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Political Ideologies
Subject: POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES Credits: 4

SYLLABUS

Understanding the Political Ideas

Theorizing the Political, the Need for Political Theory - Conceptions of Political Theory, Political Arguments
and Conceptual Analysis

Indian Political Traditions

The Confucian Tradition -Arabic-Islamic, Political Traditions - Greek and Roman Traditions, Western: Liberal
and Marxist Traditions

Meaning and Nature of the State

Sovereignty- State, Civil Society and Community, Power and Authority, Legitimacy, Political Obligation and
Revolution , Rights and Citizenship , Liberty - Justice

Direct and Participatory Democracy

Representative Democracy, Socialist Democracy, Individualism and Communitarianism, Fascism, Marxism -

Gandhism (Dharma, Swaraj, Sarvodaya and Satyagraha)

State and Globalisation

Secularism – Development, Disadvantaged and Affirmative Action

Suggested Readings:

1. Mulfrod Quickert Sibley, Political Ideas and Ideologies; A History of Political Thought, Harpercollins
College Div
2. Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Palgrave MacMillan
3. Mostafa Rejai, Political Ideologies: A Comparative Approach, M.E. Sharpe
4. M. Rejai, Comparative Political Ideologies,
 CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THEORY

STRUCTURE
Objects
Understanding the Political Science
Political Arguments and Conceptual Analysis
Theorizing the Political Science
The Need of Political Theory
Conceptions of Political Theory
Review Questions
OBJECTS
After going through this chapter, you should be able to:
What is politics?
Explain the meaning of state?
Describe the concept of power.
Discuss legitimation and delegitimation.
Discuss the nature of political arguments
Distinguish between empirical and political theory.
Discuss the different usages of political theory.
Discuss various conceptions of political theory;

UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL SCIENCE

Politics since a Practical Action
Politics since a practical action is the communication and the thrash about in excess of system of
human possibilities. Since such, it is in relation to the authority; that is to say, it is in relation to
the capability of social mediators, agencies and organizations to uphold or change their
habitation, social and physical. It is in relation to the possessions, which underpin this capability,
and in relation to the forces that form and power its exercise. Politics is a phenomenon establish
in all clusters, organizations and civilizations, cutting crossways private and public life. It is
expressed in all the dealings, organizations and buildings that are implicated in the manufacture
and reproduction of the life of civilizations. Politics creates and circumstances all characteristics
of our lives and it is at the center of the growth of communal troubles, and the manners of their
settlements.
Politics Hard to Describe Precisely
A crisp definition of politics-one that fits presently those things we instinctively call ‘political’—
is impossible. Politics is a word with varied uses and nuances. Possibly, the adjacent we can
approach to a capsule report is this:
Politics is the action through which clusters reach binding communal decisions by attempting
to reconcile differences in the middle of their members. There are important points in this
definition.
Nature of Politics
Politics is a communal action, involving people who accept a general membership or at least
acknowledge a shared fate. Therefore, Robinson Crusoe could not practice politics. Politics
presumes an initial variety of views, if not in relation to the goals, then at least in relation to the
means. Were we all to agree all the time, politics would be redundant. Politics involves
reconciling such differences by discussion and persuasion. Discourse is so, central to politics.
Political decisions become authoritative policy for a group, binding members to decisions that are
implemented through force, if necessary. Politics scarcely exists if decisions are reached solely
through violence, but force, or its threat, underpins the procedure of reaching a communal
decision.The must of politics arises from the communal character of human life. We live in a
group that necessity reach communal decisions: in relation to the distribution possessions, in
relation to the relating to other clusters and in relation to the scheduling for the future. A family
discussion where to take its vacation, a country deciding whether to go to war, the world seeking
to limit the damage caused through pollution—all are examples of clusters seeking to reach
decisions which affect all their members. Since social creatures, politics it section of our fate: we
have no choice but to practice it.
Politics: An Inescapable Characteristic of the Human Condition
Therefore although the word ‘politics’ is often used cynically, to criticize the pursuit of private
advantage under the guise of public interest, politics is in fact, an inescapable characteristic of the
human condition. Indeed, the Greek philosopher Aristotle argued that ‘man is through nature a
political animal’. Through this, he meant not presently that politics is unavoidable, but rather that
it is the essential human action; political engagement is the characteristic which mainly sharply
separates us from other species. For Aristotle, people can only express their true nature since
reasoning, virtuous beings by participation in a political society.Members of a group rarely agree;
at least initially, on what course of action to follow. Even if there is agreement in excess of goals,
there may still be a skirmish in excess of means. Yet a decision necessity be reached, one method
or the other, and once made it will commit all members of the group. Therefore, politics consists
in processes for allowing a range of views to be expressed and then combined into an overall
decision. Since Shively points out, ‘Political action may be interpreted since a method to job out
rationally the best general solution to a general problem—or at least a method to job out a
reasonable general solution.’ That is, politics consists of public choice.
Politics
Everybody has few thought in relation to the meaning of the word politics; to few people the
question may even seem quite superfluous. ‘Politics’ is what one reads in relation to the in the
papers or watches on television. It deals with the behaviors of the politicians, notably the leaders
of political parties. What is politics all about? Why, precisely, are these behaviors ‘political’ and
what defines the nature of politics? If one starts with a definition couched in words of the
behaviors of politicians, one might say that politics concerns the rivalries of politicians in their
thrash about for authority. This would certainly be the type of definition with which mainly
people would agree. There would, also, almost certainly be agreement that politics refers to the
connection flanked by states on an international level.‘Politics is in relation to the authority and
how it is distributed.’ But authority is not an abstract entity floating in the void. It is embodied in
human beings. Authority is a connection existing wherever a person can impose his will on other
persons, creation the latter obey whether they want to or not. Hence, a situation characterized
through leadership, a relation of power and subordination. Max Weber, in his well-known lecture
of 1918, ‘Politics since a Vocation’, started through proposing that the concept of politics was
‘very broad-based and includes any type of self-governing leadership in action.’ In whatever
context such leadership in action exists, politics is present. In our words, political would contain
any situation where authority dealings lived, i.e., where people were constrained or dominated or
subject to power of one type or another. It would also contain situations where people were
constrained through a set of buildings or organizations rather than through the subjective will of
persons.Such a broad definition has the advantage of showing that politics is not necessarily a
matter of government, nor solely concerned with the behaviors of politicians. Politics exists in
any context where there is a building of authority and thrash about for authority in an effort to
gain or uphold leadership locations. In this sense, one can speak in relation to the politics of deal
unions or in relation to the ‘university politics’. One can discus ‘sexual politics’, meaning the
power of men in excess of women or the effort to alter this relation. At present, there is much
controversy in relation to the race politics with reference to the authority, or lack or it, of people
of dissimilar color or race in several countries.In a narrower sense, though everything is politics,
which affects our lives by the agency of those who exercise and manage state authority, and the
purposes for which they exploit that manage. Weber after initially giving an extremely broad
definition of politics in words of common leadership went on to produce a distant more limited
definition: ‘We wish to understand through politics’, he wrote, ‘only the leadership, or the
influencing of leadership, of a political association, hence today, of a state’. In this perspective,
the state is the central political association. A political question is one that relates to the state, to
the topic of who controls state authority, for what purposes that authority is used and with what
consequences, and therefore on.
State
A new issue comes here: what is state? The question is through no means a simple one to answer,
nor is there a common agreement since to what the answer should be. It necessity first be noted
that there are several shapes of the state, which differ from one another in significant methods.
The Greek municipality-state is clearly dissimilar from the contemporary nation-state, which has
dominated world politics as the French Revolution. The modern liberal-democratic state, which
exists in Britain and Western Europe, is dissimilar from the fascist-kind state of Hitler or
Mussolini. It is also dissimilar from the state, which lived in the former USSR and in Eastern
Europe. A significant section of the revise of politics, and certainly an integral unit of this book,
is the account of what is meant through those words. The purpose is to illustrate how each shape
distinguishes itself from the other and what the significance of such distinction is.
State: Differences on Explanation of Political Organizations/Social Context
States differ in words of their political organizations since well since in words of the social
context within which they are located and which they attempt to uphold. Therefore, while the
liberal-democratic state is characterized through representative organizations such since a
parliament and a self-governing judiciary, the leader controls the fascist state. With respect to the
social context, the crucial contrast is flanked by Western and Soviet kind organizations in
therefore distant since the former are embedded in a society which is organized according to the
principles of a capitalist economy, while in the latter case the productive possessions of society
are owned and controlled through the state. In each case, so, the state is differently structured,
operates in a social framework of an extremely dissimilar type, and this affects and powers to a
big extent the nature of the state and the purposes, which it serves.There are dissimilar shapes of
the state, but whatever shape one has in mind, the state since such is not a monolithic block. To
start with, the state is not the similar since the government. It is rather an intricate of several units
of which the government is only one. In a Western-kind liberal-democratic state, those who
shape the government are indeed with the state authority. They speak in the name of the state and
take office in order to manage the levers of state authority. Nevertheless, to change the metaphor,
the homes of the state have several mansions and of those, the government occupies one.
Ralph Miliband’s Views on the State
In his book The State in Capitalist Society, Ralph Miliband registers those dissimilar units, which
jointly constitute the state. The first, but through no means the only unit of the state tools, is the
government. The second is the administrative unit, the civil service or the bureaucracy. This
administrative executive is, in liberal-democratic organizations, supposed to be neutral, carrying
out the orders of politicians who are in authority. In fact, though, the bureaucracy may well have
its own power and dispose of its own authority. Third, in Miliband’s list approach the military
and the police, the ‘order-maintaining’ or the repressive arm of the state; fourth, the judiciary.
In any constitutional organization, the judiciary is supposed to be self-governing of the holders of
government authority; it can act since a check on them. Fifth, approach the elements of sub-
central or regional government. In few federal organizations, these elements have considerable
independence from the central government, controlling their own sphere of authority, where the
government is constitutionally debarred from interfering. The connection flanked by the central
and the regional government may become an significant political issue, since witnessed through
the controversy in recent British politics in excess of the abolition of the Greater London Council
and the metropolitan counties, the argument in relation to the financing regional government,
‘rate capping’, and therefore on. Sixth and finally, one can add to the list representative
assemblies and the parliament in the British organization. One may also mention political parties;
however they are not normally section of the state tools, at least not in a liberal democracy. They
play their obvious role in the representative assembly and it is there that, at least partly, the
competitive fight flanked by the government and the opposition is enacted.
Politics since a Vocation
The point brings us back to Weber and his already quoted lecture, ‘Politics since a Vocation’.
The state, Weber sustained through maintaining that a definition of the state could not be given in
words of the tasks which it undertakes or of the ends it pursues. There was no task, which
specifically determined the state. So, one had to describe the state in words of the specific means,
which it employed, and these means were, ultimately, physical force. The state, Weber wrote, ‘is
a human society that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate exploit of physical force
within a given territory’.There are three separate units combined here: a given territory, or
geographical region, which the state controls; the exploit of physical force to uphold it’s manage
and thirdly, but mainly significant, the monopoly of the legitimate exploit of such force or
coercion. This legitimacy necessity is acknowledged through mainly, if not all, of those who are
subject to the state’s authority. Weber concluded that for him politics meant ‘striving to share
authority or striving to power the sharing of authority either in the middle of states or in the
middle of clusters within a state.’It was also mentioned that each state exists within a scrupulous
social context. The revise of politics is vitally concerned with the connection of state and society.
A state centered perspective on politics does not imply that its revise should neglect what
happens in the wider sphere of society and how that may, since Weber says, ‘power the sharing
of authority’.Further information cannot be ignored: this is the sustained development and
centralization of state authority. If one sees the state in words of specialized tools of power, then
the history of contemporary times has been marked through the extension of its level and grip.
The contemporary state needs an increasingly intricate bureaucracy dealing with a mounting
diversity of tasks. It requires superior and more sophisticated armed forces, more regulative
welfare agencies, and engages in a wider range of behaviors than was the case before. This
extension of the state’s sphere of action, its development and growth, applies both to liberal-
democratic organizations in their capitalist socio-economic context, and to socialist organizations
with their communal economic framework. Weber saw such development manifested all in the
emergence of a trained, skilled and rationally effective bureaucracy. Someone of quite a
dissimilar political and theoretical backdrop, Marx, agreed with him on this point. Marx wrote in
the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte of the development of state authority in France,
which he saw since typical of the contemporary state. He called how by socialism, eventually the
state would be abolished and society would govern itself without a specialized tools of
repression. Weber, on the contrary, whispered that socialism would require even more officials to
administer a collectivized economy and society.
The Legitimate Exploit of Authority
The point is that, although the state depends on force, it does not rest on force alone. Here, the
notion of the legitimate exploit of authority comes in. Authority, in common, and therefore the
authority of the state, can be exercised in dissimilar methods. Coercion is one shape of authority
and possibly the easiest to understand, but it is not the only one. Not all authority dealings are to
be understood on the foundation of the similar crude model. If a lecturer by force of argument
and breadth of knowledge helps students to shape their ideas, such a person exercises a type of
authority, however not against the students’ will.More to the point, all holders of authority
attempt to get those who are subject to their rule to consider in the rightness and justness of the
authority they wield. This effort at justification in order to create people consent constitutes the
procedure of legitimation. One can refer to such justified or carried authority since ‘power’ to
distinguish it from such authority since is obeyed only because of a fear of sanctions. In such a
situation of legitimate authority, or power, people obey because they think it is right to do
therefore. They consider, for whatever cause, that the authority-holders are entitled to their
dominant role. They have the legitimate power, a right to command. In the terms of one recent
analyst of authority, ‘Legitimate power is an authority relation in which the authority holder
possesses an acknowledged right to command, and the authority subject, an acknowledged
obligation to obey.’
Max Weber on Legitimation
According to Weber, there are three kinds of legitimation, i.e. three ways through which the
wielding of authority can be justified. The first kind pertains to traditional power. There,
authority is justified because the holders of authority can appeal to custom and habit; power has
always been vested in them personally or in their families. The second kind is charismatic
legitimation. People obey the authority-holder because of the exceptional personal qualities
displayed through the leader. Finally, the third kind is of the legal-rational type. People obey sure
persons who are authorized through specific rules to command in strictly defined spheres of
action. One might also say that the first two kinds are of a personal nature, while the legal-
rational kind illustrates a procedural character. Since such it corresponds to the contemporary
conception of political power. It is, since Weber says, ‘power since exercised through the
contemporary ‘servant of the state’ and through all those bearers of authority who in this respect
resemble him.’It is obvious that the authority-holders in any organization will wish to have their
authority carried since legitimate. Seen from their point of view, such an acceptance will permit a
considerable ‘economy’ in the exploit of force. People will obey freely and voluntarily. The
means of coercion, then, will not require to be constantly displayed; they can rather be
concentrated on those who do not accept the legitimacy of the authority building. In any political
organization, there will be those who comply with the rules only because non-compliance will be
punished. Clearly, though, the continuity of any political organization is enhanced to the degree
that people voluntarily obey the rules or laws because they accept the legitimacy of the
recognized order. Hence, they recognize the power of those empowered through the rules to issue
commands. In reality, all political organizations are maintained by a combination of consent and
coercion.
Legitimation: Central Concern of Political Science
These are the causes because of which, since C. Wright Mills puts it, ‘The thought of
legitimation is one of the central conceptions of political science.’ The revise of politics is
centrally concerned with the ways through which holders of authority attempt to get their
authority justified, and with the extent to which they succeed. It is crucial in learning any
political organization to investigate the degree to which people accept the existing authority
building since legitimate, and therefore, how much the building rests on consent since separate
from coercion. It is also significant to ascertain the actual justifications of authority, which are
offered; that is to say, the ways through which an organization of authority is legitimized. This,
since the elitist theorist Mosca points out, is the ‘political formula’ of any political organization.
The question of legitimacy, furthermore, is highly significant in dealing with the topics of
continuity and change of political organizations. Consent may be granted or withdrawn. It is true
that political organizations can survive in situations where big parts of the population cease to
accord any legitimacy to the organization.The case of South Africa in the recent past may be
cited since an instance; similarly, that of Poland, where it seemed that the Jaruzelski regime had
small legitimacy in the eyes of substantial popular units. The point is that in such a situation, a
regime has to rely largely on force. It then discovers itself in a more precarious location,
vulnerable and open to the impact of fortuitous measures. The organization may survive for quite
a time. Though, once it rests on force distant more than on consent, one condition for a
revolutionary change presents itself.
Procedure of ‘Delegitimation’
This explains why a revolution is often preceded through an era when the dominating ideas of the
organization are subjected to continued criticism. One may call this a procedure of
‘delegitimation’ whereby the ideas, which justify the existing building of authority, approach
under attack. Extensive before the fall of the ancient regime in France, the ideas of Divine Right
and of autocracy were ridiculed and refuted through the philosophers, the critics of the absolute
state. Such a movement of delegitimation contributed to undermine the foundations of the old
order. It prepared the method for its revolutionary overthrow.A case in point in contemporary
times would be the fate of the Weimar Republic when big parts of the German population lost
confidence in the democratic regime and, fearing a communist alternative, gave their support to
Hitler’s National-Socialist party. The result was the fall of the republic without much of a thrash
about. Same reasons had same effects all in excess of the European Continent. Several western
organizations of liberal democracy were overthrown and replaced through fascist or semi-fascist
authoritarian organizations since happened in Italy, Spain, Austria and Hungary. The conclusion,
in a common sense, necessity is that any organization loses its continuity once it ceases to enjoy
legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects.Finally, it necessity be noted that even in normal times,
procedures of legitimation and delegitimation are permanent characteristics of any political
organization. The procedure of legitimation is accepted on in more or less subtle methods by
several channels accessible for the legitimation of the existing order. Legitimizing ideas are
absorbed from the earliest levels of education, diffused by a diversity of shapes of social
interaction, and spread especially by the power of the press, television and other size media.
Views, which are carried or measured to be within the boundaries of the organization, are
approximately forced on readers, listeners and viewers. Action, which goes beyond those limits,
is presented since illegitimate.
Manipulated Consent
There are still more effective ways accessible to prevent subversive ideas from even arising.
They may be intercepted at source, the source being the conscious and even the subconscious
mind. A significant dimension of authority is the capability to affect and mould people’s
consciousness therefore that they will accept the existing state of affairs without ever becoming
aware of alternative possibilities. Consent, then, becomes manipulated consent. To a sure extent
we are all affected through the prevailing ‘climate of opinion’. From there an ascending level
leads to a location where the molding of minds, manipulation, is made the deliberate purpose of
the state in order to make a monolithic popular mentality. Such was the purpose of Goebbels’
propaganda machine in Nazi Germany and this is even, the purpose of any totalitarian
regime.Manipulation is ‘authority wielded strange to the powerless’, since C. Wright Mills
defines it. Peter Worsley points out that ‘the mechanisms through which consciousness is
manipulated are of rising importance in contemporary society.’ In Marxist language, such
manipulated consent would eventually produce a ‘false consciousness’. Against that, it could be
argued that where people are free to choose and to express their choice since in liberal-
democratic organizations, the manipulation of consciousness is not possible.Manipulation can
only happen where free choice does not exist, since in one-party organizations. It is also argued
that wherever people are free to choose, but do not in fact choose an alternative to the existing
order-for instance, through supporting parties committed to radical changes-it is safe to assume
that the existing building of society is broadly ‘what people want’. This would lead to the
conclusion that the importance of political choice and the skill to freely express that choice
cannot be overrated. Though, ‘what people want’ is too few extent conditioned through several
factors. Choice does not take lay in a vacuum. In short, the choice itself cannot be measured since
totally free from the impact of a procedure of legitimation.
Personnel of the State Machine: The Elite
They chiefly stem from the information that state authority is structured or broken up, therefore
to speak, into separate sectors. It has already been mentioned that the specific connection of the
several sectors is determined through the political organization within which they operate. A
further question involves the personnel of these sectors. The state, after all, is not a machine;
however the phrase ‘machinery of the state’ may be used. The state is a set of organizations
staffed through people whose ideas and vital attitudes are mainly convinced through their origin
and social habitation. The composition of the state elite is a significant problem in the revise of
politics. J.A.C. Grifith in The Politics of the Judiciary exemplifies what is meant through the
word ‘state elite’ with reference to a recent revise. It illustrates that in Britain, ‘in broad words,
four out of five full-time professional judges are products of the elite. It is not surprising that
while discussing ‘judicial opinion in relation to the political cases’, Griffith discovers ‘an extra
ordinary consistency of come in these cases concentrated in a fairly narrow section of the
spectrum of political opinion.’It necessity be noted here that from dissimilar theoretical points of
view, dissimilar answers will be given to the question since to how decisive the nature and
composition of the state elite are. Elitist theories accord the highest importance to this factor. In
their perspective, the nature of a political organization is best explained through an analysis of its
elite, that ruling minority, which controls the state tools. In this perspective, approximately
everything depends on the talents and abilities of the leaders. A low excellence of leadership will
have disastrous consequences. For that cause, Max Weber was much concerned with the nature
of Germany’s political leadership. He was in favor of a strong parliament, which, he whispered,
would give an adequate training ground to produce leaders willing and capable of responsible
action. Alternatively, leadership would fall into the hands of the bureaucracy whose training and
life approach made them unsuitable material for creative leadership.Marxist theories would view
the matter differently. They would accord less importance to the nature of the state elite. The
argument would rather be that the purpose and the aims of state action are determined less
through the elite, but distant more through the social context and the economic framework within
which the state organization is situated. This building is of greater significance, in this view, than
the character of the personnel that staff the state machine. Usually, ‘structural’ theories would
emphasize the constraints on the government stemming from the social buildings within which
the government has to operate. Nevertheless, the two kinds of interpretation require not be
mutually exclusive.This brings us to a final question, which deals with the relation of state and
society. The phrase, which Marx applied to the Bonapartist state, that its authority was not
‘suspended mid-air’, can be generalized to apply to all kinds of state organizations. Then, many
troubles present themselves. How does the authority building of society affect and constrain the
political leaders? To what extent does the state interfere to uphold and legitimize or,
alternatively, mitigate the inequalities of the social organization? To what extent indeed is ‘civil
society’ self-governing of the state? For few theorists, the concept of ‘totalitarianism’ is meant to
suggest a situation where society is completely controlled through state authority and, so, has no
independence at all.

