People of The Philippines, Appellee, EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant
People of The Philippines, Appellee, EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant
People of The Philippines, Appellee, EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant
DECISION
Object 7
2
3
4
5
6
PER CURIAM:
On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2) counts of
rape and one (1) count of attempted rape in the complaints which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 10 years of age, against her
will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. 96-150
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12
years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Criminal Case No. 96-151
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and
attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime of
Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the
timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was first sexually abused in
the morning of September 1993. While inside their house in Sucat, Paraaque, appellant entered her
room and laid down beside her. He removed her clothes and asked her to lie face down then inserted his
penis into her anus. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but she kept the incident to herself as her
father might hurt her.5
A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he asked her to lie on her
side facing him and to place her thigh over his. While in that position, appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina which caused tremendous pain.6 As in the first incident, complainant kept the ordeal to
herself. It was only in November 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to her mother.
On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While leaning on the kitchen sink, he
raised her t-shirt, fondled and kissed her breasts. He then removed their shorts, fondled her vagina and
inserted his penis, but when her brother Edwin went out of his room, appellant immediately asked her
to dress up.7
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant laid complainant down
on the sofa then placed himself on top of her and made pumping motion even with their shorts on.
Appellant stopped only when he heard the arrival of his wife.8
On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal, who upon learning
of the abuses done by the appellant, advised them to go to Camp Crame where they filed a
complaint.9 The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined complainant and found
her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.10
Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married Maria Loreto V. Dimaano on
December 25, 1976 and begot three children with her, namely, Edwin, Eric, and Maricar. He alleged
that he worked in several companies abroad11 but admitted that he was in the Philippines in September
1993. He contended though that he could not have raped complainant because he was always in the
office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another assignment overseas.12
He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or January 1, 1996
because there were other people in the house. He argued that had he raped complainant, then she would
not have accompanied him to the Paraaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of San Antonio to apply
for police clearance and barangay I.D., and to Uniwide Shopping Center at Sucat, Paraaque, where they
applied for membership at the Video City Club.13 He also maintained that the fact that his daughter
was in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove that he was responsible for it because it is also
possible that his daughter had sexual intercourse with another man her age.14
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible. She narrated the
obscene details of her harrowing experience which no girl of tender age would have known unless she
herself had experienced it. It found the delay in reporting the rape understandable due to the fear
complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel between
complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious charge of rape against
appellant. It disregarded the Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng
Sumbong since complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same. Besides, she
testified in open court that she was pursuing the case against her father. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of rape (2 counts) and the crime of attempted rape. For the rape committed in September 1993, he is
sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. For the rape on December 29, 1995, he is imposed the
supreme penalty of death. And for the crime of attempted rape, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (Act No. 4103 as amended), he is sentenced to a penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional medium to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor maximum. He is ordered to
indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.15
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City, Branch 257 convicting accused-appellant Edgardo Dimaano of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua is also
ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 as
moral damages and Php25,0000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as found guilty of
qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
7659, and sentenced to death penalty, is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO
Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of
attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
7659, is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years
of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, Php25,000.00 as moral damages, and Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty Cases
(A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), this case is CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court for
review.
Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.16
In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION HAS
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE AFFIDAVIT
OF DESISTANCE BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DULY
CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH PUT TO DOUBT THE REASONS BEHIND THE
FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES OF RAPE AGAINST HEREIN ACCUSED.17
Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she could have reported them to
the authorities when she accompanied him to Paraaque Police Station and the Barangay Hall of San
Antonio or to their relatives when she had the opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the trial
court considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Sumbong, it
would have known that complainant was only pressured by her mother into filing the complaint.
We are not persuaded.
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence which
appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly
their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct and cross-examination by counsel.18 Absent any
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight which would affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility deserves the appellate
court's highest respect.19
It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and
credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused
deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an
eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to
tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.20
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of the
complainant who was only 12 years old when she narrated to the court the violations of her person as
follows:
For rape committed in September 1993:
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you?
A: September 1993.
COURT:
No specific date?
A: I cannot remember, Maam.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
Can you remember how old were you at that time?
A: 10 years old, Maam.
Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what happened next, if anything
happened?
A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako.
Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next?
RECORD: The witness is crying.
A: He inserted in my anus ' ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko.
Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you?
A: No, Maam.
Q: Why not?
A: Because I was afraid of my father.
Q: Why are you afraid of your father?
A: Because he might hurt me.
Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident that occurred?
A: There is, Maam.
Q: When was it?
A: After a few days after the first incident.
Q: After he entered your room, what happened next?
A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes.
Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing?
A: He removed his clothes.
Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any?
A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side ' pinatagilid niya ako.
Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any?
A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was then lying on his side.
Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what happened next, if any?
A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21
For rape committed on December 29, 1995:
Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened?
A: There was, Maam.
Q: What is that incident?
A: I was raped by my father on that day.
Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you?
A: I was then at the kitchen of our house.
Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time?
A: I was then sitting at our dining set.
Q: What about your father, what he doing?
A: He was cooking.
Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any?
A: He told me to approach him.
Q: After you approached him, what happened next?
A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him.
Q: What happened after you embraced him?
A: After that, he raised my T-shirt.
Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next?
A: He held my breast.
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: He kept kissing my breast.
Q: How many times did he kiss your breast?
A: Many times.
Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast?
A: He put my shorts down.
Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any?
A: He also put down my panty.
Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any?
A: He held my organ.
ATTY. MALLARES:
At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific with respect to organ.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
When you say organ', what do you mean?
A: Pekpek.
COURT: Proceed.
ANSWER:
After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief.
Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.22
For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996:
Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00 P.M.?
A: We were in our sala on the sofa.
Q: When you say 'we', who are those you are referring to?
A: Me and my father.
Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what happened?
A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and kissing my breast.
Q: What were you wearing at that time?
A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.
Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra?
A: He raised them.
Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time?
A: Shorts and T-shirt.
Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next?
A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he went on top of me.
Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any?
A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts.
Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your vagina?
A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23
The trial court believed the complainant and held that:
The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the indicia of truth. It is
spontaneous, direct and clear. It is vivid and complete with details. Her testimony is truthful and
convincing. Her credibility is beyond question.
The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the offense, undergo the
troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she
has not in fact been raped. The Court believes that a girl who is only twelve (12) years old would not
ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it is not true.24
We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not diminished by her failure to report
the sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting
the rape incidents, especially in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the
victim, more so when the lecherous attacker is her own father. Strong apprehensions brought about by
fear, stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended party to doubt or even distrust what should otherwise
be a positive attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The Court has thus considered justified the filing
of complaints for rape months, even years, after the commission of the offense.25
In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that the charges were fabricated
for complainant's reactions were consistent with reason. Her complete obedience to appellant, her lack
of struggle and the studied silence she kept about her ordeal were all brought about by genuine fear
posed by her own father against her.
Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. A survey of
our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when
executed as an afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is
quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the appellant arrested by the
police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her anguish in
detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.26
Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted
her when she affixed her signature27 and had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the
cases.28 Besides, the trial court is not bound to dismiss the cases, as it is still within its discretion
whether or not to proceed with the prosecution,29 considering that the compromise agreement and the
affidavit of desistance were executed long after the cases have been filed in court.
Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State belongs the power to
prosecute and punish crimes.30 By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action, once it has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege
to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case was already filed and must
therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.31
In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that complainant never retracted her
allegation that she was raped by her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise
doubts about the rape. All she stated in the affidavit was that she had decided to withdraw the
complaints after the appellant agreed not to disturb the complainant; to consent to annul his marriage;
allow his wife to solely manage the conjugal properties; and entrust the custody of his children to his
wife. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainant's testimony that appellant raped her
on several occasions.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without
consent.1âwphi1 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial
not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is
presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12
years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was
done through force, violence, intimidation or threat.32
We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be
employed where the overpowering moral influence of appellant, who is private complainant's father,
would suffice. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into
submission to his beastly desires.33 The instant case is no exception. Appellant took advantage of his
moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon his daughter.
Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 96-
125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape committed in September 1993 and on December 29, 1995.
However, we acquit appellant in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure
to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and
attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime of
Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the
timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.34
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed.35 What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited.36 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.37
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege specific
acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient
allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the
complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction;
otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 96-125 as the
rape was committed in September 1993 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as
the Death Penalty Law, on December 31, 1993. Prior to R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the the crime of rape, when committed
against a woman who is under 12 years old or is demented. Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-
150 which was committed on December 29, 1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus
applies. It provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship were properly alleged in the information and proved during
trial by the testimonies of the complainant, her mother and the appellant himself; they were also
supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate and birth certificate, respectively.
In the case of People v. Cayabyab,38 this Court, in affirming the death penalty, held that a photocopy
of the birth certificate is admissible to prove the age of the victim, as the original thereof is a public
record in the custody of a public officer. The admission of this secondary evidence is one of the
exceptions to the 'best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Further, we held that production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion,
whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring its production.
Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the custody of the local civil
registrar who is a public officer. The presentation, therefore of their photocopies is admissible as
secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is also well to note that appellant did not dispute their
contents when offered as evidence to prove relationship and minority. Having failed to raise a valid and
timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a primary
evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby.39
Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil indemnity
and exemplary damages, which the trial court lumped together for all the crimes committed, by
separately awarding the sums of P50,000.0040 and P75,000.0041 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and P25,000.0042 as exemplary damages, for each count of
rape, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence.
The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory
upon a conviction for rape.43 On the other hand, exemplary damages is awarded when the commission
of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.44
Finally, the awards of P50,000.0045 and P75,000.0046 as moral damages in Criminal Case Nos. 96-
125 and 96-150, respectively, by the Court of Appeals are also sustained in line with the prevailing
jurisprudence. The award of moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of
further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has
actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 47
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263 affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and
96-150, finding appellant Edgardo Dimaano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
committed against his own daughter, Maricar Dimaano, and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and DEATH, respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-
125 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and in Criminal Case No. 96-150 the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED. Appellant is
however ACQUITTED for the crime of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for failure of the
complaint to allege the specific acts or omissions constituting the offense.
SO ORDERED.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an information filed on 2 August l988 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, accused
Edwin Pascual was charged with the violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended. The said information alleges:
That on or about the 28th day of May, 1988, in the Municipality of Pateros, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another 3.80 grams of
marijuana fruiting tops placed in a transparent plastic bag, which are prohibited drug
(sic), in violation of the above-cited law.
Contrary to law. 1
The case was docketed as Spl. Criminal Case No. 717-D.
Upon arraignment on 22 August 1982, 2 accused pleaded not guilty. Trail was set for 26 September
1988. On that date, however, accused signified his intention to plead guilty to the lesser offense defined
in Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended. To afford him time to secure "the necessary
approvals (sic) from the authorities concerned regarding" that intention, the hearing was reset for 7
October 1988. 3 Since nothing positive developed thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. At the trial, the
prosecution presented as witnesses the arresting officers, Pat. Armando de Villa, Pat. Domingo Casiño
and Pat. Romeo de Castro of the Pateros Police Station, and P/Lt. Tita
B. Advincula of the PC Crime Laboratory Services at Camp Crame, Quezon City. 4 The prosecution's
theory of the case, as summarized by the trial court, is as follows:
. . . Prior to May 28, 1988, P/Major Ernesto I. Josef, the Station Commander of the
Pateros Police Station, received telephone calls from residents of Pateros informing him
of rampant drug selling along said area. Acting on said information, he tasked Pat.
Romeo de Castro to compose (sic) a team to conduct surveillance in the area in order to
identify the suspected pusher and to apprehend him through the so-called "buy-bust"
operation. Chosen as members of the team were Pat. Armando de Villa, Pat. Domingo
Casiño and Pat. Eduardo Reyes of the Pateros Police Station.
At the height of a week-long surveillance, the group was able to ascertain the identity of
the suspected pusher as a certain alias "Tabo." On May 28, 1988 at around 7:10 o'clock
in the evening, they conducted the "buy-bust" operation at T. Sulit St., Barangay Aguho,
Pateros, Metro Manila where the suspected pusher allegedly indulged in the illicit trade
of marijuana. Pat. Romeo de Castro briefed each member of the team on how to go
about the operation. He assigned Pat. Armando de Villa as poseur-buyer and the rest as
back-up. He then gave Pat. de Villa three (3) previously xeroxed ten-peso bills with
Serial Nos. FK920246, EK440768 and FH627260 (Exhibits "A", "A-1" and "A-2",
respectively) which would be used in purchasing marijuana from the suspect.
In (sic) just a while, Pat. de Villa spotted the suspect in a dimly lit vacant lot talking to a
person and when he came near them, the suspect asked him: "Iiskor ka ba". Since he
answered yes, worth P30.00 of marijuana, the suspect told him to wait for a while as he
would come back. A few moments later, the suspect appeared and handed to Pat. de Villa
three (3) tea bags of marijuana in exchange of (sic) the amount of P30.00 which Pat. de
Villa paid to the suspect. At this point in time, Pat. de Villa executed a pre-arranged hand
signal to his teammates who immediately closed in and assisted him in apprehending the
suspect. The latter was frisked and recovered from his possession were the three (3) ten-
peso bills found at his right back pocket. He was subsequently brought to the Pateros
Police Station where he was investigated by Pat. Domingo Casiño. The suspect pointed
to one alias John-John Pilay of Barangay Martinez de 96 as the source of marijuana.
Through a letter-request for technical assistance signed by Pat. Domingo Casiño on May
23, 1988 (Exhibit "D"), the marijuana specimens confiscated from the suspect were
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory Services at Camp Crame, Quezon City for chemical
analysis. After conducting three (3) tests on the subject specimens, namely: microscopic,
chemical and thin layer chromatographic tests, Forensic Chemist, P/Lt. Tita B.
Advincula, declared in her Chemistry Report No. D-492-88 (Exhibit "C") and Certificate
Laboratory Result (Exhibit "F") and which she affirmed in her testimony that the subject
specimens gave positive result for marijuana, a prohibited drug. 5
Upon the other hand, the defense presented the accused, who denied committing the crime, the
accused's neighbors, Ernesto Nicdao and Conrado Asuncion, who corroborated his testimony, and the
accused's sister, Jocelyn Tolentino. Their testimonies were condensed by the trial court as follows:
Accused, in his defense, claimed that he did not commit the crime as charged. He
alleged that on May 28, 1988 at around 5:10 o'clock in the afternoon, he arrived home
from work at T. Sulit St., Barangay Aguho, Pateros, Metro Manila and took a short rest.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, three (3) persons whom he later identified as police
officers approached him while he was just resting near their house and invited him to go
with them to the Pateros Municipal Hall because somebody allegedly bought three (3)
bags of marijuana from him. He vehemently denied said accusation but the police
officers nevertheless handcuffed him, searched him and brought him to the Municipal
Hall Pateros without a warrant. At the Pateros Police Station, he was shown the tea bags
of marijuana which allegedly came from him. He disowned them but the police officers
would not believe him. He was later detained and the corresponding charge was filed
against him.
Accused's testimony was supported by the testimonies of his neighbors Ernesto Nicdao
and Conrado Asuncion who at that time were near the place of the arrest. They were
united in saying that accused was handcuffed and frisked by three (3) unidentified male
persons but nothing except a plastic bag of rice was found in his possession. Later
accused was asked to board a tricycle going to the municipal hall.
For her part, accused's sister, Jocelyn Tolentino, told the Court that after receiving the
information that his brother was arrested she immediately went to the Pateros Municipal
Hall. There she saw her brother at the investigation room being frisked by a policeman
and was being forced to admit that he was selling marijuana. Then she saw her brother
being brought to the detention cell. 6
After evaluating the evidence of both parties, the trial court promulgated a decision on 8 May 1989, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN PASCUAL y FLORES guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to pay a fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his
preventive imprisonment. 7
On 9 May 1989, accused filed his notice of appeal.
In his four-page Brief, 8 accused contends that:
I
The trial court erred in finding that the testimony (sic) of the three (3) policemen who
allegedly conducted a "buy-bust" operation against the appellant is more credible that
(sic) the testimony of the three (3) witnesses for the defense and the appellant.
II
The trial court erred in finding appellant guilty of the capital offense charged based on
the testimony (sic) of said policeman.
III
The trial court erred in finding no violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant
against arrest without warrant and against unreasonable search.
In support of these assertions, he presents the following bare arguments and nothing more:
The testimony (sic) of said policemen is not more credible that (sic) the testimony of the
appellant and his three (3) witnesses.
The evidence for the prosecution does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the appellant committed said capital offense.
The reasons are:
Nicdao and Asuncion, the neighbors of the appellant, categorically testified that they
witnessed the arrest of the appellant and the search of his body by said policemen.
Nicdao and Asuncion categorically testified that they did not see the transfer from the
appellant to Pat. de Villa of three (3) tea bags of marijuana.
Nicdao and Asuncion categorically testified that they did not see the transfer of xerox
copies of three (3) ten-peso bills from Pat. de Villa to the appellant.
The testimony of said policemen that they used xerox copies of three (3) ten-peso bills in
the "buy-bust" operation is hard to believe.
Hence, the incredible testimony (sic) of said policemen cannot be considered as
constituting proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed said capital
offense.
Violations of the constitutional rights of the appellant against arrest without warrant and
against unreasonable search were committed by said policemen.
The testimony (sic) of the appellant and his witnesses proves (sic) that the appellant was
not committing said capital offense at the time that he was arrested and his body was
searched by said policemen.
Hence, the constitutional rights of the appellant against arrest (sic) without warrant and
against unreasonable search were violated by said policemen when they arrested the
appellant and searched his body without a warrant of arrest and without a search
warrant. 9
These arguments do not deserve the scantest consideration as they are nothing but mere conclusions
which betray either the hopelessness of the accused's cause or his counsel's lack of zeal and seriousness
in defending his client. If the latter was due to counsel's firm conviction of the futility of the appeal, he
should have, instead of pursuing the appeal only to file a pro-forma brief therein, given the accused a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the case. 10
Nevertheless, if only to satisfy accused's plea for justice, this Court is inclined to consider the assigned
errors:
1. Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the finding of the trial court, considering that the
latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 11 This present case
cannot qualify as an exception to the rule and the accused miserably failed to point out any reason why
it should be considered as such. Two important considerations enhance the correctness of the findings
of the trial court. Firstly, the testimonies of the arresting officers are positive in character while that of
the accused is negative. Thus, the former testimonies necessarily prevail over the latter. Secondly, no
improper motive had been imputed to the arresting officers. They are, therefore, presumed to have
regularly performed their official duty in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. 12 That the
accused sold three (3) tea bags of marijuana and received consideration therefor in a buy-bust operation
was duly proved by the testimony of Pat. Armando de Villa, thus:
Q Who was your suspect according to the result of your surveillance?
A A certain Tabo, Edwin Pascual alias Tabo.
Q Please tell the Court the result of your operation against Tabo on the night of May 28,
1988?
A At about 7:15 in the evening the group led by Lt. De Castro and I and I (sic) was
assigned as poseur buyer of the suspect and when I reached the vacant lot when (sic)
Tabo was there and approached me and asked if I would score and I said, Yes and I gave
him the three-ten peso bills and then he go (sic) to the alley and when he come (sic) back
he was bringing with him three tea bags of marijuana.
