisation set in late and the people’s standard
of life, literacy rate and life expectancy is low. These nations struggle to
acquire the standard of life in developed nations. The human development
index (based on indicators such as life expectancy at birth, literacy rates,
and gross development product) measures the degree of development in a
country and in doing so forms the basis of ranking them.
107

Theories of Economic inequality among world nations may be understood through
dependency theory developed in the late 1950s under the guidance of
Prebisch __ the then Director of the United Nations Commission for Latin
America. Prebisch and his colleagues were deeply concerned about the fact
that economic development in industrialised countries did not lead to a
similar trend in the poorer countries, rather, it often resulted in economic
problems in the latter. Dependency theory was developed in order to explain
the persistent poverty of poorer countries by examining patterns of
interaction among nations and by suggesting that inequality between them
was an intrinsic part of those interactions (see Ferraro, 1996).
More clearly stated, dependency theory explains that countries in the world
fall into two categories: wealthy nations that are the core countries and
poorer nations that are the peripheral countries. The core countries obtain
the resources and raw material from peripheral countries. Here, they are
processed and finally returned to the peripheral nations as manufactured
goods. While the poor nations provide the natural resources, cheap labour
and confirmed destination of finished products that are priced exorbitantly,
the wealthy nations maintain their superiority over them. Surely, without
the input from peripheral nations, the core nations will not be able to
maintain their position. Since it is in their interest, the core nations
perpetuate the situation of inequality through different economic and human
resource development policies. Resistance by peripheral countries is met
with imposition of economic sanctions, stringent policies of international
trade and commerce, sometimes military invasion.
25.3 Natural and Social Inequality

Interest in the subject of the origin and foundation of inequality in society
may be traced to the times of Rousseau. He explained that equality prevailed
so long as people remained content with their way of life __ one in which
they wore clothes of animal hides, adorned their bodies with feathers and
shells and confined themselves to the activities that each person could
perform individually. From the time one person began to stand in need of
help of another, when one person began to collect provisions, work became
inevitable and equality in relationships disappeared. Rousseau (1754) identified
two kinds of inequality among people, (i) natural or physical inequality
referring to difference of age, health, bodily strength, and mental abilities;
and (ii) moral or political inequality referring to differences in privileges that
are established or authorized by the consent of people themselves e.g.
power, honour.
Tocqueville (1956) accepted that inequality imposed by nature on people

was difficult to get rid of and that equality remained a cherished ideal. He
distinguished between aristocratic society (which was characterised by rigid
hierarchy of estates or castes) and democratic society (which was
characterised by mobility of individuals across classes). Society in Europe
prior to the nineteenth century was aristocratic; society in America in the
first half of the nineteenth century was democratic in character. Tocqueville’s
contrast between aristocratic and democratic societies stretched beyond
their political organisation to incorporate social distinctions, religious
experiences, and aesthetic sensibilities. Despite the fact that Tocqueville
belonged to aristocratic society, he was impressed with egalitarianism or the
principle of equality pervading different dimensions of life. He firmly believed
108 that some day, Europe and the rest of the world would be under the cover

of equality. He agreed that western civilisation did, in principle, recognise Concepts of Difference
and Inequality
equality even though its own institutions were hierarchical.
Later, Béteille developed Tocqueville’s idea that all systems are mixed and
that in real situations pure hierarchy or equality does not exist. What exists,
however is,“moving equilibrium between incompatible and ever-varying forces”
(Macfarlane, 1999: 288). Béteille proposed a distinction between harmonic
system (in which society is divided into groups that are hierarchically placed
and the ordering is considered as appropriate) and disharmonic systems (in
which there is no consistency between the order in which groups are arranged
and the natural scheme of things i.e., there is a discrepancy between the
existential and normative orders). He explained the disharmonic system in
terms of one which upholds equality as an ideal but practices inequality. In
Béteille’s own words (1977:1), “The great paradox of the modern world is
that everywhere men attach themselves to the principle of equality and
everywhere, in their own lives as well as in the lives of others, they encounter
the presence of inequality. The more strongly they attach themselves to the
principles or the ideology of equality the more oppressive the reality
becomes”. We often encounter natural inequality in terms of differences in
capacities in potential, abilities bestowed on individuals by nature that
make for unequal endowment of opportunities available to them. Béteille
(1983: 8) writes, “To an anthropologist for whom the variety of cultures has
a central place in the human scheme of things, it would appear that the idea
of natural inequality is inherently ambiguous, if not a contradiction in terms.
Nature presents us only with differences or potential differences. With human
beings these differences do not become inequalities unless and until they
are selected, marked out and evaluated by processes that are cultural and
not natural. In other words differences become inequalities only with the
application of scales; and the scales with which we are concerned in talking
about inequalities in a social context are not given to us by nature, but
culturally constructed by particular human beings under particular historical
conditions”.
Consider the example of the two children — one who is blind by birth and
the other who has normal vision. The two children are endowed with unequal
abilities that make them perform the same task with unequal precision. So
long as we do not evaluate the performance of the two children and judge
their abilities, there is no perception of inequality — natural or social. The
two children are said to be differently endowed by nature. Natural inequality
between them is perceived when we asses their performance. We then refer
to natural inequality to mean inequality meted out by nature itself. Natural
inequality becomes the basis of providing opportunities and resources,
providing privileges and discriminations that form the groundwork of social
inequality. One example of social inequality is enfolded in division of labour
which is accompanied with inequality in status and power. Simplistically
viewed, division of labour corresponds with social differentiation. Some
positions are held in esteem while are associated with subjugation.

Distinguish between natural inequality and social inequality.
25.4 Major Theoretical Perspectives

There are at least three theoretical perspectives on social stratification. The
first is the functionalist perspective which seeks to explain social stratification 109

Theories of in terms of its contribution to the maintenance of social order and stability
in society. Like other functionalists, Parsons believed that order and stability
in society are based on values held in common by people in society. Those
individuals who conduct themselves in accordance with these values are
ranked above others. Thus, a successful business executive would be ranked
above others in a society which values individual achievement while
individuals who fight battles and wars would be ranked above others in a
society which values bravery and gallantry. Functionalists uphold that
relationship between social groups in society is one of cooperation and
inter-dependence. Parsons explains that in a highly specialised industrial
society, some people specialise in organisation and planning while others
follow their directives. Certain positions are functionally more important in
society than others. These are often ranked higher in the social hierarchy
and fetch greater rewards than others. This inevitability leads to inequality
in distribution of power and prestige.
The second is the Marxist perspective which differs from the functionalist
perspective in focusing on divisive rather than integrative aspect of social
stratification. Marxists regard social stratification as a means through which
the group in the upper rungs exploits those in the lower rungs. Here the
system of stratification is based on the relationship of social groups to the
forces of production. More clearly stated, Marxists identify two major strata
in society: one that controls the forces of production hence rules over
others, second that works for the ruling class. Form Marxian standpoint,
economic power governs political power. The ruling class derives its power
form ownership and control over forces of production. The relations of
production prevail over major institutions, values and belief systems. Evidently
the political and legal system pursue the interests of the ruling class. The
ruling class oppresses the serving class. Thus, stratification in society serves
to foster exploitation and hostility between the two major strata.
The critical terms in the Marxian framework of social stratification are, (i)
class consciousness by which is meant the awareness, the recognition by
the people belonging to a class (e.g., workers) of their place in the production
process and of their relation with the owning class. Class consciousness also
subsumes the awareness of the extent of exploitation by the owning class
in terms of their deprivation of and appropriate share in the ‘surplus value’
of goods produced by them. Over time, workers realise that the way to
relieve themselves of the exploitation and oppression is overthrowing the
capitalist owners through unified, collective revolution; (ii) class solidarity
by which is meant the extent to which the workers join together in order
to achieve their economic and political objectives; and (iii) class conflict by
which is meant struggle when class consciousness has not matured or it may
be conscious struggle in the form of collective assertions and representations
of workers intended to improve their lot.
The third is the Weberian perspective according to which social stratification

is based on class situation which corresponds with market situation. Those
who share common class situation also share similar life chances. They
constitute one strata. Weber identified four groups in a capitalist society:
the propertied upper-class, the property-less, white collar workers; the petty
bourgeoisie; and the manual working class. Weber did agree with Marx on
the significance of the economic dimension of stratification. He, however,
added the aspects of power and prestige to the understanding of social
110

stratification. Weber was convinced that differences in status led to Concepts of Difference
and Inequality
differences in lifestyles.
Tumin (1985:13) explains this more clearly, “As distinguished from the
consequences of property differences for life chances, status differences,
according to Weber, lead to differences in life styles which form an important
element in the social exclusiveness of various status groups. Status groups
acquire honour primarily by usurpation. They claim certain rewards and act
out their claims in terms of certain manners and styles of behavior and
certain socially exclusive activities. And while status groups do not usually
rest on any legal basis in modern societies, corresponding legal privileges are
not long in developing once the status groups stabilize their positions by
securing economic power”. In short, much like Marx, Weber agreed that
property differences are important in forming of status groups. Property
differences also define the lines of distinction and privileges among them.
Unlike Marx, Weber assigned greater importance to status groups than to
the development of community feeling and motivation for undertaking
concerted action by members of an economic class against the system.
Weber also laid stress on party which often represents interests determined
through ‘class situation and status situation’. According to Weber, the
economic aspect is crucial in classes, honour is crucial in status groups, and
power is crucial in parties.
Weber’s perspective on social stratification derives from three components:

class, status, and power. Betellie (1969: 370) writes, “In Weber’s scheme,
class and power appear to be generalised categories: the former arises form
unequal life chances in a market situation and the latter form the nature of
domination which is present in one form or another in all the societies.
Status, on the other hand, seems to be a kind of residual category”. Weber
clarified that social honour (in capitalist societies of the west too) is not
solely determined by possession of wealth or power. He said that social
honour is linked with values, not material interests. Evidently, the
determinants of status honour are not only economic power and political
power but also style of life which includes material components and non-
material components (e.g. literacy and /or artistic sensibilities). In case of
material component, it is easy to superimpose economic advantages on
advantages of status i.e., those who are able to strengthen their economic
condition are also to acquire status in industrialized societies (given to mass
production of consumer goods, and common media of communication). The
spread of uniformised education greatly reduces distinction between non-
material component of people’s style of life. Béteille (1969) explains that
economic advantages are not easily translated into status advantages because
of several reasons. In order to acquire an exclusive style of life, an individual
has to be a part of a particular social milieu. Often , he/she has to encounter
resistance from those who are a part of that social circle. This resistance
suggests the importance attached to inequality.

Discuss the major theoretical perspectives on social stratification.
25.5 The Debate

Kinsley Davis and Wilbert Moore discussed the issues of functional necessity
of stratification, determinants of positional rank, societal functions and
stratification, and variation in stratified system at length. They explained 111

Theories of that unequal distribution rights and perquisites making for social inequality
provides the motivation to people to perform duties associated with a given
position and to achieve position that affords more prestige and esteem.
Social inequality, therefore ensures that “the most important positions are
conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons. Hence every society, no
matter how simple or complex, mist differentiate persons in terms of both
prestige or esteem, and mist therefore possess a certain amount of
institutionalised inequality” (Davis and Moore, 1967: 48). The positions that
carry the best reward and highest rank are those that are excessively important
for society, and require greatest training or talent. They clarify that in
effect, a society needs to accord sufficient reward to position of high rank
only to ensure that they are filled competently. It may also be understood
that a position important in one society may not be equally important in
another one.
Tumin (1953, rpt.1967: 53) summarises the central argument advanced by

Davis and Moore in sequential propositions stated in the following words:
1) “Certain positions in any society are functionally more important than
others, and require special skills for their performance.
2) Only a certain number of individuals in any society have the talents
which can be trained into the skills appropriate to these positions.
3) The conversion of talents into skills involves a training period during
which sacrifices of one kind or another are made by those undergoing
the training.
4) In order to induce the talented persons to undergo these sacrifices and
acquire the training, their future positions must carry an inducement
value in the form of differential, i.e., privileged and disproportionate
access to the scarce and desired rewards which the society has to offer.
5) These scarce and desired goods consist of the rights and perquisites
attached to, or built into, the positions, and can be classified into those
things which contribute to a) sustenance and comfort, b) humor or
diversion, c) self-respect and expansion.
6) This differential access to the basic rewards of the society has a
consequence the differentiation of the prestige and esteem which the
various strata acquire.
7) Therefore, social inequality among different strata in the amounts of
scarce and desired goods, and the amounts of prestige and esteem which
they receive, is both positively functional or inevitable in any society”.
Tumin argues that at the outset it is not proper to treat certain positions
as functionally more important than others, e.g. it is not appropriate to
judge that the engineers in a factory are functionally more important because
of special skills than unskilled workmen. Surely, some labour force of unskilled
workmen is as important and indispensable to the functioning of the factory
as some labour force of engineers. Furthermore, relative indispensability and
replaceability of a set of skills among a people largely depends upon the
bargaining power of those who possess it. This power depends on the
prevalent system of rating. Motivation is determined by several factors out
of which rewards and other inducements are only some. There is also a
likelihood that a system of norms concerning withdrawal of services “except
under most extreme circumstances would be considered as absolute moral
anathema”. In such a situation, the notion of the relative functionality
112 proposed by Davis and Moore would have to be substantially revised.

The second proposition regarding range of talent and the presence of limited Concepts of Difference
and Inequality
number of individuals with talents is contested by Tumin on the ground that
in any society there is no adequate knowledge to determine and judge the
amount of talent present in society. He explains that societies that are
rigidly stratified are less likely to be able to discover new facts about the
talents of its members. “Smoothly working and stable systems of stratification
tend to build- in obstacles to the further exploration of the range of available
talent. This is especially true in those societies where the opportunity to
discover talent in any one generation varied with the differential resources
of the parent generation” (Tumin, 1953, rpt.1967: 54-55). If the differential
rewards and opportunities are socially inherited by the subsequent generation,
then the discovery of talents in the next generation becomes particularly
difficult. More importantly, motivation depends on distribution of rewards in
the previous generation. This means that unequal distinction motivation in
a generation is because of unequal distribution of rewards in the preceding
generation. Access to privileged position is restricted by the elites in society.
In the third proposition, Davis and Moore introduce the concept of sacrifice
which Tumin (ibid) states is “the least critically thought-out concept in the
repertoire, and can also be shown to be least supported by actual facts”. He
challenges the prevalence of sacrifice by talented people undergoing training
since it involves losses that arise out of surrender of earning power and cost
of the training. One of the basic issues here is the presumption that the
training period in a system is essentially sacrificed. This is not always true
because the costs involved in training people may be borne by the society
at large. If this happens, the need to compensate someone in terms of
differential rewards when the skilled positions are staffed become redundant
as much as the need is stratify social position on these grounds.
Tumin argues that even if the training programme is sacrificed and the talent
in society is rare, the fourth proposition of Davis and Moore suggesting
differential access to desired rewards does not hold. The allocation of
differential rewards is scarce and desired goods and services as the only or
the most efficient was of inviting appropriate talent for to there position is
itself questionable. The joy in work, work satisfaction, institutionalised social
duty or social service also provide motivation for the most functionally
important positions. This aspect has been overlooked by Davis and Moore.
In the fifth and sixth proposition, Davis and Moore classify rewards into
three categories, those that contribute to sustenance and comfort, those
that contribute to humor and diversion, and those that contribute to self-
respect and ego-expansion. He draws correspondence between differentiation
of prestige and esteem which various strata acquire and stratification as
institutionalised social inequality. Tumin questions the allocation of equal
amounts of the three kinds of reward for effective functioning of the
stratification system could one type of reward not be emphasised to an
extent that the others were neglected. He says that it is not possible to
determine whether one type of reward or all three of them induced
motivation. Societies emphasise different kinds of rewards in order to
maintain balance between responsibility and record. Again, the differentiation
in prestige between conformist or the deviation does not equate with
distinction “between strata of individuals each of which operates within the
normative order, and is composed of adults”.
113

Theories of The seventh proposition of Davis and Moore focuses on social inequality
among different strata in term of scarce and desired goods as also the
amount of prestige and esteem they incur. These are positively functional
and inevitable in society. Tumin (1953, rpt. 1967: 57) writes, “If such
differential power and property are viewed by all as commensurate with the
differential responsibilities, and if they are culturally defined as resources
and not as rewards, then, no differentials in prestige and esteem need to
follow”.
Box 25.2: Dysfunctions of Stratification

Tumin (1967:58) proposed the following provisional assertions:
1) “Social stratification systems function to limit the possibility of discovery
of the full range of talent available in a society. This results from the
fact of unequal access to appropriate motivation, channels of recruitment
and centers of training.
2) In foreshortening the range of available talent, social stratification
systems function to set limits upon the possibility of expanding the
productive resources of the society, at least relative to what might be
the case under conditions of greater equality of opportunity.
3) Social stratification systems function to provide the elite with the
political power necessary to procure acceptance and dominance of an
ideology which rationalizes the status quo, whatever it may be as
“logical”, “natural”, and “morally right”. In this manner social
stratification systems function as essentially conservative influences in
the societies in which they are found.
4) Social stratification systems function to distribute favorable self-images
unequally throughout a population. To the extent that such favorable
self-images are requisite to the development of the creative potential
inherent in men, to that extent stratification systems function to limit
the development of this creative potential.
5) To the extent that inequalities in social reward cannot be made fully
acceptable to the less privileged in a society, social stratification systems
function to encourage hostility, suspicion and distrust among the various
segments of a society and thus to limit the possibilities of extensive
social integration.
6) To the extent that loyalty to a society depends on a sense of significant
membership in the society depends on one’s place on the prestige
ladder of the society, social stratification systems function to distribute
unequally the sense of significant membership in the population.
7) To the extent that participation and apathy depend upon the sense of
significant membership in the society, social stratification systems
function to distribute loyalty unequally in the population.
8) To the extent that participation and apathy depend upon the sense of
significant membership in the society, social stratification functions to
distribute the motivation to participate unequally in a population”.
Davis, in turn, asserts that Tumin seeks to demolish the concept of

institutionalised inequality. He offers no explanation of the universality of
stratified inequality. While the interest of Davis and Moore lay in
understanding why stratification exists in society, Tumin argues that
stratification does not have to be. Evidently, they are addressing different
issues. Further, Davis alleges that Tumin’s critique suffers from confusion
about abstract or theoretical reasoning with raw, empirical generalisations.
114

He defends his own position by stating that the chief concern was with Concepts of Difference
and Inequality
stratified inequality as a general property of social systems involving high
degree of abstraction. Again, Tumin’s critical appraisal of the theory proposed
by Davis and Moore is based on only one article conveniently ignoring other
publications that answer several question raised by him. His own
understanding and presentation of Davis and Moore theory is inadequate.
This, in fact, is why Tumin’s concept of stratification is inconsistent. Moore
too explicitly states that Tumin has not defined social stratification clearly.
This led him to wrongly assume that differential rewards and inequality of
opportunity were the same thing.
Tumin (1953, rpt 1967: 63) guards his position on several counts summarized
in the following words, “Of course, all institutional arrangements of any
complexity are bound to be mixed in their instrumentality. It is the recognition
of this mixture, and the emphasised sensitivity to the undesired aspects,
which impels men to engage in purposeful social reform. In turn, social
scientists have been traditionally concerned with the range of possible social
arrangements and their consequences for human society. One is impelled to
explore that range after probing deeply into whether a given arrangement
is unavoidable and discovering that it is not. One is even more impelled to
such exploration when it is discovered that the avoidable arrangement is
probably less efficient than other possible means to the stated end. It was
toward such further probing that I directed my original remarks”.
25.6 The Rise of Meritocracy

Michael Young projects a future British society in which all the members
were provided equal opportunity to realise their talent and that would
determine social roles i.e. the most able people would occupy the most
important position in society; social status would be commensurate with
merit. This arrangement of role allocation came to be referred to as
meritocracy. Young (1961) emphasises that meritocracy was completely
dysfunctional in society. Those who occupied upper position by virtue of
their merit would treat those occupying the lower positions with contempt,
and as inferior them. This would happen because the people in important
position would be absolutely convinced of their superiority, there would be
no trace of self-doubt hence no restrain on their arrogance. Haralambos
(1980: 37) explains Young’s argument the following words, “Members of the
upper strata in a meritocracy deserve their positions; their privileges are
based on merit. In the past they had a degree of self-doubt because many
realised that they owed their position to factors other than merit. Since
they could recognise intelligence, wit and wisdom in members of the lower
strata, they appreciated that their social inferiors were at least their equals
in certain respects”. As a result they would treat the lower orders with some
respect. Meritocracy confirms that those in the lower rungs are inferior.
They are hence treated with despise and arrogance. Those in the lower
strata may resent it and take offence leading to conflict and tension between
the ruling minority and the rest of the society. In corollary, those in the
lower strata would be greatly demoralised because they would not be able
to assign lack of opportunity to be successful as the cause of their situation,
neither would they be able explain the success of others in terms of advantages
of birth, influence, wealth and power. This would lead to loss of self esteem
and of inner vitality.
115

Theories of
Social Stratification 25.7 Conclusion
In this unit, we have explored the concepts of difference and inequality in
the larger framework of societies and social relationships. We identified the
determinants of inequality and distinguished between natural and social
inequality. Sahlins (1969) identifies three functional criteria of stratification:
economic (referring to the extent of control over production, distribution,
and consumption and the privileges associated with them), socio-political
(referring to power and authority to regulate interpersonal affairs and impose
sanctions on those who go wrong), and ceremonial (referring to access to
the supernatural and in distinctive ritual behaviour).
The degree of stratification varies in different societies. Simple societies

are less stratified than complex societies that are characterised by large number
of social classes, ranks and groups differentiated on the basis of economic
and socio-political criteria. All societies are, however, stratified to lesser or
larger extent. Egalitarian societies (those in which every individual has equal
status) are only theoretically real, for all societies do afford differences in
status and privileges to some individuals. Social inequality, therefore,
continuous to remain relevant in society and in sociological writings too.

Béteille, Andre, 1983, The Idea of Natural Inequality and Other Essays, Oxford
University Press, Delhi
Gupta, Dipankar, 2004, ‘Social Stratification’, in Handbook of Indian Sociology,

ed. Veena Das, Oxford University Press, New Delhi
Tumin, Melvin M, Englewood, 1985, Social Stratification: The Forms and

Functions of Inequality, Prentice-Hall
25.9 References
Béteille, Andre, 1969, ‘Introduction’, in Social Inequality, ed. Andre Béteille,
Penguin Books, England
Béteille, Andre, 1969, ‘Equality and Inequality: Ideals and Practice’, in Social
Inequality, ed. Andre Béteille, Penguin Books, England
Béteille, Andre, 1977, Inequality and Men, Basic Blackwell, Oxford
Béteille, Andre, 1983, The Idea of Natural Inequality and Other Essays, Oxford
University Press, Delhi
Davis, K. and Wilbert E. Moore, 1967 (orig. 1945), ‘Some Principles of

Stratification’, in Class, Status, and Power: Social Stratification in
Comparative Perspective, ed. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Ferraro, V., 1996, ‘Dependency Theory: An Introduction’, Working Paper
Gupta, Dipankar, 2004, ‘Social Stratification’, in Handbook of Indian Sociology,

ed. Veena Das, Oxford University Press, New Delhi
Macfarlane, Alan, 1999, ‘Andre Béteille and Alexis de Tocqueville’, in

Institutions and Inequalities: Essays in Honour of Andre Béteille, ed.
Ramachandra Guha and Jonathan P. Parry, Oxford University Press, New Delhi
Haralambos, M. (with R. M. Heald), 1980, Sociology: Themes and Perspectives,

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and Inequality
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 1754, (Trans. GDH. Cole) What is the Origin of
Inequality among Men, and is it Authorized by Natural Law, n.d
Sahlins, M. D., ‘Social Stratification’, in Social Inequality, ed. Andre Béteille,

Penguin Books, England
Tocqueville, A.de, 1956, Democracy in India, Alfred Knopf
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of Inequality, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey
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and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective, ed. Reinhard
Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Young, Michael, 1961, The Rise of Meritocracy, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth
117

Theories of
Unit 26
Class
Contents
26.1 Introduction
26.2 The Concept of Class
26.3 Theories of Class Structure
26.4 Class Struggle
26.5 Social Mobility
26.6 Classlessness
26.7 Conclusion
26.9 References
Learning Objectives
After going through this unit, you will be able to discuss the
sociological perspective on class
interrelationship between classes
movement between class positions
26.1 Introduction
Prior to the French Revolution, the term ‘class’ was used in a general sense
as in the writings of Adam Smith, Madison and other scholars of the eighteenth
century. Several of them used it interchangeably with ‘group’ or ‘estate’. It
was in the nineteenth century that class as a category came to be recognised
as a relevant concept in explaining social theories, ideologies, social
movements, social structure, and social change. The heuristic potential of
‘class’ was particularly important in the context of social stratification. In
fact, class was identified as one of the most significant basis of stratification
in society. Several sociologists have proposed theories of class structure and
explained the phenomena of mobility between class positions. In this unit,
we begin with the meaning and concept of class and class society and then
explore the sociological perspective on class and the theoretical approaches
crucial to understanding class and classless society in sociological writings.
We also discuss the issue of struggle between classes and mobility between
classes.
26.2 The Concept of Class

According to Ossowski (1967), the following three assumptions are common
to all conceptions of ‘class’ society.
1) Classes constitute the most comprehensive groups in the social structure.
While classes are differentiated groups in society, they are not
independent of each other. It is not possible to speak of one class without
reference to other classes.
2) Division of people into classes concerns social status connected with a
system of privileges and discriminations not determined by biological
criteria. This implies that each class is accorded certain privileges and
118 discriminations that have a bearing on its social status. Now, the social

status, in this case, has nothing to do with sex or any other criteria that Class
is biological in nature. Evidently, some classes are receive more privileges.

