Troop BHQ Maintext

1
‘We’ll Follow You – Lead the Way’

Lance-Sergeant Doug Colls
The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank

Battery
Battery & Divisional HQ Sections
Nigel Simpson
Secander Raisani
Philip Reinders
With special help from Geert Maassen

2
ISBN: XX-XXXXXX-X-X-X
© 2018
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or

transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the copy right holders. Where
ever possible we tried to trace the copyright holders of the photographs but in some
cases this had been unsuccessful. We would like to hear from anyone who we were
not able to contact in time.
3
Contents
INTRODUCTION – Background to this Booklet
About this Book _________________________________ 6

Order of Actions _________________________________ 7
• Timings given __________________________ 8
• Background to the Arnhem Operation _____________ 8
• Some Terms Used __________________________ 9
• White Lanyards __________________________ 9
CHAPTER 1 – The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery R.A.
Early Beginnings. _________________________________ 12
CHAPTER 2 – The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery R.A.
Main HQ Section Transport. ___________________________ 24

• Willy’s Jeep 4x4 Vehicle. ____________________ 24
Battery Reorganisation. ___________________________ 26
Events Lead Up to Operation Market Garden. ______________ 28
Order of Battle September 1944. _____________________ 34
CHAPTER 3 – Battery HQ Section
1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery Royal Artillery HQ Officers _ 37

The Battery HQ Sections at Arnhem. _____________________ 38
Battery HQ Section Daily Actions. _____________________ 38
• Sunday 17th September 1944 _____________________ 38
• Monday 18th September 1944 _____________________ 49
• Tuesday 19th September 1944 _____________________ 71
• Wednesday 20th & Thursday 21st September 1944. _ 87
4
CHAPTER 4 – Divisional HQ Section
Divisional HQ Section Daily Actions

• Sunday 17th September 1944 ____________________ 94
• Monday 18th September 1944 ____________________ 100
• Tuesday 19th September 1944 ____________________ 107
• Wednesday 20th & Thursday 21st September 1944. ___ 110
• Friday 22nd to Monday 25th September 1944. _______ 115
• Tuesday 26th September 1944 ____________________ 120
CHAPTER 5 - APPENDIX
Battery Gun Troop Ranks ___________________________ 124

Battery Roll 1939 to September 1940 _____________________ 124
Battery Roll Operation ‘Fustian’ 1943 _____________________ 125
HQ Section Roll Operation ‘Market-Garden’ 1944 ________ 126
Divisional HQ Roll Operation ‘Market-Garden’ 1944 ________ 126
Roll of Honour __________________________________ 127
Glider Pilots and Occupants ____________________________ 129
Full Glider Loading List ____________________________ 130
List of Primary Sources ____________________________ 131
List of Photograph Numbers Used In This Booklet ________ 133
5
‘The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank

Battery’
Background to This Booklet

6
About this booklet

Many ‘accounts’ of the 1st Airlanding Anti-tank Battery R.A. have been
recorded in books associated with Operation Market Garden and particularly
of the actions of the guns of the Battery from the 17th to 25th September
1944. A comparison of these ‘accounts’ often highlights a contradiction and
causes a confusion of where each gun actually was and what action they were
really involved in, even on a day by day basis. Even so, very few books
actually give reference to the Battery actions in other theatres of operation
prior to Arnhem. These also will be considered to give a broad overview of the
Battery and its members.
With intensive research by the authors of this booklet, in obtaining from
members of the Battery, detailed personal accounts, it was possible to cross
reference them with other personal accounts from members of other units who
were close to the action. In this way it was possible to overlap the two and
form a comprehensive detail of the actions and positions of each individual
Battery gun or Troop section, along with a time frame for these actions. It is
not claimed that the accounts presented in this booklet are 100% accurate and
to the exact minute, but the authors believe that the following accounts and
simulations will show the closest possible correlation to the original position
and actions. The simulations presented specifically relate to the action of each
gun during Operation Market-Garden in September 1944.
Due to the fact that many Battery gun accounts overlap between each Troop,
this can sometimes add to the confusion. Hence a series of booklets have been
produced, whereby each will concentrate on the individual Troop or Section of
the Battery and the action of each gun of that Troop.
These booklets include the following: -
Battery HQ and Divisional HQ Sections
A 6-pounder Troop B 6-pounder Troop
C 6-pounder Troop Z 6-pounder Troop
D 17-pounder Troop P 17-pounder Troop
It is interesting and important to note the order in which the Battery members
accounts were translated and applied to the areas of action they were involved
in: -
7
1) From these Battery accounts that were obtained from 1976 up to 2005, they
were examined and interpreted by the author onto archive maps of the
operations the Battery was involved in, including France, Sicily and the
Arnhem area, with the aid of Philip Reinders. Each gun location and
movement were plotted, and accounts of actions were recorded in full in the
manuscript ‘White Lanyards’ in 2005. It was found that many of the gun
positions and the time frame of actions they were involved in conflicted with
previously recorded and published accounts.
2) During April 2014 these accounts and gun positions were then extrapolated
within a simulation program adapted by Secander Raisani, for Operation
Market-Garden. In this way the author was able to check the gun positions for
LOS, LOF and AOE, to confirm if the gun positions recorded in ’White
Lanyards’ were feasible and accurate. This was particularly completed for the
Arnhem Bridge perimeter.
3) After these simulations were completed, a number of archive materials
previously unseen became available and were examined by Secander Raisani,
Geert Maasen and Philip Reinders. These included particularly photographs of
the various areas of action taken during and directly after the battle in Arnhem
and were compared to what was to be expected if the Battery accounts were
truly accurate for this Operation.
The results were astonishing to say the least. It is hoped that the reader of this
booklet will therefore be able to draw their own decisive conclusions based on
the evidence presented.
Order of Actions
It must be remembered that the Battery was engaged in a large number of
engagements prior to it becoming an Airborne Unit, so these will be
considered in chronological order in each booklet. This includes the French
campaign in 1940, followed by the defence of Britain until the Battery’s
deployment to North Africa in 1943. Its first losses in action during the Sicily
and Italian campaigns and its return to Britain prior to Operation Market-
Garden.
An order of action events, that each individual gun or section that the Battery
took part in, will be discussed on a daily basis for each Troop in separate
booklets and a suggestion of where each of the Battery guns were likely to
have been placed will be presented. These events, where possible, will be
8
compared to other narratives to give a time frame for the actions that were
taking place.
Finally, photographic evidence will be presented, where possible, to confirm if
the written Battery members accounts have been interpreted by the authors
correctly.
Timings Given
It is impossible to give timings of events to the exact minute, so all timings in
this booklet are indicated to provide a ‘Time Frame’ of when they occurred. In
some instances, with available aerial photographs a more precise ‘Time
Frame’ is possible provided by the simulator.
This ‘Time Frame’ also allows for the booklets recording the events of each
Battery Troop to be compared and cross referenced to each other.
Background to the Arnhem Operation

The 1st Airlanding Anti-tank Battery would not have been in a position to
support the Parachute Battalions had it not been for their exploits starting with
the Battle for France in 1940. The adaption of a simple mobile gun Battery, to
one that could act independently and with aggression under difficult
circumstances is the start of this booklet. From this simple start a highly
trained and motivated group of men under the leadership of Major William
Arnold and his Battery officers, grew to the largest and most competent
Airlanding Battery of the Airborne Divisions.
The Battery initially joined up with the 1st Parachute Brigade in North Africa
in early 1943 and from there it took part in the attack on Sicily and Italy,
before returning home to Britain in early 1944. They were placed on standby
for the D-Day landings but were not utilized, before the plans for Operation
Market-Garden were confirmed and implemented.
The plan for the Battery in Operation Market-Garden was in fact, as explained
by Lieutenant John Howe of the Battery, quite simple. Each gun Troop of the
Battery had four 6-pounder anti-tank guns and would support each Parachute
Battalion. Two 17-pounder guns of D Troop would support the 1st Battalion
and the remaining two would support 3rd Battalion, as contrary to what is
often suggested, a heavy German counter attack was expected and with
substantial armoured vehicles. The P Troop 17-pounder guns and Z Troop 6-
9
pounder guns would provide the 1st Airborne Division’s Headquarters anti-
tank defence.
Therefore, A Troop would support 1st Parachute Battalion, B Troop 2nd
Parachute Battalion and C Troop 3rd Parachute Battalion of the 1st Parachute
Brigade. For Operation Market-Garden, all gun positions had been pointed out
to all gun Sergeants on cloth maps prior to the operation.
Some Terms Used

The term Kampfgruppe is generally ascribed to a type of tactic used by the
Germans during the whole war. The Kampfgruppe (KG) consisted of the
gathering together of ad hoc groups of troops of varied types but with the aim
to conquer a precise point of the front. The group of troops used in the KG did
not necessarily bear the original name of the units but was formed with the
power of fire and mobility. These combat groups were identified normally by
the name of the commander, while some did take the identification of its unit
of origin.
The expressions used by the German military and British often differ in their
designation of weapon calibre, such as the Germans would generally refer to it
in cm’s (centimeters) and the British in mm’s (millimeters) or imperial. In this
booklet the British term is used when identifying a weapon designation, for
example a 20mm Flak gun as opposed to the German designation as a 2cm
Flak gun.
‘White Lanyards, Worn With Pride’

This is the title of a manuscript, written by the author, and circulated to the
surviving members of the Battery in 2005. It includes the in-depth accounts of
the 223 Battery, in the disastrous French campaign of 1940, its transformation
to the 223 (Independent) Battery and its reorganization to become an Airborne
unit. It then includes actual accounts of the Battery in action during the attack
on Sicily with Operation ‘Fustian’ in July 1943 and the following Italian
campaign. All of which is given from the personal accounts of members of the
Battery at that time.
10
Special Mention
A Special mention is made by the authors to the invaluable help and in-depth
discussions with Mr. Marcel Zwarts.
11

Battery’
Chapter 1
12
Early Beginnings
The 1st Airlanding Anti-tank Battery was formed from the original members
of the 223 Anti-tank Battery, whose origins started in Barrow-in-Furnace in
1938 with the formation of the 56th Anti-Tank Regiment, who in turn had
drawn its men from the 4th Battalion, The King’s Own Royal Regiment
(Lancaster) Territorial Army formation.
Fig 1: King’s Own Royal Lancaster Regiment Collar and original Cap Badge.
On the 1st September 1939, Germany invaded Poland, an ultimatum for the
Germans to withdraw was sent by Britain and France. This ultimatum was
ignored and as a consequence at 11:15h. BST, it was announced by the then
British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, ‘….this country is at war with
Germany’.
As a consequence, in September 1939 the 56th Anti-Tank Regiment as a
whole was attached to the 42nd Infantry Division. The Infantry Battalions of
the 42nd Division had no anti-tank weapons of their own during this period of
time except for the quickly becoming obsolete ‘Boys anti-tank rifle’.
Therefore, each of the four Battery’s of the 56th Regiment was required to
support each Brigade of the 42nd Division.
At the beginning of April 1940, the 223 Battery was stationed at Westcourt
House and stables in Burbage, Wiltshire, in its preparations for war. It was
subsequently shipped to France as part of the British Expeditionary Force
(BEF) in April 1940.
The Officer in the centre of the photograph below is probably Captain Mason,
the then Battery Captain. Also, in picture have been identified Lance-
Bombardier’s L. Doughty (at the back righthand side), L. Jacobs, M. L.
Philips and Bombardier G. Robson (KIA), all were at Arnhem 1944. Each
13
became an integral and foundation member of the Battery when it became an

Airborne Unit
The photograph is by kind permission of authors and website: - www.burbage-
wiltshire.co.uk
Fig 2: 223 Battery HQ senior NCO’s prior to going to France with the BEF.
On the 17th April the advance party of the 56th Regiment was transported on
the ship SS Ben-My-Chree to the port of Cherbourg in France. The remaining
part of the Regiment then followed on the 20th April on the ship SS Louth,
where the Regiment moved and concentrated at St Jean-sur-Mayenne in north-
western France.
On the 25th April the Regiment started their move forward toward the
Belgium front line and passed through Le Mans and Evreux and the 223
Battery arriving at Croissy-sur-Seine on the outskirts of Paris. From here the
223 Battery moved via Arras and Lille to Lambersart on the Belgium border.
The 42nd Divisions front behind the Belgium frontier now ran from Roncq on
the right, where 224 Battery of the 56th Anti-Tank Regiment was supporting
the 127th Brigade, to Armentieres on the left, where 221 Battery was in
support of the 125th Brigade. The 223 Battery was in the centre supporting the
126th (East Lancashire) Brigade, while the 222 Battery was being held as the
Divisional Reserve at Lambersart. There were no prepared defences, so all the
gunners were utilized to dig ditches, place entrenchments and concrete
14
bunkers. The Allied strategy at this time was still very much based on static
defences and techniques of the First World War, but soon lessons were learnt.
Fig 3: Regimental Headquarters of the 56th Anti-Tank Regiment RA King's

Own, prior to proceeding overseas in April 1940 to France and Belgium.
Rear row, left to right: Gunner J Foxcroft; Gunner S Atkinson; Lance Bombardier S
Waite; Driver A W Bason; Lance Bombardier L Burdock; Gunner F W Waterman;
Lance Bombardier A Grant; Gunner A Higgins; Driver C H Connelly.
Fourth row, left to right: Gunner S A Slacke; Gunner W Sharples; Lance Bombardier
W High; Gunner G Curtis; Private W L Eaton; Bombardier A Gaskarth; Gunner D
Hunter; Lance Bombardier F Cartmell; Lance Bombardier C A Dyer.
Third row, left to right: Driver E W Huntley; Driver M L Houslop; Driver W H Lewis;
Gunner S W Madle; Driver D Elsender; Driver F Wadsworth; Gunner H J Smith;
Gunner G Parnham; Driver C Hartley; Driver A Ferguson; Gunner J R Barker;
Gunner J Robson.
Second row, left to right: Sergeant C Thompson; Gunner E Sharpe; Sergeants GR
Fallows; JE Burrow; J C Williams; R Nelson; W Wyton; A R Thompson; J V Rowe;
A A Catt; T Regan and Gunner J E Blacket.
Seated row, left to right: Regimental Sergeant Major K J E Brierley; Lieutenant E
Braithwaite; Captain T I J Toler; Lieutenant Colonel Palmer; Major J R S Thompson;
2nd Lieutenant P B Wood; Lieutenant Hannigan; Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant
C W Morrison. Seated on ground; Lance Bombardier F E Softley.
15
War developments moved on very quickly and at 04:30h on 10th May, the
area of the 223 Battery was bombed at the same time as the Germans invaded
Belgium and the Netherlands. By the 16th May the front at Sedan had
collapsed and the French were in full retreat toward Paris. The 223 Battery in
support of the 126th Brigade were moved to Templeuve south of Lille to
counter the German threat and their drive to the French coast. They became
detached from the 56th Regiment as part of a makeshift deployment called
‘MacForce’ under command of Major-General F.N. Mason Macfarlane. From
this point onward, the 223 Battery was required to make its fighting retreat
following the line through the towns of Hazebrouck, Cassel, Wormhout to
Dunkirk. The Battery suffered a small number of casualties killed, a few
wounded including the O/C Major Pedley and POW’s but made a significant
name for itself as a very competent unit.
Fig 4: Map showing the collapse of the French front and retreat back to Dunkirk,
May 1940
16
The 223 Battery was then also able to withdraw from Dunkirk on the ship SS
Royal Daffodil arriving at Ramsgate on the south-east coast of Britain and
were transported by train and reformed in Yorkshire. By the end of June, still
as an Independent unit, the 223 Battery had been refitted with the 2-pounder
anti-tank gun and was officially attached to the 31st Independent Infantry
Brigade in a state of full war readiness.
Fig 5: The SS Royal Daffodil and unloading from the ‘Little Ships’ at Ramsgate
mole from Dunkirk, (copyright the Ramsgate Maritime museum)
At this time, the 223 (Independent) Battery was now joined by Captain Ian
Toler who was promoted to Major, with his batman John Foxcroft, as the new
Officer Commanding, both were transferred from the 56th Regiment HQ.
Fig 6: Major Ian Toler, who took command of the 223 Battery on its return from
Dunkirk. He eventually left the Battery to become a glider pilot and took part in
Operation Market Garden. He joined the Battery with his Batman, John
Foxcroft (shown right) who remained with the Battery.
Also, in June 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote to the War Office
recommending that Britain raise a force of approximately 5,000 Parachute
17
troops. Almost immediately, one of the newly formed Commando units, No.2
Commando, was chosen to undergo conversion to this role. Later re-
designated 11th SAS Battalion, these were Britain’s first airborne troops.
In other theatres of operation. it was seen that the standard British anti-tank
weapon, the 2-pounder gun, was no longer capable of engaging and destroying
the now heavier armoured German vehicles that were being employed. As
such, nearly all British anti-tank units were re-equipped with the more
powerful 6-pounder anti-tank gun, which was capable of engaging these
German armoured vehicles and at longer distances. The 223 (Independent)
Battery was also re-fitted with the 6-pounder anti-tank gun, whereupon all
members of the Battery were now required to undergo intensive training on
the new gun. This required improvisational skills of how to manhandle guns
through rough terrain and over rivers and setting up defensive positions. The
Battery was therefore moved to various places throughout Wales and the
Yorkshire moors and other inhospitable areas throughout the winter of 1940 to
summer 1941.
With the formation of the 1st Parachute Brigade in September 1941, it was
seen that as an Infantry Brigade, it lacked substantial anti-tank capabilities. It
was therefore decided that a unit that had demonstrated great tactical and
improvisational abilities during the Battle of France in 1940, should be
converted to an Airlanding unit to provide the Parachute Brigades anti-tank
defence. The 223 (Independent) Battery was chosen for this specific role,
because of its achievements during the Battle of France. The Officers and men
were therefore asked to volunteer for this new role. About 40 men decided
against it, so a call for volunteers was sent out which was soon answered.
At the start of November 1941, the Battery and the 31st Independent Infantry
Brigade that it was a part of, learnt they would become part of the newly
formed 1st Airborne Division. On Friday 21st November 1941, Battery
Captain Robert Horne driven by gunner Toseland was sent along with the rest
of the Brigade Officers to Ringway Manchester, to observe the experiments
being carried out with gliders. At the beginning of December 1941, 31st
Independent Brigade was then re-designated as the 1st Airlanding Brigade.
On 28th June 1942 the Battery was re-designated as 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank
Battery R.A. Commanded by Major Toler. It became directly responsible to
the CRA Lieutenant-Colonel C.H.P. Crawfurd and to Divisional Headquarters
Commanded by Major-General ‘Boy’ Browning.
18
On Saturday 26th September a full gun detachment consisting of Captain

Spencer-Thomas, A/Sergeant Holmes, Bombardier Towell, gunners Townsend
and Greaney and Lance-Bombardier Flaherty, were sent to Netheravon
Aerodrome. History was made when a 6-pounder gun, Jeep and full gun crew
took to the air, with a second trip completed that same day in the Horsa glider.
During the period of intensive training in gliders, a number of men also
decided that they would like to take up their passion for flying. As a
consequence, both Major Toler and Lieutenant Robin Walchi, left Battery HQ
and became glider pilots. Their association with the Battery would remain
throughout the war and after it at Battery reunions.
At the beginning of November 1942, the Battery, due to its success with the
Horsa glider, was placed under the command of Major W.F. Arnold and
became part of the 1st Parachute Brigade, 1st Airborne Division. Major
Arnold ensured that the men from the Battery were at their peak physical
fitness and along with the assigned APTI, Staff Sergeant A. Cook, he would
lead the Battery PT every morning from 07:00h. More training ensued during
the winter months and a reorganisation of the Battery gun teams took place,
ensuring the more experienced gunners kept gun team cohesion.
The Battery then joined the 1st Parachute Brigade in North Africa in May
1943. Most of this time was spent training and getting acquainted with each of
the Parachute Battalions. The Battery soon saw its first action in Sicily on 13th
July, when it again made history and first flew in gliders into battle in
Operation ‘Fustian’.
During the operation, seven Officers and 83 Other Ranks (ORs) took part
including twelve 6-pounder anti-tank guns which were supposed to arrive, but
a number of circumstances prevented this from happening. Heavy flak caused
most planes and gliders to veer of course;
The Horsa glider with Sergeant Casemore of A Troop took a full hit and
crashed in flames killing all on board.
The Horsa glider with Sergeant Turner of D Troop, was forced to take evasive
action and actually landed in Italy where he and his crew were all taken POW.
The Waco glider with Bombardier Davy and gunner Hall couldn’t find the
land when released and ditched in the sea. After swimming to shore gunner
Hall managed to evade but Bombardier Davy was taken POW.
The Waco glider with Lieutenant Cox landed within the enemy beach
defences and initially he and the D Troop men with him were taken POW, but
soon managed to escape.
19
Those who were to parachute in, including Major Arnold, Lieutenant Hagen
and many others were dropped seven to ten miles away from the objective.
Other gliders in the dark hit obstacles like power lines and even the iron
girders of the Primosole Bridge, crashed and many of the crew were killed,
including:The Horsa with Sergeant Little of A Troop, when the load of gun
and Jeep broke loose, and some of the crew were crushed. The pilot in this
instance was Lieutenant Walchi, who escaped with numerous injuries.
Approx Landing Places
A – Sgt Doig glider

B – Sgt Atkinson glider
C – Sgt Little glider
D – Sgt McCarner glider
E – Sgt Anderson glider
1 – Sgt Anderson gun
Fig 7: Map of Primosole Bridge showing the approximate landing places of the
gun teams that were able to put their gun into position and Sgt Little’s gun team
that were killed when it crashed.
20
Even so, again the Battery equipped itself in an exceptional way. Though it
was scattered far and wide, three guns of the Battery those under Sergeants
Atkinson, Anderson and Doig held the southern end of the Bridge with the
mixed bag of Para’s from various Battalions. One other gun took part in action
further south of the Primosole Bridge, one gun that of Sergeant Rams aborted
on take-off and others had to be either abandoned or were destroyed on
landing. A number of the men distinguished themselves earning the MM,
including Lieutenant E. Clapham and Lance-Bombardier D. Reed.
When eventually forced to retire from the Primosole Bridge, the Battery found
that a total of 3 Officers and 24 OR had been a part of the holding force which
totalled 12 Officers and 283 OR, from the planned Brigade strength of 1,856.
The Battery lost two Gun Sergeants and eight gunners Killed in Action, one
Gun Sergeant and ten gunners taken POW and one Officer, three Sergeants
and six gunners wounded or injured. The surviving members of the Battery
were then transported back to North Africa on 15th July, where recuperation
took place and replacements were called for.
With the Island of Sicily secured, the 1st Airborne Division was then utilised
as a ground force in September 1943 and the Battery saw action in Italy. It
was here that the limitations of the 6-pounder anti-tank gun were noticed
against the heavier German tanks that were being employed. The Battery was
part of major actions that took place on the advance from Taranto northwards
to Goia-del-Colle, San Basilio, before being withdrawn back to Altamura. On
the 27th November while supposedly returning to Britain, a large proportion
of the Battery was forced to divert back to Bizerta due to problems with the
ship the SS Cuba that they were on. They therefore stayed in Blida in North
Africa for the Christmas of 1943.
Finally, a ship was found for the men, the SS Majola and on or about 22nd
January 1944 the men finally arrived back in Britain. Here the Battery was
concentrated at the villages of Heckington and Helpringham in Lincolnshire. It
was decided that the Battery should then increase in size, with two anti-tank
Troops adopting the more powerful 17-pounder anti-tank gun. The Battery
therefore consisted of three 6-pounder anti-tank Troops, A to C, and two
Troops, D and P of 17-pounders. These two Troops therefore had to go
through even more intensive training on the use of this gun and also use the
larger Hamilcar Gliders to enable them to transport the 17-pounder anti-tank
gun and its’ towing Portee into battle.
21
Numerous drills and exercises took place throughout Britain as the men
became highly trained and motivated in readiness for the attack on Hitler’s
fortress Europe. The Battery particularly undertook more intensive training
including that of moving targets in its readiness for the invasion. Finally, a
further 6-pounder Troop, designated Z Troop was added to the Battery to
bolster the defence of the Divisions Headquarters for the expected and soon to
happen airborne attack.
22
23