Q Were you able to get the three bags of marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q What else did you and your group do after you were handing the three bags of
marijuana?
A I gave my signal. When I raised my right hand that is the time, sir.
Q Did you raise your hand for the signal?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A My companion came near me and apprehended the suspect and brought him to the
station, sir. 13
Upon cross-examination, Pat. de Villa narrated more specifically how the buy-bust operation was
conducted:
Q In that point of operation when for the first time did you see the accused?
A Around 7:10, sir.
Q Where was the accused at that time when you first saw him?
A At the vacant lot, sir,
Q Could you give us the specific location of that vacant lot?
A Corner of T. Sulit and Quiogue St., sir.
Q Were you alone when you first saw the accused at that vacant lot?
A Yes, sir.
Q What action did you take when you saw the accused at the vacant lot?
A I went at (sic) the vacant lot and the suspect arrived and asked me if I would buy
marijuana.
Q What were the exact words of the accused when he approached you about your
intention to buy marijuana?
A He asked me and I quote, "Pare, i-iscore ka ba at ilan?" I said worth P30.00.
Q How did the accused came (sic) to know that you are (sic) buying marijuana?
A Because during the surveillance that is what we got from the residents in the area.
Q What were (sic) your reply when the accused offered to buy marijuana?
A We said Yes.
Q And then what happened?
A When I said Yes and he left the place and when he came back, the suspect, marijuana
(sic) was already with him.
Q And after that, were you able to buy marijuana?
A Yes, sir. 14
The abovequoted testimony of Pat. de Villa was corroborated by his companions during the buy-bust
operation, Pats. Casiño and De Castro. Moreover, P/Lt. Tita Advincula, the forensic chemist who
examined the contents of the three (3) tea bags obtained from the accused, testified that after she
conducted a microscopic examination, a chemical test and a tin layer examination thereon, she reached
the conclusion that the same were positive for marijuana. 15
The contention of the accused that the policemen used xerox copies of the ten-peso bills in the buy-bust
operation is completely misleading. Actual and genuine ten-peso bills were used; only the machine
copies thereof were offered in evidence. Thus, in his direct testimony, Pat. de Villa said: 16
Q You said you paid three-ten peso bills. Do you have that?
A In (sic) our investigator, sir.
COURT: Who is that?
A Pat. Domingo Casiño, sir.
FISCAL: Do you remember if those three-ten peso bills were marked?
A Yes, sir.
Q What are the markings?
A The serial number (sic) of the three-ten peso bills, sir.
Q Do you remember?
A I have my note, sir. One is FK920246, Two is EK440768 and Three is H627267, sir.
Q If you are shown a photocopy of that (sic) three-ten peso bills, Will you be able to tell
the Court whether those are the three-ten peso bills you used in the buy-bust operation?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you the machine copy of the three-ten peso bills. Will you go over it
and tell the Court whether that is the faithful reproduction of the three-ten peso bills you
used in that buy-bust operation?
A Yes, sir. That is the same. (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, it is settled that the presentation in evidence of the "buy-bust" money is not
indispensable for the conviction of an accused provided that the sale of marijuana is adequately
proven by the prosecution. 17
2. The last issue raised by accused is the alleged violation of his constitutional rights against
warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizure. He claims that when he was arrested and
searched on 28 May 1988, he was not committing any offense; hence, the same is illegal and violates
his constitutional rights.
This contention is likewise unmeritorious. Accused was arrested while in the act of selling marijuana to
Pat. de Villa; he was caught in flagrante delicto. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides
that:
Sec. 5 Arrest without a warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
x x x x x x x x x
Moreover, Section 12, Rule 126 provides:
Sec. 12 Search incidental to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Based on the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest,
as well as unreasonable searches and seizure, was not violated.
We therefore affirm the finding of the trial court that accused is guilty of the crime charged. However,
as to the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court, the same is improper as this is not the
penalty providedfor the offense charged. Section 4, Article II of Republic Act. No. 6425, as amended,
provides the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua, a penalty provided for in appropriate cases under the Revised Penal
Code and which carries accessory penalties, is completely different from life imprisonment. 18
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification above indicated changing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to life imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 02348 dated
October 25, 2007 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Jesusa Figueroa in Criminal Case No.
04-2433 for violation of Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.cralaw
That on or about the 2nd day of July 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her
possession, direct custody and control a total weight of nine point fourty [sic] two (9.42)
grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, in
violation of the above-cited law.[2]
That on or about the 2nd day of July 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attempt to sell, give away, distribute and deliver four point sixty (4.60) grams of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, by then and there
agreeing to sell and deliver the said dangerous drug to the proposed buyer PO3 JOSEFINO
CALLORA, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs,
but which nevertheless failed to consummate the said sale by reason of causes other than
her own spontaneous desistance, that is she got frightened by the presence of police officers
at the scene of the crime.[3]
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Thereafter, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 64 of Makati City proceeded with the trial of the aforementioned charges. The versions
of the prosecution and the defense of what transpired on July 2, 2004, as concisely summarized by the
Court of Appeals, were as follows:
Version of the Prosecution
In the evening of June 20, 2004, an informant came to the office of P/Supt. Nelson T. Yabut
(P/SUPT. YABUT), Chief of the Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operations Task Force (PNP AIDSOTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City and
informed him of the drug pushing activities of a certain “Baby,” later identified as accused-
appellant FIGUEROA. P/SUPT. YABUT instructed PS/Insp. Pepito Garcia (PS/INSP.
GARCIA), PO3 Josefino Callora (PO3 CALLORA) and PO2 Rogie Pinili (PO2 PINILI) to
conduct discreet surveillance operation to verify the information.
On June 23, 2004, at about 8:00 p.m., PO3 CALLORA, together with the informant, met
with accused-appellant FIGUEROA at the parking area of SM Bicutan in Taguig, Metro
Manila. The informant introduced PO3 CALLORA to accused-appellant FIGUEROA as
the one who was willing to regularly buy shabu from her should her sample be of good
quality. Accused-appellant FIGUEROA, however, told them that she had no stock of shabu
at that time, but she promised to inform PO3 CALLORA through the informant once she
already has supply of good quality shabu.
In the morning of the following day, the Special Operation Unit 1 of the PNP AIDSOTF
requested the PNP Crime Laboratory to dust with ultra-violet powder the two (2) pieces of
P500.00 bills with serial numbers FG403794 and MY883243 to be used in the planned buy-
bust operation against accused-appellant FIGUEROA.
On July 2, 2004, at about 12:00 noon, the informant called the Desk Officer of the Special
Operation Unit 1 of PNP AIDSOTF, who in turn relayed to P/SUPT. YABUT that accused-
appellant FIGUEROA had informed him that she already had a stock of good quality shabu
and asked how much shabu would be bought by PO3 CALLORA. P/SUPT YABUT
instructed the informant to tell accused-appellant FIGUEROA that P10,000.00 worth of
shabu would be bought from her. Later on the same day, the informant made another
telephone call and relayed the information that accused-appellant FIGUEROA had agreed
to deliver the shabu worth [P10,000.00] in front of the 7-Eleven Convenience Store at the
corner of M. Almeda and M. Conception Avenues, San Joaquin, Pasig City at about 4:00
p.m. of that day.
A team, composed of P/SUPT. YABUT, PS/INSP. GARCIA, PO2 PINILI and PO3
CALLORA, was then formed to conduct the buy-bust operation, with PO3 CALLORA
designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money was prepared. The genuine two (2)
pieces of P500.00 bills were placed on top of boodle money to make them appear as
P10,000.00.
At about 4:00 p.m. of July 2, 2004, the team proceeded to the agreed meeting place. PO3
CALLORA arrived in the vicinity of 7-Eleven on board a car driven by PS/INSP. GARCIA
and met with the informant. PO3 CALLORA and the informant waited for accused-
appellant FIGUEROA, who after a few minutes, arrived driving a Toyota Revo with Plate
No. XPN 433. Seeing the two, accused-appellant FIGUEROA waived at them and drove
towards them. Stopping near them, accused-appellant FIGUEROA rolled down the
window of her car and asked where the money was. On the other hand, PO3 CALLORA
asked for the shabu. At that juncture, accused-appellant FIGUEROA opened a Chowking
plastic bag and showed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. When PO3
CALLORA was about to hand over the buy-bust money to accused-appellant FIGUEROA,
the latter sensed the presence of police officers in the area, so she sped away towards the
direction of Kalayaan Avenue and C-5 road. The other occupants of the car were Susan
Samson y Figueroa, sister-in-law of the accused, Margie Sampayan y Garbo, Fe Salceda y
Resma and Christian Salceda y Resma, a nine[-]year[-]old boy.
PO3 CALLORA immediately boarded the car being driven by PS/INSP. GARCIA and gave
chase. PO2 PINILI, who was driving another vehicle, joined the chase.
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA’s vehicle was finally blocked at Kalayaan Avenue near the
intersection of C-5 road. At that time, PS/INSP. GARCIA saw Christian Salceda y Resma
alighted from the backdoor of the Toyota Revo and threw the Chowking plastic bag to the
pavement, which was about two steps from the backdoor. PS/INSP. GARCIA picked it up
and saw a heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
inside. PO3 CALLORA and PO2 PINILI introduced themselves as police officers. The
Toyota Revo was checked by PS/INSP. GARCIA and PO2 PINILI, which was witnessed by
PO1 Alvarado and PO3 Basa of the Makati Police PCP No. 7, MMDA Traffic Enforcers
Gonzales and Salvador and a reporter/press photographer of Manila Star named Eduardo
Rosales. Retrieved under the floor matting of the Toyota Revo were two heat sealed
transparent plastic sachets of undetermined quantity of white crystalline substance.
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA was informed of her violation and was apprised of her
constitutional rights. She was brought to the office of Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP
AIDSOTF for investigation. The items recovered from the crime scene were brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were tested positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride.
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA denied that she met and transacted with PO3 CALLORA
regarding the sale of shabu. She likewise denied knowledge of the plastic sachets of shabu
that were recovered under the floor matting of the car she was driving as well as the plastic
sachet of shabu inside a Chowking plastic bag found on the pavement of Kalayaan Avenue
corner C-5 road.
She alleged that between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. of July 2, 2004, she was driving a Toyota Revo
with Plate No. XPN 433 on her way to the house of her elder brother at Eco Center,
Barangay Calsada, Taguig City to get their mother’s allowance. Their mother stays with
her at her residence at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque City. With her as passengers
were Susan Samson y Figueroa, Fe Salceda y Resma, and the latter’s nine[-]year[-]old son,
Christian Salceda y Resma, and Margie Sampayan y Garbo, accused-appellant
FIGUEROA’s laundrywoman. They stayed at her brother’s house for about twenty (20)
minutes.
From her brother’s house, she proceeded to Tejeron, Sta. Ana, Manila to bring Susan
Samson y Figueroa to the latter’s house. The other passengers remained in the car.
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA then continued driving, taking the C-5-Kalayaan Avenue
route. When she was about to proceed after the traffic light turned green at the junction of
Kalayaan Avenue, a navy blue car blocked her path. P/SUPT YABUT alighted from said
car and was shouting that he was a police officer while approaching accused-appellant
FIGUEROA. He ordered accused-appellant FIGUEROA to roll down her car window.
Accused then asked, “Bakit po mister?” P/SUPT YABUT reiterated that he was a police
officer and ordered accused-appellant FIGUEROA to get down from her car as they would
be searching the same.
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA and her companions were made to stay at the sidewalk for
about thirty (30) minutes. They were asked to turn their backs and were told not to do
anything while the search was going on. P/SUPT. YABUT later said, “Aantayin muna natin
sila.” For another thirty minutes, they stayed at the sidewalk until other persons referred to
by P/SUPT. YABUT arrived at the scene.
After the search, accused-appellant FIGUEROA and her companions were ordered to board
the same Toyota Revo, which was driven to Camp Crame by one of the persons who
arrived at the scene.[4]
On May 18, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision[5] acquitting accused-appellant in Criminal Case No.
04-2432, but convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-2433. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing[,] judgment is rendered as follows:
2. In Criminal Case No. 04-2433, the accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado alias “Baby” is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Sec. 26, Art. II, RA
9165 and is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00).
Let the one plastic bag labeled Chowking containing one (1) heat sealed plastic sachet with
4.60 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride be turned over to the PDEA for its
appropriate disposition.
The period during which the accused is detained at the City Jail of Makati shall be
considered in her favor pursuant to existing rules.[6]
Alleging that the foregoing decision was contrary to law and unsupported by the evidentiary records,
accused-appellant sought a review of the same with this Court through a Notice of Appeal, which the
RTC gave due course. However, in accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo,[7] we remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
On October 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision affirming the conviction of
accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision, dated May 18, 2006, in Criminal Case Nos. 04-2432 and 04-2433, of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October
15, 2004, this judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.[8]
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST
OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE SPECIAL OPERATION UNIT 1 OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE ANTI-ILLEGAL DRUGS SPECIAL OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE WAS IRREGULAR BECAUSE OF LACK OF PRIOR COORDINATION
WITH THE PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA).
Second
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A PRIOR
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PO3 JOSEFINO CALLORA AND ACCUSED REGARDING
THE ALLEGED SALE OF SHABU.
Third
Fourth
In both the Appellant’s Brief with the Court of Appeals and accused-appellant’s Supplemental Brief
before this Court, the main defense proffered by accused-appellant was the alleged violation of Section
86[12] of Republic Act No. 9165, requiring that the Philippine National Police (PNP) maintain close
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on all drug related matters.
Accused-appellant’s contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165
does not invalidate operations on account of the the law enforcers’ failure to maintain close
coordination with the PDEA. Thus, in People v. Berdadero,[13] the Court noted that Section 86, as
well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of
the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-
bust operation. This Court consequently held that “this silence [cannot] be interpreted as a legislative
intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such
an arrest inadmissible.”[14] The same conclusion was reached by this Court in People v. Roa,
[15] People v. Mantalaba[16] and People v. Sabadlab.[17]
Accused-appellant argues that the alleged sale transaction borne out by the evidence of the prosecution
was not between Police Officer 3 (PO3) Josefino Callora and accused-appellant Figueroa, but was
instead between the latter and the unnamed informant. Accused-appellant concludes that the testimony
of PO3 Callora regarding the alleged sale transaction is purely hearsay, and therefore inadmissible and
without probative value, as it was the informant which is competent to testify on the alleged agreement
to sell drugs.[18]
We disagree. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, we have held that the hearsay
rule does not apply where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or
falsity thereof is immaterial.[19] In the case at bar, the testimony of PO3 Callora as regards the
conversations between the informant and accused-appellant is admissible insofar as it established that
said information led the police officers to prepare for and proceed with the buy-bust operation. The
conversation between the informant and the accused-appellant was not necessary to prove the
attempted sale of shabu, as said attempt to sell was already clear from accused-appellant’s actuations
on July 2, 2004, which were all within the personal knowledge of PO3 Callora and testified to by him,
to wit: (1) when accused-appellant arrived at the scene, she waived at the informant and PO3 Callora
and approached them while driving her Toyota Revo;[20] (2) upon reaching PO3 Callora and the
informant, accused-appellant asked PO3 Callora where the money was, while the latter asked for
the shabu;[21] (3) accused-appellant showed PO3 Callora a Chowking plastic bag containing a sachet
of white crystalline substance;[22] (4) when PO3 Callora was about to give her the money, accused-
appellant sensed that there were police officers around the area, and drove away;[23] (5) PO3 Callora
and the informant boarded the car of PS/Insp. Garcia, and they chased her to C-5 Road corner Kalayaan
Avenue.[24]
Under the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a crime when the offender commences its
commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.[25] This
definition has essentially been adopted by this Court in interpreting Section 26 of Republic Act No.
9165. Thus in People v. Laylo,[26] we affirmed the conviction of the appellant therein and held that the
attempt to sell shabu was shown by the overt act of appellant therein of showing the substance to the
poseur-buyer. In said case, the sale was aborted when the police officers identified themselves and
placed appellant under arrest.
The identity of the white crystalline substance was furthermore established by the testimony of
PS/Insp. Garcia, who likewise testified as to the following matters based on his own personal
knowledge: (1) after the chase, PS/Insp. Garcia saw a boy (later identified as Christian Salceda) alight
from the vehicle and threw a Chowking plastic bag two to three meters from the vehicle;[27] (2)
PS/Insp. Garcia picked up the Chowking plastic bag from the sidewalk ad found a sachet
of shabu inside the same;[28] (3) PS/Insp. Garcia later proceeded with the other police officers to their
office, where they requested for a laboratory examination of the white crystalline substance;
[29] PS/Insp. Garcia identified the Chowking plastic bag and the sachet containing white crystalline
substance in court. He identified the mark “PEG-1” on the sachet as his initial and testified that he was
the one who marked the same.[30]
The prosecution presented as its Exhibit “B” an Initial Laboratory Report. The report states that the
heat-sealed transparent plastic bag with the marking “PEG-1” inside a Chowking plastic bag was found
to contain 4.60 grams of white crystalline substance. The latter specimen was found positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.[31]
In light of the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, which were found credible by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, the crime of attempt to sell a dangerous drug under Section 26 of
Republic Act No. 9165 was sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As for the purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we agree with the
pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that discrepancies “referring to minor details, and not in
actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair [the witnesses’] credibility”[32] nor
do they overcome the presumption that the arresting officers have regularly performed their official
duties.[33]
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the rulings of the lower courts in the instant
case.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 02348 dated October 25, 2007 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Jesusa Figueroa in
Criminal Case No. 04-2433 for violation of Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate Justices
Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.
[2] Records, p. 3.
[3] Id. at 4.
[6] Id. at 33-34.
[8] Rollo, p. 17.
[9] Id. at 30-35.
[10] CA rollo, p. 44.
[11] Id. at 48-49.
[12] Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal
Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. — The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the
Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby
abolished; however they shall continue with the performance of their task as detail service
with the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the
Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is
sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are affected shall
have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original
mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by
the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated in
the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and other
emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their original mother
agencies.
The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in
this Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years
to finally decide to join the PDEA.
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the
PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided,
however, That when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-
drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA
shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer
the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs
shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.