They occupy higher status in comparison to those who receive more
discrimination and occupy lower status. The differentiation and disparity
constitutes the basis of social stratification and determines inter-class
relations.
3) The membership of individuals in a social class is relatively permanent.
This does not, in any way, rule out the possibility of transition from one
class to another. What is stressed here is the fact that such transition is
made by some individuals only. Often, one remains in a particular class
throughout one’s life.
Against this backdrop, it may be noted that while some classes are treated
as superior on the basis of social status, privileges, and discriminations,
others are treated as inferior. These socially relevant privileges and
discriminations may be of different kinds. In a specific sense, however, the
concern here is with wealth and power. This is notwithstanding the fact
that Marx identified the privilege of exploiting other men’s labour as the
fundamental basis of class differentiation. Again, each class occupies a distinct
place in the class hierarchy. The awareness of the place of one’s class in the
class hierarchy is referred to as class-consciousness. Class-consciousness is
usually entwined with class interests and class solidarity. The other
characteristic of class society is social isolation that refers to social distance
and absence of close social contact between classes. One needs to understand
that social isolation or lack of interaction between classes fosters class-
consciousness and class solidarity that perpetuates class structure. In fact,
Marx asserted that consciousness or awareness of class interest and feeling
of class solidarity are the guiding basis of identifying a group as class. People
belonging to a particular class exhibit distinctive behaviour and make use of
specific vocabulary or pronunciation or speech. This implies that, among
others, behaviour and speech also sets one class apart from another. These
differences as also differences in access to wealth and power together with
social distance and isolation of one class from another deepen cleavages
between classes. As cleavages deepen and class distance increases, conflict
in class interests emerges and conflict between classes becomes common.
There are two fundamental perspectives from which the concept of class
may be understood. The first is the nominalist perspective that is identified
with the American school of thought; the second is the realist perspective
that is identified with the European school of thought. The nominalist
perspective treats the class as an ensemble, a conglomeration of people who
share common status. The emphasis is on the social status of each individual
in terms of respect that others bestow on him/her. In the words of Aron
(1969: 71), “Each person enjoys a certain position of esteem or prestige
which results from the totality of situations in which he exists, and each
situation can be analyzed from three points of view: in relation to property,
occupation and power.” Surely the place of an individual in the social domain
is subjective and dependent on the judgment of the other people. There is,
however, agreement on the notion that different individuals hold different
positions in society. The position of an individual in hierarchy, as mentioned
earlier, is a play of three elements: relations of property, occupation, and
power upon which his/ her position is determined in the class structure. It
may be understood as this stage that no single element determines the class
to which an individual belongs. The emphasis rather is on the sum total of
119

Theories of social considerations. Individuals with similar prestige and status belong to
one class. The realist perspective, on the other hand, treats social class as
a real ensemble that is determined by material facts and by the collective
consciousness of the people. Two ideas emerge from this approach. One is
that a class is characterised by collective unity which is real, and the second
is that people belonging to a particular class share collective consciousness.
Let us distinguish between the nominalist school and the realist school more
clearly.
1) The nominalist school lays emphasis on individuals and interpersonal
relations while the realist school lays emphasis on collective realities in
explaining class.
2) The nominalist school postulates that people who have similar status or
social prestige constitute a class. When social status changes, the class
of a person also changes which means that it is easy to move from one
class to another. There is no conflict between classes because the limits
and boundaries of classes are not rigid and clearly defined, and more
importantly classes are not associated with seizing of power. In simple
terms, power is held and exercised by upper classes while the workers
are never able to use it. The realist school, on the other hand, asserts
that the conflict of power is inherent in relations between the classes.
This is due to collective unity and collective consciousness of people
belonging to each class. The people of a particular class seek to foster
the interests of its own class that are often in conflict with those of
other classes and in doing so each class tries to consolidate its own
position in society.
3) The nominalist school upholds that the collective reality which the realists
of boast of does not exist or hardly exists or, if it all, exists unequally
while the realists school emphasises that by ignoring collective
consciousness in explaining class, the nominalists have missed the essence
of what constitutes the class.
The distinction between the American concept of class and the European
concept of class proposed by Aron roughly corresponds to the hierarchical
view of class and the dichotomous view of class proposed by Ossowski. The
hierarchical view is associated with the nominalist position, and the
dichotomous view is associated with the realist position.
Box 26.1: Denotation of the Term ‘Class’

Ossowski (1967:90) identifies three meanings of the term class each of
which has been used in sociological theories and in different accounts of the
system of social relations.
1) “In the general sense each group which is regarded as one of the basic
components of The social of the social structure may be called a ‘class’
of the social structure,…... In any case such a comprehensive concept
includes both estate and caste, and also class in the second and third
meanings distinguished here.
2) Of the two specifying versions of the concept of class that I should like
to consider here, the first shows us a social class as a group distinguished
in respect of the relations of property,…
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Class
……. Some caste or estate-systems can at the same time be economic
class systems, but such a coincidence can only be empirically established.
In cases where such a coincidence does apply one can speak of the
“class” aspect of caste relation or the “estate” aspect of the class-
system.
In a somewhat different meaning it is also possible to speak of the

“class” aspect of an estate-system or a caste-system even when the
coincidence does not occur, if we assume that between an estate-
system and a class-system there holds some more or less complicated
causal dependence…
3) In the second version specifying the concept of class, the class-system

is contrasted with group-systems in the social structure in which an
individual’s membership of a group is institutionally determined and in
which privileges or discriminations result from an individual’s ascription
to a certain group. In contradistinction to such groups of a caste or
estate type, a class in this version is a group of which membership is
not assigned by a birth-certificate nor any official document, such as
a title of nobility or an act of manumission, but is the consequence of
social status otherwise achieved.
The privileges and discriminations, which in this case require no sanction

from any source, are not the effect but the cause of the individual’s
placement in the capitalist or proletarian class: one is reckoned among
the capitalists because one possesses capital, and one belongs to the
proletariat because one possesses no other source of income than the
capacity to hire out one’s labour”.
26.3 Theories of Class Structure

a) The Classical View: Aristotle
Aristotle (1943) maintained that people are differentiated into three
‘elements’: one class is very rich; the other class is very poor. The third class
occupies a position between the two in being neither very rich nor very
poor. Those who are very poor feel too degraded and find it difficult to
follow rational principle there is a possibly that they “grow into petty rogues
and rascals”. Those who are very rich are not willing to submit to authority.
They also find it difficult to follow rational principle and are likely to grow
into great criminals who commit offences from violence. The poor are not
able to command so others often rule them. The rich are given to despising.
They demand unquestioning subservience from others and make good masters.
The people of middle class follow the rational principle and obey rules. They
do not eye others’ goods, others do not eye their goods; and they do not
make plans against others, others do not make plans against them. They are
free from factions and disputes. The presence of a large middle class ensures
a well-governed state and safe democracy. Democracies are safer and more
permanent than oligarchies because they have a large middle class that has
a substantial share in the government.
When there is no middle class, the poor and the rich quarrel with each other
and the class that is able to get an upper hold, regards political supremacy
as the reward for victory. The result is that it sets up either democracy or 121

Theories of oligarchy that is geared to its own interests and advantage and not of the
public rather than a just or popular government.
b) Capitalism and Social Classes: Karl Marx

Here we will critically discuss Marx’s views on social classes. We begin with
his perspective of social classes in detail and then go on to its critical
appraisal.
i) Marx’s perspective on social classes

Three periods in history are identified: ancient civilization, feudalism, and
capitalism. Each period is marked by a predominant mode of production.
Some of the predominant means of production identified by Marx are:
primitive communism, ancient empires, feudalism, capitalism, and advanced
communism. He clarified that class relations are characteristics of those
means of production in which a section of population controls the means of
production while others are excluded from it. Those who control the means
of production exploit those who transform the means of production into
finished products. The mode of production constitutes the basis of class
structure. The capitalist or ruling class and the wage labour or the oppressed
class makes up the class structure. In Marxian sense, a social class is an
aggregate of people who perform the same function in the production
process. These classes occupy different positions in the economy. The position
that a person occupies in the social organisation of production determines
the social class to which he/she belongs. The basic determinant of class is
the way in which an individual cooperates with others in the satisfaction of
basic needs of food, clothing and shelter. Cooperation implies division of
labour and organisation of production. Marx propounded that the first concern
of human beings is to satisfy basic needs which forms the basis of production
of material life. Once a need is satisfied, new ones emerge. Rising needs
create new social relations. Social relationships enfold cooperation of several
individuals. The relation between them is governed by struggle because the
ruling class owns and controls the means of production. It also exercises
control over the moral and intellectual life of the people. The entire law and
governance machinery, art, literature, science and philosophy serve the
interest of the capitalist class (or the bourgeoisie). This is typical in capitalist
mode of production. A vast majority of Marx’s writings are concerned with
class relations in capitalism. In the capitalist mode of production, the raw
material for production, the tools, the land and all that is necessary for
production belongs to the capitalist class as its private property. Those who
are actually engaged in the production process do not own the means of
production. They work for the bourgeoisie by selling their labour, their ability
to work, and their expertise for wages by which they subsist. They constitute
the non-owning class, the wage labour, or the proletariat. The sale of finished
products in the market fetches money that is more than the cost of
production. This is the net profit to the capitalist class. It is often reinvested
and in this way more and more profit gets generated for the capitalist class.
Now, while the labour process and means of production (what Marx calls
‘constant capital’) does not change quickly, the labour-power (what Marx
calls ‘variable capital’) is pressed hard to maximise the output so that more
and more returns from finished products are accrued. ‘Surplus value’ is the
balance between the investment in the labour process and the returns from
it (that are appropriated by the capitalist class).
There is no denying that the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the
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proletariat is that of antagonism, hostility and strife since the capitalist class Class
tries to exploit the wage labour class while the wage labour class tries to
bring about an end to exploitation. Marx believed that class struggle was an
important means through which social change could be effected.
Income, consumption patterns, educational attainments, or occupations are

clues to the distribution of material goods and of prestige symbols. Income
or occupation cannot be a determinant of class position because class is
determined by the position of a person in the social organisation of
production. Consider the case of two blacksmiths--__ one running his own
shop, the other working in a factory. The two men belong to the same
occupation but different social classes. Marx cited several conditions which
were crucial for the development of social class: conflict over economic
rewards, physical concentration of masses of people and easy communication
among them, the development of solidarity and political organisation in place
of competition between individuals and organisation for purely economic
needs (Bendix and Lipset, 1967). It may be understood at this stage itself
that the setting up of large industry brings together several people at one
place. It is only natural that there will be competition between them. Common
interest against their superior who exploits them for his\her advantage keeps,
however, them united. They enter into strife with the capitalist rather than
among themselves.
Workers are seen to sacrifice a part of their wages in favour of associations

that are constituted of enterprising people representing the wage labour
class who put up a strong resistance to exploitation by the capitalist. There
is often the possibility that the association takes up a political character.
Marx felt that the conflict between the workers and the capitalist class was
not born out of struggle for economic advantage only. He emphasised the
role of machine production under capitalism too. As machines made way into
the production process, the social relations underwent major transformation
and human beings came to be mere appendages of the machines. The
machines did most of the work of men would only operate them. This
deprived the workers of all opportunities to derive psychological satisfaction
from their work. Marx referred to the lack of satisfaction as ‘alienation of
human labour’.
In the words of Bendix and Lipset (1967: 10), “Marx believed that the
alienation of labour was inherent in capitalism and that it was a major
psychological deprivation, which would lead eventually to proletarian
revolution ….. Marx contrasted the modern industrial worker with the medieval
craftsman, and ___ along with many other writers of the period ___ observed
that under modern conditions of production the worker had lost all
opportunity to exercise his ‘knowledge, judgment and will’ in the manufacture
of his product”. To Marx this deprivation seemed more significant than the
economic pauperism to which capitalism subjected the masses of workers.
ii) Appraisal of Marx’s Perspective on Class

Marx’s ideas on class were subsequently re-considered by later writers many
of whom were convinced that the reality of the system of exploitation gets
obscured to a great extent in the course of everyday life. This is because
in everyday life the process of exploitation is not always obvious and
identifiable as it was in slavery or feudalism in which the slave or the serf
who worked for the whole day for a meal to fill his belly or the serf who tilled
123

Theories of the land of his lord the whole day to be given a strip of land for his use,
could see the clearly that the product of his labour was being kept away
from him. The worker in the capitalist society who was given wages in
return of his services (which was much less than the value of work the
worker had produced) could not easily notice the process of exploitation.
The other factor that obscures the reality of the process of exploitation in
everyday life is that the ideas of the ruling class are reproduced and reinforced
in newspapers, electronic media, schools, and other agencies. The working
class accepts them innocently and unwittingly as obvious and part of common
sense. Often the working class people do not see their situation the way
Marx’s theory projects. This has been the major reason for the lack of zeal
in proletarian revolution.
Lukacs sought to demonstrate that left to its own devices, the working class
would never fully understand the necessity of liberating itself through socialist
revolution. It needed to be led by socialist thinkers. Louis Althusser blamed
‘ideological state apparatuses’ such as school and the media for reinforcing
the idea that we are individuals in control of our own destiny among the
working class people. This shadows the system of exploitation and the position
of the working class as victims (Saunders, 1990). A. Gramsci refers to ‘class
domination’ as ‘hegemony’ known more generally in Marxian theory as the
dominant ideology thesis i.e. the existence of a powerful dominant class
ideology that stresses the nature of private property and creates an
acceptance of the whole capitalist social order among all classes. According
to Giddens there are three main sources of class power: the possession of
property, qualifications, and physical labour power. These tend to give rise
to three-class structure: a dominant/upper class based on property, an
intermediate/middle class based on credentials, and a working/lower class
based on labour power. What Giddens laid out bears a relationship with the
claim of Erik, Wright and Frank Parkin that class relations are determined by
access to resources. Frank Parkin was chiefly concerned with the attributes
such as race, religions, language and others that serve as the basis by which
social collectivities seek to maximise rewards by restricting access to resources
and opportunities to a limited group of people whom they treat as eligible.
Those who control the ‘cultural capital’ constitute a ‘new class’ referred to
by Alvin Gouldner as ‘cultural bourgeoisie’. The cultural bourgeoisie is in
control of cultural capital wherein ‘capital’ is explained by Gouldner as any
produced object that is used to make utilities that can be sold. The processor
gets income or claim to income by virtue or the imputed contribution to
economic productivity. Gouldner argues that these claims to income are
enforced by modifying others’ access to capital objects (Wright, 1985). By
now, it is evident that there has been a fundamental and conspicuous shift
from the thrust on exploitation as the basis of class relations in the capitalist
societies to domination as the basis of class relations in the post- capitalist
societies.
c) Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society: R. Dahrendorf

The second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century
witnessed the legal recognition of joint stock companies in Germany, England,
France and the United States. In the present day, joint stock companies
have largely replaced the economic enterprises that were owned and managed
by a capitalist or his\her family. The stock or the shares of a company are
widely dispersed much in contrast to a capitalist set up in which the ownership
lies in the hands of a single individual. In the post-capitalist era, the joint
124

stock companies afford far-reaching implications for the structure of industrial Class
enterprises and for the broader structure of society of which social classes
constitute an important component.
In the joint stock companies, the stockholders hold ownership, while the
control lies in the hands of managers who are not like the capitalists. This
arrangement keeps the owners away from the actual sphere of production
and reduces the distance between managers and workers. This is the radical
view upheld by Marx himself. The other is the conservative view that asserts
that the owners (stockholders) and controllers (managers) are not widely
different. They constitute a somewhat homogenous group. The stockholders
and manages hold similar outlook and may be treated as similar to the class
of capitalists. This view which comes out in the writings of C.Wright Mills
(1954) stands out in sharp contrast to Marx’s own analysis.
R. Dahrendorf (1959: 95) explained that the, “social structure of joint stock
companies as well as co-operative and state owned enterprises differs from
that of the classical capitalist enterprise, and that therefore a transition
from the latter to the former is a process of social change”. He suggested
that the separation of ownership and control involved a change in the
structure of social positions and also a change in the recruitment of personnel
to these positions. This refers to the distribution of the roles of capitalist
in two positions the owner, and the manager.
The owners are alienated from production process in the sense that they do
not participate in the day–to–day affairs of production enterprise and do not
have a defined place in the formal hierarchy of authority in the enterprise.
This is so because the workers deal with and are answerable to the managers.
It may be recalled that the capitalist exercised authority because he owned
the means of production over which the subsistence of the workers depended.
The managers on the other hand hold authority by virtue of the property
rights delegated to them by the stockholders. Since the managers remain in
contact with workers, they seek to exercise their authority with consensus
of the workers or else the manual and clerical workers would make their
interests felt in many complex and unregulated ways such as by disturbing
the process of production significantly. The managers cannot afford to let
this happen because the stockholders would reprimand them. Bendix (1956)
explained that there are three kinds of entrepreneurs in the post- capitalist
era, the capitalist, the heirs, and the bureaucrats. Thus, there is a definite
change in the composition of the entrepreneurial class.
Dahrendorf maintained that capitalism has completely eroded and given way
to different groups that bear a relationship with each other that is much
different from the relationship between bourgeoisie and the proletariat
highlighted by Marx. He outlined three effects of this development on class
conflict: (i) when managers replace capitalists, there is a complete change
in the composition of the groups participating in the conflict; (ii) change in
recruitment and composition of the groups participating in the conflict leads
to a change in the nature of issues that causes conflict; the managers who
are like functionaries without capital do not act, behave and hold attitudes
like the all powerful capitalists. Further the interests of the labour towards
the new opponents are different; and (iii) the decomposition of capital
(referring to differentiation in ownership and control of the means of
production i.e. capital) involves a change in the patterns of conflict.
125

Theories of In the course of such developments, the capitalist class and the labour class
cease to be homogenous classes. The labour also ceases to be homogenous
class (there are unskilled labourers, semi skilled labourers, and skilled labourers,
as also those equipped with different skills). The labourers who hitherto
treated themselves as a single class with common interests and distinctive
class consciousness now become increasingly aware of differences among
themselves. This is referred to as decomposition of labour. The twin
phenomena of decomposition of capital and decomposition of labour are
almost inevitably accompanied with the emergence new middle class both
within and outside the industry of modern societies. Lederer and Marschak
coined the term ‘new middle class’. In post-capitalist societies, the new
middle class is constituted of salaried employees in tertiary industries, in
commercial firms, in shops and restaurants, in cinemas, as also salaried skilled
workers and foremen. The bureaucrats exercise authority and are positionally
aligned with the ruling class. While it is true that bureaucrats do not
constitute the ruling class, it is widely accepted that they are a part of it
and in industrial, political and social conflicts they stand by the side of the
ruling class. The other interesting fact is that a large number of salaried
employees identify themselves with the interests, attitudes and lifestyles of
the higher-ups.
The emergence of the new middle class has a profound impact on the class
structure proposed by Marx. Dahrendrof suggested that the bureaucrats add
to the bourgeoisie class while the white-collar workers add to the proletariat
class. Both the classes become highly heterogeneous in composition,
therefore, less united. Like the industrial workers, white color workers,
have no property and no authority but they do exhibit many social
characteristics that are entirely different from those of the working class.
Similarly, though the bureaucrats do exercise authority that the older ruling
class did too, they differ from the ruling class in several respects. Much more
important than the decomposition of capital and the decomposition of labour,
Dahrendorf explained is the question, whether the concept of class continues
to remain relevant to the conflict groups of post-capitalist societies.
Furthermore, the simplistic dichotomy in class structure in the Marxian
framework no longer seems to be valid in explaining the structure and conflict
in post-capitalist and advanced industrial societies.
d) Class and Status: Max Weber

Max Weber’s major objection to Karl Marx’s theory of class was the undue
emphasis on the economic aspect. Weber did recognise the importance of
the economic aspect of society but he did not rate it as the most important
one. He said that specific life chances are created by the way the disposition
over material property is distributed among some people who meet
competitively in the market for the purpose of exchange. When we talk of
disposition over material property, the focus is on owners only who get the
monopoly to acquire valued goods while the non–owners are excluded from
competing for highly valued goods. In acquiring capital goods and exercising
monopoly over them, propertied people get an entrepreneurial function and
the chance to share the returns on capital. The non-owners are without
property and are able to offer their services, at best their labour while those
who have property engage in price wars with them. Now, those who are
without property are forced to get rid of their products in order to subsist.
Weber explained that ‘property’ and ‘lack of property’ are the basic categories
of class situation. Those who are propertied, for example, may belong to a
126

class of renters or entrepreneurs. Those who are without property are Class
differentiated on the basis of services they offer. Thus, neither the propertied
or the without property constitute a homogenous category. The former is
differentiated on the basis of the kind of property that is usable for returns;
the latter is differentiated on the basis of the kind of services that can be
offered in the market.
In simple terms, Weber’s concept of class has to do with the kind of chance
in the market that affords a common condition for an individual’s fate. Class
situation, therefore, is market situation. It may also be noted that those
people whose fate has nothing to do with the chance of using goods or
services for themselves in the market such as the slaves do not form a class
in the technical sense of the term. They constitute the status group. Weber
emphasised that classes are not communities. They represent the basis of
communal action (communal action refers to that action which is oriented
to the feeling of individuals that they belong together). In Weber’s own
words (1946:251), “We may speak of a ‘class’ when (1) a number of people
have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far
as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in
the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented
under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets”. The three
elements form the class situation that, in more comprehensive sense, is
market situation. For Marx, class has to be understood in the framework of
an individual position in the structure of production; for Weber class needs
to be understood in the framework of the individual’s position in the context
of the market of exchange.
Other than class, Weber proposed the concept of status groups. Status
groups differ from classes in being communities. In place of purely economically
determined class situation, status situation assumes importance. Weber said
that status situation is determined by social estimation of honour. This
honour may be any quality that is shared by the people and held in esteem.
Possession of property is not always associated with social honour and, is
therefore, not essentially a qualification for acquiring status. Income, family
background, education and all those criteria that are valued may be identified
as markers of status. People belonging to the same status group may interact
with each other on many occasions. Status order refers to the stratification
on the basis of honour and lifestyle that characterise status groups. What is
interesting to note is the fact that the status honour may be accompanied
with honorific preferences such as the privilege of wearing special costume.
Furthermore, artistic and literary activity connected with physical labour or
used for income generation is treated as degrading work and not held in high
esteem. The social honour associated with it declines tremendously. Weber
maintained that often status disqualification operates against the performance
of physical labour. In Weber’s words, (1946, cited here from Bendix and
Lipset, 1967: 27), “With over simplification one might thus say that ‘classes’
are stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition
of goods; whereas ‘status groups’ are stratified according to the principle of
their consumption of goods as represented by special ‘styles of life’”. He
further explained that class and status groups are distinguished on another
count. Class has a bearing with the market and individual’s position in it.
There is no order of honour or personal distinctions in the market that is the
critical feature of status groups. The status order would get weakened if the
same honour were bestowed on people who acquire economic power that
bears the stigma of extra-status origin as to those who seek to acquire 127

Theories of status by virtue of their lifestyle. Status however, rises if economic power
comes over and above the virtue of lifestyle. It is therefore only natural that
those who uphold status order react with peculiar sharpness to pretensions
of purely economic acquisition. Status is the predominant and preferable
means of social stratification in conditions when acquisition of goods and
distribution of goods is fairly uniform and stable. Stratification by status
gets pushed into the background and stratification by class becomes important
each time economic transformation takes place and technological repercussions
set in.
In addition to stratification by class and status, Weber proposed the concept

of party as the third element according to which society is stratified. The
people who constitute a party are those who have a goal towards which
they strive collectively and in a planned manner. The goal may be a cause
i.e., a party may seek to realise a programme for ideal or material purposes
or the goal may be ‘personal’ e.g. honour for the leader or followers of the
party. Parties may exit in a social club as well. Their action is geared towards
acquisition of social power by which is meant the potential to influence
communal action.
The existence of a party in a state always presumes the prevalence of

rational order and the presence of a staff of persons who are willing to
enforce it. In a specific sense, parties may pursue interests that are
determined through class situation or through status situation. They may
even recruit members from them. They may not, however, be fully class
parties or fully status parties. They may be neither of the two. Their means
of attaining power may range from violence to canvassing for votes through
social influence, bribes, public addresses, or even obstruction in parliamentary
proceedings.

