CHAPTER 7

THE DECISION
A "decision" is the adjudication or settlement of a controversy by a court of law.
It goes into the roots of the controversy, makes a searching examination of the facts and
the issues of the case, applies the law and considers the evidence presented, and
determines the rights of the parties.l This is distinguished from a "judgment" which is a
determination by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged,
and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the
accused. It is usually the dispositive portion of a decision, but may be used
interchangeably with the term decision itself.2
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
To be valid, decisions should comply with the form, procedure, and substantive
requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and the circulars and
orders of the Supreme Court.3 Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution provides that
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court on Civil Procedure similarly provides:
Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments andfinal orders. - A judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk
of court
In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. - The judgment must be written in
the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
'PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY, FUNDAMENTAL OF DECISION WRITING FOR JUDGES 16 (2009).
2Id. at21.
3 Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004.
114 1LEGAL METHoD ESSENTIALS 2.0
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the
judgment is based.
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Supreme Court also issued Administrative
Circular No. 1 on January 28, 1988, prompting all judges "to make complete findings of
facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of
the evidence presented.. .They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form
4
conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced."
The Constitution and the Rules of Court identify two essential parts of a
judgment the body and the decretalportion. Although the latter is the controlling part, the
former is important because it is where the court clearly and distinctly states its findings
of fact and of law on which the decision is based. 5 According to the Supreme Court.
The term findings of fact that must be found in the body of the decision
refers to statements of fact, not to conclusions of law. Unlike in pleadings
where ultimate facts alone need to be stated, the Constitution and the
Rules of Court require not only that a decision should state the ultimate
facts but also that it should specify the supporting evidentiary facts, for
they are what are called the findings of fact.6
The Supreme Court has discussed the significance of the constitutional provision
in this way:
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and
fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to
the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know
why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from
deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the
Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of
4 Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.L No. 132426, October 24, 2000, citing People v. Alvero, G.R. No.
69564, January 29,1988 and Pengson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-65622, June 29,
1984.
5 University of the Philippines v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23,2012.
6 Id.
 THE DEcisK)NI 115
passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained
public confidence in the justness of his decision.7
Due process demands that the parties be given information on how the case was
decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court 8 Thus, judges should exert effort to ensure that their decisions
present a comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that
substantially address the issues raised by the parties.9
Although Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to
decisions rendered in administrative proceedings and applies only to decisions rendered
in judicial proceedings, 10 the Court has ruled that this requirement extends to decisions
written by labor arbiters. The failure of a labor arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission to express the basis for their decisions is an evasion of their constitutional
duty that constitutes grave abuse of discretion."
This mandate applies in cases "submitted for decision," or given due course after
the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not
applicable to an order or resolution refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari.12 The
constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it
is based. It does not prohibit courts from adopting the narration of facts made in the
13
briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in their own words.
REPOSITORIES OF DECISIONS
A system that adheres to binding precedent requires the publication of reported
cases. The official repository of Supreme Court decisions is the Philippine Reports."4
Unofficial reporters include Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA), which is
published by Central Books's and which is also available online.16 Supreme Court
decisions available from SCRA begin from 1901 to the present Another unofficial
7Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132426, October 24, 2000, citing People v. Alvero, G.R. No.
69564, January 29,1988 and Pengson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-65622, June 29,
1984.
8 Nicos Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992; People v. Judge
Bellaflor, G.R. No. 103275, June 15, 1994; Anino v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 123226, May 21,1998.
9Madrid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130683, May 31, 2000.
10 Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008.
" Miguel v. JCT Group, Inc., G.R. No. 157752, March 16,2005.
'2 Nunal v. Commission on Appointments, G.R. No. 78648, January 24,1989.
13 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104874, December 14,1993.
14China Airlines v. Chiok, G.R. No. 152122, July 30,2003.
1 See http://centraLcom.ph/centralbooks/.
16 See http://centraLcomCph/escra/.
116 1LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 2.0
repository, CD Technologies Asia, makes the complete text of Supreme Court decisions
17
available on DVD and online.
PERSONAL OPINIONS OF JUDGES
The Supreme Court frowns upon the inclusion of personal views in court
decisions. The decision of a court should contain only opinion that is relevant to the
question before the court for decision. After all, courts are not concerned with the
wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law.
Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decision which may
only reflect unfavorably upon their competence and the propriety of their judicial
actuations.' 8 Intemperate speech detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness that
should be the constant hallmarks of a dispenser of justice.19
FORM OF DECISIONS
The Constitution does not prescribe a form for decisions, although certain
guidelines should be observed by judges. Brevity in writing decisions is desirable but it
should not be used as a substitute for substance.20 A judge must make an effort to
explain his or her opinion and to support it with law or jurisprudence. 21
In writing a decision, judges are not required to adopt a florid and dramatic
style. The Supreme Court has said that "the decision [should] be lucidly crafted,
complete in all its vital details, to enable the parties involved to understand how the
judge arrived at his conclusions." 22 Judges must write decisions and resolutions with
due care, and make certain that they accurately reflect their conclusions and final
dispositions.23 Judges should prepare concise but complete, as well as correct and clear
decisions, orders, and resolutions. 24
The Supreme Court in Velarde v. Social Justice Society25 suggested the following as
essential parts of a good decision: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3)
17 See http://www.cdasiaonline.com/.
18 Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, G.R. No. L-30001, June 23,1970.
19 Balagtas v. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-01-1377, June 17,2004.
2D Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000.
21 People v. Francisco, G.R No. 106097, July 21, 1994. The Constitutional provision applies to
decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission. See Miguel v. JCT (Group, Inc.), G.R. No.
157752, March 16,2005.
22 People v. Geral, G.R. No. 145731, June 26,2003.
3 Lirn v. Chan, G.R. No. 123891, February 28, 200 citing Caltex Refinery Employees Association v.
Brillantes, G.R. No. 123782, September 16, 1997 and Saballa v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 102472-84,
August 22,1996.
24 Office of the Court Administrator v. Espafiol, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1872, October 18, 2004.
25
G.R. No. 159357, April 28,2004.