(Emphasis supplied)
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty5 to the offense charged. After pre-trial, trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution's evidence consists of the testimonies of (1) PO2 Borban Paras, the one who arrested
appellant and seized the illegal drug from him; (2) PO2 Rafael Espadero, the one who received the
marked specimen from PO2 Paras; (3) PO2 Eduardo Ronquillo, one of PO2 Paras' companions during
the arrest of accused; and (4) P/Sr. Insp. Margarita Mamotos-Libres, the forensic chemist who
examined the specimen seized from the appellant. The testimonies of PO2 Espadero, PO2 Ronquillo
and P/Sr. Insp. Libres were abbreviated due to the stipulations entered into by the prosecution and the
defense. 6 The evidence of the prosecution may be summed up as follows: On September 6, 2010,
around 10:15 p.m., PO2 Paras received a phone call from a concerned citizen infonning him that
someone was indiscriminately firing a gun at BMBA Compound, 4th Avenue, Caloocan City. PO2
Paras and his companions, PO2 Ronquillo, PO3 Baldomero and PO2 Woo, responded to the call and
reached the target area around 10:25 p.m. 7 There they saw a male person, later identified as appellant
Enrico Briones Badilla, standing along the alley. Appellant was suspiciously in the act of pulling or
drawing something from his pocket; thus, as a precautionary measure, and thinking that a concealed
weapon was inside his pocket, PO2 Paras immediately introduced himself as a police officer, held
appellant's arm, and asked the latter to bring out his hand from his pocket. 8 It turned out that appellant
was holding a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras confiscated the plastic sachet
from appellant, informed him of his constitutional rights, and arrested him. Appellant and the
confiscated plastic sachet were brought to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task Group
(SAID-SOTG) Office where PO2 Paras marked the plastic sachet with "BP/EBB 07 Sept 2010."9
Thereafter, PO2 Paras turned-over appellant and the seized item to PO2 Espadero who placed the
seized item in a much bigger plastic sachet which the latter marked with "SAID-SOTG EVIDENCE 07-
Sept 2010. "10 PO2 Espadero then prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination 11 of the seized
item, dated September 7, 2010, and another request for drug test on the urine sample taken from
appellant. These requests were both signed by P/Chief Insp. Bartolome Tarnate. PO2 Espadero
transmitted the requests and the specimen to the Northern Police District Crime Laboratory Office,
where duty desk officer PO1 Pataweg received and recorded the same in his logbook. PO1 Pataweg, in
the presence of PO2 Espadero, turned-over the requests and the specimen to P/Sr. Insp. Libres for
laboratory examination. 12
The white crystalline substance was found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug, per Physical Science Report No. D-246-10, 13 while the urine sample taken from appellant was
found positive for methylamphetamine, per Physical Evidence Report No. DT-250-10. Upon
completion of the laboratory examination on the seized item, P/Sr. Insp. Libres marked the plastic
sachet with "A" MML, countersigned it, and placed it in a brown envelope where she also wrote her
initials "MML" and placed the markings "D-246-10," 14then she deposited the envelope containing the
seized item to the evidence custodian of their office and later retrieved the same tor presentation in
court.
The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant as its sole witness and offered a different version of
what transpired on the day of the arrest. Appellant narrated that on September 6, 2010, around 10:30 in
the evening, he was walking along 4th Avenue, Caloocan City when a male person called him.
Recognizing the man as a police officer who frequented their place, he approached the man. When he
got near the man, the latter's companion poked a gun at him. By instinct, he shoved the gun away and it
fell on the ground. 15
According to appellant, the police officer then arrested him, shoved him aboard the police vehicle, and
brought him to 3rd Avenue, Caloocan City. When the police officers failed to see their target person at
the said place, they left and went to the police station where he was told that he would be charged with
a non-bailable offense. He only saw the plastic sachet containing shabu in court. He denied the
accusations against him and stated that he was arrested because the police officers thought he would
fight back when he shoved the police officer's gun. The police officers asked ₱20,000.00 from him
allegedly because they knew that his father had a junk shop business, but he refused to give them
money. He questioned the positive result of the drug test because allegedly no examination was
conducted on his person. 16
In its Decision dated September 9, 2013, the RTC held appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused Enrico
Briones Padilla beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of Twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱400,000.00) in accordance with Section 11 sub-section 2 of Art. II, R.A. 9165, otherwise known as
the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002".
The drugs subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to
be dealt with in accordance with law. 17
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid Decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.
On March 27, 2015, the CA affirmed the appellant's conviction but with modification as to the penalty
imposed.1âwphi1The decretal portion of the Decision reads, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision elated September 9, 2013 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION of the prison term which is hereby fixed at 20 years and 1 day. 18
Still unsatisfied, appellant elevated the aforesaid Decision of the CA to this Court via a Notice of
Appeal.
In a Resolution 19 dated July 22, 2015, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs if they so desire, but both parties manifested that they are no longer
filing a supplemental brief.
In his Brief, 20 appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE NOTHWITHSTANDING ITS FAILURE TO
PROVE THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE ALLEGED SEIZED SHABU.
III
On the first error, appellant argues that there was no basis for his apprehension because there was no
prior knowledge that he was the suspect in the alleged indiscriminate firing incident and that there was
no mention that he executed an overt act reflecting any intention to commit a crime. Also, there was no
testimony that he had just committed an offense, such that, it cannot be said that PO2 Paras had any
immediate justification for subjecting him to any search. Thus, the shabu may not be utilized as
evidence to sustain his conviction.
On the second error, appellant submits that the failure to mark the seized item right away is a violation
of the chain of custody rule as mandated by Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
RA 9165. There was no immediate conduct of a physical inventory and the seized item was not
photographed in the presence of appellant or counsel, or of a representative from the media, and the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign copies of the
inventory. Appellant avers that there is no absolute certainty that it was the same drug item that was
allegedly recovered from him, and there was also no justifiable ground warranting the exception to the
chain of custody rule.
On the third error, appellant contends that failure to comply with the chain of custody rule negates the
presumption that official duties had been regularly performed by the police officers.
We dismiss the appeal.
First Issue: Legality of Arrest
We stress, at the outset, that appellant failed to question the legality of his arrest before he entered his
plea. The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if
he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. Any
objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.21 Thus, appellant is deemed to have waived any objection thereto since he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he entered a plea of not guilty during the
arraignment, and thereafter actively participated in the trial. He even entered into a stipulation, during
the pre-trial of the case, admitting the jurisdiction of the trial court over his person.22
In any event, appellant was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require
a warrant in accordance with Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. 23 Such arrest is commonly known as in flagrante delicto. For a warrantless arrest of an
accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. 24
We emphasize that the series of events that led the police officers to the place where appellant was
when he was arrested was triggered by a phone call from a concerned citizen that someone was
indiscriminately firing a gun in the said place. Under the circumstances, the police officers did not have
enough time to secure a warrant considering the "time element" involved in the process. To obtain a
warrant would be impossible to contain the crime. In view of the urgency of the matter, the police
officers proceeded to the place. There, PO2 Paras saw appellant, alone in an alley which used to be a
busy place, 25 suspiciously in the act of pulling something from his pocket. Appellant's act of pulling
something from his pocket constituted an overt manifestation in the mind of PO2 Paras that appellant
has just committed or is attempting to commit a crime. There was, therefore, sufficient probable cause
for PO2 Paras to believe that appellant was, then and there, about to draw a gun from his pocket
considering the report he received about an indiscriminate firing in the said place. Probable cause
means an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a crime has been committed or about to
be committed. 26
Thus, thinking there was a concealed weapon inside appellant's pocket and as precautionary measure,
PO2 Paras (who was three or four meters away from appellant)27 immediately introduced himself as a
police officer, held appellant's arm, and asked the latter to pull his hand out. Incidentally, appellant was
holding a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras then confiscated the plastic
sachet from appellant, informed him of his constitutional rights, and arrested him. When an accused is
caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only authorized, but are duty-bound, to arrest him
even without a warrant. 28 And considering that appellant's arrest was legal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it were likewise lawful.29
Therefore, We agree with the CA when it adopted the People's disquisition:
The police officers are completely justified for being at the BMBA compound when appellant was
arrested, since they were merely performing their regular duty of responding to a reported crime.
When appellant was found alone, acting suspiciously in the reported area, PO2 Paras instinctively
thought that appellant was about to pull out a gun or a weapon from his pocket due to a previous
report of indiscriminate firing, that he approached him as a precautionary measure.
xxxx
In the course of the performance of their official duties, the police officers inadvertently
recovered from appellant a plastic sachet of shabu which was voluntarily given by
appellant himself. Clearly, the item recovered from appellant was not a product of illegal
search and seizure, because appellant voluntarily surrendered the drugs in his possession. In
short, appellant was not forced or coerced to bring out the contents of his pocket, thus, the
recovery of evidence was appellant's own volition.
Accordingly, appellant was arrested because he was caught in flagrante delicto of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, given that mere possession of a prohibited
drug already constitutes a criminal offense.
Appellant's arrest, therefore, was completely justified pursuant to Section 5 (a) of Rule 113
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that a person may be arrested
without a warrant when in a presence of the arresting officer, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.30
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall
immediately, after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Further, Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165
similarly provides that:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
xxx Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.
In the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and, in sustaining a conviction therefor, the identity and integrity of
the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises
from the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily
open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt
or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant;
otherwise, the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165 fails. 31 In
this regard, the aforesaid provisions outline the procedure to be observed by the apprehending officers
in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs.
Under the same proviso, however, non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable
grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers.32 While nowhere in the prosecution's evidence would show the "justifiable ground" which
may excuse the police operatives involved from making the physical inventory and taking of
photograph of the drug confiscated and/or seized, such omission shall not render appellant's arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him as inadmissible in evidence. Said "justifiable ground"
will remain unknown in the light of the apparent failure of appellant to specifically challenge the
custody and safekeeping or the issue of disposition and preservation of the subject drug before the trial
court. He cannot be allowed too late in the day to question the police officers' alleged non-compliance
with Section 21 for the first time on appeal. 33
Moreover, the rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the
identification of the persons who handled the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the
authorized movements of the illegal drugs from the time they are seized from the accused until the time
they are presented in court. 34 The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary
doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by
records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into
possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to
the time it was offered in evidence. 35
Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, implementing R.A. No.
9165, defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from
the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the
final disposition.
In the case at bench, after PO2 Paras confiscated the plastic sachet with white crystalline substance
from appellant, the same remained in PO2 Paras' possession until appellant and the seized item were
brought to the SAID-SOTG office. Upon reaching the office, PO2 Paras marked the plastic sachet with
his initials "BP/EBB 07 Sept 2010" and turned it over to police investigator PO2 Espadero who, in turn,
placed it in a much bigger plastic sachet and marked the bigger plastic sachet with "SAID-SOTG
EVIDENCE 07 Sept 2010 ". Then, PO2 Espadero prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination
dated September 7, 2010.36 Later, PO2 Espadero brought the plastic sachet and the request to the PNP
Northern Police District Crime Laboratory Office where PO1 Pataweg, the duty desk officer, received
the same. Thereafter, PO1 Pataweg, in the presence of PO2 Espadero, turned over the requests and
specimen for laboratory examination to P/Sr. Insp. Libres, a forensic chemist. Per Physical Science
Report No. D-246-10, the white crystalline substance was found positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, while, per Physical Evidence Report No. DT-250-10, the urine
sample taken from appellant was found positive for methylamphetamine. Upon completion of the
laboratory examination on the seized item, P/Sr. Insp. Libres marked the plastic sachet with "A"
MML, countersigned it, and placed it in a brown envelope where she also wrote her initials "MML" and
marked the envelope with "D-246-10". She then deposited the envelope containing the seized item to
the evidence custodian of their office. She later retrieved the same from the evidence custodian for
presentation in court. The Chemistry Report and the subject specimen were presented in court as
evidence, and were properly identified by prosecution witnesses.
Hence, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated drug had not been compromised because it established the crucial link in the chain of
custody of the seized item from the time it was first discovered until it was brought to the court for
examination. 37 The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the
confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until the time they are
presented in court.38
In this case, the facts persuasively proved that the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same item
seized from appellant.1âwphi1 The integrity and evidentiary value thereof were duly preserved. The
marking and the handling of the specimen were testified to by PO2 Paras and PO2 Espadero.39 During
the trial, the prosecution and the defense entered into a stipulation that witnesses PO2 Espadero and
P/Sr. Insp. Libres (the forensic chemist) could identify the subject specimen as well as the documents
they prepared. 40 The aforesaid witnesses testified about every link in the chain, from the moment the
seized item was picked up to the time it was offered into evidence in court.
To reiterate, We discussed in the case of Mallillin v. People 41 how the chain of custody of seized items
should be established, thus:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 42
However, while the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.43 Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section
21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused's arrest illegal or the items
seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. The most important factor is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item.44
In a number of cases, 45 We held that with the implied judicial recognition of the difficulty of complete
compliance with the chain of custody requirement, substantial compliance is sufficient as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
We ruled that the marking and inventory of the seized items at the police station immediately after the
arrival thereat of the police officers, as in this case, were in accordance with the law, its implementing
rules and regulations, and relevant jurisprudence. Also, the failure to photograph and conduct physical
inventory of the seized items is not fatal to the case against the accused and does not ipso facto render
inadmissible in evidence the items seized. What is important is that the seized item marked at the police
station is identified as the same item produced in court.46
Therefore, in this case, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory
and photograph of the seized drug nor mark the same immediately after seizure, these will not render
appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. There is substantial compliance by
the police officers as to the required procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated item. The
succession of events established by evidence and the overall handling of the seized item by the
prosecution witnesses all show that the item seized was the same evidence subsequently identified and
testified to in open court.47
Specifically, in People v. Padua,48We stated that the purpose of the procedure outlined in the
implementing rules is centered on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items. We also reiterated in People v. Hernandez, et al. 49 that non-compliance with Section 21 would
not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Third Issue: Defense of Alibi
For the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proved: (a)
the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and,
(c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs. 50 All
these elements were adequately proven by the prosecution. Appellant was found to have in his
possession 7.75 grams of shabu, a dangerous drug. He could not present any proof or justification that
he was fully authorized by law to possess the same. The mere possession of a prohibited drug
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi (intent to possess) sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.51
Appellant's mere denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical identification and declarations
of the police officers. The defense of denial, frame-up or extortion, like alibi, has been invariably
viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.52 As evidence that is both negative
and self-serving, this defense of alibi cannot attain more credibility than the testimony of the
prosecution witness who testified clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the crime
committed. 53 One such positive evidence, in this case, is the result of the laboratory examination
conducted on the drug recovered from the appellant which revealed that the confiscated plastic sachet
tested positive for the presence of "shabu". 54
Furthermore, the defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their
official duties. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed can only be overcome
through clear and convincing evidence showing either of two things: (1) that they were not properly
performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper motive. 55 In the present case,
appellant failed to overcome such presumption. The bare denial of the appellant cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses for failing to present any corroborative evidence. 56 As
correctly ruled by the trial court, when accused testified that he came from a drugstore in Monumento
in the evening of his arrest and allegedly bought medicine, accused should have presented to the police
officers the item he bought, or any receipt, to prove that he was not at the place when the alleged
indiscriminate firing occurred. 57
Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and conclusions of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed because
it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their deportment and manner of
testifying. 58 The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the
CA as in this case. 59 Hence, We find no compelling reason to deviate from the CA's:findings that,
indeed, the appellant's guilt was sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Turning now to the imposable penalty, We sustain the penalty imposed by the CA. Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the penalty for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in
the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall
be graduated as follows:
xxxx
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or
more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride
or "shahu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy",
PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred
(500) grams of marijuana. 60
The aforesaid provision clearly states that the imposable penalty for illegal possession of any dangerous
drug, like shabu, with a quantity of five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams, is
imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from
₱400,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.
Thus, for the illegal possession of shabu in the amount of 7.75 grams, as in this case, the CA correctly
imposed the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day and a fine of Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00). The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in this case
because the penalty of imprisonment provided for illegal possession of five (5) grams or more but less
than ten (10) grams of shabu is indivisible. 61
All told, We find no reason to modify or set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 27,
2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06354 is AFFIRMED.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FAILURE TO
PROVE THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SHABU ALLEGEDLY SEIZED.
II
III
IV
II.
III.
In its Decision dated September 6, 2010, the Court of Appeals found no palpable error in the judgment
of conviction rendered by the RTC against accused-appellants and rejected accused-appellants’
argument that the prosecution failed to establish the factual details constituting the essential elements of
an illegal sale of dangerous drugs. According to the appellate court, Article II, Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9165 penalizes not only those who sell dangerous drugs, but also those who "trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug,"
without being authorized by law. In this case, the prosecution was able to prove with moral certainty
that accused-appellants were caught in the act of illegally delivering, giving away to another, or
distributing sachets of shabu. In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 82 dated June 11, 2008 convicting appellants for violation
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.24
Hence, this appeal.
Since accused-appellants had opted not to file any supplemental briefs, the Court considers the same
issues and arguments raised by accused-appellants before the Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellants stress that for a judgment of conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
identities of the buyer and seller, the delivery of the drugs, and the payment in consideration thereof,
must all be duly proven. However, accused-appellants lament that in their case, the prosecution failed
to establish by evidence these essential elements of the alleged sale of shabu. Accused-appellants add
that the prosecution was also unable to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu
had been preserved in accordance with Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No.
9165. Accused-appellants point out that PO1 Arugay did not mention the time and place of the marking
of the sachet of shabu purportedly sold to him by accused-appellant Maongco; while PO2 Ong
admitted that he marked the sachet of shabu he received from accused-appellant Bandali only at the
police station. Both PO1 Arugay and PO2 Ong merely provided an obscure account of the marking of
the sachets of shabu, falling short of the statutory requirement that the marking of the seized drugs be
made immediately after seizure and confiscation.
The appeal is partly meritorious.
In the case of accused-appellant Maongco, the Court finds that the RTC and the Court of Appeals both
erred in convicting him in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731 for the illegal sale of shabu under Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. The evidence on record does not support accused-appellant
Maongco’s conviction for said crime, especially considering the following answers of prosecution
witness PO1 Arugay during the latter’s cross-examination, practically admitting the lack of
consideration/payment for the sachet of shabu:
Q. What did you tell Michael Maongco?
A. I introduced myself as the cousin of Alvin, sir.
Q. After that, you immediately arrested him?
A. Yes, sir. I first asked my order of shabu.
Q. In your affidavit, you testified that you asked one "bulto" of shabu?
A. More or less five grams of shabu, sir.
Q. Did the accused ask any in exchange of that shabu?
A. No, sir.
Q. Immediately, you arrested him already?
A. After I got my order from him, I introduced myself as policeman, sir.
COURT:
Who gave you that one "bulto" of shabu?
A. I have the money but he did not ask it from me, your Honor.
Q. Was there any arrangement between you and Maongco as to how much this one "bulto" cost? A.
Alvin and Maongco were the ones who talked.
xxxx
Q. Meaning to say, it was Maongco and Alvin who talked in Quezon Avenue?
A. They talked over the cellphone.
xxxx
Q. But you did not hear the conversation?
A. No, sir.25 (Emphases supplied.)
Inarguably, consideration/payment is one of the essential elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
without which, accused-appellant Maongco’s conviction for said crime cannot stand. Nonetheless,
accused-appellant Maongco is still not absolved of criminal liability.
A review of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731 readily reveals that accused-appellant
Maongco was not actually charged with illegal sale of shabu. Said Information specifically alleged that
accused-appellant Maongco "willfully and unlawfully dispensed, delivered, transported, distributed or
acted as broker" in the transaction involving 4.50 grams of shabu. These acts are likewise punishable
under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos ( ₱500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. (Emphasis supplied.)