Compare and contrast Weber’s and Marx’s concept of class.
26.4 Class Struggle

As mentioned earlier, competition, strife, conflict, and struggle are inherent
among classes in society. Marx propounded that inherent in the structure of
classes was the identification of a common ‘class enemy’ as an entity against
which all the members of a class would unite. If there was no class enemy,
the people of a class would compete with each other fiercely and there
would be no class solidarity or class cohesion. Marx maintained that when
a large-scale industry is set up, scores of people come together in the search
of avenues for subsistence. Naturally, they compete with each other on
several counts. But, their common wages, common interest against their
superiors, and other similar conditions keep them united and curtail
competition among themselves. The capitalists on the other hand unite in
the idea of repression. In the event of united capital, the working class
forms associations. The interests that they define are class interests but the
struggle of a class against another class is a political struggle. It may be
appreciated that the conflict between classes is restricted to the race for
economic rewards and resources. It also develops because of psychological
suffering that accompanies alienation of labour.
128

As specialisation and division of labour set in, the labourer gets more and Class
more alienated from the production process. This alienation gets initiated at
the time when the ‘capitalist represents to the single workman, the oneness
and the will of the associated labor. It is developed in manufacture that cuts
down the laborer into a detail labourer. It is completed in modern industry,
which makes science a productive force distinct form labour and presses it
into the service of capital’ (Bendix and Lipset, 1966: 10). Marx explained that
in a capitalist system, social productiveness, and development of production
are carried out at the cost of the laborer. This is done through excessive
domination over, and exploitation of the labourers. The labourer is reduced
to an appendage of the machine, the work itself loses charm. Labourer loses
the motivation to work to his fullest potential. The conditions under which
he is made to work are not encouraging. All this is done to accumulate
capital. As the urge of the capitalists to accumulate capital increases, the
plight of the labourer worsens.
Marx was sure that class conflict under capitalism leading to revolution and
consequent overthrow of capitalist class would establish the workers as the
major agent of social change. He envisaged that over a period of time, social
division would cease to exist and with that would also end the exploitation
of one class by another. The change would take place when the dissatisfaction
of the workers would convince them completely that capitalism needed to
be overthrown and that the way to do it was revolutionary political
organisation. The labourer has to emerge as a strong political power and
collectively negotiate for power.
Marx’s prediction of a proletarian revolution is based on the premise that

capitalist society would affirm conditions that establish and consolidate the
position of two main classes in society. The bourgeoisie would surrender
human values in the “icy waters of egoistical calculation”. The proletariat,
on the other hand, working in the constraints of factory production given
to object degradation that collapses family life, religious beliefs, and national
characteristics. They would rise to regain humanity. This prepares conditions
for revolution that would usher in a new social order in which the process
of material production ‘would be consciously regulated by freely associated
men’.
Weber, on the other hand believed that relative control over goods and
services (that constitute the groundwork for the conception of class),
produces income, opens up the possibility of procuring other goods, provides
social position, and provisions a certain style of life. Those in common class
situation are often led to similar sentiments and ideas but not necessarily
to concerted action (Bendix, 1974). Class organisation emerges when there
is an economic opponent. Weber (1968) proposed that it becomes important
to curtail the competition when the number of competitors increases with
respect to the profit span. For doing this, one group of competitors adopts
some characteristics of its actual or potential group of competitors. The
characteristics are externally identifiable such as language, religion, descent,
residence and others. Sometimes associations are formed with rational
regulations. Over, a period of time, if monopolistic interests persist,
competitors establish a legal order that limits competition through formal
bodies. Weber refers to this as domination by virtue of constellation of
interest. Monopolisation calls for constitution of a common front against the
interests of outsiders and solidarity of those who constitute it. The
organisation of the group in defense against the interests of outsiders brings 129

Theories of an end to further competition. The membership to the group is restricted
to ensure monopoly; and participation is controlled to ensure solidarity. If
the monopoly is rooted in law, and the government enforces restrictions,
then it is easy to restrain the competition and exercise control over the
members of the organisation. Weber referred to this as domination by ‘virtue
of authority’.
26.5 Social Mobility

By social mobility is meant transition of individuals from one position in the
social hierarchy to another. Here, we restrict the use of the term to mean
movement between class positions. The concept of social mobility pre-
supposes that people’s position in modern class societies is not determined
and fixed by virtue of their birth in a particular class. That an individual has
the option to make transition between classes is the very basis of social
mobility. The movement from one class to another may occur either in the
lifetime of an individual or over a span of a generation or more. When an
individual moves from class to another in his/ her own lifetime (for example,
a person who joins service as a clerk and through a series of promotions
becomes the managing director of a company) the mobility is referred to as
‘intra-generational mobility’. On the other hand, when mobility occurs
between generations (for example, children carpenters or cobblers become
accountants, engineers or doctors and take up higher social positions than
those of their parents), the mobility is referred to as ‘inter-generational
mobility.’ Mobility may be both upward (as when the son of a blacksmith
adopts the profession of a charted accountant) or downwards (as when the
son of a doctor becomes a typist).
Box 26.2: Social Mobility: Motivation Theory of Veblen

“Those members of the community who fall short of [a] somewhat indefinite,
normal degree of prowess or of property suffer in the esteem of their fellow-
men; and consequently they suffer also in their own esteem, since the usual
basis for self-respect is the respect accorded by one’s neighbours. Only
individuals with an aberrant temperament can in the long run retain their
self-esteem in the face of the dis-esteem of their fellows.
So as soon as the possession of property becomes the basis of popular

esteem, therefore, it becomes also a requisite to that complacency which
we call self-respect. In any community where goods are held in severality,
it is necessary, in order to ensure his own peace of mind, that an individual
should possess as large a portion of goods as others with whom he is
accustomed to class himself; and it is extremely gratifying to possess
something more than others. But as fast as a person makes new acquisitions,
and becomes accustomed to the resulting new standard of wealth, the new
standard forthwith ceases to afford appreciably greater satisfaction than the
earlier standard did. The tendency in any case is constantly to make the
present pecuniary standard the point of departure for a fresh increase of
wealth; and this in turn gives rise to a new standard of sufficiency and a
new pecuniary classification of one’s self as compared with one’s neighbours.
So far as concerns the present question, the end sought by accumulation is
to rank high in comparison with the rest of the community in point of
pecuniary strength. So long as the comparison is distinctly unfavourable to
himself, the normal, average individual will live in chronic dissatisfaction
with his present lot; and when he has reached what may be called the normal
130

Class
pecuniary standard of the community, or of his class in the community, this
chronic dissatisfaction will give place to a restless straining to place a wider
and ever-widening pecuniary interval between himself and this average
standard. The invidious comparison can never become so favourable to the
individual making it that he would not gladly rate himself still higher relatively
to his competitors in the struggle for pecuniary reputability” (Veblen, 1934:30-
32).
It may be understood that in industrial societies, the rate of inter-generational

mobility is significant. It is common to find children joining the workforce
at a higher position than the one their parents attained when they started
work. This happens because, industrial societies lay emphasis on formal
qualifications at the time of recruitment. Children of working class parents
often gain the qualifications before they set out to look for employment.
Further, upward social mobility is more common than downward social mobility
because the demand for unskilled manual labour has declined significantly in
the wake of technological advancement and the shift from the need for
industry workers to service that call for specialisation entail higher position.
More and more children find that higher positions are open for them and
that opportunities are much more abundant than those available to their
parents. Movement across a short range of positions in the social hierarchy
is more common than movement across a wide range. People usually find it
possible to improve their position marginally than to improve it substantially
(Saunders, 1990).
In the context of social mobility in America, Marx noted that the classes
have not yet becomes fixed. There is constant flux of elements between
them. Weber emphasised the non-economic forces and the desire for
independence among the farm workers in the German economy. In fact, the
emphasis on the role of non-economic forces and the differential social
mobility of the Catholics and Protestants was the starting point of his thesis
on the relationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism.
The writings of Marx and Weber greatly influenced Sorokin’s study of social
mobility in American, English and several other societies.
Sorokin stressed the extent and rapidity of the growth of new middle class
of salaried employees in capitalist societies and concluded that large-scale
intra–generational and inter-generational mobility occurs in occupational terms.
More and more men were found to shift from manual labour non-manual
forms of employment. He accepted that children seem to more likely to
enter their fathers’ occupational groups than any other and that mobility is
more likely to occur between occupational groupings within the same class
than between groupings in different classes. He maintained that membership
of a social grouping consists of two elements, one is the relatively permanent
and stable, the other is ever changing with entry into one occupation for
a particular span of time then exit from it and entry into another one.
Working class cannot be treated as an agency of social transformation for
two reasons, (i) there is declining permanent element within the working
class and the social democratic and communist affiliations are likely to be
rejected by the expanding fluid element, and (ii) the revolutionary capacity
of working class gets diminished, since it is made up those who are incapable
of socially upward movement on the one hand and the calibre of its leaders
on the other hand. Sorokin contents that the mobility rates and mobility
patterns do not follow an identifiable design or pattern and even if proletariats
131

Theories of get the opportunity to be dictators, they would not be able to achieve
much (Goldthorpe, 1987).
Lipset and Bendix upheld that industrialisation led to high mobility rates.
What is more interesting to note is their observation that the overall pattern
of social mobility appeared to be the same in the industrial societies of
various western countries. This is better known as the Lipset – Zetterberg
(or the LZ), thesis (Zetterberg was the co-author of the first paper in which
this generalisation was proposed). Lipset and Bendix’s study differs
significantly from Sorokin’s study in that it concentrated on movement from
manual to non-manual occupations which they defined as upward mobility
despite the fact that they were aware that some white collar positions are
lower in income and prestige than skilled manual work. Another crucial study
on social mobility in America was that undertaken by Blau and Duncan. They
began the study with the assumption that systematic exploration of
occupational status and mobility were important in understanding social
stratification. They confirmed that the rate of mobility between blue-collar
and white-collar occupations was only little among various industrial societies.
Their claim was, however, that elite mobility in America was exceptionally
high. This was perhaps due to high level of popular education in the United
States and lesser emphasis on formal distinctions of social status. They also
maintained that most men in America do not attain high occupational status
but do get to improve their standard of living hence their social status by
way of raising conspicuous consumption. Finally they noted, “The stability
of American democracy is undoubtedly related to the superior chances of
upward mobility in this country, its high standard of living and the low
degree of status deference between social strata for these condition make
it unlikely that large numbers of underprivileged men experience oppression,
despair of all hope and become so dissatisfied with the existing system of
differential rewards as well as with political institutions that they join
extremist political movements committed to violent rebellion” (Blau and
Duncan, 1967: 439).
Goldthorpe, Llewllyn, and Payne (1987) bespeak of three major theses on

social mobility. The first thesis on social mobility is the ‘counter-balance
thesis’ attributed to Westergaard and to Parkin. The counter-balance thesis
proposes that opportunities for inter-generational mobility have expanded
but these are countered by a decline in opportunities for intra-generational
mobility. This has happened because of growing professionalism,
bureaucratisation, and technical complexity in work. So, greater social mobility
takes place inter-generationally. At the same time, there is lesser possibility
of upward mobility in the course of an individual’s working life. Goldthorpe,
Llewellyn, and Payne contradict the counter-balance thesis through their
findings based on older and younger cohorts in the sample. They concluded
that it was not more difficult for younger group to work its way up after
starting in employment than it has been for the older group. Avenues for
upward mobility for the working class have increased due to wider educational
opportunities. At the same time, none of the traditional avenues for upward
mobility are closed.
The second thesis on social mobility is the ‘closure thesis’ attributed to

Giddens, to Bottomore, and to Miliband. The closure thesis suggests that
those who occupy the superior positions seek not only to retain them for
their own selves and for their children but also to acquire control over the
132 resources so that they are able to achieve what they want. This means that

social mobility remains confined to lower positions while higher positions are Class
not open to its effects. Goldthorpe, Llewellyn, and Payne refute this claim
after studying higher-grade professionals, administrators, managers and
proprietors. They demonstrate that while only one quarter of them were
born into this class, more than a quarter of them came from manual working
class backgrounds. Thus, far from being closed to lower classes, the top class
was found to be heterogeneous in composition.
The third thesis on social mobility is the ‘buffer zone’ thesis attributed to
Parkin, to Giddens, to Bottomore and to Westergaard and Resler. The buffer
zone thesis holds that the social mobility, in large part, is confined to skilled
manual and routine clerical grades which often change places with each
other but rarely move much higher and much lower in the system. This short
range mobility is restricted to buffer zone which is constituted of manual-
non- manual boundary restructuring longer range mobility which would lead
to heterogeneous elements on either side. Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne
suggest that if there is no buffer effect against upward social mobility, there
could be one in the case of downward social mobility. There, is thus, a kind
of one – way screen that allows upward mobility and restricts downward
mobility flows (Saunders, 1990).
26.6 Classlessness
For long, class relationships have been recognised as an integral component
of social structure. Their importance in regulating economic and political
domains of life has been well accepted. In academic discourse too, much
attention has been laid on the analysis of class and class relationships. Marx
emphasised that the overthrow of capitalist class by the revolutionary working
class, the abolition of private property and capitalism were the pre-conditions
for classless society founded on equality of condition. He projected that
once the capitalist class was overthrown, new ruling class now constituted
of the proletariat would dismantle capitalism. This could be understood as
the conception of ‘one-class classlessness’. After this period of transition,
the older conditions of production that lay at the root of class conflict would
be done away with. It is then that class distinctions would cease to exist
and the foundation for a classless society with free development of one and
all would be laid. Here, any one social group would not monopolize economic
and political power. This is the conception of ‘total classlessness’. The third
conception of classlessness is that of ‘multi-class classlessness’ in which
equality and fragmentation of class structure exists simultaneously. Weber
argued that there was no escape from bureaucratic domination. Socialism,
he maintained would aggravate rather than eliminate the problem.
Bureaucratisation does involve equality of treatment favouring the leveling
of social classes privileges. The socially privileged, however, close opportunities
for others. Weber discussed classlessness in terms of provision of equality of
opportunities following bureaucratisation. At the same time he expressed
reservations against the anti-democratic nature of bureaucratisation itself.
While the opportunity to reach the highest position is available to all and
the social and economic status of an individual is not determined by birth,
everybody may not be able to make use of the opportunities that seem to
be available to them in order to enhance their social position. This is the
irony inherent in multi-class classlessness.
The three conceptions of classlessness discussed here, viz. one class

classlessness, total classlessness, and multi-class classlessness do not ensure 133

Theories of the end of class as a relevant category of sociological analysis, for class is the
commonly encountered reality in society.

Can there be a society without classes? Discuss.
26.7 Conclusion
In this unit, we have tried to understand the different conceptions of class
beginning with the widest concept of class. It would be clear by now that
sociologists have proposed different determinants and criteria for defining
class. These range from the economic positions of a group of people to their
position in the market situation. Underlying all the theoretical propositions
is the understanding that classes constitute the most comprehensive groups
in social structure, they are associated with a system of privileges and
discriminations (Ossowski, 1967) and that there is scope of mobility between
classes. The classes, therefore, cannot be defined as watertight compartments
with rigid boundaries.

Bendix, R. and S.M.Lipset, 1967, ‘Karl Marx’s Theory of Social Classes’, in
Class Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective,
ed. Reinhardt, Bendix, and Seymour Lipset, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Goldthorpe, J.H., 1987, Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain,
Oxford, Clarendon Press
Saunders, P., 1990, Social Class and Stratification, Routledge, London
26.9 References
Aristotle, 1943, Politics (trans. by Benjamin Jowett), Modern Library, New
York
Aron, R, 1969, ‘Two Definitions of Class,’ in Social Inequality, ed., Andre

Béteille, Penguin Books, England
Bendix, R. and S.M.Lipset, 1967, ‘Karl Marx’s Theory of Social Classes’, in

Class Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective,
ed. Reinhardt, Bendix, and Seymour Lipset, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Bendix, R., 1956, Work and Authority in Industry: Ideologies of Management

in the of Industrialisation, Wiley
Béteille, A, (ed.), 1969, Social Inequality, Penguin, England
Blau, P.M. and O.R.Duncan, 1967, The American Occupational Structure, Wiley,
New York
Dahrendrof, R, 1959, Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society, Routledge

and Kegan Paul, London
Goldthorpe, J.H., 1987, Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain,
Goldthorpe, J.H.Llewellyn, and P.Catrione Payne, 1987, Social Mobility and

Class Structure in Modern Britain, Oxford University Press
Lipset, S.M. and H.L, 1967, Zetterberg ‘A Theory of Social Mobility’, in Class,
134

Status, and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective, Routledge Class
and Kegan Paul, London
Marx Karl, 1936, Capital, Modern Library, New York
Mills, C.Wright, 1954, The New Man of Power, New York
Ossowski, S., 1967, Different Conceptions of Social Class, in Class, Status,

and Power: Social Stratification Comparative Perspective, ed. Reinherdt,
Bendix, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Saunders, P., 1990, Social Class and Stratification, Routledge, London
Veblen , T, 1934, The Theory of The Leisure Class, The Modern Library, New
York
Weber, M., 1968, Economy and Society Vol.I, II, III, Bedminister Press, New
York
Wright, E.O., 1985, Classes, Verso, London
135

Theories of
Unit 27
Gender and Social Stratification
Contents
27.1 Introduction
27.2 Weber, Marx and Stratification
27.3 Gender and Social Stratification in Cross-Cultural Perspective
27.4 Status of Women
27.5 The Indian Context
27.6 Caste and Gender
27.7 Tribe, Gender, Stratification and Change
27.8 Conclusion
27.10 References
Learning Objectives
After you have read this unit you will be able to
discuss gender and stratification
discuss the contribution of Marx and Weber to understanding of social
stratification
27.1 Introduction
In most societies the tasks of women are clearly differentiated. In the West
as well as in the middle class sections of Indian society, men have been seen
to be the bread winners and women were expected to take care of the
house and raise children. This arrangement used to be considered as ‘natural’
and complementary, having roots in the biological makeup of the sexes. The
economic dependence of women and sexual division of labour were closely
interlinked.
The ideology of ‘naturalness’ of division of labour has been challenged as

women started entering the labour force in large numbers in the West. The
rise of feminist movement in the west raised questions about division of
labour and almost universal subordination of women across societies and
cultures. The questions like has employment changed women’s status? Are
they facing double burden of performing jobs which are negatively valued.
For example housework not being considered as work whereas paid work
outside the household as work. Statistics show that women all over the
world earn much less than men for the same work. Occupations are also
segregated along gender lines. Other questions relate to women’s active
participation in work force, its consistent devaluation and women’s exclusion
from decision making. In understanding these issues we look for answers in
the stratification theories.
Feminist scholars resist to treat the problem of women essentially an artifact

of the contemporary system of economic exploitation. They have argued
that the oppression of women is not to be seen as ‘secondary’ to class
oppression as a whole. Women are oppressed as a class by men and patriarchal
structures are geographically and historically almost universal. The major axis
136

of differentiation in prevailing society is not class but gender and it is Gender and
women who wait for the ‘longest revolution’. Gender in class stratification
theories attempts to uncover the sources of structured inequality and social
change. Both Marxists and Weberians have been engaged in empirical research
which both document and attempt to explain the forms and structures of
inequality. It has been widely criticized that the class situation of family
members is ‘derived’ from that of the main breadwinner who is usually a
man. The question of gender raises serious problem for both theoretical and
empirical work in social stratification. The active participation of women in
all walks of life, the decrease in the number of households that have only
male bread winners, passage of new laws created an environment for women’s
location in social stratification. According to Newby (1982) the issue of gender
inequality arose from women’s movement.
27.2 Weber, Marx and Stratification

Weber observed that societies can be stratified according to their degree
for class or status formation, providing the most important and basic fact of
social stratification theory. The first form of inquiry concerns with the extent
to which class or status systems are the predominant modes of social action
at the societal level. Theories of social stratification then presuppose as
their explanatory object the inter and intra-societal variability of class or
status formations. At this time the question of sexual inequality treated in
terms of division of labour (Marxist approach) which considers women as
‘reserve army’ i.e. The labour of women could be called upon to facilitate
expansionary ‘deskilling’ clerical work as well as in periods of acute labour
shortage such as in wartime. According to Max Weber economic and
technological changes favour class stratification and pushes status stratification
in the background.
Since the determination and explanation of the variability of class and status
formation have been the central concerns of the study of social stratification,
the documentation of the inequality of opportunities and outcome occupied
a subordinate place. It was justified on several grounds. First, because of
interest in the distribution of unequal rewards, life-chances and how different
social arrangements could procure ‘better’ outcomes and opportunities. The
second season was the importance given to the explanation of ‘outcomes’
of class or status differentiation, which were considered as by-product of
stratification analysis. These approaches never gave serious thought to issues
of gender inequality, because the emphasis was on class polarisation and
status-group consolidation. Earlier it was always presumed that gender
relations are usually heterosexual and therefore crosscut by class and status
relations. It gave bearing on the view that gender relations are somehow
similar to ethnic relations.
Box 27.1: Marx and Patriarchy

Marxist school of thought has led to the conceptualisation of sexual division
in terms that have less to do with actual social relationship or patterns of
social interaction, that with the determination of the ‘place’ of female
labour within the class structure and of its ‘functions for capital’. A major
question arose from this perspective is whether or not female domestic has
always had difficulties in formulating a stable and coherent theory of action
which could relate the analysis of objective class position and of system
contradictions to class formation. There was a fundamental difference from
the kind of analysis that has accreted around the concept of ‘patriarchy’ 137

Theories of
Social Stratification which refers to patterns of behaviour or forms of social interaction. Both
Marxists and patriarchy approaches also differ on whether women constitute
a class or not, while patriarchy is seen as a structure of social relations in
men are privileged systematically and women disprivileged in such a variety
of social contexts that it makes sense to think of gender relations as a form
of ‘stratification’.
Patriarchy constitutes a type of social formation that has been improperly

ignored by conventional stratification analysis. According to Mann (1986) the
omission of gender as a basis of social stratification created a crisis in
stratification theory. The five main areas of stratification theory, which have
been influenced by Gender, are individual, the family and household, the
division of labour between the sexes, social class and nation-states.
27.3 Gender and Social Stratification in Cross-

Cultural Perspective
The unequal accesses to resources, opportunities and rewards and to rights
between men and women are legitimised by patriarchy across societies and
cultures. Status inequality between men and women is not a new phenomena
which is reinforced through patriarchy and its institutions, gendered division
of labour and social institutions like marriage, dowry, property and inheritance
and subordination. Sylvia Walby (1994:22-28) observes that patriarchy is not
only differential distribution of power but also it is built into the very
mechanism of production.

Write a note on gender in a cross-cultural perspective. Discuss your views
with your friends.
Feminist sociologists working on the concept of class have challenged its

basis solely derived from man’s occupations. A major concern of feminist
critique has been to consider what modification of class boundaries would
be necessary if women in paid work are to be considered as well. Secondly
they have sought to reevaluate the contribution of women’s work to the
family.
Cross cultural research on sexual division of labour attempted to describe

wide range of women’s productive activities in societies with different
mode of subsistence but also the status implications of these on status of
women.
For feminist anthropologists right from the very beginning the chief concern
has been to explore the causes of universal gender inequality. They sought
to explain its origin and perpetuation in terms of sociological, cultural and
material terms. Each of these explanations rested upon a major dichotomy
which was taken to be universal: public/domestic, nature/culture and
production/reproduction.
In feminist anthropology, the relationship of gender with social stratification

has been conceptualised primarily in the way gender informs social structures
as a symbolic construct and as a metaphor for social action. Gender is
conceptualised as symbolic representations and the behaviour of women
138 and men and their relations. Anthropologists like Rosaldo, Lamphere and,

Ortner identified gender and kinship as the basis of social inequality whereby Gender and
recognising how women’s access to property and decision making etc. are
subsumed within larger ideological, material and political contexts of kinship
structures.
Ortner and Whitehead (1981) proposed a model of prestige structures which

is defined as the set of prestige positions or level that result from a particular
line of social evaluation, the mechanisms by which individuals arrive at a
given level or positions, and the overall conditions of reproduction of the
system of statuses(ibid..13).
Gender, they argued, is one such prestige structure, and in every human
society, man and woman compose two differentially valued terms of a value
set, men being men, higher (ibid..16). They suggested that male prestige is
linked to ‘public roles’, such as chief or a Brahman, while female prestige is
defined in relation to men, in such roles as wife, sister and mother, in other
words female structures are encompassed within the male structures.
Conceptualising gender as one of the prestige structures pushed the gendered
analysis of social stratification across societies.
Anthropological literature suggests that women’s work outside of household

and in subsistence economy indicates as well as reinforce generally egalitarian
relations between women and men. Women’s in Vanatinai have access to
power both through their control of the economic capital of land and through
their accumulation of symbolic capital in exchange and mortuary ritual. But
among horticulturists in highland New Guinea, women raise staple crops but
men raise prestige crops that are the focus of social exchange.
Box 27.2: Division of Labour

This cultural valuation is the foundation for gender stratification that is then
reinforced by gender ideologies of male superiority and a high degree of
sexual antagonism between men and women. Meigs (1990) describes a
“chauvinistic” ideology that is rooted in men’s role as warriors. The division
of work among Mundurucu, an Amazonian horticultural society, where men
hunt, fish and fell the forest area for gardens while women plant, harvest
and process manioc. Men work at Mudurucu has more assigned value. As
Murphy and Murphy (1985) state “Male ascendancy does not wholly derive
from masculine activities but is to a considerable degree prior to them”.
Male domination is traditionally symbolic. According to Martin and Voortries
(1975) the decline in female participation in agriculture is that the female
domestic workload tends to increase when root crops are replaced by cereal
crop and when animal labour replaces manual labour.
Women’s value is defined by their reproductive abilities rather than by their

productive activities. Bride wealth is considered as compensation to the
bride’s parents or her kin for the productive and reproductive rights of the
bride; dowry as a form of inheritance provides a bride with land and other
wealth and helps her to attract a husband.
In traditional patriarchal Irish family (studied by Arensberg & Kimball (1940)

work was divided by gender and age. The division of labour considered
“natural” and power in the hands of men. Pastoral societies are also generally
characterised by patriarchy and a dichotomisation of the sexes, both
symbolically and socially segregation of the sexes and gender stratification
139

Theories of are fundamental attributes of many pastoral societies. Campbell (1964) who
studied “Sarakatsoni of Greece” says that the life of pastoral ‘Sarakatsoni’
revolves around three things: sheep, children and honour gender ideology is
embedded in these three valued items. The ultimate authority lies with the
male despite the fact that female contributes equally in all aspects of life.
27.4 Status of Women

Generalisations are often made about the status of women according to
different modes of adaptation but these studies show that great amount
diversity persists. To understand gender stratification, the interlinkage of
both ideology and participation in production must be understood. As Atkinson
(1982: 248) states, “It is too facile to deny the significance of sexual
stereotypes or to presume that women’s influence in one context cancels
out their degradation in another, just as we know that women’s status is
not a unitary phenomenon across cultures, we need to be reminded that
the intra cultural picture is equally complex.” Socialist feminist scholars,
however, maintain that patriarchy precedes class inequality. They clearly
show that new forms of subordination and gender asymmetry have superseded
the old, leaving patriarchal control undisturbed. Industrial work privileged
men who took control over the earnings and social power while leaving
women as dependents.
Leela Dube, Eleanor Leacock and Shirley Ardener (ibid:xi) provide a cross-
cultural perspective; focusing upon the insignificance and passivity of women
and the primary of men in various societies. Leela Dube observes that making
women invisible despite their obvious preference and effective visibility is
the root cause of their low status in society.
Inequalities of gender can be explained by “gender regimes” which is a

cluster of practices ideological and material, which in a given social context,
acts to construct various images of masculinity and feminity and thereby to
consolidate forms of gender inequality (Connell, 1994: 29-40). According to
Kabeer (1995:37) ‘biology is gendered as well as sexed’. Male and female are
translated as man and woman based on mutually exclusive traits of masculinity
and feminity.
Women are attached to a two-fold stratification i.e. in relation to men and

in relation to other women. Gender structures different spheres of male-
female inequality.
Many egalitarian societies in the contemporary world are characterised by a

division of labour whereby men hunt and women gather. Friedl (1975:78)
outlines four reasons for this division i.e. the variability in the supply of
game, the different skills required for hunting and gathering the incompatibility
between carrying burdens and hunting and the small size of semi nomadic
foraging population. Despite the common assumption that men hunt and
women gather, there is no sharp division of labour. The Tiwi, Australian
aborigines who live on Melville Island off the coast of Northern Australia both
men and women hunt and gather. Women are considered economic assets
and a source of wealth and prestige for men. Women acquire social status
and can be politically influential. Goodale (1971) suggests that Tiwi culture
emphasises the equality of men and women in society. Among the Agta
Negritos of North Eastern Luson, the Philippines women enjoy greater social
140 and economic equality with their men compared to Tiwi of Australia. They

make significant contribution to the daily food supply and also control the Gender and
distribution of the food they acquire, sharing them with their families and
trading them in the broader community. This challenges the widely held
notion that in foraging societies pregnancy and child care are incompatible
with hunting. They have developed methods of contraception and abortion
to aid them in spacing their children.
In horticultural societies, in which cultivation and farming is required by the

use of hand-tool technology women play important roles in production.
Lepowsky points to gender egalitarianism among the horticultural and
matrilineal people of the pacific island of Vanatani. He says that the prominent
position of women in Vanatinai exchange and other activities.
27.5 The Indian Context

According to Kalpana Bardhan (1986;94) “Although the family is the salient
units of analysis for stratification studies, whether based on class or caste
analysis, it is not quite sufficient situated within the broader framework,
the division by sex and the status of women affect its properties of stability
and dynamics”.