 THE DECISKN 1117
issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule,
separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) a dispositive portion.26
In that case, the Social Justice Society, a registered political party, filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief against several religious leaders which it alleged to be endorsing
the candidacy of candidates for elective office or urging members to vote for specified
candidates. It sought to clarify whether these alleged acts of endorsement or urging
violate the Constitutional provision on the separation of church and state. The trial court
rendered a decision narrating proceedings before it and discussing the legal issue on the
separation clause.
The Court observed that the trial court's decision contained no statement of facts
nor any assessment thereof. The decision clearly violated the constitutional directive.
Moreover, the court a quo did not include a dispositive portion which is important
because the dispositive part of the decision or order is the controlling factor that
determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein. The
Court ruled that the assailed decision indeed failed to decide anything for not making a
statement of facts and having a dispositive portion. It stated that decisions must express
clearly the facts and the law on which they are based, as required by the Constitution,
the Rules of Procedure and an administrative circular of the Judiciary. It likewise cited a
line of cases emphasizing the mandate of making proper and valid decisions.
In SebastianJr. v. Reyes,7 the Supreme Court dismissed a judge after it was shown
that she failed to put her judgment into writing, merely requiring the accused to read it
from the computer screen without assistance of counsel. The Court dismissed Judge
Reyes from service. It found that the verbal judgment she rendered was in violation of
the Constitution. It pronounced that a verbal judgment is ineffective because it does not
respect the right of the losing party to know the reason for his/her loss for purposes of
appeal to a higher court. Without these reasons, the party would be unable to point to
the possible errors which the higher tribunal may review.
26 There are other non-essential parts of a decision such as an introduction or prologue, and
epilogue, which may be used especially in cases where controversial or novel issues are involved.
According to the Court, an introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of
the principal factual or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases - particularly those concerning
public interest or involving complicated commercial, scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject
matters - a longer introduction may inform readers with the specific nature of the controversy
and the issues involved. An epilogue may be a summation of the important principles applied to
the resolution of the issues of paramount public interest or significance. It may also lay down an
enduring philosophy of law or guiding principle. Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No.
159357, April 28, 2004.
2 A. M. No. MTJ-06-1638, September 18,2009.
118 1LEGAL METHOD ESSENMS 2.0
Students of law should read the Velarde decision for guidelines on various parts
of a well-written decision. 28 Vandevelde29 lists the following components of a decision
which have been reduced to the barest outline here:
1. Facts
An opinion usually begins with a description of facts. It is a narration of events
that gave rise to the dispute submitted for the court's resolution.
2. Procedural History
This portion describes the events that occurred in the trial or lower appellate
court during the course of the litigation beginning with the filing of a complaint
3. Question Presented
These are the questions that appellant is asking the court to decide.
4. Rule of Law
To receive the issues raised, courts announce rules of law. These are the
principles that apply to the case before the court
5. Application of Law to the Fact
This is the part of the decision that determines whether each element of each rule
apply to the facts before it
6. Holding
This is the decision of the court with respect to a question presented.
7. Disposition
This is essentially a procedural directive of some kind that gives effect to the
court's decision. 30
The following is a short example that shows parts of a Supreme Court decision.
(Citations are omitted in the reproduction)
28 See also Reynato S. Puno, Decision Writing,4:14 PHILJA JURIDICAL JOURNAL 1-28 (2002).
2 KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINIG LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCrIoN TO LEGAL REASONING 27
-32(1998).
30Id.
 THE DECISION 1119
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
KARLO ANGELO G.R. No. 193960 Each case is assigned a
DABALOS y SAN DIEGO,
docket number when
Petitioner,
Present filed.
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - PEREZ and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Promulgated:
BRANCH 59, ANGELES January 7, 2013
CTY (PAMPANGA), This is the date the
REPRESENTED BY ITS decision was
PRESIDING JUDGE MA. promulgated.
ANGELICA T. PARAS-
QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE
OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES
CITY (PAMPANGA); AND
ABC,
Respondent The surname of the
Justice who wrote the
decision or the "ponente"
DECISION is written here.
PERLAS-BERNABE, I.:
The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a
provision that would render it toothless in the pursuit of
the declared policy of the State to protect women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety
and security.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the Orders dated Sep , tober
5, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, This is the statement of
the case. It explains the
Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 which denied nature of this case.
petitioner's Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.
1201 LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 2.0
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5 (a) of I These are the facts of the
9262 before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59, in an case.
Information which states:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009,
in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being
then the boyfriend of the complainant, ....
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use personal violence [on] the
complainant, by pulling her hair, punching
complainant's back, shoulder and left eye,
thereby demeaning and degrading the
complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity
as a human being, in violation of Section
5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found
probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest
against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted
a cash bond for his provisional liberty and on August 12,
2010, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner
averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13,
2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private
respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her
relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject
incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought
payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the
latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he
was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he
admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped
petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical
injuries alleged in the Information.
The RTC Ruling
This section explains the
The RTC denied petitioner's motion. It did not consider decision of the Regional
material the fact that the parties' dating relationship had Trial Court where the
ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the case was tried.
parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the
infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of
violence against women and their children as defined in
 THE DECiSION 1121
Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262.
Issues
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1) The Court identifies the
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense; 2) issues or assignment of
err'ors.
whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will
favor the accused; and 3) whether the Information alleging
a fact contrary to what has been admitted should be
quashed.
The Court's Ruling- The Court makes a
ruling and then
proceeds to explain it in
The petition has no merit the "ratio" of the case.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical
injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262
because its proximate cause was not their dating
relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed
was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Court.
The Court is not persuaded.
Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this
Act,
(a)"Violence against women and their children"
refers to any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty....
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting
qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as
a crime of violence against women through physical harm,
122 1LEGAL METHOD ESSENTiALS 2.0
namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child
and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with
whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with
whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the
elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment, to wit.