Several of the acts enumerated in the foregoing provision have been explicitly defined under Article I,
Section 3 of the same statute, viz:
Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) Administer. – Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body of any person, with or
without his/her knowledge, by injection, inhalation, ingestion or other means, or of committing any act
of indispensable assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to himself/herself unless
administered by a duly licensed practitioner for purposes of medication.
xxxx
(k) Deliver. – Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and
by any means, with or without consideration.
xxxx
(m) Dispense. – Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or any dangerous drug with or
without the use of prescription.
xxxx
(ii) Sell. – Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical whether for money or any other consideration.
(jj) Trading. – Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-
mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or acting as a
broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any other consideration in violation of this
Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
As for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, it must be proven that (1) the accused passed on
possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2) such
delivery is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is
that the delivery may be committed even without consideration.
It is not disputed that accused-appellant Maongco, who was working as a taxi driver at the time of his
arrest,26had no authority under the law to deliver any dangerous drug. The existence of the two other
elements was established by PO1 Arugay’s testimony that provided the following details:
FISCAL ANTERO:
Q. Why did you arrest this certain Alvin?
A. For violation of R.A. 9165, sir.
Q. What happened when you arrested this alias Alvin?
A. We investigated on where the shabu he was selling came from.
Q. What was the result of your inquiry as to the source of the shabu?
A. We learned that the source came from a certain Michael, sir.
Q. When you found out that the source came from a certain Michael, what did you do, Mr. Witness?
A. We formed a team and we made a Pre-Operation Report, sir.
Q. Aside from mentioning about the source as Michael, what are the other details?
A. No more, sir. On June 19, 2004 at about 10:30 a.m., our group was dispatched in Quezon Avenue
corner Roces Avenue.
xxxx
Q. What happened when you arrived in that area?
A. We went to the place where Michael is always staying and when he arrived he was pointed by Alvin,
sir.
Q. What did you do when Alvin pointed to Michael?
A. I pretended to be the cousin of Alvin who was going to get the order.
Q. What happened when you approached this Michael?
A. I asked from him my order of "dalawang bulto" and he asked me who am I and I told him that I am
the cousin of Alvin and that Alvin cannot come because he was sick, sir.
Q. What happened after you said that?
A. I asked from him my order and then he took something out from his pocket and he showed it to me.
It was a shabu, sir.
Q. What happened next?
A. After I got the order we arrested Michael, sir.
xxxx
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
Q. What was Maongco doing at that time?
A. He was staying in a waiting shed along Quezon Avenue, sir.
Q. What was he doing there?
A. He was waiting for somebody, sir.
Q. Immediately you approached Maongco?
A. He was pointed by Alvin, sir. I alighted from the taxi.
Q. What was his reaction when you approached him?
A. He was a bit surprised, sir.
Q. What did you tell Michael Maongco?
A. I introduced myself as the cousin of Alvin, sir.
Q. After that, you immediately arrested him?
A. Yes, sir. I first asked my order my shabu.
Q. In your Affidavit, you testified that you asked one "bulto" of shabu?
A. More or less five grams of shabu, sir.27 (Emphases supplied.)
There was a prior arrangement between Carpio and accused-appellant Maongco. When PO1 Arugay
appeared for his purportedly indisposed cousin, Carpio, and asked for his order of shabu, accused-
appellant Maongco immediately understood what PO1 Arugay meant. Accused-appellant Maongco
took out a sachet of shabu from his pocket and handed over possession of said sachet to PO1 Arugay.
Based on the charges against accused-appellant Maongco and the evidence presented by the
prosecution, accused-appellant Maongco is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery of shabu
under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
For the same reasons cited in the preceding paragraphs, the RTC and the Court of Appeals also erred in
convicting accused-appellant Bandali for the crime of illegal sale of shabu in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
127732.
The Information against accused-appellant Bandali, same as that against accused-appellant Maongco,
charged him with "willfully and unlawfully dispensing, delivering, transporting, distributing or acting
as broker" in the transaction involving 4.45 grams of shabu . However, unlike accused-appellant
Maongco, accused-appellant Bandali cannot be convicted for illegal delivery of shabu under Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, given that the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the latter
were radically different from those of the former.
PO2 Ong testified:
Q. How did this Arugay arrest this Michael?
A. I was only a back-up of Arugay, sir.
Q. What did you see, if any?
A. I saw that he recovered one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, sir.
Q. He recovered it from whom?
A. From Michael Maongco, sir.
xxxx
Q. What happened when this man was arrested by Arugay?
A. We looked for the other "bulto" because according to Michael there were two and it was in the
possession of Phans, sir.
THE COURT:
Q. Where did you look for him?
A. At Jollibee, Pantranco, your Honor.
xxxx
Q. Did you find him in Jollibee?
A. Yes, your Honor, because according to Michael Maongco he was wearing blue T-shirt.
Q. What did you do when you found him at Jollibee?
A. I went near him and asked him to put out the other shabu in his possession, your Honor.
Q. You yourself?
A. My companions were just there, your Honor.
Q. You yourself approached him?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. When you demanded the production of what?
A. One (1) bulto of shabu, your Honor.
PROS. ANTERO:
Q. Why do you know that he was Bandali?
A. Because Michael Maongco was pointing to him that he was Phans Bandali, sir.
Q. Was Michael with you when you went to that Jollibee?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened when you demanded from Bandali this shabu?
A. He voluntarily put out the shabu, sir.
Q. What happened next, Mr. Witness?
A. I told him of his violation and his rights, sir.28 PO2 Ong further confirmed during his cross-
examination:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, you mentioned a while ago that you arrested Phans Bandali inside Jollibee,
Pantranco.1avvphi1 Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you did not buy from him a shabu, Mr. Witness?
A. No, sir.
Q. You just demanded from him a plastic sachet?
A. Yes, sir.29 (Emphases supplied.)
In accused-appellant Bandali’s case, it cannot be said that he knowingly passed on the sachet of shabu
in his possession to PO2 Ong. PO2 Ong approached accused-appellant Bandali as a police officer,
absent any pretense, and demanded that the latter bring out the other sachet of shabu. Accused-
appellant Bandali’s voluntary production of the sachet of shabu in his possession was in subservience
to PO2 Ong’s authority. PO2 Ong then acquired the sachet of shabu from accused-appellant Bandali by
seizure, not by delivery. Even if there may be doubt as to whether or not accused-appellant Bandali was
actually aware at that moment that PO2 Ong was a police officer, the ambiguity would still be resolved
in accused-appellant Bandali’s favor.
This does not mean though that accused-appellant Bandali goes scot-free. The evidence for the
prosecution did establish that accused-appellant Bandali committed illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, penalized under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165.
For the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the following essential
elements must be proven, namely: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified
to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possess the said drug.30Accused-appellant Maongco informed the police officers that the
other sachet of shabu was in the possession of accused-appellant Bandali. Accused-appellant Bandali
herein was in possession of the sachet of shabu as he was sitting at Jollibee Pantranco branch and was
approached by PO2 Ong. Hence, accused-appellant Bandali was able to immediately produce and
surrender the said sachet upon demand by PO2 Ong. Accused-appellant Bandali, admittedly jobless at
the time of his arrest,31 did not have any authority to possess shabu. And as to the last element, the rule
is settled that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi, which is sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of
such possession.32
But can accused-appellant Bandali be convicted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Article
II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 when he was charged with illegal dispensation, delivery,
transportation, distribution or acting as broker of dangerous drugs under Article II, Section 5 of the
same statute? The Court answers in the affirmative.
Rule 120, Section 4 of the Rules of Court governs situations where there is a variance between the
crime charged and the crime proved, to wit:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.
Well-settled in jurisprudence that the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.33 The same ruling may also be applied to the other acts
penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 because for the accused to be able to
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit, or transport any
dangerous drug, he must necessarily be in possession of said drugs.
At the outset of the trial, both parties had admitted the laboratory results showing that the contents of
the two sachets tested positive for shabu, although accused-appellants contest the identity and integrity
of the sachets and contents actually tested since the chain of custody of the same was not satisfactorily
established in accordance with Republic Act No. 9165 and its implementing rules.
The Court disagrees with accused-appellants as the police officers had substantially complied with the
chain of custody rule under Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9165. The
Court had previously held that in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a
physical inventory, to photograph, and to mark the seized drugs at the place of arrest do not render said
drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the
same.34 The Court had further clarified, in relation to the requirement of marking the drugs
"immediately after seizure and confiscation," that the marking may be undertaken at the police station
rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of the accused and that what is
of utmost importance is the preservation of its integrity and evidentiary value.35
The Court finds no fault on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals in giving more weight
and credence to the testimonies of the police officers vis-à-vis those of the accused-appellants.
Questions as to the credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the appreciation of the trial court
because of its unique opportunity of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the reviewing
tribunal.36
Moreover, accused-appellants’ uncorroborated defenses of denial and claims of frame-up cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti. The testimonies of police officers who caught the accused-appellants in flagrante delicto
are usually credited with more weight and credence, in the absence of evidence that they have been
inspired by an improper or ill motive, than the defenses of denial and frame-up of an accused which
have been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted. In order to prosper, the
defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence,37 which
accused-appellants failed to present in this case.
Lastly, the Court determines the proper penalties to be imposed upon accused-appellants.1âwphi1
Under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalties for the illegal delivery of dangerous
drugs, regardless of the quantity thereof, shall be life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). Hence, accused-
appellant Maongco, for his illegal delivery of shabu in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731, is sentenced to
life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 prescribes the penalty, for possession of less than five
grams of dangerous drugs, of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
plus a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱400,000.00). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term as prescribed by
the same law. Resultantly, accused-appellant Bandali, for his illegal possession of 4.45 grams of shabu
in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732, is sentenced to imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day,
as the minimum term, to twenty (20) years, as the maximum term, and ordered to pay a fine of Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision Is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to read as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731, accused-appellant MICHAEL YUMONDA MAONGCO
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery of shabu penalized under Article
II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, and is sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and
ordered to pay a FINE of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00); and
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732, accused-appellant PHANS SIMP AL BAND ALI is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu with a net weight of
4.45 grams, penalized under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as the minimum
term, to twenty (20) years, as the maximum term, and ordered to pay a FINE of Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2016 > June 2016 Decisions > G.R. No. 204441, June
08, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN Y
ANDALES, Respondent.:
G.R. No. 204441, June 08, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL KURT
JOHN BULAWAN Y ANDALES, Respondent.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204441, June 08, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN Y
ANDALES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision 1 dated 25 October 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 00798-MIN, which affirmed with modification the Judgment 2 dated 24 August 2010
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2008-714,
effectively finding (accused-appellant) Michael Kurt John Bulawan y Andales guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as follows:
That on November 10, 2008, at more or less 10:55 in the evening at Gusa National
Highway, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell
and/or offer to sell and give away to the arresting officer 101 Rodolfo S. de la Cerna, Jr.,
acting as poseur buyer, one (1) pack of dried marijuana fruiting tops with stalks wrapped in
a magazine paper weighing 13.98 grams, which upon qualitative examinations conducted
thereon, give positive result to the test for the presence of aforesaid dangerous
drug.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 4 Trial
on the merits followed.
The prosecution relied on the testimony of 101 Rodolfo S. De La Cerna, Jr. (101 de la Cerna) of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), who testified as follows:
That he executed an Affidavit in connection with this case [Exh. "F"]. On November 10,
2008, at about 10:55 in the evening, he was along Gusa [NJational Highway, particularly in
front of "Starwood" acting as a poseur buyer for marijuana. That the said operation was
headed by I01 Neil Pimentel and they were backed up by P03 Benjamin Jay Reycilez and
I01 Gerald Pica. He was with their confidential informant who informed him that there was
already a transaction negotiated earlier for the purchase of [P]1,000.00 worth of marijuana.
They waited for the subject of the buy-bust for about five minutes. The accused arrived and
he was introduced to him by their CI. After he was introduced, the accused handed to him
the marijuana wrapped in a magazine paper. After the accused gave him the marijuana, he
inspected it if to verify if it was indeed marijuana and after confirming it, he made a "miss-
call" signal to their team leader who was inside the vehicle which was parked about 10 to
15 meters away from them. He then immediately announced that he is a PDEA agent and
he informed the accused of the latter's violation.On questioning of the Court, he testified
that there were only three of them, two [2] from the PDEA [he and Pimentel] and one [1]
from the CAIDTF [Reycitez]. He ordered them to "appraise the rights " of the accused
when the latter was already arrested. When asked by the Court why he was the only person
who executed the Affidavit, he answered that he was the poseur buyer and that he was
responsible for the arrest of the accused, and it was already dark, it was already 11:00
o'clock in the evening. He however testified that it is not a normal procedure in the office
that only one officer will execute an affidavit. He further testified that he did not prepare
the buy bust money in the amount of [P]1,000.00 and that when he met the accused, he had
no [P]1,000.00 with him and that he arrested the accused when the latter showed him the
marijuana. He then informed the accused of his rights and when the other members arrived,
he conducted an inventory [Exhibit "G"] right at the place, and then proceeded to the Office
where he made the markings "RDC". He prepared a laboratory request for examination
[Exh. A]and he delivered the request including the specimen [Exhibit B] as well as the
accused to the crime laboratory for examination. The result was positive [Exhibit "C" and
Exhibit "D"]. He also took photographs of the accused [Exhibit "H"]. Finally, he identified
the accused who answered with the name Michael Kurt John
5
Bulawan. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The defense, on the other hand, hinged their case on the testimony of accused-appellant, to wit:
That on November 10, 2008 at about 10:00 o 'clock in the evening, he was at his house
preparing to sleep when he received a text message from his friend Joey Maalyao of
Camella requesting him to go out from his house and inviting him to attend the birthday
party of the classmate of his wife, a nursing student. He told Joey that he will not go out
because he was tired as he had just took (sic) an exam. However, Joey insisted so he went
out of his house and saw the service vehicle of Joey, a Tamaraw FX parked at about 500
meters away. His house is in the interior part. He then approached the vehicle and he
became aware that there were companions inside the tinted vehicle and he asked Joey who
were these persons and Joey answered that they were his cousins. There were about four of
them inside the vehicle, one was the driver, one was at the passenger side and there were
two at the back. Joey was seated at the front seat. When he was informed by Joey that they
were his cousins, he went inside the vehicle. When the engine started, and was in the
vicinity of Lapasan the men inside started to search him bodily and they got his went inside
the vehicle. When the engine started, and was in the vicinity of Lapasan the men inside
started to search him bodily and they got his cellphone, wallet, and coins. They held his
neck and hands and told him it was an arrest. He then asked Joey was (sic) offense had him
(sic) committed against him and why his companions were searching him and Joey told him
to be considerate since he was just pressured by those men. One of the men beside him
handed marijuana to him and to use it inside the vehicle. Then he was brought to the office
and they took his picture in front of the vehicle of his friend. The man who took the picture,
he identified later as 101 De la Cerna. That de la Cerna took out something from the vehicle
owned by Joey and forced him to point them out. He was then handcuffed by de la Cerna
and was forced again to point out to the items which were wrapped with a newspaper, then
he was brought back to the office and was detained thereat. At about 2:00 o'clock dawn he
was brought to the PNP Crime laboratory at Patag, and Joey was with them, then he was
brought back to their office. He stayed in the office for three days. They parted ways with
Joey when he was already committed at the BJMP in Lumbia. He was later informed that
the PDEA agents did it to him in exchange for Joey because Joey was arrested in Carmen.
He learned of this information from his friend who is a neighbor of Joey in Camella and
who visited him at Lumbia.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
After weighing the evidence, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC found that although the identity of the
alleged buyer, seller, and object were established, two elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were
still missing - the consideration and the payment. As testified to by 101 de la Cerna himself, he did not
bring any buy-bust money and that there was no payment of the alleged marijuana he received from
accused-appellant.8
Nevertheless, the RTC found accused-appellant liable for possession of dangerous drugs, which crime
is necessarily included in the offense charged. The RTC then disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused MICHAEL KURT JOHN
BULAWAN Y ANDALES GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense
defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, the offense proved which
is included in the offense charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for twelve [12] years and one [1] day to thirteen [13] years, and to
pay the Fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00], without subsidiary penalty
in case of insolvency.
The accused shall be entitled to be credited in full of his preventive detention and the period
of his actual incarceration shall be deducted from the number of years with which the
accused is to serve his sentence.
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused-appellant went before the Court of Appeals. After a review of the records, the appellate court
found accused-appellant guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.
Citing People v. Conception,10 the Court of Appeals held that Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
covers not only the sale of dangerous drugs but also the mere act of delivery after the offer to buy by
the entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller.11
The Court of Appeals further held that, in convicting accused-appellant of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, accused-appellant's right against double jeopardy was not violated. Citing US v.
Abijan,12 the appellate court held that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives his constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render judgment as the law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to them, and whether they are assigned as errors or not.13
SO ORDERED.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I.
II.
III.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
V.
In sum, accused-appellant argues that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt, and that
he cannot be convicted of delivery or possession of dangerous drugs when such was not charged in the
Information.16
Accused-appellant is charged, particularly, with unlawfully selling and/or offering to sell or give away
marijuana.17
For a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165; the following elements must be present: (1) the identities of the buyer and
seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. What is
material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of corpus delicti.18
In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that no sale was consummated as the consideration, much less
its receipt by accused-appellant, were not established. As testified on by 101 de la Cerna:
Pros.
Borja:
To witness, proceeding.
Q You mentioned earlier that there was a negotiation for the purchase of
P1,000.00 peso worth of marijuana, did you prepare money for that operation?
A No, sir.
Q You mean when you met the accused, there was no P1,000.00 with you?
A No, sir.
Q And you arrested him after he showed to you the marijuana?
A After he gave to me the marijuana sir.19
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Q Did you bring the money at that time?
A No, Ma'am.
Q You mean you are supposed to conduct a buybust operation, you did not bring
any money to be given to the accused?
A It is agreed upon to conduct delivery.
Q What you are trying to tell this Court therefore, is that the accused delivered
drugs without receiving first the money?
A Yes, sir.20
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
To witness.
Q There was no pre-payment prior to the agreed time of delivery?
A No Your Honor.
Q You did not also promise him that you will pay it only after the delivery?
A No, Your Honor.21
In People v. Dasigan,22 where the marked money was shown to therein accused-appellant but was not
actually given to her as she was immediately arrested when the shabu was handed over to the poseur-
buyer, the Court acquitted said accused-appellant of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Citing People v. Hong Yen E,23 the Court held therein that it is material in illegal sale of dangerous
drugs that the sale actually took place, and what consummates the buy-bust transaction is the delivery
of the drugs to the poseur-buyer and, in turn, the seller's receipt of the marked money. While the parties
may have agreed on the selling price of the shabu and delivery of payment was intended, these do not
prove consummated sale. Receipt of the marked money, whether done before delivery of the drugs or
after, is required.
In the case at bar, there is more reason to acquit accused-appellant of the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs as the prosecution was not able to prove that there was even a consideration for the
supposed transaction.
The prosecution claimed that that there was prior negotiation between the confidential informant and
accused-appellant. The prosecution, however, failed to adduce any evidence of such prior negotiation.
In fact, nothing can be gained from the records and from the testimonies of the witnesses as to how the
supposed confidential informant conducted the alleged negotiation with accused-appellant.