POLITICAL ARGUMENTS AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Nature of Arguments in the Classical Custom
From Plato to Marx, there are many philosophers, whose scripts have been broadly carried to
constitute what is described since the Western Classical Custom. Political arguments, in this
custom, have usually been of a normative nature due to the information that the subjects of
concern and reflection have been matters such since: what is justice? Are there human rights and
if therefore, what are they? What is the role of the state? Do individuals have definable requires
and if therefore, who has an obligation to satisfy them? Should the government seek the greatest
happiness of the greatest number and, if it should, what is the lay of the minorities within this
rubric? What provides government legitimacy and a state sovereignty? What sorts of claims on
possessions does the recognition of merit or desert embody? How distant is the majority justified
in imposing its moral outlook on the rest of society? Can we provide an adequate explanation of
the social and political organizations? What is the best shape of government?Through and big,
the classical custom has been concerned with the nature of good life, with the institutional
arrangements that would be necessary for human beings to flourish, for requires to be met or
their rational capacities realized. At the similar time, there has been a preoccupation with what is
politically right-with the nature of law, justice, the best shape of government, the rights and
duties of the individuals, and with the distributive system of society. Political theories were in
relation to the right and the good and therefore were the political arguments. Seen in this method,
the subject matter of political philosophy was extremely much a section and parcel of moral
philosophy.Political arguments assumed the shape of moral reasoning with a clear purpose of
settling moral issues or claims of moral and political truth on a rational foundation. Political
arguments purported to convey few truths in relation to the fundamental nature of politics, to
create claims which could be regarded since objective and inter–subjectively valid. This truth and
objectivity was based upon dissimilar assumptions: sometimes in relation to the cause,
sometimes in relation to the empirical experience, sometimes in relation to the intuition, and
occasionally, revelation. At the similar time, few epistemological power was also invoked such
since cause or experience therefore that ultimately claims in relation to the fundamental human
requires, goals, purposes, relationships and the shapes of rule suitable to these which entered in
the political philosophy were supposed to be true. For instance, Plato, Hobbes, Hegel and Mill,
worked out, at least in section, the cognitive foundation on which the claims in political
philosophy were advanced.Political arguments in this custom, therefore, proceeded from sure
self-apparent truth, axioms, or assumptions in relation to the nature of truth or knowledge,
towards conclusions in relation to the political truths or claim to truths. As the philosophers
themselves set up the standards of cognitive truth, the validity of their political arguments could
only be judged internally. Appeal to few theory or self-governing criterion was out of question. If
you carried the premise of the philosophy or the theory, there was no method to escape from the
validity of the conclusion. It would, though, be a dissimilar matter if the disputes were in excess
of the premises –if its cognitive claims were challengeable.Indeed, the history of the classical
custom illustrates that there were biggest differences in the conclusions reached through political
philosophers, on explanation of the information that their premises or epistemology were
dissimilar. Such being the case, a point appeared with regard to the significance of such
philosophies.
Positivist Critique of Normative Theory
Positivism, especially logical positivism that was convinced through linguistic philosophy,
rejected much of the normative political theory since irredeemably subjective, lacking in
cognitive foundation and even meaningless or outright nonsense.Wittgenstein, who inspired
logical positivist theories, had advanced three theses, which are of interest to us here, in
explicating the case against normative theory. The first was that logic and mathematics consist of
tautologies; second, that language has truth-functional building and that its vital units are names,
and third, no ethical or moral reports can convey definite cognitive information.Elaborating the
first, he said that the vital building of mathematics could be derived from logic and in that sense,
the truths of mathematics are conventional rather than revealing ‘facts’ in relation to the numbers
and their relationships. That is to say, given sure definitions of the vital words, and a scrupulous
understanding of the rules of inference, the entire building of mathematical truth could be
generated. But these shapes of truth depend upon their definitions of vital words and the rules of
inference. In a sense, they are true through definition. It may seem that we create new discoveries
in mathematics, but this is only because the remote consequences of definition are hard to foresee
and have to be teased out with great complication and elaboration.The second thesis is that
language has a building that can be laid bare through logical analysis. This analysis will reveal
language since being truth-functional. That is to say that, intricate propositions in language,
which we exploit to convey information, can be shown to be analyzable into component
propositions. Obviously, this procedure has to stop and we are left with the vital structure blocks
of language, that he calls ‘Elementary Propositions’. These elementary propositions consist of
names. Names are significant, because they provide meaning to elementary propositions for:
They provide meaning directly rather than being mediated through other propositions, and
They relate directly to the world.
Consequently, if meaningful uses of language have to turn upon the information that names refer
directly to substances, then this has clear consequences for moral and political thinking. If the
propositions contained in the normative political scripts are not susceptible to this analysis, then
they are not meaningful. Substances are either material substances or direct sense experiences.
Political language, therefore, gets in deep trouble, for in what sense words like good, justice;
right could be analyzed therefore since to refer to substances?Moral and evaluative words usually
do not admit of this truth-functional analysis and moral ‘substances’ cannot be spoken in relation
to the in a cognitively meaningful manner. Therefore, there can be no theory of values. Only
those propositions describing vital experiences of material substances could be meaningful. It
followed from this that, a proposition to be valid necessity be verifiable empirically, for which
the proposition necessity refer to direct sense experience or the nature of that experience could, in
principle, be specified if directly accessible sense experience was not involved.
It may be argued that few political theories of the classical custom were based upon factual
premises, such since those of Hobbes, Aristotle and Mill. Their theories were based on facts of
human nature. To the extent the factual premises were empirical, they could in principle be
verified and then be meaningful. Positivists would accept these premises since meaningful, but
would rather concentrate on the nature of the support which these empirical propositions are
supposed to provide to normative and evaluative conclusions. And in this context, they invoked
Hume who had argued that factual premises in an argument cannot yield normative, moral or
evaluative conclusions to dismiss such theories.
Nature of Arguments in the Empirical Custom
While positivism dismissed normative political theory, it encouraged a scientific revise of
political phenomena based upon the methodology of natural sciences. Within this custom, the
nature of political argument underwent a important change, for now both the subject matter since
well since the methodology on which it could justify its arguments were dissimilar from those in
the normative theory.Since regards the subject matter of the arguments, political arguments could
only be in relation to the empirical political behaviour and logical analysis of political concepts.
With regard to the revise of politics, the arguments required that the propositions be defined in
words of little empirical sense content. This, in turn, required that arguments be based on the
behavioral come to the revise of political attitudes since well since an individualistic
reductionism come to social and political phenomena. The latter, implied few type of
methodological individualism therefore that the concepts relating to social wholes such since the
state, the society, the polity could be rendered into few set of reports that refer only to the
empirically detectable behaviour of individuals. In effect, political arguments were sanitized of
metaphysical suppositions and rendered wholly value-neutral, which could be tested and verified
since these arguments were in relation to the empirical phenomena.Political arguments, in this
custom, rejected a priori reasoning in relation to the human beings and society, and were based
on factual and statistical enquires. It was grounded in the theory of knowledge that took
experience since the only valid foundation of knowledge. Within such a framework, the purpose
of political arguments was to explain the observable phenomena and the validity of the
arguments would be judged on the criteria of internal consistency, consistency with respect to the
other arguments that seek to explain related phenomena and the capability to generate empirical
predictions that can be tested against observation. The truth claim of the arguments could be
vindicated, if it either met the verification principle or Popper’s falsification principle.
Behavioralists in the middle of the positivists followed the falsification principle. If the argument
could not be falsified, then it was merely tautological; that is true through definition only, and
hence meaningless. Arguments to be valid necessity are capable of being falsified, only then can
they be said to be based on the scientific way.
Decline of Positivism and Interpretive Theory since an Alternative
Positivism had no satisfactory answer to this and it emerged that the extremely criterion for
judging flanked by sense and non-sense in reports began to seem non-sensual itself. Interpretive
theory, or Hermeneutics, appeared in political inquiry since an alternative to positivist political
science. They criticize the empiricist come for assuming a disjuncture flanked by political life
and language of that political life. In other terms, they criticize empiricism for its assumption that
there is a political reality that exists and that in principle can be exposed independently of the
language of that polity and for, downplaying internal relationship flanked by social/political life
on the one hand, and the language that is embedded in it, on the other. Interpretive theorists
uphold that our political practices are expressed and constituted through the language that is
lodged in them, and that the language lodged in them gets its sense from the shape of political
practices in which it grows. Charles Taylor says that our political practices cannot be recognized
in abstraction from the language we exploit to define them, invoke them or carry them out. The
vocabulary of the social dimension of the situation is grounded in the form of the social practices
in this dimension; that is to say that, vocabulary would not create sense if the range of practices
did not exist.
And yet, this range of practices would not exist without the prevalence of this or few related
vocabulary. The language is, therefore, constitutive of reality, is essential to its being the type of
reality it is.When language is constitutive of reality, then the account of political life necessity
goes beyond empirically observable behaviour and subjective attitudes. Account necessity goes
deeper to uncover the meanings and practices of language and political life and shape the social
matrix against which subjective intentions are shaped. These more vital inter–subjective and
general meanings and practices need a deep hermeneutics that goes beyond the proof required of
empirical inquiry. Hence, empirical social science is insufficient for explaining the mainly
fundamental characteristics of political and social life. Account in words of subjective attitudes
and empirical indicators of behaviour are too thin to identify and explanation for the mainly
profound meaning and sense of political life.To create manifest the meaning of social/political
practices informed through language, we need interpretation, because they are often inchoate,
tacit and imperfectly articulated. But then any such interpretation in contestable and because, to
support a scrupulous interpretation is to endorse one set of political alternatives, while
undermining others. Interpretive theory, so, cannot be value-neutral. Gadamer in his Truth and
Way, suggests that one suitable model to understand the meaning of social/ political practices is
the model of interpreting a text: a model in which we are not interested in search for reasons or
framing of laws, but understanding a entire in words of its sections, and its sections, in words of
the contributions they create to the meaning of the entire. Interpretive theory has cast an
extremely strong power in recent years on the normative theories of communitarians, feminists,
and post-modernists.
Normative Turn in Political Theory
The 1970’s saw a normative turn in political theory at the hands of Rawls, Nozick, Walzer,
Dworkin, Grewith and others. Possibly, one of the mainly vital causes for the change of fortune
has been the decline of positivism since a potent force in philosophy. This decline in a big
measure was due to the infirmity of the verification principle itself. Beside with this, a climate for
revival of normative political theory was created through the deep moral crisis that the western
culture was facing. A view had, so, gained ground that a society requires few type of a moral
basis, a set of beliefs which either do or might hold it jointly, the thought here being that
practical cause is rootless and arbitrary, if it is not based on a set of agreed values which are
taken since authoritative for that society.But if values are subjective, a matter of preference, since
positivists will uphold, then how do we agree on values? Normative political theory, on the other
hand, maintains that this agreement is possible, if few common set of principles could be
establish which could then give a foundation for accommodation flanked by subjective
standpoints and flanked by dissimilar values. The crucial question then is how do we get that set
of common principles? There are two answers or methods for this.