1. The offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship with the offended
woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through
another, commits an act or series of acts
of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for
RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act
of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere
in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying
the rule on statutory construction that when the law does
not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the
punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is
sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of
such relationship between the offender and the victim
when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the
Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence
should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of
petitioner using the rule of lenity because there is no
ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any
construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA
9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the
same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher
penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to
purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders
 THE DECISION 1123
whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom
they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or
their children with the end in view of promoting the
protection of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged
the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating
relationship between the petitioner and the private
respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner;
and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the
offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said
law which reads:
SEC. 7. Venue. - The Regional Trial Court
designated as a Family Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
of violence against women and their children
under this law. In the absence of such court
in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any
of its elements was committed at the option
of the complainant.
Finally, the Court finds the Order of the RTC, giving the
prosecutor a period of two (2) days to amend the
Information to reflect the cessation of the dating
relationship between the petitioner and the offended party,
to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
to wit
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.
- If the motion to quash is based on an
alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides that an information may be amended, in form or
in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. In the present case, the accused
petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was
correct in directing the amendment of the Information and In a civil case, the
in denying the motion to quash the same. dispositive portion
should state whether the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders complaint or petition is
granted or denied, the
specific relief granted
and the costs.
124 1LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 2.0
dated September 13, 2010 and October 5, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in
Criminal Case No. 09-5210 are AFFIRMED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the
RTC is directed to continue with the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 09-5210.
SO ORDERED.
Theoretically, every decision of a lower court or administrative body can come
up to the Supreme Court for review. A review of a criminal conviction would typically
look like the following case.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
MEL DIMAT, G.R. No. 181184
Petitioner,
Present
VELASCO, JR., I.,
Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA, Criminal cases are
brought by the People of
EZ and the Philippines because
the State is the offended
PEOPLE OF PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. party when crimes are
PHILIPPINES, committed.
Respondent. Promulgated:
January 25, 2012
justice Abad is the
ponente or author of this
ABAD, Decision.
Cases sometimes begin by
providing the reader with
an idea of what the case is
This case is about the need to prove in the crime of about.
"fencing" that the accused knew or ought to have known
that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or
robbery.
 THE DECiSioN 1125
The Facts and the Case
The government charged the accused imat
with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law before the M_
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02- These are the facts of the
202338. aeI
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla
and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara,
testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgado's wife,
Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari
bearing plate number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed
of sale gave the vehicle's engine number as TD42-126134
and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of
the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan
Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a
suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the
vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was
actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-
YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on
their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp
Crame office and there further learned that it had been
stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.
Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan
Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which he The evidence in favor of
mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporatio Me the defense is also
vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 binsons examined bycourts.
Galleria's parking area. He reported arnapping to the
TMG.
For his part, at claimed that he did not know
Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith
and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a
deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134
and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later
sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although
the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the These paragraphs explain
police officers took into custody had the same the decisions of the trial
v ~~~~court
adteCuto
number, they were not actually the same vehicl court and the Court of
Appeals.
On July 20, 2005 the RTC Dimat guilty of
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him to an
imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision
mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal.The court also
ordered him to pay P-850,000.00 as actual damages and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of
suit
On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA)
126 1LEGAL METHoD ESSENTIALS 2.0
affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 29794[21 the RTC decision but
modified the penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and I day
of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 17
years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period, as maximum, thus, the present appeal.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or
not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly
sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was
earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.
To determine liability for
The Ruling of the Court the crime of fencing, all
the elements of the crime
The elements " cg" are 1) a robbery or theft must be present.
has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the
robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article or object taken" during that
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have
known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he
intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for
another.
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla's Nissan Safari
on May 25, 1998. Two years later in December 2000, Dimat
sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00. Dimat's defense is that
the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold
to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis The Court explains why i
number CRGY60-Y03553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale is not persuaded by the
covering those transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen defendant's arguments.
Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine num T42-
119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111
But Dimat's defense is flawed. First, the Nissan
Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the
road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the
engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen
from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not
reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle's engine and
chassis.
Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his
main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law
and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum,
requiring no proof of criminal intent Of course, the
prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should
have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later
 THE DEctSIN 1127
sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that
he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday
Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as
collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the
old certificate of registration and official receipt of the
vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of
registration and official receipt already in his name. But
Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that
Tolentino's failure to deliver the documents should not
The Court makes its
prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself co conclusions based on its
produce any certificate of registration or receipt examination of the
evidence.
Based on the above, e ently, Dimat knew that the
Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He
said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of
registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not
be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was
unable to make good on his promise to produce new
documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the
Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold
the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort
to check the papers covering her purchase. That she might
herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did
not stand accused in the case.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the .ecion of
the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 in CA-G.R. C-- The Court upheld tei
29794. conviction.
SO ORDERED.
Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate
Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Raffle dated August 8,
2011.
THE DISPOSITION OR DISPOSITIVE PORTION
To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, the same must be considered in
its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the
decision and not merely in the fallo thereof. 31 Whatever may be found in the body of the
decision can only be considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and
while they may serve as guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio decidendi, what is
31 Republic of the Philippines v. de los Angeles, G.R. No. L-26112, October 4,1971.
128 1LEGAL METHOD ESSENTiALS 2.0
controlling is what appears in the dispositive part of the decision. 32 The resolution of the
court in a given issue - embodied in the fallo or dispositive part of a decision or order
- is the controlling factor in resolving the issues in a case. Thefallo embodies the court's
decisive action on the issues posed, and is the part of the decision that must be enforced
during execution. The other parts of the decision only contain the ratio decidendi (or
reason for the decision) and, in this sense, assume a lesser role in carrying into effect the
tribunal's disposition of the case.33
If there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the falo and the body of
the decision, thefalo controls. This rule rests on the theory that thefalo is the final order
while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing. However, where
the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there
was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. 34
The Supreme Court has departed from the general rule "to be able to do justice
and equity to all concerned." In Republic of the Philippines v. de los Angeles,35 the Court
explained that "the provision of the Constitution of the Philippines regarding the form
of judgments constitutes the conclusion and findings of facts and law of the court as
integral parts of the judgment, so that the judgment must be in accordance therewith,
hence it can be said that there is constitutional warrant to examine the other parts of a
decision whenever it is necessary to determine the meaning of its dispositive part."
