Curative Petition Ayub PDF

Ba:r & Bench (www.barandb,ench.
com)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
CURATIVE PETITION [C] NO. ________ OF 2020
IN
REVIEW PETITION (C) diary no 44086 OF 2019
IN
CIVIL APPEAL No. 10866-10867 OF 2010
Arising out of the final Order in Review Petition dated

11.12.2019 in Civil Appeal No. 10866-10867 of 2010 passed
by this Hon’ble Court.
IN THE MATTER OF:
DR. MOHAMMAD AYUB PETITIONER/APPLICANT

VERSUS
MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
I.A. NO. OF 2020
[APPLICATION SEEKINGEXEMPTION FROM FILING THE

TYPED COPY OF JUDGMENT IN REVIEW]
PAPER BOOK
(FOR INDEX KINDLY SEE INSIDE)
ADVOCATE FOR PETITIONER: ABHINAV SHRIVASTAVA

Ba:r & Bench (www.barandb,ench.com)
RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS
Sl. No. Date of record of proceedings Pages

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IN
IN
IN THE MATTER OF:

VERSUS
MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
OFFICE REPORT ON LIMITATION
1. The Petition is/are within time.
2. The Petition is barred by time and there is delay of
____days in final Impugned Judgment& Orderdated
09.11.2019 in Civil Appeal No. 2894 of 2011 passed by this
Hon’ble Court filing the same and petition for condonation of
____ days delay has been filed.
BRANCH OFFICER
New Delhi.
Dated : January, 2020

IN
IN
IN THE MATTER OF:-
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
CURATIVE PETITION (C) No. IN THE IN THIS

of 2020 IN REVIEW PETITION [C] APPEAL PETITION
diary no 44086 OF 2019 ARISING
OUT OF CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10866
OF 2010]
1. Dr. Mohammad Ayub aged about Not a party Petitioner

64 years, S/o Late Ashik Ali /Applicant
resident of Zohara Complex,
Barhalganj
Versus
1. MAHANT SURESH DAS, Respondent Contesting
Chela of Sri Param Hans Ram No. 1 Responde
Chandra Das, R/o. nt
DigambarAkhara, Ayodhya City, No.1
District Faizabad, Uttar Pradesh
2. NIRMOHI AKHARA, Respondent Contesting

Through Mahant No. 2 Responde
Rameshwar Das, nt
MahantSarbarakar, R/o. No.2
NirmohiAkhara, Mohalla Ram
Ghat, City Ayodhya, District
Faizabad, Uttar Pradesh
3. THE STATE OF UTTAR Respondent Contesting

PRADESH, Through its Chief No. 3 Responde
Secretary to the State nt
Government, Uttar Pradesh No.3
4. THE COLLECTOR, Respondent Contesting

Faizabad, Uttar No. 4 Responde
Pradesh nt
No.4
5. THE CITY MAGISTRATE, Respondent Contesting
Faizabad, Uttar Pradesh No. 5 Responde
nt
No.5
6. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF Respondent Contesting
POLICE, Faizabad, Uttar No. 6 Responde
Pradesh nt
No.6
7. B. PRIYA DUTT (SINCE Respondent Contesting
DECEASED) No. 7 Responde
Through his Legal Heir nt
(i) JYOTI PATI RAM No.7
MohallaRakabganj, Faizabad,
Pradesh
8. PRESIDENT, ALL INDIA HINDU Respondent Contesting

MAHA No. 8 Responde
SABHA, Read Road, New Delhi nt
No.8
9. PRESIDENT, ARYA MAHA Respondent Contesting
PRADESHIK SABHA, No. 9 Responde
BaldanBhawan, Shradhanand nt
Bazar, Delhi. No.9
10. PRESIDENT, ALL INDIA Respondent Contesting
SANATAN DHARAM SABHA, No. 10 Responde
Shop No.35, GeetaBhawan, nt
Ground Floor, A-Block, Kirti No.10
Nagar, Delhi
11. DHARAM DAS ALLEGED CHELA Respondent Contesting

BABA ABHIRAM DAS, Resident No. 11 Responde
of Hanuman Garhi, Ayodhya, nt
Faizabad, Uttar Pradesh No.11
12. SRI PUNDRIK MISRA, S/o. Raj Respondent Contesting
NarainMisra, Resident of No. 12 Responde
BalrampurSarai, Rakabganj, nt
13. RAMESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, Respondent Contesting
S/o. Sri Parsh Rama Tripathi, No. 13 Responde
Resident of Village: Akbarpur, nt
ParganaMijhaura, No.13
TahsilAkbarpur, District:
Faizabad, Uttar Prades\
14. MADAN MOHAN GUPTA, Respondent Contesting

Convener of AkhilBhartiya No. 14 Responde
Sri Ram nt
Janam Bhoomi No.14
PunarudharSamiti,
E-7/45, Bangla, T.T. Nagar,
Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh
15. UMESH CHANDRA PANDEY, Respondent Contesting

S/o. Sri R.S. Pandey, R/o. No. 15 Responde
RanupalliAyodhya, District nt
S/o. Sri R.S. Pandey, R/o. No. 16 Responde
RanupalliAyodhya, District nt
17. THE SUNNI CENTRAL BOARD Respondent Contesting
OF No. 17 Responde
WAQFS, through its Secretary, nt
Shah No.17
GhayasAlam, Moti Lal Bose
Road, P.S.
Kaiserbagh, City Lucknow, Uttar
Pradesh
18. MISBAHUDDEEN, Respondent Contesting

S/o. Late ShriZiauddin, R/o. No. 18 Responde
MohallaAngooriBagh, Awadh nt
City, District Faizabad, Uttar No.18
Pradesh
19. MOHAMMAD HASHIM Respondent Contesting

(DEAD) THR. LRS. No. 19 Responde
MOHAMMAD IQBAL ANSARI nt
S/o.Late Mohammad No.19
Hashim,Residing at 4/318,
Kotia, AyodhyaCity, District
20. MAULANA MAHFOOZURAHMAN, Respondent Contesting

S/o. Late MaulanaVakiluddin, No. 20 Responde
Resident of Village Madarpur, nt
Pargana and TahsilTanda, No.20
District Faizabad, Uttar Pradesh
21. FAROOQ AHMAD, Respondent Proforma

S/o. Late Sri Zahoor Ahmad, No. 21 Responde
Resident of nt
MohallaNaugaziQabar, Ayodhya No.21
City, District Faizabad, Uttar
Pradesh
22. M. Siddiq. (D) Thr. LRs. Appellant Proforma

Responde
MAULANA SYED ASHHAD nt
RASHIDI, No.22
S/o. Maulana Syed
RashiduddinHamidi, President,
JamiatUlama-i-Hind,
SubhashMarg, AhataShaukati
Ali, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
CURATIVE PETITION (C) No. IN THE IN THIS

of 2020 IN REVIEW PETITION [C] APPEAL PETITION
diary no 44086 OF 2019 ARISING
OUT OF CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10867
OF 2010]
1. Dr. Mohammad Ayub aged about Not a party Petitioner