Battery’
Chapter 2
24
Main HQ Section Transport and Comms

During the initial years of the 223 Battery, the main transportation used was
the standard Morris Commercial CS8 and Bedford MW Portee, these served
both as gun towing vehicles for the 2-pounder anti-tank gun and as the
command post vehicle for the gun Troop Officer Commanding. Due to the
shortage of commissioned Officers, a Lieutenant was placed in command of
two Battery Troops, while each Troop was placed under the command of a
Warrant Officer, known as the Troop Sergeant (TS). This proved extremely
difficult and inefficient for a single Officer to bring the guns in and out of
action and had to be changed when the Battery returned from Dunkirk.
After Dunkirk and with the use of the Horsa glider as the means by which the
men and anti-tank guns would be delivered to the objective, it was found that
the Morris/Bedford Portee would not fit into the glider. Therefore, another
suitable vehicle had to be found that had the capability to tow the larger 6-
pounder anti-tank gun, also be suitable as a command post vehicle and be air
transportable. This was needed for each Troop of the Battery and for the
Officers and reconnaissance section of the Battery Headquarters. It wasn’t
long before a new American vehicle was found that was extremely robust and
capable, both off-road and on-road, known as the ‘Blitz Buggy’.
Willys Jeep 4X4 Reconnaissance Vehicle

The Willy’s MB U.S. Army Jeep (formally the Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4) and the
Ford GPW were manufactured from 1941 to 1945. Used in all theatres of the
Second World War, this vehicle towed the 6-pounder guns and the
ammunition trailer. This vehicle was used extensively throughout North
Africa by the Battery, during Operation ‘Fustian’ and then throughout Italy.
Unfortunately, it had a tendency to overturn at high speed, and in Italy while
travelling as the Liaison Officer for the Battery, Lieutenant Hagen died of his
injuries due to an accident near Altamura. All the Jeeps that were used in
Arnhem, about 550 in all, came by Horsa glider.
To fit in the glider the Jeep had to be modified, this meant that the front
bumper had to be shortened, the fuel container on the back had to be removed
and the spare wheel was placed in front of the grille. The steering wheel had to
be removed to enable the Jeep to fit into the Horsa, therefore it had a special
bolt to enable it to be quickly removed and then attached after the landing.
25
Some books mention all Airborne Jeeps had their windshields removed but
photos taken during the Arnhem battle would suggest this was not required to
be the case for it to fit in the Horsa glider. The Jeep would be modified for the
role they would be required for.
The Battery Headquarters Jeep was fitted with the necessary radio equipment
for the Officer Commanding, Major Arnold, to keep in contact with his gun
Troops, while each Troop HQ section Jeep was fitted with the same. The gun
towing Jeeps were fitted with a basket on the bonnet to carry extra
ammunition, along with a trailer for even more ammunition.
Front engine, rear-wheel drive 4X4

Engine : 134 cu in (2.2 L) Transmission : 3-speed manual
Wheelbase : 80 in (2,03 m) Length : 131 in (3,32 m)
Width : 62 in (1,57 m)
Height : 72 in (1,82 m) reducible to : 52 in (1,32 m)
Curb weight : 2,293 lb (1,040 kg) Speed : 60 mph (96km)
Fig. 8: A standard Willys Jeep MB as shown in the manual.
Fig 9: A No.18 Set Comms, that was dropped

by parachute canister during the Sicily
operation and was used by Gunner ‘Badgie’
Cameroon with Major Arnold and Gunner
Donald Marsden with Lieutenant ‘Paddy’
Hagen O/C A Troop. Due to the fact the
canister could float a distance from the drop
zone, Gunner Marsden was KIA while trying
to retrieve the Comms set.
26
Fig. 10: A No.22 Set installed in a Jeep. The set was even before the ‘Market-
Garden’ Operation, known to only have a practical range of some 5-miles and
was very sensitive to the antenna orientation, therefore making it susceptible to
failure in the environment it was to be employed in. At Arnhem, due to many
limiting factors, including drift off network due to heavy landings, battle
conditions and grounding of the set, it proved ineffectual and the Battery at the
Bridge was unable to contact any one during the whole time they were there. The
A/BSM Sergeant L. Doughty and gunner K. Patterson were the Battery Comms
at Arnhem Bridge
Battery Reorganisation
Upon its final full return to Britain from North Africa, Major Arnold put into
operation the lessons he had learnt from the Sicilian and Italian campaigns,
namely a restructuring of the command and control of the Battery. This was
particularly important due to the increase in size of the Battery.
The P Troop was formed in April 1944 and joined D Troop in its use of the
17-pounder anti-tank gun, so it required the necessary HQ staff to service its
needs. Therefore, Captain McCleod was placed directly in charge of the two
17-pounder Troops, while Captain Llewellyn-Jones was place in charge of the
three 6-pounder Troops. The Z Troop was later added on 5th June and also
became directly responsible to Lieutenant Jones.
Another major aspect was that of supply for the Battery, therefore Captain
Bear was transferred from the Light Regiment and place in charge of all
27
supplies. Captain Bear was extremely experienced and had been injured in
Italy and was an incredible assistance to the Battery.
1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery R.A. BHQ Command Section O/C

Major William F. Arnold Batman Bombardier Bill Bailey
Liaison Officer
Lieutenant Harry Whittaker Batman Bombardier Len Smallwood
Lieutenant John C. Howe
Training
BSM WOII H. Nesbitt / WOII Ben Wright
APTI Staff Sergeant Alf Cook
Troop HQ and Comms (detached at Arnhem)
A/BSM Les Doughty Driver Ken Patterson
Don R William Hartley
Battery Nominal Roll Clerk
L/Sergeant Doug Colls
Rations (detached at Arnhem)
L/Sergeant Ronald J. McCreedy L/Bombardier Jim Rooke
L/Bombardier A. G. Taylor Driver William Hodges
Driver Sammy Henderson Driver John Brundell
Maintenance Section (detached at Arnhem)
Sergeant Francis E. Pearce Bombardier Les Bluer
Gunner Nick Gregory Gunner William J. Parry
Gun Fitters Section (detached at Arnhem)
Sergeant Les Jacobs L/Bombardier Jim Crabtree
Driver Henry B. Weatherell Driver Ronald ‘Wally’ Hammond
Reconnaissance Section (detached at Arnhem)
Bombardier A. McGough Bombardier M. L. Phillips
L/Bombardier Peter D. Martin Gunner H. Pymm
Gunner J. Rowlands Gunner Frederick G. Forder
Driver H. Simmons Driver John McLaughlen
RAMC
Lieutenant Derrick H. Randall Orderly Private C. H. Halford
Battery Quarter Master Section O/C Captain ‘Q’
Captain Henry Bear Batman Gnr John ‘Foxly’ Foxcroft
Liaison Officer
Lieutenant William J. Reed Batman L/Bmbdr Steve Gillespie
2nd Lieutenant H. William Neal
BQMS
WOII Edward E. R. Rolfe Sergeant Alec Mashiter
Clerk
Sergeant W. Hartley Corporal Jones
28
Battery 17-Pounder Gun Troops Command Section O/C Captain ‘A’

Captain Norman McLeod Batman Albert V. Hubbard
Liaison Officer
Lieutenant Geoff Ryall Batman Bernard Jeffrey
Troop HQ and Comms
Sergeant George Willis Driver Harry ‘Badgie’ Cameron
Don R George W. Dove
Reconnaissance/Gun Fitter Section (attached from BHQ at Arnhem)
L/Bombardier Peter D. Martin Gunner Frederick G. Forder
Driver Henry B Weatherell
Maintenance Section (attached from BHQ at Arnhem)
Sergeant Francis E Pearce
Battery 6-Pounder Gun Troops Command Section O/C Captain ‘G’

Captain Arvian Llewellyn-Jones Batman Gunner James H. Carter
Liaison Officer
Lieutenant J. Anthony Cox Batman Frank J. Greaney
Troop HQ and Comms (attached from BHQ at Arnhem)
A/BSM Les Doughty Driver Ken Patterson
Don R William Hartley
Gun Fitter Section (attached from BHQ at Arnhem)
Sergeant Les Jacobs L/Bombardier Jim Crabtree
Driver Ronald ‘Wally’ Hammond
Maintenance Section (attached from BHQ at Arnhem)
Bombardier Les Bluer Gunner Nick Gregory
Approximate Battery personnel dispositions for June 1944.
Events Leading Up to Operation Market Garden.

With the Allies advancing rapidly, the Allied commanders recognised that
supply of their field armies would soon become a serious problem, especially
with extremely long supply lines stretching from the original Beachheads in
Normandy and with the port of Antwerp still closed. To supply each field
army would be an almost impossible task, so bold decisions had to be made.
Field Marshal Montgomery, commanding the 21st Army Group, also felt that
with the German Oberbefehlshaber West (OFW) Army Groups in such
disarray, priority of supplies should be given to just a single army to enact a
plan that would deal the enemy a decisive blow and quickly end the War by
the end of 1944
29
A part of this Army Group was the 2nd British Army that was advancing
through the lowlands of Europe, so Montgomery convinced the Supreme
Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, of the merits of attacking by
parachute and glider. A number of Operations were drawn up for the Airborne
Army, but these were cancelled as the ground forces advanced beyond the
stated objectives. A number are listed below, starting with the 8th planned
Operation and list the objective.
8 – July 20 1944 SWORDHILT MORLAIX

9 – Aug 7 1944 TRANSFIGURE RAMBOUILLET
10 – Aug 15 1944 AXEHEAD SEINE CROSSING
11 – Aug 17 1944 BOXER BOULOGNE
12 – Sept 2 1944 LINNET TOURNAI
13 – Sept 4 1944 LINNET2 MAASTRICHT
14 – Sept 6 1944 INFATUATE WALCHEREN
15 – Sept 7 1944 CLOVER GRAVE
16 – Sept 8 1944 COMET GRAVE
17- Sept 15 1944 SIXTEEN ARNHEM
The Battery was on high alert during all these planned and then cancelled
operations, which caused the men to be on edge. Finally, operation Market
with the exact same objectives as Sixteen was given the go ahead, flying the
whole Airborne Army into Holland to capture the five key Bridges around the
towns of Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The only difference between
Market and Sixteen, was that the SAS were to play a less active role, the order
of battle and all objectives were otherwise identical.
The 2nd British Army would at the same time break through the German front
line and advance the sixty-four miles to the River Rhine at Arnhem. At each
river crossing point, the 2nd Army would then properly secure each of the
Bridges that had initially been captured by this ‘Airborne Carpet’.
Once the final Bridge at Arnhem had been reached and secured, there would
be no more major river obstacles to cross and as a consequence the 2nd Army
could then swing its line of advance and enter Germany itself.
30
Thus, the plan for Operation ‘Market Garden’, was given the final go ahead
and each part of it was laid before the Allied commanders. Operation ‘Market’
was the code name for the Airborne landings and Operation ‘Market’ the code
name for the ground offensive part of the plan. Once agreed, the Allied
commanders had little over a week to prepare their own separate Divisional
plans to secure these main Bridges.
Fig 11: The outline plan for Operation Sixteen, crossed out and renamed Market
31
Major Arnold was briefed, contrary to many previously published reports, that
there was likely a large concentration of German armour in the Arnhem area
on landing. As such, the gliders containing the Battery guns and heavy
equipment would be flown in first and upon landing would help secure the
LZ’s for the lightly armed and vulnerable paratroopers who would land later.
Once each of the Battery’s Troop’s knew what to expect, the men from the
Battery were taken to their respective airfields ready for the Operation to
commence.
On Sunday morning the 17th September, the men assembled at the airfields
across Britain. Those at Manston were given a slap-up meal by the Women’s
Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF’s) canteen for breakfast.
Many Battery members took the opportunity to fill any available place that
they had in Flak Jackets with cans of evaporated milk for extra food, instead
of extra ammunition.
Others noted seeing many WAAF’s crying as they recognised the men were
going on a very dangerous mission. Breakfast for those of the Battery who
were leaving from Tarrant Rushton was not as glamorous as there were no
WAAF stations there; instead they had the typical meal prepared by the Army
Cooks. Many recalled the breakfast as being rather grim to say the least, but at
least they had a cup of tea laced with a good tot of rum.
Those of the Battery who were to be parachuted in were ordered early
morning to be ready to move to the airfields and around 10:00h. motor
transport arrived. These Battery members remembered that they all needed a
lot of help, not only to get into the motor transport, but also to get on the
planes, as they were fully loaded with life jackets, body armour, grenades,
ammunition and weapons.
The weather was glorious for a late summer’s day and to many it seemed as if
they were going on another exercise. Those taking off from Manston were
scheduled to start from 10:33h. and those from Tarrant Rushton from 10:43h.
All guns and Jeeps/Portee’s in each glider had already been secured before
breakfast and now the men returned to their respective gliders ready for take-
off. All Gun Sergeants made their acquaintance with their glider pilots as these
were to initially provide close fire support.
11:45h. The vast majority of the air armada was airborne and looking
out of the gliders, an endless stream of planes could be seen in all directions,
32
with the occasional fighter darting in and out of the huge formation, as it
provided escort for the convoy.
Fig 12: The air routes the Battery took, those by Glider and those by Parachute.
Copyright, History of Manston Airfield
Looking to the ground, many men from the Battery even remembered seeing
people walking up church paths on their way to Sunday morning worship. In
the van of the formation were the twelve Stirling bombers carrying 21st
Independent Parachute Company. They were to drop on each LZ first, secure
the immediate area and then set out the markers for wind direction and Zone
identification, for the rest of the formation as it arrived.
12:40h. The Vanguard made their descent and set about their tasks
ready for the rest of the Division to arrive, sustaining no casualties at this point
in time. For the Battery, the planes and gliders reached the correct DZ’s and
LZ’s exactly on time.
13:00h. The leading gliders of the Airlanding Brigade came down on
LZ-S with the initial Horsa gliders landing safely, taxing and parking at the
top end of the field as though they were on a parade ground, leaving room for
the remaining gliders to come in safely. Of the 153-gliders assigned to this LZ,
approximately 134-gliders arrived. The infantry quickly unloaded and secured
the immediate area for the rest of the gliders and also secured the LZ-Z area.
33
13:20h. The Horsa gliders carrying the guns and equipment for
Battery HQ, A, B and C Troops of the Battery arrived. As they detached from
the tug aircraft over the LZ, all Gun Sergeants were given their final
instructions by the pilots so were required to open the front and back doors of
the glider. In this way, upon landing they were able to immediately vacate the
glider, lower the ramps and unload their Jeep and gun and be ready for action.
LZ-S
Wolfheze
LZ-Z
LZ-Y DZ-X
RV
Fig. 13: The Drop and Landing Zones approximate locations.

13:42h. The second wave of gliders came over LZ-Z, including the 8-
Hamilcar gliders containing D and P Troops. The LZ consisted mainly of
arable or scrub land, but some of it was also sandy and soft…………and so
started the assault on the main road Bridge at Arnhem.
34
Order of Battle September 1944

O/C 1st Airborne Division
Major-General
R.E. Urquhart
Commander Royal Artillery (CRA)

Lieutenant-Colonel
R. Loder-Symonds
BHQ Comms O/C 1st Airlanding A/T Bty RA

BSM Doughty Major W.F. Arnold
Gnr Patterson Lieutenant H. Whittaker
Captain ‘G’ Captain ‘A’ Captain ‘Q’

O/C 6-pdrs O/C 17-pdrs Quartermaster
Captain Captain Captain
A. Llewellyn-Jones N. McLeod H. Bear
Lt. J.A. Cox Lt. G. Ryall BQMS – A. Mashiter
TS. Willis
A Troop D Troop
Lieutenant Lieutenant
RAMC
E.E. Clapham J.T Lewis
TS. Thomson TS. Masterson Lieutenant
D.H. Randall
B Troop P Troop
Lieutenant Lieutenant
P. MacFarlane T. Casey
TS. McCarner
Liaison Officer Seabourne Echelon
C Troop Lt. E. Withecombe Lieutenant
Lieutenant J. Howe
E. Shaw BQMS – E. Rolfe
F Troop
TS. Davis
Lieutenant
R.L. McLaren
Z Troop Rear Echelon
Lieutenant X Troop Lieutenant
E. McNaught Lieutenant W.J. Reed
TS. Denholme G.A. Paull 2nd Lt. H.W.Neal
35

Battery’
Chapter 3
Battery HQ Section
In Operation ‘Market Garden’
36
1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery Royal Artillery HQ Officers
Battery HQ Liaison Officer

Lieutenant Harry Whittaker
OFFICER COMMANDING 1ST AIRLANDING ANTI-TANK BATTERY
MAJOR WILLIAM FRANK ARNOLD
Battery HQ Liaison Officer

Lieutenant J. Anthony Cox
OFFICER COMMANDING ALL 6-POUNDER TROOPS at BHQ
CAPTAIN ‘G’ ARVIAN DAVID LLEWELLYN-JONES
Divisional HQ Liaison Officer

Lieutenant Geoff Ryall
OFFICER COMMANDING ALL 17-POUNDER TROOPS at DIV HQ
CAPTAIN ‘A’ NORMAN MCLEOD
37
A/Battery Quarter-Master Sergeant

Sergeant Alec Mashiter
OFFICER QUATERMASTER at DIV HQ
CAPTAIN ‘Q’ HENRY BEAR
Battery HQ RAMC Officer

Lieutenant Derek Randall
Battery Quarter-Master Sergeant-Major

WOII Edward E. R. Rolfe
Battery O/C Seaborne Echelon
Lieutenant John C. Howe
38
The Battery HQ Sections at Arnhem

The plan for the 1st Battery 6-pounder Troops with Captain ‘G’ Arvian
Llewellyn-Jones was to support the 1st Parachute Brigade; therefore, Battery
HQ section was to be in a position to co-ordinate the anti-tank defence around
the bridgehead. As such Battery HQ section would join to 1st Parachute
Brigade HQ and follow direction from Brigadier General Lathbury.
As regards the Divisional HQ section of the Battery with Captain ‘A’ Norman
McLeod, this was placed under the command of the CRA Lieutenant Colonel
Loder-Symonds. Each 17-pounder Troop was to be ready to be moved into the
bridgehead wherever required, to counter the known German armoured forces
that were in the vicinity.
The following are the daily accounts for the Battery HQ section and those
individual accounts engaged in the various actions and held by the author. As
the Battery HQ and Divisional HQ sections became completely separated
during the operation, this will be followed by the daily accounts of the
Divisional HQ section.
Battery HQ Section Daily Actions

Sunday 17th September 1944
Sunday morning the men were given their final briefing and take-off times,
those from Manston were scheduled to start from 10:33h and those from
Tarrant Rushton from 10:43h.
For most, the crossing was extremely peaceful with no Flak, for others
sporadic Flak Batteries caused planes to veer off course and take evasive
action, even for the gliders to cast-off early.
13:30h to 13:45h Captain Llewellyn-Jones tells us that his, ‘glider
(No.327) came in low over the top of power cables and just cleared the trees
before the open ground of LZ-Z. The glider pilots brought the glider to near
stalling speed and then at the last moment landed the glider running it into a
light thicket, as their orders were to get the gliders as far away from the DZ’s
in the centre of the heaths, as possible’. The glider stopped just short of the
copse of trees to their front, he then watched as the next glider, ‘went hurtling
past us and into the wooded area, ripping the wings off the glider. All its
39
occupants surfaced unscathed and none the worse for their experience. No
shots were fired and exit from the gliders broke all records, with the Jeeps and
trailers out with great precision. In the centre of the heath was a small road
with an isolated house known as Jonkershoeve, intended to be the original
assembly point of Brigade HQ’.
With the rapid extraction of all the equipment from the gliders Captain
Llewellyn-Jones, in the absence of Major Arnold who would parachute in,
decided to move straight off the LZ and into the suburbs of the village close-
by, as he thought it now too dangerous to move across the open ground as the
gliders were coming in thick and fast. Lance-Bombardier Jim Crabtree was
sent to inform the other members of BHQ on his motorcycle.
Jim Crabtree went around the whole Landing Zone and relayed the message
and eventually met up with the BHQ members of glider No. 328. Driver Wally
Hammond went off with the Jeep to the new Rendezvous point as he was to
drive Major Arnold.
H G
F C
Fig. 14: LZ-Z, the glider No. 327 of Captain Llewellyn-Jones is close to the tree
line top of shot. A–Hamilcar 318 overturned. B–Hamilcar 314. C–Hamilcar 316.
40
D–Hamilcar 315?. E–Hamilcar 320. F–Hamilcar 321. G-Hamilcar 319

overturned.
As there was no heavy equipment with the gliders, unlike those with the
Battery guns, the glider pilots who had taken BHQ section to Arnhem were
dismissed and took up defensive positions on the LZ.
Lance-Sergeant Doug Colls decided that they also needed transport to get to
the Bridge, on the principle according to Colls, 'Riding is always preferable to
walking'. They came across an abandoned car with a Red Cross painted on the
side, with either a gas bag or charcoal burner on the rear and so
Driver/Mechanic Nick Gregory decided to get the car going. While waiting
Don R Bill Hartley drove off on his motorbike for a tour of the LZ to relay the
instructions from Captain Llewellyn-Jones. Here he met up with Sergeant
Simpson of C Troop HQ section who was collecting and organising
ammunition and aided him in loading it into a Jeep of the RAOC. He returned
to the others and now with the car working they waited for Crabtree.
During this time, further gliders had arrived on the Landing Zones and
particularly the larger Hamilcar gliders had problems, two of them completely
turning over on landing, wrecking the 17-pounder guns of the Battery and
injuring a number of the crew. Others from the Battery gun teams came to
their aid.
14:00 to 14:45h The various Battalions transport planes arrived over
the Drop Zones. Major Arnold upon landing surveyed the situation and went
to see the overturned gliders. Here he saw a number of the men helping the
RAMC and Engineers and immediately told them to follow him, which
included Gun Sergeant Robson of C Troop as they had missed their RV time.
14:30h Major Arnold was met by Driver Wally Hammond and the
BHQ section was ordered to get ready to follow directly behind the Brigade
HQ section. Most members of BHQ had now assembled at the new RV.
15:00h The 2nd Battalion with Brigade HQ following behind, started
along the lower road ‘Lion’ route toward the main Arnhem Bridge. Major
Arnold gave the order for march and Battery HQ also set off.
15:15h Colls became aware that BHQ had set off but didn’t know
what direction. Nick Gregory was still trying to get the ambulance working so
Colls sent Crabtree off, ‘Get on your Motorbike with Alf Cook riding shotgun
for protection and see where BHQ has gone’. They drove off and after some
41
time they passed the staff car with the body of General Kussin hanging out of
the door. They received info that they were on the 3rd Battalions route so
knew the approximate position. Almost immediately they came under small
arms fire, so Crabtree turned his motorbike around and headed back to the LZ
to report to Colls.
Fig. 15: The line of advance to the Bridge taken by 2nd Battalion with Brigade
HQ and Battery HQ, is shown in red. The advance started at 15:00h. and the
column reached the Bridge at 20:15h. on the 17th of September.
A - Landing Zone Z.
B - Area of glider with chalk number 318.
C - Rendez-Vous.
D - Lion Route into Arnhem.
15:45h Crabtree finally got back to the others where he told Colls and
Hartley what had happened, who then told Crabtree, ‘We’ll follow you!’ With
Gregory driving, Colls and Cook got in the car with rifles and a Bren gun
poking out of the open windows. Crabtree on his motorbike led the way,
followed by the car and then Hartley on another motorbike. Crabtree, after
getting lost for a short time, eventually led the men to the column containing
Major Arnold.
42
As the BHQ section moved through Heelsum they were greeted by large
crowds of Dutch people, but as they came under fire, the people quickly
dispersed. The small German resistance was dealt with quickly and the
advance pressed on into Oosterbeek. Captain Llewellyn-Jones also
remembered that during this march, he was shown many pictures of the Dutch
Queen by the cheering crowds. He then had to issue orders to his men that
they should, ‘Control the intake of Apricot Brandy’, which was free flowing in
the celebrations, ‘as the senses of all were required for rapid reaction’.
Captain Llewellyn-Jones knew that action and death was bound to break out at
some stage, sooner rather than later.
Colls remembered that there was intermittent gunfire all the way along the
lower road into Arnhem, especially as they reached the outskirts of the town,
coming mainly from south of the river. The men felt quite pleased with
themselves until Major Arnold pointed out the error of their ways, in firing
from a Red Cross vehicle. They therefore got out of the car and piled into
Major Arnold's Jeep.
On a number of occasions, the column came to a halt and had to wait while the
rifle Companies from the 2nd Battalion skilfully dealt with the German threat.
All in the column heard the explosion from the destruction of the Railway
Bridge. As the BHQ section got closer to the outskirts of Arnhem, all recalled
that the firing started to intensify ahead of them and the report was received
that armoured cars were operating ahead of them. Driver Patterson with
A/BSM Doughty reported that Comms were basically none functioning and
Major Arnold was not able to raise any of his Troop commanders to confirm
their progress. Frustration was starting to set in.
18:45h By the time the BHQ section reached the Den Brink area of
Arnhem, the light was fading fast, and the Germans were unable to cause too
much harassment with their fire on 2nd Battalion and each of the HQ sections
as they passed by. Colls then recounted, 'As we approached a crossroads
where we were to turn right to go down to the river (Onderlangs), we had to
drive the Jeep very fast to try to avoid the gunfire. The Jeep was towing a
trailer and as the Jeep was full, I was standing on the towing bar of the
trailer. Unfortunately, as the Jeep turned at speed I fell off and I suppose I
was lucky not to be hit'. Colls got back on the Jeep and continued his journey
to their objective.
20:00h Reports suggest that the BHQ section moved slowly through
the streets of Arnhem town and reached the area of the Grote Markt at this
43
time. It is known that this section took a slightly different route to the road
Bridge, moving through the Sabelspoort but then turning up Eusebiusplein and
onto Marktstraat.
20:40h The BHQ section arrived at the Arnhem Road Bridge and
Captain Llewellyn-Jones and others of BHQ noted that initially in the
darkness, armoured vehicles could be heard moving over the Road Bridge.
These proved to be elements of SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Viktor Graebner’s
Reconnaissance Squadron, 9th SS Panzer Division, driving towards Nijmegen.
Immediately Major Arnold called an Officers conference of which building to
setup BHQ in and where the guns at this moment should be placed while
awaiting the rest of the Division’s arrival and the bridgehead could be
expanded.
B D
Arrival of Battery HQ
RV
C A
Fig. 16: Scale plan of the Bridge area and Battery HQ section arrival.
Note: 1st Airlanding Battery Guns available for action: - 5.
- Sgt. Robson stayed on Eusebiusplein, first at corner of Kadestraat pointing east, then
closer to Markstraat opposite point E still with LOS east.
- RV of 4 guns under Bridge, then deployed to Battery HQ and Joiners yard.
- Sgt. Shelswell, then deployed to Bridge
- Sgt. O’Neill, then deployed to D
- Sgt. Kill, then deployed to area F
- Sgt. Doig deployed at Kadestraat pointing south.
- A – Initial Battery HQ building
44
- B – 1st Parachute Brigade HQ building - E – 2nd Battalion HQ building