Write briefly on patriarchy, economy, and class structure. Put down the main
points in your notebook.
In Indian society, besides family as a basic unit of stratification the role of

kinship, family and everyday relations, the role of male head of the family,
status equality between men and women are some of the questions, which
needs examination. Michael Mann (1986:40-56) discusses patriarchy, economy
and class structure. According to Mann compartmentalisation of women persists
despite involvement of women in politics, development programmes and
processes and feminism. Indian society has been divided into purushjati and
stree jati. To conceptualise women and write about them, Nita Kumar (1994:4)
suggests four ways to deal i.e. by making women the object of human ‘gaze’
by seeing women as actors and subjects by giving them the prerogative of
males, by focussing on the patriarchal, ideological discursive within which
women exist and which seemingly control them without a chance to get out
of them, by looking at the hidden, subversive ways in which women exercise
their agency. She raises some questions like desirability of having women as
subjects and to replacing of the masculine, rational, free subject into a
feminine one.
According to Monisha Behal’s (1984) work in Mainpuri district in west Uttar

Pradesh, women’s lives in the village are full of gloom and sadness because
of work overload, bad health, drudgery and poverty. Madhu Kishwar and Ruth
Vanita (1984) pose the women’s question by highlighting the incompatibility
of Indian constitutional Law, violence, aggression and crimes against women.
Mahatma Gandhi viewed that women has infinite capacity for sufferings
because she is the mother of man has also been critically examined. Joanna
Liddle and Rama Joshi (1986) studied the Indian women in the context of
interconnections between gender, caste and class. They explained that the
patriarchal upper castes tightened both caste and gender division as they
consolidated their economic supremacy and defended challenges to that
supremacy.
141

Theories of
Social Stratification Box 27.3: Women and Dalits
Status asymmetry of genders is part of the larger social structure which is
reinforced through caste and family values. Gender and caste are important
aspects of class exploitation. Women in the Indian society are stratified
along caste, class, religious and ethnic boundaries thus no generlisations on
the status become possible. Women are stratified. Women from Dalit sections,
suffer from triple oppression — caste, class, gender.
Divided by economic inequality and the ideology of hierarchy Indian women

hardly share interests. It has been found that work is prime mover of
women’s status because there is a correspondence between economic
stratification, social hierarchy and differentiation of female work pattern
and employment modes. Caste oppression, class exploitation and gender
inequities are more stable and durable as they are practiced within the
family.
Women’s movements in India have mainly focused on those issues which

seem to cut across boundaries such as violence against women, work related
inequalities, access to education and employment, health, social recognition
of work of house wives and remuneration for their work, political repression
and under representation, price rise etc.
Raising issues of exploitation and oppression in different spheres of life i.e.

family, marriage, economy, religion and politics, feminists seem to cover a
large vista of gender concerns in diverse Indian contexts.
In all kinds of writings it has been admitted that patriarchy, stratification

system and status of women are closely inter-related and any kind of positive
change in the status of women would be an attack on patriarchy and
stratification system. Through a symbolic analysis unequal practices have
been seen express deep seated cultural valuations of what it is to be a
masculine and feminine. Leela Dube (op. cit.) discusses the relationship
between man and women by using metaphoric concepts of ‘seed’ and the
earth in various patrilineal cultures as justification of gender asymmetry.
Women in literary writings have been projected in a conservative form. In

the last three decades large spate of writings on various aspects of gender
inequality challenge the invisibility of women in economy, denial of
unemployment, decision making and violence and crime against women as
male privileges.
The abolition of landlordism and the breakdown of its socio– cultural milieus
have affected women in a positive manner. Mencher and Saradamoni (1983:A
–167) find that female income is essential for below poverty line houses.
Most of the women are engaged in three types of work: (a) participation in
the traditionally defined labour force (b) domestic work plus activities like
alone. Even these women are victimized because of their sex and poor
economic back-ground.
Karuna Ahmad finds (1979 : 1435 – 40) five trends in women’s employment:
(a) clustering of women in a few occupations (b) clustering either in low
status occupation or in the lower rungs of the prestigious profession, (c)
women receive lower salaries than men, (d) high proportion of highly educated
142 and professionally trained unemployed women.

Studies suggest that women’s professional locations reflect their position in Gender and
society in terms of caste and class backgrounds and educational achievements.
Perceptions regarding status among women are shaped by modern education
than the traditional values regarding marriage and family.
Agnihotri (1996) and Agarwal (1984) gave preference for Marxist approach in
analysing women. Agarwal proposes that a number of questions which would
have a bearing on gender relations will get obfuscated in the organisation of
production and relations of production. But despite the metaphor of reforms
and individuation of women, emphasis on chastity, patriarchy, division of
Labour, sacredness of Marriage seclusion with the household has persisted
27.6 Caste and Gender

The three basic characteristics of caste are:
i) Exclusion or separation i.e. rules governing marriage and contact, which
maintains distinctions of caste.
ii) Hierarchy i.e. the principle of order and rank according to status.
iii) Interdependence i.e. the division of labour which is closely tied to
hierarchy and separation.
These three analytically separable principles of the caste system operate

through units based on kinship. Women’s lives are largely lived within familial
parameters. The centrality of the family and household remains very important
in their lives (Dube,1996: 1- 27).
Women’s work contributes substantially to the occupational continuity of a

caste group. significant continuities in the link between caste and occupation
can be seen with respect to Brahmin is still acting as a Purohit (priest) for
upper and middle level castes. Among artisan castes of goldsmiths, blacksmiths,
potters and weavers, many are still using their traditional profession for
their living and women are helping them directly or indirectly at all levels of
work. Basket weaving is a joint activity of men and women. In rural areas
and small towns it is common for women from households of petty traders
and shopkeepers to grind spices and prepare fries, fritters and preserve for
sale in the family shop. It is a fact that occupational continuity of a particular
caste depends largely on women (ibid).
Jajmani relations, short-term contractual affiliation between artisans and

service castes and land owners, cultivators and traders, and relations of
exchange among occupational castes, a feature of many rural and semi-urban
areas, function at the level of family. Both men and women render services
and receive remuneration in case and kind for their work. We can see in
every region of India there are specific ‘Untouchable’ castes whose women
work as midwives: these women, along with the men of their caste, share
the essential task of removing pollution of upper and clean castes. The bond
or contract which ties labourers to their masters is understood to include
the services of both the husband and the wife (ibid).
The necessity of continuing with occupational work is an important basis for

marrying within the caste. Women’s contribution to occupational continuity
is carried out within patrilineal limits and under the impositions and controls
of caste. A woman’s education may also be restricted keeping the work
demands and marriage market in mind.
143

Theories of In difficult times of the family, Scheduled Caste women generally do works
of scavenging but not the men. It is held that since women are used to
doing domestic work for their own household, can do similar kind of work
for others. The men feel that it is below their dignity to do such works or
jobs. Among migrant families, women are often the principle supporter of
the family. But the controls are retained at this time also. Social and ritual
matters are discussed and decided upon by the males of the caste with in
the neighborhood (ibid).
Food and Rituals: Food constitutes a critical element in the ritual idiom of
purity and pollution. The concern of purity and pollution centering on food
begin at home. The prescriptions and prohibitions regarding food for women
are governed by principles of kinship, marriage and sexuality. Women play
key role in maintaining the sanctity and purity of home. Notions of safety
relating to both purity/pollution and the ‘evil eye’ entail a variety of
restriction and constraints on women in the tasks of processing, preserving,
cooking and distributing food. In situation away from home and their locality
men tend to be more relaxed about rules of commensality, in a similar context
women are both chaperoned and watched over carefully and are expected
to follow rules more strictly (ibid).
There is a pervasive notion that women never attain the level of purity of
men of their own caste. It is well known that traditionally women of twice-
born castes have been equated with Shudras who could not be initiated
into the learning of the Vedas (ibid).
Marriage and sexual relations constitute a central arena in which caste

impinges on women’s lives. The cultural apprehension of the vulnerability of
women and the emphasis on their purity and restrained behaviour which
emphasises on limited interaction with opposite sex, are important
components of management of female sexuality in a caste society. The strong
patriliny in North India institutionalizes control of sexuality and fertility of
women. In the case of an unattached woman, pregnancy is a disaster because
in partrilineal society the issues of caste boundaries and her own purity are
involved.
Growing up of a female child is marked by severe controls, idealization of

familial roles, and emphasis on female modesty and strong value attached to
virginity of female. Women are expected to retain the purity of caste at all
life stages.
The pre-pubertal phase is looked upon as intrinsic purity stage and it is

celebrated in a number of ways, like worshipping and feeding virgin girls on
8th day of Navaratri. This calls for restrained behaviour on their part and
emphasises the need for protection and vigilance. In Indian society, restrained
and controlled sexuality is a pre-requisite for socially sanctioned motherhood
(Dube ibid). Even in urban areas middleclass women working in the public
work sphere experience pressures to confirm to the image of ‘good woman’
and face sexual harassment.
The principles of sexual asymmetry underlie the relationship between caste

endogamy and dowry, the different fates of men and women in inter-caste
unions and the sexual abuse of women. Sexual mores and restrictions are
less severe in case of ‘lower caste’ women. Men have mechanism by taking
144 purifactory bath and the ritual expatiation of the offence to escape pollution

which occurs through sexual intercourse with a low caste woman, but the Gender and
same is not accepted in case of ‘upper caste’ female, she is banished,
declared dead to the family. Inter-caste marriages especially in rural India are
still not tolerated and many cases of killing the couples have been reported
in the recent past. Sexual violence against lower caste and tribal women is
not an uncommon feature here.
M.N. Srinivas (1976: 90) has pointed out that in contemporary caste society
cognate jatis tend to get telescoped to form a single entity for purposes of
marriage caste both imposes constraints and creates the dominant ethos
which underlie the practice of dowry within Hindu society. The increasing
social and economic differentiation has increased the demand and expectation
on the part of the groom’s family.
27.7 Tribe, Gender, Stratification and Change

For long it was assumed that tribal societies were not stratified along caste
and class in the Indian context and the gender relations were seen to be
near egalitarian. Tribal Women’s status was also seen to be much higher than
the caste women since concepts of purity and pollution did not apply to
them and women enjoyed considerable autonomy in sexual and marriage
affairs. Despite women’s major contribution to tribal economy, they were
excluded from inheritance of property and political decision making. Recent
literature suggest that tribal societies are changing at a fast pace. Colonialism,
coexistence with caste groups, missionaries, industrialisation, education,
political democratisation etc have influenced them to a great extent. Gender
asymmetry which always existed in these groups has multiplied and become
more complex due to import of outside influences and growing stratification
based on wealth and power (Mehrotra, 2004). Gendering of politics and the
state are other major areas of concern. Women’s right to vote and the
constitutional provisions for gender equality could not ensure women’s active
participation in the political realm and statutory bodies. Their exclusion from
public decision making bodies is near complete. Gender inequality is inbuilt
into state’s seemingly progressive policies as highlighted by Swaminathan
(1987,cf. Sharma,1997). She picks up Minimum Wages Act and the Equal
Remuneration Act as well as policies for women’s education and the Hindu
Law of Succession. Women’s movements in India have created a great deal
of awareness and gender issues have come to the centre stage. Women’s
organisations raising questions of gender inequality and empowerment have
been operational at both grassroots and other levels of Indian society,
employing local strategies in resisting social and economic oppression
(Mehrotra, 2002). National and international agencies have created spaces
through NGO action in rural and tribal areas for economic as well social
development. The much debated and practiced phrase women’s empowerment
has become the buzz word and a quiet revolution is taking place at grassroots
level through women’s active participation in development process. Agarwal
(1994), however, notes that effective rights in land alone can empower
women. Women’s struggles are about bringing social transformation and
emancipation from cultural bondage which keeps the stratification stable.
27.8 Conclusion
From the above discussion it is clear that a gender informs and organises
social stratification as one of the organising principles like race, class, caste
or status. Gender in interface with race and class determines the structure
145

Theories of of western society, whereas caste and gender enter into class laying down
the structure of action for its members in the Indian context. The
understanding of status implications in social life and everyday routine of
men and women are symbolically represented in ideological and material
aspects of society.
The question of gender and stratification is not to be understood in terms

of inequality between men and women and in terms of subordination of
women alone. Recent researches on masculinity also suggest maleness to be
the symbolic construct as the femaleness is, reflecting that how gender as
a cultural construct expresses the relational dimension rather than the
individual attributes across societies and cultures.

Arensberg, Conrald M. and Solon T. Kimball, 1940, Family and Community in
Ireland. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press
Bretell, C.B. and C.F. Sergeant (eds.), 2001, Gender in Cross Cultural
Perspective.New Delhi, Prentice Hall
Dube, Leela, Eleanor Leacock and Shirley Ardener (eds.) 1986, Visibility and
Power: Essays on Women in Society and Development. Delhi, Oxford University
Press
Kishwar, Madhu and Ruth Vanita, 1984, In Search of Answers: Indian Women’s
Voices from Manushi. London, Zed Books
27.10 References
Agarwal, Bina, 1984, A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South
Asia. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Agnihotri, Indu, 1996, ‘Bringing Land Rights Centre-state’, Economic and

Political Weekly, Vol. XXXI, No.9: 526-29
Ahmad Karuna, 1979, ‘Studies of Educated Working Women in India: trends

and Issues’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.XIV, No.33: 1435-40
Arensberg, Conrald M. and Solon T. Kimball, 1940, Family and Community in

Ireland, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press
Atkinson, Jane, 1982, ‘Review: Anthropology,’ Signs 8:236-258
Bardhan, Kalpana, 1985, ‘Women’s Work, Welfare and Status: Forces of Tradition
and Change in India,’ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XX, No 51 and 52:
2207-20 and pp. 2261-69
Behal, Monisha, 1984, ‘Within and Outside the Courtyard: Glimpses into
Women’s Perception,’ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XIX, No.41: 1775-
77
Bretell, C.B. and C.F. Sergeant (eds.), 2001, Gender in Cross Cultural
Perspective, New Delhi, Prentice Hall
Campbell, John K, 1964, Honour, Family and Patronage, Oxford, Oxford

University Press
R.Crompton and M.Mann (ed.), 1986, Gender and Stratification, Cambridge,

The Polity Press
146

Dube, Leela, Eleanor Leacock and Shirley Ardener (eds.), 1986, Visibility and Gender and
Power: Essays on Women in Society and Development, Delhi, Oxford University
Press
Dube, Leela, 1996, “Caste and Women,” in M.N. Srinivas (ed.) Caste : Its
Twentieth Century Avatar, Viking, Penguin Publishing House, pp:1-27
Friedl, Ernestine, 1975, Women and Men: An Anthropologists’ View., New

York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston
______________, 1978, ‘Society and Sex Roles,’ Human Nature. April: 68-75.
Goodale, Jane C, 1971, Tiwi Wives: A Study of the Women of Metville Island,
North Australia, Seattle, University of Washington Press
Kabeer, Naila (1995), Reversed Identities: Gender Hierarchies in Development

Thought, New Delhi, Kali for Women
Kishwar, Madhu and Ruth Vanita, 1984, In Search of Answers: Indian Women’s
Voices from Manushi, London, Zed Books
Kumar, Nita (ed.) 1994. Women as Subjects: South Asian Histories, New
Delhi, Stree
Liddle, Joanna and Rama Joshi, 1985, ‘Gender and Imperialism in British
India’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XX, No.43, pp. WS-72-WS-78
Liddle, Joanna and Rama Joshi, 1986, Daughters of Independence: Gender,

Caste and Class in India, New Delhi, Kali for Women
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Families, Lineages, Genders, Class and Nations’, in Rosemary Crompton, and
Michael Mann (eds), Gender and Stratification. Cambridge Polity Press, pp.40-
56
Mann, Michael, 1994, ‘Persons, Households, Families, Lineages, Genders,

Classes and Nations’, in the Polity Reader in Gender Studies, pp. 177-94
Martin, M. Kay and Barbara Voortries, 1975, Female of the species, New York,
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Peggy and Ruth Goodenough (eds.). Beyond the Second Sex: New Directions
in the Anthropology of Gender, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press,
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Mehrotra, Nilika, 2002, “Perceiving Feminism: Some Local Responses,’

Sociological Bulletin, 51(1)58-79
______________, 2004, ‘Situating Tribal Women,’ The Eastern Anthropologist,

57 (1) 61-73
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Columbia University Press
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147

Theories of Sood, Rita, 1988, Changing Status of Women and Patterns of Adjustment: A
Sociological Study in Delhi Metropolis. Ph.D. Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru
University. New Delhi
Sharma. K.L.,1997, Social Stratification in India, New Delhi, Sage

Publications,pp 133-156
Srinivas, M.N., 1952, Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India.
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Publishing House
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Gender Studies, pp.22-28
148

Unit 28
Theories of Origin of Caste System
Contents
28.1 Introduction
28.2 Definition of Caste
28.3 Theories of Origin of Caste System
28.4 Caste System Through Ages
28.5 Caste: Not an Isolated Phenomenon
28.6 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After you have read this unit you will be able to
give a definition of caste
outline theories of caste as an institution
describe the caste system over the ages
28.1 Introduction
It is perhaps true that the most frequently mentioned peculiarity of the
traditional Hindu Society is the institution of caste, or as it more frequently
called, the caste system.
The origin of caste is a subject, which has given rise to a great deal of
speculation. The Indian caste system which is an age-old institution, even
to it, there is no unanimity with regards to its origin. The caste structure
is so complex that in spite of large number of researches done by social
scientists no valid explanation with regard to its origin could come out.
This unit seeks to have a look at the various theories of origin of caste
system; various definitions given by scholars and also the issue that how the
caste system has sustained itself through ages; what all forces were
responsible for its sustainability.
28.2 Definition of Caste

The word is derived from the Latin word ‘Castus’, which means ‘pure’. The
Portuguese word ‘Casta’ which means race, lineage or pure stock. But ‘Caste’
was not used in its Indian sense till the seventeenth century. The Indian use
is the leading one now, and it has influenced all other uses. As the Indian
idea of caste was but vaguely understood, this word was loosely applied to
the hereditary classes of Europe resembling the caste of India, who keep
themselves socially distinct. The Portuguese used this word to denote the
Indian institution, as they thought such a system was intended to keep
purity of blood.
On one hand the learner is used to describe in the broadest sense the total
system of social stratification, peculiar to India, on the other hand, it is
used to denote four more or less distinct aspects of this total system. i.e.
varna, jati and gotra. 149

Theories of Careless use of the English word ‘caste’ has been the source of considerable
confusion. Manu distinctly says that there are only four varnas, Brahman,
Kshatriya, Vaisya and Shudra & there is no fifth varna, while he admits of
over fifty jatis. Varna, according to Manu are four divisions into which the
castes are grouped. But later scholars point out that even Manu confuses
jati with varna. The confusion is due to the fact that the Brahmin can be
called both a varna and jati.
According to Risley, “a caste may be defined as a collection of families or

groups of families bearing a common name; claiming common descent from
a mythical ancestor; human or divine, professing to follow the same hereditary
calling; and regarded by those who are competent to give opinions as forming
a singly homogenous community. The name generally denotes or is associated
with a specific occupation. A caste is almost invariably endogamous in the
sense that a member of the large circle denoted by the common name may
not marry outside that circle, but within the circle there are usually a
number of smaller circles each of which is also endogamous”. Ketkar defines
a caste as a social group having two characteristics:
1) membership is confined to those who are born of members and includes
all persons so born.
2) the members are forbidden by an inexorable social law to marry outside
the group. Each one of such groups has a special name by which it is
called. Several of such small aggregates are grouped together under a
common name, while these larger groups are but subdivisions of groups
still larger which have independent names.
Box 28.1: Views on Caste System

Gait says that caste is an endogamous group or a collection of such groups
bearing a common name who by reason of traditional occupation and reputed
origin, are generally regarded, by those of their countrymen who are competent
to given an opinion, as forming a single homogenous community, the
constituent parts of which are nearly related to each other than they are to
any other section of society.
Béteille has defined caste, ‘as a small and named group of persons
characterised by endogamy, hereditary membership and a specific style of
life which sometimes includes the pursuit by tradition of a particular
occupation and is usually associated with a more or less distinct ritual status
in a hierarchical system’.
M. Senart defines caste ‘as a close corporation, in theory at any rate

rigorously hereditary; equipped with a certain traditional and independent
organisation including a chief and a council, meeting on occasion in assemblies
of more or less plenary authority and joining together at certain festivals;
bound together by common occupations, which relate more particularly to
marriage and to food and to questions of ceremonial pollution, and ruling
its members by the exercise of jurisdiction the extent of which varies, but
which succeeds in making the authority of the community more felt by the
sanction of certain penalties and above all by final irrevocable exclusion
from the group.
Nesfield defines a caste as ‘a class of the community which disowns any

connection with any other class and can neither intermarry nor eat or drink
with any but persons of their own community.’
150

Majumdar & Madan define caste thus: “If a number of people constitute a Theories of Origin of
Caste System
group not because of physical togetherness but because they have some
common interests and common ways to doing things, as a consequence of
which stratification of society into higher and lower group emerges, then
there groups may be called as status groups. It a status group is open to
entry, that is, if anybody can become its member by fulfilling certain pre-
requisite conditions, like obtaining a degree, or paying an admition fee, or
earning a particular income, then the status group may be called a class. If
the recruitment is not free, that is, if a status group is not open to any
body, but only those are its members who have certain ascribed, attributes,
which cannot be acquired by other, then it is called a caste.’’
Bougle, the French writer, concludes that the caste system divides the
whole society into a large number of hereditary groups, distinguished from
one another and connected together by three characteristics:
1) separation in matters of marriage and contact, whether direct or indirect
(food);
2) division of labour, each group having, is theory or by tradition, a profession
from which their members can depart only with certain limits;
3) and finally hierarchy, which ranks the groups as relatively superior or
inferior to one another.
This definition indicates the main characteristics of the system.
Like the numerous definitions given by various scholars since decades there
are numerous theories of origin of caste system.
28.3 Theories of Origin of Caste System

As is evident from the various definitions given above, caste in India is a
social institution, deriving sanction from and intimately interwoven with the
Hindu religion. Membership of a caste is compulsory and not a matter of
choice. A person is born into it.
It is practically impossible for individuals to change their caste. Each caste

boasts of a peculiar tradition of culture and tries to preserve it tenaciously.
The customs by which it lives are generally different in some respects from
those of any other castes and are sometimes in marked contrast to those of
any other caste. The caste system provides the individual member of caste
with rules which must be observed by him in the matters of food, marriage,
divorce, birth, initiation and death.
Caste sanctions and strictures still govern all social, religious and economic
activities.