64 years, S/o Late Ashik Ali /Applicant
resident of Zohara Complex,
Barhalganj
Versus
1. BHAGWAN SRI RAM VIRAJMAN Respondent Contesting

AT SRI No. 1 Responde
RAMA JANAM BHUMI nt
AYODHYA, also called Bhagwan No.1
Sri Rama LalaVirajman,
Represented by next friend, Sri
TrilokNathPandey, S/o. Late
AskrutPandey, R/o.
KarsewakPuram, District
2. ASTHAN SRI RAM JANAM Respondent Contesting

BHUMI No. 2 Responde
AYODHYA, Represented by next nt
friend, Sri TrilokiNathPandey, No.2
S/o. Late AskrutPandey, R/o.
KarsewakPuram, District
3. TRILOKI NATH PANDEY, Respondent Contesting

S/o. Late AskrutPandey, R/o. No. 3 Responde

KarsewakPuram, District nt
4. SRI RAJENDRA SINGH, Respondent Contesting

S/o. Late Sri Gopal Singh No. 4 Responde
Visharad, at present residing at nt
Gonda, Care of the State Bank of No.4
India, Gonda Branch, Gonda,
Uttar Pradesh
5. MAHANT SURESH DAS, Respondent Contesting

Chela of Late No. 5 Responde
MahantParamRamchandraDas, nt
R/o. DigambarAkhara, Ayodhya No.5
City, District Faizabad, Uttar
Pradesh
6. NIRMOHI AKHARA MOHALLA Respondent Contesting

RAM GHAT, AYODHYA, through No. 6 Responde
its MahantJagannath Das, Chela nt
of Vaishnav Das Nirmohi, R/o. No.6
Mohalla Ram Ghat,
NirmohiBazar Pargana Haveli
Awadh, Ayodhya City, District
7. SUNNI CENTRAL BOARD OF Respondent Contesting

WAQFS, through its Chairman, No. 7 Responde
Moti Lal Bose Road, Lucknow, nt
Uttar Pradesh No.7
8. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, Respondent Contesting
through the Secretary, Home No. 8 Responde
Department, Civil Secretariat, nt
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh No.8
9. THE COLLECTOR Respondent Contesting
ANDDISTRICT No. 9 Responde
MAGISTRATE, Faizabad, nt
Uttar Pradesh No.9
10. THE CITY MAGISTRATE, Respondent Contesting

Faizabad, Uttar Pradesh No. 10 Responde
nt
No.10
11. THE SENIOR Respondent Contesting

SUPERINTENDENT OF No. 11 Responde
POLICE, Faizabad, Uttar nt
Pradesh No.11
12. THE PRESIDENT, ALL Respondent Contesting

INDIA HINDU MAHASABHA, No. 12 Responde
New Delhi nt
No.12
13. THE PRESIDENT, ALL Respondent Contesting

INDIA ARYA SAMAJ, Dewan No. 13 Responde
Hall, Delhi nt
No.13
14. THE PRESIDENT, ALL INDIA Respondent Contesting

SANATAN DHARMA SABHA, No. 14 Responde
Delhi nt
No.14
15. DHARAM DAS, Respondent Contesting

Chela Baba Abhiram Das, No. 15 Responde
Resident of Hanuman Garhi, nt
Ayodhya, Faizabad, Uttar No.15
Pradesh
16. SRI PUNDRIK MISRA, Respondent Contesting

S/o. Raj NarainMisra, Resident No. 16 Responde
of BalrampurSarai, Rakabganj, nt
17. RAMESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, Respondent Contesting
S/o. Sri Parsh Rama Tripathi, No. 17 Responde
Resident of Village: Akbarpur, nt
ParganaMijhaura, No.17
TahsilAkbarpur, District:

S/o. Sri Uma ShankerPandey, No. 18 Responde
R/o. RanopaliAyodhya, District nt
19. SRI RAMA JANAM BHUMI NYAS, Respondent Contesting
Through its Trustee, Mr. No. 19 Responde
ChampatRai, nt
having its office at No.19
SankatMochan Ashram,
Sri Hanuman Mandir, Rama
KrishanPuram, Sector VI, New
Delhi
20. SHIA CENTRAL BOARD OF Respondent Contesting

WAQFS, No. 20 Responde
U.P. LUCKNOW, through its nt
Chairman, No.20
817,Indra Bhawan,
AshokMarg,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
21. VAKEELUDDIN (DEAD) through Respondent Proforma

his Legal heir No. 21 Responde
MAULANA MEHFOOZ REHMAN, nt
S/o. Late ShriVakeeluddin, R/o. No.21
MadarpurPargana and Tehsil
Tanda, District Faizabad, Uttar
Pradesh
22. M. Siddiq. (D) Thr. LRs. Appellant Proforma

MAULANA SYED ASHHAD Responde
RASHIDI, nt
S/o. Maulana Syed No.22
RashiduddinHamidi, President,
JamiatUlama-i-Hind,
SubhashMarg, AhataShaukati
Ali, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
CURRATIVE PETITION BY PETITIONER AGAINST THE

ORDER DATED 11.12.2019 PASSED IN REVIEW PETITION
[C] diary no 44086 OF 2019 PASSED BY THIS HON’BLE
COURT, SEEKING REVIEW OF JUDGMENT DATED
09.11.2019 IN CIVIL APPEAL No. 10866-67 OF 2010 AND
OTHER CONNECTED APPEALS.
To,
THE HON’BLE CHIEF
JUSTICE OF INDIA AND
HIS COMPANION JUDGES
OF THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA
THE HUMBLE PETITION OF THE
PETITIONER ABOVE-NAMED
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:-
1. That petitioner is filing the present Curative Petition

against the order dated 11.12.2019 passed by this
Hon’ble Court in Review Petition [C] diary no 44086 OF
2019 arising out of judgment dated 09.11.2019
pronounced by this Hon’ble Court in the batch of
matters, wherein the lead matter was Civil Appeal No.