- C – Joiners shop and yard - D – Petrol Garage Van Eeuwen
Once a suitable building was identified, the B Troop 6-pounder guns that had
arrived were then ordered to park in a joiner’s yard. This was close to the
Bridge structure but back away from the river itself, while Major Arnold and
Captain Llewellyn-Jones decided their tactical deployment. The building that
was commandeered by these Officers as Battery HQ was also at this stage
occupied by some men of 9th Field Company Royal Engineers. It had a small
walled garden to the front and from the corner of the house Major Arnold and
Captain Llewellyn-Jones had a clear view of the dark road tunnel under the
Bridge. They then took the decision to site Sergeant Robson’s gun at that
corner of the road Bridge tunnel and buildings, in sight of Battery HQ and able
to fire under the Bridge should an attack come from that direction. The other
four guns were still awaiting their deployment and remained next to the
joiner’s yard at the back of Battery HQ.
21:30 to 21:45h Lance-Sergeant Bill Fulton with No.3 platoon, A
Company was ordered to take a small section of men onto the Bridge and
move to the southern end to see what opposition they faced. After stealthily
getting up the steps and onto the Bridge, they moved forward about 50-yards
when the element of surprise was lost as a guard had to be dealt with and shot.
This small section came under-fire from a machine gun positioned in a
wooden structure constructed next to the abutment, prior to the centre section
of the Bridge.
22:00h Lieutenant-Colonel Frost, who was now in a position to see
what the problem was, met Major Arnold along with Lance-Bombardier
Crabtree, who recalled, ‘the two Officers took me to the top of the pedestrian
steps opposite 2nd Battalion HQ building to reconnoitre the situation’. Major
Arnold said to Crabtree. ‘Take a look around that wall and see if it’s clear!’
Being one of the gun fitters under Sergeant Jacobs, Crabtree was in a position
to advise Major Arnold if it was indeed feasible to put a gun onto the roadway,
which he duly did. Crabtree also remembered thinking to himself, ‘why am I
the one who has to put my head out and look around the corner?’ Major
Arnold then pointed out the situation to Lieutenant McFarlane, who in turn
went to Gun Sergeant Shelswell and together they surveyed the small
gravel/cobbled pedestrian path that ran parallel to the road, that ended with a
few steps just down from the road surface.
45
The members of BHQ were told to take up defensive positions in the close-by
houses; here Crabtree noted he spent the first night in the same building as
Don R. Hartley, near the Bridge and overlooking the Rhine and river road
Rijnkade. He setup their Bren gun to be able to fire on the Bridge and across
the river. At the same time, Captain Llewellyn-Jones and Lieutenant Cox went
off on reconnaissance, to identify the best positions for the guns to be placed.
Sporadic firing was happening at this stage around the whole of the northern
end of the Bridge, so this was particularly risky for the officers as they could
be seen as targets by both British and German soldiers.
22:15h The first wooden pillbox was successfully dealt with by the
gun of Sergeant Shelswell who had been placed on the road. This was
followed by a second wooden structure that suddenly burst into flames as it
contained signalling equipment. Shelswell was then told to hold his fire.
22:30h An attack by Lieutenant Grayburn with No.2 Platoon was
mounted to try to gain the southern end of the Bridge. The attackers withdrew
as they came under heavy fire from machine guns situated in the Bridge
concrete abutments previously obscured from the view of Shelswell. The
Para’s also came under fire from a half-track on the south side of the Bridge.
According to the German reports, it was likely machine gun fire from a half-
track left by Hauptsturmführer Viktor Gräbner as a wireless relay station on
the southern ramp. This half-track was over the rise of the Bridge and out of
view of Shelswell. At approximately 18:00h, Gräbner had received orders to
move his reconnaissance Battalion and reconnoitre the road from Arnhem to
Nijmegen to search for any Parachute troops. He had travelled over the Bridge
with approximately eight armoured cars and over thirty other vehicles with
approximately 420 men. But he had left a small detachment on the southern
approaches to the ramp. The same reports tell us that SturmBannFuhrer
Brinkmann in command of SS Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 10. with his HQ
and (1st) 1. Kompanie containing possibly six Sd.kfz.222 and three Sd.kfz.231
Armoured cars with some half-tracks, had arrived to the north of Arnhem.
This thus freed up the Battalion of Gräbner to advance on the Nijmegen road
through Elst.
23:00h. to 23:30h To deal with this obstruction, a flame-thrower was
brought up and used on the concrete pillbox. It seems that prior to this, at least
three trucks likely from Kampfgruppe ‘Brinkmann’, one at least carrying a
number of barrels of fuel had also been abandoned on the Bridge and had been
leaking fuel. The fuel had drained down the slope in the gullies of the Bridge
46
which caught fire with the flames tracking back to the abandoned trucks,
causing a large explosion to occur. The Bridge now became completely
illuminated as the fire burned intensely.
02:30h to 03:00h It was deemed too dangerous to attempt any more
attacks to secure the southern end of the Bridge, as the whole area was on fire.
Major Arnold by this time had decided that the building chosen as Battery HQ
was not in a good position and was drawing German fire and that the main
elements of BHQ would relocate themselves to another building. At the same
time, he would leave a small contingent of the men under the Command of
Lieutenant McFarlane O/C B Troop in the original building with B Troop HQ
section, including at this point Staff Sergeant Cook from BHQ. Like everyone
at this stage Major Arnold was expecting the other Battalions to arrive along
with the rest of the Battery’s guns.
Soon news was filtering through that the rest of the Parachute Battalions were
not faring well and were stuck in Arnhem town with growing German
resistance. As the guns were now vulnerable at the joiner’s yard and Robson’s
gun was clearly visible on the main road, all illuminated by the Bridge fire,
both Major Arnold and Captain Llewellyn-Jones took the decision to move the
guns to what they considered safer positions.
B
C
Fig. 17: Gun positions at 03:30h Monday 18th September.

Known positions of the BHQ men:
- A - Lieutenant Tony Cox, Staff Sergeant Alf Cook, Bombardiers Frank Greaney and
Les Bluer
47
- B – L/Bombardier Jim Crabtree and Don R Bill Hartley

- C – Major Arnold, Captain Llewellyn-Jones and the remainder of BHQ
The new Battery HQ building was now positioned at a wine merchants next to
Markstraat, where the men set about barricading the building and fortifying
the back garden. Gunner/Driver Wally Hammond setup the Bren gun to cover
the small road that came from behind the Provincial Government building and
led to the back gardens that was a part of Battalion and Brigade HQ buildings.
Lieutenant’s Cox and Whittaker, the Liaison Officers, conferred with Captain
Llewellyn-Jones and Major Arnold that it was extremely difficult to site the
guns properly as the AOE and LOS were not suitable and provided the guns
with no cover. Therefore, apart from the three guns currently deployed, the
other two of Doig and Shelswell would remain in the vicinity of the gardens at
the rear of the Battalion and Brigade HQ buildings awaiting their deployment.
It was also at this stage decided that it would be prudent to get all the vehicles
off the road as soon as possible and to a designated area for the Jeep park in an
area surrounded by houses. This was also considered in other publications to
be where all the Battery guns were kept at some stage or other, but this has
since been proven to be incorrect.
48
Fig 18: Family Hesselink wine importers and area in front of it where Sergeant
Robson’s 6pounder gun was positioned. The building on the left was used as
Battery HQ from the early hours of the morning of the 18th onwards. The lower
windows can be seen where Lance-Sergeant Doug Colls leapt out of to help man
the gun of Robson.
49
Monday 18th September 1944

Captain Llewellyn-Jones related that all Officers recognised that resistance
in Arnhem was significantly more than they had been briefed. Before first
light, armoured vehicles were heard to the south of the river and it was
assumed that these would at some stage make an appearance.
First light is recorded as happening at 05:19h and sunrise at 06:13h.
00:30h. L/Bombardier Crabtree reported that, ‘in my position from the
house overlooking the river and river road (RijnKade), the fire on the Bridge
gave off an eerie light. I heard lots of movements of armoured vehicles but
was unable to engage anything with my Bren gun. He took it in turns with
‘Don R’ Hartley on lookout, while the other slept.
01:00h. The German reports tell us that the 9th SS-Reconnaissance
Battalion of Hauptsturmführer Viktor Gräbner had returned from Nijmegen to
the south of the Bridge having encountered no enemy resistance. Reports of
actions at the Bridge had been relayed to him. Under his command were 30
armoured vehicles, including armoured cars and half-tracks and approximately
420-men.
00:00 to 02:00h. A number of German reports confirm actions taking
place to the north of the Bridge, as German Kampfgruppe elements proceeded
to advance and attempt to make their way over the Bridge to Nijmegen. For
example (1st) 1. Kompanie of SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 10,
commanded by SS-Obersturmführer Karl Ziebrecht reached the Bridge from
the northeast. His armoured vehicles were fired at as they tried to drive up
Nijmeegseweg, so he withdrew.
Similarly, at about midnight a second German counter-attack took place from
the direction of Arnhem town and northwest. SS-Sturmbannführer
Sonnenstuhl reported that his small group had arrived in Arnhem earlier that
evening, but again as they advanced down Nijmeegseweg, they were met by
fire and were forced to withdraw.
Again, a report from a scratch group led by SS-Sturmbannführer Leo H.
Reinhold, containing a part of the 1st Battalion SS-Panzer-grenadier Regiment
22 of SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl-Heinz Euling of the 10. SS-Panzer Division
“Frundsberg”, states he attacked from the east. Again, this report tells us he
was stopped at the corner of Badhuisstraat and Nieuwe Kade, likely by the
platoon from C Company, 3rd Parachute Battalion with Lieutenant Infield.
50
While another part of this unit was stopped and forced to withdraw while
advancing down Westervoortsedijk. This action must have occurred after
01:00h due to the known arrival of C Company with Lieutenant Infield at this
area.
04:00h. By now the Germans had responded significantly to the
landings and different elements of German Battle groups were arriving in
Arnhem throughout the night. Kampfgruppe ‘Brinkman’ of the 10th SS-
Reconnaissance Battalion was already in action in Arnhem itself. To the north
arrived further elements of Kampfgruppe ‘Euling’ along with the 3rd
Company of 21st Panzer Grenadier Regiment of 10th SS-Panzer Division,
supported by two Flak Companies of 88mm and 20mm guns.
Further German reports tell us that the leading elements of Major Hans-Peter
Knaust, the commander of the Panzer-grenadier Training and Replacement
Battalion 'Bocholt', reported for orders at this stated time. Initially with him
came his command half-track plus probably just a few Panzer Mark III tanks
from the 6th Panzer Replacement Regiment 'Bielefeld'. His immediate task on
arrival was to relieve ‘Euling's’ men at the northern ramp, so that they could
continue on to Nijmegen. It was decided that elements of Kampfgruppe
‘Brinkmann’ to the north and east, would make the first attacks at dawn.
While those smaller forces to the west, would just attempt to seal off the
western approaches. German eyewitness accounts, including SS-Corporal
Rudolp Trapp, who fought throughout the battle, confirm this.
06:30 to 07:00h. A number of minor incidents and skirmishes occurred
as the Germans attempted to estimate the strength and defensive positions of
the Para’s. This included the use of lorried infantry and a captured American
Dodge WC51 Beep driving down to and passing the Brigade HQ building.
07:30h. The German Reports of Obersturmbannführer Harzer stated
that Kampfgruppe ‘Brinkman’ made its first un-coordinated attacks against the
perimeter. This was made by ‘Euling’ from the north along
Eusebiusbuitensingel and also by ‘Knaust’ from the east down
Westervoortsedijk to the ‘Cadiz’ milk factory, with possibly two Mk III tanks
supported by infantry.
The only gun available to the east was that of Sergeant Kill and it seems that
this was able to engage the enemy armour, but the Battery crew were forced to
take shelter and leave the gun. German infantry and tanks continued to press
on with their attacks and Para accounts tell us that they were evicted from
51
positions in the milk factory. At this stage, the defence by the Para’s was
strong enough to force the Germans eventually to retire. The initial positions
that were lost, were soon recaptured and likely the gun of Sergeant Kill was
recovered. This gun can be seen in later aerial photographs and so was clearly
not destroyed by the Germans at this stage.
During this initial attack, the Mk III tanks continued to advance with the
infantry, who were able to place demolition charges under the Bridge itself
which shows us how far they penetrated, and one tank got as far as the road
tunnel.
Sergeant Robson had his gun sited in the middle of the road opposite the new
Battery HQ building facing toward the tunnel under the Bridge. Driver
Patterson the radio operator for A/BSM Doughty explained that the men, ‘in
Battery HQ could hear the order ring out clearly, as Robson’s crew responded
quickly to the tank threat, probably forgetting about the spades of the gun. A
positive reaction to firing the gun occurred, which sent it sprawling
backwards towards the houses, maybe up to 20-yards’. Bombardier Chilcott,
Driver Jones and gunner Brabbs of the gun crew were badly injured as the gun
careered backwards.
Captain Llewellyn-Jones noted: ‘To me and Major Arnold’, who were in
Battery HQ, ‘there seemed to be no apparent damage to the tank, which
remained partially hidden by the gloom of the road tunnel’. The injured crew
recovered the gun with some difficulty, while ‘Major Arnold ordered two men
from Battery HQ should go and help’.
The men included the Battery Clerk Lance-Sergeant Colls, who informs us, ‘I
had never fired a gun in my life before and was used to typing out the nominal
roles. We jumped out of the windows of the Battery HQ building and ran to
the gun. The spades were anchored and the recoil dealt with and by the time
that we had reached the gun, the German tank had started to appear in full
view and its gun was traversing menacingly round to deploy in action against
the 6-pounder gun and buildings behind us’.
Robson commenced firing at the tank and with the trail wedged, the tank was
hit a number of times, it slewed round and blocked part of the road tunnel,
with smoke billowing out of it. Accounts from Glider Pilots, such as Arthur
Rigby and Para’s in close-by buildings, including Private James Sims of the
mortar platoon, 2nd Parachute Battalion in the mortar gun pits, also reported
that the shouts of this German driver or tank commander could be heard,
52
which turned to screams when the tank caught fire. No photographic evidence
for the destruction of this tank has yet been found. But, with so many
eyewitness accounts, the authors believe that this action is correct.
Lance-Sergeant Colls then explained that a wry smile appeared on the faces of
all the men, as for him he had got his first ever kill. At the same time, Captain
Llewellyn-Jones announced to all in the Battery HQ building as heard by Ken
Patterson that the, ‘Battery was the first artillery formation to take their guns
to Battle by air, that may well have been the first tank destroyed by an
airborne gun’. That he made such a bold statement suggests that the action of
Sergeant Robson’s gun did indeed happen very early morning on the 18th and
not the following day, when the Battery was heavily engaged and also
confirms this tank attack is prior to the Gräbner attack.
It is unknown from which Kampfgruppe that these Mk III tanks came from.
They could have been from ‘Brinkman’ or ‘Knaust’, who may have been able
to call on these armoured vehicles, or they may have been from ‘Mielke’.
Some reports have suggested that ‘Mielke’ tanks did not arrive until the
following morning of the 19th due to Allied air attacks on the rail network, but
there is photographic evidence that Mielke himself was present on the 18th
during these initial attacks.
Mielke was a tank commander and it is quite probable that he would have
arrived with his tank, so if this is the case there is also a possibility that the
report that his tanks arrived on the 19th is incorrect. The accounts in ‘Then
and Now’ state that ‘Mielke’ and his tanks were, ‘pulled back from the action’
to where a photo of him was taken, when heavier tanks arrived.
This photo below was taken near the junction of Westervoortsedijk and
Rijnwijk, where also the second archway in the picture was in fact destroyed
later in October by Allied bombing. To be ‘pulled back’, implies that his tanks
were indeed engaged. Whatever the situation, it is fact that the Bridge
perimeter was attacked by Mk III tanks at this stage, whether all ‘Mielke’
tanks were present it is impossible to say, but the authors are confident a
number of his tanks were present by very late evening 17th or very early
morning 18th.
53
Fig.19: Mielke (with

binoculars) arrowed
under the arches of
Rijnwijk. A heavily
camouflaged vehicle
lurks in the background
and is quite probably a
Mk III tank due to the
size. The photo was
taken by Lance-
Corporal Karl-Heinz
Kracht the loader in a
Mk III tank.
Fig. 20: An aerial photograph taken on the 19th. Mielke tanks are circled yellow
at Rijnwijk. The brick arches where Mielke stood is circled red.
07:30h. Accounts tell us that there was now a lull in the fighting as the
Germans withdrew having completely under-estimated the strength of the
perimeter, while all in the perimeter now took action to strengthen their
positions. It may well be at this point that ‘Mielke’ was ‘pulled back’.
54
07:45h to 08:45h. Now aware that tanks were situated to the north of the
Bridge perimeter, Major Arnold sent Lieutenant’s Cox and Whittaker on
intensive reconnaissance, but they returned unable to find suitable places for
the guns at this time. The men were encouraged to make their positions more
defensive and be vigilant to German infiltration.
At this stage the two Jeeps and trailers of ammunition that came with BHQ
were in the gardens behind the Battalion and Brigade HQ buildings. Major
Arnold therefore instructed Sergeant’s Shelswell and Doig to establish a cache
of gun ammunition in a safe location. At the same time Lieutenant MacFarlane
was instructed to establish the same in the area of the joiner’s yard. Positive
proof of this can be seen in the following photo enlargement.
Fig 21: Wing Commander Webb from no. 16 Photo Recce Squadron flew over
Arnhem around 15:45h (as calculated by the shadows in the simulation
program). In the full aerial photograph of Fig. ???? a Jeep with trailer (or gun)
can be seen next to the Stoomgemaal.
55
Captain Llewellyn-Jones remembered that they expected an attack from the

south of the river having heard the noise of armoured vehicles earlier in the
morning. It was essential therefore to be prepared for any such attack.
Sergeant Robson’s gun was still on Marktstraat, but it was almost impossible
to engage targets on the Bridge due to the concrete parapet, which therefore
had to be removed. Lieutenant Cox states, ‘I instructed Robson on the removal
of the parapet. I leant out of the window of the corner house and directed
Robson’s fire from there’. Robson cut about a five-foot section (‘V’ cut) of the
wall away with solid shot; Cox explained, ‘the debris was removed by the
Para’s dug in at the top of the pedestrian steps and embankment. A member of
the Battery was placed on this embankment so as to be able to see along the
length of the Bridge road surface and inform Sergeant Robson and O’Neill of
any approaching vehicles’.
Note: - Some books have stated that the ‘V’ cut was made by Sergeant Doig’s
gun deployed on the side street known as Kadestraat. This is incorrect,
eyewitness evidence from Shelswell and Lieutenant Cox, as well as other
Battery member’s accounts, was first used to disprove this in 2005.
Photographic evidence which only became available from May 2014 confirms
the author’s interpretation of events from these eyewitness reports.
Fig 22: The houses along Marktstraat, it is not exactly known which house
Lieutenant Cox was referring to when he stated he ‘leant out of the window to
direct the fire of Sergeant Robson’. He could have meant the house on the corner
of Kadestraat, which was later used as Troop HQ building or the house next to
the Bridge.
56
Due to the injuries of the crew of Sergeant Robson, it is quite likely that those
who now helped operate the gun would have been members of BHQ, but the
technical side of firing the gun would have been other trained gunners. No
doubt Captain Llewellyn-Jones with Lieutenant Cox were busy identifying
and pulling spare gun members from around the perimeter. This seems to
agree with the fact that Lance-Bombardier Crabtree states that, ‘early morning
Don R Hartley was called back to Battery HQ building on his BSA 125
motorbike’. The ‘Don R’ would have been tasked with travelling around and
giving the instructions to the Battery Officers and Troop Sergeants. A very
dangerous task but certainly possible at this stage. Lance-Bombardier Crabtree
was at this stage still required to stay in the waterfront building as Battery
lookout over to the southside of the Rhine. He also still had his BSA 125
motorbike in the back garden of this building.
Fig 23: Looking east down Marktstraat towards the Bridge and the road tunnel,
the ‘V’ cut can now be clearly seen to the right and above the Bridge support
pillar. To the right would have stood the house on the corner that Lieutenant Cox
would have leant out of to direct Sergeant Robson’s fire. This is the view that
Sergeant Robson would have seen during the attacks.
57
Fig. 24: Further evidence of the ‘V’ cut as made by Sergeant Robson as indicated
by the authors. After the ‘V’ cut was made it is uncertain where Sergeant Robson
again exactly moved his gun to on Marktstraat. It would have taken great
practice and skill for a gun to engage moving targets through this ‘V’ cut.
Testament to the degree of training the Battery went through.
08:55h. Lookouts reported a large concentration of armour on the