THEORISING THE POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Historical Come
The traditional or the historical come to political science is best represented through George H.
Sabine. Sabine proceeds with his definition of political science in an extremely practical manner.
He suggests that we contain in political science all those subjects which have been the biggest
themes of discussion in the scripts of familiar political philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, Bentham, Mill, Green, Hegel, Marx, and others. In the scripts of these
philosophers, we may attempt to search out those questions which they have raised in relation to
the truth or the validity of political theories. Questions regarding goods or ideals to be realized in
or by the state, meaning of freedom, why men obey the government, the sphere of government
behaviors, meaning of equality—these are few of the questions which have agitated the minds of
political philosophers during the ages. In addition, we may also create an inventory of questions
concerning the state, the connection flanked by state and society and flanked by the individual
and the state, and talk about them at length if they have not been fully discussed through these
political philosophers. These shape the bases of political theory. Sabine and other traditional
writers have attached a great trade of importance to the historical come. A political theory is
always advanced in ‘reference to a pretty specific situation’ and, so, reconstruction of ‘the time,
lay and the conditions in which it was produced’ is essential to understand it. The information,
that a political theory is always rooted in a ‘pretty specific situation’ does not mean that it does
not have significance for the future. Great political theory excels both in the ‘analysis of a present
situation and in suggestiveness for other situations’. Since such, a good political theory, even
however it is the outcome of a peculiar set of historical conditions, has significance for all times
to approach. It is exactly this universal character of political theory which makes it respectable.
A typical political theory contains, according to Sabine:
‘Factual reports in relation to the postures of affairs that gave rise to it’,
Reports of ‘what may be roughly described a causal nature’, and
Reports that ‘something ought to occur or is the right and desirable item to have happened’.
Political theories, therefore, constitute, according to Sabine, three units—the factual, the causal
and the evolutionary. Political theories of great worth have usually been evolved throughout eras
of stress and strain. In the recognized history of more than twenty-five hundred years, there have
been two eras of in relation to the fifty years each in two spaces of fairly restricted areas where
political philosophy has thrived mainly:
In Athens, in the second and the third quarters of the fourth century B.C., when Plato and
Aristotle wrote their great jobs, and
In England, flanked by 1640 and 1690, when Hobbes, Locke and others evolved their
political theories.
Both these eras have been eras of great changes in the social and intellectual history of Europe.
Great political theories are, therefore, ‘secreted’, since Sabine would put it, ‘in the interstices of
political and social crises’.They are produced, not through the crises since such, but through the
reaction they leave on the minds of the thinkers. In order, so, to understand political theory, it is
necessary to understand clearly, the time, the lay and the conditions in which it has evolved. The
political philosopher may not actually take section in the politics of his times, but he is affected
through it and, in his own turn, he tries vigorously to affect it. Political theories, according to
Sabine, ‘play a double role’, in the sense that while they belong to the abstract world of idea, they
also power beliefs which become reasons and serve since causal measures in historical situations.
It is also necessary to understand whether a political theory is true or fake, sound or inane, valid
or unreliable. This involves the question of values. It is, so, necessary that in the understanding of
political theory we should attempt to bring in the factual, the causal since well since the valuation
factors.
The Sociological Come
The historical come has been usually criticized since one which is much too deferential to
custom. It is also pointed out through several of the contemporary writers that this come takes a
narrow view of politics and restricts it to the domain of the state.Many modern writers have tried
to widen the scope of political science therefore since to contain not only the state but the society
since well, a point of view which is extremely clearly brought out through Catlin. Catlin would
like to exploit politics in the Aristotlean sense, in the sense in which it contains all those
behaviors which are accepted out within the auspices of society. Catlin regards political science
since indistinguishable from sociology, and has pointed out a number of advantages of this come:
It allows the student to trade with the dealings and building of society since a entire and not
with a segment of it artificially created flanked by the fifteenth and the seventeenth century in a
section of Europe and now called since the ‘contemporary state’.
It links up his studies with a common theory of society which the political scientists can
ignore only at their peril, something which mainly contemporary political scientists have not
done.
If the political scientist deals with the state since his element of analysis, he is likely to
neglect the trivial and the general details concerning political measures taking lay from day to
day, which he cannot understand unless he relates them to happenings in society. A big number
of states exist today, but they cannot all be treated since individual elements for the purposes of
political analysis. One has to go to their vital features.
If the political scientist decides to go beyond the revise of organizations and undertakes the
revise of functions and procedures he would discover it easier to pick up an element of analysis.
Catlin, on his section, has opted for the revise of the phenomenon of manage since the central
concern for the revise of politics. Through the act of manage, he means ‘the act of individuals’.
Catlin would have no objection to describe politics, since V.O. Key has done since ‘the revise of
government’, provided we accept ‘government’ since a synonym for ‘manage’ and not
organizations, like that of President or Cabinet. One could also call politics ‘the revise of
authority and power’, if we clearly understood that ‘power is not government’, or in Max
Weber’s terms, ‘the thrash about for authority or the influencing of those in authority’, and
embracing ‘the thrash about flanked by states since such and flanked by organized clusters within
the state’.
The Philosophical Come
Besides the traditional and the modern view-points concerning political science, there is a third
view point advanced through Leo Strauss, which may be called since the philosophical come.
Leo Strauss makes a distinction flanked by political theory and political philosophy and believes
that they are both sections of political idea. Political theory, according to Strauss, is ‘the effort
truly to know the nature of political things’. Philosophy being the ‘quest for wisdom’ ‘or quest
for universal knowledge, for knowledge of the entire’, political philosophy is ‘the effort truly to
know both the nature of political things and the right, or the good, political order’. Political idea
extends to both political theory and political philosophy. Political theory and political philosophy
are complementary to each other, as ‘usually speaking, it is impossible to understand idea or
action or job without evaluating it’. Strauss is critical of both ‘historicism’ since advocated
through Sabine and ‘social science positivism’ for which Catlin has been pleading, the former
being in his views ‘the serious antagonist of political philosophy’.Values, Strauss believes, are an
indispensable section of political philosophy, and cannot be excluded from the revise of politics.
All political action aims at either preservation or change, and is guided through few idea or
evaluation of what is bigger and what is worse. A political scientist is expected to possess more
than opinion. ‘If this directedness becomes explicit, if men create it their explicit goal to acquire
knowledge of the good life and of the good society, political philosophy emerges’.‘The
assumptions regarding the nature of political things, which are implied in all knowledge of
political things’, writes Strauss, ‘have the character of opinions. It is only when these
assumptions are made the theme of critical and coherent analysis that a philosophic or scientific
come to politics emerges.’ Political philosophy is the ‘effort to replace opinion in relation to the
nature of political things through knowledge of the nature of political things’, ‘the effort truly to
know both the nature of political things and the right, or the good, political order.’ Political
philosophy in the comprehensive shape has been cultivated as its beginnings, approximately
without any interruption, till extremely recently when the behavioralists started raising disputes
in relation to it’s subject-matter, ways since well since functions, and demanding it’s extremely
possibility.
An Integrated Come
If it is significant not to allow political science to be lost in scientism or moralism, it is also
significant that both the scientific and the philosophic characteristics of political theory should be
properly understood and emphasized. But before we attempt to understand the scientific
characteristic of political theory, we should first understand what we mean through science,
presently since before we attempt to understand the philosophical characteristic of political
theory, we necessity understand what we mean through philosophy. Science has been variously
called since ‘a branch of knowledge or revise dealing with a body of facts or truths systematically
arranged and showing the operation of common laws’, ‘knowledge, since of facts of principles,
gained through systematic revise’, ‘a branch or body of organized knowledge’. A scientific come
to the revise of a problem, so, involves two things:
The agreement on ways, and
The training of the human beings in scientific job.
Taking these two characteristics into consideration, Friedrich would describe science since ‘a
body of ordered knowledge, recognized to and progressively enlarged through the specialists in
that field of knowledge by the exploit of ways which they since a group accept since workable
methods for arriving at that scrupulous type of knowledge’.Science is, therefore, ‘organized’
knowledge and because there is a consistency of ways employed in the gathering of the
scrupulous knowledge of that science through several scholars, which provides it a logical
coherence, scientific reports are capable of validation through other scholars. This definition of
science, which it would be hardly possible to challenge, does not say that the similar ways would
be applicable to all the science. In fact, the way of one may not be applicable to another. Taking
the easy matter of generalization, no two sciences agree in the degree of generalization which
would create them true sciences. One might argue that they are same at least in the sense that
they both operate with precise quantitative data. Science, though, demands not only accuracy but
also relevancy and adequacy of results. History has been made highly scientific throughout the
last some decades. But the development of its ‘scientific’ character has nothing to do with
quantification—it is on the foundation of a more scientific revise of sources and a more critical
exploit of the other kinds of proof which has led to greater progress in the exploit of scientific
ways in history. Friedrich makes it extremely clear that, ‘neither the degree of generalization, nor
the degree of quantification, are in themselves ‘absolute’ criteria of scientific progress, but
necessity be evaluated in relation to the material in hand and to be assessed.’ He quotes Aristotle
with approval when he describes it since ‘the spot of an educated man’ ‘to seem for precision in
each class of things presently therefore distant since the nature of the subject admits’.
Autonomous Character of Political Science
The secure identification of political science with either science or philosophy raises, in the
opinion of Norman Jacobson, another type of danger, the danger of political theory ending up in
few type of ‘scientism’ or ‘moralism’. Jacobson has tried to create it clear that political science is
neither scientism nor moralism—neither totally recognized with science nor with morality—but
distinct from both of them and maintaining an identity of its own. Those who attempt to mould
political science in the perfect image of science and attempt to apply ways and processes of
science to it do not always understand what science means. One may not deny the advantage of
utilizing the knowledge of one field for the bigger understanding of another, but one has to also
understand the distinction flanked by the two meadows. Jacobson is of the view that modern
political scientists are trying to create of political science anything but political science. ‘It would
look’, he writes, ‘that politics is psychology, or it is sociology, that it is moral philosophy or
theology’—that it is ‘approximately anything but politics’. Politics, in his view, is a special type
of intellectual action. There is no harm in trying to pursue it more effectively through drawing
upon the best that meadows of enquiry in other disciplines have to offer, but this should be done
only therefore distant since it helps us in bigger understanding of politics. Politics, in fact, has got
to be studied in its own right. If ‘science’ is taken out of political theory, it might become a
worthless ‘ethical’ residue; if ‘philosophy’ is taken out of it, it might be reduced to mere
methodology. Those who emphasis either the scientific or the philosophical character of political
science to the extent of identifying political science with one or the other, may be good advocates
of ‘scientism’ or ‘moralism’, but they certainly lack in a sense of commitment to political science
itself.
Empirical vs. Normative Theory
While many approaches to political science have been advocated from time to time, and several
of them have often co-lived simultaneously, they might be broadly divided into two categories—
the empirical-analytical or the scientific-behavioral come on one face and the legal-historical or
the normative-philosophical come on the other, and each of these two approaches has been
largely demarcated from the other through the emphasis it lays on facts since against values or on
values since against facts. Two opposing locations are taken up in this respect through those who
have been called through Robert Dahl since Empirical Theorists and Trans-empirical Theorists.
The empirical theorists consider that an empirical science of politics based on facts alone is
possible, whereas the others, the trans-empirical theorists, are of the opinion that the revise of
politics neither can nor should be purely scientific. The controversy largely revolves a round two
biggest issues:
Can political analysis be neutral?
Should political analysis be neutral?
Concerning the first, the empirical theorists are sure that it is possible to isolate and to test the
empirical characteristic of our beliefs in relation to the politics without the must of going into the
value-laden question of whether the empirical propositions are true or false. A ‘correct’ decision
on what is empirically true is not the similar since a ‘correct’ decision on what ought to be.
Whether values are derived from God’s will, or natural laws, or are purely subjective in nature,
since the existentialists consider. Facts are there for all to see and can be subjected to empirical
tests, whereas values cannot be tested this method. Whether the continuity of popular
governments in common or in a scrupulous country is in any method dependent on literacy,
multi-party organizations, proportional representation, a two-party organization, whether it can
best function under single-member constituencies, are questions which can be tested empirically,
irrespective of the information whether they are regarding the right or the wrong political
organizations. The trans empiricists, on the other hand, consider that whatever be the situation in
the natural sciences, facts and values are therefore closely inter-twined with each other that, in
the revise of politics, one can not distinct them except for in the mainly trivial
instances.Whatever one might pretend, they would say, one is creation value judgments all the
time. Any comprehensive theory in relation to the politics, they argue, necessity inevitably
include evaluations not merely of the empirical validity of the factual reports in the theory, but
also of the moral excellence of the political measures, procedures or organizations called in the
theory. It is so, that there can be a totally objective theory of politics.
Modern Relevance of Classics
While the empirical theorists, under the impressive, scientific garb of ‘behavioralism’, seemed to
be dominating the discipline of political science throughout the fifties and the sixties, the ‘uses’
since well since the ‘relevance’ of classical political philosophy sustained to be widely
recognized and a number of influential modern political thinkers sustained to defend and uphold
the traditional-classical political theory and severely criticize the empirical-analytical approaches.
They may not be extremely big in numbers, but they belong to dissimilar countries and exercise a
great trade of power in excess of a big number of their students and admirers. The names which
immediately strike one’s mind in this relationship are those of Michael Oakeshott, Hannah
Arendt, Bertrand Jouvenel, Leo Strauss, Christian Bay and Eric Voegelin.A classic has been
defined since a job in a ‘class’ through itself, a job ‘of the first rank and of acknowledged
excellence’. Jobs like Plato’s Republic and Laws, Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics, Augustine’s
Municipality of God, Aquinas, Treatise on Law in the Summa Theological, Machiavelli’s Prince
and Discourses, Hobbes’s Leviathan, Locke’s Second Treatise, Rousseau’s Social Contract,
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Marx’s Philosophic-and Economic Manuscripts of 1844 and
German Ideology approach under the category of ‘classics’. The extremely exploit of the term in
plural involves a ‘conversation of several voices’, a dialogue flanked by dissimilar perspectives
and interpretations of reality since an entire. ‘A conversation’, since Dante Germino has pointed
out, ‘is not a battle of voices, but rather a reflection of sure predominant rows of argument, which
can be recognized through those who will listen.’ It is a ‘conversation of mankind’ which extends
beyond the contemporary into the medieval and the ancient ages and the excellence of which is
not affected through the context of time or legroom in which a scrupulous political philosopher
was situated. All that was necessary was that one taking section in this ‘conversation of mankind’
was directly involved in the issues of the day which, whether in politics or in philosophy, are
issues of all time, was capable of deep thinking, or contemplation, on these issues and could
express himself in a language which would appeal to men in all ages.
Stability of Traditional Political Idea
Michael Oakeshott, who took in excess of the chair of political science in the London School of
Economics and Political Science from Harold Laski in 1951, has been recognized with the
resurgence of conservative thinking in England. But it would be wrong to regard Oakeshott since
merely a conservative, however conservative he was in every sense of the word. His biggest
contribution was to recover political theory since a custom of enquiry and regain for political
science, the possibility of a critical, theoretical analysis. Since dissimilar from the behavioralists,
who were beginning to create a spot in the United States of America when he was enunciating a
dissimilar type of doctrine in his lectures and seminars to his students at the London School of
Economics and by his publications. Oakeshott based his philosophical analysis on experience
which seeks to rediscover the multi-dimensionality that had been denied to experience through
the ideological and positivist writers. Oakeshott treats philosophy and science since simply two
dissimilar types of behaviors and believes that it would be wrong to effort to transfer the ways
and concerns of the one to the other. ‘The notion that philosophy has anything to learn from the
ways of scientific idea,’ he writes, ‘is altogether false.’ Philosophy necessity be pursued for its
own sake, and necessity ‘uphold its independence from all extraneous interests, and in scrupulous
from the practical interest’. Oakeshott believes that political philosophy—or, since he would like
to call it, philosophizing in relation to the politics—is a limited action within the context of the
superior role of philosophizing—the effort ‘to see one scrupulous manner of experience—
practical experience—from the standpoint of the totality of experience’. Reflection in relation to
the political life can be at a diversity of stages, and was apt to flow from one stage to another, but
in political philosophy we have in our mind, the world of political action and also ‘another
world’ and our endeavor is to explore ‘the coherence of the two worlds jointly’. Political
philosophy for him is ‘the consideration of the relation flanked by politics and eternity’. ‘Politics
is contributory to the fulfillment of an end which it cannot itself bring about’. Political
philosophy for Oakeshott is not, what it is to the behavioralist, a ‘progressive’ science which
accumulates solid results and reaches conclusions upon which further research may be based. It
is, on the other hand, closely integrated to history—‘indeed, in a sense it is nothing but a history,
which is a history of the troubles philosophers have detected and the manner of solution they
have proposed, rather than a history of doctrines....’ Hannnah Arendt is a more prolific writer.
Believing in the uniqueness and responsibility of the individual human person, she is not only
opposed to totalitarianism of all types, but also to the behavioralist come in social sciences,
which prepares the ground for totalitarianism. In its search for uniformity in human behaviour,
she warns, it will itself contribute to the creation of a uniform stereotyped ‘man’. The name of
Bertrand de Jouvenel may possibly be mentioned beside with that of Hannah Arendt. Both
consider that politics has a potentiality for creative action and should not be transformed into the
dead uniformity of management. Both are against totalitarianism, which threatens to become the
predominant phenomenon of the twentieth century, and have tried to analyze its intellectual and
moral roots. Leo Strauss, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, whose
death in October 1973 was a great loss to political philosophy, is one of the mainly outstanding
modern theorists and a staunch critic of the behavioralist come. His impact on American
philosophy and political science has been extremely great. In Chicago, there are a big number of
political scientists who regard it their privilege to be measured his disciples.
The New Science of Politics
Views of Eric Voegelin
In the middle of the contemporary political thinkers who have taken flights into the heights of
political philosophizing, the name of Eric Voegelin stands out since the mainly prominent. He is
a prolific writer, however his approach is somewhat complicated and it is not always simple to
follow him. He does not create a distinction flanked by political theory and political science—to
him political theory would mean a critical reflection on politics, without which there can be no
political science. Voegelin is strongly of the view that we never had the materials accessible and
the intellectual climate appropriate for great advances in theoretical analysis, since now.
Voegelin is against organization structure in contemporary philosophy and believes that the
organization-constructors are ignorant of the vital experience of subsistence. It is the duty of the
political theorist to empirically analyze, and critically evaluate, man’s experiences by history
with a view to seeking the light which they shed upon his own search for truth in relation to the
order in human society, a task which was superbly done through the Greek philosophers and the
Christian theologians. Voegelin sharply disagrees with the contemporary political theorists who
would treat political theory since essentially methodology and its task since merely acting ‘since
the hand-maiden of research into behavioral regularities on the phenomenological stage’. He
would rather regard political theory since ‘an experimental science of right order, based on the
total experience of the existing human person’. The task of political theory is to elaborate
‘empirically and critically, the troubles of order which derive from philosophical anthropology
since section of a common ontology’.
Views of Christian Bay
At a time when the behavioralists were trying to rationalize and justify the elitist concept of
democracy by their ‘applied’ studies and collection of statistical data, Christian Bay, in the best
custom of classical political philosophers, was questioning their ‘wisdom’ and raising few
fundamental questions concerning troubles and perspectives of enquiry, which look to have been
neglected through them. He agreed with David Easton’s definition of politics since consisting of
‘all the procedures through which public values are promoted and distributed through means of
authority and power’, but objected to a virtual absence in such a definition of any reference to the
relatedness of politics to human requires and troubles. The size of behavioral research in political
science today, he writes, ‘deals with voting and with opinions and attitudes on social, political
and economic issues. But we should not mistake the political horizon we encounter in this
research for the entire realm of the political. There is too much that gets lost when attention is
focused on what we can readily measure through the average types of sociological techniques—
individual meanings of political commitments, for instance’. He was critical of the prevailing
tendency in current research of not trying to relate behavioral data meaningfully to normative
theories of democracy. He quoted in this relationship the ‘painstaking analysis of political
behaviour with an astonishingly superficial effort at bringing their data to bear on democratic
theory’ that Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee had made when they concluded that the American
organization of democracy ‘does meet sure necessities for a going political system’ and that ‘it
often jobs with distinction’. ‘With a more adequate conception of politics’, he wrote, ‘It will
become clear, I consider, that what these and several other authors of books on political
behaviour are looking at is only a limited range of data, which badly requires to be
complemented through a more rigorous scientific inquiry, and also through a much superior
canvas of political theory that contains a lay for concepts such since requires, development, and
the general good, to name a some only.’ It was even more shocking for Bay to discover a ‘highly
respected writer’ like S.M. Lipset cheerfully claiming that democracy ‘is the good society itself
in operation’, or that ‘the provide-and-take of a free society’s internal struggles’ was the best man
could hope for on this earth. Quoting a some more examples, he wrote, ‘Determined to utilize the
accessible arsenals of sociological techniques, this row of research has stressed the phenomena
that can be weighed and counted to the exclusion of more diffuse and elusive characteristics of
politics. In their desire to be scientific, these investigators have shied absent from normative
inquiry to such an extent that they unblushingly relate their fine empirical job to the crudest
notions of, and assumptions about, democracy—either since an end in itself or since a means to
even vaguer conceptions of human wants’.