10866-67 of 2010. The said batch of matters related to
the Ramjanambhoomi/Babri Masjid civil dispute in terms
whereof OOS No. 5/1989 has been decreed and OOS No.
4/1989 has been partly decreed.
2. The petitioner has not filed any other Curative Petition

before this Hon’ble Court against the order dated
11.12.2019 passed by this Hon’ble Court in Review
Petition [C] diary no 44086 OF 2019 arising out of
judgment dated 09.11.2019 of the pronounced by this
Hon’ble Court in the batch of matters, wherein the lead
matter was Civil Appeal No. 10866-67 of 2010.
3. The petitioner herein was not the party before this

Hon’ble Court in the impugned Civil Appeal No.
10866/2010, but since the judgment impugned passed
by this Hon’ble Court dated 09.11.2019 was not only a
descriptive judgment which describes various historic
facts and dealt with the approval pertaining to the same,
but also affects the sentiments of large number of
persons of one community & religion. Due to this reason
petitioner herein as a responsible and law abiding citizen
of his native area and also as a socially active figure
attempting continuously to raise the bonafide cause on
his part.
4. That the primary reason leading to file the present

Curative Petition in brief are that the originally Suit No.4
of 1989 was filed and was tried under Order I Rule 8 of
CPC and even if the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs U.P.
which was the Original Plaintiff No.1 in O.S. No. 4 of
1989 had not preferred properly the Review Petition
before this Hon’ble Court but the said Suit was filed in a
the representative capacity for the entire Muslim
Community and the present curative petitioner is entitled

to approach this Hon’ble Court because there are patent
errors on the face of the record in the judgment in review,
passed by this Hon’ble Court dated November 9, 2019
reported in 2019 (15) Scale 1
5. That the judgment contains several errors apparent on

the face of the record which go to the root of the matter.
6. That the judgment relies upon patent errors and creates

rights based on illegal acts which is incorrigible in light of
settled law.
7. That there has been a violation of Principles of Natural

Justice (nemodebetesscjudex in propriacausa) and the
Rule of Law.
8. That the material errors in the judgment in review,

manifest on the face of the order, undermines its
soundness and results in miscarriage of justice
9. It is evident from the facts and submissions hereinabove

that the judgment in reviewcontains patent factual and
legal errors, which sufficiently make out a case for review
in the Open Court. Inter alia, following are the grounds
which establish a case for review by this Hon’ble Court:
10. That the grounds taken in the Curative Petition has

already been raised in the Review Petition which has
been dismissed by circulation and no new ground has
been taken in the Curative Petition, the present Curative
Petition before this Hon’ble Court on the following
amongst others:
GROUNDS
A. NON APPRICIATION OF FACTS REGARDING

POSSESSION, MANIFEST ON THE FACE OF THE
JUDGMENT DATED 09.11.2019 PRONOUNCED BY
THIS HON’BLE COURT IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10866-
67 OF 2010
A1. A claim to possessory title must be based on exclusive and

unimpeded possession which has to be established by
evidence, which was never the case for the Hindus whether
we consider the outer or the inner courtyard, and hence
such a finding is contrary to observations in the judgment
itself.
1.1. The judgment holds that Hindus were in exclusive

possession of the outer courtyard and that the
Muslims were not in the exclusive possession of the
inner courtyard, which may be erroneous in light of
the following:
a. The fact that the inner courtyard was

“landlocked” [@ Para 720 (viii)] and
Muslims had not completely lost access to
or abandoned the disputed property [@ Para
718] brings us to the logical conclusion that
the Hindus could not have been in exclusive
possession of the outer courtyard.
b. The finding that there is an absence of any

evidence to indicate that the Muslims had
asserted any right of possession or
occupation over the area of the disputed
property beyond the railing [@ Para 720
(iv)] is without any basis and completely
disregards the Suit of 1885 which was
essentially decreed in favour of the Muslims.
c. With respect to the suit of 1885, it is essential

to keep in mind S 33 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 which reads as under:
“Relevancy of certain evidence for proving,

in subsequent proceeding, the truth of
facts therein stated.—Evidence given by a
witness in a judicial proceeding, or before
any person authorized by law to take it, is
relevant for the purpose of proving, in a
subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a
later stage of the same judicial proceeding,
the truth of the facts which it states, when
the witness is dead or cannot be found, or
is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept
out of the way by the adverse party, or if
his presence cannot be obtained without
an amount of delay or expense which,
under the circumstances of the case, the
Court considers unreasonable: Provided—
that the proceeding was between the
same parties or their representatives in
interest; that the adverse party in the first
proceeding had the right and opportunity
to cross-examine; that the questions in
issue were substantially the same in the
first as in the second proceeding.”
1.2. The judgment records that ‘…As regards namaz
within the disputed site, the evidence on record
indicates that namaz was being offered until 16
December 1949. However, the extent of namaz would
appear to have been confined to Friday namaz
particularly in the period preceding the events of
December 1949…’ [@ Para 771]
1.3. The judgment also records that ‘…a reasonable

inference that there was no total ouster of the
Muslims from the inner structure prior to 22/23
December 1949though their access was intermittent
and interrupted; and…’ [@ Para 786(xi)]
A2. The present case relates to title or ownership of this

composite place of worship for which the court factored in
the length and extent of use of the site, and on balance of

probabilities, the evidence presented by the plaintiffs in
Suit 4, especially when it comes to a finding of
possession/title stands at a better footing and
presumption of title (u/S 110 Evidence Act, 1872) must be
held in favour of the Muslims who were in lawful
possession till the premises were attached.
A3. That the judgment in review despite making note of the

various judicial cases [@Para 46], has wrongly concluded
that the Muslims made no assertion on the outer
courtyard after the grill wall was built on direction of the
British Government for maintaining law and order. This is
evident from the following:
3.1. On December 10,1858, an order was passed in Case

No. 884 recording that Jhanda (flag) was uprooted
from the Masjid and the Faqir, who had trespassed
into the Babri Mosque and affixed a flag therein,
residing therein was ousted
3.2. On 25.9.1866, an application was filed by Mohd.

Afzal (Mutwalli Masjid Babri) against Tulsidas and
other Bairagis, praying for demolishing the new
Kothari which has been newly constructed by the
Respondent for placing idols etc. inside the door of
the Masjid where Bairagis have constructed a
Chabootra.
3.3. On August 26, 1868, an Order was passed by Major

J. Reed Commissioner, Faizabad in the case of
Niyamat Ali and Mohd. Shah Vs. GangadharShastri.
This case was filed by the Muslims against one
Ganga Dhar alleging that he was encroaching on
the North West Corner of the Masjid, however the

encroachment could not be proved.
3.4. In November 1873, an Appeal was filed by Mohd.

Asghar against placing of an Idol on platform of
Janamsthan. MahantBaldev Das was directed by an
Order of the Court to remove the idol i.e.
CharanPaduka which he failed to comply with. Its
pertinent to note that even this was done illegally.
3.5. Appeal against the permission of opening of the

Singh Dwar in 1877 was dismissed on the ground
that it doesn’t interfere with the worship of
Muslims. It’s important to note that it wasn’t done
at the behest of their worship, however, as has been
read in the judgment in review.
3.6. On November 2, 1883, Mohd. Asgar filed a case

(being Case No. 19435) before Learned Assistant
Commissioner stating that he is entitled to get the
wall of the mosque white-washed but is being
obstructed by Raghubar Das.
3.7. The 1885 suit- In this case the Hindu parties

pleaded that the Ram Chabutara was being
worshipped as the birthplace of Lord Ram and that
they be permitted to construct a temple on the
same. The case of the Hindu parties was dismissed
by the Learned Sub Judge on December 24,1885
and subsequently even the first appeal and second
appeal were dismissed on March 18/26,1886 and
November 2,1886 respectively. While the suit of the
Hindu parties was dismissed, it was categorically
held that Ram Chabutara was the birthplace of Lord
Ram and that the Hindu parties had very limited
prescriptive rights over the Ram Chabutara,
SitaRasoi and Bhandara. The same has been

inferred to have been evidence as to exclusive
possession of the Hindus in the outer courtyard
which goes completely against the judgments of
1886.
B. BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT HAS OTHER ERRORS

APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD
B1. Burden of Proof on Plaintiffs in Suit 5 Not Discharged.