south side of the river. Initial thoughts were of an early appearance of XXX
Corps, but these were soon dispelled.
It was in fact the same armoured vehicles that had been heard on the Bridge
road surface while the Battery was parked in the road tunnel the previous
night. Having returned from Nijmegen early morning, Hauptsturmfuhrer
Gräbner now decided to commit his forces.
09:00h. Many accounts speak of the armoured dash made by the
Germans from the south into the British held perimeter. This armoured
column was spearheaded by six Sdkfz231 armoured cars and followed by an
array of approximately twelve half-tracked Sdkfz250’s, Sdkfz251’s, Sdkfz10’s
and at least twenty-one trucks, many types of German, French and anything
else to hand. Battery accounts state the engagement of the vehicles by both the
guns of Sergeant Robson and O’Neill, and the yell of the Battery member who
gave instructions from the embankment of, ‘Standby…..Steady…..Fire’.
Photographs of destroyed half-tracks show that they halted on the road when
hit, while the trucks were further back down the column. The exact number of
vehicles engaged by the two guns and destroyed was never stated by any of
58
the Battery members, only that there were quite a number hit and ammunition
started to get low. Of course, many of the Para’s were firing everything they
had at this column, so it would be almost impossible to claim who destroyed a
particular vehicle. A study of these vehicles was carried out by Marcel Zwarts
and highlighted the possibilities.
The attack with supporting infantry continued for approximately 2-hours
before the Germans were forced to withdraw leaving at least 70-dead.
10:30h to 11:30h. Driver Patterson tells us that the Battery HQ building
was subject to an infantry attack from the west, while the ‘Gräbner’ action was
still taking place. This happened from the direction of the Grote Markt and
through the garden areas. Driver Hammond was still in the garden with the
Bren gun and was able to easily hold the attack off. The attack from the west
did not carry much weight at this stage.
This action is confirmed by Glider pilot Sergeant Rigby who records the same
attack on the wooded area, where the mortars he states, ‘unfortunately one of
the first ones to land dropped smack onto our jeep..... Despite a large number
of bombs, which did considerable damage to our equipment we were not hit
and our weapons and carried ammunition were intact’.
The decision by the Battery Officers to unload the ammunition and stores
from the Jeeps and trailers was a particularly wise one.
11:30h. After the Gräbner engagement, an assessment of the situation
was made by Captain Llewellyn-Jones and the guns that were seen to be
vulnerable were to be re-sited. This was also a necessity due to the number of
vehicles destroyed both on the Bridge and in the road tunnel.
Other accounts tell us that soon after Gräbner’s attack, another mortar barrage
was fired against the perimeter and no doubt Robson felt very exposed in the
centre of the roadway on Marktstraat, this may be another reason that forced
him to move his gun. The road surface was said to be ‘hard and so the
shrapnel bursts were not absorbed by the surface but helped the fragmentation
causing wounds from splinters’. By moving closer to brick buildings, the
chance of being hit by flying shrapnel was reduced, as the building would
absorb the shell impact. He was also probably more obscured from German
artillery spotters.
Lance-Sergeant Colls states that, ‘at this stage, being the Battery clerk, I was
assigned the task of checking the ammunition supply of all the Battery
59
positions’. He mentions that he, ‘visited the men in the Troop HQ building and
those in slit trenches, including Troop Sergeant McCarner’. This confirms
that the Battery HQ and Troop HQ buildings were in separate locations at this
time. Colls continued, ‘While checking on Sergeant McCarner, he was dug in
next to a wall and it seemed that he was messing around as there kept what
seemed to be mud splattering against the wall above my head. So I told him to
stop F’ing around. He casually told me…’I think a German has got you in his
sights but you move before he can hit you, so I suggest you get down’….. I
went headfirst into that slit trench to the amusement of the others from B
Troop’.
Lance-Bombardier Crabtree tells us, ‘During the Gräbner attack, the building
I was in was ripped apart by mortar and other shells, the only stairs down
were in full view of the Germans. The cable lift at the back was a shattered
wreck with just the cables swinging freely, so I had to slide down those with
the Bren gun strapped to my back. Bill Hartley had already been called back
to Battery HQ building, so I decided to setup my Bren gun in the garden at the
back of this building, trained on the garden gate that was closed. During the
attack the Germans also tried to rush us with lorried infantry along the river
road (from Nieuwe Kade into Rijnkade) but were stopped in their tracks. One
poor unfortunate decided to make a run for cover, flung my gate open and saw
the Bren gun as I opened up on him. His face was ashen white. No others
attempted to come through that gate. After the attack and the Germans
withdrew I was recalled to Battery HQ building, arriving on the back of ‘Don
R’ Bill Hartley’s BSA 125 motorcycle and was then assigned the task of
providing covering fire with my Bren gun out of a gate in the gardens of
Brigade and Battalion HQ buildings’. Firing up Hofstraat towards the Battery
HQ building he was able to cover the Battery supply dump in these gardens.
No doubt also providing a cross fire with the Bren gun with Driver Hammond
further up the road.
60
Fig 25: The building on Rijnkade which was occupied initially by Lance-
Bombardier Jim Crabtree and ‘Don R’ Bill Hartley, before both were recalled
back to Battery HQ. The rear lift shaft can clearly be seen and the rear garden
Crabtree setup his Bren gun. The German attacks developed at this stage down
Nieuwe Kade and under the Bridge to these houses before they were repulsed.
SS-Rottenführer Rudolph Trapp, who was to the west of the perimeter and
operated in the Grote Markt area, stated in his many accounts that any attempt
to infiltrate into the road to the rear of Battery HQ building and Hofstraat
meant certain death. He stated that to him it seemed that bricks were removed
from the wall where the machine guns fired from and then replaced so that its
exact position could not be detected. This area was subject to murderous
machine gun fire, seemingly confirming the positions of Crabtree and
Hammond, and no doubt others.
Trapp then explained that a large caliber cannon was brought to his area from
Kampfgruppe ‘Knaust’, which was used to demolish buildings and break
down walls. In this way, it would allow troops to move to the rear areas of the
perimeter out of sight of British machine gunners. Mortars were then also
trained on the known areas occupied by British troops.
61
D
C
B
Fig. 26: The rear road and area behind Battery HQ building looking from the
Grote Markt, that was covered by the Bren guns operated by Lance-Bombardier
Crabtree an Driver Hammond from the Battery.
-A-Battery HQ Building
-B-Driver Hammond
-C-Lance-Bombardier Crabtree
-D-Hofstraat
-E-Combat area of SS-Rottenführer Rudolph Trapp
During this mortar attack, a number of buildings were hit again and caught
fire; this included the Troop HQ building with Lieutenant McFarlane inside.
Though the fire was dealt with at this stage, some of the Troop Jeeps still in
the joiner’s yard at the back were now also being subjected to mortar fire, so
the order was given to remove them and any of the ammunition in the trailers.
Lieutenant Cox: ‘they were to be taken to another larger area of ground
surrounded by houses that could be entered opposite the joiner’s yard and this
task was allocated to me and Lieutenant Whittaker’. When Lieutenant Cox
arrived back at the joiner’s yard he had to, ‘remove a large amount of
ammunition from the bonnet of one burning Jeep, while being subject to
mortar fire and not knowing if the ammunition would explode’. The
ammunition was stored safely by Cox. That the ammunition was on the bonnet
of a jeep suggests that the jeep was preparing to take a gun into action, or
ready to run a resupply mission.
The Battery HQ Jeeps and trailers from the gardens behind the HQ buildings
were moved by Lieutenant Whittaker and driven to the ‘Jeep Park’.
62
Understanding what is meant, it seems from Captain Llewellyn-Jones account,

that Lieutenant Cox was assigned the Jeeps across the road from Battery HQ,
while Lieutenant Whittaker was assigned the Battery HQ side of the road.
Fig. 27: Confirmation of a Jeep towing a trailer or possibly even a gun near the B
Troop HQ building and the joiner’s yard (Stoomgemaal) on Kadestraat. From
the simulator, it was determined that this photo was taken at 15:45h.
Many authors have located the place that everything was moved to and in their
description, call it a ‘Gun Park’. This is incorrect as in fact at no stage were
multiple Battery guns placed in that location, only one possibly. Battery Jeeps
were indeed relocated to this area. The ‘Gun Park’ has been identified as the
wooded area behind the buildings used for Battalion and Brigade HQ. As
discussed by both Sergeant Shelswell and Glider Pilot Sergeant Rigby, here
was parked the gun of Sergeant Sheslwell, while the gun of Sergeant Doig was
on Hofstraat next to this wooded area.
12:00h. Now that the Germans were fully aware of the strength and
position of the defending Para’s, they immediately started to co-ordinate their
attacks. Accounts tell us that these came from the north and east and were
carried out by infantry of Kampfgruppe ‘Brinkman’ now with reinforcements
of ‘Knaust’ and supported by Panzer Mk III tanks. They also used 88mm
artillery and heavy mortar fire everywhere around the Bridge perimeter. John
63
Kamevaar, whose family home was on Nieuwe Kade 3, witnessed these

attacks take place, as they continued all afternoon from the east.
12:30h. Captain Llewellyn-Jones says, ‘Lieutenant Whittaker got in a
Jeep with a gun attached in the side street near Battery HQ, but like most
Jeeps and guns, the tyres had burst and been shredded by the mortar fire’.
This description only fits the gun of Sergeant Doig that was initially presumed
to have been destroyed by the mortar fire in Hofstraat. The Captain explained
that this made the Jeep almost impossible to drive on its steel rims and as
Whittaker, ‘drove out onto the main road, the Jeep he was driving was
peppered by mortar fire fragments. The Jeep with gun in tow careered round
the wide road and finally came to a halt as it hit a brick wall near the road
tunnel’.
Captain Llewellyn-Jones, who was also moving between buildings near the
waterfront at this time, reported that, ‘on a number of occasions during the
fighting, guns were unhooked from wrecked Jeeps and hooked back up to
those still running and then moved into new positions’. This certainly
happened for the gun of Sergeant Shelswell, as the jeep was confirmed
destroyed by Sergeant Rigby in the wooded area ‘Gun Park’.
B
C
Fig 28: The sheltered area between the houses and opposite the joiner’s yard on
Hofstraat, with entrance into it. Here all the jeeps were kept as driven by
Lieutenant Cox and resulting in Lieutenant Whittaker’s death, and showing
likely path taken by Whittaker and his final resting place with the gun of Doig
Location of the ‘Jeep Park’ circled red with the locations for: -
A- Troop HQ building B- Battery HQ building C- Hofstraat
64
Lieutenant Whittaker had been critically wounded due to mortar concussion

before impacting against the wall, though there were no visible signs of injury.
He died a few days later when all of the seriously wounded had been
transferred to the hospital in Apeldoorn.
13:00h. Captain Llewellyn-Jones, ‘witnessed the gun towed by
Lieutenant Whittaker being salvaged’ and it seems that it was quickly put into
a position by the road tunnel near the concrete support pillar. Battery
members, who were still occupying the house on the corner, were seen by the
Captain to come out and prepare the gun for action near to the concrete pillar.
This was probably on the side opposite the houses, due to the restricted LOS
caused by the destroyed Mk III tank and other vehicle debris. That it was
deployed also indicates that the Battery members deemed it operational,
though how long it remained in this position is uncertain, probably until
another jeep could be obtained. It seems that this gun was then taken to the
joiner’s yard, waiting on a decision as to where it should be placed ready for
action. That it was in the joiner’s yard can be ascertained that just a short
while later (see below), it was used to attempt a shoot and that a jeep can be
seen in the aerial photo taken at 15:45h. as shown in Fig. 26.
This is something that was not reported by other authors, possibly due to the
misconception that Doig’s gun had been destroyed and what other gun could it
have been, so the account may well have been dismissed or confused with
another gun. The authors do not believe this to be the case. At least seven
other members of the Battery discuss the movement of the gun that was
recovered near the Bridge concrete pillar. This included Bombardier
Smallwood who was visibly upset as he was Lieutenant Whittaker’s Batman,
along with Bombardier Bluer.
Bombardier Smallwood’s recalls, ‘I had been particularly upset with the death
of Lieutenant Whittaker as it was my duty to provide close support and act as
body guard to the Lieutenant as his assigned Batman. I helped to recover the
Lieutenant’s body and then remained in a house on the corner of Marktstraat
next to the road tunnel almost throughout the rest of the battle’.
14:00h. From the accounts of Dutch Captain Hendrik Kamevaar’s
family and from Lieutenant Infield O/C 8 Platoon C Company 3rd Battalion,
and a number of his men, we know that two Mk III tanks opened fire at close
proximity to houses No.2 and 3 on Nieuwe Kade at the corner with
Badhuisstraat. Those defending the house were initially able to hold up this
determined attack but were subsequently surrounded. From point blank range,
65
the tanks fired into the house and the stunned defenders were now taken
prisoner.
This confirms the fact that Kampfgruppe ‘Brinkman’ did indeed contain, or
was able to call on support from, older tanks and also substantiates the claim
that a Mk III tank had been destroyed under the Bridge earlier in the day.
These tanks undoubtedly belonged to ‘Mielke’, who had at his disposal six Mk
III and two Mk IV tanks. This was the first setback for the perimeter as now
tanks could advance down Nieuwe Kade with infantry support, unhindered.
Also, as the photographs were taken by Lance-Corporal Karl-Heinz Kracht
who was a loader in a Mk III tank, this also confirms that his tank was present
to the east of the perimeter early morning this day. His account therefore
probably makes a mistake when he says he arrived on the 19th and not the
18th.
15:00h. Lieutenant Cox says: ‘the artillery and mortar barrage had
been on-going for a number of hours and it had become obvious to me, that
one of the churches nearby was being used as an Observation Post by German
artillery spotters’. He explains ‘I tried to get a 6-pounder gun deployed for
action to knock the top off the church by trying to elevate the gun up over the
remains of a pile of timber in the builder’s yard, but again the area became
the target of mortar fire. The whole yard became an inferno as the stored
paint and spirits caught fire and so the area had to be evacuated and the gun
moved’.
Again, from high resolution photographic evidence available, it is possible to
see under the ramp of the Bridge a large amount of wood had been stored that
could easily have been used. The AOE of a gun on the ground was insufficient
to clear the local buildings to hit the church tower, so again illustrates the
accuracy of the accounts. By lifting the gun up, on blocks of wood as it were,
a sufficient clearance could be made of the buildings close-by. The time taken
to attempt this was sufficient to attract mortar fire and so the plan was quickly
abandoned, and the gun moved by Lieutenant Cox, Bombardier Smallwood
and Sergeant Simpson, though Captain Llewellyn-Jones states in was Sergeant
Quinn. (Quinn was in hospital in Britain he had appendicitis and so it certainly
was not him). It is likely at this stage after the attempted shoot that the gun of
Sergeant Doig was taken to the ‘Jeep Park’.
With the loss of the defence on Nieuwe Kade, the German accounts of Lance-
Corporal Karl-Heinz Kracht, explain that they were very wary of the anti-tank
guns and so reversed the tanks into positions to fire on the perimeter.
66
Numerous Battery accounts tell us that their anti-tank guns were now in action
against German armour, which specifically kept at a longer range than before
and reverted to shelling the perimeter. This shows corroborative evidence
from both sides. There is no indication that during this action any Mk III or
Mk IV tanks were destroyed.
15:45h. An aerial reconnaissance aircraft flew the Bridge perimeter
and a series of photographs were taken. From these can be seen to confirm the
position of a Jeep either towing a trailer or a gun in the yard at the back of the
joiner’s, a closeup can be seen in Fig. 26. The position of deployment of
Sergeant Kill’s gun in the eastern part of the perimeter can also be seen and so
we can confirm the ‘time frame’ for Battery events and German tank attacks.
Fig. 29. The Bridge photo taken at 15:45h. and showing the wreckage of the
Grabner armoured attack. The buildings are currently not burning as at this
stage the fires were contained.
67
16:30h. Driver Patterson in the Battery HQ building makes mention

that due to the mortar fragments as they hit the hard road surface, the gun of
Sergeant Robson had to be moved closer to the buildings.
Sergeant Shelswell in his account helps us to identify that the gun of Robson
was moved close to the Battalion HQ building and able to fire under the road
Bridge and engage targets to the east by the ‘Camiz’ milk factory.
From this point in time, Major Arnold was aware that the Germans were
slowly making ground from the west and close to his Battery HQ building
position and the gunners of the Battery in the building became engaged in
small arms fire-fights. Particularly this was the case with gunner Hammond in
the back garden, with infiltration happening through the small road behind the
Provincial Government building. Captain Llewellyn-Jones and Major Arnold
were now also conscious of the fact that German armour could appear from
the west. They then took the decision to site the gun of Sergeant Shelswell
opposite Battery HQ building with LOS both east and west. He sited the gun
between two buildings to provide some cover from shrapnel bursts. While
engaging an infantry gun to the west, Sergeant Shelswell received a wound to
his foot, so setup the Bren gun in the house and left his gun to his crew to
handle.
That Shelswell and members from Battery HQ building make mention of an
infantry gun firing from the west is confirmed by Panzer-grenadier Horst
Weber, who reports the use of the PAK 7.5cm gun at this stage.
A side question arises as to what happened to the destroyed Jeeps, as in the
aerial photographs no such Jeeps are ever seen. It seems that they were moved
out of the way, while German and civilian trucks were left, the reason is not
apparent.
17:30h to 18:00h. The heavy shelling continued to intensify, and Major
Arnold was informed that the gun of Sergeant O’Neill had been destroyed by
falling debris. The shelling also caused the Troop HQ building now to catch
alight, the fire became so intense that it was starting to get out of control and
was hampering the men putting up their defence.
Staff Sergeant Cook: ‘Lieutenant McFarlane moved his Troop HQ to a
building on the main road close to the road tunnel and opposite 2nd Battalion’s
HQ building’ this means that Battery HQ building was opposite but about
100-yards further west. This would make sense, as to the rear of the Troop HQ
building and by crossing Kadestraat was the ‘Jeep/Gun Park’, so if any Troop
68
Jeeps were required to move the guns, they could get to the Jeeps relatively
easily.
20:00h. Captain Llewellyn-Jones: ‘Major Arnold took the decision to
consolidate his HQ buildings, so one by one some of the men of Troop HQ left
this building. Using the cover of the buildings the men moved up the road
toward us and then had to run across the road’ from where Shelswell had his
gun ‘to the Battery HQ building’.
All made it across safely and Major Arnold made contact with Lieutenant-
Colonel Frost to inform him that his Troop and Battery HQ position were now
in one building, while Captain Llewellyn-Jones then tried to make contact
with the rest of the Battery men to inform them of the consolidated Battery
HQ building.
Even so, it is known that a number of men from the Battery and specifically
from Battery HQ were still occupying houses, both as spotters and runners
around the perimeter. Staff Sergeant Cook, Bombardier Bluer, along with at
least Bombardier Smallwood remained in the houses next to the road tunnel.
Major Arnold set up a defensive perimeter in the back garden of Battery HQ
and men were placed in slit trenches, in support of his Driver Hammond, who
was already there. As the Battery HQ was furthest west of all occupied
buildings and with German attacks intensifying from this direction, it seems
that Major Arnold needed to bolster his defences.
The Battery HQ personnel in the Battery HQ building at this stage contained
the following known members, who provided the defence in this area of the
Perimeter.
Major W. Arnold A/BSM L. Doughty

Sergeant L. Jacobs L/Sergeant D. Colls
L/Bombardier A. Taylor Gunner N. Gregory
Gunner K. Patterson Gunner R. Hammond
Don R W. Hartley
The rest who occupied the building were members of B Troop and from
the Signals section.
69
A
E
C
D
Fig. 30. Known Battery HQ positions and personnel as of Monday night.

A- Battery HQ building with Major Arnold
B- B Troop personnel with Captain Llewellyn-Jones & Batman J. Carter
C- Bombardiers L. Bluer & L. Smallwood
D- Lieutenant Cox with S/Sergeant A. Cook & Batman F. Greaney.
E- L/Bombardier J. Crabtree
F- Driver R. Hammond
70
21:00h. Captain Llewellyn-Jones, still wearing his old blue scarf, a

souvenir from his time in North Africa, then joined the four men from the B
Troop still in the house opposite 2nd Battalion’s HQ building. Captain
Llewellyn-Jones clearly remembers that morale was still tremendously high as
relief in the form of the advanced elements of XXX Corps was expected
within a day, as well as reinforcements from the second-lift.
With night fall, the defence of the Bridge perimeter was still holding out
strongly, but a number of essential positions in the east of the perimeter had
been lost to the Germans. For the Bridge perimeter, crucially there had been
no arrival of reinforcements and no resupply of ammunition.
The Germans on the other hand had been receiving a steady stream of
reinforcements and coordinated attack plans were made and the Germans
started their attacks at first light. In the meantime, the German 88mm guns and
heavy mortars continued to shell the perimeter. Many Battery accounts tell us
that the men slept only very briefly if at all and remained in as much shelter as
possible in the houses.
One man was kept as a spotter on the gun sight and would call the rest of the
crew to action should any tank intrusions occur, while the gun itself was also
covered by the crew’s Bren gunner.
No accounts tell us of any major incursions during the night time.
Senior NCO’s present at the Bridge, L to R : A/BSM Les Doughty, S/Sgt Alf
Cook, Sgt Les Jacobs & L/Sgt Doug Colls
71
Tuesday 19th September 1944