What do you think are the most important aspects of caste. Read the entire
unit before writing the answer in your notebook.
It is obvious that such a system of social stratification divides the society

into thousands of small, hereditary and endogamous groups, each cluster of
groups having its own distinctive sets of customs and practices, which together
form a hierarchy, each such group of caste is associated with one or more
151

Theories of traditional occupations and is related to the other by means of an elaborate
division of labour.
The caste system on which the traditional order of the Hindus society is
based is believed to have been of immemorial antiquity. The complex nature
of the caste structure is evident from the fact that, even after a century
and a half of painstaking and meticulous research in the history and function
of the social system, we do not posses any conclusive explanation of the
circumstances that might have contributed to the formation and development
of this unique system in India. As commented by D.N. Majumdar, there are
today as many theories regarding the origin of the caste system as there are
writers on the subject.
Census of India done in 1931 made references of the following five therories
with regards to the origin of caste. Hence, to simplify our endeavor we too
would follow the same reference.
a) The Divine Origin:

It may be pointed out that most of the religious authorities, Shastra’s and
puranas have advocated the divine origin of the caste system. So, the
general feeling among the Hindus is that it has been established by the
order of God or at least by his wishes, and so it should be religiously followed.
As per the ‘Purusha Sukta’ in Rig Veda, the people belong to four main
castes (varnas) constituting the four body parts of the purush (the creator).
The Brahmin was his (pursha’s) mouth, the Rajanya (kshatriya) was his arms,
the Vaisya was this thigh; and the shudra sprang from his feet.
This view has also been expressed in most of Dharma-Shastras, smirities and
Puranas. Manu, whose pronouncement is vited as an authority, also supported
this view. He further asserted that different castes arose as a series of
crosses first between the four varnas and then between their descendants
and also by degradation due to non observance of sacred rities. Besides ,
the book of Manu also contains reference to caste by the ten primeval rishis
i.e. Marichi, Atri, Angiras, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Prachetas, Vaisistha, Bhrigu
and Narda. In the Mahabharta , divergent views have been expressed. In
Shantiparva, Bhrigu has asserted that the world was created by Brahma and
later on separated into castes in consequence of work. But in the Mahabharata
it is stated that the Lord Krishna created Brahmins from his mouth, Kshatriyas
from his arms, Vaisyas from his thighs and Shudras from his feet. In the
Bhagwad Gita it is stated that the four fold division of castes was created
by god according to appointment of qualities and duties.
b) Karma and Transmigration:

Then there is the theory of karma and transmigration of soul which seeks to
justify the caste system. The various conditions of men, the highest, the
middling, and the lowest are caused by karma. One’s status in life is determined
by ones action (karma) in past incarnations. Whatever a man enjoys or
suffers is a result of his own actions. His bad actions would bear bitter fruit,
whether they were done overtly or covertly. In consequence of many sinful
acts committed by one’s body, voice or mind, that individual in the next
birth would become a bird, or a beast, or be born as a low caste person
respectively.
Those who perform good karma pass into superior existence, and those who
152

lead an ideal life obtain nirvana from birth and death. Such being the idea Theories of Origin of
Caste System
of retribution and justice, not only one is dissuaded from bad life but he is
also persuaded into a meritorious life by promise of absolution, of heaven,
of expiration of sins of himself and also his ancestors. Thus even the most
wretched man with his, most degrading occupation remains satisfied with
the belief that the miseries of his present life, are the result of his sins in
his previous life, and if he submissively performs his caste duties in this life
he will be born in a higher caste in the next life.
Box 28.2: Formation of Castes

According to the Racial theory propounded by Herbert Risley (1915) in his
book ‘The People of India’ racial differences and endogamous marriages
lead to the origin of the caste system. According to him, caste system
developed after emigration of IndoAryans from Persia where the society was
divided into four classes—priests, warriors, cultivators and artisans and this
they maintained even after coming here. They differed from the non-Aryans
in culture and racial tracts. So in order to maintain their superior status they
started practicing hyper gamy and imposed restriction on ‘Pratiloma’
marriages.
Risley (1915) described six processes by which the castes might have formed.
They are enrolment of tribes of aboriginal in the range of Hindusim either
under their own tribal designation or under a new caste name, occupation
as the chief factor in the evolution of caste, change in original occupation
leading to subdivision of the caste which ultimately developed into separate
caste, development of new caste due to neglect of established ceremonial
practices, tendency of certain groups to preserve by gone traditions more
rigidly, and the sectarian type who started life as religious sects.
Kroeber (1930) supports racial factor but he also regards religious, cultural
and occupational factors as significant.
Ghurye (1932) has described the caste system as Brahminical system and
believes that the conquered non-Aryan race becomes the shudras who were
debarred from religious and social activity of the Aryans.
Majumdar (1957) believes that clash of culture and contact of races led to
social groupings. He also believes that three superior classes assigned
particular occupation for their members and to maintain their superior status,
debarred other people from practicing such occupations. This led to
hierarchical caste system.
Thus it appears that the racial factor has been accepted by most of the
scholars but still it cannot be taken as the only factor in the development
of the caste system.
European writers on the subject of caste origins knew about the racial
difference between castes, high and low, and consciously and unconsciously
linked their findings to race. Weale wrote that the whole history of India,
form the earliest times, had been one long story of colour prejudice and that
more cruelty had probably been displayed there than in the rest of the
world, believed that the Aryans races who were ‘white’ simply devised the
iron system of caste to prevent the under mixing of a dominant race with
a ‘black’ inferior race.
153

Theories of W.J.Thomas finds marked physical contracts in the population, correlated
with superior and inferior cultures and this according to him is the basis of
caste distinctions.
Dudley Buxton thinks that caste is still of assistance in dividing up the

complex races of the Indian peninsula.
Gillin thinks that it is possible that caste in India originated in the racial
differentiations between various populations,
MacIver also leans towards the theory of the racial origin of caste structures.
He says that caste perhaps arose but of the superimposition of one
endogamous community on another, religion and pride of race which such a
superimposition must have engendered.
The colour questions in the formation of caste has also been considered.
The colour question at the root of the varna system is apparent from the
word verna, which means colour.
The class, which retained utmost purity of colour by avoiding intermixture

normally, gained precedence in the social scale. The status also depends
upon the extent of isolation maintained by the social groups. The Brahmins
were white, the Kshatriyas red; the Vaisyas were yellowish and the Shudras
were black as described in the Mahabharta. The three higher varnas have
tried to maintain their claims to superior status by keeping to themselves
the important professions.
Karve, however does not accept the view that the original meaning of varna
was ‘colour’. She argues that in the early scanned literature and in grammatical
works varna meant ‘class’. Karve continues that ‘at a later time the word
varne to mean ‘colour’ and the fourfold division of the ancients was then
taken to be based on physical feature, namely colour.’
The social factor in the formation of the caste structure, in a sense, admitted
by most of the scholars and yet the development of the caste system cannot
be explained wholly on the basis of race.
c) Occupational Theory:
Occupational theory propounded by Nesfield (1885) advocates occupation as
the lone factor for the development of this system. According to him, before
this system priesthood was not the exclusive monopoly of Brahmins. But
later on when hymns and rituals became more complex, a section of people
got themselves specialized and became the Brahmins. Due to importance of
sacrifices such people came to be more respected. Later they made this
occupation hereditary. After this other sections of people also organised
themselves for securing privileges. They did this in self-defense and also in
imitation of group of people whom they held in high esteem.
Box 28.3: Ranking and Caste

Different occupations grouped together men from different tribes into castes,
which then borrowed the principles of endogamy and prohibition of
commensality from the customs of the old tribes and thereby solidified
themselves into isolated units. The ranking of any caste as high or low
depended upon whether the industry represented by the caste belonged to
an advanced or backward stage of culture and thus the natural history of
154

Theories of Origin of
human industries afforded the chief clue to the gradation as well as the Caste System
formation of the Indian castes. Thus the castes following the most primitive
occupations like hunting, fishing, basket making etc were regarded as the
lowest, the metal workers, agriculturalists and readers were higher in rank,
while the highest caste was of those who were priests and teachers.
Slater in his book, ‘Dravidian Elements in Indian Culture’ emphasises the fact
that caste is actually stronger in southern than in northern India and suggests
that caste arose in India before the Aryan invasion as a result of occupations
becoming hereditary and marriages being arranged by parents within the
society of the common craft because sexual maturity developed early and
trade secrets were thus preserved. As a result of magic and religious
ceremonies also, exclusive occupational groups were built up, marriage outside
which became prejudicial and contrary to practice. The Aryan invasion had
the effect of strengthening a tendency to associate difference of colour and
of strengthening also a tendency for castes to be placed in a scale of social
precedence. He also maintains the existence in the pre-Aryan society of
Indian of an order of priest magicians.
Denzil Ibbetson explains caste as arising from a combination of tribal origins,

functional guilds and a ‘levitical religion’ and lays great stress on the tribe
the turning point in the career of a tribe comes when it abandons its wild
and romantic life and adopts a particular occupation as its principal method
of economic subsistence. This is the guild stage in caste history, and is
common at some period or other of economic progress to all peoples in the
world. The formation of guilds of occupational groups naturally led to
recognition of skills and importance of the various guilds. In medieval times,
the guilds vied with one another for predominance in accordance with their
economic status exercising various degrees of pressure on the social life of
the country. The exaltation of the priestly guild was soon followed by the
priests insisting on the hereditary nature of their occupational status, and
this led to the formation of endogamous units, as more and more of the
guilds wanted to conserve the social status and privileges they enjoyed and
to secure these permanently for the members of the guild. Later various
other guilds followed suit and a hierarchical organisation established itself.
Chappel and Coon trace the origin of castes to the absorption of aboriginal
types, and they also explain the formation of new castes with reference to
the emergence of new occupations.
d) Tribes and Religious Theory:

From very early times, there has been a gradual and silent change from tribes
to caste. This change has taken place in a number of ways, and it is believed
that most of the lower or exterior castes of today were formerly tribes.
Risley has mentioned four processes by which the transformation of tribes

into castes is effected. The processes are:
1) The leading men of an aboriginal tribe, having somehow got on in the
world became independent landed proprietors, managed to enroll
themselves in one of the more distinguished castes.
2) A number of aborigines embrace the tenets of Hindu religious sect and
becoming Vaishnavas and giving up their tribal name.
3) A whole tribe of aborigines, or a section of tribe enrolling themselves in
155

Theories of the ranks of Hinduism, under the style of a new caste which, though
claiming an origin of remote antiquity is really distinguishable by its name
from any of the standard and recognised.
4) A whole tribe of aborigines, or a section thereof, become gradually

converted to Hinduism without abandoning their tribal designation. Risley
mentions the case of the Bhumij of Western Bengal, a pure Dravidian
race, who lost their original language and now speak only Bengali. They
worship Hindu gods in addition to their own (the tendency being to
relegate the tribal gods to the women), and the more advanced among
them employ Brahmins as family priests. They still retain a set of floristic
exogamous subdivision closely resembling those of the Mundas and the
Santhals, but they are beginning to forget the totems and the names
themselves will probably soon be abandoned in favour of aristocratic
designations. The tribe will then have become a caste and will go on
giving up its customs that are likely to betray its true descent.
To these four process, Majumdar has added a fifth in which an individual

member of an aboriginal or semi-aboriginal tribe adopts the surname and
gotra of a particular caste, manages to enroll himself as a member of that
particular caste and gradually intermarries with the members of that caste.
His wealth and influence attract members of the caste he aspires to belong
and thus in the long run he may establish himself as a permanent member
of that caste. Cultural contact with Hindu castes leads to the adoption by
the tribes of Hindu beliefs, rituals, customs and to participation in Hindu
festivals and attendance at Hindu temple.
The process of gradual evolution from the aborigines to a higher class Hindu
is a main feature of social evolution in India which government offices have
noticed and commented upon it.
Bhuiyas present an excellent example of how from the aboriginal state,

caste or group differences and distinctions arose gradually as men disclaimed
earlier association and claimed new importance to themselves both divine
and social. Similarly, there is a great parallel between the Munda social
organisation and the Hindu organisation of ‘gotra’ and ‘varna’. The Mundas
are now found in certain parts of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, where they are
known under three different names, the Mundas, Santhals and Hos.
The Santhals are divided into 12 main septs of which the trace of one sept
only could not found. Most probably the lost sept has become completely
brahminised or Kshatriyaised and their descendents are not likely to give out
their secrets.
e) Family and Marriage:

This explanation given by Senart (1930) holds that the principle of exogamy
is the main basis of Indian caste system. In his opinion caste is the normal
development of ancient Aryan institution which assumed a peculiar form
because of peculiar conditions in India like prohibition of marriage within
one’s gotra, pollution by touch with lower classes, prohibition of inter-caste
dining etc. He has presumed beginning of caste system in the form of varna
division to the Indo Iranian period because of four-fold division of society
in the Rig Vedic India.
156

Risley mentions that the invading Aryans displayed a marked antipathy to Theories of Origin of
Caste System
marriage with personas of alien black race and devised an elaborate system
of taboo for the prevention of such union. But intermarriage could not
altogether be prevented.
28.4 Caste System Through Ages

Rig Vedic society was basically tribal in character. According to Keith, the
Vedic Indians were primarily pastoral, and this holds good for the Aryans
known from the early parts of the Rig Veda. The Aryans encountered the
urban population of Harappa society and ultimately conquered them in war.
Social adjustment between the Aryans and survivors of Harappa society and
other people naturally led to the rehabilitation of some of the surviving
priests and chiefs into corresponding positions, possibly of inferior nature in
the new Aryan society. Early literature throws hardly any light on the process
of assimilation between the Aryan commoners and those of the survivors of
earlier societies. It is likely that most of them were reduced to what came
to be known as the fourth varna in the Aryan society. In essence, the Rig
Vedic Aryan society and perhaps the society described in the Atharva Veda,
was characterised by the absence of sharp class diversions among its members,
a feature, which is usually found in early societies. The Shudras appear as
a social class only towards the end of the period of the Atharva Veda.
The Aryans, white skinned, good featured, making sacrifices and worshipping
gods like Agni, Indra, Varun etc were distinguishable ethnically and culturally
from the Dasyus, who were black skinned (krishanthvach), flat nosed (anas),
of unintelligible speech (mridhravach), not sacrificing (ayajnan), worshipping
no god (adevayu) and following strange customs (anyavrata).

Provide an outline of the various theories of caste. Which one do you
favour? Write your answer in your notebook.
Gradually the Daynrs, instead of being exterminated were taken as slaves.

‘Das’ became in the later literature synonymous with slave and the people
were employed in menial jobs. It is most likely that Dasyus (slaves) and
Shudras were originally the names of prominent tribes conquered and reduced
to slavery by the Aryans. By the time the Purusha Sukta was composed the
Dasa slaves of the Aryan conquerors had begun to be called Shudras. The
idea of ceremonial impurity of the Shudras involving prohibition of physical
and visual contact with him appeared towards the clos of the Vedic period
(1000-600 B.C.) The first notice of such a marked degradation is found in the
Satapatha Brahamana.
Around the 600 B.C.—300 B.C., the difference between the Vaisayas and
Shudras was getting narrower day by day. The occupation of the two castes
were practically interchangeable. The Vedic society now advanced from
tribalism to feudalions. The proud higher castes — Brahmin and Kshatriya
began to adopt a more exclusive policy towards them. The social position of
Shudra underwent a change for the worse. Shudra ceased to have any place
in the work of administration. The lawgivers emphasised the old fiction that
the Shudra was born from the feet of the God and thus imposed on him
numerous social disabilities in matters of company, food, marriage and
education. The idea that food touched by the Shudra is denied and cannot
be taken by a Brahmin is first expressed in the Dharmasutras (500B.C.-300 157

Theories of B.C.). Shudra could not take part in Vedic sacrifices and sacraments. He
came to be excluded from the Vedic sacrifices to such an extent that in the
performance of certain rites, even his presence and sight were avoided.
It has been said that the origin of untouchability may be traced back of
pollution. Untouchablility may be traced back to pollution. Untouchability
has its origin in both hygiene and religion. Finally the idea of untouchability
has been traced to the theoretical impurity of certain occupations.
Sharma thinks that one of the reasons for the origin of untouchability was
the cultural lag of the aboriginal tribes, who were manly hunters and galherens,
in contrast to the members of the Brahminical society, who possessed the
knowledge of metals and agriculture and were developing urban life. Gradually,
Brahmins and Kshatriyas withdrew more and more from the work of primary
production and tended to be hereditary in their positions and functions.
The Nishadas, Chandalas and Paulkasas, the earliest mention of them is
found in Yajurved. Out of there chandalas and Nishadas were considered as
untouchables in later Vedic Society. In Dharamsutras and Pali texts Chandalas
are clearly depicted as untouchables and the Vedic texts kept the fifth caste
altogether out from the four-fold division of society. During this time the
Varna divided Brahminical society was undermined by the activities of heretical
sects and the inclusion of foreign elements such as the Bactrian Greeks,
Sakas, Pathans and Kusanas. Manu desperately tries to preserve Brahminical
society, not only by ordaining rigorous measures against the Shudras, but
also by inventing suitable geneologies for the incorporation of foreign
elements into varna society. In order to assimilate numerous aboriginal tribes
and foreign elements Manu made a far greater use of the fiction of
Varnasamkara (intermixture of varnas) than was done by his predecessors. In
the majority instances the mixed castes were lumped with the Shudra in
respect of their hereditary duties gives a list of Jatis, many of whom have
changed in name and some of them have ceased to exist. He distinguishes
the following categories:
a) four original varnas
b) castes, which were supposed to be produced by mixtures with pure and
mined castes
c) castes which have lost their status on account of neglect of sacred rites
d) castes due to the exclusion of persons from the community
e) slaves and their descendants
f) people excluded from the community of four Varnas an well as their
descendants
Manu mentions the old mixed castes, who are said to have originated from
the intermixture of the varnas and ascribes a similar origin to a long list of
mixed castes resolve themselves into three types:
a) castes produced from different pure castes;
b) those produced by the mixture of pure castes an one side and mixed on
the other;
c) and those produced from parents of mixed origin on both sides.
Manu also advocated that higher castes should avoid all contact with the
Chandalas and Svapakas. Chandalas and Svapakas should live outside the villages,
158 their sole property consisted of dogs and donkeys; food vessels used by

them would be discarded forever. Manu goes further that if a Brahmin had Theories of Origin of
Caste System
contact with a Chandala or Antya, he would fall from his Brahminhood.
The advent of foreign people served to loosen the shackles of the varna
system. The law books of the Gupta period retain the distinction between
the Shudras and untouchables. During this period there seems to have been
not only an increase in the number of untouchables but also some
intensification in the practice of untouchability. Fahien (AD 399-414) informs
that, when the Chandalas enter the gate of a city or a market place, they
strike a piece of wood to give prior notice of their arrival so that men may
know and avoid them.
After the death of Harsha (AD 647), Sind came under the occupation of the
Arab in A.D. 712 and since then Muslims continued to come to India as
travelers, traders and mercenaries. From the 11th century onwards, Muslim
invasion with cold-blooded murders, forcible conversion, looking and
devastation of the countryside, breaking up of Hindu idols and desecration
of Hindu temples began in India on a large scale and the Indians experienced
perpetual insecurity. For fear of their culture being submerged under the
impact of new forces, the Hindus framed rigid rules against inter-marriage
and inter-dining. The principle of hereditary came into prominence by 1000
A.D. Pratiloma and anuloma marriages were discouraged. The position of
Shudras improved. There was improvement in their economic condition but
intellectually they remained rather backward, because higher education was
largely restricted to the elite— the Brahmins and the Kshatriyas.
With continuous Muslim invasions, there was considerable effect on the

Hindu social system. In 16th century, there was further hardening of the caste
system by early marriage to prevent religious conversions. The Portuguese
occupation of some part of India in early 16th century gave rise to fresh
conversions of Hindus into Roman Catholics. In medieval India, with resurgence
of Hinduism by Sankracharya (788-820 A.D.) the Muslim and Christian convert
freely got reconverted into Hinduism. Further Vaisnavaites and Saivaites
devotees a during this critical period, held the torch of Hinduism. Various
Bhakti movements by Acharya Ramanuj, Madhavacharya, Vallavacharya, Kabir,
Nanak, Chaitanya, Tulsi Das and Many other did help check Islamisation of
India. Many converts came back to Hindu fold.
By the time British consolidated their position in India, the Hindu social
system had accumulated many undesirable features. The various policies of
the British rulers were geared mainly for the maintenance of law and order,
for the collection of taxes, and for keeping an unrestricted market for British
goods. Their centralised administration completely disrupted the old economy
of the country. The old village economy which, for long, remained unaffected
by the political conflicts and which had given so much strength to the caste
system, became disrupted under British rule. The land policy created a new
class of landlords and above million in to the ranks of tenants and agriculture
labourers.
The caste divided Hindu society which ensured employment and protection
to its various caste groups, could not effectively challenge the British policy.
For the first time caste system faced a serious challenge from its foreign
rules.
159

Theories of Western education and social reforms, brought abolition of untouchability.
These movements had an aim of cleansing the Hindu social order of some of
its undesirable features, narrowing down the caste distinctions, changing
the attitude of high caste people towards the untouchables. Growth and
town, establishment of industries in urban areas, introduction of railways,
led to relaxation of caste prejudice new economic activities taken by the
state gave birth to numerous non caste occupation. A process was set into
motion, which began to attack the importance of caste as ritual cum-
occupational division of society. The establishment of evil and criminal courts
robbed the caste system and the caste panchayats of authority they once
had even the members of particulars castes.
But the same time the British policy was not for fostering unity and cohesion
of the various section of people of India. Its policy was directed towards
dividing and sub-diving. People at whatever level possible be it religion,
region, language or caste. Introduction of separate electorates or special
recognition accorded to non-Brahmins castes in the south not only contributed
to the disruption of whatever solidarity India once possessed and fostered
jealousy between provinces, creeds, also hardened the caste distinctions.
Thus we see that the process of continuous adjustment and wider integration
was always at work. It is clear from the above discussion that caste system
becomes more and which rigid over centuries. The forces which led to origin
of caste are also the forces, which led to sustainability of the caste system
as such.
28.5 Caste: Not an Isolated Phenomenon

Social institutions that resemble caste in one respect or the other are not
difficult to find elsewhere. The caste system has survived in a perfect form
in India than elsewhere, but Hocart shows that the Indian caste system is
not an isolated phenomenon as it is thought to be.
Comparable forms, still exist is Polynesia and Melanesia and that clear traces
of them can be seen in ancient Greece, Rome and Modern Egypt.
Hutton finds analogous institutions, which resemble caste in one or other

of its aspects in various parts of the world like Ceylon, Fiji, Egypt, Somali,
Rnada and Urundi in modern Africa and Burma.
Ghurye traces elements of caste outside India like Egypt, Western Asia,
China, Japan, America, Rome and Tribal Europe.
In ancient Persia there were the Atharvas (priests) Aathaesthas (warriors)

Vastriya fshuyants (cultivators) and Huitis (patricians). The only important
difference lay with regard to fourth class, which was the artisans class in
Persia, and the servile or Shudra class in India.
In Western Roman Empire, there were occupational hereditary groups as

created by the theodisian code. Such groups would have been created only
if there were elements of social segregation in the society.
In Sweden, in the 17th century, marriages outside the class were punished.
According to the German law the marriage of a man belonging to the high
160 mobility with a woman is not entitled to the rank of her husband nor is the

full right of inheritance possessed by her and her children. The upper caste Theories of Origin of
Caste System
Muslims namely the Sheikhs, Saiyads, and the Pathans are intensely cautious
of their lineage and avoid weaving marital relations with the low caste
muslims like Ansaris and Julahas.
28.6 Conlusion
We have come to realise that the major theory of the origin of caste is
rooted in the hindu myths and legends. The religious texts accord divine
origin to the caste system in India. Interestingly, it is believed that birth in
a high caste is, in fact, a reward of good deeds performed in the previous
birth. Most people belonging to upper castes seek to arrange marriages
within their own caste so as to maintain their superiority.

Srinivas M.N. 1962 Caste in Modern India and other Essays, London, Asia
Publishing House
Lerner, Daniel 1958, The Passing Away of Traditional Society. Free Press of
Glencoe
161

Unit 29
Theories of Modernisation and
Modernity
Contents
29.1 Introduction
29.2 Approaches to Modernisation
29.3 Implication of Modernisation Theories
29.4 Phases in Modernisation Processes
29.5 Modernisation : The Asian Syndrome
29.6 Modernisation Process as a Whole
29.7 The Phenomena of Modernity
29.8 Approaches to Modernity
29.9 Conclusion
29.11 References
Learning Objectives
After having read this unit you will be able to,
define Modernisation
outline approaches, implications, and phases of Modernisation
discuss Modernisation in India
describe the phenomena of modernity
outline the approaches to modernity
29.1 Introduction
The theories of Modernisation inform us about how the various parts of the
world developed into industrial powers. The approaches/theories that describe
and analyse how and why this happened are the subject of the initial part
of this lesson. Thereafter we will turn to modernity and see how a
presentation and analysis of the same helps our understanding of modern
western society as also the social processes witnessed in some Asian societies.
Thus Modernisation is an outcome of various social processes. The major
events in this historical development began after the IInd world war and
these include the emergence of America (US) as a superpower in the globe
which had the result of trying to styme the rise of communism. To bring
about this aim of ‘containment ‘ the US invested greatly in the strengthening
of the economic base of certain countries including Western Europe, South
Korea and Japan. Modernisation also stems from the growth of the communist
movements in China Vietnam, Soviet Union (now no longer existing as a
communist bloc) and Cuba. The third of these processes include the factors
of decolonialisation in Asia and Africa and the termination of colonies
controlled by European powers.
At this point of time the former colonies had to face the challenge of
adopting some appropriate model of growth. In this they were assisted and
helped by the US which sent vast teams of social scientists to study the
165

Issues of Modernity ground situation in the new nations states. The idea behind this move of
the US was to see how capitalist ideologies could be used in the economic
growth of these nations most of whom were poor due to the long period of
colonisation which had greatly debilitated their resources and has been
deeply exploited. This included the export of raw materials which were
turned into products and commodities and reexported to the colonies so as
to make great economic profits. This strategy of supplanting capitalism and
capitalist ideologies was no doubt also an attempt to the influence of
communist ideology and to destroy it over a period of time. There is thus
a great dimension of political maneuvers and ideology which is involved in
the process of Modernisation. Thus the scholars in all fields of social science
studied these societies and their findings began to be published soon after
the IInd world war. The main tools of analysis and of subsequent published
included primarily the evolutionary theory and secondly the functionalist
theory. Let us describe these approaches now so that the overall process of
Modernisation begins to be clear. Thus evolutionary theory and theorists
pointed out the several factors which comprised the view point of this
approach found social charge in these societies to be in a linear progression
going from primitive to complex society. This was held to be so in all societies.
Again this theory and the theorists associated with it held that such linear
progress of societies was leading to a better world and represented the
good of humanity and civilization at large. Further social change was envisioned
as a gradual occurrence and was dissociated from any sudden and violent
chain of events eg revolution. Change was slow and steady and not sudden
and violent as the communist ideology upheld. This slow change considering
the situation of modern societies was felt to take enormous spans of time
running in to centuries, not just decades. Thus the functionalist theorists,
foremost of whom was Parsons, built up various tenets to promote its view
point the main ones being the analogy of society as being an organism which
had various interrelated segments in societal institutions. In this organismic
entity (society) each of the various institutions performed a particular part
which contributed to the whole. This theory propagated that there were
four main functions which the institutions performed. These were the
functions of - (a) adaptation to the environment performed by the capitalist
economic system. Then was the function of. (b) goal attainment which was
a government function a function which encompassed liberal aims(Rojas 1996:
p1). Next came the function of integration performed by legal and religious
institutions, specifically the Christian religion. Finally there is the latency
function performed by the family and by educational institutions.
29.2 Approaches to Modernisation

Thus Modernisation approaches distinguished between traditional societies
and modern societies. Thus the traditional societies were such that they
tended to have a large personal, face to face nature which was felt to be
inferior in terms of market relations. On the other hand modern societies
tended to be neutral and therefore much more capable of dealing with and
exploiting the market and the environment.
One of the key institutions in the society is the family and the nature of this
differed again in traditional and modern societies. Thus the family in
traditional societies was responsible for many functions. That is to say it is
multifunctional and covered issues of religion, welfare, education,
reproduction also emotional scaffolding. On the other hand the modern
166 family which the functions of the family are now the domain of the state.

In this theory social disturbances occur when any of the parts of society Theories of Modernisation
and Modernity
begin to malfunction or to fail to deliver what was expected of it to maintain
the status quo. Disturbances include peaceful / violent agitation, revolution,
guerilla warfare and now terrorism. However there is a disturbing side to
these activities because any individual / institution that provokes the state
and the status quo is deliberately and often violently desisted and resisted
for doing so. These actions are deliberately viewed as action which is
humanitarian. The question of human rights is a recent phenomena and
organisations have be instituted to ensure that democracy is not violated at
the cost of middle level disturbances whether by groups or by institutions.
Box 29.1: Mc Donaldization

If we equate formal rationality with modernity, then the success and spread
of the fast food restaurant, as well as to the degree to which it is serving
as a model for much of the rest of society, indicate that we continue to live
in a modern world…
While there may be other changes in the economy which support the idea
of a post industrial society, the fast food restaurant and the many other
elements that are modeled after it do not. (Ritzer 1996, sociological theory.
P:579).
Smelser’s point of view differed somewhat from what we have been pointing
out. He took as his point of attention the effect of the economy and related
institutions on the overall social structure. He pointed out that in
Modernisation process society developed from simple technology to complex
ideology. Further this was a movement away from subsistence to cash crops
so far as agriculture is concerned. Again Smelser indicated that machine
power begins to dominate pushing aside simply human (physical) labour.
Finally there is an emphasis on urbanisation and urban structures rather than
development of the rural areas. Smelser however was realistic enough to
realise that these developments were not simple and linear but that these
processes took place at the same time (together) but not at the same rate
(Smesler, 1969).
Also such changes would occur at a different pace at different social structure
and societies. In other words there was not one single trajectory towards
social change because the traditions were varied in different societies. They
therefore provided different kinds of challenges. Similarly Rostow published
a theory of Modernisation which took the terminology of aviation and
proposed various stages of development.
This theory talks of a primitive society moving on to get preconditions for

the pre “take – off” onto the “take- off stage”, the drive to maturity and
finally to a mass consumption society. Thus for Rostow (Rostow, 1960)
economic development goes through various stages and that this is universal
to all societies, and that Modernisation is a process of homogenisation, of
Europeanization, irreversible progressive, evolutionary and transformative.
This theory has some questionable implications. Thus following this theory
it is implied that the nations which are traditional have as their ultimate
model western advanced societies which they must emulate in every way to
themselves reach an advanced state/modern state. This in itself implies that
the capitalist state and ideology is the path to be followed by the under
developed states. Thus Modernisation and theories explaining it accept
167

Issues of Modernity without hesitation that American policies of trade and foreign policy, and
that of international relations have to be accepted and subscribed to because
they are at the core of the modernising process.
29.3 Implication of Modernisation Theories

As you will have noticed that there is a heavy western bias in these theories
and their implications. Modernisation theory itself is mostly a western product
and sets up these societies as an ideal that the less developed countries
must follow without hesitation including capitalist ideology because this
‘‘works’’ and works best. However dependency theory takes a wider global
perspective. It points out that the problems faced in development are not
just those of social structure in traditional societies but in large part due to
world wide structures imposed by the Western world, or the North.