This Hon’ble Court in A. Raghavamma and Anr. v. A.
Chenchamma and Anr. AIR 1964 SC 136 has held
that, “There is an essential distinction between
burden of proof and onus of proof; burden of proof lies
upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never
shifts but the onus of proof shifts.”
B2. Thus, while the onus of proof can shift, the incidence of
the burden of proof does not. Suit 5 is not a suit by a
worshipper, it’s a suit by a next friend on behalf of the
deity and is a title suit. The plaintiffs in Suit 5 have
failed to discharge their burden of proof, in so far as
they need to establish their title to the disputed
property. The Hindus as the Muslims alike were
supposed to establish their Possessory Title (apart from
Worship) in terms of point (ix) of sub-section F, “Points
for Determination”. However, besides having recorded
that the inner courtyard saw infrequent disputes, and
those to be evidence of worship, if any, it still does not
amount to a Possessory Title having been established by
the Hindus. The evidence presented by plaintiffs in Suit
5 must also be scrutinized through the same lens which
has been used to appreciate the evidence in support of
Suit 4. Anything short of this would be manifestly
arbitrary and be a violation of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India.
B3. The judgment at one place states that ‘…At the outset,
before setting out in detail the evidence on behalf of
plaintiffs in Suit 5, it is pertinent to note that this Court
records that in order to establish their case, the plaintiffs
in Suit 5 need to prove that:
(i) There existed an ancient Hindu temple at

the disputed site;
(ii) The existing ancient Hindu temple was
demolished in order to construct the Babri
Masjid; and
(iii) The mosque was constructed at the site of
the temple.
The burden of proof to establish a positive case lies on
the plaintiffs in Suit 5 in terms of Sections 101 to 103
of the Evidence Act 1872.’[@ Para 485]
B4. Further, the submission that the existence of an
ancient Hindu temple below the disputed property
was evidence that the title to the disputed land vested
in the plaintiffs in Suit 5 was rejected and the
judgment in review concluded that, “This Court cannot
entertain or enforce rights to the disputed property
based solely on the existence of an underlying temple
dating to the twelfth century.” [@ Para 649].
B5. This is because no argument other than a bare
reliance on the ASI report was put forth. No evidence
was led by the plaintiffs in Suit 5 to support the
contention that even if the underlying structure was
believed to be a temple, the rights that may flow from
it were recognized by subsequent sovereigns. The
mere existence of a structure underneath the
disputed property cannot lead to a legally enforceable

claim to title today.
B6. Subsequent to the construction of the ancient
structure in the twelfth century, there exists an
intervening period of four hundred years prior to the
construction of the mosque. Further, it is admitted by
all parties that at some point during the reign of the
Mughal Empire, a mosque was constructed at the
disputed site. Lastly, that even if this Court was to
assume that the underlying structure was in fact a
Hindu temple which vested title to the disputed site in
the plaintiff deities, no evidence was led by the
plaintiffs in Suit 5 to establish that upon the change
in legal regime to the Mughal sovereign, such rights
were recognized. [@ Para 648].
B7. The remit of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI)
and the conclusions arrived by the ASI Report assume
importance in this light. The question referred to the
ASI was “whether there was any temple/structure
which was demolished and mosque was constructed
on the disputed site”[@ Pg 2, ASI Report, 2003]. The
judgment makes the following important observations
with respect to the ASI Report:
A. The report is an opinion; nevertheless of

an expert governmental agency in the
area of archaeology. [@ Para 487]
B. There is the presence of pillar bases
above the circular shrine. This aspect
must be taken into account while
ascertaining the overall weight to be
ascribed to the ASI report. [@ Para 501]
C. According to the ASI team, what remains

of the sculpture indicates a ―waist, thigh
and foot of a couple... But, calling it a
―divine couple is beyond the stretch of
imagination. [@ Para 503]
D. The possible linkages of Buddhist or Jain
traditions cannot be excluded... The
excavation in the present case does in
fact suggest a confluence of civilisations,
cultures and traditions…The statement
that some of the fragments belong to an
Islamic structure has in fact been noticed
in the ASI report. [@ Para 504]
E. Caveats:
a. The circular shrine (conceivably a
Shiva shrine) and the underlying
structure with pillar bases belong
to two different time periods
between three to five centuries
apart;
b. There is no specific finding that the
underlying structure was a
temple dedicated to Lord Ram;
and
c. Significantly, the ASI has not
specifically opined on whether a
temple was demolished for the
construction of the disputed
structure. [@ Para 509]
F. The High Court had inferred that since
the foundation of the erstwhile structure
was used for the construction of a
mosque, the builder of the mosque would
have been aware of the nature of the

erstwhile structure. This is an inference
which the High Court has drawn though
that is not a specific finding which the
ASI has returned in the course of its
report. [@ Para 510]
G. ASI‘s inability to render a specific finding
on- whether a Hindu temple had been
demolished to pave way for the
construction of the mosque- is certainly a
significant evidentiary circumstance
which must be borne in mind when the
cumulative impact of the entire evidence
is considered in the final analysis. [@
Para 511]
B8. Having marshalled through the entirety of evidence,

this Court specifically finds that a finding of title
cannot be based in law on the archaeological findings
which have been arrived at by ASI. [@ Para 788
III].Apart from this, it concludes on the ASI Report as
follows:
1. A reasonable inference can be drawn on the
basis of the standard of proof which governs
civil trials that:
(i) The foundation of the mosque is based on
the walls of a large pre-existing structure;
(ii) The pre-existing structure dates back to
the twelfth century; and
(iii) The underlying structure which provided
the foundations of the mosque together with
its architectural features and recoveries are
suggestive of a Hindu religious origin
comparable to temple excavations in the

region and pertaining to the era. [@ Para
788 I].
2. However, in light of the claim of the plaintiffs in
Suit 5 and the remit of the ASI, the Caveats
seem to be more significant and are as follows:
(i) While the ASI report has found the existence
of ruins of a preexisting structure, the report
does not provide:
(a) The reason for the destruction of the
pre-existing structure; and
(b) Whether the earlier structure was
demolished for the purpose of the
construction of the mosque.
(ii) Since the ASI report dates the underlying
structure to the twelfth century, there is a time
gap of about four centuries between the date of
the underlying structure and the construction of
the mosque. No evidence is available to explain
what transpired in the course of the intervening
period of nearly four centuries;
(iii) The ASI report does not conclude that the
remnants of the preexisting structure were used
for the purpose of constructing the mosque
(apart, that is, from the construction of the
mosque on the foundation of the erstwhile
structure); and
(iv) The pillars that were used in the
construction of the mosque were black Kasauti
stone pillars. ASI has found no evidence to show
that these Kasauti pillars are relatable to the
underlying pillar bases found during the course
of excavation in the structure below the