The Germans started their attacks on the perimeter as soon as it became light
enough to have co-ordination.
05:30h. The accounts of ‘Brinkman’ and ‘Harzer’ tell us that with the
arrival of reinforcements, the initial attacks to remove the Para’s from the
Bridge started. The attacks, now co-ordinated, began with an immense
artillery and mortar barrage, with the surviving tanks of ‘Mielke’ moving in
from the east and north of the town. Even so, the reports tell us that they were
still at this point wary of the anti- tank guns and remained at a very respectable
distance, firing AP followed by HE into the buildings to flush the Para’s out,
particularly on the eastern part of the perimeter.
The guns of Sergeant Robson and Shelswell were still in their positions
opposite each other when the Germans attacked. We are certain of this as
when Major Arnold was made aware of the attack and probably knowing that
the gun of Sergeant O’Neill was no longer in action and therefore there was no
anti-tank cover for any attacks developing particularly from the north.
Immediately in person the Major ran across the road from the Battery HQ
building and asked Bombardier Coughlan. ‘Where’s your Sergeant?’ The
Bombardier informed the Major that, ‘he was wounded inside the house and
so Major Arnold called for the Jeep and commandeered the gun and the
crew’.
06:00h. Major Arnold put Sergeant Doig in charge of Shelswell’s gun
team and they maneuvered it to a position to cover the northern approaches to
the Bridge ramp, by the side of the wall of the garage Van Eeuwen, but in the
front garden of Brigade HQ building. Reports suggest that it became heavily
engaged against the German tanks arriving from the north, but who now
cleverly positioned themselves where anti-tank guns could not fire on them
with ease.
Like any good O/C, Major Arnold with Captain Llewellyn-Jones, were fully
aware of the disposition of their anti-tank guns and their deployment. A
question arises as to why the gun of Sergeant Shelswell was not deployed
during the hours of darkness but in daylight and in view of German spotters in
the morning daylight. Though no definitive answer can be made, it is quite
likely that those in the Bridge perimeter fully expected reinforcements from
the west at any time sooner rather than later and that XXX Corps would also
72
be arriving to the south. In view of this, possibly to Major Arnold there was no
need to further deploy his guns, but to ensure Eusebiusplein and Marktstraat
remained fully open for the arriving reinforcements. The time of day that it
was in fact deployed was before full sunrise at that time of the year and a
number of men state the area early morning had a mist from the river.
With the position of Sergeant Shelswell’s gun, but manned by Doig, at the
Brigade HQ building, this accounts for the confusion of guns as often
presented in other published accounts.
We have confirmation of the placement of this gun with Doig, in the accounts
of Lieutenant Harvey Todd a member of Jedburgh team Claude who states he
was positioned in a sniper’s position in the roof beams of the Brigade HQ
building. He confirms that the, ‘German counterattacks started at dawn, with
another serious attack just after noon, while harassing attacks continued
throughout the day’. This confirms our time frames. He states that he acted as
a spotter for the anti-tank gun on a number of occasions, guiding their indirect
fire at German artillery that had been place in the gardens to the north of the
Bridge ramp. The German accounts also confirm this, though the accounts are
embellished and state the Para’s had a large calibre field gun in a concrete
emplacement.
08:00h. Accounts from Para’s in the east of the perimeter tell us that
the Mk III tanks of ‘Mielke’ continued to work their way forward shelling the
houses along Nieuwe Kade. Tank loader Kracht recalled the attacks, 'On Quay
street (he probably meant Nieuwe Kade) we went into position behind a
biscuit factory. Here we were ordered to provide fire support for the Panzer-
Grenadiers and to shoot at the houses and two steeples (around the market
square and Eusebius church)’.
Evidence suggests that both the Germans and the Para’s around the Bridge
considered that the church was being used as an artillery observation post. Mr
Van der Lee stated it was in fact being used for the fire watch and often the
firemen wearing their helmets were wrongly identified and came under fire.
Even at this stage, the German armour was still keeping a distance from the
anti-tank guns and were not in their direct LOS.
09:00h. From the accounts of Rottenführer Rudolph Trapp of 3.
Kompanie, Panzer-grenadier Company 21 of 10th SS ‘Frundsberg’, an attempt
was made to rush down Rijnkade to deliver ammunition and establish contact
between the western and the eastern part of the German attacking forces. This
73
was made in a halftrack but ended in complete disaster for the Germans with
only Trapp and one other escaping. Private Sid Elliott occupying a house on
Kadestraat says that he was one of those that attacked the halftrack with
gammon bombs and managed to destroy it with it coming to rest at the corner
of Kadestraat.
There are conflicting accounts of actions at this time, some mentioning
armoured cars, but no photographic evidence for wreckage has been found,
even in aerial reconnaissance later during the day that was taken. That an
attack from the west, though thought to be infantry, is made in the Battery
accounts and would correspond with the time frame mentioned by
Rottenführer Rudolph Trapp.
10:00h. Further German reports tell us that by now those tanks that
were moving slowly down Nieuwe Kade and Westervoortsedijk continued
stopping at each occupied house and were systematically destroying them and
evicting the Para’s. The three Mk III tanks still stayed at a distance, likely
knowing that the gun of sergeant Kill was in close proximity but were in a
position where again the anti-tank gun could not engage them.
Lieutenant Cox and Staff Sergeant Cook confirm that during the morning the
former Troop HQ building, ‘was in a state of collapse and burning out of
control due to incessant artillery and mortar fire and now phosphorus shells’.
The building had to be abandoned completely with both men moving to
another close-by location.
10:30h. The German Commanders sent a captured Engineer, Lance-
Corporal Stan Halliwell, over the Bridge to offer surrender proposals to Frost,
who of course told him to tell the Germans that they should, ‘Go to Hell!’.
Halliwell thought it best not to return to the Germans and so remained with his
comrades, knowing that the Germans would soon guess that the answer to
their request was a resounding NO!
From the accounts of ‘Knaust’ and ‘Mielke’ as previously discussed, we know
that six Mk III and two Mk IV tanks were available for action from the north
and east. One was likely to have been destroyed early under the road tunnel,
the position of the two Mk IV tanks on Westervoortsedijk is known along with
the three Mk III tanks on Nieuwe Kade. Therefore, it is likely two Mk III
tanks were operating from the north. A number of the defenders from the Van
Limburg Stirum School to the north and east of the Bridge ramp make
mention of engaging tanks moving down from the north. This seems to
74
confirm the total number of tanks included in accounts for this day. Lance-
Corporal Karl-Heinz Kracht in his Mk III tanks explained, that being
unhindered down Nieuwe Kade, the tanks advanced and started to shell the
house on the corner near the road tunnel. They were supporting the Panzer-
grenadiers who had the unenviable task of extricating the Para’s from the
various buildings.
The accounts of Captain Tony Franks, Second-in-Command of the 2nd
Battalion's A Company, tell us that the houses occupied by Lieutenant
McDermott with his No.3 Platoon were forced to evacuate their building at the
corner of Ooststraat and Marktstraat. This was close to the Bridge tunnel on
the eastern side, which was now occupied by the Panzer-grenadiers. It may
well be at this time that the gun of Sergeant Kill was overrun, and the crew
taken prisoner. These buildings were soon recovered during a counter attack,
but at great cost to the Para’s. From this point forward, this may account for
the reason that soon the three Mk III, now supported by two Mk IV tanks
became bold in their advance and came much closer to the Bridge tunnel.
Probably they considered that the anti-tank defence had been neutralized with
the loss of Kill’s gun. The Mk IV tanks were much more heavily armoured
than the Mk III, so also makes sense that the Mk IV’s advanced down
Westervoortsedijk, just in case they encountered more anti-tank guns firing
from the west.
Fig. 31: The Tram offices on the corner of Marktstraat and Ooststraat and other
buildings initially lost but then retaken after a counterattack by Lieutenant
McDermott, but at the cost of his life. The building closer to the Bridge (arrowed)
was occupied by Lieutenant Cox, S/Sergeant Cook and Batman Greaney at this
stage, who helped in the counter-attack to retake the buildings.
75
We are aware of the building that Staff-Sergeant Cook was at this time
positioned in, as both Lieutenant Cox and Bombardier Smallwood make
mention of the fact: ‘The Germans on a number of occasions laid explosives
on the support pillars of the Bridge under the road tunnel. Staff-Sergeant
Cook was one of the first out of our building and while under fire was able to
help the Engineers dismantle them. An extremely brave thing to do’.
German reports tell us that they were concerned with the advance of the Allies
and as their armour could not cross over the Rhine in sufficient numbers, it
seemed that a break through to Arnhem by XXX Corp would happen sooner
rather than later. As a consequence, without destroying the whole Bridge, by
removing this small section they could command the Bridge from the north
and if necessary repair it and allow armour to cross toward Nijmegen.
11:30h. to 12:30h. Aerial photographs, as shown in Fig. 31 confirm that many
buildings were on fire, particularly the Jewish school building, where smoke is
clearly visible. The time of this photo has been determined by the simulator
from the shadows cast by the buildings. A series of photographs were taken at
this time, each show particular features of interest which will be explained.
Both Panzer-grenadier Trapp and Weber state that a number of the buildings
in the west, such as the House of Justice, were deliberately set on fire by the
Germans. Due to their limited number of troops, the fire stopped the perimeter
from expanding and kept the Para’s in confined areas that could be shelled
easily.
A
B
C
D
F
H
E
G
I
Fig. 32: At 12:30h a number of houses are now clearly on fire and a number of
German vehicles can be seen on closer examination.
76
- A – Overhead pipes at the Camiz Milk Factory where the Mk IV tank was destroyed.
- B – Lieutenant Cox, S/Sergeant Cook & Batman Greaney
- C – Former Troop HQ building now abandoned.
- D – Bombardiers Bluer & Smallwood
- E – Brigade HQ building & gun with Sergeant Doig.
- F – Likely position of Sergeant Robson’s gun moved from Battery HQ building.
- G – L/Bombardier Crabtree - H – Battery HQ building
- I – House of Justice set on fire by the Germans.
Fig. 33: A close up of Fig. 31 showing vehicle movements. Two Circled red are
larger vehicles and likely Mk III tanks. The rest are smaller circled yellow and
are likely armoured cars or halftracks/SPW
The likely German tank circled to the northeast is shrouded in smoke in Fig.
32 (north is bottom left of photo), likely confirms the account of Lieutenant
Todd, who stated that. ‘I again directed the fire of an antitank gun from my
position in the rafters of the Brigade HQ building, against armoured targets to
the north of us, but who could not be readily observed from the ground’. This
would have been in an indirect fire role that the gun with Sergeant Doig would
have been involved in, while in position at the side of the Brigade HQ
building, due to its LOS. There are no Battery reports of this encounter,
77
probably due to the fact only one person on the gun survived the action this
day before the gun was destroyed. This was gunner Jimmy Connelly from the
original crew of Sergeant Doig, who would never speak in-depth of his
experiences at Arnhem.
A closer examination of the photo in Fig.31 of the shadows cast at the Camiz
overhead pipes locality, do not allow for conclusive evidence to be drawn if a
tank has been destroyed there at this time. From further photo evidence this
tank still has to have been destroyed later in the day, not the following day.
Robson does not in his accounts comprehensively talk about two tanks, only
that during, ‘the engagement of a tank in the eastern perimeter, my gun was
eventually destroyed by falling debris’.
13:00h to 13:30h. A further set of aerial photos were taken, and again
specific movement of armour can be seen in the east of the perimeter. This is
almost certainly the Mk IV tanks moving toward the Camiz milk factory.
Before any attack by German Panzer-grenadiers, the whole perimeter was
subject to a massive mortar and artillery barrage. The main attacks again
taking place from the east and north and supported by armoured vehicles.
It is almost certain that the tank close to the Tram terminal was destroyed first
in the engagements that now took place. This is due to the fact that we know
which tank destroyed the gun of Sergeant Robson, that being the one under the
overhead pipes of the Camiz milk factory. The tank at the Tram terminal
clearly shows signs of 6-pounder AP or APDS damage to the skirt armour.
Likely the tank was disabled due to the loss of its track being removed by the
6-pounder, the only gun capable of engaging this tank was Robson’s. But it
was clearly destroyed by a strike to the rear of the tank, which can only have
been delivered at close range and probably by PIAT. This seems to confirm
the account given by Captain Tony Frank of A Company, 2nd Battalion,
though he stated it was one of the three Mk III tanks that were advancing. This
is a confusion as we are certain no further Mk III tanks were destroyed in the
Bridge perimeter, only the initial one in the Road Bridge tunnel.
All accounts, British and German, detail the appearance of two Mk IV tanks
on Westervoortsedijk and the three Mk III tanks on Nieuwe Kade, though this
has not been confirmed from photographic evidence.
13:45h. That a number of buildings started to collapse is confirmed by
Sergeant Gillie of B Troop, 1st Parachute Squadron Royal Engineers, who
states he, ‘was in a house on the corner of the street right next to the road
78
tunnel’. He explains that a, ‘tank positioned itself on the eastern side of the
road tunnel and began firing at the buildings on that side and then fired under
the tunnel and into the houses on the western side of the perimeter’.
He was unable to get a shot at the tank ‘about 50 yards away’, with any
weapon but noticed a gun in the western perimeter near the corner of the, ‘side
street opposite’, which he can only mean to be Hofstraat. This means that the
Battery gun of Sergeant Robson at the HQ building was at some stage moved
closer to Hofstraat and now engaged the tank advancing from the east.
Sergeant Gillie says he, ‘watched in amazement as a lone gunner (quite
probably at this stage, Sergeant Robson himself) would run out of the side-
street, load the gun then run back to cover. He would again then run to the
gun and aim, run back to cover, then again return to the gun and fire at the
tank. This solitary gunner managed to get at least 3-shots off at the tank. The
tank returned fire at least 5-times and with its fifth shot brought the corner of
the house crashing down on the gun effectively putting it out of action, while
the gunner was safely under cover down the side-street’.
Private Len Hoare, who was at this point in time taking his turn in the 2nd
Battalion Mortar pits also mentions the duel of an anti-tank gun, ‘just behind
where we were situated’, with a German tank. Though he seems to confuse
two actions of the anti-tank gun, he confirms that one action eventually led to
the anti-tank gun being destroyed. He also clearly identifies the position of this
anti-tank gun.
Fig. 34: The Mk IV Ausf. G tank of ‘Mielke’ destroyed at the Tram terminal,
showing the 6-pounder strikes on the skirt armour. The tank was in the process
of turning when it was struck side on. One strike obviously penetrated the skirt
armour and removed the track as the tank was reversing. It was then destroyed
by PIAT in the rear and engine compartment.
79
From the 3D modeler, Sergeant Gillie’s LOS would have been severely
restricted if he was on the north side and in the house at the corner of
Westervoortsedijk and Eusebiusbuitensingel due to destroyed vehicles and he
would not have been able to see to the western side of the perimeter at all.
Therefore, the authors are convinced he is more likely to have been in the
large house at the corner of Ooststraat and Westervoortsedijk, the Tram
Offices previously retaken by Lieutenant McDermott. Therefore the ‘side
street opposite’, in the western perimeter can only be Hofstraat as stated.
The LOS of Sergeant Gillie from the Tram Office likely means he could not
see the Mk IV tank at the Tram terminal and also the distance for him to get a
shot with any weapon (especially a PIAT) was too great. Therefore, the Mk IV
tank that he referred to engaging the anti-tank gun, can only be the one under
the overhead pipes at the Camiz milk factory.
Fig. 35: The Mk IV Ausf. H tank of ‘Mielke’ destroyed at the Camiz milk factory
overhead pipes, clearly showing the 6-pounder strikes on the front armour. The
tank driver was likely killed, and the tank immobilized but not destroyed.
80
15:00h. Even though, ‘Robson’s gun had been put out of action’,
Battery accounts tell us that ‘Major Arnold kept some men there on duty, at
regular intervals. These men would use it as a screen to hide behind, but it
also enabled them to get a good shot at the Germans as they came up from the
Eusebiusplein direction, in the open from the west’. From a gun position on
the north side of Marktstraat it can be seen through the simulator that indeed
any German targets could be seen moving up from the Eusebiusplein. Though
the front side of the gun shield would likely have been used to protect anyone
from attacks from the east as it was facing during its duel with the Mk IV tank.
16:00h. Driver Patterson tells us that he, ‘was using a rifle, while
Bombardier Bradley manned the Bren gun at the gun shield. We had spotted
some Germans across from us moving up the road toward us, down the road
that we had come on Sunday’. Unfortunately, the Germans had seen them and
‘immediately opened fire on the two of us, hitting Bombardier Bradley in the
face, killing him outright’. Driver Patterson was then, ‘forced to take cover
and was later able to re-join BSM Doughty in Battery HQ building’.
Bombardier Bradley had been known as the granddad of the Battery as he was
37 years old. He was also the Bombardier on Sergeant Doig’s gun team and so
helps to explain that Sergeant Doig was now with Shelswell’s gun team and
separate from his own team. Clearly the, ‘road we had come on Sunday’,
confirms these attacks from the west.
16:30h. A report by Knaust states that the Mk III tanks were
withdrawn from the front due to concerns that they could be lost to anti-tank
fire, with orders to now shell the immediate western section of the perimeter
and the church tower.
17:00h. Battery reports including the wounded Sergeant Shelswell
state that the gun with Sergeant Doig was destroyed by the heavy
bombardment, with the loss of a number of the Battery who were crewing it at
the time. All members were from B Troop plus it seems a member from the
Glider Pilot Regiment. Later reports from a Lieutenant Joseph Enthammer, a
V2 artillery officer who had been captured on Sunday, confirm these deaths as
when released he saw, ‘the bodies (of Sergeant Doig and the Glider Pilot) still
with the gun’ by the side of the garage Van Eeuwen.
Both Driver Patterson and Lance-Sergeant Colls tell us that the ‘Battery HQ
building was subject to a massive mortar attack and was set on fire, while one
blast also killed driver Hammond in his slit trench in the back garden’. They
stated that the fires were dealt with and the defence of the building was still
81
strong and no German infiltration was made. Driver Hammond was initially
buried in a field grave in the garden, but his body was subsequently lost.
At the same time, Lance-Bombardier Crabtree tells us that, ‘during a mortar
attack I was still manning my Bren gun at the gate in the gardens behind
Battalion HQ building but was forced to leave the exposed position to find
cover. An American Lieutenant Harvey Todd and Captain Jacobus
Groenewoud approached me’, part of Jedburgh team Claude, who ‘asked if
they could go up the road that my Bren gun was covering. I informed them
that I thought that they were committing suicide, but they insisted on going
and soon disappeared’, in an attempt to get to the home of a nearby Doctor. In
the attempt Captain Groenewoud was killed, while Lieutenant Todd learnt that
no medical supplies could be obtained and eventually returned to the Brigade
HQ and informed Lieutenant-Colonel Frost.
This time frame therefore agrees with the Knaust report of shelling the
perimeter.
Fig. 36: Field graves in the gardens on Hofstraat
Major Arnold now only had the salvaged gun of Doig, at his disposal to
counter the German armoured threat. It was impossible for him to do anything
along the Rijnkade, as the guns would have been easy targets for German
artillery on the south bank and like Sergeant Kill’s gun, prone to German
infantry attacks and overrun. It is likely that this salvaged gun of Sergeant
Doig was now deployed near the road tunnel and the concrete support pillar,
now considered as being on the north side of Marktstraat.
82
As all major armoured attacks were developing from the north and east,
therefore this surviving gun was placed in a position where it seemed that it
could engage targets from both directions. It also could be turned around and
faced west and fire along Marktstraat. It was therefore really placed in the
centre of the defensive perimeter with the maximum number of Para’s that
could provide covering fire while in an engagement. Major Arnold was
certainly aware of its deployment position as it was soon to be used in action.
A B
C
D
Fig. 37: Positions of the guns prior to the Tiger tank attack.
Blue Arrow – Some of the movements of Sergeant Robson gun.
Red Arrow – The movement of Sergeant Doig gun from Jeep park to centre of
defense. Moved by Jeep at this stage.
- A – Destroyed gun of Sergeant Robson during Mk IV tank duel.
- B – Destroyed gun of Sergeant Shelswell but with Sergeant Doig in charge and
where he was subsequently killed.
- C – Initial position of Sergeant Doig gun.
- D – Subsequent position of Sergeant Doig gun prior to 18:00h.
08:00h. to 18:00h. German accounts tell us that part of the Schwere

Panzer Kompanie ‘Hummel’ had been alerted to the landings and had
immediately entrained for Arnhem. The railways were blocked and so the
Kompanie of 14 Tiger tanks had to make the final journey of 30-miles on the
road. Only two arrived without mechanical problems and were immediately
assigned to Kampfgruppe ‘Brinkman’.
83
20:00h. Many accounts tell us that as it was getting dark, two German
Tiger Tanks, under the commands of Leutnant Knaack and Feldwebel
Barneki, appeared from the north. They came down Eusebiusbuitensingel past
the school, firing the main guns into the buildings on either side as they went.
The salvaged gun of Sergeant Doig was initially in a good position should the
tanks make for the road tunnel but subject to infantry fire from the east.
Battery members stated that they tried to lure the tanks into a trap to engage at
point blank range, how they did this was not fully explained. Bombardier’s
Bluer and Smallwood engaged them with small arms fire, so it maybe that the
tanks saw the buildings and would move closer to get a clearer shot. If the
tanks came toward the road tunnel and to the Tram Office, then the anti-tank
gun would have been able to get a shot at the thinner side armour of the tanks.
Instead the Tiger’s then turned up the bank as they passed the school and
appeared on top on the main road. Doig’s gun was now out of position and
would have to be manoeuvred. Battery accounts then state that Sergeant Cook
and Bombardier’s Bluer and Smallwood and other Battery members attempted
to put Doig’s gun into position, but this proved too difficult under constant
machinegun fire.
Fully aware of this threat but unsure of the disposition of the Battery members
close to the gun, Major Arnold stated, ‘I personally gathered together a crew
consisting of myself, Captain Llewellyn-Jones, Lance-Sergeant Colls,
Lieutenant McFarlane and driver Gregory’. Cook tells us that, ‘along with
Bombardier Bluer we provided covering fire from our position’. Captain
Llewellyn-Jones reported that, ‘in the dusk together we ran across the road to
the road tunnel and with the aid of Bombardier Smallwood manhandled a
(Doig’s original) gun, into a position where we could fire at the tanks if they
should appear from the far side. The gun was moved with great haste and to
my surprise and of the men; we arrived safely to a position against the front of
Brigade HQ building with no casualties’.
The anti-tank gun was around the curve in the road and so was out of sight of
the men that remained in the Battery HQ building. These included BSM
Doughty, driver Patterson and Don ‘R’ Hartley, who ‘Major Arnold had told
to keep an eye out for any Germans that may attempt to come down the road
from the west’.
One of the tanks then made an appearance on the top of the embankment as if
it were going to come into the western side of the perimeter. Ammunition for
all guns was in very short supply, the distance to the tank was point-blank and
the angle of engagement was steep. The tank saw the 6-pounder gun and tried
84
to depress its gun to fire at it. Instead the shot passed about 20-feet above the
head of Major Arnold and into the Brigade HQ building, the debris showered
down on the Major and those with him. Major Arnold managed to get two
shots off at this massive tank. Amid a shower of sparks, the second shot hit the
tank, though Major Arnold thought that its armour was too thick for the 6-
pounder ammunition to pierce and destroy it. The APDS round had in fact
pierced the tanks armour at the turret and damaged its gun, causing a lot of
damage inside and injuring two crew members of Knaack’s tank.
The sparks had been caused by the projectiles ‘Shoe’ hitting the armour
plating. With difficulty, the tank’s crew managed to drive it back over and
then down the embankment and went out of sight, turning down Nieuwe
Kade, where unbeknown to Major Arnold, it soon came to a halt.
Captain Llewellyn-Jones was now left in charge of the gun while Major
Arnold made his way back to Battery HQ with Lance-Sergeant Colls.
Patterson well remembered the reaction from the men as Major Arnold entered
the Battery HQ building. They knew he’d been in a desperate fight and come
out of it and so to speak, ‘we took our hats off to him’.
A
B B
Fig. 38: Engagement with the Tiger Tank of Knaack

- A - Dash made by Major Arnold and Captain Llewellyn-Jones and other Battery
members from Battery HQ building.
- B - Three destroyed 6-pounder anti-tank guns.
- C - The salvaged gun of Sergeant Doig, moved by Major Arnold to Brigade HQ
building to engage Knaack’s Tiger tank.
85
21:30h. Captain Llewellyn-Jones tells us he, ‘took the decision to

move the gun away from directly in front of Brigade HQ building and onto a
section of the grassy embankment. The gun was dug in and two slit trenches
were dug for the men in record time, while it was obvious that our actions had
been watched by German artillery observers’.
23:00h. The gun was left in the charge of Lieutenant McFarlane, while
Captain Llewellyn-Jones says that during the relative safety of night he took it
upon himself to check on the men from the Battery who were still barricaded
in a number of houses over-looking the Bridge. After the constant action, this
act must be considered to be extremely brave, as the Captain at any time could
have been mistaken for a German and shot. All the men were suffering from
exhaustion. Next to the road tunnel he found Staff Sergeant Cook and
Sergeant Simpson, along with Bombardier Bluer who were again then joined
by Bombardier Smallwood. He then moved to the 2nd building that had been
used as Troop HQ overlooking the island where Private Sims and the mortar
crew were, near the corner of Kadestraat. This contained five men from B
Troop HQ section. By this time, a prolonged drizzle had started to fall over
Arnhem and while here Captain Llewellyn-Jones witnessed a few unusual
things that happened.
Many of the civilians had not left their houses and were stuck in the cellars. In
the house an elderly but very alert man suddenly appeared in a very colourful,
full dress uniform of the First World War, even carrying his own sword. It
took a while for Captain Llewellyn-Jones to persuade him that he was a target
for the German snipers and that he should change and leave the scene in his
civilian clothes and to relative safety.
This was followed some time later when he and the five men of B Troop were
visited by Major Tatham-Warter of the 2nd Battalion. According to Captain
Llewellyn-Jones’ account, ‘the upper part of the house the men were in was
ablaze and we needed to get out to another position’. The Captain saw that
defence of the Bridge was now being centred around Brigade HQ building on
the opposite side of the street and so it was agreed that they should make a
dash for the buildings. They stood in the entrance of their building and just as
the first man was about to go, they saw a lone figure casually strolling across
the street toward them under a shredded black umbrella, which they realised
was a Para Officer when he arrived at their position.
His smock was undone and hung between his legs; he came straight up to the
Captain and the men and said reassuringly. ‘How are you chaps getting on?
86
XXX Corps are on their way and should be with us tomorrow, in fact we could
hear their guns from the south of the Bridge earlier today. So, we just have to
hang on through tomorrow and then we should be OK. Glad to see you are in
good heart, keep up the good work’. Major Tatham-Warter then turned away
from the door and walked quietly across the road again, umbrella still up,
without a shot being fired at him. This quiet bravery again encouraged the
men and the Captain.
Captain Llewellyn-Jones continues in his account that, ‘immediately the figure
had disappeared toward Brigade HQ building, the men gathered their
thoughts and looked around the burning buildings as they gave off an eerie
light and cast shadows. Then B Troop Sergeant McCarner set off across the
road, running in a zig-zag pattern with a series of side stepping jinks, to throw
off the aim of any sniper or machine gunner that may have had him in their
sights. Bullets rang out and hit the cobbles in front of the Sergeant, which was
followed by a shout of verbal from the Sergeant, of what he would do if he
could get the man who had shot at him’.
The next four men were then sent on their way across the road, each by a tap
on their shoulder by the Captain as he followed up in the rear, at about 10-
second intervals. Of the six men, four including the Captain and Troop
Sergeant made it across the road, while two lay wounded and were eventually
carried to safety by very brave medical orderlies. This account really confirms
that Captain Llewellyn-Jones and B Troop along with its HQ section, was now
separated from Battery HQ and shows that all units at this stage were acting
almost independently. The men remained close to the Brigade HQ building
and it is likely that these were the men that were used to stand guard at the gun
sight of the only operational gun.
01:00h. The accounts tell us that all took shelter as much as possible
during the night under the incessant mortar and artillery bombardment, but
none tell of any serious incursions by the Germans during the night time.
Sergeant Rigby even makes note that only certain areas of the perimeter were
subject to specific fire, while other houses were not and so many of the men
were able to gain some sleep.
87
Wednesday 20th and Thursday 21st September 1944