Do you think that the “metropolis-satellite” relationship between countries
of north and south still exists? Give reasons for your answer.
Thus Andre Gunder Frank has pointed out that relations between North and
South are arranged as a chain described by him as “metropolis – satellite”
relationships. Thus we can see that there is an underlying hierarchy in world
relations (Foster-Coster, 1985). At the top of the chain is the metropolis (US)
that has no strong dependence on other regions. We then go on to the
strong dependencies but are dependent on the USA (or other well developed
Western societies) for aid or any other kind of help. The downward chain
continues and culminates right down to states (nations) which are very
highly or even totally dependent on the nations higher up in the hierarchy
of dependencies for almost everything in food, fertilizers, clothes,
automobiles, machines etc.
According to Frank such dependencies become a problem when a State

wants to develop itself economically and socially. Thus such moves often call
for sanctions against the satellite states by the metropolises on which the
satellite is dependent. This means also that dependency of this sort stems
the freedom to chose by the satellite states, and to try and evolve in their
own way because whatever they have by way of economic wealth is consumed
by the nations higher in the hierarchy.
This theory is readily witnessed in international relations and the aid to the
third world by the North have the most exploitative terms and conditions,
which ensure that the satellite states can never be free of the donor in
economic terms. Frank opines that the dismantling of such relations can
alone lead to development along the lines that the third world nations want.
Thus dependency theory is opposed to Modernisation theory, but it is
definitely an alternative explanation. Further such an explanation exposes
some harsh realities of contemporary societies across the globe. Modernisation
theory is more of an ideology whereas dependency theories exposes the
harsh economic international realities. Neither of them has produced any
specific development just attributable to them. It may be noted however
that Modernisation has since the 17th century has had an affect, beginning
with the Western countries, impacted all over the globe. To give an example
let us turn to the field of communication. Thus Modernisation theories shed
light on how the media is affected by these relatively recent changes both
168 in relatively traditional and postmodern societies we may note that the

Modernisation theories we have been discussing can be seen to have evolved Theories of Modernisation
and Modernity
in three relatively distinct phases. The first phase of these theories began
in the 1950s and 1960s and tried to explain how Western styles of living
gradually spread all over the globe (world). These was also a spread of
technological innovations and the ideology of individualism.
29.4 Phases in Modernisation Processes

The economic aspect where the mass media helped to spread technological
innovations that were at the core of Modernisation.
Cultural development including education and literacy rates. This too was
aided by the mass media which can promote modernity.
Identify development especially a rational identity was also helped by the
media including the process of nation building and elections.
However a basic shortcoming of these approaches to Modernisation was

their Western bias. Now the second phase of Modernisation was linked to
critical theory that held away in the 1980s. These theories are in fact a
critique of the western impact of Modernisation. Thus according to the
media dependency theory there was a dependence of the developing countries
on the mass media of the western world. That is to say the peripheral
countries depended upon the core. Now we come to the third phase of the
development of Modernisation theory beginning in the 1990s. These theories
attempted to be neutral in their approach. Thus according to Giddens modern
society (Giddens, A. 1991) and culture is marked by time space distantiation
and disembbeding features or characteristics. Thus while traditional society
involves much face to face interaction by those living in proximity to each
other in modern cultures and societies the space across which interaction
occurs using mass media. Thus the disembedding process such as currency,
symbols, the internet and english language all help bring the North and South
into a clearer focus. We now term to another area of Modernisation which
has its presentation and analysis based on work in India.
29.5 Modernisation: The Asian Syndrome

Yogendra Singh points out at the beginning of his analysis that prior to
Modernisation the traditions of India were based on the various principles
of hierarchy, holism, continuity and transcendence. These were the basic
aspects of tradition. These factors to some extent existed also in the
traditional west. However as Singh notes Indian and Western tradition were
in fact divergent to each other. This arose specifically from their own differing
historical background their specific social and cultural heritage and overall
social situation. Singh asks whether despite these differences would it lead
to a universal model of Modernisation? Singh distinguishes between social
change perse and Modernisation. Social change as such need not necessarily
imply Modernisation. However the changes which were ortho-genetic and
heterogenetic were pre-modern. Thus the Islamic tradition in India was
heterogenetic and was established by conquest. Thus endogenous change in
Hinduism were confined to Sanskritisation. This in itself was based on a
historical process which took many generations and was positional alone not
structural. Modernisation in India commenced with its contact with the
west which brought about vast changes in the Indian social structure. However
it cannot be said that all contacts led to Modernisation. In fact Singh notes
that in the process of contact with the west certain traditional institutions
169

Issues of Modernity also got further strengthened. Thus as Singh notes it would be misleading
to think of a clear polarity between tradition and modernity, and he feels
this is more theoretical than actual.
Box 29.2: Changes in Traditional India

The changes which thus occurred were confined to differentiation within the
framework of traditional social structure and values; structural changes
were way few, and those which took place were limited in respect of the
type of roles ….Similar development in religious role structure and
organisations partially followed the emergence of other traditions. But these
changes by no means could be called structural, since differentiation of roles
was segmental and did not alter the system as a whole. (Yogendra Singh,
1986, The Modernisation Of Indian Tradition: p:193).
During the British period Modernisation was selective and sequential. It was
not in synchronisation with family caste and village. These areas were not
of much concern by the British, more so after the revolt of 1857. British
administration felt that these structures were not dynamic and were
autonomous, especially the village and caste system. Caste was considered
in the army and beaurocrasy, and in the national movement of a communal
electorate was introduced. Singh feels these factors influenced the post
colonial Modernisation process. The process of Modernisation found expression
and ground in the freedom struggle of India led by Mahatma Gandhi whose
actions and mobilisation of the masses led to what Singh calls a new political
culture of Modernisation. However, Gandhi was not able to avert the partition
of the nation into two because the historical background of Islam and Hinduism
was different.
Singh asks how Modernisation can lead to an integrative pattern which is

rather a complicated one whether this is overt or convert. How can a society
avert a structural breakdown. From here on in the answer we are on familiar
ground (discussed earlier in this unit) as Singh turns to the main theories of
Modernisation, that is the structural and the evolutionary theories of
Modernisation. These approaches have been adequately discussed earlier
and we will not repeat them again. The student can at this point go back
to the beginning of the unit before reading further.
29.6 Modernisation Process as a Whole

In this analysis Singh now turns towards a discussion of Modernisation as a
whole. He points out that Modernisation did not lead to institutional and
structural breakdown because of the characteristics of society in India. One
of these characteristics was the political structures. Further the caste system
itself was also independent of the political system. Thus the various which
village areas had their own councils (panchayat) through which they
attempted to solve village level problems. This type of inter structural
independence was a great facilitator of Modernisation, but as pointed out
earlier did not lead to societal breakdown. Thus Singh notes that modernity
developed as a sub-structure and sub-culture rather an over arching entity.
Over time however this segmental presence of Modernisation became
‘encompassing’ and the structural autonomy was no longer the prime ‘shock-
absorber’. Again changes in political systems made this pervade on society
and stratification cultures. In its wake there are stresses on the entire
cultural system. However it is clear that Modernisation requires adaptive
170 changes in value systems which are non traditional in terms of values and

norms. Singh gives the example of the process of secularism and untouchability Theories of Modernisation
and Modernity
which are definitely part of the Modernisation process in present day India
which is resisted by the traditional value system (Singh, 1986).

To what extent does Modernisation lead to the breakdown of inequality? Give
reasons to support you’re your answer.
Singh asks again whether society in India be able to avoid “structural

breakdown” in what he refers to as the “second phase” of Modernisation?
Further the absence of the structural autonomy creates serious problems or
“bottlenecks” for the transition to modernity? Thus Singh opines that in the
cultural area legislations have altered the overall landscape since they have
been made with a view to terminate social inequality and its attendant
exploitation and alienation, and pave the way towards democratic rights and
other commitments made in the constitution of India. Such processes have
pushed society in India away from the positional changes of Srinivas’s theory
of Sanskrilisation. In place of this process these has been a creation of new
identifies, caste associations and tribes. This process in itself is speeded up
by the Great Traditions of Modernisation eg education, industrialisation and
urbanisation. Further Singh notes that traditional structures are being
mobilised for modern objectives and protest movements. Paradoxically tradition
itself is strengthened because media and transport processes spread ritual
structures, and help organise further the various religious groups and
activities. Again religious sects and other religious groupings employ the
bureaucratic approach and this is in part responsible towards the integration
of sects from the overarching religious order. However Singh is careful to
point out that in the post colonial period of Modernisation there have been
several structural changes. Thus caste, family, village, and community retained
their traditional identity. Caste especially has been witnessed to be extreme
fluid and adaptive to new situations and has in no way been abolished so
far as the ground reality is concerned. Further caste has adopted to the
modern era in India by involving itself in many different areas such as
democratic participation, politics and trade unionism, and is tenacious in its
persistence more so in the area of joint family groups.
Modernisation in the colonial era was relatively homogenous in the elite

structures. Thus the elite from industry, military and politics came from a
background in caste and class stratum. These elite had access to modern
education and had similar ideologies. It is clear then that the base for such
elites was fairly delimited. In the post independence era this narrow base
has increased. The result of this that there is a differentiation between the
elites themselves, broadly the political and the non political elite. Singh
points out that the political elite is less Westernized and identify much more
with traditionality and symbols related to it. Singh also notes that the federal
structure of a one party system has given way to a multiparty system, with
the subsequent divergence in ideologies. Further the income created by the
various FYPs has mainly benefited those who are already rich rather than the
poor, especially rural masses. Thus the attempt to plan has accentuated the
divide between the rich and the poor. Again the fast rate of growth in
population has itself created structural tensions. Thus till recently the
industrialisation process India remained what Singh calls a ‘rural-peasant’
type of society, except for pockets such as the metropolitans of India of
which there are few in India.
171

Issues of Modernity These structural inconsistencies arise therefore from a variety of sources;
these are:
Democratisation without appropriate civic culture
Bureaucratisation without universalistic norms
Growth of the mass media.
Aspiration growth without increased resources and distributive justice.
Stress on welfare ideology only at the verbal level.
Over urbanisation without inadequate and proper charges in the social
strata.
Singh cites Gunnar Myrdal according to whom nationalism and democracy

have grown in an uneven way in Asia. In western societies an independent
state, effective government and adequate law enforcement proceeded
nationalism and democracy. In contrast in South Asia this was not the case
and therefore this imbalance also created a economic dependence on
developed countries. It also meant slow economic development and extremely
tardy changes in institutions.
In India especially with a larger percentage of intellectuals and middle classes

which are important for a real democracy, Modernisation did not proceed
unimpeded. As Myrdal notes the “soft–state” approach meant a serious blow
for social change which can be “circular” or “cumulative”. Myrdal does not
subscribe to evolutionary stages of growth which he feels is a teleological
and conservative ideology. Thus the Modernisation process in India is moving
towards a critical phase. However Singh is of the view that these stresses
and contradictions will not lead to institutional breakdown. He feels that a
‘constant coordination of Modernisation’ is absolutely essential for a
democracy based Modernisation in India. He is also of the view that
Modernisation is not a single monolithic process and can and does differ
from one society to another.
29.7 The Phenomena of Modernity

Let us now turn to a related concept and a related process to Modernisation
viz. the phenomena of modernity. Thus the term modernity is a term employed
to discuss the stage of a society that is more developed than another
society. This term is usually employed to describe a society that uses world
wide capitalism as the model to overall world development. Thus when a
society is has the characteristics of modernity it is named a modern society.
On the other hand the process of becoming a modern society is called
Modernisation (as we have seen earlier). The defining features of such modern
societies is:
Emergence of nation state
Industrialisation and capitalism
Rise of democracy
Heavier dependence on technological innovation
Attendant urbanisation
The overall development in mass media
In western Europe some of the defining features include:

Renaissance and enlightenment
172

Reformation and counter reformation Theories of Modernisation
and Modernity
French Revolution and American Revolution
The Industrial Revolution
Many attempts have been made is sociology to try and define modernity.
Some of the factors used to define modernity include:-
Disenchantment of the world
Rationalisation
Mass society
Secularisation
Democratisation, and so on
Thus modernity is often contextualised by comparing modern societies to

pre or post modern societies. This in itself creates some problems in terms
of being able to define modernity. This is especially difficult when we try to
construct a three stage model from pre modern to modern, and then onto
post modernity. The features we have noted is a movement from somewhat
isolated communities to more large scale integrated societies. In this sense
Modernisation could be understood as a process which is not unique to
Europe alone.
Box 29.3: Cultural Crystallisation

One of Germay’s leading social philosophers in the Adenauer period following
the second world war, Gehlen (1963) proposed the theory of “cultural
crystallisation” to describe the modern situation. According to Gehlen in a
famous phrase, “the premises of the Enlightenment are dead, only their
consequences remain”. In his view the institutional complexes of modern
society have separated themselves from cultural modernity which can now
be discarded… cultural ideas are no longer able to produce the “new” that
was central to modernity (Genard Delanty 2000, Modernity and Postmodernity,
p:73).
Thus large scale integration implies that there is a vibrant economy which
reaches out to all parts of a nation state. This in itself is possible when
mobility in the society has increased. Further these developments imply
specialisation with is a society and linking up of sectors. However these
processes can sometimes appear to be paradoxical. Thus a unique local culture
loses its identity by these increasingly powerful influences of cultural factors
eg. Folktales, popular music and homogenisation of cultures, food recipes.
These factors are found to exist in a greater or lesser extent in all local
cultures, and helps to diversify them. This is found to a greater extent in
the metropolitan towns where mobility is higher.
Thus bureaucracy and hierarchical aspect of governments and the industrial

sector are the areas which grow in power in an unprecedented manner.
However the role of the individual still exits in such a society where there
is dynamic competition and individualism, both exist side by side. This is
then quite different from societies where the role of the individual is
ascriptive. That is to say the individual in modern societies is influenced by
more than family background and family preoccupations.
Now it is necessary to point of that such social changes are found at different
173

Issues of Modernity levels of social integration, and are not simply the features of European
society at any particular point of time. These changes can happen when two
communities merge together. Thus when two individuals develop a
relationship the division of roles also tend to merge. Again in the process of
globalisation we find the international flows of capital change the ground
situation. Thus while it can be said that modernity has some apparently
contradictory elements in reality these can be reduced to several simple
concepts related to social change.
How then does this view of modernity explain the world wide influences of
West European and American societies since the Renaissance. Initially, we
can say that the internal factor is that only in Europe, that rational thinking
began to substitute intellectual activities that were shrouded in superstition
and religion.
Secondly, there was an external elements as well, and this was the factor of
colonisation, which created an exploitation nexus between these societies,
which were exploited and others which exploited the societies.
However we find that there are many traces of ancient societies which
coexist within the umbrella of modernity. This includes joint families, small
scale enterprise, vast income diversity and so on. It has however been
argued that features many in fact be regarded as aspects of modernity itself
rather than any threat to it.
Modernisation was very beneficial to society in many ways, especially in the

field of health and in the field of nutrition. Thus fatal diseases were controlled
or eliminated, and the values of egalitarianism began manifesting themselves.
However some drawbacks are also there and the picture is not just positive.
This not only did technological advantages breed greater economic wealth
but also developed nuclear bombs two of which were dropped on Nagasaki
and Hiroshima. Nuclear technology still evokes negative responses, when it
is proposed to be used for military purposes. Similarly the degradation of
environment and overall pollution are well known. However decreasing
biodiversity , climate change all result from a hyper individual society.
Psychological problems and laxity of morals also create problems of modernity.
29.8 Approaches to Modernity

Thus as Taylor points out there are at least two approaches for the
comprehension of how modernity came into being. These are ways of
comprehending what makes the existing society so very different from that
which enveloped man before modernity arose.
One method looks at the differences in contemporary western society and

culture and medieval Europe as similar to the difference between medieval
Europe and medieval India. So we can think about and analyse difference
between civilizations, and their attendant culture. On the other hand the
situation can be looked at from the viewpoint of change involving the end
of one type of traditional society and the coming into being of modern
societies. The latter perspective is the more influential one and it provides
an analysis that gives a different perspective. The approach mentioned first
is a cultural approach and the second an a-cultural approach. In the cultural
174 approach there are many cultures, which have in them language and cultural

practices that help us to understand the self the other psychological sets, Theories of Modernisation
and Modernity
religion, morality and so on. These factors are specific to a culture and are
often non comparable. Keeping the above in view a cultural theory of
modernity outlines first and then analyses the transformation into the new
culture. The present day world can be seen as a culture with specific
comprehension of the self and morality. Thus this model of modernity can be
seen and used analytically to contrast with the earlier aspects of civilization
(Taylor, 2004). On the other hand, an acultural theory describes the entire
process in terms of some culture neutral analysis. This implies that the
entire process is not analysed in terms of culture that existed and then
transformed into modernity. Rather it is considered too general an approach
that can be seen as the process any traditional society would undergo. Thus
acultural theory conceives of modernity as the rise of reason in different
ways such as the growth of scientific consciousness, development of secular
thought ways, instrumental rationality, fact finding and evolution.
Modernity can also be explained and accounted for in socio-cultural terms

and also intellectual shifts. Thus transformation social, cultural, individual
can be seen to arise from increased mobility, demographic changes,
industrialisation and so on. In such cases as mentioned above modernity is
conceived of as transformations which all cultures can go through and will
undergo in due course of time.
Such changes are not defined in terms of individualism, morality, good and
evil. They are instead talking of cultures and civilizations as a whole.
Box 29.4: Explanations of Modernity

...Explanations of modernity in terms of reason seem to be the most popular.
Even social explanations tend to invoke reason. Social transformations, like
mobility and industrialisation are thought to bring about intellectual and
spiritual changes because they shake people loose from old habits and beliefs
__
religion or traditional morality __ which then become unsustainable because
they lack the kind of independent rational grounding that the beliefs of
modernity __ such as individualism or instrumental reason __ are assumed to
have (Charles Taylor, 2004, Two Theories of Modernity).
Thus any culture would be impacted by the increase in scientific

consciousness, secularisation of religion and the growth of instrumental
thinking. Modernity then, in this approach/theory issues from rationality
which is culture-neutral. This is despite the fact that the theory can account
for why modernity arose in one society rather than another; or why it arose
in some societies first and other later. In fact the theory does not lay down
specific points or stages into modernity but as something general that can
take any particular culture as its input. So this operation/transformation is
not to be seen as a perspective about human values or shared meanings. In
the case of social explanations, causality is assigned to developments like
industrialisation that do impact on values. Considering then the explanations
in terms of rationality, this is thought to be the exercise of a “general
capacity” which was ripe for maturing and unfolding. Given specific conditions,
people see scientific thinking as having a place in society. They will also see
that instrumental rationality is beneficial. Again religious beliefs are by no
means universal or undisputed, and require a leap of faith. Finally facts and
values are separated.
175

Issues of Modernity Now these transformations are facilitated by the presence of certain values
and understandings and are hindered by other types of cultural values if
they happen to be the dominant ones. These transformations are defined
by the whole social and cultural context existing at any point of time.
We can see then that the dominant theories of modernity over the last few
centuries have been of the acultural type. Modernity also involves a shift in
the individual and community perspective. This is because until the viewpoint
changes the society concerned cannot move from a pre-modern to modern
and onto post modernity. On the other hand Weber paradoxically argues that
the rationalisation (an important aspect of modernity) is a steady process,
which was cultural general rather than culture specific. Similarly the process
of pre- modern to modern in society was explained by Durkheim in terms of
the transformation from mechanical to organised forms of social solidarity.
This is an also the aspect of Tocqueville’s concept of “creeping democracy”
in which there was a move towards greater sense and actualisation of equality
among the various strata of society. These are all different but at the same
time related activities.
29.9 Conclusion
Given all these types if explanations Taylor still feels that explanations and
analyses of modernity focusing on reason are the most accepted ones.
Explanations focusing on the social still tend to talk of reason transformations
that are social. Thus the factors of mobility and industrialisation are felt to
bring about intellectual and spiritual changes since they tend to create new
layers of conditioning which by pass the old layers. That is they loosen old
habits and beliefs, whether religion or the old morality including individualism
and instrumental reason. There is however the question of negative theories
of modernity which do not have the positive or beneficial view of modern
developments and see society going into a decline with the onset and the
maturing of modernity. Thus rather than seeing modernity as having unleased
many capacities in different directions, negative theories, see it as a
dangerous development. These too are essentially acultural theories. Thus
modernity is characterised by a loss of perspective, an erasure of roots,
dependence on history or even God. Thus the negative theories of modernity
see it as a loss of the previous state of overall well being.
That is to say that the arrival of modernity and all its various facets has to
be seen as a mixed blessing. On one side are the positive socially relevant
areas and technological development. On the other are the problems
associated with the arrival of and settling down of modernity. Here the
negatively oriented theorists point of that modernity has its own problems
created by a fast developing technology that has its impact on the overall
life of the people.
Thus while modernity began in the sixteenth century at the time of

Enlightenment, it continued to develop until the beginning of the 20th century.
In other words modernity has its “discontents” as well. Let us briefly mention
what these are.
Firstly we must realise that modernity does have problems as we pointed

out. The belief in development and progress, forward looking attitude, the
dependence on rationality and reason have also given rise to optimism that
176 was betrayed by doubts raised by post traditional thought. However we

must note that modernity achieved a lot of social structural changes. Theories of Modernisation
and Modernity
Thus the routine behavior on day to day basis alters and changes as technology
develops. This is because technological innovations and inventions since
Enlightenment have altered the entire fabrics of the world, restricting itself
to large well developed towns, cities, and metropolitans. It is capitalism
which has basically been the power behind the innovations and inventions.
The airplane and motor car have from an initial slow start become integral
parts of daily life the world over. Thus time and space have conceptually
receeded and nothing can be done in the modern world with precise timing
and adequate space. Thus mechanical solidarity has given way to organic
solidarity to use the terms coined by Durkheim. Weber’s concept of
rationalisation has pervaded the modern world and given rise to precise type
of thinking. Further urbanism saw large scale migrations. Discipline, secularity,
alienation, anomic and the iron cage of bureaucracy are all parts of the
organic structure of beaurocratic organisation in the modern world.