mosque.[@ Para 788 II].
B9. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that the judgment

is required to record a finding for the questions set out
in sub-section F, “Points for determination”. However,
having recorded the findings for Points (iii)(b) and (iii)(c)
in the negative, i.e., overturning the majority judgment
of the Allahabad High Court, the judgment doesn’t come
to a logical conclusion when it comes to Point (iii)(d) i.e.
“What, if any are the legal consequences arising out of the
determination on (a)(b) and (c) above. The relevant Points
for determination are reproduced as under:
“(iii)(b) Whether the temple was demolished by Babur or
at his behest by his commander Mir Baqi in 1528 for the
construction of the Babri Masjid;
(iii)(c) Whether the mosque was constructed on the
remains of and by using the materials of the temple;”
B10. The Court also answered Point (xiii) – “Whether the

plaintiff in Suit 5 have established their title to the
disputed property” - in sub-section F, “Points of
Determination” in the affirmative, despite holding that
no evidence which could establish Title has been
adduced by the plaintiffs in Suit 5. Apart from the Oral
testimonies which were recorded half a decade after
the reprehensible and illegal acts of 1949, the Court
has considered the following submissions/evidence
and held as follows:
Submission/Evidence Finding w.r.t. Title of

Disputed Property
B1. Parikrama: “The performance of the

parikrama, which is a
form of worship
“It was urged that the
conducted as a matter of
performance of the
faith and belief cannot be
parikrama
claimed as the basis of
(circumambulation) around
an entitlement in law to a
the disputed property
proprietary claim over
delineated the property
property.”[@ Para 164]
which was worshipped as
the Janmasthan and it is
this property, being divine,
upon which the status of a
juristic person must be
conferred.”[@ Para 163]
B2. Travelogues, “Consequently, where

Gazetteers and there is a dispute
Books pertaining to possession
and title amidst a conflict
of parties, historical
“Issues of title cannot be
accounts cannot be
decided on the basis of
regarded as conclusive.
historical work, treatises
The court must then
and travelogues”[@ Para
decide the issue in
584]
dispute on the basis of
credible evidentiary
material.” [@ Para 591]
“While we have made a

reference to the accounts

of travellers and
gazetteers, we read them
with caution. The
contents of these
accounts cannot be
regarded as being
conclusive on the issue of
title which has
necessitated an
adjudication in the
present proceedings.” [@
Para 594]
B3. ASI Report “A finding of title cannot

be based in law on the
archaeological findings
which have been arrived
at by ASI.”[@ Para 788
III].
B11. With respect to the oral evidence, it is essential to

note that the judgment makes note of three
significant areas of dispute:
(i) The presence of idols under the central

dome of the three domed structure, which
was a part of the Babri Mosque to the
Muslims and the “GarbhGrih” to the Hindus.
(ii) Second, there are variations in regard to

the statements of the Hindu witnesses on
whether and, if so the nature of the prayers,
that were offered inside the inner sanctum

prior to 22-23 December 1949. The case that
prayers were offered at the railing is
inconsistent with the claim that prayers were
being offered inside the three domed
structure by the Hindus between 1934 and
1949. According to the Muslim witnesses, no
prayers were being offered inside the three
domed structure by the Hindus; and
(iii) Third, there is a variation between the

statements of the Hindu and Muslim
witnesses on whether namaz was offered
inside the three domed structure of the
mosque between 1934 and 1949. [@ Para
532]
B12. The above stated significant areas of dispute must

be seen in light of the fact thatthere is no dispute in
regard to the faith and belief of the Hindus that the
birth of Lord Ram is ascribed to have taken place at
Ayodhya. What is disputed is whether the disputed
site below the central dome of the Babri Masjid is
the place of birth of Lord Ram. And, it was
categorically submitted that there is no evidence of
the area below the central dome being worshipped as
the place of birth of Lord Ram before 1949. [@ Para
591]. And, the judgment seems to have held that
there, in fact, was no evidence to suggest that the
Ramchabutra was ever under the central dome or
that the idols existed inside the mosque prior to
December 1949. [@Para 391]
B13. Lastly, with respect to granting title only on the

basis of faith and belief, the judgment holds as
follows:
a. “Title cannot be established on the basis of faith

and belief above.” [@Para 788 IV].
b. “The adjudication of civil claims over private

property must remain within the domain of
the secular if the commitment to
constitutional values is to be upheld.” [@Para
204]
c. “From Shahid Gunj to Ayodhya, in a country

like ours where contesting claims over
property by religious communities are
inevitable, our courts cannot reduce
questions of title, which fall firmly within the
secular domain and outside the rubric of
religion, to a question of which community‘s
faith is stronger.” [@Para 205]
Thus, in effect, there is no evidence to prove title or

possessory title in favour of plaintiffs in Suit 5 and
therefore, the finding for sub-section F, “Points of
Determination”, (xiii) could not have been in the
affirmative. At best, the appreciation of evidence
establishes worship at the dispute site (in the outer
courtyard prior to December 1949), and not possessory
title. Thus, the answer to the second limb of “Point of
Determination”, (xi) could also not been in the affirmative,
and hence, the judgment must be reviewed.
C. BECAUSE OF THE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING

MATERIAL FACTS THAT RAISE PERTINENT LEGAL
ISSUES, AND VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
JUSTICE (NEMO DEBET ESSC JUDEX IN PROPRIA CAUSA)

AND RULE OF LAW
C.1. The connivance/negligence of the authorities which led to

the desecration of the mosque and violation of this Court’s
order which led to its demolition have been held to be illegal
acts. No right can flow from such illegal and reprehensible
acts of 22nd and 23rd December 1949, when the mosque
was desecrated by surreptitiously installing idols inside it,
and thereafter, the planned demolition of 6th December
1992.
1.1. The Court asked if the surreptitious installation of

the idols on the night between 22 and 23 December
1949 created a right in favour of NirmohiAkhara,
but didn’t not have to answer the question because
NirmohiAkhara denied the event altogether. [@para
268] However, having held that idols were
surreptitiously placed under the central dome
[@para 302, 388, 719], this is a pertinent question
of law which should have then been answered while
deciding Suit 5 and Suit 1.
1.2. The judgment in reviewrecords that there is no

controversy as to precise date of construction of the
mosque- “Hence, both in the pleading in Suit 4 and
in Suit 5, there was essentially no dispute about the
fact that the mosque was raised in 1528 A.D. by or
at the behest of Babur.” [@Para 68] - and that there
is evidence on record to hold that Muslims offered
Friday namaz at the mosque and had not
completely lost access to or abandoned the disputed
property. [@Para 718]
1.3. Further, that during the pendency of the suits, the

entire structure of the mosque was brought down in
a calculated act of destroying a place of public
worship. The judgment further holds that, “The
Muslims have been wrongly deprived of a mosque
which had been constructed well over 450 years
ago.” [@Para 798]. Furthermore, it holds that, “the
Muslims were dispossessed upon the desecration of
the mosque on 22/23 December 1949 which was
ultimately destroyed on 6 December 1992. There was
no abandonment of the mosque by the Muslims.”
[@Para 799]
1.4. The judgment in fact holds that the Muslims were