A common observation that all members of the Battery made and must be
clearly taken into account at this stage is that, ‘lack of sleep, fatigue and the
intense noise of battle tended to make each day blend into one’ and so
accounts become confused from this time.
05:30h. Accounts from the Para’s tell us that by this time the men at
the Bridge saw their positions on either side of it more or less isolated from
each other, while throughout the night German shells and mortars had
pounded the area. The Germans now relied on phosphorus ammunition to set
the buildings on fire to drive the men out, while German infantry and tanks
assaulted the whole perimeter from all sides.
German reports tell us that they were aware that the force now holding the
perimeter had shrunk to no more than what they considered to be 150 fighting
fit men and that the Para’s ability to fight was almost exhausted. As a
consequence, Kampfgruppe ‘Knaust’ was pulled out of the fighting and given
orders to be ready to cross the Bridge to join the new blocking line at Elst on
the south side of the Bridge.
08:00h. Contact was made with Major-General Urquhart at
Oosterbeek, who informed Lieutenant-Colonel Frost his only hope lay with
XXX Corp.
10:00h. The defence centred around the school on the eastern side of
the Bridge ramp collapsed as recorded by Captain Mackay A Troop 1st
Parachute Squadron Royal Engineers and Major Lewis of C Company 3rd
Battalion Parachute Regiment. Both confirmed that a Tiger tank supported by
at least two Mk III tanks were able to come close to the Van Limburg Stirum
School and systematically destroy it forcing all inside to surrender.
10:30h. Captain Llewellyn-Jones tells us that the salvaged gun of
Doig was, ‘still dug in, in front of Brigade HQ and ready for action against
armoured incursions’. He assigned, ‘each of the Officers from the Battery to
take it in turns to man this gun along with the remaining fit men from the
Battery, who set about burying themselves even deeper into the slit trenches
they had dug the previous day’. Captain Llewellyn-Jones deemed it morale
boosting to share this extremely dangerous duty and therefore decided to
include all the Battery Officers available who had moved into at Brigade HQ
to aid in its defence.
88
Many Battery accounts tell us that the men, ‘had the greatest respect for all
our Officers, even new ones that had just joined prior to Arnhem’, as they
considered them, ‘more than capable of performing the most technical of gun
duties’.
11:00h. The area was intensively shelled by mortars and the men in
the slit trenches all became casualties, including Captain Llewellyn-Jones’s
whose turn it had been to take post at the gun sight. He tells us that, ‘all the
men had to be removed to the Regimental Aid Post in the basement of the
Battalion HQ building’.
This final gun was badly damaged by the barrage and put out of action. There
were no anti-tank guns left for the defence of the Bridge perimeter and all
Battery personnel now took on an infantry role.
It seems that at no stage during the morning did this final gun engage any
armoured vehicles; there are no accounts from any Battery members. That
men were posted at the gun sight does though suggest that ammunition for the
gun was available, though in extremely short supply.
Driver Patterson states that even at this stage, those in the Battery HQ building
were still able to hold their own against the ever-increasing attacks developing
from the west. Again, all still present in the building make mention of lack of
ammunition of all sorts.
13:00h to 13:30h. Lieutenant-Colonel Frost reported that to him it was
obvious that the wounded in many of the buildings were now severely at risk
of being burnt alive. He called for a truce so that the wounded could be
removed. Frost was soon wounded and so command of the men at the Bridge
was handed over to Major Freddie Gough.
15:00h. German reports state that they knew the collapse was
imminent but still needed to force the Para’s away from the Bridge to enable
reinforcements to cross over to Elst. The reports were that the Nijmegen
Bridge had been taken and Allied tanks were on their way. Lance-Bombardier
Crabtree stated that the rumours were XXX Corp would mount an attack to
secure the Bridge and bring relief within the next three to five hours.
The German intention on the other hand, was apparently to seize the small
archway over the road and blow that, denying the Bridge to any armour
arriving from the south, without blowing the massive Bridge structure itself.
The Germans stormed in and attempted to place explosive charges against the
89
pillars. Staff Sergeant Cook was seen removing these charges while under
intense fire and leading a section during the counter attacks. The Germans
were beaten off but at a huge cost of life, while the whole of the eastern sector
was now lost to the Germans.
The men in the Battery HQ building, such as BSM Doughty and driver
Patterson all remembered just staying barricaded in their building and under
constant fire. Bombardier Smallwood stated he and a few of the Battery were
separated near the Bridge but couldn’t get to the Brigade HQ building and
were forced back toward the ‘Jeep park’ and the river.
19:00h. to 21:00h. Between approximately this time the ceasefire was
organized, so just before he arranged the truce, Major Gough gathered as
many men who were not of the 2nd Battalion as possible in his immediate
area. He then ordered them to head north into Arnhem and to make their way
toward Oosterbeek and the rest of the Division who were now forming a
defensive perimeter. During the cease-fire to remove the wounded, a number
of these men quietly tried to slip into the town.
During the two-hour truce, approximately 280-wounded men, including
Lieutenant-Colonel Frost, Captain Llewellyn-Jones and Sergeant Shelswell,
were moved out of the burning buildings and carried into German care.
Shelswell remembered that he was helped up the stairs of the Regimental Aid
Post and left to sit on a grassy bank. Here German trucks arrived, and the
wounded were immediately transferred to the St Elizabeth’s Hospital. A
number of the critically injured were also brought up and transferred, this
included Lieutenant Whittaker, who was subsequently moved to the Hospital
that was setup at Apeldorn, but unfortunately the German and British doctors
were unable to save him.
Lance–Bombardier Crabtree explains, ‘we knew the truce was ending so I took
up my position again at the end of the garden with my Bren gun. The mortars
came down thick and fast and during this mortar bombardment, I was very
seriously wounded. If it hadn’t been for the Germans over running my position
early the following morning and immediately removing me to St Elizabeth’s
Hospital, I probably would have died of the wounds I had received’.
The exact time for the ceasefire has been difficult to establish as a large
number of men from the Battery and other units, stated it was mid-afternoon.
In contrast, a Dutch family taking shelter in the doctor’s house, make mention
that two young Dutch men were executed by the Germans at 19:45h. during
90
the ceasefire as they were considered to be resistance fighters and terrorists.

Leutnant Joseph Enthammer, the commander of a V2 crew, who had been
taken POW on Sunday night/Monday morning stated he was moved with other
POW’s just before the end of the ceasefire at 21:00hrs.
22:00h. Major Arnold explains he then, ‘issued the order to evacuate
the Battery HQ building and make for the Brigade HQ building, through the
back gardens’. With the Germans all around and with mortars falling into the
gardens between their building and Brigade HQ building, they evacuated as
quietly as possible. One by one the Battery HQ staff, including Major Arnold,
BSM Doughty and his driver Patterson, Don ‘R’ Hartley and a few others,
made it safely to Brigade HQ building.
23:45h. Major Arnold says that, ‘Major Gough ordered the surviving
men in the Brigade, Battalion and close-by buildings and in the gardens to
split up into groups of 5 or 6-men and to head north into Arnhem’. Major
Arnold was accompanied by a few from the Battery and some from the Para’s,
but it wasn’t long before they ran into a German patrol and were forced to
surrender.
Driver Patterson was with Don ‘R’ Hartley and stated they managed to skirt a
large concentration of Germans and considered that by first light they had
managed to get quite a distance into the town. Here they decided to stay quiet
in the garden of a house and concealed themselves under bushes while it was
daylight. All of this was reminiscent of the scenes faced by a large number of
those that attempted to break out.
A few of the Battery still to the south near Rijnkade and the ‘Jeep park’, stated
they made for the river and footpath in the dark, probably the least defended
route. This included Sergeant Simpson together with Bombardier Smallwood.
09:30h. on 21st Driver Patterson states, ‘we halted and rested in a
garden and could hear the Germans searching all around us. We hid under
bushes and in stacks of wood as we had nowhere to go and no ammunition’.
11:00h. on 21st Patterson continues, ‘the voices got closer, then it
went quiet. We knew that a German presence was in the garden in our
immediate vicinity. Suddenly a German came close to us and ordered that we
should all stand up and surrender, which under the present circumstances we
were obliged to do. As we stood, we found that we had been completely
surrounded and machine guns were trained on us from every angle’.
91
The men were escorted to the nearby St Eusebiuskerk and here they met up
with more men from Battery HQ, including Major Arnold and Lieutenant Cox.
The A/BSM Les Doughty commented, ‘Myself and a few guys along with
Major Arnold had taken shelter down a manhole at the back of the Battery HQ
building. I had just my pistol in my hand when suddenly the cover was lifted
and a German shouted for us to come out. The Major shouted, ‘shoot him
Doughty, shoot him!’. I thought better of it and it was just as well as the
Germans had hand grenades at the ready and we would have all been killed’.
The Brigade Major Tony Hibbert, made the following note, ‘The rest of the
booty was systematically dealt with (by the Germans). All the extra clothing,
equipment, weapons and ammunition we had with us were carefully sorted
and stacked against the cathedral walls. Although it was depressing to see
how many weapons and how much equipment had been taken, it was satisfying
to see how small the pile of ammunition was: a half dozen shells for a 6-
pounder gun that had long been knocked out, and a few dozen .303 bullets’.
Fig. 39: Prisoners at the St Eusebiuskerk
12:00h. on 21st German reports tell us that Kampfgruppe ‘Knaust’

crossed the Arnhem Bridge to assist in the blocking line at Elst, along with
approximately 13 Tiger Tanks of Schwere Panzer Kompanie ‘Hummel’.
18:00h. on 21st The men at the St Eusebiuskerk were separated from
the Battery Officers and were marched off into captivity.
92
The gallant actions of all at the Arnhem Road Bridge came to an end. By this
time, unbeknown to any of the men at Arnhem, the armour of XXX Corps had
at long last managed to travel over the captured Nijmegen Bridge and was
now just 11-miles short of Arnhem.
Other HQ members also taken POW at the Bridge, from L to R : Bombardier

Les Bluer, Driver Nick Gregory, Don R Bill Hartley & Driver/Radio Operator
Ken Patterson.
93

Battery’
Chapter 4
Divisional HQ Section
In Operation ‘Market-Garden’
94
Divisional HQ Section Daily Actions

Sunday 17th September 1944
The general idea for the Divisional HQ section of the 1st Airlanding Anti-
tank Battery was to counter the threat of the greatest concentration of German
armour wherever it was positioned. Captain Norman McLeod, 2nd in
command of the 1st Battery would therefore take command of all 17-pounder
Troops of both the Airlanding Battery’s once they had landed and form a 3rd
Battery, under the immediate direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Loder-Symonds
CRA.
During the initial landings of the Operation, a number of units of the 1st
Airlanding Brigade, from 2nd Battalion South Staffordshire, 1st Battalion
Border and 7th Battalion Kings Own Scottish Borderers, would also land and
secure the immediate area and Landing/Dropping Zones. Therefore, to co-
ordinate the anti-tank defence from these units a number of men from the
South Staffs were temporarily transferred to the command of Captain
McLeod.
10:33h. Recorded take-off time. The Radio equipment along with
supplies were transported in three Horsa gliders from Tarrant Rushton, each
carrying a Jeep and trailer.
The Battery’s RAMC officer, Lieutenant Derrick Randall was in glider 376
and recalled that the journey was, ‘extremely boring and the artillery guys I
was with couldn’t wait to get down and into the Germans. I did have time to
chat to the two Glider pilots and that was about it’.
13:35h. All three gliders landed in quick succession and the Jeeps with
trailers were unloaded in quick time. Driver Lance-Sergeant Morrison with
Lieutenant Randall drove to the side of the LZ and set up a temporary Aid post
in the bushes.
Driver and Radio operator Harry ‘Badgie’ Cameroon drove the 2nd Jeep
accompanied by gunner Vic Hubbard the Captains Batman, to the same
position off the LZ. He was followed by Driver Henry Weatherell in the 3rd
Jeep with gunner Bernard Jeffrey the Batman of Lieutenant Geoff Ryall. Here
they awaited the Lieutenant and Captain who were parachuting in.
Troop Sergeant George Willis took control and sent out the Recce gunners to
survey the area, while the men attached from the South Staffs setup a
95
defensive perimeter. Though Sergeant Willis was originally to arrive with the
Battery’s Z Troop, at the very last moment Major Arnold had to make a
shuffle round of his personnel when he learnt that there were not enough
transport planes to bring in all his gliders on the first lift.
13:50h. The transport planes arrived on the DZ, Lieutenant Geoff
Ryall parachuted with stick-131 but was also in some discomfort. He stated ‘I
attempted a stand-up landing. Unfortunately, it was a heavy landing, my front
teeth were knocked out by the cocking handle of my Sten gun, which I had
tucked up under my webbing’. The injury required medical attention and it
actually stopped him from eating for the next 2-days.
Wolfheze DZ-X
LZ-Z
LZ-S
Fig. 40: The Landing Zones and Drop Zones before 13:00h. on the 17th. The
river Rhine can be seen top of picture (southerly direction).
LZ-Z – Battery Divisional HQ Section glider Landing Zone
DZ-X – Battery Divisional HQ Section parachute Drop Zone
The Captain met his driver Cameroon and his Batman Hubbard and
immediately became aware that all was not good and a re-arrangement of the
96
3rd Battery plan had to be made. With the loss of two 17-pounder guns on
landing and a 3rd without a towing vehicle, plus the 6-pounder guns of the
Battery that had not arrived, meant the advancing Battalions were short of
anti-tank protection.
At his First Aid post, Lieutenant Derek Randall recalled: ‘Even at this early
stage I was called on to help a number of the Battery who had been injured,
including a number of broken bones sustained by those in Gliders that had
turned over’. He also recalled, ‘unfortunately for a number of the Glider
pilots, I was not able to help them and they succumbed to their injuries’.
14:30h. With the arrival of Major Arnold, a brief and specific Officers
meeting was called, to confirm the Battery objectives, while a reorganization
of the Battery was also required. Major Arnold stuck with the main objective
in mind and arranged the Battery HQ section column, while Captain McLeod
was now left in control of the late arrivals and the reorganization due to
Battery losses at this stage.
15:30h. A number of others from the Battery had missed their
rendezvous, particularly the various Troop 2nd Jeep’s with supply trailers, so
the Captain told them to stay with his Division HQ section and await further
instructions. The Captain knew that supplies would be required and had to
keep them safe at all costs.
Driver Cameroon reported that he could not raise Major Arnold on the Comms
network, so Captain McLeod remained in close contact with the CRA and
Divisional HQ and stayed close to the LZ. There was no reported action for
any members at this stage though a small number of German POW’s were
being escorted by the security detachments as they were gathered in the
locality.
German reports including Sepp Krafft with his SS Training and Replacement
Battalion 16, who were the largest self-contained unit nearest to any of the
Landing Zones, immediately reported contact with the Para’s. They had been
exercising in the woods by Wolfheze, two to three kilometres east of Landing
Zone-Z. With limited personnel he formed a simple blocking line while
conducting a reconnaissance forward in force. A further report from SS
Captain Klaus Von Allworden and the 9th SS Anti-Tank Battalion Panzerjager
9, consisting of probably two Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers, state they were at
this time operating on the Ede-Arnhem road and Dreyenseweg junction. This
97
led to confusion particularly with the 1st Battalion and its line of advance
when they came in contact with these German units.
With no clear Comms, the situation that the Captain faced was extremely
chaotic at this stage, as reports by Sergeant Willis and the Recce Battery
members were sketchy. Sergeant Willis was a very experienced member of the
Battery, having been in North Africa and severely injured in the same glider as
Lance-Bombardier Crabtree during the invasion of Sicily in 1943.
All members of the Battery that remained on or near the Landing Zones
reported that there was distant sporadic fire, but nothing that seemed to be
causing too much concern. The Captain took the opportunity to visit the men
and encouraged them to dig in and await further instructions and be ready to
move at any given moment. He instructed those that had lost their guns during
the landing to await the 2nd lift on the following day and to join with the 2nd
Battery as extra help and support.
16:30h. Reports from the advancing Battalions were given to the CRA
that all was not good, and they were being delayed due to opposition from
armoured vehicles. The exact type and numbers were not known as again the
reports were very confused as no clear Comms could be established. Still
maintaining the advance to the designated objectives, the CRA conferred with
Captain McLeod and the decision was made to bolster the advance with
further antitank support.
German reports from SS Lieutenant Gropp’s Hohenstaufen Ant-Aircraft
Battery Kampfgruppe, state that an 88mm and a 20mm gun were engaged on
the Ede-Arnhem railway cutting. As indicated from previous reports, the 1st
and 3rd Battalions were being confronted by stiffening German opposition as
more alert troops were entering Arnhem and Oosterbeek. The first ten
operational armoured vehicles from the 9th SS-Reconnaissance Battalion of
Hauptsturmführer Viktor Gräbner was immediately despatched to reconnoitre
the landing zones. This seems to include at least two armoured cars and a
number of halftracks mounting the short barrelled 75mm L/24 guns, the rest
included armoured halftracks Sd.Kfz 251 Ausf D and Sd.Kfz 9. These
halftracks were known to have operated on Amsterdamseweg,
Benedendorpsweg and Utrechtseweg from the 17th onwards.
98
Fig. 41: Sd.Kfz 251-9 75mm Kwk 37 L/24 halftrack
17:30h. After his medical attention the Captain dispatched Lieutenant

Ryall with a replacement P Troop 17-pounder gun to catch up with the 1st
Battalion. This makes sense as the 1st Battalion were furthest north of the
advancing Battalions and considered to be in the path of the heavy armoured
elements that the Germans were reported to have in the area. One of the
supporting A Troop 6-pounder guns (Sergeant Atkinson) had failed to arrive,
while the 2nd D Troop gun had turned over on landing. The Lieutenant wrote
an account of his actions, but it gives no specific details and his events tend to
run one into the other.
19:00h. Lieutenant Ryall tells us, ’the gun I was with finally caught up
with the rear elements of 1st Battalion, which had become rather fragmented
even at this stage…….We had a very uncomfortable night’. Everywhere the
Battalion was held up and Lieutenant Ryall and the gun was not able to make
much forward movement during the evening.
20:00h. The 1st Battalion reports stated they were faced with intense
German activity with armoured support, so the Battalion took up all round
defensive positions until all detached Companies could catch up. The exact
location where Lieutenant Ryall spent the evening is unknown but likely in a
wooded area still west of Arnhem but south of Amsterdamseweg and with the
T Company of 1st Battalion.
Captain McLeod visited the men that had been injured or detached from their
crews and issued orders that all should dig in for the night and post sentries.
This they did and many men from the Battery reported that they had chance to
have, ‘a nice brew up and something to eat’. All the men were positioned
99
amongst the trees on the eastern edge of the DZ and LZ and awaited the 2nd
lift the following day.
Captain McLeod conferred with the CRA regarding the developing situations
and became aware that the General was also missing. Comms could still not
be established with Major Arnold or any of the other Battery Troop Officers
including Lieutenant Ryall. Sergeant Willis and his Recce team were therefore
sent out to scout the area and report suitable positions for the arriving guns of
Z Troop on the 2nd lift.
There were no accounts of any action during the night.

100
Monday 18th September 1944

In the wooded area to the east of the Landing Zone, Battery reports stated that
during the night and early morning, all members were dug in and were
awaiting the arrival of the 2nd lift.
01:00h – 04:00h. Reports from the 1st Battalion stated that having
received communication from Lieutenant-Colonel Frost at the Bridge in
urgent need of reinforcements, the Battalion swung their line of advance in a
southerly direction. Movement through the woods with vehicles and anti-tank
guns during the dark was extremely difficult. There was no contact from
Lieutenant Ryall with Captain McLeod nor with any of the Troop Officers on
their comms sets. The Battery was completely blind of all the situations that
were developing on the advance into Arnhem and the objectives.
05:00h. The 1st Battalion reports state that they had advanced through
Oosterbeek and onto Utrechtseweg and their leading elements were about to
proceed toward the northern railway underpass. Here the leading platoon came
under heavy fire from machine guns and mortars. It is probably at this time
that Lieutenant Ryall continued his narrative.
Knowing that Lieutenant-Colonel Frost was in urgent need of reinforcements,
the 1st Battalion decided to disengage and move further south toward the
lower ‘Lion’ route as used by 2nd Battalion during the previous evening. It is
known that the rear elements of the 1st Battalion, which would have included
Lieutenant Ryall, then proceeded down a side road to Julianaweg and then
onto Prins Berhardweg. Battalion reports state they at this time met with
elements of the 3rd Battalion that had lost contact with the rest of their
Companies.
All the men on the Landing Zones stood too at first light and Captain McLeod
conferred with the CRA on the latest information that was filtering through.
The CRA and Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Sheriff’ Thompson of the Light Regiment
took the decision to re-site the guns of the Light Regiments No.3 Battery to a
new position near to the Oosterbeek Church on the lower road. This would
bring these guns also within range of the Arnhem Road Bridge and they would
therefore be able to fire in support of Lieutenant-Colonel Frost and the men
who were now known to be at the Bridge. Limited contact had been made
through the Forward Observation Unit (FOU), but as yet Captain McLeod
could not raise Major Arnold on the Comms net.
101
07:00h. Captain McLeod issued orders that two 17-pounders would