Delanty Gerard 2000, Modernity and Postmodernity: Knowledge, Power and
The Self. London, Sage
Lyon, David, 1999, Postmodernity. Bnckingham: Open University Press
Singh Yogendra, 1986, Modernisation of Indian Tradition. Jaipur , Rawat

Publications
Wagner, Peter 2001, Theorizing Modernity; Inescapability and Attainability in

Social Theory. London, Sage
29.11 References
Giddens, A (1991) The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford : California.
Foster-Carter, Aidan 1985, The Sociology of Development. Canseway Press,

California
Rostow W.W. 1960, The Stages of Economic Growth : A Non Communist

Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Semlser N.1969, “Mechanisms of and Adjustment to Change” in T.Buns (ed)

“Industrial Man”, Perguin 1969.
Rojas Robinson, 2004, Modernisation Theory and The Law of Change Retrieved
From http://www.Rrojasatabank.org/Capital8.html.
Singh Yogendra 1986, The Modernisation of Indian Tradition. Jaipur Rawat .
Taylor Charles 2004, Two Theories of Modernity. Retrieved :Taylor X. html.
177

Unit 30
Tradition and Modernity
Contents
30.1 Introduction
30.2 Tradition Society and Culture
30.3 Tradition and Modernity
30.4 Modernity as a Juggernaut
30.5 Ontological Insecurity and Modernity
30.6 Modernity Rationality and Norms
30.7 Conclusion
30.9 References
Learning Objectives
After reading this unit you will be able to
describe the concept of tradition
define modernity
outline the “juggernaut” of modernity
discuss modernity and rationality
30.1 Introduction
In this unit we will take up the topics of tradition and modernity. At the very
outset it is pointed out that tradition and modernity are not contradictory
or competing concepts. Rather they represent different faces of meaning
and are in fact symbiotically related to each other. As such tradition (s) is the
ground from which all manner of modernity arises. Further we may point out
that as it stands tradition has to be qualified, which it is to say it could be
a local tradition or an all-society tradition. Thus these are many different
strands to the thinking on tradition and there are very many differing
interpretations. Thus tradition is a live and vital factor in many cultures and
could be:
Tradition of food and edibles
Tradition of music and dance
Scriptural tradition
Artistic tradition
Martial arts tradition
Sociological tradition
Tradition and attire
Thus the terms ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ do not exist in isolation of each
other but are in fact related to each other. While these terms concepts and
processes exist, they exist and function dialogically. Thus modernity is an
economic force while tradition is fundamentally cultural and social.
What is the role of tradition is a pertinent point here. Tradition is basically

178 a series of attitudes, languages, music, art, scholarship and so on which have

been developing since ages past. Over the passage of time tradition becomes Tradition and Modernity
more or less entrenched in the body politic and we have even traditional law
and scriptures in any case are an aspect of tradition. Now why is tradition
so important to the individual and society? This is because it provides a
continuity to social process and garners the creative and improvisational and
transmits these traditions to the forthcoming generations of the members
of a given society and thereby assuring survival of the society itself. Tradition
is, therefore, a repository of survival mechanisms without which a society
would fail to cohere. It would set fragmented and break up, the result of
which would be anomic. Let us consider the music tradition in India. In this
particular tradition of classical music there are “gharanas” or groupings, and
each of these has a lineage comprising the singers who had commenced or
inaugurated the gharana and all those who have passed their talent down
the line producing maestros who would take over charge once the older
musicians went on into retirement.
Now, once there is an example to work upon we can see that tradition also
implies a life-style, a way of living. As such the training in music, art, drama
is very rigid and within the confines of tradition which often passes by vote
and repetition of movement, notes, or other exercise which any particular
training may require. Usually with the teaching of traditional music and
dance are an endless series of do’s and don’ts which is what tradition is all
about. Thus tradition refers to a body of knowledge that has a structured
inventory of actions and ideology that comprise its legitimate domain.
Thereafter it is a question of pinpointing what area of tradition is it that we
are referring to. Thus on examination we find that tradition itself has a
reasonably long duration for which it has established itself; further there are
many different strands or what we may call “varieties of tradition.” Then to
continue with the example of music gharanas in India we find that there is
a basic division between north Indian classical music and South Indian classical
music. Each of these two basic divisions has numerous subdivisions and so
on. It is, therefore, a misnomer to treat the concept of tradition as a term
which covers everything in society and culture. Thus if it is held that the
tradition of music is very strong in India, it may also be asked “what type
of music tradition is it that is being referred to? ’’
Clearly then tradition also represents a rubric under which all little traditions
can be assimilated. If it is considered in depth tradition can be seen to
involve various different types of activities within it which would need some
brief elaboration. Tradition thus encompasses and embodies:
a particular process or legacy
sub traditions which from the field from which required contributions
can be made
a historical aspect, either oral or scripted
a certain concept of the supernatural
economic structures of sustainance
aspects of indigenous art
facts of architecture
scholarship in all areas of social concern
literature both scriptural and others
technological structures
military for self defense or offence 179

Issues of Modernity Thus tradition is clearly a type of structure and ideology that has a past and
charges over time to absorb developments in that field so that tradition
remains itself, but at the same time recreates and expands itself.
30.2 Tradition, Society and Culture

Tradition then is “accreted” over time and its boundaries become increasingly
well defined. This means that tradition expands or contracts depending
upon the social and cultural situation. Further it would be wrong to assume
that traditions constantly expand and that progress is always linear. It is
quite possible that there is non linear retrogression as well. A third situation
arises when tradition develops an entropic tendency and stagnates for some
time before once again addressing progression (linear forward movement) or
retrogression.
Thus tradition begins when a particular action or activity is seen to be of

significance to the society. However, as we have pointed out that there are
many types of tradition (music, art, architecture) and many strands within
each one of them. As such it is possible to study some of these strands but
to study them in totality would imply many years of research and might still
be lacking sufficient data to be able to come to a holistic and synoptic point
of view (Rojas, 1966). Thus what we are talking about is the fact that there
is no such thing as a total vision of any society which is pluralistic, since
members from different races and ethnicities will have different traditions.
Thus the tradition that peoples and societies inherit from their forefathers
is available to them in various forms. Any process over several generations
becomes by itself a particular tradition or a sub tradition.
Box 30.1: The Accretion of Tradition

Thus tradition:
accumulates over decades/centuries. Consider for e.g. the scriptural
tradition of India which is itself a plurality. Thus in the shift from oral
tradition to the scripting tradition there is a formalisation of knowledge
and as this process goes on the society that is subjected to it develops
not just one but pluralist traditions.
the field of art and architecture is replete with the traditions that have
emerged from it. Thus in India there are several traditions in art and
architecture including. The (i) Classical (ii) medieval and, (iii) traditional.
In each of these areas artists and architects have been responsible for
development of classical medieval and traditional art and architecture. These
traditions developed in India over centuries of accretion. Further the
economic structures are such that they begin from centuries earlier and
tend to be well fixed until Industrialisation begins in the 1800’s. In the
Indian tradition the exchange of goods and services commenced and worked
in terms of physical exchanges of services which could be provided to the
landlords by the hoi polloi. This was a traditional system and exploited the
landless labourers by underpaying and making them work for long hours. For
doing this the sharecroppers as they were known, were given at the end of
the agricultural season a certain amount of grains to help them to subsist.
Such examples can be found globally and feudalism was yet another iniquitous
system. The point is that it is rather difficult to say with any degree of
certainty that tradition(s) are ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ On examination, however, it
is clear that though Indian tradition has sanctity yet sati and dowry is part
180 of this very same tradition. Thus it is a weeding of tradition which alone can

make it work efficiently and not flow over into negative directives. Over a Tradition and Modernity
span of time (usually centuries) any specific tradition begins to coagulate

into a specific conglomeration of beliefs and rities. These beliefs and rities
are specific to any tradition and apply equally to sub traditions within and
subordinate within it.
Traditions then cover the entire ideological gamut and are also applicable to
the material culture. What then is tradition? Tradition is a particular approach
to social reality which it influences and provides a direction to individual and
social reality. Thus it would be better to talk in terms of the plural traditions
than to mention some overarching condition which would be a false construct
as reality is not entirely apprehended under it.
Traditional technology is another area which has been extensively used and
improved upon. Thus in agriculture the use of the tractor or combine harvester
has brought matters to a confrontation. Thus while the situation (harvesting)
has changed, the attitudes are still traditional, both in the family and at
work. Thus at a particular time in the flow of tradition non-traditional, modern
machines, are used. This means now that there is a contradiction between
the technology and the attitudes of the workers and their beneficiaries. Age
old customs and tradition’s often get non functional and sometimes changes
have to be introduced to make the two compatible. Tradition then is what
holds a society together. However, there are factors within a tradition which
may go out of circulation. Thus in some metros in India the scriptural and
popular level of celebrating festivals, like Holi, Diwali, and so on is such that
tradition battles with culture and many changes have occurred in these
festivals in cities including plastic lighting on the house and a few burning
candles to observe traditional candle lighting in Diwali.
30.3 Tradition and Modernity

In such and other activities tradition comes head on with the whole concept
of modernity. The question of course is in which way modernity relates to
tradition. Is modernity a different type of tradition? Do tradition and modernity
have anything in common and how are they related to each other?
Tradition has a tendency to become entropic and inward looking. This is true
of many local level traditions and sub traditions are stamped out and disappear
without leaving much of a trace. The pertinent question here is why does
tradition disappear, change, ameliorate or attempt to coexist with modernity?
The fact of the matter is that the vectors or chief characteristics of a tradition
are themselves set to develop, change, or become stagnant. Thus tradition
has many sub traditions and it is these that often linger on, indefinitely, in
various geophysical territories within a specific culture area.

Discuss the concept of tradition ? Does tradition change or does it remain
static?
At some point in the development or spread of a tradition tends to become

less influential and is capable of dealing only with local traditions. At the
some time tradition sees the necessity of dynamism and various religious
traditions themselves find it difficult to sustain themselves. Thus when a
tradition becomes entropic it becomes clear that the tradition is now stagnant
181

Issues of Modernity and in being so is quite capable of calcifying and becomes superficially
related to rities, rituals, ceremonies while the essential communication
remains obfuscated and confused.
Thus tradition is dynamic and records accretive changes. We must also keep
in mind that social changes are part of the process of society. However, it
is equally clear that beyond a point tradition is not able to deal with a new
set of situations and the new institutions, At this point if the society is not
to become anarchic, it will require that traditions ameliorate and try to
change. Yet a tradition can only follow its ontology and find itself as
inadequate in the face of modernity. Thus the forces of modernity tend to
choke tradition or at least make it relatively insignificant and even innocuous.
However, tradition though it becomes quiescent it is not really banished by
modernity because modernity is evidenced only in the advanced countries
of the West and in the metropolitans of the East. This is made clear when
we compare architecture of the North and the South. Thus a luxury hotel
in metropolitan of a developing country is virtually no different than that of
an advanced country. Thus tradition is never really banished but is pushed
back as the forces of modernity take root.
Box 30.2: Aspects of Modernity

Some aspects of modernity include:
emergence of nation-state and nationhood
industrialisation and capitalism
democracy
increasing influence of science and technology
the phenomena of urbanisation
expansion of mass media
There are, however, other defining characteristics of modernity which include

disenchantment with the world
secularisation
rationalisation
commodification
mass society
Modernity, however, means different things in the North and the South.
Thus modernity indicates a type of society that is more developed relative
to other societies. So, a society characterised by modernity is described as
a modern society.
We can compare modern society with societies that are pre-modern or those
that are post-modern. However neither of these approaches is fully
satisfactory. The social structure of modernity is such that it defines the
transition from isolated communities to mass scale society. Referred to in
this manner modernity is found, therefore, not just in the West. This process
can be seen as working all over the world rather than just in the advanced
nations.
Thus mass society implies:

large scale movement of goods, people, and information among separate
areas
standardisation of many aspects of society which are helpful for mobility
182

increased specialisation and interdependence of different parts of the Tradition and Modernity
society
Thus modernity can be apparently contradictory, but these features listed

above are different parts of the overall ontology of this process. When the
elements or products of modernity “invade” another culture through popular
processes such as various cultural aspects such as folktales and cinema there
is a widespread ‘overhaul’ of cultural and social ontology and these tend to
change a society and prepare it for further changes. This results in a
homogenisation of culture and creates widespread diversification at the
local level. There are other features, such as democratic government and the
hierarchical structures within it. So also does the private sector grow greatly
in influence (Genard Delanty, 2000). This sometimes creates a friction and
modernity can be perceived as being totalitarian. However, the individual in
modernity belongs to those subsystems, and is part of the competition,
liberty, and individualism. This is all the more true for comparisons of
modernity with societies that are traditional.
Modernity brought with it many blessings to the people including much

better health and economic prospects. However, there are also some problems
which have emerged with modern society e.g. the nuclear bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki during world war II; and the arms race thereafter.
Other problems include environmental degradation e.g. air and water pollution.
Modernity also creates great stress on people and alienation or being without
specific interest in anything (malaise). At the present point the debate is
still on whether modernity is socially positive or not, whether it has proved
beneficial or not to world society.
30.4 Modernity as a Juggernaut

Giddens position conflicts with the contention that society has entered into
a post modern world. Thus modernity witnesses tremendous increases in the
scope, pace and depth of change relative to systems that preceded it.
Further the path or trajectory of change is not linear, going forward step by
step. For Giddens modernity implies
capitalism
industrialism
surveillance programs and activities
military power
Giddens theory of structuration and its basic components adequately describe

modernity. These elements are:
distanciation, or separation in of time and space
disembedding
reflexivity
While in pre-modern societies time and space were totally interconnected.

However, with the onset of modernity time and space were no longer closely
linked, and this interconnection became very weak. Now, this fact is important
so far as modernity is concerned.
Distanciation helps in the establishment of organisations and bureaucracy,

and makes possible the nation-state which is international. That is it is 183

Issues of Modernity possible to connect local and global arenas. Again the modern society is
within the matrix of history and it takes from that to influence the present.
Finally such distanciation makes possible the second of Giddens factors of
modernity that is disembedding. Disembedding itself is the process of
transcending the local context and it’s reorganising itself along indefinite
stretches of time and space. According to Giddens there are two varieties
of disembedding factors. These are:
symbolic tokens e.g. money. This allows for time-space distantiation and
allows money transactions with those who are widely separated in time
and space.
systems of professional expertise. These are very useful because they
help create the environment. Some such experts include doctors and
lawyers. Other experts affect everyday commodities and even property.
Thus expert systems provide reassurance across time and space. Again in
abstract systems, trust is fundamental not only to modern societies also
because the symbolic tokens and expert systems serve to dissembed the
society in the modern world.
Thus an economy based on monetary transactions and the legal system work
because the members have trust in them.
Again another basic characteristic of modernity is the phenomena of

reflexivity. Thus all social and psychological aspects, processes, events, can
be reflected upon, understood better and working as an activity which
influences the further development of a phenomenon. The fact of
disembedment indicates
the need for trust
the need for expert systems
Trust according to Giddens is socialised into children and then reinforced by

behaviour that conforms to this expectation of mutually reliable behaviours.
However, this is also accompanied by destabilising factors, risk factors that
threaten trust and create ongoing lack of security in people. Thus the risk
of nuclear wars are neither fought nor won. The risk factor in global or local
war is such that several danger points have arisen and disarmament of military
of nuclear warheads could easily be one of the international projects to
increase the sense of security for the subjects.
Giddens points out that the risk factor extends into the material environment
and what can be done to prevent its degradation (forests, rivers, rural and
urban habitats). Again global investments existing in institutional settings
are also risky. The subjects take notice of risks while taking action. Religion
receded and only those facts are believed in which the subjects can realise
and turn into reality. The awareness of the different risk factors is increasing
in the modern world and is one of the facts of modernity. Again the subjects
and the ‘public’ are aware that even experts cannot handle certain risks and
risk-situations.
30.5 Ontological Insecurity and Modernity

According to Giddens ontological insecurity has been created within
modernity itself and suggests that
design faults in the construction of the modern world
184 operator failure of those who run the modern world

unintended consequences Tradition and Modernity
reflexivity of the modern society
Thus according to Giddens in modern society ‘control’ becomes an important

issue because new knowledge is continuously cropping up and superceding
the old, and giving it a different direction altogether. As an answer to this
Giddens suggests utopian realism.
That is utopian ideals and social reality should be taken together as a single
unit rather than aim for just the one or the other. Giddens is critical of the
postmodern theories and feels that were systematic knowledge impossible
the intellectual activity/academics would come to a standstill. He feels that
postmodernism would involve a world in which
there are post scarcity systems
multilayered democracy
demilitarisation
humanisation of technology
However, it is clear that post modernity cannot be predicted in such simple

parameters which need not appear at all.
Giddens notes that the reflexive modern world pushes the self into becoming
a “reflexive project.” Thus the self becomes an area to be reflected upon
with a view to ameliorating it and bringing it into tune with itself and
society. Thus he points out that the subject is a result of inner search and
also the body must be controlled and socially projected in a specific manner
in the relevant physical spaces. There are formulas how which define we
interact. In fact reflexivity has led to a body-obsession and a social neurosis.
Modernity and modern society are also characterised by setting apart some
areas of deviance from the normal day to day living. This has been termed
the “Sequestration of experience” by Giddens. Thus phenomena like madness,
sickness, death and sexuality are sequestered and delineated as areas that
should be hidden from the attention. The reason that the phenomena of
sequestration comes about is because abstract systems have controlled large
segments of society. Though sequestration brings with it a sense of penacling
security it is quite clear that there is an avoidance of basic truths, such as
the processes of death, sickness, madness etc.
Thus modernity has brought with both positive and negative consequences.
One of the negative consequences is that there tends to be a sort of malaise
or what Giddens terms “personal meaninglessness.” This is because important
areas of daily life have been sequestered, and repressed. The light at the
end of the tunnel is reflexivity of modern life which as it increases will
ensure that such sequestration does not take place and processes that have
been swept under the carpet will one day be the most significant and
important. While Giddens is concerned with modernity we find that Beck is
interested in the new modernity. Thus Beck and Giddens feel that we are
living in a modern world rather than a post modern one. What is the risk that
accompanies the new modernity? Beck labels the new modernity as “reflexive
modernity.” Beck feels that relationships in such a society are increasingly
reflexive and individuals are forced to make wide range of individual decisions
so far as relationships are concerned, and how they can be begun and
maintained.
185

Issues of Modernity According to Beck, within modernity itself there is a change from industrial
society to the risk society which is different from industrial society but not
totally. Thus the classical modernity was centred on producing wealth and
equal distribution of the same. On the other hand the advanced modern
societies the main issue is the reduction and canalisation of risk. Thus the
main concern in classical modernity believed in equality, the concern of
advanced modernity is a safety. These risks come from wealth produced in
industry. This includes the nuclear industry and bombs whose effects and
side effects can be devastating.
Box 30.4: The Risk Factor

Even industrial pollutants are themselves a source of risk and have most
dangerous effects on health. This kind of risk, including nuclear annihilation,
is not simply localized but global. Again risk and class intermesh to some
extent. Thus in industrial society it is clear that the wealthy classes can
avoid risk or reduce it simply because they have the wealth to purchase
safety. And this helps to strengthen the class society. On the other hand
poverty is full of risks. Beck extends his analysis and states that the truth
about social classes applies to the nation-states as well.
Thus the rich nations are able to minimize risks, the poor or poorer nations
find that risk is centred in and around them. Again richer nations make
further wealth and profit by catering to the poorer nations in order to build
technology that will help to control the risks in poor nations and try to
ameliorate them to some extent. It is pointed out, however, that no nation
is completely safe from risks, nor are individuals. However, the nations that
profit from the risk factor in poor nations find that there is a ‘boomerang
effect’ and factors associated with risk tend to become proactive and try to
eliminate or control the areas where risk reduction technologies are being
made in the wealthy nations. However, though advanced modernity creates
risks we find that accompanying these risks is reflexivity and makes those
that produce risks themselves begin to think about the situation and how
to alter it. But this is also in the case of those nations that are poor and
face these risks. According to Beck it is science and the scientists that are
responsible and a protector of global “contamination” of nature and culture,
and accuses science and scientists for being illogical.

Discuss the aspects of risk taking in modern society. Is there some way in
which this can be reduced or removed?
Again in classical industrial society we find that nature and culture were
separate entities in the case of advanced modernity they go hand in hand
are deeply interlinked and interrelated to each other. This linkage means
that changes in either nature or culture feedback onto each other. Thus
Beck points out that nature and society are related to each other almost
symbiotically. This has led to the facts of nature being made political and so
scientists, including social scientists are now in the domain of and being
effected by politicisation. According to Beck the governments are losing
their powerful control because of sub political bodies like research institutes.
Subgroups of people are more responsive relative to the government. We
can say advanced modernity has generated both hormones risks and also
ways to deal with it. Ritzer evaluates modern society using the concepts of
hyperrationality, Mcdonaldization and Americanization. Let us begin with
186

hyperrationality. Ritzer points out that the concept of hyperrationality draws Tradition and Modernity
heavily on rationality as conceptualised by Weber. For Weber we live in an

increasingly rational world. Formal rationality is seen to be used for system-
usage than Weber’s other types of rationality: Substantive, theoretical and
practical. Thus we see that formal rationality implies the increasingly felt
need and importance of institutions which force members to adhere to a
strict code of behaviour and conduct.
30.6 Modernity Rationality and Norms

On the other hand, substantive rationality implies dominance of norms and
values in making of rational choice. Thus theoretical rationality deals with
intellectual apprehension. On the other hand practical rationality defines
the context/situation so far as daily decisions are concerned.
Now, we can say that hyperrationality goes beyond formal rationality. Thus
a hyperrational system combines Webber’s forms of rationality which include,
formal rationality
substantive
intellectual
practical
The reason such a system is called hyperrational because it uses and combines
all four of Weber’s forms of rationality.
Formal rationality has four aspects which are:

efficiency
predictability
quantity rather than quality
Substitution of non human for human technologies
Box 30.4: The Irrationality of Rationality

Thus this form of rationality is also accompanied by the “irrationality of
rationality.” In this schema we find that efficiency is always with a view to
an end. And how we can use the best means to a goal. In fact food restaurants
the delivery system is made so convenient and automatic that there are
drive in facilities to help accelerate the process of food distribution and
consumption. Now, the next factor in formal rationality is that there is a
standardisation of processes and events and there are “no surprises”, and
the branches of fast food restaurants are very similar even across nations.
They all proceed along the assembly line, mechanised approach to food.
Further fast food restaurants pay greater attention to quantity rather than
quality. Such a formally rational system has intrinsic to it the generation of
“irrationalities”, such as making the “dining experience” most bizarre,
demystifying and dehumanising.
Ritzer indicates that this is the trend all over the modern world where the
emphasis is on quick turnover for business. Examining credit cards Ritzer
feels that each of the factors applied to Mcdonaldization are true for the
credit card industry. Loans are processed quickly. Again the credit card makes
consumption predictable. Credit cards come with different credit limits and
the transactions are relatively dehumanizing. Thus both the credit card and 187

Issues of Modernity the fast food restaurant can be seen to be an intrinsic aspect of the modern
world.
Ritzer also argues for the “Americanization” of modern society which was
evident in our discussion of fast food restaurants and credit card usage.
Thus America is perceived as practicing/living in a modern world and engaged
in the construction of the American way of life. Thus credit card usage is
part of Americanization. The major credit cards companies are based in
America. The Visa, MasterCard, and American Express are major cards relative
to those based in Britain (Barclay Card) and Japan (JCB). The credit card
companies are making a concerted effort to ‘globalize’ the credit cards. It
is noted, however, that credit cards are and can be used for indigenous
purchases. This both the credit cards and fast food restaurants have become
part of the modern world and is in part a reflection of a specific world era.
Let us now turn to some of the main ideas in the social theory of Jurgen
Habermas, concerning modernity. Habermas feels that modernity has yet to
play itself out and that there are many modern areas that can be developed
further, before thinking of a postmodern world. According to Habermas
modernity does have a number of paradoxes. Thus rationality that is a part
of the overall social system is contradictory and conflictual with the rationality
of the life-world as a whole. On the one hand social systems have multiplied
their complexity and use instrumental reason. Again the life-world has also
multiplied its diversity in terms of secularisation and the processes of
reflexivity.
Thus a rational society according to Habermas is one where the system and
the life-world exist together living an intermeshed but parallel existence.
This conjoining and interaction leads to a stage in society of abundance
economically, and environmental control due to rational systems being present
and employed to their optimum. The problem of the modern world is that
now the system begins to exercise power or to ‘colonize’ the life-world.
This leads to a situation where the rational system denies the freedom to
the life-world, a freedom that is necessary to allow the life world to grow
to further maturity. Thus for Habermas the ‘colonization’ of the life world
in modernity is its basic marker, and is, therefore, that he regards modernity
as an ‘unfinished project.’ To Habermas the fully rational society where the
rational system and the Life world(s) can exist and express themselves
satisfactorily. At the moment such a situation does not exist and the life-world
is greatly subdued and impoverished. This is the obstacle that has to be
crossed over. It does not mean a violent destruction of systems economic
or administrative, since they help life worlds to rationalize their existence
and ontology. How is this to be done? This requires that we examine the
relationship between system and life-world.
According to Habermas
“restraining barriers” should be erected to reduce colonisation of life world
“sensors” should be used to make a greater impact of life world on the
system
In this manner the two areas that is life world and system benefit each
other greatly. Habermas feels that until the above facts assert themselves
modernity’s project will take long to complete. Thus Habermas is squarely of
the view that modernity has much to offer and that we are not in a
188 postmodern society as yet.

30.7 Conclusion Tradition and Modernity
Finally to put the last word in Habermas has criticized postmodernism on

several grounds. Since our next unit is on post structuralism/postmodernism
this unit would serve also as a precursor of our discussion on the same. Thus
for Habermas:
It is very difficult to objectively evaluate the postmodernists because
one is not sure whether what one is reading is social theory or literature.
In the former case the problems arises in postmodernists erecting a
formidable fascade of jargon which is not in the mainstream of sociological
knowledge. Hence, one doesn’t know where to classify such theory.
Normative sentiments are concealed from the reader, but nevertheless
they offer normative critiques of contemporary society. However, these
are not exactly grounded and, therefore, not effective.
It has a totalising tendency despite the fact that postmodernists
themselves are against this phenomena.
Post modernists ignore the facts of daily life.
In short postmodernists are shut off from the very sphere (life-world) of
activity from which they deprive themselves. As such the source of social
data and the area of expression, that is everyday life is, cut off from them.
Thus in this unit we have examined and presented several theoretical positions
on tradition and modernity. We have covered the approach of Giddens to
modernity as also that of Beck and Ritzer. Finally, we considered the ideas
of Habermas. All this has set the stage for our next unit. To fully understand
and appreciate the units on post structuralism and postmodernism the
background provided in this unit will be of great use.