deprived of the mosque otherwise than by the due
process of Law and thereafter the premises were
attached under S 145 CrPC. The finding has been
reproduced as under:
“The events preceding 22/23 December 1949

indicate the build-up of a large presence of Bairagis
in the outer courtyard and the expression of his
apprehension by the Superintendent of Police that the
Hindus would seek forcible entry into the precincts of
the mosque to install idols. In spite of written
intimations to him, the Deputy Commissioner and
District Magistrate (K KNayyar) paid no heed and
rejected the apprehension of the Superintendent of
Police to the safety of the mosque as baseless. The
apprehension was borne out by the incident which
took place on the night between 22/23 December
1949, when a group of fifty to sixty persons installed
idols on the pulpit of the mosque below the central
dome. This led to the desecration of the mosque and
the ouster of the Muslims otherwise than by the due

process of law. The inner courtyard was thereafter
attached in proceedings under Section 145 CrPC
1898 on 29 December 1949 and the receiver took
possession;” [@ Para 788 XVI]
1.5. Thus, the judgment holds that Muslims were in

possession of the Mosque till it was desecrated and
the Hindus came to be in possession of the Mosque
by illegal acts and the same cannot be equated to
lawful possession. It is unprecedented,
unconscionable and against the principles of Rule of
Law to equate the two and hold that the evidence in
favour of plaintiffs in Suit 5, stands at a better
footing than that of plaintiffs in Suit 4, when it
comes to establishing possession of the inner
courtyard. [@para 800]
1.6. In Northern India Caterers v Lt Governor of

Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674, it was held that, “the
court may also review a judgment if a manifest
wrong has been done and if it is necessary to pass
an order to do full and effective justice”. No right
(possession, ownership, prayer) can be claimed if it
was founded on an illegality in which the claimant
was or was not complicit. [@ A68]. The trespass of
1949 was pre-meditated, pre-planned to desecrate
the mosque, which has been accepted by this Court.
However, the judgment while recognizing the
illegality of these acts, fails to consider the
consequences of the illegal ouster, and hence, the
judgment must be reviewed.
C2. Moreover, it is settled law thatEx dolomalo non orituractio

i.e. 'no right of action can have its origin in fraud'.
2.1. The law was stated as far back as 1775 by Lord

Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson [(1775) 1 Cowp
341, 343 : 98 ER 1120, 1121] in the following
words:
“The principle of public policy is this; ex

dolomalo non orituractio. No Court will lend its
aid to a man who founds his cause of action
upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the
plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of
action appears to arise ex turpicausa, or the
transgression of a positive law of this country,
there the Court says he has no right to be
assisted. It is upon that ground the Court goes;
not for the sake of the defendant, but because
they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff.”
C.3. In KedarNathMotani v. PrahladRai, AIR 1960 SC 213,

having referred to Holman v. Johnson, this Court held as
under:
15. The correct position in law, in our opinion, is that

what one has to see is whether the illegality goes so
much to the root of the matter that the plaintiff cannot
bring his action without relying upon the illegal
transaction into which he had entered. If the illegality
be trivial or venial, as stated by Williston and the
plaintiff is not required to rest his case upon that
illegality, then public policy demands that the
defendant should not be allowed to take advantage
of the position. A strict view, of course, must be taken
of the plaintiff's conduct, and he should not be
allowed to circumvent the illegality by resorting to
some subterfuge or by mis-stating the facts. If,
however, the matter is clear and the illegality is not
required to be pleaded or proved as part of the cause
of action and the plaintiff recanted before the illegal
purpose was achieved, then, unless it be of such a
gross nature as to outrage the conscience of the
Court, the plea of the defendant should not prevail.”
C.4. No right of action can have its origin in fraud, and the
claim of plaintiffs in suit 5 cannot stand without the
illegally desecrating the mosque in 1949 and demolishing
it in 1992. What relief would this Court have given if the
mosque still stood at the disputed site?
C.5. Another legal maxim of considerable import is- Ex

turpicausa non oritur action i.e. from a dishonorable cause
an action does not arise. The dishonourable cause of action
in this case is the shifting of idols from the Ram Chabutra
(which was believed to be the birth place of Lord Ram until
1949) to be placed under the central dome in order to
desecrate the mosque in sheer violation of Rule of Law.
5.1. In ImmaniAppaRao v.
GollapalliRamalingamurthi, AIR 1962 SC 370,
this Court held as under:
“13. Out of the two confederates in fraud

Respondent 1 wants a decree to be passed in his
favour and that means he wants the active
assistance of the Court in reaching the properties
possession of which has been withheld from him by
Respondent 2 and the appellants. Now, if the
defence raised by the appellants is shut out
Respondent 1 would be entitled to a decree because
there is an ostensible deed of conveyance which
purports to convey title to him in respect of the
properties in question; but, in the circumstances,
passing a decree in favour of Respondent 1 would
be actively assisting Respondent 1 to give effect to
the fraud to which he was a party and in that sense
the Court would be allowed to be used as an
instrument of fraud, and that is clearly and patently

inconsistent with public interest.”
5.2. Recently, inNarayanamma and Anr v. Govindappa

and Ors, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1260, this Court
held as under:
“19… 21. To the same effect is the opinion of

Story [Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. I, s.
421; English edition by Randall, 1920, s. 298.] :
“In general, where parties are concerned in
illegal agreements or other transactions,
whether they are mala prohibita or mala in se,
courts of equity following the rule of law as to
participators in a common crime will not
interpose to grant any relief, acting upon the
known maxim in pari delicto
potiorestconditiodefendentis et possidentis. The
old cases often gave relief, both at law and in
equity, where the party would otherwise derive
an advantage from his inequity. But the modern
doctrine has adopted a more severely just and
probably politic and moral rule, which is, to
leave the parties where it finds them giving no
relief and no countenance to claims of this sort.”
20. It could thus be seen that, although illegality

is not pleaded by the defendant nor is relied
upon by him by way of defence, yet the court
itself, upon the illegality appearing upon the
evidence, will take notice of it, and will dismiss
the action ex turpi causa non oritur actio. It has
been held, that no polluted hand shall touch the
pure fountain of justice. It has further been
held, that where parties are concerned in illegal
agreements or other transactions, courts of

equity following the rule of law as to
participators in common crime will not interpose
to grant any relief, acting upon the maxim
in pari delicto potiorestconditiodefendetis et
possidentis.
26. However, the ticklish question that arises in