now accompany the Light Regiment to provide anti-tank support. At the same
time Divisional HQ was to move forward in the wake of the advance of the
2nd South Staffs moving along Utrechtseweg toward the Hartenstein Hotel,
therefore Division HQ section would do the same. Orders were issued to the
men, while those who were from other gun crews were told to remain and
await the 2nd lift due in at approximately 10:00h.
Fig. 42: The northern railway underpass that S Company 1st Battalion
disengaged from, while Lieutenant Ryall and the P Troop gun was to their rear.
Also showing the approximate route they took down Julianawag then Prins
Bernhardweg toward the Oosterbeek Laag southern railway underpass.
Lieutenant Ryall gave two accounts of his actions, each slightly different;
‘Everywhere we were constantly being held up in the town. We had taken up a
position by the side of a house covering the road…………’. The next, ‘We
continued to move forward under stiffening opposition and suddenly a shout
went up that there was a German counter attack. We had pulled off the road,
so we tried to turn around and get out of the way. The gun Portee had become
102
stuck down to its axles in the soft earth, so I went off to get a Bren carrier to
help tow us out. By the time I got back I was stopped from going forward by a
Para officer who told me the area had been overrun and the gun had been
lost. I gathered the crew together of the gun and instructed them that they
were to now act as support for the other guns of the Battery’.
The exact time and location of the loss of this gun is unknown. The gun was
said to be in a built-up area and placed next to a house ready for action, while
it is believed he meant that the infantry they were supporting, ‘were constantly
being held up in the town’. At no point it seems did Lieutenant Ryall or the
gun pass under either of the railway underpass’s, so it is likely that the gun
was lost when the Battalions S Company disengaged from the north to move
south. Likely the S Company was pursued by German infantry and at this
point the gun was lost, possibly near the junction of Julianaweg to Prins
Bernhardweg or in this area.
08:00h. The 1st Battalion war diary states that the leading Company
had passed under the lower railway underpass but was being held up by
German infantry ‘astride the road junction’ on Klingelbeekseweg and a
factory to their front. This confirms the time that the gun with Lieutenant
Ryall was lost prior to this event and so was likely as stated in the area above,
as there are no Battery reports of seeing a lost gun in the town east of the
lower underpass.
10:00h. Lieutenant Ryall reported that he was finally able to make
contact with the rest of the 1st Battalion who were moving toward Arnhem
town centre and with Lieutenant Eric Clapham and 2nd Lieutenant Ben
Lockett of A Troop. He therefore placed the men from the abandoned gun
under the A Troop command and, ‘therefore I went back to report to Captain
McLeod that the resistance we faced was significantly stronger than had been
anticipated. The journey back was a little eventful, but I found the Captain still
on the edge of the LZ and preparing to move’.
Travelling down Utrechtseweg, the Lieutenant would no-doubt have met the
elements of the 2nd South Staffs moving forward. The Para Battalions had
removed the significant threat initially posed by the Germans, but the
advancing elements were still encountering snipers. Hence why the Lieutenant
said his journey, ‘was a little eventful’.
10:15h. Preparing to move from the Landing Zone, Batman Hubbard
then related, ‘suddenly we were all taken by surprise as a number of German
103
fighters appeared overhead and so we took cover in the slit trenches as their
machine gun fire stripped the bark off the trees in the area. Soon they left and
so we just got back on with our job and waited for the second-lift’.
12:00h. Lieutenant Ryall arrived back from 1st Battalion’s advance
and reported his gun loss and the situation to Captain McLeod and the CRA
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Loder-Symonds. He was now put in charge of the
anti-tank defence of Divisional HQ and the two remaining 17-pounder guns of
P Troop. He would then liaise with Lieutenant Eustace McNaught and his Z
Troop when they arrived on the second-lift, which was now late. Lieutenant
Ryall while with the 1st Battalion had taken the opportunity to reconnoiter the
lines of advance and was aware of the German dispositions including their use
of flak barges on the river. All of this he reported to the CRA and Captain
McLeod.
15:00h. The second-lift finally arrived five hours late and was met by
substantial opposition on the DZ and LZ’s. The remaining gliders with the
men from the Battery assigned to come with the Jeep and extra ammunition
with Captain Bear, met at the rendezvous. Most were destined not to meet up
with their own gun crews but to fight on another or as infantry.
It is not sure who or if all of the Recce section with Sergeant Willis had
accompanied the re-sighting of the Light Regiment’s guns, following with two
17-pounder guns that had been sent. Whatever the case, the report was relayed
back to Captain McLeod that the lower route was free of all opposition at this
stage.
With the arrival of F Troop and X Troop 17-pounder guns of the 2nd Battery,
Captain McLeod immediately assigned Sergeant Tom Hughes’ 17-pounder
gun to follow along with the subsequent two Companies of South Staffs that
had just arrived in their push to link up with their own Regiment and the
remnants of 1st Parachute Brigade. But, instead of taking the Utrechtseweg,
Lieutenant Ryall’s instructions to Sergeant Hughes were for him. ‘To advance
towards Arnhem in order to destroy a boat with an anti-aircraft gun on it,
following the route taken by the 2nd Battalion and Lieutenant-Colonel Frost’.
This would have followed the instructions as relayed by the Recce section and
given the most secure route for the gun to follow.
16:00h Captain Henry Bear and Captain McLeod decided to keep the
remaining men of the Battery together and follow directly with Divisional HQ,
this included all the second-lift Jeeps and supply trailers. Soon the Divisional
104
HQ section was on the move to a new location at the Hartenstein Hotel.

Captain McLeod kept in close contact with the CRA and followed directly
behind him when the move toward Arnhem from the LZ’s and DZ’s began.
Fig. 43: The area of the Hartenstein Hotel, the rear of which Captain McLeod
setup his HQ close to the tennis courts.
A-Hartenstein Hotel B-Tennis Courts
Route taken along Utrechtseweg towards Arnhem and used by Captain Bear.
18:00h. Accounts by Batman Hubbard tell us that Captain McLeod

setup the Divisional HQ section at the back of the Hartenstein and close to the
tennis courts. Still no contact could be made on the Comms network. The final
17-pounder gun of Sergeant Neery was then instructed to dig in and cover the
western approaches to the Hartenstein, while the Captain then later in the day
just as it was dusk, set up an F Troop gun on the green opposite the front of
the Hartenstein.
At the same time, Lieutenant Randall set up his Aid Post in the cellar of the
Hartenstein, initially he was able to operate on casualties with electricity, but
this was soon cut. He then tells us, ‘I had never been so grateful for my tilley
lamp from that point onwards’.
Captain Bear considered the situation of the men on the advance into Arnhem
and knew that ammunition of all sorts must be in short supply. He therefore
formed a column of Jeeps and trailers and followed on behind the advance of
105
the final two companies of the 2nd South Staffs. Progress proved to be
extremely slow and increasingly dangerous along Utrechtseweg.
Lieutenant Ryall having returned to the Divisional HQ section and with the
confirmation that Lieutenant McNaught had failed to arrive; the CRA
delegated the defence of the Divisional HQ with three Z Troop 6-pounders to
him. Immediately Lieutenant Ryall set up one gun at the entrance to the
Hartenstein on the driveway and the other two guns were setup one facing east
the other west at the back of the Hartenstein, the exact locations are not known
but close to the tennis courts. A further 6-pounder gun of Sergeant Proctor of
C Troop also arrived on this lift, having aborted the take-off on day one.
Lieutenant Ryall took this gun under command and posted it to the front of the
Hartenstein facing west, opposite the 17-pounder on the green.
19:00h. Captain Bear stated, ‘I was concerned due to the incessant
attacks on the road leading to Arnhem, so I had no choice but told all the
drivers with trailers to return to the Hartenstein area’. Here he set up a
Battery dump to the rear of the Hartenstein near to the tennis courts and
Divisional HQ section with Captain McLeod and kept the drivers from the
second-lift close at hand.
Reports from the 2nd South Staffs state their two forward Companies were
finally able to move through the northern underpass on Utrechtseweg. They
were able to link up with the remnants of 1st Battalion that were moving up
from Klingelbeekseweg and the lower underpass. German resistance on Den
Brink was still significant and needed to be cleared and the further two
Companies of South Staffs were also having difficulties in moving along
Utrechtseweg. The full 2nd South Staffs Battalion linkup did not occur until
the early hours of the following morning.
All men were told to dig slit trenches for themselves in an all-round defensive
position at the Hartenstein. Movement was unrestricted, and the men took to
chatting with each other and making the standard brew up with food shared
around. Sergeant Willis and the Recce section were sent on intensive spotting
of the locations of possible German troops, which was the most hazardous
action during the day. Radio’s were not working still, so Sergeant Willis along
with it is thought Lance-Bombardier Peter Martin and Gunner Albert Forder
had to move cautiously in and out of contact and report the German positions.
Battery reports for the rest of the day state that there were only minor actions
and shelling and in fact it was a relatively quiet night.
106
Fig. 44: The likely position of the anti-tank defence of the Hartenstein Hotel as
organized by Lieutenant Ryall and Captain McLeod, with the three 6-pounder
guns of Z Troop and the gun of C Troop.
A – Hartenstein Hotel
107

The attacks to relieve the Bridge were repulsed throughout the morning and
in all areas the attacking Battalions were eventually forced to retreat. The
biggest concerns for the Battery were a lack of ammunition and the loss of
guns.
Captain Bear decided that he needed to run the gauntlet of the Utrechtseweg
road and get the needed supplies to those of the Battery guns in forward areas,
but he did not know exactly where the guns were. Communications had
completely broken down between Divisional HQ section and each gun Troop
HQ section. His plan was to run a simple supply railway system once he had
established the position of the Battery’s Troop HQ.
10:00h. Captain Bear set off with his driver and a supply Jeep pulling
a trailer full of ammunition to Arnhem. Captain Bear tells us, ‘we drove (with
his driver Dennis White but of A Troop) at full speed and were able to avoid a
number of machine gun posts firing on fixed lines and I established a link with
the Battery’s A Troop. We delivered the supplies in the trailer and feeling
quite good drove back to the Hartenstein again avoiding machine gun bursts’.
The time taken to deliver the ammunition and then return is not stated by
Captain Bear.
From the Battalion reports, it is known that they were unable to capture the
northern railway underpass on the Utrechtseweg, so had to move south. It is
likely that Captain Bear followed this road until reaching Julianaweg. Turning
right, they would then have continued down toward Prins Berhardweg and
then the southern railway underpass on Benedendorpseweg. The actual route
Captain Bear stated was along Utrechtseweg but he mentioned no other routes.
12:00h. Captain Bear set off a second time in the Jeep with the trailer
along the same route and driver White reported. ‘it was getting pretty hairy at
this stage now as the Germans were arriving in force. We dropped off the
ammunition and went straight back. I was happy the Captain didn’t ask me to
do a third trip’.
Again, Battalion reports tell us that they were at the height of their attacks to
get to the Bridge to relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Frost. No doubt the rear
companies engaged in the attack would have been securing the rear areas and
it is possible that the northern underpass was now open, but subject to German
fire from the Mariendaal area north of the railway line. Battery reports also tell
108
us that they guns were in a column in the Alexandrastraat area, just west of the
St Elizabeth Hospital and the Den Brink high ground had mainly been cleared.
It may be at this time that Captain Bear used exclusively the Utrechtseweg and
hence why driver White stated, ‘it was getting pretty hairy at this stage now as
the Germans were arriving in force….’ The Germans were not at this time
engaging the lower road and underpass.
14:00h. Captain Bear decided to make a third trip with driver Henry
Weatherell to get more supplies through. The Captain reported that the Jeep he
was in was ambushed and wrecked and the driver was killed while he was
lucky to escape. The Captain recognised that the Germans were too strong to
get through now and when he managed to get back to the Hartenstein
conferred with Captain McLeod regarding the situation. The decision was
made that they should not attempt any more runs and so conserve the
ammunition. This was particularly the case due to the fact that the relief attack
had been repulsed and the remnants of the attacking forces, which would
include the Battery guns, were now retiring toward the Hartenstein.
During the late afternoon pressure was mounting from the north and east by
German attacks and so the CRA took the decision to move the final two
Battery’s of the Light Regiment to the Old Church (Oude Kerk) at Oosterbeek
and concentrate the Regiment there. Therefore, Captain McLeod and
Lieutenant Ryall sent two of the 17-pounder guns to provide ant-tank cover
for them in this area.
17:00h. From the landing reports, it is thought that Captain McLeod
was now able to obtain two of the five salvaged Polish 6-pounder anti-tank
guns from the third lift from the LZ. Under direction from the CRA he
directed them to the south of Oosterbeek and to provide extra anti-tank
defence to the Light Regiment guns.
18:00h onward Due to the lack of Comms network, Captain McLeod
had no choice now but to utilize his Recce section as spotters for him. He
therefore sent Sergeant Willis to the northwest and Lance-Bombardier Martin
towards the Oosterbeek Hoog station. They would report as best as possible
the movement of German armour, so that Captain McLeod and Lieutenant
Ryall could counter the threat.
With the arrival of the 2nd Battery, Captain McLeod decided that the defence,
with the formation of the Division’s perimeter centred on the Hartenstein, was
of paramount importance, He decided to place a 17-pounder gun on the green
109
opposite the Hartenstein, with LOS straight down the Utrechtseweg toward
Arnhem.
Again, Battery accounts tell us that there was little German activity against the
perimeter being formed, though there was intense activity around the
Hartenstein as men from the Battery arrived from the retreat. Lieutenant Ryall
now organised the defensive positions and the men dug their slit trenches. The
perimeter was now subject to a mortar barrage and shelling by German 88mm
guns with airburst shells, but it was reported as a relatively quiet night. Battery
accounts tell us that the men were able to get relative rest and ‘we particularly
enjoyed a typical brew up’.
Fig. 45: The lower part of Oosterbeek, showing the Oude Kerk circled red and
the polder near the Rhine river bottom of picture. The Hartenstein Hotel is out of
picture to the northwest (top left)
110
Wednesday 20th and Thursday 21st September 1944

During the early morning those involved in trying to get through to the
Bridge were now forced to retire further toward Oosterbeek from the incessant
pressure from the German assaults and were starting to take up positions in the
Divisions perimeter. The remaining men from the 4th Brigade at this time had
not been able to get from the landing areas and DZ into the defences which
were weak to the east and north of the Hartenstein.
09:30h. Captain McLeod made the decision with Lieutenant Ryall to
bring the C Troop gun from the back of the Hartenstein to the green at the
front and provide anti-tank defence in depth. The men dug a gun pit and slit
trenches for themselves. No doubt the information filtering back was that the
attacks had been stopped by tanks and so these would probably be following
on the heels of the retiring men
11:00h. The Germans made a measured attack from the north and only
the Battery gunners on the green were able to offer any defence. Suddenly the
CRA himself appeared in a Bren carrier from the Hartenstein and waving his
hand in the air shouted to those dug in on the green, ‘Come on you lot! Let’s
go and get the buggers!’ The Battery members wielding rifles and Bren guns
jumped up out of their trenches and charged forward behind Lieutenant-
Colonel Loder-Symonds and set about the Germans. They were soon put to
flyt and the danger passed as more men from the Battalions filtered into the
perimeter.
12:00h. Captain McLeod personally moved the C Troop gun again, it
took up a position in the corner of a house garden opposite Schoonoord and
Quatre Bras, which were being used as Dressing Stations. Here they sighted
the 6-pounder to cover pointing east Utrechtseweg and north Stationsweg.
Divisional HQ at the Hartenstein was to their west through a lightly wooded
area, about 800-yards away. German armour was now noted advancing from
Arnhem along Utrechtseweg in the wake of the retreat.
13:00h. As the perimeter was still unstable at this stage, the Captain
assigned a number of the none gun team members to provide fire support.
Driver Bernard Jeffries, the Batman to Lieutenant Ryall tells us, ‘The
Commanding Officer of the 10th Battalion came running up to us and told the
gun crew to put some rounds into a house opposite the Schoonoord as his
men were about to take up a position there. He wanted to know it was clear
of Germans as he was very short of men. The gun crew did it and then he told
111
us all to leave the gun and join the men in the house. The Bombardier
removed the firing mechanism and we had no choice but to follow his
command. We weren’t there long when suddenly the Brigadier (Hackett)
arrived and the gun crew were told to take the gun back to the Hartenstein. I
went with the Bombardier and Driver Crane to get the Jeep and as we were
hitching the gun up, the Bombardier was hit by mortar fragments in the hand.
We still managed to get the gun hooked on and swiftly went back to our
position on the green’.
Bombardier Jones went straight to the RAP in the basement of the Hartenstein
manned by Lieutenant Randall, while the crew setup the gun ready for action.
16:00h. More guns from the Battery started to arrive from the retreat
and reported to Captain McLeod. He directed the two guns with A Troop to
setup defensive positions on Weverstraat coving down Jagerskamp to the
Tafelberg, under their Officer Commanding Lieutenant Clapham. Lieutenant
Ryall was now given the task of keeping the contact open between all guns to
be able to counter the growing armoured threat.
17:00h. During the late afternoon the Germans now tried to penetrate
deep into the Divisional area that was being formed and a number of
Sturmgeschutz (Stug) III tanks maneuvered up Utrechtseweg and started to
shell the area of the Hartenstein. The CRA in person again appeared on the
Utrechtseweg and lay down in the middle of the road and directed the fire of
the 17-pounder gun on the green and engaged the Stug tanks. Battery reports
stated that one was hit three times in quick succession and slewed to a halt
sideways on and blocked the road. The other two quickly retired and instead
started to shell the area at long range.
German reports as described by SS-Captain Moeller leading his assault-
pioneers as they battled along the Utrechtseweg and by SS-Corporal Wolfgang
Dombrowski, stated that the Stug was only damaged. Instead of slewing
sideways it reversed up the side road where it came to a halt and the crew
bailed out and bolted toward the German lines and the Stug was abandoned.
Some of the Para’s even attempted to get it going but were unable to turn it
around so that they could fire the gun.
The rest of the day and night was taken up with making good all their
defensive positions and fending off probing attacks by German armour.
Sergeant Willis brought in much needed supplies from a drop that came close
to the defensive perimeter. A few more Battery members arrived at Divisional
112
HQ section and Captain McLeod directed a number of other Battery members

to give more support to those operating particularly the 17-pounder guns close
by the Oude Kerk.
05:00h on 21st Attacks by the Germans developed around the
perimeter from first light and still more Battery members were reported as
arriving back at Divisional HQ section. Again, from this time, reported events
start to blend into one another due to the incessant artillery and mortar fire,
coupled with the exhaustion of days of non-stop fighting and lack of sleep.
Therefore, it is very difficult to piece together an accurate account.
The three distinct German attacks from the east and Arnhem, were led by SS-
Kampfgruppe Spindler, which included Moeller and was driving along and
north-east of Utrechtseweg. Covering the built-up area left of Spindler to the
lower Rhine were the two SS-Kampf-gruppen of Von Allworden and that of
Harder. Further to their north and mopping up the actions on the Landing
Zones was Kampfgruppe Bruhns. This highlights the likely German units in
the north and east that the Battery members were facing.
13:00h on 21st Stugs again attacked along Utrechtseweg but were
now very wary of the threat posed by the anti-tank guns (particularly those on
the green opposite the Hartenstein). Instead they now positioned themselves
on the north side of the road or in protected areas and the Battery guns were
not able to engage them.
16:45h. on 21st onwards The Stug’s moved forward in support of the
German infantry to press in further attacks and so the Para’s called for the
Battery to help stalk these tanks. This included also one of the two 20mm
Polsten guns, which when moved to near Vreewijk, was hit and destroyed
killing its Commanding Officer. These Polsten guns were assigned from the
Recce Squadron also to the Divisional HQ section, but this is the only action
of them that was known. A composite force of men from the Battery at the
Hartenstein also manhandled a Z Troop 6-pounder within the LOS of the
Stug’s and Battery reports say it managed to hit and damage one. The 6-
pounder gun then became the attention of the other Stug’s, while mortars were
trained on the area and it is known that this gun was hit and destroyed. There
are no clear reports of the actions of the Z Troop guns, though the glider
loading list does exist. From Battery reunions and discussions, it is thought
that the Z3 gun manned by L/Sergeant Skelton was involved in this action.
113
Fig. 46: A German Stug III SP-gun advancing west toward the Hartenstein Hotel
along Utrechtseweg on the 20th September. The Battery guns are further ahead
out of shot, but likely engaged this Stug.
With the loss of the Z Troop gun, Captain McLeod and the CRA gave the
order forbidding the stalking of armoured vehicles with manhandled anti-tank
guns. In his after-action report to HQRA, Captain Bear made the following
observations as to why there were a large number of anti-tank gun losses, he
wrote:
‘To give the details of the loss of each gun would be impossible, but four basic
reasons are suggested.
1) The misuse of the 17-pounders by using them as mobile Anti-Tank guns in
the forward areas.
2) The failure of the infantry to realise that the tank must come to the gun and
NOT the gun to the tank.
3) If the infantry require a gun forward they must stay to see it out again.
4) The absence of any PIAT or similar projector for the flank or rear defence
or for hunting local hulled down tanks.
114
The only reason any guns were saved was the realisation by the CRA that
guns were being misused by the infantry and the immediate decision to group
those left in the Division HQ group and KEEP THEM THERE. Without this
Group it is doubtful whether there would have been any withdrawal’.
Accounts state that the Battery was fully engaged during the day fending off
German armoured assaults at long range. The infantry was ensconced in bitter
hand to hand and house to house fighting but were able to hold the Germans.
German reports state that 88mm, 20mm and even heavy 150mm gun batteries
had been moved up and were now able to shell the whole perimeter.
The Recce gunner George Forder was critically wounded while reporting on
German tank dispositions, he died of his wounds under the supervision of
Lieutenant Randall at the Hartenstein. The exact details are unknown.
3 B
A 2
B
Fig. 47: Position of Battery guns to counter the German advances west from
Arnhem toward the Hartenstein Hotel.
A-Hartenstein B-MDS at the Schoonoord and Vreewijk
1-The 17pdr and C Troop 6pdr gun on the green opposite the Hartenstein
2-Position that the C Troop gun was moved to before returning to the green.
3-Likely position of a Z Troop gun.
4-Likely position of the damaged Stug III SP gun when it halted. As witnessed and
who attempted to start it, Lieutenant Joseph (Pat) Glover, 10th Battalion.
Extent of the 10th Battalion initial defences shown in red.
Stug III advances along Utrechtseweg shown in yellow.
115
Friday 22nd to Monday 25th September 1944