Repeatedly, this Court has reminded the prosecution of its duty to present a complete picture of the
buy-bust operation - "from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of sale."24
In the present case, no information was presented by the prosecution on the prior negotiation between
the confidential informant and accused-appellant. Moreover, the testimony of I01 de la Cerna failed to
show any kind of confirmation of the alleged prior negotiation. Thus, there is no proof of the offer to
purchase dangerous drugs, as well as the promise of the consideration.
Also, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti of the offense charged.
In People v. Torres,25 we held that the identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral
certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or
seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit. In this regard,
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R. A. No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards
for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.26
However, this Court has also said that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it
is not "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important factor is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.27cralawred
In the case at bar, the chain of custody of the seized alleged marijuana was not sufficiently established,
thereby casting doubt on the identity and integrity of the supposed evidence.28
The foregoing is I01 dela Cerna's testimony on the handling of the seized alleged marijuana:
Q And you mentioned about marijuana, if that marijuana be shown to you, will you be
able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which I am showing to you this marijuana leaves wrapped in a magazine paper, is
this the one you said delivered to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q And why do you say that this is the one?
A I put marking on it.
Q Where did you place the marking?
A At the left portion sir.
Q Where did you make the marking?
A At the office sir.
That is all that was said as regards the handling of the seized item. The prosecution failed to prove that
the identity and integrity of the seized item was preserved - whether it was kept by I01 dela Cerna from
the time accused-appellant allegedly handed it to him until the time he marked it in the office, whether
I01 dela Cerna turned it over to his superior as is the usual procedure, whether it was returned to I01
dela Cerna for it to be brought to the crime laboratory, whether the specimen was intact when the crime
laboratory received it, whether the crime laboratory officers marked and sealed the seized item after it
was tested, and whether the proper officers observed the mandated precautions in preserving the
identity and integrity of the seized item until it was presented in open court.
On the contrary, what we can deduce from I01 dela Cerna's testimony is the fact that the seized item
was not placed in a plastic container and sealed upon confiscation. As sworn to by PSI Erma Condino
Salvacion, the forensic chemist who conducted the laboratory test on the seized item, what she tested
were "suspected Marijuana leaves wrapped in a magazine paper with markings 'RDC-D'."29 Also, when
the said item was presented in open court for identification, it was still wrapped in magazine paper.30
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over a supervising
officer, who would then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it
is unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand a number of times, it is
imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the suspect to place his marking
on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be
removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. At the trial, the officer can then
identify the seized substance and the procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until it
reaches the crime laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal the
same.In this way the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition
it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician tests and verifies the
nature of the substance in the container, he should put his own mark on the plastic container
and seal it again with a new seal since the police officer's seal has been broken. At the trial,
the technician can then describe the sealed condition of the plastic container when it was
handed to him and testify on the procedure he took afterwards to preserve its integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would have to
present every police officer, messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the
entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly one's possession has been. Each of them has
to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or substituted
while in his care. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, as the seized substance was not sealed, the prosecution should have presented all the
officers who handled said evidence from the time it left the person of the accused to the time it was
presented in open court. The prosecution did not.
Time and again, this Court has held that "the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the
integrity of the seized items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is
enough to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused, x x x A conviction cannot be sustained
if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug."33
On a final note, in People v. Maongco34 we clarified that possession is necessarily included in the sale
of dangerous drugs. Thus:
Well-settled in jurisprudence that the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs necessarily
includes the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The same ruling may also be
applied to the other acts penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
because for the accused to be able to trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit, or transport any dangerous drug, he must necessarily
be in possession of said drugs.35
In the present case, however, as the prosecution failed to establish every link in the chain of custody of
the subject dangerous drugs, thus compromising its identity and integrity, accused-appellant cannot be
held liable for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the appeal. The Court ACQUITS accused-appellant
Michael Kurt John Bulawan y Andales and ORDERS his immediate release from detention, unless he
is detained for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlib
G.R. No. 210454
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
RONALDO CASACOP y AMIL, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 10 July 2013 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 05055 affirming the conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch
93 of appellant Ronaldo Casacop y Amil for violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
Appellant was charged with the crime following a "buy-bust" operation. The accusatory portion of the
Information against appellant reads:
Criminal Case No. 5485-SPL
On July 21, 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court the said above-named accused not being authorized/permitted by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody dangerous
drugs paraphernalia such as one (1) rolled aluminum foil strip and one (1) improvised "tooter," both
positive of traces 'shabu' .2
Criminal Case No. 5486-SPL
On July 21, 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court above-named accused without the authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) small
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE,
commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of zero point nineteen (0.19) gram.3
Criminal Case No. 5487-SPL
On July 21, 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused without any legal authority, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously in consideration of three (3) pieces one-hundred peso bill, sell,
pass and deliver to a police poseur-buyer one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE weighing zero point zero six (0.06) gram.4
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Acting on a tip from an informant that a. certain Edong was selling shabu in Quezon Street, Barangay
San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna, the Chief of Police of San Pedro Police Station, Police
Superintendent Sergio Dimandal formed a team to conduct surveillance on appellant. Upon receiving a
positive result, Senior Police Officer 4 Melchor Dela Peña (SP04 Dela Pefia) prepared a pre-operation
report which was sent to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).5
SP04 Dela Peña then formed a buy-bust team composed of Police Officer I Jifford Signap (POI Signap)
as the poseur-buyer, SPO2 Diosdado Fernandez, SPOI Jorge Jacob and POI Rommel Bautista, as police
backup. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. POI Signap and the informant
approached appellant's house. POI Signap was introduced to appellant by the informant as the buyer
of shabu. He handed the marked money, consisting of three (3) Pl00.00 bills, to appellant, who took a
plastic sachet from his left pocket and gave it to him. PO1 Signap made the prearranged signal of
calling SP04 Dela Peña. The backup team rushed towards appellant's house and arrested him. PO1
Signap frisked appellant and recovered an improvised glass tooter, aluminum foil strip, cigarette lighter
two (2) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, and the marked money. POI Signap conducted a
physical inventory of the seized items and correspondingly marked them in appellant's house.6
Thereafter, appellant was brought to the police station. Thereat, SPO4 Dela Peña prepared a certificate
of inventory.7 A request letter8 was sent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime lab.oratory for
the examination of the seized items. Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas issued Chemistry Report
No. D-808-059 which confirmed the seized items as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
Appellant, for his part, denied the charges of possession of shabu and its paraphernalia and sale
of shabu. Appellant testified that he was urinating at the back of his house on 21 July 2005 at around
12:00 pm when five (5) police officers barged into his house. After confirming that he is Edong,
appellant was handcuffed and brought to the police station. Appellant claimed that the police only
planted evidence against him because they were not able to pin him down in a robbery case.
On 7 January 2011, the R TC rendered a Decision10 finding appellant guilty of all the charges against
him. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment:
1) Finding accused Ronaldo Casacop y Amil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case No. 5485-SPL, hereby sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years as minimum to four (4) years as maximum, to
pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs.
2) Finding accused Ronalda Casacop y Amil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case No. 5486-SPL, hereby
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15)
years as maximum and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.
3) Finding accused Ronalda Casacop y Amil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation 'Of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case No. 5487-SPL, and hereby sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos and to pay the costs.
The drugs paraphernalia such as one (1) rolled aluminum foil strip and one (1) improvised "tooter", the
0.19 and 0.06 grams (sic) of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "shabu" which constitutes the
instrument in the commission of the crime is confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government. The
Branch Clerk qf Court of this Court is hereby directed to immediately transmit the drugs paraphernalia
such as one (1) rolled aluminum strip and one (1) improvised "tooter", the 0.19 and 0.06 grams (sic) of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "shabu" to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.11
Appellant seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals. On 10 July 2013, the
appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC.
Appellant appealed his conviction before this Court, adopting the same arguments in his Brief12 before
the Court of Appeals.1âwphi1
Appellant asserts that the chain of custody of the object evidence was never established. Moreover,
appellant claims that Section 2l(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 was
not complied with.
For the successful prosecution of a case for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.13 On the other hand, in prosecuting a case for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of
an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.14
In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were established. PO1 Signap, the poseur-
buyer, positively identified appellant as the person who sold him the white crystalline substance in one
plastic sachet which was later proven to be positive for shabu. In exchange for this plastic sachet; PO1
Signap handed the marked money as payment. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and
the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.15
All the elements in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs and paraphernalia were
likewise established. Found in appellant's pocket after he was caught in flagrante were two (2) more
plastic sachets containing shabu, an improvised glass tooter containing shabu residue and the rolled
aluminum foil with shabu residue. Under Rule 126, Section 13, a person lawfully arrested may be
s,earched for anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a warrant. There was no showing that appellant had legal authority to possess the shabu and its
paraphernalia. Moreover, the fact that these contraband were found in his physical possession shows
that he freely and consciously possessed them.
The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
in sustaining a conviction under R.A. No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved. 16
Records show that PO1 Signap recovered from appellant three (3) plastic sachets of shabu, a glass
tooter and aluminum foil. These items were marked and inventoried in the house of appellant and in his
presence. Thereafter, these seized items were brought to the police station where a request for
qualitative examination was made. SPO4 Dela Peña signed the request and it was sent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory. Police Senior Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas conducted the
examination. Thus, the chain of custody was clearly accounted for.
As the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to establish the corpus
delicti were proven, substantial compliance with Section 21, paragraph I, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
will suffice.
The Court of Appeals successfully rebutted appellant's argument that the police officers failed to
comply with procedure in the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs, thus:
Appellant contends that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of paragraph I, Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs. This
cotention is untenable. It appears from the testimony of PO1 Signap during direct and cross-
examination, as appreciated and contained in the decision of the court a quo, that after PO1 Signap
showed the three (3) marked one hundred peso (Pl00.00) bills, appellant brought out a plastic Sachet
containing white crystalline substance which was later found out to contain "shabu," a dangerous drug.
Two (2) more plastic sachets containing "shabu" and other drug paraphernalia were recovered from
appellant after he was bodily searched. Thereafter, the apprehending team, before proceeding to the
Police Station, had the seized drugs and drug paraphernalia inventoried and marked at appellant's house
in his presence. At the said station, SPO4 Dela Pena prepared a Certification of Inventory as to the
items seized from appellant. The said certification was signed by one representative from the media by
the name of Edward Pelayo. A Booking Sheet/ Arrest Report was issued to appellant and a letter
request was sent to the PNP, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba City, Crime Laboratory Office for
examination of the seized plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance.17
All told, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant sold and
possessed shabu and shabu paraphernalia. Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of
life imprisonment to death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to Pl0,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species
of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved. For the crime of illegal sale
of shabu, appellant was properly sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.
Appellant was also caught in possession of 0.19 gram of shabu. The crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs is punished under Section 11, paragraph 2(3), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which
provides an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00),
if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who unless authorized by law,
shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and any other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
We sustain the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the crime of
illegal possession of shabu.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 10 July 2013 of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of
appellant Ronaldo Casacop y Amil by the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, for
violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed,
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118,
the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining.
It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in
criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law,
R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only
possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by
case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of
paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No.
191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the
relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve
an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for
the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional
because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever
warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the
Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to
declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that
such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this
judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26,
2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA
BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
III.
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and
no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's
rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was
granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this
power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to
be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface.
In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme
Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953
which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July
4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the
disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court
during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain
that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any
attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is
the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of
Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary
by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so
with the Executive. x x x.22
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making
authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing
scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions
by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the
Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and
more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers
debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was
an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the
said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner
Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the
National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee
members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may
repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court"
and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present
lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article
VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the
Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected
an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of
the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have
rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon.
Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from
Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 -
Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from
the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following:
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2,
Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this
plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was
substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will
promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but
before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects
of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Upon arraignment, Hirang entered a plea of not guilty. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. 5
Version of the Prosecution
The private complainants are minor victims of Hirang in his prostitution activities. The following
persons testified for the prosecution: victims DDD, AAA, CCC and BBB, International Justice Mission
(UM) Investigators Alvin Sarmiento (Sarmiento) and Jeffrey Villagracia (Villagracia), National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator (SI) Menandro Cariaga (Cariaga), SI Anson L. Chumacera
and forensic chemist Loren J. Briones. 6
AAA was born on November 25, 1989. She was only 16 years old when Hirang recruited her in August
of 2006 as a sex worker, for which she was paid ₱1,000.00 per day, less Hirang's commission of
₱200.00. She was later prodded to work as a sexy dancer and prostitute at the Catwalk Club along
Quezon Avenue. She joined her customers in their tables at the club, and gave sexual services in hotels.
She left the club after two nights, upon her live-in partner's order. Still, Hirang sourced several other
prostitution jobs for AAA. He convinced AAA to work in a cybersex den in Muñoz, Quezon City. She
received ₱700.00 a month, less ₱200.00 commission received by Hirang. In September 2006, Hirang
made AAA work again as a sexy dancer at Philippine Village bar in Puerto Galera. AAA had to quit her
job when she got pregnant, but resumed work for Hirang after she gave birth.7
CCC was born on December 19, 1992. She was 14 years old when she was recruited by Hirang for his
illicit activities. She met Hirang at the house of Ka Lolet, her best friend's mother. She knew Hirang to
be scouting young girls who could be traded for sex. Sometime in June 2007, Hirang asked CCC to go
with him and meet some Koreans. 8
DDD, who was born on February 11, 1991, was 16 years old when she ran away from home in 2007
and stayed at a friend's house in Sta. Ana, Taguig City. As she was then in need of money, she accepted
an offer from one Ate Lolet, a pimp, that she be introduced to a male customer, with whom she had
sexual intercourse for ₱2,500.00. It was Ate Lolet who later introduced DDD to Hirang.9
BBB was born on March 28, 1990. CCC is her younger sister. She was 17 years old when on June 27,
2007, she visited CCC at Ka Lolet's house. There she saw Hirang, who invited her to come with him in
meeting some Koreans that evening. Later in the evening, at around 8:00 p.m., BBB went back to the
house of Ka Lo let to meet Hirang. It was then on June 27, 2007 that Hirang sold BBB, along with
AAA, CCC and DDD, to his Korean customers for sexual activities. Hirang told his victims that they
would receive ₱5,000.00 after a "gimik" 10 with them. At around 10:00 p.m., their group proceeded to
meet with the Koreans at Chowking restaurant, C-5 in Taguig City. Hirang instructed the girls to tell the
Koreans that they were 16 years of age, as this was their customers' preference. 11
When their group arrived at Chowking, Hirang talked to a Korean and then introduced the girls to him.
The Korean handed money to Hirang and as the latter was counting it, NBI agents arrived at the scene
and announced a raid. NBI agents arrested Hirang, while a social worker approached the girls and
brought them to the NBI for their statements. 12
The raid was conducted following a prior investigation conducted by IJM, a non-profit organization
that renders legal services and is based in Washington, D.C. IJM's investigators Sarmiento and
Villagracia gathered data on human trafficking in Metro Manila, after information that Hirang was
selling minors for prostitution. Hirang was introduced by a confidential informant to Villagracia, who
posed as a travel agency employee having Korean friends. Villagracia claimed to have Korean friends
as they knew Hirang to be transacting only with foreign customers. 13
Hirang and Villagracia first agreed to meet on June 20, 2007 at Chowking restaurant along C-5 Road in
Taguig City. Villagracia introduced Hirang to Sarmiento, who introduced himself as Korean national
studying English in Manila. Hirang informed Sarmiento that he had with him AAA, who was good in
bed, only 15 years old and could perform any sexual position, for a fee of ₱20,000.00. Sarmiento,
however, told Hirang that he and his other Korean friends had other plans for the night. Hirang
demanded a cancellation fee of ₱1,500.00 and scheduled another meeting with Sarmiento and the other
Koreans on June 26, 2007. 14
Thereafter, IJM submitted a report to the NBI-Field Office Division, and asked for the agency's
investigative assistance and operation against Hirang. On June 26, 2007, IJM and NBI operatives
agreed during a conference that they would conduct an entrapment operation on June 27, 2007.
Sarmiento reset his meeting with Hirang to June 27, 2007. Hirang initially got mad, but was appeased
after Sarmiento promised to give a bonus of ₱20,0000.00. Cariaga prepared the marked money to be
used during the entrapment, and was tasked to be the driver of poseur-customer Sarmiento. Several
other NBI and IJM agents served as back-up during the operation, in case any untoward incident should
happen. 15
On June 27, 2007, the entrapment was conducted with proper coordination with local authorities. A
social worker from the Deartment of Social Welfare and Development and members of the media for
the segment XXX of ABS-CBN Channel 2 joined the operation. Villagracia secretly recorded his
conversation with Hirang. 16
Hirang introduced AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD to Sarmiento, who feigned his desire to pursue the
transaction. Hirang specified the sexual services that the girls could offer, and assured Sarmiento that
the girls could fulfill their customers' sexual fantasies. 17 Sarmiento then handed to Hirang a fictitious
check amounting to ₱20,000.00, while Cariaga handed the ₱7,000.00 marked money. As Hirang was
counting the cash, he complained that the amount was not enough as he charged ₱20,000.00 per girl,
plus bonus. At this point, Cariaga performed the pre-arranged signal with NBI operatives, who declared
the entrapment operation and arrested Hirang. An ultraviolet dust examination later performed upon
Hirang rendered positive result for fluorescent powder specks. 18
Version of the Defense
Hirang and his mother Myrna Hirang (Myrna) testified for the defense.
Hirang claimed to be self-employed, selling longganisa and other wares for a living. He denied dealing
with sexual trade. It was upon the instigation of Villagracia, who was introduced to him by his friend
Jun Valentin (Valentin), that he agreed to bring the girls for the supposed Korean clients. Hirang
described Villagracia as a drug addict who frequently visited Valentin's house for pot sessions.
Villagracia told Hirang that he knew of Koreans looking for girls and were willing to pay ₱20,000.00 to
₱25,000.00 for each girl who must be 13 to 14 years old. 19
On June 20, 2007, Hirang, Valentin and two girls went to meet up with Villagracia at Chowking in C-5
Road, but the Koreans cancelled the transaction. Villagracia was disappointed that the girls brought by
Hirang were already 23 years old. They agreed to meet again, but Villagracia reminded Hirang to bring
young girls next time. Hirang promised to do so, and then received ₱500.00 from Villagracia.20
When they later talked again over the telephone, Villagracia advised Hirang to convince the Koreans to
hire the girls so that Hirang and Valentin could receive the ₱5,000.00 commission per girl. Another
Korean promised to give a bonus of ₱10,000.00 if Hirang could provide young girls. Since Hirang
claimed to have no girls for the service, he went to the house of Ka Lolet with whom he had previously
transacted whenever he needed girls for sexual services. Ka Lolet provided BBB, CCC and DDD,
while Hirang personally talked to AAA. Hirang and Ka Lolet agreed to give each girl ₱5,000.00, while
a ₱5,000.00 commission for each girl would be divided among him, Ka Lolet, Villagracia and
Valentin.21
Hirang and Villagracia met again on June 26, 2007 at Valentin's house. Villagracia reminded Hirang
that the girls should be young. He also gave instructions on the dresses that the girls should wear during
their meeting. On the evening of June 27, 2007, Hirang went to Ka Lolet's house and from there,
brought the girls to Chowking in C-5 Road on board a van provided by Ka Lolet. One Korean national
gave Hirang money for their food. As their order was being served at the restaurant, NBI operatives
approached Hirang and arrested him. 22
In her testimony, defense witness Myrna claimed knowing Villagracia, as the latter frequently talked to
Hirang over the cellphone. There were times that she answered Villagracia's calls, and the latter
introduced himself as a friend of Hirang with whom he had an arrangement. 23
Ruling of the RTC
On June 25, 2011, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station rendered its
Decision24 convicting Hirang of the crime of human trafficking. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, [HIRANG] is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Section 6 of [R.A.] No. 9208 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos (Php2,000,000.00).
