ROAN V.

GONZALES
CRUZ, J. | G.R. No.71410. November 25, 1986
Topic: Issuance of Search Warrants; Requirements Therefor
Nature: PETITION to review the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Marinduque

PARTIES:
1. Petitioner - JOSEFINO S. ROAN
2. Respondents - THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL
FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE

DISPUTED MATTER: Validity of a search warrant issued by a trial court judge

FACTS:
1. A search warrant was issued by respondent judge (Gonzales) on May 10, 1984.
a. Application for the said search warrant was personally led by PC Capt. Mauro Quillosa.
b. Together with Quillosa were two witnesses (Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida), who
presented to respondent judge their respective afidavits.
c. The application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, as such respondent Judge
proceeded to examine Quillosa on the contents of the application to ascertain if he
knew and understood the same.
d. Afterwards, Quillosa subscribed and swore the said application before respondent.
2. Petitioner’s (Josefino Roan) house was searched two days after the issuance of the search
warrant. The said search was performed by military authorities. Despite none of the articles
listed in the warrant was discovered, the officers who conducted the search found one Colt
Magnum revolver and live bullets which they confiscated. The said items served as bases for
the charge of illegal possession of firearms against the petitioner.

ISSUES/HELD/RATIONALE:
a. Whether or not the search warrant issued should be annulled on the ground that it violates
the Constitution
YES.
 To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be
determined by the judge or some other authorized officer after examining the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No less important, there must be
a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to
prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant.
i. Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff
as referring to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the
probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.
ii. The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" was a
refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the1934
Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the
condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federal
Constitution of the United States which served as our model it was then
already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless,
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of
that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following a
brief debate, approved by the Convention.
iii. Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was
then Rule 126:
- SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The municipal or city judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce
and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

 APPLICATION [Sub-issues]:
i. [Petitioner’s argument] The petitioner claims that no depositions were
taken by the respondent judge.
- Supreme Court (SC): NO. As a matter of fact, depositions were
taken of the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the
affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the
complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.
 a. By his own account, all he did was question Captain
Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood the same," and
only because "the application was not yet subscribed and
sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked
any questions at all if the affidavit had already been
completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he
did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself
to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the
applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the
record, together with the affidavit presented to him.
b. Mata v. Bayona
i. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be found
later that his declarations are false.
c. The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need
to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering
that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of
the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses
whose depositions as aforementioned had already been
taken by the undersigned.”
d. In other words, the applicant was asking for the
issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to
him, as required by settled jurisprudence.”
i. The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to
provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in
case the applicant's declarations are found to be
false. His application, standing alone, was
insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant
sought. It was therefore necessary for the
witnesses themselves, by their own personal
information, to establish the applicant's claims.
- Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the
depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself,
there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.
a. It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the
claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents
of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent
and justification of the application.
- The above-discussed defects have rendered the search
warrant invalid.

ii. [Solicitor General’s Argument] Whatever defect there was, was waived
when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his
conformity in writing.
- SC: NO. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military
authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the
supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later
to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with
the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority
of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This
was not, as we held in a previous case the manifestation merely of
our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given
the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here,
as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.

iii. [Respondents’ Argument] The Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have
bullets seized from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could
have been taken by the military authorities even without a warrant.
Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and
considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the illegal articles could be taken
even without a warrant.
 - SC: NO. The pistol and bullets cannot be used as evidence against
the petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegal
possession of firearms [Please see the ratio below]. Pending
resolution of that case, however, the said articles must remain in
custodia legis.
a. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the
search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there
was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant,
the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner.
In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's
premises had no right to be there and therefore had no
right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
b. It does not follow that because an offense is malum
prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of
this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply
because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military
authorities could have just entered the premises and
looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner
without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact
that they did bother to do so indicates that they
themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for
the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of
possessing.
c. It is true that there are certain instances when a search
may be validly made without warrant and articles may be
taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a
warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful
arrest, as when the person being arrested is frisked for
weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the
arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to
prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband and even in
the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and
aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation
of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease
in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. The individual may
knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an
illegal search. And it has also been held that prohibited
articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to
eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them
inadvertently.
d. Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any
of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even
claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the
fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were
not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule
having been violated and no exception being applicable,
the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets
were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by
the exclusionary principle.
e. Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later
expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While
conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal
might be allowed to go free because "the constable has
blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the
exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against
abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand's
justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by
their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.

iv. [Procedural flaw noted by the SC] it is true that the petitioner should have,
before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the search
warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure.
But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we
take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of
the constitutional issues raised.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby
declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985, is made
permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.