THE NEED FOR POLITICAL THEORY

Political Theory and other Inter- Related Words
A distinction can be made flanked by political theory and same words. The differentiation
flanked by political theory and political science arises because of the common shift in intellectual
perceptions brought in relation to the through contemporary science. Political Science has tried to
give plausible generalizations and laws in relation to the politics and political behaviour. Political
theory reflects upon political phenomenon, procedures and organizations and on actual political
behaviour through subjecting it to philosophical or ethical criterion. It considers the question of
the best political order, which is a section of a superior and a more fundamental question;
namely, the ideal shape of life that a human being ought to lead within a superior society. In the
procedure of answering immediate and regional questions, it addresses perennial issues, which is
why a revise of the classical texts shape a significant component of the discipline. A classic in
political theory has the essential ingredients of a great literary job, which inspite of its regional
setting, deals with the perennial troubles of life and society. It contains the quintessence of
eternal knowledge and is an inheritance not of any one civilization, lay, people or time, but of the
whole humankind. Specific political theories cannot be measured since the correct or final
understanding of an event. The meaning of an event is always open to future interpretations from
new viewpoints, each explaining and analyzing from a scrupulous standpoint or concern in
political life. Furthermore, political theory is critical in its endeavor, for it provides an
explanation of politics that rises above those of ordinary people. There is no tension flanked by
political theory and political science, for they differ in words of their boundaries and jurisdiction,
and not in their aim. Political theory supplies ideas, concepts and theories for the purpose of
analysis, account, account and criticism, which in turn are included in political science. Political
philosophy gives common answers to questions such since what is justice, concepts of right, the
distinction flanked by ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and the superior issues of politics. Political philosophy is a
section of normative political theory, for it attempts to set up inter-relationships flanked by
concepts. It is, possibly, accurate to say that every political philosopher is a theorist; however
every political theorist is not a political philosopher. Political philosophy is an intricate action,
which is best, understood through analyzing the several methods that the acknowledged masters
have practiced it. No single philosopher and no one historical age can be said to have defined it
conclusively, any more than any one painter or school of painting has practiced all that we mean
through painting. Political idea is the idea of the entire society that contains the scripts and
speeches of the articulate parts such since professional politicians, political commentators,
society reformers and ordinary persons of a society. Idea can be in the shape of political treatises,
scholarly articles, speeches, government policies and decisions, and also poems and prose that
capture the anguish of the people. Idea is time bound; for example, the history of the twentieth
century. In short, political idea contains theories that effort to explain political behaviour, and
values to evaluate it and ways to manage it. Political theory, unlike idea, refers to the speculation
through a single individual, usually articulated in treatises since models of account. It consists of
theories of organizations, including that of the state, law, representation and of election. The
manner of enquiry is relative and explanatory. Political theory attempts to explain the attitudes
and actions arising from ordinary political life and to generalize in relation to them in a
scrupulous context: this political theory is concerned about/with the relationships flanked by
concepts and conditions. Political philosophy attempts to resolve or to understand conflicts
flanked by political theories, which might seem equally acceptable in given conditions. Political
ideology is a systematic and all embracing doctrine, which attempts to provide a complete and
universally applicable theory of human nature and society along with a detailed program of
attaining it. John Locke is often called since the father of contemporary ideologies. Marxism is
also a classic instance of an ideology summed up in the report that the purpose of philosophy is
to change and not merely interpret the world. All political ideology is political philosophy;
however the reverse is not true. The twentieth century has seen several ideologies like Fascism,
Nazism, Communism and Liberalism. A distinctive trait of political ideology is its dogmatism,
which unlike political philosophy, precludes and discourages critical appraisal because of its aim
to realize the perfect society. Political ideology is a negation of political theory because an
ideology is of recent origin, and under the power of positivism is based on subjective,
unverifiable value preferences. Gamine, furthermore, distinguishes a political theorist from a
publicist. Every political theorist has a dual role; that of a scientist and a philosopher and the
method he divides his roles will depend on his temperament and interests. Only through
combining the two roles can he contribute to knowledge in a worthwhile manner. The scientific
component of a theory can seem coherent and important, if the author has a preconceived notion
of the aims of political life. The philosophical foundation is revealed in the manner in which
reality is depicted. Political theory is dispassionate and disinterested. Since a science, it describes
political reality without trying to pass judgment on what is being depicted either implicitly or
explicitly. Since a philosophy, it prescribes rules of conduct which will close a good life for all in
the society and not basically for sure individuals or classes. The theorist will not himself have a
personal interest in the political arrangements of any one country or class or party. Devoid of
such an interest, his vision of reality and his image of the good life will not be clouded, nor will
his theory be special. The intention of an ideology is to justify a scrupulous organization of
authority in society. The ideologue is an interested party: his interest may be to defend things
since they are or to criticize the status –quo in the hope that a new sharing of authority will
approach into being. Rather than disinterested prescription, we love rationalization.
Usages of Political Theory
Political theorists as Aristotle attempt to describe the political to understand political practices
and their application. Aristotle’s remarks that ‘man is a political animal’ takes explanation of the
inherent human desire for society and the information that human beings require and can
discover fulfillment only by a political society. For Aristotle, the political is significant for it
stands for a general political legroom in which all citizens participate. Though, the ambit of
politics has to be limited. The political dimension of political theory concerns itself with the
shape, nature, system of the state or government and its connection with the individual citizen.
However inter-connected, the political is treated since a specific region separate and dissimilar
from the other spheres like the economy and civilization. This is the primary focus of the liberal
custom. On the contrary, Marxism categorically rejects the liberal distinction flanked by the
political and the non-political through arguing that political authority is a handmaiden of
economic authority. It specifies affinity flanked by the economic authority and the state.
Since the History of Political Idea
Usually, courses in political theory offer a detailed and elaborate revise of books or scrupulous
political philosophies, from Plato to modern times, from a historical perspective. These books are
studied for their normative reports in relation to the desirability of sure kinds of organizations,
governments and laws, which are usually accompanied through rational arguments. The classics
are portrayed since timeless in excellence, permanent in relevance and universal in their
significance. In the course of analyzing texts from a historical perspective, it is significant to see
how a scrupulous thought or concept has evolved in the course of time; and the dissimilar
meanings and interpretations it has been subjected to. While it is significant to know who said
something for the first time, it is equally significant to know the new ramifications of a thought
or a concept. It is for this cause that Wolin rightly describes the history of political theory since
marked through both stability and innovation.
Since a Technique of Analysis
Aristotle’s remarks that the individual is a political animal designates the primacy of politics and
the information that political thinking takes lay at several stages and in a diversity of methods.
The political in such a view not only becomes all pervasive, but the highest type of action.
Politics symbolizes a communal public life wherein people make organizations that regulate their
general life. Even deceptively easy general sense questions and political opinion merit an answer;
for example, are individuals equal? Is the state more significant than the individual? How to
justify violence employed through the state? Is this an inherent tension flanked by freedom and
equality? Is the minority justified in dictating words to the majority and vice-versa? One’s
response to these reports often reflect what ought to be the case rather than what is the case. At
stake here is a choice flanked by values and ideals. Through exercising one’s preferences, one
also inadvertently subscribes to a political ideology which means that answers to questions will
modify not only according to individual opinion, but would also diverge depending on one’s
value preferences. It is because of this vital cause that political theory is to be a section of an
open society, for there would always be liberals and conservatives training in political theory
who would help one to answer the aforesaid questions logically, speculatively and critically.
Since a Conceptual Clarification
Political theory helps to understand the concepts and words used in a political argument and
analysis: like the meaning of freedom, equality, democracy, justice and rights. These words are
not only regularly used in daily conversation, but also in political theory communication. An
understanding of these words is significant for it helps one to know the method these words have
been employed, the shifts in their definition and their usage in a building of argument. Several,
like Weldon stress on require scrutinizing concepts in ordinary pre-theoretical language.
Examines of concepts also reveal the ideological commitment of a speaker or/and writer. Liberals
describe freedom since implying choice, absence of restraints while socialists like freedom with
equality. Liberals describe a state since an instrument of human welfare, while for a socialist a
state is an instrument of oppression, power and class privileges. Conceptual classification is
definitely possible, but cannot be neutral. Those occupied in it overtly or covertly subscribe to
value preferences, and in this sense their task is not dissimilar from the authors of classics in
political theory who help one to understand the underlying foundation of human, political and
moral actions.
Since Formal Model Structure
This perception is particularly popular in the United States, for it considers political theory since
an exercise in devising formal models of political procedures; same to the ones in theoretical
economics. These models serve two purposes: first they are explanatory, offering systematically
the factors on which political procedures are based. Second, they are normative, for they attempt
to illustrate the consequences that accrue from following a sure rule. A good instance of such an
exercise is Antony Down’s ‘theory of electoral competition’ which perceives voters since trying
to gain maximum utility from an election result and parties since teams trying to maximize their
probability of winning. Downs then illustrates how parties, in order to win, devise ideological
stances. Another significant model is Kenneth Arrow’s ‘impossibility theorem’, which states that
in the middle of other things being equal, where a democratic choice has to be made flanked by
more than two alternatives, the outcome would extremely likely be an arbitrary one and
convinced through the process employed to exercise the choice. Joseph Schumpeter’s elitist
theory of democracy is based on the assumption that a human being takes his economic life more
seriously than his political one.
Since Theoretical Political Science
The emergence of political science in the twentieth century has led few political scientists to
seem upon political theory since a mere theoretical branch of the discipline. An effort is made to
integrate empirical observations with a systematic account of one’s everyday experiences in the
world. This view dispenses with the normative content of traditional political theory. However
mere account of political phenomena is possible but grounding it in empiricism is not adequate.
Any effort to formulate a political theory free of normative units would inherently fail. This is
because any account of political measures would mean an interpretation of the intentions and
motives of the participants and such an interpretation would bring forth, normative issues.
Importance of Key Theoretical Concepts
A reader receiving introduced to political theory for the first time may think it enough to revise
the organizations rather than abstract concepts in order to understand the character and nature of
society. While a revise of organizations is possible, one has to realize that institutional
arrangements modify from society to society because they are based on divergent sets of ideas.
This realization takes us to the heart of the matter since to what is more significant, reality or
ideas, facts or concepts. Do ideas reflect reality or is reality based on ideas?
Is Political Theory Dead?
In the transitional of the twentieth century, several observers readily wrote an obituary of
political theory. Few spoke of its decline. Others proclaimed its death. One referred to political
theory since being in the doghouse. This dismal view is because the classical custom in political
theory is, through and big, loaded with value judgments beyond manage of empirical testing. The
criticism of normative theory came from logical positivists in the 1930s and from behavioralism,
subsequently. Easton contends that as political theory is concerned with few type of historical
shape, it had lost its constructive role. He blames William Dunning, Charles H. Mcllwain, and
George M. Sabine for historicism in political theory. This type of political theory has dissuaded
students from a serious revise of value theory. In the past, theory was a vehicle whereby
articulate and intelligent individuals conveyed their considerations on actual direction of affairs
and offered for serious consideration, few ideas in relation to the desirable course of measures. In
this method, they revealed to us the full meaning of their moral frame of reference. Today,
though, the type of historical interpretation with which we are well-known in the revise of
political theory has driven from the latter its only unique function; that of constructively
approaching a valuation frames of reference. In the past, theory was approached since an
intellectual action whereby the student could learn how he was to go in relation to the exploring
the knowable consequences and, by them, the ultimate premises of his own moral outlook.
Scrutiny of the jobs through American political theorists reveals that their authors have been
motivated less through an interest in communicating such knowledge than in retailing
information in relation to the meaning, internal consistency and historical growth of past political
values. Dunning in his three volumes entitled A History of Political Theories set the tone for
research in political theory. This training since a historian enables him to political theory
primarily since offering troubles of historical change and to unfold the role of political ideas in
this procedure. Since a result political theory, for Dunning, becomes a historical explanation of
the circumstances and consequences of political ideas. He seeks to uncover the cultural and
political conceptions of an age and to isolate the powers of these ideas, in turn, on the social
circumstances. Easton describes Dunning since a historicist, for he deflects political theory from
moral thoughts and consciously avoids dealing with moral issues in a purely historical context.
Dunning perceives political theory since essentially historical research into issues that arise from
observation of political facts and practices. He confines his revise to the legal rather than the
ethical dimensions of political life, however subsequently his students broadened it to encompass
theories of political action. He considers moral views since a product of caprice, dogmas without
justification and hence, not worthy of analysis or interpretation. He neglects the meaning and
logical consistency of ideas. Mcllwain’s The Development of Political Idea in the West uses
historical research, for he regards political ideas since an ‘effect rather than an influential
interacting section of social action’. Being virtual ciphers in the changing patterns of actual life,
ideas can have meaning only since a section of a history of theories in which ideas may
condition, subsequent ideas, but in which they leave no impact upon action. Political theory is
construed here since a branch of the sociology of knowledge, which deals primarily with the
conditions shaping knowledge since it has varied in excess of time. The task of the political
theorist is to illustrate the method in which a social milieu moulds and forms political idea. It is
concerned with the exclusively empirical task of uncovering the determinants of ideology.
Sabine’s A History of Political Theory has singularly convinced studies in political theory more
than any other book written throughout the thirties. Like Dunning and Mcllwain, Sabine
considers the historical revise of theory since a suitable come to the subject matter. The
impression that one gets from the book and from an account of his way is ‘that a historical revise
of theory gives its own self evident justification’. Sabine combines the come of both Dunning
and Mcllwain. Like Dunning, he believes that political idea is a section of the political procedure
which interacts and powers social action. He shares Mcllwain’s belief that it is necessary to
define and examine moral judgment in each theory since these are the determining factors in
history and not mere rationalizations of an action. Moral judgments are not inferior to factual
propositions since Dunning contends. However Sabine reiterates Dunning’s interpretation of the
relation flanked by ideas and action, he differs in his conception of the nature of history of
political theory through his emphasis on the role of ethical judgment. For Sabine, every political
theory can be scrutinized from two points of view: since a social philosophy and since an
ideology. Since an ideology, theories are psychological phenomena precluding truth or falsity.
Theories are beliefs, ‘measures in people’s minds and factors in their conduct irrespective of their
validity or verifiability’. Theories play an influential role in history and so, the task of a historian
is to ascertain the extent to which these theories help in shaping the course of history. A theory
has to be examined for its meaning rather than for its impact on human actions. Viewed in this
perspective, a theory includes of two types of propositions: factual and moral. Sabine focuses on
factual rather than moral reports for the latter precludes descriptions of truth or falsity. He
regards values since reflecting human preferences to ‘few social and physical information’. They
are not deducible from facts, nor can they be reduced to facts or nationally exposed since being
expressions of emotions. As political theory advances few reports of preference, value judgments
shape the case of theory and explain the cause for its subsistence. The moral unit characterizes
political theory, which is why it is primarily a moral enterprise. In spite of factual propositions
within a theory, a political theory on the entire can hardly be true in depicting a scrupulous
episode or era. Easton examined the causes for the decline of political theory in common and its
decline into historicism in scrupulous. First, and foremost, is the tendency in the middle of
political scientists to conform to the moral propositions of their age leading to a loss of the
constructive come? The emphasis is to uncover and reveal one’s values which imply that there is
no longer require to enquire into the merit of these moral values, but merely understand their
‘origins, growth and social impact’. History is used to endorse existing values. Secondly, moral
relativism is responsible for the attention a theory received with history.
Revival of Political Theory
In the 1930s, political theory began learning the history of ideas with the purpose of defending
liberal democratic theory in opposition to the totalitarian tenets of communism, fascism and
nazism. Lasswell tried to set up a scientific political theory with the eventual purpose of
controlling human behaviour, furthering the aims and direction given through Merriam. Unlike
the classical custom, scientific political theory describes rather than prescribes. Political theory in
the traditional sense was alive in the jobs of Arendt, Theodore Adorno, Marcuse, and Leo
Strauss. Their views diametrically differed from the broad ideas within American political
science for they whispered in liberal democracy, science and historical progress. All of them
reject political messianism and utopianism in politics. Arendt focused largely on the uniqueness
and responsibility of the human being, with which she initiates her criticism in behavioralism.
She contended that the behavioral search for uniformities in human nature has only contributed
towards stereotyping the human being. Strauss reaffirms the importance of classical political
theory to remedy the crisis of the contemporary times. He does not agree with the proposition
that all political theory is ideological in nature mirroring a given socio-economic interest, for
mainly political thinkers are motivated through the possibility of discerning the principles of the
right order in social subsistence. A political philosopher has to be primarily interested in truth.
Past philosophies are studied with an eye on coherence and consistency. The authors of the
classics in political theory are Larger because they were geniuses and considered in their scripts.
Strauss scrutinizes the ways and purposes of the ‘new’ political science and concludes that it was
defective when compared with classical political theory, particularly that of Aristotle. For
Aristotle, a political philosopher or a political scientist has to be impartial, for he possesses a
more comprehensive and clearer understanding of human ends. Political science and political
philosophy are identical, because science consisting of theoretical and practical characteristics is
identical with philosophy. Aristotle’s political science also evaluates political things, defends
autonomy of prudence in practical matters and views political action since essentially ethical.
These premises Behavioralism denies, for it separates political philosophy from political science
and substitutes the distinction flanked by theoretical and practical sciences. It perceives applied
sciences to be derived from theoretical sciences, but not in the similar manner since the classical
custom visualizes. Behavioralism like positivism is disastrous, for it denies knowledge
concerning ultimate principles. Their bankruptcy is apparent, for they look helpless, unable to
distinguish the right from the wrong, the presently from the unjust in view of the rise of
totalitarianism. Strauss counters Easton’s charge of historicism through alleging that the new
science is responsible for the decline in political theory, for it pointed to and abetted the common
political crisis of the West because of its overall neglect of normative issues. Vogelin regards
political science and political theory since inseparable and that one is not possible without the
other. Political theory is not ideology, utopia or scientific methodology, but an experiential
science of the right order in both the individual and society. It has to dissect critically and
empirically the problem of order. Theory is not presently any opining in relation to the human
subsistence in society, it rather is an effort at formulating the meaning of subsistence through
explicating the content of a definitive class of experiences. Its argument is not arbitrary, but
derives its validity from the aggregate of experiences to which it necessity permanently refer for
empirical manage.
Recent Growths
As the Seventies, political theory has revived mainly due to the efforts of Habermas, Nozick and
Rawls. The themes that figure prominently as its revival are broadly social justice and welfare
rights theory within a deontological perspective, utilitarianism, democratic theory and pluralism,
feminism, post-modernism, new social movements and civil society, and the liberalism-
communitarian debate. In fact, communitarianism has tried to fill the void left through the
declining popularity of Marxism. Though, this unprecedented lease of life that political theory
has received is restricted to the academia and since a result, it is ‘a type of alienated politics, an
enterprise accepted on at few aloofness from the behaviors to which it refers’. This resurgence
suggests that earlier pronouncements in relation to its decline and/or demise are premature and
academically shortsighted. Though, one has to be cautious in distinguishing modern political
theory from the classical custom, since the former derives its inspiration from the latter and in
this sense, they are attempts to refine rather than being original, adjusting the broad frameworks
of the classical custom to the modern complexities. This new establish enthusiasm has been
confined to liberal political communication, largely due to the seminal job of Rawls fulfilling