The general rule applies when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is
definite, clear, and unequivocal, and can be given effect wholly without need of
interpretation or construction. 36 The exceptions where the dispositive part of the
judgment does not always prevail over the body of the opinion are as follows:
(a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may
be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment because the
dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision's
ratio decidendi;
(b) where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is
37
found in the body of the decision.
(c) where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so
clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion,
the body of the decision will prevail.38
32Tropical Homes, Inc. v. Fortun, G.R. No. 51554, January 13,1989.
33 So v. Food Fest Land, Inc., G.R. No. 183628, February 9, 2011. In another case, the Court
explained that while the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in
the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion that finally invests
rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the
corresponding duties or obligations. See Florentino v. Rivera, G.R. No. 167968, January 23,2006.
34 Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation, GR. No. 198423, October 23,2012.
mG.R. No. L-2611Z October 4,1971.
36Obra v. Spouses Badua, G.R. No. 149125, August 9,2007.
37 Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chung v. Director
of the National Library, G.R. No. 131502, June 8,
2000.
 THE DECISioN 1129
If there is ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion
of a decision, the court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the
judgment had become final, and for this purpose it may resort to the pleadings filed by
the parties and the court's findings of facts and conclusions of law as expressed in the
body of the decision. 39
Where there are inaccuracies in the dispositive portion, a court is not precluded
from issuing a writ of execution with the correct address of the subject property. This act
falls within a court's inherent power "to amend and control its process and orders so as
to make them conformable to law and justice."40
The court is also not precluded from resolving inaccuracies by resorting to the
body of the decision. While the general rule is that the dispositive portion of a decision
becomes the subject of execution, the body of the decision becomes controlling when
there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the dispositive portion or when there is extensive
and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue found in the body.41
Thus, although the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals ruled that
"although the prayer for dismissal of the complaint in Manila may be pursued before
said court during the proceedings," the trial court erred in failing to resolve the motion
to dismiss. Notwithstanding that the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals
decision seemed to grant the trial court discretion in resolving the said motion, the body
of the same decision clearly held that the trial court should dismiss the case on the
grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping.42
THE SYLLABUS
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions
or resolutions is not the work of the Court, nor does it state the Court's decision. The
syllabus is the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of the decision. The
reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience of lawyers in reading the reports. A
syllabus is not a part of the Court's decision. According to the Court, a counsel should
3
8People v. Lacbayan, G.R. No. 125006, August 31, 2000. In one case, the Court held that the body
of a decision prevails over the fallo when "the inevitable conclusion from the former is that there
was a glaring error in the latter, in which case the body of the decision will prevail." See PH
Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109648, November 22,2001.
3
9 Galang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139448, October 11, 2005.
4o Montebon v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 180568, July 13, 2009. In this case, the regional trial
court already assumed jurisdiction over the case. As such, the Metropolitan Trial Court was no
longer in a position to correct the error contained in the dispositive portion. The duty devolved
upon the Regional Trial Court before which the appeal was pending, is to rectify the error
contained in the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be executed. Clerical error or
ambiguity in the dispositive portion of a judgment may be rectified or clarified by reference
primarily to the body of the decision itself and the pleadings previously filed.
41 Wilson Ong Ching Klan Chung v. Director
of the National Library, G.R. No. 131502, June 8,
2000.
42Id.
130 1 LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 2.0
not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.
Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a
lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision for authority.
It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme
Court accurately. 43
Lawyers and litigants are mandated to quote decisions of the Supreme Court
accurately. Judges should do no less by strictly abiding by this rule when they quote
cases that support their judgments and decisions. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins them to perform official duties diligently by being faithful to the law
and maintaining their professional competence. 44
In Allied Banking Corporationv. Court of Appeals,45 Labor Arbiter Almirante quoted
from the Supreme Court's decision in Dosch v. National Labor Relations Commision.46 The
Labor Arbiter included the phrase "[r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that
being away from the family" as part of the quoted decision, which, in actuality is a
headnote from the Supreme Court Reports Annotated syllabus. The Court thus
admonished the Labor Arbiter for misquoting its decision by including text from the
syllabus otherwise not found in the decision itself. It explained that the syllabus is not
the work of the Court and is therefore not part of the Court's decision. It cannot be cited
in place of carefully considered text in the decision because it is merely the work of a
reporter who gives his/her own understanding of the decision.
THE CERTIFICATION
Article VIII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for
decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the
case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.
A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and
43 Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Galandia, G.R. No. 144412, November 18,
2003 citing French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126477, September
11, 1998, and Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-Natu v. Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., G.R. No. L-25291, January 30,1971.
44 China Airlines v. Chiok, G.R. No. 152122, July 30, 2003. However, since that case was not
administrative in nature, the Supreme Court could not rule on the Court of Appeals Justices'
administrative liability. The Court pointed out that in administrative proceedings, the
respondents must first be given an opportunity to be heard before sanctions can be imposed. It
added that the case at bar was an appeal from the Court of Appeals' Decision and was not an
administrative case against the magistrates concerned. The Court said that "[tihese two suits are
independent of and separate from each other and cannot be mixed in the same proceedings."
Without any proper administrative case, the Court could only determine whether the error in
quotation would be sufficient to reverse or modify the Court of Appeals' Decision.
45G.R. No. 144412, November 18,2003.
4
6 G.R. No. L-51182, July 5,1983.
 THE DECiSioN 1131
a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the
parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a
decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. All lower collegiate
courts shall observe the same requirements.