SO ORDERED.25
Feeling aggrieved, Hirang appealed26 to the CA based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING [HIRANG'S] DEFENSE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE CONFLICTING
AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [HIRANG'S] RIGHTS
UNDER [R.A.] NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED,
DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE VIOLATED.27
Ruling of the CA
The CA denied the appeal via a Decision28 dated March 9, 2015, with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 25, 2011 of the [RTC] of Pasig City,
Branch 163, Taguig City Station in Criminal Case No. 135682 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.29
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
xxxx
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen
(18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.
(c) Prostitution - refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the use of a
person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money,
profit or any other consideration.
In People v. Casio,33 the Court defined the elements of trafficking in persons, as derived from the
aforequoted Section 3(a), to wit:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without
the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders";
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another"; and
The information filed against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of the
minor victims for sexual activities and exploitation, with the offender taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the young girls through the guarantee of a good time and financial gain. Pursuant to
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was
committed in a large scale and his four victims were under 18 years of age.
The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who testified during
the trial.1âwphi1The young victims themselves testified on their respective ages, and how they were
lured by Hirang to participate in the latter's illicit sex trade. Hirang recruited the girls to become
victims of sexual abuse and exploitation. Mainly upon a promise of financial benefit, the girls agreed
and, thus, joined him on June 27, 2007 in meeting with the Korean customers in search for prostitutes.
Police authorities personally, witnessed Hirang's unlawful activity, as they conducted the entrapment
operations and arrested him after Hirang transacted with the supposed customers and received payment
therefor.
Hirang still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were conflicting
and improbable. Such alleged inconsistencies pertained to the supposed participation of Ka Lolet in the
recruitment of the victims, how the IJM agents came to personally know of Hirang, and other incidents
that involved prior surveillance and the entrapment operation itself. It is evident, however, that the
supposed inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies pertained to minor details that, in any case, could
not negate Hirang's unlawful activity and violation of R.A. No. 9208. Moreover, the Court has ruled
time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be
given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by
the trial court and affirmed by the CA. 35
Hirang argued that he was merely instigated to commit the offense, but even such defense deserves
scant consideration.1âwphi1 It has been established by the prosecution that Hirang has been engaged in
the illegal activities leading young women to prostitution, and the police officers merely employed
means for his capture. Trafficking of women was his habitual trade; he was merely entrapped by
authorities.36 Entrapment is an acceptable means to capture a wrongdoer. In People v. Bartolome,37the
Court distinguished between entrapment and instigation, as it explained:
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for
the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their
agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would
otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or
design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement
officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the
accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the
accused will have to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been
said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent" while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary
criminal."38
In this case, it was established during trial that Hirang had been recruiting and deploying young girls
for customers in the sex trade. The IJM personnel approached him for girls precisely because of his
illicit activities. Also, Hirang was not first approached for prostitutes by police or government
authorities, but by investigators of IJM, which is a non-profit and non-governmental organization. IJM
only sought coordination with the police officers after Hirang, Sarmiento and Villagracia had
determined to meet on June 27, 2007 for the transaction with the purported Korean customers. Clearly,
there could be no instigation by officers, as barred by law, to speak of.
Even as the Court considers the alleged failure of the apprehending police officers to inform Hirang of
the Miranda rights upon his arrest, there is no sufficient ground for the Court to acquit him. The CA
correctly explained that any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured by his voluntary act of
entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the issue.39 In People v. Vasquez,40the
Court held:
[T]he Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated
in People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before
the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information
against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of
their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.
x x x. 41 (Citations omitted)
Given the foregoing, there is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse Hirang's conviction for qualified
trafficking under R.A. No. 9208. The RTC and CA correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment
and fine of ₱2,000,000.00, applying Section 10(c) of R.A. No. 9208, to wit:
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and sanctions are hereby established for
the offenses enumerated in this Act:
xxxx
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not
more than Five million pesos (5,000,000.00)[.]
Damages in favor of the victims should, however, also be awarded. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,42 each victim is entitled to ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. This is supported by Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
xxxx
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse, thereby justifying the award of
moral damages. When the crime is aggravated, the award of exemplary damages is also justified.43
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 9, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05129 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that victims AAA,
BBB, CCC and DDD are each entitled to ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Lolita was advised to file a complaint with the police regarding her ordeal in Malaysia. On August 2,
2005, at past 9:00 o’clock in the morning, Lolita Plando went to Zamboanga Police Office at Gov. Lim
Avenue to file her complaint. x x x
In her Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"; "1-A"-Lalli), Hadja Jarma Lalli admitted that she met Lolita Plando
on June 6, 2005 on board M/V Mary Joy while the said vessel was at sea on its way to Sandakan,
Malaysia. The meeting was purely coincidental. By coincidence also, Hadja Jarma, Nestor Relampagos
and Lolita Plando boarded the same van for Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Upon arrival, they parted ways.
They did not see each other anymore at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She did not know what happened to
them. She went to Kota Kinabalu to visit his son-in-law. She denied having recruited Lolita Plando for
employment abroad (Exh. "1"; "1-A"). x x x
xxx
Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary
Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3,
testified that Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not
only for herself but also for other women passengers.
xxx
Ronnie Aringoy submitted the Affidavit of his witness Rachel Cañete (Exh. "2") and the
Joint Affidavits of witnesses Mercedita Salazar and Estrella Galgan. Rachel Canete
declared that Lolita Plando whom she knows as Cristine Plando worked as a GRO (guest
relation officer) and massage attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor, that Lolita
Plando has four children sired by different men; and that she knows for a fact that Lolita
Plando has been going to and from Malaysia to work in bars. When she testified in court,
Rachel did not present other evidence to substantiate her allegations. Mercedita Salazar and
Estrella Galgan declared in their Joint Affidavit that Lolita Plando who is known to them as
Marife Plando was their co-worker as massage attendant and GRO (guest relation officer)
at Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke bar where she used the names Gina Plando and
Cristine Plando. She worked in the said establishment for nine months from February to
October 2002. She has four children from four different men. No other evidence was
submitted in court to prove their assertions.4
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated
February 10, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners
from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent Order 2 dated April 21, 1997 denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor
Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was
denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995
which was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SAPAGKA’T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo’t higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYA’T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala
A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng
lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito
sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalo’t higit ang Lotto;
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent
Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1)
a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from
implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal
Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order
annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Defendants, their agents and representatives are hereby enjoined
from implementing or enforcing resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan ng Laguna prohibiting the operation of the lotto in the province of Laguna.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated April
21, 1997, which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna, thru counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiff’s counsel and the comment
thereto filed by counsel for the defendants which were duly noted, the Court hereby denies the motion
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were committed by
the respondent trial court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
II
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial
Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It
is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government’s police power under the General Welfare
Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. 6 They also
maintain that respondent’s lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the
local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections
2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. 7cralaw : red
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the
power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and
permitted its operations around the country. 8 As for the allegation that no prior consultations and
approval were sought from the sangguniang panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent Calvento contends
this is not mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-
executing provision of the Local Government Code of 1991. 9 He also states that his operation of the
lotto system is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had been granted
a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress. 10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of
Laguna has no power to prohibit a form of gambling which has been authorized by the national
government. 11 He argues that this is based on the principle that ordinances should not contravene
statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of the national government. The local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. This being
the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be permitted is for
Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the
PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of
authority, the province’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by
preventing something already allowed by Congress.
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor’s permit based thereon are valid; and
(2) whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto
system can be operated in a given local government unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor’s permit for the
operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private Respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision
on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance,
however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement
on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to
prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much
when they stated in their petition that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The Resolution is a
policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection
to the operation of and/or all forms of gambling including the Lotto operation in the Province of
Laguna. 12
As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.
This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the
national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of
Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a
franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. The pertinent provision reads:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. — The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and
providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national
character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One
thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in such
frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be
promulgated by the Board of Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government
deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local
government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated
otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may
not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel v. Virac, 13 ordinances
should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as
elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. 14chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so
great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the state,
and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing
Clinton v. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different
conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local
government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution),
which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still
the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. 15
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted
to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central
authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization." It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in
imperio." 16chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of
Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto
in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit
concerned. The Board’s enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the
national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of
Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the
setting up of lotto outlets around the country. These provisions state:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people’s organizations,
and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a
project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the
national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c)
and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof. 17 Section 26
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It
shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing
or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution,
climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover,
and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or
program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological
balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects
thereof.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and
programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may
cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable
resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain
animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for
the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.
Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of
Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought
on their part. There is no indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for
his refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions of
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or
implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That
resolution expresses merely a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding
legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent
mayor’s refusal to issue the permit sought by private respondent in connection with a legitimate
business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
2. Id. at 21.
4. Rollo, p. 20.
5. Id. at 21.
6. Id. at 13.
II
III
notarized separately; there is even no evidence on record that the sellers of the property transacted
separately with him. He points out that the corporate officers of AFP-RSBS, especially its President, do
not personally deal with any of the sellers. The bare fact that he executed the bilateral deeds of sale and
that the project was approved by the higher level of the management, cannot lead to the conclusion that
he took part in the implementation of the transactions.
Petitioner maintains that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or excess of jurisdiction in filing the charges against him. He insists that the delictual acts contained in
the two Informations, Criminal Case No. 28022 (for violation of R.A. 3019) and Criminal Case No.
28023 (for estafa through falsification of public document), are one and the same; to charge him under
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 despite his indictment for estafa is to duplicate the very same charge under
another name, which under the principle of double jeopardy, is proscribed. He further argues that while
it is true that, in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the charge against him for said crime is "in addition" to his
criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code, the phrase connotes cumulativeness and simultaneity
of liability.
Petitioner points out that the panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors recommended the filing of only one
count of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, but the Ombudsman filed five (5) counts thereof.
The issues are the following: (1) whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against petitioner for estafa
through falsification of public document and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; (2)
whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
finding probable cause against petitioner for the issuance of warrants for petitioner’s arrest without first
conducting a hearing; (3) whether petitioner may be charged and prosecuted for five (5) counts of
estafa thru falsification of public documents; and (4) whether petitioner may be prosecuted for both
estafa through falsification of a public document and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
without violating his right against double jeopardy.
The petition has no merit.
On the first issue, the rule is that as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the
determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter,
is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is empowered to
determine, in the exercise of his discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person
believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. Whether or not the Ombudsman has correctly
discharged his function, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct assessment of the evidence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court may not be compelled to pass upon.
As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory power, exercised through the
Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable
cause, 32 except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. In such case, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. 33 Indeed, if the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration in the
determination of probable cause, there is abuse of discretion. 34 As we ruled in Mendoza-Arce v.
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), 35 a writ of certiorari may issue in any of the following instances:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground
has been denied. 36
In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to charge him with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for estafa through falsification of a public document.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s claim that there is no probable cause on record for the filing of the
Information against him. It bears stressing that probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. It implies probability of guilt and
requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify conviction. 37 The
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against petitioner is buttressed by his encompassing and
comprehensive resolution, independent of the findings of the Senate Committees, as well as the
documents appended to the Informations. Petitioner’s bare claim to the contrary cannot prevail over
such positive findings of the Ombudsman. In fine, the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause prevails over petitioner’s bare allegations of grave abuse of discretion; that he was not
involved in the step-by-step consummation of the anomalous transaction; and that as President he was
involved only in the top level policy formulation and implementation.
It is true that in the Joint Resolution dated March 30, 2001, the Panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors found
no sufficient evidence that petitioner acted in bad faith and that he merely relied on the
recommendations of his subordinates. However, after a thorough investigation, another panel of
Ombudsman Prosecutors found that, indeed, petitioner not merely relied on the recommendations of his
subordinates but likewise perpetrated overt acts, which, along with those of the other accused, resulted
in the consummation of the crimes charged. Thus, as maintained by the respondents in their Comment
on the petition, petitioner signed documents, indicating his evident bad faith on the highly anomalous
transactions; petitioner was aware of the forgeries and anomalies in the buying of the parcels of land,
yet gave his conformity thereto, causing grave injury to its members and to the public in general. Thus,
it was also found that petitioner, together with his cohorts, conspired to perpetuate clear fraud on the
government and the AFP-RSBS members by giving a semblance of regularity to real estate acquisitions
at bloated prices.
The fact alone that petitioner was aware, in each transaction, that the two (2) deeds of sale contain
contradictory costs for every acquisition, and that he failed to rectify the same eloquently speak of his
participation in the criminal malevolence. He was a member of the Investment Committee of the AFP-
RSBS, which screened potential investments, that were thereafter subjected to further screening and
approval by the Executive Committee of which he was also a member; hence, petitioner had full
knowledge of the transactions, from the time they were conceptualized until the properties were paid
for. The records show that the Tanauan, Batangas properties alone were overpriced by about 600%.
Thus, petitioner consented to the crimes charged by the following overt acts:
(1) Petitioner and his co-accused prepared or caused to be prepared two (2) deeds of sale covering the
same transactions: a deed of sale with the seller or sellers as the sole signatory or signatories therein
(unilateral deeds); and a deed of sale with the seller or sellers and the buyer, AFP-RSBS, represented by
petitioner (bilateral deeds);
(2) The considerations in the unilateral deeds of sale and the bilateral deeds of sale did not tally,
notwithstanding the fact that they covered the same subject matter and transaction, with the bilateral
deeds of sale bearing a bloated price; and,
(3) Of these two deeds, the unilateral deeds of sale bore the correct value given to the seller(s) as
evinced, among others, by the fact that the same were the ones registered with the Registry of Deeds.
The bilateral deeds of sale could not possibly be the basis of the transfer of the properties because the
supporting bilateral deeds carried dates much later than the date of issue of the titles, which were
likewise not filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Registry of Deeds of Tanauan,
Batangas. The Court cannot supplant the findings of the Ombudsman that the unilateral deeds of sale
were prepared by the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS, in as much as both the unilateral and bilateral
deeds of sale have exactly the same print and form. The residence certificate number of petitioner
which is indicated in the bilateral deeds of sale is likewise printed in the unilateral deeds. Petitioner’s
fraudulent intent is further proven by the fact that the Status of Transaction Form (STF), where the
subject lots were endorsed for payment, bore his signature. The unilateral deeds of sale resulted in the
issuance of the titles, which were also the supporting documents enumerated in the STF. In many
instances, the bilateral deeds of sale carry dates much later than the dates their corresponding titles
were issued.
Petitioner was likewise unable to establish his claim that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. His bare claim that the
Sandiganbayan merely relied on the Memoranda of the Panel of Prosecutors to the Ombudsman and
did not scrutinize the evidence appended thereto is not supported by the records. In the first place, the
Sandiganbayan is presumed to have performed its duty as provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which can likewise be gleaned from its February 22, 2005 Resolution:
[1] While accused Ramiscal is correct in stating that this Court, in determining the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused, had evaluated the
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and its supporting documents, he is, however, wrong in
presuming that such process failed to consider the evidence the accused adduced during preliminary
investigation. It should be noted that the supporting documents submitted by the Office of the
Ombudsman to this Court included, among others, the counter-affidavits submitted by the accused at
the preliminary investigation. Parenthetically, there is no need, and the rules do not require this Court,
to enumerate in detail what were the supporting documents it considered in determining the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest because the same are matters of record that
the parties can easily verify. 38
We agree with the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require
cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the
accused before any warrant may be issued. Section 6, Rule 112 mandates the judge to personally
evaluate the resolution of the Prosecutor (in this case, the Ombudsman) and its supporting evidence,
and if he/she finds probable cause, a warrant of arrest or commitment order may be issued within 10
days from the filing of the complaint or Information; in case the Judge doubts the existence of probable
cause, the prosecutor may be ordered to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice.
The provision reads in full:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or
a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation
or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint of information. 39
The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge
must determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayan’s
determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge
should not be stymied and distracted from his determination of probable cause by needless motions for
determination of probable cause filed by the accused.
We hold that petitioner likewise failed to establish his claim that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of authority in denying his motion to quash the Information.
First. The anti-graft court correctly ruled that it has jurisdiction over the crimes charged.
In People v. Sandiganbayan 40 and Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 41 this Court ruled that the AFP-
RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in the nature of public
funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees or
managers of government owned or controlled corporations. 42 Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, whether simple or complexed with other crimes. 43
As gleaned from the material averments of the Information in Criminal Case No. 28023, the charge
against petitioner is estafa through falsification of public document in the performance of his duties and
in relation to his position as president of the AFP-RSBS.
Second. On petitioner’s claim that he should be charged with only one count of estafa through
falsification of public document instead of five (5) charges, respondents counter that the criminal acts
petitioner and his co-accused are not continuous crimes. Respondents argue that a continuous crime
may exist only if there is only a single criminal intent and the commission of diverse acts is merely a
partial execution of said single criminal resolution. In the instant cases, the requirement of singularity
of criminal intent does not exist because there are as many criminal intents as there are anomalous
transactions, causing grave damage to the government at each instance. There was no need for the
accused to perform another or other delictual acts to consummate the felony. Respondents maintain that
petitioner was motivated by separate intents as he signed each document, all of which are criminal in
character; hence, it is but proper that corresponding Informations be filed against him for each and
every act of falsification committed.
The Sandiganbayan, for its part, sustained the contention of respondents and ruled that the
determination of (a) the charge/s and the person/s against whom the charge is filed are addressed to the
sound discretion of the Prosecutors based on the facts before them; and (b) the crimes committed by
petitioner are separate, and not a single crime consisting of series of acts arising from a single criminal
resolution. Thus:
In the first place, the question of the number of criminal charges that must be instituted against a
criminal respondent (whether one count or multiple counts of the same offense) is one addressed to the
sound discretion of the prosecution service. It is enough, as this Court has already ruled, that the
informations filed in these cases are based on facts establishing probable cause for the offenses
charged. This Court will not compel the Office of the Ombudsman to file only one information for
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents when its preliminary investigation established the
commission of several counts thereof as such action on the part of this Court would constitute undue
interference with the Office of the Ombudsman’s control over the prosecution of these cases.