Germino’s wish of a require to strengthen the open society. Recent liberal theory, in its revived
sense, focuses on the thought of impartiality and fairness in the belief that ‘discrimination
necessity be grounded on relevant differences’. It is no coincidence that a well formulated and
detailed analysis of the concept of justice, extensive in excess of due as the time of Plato,
emerges in Rawls for whom justice means fairness. Rawls in the classical custom deals with what
ought to be, for he confronted the vexed problem of sharing of liberties, opportunities, income,
wealth and the bases of self-respect. In the middle of the competing ideologies which usher in the
twentieth century, only liberalism, unlike fascism and communism, permits free swap of ideas. It
synchronizes, and adapts if necessary, theory in light of practice and specifies the units that
constitute a presently political and social order without being doctrinaire and dogmatic. Though,
much of this new liberal political theory has been in the nature of refining and clarifying the
earlier theoretical postures. Moreover, the loss of challenge through both fascism and
communism, the first, because of its defeat in the Second World War, and the second, which
collapsed due to its own internal contradictions, also prove that utopian and radical schemes are
no longer theoretically and practically desirable and feasible alternatives. Nonetheless, liberalism
sides challenges in recent times from communitarianism, post-modernism and feminism.
CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL THEORY
Growth of Political Theory
Growths in political theory always reflect the changes which happen in society. Political theories
are produced in response to the challenges which emerge at dissimilar times. Though, since
suggested, do well to keep in mind that political idea, which also emerges due to societal
challenges, is bound through time since well since legroom, and is so, dissimilar from theory
which breaks such barriers and proves its worth in understanding and explaining political
phenomena of dissimilar nature and origin. This happens, because theories are purged and
purified from ideologies and biases and arrives at sure principles, which are not only timeless,
but may even be described knowledge. Political theorists, while indulging in theorization, pursue
ideas not for the sake of fulfillment of their fads and fantasies, but in order to search those
principles whose understanding can create life bigger. And in this enterprise, theorists, through
and big, are motivated through the concrete political situation. The history of political theory
bears out how ills and maladies afflicting civilizations have lubricated the apparatus of
theorization, by which several carried principles and practices and the assumptions behind them
were questioned and the blueprint for the future was drawn. It is, though, true that the incentive
for theory always comes from few sort of failure and a related conviction that things can be
bettered by an improved understanding and may, ultimately be resolved. Hence, political theory’s
task is not limited to providing a fleeting response and receiving contented with a compromise.
Rather, it has to reach at the root of the problem and has to discover remedies in the shape of an
alternative set of principles. Hence, any project on theory needs a ‘vision’ by which a theorist
could think not only in relation to the troubles at hand, but also beyond them. It is here that
political theory might be differentiated from art or poetry. In words of vision, reflections and
ruminations, there is not much variation flanked by political theory and other creative behaviors
like art and poetry. But what sets separately the political theorist from the poet is that his urge
and search are a conscious act with a definite design, whereas a poetic act is one of spontaneity.
So, it is not creativity, but consciousness that denies poetry the status of a theory.
Towards a Definition of Political Theory
Political theory is defined in dissimilar methods through dissimilar people. The definitions
modify on the foundation of emphasis and understanding of its constitutive units. Sabine’s well
recognized definition of political theory is that it is something ‘which has characteristically
contained factors like the factual, the causal and the valuational’. To Hecker, political theory is
‘dispassionate and disinterested action. It is a body of philosophical and scientific knowledge
which regardless of when and where it was originally written can augment our understanding of
the world in which we live today and we live tomorrow’. So, one may say that what we mean
through political theory is a coherent group of propositions, with few explanatory principle, in
relation to the a class of political phenomena. It implies that a theory unlike idea, cannot believe
a multitude of phenomena at a time, and will have to get concerned with a class or kind of issues
only.
Dominant Conceptions in Political Theory
It is quite hard to identify and categorize several conceptions of political theory which are put
into exploit through theorists. The difficulty emanates from a tendency in the middle of theorists
to go for an exercise in which they start drawing on dissimilar conceptions and customs. This is
truer with modern political theory than with the ones which preceded it. In the past, theorists
somewhat maintained a purity of conception in theory—structure and seldom out stepped the
framework they had chosen. But this does not apply to the modern times, which are a witness to a
crop of theory which seems hybrid in nature. But broadly speaking, three dissimilar conceptions
emerge in political theory on the foundation of which both the past and the present theories can
be conceptualized, judged and evaluated.
Historical Conception
Several theorists have attempted theory—structure on the foundation of insights and possessions
from history. Sabine is one of the largest exponents of the historical conception. In his opinion, a
question such since what is the nature of political theory can be answered descriptively; that is,
how theory has responded to historical measures and specific situations. In other terms, in this
perspective, political theory becomes situation dependent in which each historical situation sets a
problem, which in turn is taken care of by solutions devised through the theory. This conception
of political theory is deferential to custom. Cobban also believes that the traditional manner, in
which a sense of history is instilled to the full, is the right method to believe the troubles of
political theory. It is true that the past acts since a precious guide in our endeavor of theory—
structure and teaches us not to be too certain of our originality. It also hints that it is possible to
think in methods other than those which are fashionable and dominant, besides shedding light on
the sources. The historical understanding also sensitizes us in relation to the failings of the past
generations and ties them with the communal wisdom of the present and promotes
imaginativeness in us. The historical conception also contributes significantly to our normative
vision. The history of ideas may tell us that our social and political universe is a product of things
whose root lies in the past. And knowing them bigger would tell us how we have sure values,
norms and moral expectations and from where they have approach. With this sense in us, it is
possible to interrogate these values and critically assess their utility. But a blind adherence to this
conception is not without its folly. The novelty of the project described political theory is that
each specific situation is unique, riddled with new challenges. Hence, worth of the past
sometimes becomes redundant and could even be a hindrance, if one is oblivious of this
characteristic. So, the utility of this come in political theory beyond a sure stage is doubtful since
it is always wedded to outmoded ideas from outmoded ages. The suggestive values of the ideas
remain, but the theoretical function recedes substantially.
Normative Conception
The normative conception in political theory is recognized through dissimilar names. Few people
prefer to call it philosophical theory, while others refer to it since ethical theory. The normative
conception is based on the belief that the world and its measures can be interpreted in words of
logic, purpose and ends with the help of the theorist’s intuition, reasoning, insights and
experiences. In other terms, it is a project of philosophical speculation in relation to the values.
The questions, which are asked through the normativists, would be: what should be the end of
political organizations? What should inform the connection flanked by the individual and other
social systems? What arrangements in society can become model or ideal and what rules and
principles should govern it? One may say that their concerns are moral and the purpose is to
build an ideal kind. Hence, it is these theorists who have always conceived ‘utopia’ in the realm
of political ideas by their powerful imagination. Normative political theory leans heavily towards
political philosophy, because it derives its knowledge of the good life from it and also uses it
since a framework in its endeavor to make absolute norms. In fact, their apparatus of theorization
are borrowed from political philosophy and so, they always seek to recognized inter-relationships
in the middle of concepts and seem for coherence in the phenomena since well since in their
theories, which are typical examples of a philosophical outlook. Leo Strauss has strongly
advocated the case for normative theory and has argued that political things through nature are
subject to approval or disapproval and it is hard to judge them in any other words, except for
since good or bad and justice or injustice. But the problem with the normativists is that while
professing values which they cherish, they portray them since universal and absolute. They do
not realize that their urge to make absolute average for goodness is not without pitfalls. Since
suggested, do well to keep in mind that even a political theorist is a subjective instrument in the
assessment of the world and these insights are conditioned through several factors, which may be
ideological in nature.
The exponents of empirical theory take normativists to task for:
Relativity of values
Cultural foundation of ethics and norms
Ideological content in the enterprise and
Abstract and utopian nature of the project.
It is true that the proponents of the normative conception get preoccupied with the inquiry in to
the internal consistency of theory and that pertains, mostly to the nature of ideas and rigor in the
way, while remaining unmindful and sometimes, even negligent in relation to the empirical
understanding of the existing social and political reality. It is more agonizing and distressing,
when one discovers that this proclivity in the middle of them is accompanied through another
syndrome, under which they prefer to respond to a theorist and undertake only a review of his job
through turning absent their eyes from the empirical reality which stares at them. Therefore, it
turns out to be an illusory and deceptive exercise in theory-structure in the name of high and
noble normative concerns. But in the far past those who championed normative theory always
tried to connect their principles with the understanding of the reality of their times. So, all
normative enterprises in the past had direct or indirect empirical referents and Plato’s theory of
justice could be a good instance to show it. In recent times, again the old sensibility within the
normative theory has reemerged and the passion for good life and good society has been matched
through methodological and empirical astuteness. John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice is a case in
point which attempts to anchor logical and moral political theory in empirical findings. Rawls,
with his imagination, creates ‘original location’ to connect normative philosophical arguments
with real world concerns in relation to the distributive justice and the welfare state. Few other
theorists are also attending to the tasks of developing moral theories in relation to the equality,
freedom and democracy through rooting them to every day concerns and marrying them to
specific situations.
Few normative theorists of the new generation have also started discarding the well recognized
inclination of theory, more a feature of the older days, under which either exuberant justification
for the existing arrangements was offered or they hesitated to critique them and therefore,
accepted the stage of status—quoism in their idea. Now, a new crop of theory has surfaced
recognized since critical theory, which since a section of the normative project, is occupied with
political measures and tries to combine ideas with practice, and also makes effective
interventions to facilitate changes for the bigger in society and politics.
Empirical Conception
What has dominated political theory in the twentieth century is not normativism, but another
conception recognized since empirical political theory which derives theories from empirical
observations. Empirical political theory refuses to accord the status of knowledge to those
theories which indulge in value judgments. Naturally, so, normative political theory is debunked
since a mere report of opinion and preferences. The drive for value—free theory started in order
to create the field of political theory scientific and objective and hence, a more reliable guide for
action. This new orientation came to be recognized since positivism. Under the spell of
positivism, political theorists set out to attain scientific knowledge in relation to the political
phenomena based on the principle which could be empirically verified and proved. Therefore,
they attempted to make a natural science of society and in this endeavor; philosophy was made a
mere adjunct of science. Such an explanation of theory also portrayed the role of a theorist since
of a disinterested observer, purged of all commitments and drained of all values. This empirical
project in political theory was premised on the empiricist theory of knowledge which claims to
have the full blown criteria to test what constitutes truth and falsehood. The essence of this
criterion is lodged in the experimentation and the verification principle. When political theory
was reeling under this power, a therefore described revolution started and became popular since
‘Behavioral Revolution’. This revolution reached a commanding location within political theory
in the 1950’s and engulfed the whole field of revise and research through advocating new
characteristics. They incorporated:
Encouragement to quantitative technique in analysis
Demolition of the normative framework and promotion of empirical research which can be
susceptible to statistical tests
Non-acceptance and rejection of the history of ideas
Focus on micro–revise since it was more amenable to empirical treatment
Glorification of specialization
Procurement of data from the behavior of the individual and
Urge for value—free research.
In fact, the behavioral climate got surcharged through an anti—theory mood and those who
lambasted theory in a conventional sense had a field day. Theory was caricatured and made
synonymous with ideology, abstraction, metaphysics and utopia. Later on, when logical
positivism emerged since a revitalized incarnation of positivism and incorporated in its ranks
such heavy–weights since Wittgenstein, not much change could happen in outlook. The only
variation was that the positivists wanted to create the region of political theory scientific, while
the logical positivists declared it metaphysical, non-rational and so, outside the purview of
scientific knowledge. But this mood did not last extensive since the whole understanding was
erroneous. Therefore, they soon attracted the ire and fire of few philosophers of science who
offered a vision for a post—positivist comes to science. Karl Popper set the new mood through
laying down the principle of ‘falsification’ since a criterion of scientific knowledge and argued
that all knowledge was conjectural, tentative and distant from the final truth. The real turn or
breakthrough came in the philosophy of science when Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Mary
Hesse blasted the therefore described scientific theory which was playing havoc with political
theory and discredited the positivist model through rejecting the notion of unified science and
declared it since an improper understanding of natural scientific practice. The crux or the
argument was that science since a shape of human action was impregnated with interpretation,
which consisted of meaning, discourse and translation.
Kuhn’s book The Building of Scientific Revolution was a pioneer in bringing out the
shortcomings and failures of the positivist theory and it demonstrated how all cognitions were
dependent on understanding and interpretation since a means of inter subjective discourse. Kuhn
cogently argued that it was not only the irrational conventions which lurked behind the
construction of the semantic framework, but were also informed through rational discourses
framed through interpretation and criticism. This new Kuhnian perspective, therefore, broke new
grounds in the philosophy of science and subjected the positivist explanation of knowledge and
theory to intensives criticism and scrutiny. But the ‘philosophy of the social science’ was not to
lag behind, and soon new churnings started which brought the problem of understanding under
scanner and contested the effort to perceive the problem within the framework of a unified
science.
Peter Winch, Alfred Schutz and Charles Taylor heralded this new perspective, which suggested
that understanding in the social science was loaded with troubles and two of them deserved
special attention:
All sciences are a shape of interpretative undertaking and hence, it has a theory—laden nature
of all understanding
The substance of the social science is distinctively subjective, which implies an agent who is
a self—interpreting social being.
So, the problem of social science snowballs in to a ‘double hermeneutics’. This new come
brought the problem of understanding, interpretation and the issue of how to seem at the
symbolic world of the subject into the discussion. This also infused new meaning in the
interpretative project of the political theorists through sensitizing them to the symbolic world.
Hence, what got problematized was not only the understanding of meaning, but also the issue of
explaining them. This reminds us of Max Weber, who had extensive wrestled with this
problematic by his categories of ‘causal adequacy’ and ‘adequacy of meaning’.
Modern Conception
It is a veritable challenge to map out the terrain traversed through the political theorists and the
theoretical tools deployed through them in modern times. The challenge emanates from several
sources. Modern political theory does not neatly follow the commonly carried category of
classification, viz., historical, normative and empirical and does not keep within a scrupulous
custom, since the earlier theorists did. Sometimes, they seem to be creation exploit of dissimilar
conceptions in their enterprise and employ them in a manner. Modern theorization in political
theory has grown in reaction to the limitation of the earlier projects, mostly falling under the two
great customs, namely, Liberalism and Marxism and interrogates them and their category of
analysis through selectively borrowing from them. But in the course of structure the theoretical
edifice, they break new grounds and make new locations for political investigation and also new
apparatus for searching and establishing the principles of politics. Nonetheless, the modern
project on political theory does not move beyond the words of deal described political theory
since discussed earlier; that is, historical, normative and imperial but the manner of employing
them has few hybridness in character. Modern political theory made its appearance on the
intellectual scene in the 1980s and 90s, mostly since a reaction against the recognized customs in
theory and put the categories of Enlightenment like cause and science to which all customs in
political theory were tied, to a scathing and searching criticism they brought in several
characteristics which were conquered since the basis of truth through political theory under the
scanner and set out to place down the new principles to understand and imagine the new social
and political universe which few of them put since ‘post—contemporary condition’. It is true that
the engagement of modern writers with political theory has been critical, but not equally
transformative, imaginative or visionary. Although the ‘New Social Movements’ in modern
times have been given moral and intellectual support through several of these theorists in the
name of transforming society and overcoming the maladies of the new situation. Though, it
would be arbitrary to yoke the several theoretical trends visible today under one broad frame of
analysis. For instance, discussing post—structuralism and post- modernism with
communitarianism and multiculturalism jointly would amount to intellectual atrocity against
them and their concerns and commitments. Because their history, their normative concern since
well since the theoretical apparatuses and empirical referents have an important dissimilarity and
diversion. But still one can place out the theoretical terrain on which their engagement with
political theory takes lay. The broad thrusts which bring several of the modern theorists and
theories jointly could be put under the following.
Opposition to Universalism
Political theorization in modern times has gone for subjecting the universal claims of political
theory of yesteryears, irrespective of the custom to which they belonged, to critical scrutiny.
Liberal universalism has emerged to them since devoid of a social and temporal context and in
their opinion, the hidden ‘particularism’ mostly based on the experience of western society has
masqueraded since universal values and norms. They argue that the appeal to universal principles
is tantamount to standardization; hence, violative of justice which may be inherent in a
scrupulous society or shape of life and which may embody its own values and normative
principle. The communitarian theory and the multicultural theory in recent times have
highlighted it quite forcefully and described this therefore described universalist theories since
‘exclusivist’ at the center, which has always presented one vision of ‘good’ since the only vision
of mankind. Interestingly, political theory of this diversity has not discarded the normative world
view, but the objection they have raised is that political theory, earlier, couched its value
judgment in ‘essentialist’ words and discriminated against comparative values. Therefore, they
sacrificed the truth in social and political life. So, these theories seek to deconstruct the
normative category of political theory like justice, freedom and democracy and desist from
prioritizing judgment on them or privileging one in excess of the other.
Critique of Grand Narratives
The grand narratives of both the liberal and the Marxist diversity have approach under fire on the
premise that there is an overarching or transcendental ‘basis’ of reality and truth. Few of the
modern theories have been declared ‘anti-foundational’, because of the continuous contestation
of all well carried foundations in political theory, viz., state, sovereignty and authority. In all
fairness to them, they do not reject all foundations, but only transcendental ones.
The post–modernists are in the forefront in attacking the grand narratives and argue that there is
nothing like objective pre-given reality or an objective social good which can support such grand
narratives and their designs. Their opinion is that this is nothing but ‘objectivist illusion’. Here,
they seem at the discursively constituted reality which opens it for subjective interpretation.
Since suggested, do well to keep in mind that the post- structuralist and the post–modernist break
from the ‘structural’ argument once therefore popular in political theory and reject their notion of
building which was synchronic, universal and timeless and hence, was a historical. In its lay, they
deploy a new concept of building described ‘Communication’ which is diachronic, historical and
comparative in nature.
Post—positivism
It is reminiscent of the earlier engagement with value neutrality in social science once
championed through the behavioralists in political theory. The modern theories call value free
enterprises since useless and consider that political theory is an inherently normative and
politically occupied project, which is supposed to offer prescription and a vision for the future.
Empirical and Relative
The post-positivist thrust in the middle of modern theorists do not stop them from advocating
require for empirical and relative approaches before any generalization effort is made.
Multiculturalism is one such instance, which is sensitive to the context. In fact, this type of
empirical—relative methodology would be a check on the broad generalization crossways
cultures and continents. Inspite of the new insights which approach from modern political theory,
they suffer from several weaknesses. Unlike classical political theory, there is not much relative–
empirical inquiry since yet and the tendency in the middle of theorists to borrow from the other
theorists is galore. The normative enterprise can be useful only when it is tied to reality. So, the
real challenge lies in grounding normative theory to empirical reality of society and politics. This
is the only method a valid political theory with presently generalizations can emerge, which
would also overcome the limitation of the post–modernist perspective and its weaknesses of
relativity and diffusion which are not always congenial for political projects. This may fructify
what Sheldon Wolin calls ‘epic theory’.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
What is politics?
Discuss the nature of politics.
What do you understand by the term politics?
What is legitimation? What are Max Weber’s views on it?
What is deligitimation?
 How is the nature of political argument in recent normative theories different from that in the
classical tradition?
What do you understand by conceptual analysis?
Distinguish between the philosophical and the integrated approaches to studying politics.
Discuss any two usages of political theory.
Distinguish between the empirical and normative conceptions of political theory.
 CHAPTER 2
TRADITIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