The certification requirement is a new provision introduced by the 1987
Constitution. It is meant to ensure the implementation of the constitutional requirement
that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts are reached after
consultation with members of the court sitting en banc or in a division before the case is
assigned to a member thereof for decision-writing. The decision is thus rendered by the
court as a body and not merely by a member thereof. This is in keeping with the very
nature of a collegial body that arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the
exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote. 47
The absence of the certification, however, does not necessarily mean that the case
submitted for decision was not reached in consultation before being assigned to one
member for the writing of the opinion of the court, since the regular performance of
official duty is presumed. The lack of certification serves as evidence of failure to
observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official
responsible for the omission to account therefor. Such absence of certification does not
have the effect of invalidating the decision.48
Not everything promulgated by the Supreme Court requires certification. The
certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative, cases. From
the very beginning, resolutions or decisions of the Court in administrative cases have
not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a
superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated
upon considering the collegiate composition of the Supreme Court But even if such a
certification were required, the signatures of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations and voted attest to the fact that the conclusions of the Court were arrived
at after consultation and deliberation.49
A per curiam decision - one where there is no ponente - does not require formal
certification. 50
The Supreme Court has also held that a minute resolution need not be signed by
the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor does it require
a certification of the Chief Justice. To require members of the Court to sign all
resolutions would delay the issuance of its resolutions and a great amount of their time
would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which
time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of
decisions and orders of important nature and character.5 '
When a decision is promulgated by a Division of the Supreme Court, the
Division Chair attests to the fact that the decision was reached in consultation before it
47 Consing v. Court of Appeals, G.tR No. 78272, August 29, 1989.
48 Id.
49 Prudential Bank v. Castro, A.C. No. 2756, March 15,1988.
5old.
51
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82273, June 1,1990.
1321 LEGAL METHOD ESSENTLALS 2.0
was assigned to the writer of the opinion. Thereafter, the Chief Justice certifies that "the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division." For example:
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and
the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Certification is also made by the Chief Justice in Resolutions of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.5 2
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Memorandum decisions are those which adopt by reference the findings of fact
and conclusions pf law of inferior tribunals. The statutory basis for this type of decision
5
2 See Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002, March 29, 2005, and Legarda v. De Castro,
P.E.T. Case No. 003, March 31,2005.
 THE DECISION 1133
is found in section 40 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981,53 thus:
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. - Every decision of final
resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based, which
may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by
reference from those set forth in the decision, order, or resolution
appealed from.
Memorandum decisions do not violate the constitutional requirement mandating
that decisions should state the facts and the law on which the decision is based.
However, it would be more prudent for a memorandum decision not to be limited to the
dispositive portion but to state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with
references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and
jurisprudence and the tribunal's assessments and conclusions on the case. This practice
would better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether the
dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings
of fact and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision. This is
particularly true where the decisions, orders, or resolutions came from a court in another
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the enforcement of the decisions would be based on
presumptions that laws in other jurisdictions are similar to our laws, at the expense of
justice based on the merits.5 4
Incorporation by reference is allowed to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of
the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court.
This is particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and
thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at.55
The Supreme Court has sanctioned memorandum decisions on the grounds of
expediency, practicality, convenience, and docket status of our courts.-% In Franciscov.
Permskul,5 7 the Court laid down the conditions for the validity of memorandum
decisions:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings
of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote
reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and
immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision.
For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for
direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be
contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. BIg. 129
should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of
the decision.
m Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981).
54 Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114323, September 28,1999.
55 Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 114323, July 23,1998.
5
6 Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
132428, October 24,2000.
5
7 G.R. No. 81006, May 12,1989.
134 1LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 2.0
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study
was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was
merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on
which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should
suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course,
also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with,
comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or
adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision
should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial
sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of
decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main
accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there
are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended
discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be
employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases,
where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the
time needed to dismiss it....
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the
requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the
occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the
strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike
down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
In Yao v. Court of Appeals,58 the Court struck down a decision of a regional trial
court because it was "starkly [sihallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite
in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple
summation of facts which could easily be done." Such a decision was not even
considered a memorandum decision because it merely affirmed a lower court decision
without saying more.
PER CURIAM OPINIONS
A per curiam resolution is defined as "an opinion of the Court in which the judges
are all of one mind and the question involved is so clear that it is not necessary to
elaborate on it by an extended discussion" 59
Per curiam opinions are unsigned and decided by "the court." In the federal
appellate courts of the United States, per curiam opinions are reserved for cases deemed
routine and squarely controlled by precedent or for cases in which the court wants to
control the result without writing to explain why.60 True per curiam opinions are more
authoritative than signed opinions when they contain no reservations or exceptions.
58 G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000.
59
Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-29352, February 19,1986.
60 Gerald Lebovits, Technique: Legal Method to the Madness, 75-JUN N.Y. ST.B.J.64 (2003).
 THE DEcISIoN 1135
However, the authority extends only to the result, not to the reasoning. On the other
hand, per curiam opinions are less authoritative than signed opinions, when the court
uses them to decide mundane questions. Per curiam opinions are the most authoritative
opinions of all when the court wants to make a politically important decision issued by a
unanimous court, not from an individual judge appointed by a particular appointing
authority. An example of this form of percuriam opinion is Bush v. Gore.61
The Supreme Court usually resorts to per curiam decisions for cases involving the
imposition of the death penalty62 or severe administrative penalties. 63
MINUTE RESOLUTIONS
The Supreme Court is not bound to render signed decisions all the time and has
discretion to formulate decisions or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given,
depending on its evaluation of a case. 64 It disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute
resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, where:
1. a case is patently without merit;
2. the issues raised are factual in nature;
3. the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord
with the facts of the case and the applicable laws; or
4. it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early
execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. 65
The use of minute resolutions helps the court in alleviating its heavy docket.66
No law requires the Justices of the Supreme Court to sign minute resolutions that
deny due course to actions filed before it or the Chief Justice to enter his certification on
the same. To require the Justices to sign all its resolutions respecting its action on new
cases would be unreasonable and unnecessary. 67
With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court defined the instances
when cases are to be adjudicated by decision, signed resolution, unsigned resolution or
minute resolution. Among those instances when a minute resolution shall issue is when
the Court "denies a petition fied under Rule 45 of the [Rules of Court], citing as legal
61531 U.S. 98 (2000).
62 People v. Ebio, G.R No. 147750, September 29, 2004.
63 Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, September 22,2004.
64 In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, G.R. No. L-68635, March 12, 1987.
65 Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82273, June 1,1990.