In the second place, this Court is not persuaded that what is involved in these cases is a continuous
crime, that is to say, a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal
resolution or intent not susceptible of division, with each act in that series being merely the partial
execution of a single delict. On the contrary, the Court is of the view that what is involved herein are
several completed and distinct purported criminal acts which should be prosecuted as multiple counts
of the same type of offense. Thus, as correctly perceived by the prosecution, there are as many alleged
offenses as there are alleged anomalous transactions involved in these cases. 44
When required to comment on the motion of petitioner and his co- accused for a consolidation of the
charges filed against them before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Prosecutor objected thereto, insisting
that there were as many crimes committed by the accused as there were sales contracts forged by them.
Indeed, the determination of what charges to file and who are to be charged are matters addressed to the
discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter of whether the crime perpetrated by petitioner and
his co-accused under the Informations pending in the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan constitute delito
continuado or classified as concurso de
delitos; or involve separate crimes under the category of concurso real delito involve factual
issues. 45 Such factual issues should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The
Court is being tasked to determine whether the several sales contracts executed by petitioner and his
co-accused were set afoot or triggered by a single impulse and operated by an uninterrupted force
however long a time it may occupy, which, however, is a matter best left to the determination of the
trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan. 46
Thus, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is hardly the
appropriate remedy and forum for petitioner to ventilate the issues he has raised, as only jurisdictional
issues can be resolved therein. As eloquently expressed by Justice Florenz D. Regalado, speaking for
this Court in Iligan v. Court of Appeals: 47
If, as petitioners seem to apprehend, the adverse actions of two lower courts could create a scenario of
multiple prosecutions for the same offense or, more candidly expressed, of double jeopardy, then this is
neither the procedural stage nor the proper occasion to pass upon that possibility. For, squarely
imputable to petitioners is the evident lack of factual basis for and a grossly defective presentation of
that issue for this Court to rule thereon in this proceeding and at this time. 48
It must be stressed that our disposition of the matters in the present recourse will not foreclose
petitioner’s right to ventilate the same in the Sandiganbayan, for as declared in Iligan:
However, this observation would not foreclose relief to petitioners if at the trial of this case the
evidence presented and the developments therein suffice to establish the supervening fact that indeed
there could possibly be a breach of the rule of double jeopardy. Under Section 8 of Rule 117, they can
still hereafter raise that defense of non bis in idem, provided that they can lay the evidentiary bases
therefor and refute from the standpoint of substantive penal law what was earlier said on the nature and
the non-identity of the several crimes of Estafa involved which, to repeat, we pronounced purely on the
bases of existing records sans the benefit of any evidentiary fact since none has been adduced. 49
On the last issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that the crimes committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their offices defined and penalized under the Anti-Graft Law do
not exclude prosecution for felonies defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and vice
versa. Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.–In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear then that one may be charged of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a felony under the
Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being
charged with a felony under the Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which
follows this majority opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice
Griño-Aquino as a working basis for the Court's deliberations when the case was being discussed and
for the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on the action proposed by the report.
There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions to
be drawn from those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The majority is
of the view that Messrs. Arias and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. The Court
feels that the quantum of evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data beyond reasonable
doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue injury to the Government through the
irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been satisfied.
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General 1 who, in 80 pages of his
consolidated manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of the
crime charged, with costs de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero had
also recommended the dropping of Arias from the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made the
bidding out and construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal
inefficiency in the public eye. However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may have
ordered the project, who signed a document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere
in its implementation. The careless use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent
persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who engineered the
defraudation.
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission
chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of
conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or
affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and
deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.
The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of
land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was
intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had
been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a
square meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase,
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land
in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial court.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public
documents or preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the
Government and giving a private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00 a
square meter instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and fixed by
the municipal assessor, not by the landowner.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square
meter value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan
property and if the Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must
have suffered undue injury.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:
1. No undue injury was caused to the Government
a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and
reasonable.
It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase. It
was, therefor, nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price
had to be arrived at by agreement between the parties and could never be left to the
discretion of one of the contracting parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is the
essence of a contract of sale that there must be a meeting of the minds between the seller
and the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price
(Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate the
reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other factors as location,
potentials, surroundings and capabilities. After taking the foregoing premises into
consideration, the parties have, thus, arrived at the amount of P80.00 per square meter as
the fair and reasonable price for the Agleham property.
It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true and
fair market value in 1978 of the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square meter
only as stated by the assessor in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the contrary, the
prosecution's principal witness Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig,
admitted that the purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid for the Agleham
property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is reasonable (tsn, August 19,1983, p.
20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that 'the value of lands within the town of Pasig ranges from
P80.00 to P500.00' (Ibid, p. 21); that the Agleham property is "around 300 meters" from
Ortigas Avenue, "adjacent to the existing Leongson [Liamson] Subdivision ... and near
Eastland Garment Building" (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that said property is surrounded by
factories, commercial establishments and residential subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that
the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of the Agleham property appearing on the
tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on actual use only (lbid, pp. 26-27), it being the
uniform rate for all ricefields in Pasig irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and
did not take into account the existence of many factories and subdivisions in the area
(Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74), and that the assessed value is different from and always lower
than the actual market value (Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of
expropriation proceedings.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the martial
law decree that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value stated by a
landowner in his tax declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower. Other factors
must be considered. These factors must be determined by a court of justice and not by municipal
employees.
In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no
participation, was used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms
the basis for a criminal conviction.
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would
be a fair evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent
court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the decision, insofar as it
says that the "correct" valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted that petitioners of
causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the Government because of gross overpricing, is
grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during
orderly proceedings has been presented and accepted.
The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the
respondent court.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest
or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is
suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single
detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person
involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were
falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The
registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But
were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue
in injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received
procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office
could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be
asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent 'on their subordinates
and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a
department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the
restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon,
inquire whether the correct amount of food was served and otherwise personally look into the
reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why
he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies
or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document
, letters and supporting paper that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or
departments is even more appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a
conspiracy charge and conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to
defraud the government?
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started
in 1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June
8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already been consummated before his arrival. The pre-
audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of October, 1978. Arias
points out that apart from his signature linking him to the signature on the voucher, there is no evidence
transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did not know him personally and none
approached him to follow up the payment.
Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains of
the transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already
worth P80.00 a square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner
alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00
a square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by changing "riceland" to "residential' was done
before Arias was assigned to Pasig besides, there is no such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro Manila.
Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or kangkong but this is only
until the place is dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If the
Sandiganbayan is going to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based on firmer
foundation.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias
explained that the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d documents
and under no circumstanceto relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of the Bureau of
Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal turnover of
custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him as
auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the
Government is the alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project. Assuming
that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:
Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness of
the price of the property?
A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been
consummated and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of little had been
issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines. The auditors
have no more leeway to return the papers and then question the purchase
price.
Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by the
government to private individuals there should be a pre-audit of the
papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?
A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there is.
Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the
government without paying the price Did you not consider that rather odd
or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27,1987).
A No, Your Honor.
Q Why not?
A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a condition
that no payments will be made unless the corresponding title in the
payment of the Republic is committed is made.
Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the
government?
A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether there is
an appropriation set aside to cover the said specification. As of the price
it is under the sole authority of the proper officer making the sale.
Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of property
to be bought by the government; the sale was consummated; the title was
issued in favor of the government without the price being paid first to the
seller?
A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the
government comes later than the transfer.
Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).
Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is also
that function you are also called upon by going over the papers . . . (TSN,
page 22, April 27,1987). I ... vouchers called upon to determine whether
there is any irregularity as at all in this particular transaction, is it not?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only the
tax declaration but also the certification by Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz?
A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?
Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A
They are not required documents that an auditor must see. (TSN, page 23,
April 27,1987).
and continuing:
A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the authority of
the auditor because it is inasmuch as the amount involved is beyond his
counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987). (At pp. 15-16,
Petition. Underlinings supplied by petitioner)
The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:
As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that as
the then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District he created a committee,
headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao
Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district office, as members,
specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project, gather and verify documents,
conduct surveys, negotiate with the owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and
prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any direct and active part in the
acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the committee which determined
the authenticity of the documents presented to them for processing and on the basis
thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the
deed of sale together with the supporting documents to petitioner Data for signing; on
the basis of the supporting certified documents which appeared regular and complete on
their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the signing authority at that level,
merely signed but did not approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the approval thereof
was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter transmitted the
signed deed of sale with its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of
Public Works who in turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public
Works; the deed of sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a
review and re-examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the deed of sale by
the higher authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which
petitioner Data signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her
during the processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-
24, 31-32). (At pp. 267-268, Rollo.)
On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:
It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and
convincing evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused. There
was no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the alleged
existence of conspiracy merely upon the purported 'pre-assigned roles (of the accused) in
the commission of the (alleged) illegal acts in question is not supported by any evidence
on record. Nowhere in the seventy- eight (78) page Decision was there any specific
allusion to some or even one instance which would link either petitioner Arias or Data to
their co-accused in the planning, preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported
fraud and falsifications alleged in the information That petitioners Data and Arias
happened to be officials of the Pasig District Engineering Office who signed the deed of
sale and passed on pre-audit the general voucher covering the subject sale, respectively,
does hot raise any presumption or inference, that they were part of the alleged plan to
defraud the Government, as indeed there was none. It should be remembered that, as
aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the Government as the negotiated
purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and reasonable price of P80.00
per square meter.
That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the purchase
price in the deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not prove
conspiracy. It may be noted that there was a reduction in the affected area from the
estimated 19,328 square meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by the Land
Registration Commission, which resulted in the corresponding reduction in the purchase
price from P1,546,240.00 to Pl,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of sale were simple
corrections that even benefited the Government.
Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular in
the use of the unapproved survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale because
the approval of the survey plan/ technical description was not a prerequisite to the
approval of the deed of sale. What is important is that before any payment is made by
the Government under the deed of sale the title of the seller must have already been
cancelled and another one issued to the Government incorporating therein the technical
description as approved by the Land Registration Commission, as what obtained in the
instant case. (At pp. 273-275, Rollo)
We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the
petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence
on record is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences
petitioners Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data
are acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a
reversible error in convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having
violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the
scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan
Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal,
Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the acquisition of private
lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio
Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo G. Fernando, then the
Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public
Works who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway
Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the Senior Engineer of the Office of the District
Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who was charged with the acquisition of
lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Carlos L. Jose then the
Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works
who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Claudio H.
Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer's Office,
Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers and documents pertaining to
private lands acquired by the Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project; and
accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering District, Pasig, Metro
Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the payment of
lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public
and official positions, and conspiring, confederating and confabulating with accused
Natividad C. Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered
owner of a parcel of land situated at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0097, with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose
and Claudio Arias, acting with evident bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data,
Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the
discharge of their official public and/or administrative functions, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue injury, damage and prejudice to the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines by causing, allowing and/or approving
the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of and in
the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General
Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification, dated September 14, 1978, which was
purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of
Tax Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P.
Agleham, and an alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, said supporting documents having been falsified by the
accused to make it appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting
papers is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that
19,004 square meters thereof were transferred in the name of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in fact,
the afore-stated land is actually a riceland with a true and actual market value of P5.00
per square meter only and Tax Declaration No. 49948 was truly and officially registered
in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the
Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila; that the
foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal the fact that the true and
actual pace of the 19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was
acquired in behalf of the Government by way of negotiated purchase by the accused
officials herein for the right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an overprice of
P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount,
the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied the excess of the true and actual
value of the above-mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs,
uses and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being
unknown (p. 48, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial
floods affecting the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the
northern and southern portions of Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An
announcement was published in leading newspapers advising affected property owners to file their
applications for payment at the District Engineer's Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District
headed by the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of Supervising
Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for
acquisition of improvements, and Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the project of the
impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process applications for payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by
order of the President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a
memorandum was sent to Data on August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin,
directing that all affected lands covered by the Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from
reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD, Counter-Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan
Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig
registered in the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 issued on
May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez,
parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided
into three (3) lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration
Commission on June 1, 1978 (Entry No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square
meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for
the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was
declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15
per square meter (p. 10, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978, another Tax
Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-1) was issued for the same ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169
square meters. The declared market value was P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessed
value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by
Tax Declaration No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield," jumped
to P301,690 (P10 per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and
value of the property, according to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on
the actual use of the property (riceland) not on its potential use (p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p.
40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of sales given to the Municipal Assessor's office
by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions the Assessor obtained the average valuation of the
properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's
Office was the accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney
allegedly executed on February 24,1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She
submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December
15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Agleham's 30,169-square-meter property as
"residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter
(instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to be P724,056 (instead of
P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 (Exh. H-1), the
technical description of the property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the True Current and
Fair Market Value of Real Property" required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo
Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused
Claudio Arcaya, who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of
Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004 square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz
who also initialed the supporting documents and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as
attorney-in-fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the
Bureau of Public Works who recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of
the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards, the documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer
of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale was registered and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth
certifications of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil
Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data as District Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting
Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for
payment by the accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October
24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-1 5),
for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-
meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross
overpricing of Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from Alfredo
Prudencio, Municipal Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig
(Exh. BB), and the accused Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the
certification dated September 14,1978 (Exh. J), attesting that Agleham's property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520 and that the taxes had been paid from 1975 to
1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of his subordinate Ruben Gatchalian,
Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both
Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification. They declared that such certifications
are usually issued by their office on mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax
Declaration No. 47895 dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein,
Agleham's property of 30,169 square meters was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per
square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and a market value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified that the
supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B), which Gutierrez submitted as one of the
supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because of the following tell-tale
signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax
declaration, Exhibit Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the
correct date February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification
in the genuine document; and
(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised
value of only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
(Exhs. K and K-1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on
October 18, 1978 in the names of the spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-
meters' residential property with a declared market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado
Arias, who approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the
amount of the purchase price therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed
by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and figures" (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor
checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed at the back of the General Voucher (Exh. S),
numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter
(Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land was
P100 per square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and
Fernando, certifying that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be
"residential;"
(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978)
was superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying
that he had examined the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;
(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April 20,
1978 was not an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic
Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May
28,1978 only. There were "substantial variations" noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved
technical description and the technical description of the land in the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham
(Exhs. C, C-1) bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p.
91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated
October 1, 1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez herself The
Sandiganbayan observed that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be identical to accused
Gutierrez' signatures in the General Voucher (Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which she signed in
favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh. CC), and in her affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65,
Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he
had been replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District,
he did not turn over the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been
filed in the Sandiganbayan and the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November 16,
1987, whose dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez,
Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C.
Arias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as ascended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer
perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify jointly and severally, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay
their proportional costs of this action. (p. 104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his
contention that the court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly
negligent are based on misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of
Prescillo Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government
paid for it was reasonable. Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of
the petitioners because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The
Sandiganbayan did not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause injury
to the Government and to unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be
proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit, G.R. No.
71143, Sept. 19,1988; People vs. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been
vigilant to protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland,
accepted as gospel truth the certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the
million-peso purchase which, by the standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their
curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to verify the authenticity of the documents
presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should have asked questions they
looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over the
same transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to
act in that manner to approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the land and
defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property
transferred to the Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do
but approve the voucher for payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three
aspects: (1) examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and
resources of the agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing Code
of the Phil.). Examination, as applied to auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other
documents; review procedures, and question persons, all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of
accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State Audit Code of the Philippines, Annotated by
Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was
submitted to him for payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez.
Arias did not question any person for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the
documents submitted to him and the reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying for
the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his casuistic explanation that since his subordinates had
passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was lawful and regular for, if he would be a mere
rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be useless and unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence
because he allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham
property, throwing the blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion,
Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of
properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project. He in effect would hide under the skirt of
the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated the task that was assigned to his
office to identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway project, gather and verify documents,
make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale, and process claims for
payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the implementation of the
project. Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the manner in which the
committee performed its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the
committee. By signing the deed of sale and certifications prepared for his signature by his committee,
he in effect, made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally guilty with those members of the
committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax declarations and made false
certifications regarding the use and value of the Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of
Agleham's property because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works.
It should not be overlooked, however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an
attestation that the transaction was fair, honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task of
implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within his engineering district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced
because the price of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the
petitioners are not guilty of having caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having
given unwarranted benefits to the property owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further
argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine tax declaration may not be used as a standard in
determining the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (making it mandatory in
expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as declared by the owner, or as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this Court in the case
of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to the
expropriation of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by
expropriation but through a negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no
allegation nor proof that the price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven
(11) years ago. What the accused did was to prove the value of the land through fake tax declarations
(Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn statement on the current and
fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the accused in support of the deed of sale.
Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the State agreed to pay the price on
the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived concerning the reasonable value of the
land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not
clarify that was also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of
the implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to
rebut the valuation in Agleham's genuine 1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the
riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable
value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).
The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed
their eyes to the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if
not deliberate omission, to check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval.
Since partiality is a mental state or predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by
the attendant circumstance instances.
WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010,
with costs against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a
reversible error in convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having
violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the
scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan
Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal,
Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the acquisition of private
lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio
Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo G. Fernando, then the
Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public
Works who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway
Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the Senior Engineer of the Office of the District
Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who was charged with the acquisition of
lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Carlos L. Jose then the
Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works
who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Claudio H.
Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer's Office,
Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers and documents pertaining to
private lands acquired by the Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project; and
accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering District, Pasig, Metro
Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the payment of
lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public
and official positions, and conspiring, confederating and confabulating with accused
Natividad C. Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered
owner of a parcel of land situated at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0097, with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose
and Claudio Arias, acting with evident bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data,
Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the
discharge of their official public and/or administrative functions, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue injury, damage and prejudice to the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines by causing, allowing and/or approving
the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of and in
the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General
Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification, dated September 14, 1978, which was
purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of
Tax Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P.
Agleham, and an alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, said supporting documents having been falsified by the
accused to make it appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting
papers is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that
19,004 square meters thereof were transferred in the name of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in fact,
the afore-stated land is actually a riceland with a true and actual market value of P5.00
per square meter only and Tax Declaration No. 49948 was truly and officially registered
in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the
Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila; that the
foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal the fact that the true and
actual pace of the 19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was
acquired in behalf of the Government by way of negotiated purchase by the accused
officials herein for the right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an overprice of
P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount,
the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied the excess of the true and actual
value of the above-mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs,
uses and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being
unknown (p. 48, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial
floods affecting the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the
northern and southern portions of Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An
announcement was published in leading newspapers advising affected property owners to file their
applications for payment at the District Engineer's Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District
headed by the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of Supervising
Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for
acquisition of improvements, and Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the project of the
impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process applications for payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by
order of the President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a
memorandum was sent to Data on August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin,
directing that all affected lands covered by the Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from
reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD, Counter-Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan
Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig
registered in the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 issued on
May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez,
parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided
into three (3) lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration
Commission on June 1, 1978 (Entry No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square
meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for
the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was
declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15
per square meter (p. 10, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978, another Tax
Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-1) was issued for the same ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169
square meters. The declared market value was P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessed
value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by
Tax Declaration No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield," jumped
to P301,690 (P10 per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and
value of the property, according to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on
the actual use of the property (riceland) not on its potential use (p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p.