STRUCTURE
Objectives
Greek and Roman Traditions
The Confucian Tradition
Arabic-Islamic Political Traditions
Western: Liberal and Marxist Traditions
Indian Political Customs
Review Questions
OBJECTIVES
After studying this unit, you should be able to:
Understand the essential features of ancient Greek and Roman political traditions;
Explain the ancient Greek and Roman theories of state, constitution and citizenship;
Explain the principal ideas in the Confucian tradition,
Explain the Nature of Islamic polity;
Nature of Indian political thought;
Understand the contributions of Buddhism to Indian political tradition;
Be able to demarcate the liberal tradition from the Marxist tradition;

GREEK AND ROMAN TRADITIONS

Growth and Nature of Greek Municipality-States
The Greek municipality-states were the product of peculiar Greek political and territorial
circumstances since the land was narrow and not fertile sufficient to homes a big population. The
Greek municipality-states were urbanized with the merger of a big number of tribes and clans.
Aristotle described it a ‘union of many villages’. It was a narrow and closed area, lying round an
urban centre, surrounded through mountains, sea and territories of neighboring municipality-
states. It consisted of three classes of people-citizens, foreigners and slaves. Only citizens were
entitled to possess political rights. For the Greeks, municipality-states did not mean mere
territory or an abstract thought, but freemen who continued it.
The municipality-state since a rule was a walled municipality, containing the state hearth, the
temples of municipality cults, offices of high magistrates and the ‘agora’. It existed off its land
which was often insufficient. Comparatively, it was a little territorial element since the total
territory of Athens was 1000 sq. miles and that of Sparta was 3300 sq. miles. Other municipality-
states had hardly more than 400 sq. miles of territory. In ancient Greece, Athens and Sparta were
the two prominent municipality-states and they were measured since models of two differing
political organizations. Athens stood for democracy and freedom and Sparta for sacrifice and
discipline.
The Greek Concept of State
The organization of the state played a key role in the political life of the Greeks. The state for
them was not a mere geographical element, but it was a society of persons. The Greeks always
held the view that the municipality-state was a means to achieve higher goals of life.
Two View Points in Relation to the Nature of State
There were two viewpoints in relation to the nature of state in ancient Greece. The first viewpoint
maintained that the state was a natural organization and Plato and Aristotle subscribed to this
viewpoint. The second viewpoint held that it was not a natural organization, but a product of
traditions and customs of people. The state was measured a natural organization, because it was
the highest association in words of social and historical development, values and purpose. It is a
final level in the development of associations from family by villages to the state. The state was
the entire of which other organizations were a section. The state since an entire represented the
moral universe that held the people jointly. Therefore, it was inseparable from citizens, because it
alone met all human requires and it alone was self-enough.
Must of the State for a Good Life
The Greeks held that the state was a necessary organization, because with in the state alone, we
could pursue our goals in life. According to Plato, in the ideal state only, could we live happy and
contented lives? Aristotle held that while the family and the village lived to preserve life and to
give companionship, the state lived not presently for the sake of life alone, but for the sake of
good life. The highest good and the mainly moral actions of men were represented in the state.
Therefore, for the Greeks, the state was not a mere territorial or a political element, but a moral
element with peculiar aims and goals. It enabled man to live the good life.
The Greek Concept of Citizenship
The Greek concept of state was confined to the municipality-state and in the municipality-state,
citizenship rights were given only to free men. Two other classes—foreigners and slaves—did
not possess citizenship rights. Both Plato and Aristotle gave a significant lay to the citizens,
because they recognized the state with them. Rights were given to those who were citizens of
birth and were 18 years old.
Aristotle’s Views on Citizenship
According to Aristotle, the meaning of the term citizen varied according to the constitution of
each state. In each state, there were dissimilar strata and substrata of people. In aristocracy, the
powers were unequally divided. But normally, the citizen should be free and equal. He should
possess judgment and power. According to Aristotle, goodness of a citizen implied government
of free men. He maintained that as man was a social animal, he had a natural desire for life in
society even however he had no require seeking other’s help. The citizens possessed political
rights and they actively took section in political affairs of the state. He was expected to be
vigilant of his rights and to get involved in all the behaviors of dissimilar organizations of the
state.
The Greek Concept of Constitution
Constitution is the vital law of any country and the Greeks were the first in the world to develop
it. The Greeks made experiments with dissimilar shapes of constitutions. Aristotle held that the
purpose of a constitution was to form the life of man in a desired manner. Any constitution
impresses its method of life on the citizens. Since a result, individual and communal features of
citizens are reflected in the constitution. Hence, a constitution was a sum total of the individuals
that constituted it.
Dissimilar Kinds of Constitutions
There lived dissimilar kinds of constitutions in ancient Greece. Aristotle wrote his book ‘Politics’
after learning 158 constitutions. Before him, Plato had discussed five shapes of constitutions on
the foundation of his concept of ‘cycle of change’. The ideal state, democracy, oligarchy,
democracy and tyranny were the five shapes of state in his ‘Republic’. Plato first constructed his
ideal state and then, in his later jobs, showed how the existing states deviated from the ideal. On
the other hand, Aristotle first examined the actual states and then constructed an ideal state on the
foundation of a cautious analysis. He maintained that monarchy, aristocracy and polity were the
three shapes of state which aimed at attaining the general good. He held that there were three
perverted shapes of government such since tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. This classification
was based on the concept of justice. As constitution was defined since the arrangement of offices,
the variation flanked by any two kinds of constitutions could be explained through the principle
according to which offices were awarded. Therefore, democracy awarded office on the
foundation of free birth and oligarchy, on the foundation of wealth. Aristotle was of the view that
monarchy was the best of normal constitutions and tyranny, was the worst of deviated
constitutions. The Greeks urbanized the concept of the ideal state and wanted to order all existing
states in the light of this ideal state. The aim of the ideal state was general good and it enabled the
citizens to live life according to their aptitude and capacities.
Athenian Democracy
Athens is well-known in history because of its democratic shape of government. Athenian
democracy was urbanized in excess of an era of time and it reached its glory throughout the age
of Pericles. Throughout this era, the municipality of Athens had a total population of 3, 00,000
and a half of it existed in the city and a half in the country face. It was divided into 100 demes
which were centers of society authority. In ancient Athens, the common assembly of citizens who
had crossed the age of 20 years took all the biggest decisions. It met frequently ten times in a
year and in extraordinary sessions at the call of the council. Beside with the assembly, the
Council of 500 and the Court of Magistrates also played a key role in public life. The members of
these bodies were elected not through casting votes, but through lots. They were elected for a
word of one year. The Greeks idea that this manner of filling offices through lots was a distinctly
democratic shape of rule, as it equalized every one’s chances. The Generals were directly chosen
through the assembly. They shaped the executive and accepted out functions of the state. They
could be re-elected. The Generals, the Council and the Court of Magistrates had a popular
character. Pericles declared that Athenian democracy stood for freedom and the people took
section in all decisions of the government.
Reasons of Revolution
The Greek thinkers discussed the reasons of revolution in the state. Plato was of the view that
changes in the constitution of the state took lay because of changes in the attitudes and the nature
of the people who constituted it. The social and economic changes in society got reflected in
changes in the constitutions. Aristotle elaborately discussed the reasons of revolutions. He
examined both the common since well since the scrupulous reasons which were related to a
scrupulous constitution. The mainly common reason of revolution was a passion for few concept
of equality which was involved in the thought of justice. If any group felt that it did not enjoy the
share of constitutional rights that it felt entitled to, on the foundation of its conception of justice,
it would rebel and attempt to change the organization. He also discussed methods and means to
prevent recurrence of revolution in dissimilar states.
Achievements and Failures of Greek Political Customs
There is no doubt that Greek political ideas and organizations are one of the mainly spectacular
achievements in human history. The Greeks were the first to develop a science of politics,
divorcing it shape ethics and philosophy. Also, the Greeks urbanized the concept of constitution,
and emphasized its importance in political life of the state. They also discussed dissimilar kinds
of states. They urbanized the first democratic shape of government in which citizens participated
in full degree. The Greek concept of politics was essentially moral; hence, they urbanized the
concept of an ideal state in which man could live the good life; the life which would bring the
best out of man. The Greeks failed to provide citizenship rights to more than half of their
population. They did not realize that in the course of social and economic growth, the
municipality-state since an element of governance had become outdated since large territorial
states became the order of the day. The Greek municipality-states took recourse to the policy of
forming federations in order to check internal disturbances, but they failed to set up stable or
permanent states. The classical Greek theorists did not distinguish flanked by state and society
clearly; hence, they failed to distinguish properly flanked by the interests of individuals and that
of the state.
Transition from Ancient Greece to Ancient Rome
The ancient Greek municipality-states lost their significance in 4th century BC since the
Macedonians recognized their empire in Europe and Asia. Few of the units of Greek custom were
accepted forward through Alexander and his successors. The Roman Republic appeared
throughout this period and dominated the history of the world for one thousand years. The mainly
significant contribution of Rome was advocacy of the theory of universal society for a universal
state. Since a result, the nature of Roman state was radically dissimilar from that of the Greek
municipality-states. The Romans urbanized the concepts of law and state which sought to
encompass dissimilar parts of society all in excess of the recognized world.
Roman political history can be divided into two sections:
Republican Rome and
Imperial Rome.
The Republic of Rome
The Republic of Rome appeared in the 4th century BC and urbanized unique political
organizations. These organizations were the product of a period in which there was a secure link
flanked by the people and the state. The Popular Assembly and the Senate were the two biggest
organizations and they were subordinate to law. Every biggest decision was taken in the
assembly and even great generals had to get their mandate renewed from the Senate.
Patricians and Plebians
The Roman society was divided into the two classes of Patricians and Plebians. The Patricians
constituted only 10% of the total population, but they enjoyed enormous authority because of
their social prestige, traditions, religious rights and cults; on the other hand, the Plebians,
however numerous, were poor and hence, lacked political authority. In ancient Rome, social
dealings were formed through the patron-client framework. The client was a free man and
entrusted himself to the patronage of another and received defense from him in return. The client
helped his patron in his public life with all the means accessible at his command and the patron
gave him financial and legal support.
Rule through Consuls
The Republic was governed through two elected Consuls. In an emergency, a dictator could be
nominated. Normally, a Consul was elected for a year. The Consuls possessed supreme
administrative powers. They were the commanders of the army and had a right to interpret and
execute laws. The centre of political action was not the legislature, but the executive. The two
Consuls had to take decisions after holding consultations with each other. They were subject to
one another’s veto; hence, they could not take arbitrary decisions.
Roman Political Organizations
Popular Assembly
The popular assembly was possibly the mainly significant organization in Republican Rome. It
was recognized with the people of Rome. The Commands issued through the popular assembly
were measured since commands issued through the sovereign people of Rome. The settlements
were passed in the name of the two bodies-the popular assembly and the senate. Hence, the
commands were issued in the name of the ‘Senate and the People of Rome’. The assembly
enacted laws, made proposals in relation to the war and peace and mainly importantly, nominated
the consuls. The names of the consuls were proposed through Senators from their own ranks. In
the earlier stage, popular assembly was powerful, but gradually the Senate gained authority. In
the first century BC, the Senate secured authority to create laws. The assembly was ultimately
controlled through the Senate because of its larger prestige and wealth.
The Senate
The Senate was a powerful body in the Republic of Rome. Initially, the total membership of the
Senate was 300 and throughout Augustus’s era, it was raised to 600. The members of the Senate
were elected through a lot. Under the Republic, the Senate owed its power and prestige largely to
the information that it comprised practically of all those who possessed administrative and
political experience. The Senate was a powerful body. It possessed no administrative authority,
but advised elected officials on domestic and foreign policy, fund and religion. It had the
authority of creation war and peace and concluding treaties with foreign countries. Through the
end of the first century BC, the authority of the Senate grew. It enjoyed legitimacy and even great
generals had to get their mandate renewed from it because it was supported through the people.
There were dissensions in the Senate and the patron—client connection played a key role in its
functioning. Beside with the Roman Assembly and the Senate, the Courts of Magistrates played a
significant role in the management of justice.
The Roman Concept of Law
The greatest contribution of Rome to history is the concept of law which was urbanized and
refined through a big number of Roman jurists. The Latin term for the common body of law is
‘jus’, which is broader and more comprehensive than ‘lex’. For the Romans, law meant a body of
rules enforced through courts. Throughout the Roman era, law was divided into natural and
positive law. Natural law meant the law imposed on humanity through our general human nature
and positive law meant the law imposed through the state. The Romans understood the
importance of natural law and held that there were few rules of morality, justice, reasonableness
in conduct, which were binding upon all men, not due to the information that they were laid
down in the positive law of the state, but because they were intrinsically right and deserved our
respect.
Sources of Law
The Romans were of the opinion that there were three sources of law: the traditions of people,
legislative declarations and legislative formulations. The traditions of people were evolved in
excess of an era of time and they helped a great trade in the formation of law. The legislative
declarations meant the declarations made through the Roman Assembly, the Senate and in the
later era, the imperial declarations. The third source of law was legislative formulation which
came from the decisions of the courts of magistrates. The responses of private persons skilled in
law who gave their opinions when they were consulted could also be incorporated in legislative
formulations. These three sources were responsible for the creation of positive laws in ancient
Rome.
Contributions of Cicero
Cicero was one of the greatest of Roman lawyers who wanted to preserve the Roman Republic
since a stable shape of government. Cicero was recognized for developing the Roman concept of
law. It was to the credit of Cicero that he gave the stoic doctrine of natural law, a political
dimension and declared that true law was right cause in accordance with nature and applied to all
men. It was eternal and unchangeable. He held that no legislation that contravened it could
become a law and that no people could create what was right into a wrong. Through its
commands, law summoned people to perform their duties and restrained them from doing
anything wrong. It could not place down one rule at Rome and another at Athens, nor there one
rule today and another tomorrow.
Cicero’s Views on the Nature of Man and the State
Cicero held that all men were equal before the law. All races of men possessed the similar
capability for experience and the sense of discrimination flanked by right and wrong. He
maintained that as all men were equal and subject to one law, they were fellow citizens. He was
of the view that the state could not exist permanently, unless it acknowledged and gave effect to
the consciousness of mutual obligations and mutual recognition of the right that held its citizens
jointly. Cicero described the state the ‘Commonwealth’, because it was a corporate body and its
membership was the general possession of all. It lived to supply its citizens with advantages of
mutual aid and presently government. He maintained that the state itself and its laws were always
subject to the law of God or the moral or natural law. Cicero led an extensive Roman custom of
lawyers who tried to refine the concepts of law and justice in ancient Rome.
Church and State
The Romans recognized the first universal state in the world in the first century AD. The Roman
state was a vast empire which brought under its managing huge areas of Europe and Asia. This
empire needed a bond which could hold dissimilar races jointly. The universal Roman society
needed a universal religion and in the 4th century AD, the emperor Constantine fulfilled this
require through embracing Christianity. At that time, the Church alone possessed universal aims
and an efficient coherent system, which could unite the several conflicting people and classes of
the empire in a single entire.
Views of the Church
The Church represented spiritual power and claimed that it was a separate organization from the
state and entitled to govern the spiritual concerns of mankind self-governing of the state. The
state represented temporal authority and the church and the state represented two distinct
authorities. The Church throughout this era maintained that it was obligatory on the section of a
Christian to respect constituted power. In the temporal sphere, he should obey the orders of the
state and in the spiritual sphere, the orders of the church. Therefore, every man was a citizen of
two states. The early Christian thinkers were more interested in maintaining the autonomy of the
church.
Saint Augustine on Men and God
Saint Augustine wrote his books on politics in the 5th century AD and urbanized the concept of
two municipalities—the municipality of God and the municipality of man. He held that there was
a contest flanked by the two since the municipality of man was dominated through possessive
impulses and the municipality of God was based on heavenly peace and salvation. Only in the
heavenly municipality was peace possible and only the spiritual kingdom was permanent. Since a
result, man’s salvation lies in the achievement of municipality of God.
Achievements of Roman Political Customs
The Roman custom served since a bridge flanked by the ancient Greek and Christian customs.
The Romans expounded the concept of equality before law and did not discriminate flanked by
dissimilar races of people. Republican Rome successfully ran political organizations like the
popular Assembly and the Senate. They evolved the concept of universal state that encompassed
dissimilar societies coming under the empire. They opposed Greek exclusiveness and evolved the
concept of law which gave justice to all. They were firmly rooted in the concept of morality. The
Romans under Christian power tried to demarcate the connection flanked by the church and the
state. The Romans used excursive force to suppress the opponents of the government. They did
not reject the practice of slavery. They failed to fully develop the concept of state and the
doctrine of political obligation which could bind people jointly. The brutality of the Roman
political class was legendary. Since a result, the Roman Empire could never enjoy political
continuity and political unity.