66 Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited and North British & Mercantile Insurance
Company Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, G.R. No. L-43342, October 30,
1978.
67
Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc. G.R. No. 196358. March 21,2012.
1361 LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 2.0
basis the absence of reversible error committed in the challenged decision, resolution, or
order of the court below."6 8
Minute resolutions are promulgated by the Court through the Clerk of Court,
who sends copies to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a
particular case. The Clerk of Court informs the parties of the action taken on their cases
by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court, although she never participates in the
deliberations of a case. She merely transmits the Court's action to the parties. Minute
resolutions are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of the Supreme
Court but it does not delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or
any of its subalterns. When a petition is denied or dismissed by the Court, it sustains the
challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions.6 9
The Court needs the full time and attention of its Clerks of Court and other key officials.
Its officers do not have the time to answer frivolous complaints filed by disgruntled
litigants questioning decisions and resolutions of the Court and involving cases already
deliberated upon and resolved by the Court itself. All resolutions and decisions are
actions of the Court, not its subordinate personnel. The Court assumes full responsibility
for all its acts. Its personnel cannot answer and should not be made to answer for acts of
the Court.70
Minute resolutions are not constitutionally infirm because they are not
"decisions" within the meaning of the Constitution.7 The constitutional mandate is
applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," or those that are given due course and
after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the
petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefore stating the legal basis
thereof. When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings,
decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual
or where there is no reversible error in the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.72 The constitutional requirement that a
decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based refers
only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the second paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o petition for review
or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the legal basis therefor."73
The following are substantial distinctions between a minute resolution and a
decision:
1. Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, requiring that the facts and the law on
which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly, applies
only to decisions, not to minute resolutions.
68Id.
69Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, G.R. No. 56280, July 6,1981.
70 Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82273, June 1,1990.
71Novino v. Court of Appeals, G.RI No. L-21098, May 31,1963.
72 Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127682, April 24,1998.
3
7 Tayamura v. Intermediate Appellate Court,G.R. No. 76355, May 21,1987.
 THE DECISION 1137
2. A minute resolution is signed only by the Clerk of Court by authority of the
Justices.
3. A minute resolution does not require the certification of the Chief Justice.
4. Minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports.
5. Finally, as a rule, the Supreme Court lays down doctrines or principles of law
which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of
the Court and certified by the Chief Justice. 74
Minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it constitute actual
adjudications on the merits. These Resolutions are the product of thorough deliberation
among the members of the Court When the Court does not find any reversible error in
the decision of the Court of Appeals, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its
denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals. 75 Minute resolutions denying due course to
petitions or dismissing cases summarily for failure to comply with the formal or
substantial requirements laid down by law, are dispositions on the merits. 76
The application of the rule of res judicatadepends on whether a minute resolution
of the Supreme Court is an adjudication on the merits of the petition.77 In one case, the
Supreme Court explained that a minute resolution, while not a precedent relative to
strangers to an action, nonetheless binds the parties therein, and calls for the application
of res judicata.8
Minute resolutions are typically short as the following example shows:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
RESOLUTION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution
74 Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Valderama, G.R. No. 186614, February 23,
2011.
7
5 Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc., G.R. No. 196358, March 21, 2012.
76 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103412, February 3, 2000.
77 Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited and North British & Mercantile Insurance
Company Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company and the Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-43342, October 30, 1978. See also Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2009.
78 Philippine National Bank v. Lim, Q. No. 171677, January 30,2013.
138 1LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 2.0
dated JULY 17,2012, which reads asfollows: The petitioners argue that
"G.R. No. 202263 (Citizens Homobono A. Ad , an the Judicial and Bar
H ma TCouncil should desist
Paguia, Herman Tiu Laurel and Uriel G. BorJ President from selecting a Chief
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino EI and Judicial and Bar justice.
Council). - This is a Petition for Certiorariand Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction filed by petitioners Homobono A. Adaza, Alan
Paguia, Herman Tiu Laurel and Uriel G. Borja against
respondents President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino Ill and
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) questioning the JBC's
action in going over a list of nominees for the Chief Justice
of the Court based on the follo .inggrounds:(1) there is no
provision in the Constitution authorizng They cite three reasons as
entertain nominees for the position of Chief Justice of the the bases of their
Supreme Court and to submit a list to the President; (2) argument.
there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
President to appoint a Chief Justice as he can only appoint
the members of this Court;, and (3) even if the JBC has the
power to recommend nominees for the Chief Justice and
the President can appoint a Chief Justice, they cannot do so
until the Court resolves the petitions filed before it
questioning the jurisdiction of the Senate in[ The Court rules against
Impeachment case of Chief Justice Renato C the petitioners.
We find no merit in the petition.
The first and second grounds relied upon by petitioners are
the very issues resolved by the Court in Famela R. Dulay v.I The first two arguments
judicial and Bar Council and PaquitoN. Ochoa, Jr., as Executive have been resolved by the
Court in an earlier case.
Secretary. In said case, we upheld the JBC's action in Coutnnariecse
accepting applications and nominations for the position of
Chief Justice of this Court as well as the President's power
to appoint one, as the "members of the Supreme Court"
used in the 1987 Constitution who are within the
President's appointing power refer not only to the fourteen
Associate Justices of the Court but also to the Chief Justice.
Thus, we apply the same conclusion and, consequently,
dismiss the petition.
As to the third issue, suffice it to state that former Chief
Justice Corona himself respected te aecision uj utt -e On the third argument,
Impeachment Court and did not bring the matter to this the Court cites two
Court Thus, said petitions should not bar the JBC from reasonsbe
should why the JBC
allowed to
performing its duty of selecting the nominees for the vacant shoced.
We proceed.
post, and the President from making the appointment
would like to emphasize at this point that the Constitution
imposes on the President the imperative duty to make the
appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90
days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the
 THE DECISON 1139
President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Constitution. This 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1),
Article VIII, for the President to fill the vacancy, was
undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite
mandate for the President as the appointing power, and
cannot be defeated by the pendency of the cases referred to
by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED." (Carpio, Velasco,
Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Abad and Sereno, JJ., no part,
Peralta, I., presiding, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe,JI., present)
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL Clerk of Court
Some minute resolutions, however, take time to discuss substantive issues as
shown by the next example:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
RESOLUTION
This is an older
Resolution that does not
reflect gender sensitive
Gentlemen: language.