such a situation is: “the decision of this Court
would weigh in side of which party”? As held
by Hidayatullah, J.
in KedarNathMotani (supra), the question that
would arise for consideration is as to whether
the plaintiff can rest his claim without relying
upon the illegal transaction or as to whether the
plaintiff can rest his claim on something else
without relying on the illegal transaction.
Undisputedly, in the present case, the claim of
the plaintiff is entirely based upon the
agreement to sell dated 15.05.1990, which is
clearly hit by Section 61 of the Reforms Act.
There is no other foundation for the claim of the
plaintiff except the one based on the agreement
to sell, which is hit by Section 61 of the Act. In
such a case, as observed by Taylor, in his “Law
of Evidence” which has been approved by
Gajendragadkar, J. in ImmaniAppaRao (supra),
although illegality is not pleaded by the
defendant nor sought to be relied upon him by
way of defence, yet the Court itself, upon the
illegality appearing upon the evidence, will take
notice of it, and will dismiss the action ex
turpicausa non orituractioi.e. No polluted hand
shall touch the pure fountain of justice. Equally,
as observed in Story's Equity Jurisprudence,

which again is approved
in ImmaniAppaRao (supra), where the parties
are concerned with illegal agreements or other
transactions, courts of equity following the rule
of law as to participators in a common crime
will not interpose to grant any relief, acting
upon the maxim in pari delicto
potiorestconditiodefendentis et possidentis.”
5.3. Thus, it is settled law that no cause of action can

arise based on illegal acts. What makes the cause of
action in the present case even more dishonourable
is that it was in violation of Orders of Courts,
including this one, and no polluted hand shall
touch the pure fountain of justice.
C6. The Juristic Personality of the Plaintiff No 1-Idol was not

admitted by the plaintiffs in Suit 4, and as such the
admission on the basis of which the juristic personality of
the first plaintiff in Suit 5 has been proceeded is incorrect
and fails to take into account the fact that, while the idol
was shifted within a distance of 100 feet, it was done so
illegally and in a place of worship of a people of different
faith and in violation of Rule of Law. Can illegally shifted
idol(s) claim and be accorded the status of a juristic
personality?
6.1. While discussing that legal personality which is

conferred on Hindu idols to provide courts with a
conceptual framework within which they practically
adjudicate disputes involving competing claims over
disputed property endowed to or appurtenant to
Hindu idols, this Court noted that the law thus
protects the properties of the idol even absent the
establishment of a specific or express trust.

However, it further proceeds on the premise that no
submissions were made challenging the legal
personality of the first plaintiff. Significantly, it
records that the plaintiffs in Suit 4 admitted the
juristic personality of the first plaintiff. [@Para 128]
6.2. The above stated position is incorrect and a wrong

premise as is evident from the position noted in
Para 318 which reads as under:
“The Sunni Central Waqf Board has opposed the suit

of the plaintiff-deities. In its written statement, it
denies the juridical status of the first and second
plaintiffs and the locus of the third plaintiff to act as
a next friend. According to the Sunni Central Waqf
Board, no deities were installed within the premises
of Babri Masjid until the idol was surreptitiously
brought in on the night between 22-23 December
1949. The written statement denies the presence of a
presiding deity or of any Asthan.”
6.3. Furthermore, the allegation that their existed any

temple at the site of Babri Masjid or that the
mosque was constructed after destroying it, with
the material of the alleged temple was denied, and
the same has been upheld by this Court in the
judgmentin review. Thus, the basis for the
assertions made by plaintiff in suit 5 have been
negative by this Court and it leaves no premise to
give them any relief.
C7. Another important facet of the judgmentin review is that

while it holds that “The Muslims have been wrongly
deprived of a mosque which had been constructed well over
450 years ago.” [@Para 798], it also holds in the same
para that, “As regards the inner courtyard, there is evidence

on a preponderance of probabilities to establish worship by
the Hindus prior to the annexation of Oudh by the British.”
This is incorrect because the travelogues upon which the
Court relies to establish the worship by Hindus also
notices the presence of the Mosque. And, according to S
114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Court may presume
existence of certain facts.
7.1. S 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the

relevant illustration reads as under:
“Court may presume existence of certain facts

—The Court may presume the existence of any
fact which it thinks likely to have happened,
regard being had to the common course of
natural events, human conduct and public and
private business, in their relation to the facts of
the particular case.
Illustration (f): That the common course of
business has been followed in particular
cases;”
7.2. Thus, if a mosque existed at the site for 450 years,
then it can be reasonably presumed that it was
being used for worship by the Muslims. The mosque
has always been used as a mosque since its
construction during the regime of Babur, and the
travelogues upon which the plaintiffs in Suit 5 rely
upon also notice the same and hence it cannot be
said there is no evidence prior to 1860 of worship by
the Muslims at the mosque. And, as far as title
goes, as has been detailed Para 3, there is no
evidence whatsoever to assert “title” by the plaintiffs
in Suit 5.
D. BECAUASE THE JUDGEMENT HAS ERRORS OF

CONSEQUENTIAL IMPORT
D1. The judgment has also held in favour of the plaintiffs in Suit
5 on the basis of an incorrect translation. The undersigned
has taken the effort to get the exhibit translated by various
recognized and reputed universities and no claim can be
based on an incorrect translation done by the Judge of the
High Court on his own accord which was also submitted
before this Hon’ble Court.
1.1. The relevant extract has been reproduced as under:
“Case No 884 – Eviction of Nihang Singh Faqir
from Masjid premises
(iii) A dispute has been raised about the
translation of the above document (application)
by Mr Pasha, learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of the plaintiffs in Suit 4. The document
was translated thus:
―You are the master of both the parties since
the Shahi ear (sic) if any person constructs
forcibly he would be punished by your honour.
Kindly consider the fact that Masjid is a place of
worship of Muslims and not that of Hindus.
Previously the symbol of Janamsthan had
been there for hundreds of years and
Hindus did puja.
The correct translation, according to Mr Pasha,
should read thus:
―It is evident from the clear words of the Shah
that if any person constructs forcibly he would
be punished by the government and your
honour may consider the fact that Masjid is a
place of worship of the Muslims and not the
contrary position that previously the symbol
of Janamsthan had been there for hundreds of
years and Hindus used to perform puja
The words ―and not the contrary position

in the submissions of Mr Pasha are
contrived. They militate against the tenor
of the letter of the Moazzin. The complaint
was against the erection of a Ramchabutra
inside the Masjid and in that context it was
stated that though previously the symbol of the
Janmasthan has been there for hundreds of
years and Hindus conducted puja, a
construction had been made inside the Masjid
for the first time.” [@ Para 683]
1.2. The judgment in review considers the incorrect
translation of the Application of the Moazzin to be
an admission on his part, which is incorrect and an
error apparent on the face of the record. The
relevant para is reproduced as under:
The Moazzin admitted that previously the
symbol of Janamsthan had been there for
hundreds of years and Hindus did puja inside
the three domed structure. [@ Para 773]
E. BECAUSE OF OTHER COGENT REASONS
E1. A judgment may be delivered unanimously or it may

be divided into a number of majority, concurring,
plurality, and dissenting opinions. However,
curiously, while the judgment was delivered
unanimously and signed by all the five judges, of
them seems to have recorded a different reasoning.
The purpose of such an addenda is unknown. Does
it form a part of the judgment and law under Article
129? In normal practice, an addenda specifies if it’s
an integral part of the main document. A reasonable
inference that can be drawn is that since there is no
such declaration, it is not an integral part of the