40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of sales given to the Municipal Assessor's office
by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions the Assessor obtained the average valuation of the
properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's
Office was the accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney
allegedly executed on February 24,1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She
submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December
15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Agleham's 30,169-square-meter property as
"residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter
(instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to be P724,056 (instead of
P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 (Exh. H-1), the
technical description of the property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the True Current and
Fair Market Value of Real Property" required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo
Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused
Claudio Arcaya, who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of
Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004 square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz
who also initialed the supporting documents and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as
attorney-in-fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the
Bureau of Public Works who recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of
the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards, the documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer
of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale was registered and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth
certifications of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil
Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data as District Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting
Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for
payment by the accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October
24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-1 5),
for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-
meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross
overpricing of Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from Alfredo
Prudencio, Municipal Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig
(Exh. BB), and the accused Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the
certification dated September 14,1978 (Exh. J), attesting that Agleham's property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520 and that the taxes had been paid from 1975 to
1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of his subordinate Ruben Gatchalian,
Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both
Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification. They declared that such certifications
are usually issued by their office on mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax
Declaration No. 47895 dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein,
Agleham's property of 30,169 square meters was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per
square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and a market value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified that the
supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B), which Gutierrez submitted as one of the
supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because of the following tell-tale
signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax
declaration, Exhibit Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the
correct date February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification
in the genuine document; and
(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised
value of only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
(Exhs. K and K-1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on
October 18, 1978 in the names of the spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-
meters' residential property with a declared market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado
Arias, who approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the
amount of the purchase price therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed
by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and figures" (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor
checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed at the back of the General Voucher (Exh. S),
numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter
(Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land was
P100 per square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and
Fernando, certifying that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be
"residential;"
(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978)
was superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying
that he had examined the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;
(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April 20,
1978 was not an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic
Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May
28,1978 only. There were "substantial variations" noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved
technical description and the technical description of the land in the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham
(Exhs. C, C-1) bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p.
91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated
October 1, 1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez herself The
Sandiganbayan observed that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be Identical to accused
Gutierrez' signatures in the General Voucher (Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which she signed in
favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh. CC), and in her affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65,
Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he
had been replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District,
he did not turn over the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been
filed in the Sandiganbayan and the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November 16,
1987, whose dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez,
Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C.
Arias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as ascended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer
perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify jointly and severally, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay
their proportional costs of this action. (p. 104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his
contention that the court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly
negligent are based on misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of
Prescillo Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government
paid for it was reasonable. Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of
the petitioners because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The
Sandiganbayan did not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause injury
to the Government and to unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be
proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit, G.R. No.
71143, Sept. 19,1988; People vs. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been
vigilant to protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland,
accepted as gospel truth the certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the
million-peso purchase which, by the standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their
curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to verify the authenticity of the documents
presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should have asked questions they
looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over the
same transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to
act in that manner to approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the land and
defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property
transferred to the Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do
but approve the voucher for payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three
aspects: (1) examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and
resources of the agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing Code
of the Phil.). Examination, as applied to auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other
documents; review procedures, and question persons, all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of
accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State Audit Code of the Philippines, Annotated by
Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was
submitted to him for payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez.
Arias did not question any person for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the
documents submitted to him and the reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying for
the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his casuistic explanation that since his subordinates had
passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was lawful and regular for, if he would be a mere
rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be useless and unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence
because he allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham
property, throwing the blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion,
Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of
properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project. He in effect would hide under the skirt of
the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated the task that was assigned to his
office to Identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway project, gather and verify documents,
make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale, and process claims for
payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the implementation of the
project. Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the manner in which the
committee performed its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the
committee. By signing the deed of sale and certifications prepared for his signature by his committee,
he in effect, made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally guilty with those members of the
committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax declarations and made false
certifications regarding the use and value of the Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of
Agleham's property because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works.
It should not be overlooked, however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an
attestation that the transaction was fair, honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task of
implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within his engineering district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced
because the price of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the
petitioners are not guilty of having caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having
given unwarranted benefits to the property owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further
argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine tax declaration may not be used as a standard in
determining the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (making it mandatory in
expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as declared by the owner, or as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this Court in the case
of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to the
expropriation of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by
expropriation but through a negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no
allegation nor proof that the price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven
(11) years ago. What the accused did was to prove the value of the land through fake tax declarations
(Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn statement on the current and
fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the accused in support of the deed of sale.
Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the State agreed to pay the price on
the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived concerning the reasonable value of the
land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not
clarify that was also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of
the implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to
rebut the valuation in Agleham's genuine 1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the
riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable
value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).
The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed
their eyes to the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if
not deliberate omission, to check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval.
Since partiality is a mental state or predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by
the attendant circumstance instances.
WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010,
with costs against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
Feliciano,
G.R. No. 116938 September 20, 2001
LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner,
vs.
REMEDIOS A. AMOR,* RAUL R. ARNAU, ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR.,
FRANCISCO A. VILLA, ** all of the Office of the Ombudsman, and LEONCIA R. DIMAGIBA,
Assistant City Prosecutor, Manila, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is a petition for certiorari1 to annul and set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing
the complaint for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 [e], against respondent assistant city prosecutor
Leoncia R. Dimagiba, for lack of evidence showing that complainant suffered undue injury through
manifest partiality and evident bad faith of the respondent public officials.2
The Facts
On 19 November 1991, petitioner's husband, Engr. Florencio V. Rueda, Jr., 32 years old, underwent an
operation at the Santo Tomas University Hospital, Sampaloc, Manila for the removal of a stone
blocking his ureter. Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr., urological surgeon, performed the operation with Dr.
Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes as anaesthesiologist. The surgery started at 8:30 a. m. and it was over at 9:50 a.
m. The patient was given spinal/regional anaesthesia (Pontocaine) and inhalational or gaseous
anaesthesia (Forane or Isuflorane).3
A few minutes after the surgery, while the patient was wheeled to the recovery room, he manifested
facial twitches, muscle rigidity, and tonic and clonic seizures. His body temperature rose to 42 degrees
Centigrade and blood pressure was 210 (systolic mm Hg) over 110 (diastolic mm Hg) per clinical
records.4
Doctors Antonio and Balatbat-Reyes immediately administered appropriate emergency treatment for
epileptic seizures in consultation with specialists on neurology, cardiology and anaesthesia. However,
the general condition of the patient deteriorated, and he later developed asystole at 3:15 p. m. The
doctors initiated cardiopulmonary resuscitation procedure. Nevertheless, it was unsuccessful, and at
3:45 p. m., the patient died.5
Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. signed the death certificate indicating the immediate cause of death as status
epilepticus, antecedent cause unknown. Other significant condition contributing to death-
ureterolithotomy (lower third, right) under spinal anaesthesia.6
In the evening of the same day, relatives of the victim requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to conduct an autopsy on his cadaver. According to the NBI Medico-Legal findings, the victim
died of malignant hyperthermia, secondary to anesthesia clinical7 and recommended the filing of
criminal charges against Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes, for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.8
On 7 July 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Dimagiba to whom the case was reassigned (after several
other prosecutors inhibited themselves) conducted another preliminary investigation9
On 24 August, 1993, respondent assistant city prosecutor Dimagiba recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against Dr. Reyes and the filing of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide against Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr.10
On 25 August 1993, respondent assistant city prosecutor Dimagiba filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, an information against Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.11
On 23 November 1993, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against assistant
city prosecutor Dimagiba for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 [e3, and for grave misconduct.12
On 1 March 1994, Graft Investigation Officer II (GIO) Remedios A. Amor submitted to the
Ombudsman a draft resolution recommending dismissal of the charges against assistant city prosecutor
Dimagiba for lack of evidence.13
On 4 March 1994, respondent Raul R. Arnau, head, evaluation and preliminary investigation bureau,
Office of the Ombudsman, recommended approval of the resolution.14 On 8 March 1994, respondent
Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. assistant Ombudsman (EIO), reviewed the resolution, and on 9 March
1994, respondent Francisco A. Villa, Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the resolution.15
On 7 April, 1994, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a motion for
reconsideration,16 however, on 29 July 1994, respondent officials of the Office of the Ombudsman
denied the motion.17
Hence, this petition.18
The Issue
The issue raised is whether respondent officials of the office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their
discretion in finding that there was no evidence sufficient to warrant the prosecution of respondent
assistant city prosecutor Dimagiba for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 [e].19
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner posits that in dismissing the case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide against Dr.
Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes despite overwhelming evidence pointing to the criminal liability of the latter,
assistant city prosecutor Dimagiba violated the Anti-Graft Act, R A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e].
In his comment,20 the Solicitor General submitted the view that "the Office of the Ombudsman is not
the proper forum for the review of what might be reversible errors in the appreciation of the evidence in
cases before quasi judicial or judicial bodies."21
We agree with the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman may not pass upon errors of the prosecutor's
office intrinsic to the resolution itself of the case as that function pertains to the power of review of the
Secretary of Justice.22
In fact, in this case, the petitioner appealed the resolution of assistant city prosecutor Dimagiba to the
Secretary of Justice. On 27 September 1994, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the petition for
review.23 On 23 January 1995, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.24
On March 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari25 questioning the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice, which we referred to the Court of Appeals.26 On 13 June 1996, the
Court of Appeals promulgated a decision setting aside the resolution of the Secretary of Justice and
directing the City Prosecutor of Manila to give due course to the information against respondent Dr.
Reyes.27
The essential elements of violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 [e] are as follows:
"(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
"(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties or in relation to his or her public positions
"(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;
"(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such parties; and
"(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.28
In dismissing petitioner's charges against Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes, respondent prosecutor Dimagiba
did not cause any undue injury to petitioner. Respondent prosecutor as a quasi judicial official exercises
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists sufficient to sustain the charge against Dr.
Reyes.29 In the performance of the duties of her office as prosecutor, respondent assistant city
prosecutor Dimagiba may err. 30 Such error may not necessarily cause undue injury to any party. To
constitute this element of the offense, the act of respondent must cause specific quantified injury to any
party by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such party with the public officer
acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.31
In the absence of evidence showing that the act of respondent assistant city prosecutor in dismissing the
charge against Dr. Reyes was done in evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, causing undue
injury to petitioner, the charge of violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3[e], would not prosper.32
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.
No costs.
Davide, Jr., C. J., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on official Leave
GANCAYCO, J.:
On June 23, 1984, Dr. Reynaldo Jacinto was assigned as the Officer-In-Charge of the Eulogio
Rodriguez Sr. Memorial Hospital (ERMH). He was instructed by the Minister of Health to clean it up
and get rid of its bad image. Correctly indeed, he found out that most of the medical staff were
rendering services outside of the hospital at government time and collecting full government pay. He
gathered the so-called moonlighting doctors including Dr. Veneracion Pacis-Munar and asked them to
make their choice between government service and private practice. He tried to dissuade Dr. Munar
from this practice as she was drawing full pay as a full-time member of the medical staff while teaching
in several medical schools but she remarked that she had been doing this since 1972 while working at
the San Lazaro Hospital and that she had the authority to teach.
After some time, Dr. Munar protested the promotion of Dr. Tica to the position of Medical Specialist II
which she believed should have been given to her. This caused a misunderstanding between her and Dr.
Jacinto who recommended said promotion.
On May 13,1985, after the medical staff meeting at the hospital, Dr. Munar submitted to a medical
examination by Dr. Evelyn Padre of the same hospital as she was allegedly suffering from intermittent
diarrhea. Dr. Padre issued a medical certificate that she was sick of gastro enteritis and amoebic
colic.1 She then filed an emergency sick leave application attaching the medical certificate.2 Dr.
Jacinto did not believe the findings of Dr. Padre and disapproved the application. He instructed Dr.
Munar to file an application for vacation leave. She left her vacation leave papers in the office of the
hospital's personnel officer without retaining a copy. The period covered by her vacation leave was
from May 13 to 19, 1985.
A few days later, Dr. Munar received a telegram dated May 17,1985 3 from Dr. Jacinto asking her to
report for duty on May 20,1985. She went to the hospital on said day and learned that it was the
birthday of Dr. Jacinto. He asked her to report for work and he tried to persuade her to withdraw her
protest against the promotion of Dr. Tica as a birthday gift. Dr. Munar did not agree. Apparently, Dr.
Jacinto resented this as he told her she would never be promoted. Thereafter, Dr. Munar received a
letter from Dr. Jacinto reiterating the disapproval of her application for sick leave for the period from
May 13 to 19, 1985 as she was not sick.
On May 30,1985 Dr. Munar reported for duty at the hospital. She could not get her salary as her name
was deleted from the hospital payroll. She again went on leave on June 4 to 20,1985 upon the advise of
another physician.
On July 5, 1985, she was detailed at the Quirino Memorial Hospital upon order of the Minister of
Health,4 a copy of which was furnished Dr. Jacinto. Although detailed at another hospital, Dr. Munar
was to continue to receive her salary from the ERMH.
While still working at the ERMH, she presented her daily time record for the month of May to Dr.
Jacinto but the latter refused to sign the same. She then approached Dr. Flores, the Chief of Clinic, but
he remarked that Dr. Jacinto instructed him not to sign.
At the Quirino Memorial Hospital, Dr. Munar had her daily time record signed by her superior officer
thereat which she submitted to her former place of assignment for the purpose of collecting her salary.
Nonetheless, she still could not get her salary from the ERMH so she sought the assistance of Director
Ibañez of the Regional Health Office in Quezon City who sent a letter ordering Dr. Jacinto to pay her
salary. She got a similar directive from the Minister of Health.5 Dr. Jacinto released her salary.
Meanwhile, Dr. Munar's name was not included in the proposed plantilla of the ERMH. Upon learning
about this, she wrote the Placement Committee of Region IV, Ministry of Health, about the deletion of
her name and she received a reply that her name was reincluded in the final plantilla.
During the period covered by this incident, Dr. Munar had a part time teaching job at the Philippine-
Muslim Medical School and at the Ocampo Memorial School. She taught in the former from 7:00 to
12:00 noon only during Saturdays while in the latter institution her class schedule was variable but the
same did not prejudice her office hours in the hospital. She also handled summer classes in Micro-
Biology at the Ocampo Memorial School. She claims she was authorized to teach by way of a teaching
permit issued by the Minister of Health but said permit prohibited her from teaching earlier than 6:00 in
the evening. 6 However, she was able to hold classes after 1:00 P.M. allegedly upon verbal permission
of Dr. Jacinto provided she should render service either on Saturdays or Sundays to compensate for the
lost hours in the hospital. The latter denies this.
It is on the basis of the foregoing set of facts that in due course an information was filed in the
Sandiganbayan against Dr. Jacinto by the special prosecutor of the Tanodbayan charging him with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about May 17,1985, in Marikina, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being the duly
appointed officer-in-charge of the Eulogio Rodriguez Sr. Memorial Hospital, acting
with evident bad faith, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully order the indefinite
withholding of the salary of his subordinate, Dr. Veneracion Pacis-Munar and removal of
her name in the plantilla, thereby causing undue injury to the latter.
After arraignment wherein the accused entered a plea of not guilty and a trial on the merits a decision
was rendered on May 12, 1988 finding him guilty of the offense charged with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and sentencing him to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
month, to suffer perpetual disqualification and to pay the costs.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari filed by the accused based on the following assigned errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTS
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED AS CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION DID NOT REALLY CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SECTION 3,
PARAGRAPH (E) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED, AND,
THEREFORE, ACCUSED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ARRAIGNED NOR TRIED
UNDER SUCH INFORMATION.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
ASSUMING AD ARGUENDUM THAT THE INFORMATION CHALLENGED
COULD BE THE VALID BASIS FOR ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL, THE
DECISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO
SUFFER THE PENALTY OF SIX YEARS AND ONE (1) MONTH IMPRISONMENT,
TO SUFFER PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION, AND TO PAY THE COSTS' FOR
THE MERE ACTS OF ALLEGEDLY WITHHOLDING SALARY AND REMOVAL
OF NAME FROM THE PLANTILLA (WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT SHE
RECEIVED HER PAY IN FULL AND HER NAME WAS IN THE FINAL
PLANTILLA) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND, THEREFORE, VOID (ART. III, SEC.
19-(l), 1987 CONSTITUTION) PROVIDING THAT;
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. ...
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
REGARDLESS OF THE ABOVE ERRORS, THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN
NOT RULING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION
UPON WHICH IT RENDERED A SENTENCE OF CONVICTION WERE NOT
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND, HENCE ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
The petition is impressed with merit. Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes any public officer as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.-In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
The elements of this offense are:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his functions.
In this case, it is not denied that the salary of the complainant, Dr. Munar, was withheld for sometime
upon instruction of petitioner. But his explanation therewith is that complainant failed to submit her
daily time records duly approved. Indeed her daily time records for May, June, July and August, 1985
were submitted by her only on September 24,1985. It is a well-known fact that in the government
service an employee must submit his daily time record duly accomplished and approved before he can
collect his salary.
Furthermore, petitioner asserted that he withheld the salary of the complainant from May 13 to May
19,1985, which was the period when she applied for sick leave because he disapproved her application
for sick leave. He found out she was not sick from Dr. Padre who confided to him that she was merely
persuaded by the complainant to issue said medical certificate.
At any rate, while there was indeed some inconvenience in the failure of complainant to immediately
get her salary for the aforesaid period, upon receiving the handwritten note of the Minister of Health,
the petitioner nevertheless authorized the payment of the salary of the complainant.
The petitioner also admits that he caused the removal of the name of the complainant from the plantilla
but obviously his action was the net result of his dissatisfaction with the services of complainant. The
complainant was undeniably moonlighting even during her office hours in the ERMH. She also refused
to yield to the advice of petitioner not to further protest the promotion of Dr. Tica. When her salary was
withheld, instead of appealing to petitioner who was her immediate superior, she went directly to
higher authorities for assistance. When her name was omitted in the plantilla, she again by-passed
petitioner.
Nevertheless, no real or actual damage was suffered by her. She got her withheld salary released. Her
name was restored in the plantilla. Thus, the complainant did not suffer undue injury as an element
required by the law. Such an injury must be more than necessary, excessive, improper or illegal.7 The
injury suffered by complainant in this instance, if at all, is negligible.
By the same token, the essential ingredient of manifest partiality and evident bad faith required for the
commission of the offense has not been successfully established in this case. As above discussed, the
actions taken by petitioner aforestated were not entirely without rhyme or reason. They were measures
taken by a superior against an erring employee who studiously ignored if not defied his authority.
Moreover, assuming the aforesaid actions which were taken by petitioner are erroneous or excessive,
they are certainly not criminal in nature. If at all ,the liability of petitioner may be civil if not
administrative. Indeed, because of this prosecution, the petitioner was purged from the government
service after the EDSA revolution. The nominal injury to the complainant had been more than
adequately vindicated. A conviction under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is certainly out of
the question.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated May 12, 1988 is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING the
petitioner, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan,C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.