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the
Court En Banc dated February1, 2005.
G.R. No. 127882 (La Bugal B'laan Tribal Association, et al.
vs. Ramos, et al.) The title of the case is
Before the Court is petitioners' 38-page Motion for found in the body of the
Resolution.
Reconsideration praying for the reversal of this Court's
Resolution promulgated on December 1, 2004, on the
following grounds:
"I
The assumption that Filipino-owned
corporations cannot put up the capital and
that foreign-owned corporations are not ' Several grounds were
willing to provide large amounts of raised by the petitioners
belied by the very in asking the Supreme
financial assistance are bCourt to reverse its
facts of this case. December 2004
.0 Resolution.
1401 LEGAL METHoD ESSENTALS 2.0
The interpretation of paragraph four,
section 2, article XII of the Constitution
practically negates the operation of the
first paragraph, section 2, article XII of the
Constitution.
"I
The interpretation in the Decision violates
the constitutional requirement of equitable
sharing.
"IV
The 'control test' in the Decision is not in
consonance with the requirement of 'full
control and supervision' required of the
state considering that the kind of service
contracts during Martial Law has been
reestablished and reinstated.
"V
The alleged transfer of the FTAA to TMRC
is null and void because it violates the
fourth paragraph, section 2, article XII of
the Constitution.
"VI
The provisions of the FTAA which were
invalidated by the Decision dated
December 1, 2004 are not separable and are
intrinsic to the agreements.
"TIn
The 'closing out theory' of interpretation is
not valid." This is often the reason
cited by the Court for
A close perusal of the above issues and the di ions denying a motion for
thereof shows that they are a mere rehash of guments reconsideration.
and positions already raised and discussed tensively in
the 246-page Resolution of December 1, 2004, penned by
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban; as well as in the 125-page The Resolution's inclusion
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the 100- of the number of pages
page Dissenting Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio devoted to the Court's
December 1, 2004
Morales, the 29-page Separate Opinion of Justice Dante 0.
Resolution indicates that it
Tinga, and the 10-page Concurring Opinion of Justice is disinclined to address
Minita V. Chico-Nazario. the matter further.
Further discussion of these issues would not serve any
useful purpose, as it would merely repeat the same
justifications and reasons already taken up in the foregoing
Opinions, which tackled precisely those matters and even
 THE DECISION 1141
more; any further elucidations, disquisitions and
disputations would merely reiterate the same points
already passed upon.
In regard to the present Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Carpio, which in the main attacks RA 7942 (the Mining
Law), DAO 56-99 and the subject FTAA for allegedly\ In a Minute Resolution,
limiting "the equitable share of the State from the mining the Supreme Court is
profits of the foreign contractor" (p. 46), suffice it to not precluded from
addressing substantive
reiterate that "the development of the mining industry [is] issues.
the responsibility of the political branches of government.
And let not this Court interfere inordinately and
unnecessarily." The issue of how much "profit" the nation
should or could derive from the exploration, development
and utilization of the country's mineral resources is a policy
matter, over which we "must allow the President and
Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our
country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to
eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer
their cry for viable employment opportunities in the
country," (pp. 240-241, Resolution dated December 1, 2004).
That the aforementioned law, executive issuance and
contract had been declared constitutional will not prevent
Congress or the President or the parties to the FTAA from
amending or modifying them, if indeed, in their opinion This is another
they are unwise or wanting in any respect. indication that the
Court is no longer
In any event, after a thorough deliberation on the Won, inclined to address the
none of the members of this Court have changed their issues another time.
opinions or votes. Indeed, all the conceivable aspects of this I
litigation - factual, constitutional, legal, philosophical,
technical, financial, ecological, environmental and
technological - have all been extensively taken up and
addressed during the Court's lengthy and purposeful
debates and deliberations. Justices Carpio and
WHEREFORE, the Motion is DENIED with e Carpio-Morales wrote
separate dissents to this
prayer for oral argument is likewise DE . (Ynares- Minute Resolution.
Santiago, Carpio, Morales, and Callejo S ., J], maintain their
dissents; Azcuna, J, no part).
The Supreme Court also uses minute resolutions even when the issues raised in a
case are not insubstantial.
In a case where the extent of the powers of the Judicial and Bar Council were
raised, the Court saw it fit to dismiss the case through a minute resolution despite the
fact that the issues that were raised were novel and significant Below are excerpts:
142 1LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 2.0
EN BANC
[G.R No. 202143, July 03,2012]
FAMELA R. DULAY V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
AND PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution
dated JULY 3, 201Z which reads asfollows:
The title and the nature of
"G.R No. 202143 (Famela R. Dulay v. Judicial and Bar '
the case are expressed in
Council and Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., as Executive the first paragraph.
Secretary.). - This is a Petition for Certiorariand Prohibition,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, filed by
petitioner Famela R. Dulay against the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa The petition raises
Jr., raising the following issues: substantive issues that
have never been
addressed by the
A. Whether the respondent onorable JBC can Supreme Court before.
legitimately, validly and constitutionally accepts
(sic) application for nomination and interview of
nominees for the position of a Chief Justice of the
Honorable Court and, thereafter, submits (sic) short
list of nominees to the President of the Republic of
the Philippines for the appointment of a Chief
Justice of the Honorable Court,
B. Whether the President of the Republic of the
Philippines may legitimately, validly and
constitutionally appoint a Chief Justice of the
Honorable Court, in replacement of the removed
and impeached Honorable Renato C. Corona;
C. Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can
constitutionally be headed by a retired Associate
Justice of the Honorable Court, instead of an
incumbent Chief Justice of the Honorable Court
Petitioner claims that the President of the Republic of the
Philippines cannot legitimately, validly, and
constitutionally appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, because the 1987 Constitution only empowers him to
 THE DEC oN 1143
appoint members or Justices but not the Chief Justice. She
adds that the Chief Justice should be replaced and
designated exclusively from among their peers. Petitioner
also contends that the JBC cannot be validly, legally and
constitutionally headed by a retired Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, because the Constitution specifically
provides that it be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice
and no other. ru liisg-f.