judgment. However, it begs the question- what is the
purpose of adding an addenda, if the judgment is
unanimous and not a concurring opinion?
E2. It is incumbent upon the Courts to show that their
judgments are consistent with the Constitution
and/or with the laws in force, which cannot be done
without giving reasons for their decision. And, a
decision cannot be based on two different and
contrary reasons.
11. That the Petitioner herein has not filed any other Review
Petition in this Hon’ble Court earlier for similar relief.
Further, the Petitioner herein seeks an audience in Open
Court before the present Petition is adjudicated upon.
Further, as the government’s application for modification
is really an application for Review under disguise, it
would be appropriate to treat it as such, and a hearing in
the open court should be provided to both sides.
12. That the present case, as pleaded in the present petition,

is a fit case for review and this Hon’ble Court may please
consider reviewing the order passed by this Hon’ble
Court on 09.11.2019.
PRAYER
In the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest

of justice, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court
may graciously be pleased to:
(i) Allow the Curative Petition from the order dated
11.12.2019 of this Hon’ble Court in Review Petition
[C] diary no 44086 OF 2019 arising out of the Final
Order and Judgment dated 09.11.2018 passed by
this Hon’ble Court Civil Appeal Nos. 10866-67/2010

passed by this Hon’ble Court; and
(ii) Pass such other and further order as this Hon’ble Court
may deem just and proper in the premises of this
case.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE REVIEW

PETITIONERS DUTY BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY.
FILED BY:-
[ABHINAV SHRIVASTAVA]
ADVOCATE FOR THE CURATIVE PETITIONER
DRAWN ON: January, 2020

FILED ON: January, 2020

IN
IN
IN THE MATTER OF:

VERSUS
MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS. …
RESPONDENTS
CERTIFICATE
“Certified that the Present Curative Petition from the order

dated 11.12.2019 of this Hon’ble Court in Review Petition [C]
diary no 44086 OF 2019 arising out of the Final Order and
Judgment dated 09.11.2018 passed by this Hon’ble Court
Civil Appeal Nos. 10866-67/2010 passed by this Hon’ble
Court; and it is based on the grounds admissible under the
Supreme Court Rules, 2013. No additional facts, documents or
grounds have been taken therein or relied upon in the Review
Petition which was not part of the Special Leave Petition
earlier.
Filed by
FILED ON January, 2020

NEW DELHI
ABHINAV SHRIVASTAVA
ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER

IN
IN
IN THE MATTER OF:

VERSUS
MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS. …
RESPONDENTS
APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING

CERTIFIED COPY OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER.
To
The Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India and His Companion
Justices of the Supreme Court of India at New Delhi
The humble petition of the Petitioners abovenamed
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH :
1. The petitioner is filing the present Curative Petition

against the order dated 11.12.2019 passed by this
Hon’ble Court in Review Petition [C] diary no 44086 OF
2019 arising out of judgment dated 09.11.2019 of the
pronounced by this Hon’ble Court in the batch of
matters, wherein the lead matter was Civil Appeal No.
10866-67 of 2010. The said batch of matters related to
the Ramjanambhoomi/Babri Masjid civil dispute in terms

whereof OOS No. 5/1989 has been decreed and OOS No.
4/1989 has been partly decreed.
2. That the petitioner herein respectfully prays before this

Hon’ble Court that the judgement passed in the present
case dated 09.11.2019 passed in various batch of
matters and since it is very lengthy and much in pages,
therefore, it is respectfully prayed that the same set of
web copy of the impugned judgment may kindly be
allowed to file along with this Curative petition, in the
interest of justice.
PRAYER
It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble
Court may graciously be pleased to exempt the Petitioner
from filing certified copy of the judgment dated
09.11.2019 passed by this Hon’ble Court in the interest
of justice; and
Pass such other or further order or orders as this Hon’ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.
DRAWN & FILED BY:
ABHINAV SHRIVASTAVA
Advocate for Petitioner
Drawn on _____January, 2020
Filed on ______January, 2020

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Ba:r & Bench (www.barandb,ench.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

CURATIVE PETITION [C] NO. ________ OF 2020

REVIEW PETITION (C) diary no 44086 OF 2019

Arising out of the final Order in Review Petition dated

IN THE MATTER OF:

DR. MOHAMMAD AYUB PETITIONER/APPLICANT

MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

I.A. NO. OF 2020

[APPLICATION SEEKINGEXEMPTION FROM FILING THE

ADVOCATE FOR PETITIONER: ABHINAV SHRIVASTAVA

Sl. No. Date of record of proceedings Pages

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

CURATIVE PETITION [C] NO. ________ OF 2020

DR. MOHAMMAD AYUB PETITIONER/APPLICANT

MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

OFFICE REPORT ON LIMITATION

1. The Petition is/are within time.

2. The Petition is barred by time and there is delay of

____days in final Impugned Judgment& Orderdated

09.11.2019 in Civil Appeal No. 2894 of 2011 passed by this

Hon’ble Court filing the same and petition for condonation of

____ days delay has been filed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

CURATIVE PETITION [C] NO. ________ OF 2020

IN THE MATTER OF:-

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

CURATIVE PETITION (C) No. IN THE IN THIS

1. Dr. Mohammad Ayub aged about Not a party Petitioner

2. NIRMOHI AKHARA, Respondent Contesting

3. THE STATE OF UTTAR Respondent Contesting

4. THE COLLECTOR, Respondent Contesting

8. PRESIDENT, ALL INDIA HINDU Respondent Contesting

11. DHARAM DAS ALLEGED CHELA Respondent Contesting

Faizabad, Uttar Prades\

14. MADAN MOHAN GUPTA, Respondent Contesting

15. UMESH CHANDRA PANDEY, Respondent Contesting

18. MISBAHUDDEEN, Respondent Contesting

19. MOHAMMAD HASHIM Respondent Contesting

20. MAULANA MAHFOOZURAHMAN, Respondent Contesting

21. FAROOQ AHMAD, Respondent Proforma

22. M. Siddiq. (D) Thr. LRs. Appellant Proforma

CURATIVE PETITION (C) No. IN THE IN THIS

1. Dr. Mohammad Ayub aged about Not a party Petitioner

1. BHAGWAN SRI RAM VIRAJMAN Respondent Contesting

2. ASTHAN SRI RAM JANAM Respondent Contesting

3. TRILOKI NATH PANDEY, Respondent Contesting

S/o. Late AskrutPandey, R/o. No. 3 Responde

4. SRI RAJENDRA SINGH, Respondent Contesting

5. MAHANT SURESH DAS, Respondent Contesting

6. NIRMOHI AKHARA MOHALLA Respondent Contesting

7. SUNNI CENTRAL BOARD OF Respondent Contesting

10. THE CITY MAGISTRATE, Respondent Contesting

11. THE SENIOR Respondent Contesting

12. THE PRESIDENT, ALL Respondent Contesting

13. THE PRESIDENT, ALL Respondent Contesting