Bauman, Z(1989), Modernity and The Holocaust. Cambridge:Polity
Baudrillard, J (1994) The Illusion of The End. Cambridge:Polity
Castells, M (1996), The Information Age, Vol-1:The Rise of The Network

Society. Oxford Blackwell
30.9 References
Rojas (1966), Rojas Databamk.Org/Capital L8.htm
Gerard Delanty 2000, Modernity and Postmodernity Knowledge, Power and

The Self. London : Sage
189

Unit 31
Post Structuralism and Post Modernism
Contents
31.1 Introduction
31.2 Critique of Structuralism
31.3 Post Structural Theories
31.4 Discourse Knowledge and Experience
31.5 Derrida and Deconstruction
31.6 Foucalt and the Archaeology of Knowledge
31.7 Jameson and Late Capitalism
31.8 Baudrillard and Post Modernism
31.9 Conclusion
Learning Objectives
After having read this unit you should be able to
outline post-structural theories
critique structuralism
describe deconstruction
explain “late capitalism”
discuss Baudrillard and postmodernism
31.1 Introduction
It is the intellectual trend in the ontology of ideas and schools of ideas, that
they are constantly superceded. The ideas or ideologies that are superceded
recede into the history of ideas. The new theories and ideas then occupy
centre stage in the national and international sociological and social scientific
world views. This cycle further repeats itself and though this fact is often lost
sight of in the heyday of a theoretical orientation that has become popular.
In the essay that follows we will first take up post structuralism and then
postmodern theory. We will see how there are several overlaps indeed
intermeshes between various strands of these two contemporary approaches
to the study of society and culture. Thus what we are dealing with are
strands of an overall approach. There is no one view on these approaches
and both post structuralism and post modernism are blanket terms containing
many strands of thought. Let us turn now to post structuralism first. What
does the term indicate? As is clear from the word “post structuralism”, these
approaches are those that came after ‘structuralism’. These theories and
approaches sought to seek insights into society by critiquing and deconstructing
social and cultural processes. The post modernism break with structuralism
was the fact that structuralism reduced everything into binary oppositions
and the interrelations between them. The structuralists held they could
analyse any phenomena with the help of their methodology. We must
emphasise that post structuralism is a number of approaches and not one
monolithic theory. However, these approaches have in common their point
of departure a critique of “structuralism”.
190

31.2 Critique of Structuralism Post Structuralism and

Post Modernism
Poststructuralists often point out in their various writings that meaning in

language is diverse and open to many different interpretations. Yet to get
to the meaning of a text it can be deconstructed and is different from its
apparent or surface meaning. That is different meanings can be assigned to
a single text depending upon the perspective taken. As would be clear by
now that post structuralism proceeds as a critique of structuralism which is
itself bounded by its own linguistic boundaries. Structuralism, however, was
found to be inadequate as an explanation of social process and phenomena.
Thus we find that
structuralism did not pay heed to historical processes and is a-historical
applied the rules of linguistics to societal processes which is a questionable
procedure
it is assumed that a work has meaning in itself and this persists even
before it is discovered and
the text is only a conduit between the subject and the structure of
rationality.
Thus the structuralists argue that it is language and its structure which itself
produces reality and since it is language that is responsible for thought it
determines mans perceptions whatever they may be. Further there is the
idea that meaning does not come from individuals but the rules of language
and the overall ‘system’ which controls individuals. Therefore, the individual
is subordinated and superceded by “the structure.” It is the structure which
produces meaning not the individual. It is specifically language which is at
the base of such domination over the individual.
31.3 Post Structural Theories

As can be seen post structural theories do not agree with the ‘structuralists’
in several key areas of analysis and understanding. We will now turn to these
and see how the two differ. However, before that let us look briefly at the
background to post structuralism. By the 1950’s the influence of structuralism
had set in. Saussure (1857-1913) was of the view that ‘meaning’ had to be
found in the “structure” of the whole language (Guller, 1976). It could not
be discovered in individual words, and had to have an overall linguistic
setting – that is the language as a whole. We find that around the 1960’s the
structuralist movement tried to amalgamate the ideas of Marx Freud and
Saussure. The structuralists were opposed to the existentialist movement
which put the individual and life experience at the centre. By contrast the
structuralists opined that the individual is everywhere being conditioned by
social psychological and linguistic structures which control and direct him,
rather than the individual doing the same. As you will have noticed this is
an extreme stand and the claim for universality of application of method also
drew attention to the fact that such claims of universal application did not
necessarily hold true. Also how is it that any two structural analyses of the
same field or phenomena would be different?
It was because of the short-comings of the structuralist approach that post

structuralism was developed by the intellectuals. This post structuralism is
based on a member of basic assumptions/positions. These include: 1) putting
all phenomena under one explanation, 2) there is a transcendental reality
which overarches all other reality. Post structuralism is also critical of the
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Issues of Modernity concept of man as portrayed and developed by Enlightenment thought. The
Enlightenment view that the individual is separate and whole and that the
mind is the area where values evolve on the other hand the poststructuralists
felt that the individual was embedded in social interaction. Such symbolic
beings are referred to by the word “subject”. We can then say that the
subjects are intertwined with society and culture and occupy some place
within them, and sociologically based sites. Further subjects are the actors
in everyday reality. In fact it is the subjects that make up society and the
activities therein, include work and entertainment. We could add here that
the subjects meaning and values are embedded in the identities of groups
and the activities which lead them to having an identity.
Thus these approaches that we are discussing have often been dubbed
“anti-humanist” because post-structuralism is against the divine or
transcendental wholeness as was the humanist theories view. However, ‘anti-
humanist’ is a misnomer and is actually another way of looking at human
beings one that is essentially not against individual persons. Further we find
that while structuralism presents reality as relations between binary
oppositions post-structuralism’s vision of reality is a fragmented one. Social
process and cultural relations are not viewed as neat oppositions – on the
other hand social and cultural processes are seen in bits and pieces and the
nature of reality is not seen as being amenable to total understanding of a
whole process. Parts of social process can be focused upon and analysed.
Poststructuralists are completely opposed to grand narratives and Meta theory
feeling these are equivalent to a fiction and not really apprehending reality.
Thus post-structural theories are themselves looking at the specific. Further
the physical self (the body) is studied in the context of time and history,
and brought out of the closet so to speak. Similarly it is the details of
discourse and cultural actions that are now looked into. Further the role of
language in building social and cultural reality is also evident in the work of
the poststructuralists (Godelier, 1972). Thus the fact that society and the
individual are “linguistically bound” with each other and the relationship
between the two is complex. This stand clearly negates the earlier
assumptions of social scientists that language was easy to comprehend and
use and that there were no ambiguities regarding language – use. This the
post-structural theories negate as an erroneous assumption. In fact “reality’’
itself is constructed within the social matrix and continues to reproduce
itself over time.
31.4 Discourse Knowledge and Experience

The world of discourse and knowledge set the limits for our experience – and
the subject (ego) can only experience or describe what he has experienced.
That is to also say that there are experiences for which there is no language
or a language is slowly being pieced together, and certain words and concepts
gain ground and usage. This includes the usage of metaphor, metonymy and
irony. These usages lead by themselves to a concern with ideology which
provides an ingress and insight into relations of power and the world-view
of the subjects.
Again another area in which post structural theories focus upon in their
analysis on what are known as cultural codes which themselves provide an
understanding of our lives and how they work out within various contexts.
However, it needs to be pointed out that it is understood by the post
192 structuralists that construction of meaning implies that some aspects of

social process and individual life will be emphasised and others will be relatively Post Structuralism and
Post Modernism
reduced in importance. In other words “objectivity” as in the case of earlier
sociological theory is found to be an illusion. That is the analyses of
poststructuralists does not deny its subjective orientation. Yet poststructuralists
also hold that meaning in society can be deconstructed to open up new
ideas and practices. However, such an exercise leads to an understanding of
specifics rather than general constructions. Thus loops of meaning and process
of construction reveal more about the specific scaffolding of the subject
rather than an understanding of the whole. The world is mediated by
discourse, language and ideology all of which structure the experience of
the subject. According to post structural thinking it is the text which is the
repertoire of meanings and there is no meaning outside the text. Thus
meaning resides in the text itself in toto. An understanding resides in social
signs and discourses in particular fields of study. Again almost paradoxically,
every text exists only in relation to other texts. However, it needs to be
pointed out that man’s ability to perceive reality is not at stake. Nonetheless
what we know of reality is known through various processes of discourse
symbols and language. Yet it must be understood that discourse itself is very
varied in content. It is also a fact that discourse is sometimes sketchy and
abrupt. It originates through chance and disappears also through unspecified
reasons. Thus according to Foucault there is no question of predicting history
through grand theories and meta narratives (Foucault, 1969). History is thus
viewed by poststructuralists as happening by chance. Thus in history the
twists, turns, plots, subplots and important events and happenings cannot
be pinned down – that is it happens by chance.
31.5 Derrida and Deconstruction

This brief note on structuralism is important for our understanding of the
process of “deconstruction” initiated by Derrida. The basics of this
structuralism are:
positing of a centre of power or influence which begins and ends all
social processes. This could be ‘mind’ or ‘self’ or even ‘God’.
all structures are composed of binary pairs or oppositions one of which
is more important than the other and often signified thus: +/- . These
could be good/evil, god/man and so on.

Discuss what is “deconstruction”. How did Derrida deconstruct structuralism?
Thus post structuralism began with Derrida’s critique of structuralism or

rather this ‘deconstruction’ of language society and culture. The structuralists
felt that man was chained to structures which controlled him. In contrast,
however, Derrida feels that language can be reduced to writing which does
not control the subjects. According to him all institutions and structures are
nothing but writing and incapable of controlling the individual. The
structuralists saw order and stability in language, hence in all structures; the
poststructuralists on the other hand saw language as essentially changing
and quite unstable. This means that the language structure being itself in
flux cannot create structures that constrain, restrain, or punish people,
because language itself is disorderly, and the underlying laws of language
cannot be ‘discovered’. This is what is the process of deconstruction which
as the term suggests is a sort of conceptual dissection of the concept or
193

Issues of Modernity process being studied. Derrida who coined the term deconstruction felt
that logo centrism has dominated the Western countries. This way of
perceiving has meant that writing has always been suppressed historically
speaking. This has also meant that the freedom to analyse and think is taken
away in a logocentric system. Derrida wants to dismantle this type of approach
as it sets writing free from repression. Under these circumstances what
takes place in the art form of traditional theatre is a representation of real
life. Such a representation is extremely important, in fact a controlled
theological theatre.
Box 31.1: The Theological Theatre

Derrida contrasts ‘theatre of cruelty’ as against traditional theatre which
has representational logic and renders traditional theatre as theological.
Derrida writes: the stage is theological for as long as its structure, following
the entirety of tradition comports the following elements: an author creator
who, absent and from afar, is armed with a text and keeps watch over,
assembles, regulates the time or the meaning of representation …. He lets
representation represent him through representatives, directors or actors
….. who represent the thought of the “creator”. Finally the theological stage
comports a passive, seated public, a public of spectators, of consumers, of
enjoyers. (Derrida, 1978, Writing and Difference : p:235).
Derrida’s chosen alternative stage is one which will not be controlled by

texts and authors but fall short of disorder/anarchy. Thus Derrida wants a
fundamental change in traditional theatre/life which would mean a great
change from the dominance of the writer (God?) on the stage (theatre) or
in societal process as well leading closer towards freedom of the individual.
Derrida feels thus that traditional theatre needs to be deconstructed. In
this mode of suggestion is included a critique of society itself, which is, as
mentioned earlier ‘logocentric.’ Derrida feels that in theatre it is the writer
who puts together the script, and that this influence is so strong that it is
akin to a dictatorship. Similarly in social processes the intellectual ideas and
formulations are controlled by the intellectual authorities which create
discourse.
Further we may add that post structuralists believe in the process of

decentering because when these is no specific authoritarian pressure on
society it becomes open ended and available for ‘play and difference’. This
process is ongoing reflexive and open (Derrida, 1978 :297). Thus the present
alone exists and it is the arena where social activity takes place. Thus we
should try to find solutions by harking to the past. The future itself cannot
be precisely predicted. However, there is no precise solution that Derrida
provides except that in the end there is only writing, acting and play with
difference. At this point in our presentation it would be instructive to look
briefly at an example of post structural ideas and ideology in the case of
Michel Foucault one of the major poststructuralists. One critical difference
between Foucault and the structuralists is that while linguistics is the main
influence for the former, it did not occur exclusively as the domain of ideas
that have to be adopted or modified into a poststructuralist schema. That
is post structural thinkers use a variety of ideas and influence and are not
reduced to examining the relations between binary terms. This variety of
sources in presenting an argument is what puts Foucault into the group of
the poststructuralists.
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31.6 Foucault and the Archaeology of Knowledge Post Structuralism and

Post Modernism
Foucault described his approach/methodology as the “archaeology of

knowledge.” Using this approach Foucault studied knowledge and discourse.
According to Foucault this approach provides better ingress to understanding
society and it is different from history, which he feels is portrayed in a
stereotyped linear progression, whereas the reality remains limited and
‘continuous.’
Box 31.2: The Archaeology of Knowledge

In his early work on methodology, Foucault (1966) is doing an “archaeology
of knowledge”. His objects of study are bodies of knowledge, ideas, modes
of discourse, he contrasts his archaeology of knowledge to history and the
history of ideas, both of which he regards as being too rational and as
seeing to much continuity in the history of knowledge…. This highly structural
approach in Foucault’s early work was later abandoned for a poststructuralist
orientation because it was silent on the issue of power as well as the link
between knowledge and power. Michel Foucault died in 1984 at the age of
58 as a leading sociologist. Among Foucault’s last works was a trilogy of
sexual study. There works indicated Foucault’s interest in studying sexuality.
These books were The History of Sexuality 1976, The Care of the Self 1984,
and The Use of Pleasure 1984. (From Ritzer, 1996 Sociological Theory,
p:604-5).
Foucault, however, moved away from this structural type of analysis and
began studying the ‘genealogy of power.’ His concern was to find out the
facts about governance through knowledge production. The nature of
knowledge as power should not be hierarchical and also that the higher the
knowledge (e.g. science) the greater the power it wields over the subjects.
Thus Foucault studied technique and process in science since this is what
exerts power over people through the medium of institutions. This is not to
say that the elites are scheming and manipulating power. Again Foucault uses
a non linear perception of progress in societies from the stage of barbarism
to the present civilisation. Thus history is seen instead as shifting patterns
of domination. However, knowledge/power is such that it is always opposed
and resisted. Thus Foucault’s post structural view is that while knowledge/
power are ubiquitous they are certainly not omnipotent and total in their
domination but their power/authority is always questioned and opposed. A
brief introduction to Foucault’s ideas would help us in completing the section
on post structuralism (Foucault, 1979). Thus according to Foucault
the mad have been misunderstood and mistreated over the course of
history, and subjected to moral control
power/knowledge are implicative of each other
technologies exert power e.g. the Panopticon a prison with the cells
around a large observation tower from which every thing that inmates do
is visible and observable. Such an institution is metaphoric of total societal
control of the prisoners, since it forces even the prisoners or inmates to
exercise self-restraint. Thus this is a direct relationship between
technology, knowledge and power. Thus the Panopticon is a prototype of
societal control and surveillance and the forerunner of intelligence services
and satellite observations over geophysical territories.
Post modernism is not the term for a single type of theory, metanarrative,
or grand theory. It is rather the term for an overall approach involving many 195

Issues of Modernity similar strands. There is thus no single position in postmodernism, but all the
thinkers in this approach share certain common features that separate it
from “modernism.” This has been both a feature that separates it from
‘modernism’ and the approaches all indicate that what they are doing is to
present, dissect, construct ideas that will be relevant to the postmodern
context. A large number of sociologists still tend to think that post modernism
is a passing fancy, however, it is now obvious that postmodernism cannot be
ignored both as fact and phenomena. However, it cannot be denied that
postmodernism is surrounded by diverse positions within the field itself.

Outline the common features of postmodern writers. How are these separate
from “modernism”.
It would be proper at this point to distinguish between some common terms

that are often confused with each other although they are quite distinct
from one another. Thus “post modernity” is the word used for the historical
epoch following the modern era. Further ‘post modernism’ itself refers to
cultural products which are different/separate from the modern cultural
products (in art, architecture etc.). Again ‘postmodern social theory’ refers
to a method of ideating that differs from modern social theory.
From the above it can be said that the post modern covers: 1) a new epoch,
2) new cultural products, 3) new theories about society. Further these new
realities are getting strengthened and there is a widespread feeling that the
modern era is ending and being superceded by another epoch. This was
evident in breaking up of buildings which were modern and complete.
However, the post modern theories themselves provide ready made solutions
in a general sense. However, it is questionable whether the birth of the post
modern era can be precisely dated though it appears to have transited, from
the modern in the 1960’s.
Post modernism indicates that in the cultural field postmodern cultural

products tend to replace modern products. Again postmodern social theory
has emerged from and has differences with modern social theory. Thus
postmodern theory rejects the notion of ‘foundationalism’ of the earlier
theories but itself tends to be relative, non relational and nihilistic.
31.7 Jameson and Late Capitalism

Again the postmodern thinkers reject the nation of a grand narrative or
meta narrative. For example Lyotard contrasts modern knowledge which has
a grand synthesis e.g. the work of Parsons or Marx such narratives are
associated with modern science. Thus as Lyotard identifies modern knowledge
with metanarratives, then obviously postmodern approaches demand that
such theorising should be negated in its completeness. This is because
postmodern scholars such as Lyotard are not afraid to face the differences
and challenges of such a viewpoint. Thus post modernism becomes an
instrument that welcomes different perspectives under the same broad
umbrella. Let us now turn to look at some examples of postmodern theory.
A good illustration of the postmodern theory is clearly set out in the work
of Fredric Jameson. The point of departure is that modernity and post
modernity mark a radical break from each other and are hard to reconcile the
two. However, a middle position is taken by Jameson who writes that there
196 are some continuities between the two epochs. According to Jameson

capitalism is in its ‘late’ stages, but continues to be the main form of Post Structuralism and
Post Modernism
production the world over. However, this ‘late’ stage of capitalism has been
ushered in with post modernism. Thus while the cultural logic is altered, the
underlying structure remains the same as in the incipient forms of capitalism.
This is reflective of the Marxian framework. Jameson sees the postmodern
situation as possessing both positive and negative aspects of postmodernism.
Thus there is progress and chaos side by side. Thus according to Jameson
there are three stages in the progress of capitalism. The first is market
capitalism typified by national markets. Following this phase comes the
imperialist stage which is backed up by a global capitalist network. Then the
third phase is ‘late capitalism’ share capital is used to commodify new areas.
The effect of changes in the economic structure automatically create
appropriate cultural changes. Thus Jameson points out that we can see that:
realist culture is associated with market capitalism
modernist culture is associated with monopoly capitalism
postmodern culture and multinational capitalism
Box 31.3: Late Capitalism

…..aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity
production generally the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves
of ever more morel seeming goods (from clothing to airplanes), at ever
greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural
function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation. Such
economic necessities then find recognition in the institutional support of all
kinds available for art, from foundation and grants to museums and other
forms of patronage. (from Frederic Jameson, 1984 “Post-Modernism, or The
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism”. New Left Review, p:57).
Jameson’s perspective, works mainly within a base and superstructure model.

According to Jameson postmodern society has some characteristics: firstly
there is superficiality, in the sense the cultural products keep to superficiality
and do not enquire deeply into the situation e.g. the soup cans and portrait
of Marolyn Munroe – both of which are simulacra as they are a “copy of a
copy.” Both paintings were painted from a copy of the photographs. Thus
the pictures are simulacrum – in which one cannot distinguish the original
from the copy (Jameson, 1984:86). These paintings are simulacrum and lack
in depth, and covers the surface meanings only. Further emotion or
emotionality is hardly to be found is the postmodern societies. Thus alienation
has been supplanted by fragmentation, which results in the impensonalization
of interaction. Again, and thirdly historicity is set aside and it is clear that
all that can be known about the past is textual and can spawn intertextuality
at the most. What this implies is that the postmodernists do not restrict
themselves to a single linear past but pick and choose from among the
available styles. That is to say there is a strong element of pastiche. This
implies that ‘truth’ about past history, is that we have no way of knowing
what happened. The historians then have to be satisfied with a pastiche
which in itself may not reflect much of past reality and there is no such
thing as linear historical development. Finally postmodernism has a new
technology available to it especially the computer and other electronic
machines not present earlier. What we can say then is that the post modern
societies are in deep flux and great confusion and many symptoms of this
have appeared especially with regard to certain kinds of affliction. Thus
whole new breeds of psychiatrists are busy trying to undo the stress and
197

Issues of Modernity tension that post modernism is clearly associated with. Thus there is a
problem of chaotic and disturbing trends of late capitalism. It is difficult to
cope with multinational economy and the according cultural impact of
consumerism. Jameson feels that cognitive maps are needed to deal with
postmodern realities. The maps can be put together by artists novelists and
working people. Thus Jameson’s schema tries to build bridges between
Marxian theory and post-modernism, but ended up antagonising both Marxists
and postmodernists. This was to be expected because despite Jameson’s
efforts to synthesise it was clear that a grand theory/metanarrative was
unlikely to bend backwards, and therefore, Jameson uses mainly its base/
superstructure dichotomy. Jameson’s postmodernism does try to maintain
some basic/tenous link with Marxian theory despite the fact that Marxism
is a grand narrative. However, in the case of Jean Baudrillard postmodernism
is presented as a maverick social theory of contemporary times. Thus Baudrillard
journey of ideas commences in the 1960’s, when he started out as a Marxist
critique of consumer society he was influenced by both linguistics and
semiotics. However, he soon left this orientation behind him and abandoned
both Marxism and structuralism.
31.8 Baudrillard and Post Modernism

In the 1970’s Baudrillard alleged that Marxists and their detractors both had
a similar beorgeoisie orientation which was conservative. He felt that an
alternative explanation was necessary. Thus Baudrillard put forward the notion
of “symbolic exchange” as an alternative to economic exchange. Symbolic
exchange itself involves a continuous process of a gift giving and gift taking.
It is clear that symbolic exchange was beyond and opposed to the logic of
late capitalism.
Such symbolic exchange implied the creation of a society based on the

same, but Baudrillard chose to be a-political. He studied contemporary society,
and saw that it is not production but the electronic media that characterises
it e.g. TV, computers, satellites. We have moved from societies under
different modes of production to a society that is more involved with the
code of production. Exploitation and profit motives have given way to a
domination by the signs/systems that produce them. Again signs referred to
something else but in postmodern society they become self referential and
characterised by “simulations” and ‘simulacra’ which are representations of
any aspect of consumption (Baudrillard, 1973).
For Baudrillard the postmodern world is “hyper reality.” Thus media becomes
more real than the reality itself, and provides news, views and events in an
exaggerated, skewed, and even ideological manner – thus the term hyper
reality. This is not without consequences as the real tends to be buried in
the hyper real and may ultimately be banished altogether.
Box 31.4: Catastrophe Management

In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic
advantage of the South…..that one day everything will break down. One day,
the west will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame,
if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly
decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. (Jean
Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, p:69).
198

For Baudrillard culture is undergoing a very deep change which makes the Post Structuralism and
Post Modernism
masses more and more passive, rather than increasingly rebellious. Thus the
masses encounter these changes with seeming ease absorbing each new
cultural idea or artifact. Thus for Baudrillard masses are not seen to be the
products of media. Rather it is the media which is observed to provide these
wants to the masses (for objects and entertainment). For Baudrillard society
is in throes of a ‘death culture.’ Thus it is death anxiety that pushes people
to try and lose this anxiety by using and abusing the consumerist culture.
There is no revolutionary silver lining to Baudrillard’s theory and the problem
is also that symbolic exchange societies may exist but how to bring them
about is not addressed to by Baudrillard. All in all Baudrillards brilliant and
unusual ideas make it a clear breakaway from the ideas and artifacts of
modernism. Baudrillard in deconstructing contemporary society shows just
how much sociological theory has moved forward and away from classical
thought. Thus we can see post modernism does display certain characteristics
and we can see below just what these are.
The first of these characteristics is that in postmodernism that is a multiplicity

of views, meanings and so on. Secondly the postmodernists are looking for
polysemic and alternative meanings. Thirdly there is a distrust of
metanarratives and grand narratives as found in classical sociological theory.
It also holds that since there a multiplicity of perspectives there will always
be many truths. Thus postmodernists regard concepts ideas as texts which
are open to interpretation. They also look for binary oppositions in the text.
Further, these binary oppositions are themselves shown to be false or at
least not necessarily true. Finally the post modernist identifies texts, groups
which are absent or omitted. This is regarded important to any
‘deconstruction.’
Now postmodernism is reflected in almost all areas of life including film, TV,
literature etc. which are deeply influenced by postmodern viewpoints. Let
us now turn to some postmodern aspects visible in other fields. Thus in
language words and forms are used and the concept of ‘play’ is basic to it.
Thus ‘play’ implies altering the frame which connects ideas – allowing the
troping of a metaphor. Thus the ‘text’ has a meaning which is understood
or interpreted by the reader and not the author. This ‘play’ or exercise is
the way that the author gains some significance in the consciousness of the
reader. The problem with this postmodern view about language is very difficult
to understand and is against the basis of communication where the author
communicates to the reader in as lucid a manner as possible.
In literature it is found that postmodern works is not so much opposed to

modernist literature. Instead it tends to extend it stylistically. Some post
modern literatures include David Foster Wallace and Thomas Pynchon both of
whom are critical of the vast system building of the Enlightenment modernity.
As you would have noticed post structuralism and postmodernism do have
an intermeshing quality. Indeed some authors straddle both fields e.g. Francois
Lyotard. Further structuralism tries to build models seeking out factor and
patterns that are stable, which is anathema to postmodernists and rejected
outright as a futile manoeuvre. Thus postmodernism has retained the cultural
dimension of structuralism but has rejected the claims to its scientificity.
Again post structuralism is a position in philosophy, it is not the name of an
era whereas postmodernism is associated with the post modern epoch.
199

Issues of Modernity
31.9 Conclusion
What then has postmodernism achieved? The answer is that postmodernism
has turned away the shroud over the analysis and demystified both
epistemological and ideological constructs. Further a deep look at ethnography
has to led to a reexamination and questioning of ethnography itself.
Postmodernism and its adherents point out that sociologist should analyse
the role of their own culture in the study of culture, and therefore, increase
the sensitivity of the subject. Postmodern approaches have been criticised
on several grounds. To begin with postmodernists are against theory. This
paradoxical since this is itself a theoretical position taken by the
postmodernists. Again the postmodernists emphasise the illogical or non-
rational aspects of a culture. Further, the postmodern concentrates on the
marginal which is itself evaluative. Then again the stress on intertextuality,
but do not always follow their own advice and often treat texts as standing
alone. Postmodernists also put away all assessment of theory – but this does
not mean that there is no means of assessment. Thus according to
postmodernists modernism is inconsistent but they themselves exercise it
as and which way they want. Finally the postmodernists are self contradictory
when they deny any claims of reality or ‘truth’ in their own writings. Finally
there is the issue of postmodernism not having any confidence in the scientific
method. But if sociology does follow this position, then it will turn into a
study of meanings, rather than causes which influence what it is to be an
individual in society.

Baudrillard, Jean 1976, Symbolic Exchange and Death. London : Sage
Derrida, Jaques 1978, Writing and Difference. Chicago, University of Chicago

Press
Foucault, Michel 1969 The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on

Language. New York : Harper Colophon
Jameson, Frederic 1991 Postmodernism or The Cultural Logic of Late

Capitalism Dusham, N.C. : Duke University Press
200

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1.2 Prominence of Socialism

Box 1.1: Context of Social Theory

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Thus for example the counter Enlightenment ideologues, like De Bonald

1.3 Individual vs Collectivity

1.4 Comte and The Enlightenment

Thus Comte’s sociology of “social physics” or what he called sociology was

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Thus in this theory we have first the

Reflection and Action 1.1

1.5 Durkheim and The Enlightenment

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Box 1.2: The Division of Labour

In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 1912/1965 Durkheim studied

1.6 The Marxian Ideology

Hegel’s philosophy emphasised the ‘dialectic’ and ‘idealism’ of which the

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Box 1.3: Marxian Ideology

1.7 Weberian Ideology

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Box 1.4: Formal Rationality

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As regards political economy, it was a theory of capitalism which had been

1.8 The British Sociologists

Reflection and Action 1.2

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1.9 Spencer’s Evolutionism

Spencer also saw society as an organism, in which different parts or ‘organs’

The evolutionary focus of Spencer is at least twofold. In the first instance

Another evolutionary schema that Spencer offered was that of militant to

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1.11 Further Reading

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2.2 Words and Language

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Box 2.1: Consensual Meaning

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2.3 The Nature of Concepts Concept and Theory

When scientists use a word, it gets a technical meaning. It becomes a

The process of theory formation then requires the following steps:

Box 2.2: Conceptual Abstraction

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2.4 Concepts in Sociology: Some Illustrations

When we talk of a relationship, we ask a question: Is the relationship limited

2.5 Concepts to Theorems: Natural Sciences

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results. We get a2 + 2ab + b2. So we have a formula (a+b)2 = a2 + 2ab + b2 and

Reflection and Action 2.1

In natural sciences, say in Physics and Chemistry, we come across words

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2.6 Towards Social Science: Durkheim, Weber and

Let us recall how Max Weber formulated his theories:

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Comparisons in the historical settings were attempt and existing data on

Path breaking studies such as these continue to receive attention among

b) Parsons and Merton

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