SThis the Court's
We dismiss the petition....
(The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing
to file the Petition. That discussion has been omitted.)
Even if we ignore the technical defect and we look into the
merits of the case, the petition is still bound to be
dismissed.
Simply stated, petitioner seeks the resolution of two
substantive issues: (1) whether or not the President of the
Philippines has the constitutional power to appoint the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and (2) whether or not
the JBC can validly be headed by a person other than the
incumbent Chief Justice.
The Court identifies the
pertinent constitutional
We answer in the affirmative to both questions.
provisions.
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides for the
appointment of justices and Judges, to wit
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme
Courtand judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation. x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
In interpreting the above-stated constitutional provision,. This is the Courts
petitioner considers only the Associate Justices as the interpretation of the
"members of the Supreme Court" thereby excluding the provision.
Chief Justice from the President's appointing power. Said
interpretation is baseless.
A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the
Judicial Department in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
clearly shows that the phrase "Members of the Supreme
Court" and the words "Members" and "Member" are
1441 LEGAL METHoD ESSENTALS 2.0
repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of the Supreme
Court without distinction whether he be the Chief Justice or
any of the Associate Justices or all fifteen Justices.
Section 4 (1), Article VIII thereof defines the composition of
the Supreme Court, namely, "a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices" who may sit en banc or, in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or seven Members; Section 4
(2) and (3) describe the manner of conducting business in
the Court whether it be En Banc or in division; Section 7
(1) enumerates the qualifications of the Members of the
Court and the other members of the Judiciary; Section
11 provides for the security of tenure in the Judiciary;
Section 12 states the prohibition on non-judicial
assignments of the Members of the Supreme Court and of
other courts; and Section 13 lays down the process of
decision-making. In all of these provisions, the phrase
"Members of the Supreme Court" was repeatedly used to
refer not only to the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court but includes the Chief Justice. Thus, in Section 9 of
the same Article VIII on the appointment of Justices and
Judges, the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court"
clearly refers to the fifteen Justices of the Court - one Chief
Justice and fourteen (14) Associate Justices - who are within
the appointing power of the President Although decided
under a different Constitution, we reiterate the Court's
pronouncement in Vargas v. Rilloraza that "there can be no
doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required
x x x to compose the Supreme Court are the regular
members of the Court."
We, likewise, do not agree with petitioner that the JBC can
only be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and no
other. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the JBC cannot
perform its task without an incumbent Chief Justice. To
follow this logic would lead to an eventuality where a
vacancy in the Judiciary will not be filled if a vacancy
occurs in the JBC. We can likewise infer from this argument
that if the Office of the Chief Justice is vacated, the same
will not be filled because there will be no "incumbent Chief
Justice" to act as Chairman of the JBC.
We definitely cannot sustain these arguments. The
principal function of the JBC is to recommend appointees to
the Judiciary. For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the
President a list of at least three nominees and the President
may not appoint anybody who is not in the list. Any
vacancy in the Supreme Court is required by the
 THE DEcisBON 1145
Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the occurrence
thereof. This 90-day period is mandatory. It cannot,
therefore, be compromised only because the
constitutionally-named Chairman could not sit in the JBC.
Although it would be preferable if the membership of the
JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its
mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the
President even if the constitutionally-named ex-
officio Chairman does not sit in the JBC. This intention The Court relies on the
deliberations of the
evident from the exchanges among the Co7ers Constitutional
during the deliberations of the Constitutionalommission Commission to
of 1986, viz.: determine the intent of
the framers of the
Constitution.
MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our
justices now in the Supreme Court, together
with the Chief Justice, are only 11.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence
of this subsection reads: "Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof."
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to
the executive to fill the vacancy?
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right That is
borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years,
seldom has the Court had a complete
complement.
MR. DE CASTRO. By that time, upon
ratification of this Constitution, the Judicial
and Bar Council shall be in operation.
MR. CONCEPCION. We hope so.
MR. DE CASTRO. And one of the members
thereof is a Member of Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right
MR. DE CASTRO. An ex officio member. By
the time this is ratified, Congress is not yet
1461 LEGAL METHoD ESSENTIALS 2.0
convened and there will still be an election;
so there will still be a delay of more than 90
days. Maybe before the vacancies occur in
the Supreme Court, they will be filled up by
the President.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is possible.
MR. DE CASTRO. Therefore, it will take
perhaps until November or December before
the four other justices will be appointed, if
we follow the Judicial and Bar Council. Or
can the Judicial and Bar Council function
without the presence yet of a member of
Congress who is an ex-officio member?
MR. CONCEPCION. It can operate without
the ex-officio member because a majority
would be enough, although it would be
preferable if it were complete.
MR. DE CASTRO. So that upon ratification
of this Constitution, it is possible, and the
President may do it by appointing the
members of the Judicial and Bar Council
without first a representative from
Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct
MR. DE CASTRO. So that we can
immediately fill up the four vacancies in the
Supreme Court.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct
MR. DE CASTRO. I am asking this just for
the record, that the vacancies in the Supreme
Court be immediately filled up so that our
backlog of cases can be immediately
attended to....
Considering, however, that complete membership in the
JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power
over the JBC, this Court should not be deprived of
representation. The most Senior Justice of this Court who is
not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice should
participate in the deliberations for the selection of nominees
 THE DECISION 1147
for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in
the absence of the constitutionally-named Ex-
Officio Chairman, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, to wit:
Section 12. Vacancy in office of ChiefJustice. -
In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, or of his
inability to perform the duties and powers of
his office, they shall devolve upon the
Associate Justice who is first in precedence,
until such disability is removed, or another
Chief Justice is appointed and duly
qualified. This provision shall apply to every
Associate Justice who succeeds to the office
of Chief Justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we DISMISS the petition."
(Cario, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Abad and
Sereno, 1]., no part, Peralta, I., presiding,Bersamin, Del
Castilo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe,
JJ., present)
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court