From this point onwards, the Battery reports become very imprecise and
confused and so cannot be stated with full confidence of the time period or
day on which they occurred. Other reports help in providing possible
conclusions to be drawn, when comparisons are made.
Probing attacks by tanks and infantry were still common, but more use was
now being made of German snipers, who would infiltrate deep into the
Divisions perimeter, especially in the woods behind Border Regiments
entrenched positions and to the southwest of the Hartenstein.
12:00h on 22nd The majority of the tank attacks started but all were
fended off.
15:00h on 22nd It seems from Battery reports and photo evidence that
radio contact was lost with Sergeant Wills, so Captain McLeod was not able to
know what the latest information was from the northwest of the perimeter.
Sergeant Willis reported that his position had been pinned down by snipers
and his only link via radio was destroyed. Having managed to evade from the
main Bridge, both Sergeant Simpson and Bombardier Smallwood had reported
back to the Divisional HQ section. They were now used by Lieutenant Ryall
to keep in contact with the Battery spotter outposts, especially due to the death
of gunner Forder.
The Supply drops were happening, but most fell into the hands of the
Germans, so Captain Bear recognised the serious supply situation and that all
remaining supplies had to be protected at all costs.
17:00 on 22nd onwards All reports state that the whole perimeter was
from this point onwards, subjected to continuous artillery and mortar
bombardment. The German armour generally stayed at a relatively safe
distance, knowing that the perimeter had carefully sighted anti-tank guns. The
German reports therefore show us that their infantry continually probed for
weak spots, which would then be subject to armoured units close fire support
and then assault by concerted infantry attack. Slowly the whole perimeter now
became a war of attrition. The pressure was relieved somewhat with the arrival
of the Polish Parachute Brigade at Driel and so the German commanders had
to relocate the reinforcements they had been receiving, to the south of the
river.
116
07:00h on 23rd Captain’s McLeod and Bear called an Officer’s

meeting early morning and sent Lieutenant Clapham of A Troop and
Lieutenant Ryall of Divisional HQ, to check on the state of the guns that were
still in operation in the immediate area. Lieutenant Ryall taking the western
side of the perimeter. At the same time Captain McLeod sent gunner Hubbard
to see if he could find a radio that may have been delivered during the supply
drops, so that greater contact between the Battery could be set up. Contact
with Troop Sergeant Willis was still not made, so he again sent Sergeant
Simpson to the northwest of the perimeter. Captain McLeod’s plan was to now
group all remaining Battery guns into a pool and Sergeant Simpson’s job was
to inform all 1st and 2nd Battery gun crews.
11:00h on 23rd The Germans started to shell the area again heavily
and so the whole perimeter area was later referred to as the ‘Cauldron’. During
the mortar attacks, the trench generally occupied by Lieutenant Ryall, about
50-yards back from the Hartenstein, was blown in; fortunately, Lieutenant
Ryall was checking on the gun crew situation so survived unscathed. He had
been forced by the mortars to seek shelter in one of the Z Troop gun trenches.
He then returned to report the situation to Captain McLeod and found that the
Captain had been seriously wounded by shrapnel in the mortar attack and was
in the Hartenstein RAP. The Captain was to lose his leg to save his life and
was then soon joined by Lieutenant Clapham, who had also been seriously
wounded.
Lieutenant Ryall had to inform the CRA of the situation, so Command of the
remnants of the whole Battery now passed onto Lieutenant Ryall and Captain
Bear of Divisional HQ.
Lieutenant Ryall now made each of the available Troop Sergeants responsible
for various sectors of the perimeter close to the Hartenstein, who would now
report directly to him. As A/BSM Doughty was missing and presumed POW
at the Bridge, QMS Alec Mashiter of Z Troop was made his assistant, Troop
Sergeant’s Jack Masterson would control the western sector, Charles
Thompson the eastern sector and John Davis the Divisional HQ sector. As it
was particularly difficult to remain in contact with the south of the perimeter,
the control was assigned to Lieutenant’s Thomas Casey for the eastern sector
(he soon met up with Lieutenant Edward Shaw) and John Lewis for the
western sector. Command and control was of paramount importance. These
three Officers formed their own defensive strategy independently but most
effectively.
117
Fig. 48: Early morning Gunnar Vic Hubbard was sent to look for a radio to
replace those that had been lost, and again at Arnhem in 2004.
12:00h. on 23rd The Battery ammunition dump was hit by mortar fire,
and the shell boxes were set on fire. Troop Sergeant Davis ran across the road
from the green opposite the Hartenstein and managed single-handedly to stop
the fire spreading and causing an explosion. For this action he received a
citation.
13:00h. on 23rd onwards The Z Troop gun at the rear of the
Hartenstein was brought to the front drive, to replace the one destroyed. This
gun along with the other that had remained at the front, these likely with
Sergeant J. Skelton and Bombardier Farmer, were fully engaged against
German half-tracks supporting the tank attacks from the east and north. The
exact details of the actions of these two guns are unknown.
There are very few Battery accounts from this stage onwards as the men stated
it all became a blur, only that they survived as best they could. All reports
state that the Hartenstein area was subject to extensive mortaring and sniping
during the day. There were no significant accounts of actions of the Divisional
HQ section for the 24th, only a single man was kept on the guns sights while
the rest of the crew remained in their slit trenches for protection. If a tank or
118
target was seen, only then would the crew be called to action. The men took it
in turns as the gun sight.
06:00h on 25th Urquhart was presented with a letter from Major-
General Thomas of 43rd Wessex Division. Urquhart was informed that XXX
Corps had abandoned all hope of being able to reinforce 1st Airborne Division
and outlined instructions for withdrawal of the Division back across the river
at a time of Urquhart’s choosing.
All reports state that the whole perimeter was subject to heavy mortar and
artillery fire throughout the day.
08:08h. on 25th Urquhart had considered this for approximately 2-
hours before making contact with Major-General Thomas and informed him
that the Division would pull out that very night, code name, Operation
‘Berlin’.
Once the Operation was relayed to Captain Bear, the word was sent to each
sector and an agreed withdrawal plan for the Battery was conveyed to all
wherever possible.
10:00h. on 25th Major attacks were made by the Germans to the south
of the perimeter, to try and push the Division away from the river but were
eventually repulsed and the perimeter restored. The men all reported again that
they just sheltered in their slit trenches from the constant mortar and artillery
bombardment.
13:00h. on 25th The Hartenstein area was subjected to a massive
artillery and mortar barrage that caused a large number of injuries both killed
and wounded.
22:00h. on 25th onwards Lieutenant Ryall issued the orders to the gun
crews that the guns should be rendered inoperable and that all radio and other
equipment should be destroyed. The men should then meet at their specified
rendezvous points near the Hartenstein.
During the night, Captain Bear, Lieutenant Ryall and the Troop Sergeants
each led a mixed group of men, including a number from the Battery,
generally about 15men strong. The night was very black, and the rain lashed
down, but it aided in their escape toward the evacuation point on the river.
Those who were too badly injured during the fighting to walk, were then
brought up from the Hartenstein cellar’s RAP and placed in a position to
maintain fire from their rifles and were left with the majority of the remaining
119
ammunition. At the Hartenstein they were particularly attended to by the

Battery’s RAMC Lieutenant Randall.
Lance-Bombardier Peter Martin was still in the Oosterbeek Hoog station area.
It is thought he was making his way to the meeting point at the Hartenstein
from his Recce position in the northeast, but during this very tricky time, he
was killed, the full circumstances are unknown.
Not all men received the order to withdraw to the Hartenstein, this included
Sergeant Simpson in the northwest sector, who was eventually taken POW.
While Sergeant Willis was with a group of men making their way back but
were cut off and eventually had to surrender.
120

The RAMC Lieutenant Randall having volunteered to stay behind to tend the
wounded managed to get his first night’s sleep. He remembered he woke
about dawn, because it was so quiet and it seemed so unreal. He checked the
casualties in the Hartentstein RAP and then went outside in the uncanny quiet.
Lieutenant Randall had been issued with maps of the escape route and it was
his job to walk these routes and tend any men that had been wounded during
the withdrawal. There were a number of Germans around, including some
stretcher-bearers. As he widened his search for wounded he was somewhat
surprised to see the Assistant Director of Medical Services (ADMS) Colonel
Graeme Warrack drive up in a jeep. He took Lieutenant Randall’s maps of the
evacuation routes and said that he would deal with these as he had the jeep,
leaving Lieutenant Randall to spend the day collecting the local casualties and
putting them into ambulances or trucks for evacuation. During the course of
his searches, he come across the Royal Artillery trailer with which he had
originally left England, so when he had finally finished the collection of
casualties, he went back to examine it. In it he found that although it was
pretty badly damaged, quite miraculously the small pack of his personal things
was still there, unharmed, so he collected it before the Germans got it and
must have been one of the few POWs from Arnhem who had a clean shirt!
Eventually the central area was cleared of all British personnel, so Lieutenant
Randall climbed onto the last truck and trundled through the sad tattered
streets of Arnhem and on to Appledoorn.
All those that had managed to cross during the evacuation were given some
food and drink as they reached the relative safety of the south bank. They were
then taken to the collection centre near Driel and escorted out of the
immediate danger area. Many noticed that the nerves of the men were frayed,
and they remained on edge, many were shell shocked and were in deep
thought over what had happened.
09:00h. At the roll call that was taken the following was the total men
who were remaining from the Battery HQ sections: -
Captain Henry Bear

Lieutenant Geoff Ryall
Sergeant Francis Pearce
Gunners Albert Hubbard, Bernard Jeffrey and Harry Cameroon
121
Fig. 49: Captain Henry Bear at Nijmegen, having swam across the Rhine during
the evacuation to safety.
Wednesday 27th September 1944

The word had filtered through to Lieutenant Howe, that Captain Bear and
Lieutenant Ryall were now at Nijmegen and so the B echelon with Lieutenant
Howe were taken to Nijmegen as well. Due to the lack of drivers and due to
weariness of the men who had been evacuated from Arnhem, discussions
between the three Officers meant a re-adjustment of the personnel and the
vehicles with Lieutenant Howe were handed over to Captain Bear. In this way
the men would have transport back to Brussels and Louvain, while Lieutenant
Howe and B echelon returned to active duty, as there was still a job to do on
the south bank of the Rhine.
This was the end of the Battery’s actions during Operation ‘Market-Garden’.
122
After the Battle of Arnhem, Lieutenant G. Ryall, wrote: ‘I should like to pay
my own tribute to our CRA, Lt-Colonel Loder-Symonds, who was an
inspiration to us all. Very clever and brave, yet at the same time kind and
understanding, he helped me enormously during what was a most severe
battle inoculation’.
On the 1st January 1946, A/BSM Sergeant Alec Mashiter received the
following citation and was awarded the BEM.
"This NCO has been duty Sergeant in this Regiment and previously the 173
Field Regiment, since January 1942 until November 1943. He has served in
England, Africa and Italy. During this period he always performed his duties
outstandingly well, often with little or no supervision.
He returned to England in January 1944 and then acted as a Troop Sergeant
Major of an anti-tank troop formed especially for the Arnhem operation. He
took part in that operation and commanded that troop as his troop commander
failed to arrive. He showed great courage and devotion to duty during the
whole of the operation receiving a severe wound through his chest on the
morning of the evacuation.
Despite this wound he swam the Rhine collapsing when he reached the south
bank. He has now recovered and has rejoined this unit.
He is an outstandingly loyal courageous and efficient NCO who has
consistently over a long period shown great devotion to duty both in action
and administrative work.”
Battery members part of Lieutenant Howe’s B Echelon, from L to R : Driver

John McLaughlan, Gunner Pymm and Driver Bill Parry. L/Bombardier Jim
Rooke was part of the C Echelon bringing the extra Battery rations.
123

Battery’
Chapter 5
Appendix
124
The Battery’s Headquarters and Gun Troop Ranks.

Listed below is the Battery’s Gun Troop theoretical organisation, with the
rank held by each member of the gun team. In practice, not all held the
necessary Artillery rank and not all team positions were filled. For
Communication with Battery Headquarters (BHQ) and Royal Artillery
Headquarters Communications network (R.A HQ Comms), the Troop Jeep
was fitted with a No. 22 Set Radio and kept with each HQ section of each
Troop. The Battery also employed the smaller No.68 set for local Comms.
Instructions were conveyed to the Officer Commanding (OC) the Troop from
the Troop Sergeant who was in charge of Comms and the Dispatch Rider (Don
R) was sent to convey messages to each Troop Gun Sergeant.
Ranks and Abbreviation
Battery Major Maj (Officer Commanding)
Battery Captain Capt (2nd in Command)
Lieutenant Lt. (Liaison Officer or O/C Troop)
2nd Lieutenant 2nd Lt. (Liaison Officer or 2nd in command Troop)
Battery Sergeant Major BSM (also the QMS and BQMS)
Troop Sergeant TS, (equivalent to Company Sergeant Major (CSM)).
Staff Sergeant S/Sgt (includes the APTI).
War Sergeant W/Sgt, (a war appointed rank senior Gun Sgt).
Gun Sergeant Sgt. (Commanding Gun)
Acting Sergeant A/Sgt (Bmbdr promoted Gun Sgt or in HQ section).
Lance Sergeant L/Sgt.
Bombardier Bmbdr.
Lance Bombardier L/Bmbdr.
Gunner Gnr.
Driver Dvr (was any rank above)
Batman Any rank above to generally Bombardier
125
1) 223 Battery HQ Section 1939 to September 1940

O/C Major R.C. Pedley
2nd I/C Captain A.P.T. Mason
Recce Lieutenant J.W. Thompson
L.O. 2nd Lieutenant W.J. Todd
W/BSM WOII G.E. Coston 766651
W/BQMS WOIII I. Pattinson 1461972
TSM Sergeant J.W. Bibby 3708993
Police Corporal J. Arundel 2611501
Supplies Driver A. Kerr T/81693
Ammo Driver J.W. Black T/
Supplies Driver C.L Grealy T/69963
Supplies Driver Tomlinson T/112740
T/Fitter Bombardier Les Jacobs 1033266
T/Fitter Gunner M. Davies 826630
T/Fitter Gunner R.W. Thompson 3711403
T/DvrMec L/Bombardier Les Doughty 842123
T/DvrMec Gunner E.A. Mason 1448698
Recce A/Sergeant J. Selway 1461839
Recce Gunner Bertie Baxter 1070053
Recce Gunner Adam Fail 1491362
Recce Gunner William Shilletto 806926
Batman Gunner H. Townsend 1439034
2) Battery HQ Section 13th July 1943, Operation ‘Fustian’
O/C Major William F. Arnold 50329
2nd I/C Captain Norman McLeod 148308
L.O. Lieutenant J.C. Pocock
Gun Fitter Sergeant Frank Willis 6140272
Gun Fitter Bombardier Leslie Bluer 1134266
Gun Fitter L/Bombardier James Crabtree 935907
Rations Driver Sammy Henderson 3711409
Recce Sergeant C.D.J Anderson 3710732
Recce Bombardier Eric V. Simpson 906815
Radio Gunner Harry Cameron
126
3) Battery HQ Section 17th September 1944, Operation ‘Market’

CO Major William Frank Arnold 50329
CO 6pdrs Captain 'G' Arvian David Llewellyn-Jones 207851
LO Lieutenant J. Anthony Cox 200541
LO Lieutenant Harry Whittaker 278877
A.P.T.I. Staff Sergeant Alf Cook 4689266
A/BSM Sergeant Les Doughty 842123
Clerk L/Sergeant Doug Colls 1514892
Gun Fitter Sergeant Les Jacobs 1033266
Gun Fitter Bombardier Leslie Bluer 1134266
Gun Fitter L/Bombardier James Crabtree 935907
Maintena Driver/Mech Nick Gregory 1526957
Rations L/Bombardier Albert G. Taylor 1509765
Batman Bombardier Frank J Greaney 1465280
Batman Bombardier Len Smallwood 2077387
Batman Gunner James H. Carter 1142052
Don/R Gunner William Hartley 1514908
Comms Dvr/Radio Op Ken Patterson 14321751
Driver Gunner Ronald (Wally) Hammond 1448688
Those who remained with the Battery from its inception in 1939 to Arnhem 1944 are
highlighted in red. Some who were initially a part of HQ section were subsequently
moved to other Troop’s and vice-versa.
4) Divisional HQ Section 17th September 1944, Operation ‘Market’
CO 17pdr Captain 'A' Norman McLeod 148308
Q/Master Captain 'Q' Henry J Bear 155131
LO Lieutenant Geoff Ryall 273321
RAMC Lieutenant Derrick Henry Randall 301125
Troop Sgt Sergeant George Willis 6140272
Maintena Sergeant Francis Earl Pearce
Recce L/Bombardier Peter Douglas Martin 951703
Recce Gunner Frederick G. Forder 1137514
Batman Gunner Albert Victor Hubbard 1461797
Batman Gunner Bernard Jeffrey 14569312
Comms Gnr/Radio Op H. B. (Badgie) Cameron
Driver Gunner Henry Brayton Weatherell 11423301
127
Roll of Honour
WHITTAKER, Harry.
Lieutenant in Battery HQ section, aged 28,
critically wounded at the Bridge on 20th September
and died of his wounds in the Apeldoorn hospital,
with field burial in the cemetery near St Joseph
Hospital in Apeldoorn.
HAMMOND, Ronald.
Gunner/Driver in Battery HQ
section, aged 25, known to have
been killed by mortar fire in the
garden behind Battery HQ
building near the Arnhem road
Bridge.
FORDER, Frederick George

Recce Gunner in Divisional HQ section, said to
have died of his wounds in the RAP at the
Hartenstein Hotel, exact details of death unknown.
128
MARTIN, Peter Douglas.

Recce Lance-Bombardier in
Divisional HQ section, aged 26,
killed in the Oosterbeek Hoog
station area while trying to make
for the rendezvous during the
withdrawal across the Rhine.
WEATHERELL, Henry
Brayton.
Gunner/Driver in Div HQ
section, aged 28, thought to have
been killed while driving
Captain Henry Bear during a
resupply trip between the
Hartenstein and Arnhem along
the Utrechtseweg.
129
Glider Pilots and Occupants List

Chalk Occupants State
Captain Arvian Llewellyn-Jones
327 A/BSM Sergeant Les Doughty Landed Ok
Battery HQ Driver/Radio Operator Ken Patterson
Section Lance-Bombardier Jim Crabtree
Lance-Bombardier Albert Taylor
Staff Sergeant Alf Cook
328 Clerk / Lance-Sergeant Doug Colls Landed Ok
Battery HQ Maintenance / Gunner Nick Gregory
Section Don R / Gunner William Hartley
Driver Ronald Hammond
Lieutenant Derrick Randall (M/O)
376 Lance-Sergeant Morrison (S/Staffs) Landed Ok
Divisional Don R / Gunner F. Daniels (S/Staffs)
HQ Section Gunner Stokes (S/Staffs)
Driver Henry B. Wetherell
Clerk / Private M. Douglas (S/Staffs)
Troop Sergeant Jack Masterson (D Troop)
377 Driver/Radio Operator Albert Turnbull (D Troop) Landed Ok
Divisional Lance-Bombardier Peter D. Martin
HQ Section Gunner Frederick G. Forder
Sergeant Francis E. Pearce
378 Don R / Gunner J. W. Heath (D Troop) Landed Ok
Divisional Gunner / Batman Albert V. Hubbard
HQ Section Driver/Radio Operator Harry B. Cameron
Captain Henry Bear
886 Driver Albert E. ‘Bert’ Grice Landed Ok
Divisional Driver Denis J. ‘Knocker’ White 2nd Lift
HQ Section Gunner T. Fogarty
Gunner S. Wilson
130
Battery Glider Loading List
Chalk Type Date 1st Pilot 2nd Pilot Unit

327 Horsa 17-Sep Lt H.C.L Cole (KIA) Sgt G. Freeman B Sqn
328 Horsa 17-Sep S/Sgt H.L. Clenaghan Sgt J.F. Miller B Sqn
376 Horsa 17-Sep S/Sgt J. O. McGeough Sgt H. Woltag C Sqn
377 Horsa 17-Sep S/Sgt H. Meekin Sgt D. McGowan C Sqn
(KIA)
378 Horsa 17-Sep S/Sgt C. Treble Sgt Vivian C Sqn
886 Horsa 18-Sep S/Sgt I. N. Baxter Sgt E. J. Evans B Sqn
Chalk Load No. Senior Passenger Take Relea

men Off
327 Jeep & Trailer 5 Cap Llewellyn-Jones 10:59 13:19
328 Jeep & trailer & M/Cycle 5 Staff Sergeant Cook 10:59 13:19
376 Jeep & Trailer 6 Lieutenant Randall 10:33 13:35
377 Jeep & Trailer 4 Troop Sgt Masterson 10:33 13:35
378 Jeep & Trailer 4 Sergeant Pearce 10:34 13:37
886 Jeep & trailer & M/Cycle 5 Captain Bear 12:27 14:40
131
List of Primary Sources as Used and Quoted in this

Booklet.
All primary sources are held, in most instances, with the authors, particularly
Mr Nigel Simpson, but remain the intellectual property as agreed with all
family members of the Battery who supplied this information.
These include the following, from Battery members and others, who were
present at the time of the battle of Arnhem and were present at the Arnhem
Bridge 1944:
Notes and tapes of Battery members own personal experiences that were sent
to the authors and / or conducted by the authors.
Taped interviews.
Battery and Regimental War Diaries.
Written interviews and personal life stories sent to the authors.
Answers to Questionnaires that were sent to Battery members.
Answers from questions posted in the AVC newsletter from others who were
present at the battle in Arnhem 1944. (For example, see AVC newsletter June
2003 and June 2004).
Personal correspondence with Battery members and their immediate family,
including e-mails.
Personal recollections and life stories of Battery members that were sent to the
authors.
Recollection of events by Battery members at Battery reunions attended by Mr
Nigel Simpson and subsequently recorded in written statements.
Telephone conversations with Battery members and recorded accounts from
these conversations.
Research material obtained from Mr John Curtin Howe during many visits,
including his entire personal file and the documents for ‘Point Blank Open
Sights’, though the author was not given the copyright to this booklet.
Copy of documents held by Lance-Sergeant Doug Colls and the Battery
reunion information held in ‘As You Were’ and Battery newsletters.
Material pertaining to the Battery from the museums in Barrow in Furnace and
Aldershot, in Britain and Hartenstein Hotel, Holland.
132
The following books were consulted for the German perspective: -

‘German Armoured Units at Arnhem, September 1944’, 2003, Marcel
Zwarts.
‘It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and
the Battle of Arnhem September 1944’, 2009, Robert Kershaw.
‘Hohenstaufen: 9th SS Panzer Division (Spearhead)’, 2006, Patrick Hook.
‘Feldgrau.com, German Armed Forces Research 1918-1945’, 1947,
Sylvester Stafler.
‘The Race for the Rhine Bridges 1940, 1944, 1945’, 2012, Alexander
McKee.
Axis WWII Discussion Group: Half-tracks at Arnhem – Network54
133
List of Photograph Numbers Used in this Booklet.

Unless otherwise stated, all Figures are with reference to the identification
numbers from the Gelders Archief and remain their copyright. All
Photographs have been used with the kind permission and wonderful help of
Mr Geert Maasen and the staff of the Gelders Archief, Westervoortsedijk,
Arnhem, Holland.
Fig. 1: Pg. 12 Various
Fig. 2: Pg. 13 Authors Collection / West Court, Burbage-Wiltshire
Fig. 3: Pg. 14 Authors Collection / Kings Own Regiment
Fig. 4: Pg. 15 onwar.com
Fig. 5: Pg. 16 The Ramsgate Maritime Museum
Fig. 6: Pg. 16 Authors Collection
Fig. 8: Pg. 25 none
Fig. 11: Pg. 30 Battlefield Detective
Fig. 12: Pg. 32 History of Manston Airfield
Fig. 13: Pg. 33 Geldersarchief Not confirmed
Pg. 36 Authors Collection
Pg. 37 AuthorsCollection
Fig. 14: Pg. 39 Geldersarchief 1560 - 5034
Fig. 15: Pg. 41 GSGS 4427 / sheet 6 N.W.
Fig. 18: Pg. 48 Geldersarchief 1504 - 04 - 8254
Fig. 31: Pg. 74 Geldersarchief 1560 – 1933 & Not confirmed
Fig. 32: Pg. 75 Geldersarchief 1560 – 1900
134

Fig. 35: Pg. 79 Geldersarchief 1570 - 151 & 1560 - 4131
Fig. 39: Pg. 91 Geldersarchief 2867 -140
Fig. 40: Pg. 95 Geldersarchief 3347
Fig. 41: Pg. 98 Blueprints.com
Fig. 42: Pg. 101 GSGS 4427 / sheet 6 N.W.
Fig. 46: Pg. 113 Bundesarchief 1011-407-3629-24
Fig. 48: Pg. 117 Geldersarchief & Authors Collection

Troop BHQ Maintext

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Troop BHQ Maintext

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Troop BHQ Maintext

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1

‘We’ll Follow You – Lead the Way’

The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank

Battery & Divisional HQ Sections

With special help from Geert Maassen

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or

About this Book _________________________________ 6

CHAPTER 1 – The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery R.A.

Early Beginnings. _________________________________ 12

CHAPTER 2 – The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery R.A.

Main HQ Section Transport. ___________________________ 24

CHAPTER 3 – Battery HQ Section

1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery Royal Artillery HQ Officers _ 37

CHAPTER 4 – Divisional HQ Section

Divisional HQ Section Daily Actions

Battery Gun Troop Ranks ___________________________ 124

‘The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank

Battery & Divisional HQ Sections

Background to This Booklet

About this booklet

Background to the Arnhem Operation

Some Terms Used

‘White Lanyards, Worn With Pride’

‘The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank

Battery & Divisional HQ Sections

became an integral and foundation member of the Battery when it became an

Fig 3: Regimental Headquarters of the 56th Anti-Tank Regiment RA King's

On Saturday 26th September a full gun detachment consisting of Captain

Approx Landing Places

A – Sgt Doig glider

‘The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank

Battery & Divisional HQ Sections

Main HQ Section Transport and Comms

Willys Jeep 4X4 Reconnaissance Vehicle

Front engine, rear-wheel drive 4X4

Fig. 8: A standard Willys Jeep MB as shown in the manual.

Fig 9: A No.18 Set Comms, that was dropped

1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery R.A. BHQ Command Section O/C

Battery 17-Pounder Gun Troops Command Section O/C Captain ‘A’

Battery 6-Pounder Gun Troops Command Section O/C Captain ‘G’

Approximate Battery personnel dispositions for June 1944.

Events Leading Up to Operation Market Garden.

8 – July 20 1944 SWORDHILT MORLAIX

Fig. 13: The Drop and Landing Zones approximate locations.

Order of Battle September 1944

Commander Royal Artillery (CRA)

BHQ Comms O/C 1st Airlanding A/T Bty RA

Captain ‘G’ Captain ‘A’ Captain ‘Q’

‘The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank

1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery Royal Artillery HQ Officers

Battery HQ Liaison Officer

Battery HQ Liaison Officer

Divisional HQ Liaison Officer

A/Battery Quarter-Master Sergeant

Battery HQ RAMC Officer

Battery Quarter-Master Sergeant-Major

The Battery HQ Sections at Arnhem

Battery HQ Section Daily Actions

D–Hamilcar 315?. E–Hamilcar 320. F–Hamilcar 321. G-Hamilcar 319