THE CONFUCIAN TRADITION

Emperorship
For the Mughal Empire in India, it has been said that the emperor was its ‘mainspring’: how well
the imperial government would function depended on his effectiveness. The emperor in China
too, had to be something of a mainspring. The Chinese did have a custom of scholar-officials,
and through the 7th century they were beginning to be selected by an elaborate examination
organization. Thanks to their shared knowledge, skills, motivations, and customs, they were able
to build big buildings of officialdom for managing empires of enormous mass. Their level was
greater than anything that pre-colonial India ever had. This bureaucracy often had sufficient of a
shared ideology and custom, and loyalty to the dynasty that the tools could function for a while
even with a string of passive and incompetent emperors. In the 12th century, these tools held
jointly despite having to flee the northern capital, under pressure from northern invaders – and
start afresh, south of the Yangtze. Throughout the 7th century, and certainly again throughout
the 11th, the Chinese worked up an elaborate bureaucratic building. It incorporated the
Censorate: a section of the government whose officials were required to stay a watch on
everyone else and to criticize them for their mistakes. The thought of having a Censorate had
evolved in excess of more than two millennia. Its tasks were twofold: one, wide-ranging
surveillance of the civil and military officials, on behalf of the emperor—or the state; and, two,
remonstrance with the ruler, criticizing his policies and conduct, and pleading with him to correct
them. Under the Ming, there were ‘hundreds of censorial officials’, in their own hierarchy, spread
by the empire. Yet the emperor, being ‘son of heaven’, was the fount of all legitimacy. An
emperor who was confident of himself would discover methods to bypass his tools of officials if
his interests, or his vision, were at stake. In the earlier centuries, an emperor would have had to
recognize the authority of a mainly hereditary aristocracy several of whose members were
leading officials too. Through the Sung, the aristocracy had given method to a ruling class of
subservient to the emperor, than the aristocracy had been. Henceforth, there was a greater
concentration of authority in the emperor’s hands, and stronger penalties for antagonizing him.
Through the 15th century, the Censorate had virtually abandoned its earlier function of
‘remonstrance’. It remained since an agency of surveillance alone, creation the Censorate an
instrument which the emperor and his mediators could exploit to exercise manage in excess of
the bureaucracy—and in excess of society at big. How powerful the emperor was in relation to
his officials was reflected in how to behave in his attendance. With passing dynasties, they were
required to behave in a method that became more and more servile. Throughout the Tang, the
high officials could sit with the emperor, with the Sung they had to stand before the emperor who
was sitting; and the Ming and Ching required them to prostrate themselves and kneel before the
emperor.
Scholar-Officials
Examinations and the Building of Bureaucracy
Despite the mandate of heaven to rule, the Chinese emperor was dependent on his Confucian
scholar-officials for administering the empire. The officials urged the emperor to rule through the
instance of his virtue – and leave the business of running the empire to them. A great of ritual
was involved this task, for the rituals were intended to present, to the society at big, a sense of
harmonious order and of hierarchy. Scholar-officials were the masters of this ritual too.
The connection flanked by the emperor and the officials was crucial in the development of the
Chinese imperial bureaucracy. This was a slow procedure. Through mid-first millennium BC,
before the first empire, rulers in China were already employing scholars and seeking their
counsel, but this was a connection of individual scholars. It was the Han Empire that organized
the scholars into a hierarchy. Still later, beginning with the Sui in the late 6th century,
recruitment into this body of officials came to be channeled, in section, by public examinations
which tested candidates on a specified curriculum – however the curriculum was subject to the
winds of change. Examinations were always a little channel for recruitment for office, ranging
from an annual standard of less than ten men before 655 under the Tang, to one of 200-240 men
annually under the Sung. The big bulk of men entered the lower ranks of civil service by other
channels, yet success at the examinations gave one both the prestige of the learned man and
heightened prospects of high office. Senior officials had the right to nominate their sons, and
grandsons, for lower stage offices; partly, this was a reward for the senior official’s loyal service,
and partly it was whispered that officials’ sons would themselves create good officials. There
were still other methods of entering the government in lower, regional rungs, or in specialist
behaviors like taxation. Later, these men could seem for examinations and earn promotion to
higher ranks, with wider responsibilities, in the central government. Men with outstanding
performance in the army were also sometimes brought to the civil face.
Divided Loyalties: Family vs. Emperor
China’s skill to imperial dimensions time and again pivoted on its skill to generate a formidable
bureaucracy repeatedly. The scholar-officials swore through the teachings of Confucius, and his
ideas fostered the values of moral behaviour, including filial piety and obedience. These values
served to strengthen two poles of subsistence in the Chinese world: the family and the
emperorship. On one face, these values fostered the big family, and its reverence for ancestors,
especially in the stratum of scholar-officials. These big families, and often clans, would give
material support for young aspirants preparing for the examinations – which could lead to official
careers. Furthermore, if an official fell out of imperial favor, he might require his kinsmen’s
support in his hour of adversity. So, given his comparatives’ past and future importance for him,
a bureaucrat would attempt to exploit his office, often improperly, to help his comparatives since
well since himself. On the other face, the state promoted the thought that the empire was a
family, the emperor its head: he was so entitled to obedience – presently like the head of a
family. The acceptance of this value helped close the loyalty and obedience of scholar-officials.
It made a strong imperial state possible. The related values of filial piety and obedience helped,
then, to strengthen the big family group on one face and an overbearing imperial state on the
other. This had consequences. Chinese political and administrative arrangements did not allow
much legroom for self-governing systems – such since would be needed for organized protest on
the section of the disaffected or the oppressed. In this milieu, if you removed the organization of
centralized government, which got its commands executed by its officials, reaching out to the
ends of the empire, there were no other organizations which could ensure an orderly functioning
of society. Ambitious strong men remained, with their kinsmen and servitors, each trying to set
up own dominion – and willing to fight things out. This condition recurred in Chinese history
many times.
A framework for attending to communal tasks could, apparently, be built only approximately the
emperor. In times of imperial breakdown, then, there was a widespread predisposition for turning
to whoever could hold out the promise of renewing an imperial order – a strong army leader, a
conqueror from the north. They would have been learning the scripts of Confucius, in the hope of
securing imperial office ultimately. The demise of previous regime would be blamed on the late
emperors’ personal failings Confucius and his teachings were sacred, beyond question, and
therefore was the rightful lay in the management of those who were schooled in these teachings.
If the Chinese State tended, recurrently, to be domineering, there were recurring patterns of
resistance and withdrawal too. This had two biggest foci. One was popular rebellion.
Confucianism had become the ideology of governing – and of those who were seen since
oppressors. Those who rebelled against their oppression looked for representations and ideas in
China are other biggest customs, Taoism and Buddhism. The other centre of resistance could be
in the middle of the officials themselves. Several scholar officials saw their calling in high-
minded words and for them the life of an official could sometimes become extremely frustrating.
The arbitrariness of the emperor and his secure advisors would be one source of this frustration.
In this milieu of considerable uncertainty, officials tended to shape clusters whose members
would help each other. Hostile moves on the section of rival clusters, then, became a second
source of frustration. Few frustrated men would withdraw from employment since officials, and
devote themselves to learning ancient texts, script poetry, painting, and therefore forth. Others,
occasionally, would defy the powerful, knowing well that they could side death. Such martyrdom
in the course of righteous conduct has also been a source of vitality for the Confucian custom.
Few scholar-officials could defy the powerful; none ever became emperor himself. That would
have needed the mandate of heaven, something that could be achieved only by victory in the
battlefield. The Confucians’ ideology and training did not prepare them for establishing empires;
it prepared them only to serve whoever achieved imperial authority – by succession or by force.
It was the two distinctive principles of imperial authority and of Confucian hierarchy that jointly
defined the Chinese imperial state.
The Dynastic Cycle
The Chinese imperial political history tended to move in dynastic cycles – with recognizable
phases. Since the literati and the others pursued their interests in each stage, circumstances
appeared which led to the creation of the next stage. The dynastic founder, and sometimes his
immediate successors, could often act with an exhilarating drive, continuing something of the
momentum of their initial congests. With his charisma and power, the founder could purse
ambitious projects, commanding possessions on a staggering level: build navigational canals,
hundreds of kilometers extensive, or huge palaces; mount distant-reaching campaigns of
conquest; commission the assembly of a great imperial library or biggest literary or historical
studies and compilations. The short-existed Sui dynasty, in the first decade of the 7th century,
built almost two thousand kilometers of canals, forty paces wide, by forced labour including
several women. For managing operations on this level, and for running the empire, the new
emperor would have to constitute his bureaucracy. On the other face, the literati expected that
their services would be sought for running the empire; and their ideology persuaded them that
they ought to serve the emperor. This obligation applied even for an alien, northern emperor: one
who ruled by the virtue of his energies would be sapped through having to read by vast piles of
paperwork, and having to provide his decisions; and often he had to contend also with never-
ending factional bickering in the middle of his officials. In a yet later stage of the dynasty, bored
with such a routine, the then reigning emperor might turn to diversions-his numerous consorts in
the palace, poetry or painting, Taoist ritual, in one case carpentry. He would leave the running of
the empire to his trusted officials. Sometimes, he would put his trust in sure favored eunuchs in
his palace, in which he might have greater confidence. These functionaries, in turn, could devote
themselves to their own, private agendas. Their sense of familial obligations would persuade
them to exploit their office, high or low, for advancing their families’ interests through every
means accessible. The high officials could acquire big landed estates – which would be tax-free
because their owners were government officials. Even eunuchs had families: there were the
families they had been born into; but also they would sometimes ‘marry’ women servants in the
palace, and the ‘couple’ would adopt children, therefore that something like a full family was in
lay – with all its interests; and the eunuchs did not even have an ideology that would restrain
them in their misdeeds. The officials commonly built their estates through ousting ordinary
peasants – who could not resist powerful officials. Since the ranks of the landless destitute grew,
a flood or a drought could provide the push for a great rebellion to rise. The extremely mass of a
great empire presented troubles. Meanwhile, the empire could be descending into disorder –
creation the scene for a new empire-builder. China would be entering another round of the
dynastic cycle. In the Chinese custom of script history, when the scholar-officials produced an
explanation of the previous dynasty, they invariably blamed the ‘last bad emperor’, and his
faults, for the decline of the empire. Being scholar-officials themselves, they were ordinarily
inclined to overlook the faults, and the aggrandizing tendency, of their precursors – and how it
formed the fate of the empire. It could seldom be the scholar-officials’ intention that an empire
grows therefore weak that it would no longer be able to uphold itself, for that would leave them
without their offices. Yet their actions had precisely this consequence; but it was an unintended
consequence of their pursuing their own their families’ and clans’ interests. What the successive
rounds of the cycle shared was a common pattern. Therefore big and intricate a society, indeed at
times therefore dynamic a society, could not re-level earlier measures in any great detail. There
were considerable changes; but separately from such procedures since a common expansion of
Han culture, of Han civilization power, population development, and a rising stock of historical
record and of literature, it would be hard to characterize the overall tendencies since embodying a
clear direction of ‘progress’.
The End of Confucian Imperial Ideology
For in relation to the two thousand years, Confucianism was the ideology of government in
China. The political, moral, and intellectual supremacy of Confucianism was not seriously
challenged until the mid-9th century. Through then, European and other foreign commercial,
evangelical, and other interests had made deep inroads into China. In subsequent decades, the
rulers and the scholars of China started to become aware, more and more acutely, that the
Confucian custom had no answers to the Western challenge: a challenge of huge scope, which
incorporated not only deal but also the exploit of force, and access to reliable knowledge,
including science and technology. Henceforth, they would be torn flanked by attachment to their
own custom, because it was theirs and turning to the Western custom, because in numerous
meadows it was manifestly more resourceful. The hard situation of the Chinese scholars was
somewhat same to that of that of the Pundits, the Ulema, and other types of traditional scholars in
India. In moves to defend what they could, all of them proposed same distinctions: that their
traditional studying was necessary, and adequate, for spiritual and moral farming; even however
Western studying may be needed in technological matters. The final blow came at the beginning
of the 20th century. The widespread devotion to Confucian studying had always had a scrupulous
cause: the syllabus for the imperial examinations – which were crucial for securing government
employment. Then, in 1905, the government snapped the relationship: henceforth, the imperial
examinations would not test the candidates’ knowledge of the Confucian custom. The principal
stimulus for mastering its key texts disappeared, and therefore did public interest in Confucian
ideology, since the only possible foundation for organizing government and society; however it
sustained to command respect since section of China’s history and custom. Devotion to one’s
family, and to one’s ancestors, remained since ideals. The Chinese search for an alternate
ideology led them to Communism and to the great revolution in 1949; and its leaders were
dismissive of Confucius and his ideas. Few observers consider, though, that the Chinese imperial
custom is reflected in Communist China’s authoritarian approach and in its skill to subordinate
individual purposes to communal ones.
ARABIC-ISLAMIC POLITICAL TRADITIONS
Growth of Islamic Polity
Scheduling of polity is essential for the state. After the formation of the Islamic state at Madina
in 622 AD, its evaluation had started. It is based on the Quranic verse—‘Obey God, and obey the
Prophet (Pbuh) and those power in the middle of you’.
Historical Backdrop
You may be aware, for example, that there was a tribal polity in pre—Islamic Arabia. In the pre-
Islamic polity, the Shaikh or the Saiyid was its head elected through the heads of the dissimilar
clans. In 622 AD with the formation of the Islamic State at Madina, the Islamic polity came into
practice. In the Islamic polity, there is an only a thin demarcation flanked by religion and polity.
They are therefore closely connected that it is extremely hard to distinct the two. Though,
religion always dominated. In Islam, both these powers were given to Prophet Mohammad
(Pbuh). He (Pbuh) was declared the head of the state since well since the leader of the religion.
Its rules and regulations had to be followed through the ruler and the ruled. There were no
privileges for the ruler.
Organization of Khilafat
After the death of Prophet Mohammad (Pbuh) in 632 AD, Khilafat came into subsistence.
Khilafat literally means succession to any predecessor individual or group or for that matter, to
the previous ruler in the common sense since used in the Quran for many prophets. Technically,
Khilafat has assumed the connotation of an Islamic organization of governance based on the
Quran and the Sunnah, which originated after the death of Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) to serve
the objectives of looking after the affairs of the people and for establishing the commandments of
the Shariat. On the foundation of the two injunctions of Shura and the Ijma, Muslims had elected
Abu Bakr (R.A.) since the first Caliph of Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) after his death in 632 AD.
After Abu Bakr’s (R.A.) death in 634 AD, Umar (R.A.) was chosen since the Caliph. After
Umar’s (R.A.) death in 645 AD, Usman (R.A.) was chosen and then after Usman’s (R.A.) death
in 654 AD. Ali (R.A.) was elected since the Caliph and he sustained till he was killed in 661 AD.
With Ali’s (R.A.) death, the organization of Khilafat came to an end.
Qualifications of the Caliph
In excess of the issue of the qualifications of the Caliph, approximately all the Muslim political
thinkers with the exception of Isna Asharis, are unanimous; the variation is establish only in the
number of circumstances laid down through the several Muslim political thinkers. Mawardi, for
example, lays down seven circumstances while Ibn Khalladun reduces them to five. Ghazzali
enumerates same qualifications with few modifications. Mainly of them prescribe knowledge of
Islamic sharia, soundness of body and mind, a presently character and Quraishite decent.
Qualifications of the Khalifa are since follows:
The Khalifa should be a Muslim
He should be suave and adult
He should be male, since a male alone can undertake the heavy responsibilities of running the
affairs of the state
He necessity be a free man and not a slave since he cannot discharge his duties independently
He should be free from physical and mental defects
He should be competent and bold sufficient to execute the prescribed punishments of Islam
and defend the frontiers of the Islamic state and uphold peace and order in the state
Justice is the great pre-requisite for Khalifah
Knowledge of Islam and its practical implications are also a necessity, for without this
knowledge, he cannot run the state in accordance with Islamic precepts and practices. Election of
a non-Quraishite to the office of the Caliph rendered it null and void. Similarly, Shahrastani also
holds that the Imam necessity belong to the tribe of Quresh. Ibn Khalladun’s discussion and
arguments concerning this issue lay the entire scenario in its proper perspective. Imam Hanbal is
accounted to have said, ‘If the question of the election of an amir comes and we have to choose
flanked by an inexperienced pious man and a less pious, but more experienced man in statecraft,
the preference should be given to the less pious and the more experienced one’. Imam Hanbal is
supported in his opinion through a Prophetic hadis. Those in the middle of the companions of
Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) who were noted for their piety, but had no experience of
management, were not given any administrative location. It is narrated through Muslim that
Abuzar said to Prophet (Pbuh). ‘Will you not appoint me to a public office?’... The Prophet
(Pbuh) said, ‘Abuzar, thou art weak and power is a trust...’ Abuzar was indeed an extremely
pious and God fearing companion of the Prophet (Pbuh). It may be mentioned that the Kharijites
create open the office of the Caliph for all Muslims.
Mens’ Power
It will be more suitable to refer here to another Quranic verse which is extremely significant in
relationship with men’s power in government. A hadis of the Prophet (Pbuh) also declares that
the posts of responsibility in an Islamic state can not be entrusted to a woman.
Process for the Election of the Caliph
There is no lay in the Quran and the Sunnah where a specific method of how to choose a Caliph
is related to the people whose affairs are decided through counsel in the middle of themselves.
This is consultation and not a definite or conclusive process of appointing a leader. Mainly of the
Muslim political thinkers emphasize the Caliph’s election by the bayat. Which one of those who
are qualified for the Caliphate may be chosen?
 Through designation of the Prophet (Pbuh)
Through designation of the ruling power or
Through designation of the holder of actual authority
One Caliph at a Time
In the Islamic polity there can be only one Caliph. There are explicit customs of the Prophet
(Pbuh) concerning this issue. The meeting held at Saqufa of Bani Saidah in 632 AD after the
death of Prophet (Pbuh) also helps us in this issue. In that meeting, the demand was put forth
through Ansars that one Amir from in the middle of the Ansars and the other from in the middle
of the Muhajirs might be selected since a Caliph, but this was not approved through the Muslims
present there.
Obedience to the Caliph
Islamic sayings and practices create obedience to the Caliph and his government a religious duty
of all the citizens of the Islamic state. But this obedience is limited and conditional for it is
obligatory only in the good, which may be termed since a perfect accord with the commands of
the Shariat. Therefore extensive since the Caliph or the Imam upholds the values of Islam in
common and does not forsake its aims and objectives, he should be obeyed. The Surah al-Nisa,
verse No.59 of the Quran enjoins upon the believers to obey the power in the following terms:
‘O ye who consider! Obey Allah and obey the Prophet (Pbuh), and those powers in the
middle of you. If you differ in any item in the middle of yourselves, refer it to Allah and His
messenger....’ The obedience to man in power is subservient to the obedience to God and His
Prophet (Pbuh). Therefore extensive since the rulers obey God and His Prophet (Pbuh), it is the
duty of the Muslims to obey them, but when they disobey God and His Prophet (Pbuh), the
Muslims are no longer bound to obey them. The Quranic attitude is reinforced through a number
of prophetic sayings in which Muslims are forbidden to obey that command of the ruler, which is
against the command of God and His Prophet (Pbuh).
WESTERN: LIBERAL AND MARXIST TRADITIONS
The Features of the Liberal – Marxist Customs
We can identify few features that are general for the Liberal-Marxist custom since an entire.
They are shared crossways the custom, although the method we attract the boundaries of the
custom and spot the internal cleavages within it may affect our perception of these features. The
Liberal-Marxist custom is distinctly a section of the contemporary culture and consequently,
shares a general ground with few of its central premises. This custom sometimes attempts,
methodologically or substantively, to co-opt perspectives and units from the pre-contemporary
societies. Sometimes, an effort may be made to construct a pre-history of this custom through
digging into the past. In the West, few of the scholars have traced Liberal and Marxist ideas and
units of methods of life in the middle of the Greeks and in early Christianity. Similarly in India,
scholars have established strong traces of this custom in Buddhism. Nevertheless, it does not
create this custom pre-contemporary, but retrieves units from the past into its fold while
remaining essentially contemporary. The Liberal-Marxist custom is grounded on communal
human experience, cause and argumentation much more than pre-contemporary political resting
on tradition, usage, power or revelation. The medieval Christian custom for example, saw
revelation since a uniquely privileged location providing access to truth. The Marxist – Liberal
custom may think that revelation cannot be a source of truth since distant since constituting the
general good is concerned and may such contending conceptions of it. Being reflective in relation
to the their own understanding, the Liberal and Marxist customs could not prevent investigation
into their own premises, formulations and recommendations and in the procedure, led to
reformulation of their own locations and that too drastically, at times. The freedoms to which
these customs were committed to such since speech, expression, access to knowledge and
information inevitably opened the door wide to pluralism of beliefs and values, which were in
tune with free inquiry. Both reflective understanding and personal liberty, so, led to pluralism of
beliefs and practices. Liberals and Marxists agreed on a big number of issues since important
. In several compliments, they shared a general conception of human beings and the
centrality of man on earth. Both measured their explorations since reasonable and warded off
prejudices and localisms of all sorts. Both of them whispered that freedom and a political society
conductive to freedom are values to be greatly cherished. They upheld the essential equality in
the middle of human beings and the singular role that man is described upon to play in nature.
Both of them whispered that political participation opens up prospects for greatly enriching life.
Ultimately, human beings have to take charge of their communal life and destiny and cannot let
this charge be handed in excess of to an all-merciful God or to the bounty of public
organizations. Though, they profoundly disagreed on the understanding and implications of
issues. They disagreed on the prioritization of concerns and mapped their consequences
differently. Sometimes, one of them ignored an issue, which the other idea since important. The
Liberal-Marxist custom since an entire saw the role of the masses positively. They were
committed to attract the masses actively into the political domain and determine its course. They,
though, differed on how to conceptualize the masses and how they could assert their say.
Sometimes, their locations varied overtime. Liberals who were initially enthusiastic in relation to
the drawing the masses into the political arena against autocracy and political fragmentation
started dragging their feet on the question once they were in authority and resorted to the
language of the rule of law and constitutionalism. Similarly, Marxists renounced the language of
self-rule and resorted to that of responsibility once the Marxist parties were in authority. The
Liberal-Marxist custom is directed at understanding and stipulating the foundation, the extent and
limits of public power rather than merely attuning to it. Attunement to the political organization
since an entire and the role one was expected to play in it were the hallmark of the pre-liberal-
Marxist customs. Attunement to the political organization since an entire and the role one was
expected to play in it were the hallmark of the pre-liberal-Marxist customs. The pre-
contemporary political customs were confined in legroom and time. On the contrary, the Liberal-
Marxist customs, proposed, procedurally and considerably, universal designs of organizing and
reorganizing world.
The Liberal Custom versus the Marxist Custom
While the Liberal custom shares general ground with the Marxist custom, in several
compliments, they cannot be collapsed into each other. There are important differences flanked
by them. Further, these differences assume specific shapes when we compare dissimilar
adaptations of one custom with those of the other. Liberalism assumes a relatively fixed and
rounded off conception of human nature. Human nature, in this conception, is endowed with
rationality and agency since integral to it. Marxism, on the other hand, sees human nature since a
historical product. It is formed in the vortex of the social dealings it is situated in while it, in turn,
forms those extremely social dealings. While Marxism does not deny human rationality and
agency, it argues that they are circumscribed through and have to take into explanation prevailing
social dealings. Given its emphasis on agency, the Liberal custom often tends to create freedom
and equality metaphysical circumstances of human subsistence and they precede legal and
political order. As Marxists consider these human agencies to be hedged in through the
prevailing social dealings, they tend to appreciate must and the factors that qualify, form and
direct human choices. They formulate circumstances and strategies to expand the legroom for
freedom and equality. Marxists subscribe to a theory of history, which argues that civilizations go
by both quantitative and qualitative changes. The former involves development in productive
forces and corresponding political, legal and cultural changes. The latter denotes transformation
of prevailing social, political and cultural arrangements that uphold such dealings. Usually,
Liberals do not take the historical antecedents of social mediators seriously, except for
hypothetically, to enable them and the society and state they live in to highlight sure features of
human beings since Hobbes or Locke do prior to the formulation of the social contract.
Liberalism tends to provide more foreplay to the human mind to construe reality. Marxism tends
to demarcate the sphere of objective reality from the subjective appropriation of the similar.
Further, it accords primacy to the former in excess of the latter. Though, Marxism agrees that
ideas, when they become practices or take possession of the hearts and minds of the people,
could become self-governing actors. There is a marked distinction in the concepts and categories
that Marxism deploys for social analysis and advocacy comparative to what Liberalism does. For
Liberalism, concept and categories such since ‘human’ rights and freedoms, civil society,
representation, isolation of powers, public opinion, justice and equality are central to its
communication. Marxism, though, has its framework in a body of concepts such since classes
and class thrash about, manners of manufacture, manufacture dealings and productive forces,
foundation and superstructure, surplus appropriation, state, revolution and transitions. Marxism
lays stress on social classes since vital elements of a society. It does not wholly undermine the
individual agency, but a historical role is ascribed to social classes. Through and big, Liberalism
privileges the individual rational agent and invests him or her with the capability to create
autonomous decisions and pursue a life of his/ her own. Marxism draws attention to the
procedures underway in a class divided society, which stunts and distorts human life and
deprives human beings from exploring the rich potentialities or their life. Usually, Liberals
confine human beings to a limited sphere of shared aspirations and leaves them to determine the
type of human being they wish to be through employing their freedoms. Through and big,
Marxism tends to give a comprehensive account of the course of human affairs and man’s
relation to nature compared to Liberalism. Marxism is not otherworldly. It makes the world
inform our ends and purposes. It, though, require not exclude sure spiritual pursuits since it
envisages a rich constitution of the self through freely determining subjects. While there are
persuasive strands of idea within Liberalism that confine human striving to this world, it is much
more open to wards accommodating the transcendental and other-worldly strivings of human
beings. Liberals easily leave greater legroom for spiritual and other worldly pursuits. Marxism
subscribes to a state of affairs where there is no use and where a rich constitution of the self goes
hand in with the decomposition of the society. Its theory of history considers the course of class
thrash about in a capitalist society since oriented towards such an end. Liberalism while
upholding several types of equalities attempts to balance them with freedom of choice. It is
disposed to reform the existing society than to strive after a society founded on non-use and non-
oppression. Society was not central to the Liberal imagination. Though, in the wake of the rise of
communitarians since a distinctive body of idea, Liberals are attempting to reach out to society in
a large method. Marxists have a well-formulated and passionate conception of revolutionary
transformation. Liberals tend to create the present human condition since eternal and permanent
and if they subscribe to political radicalism, it is narrowly circumscribed since a last resort. For
Marxists, revolutionary transformation is placed on the agenda through the turn social dealings
take, while for the Liberals it is a moral act in protection of rights and justice. Marxists and
Liberals differ on the conception, role and must of the state. Liberals tend to accept the state
since an unavoidable evil. Its denial begets greater harm than its sufferance. Marxists see the
state since an historical product arising in the wake of the irresolvable class antagonisms in
society. Claming to symbolize the society, it lords in excess of the society and ensures the
interests of the dominant classes. They argue that the state will wither absent with the dissolution
of class conflicts and class dealings. Liberalism has enjoyed a secure kinship with capitalism
historically. Sure adaptations of Liberalism such since classical liberalism are closely intertwined
with the early phases of the growth of capitalism. Few tend of Liberalism such since freedom of
deal and job and equality before law can be effectively employed to argue a case for capitalism.
Through its appeal to common human circumstances and shared citizenship, it tends to ignore
class dealings and thereby, let class dominance to prevail. Although Liberalism could be
distanced from capitalism, it has not succeeded in doing therefore, at least therefore distant, since
the type of rights it avows tend to defend private rights in excess of productive possessions.
Marxism, of course, is committed to the overthrow of capitalism and sees mainly of the evils of
contemporary society since due to its association with capitalism. There is also a biggest
variation flanked by the dissimilar adaptations of Marxism in relation to the Liberal adaptations.
Several of the later adaptations of the Marxist custom measured themselves since the authentic
bearers of the legacies of their founding fathers. Leninism claimed to be the exclusive bearer of
the legacies of Marx and Engels. Similarly, Maoism declared itself since the inheritor of the
legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The subsequent Liberal adaptations rarely claim themselves
since the authentic voices of the preceding adaptations. They claim a philosophical and moral
affinity, but not faithful stability. The dissimilar adaptations of Marxism are deeply stamped
through the idea of a specific thinker compared to the Liberal adaptations. So, separate
adaptations of Marxism often go under the name of their distinguished proponent. In the Marxist
custom, although the later adaptations claimed an exclusive legacy of the custom for themselves,
they in fact, became increasingly exclusive. Such exclusiveness combined with the claim that it
represented the authentic custom, led to internecine conflicts in the middle of the claimants. The
Liberal custom, though, allowed greater trade of internal differences and conflicts. The triumph
of one did not bring forth the elimination of the other. The Marxist adaptations, inspite of their
claim to symbolize the entire, became confined while Liberal adaptations without necessarily
claiming themselves since the ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ bearers of the custom were able to reach out to
the superior custom.
Adaptations of the Liberal Custom
The Liberal custom went by many mutations since its internal co-ordinates assumed dissimilar
significance since they were challenged and critiqued. Further, it gave rise to many local
variations since it came to be formulated in interface with diverse ideological and social contexts.
The following adaptations of this custom could be measured since notable.
Classical Liberalism
John Locke is the central figure since distant since this adaptation is concerned. It fused jointly a
relatively coherent body of ideas and dispositions. It unleashed and directed the course of social
and political procedure in markedly dissimilar methods than hitherto accustomed. It instilled and
promoted a dissimilar set of norms and values. It gave rise to a feature set of public organizations
and subjected them to the scrutiny of its own principles. It attempted to fashion a commonsense
and method of life infused through its ideas and dispositions. It made selective forays into the
legacies accessible to it to retrieve units conducive to the forging of this agenda. Classical
Liberalism subscribed to sure individual rights such since life, liberty and property, while there
were important differences on the perception of these rights, there was a predominant tendency to
perceive them since expressions of natural law that informed human beings. Several thinkers who
avowed this adaptation argued that human beings were brought into society and were wielded
jointly into a general will and power by a social contract. In such a formulation, human nature
was conceived since pre-social rather than shaped in and by associational ties and belonging.
Human nature was cast through this adaptation into a timeless and universal level emptying if
from historical and contextual anchoring. Classical Liberalism, particularly the Lockean
adaptation of it, whispered that private property was not created through civil society but was
prior to it. Civil society and state had no right to interfere in it. On the contrary, it was
indispensable for the pursuit of general good. Liberty, in this adaptation, was conceived in its
negative connotation since absence of restraint. Classical Liberalism conceived the role of civil
society and state since simply protective of rights. So, state could not interfere in the domain of
rights in the name of promoting few other value or impose limitation on the scope of rights,
unless defense of rights itself required such an intervention. It stood for a limited government. It
proposed a number of mechanisms to stay the government within bounds. The sphere of rights
begot a civil society made of dissimilar associations and clusters who monitored and constantly
kept a watch in excess of the behaviors of the state. The several freedoms enabled a civil society
to uphold a consistent and continuous watch in excess of the organs of government. A
representative legislature, isolation of powers, securing dispersal of public power crossways
dissimilar organs of government and periodic elections were central to the disposition of this
adaptation. It avowed majority consent rather than majority rule. It did need every adult to
express his representational preference by his vote. Virtual representation, i.e., representation by
those entitled to act since such, was sufficient. The economic counterpart of this adaptation was
free market and laissez-faire. Infect, classical liberalism admirably suited since an ideology for
the emerging bourgeois class with its feature emphasis on private property, limited and formal
avowal of freedom and emphasis on freedom of deal. Freedom of swap expressed in market was
supposed to assign a fair value to the product on swap. It was construed since keeping the state at
bay.
New Liberalism
Several ideas of New Liberalism, which consolidated itself since a separate adaptation of
Liberalism through the end of the 19th century, were initially formulated through Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. Liberty for him was not merely freedom of choice, but is the creative skill of people to
realize their full potential since human beings. Participation in the affairs of the society expanded
creative potentialities tremendously through placing at one’s disposal communal possessions
against the solitary possessions one could muster in the pre-social state. Participation in the
political society and its procedures enabled one to discover his real will and to shed
contingencies of passing and lingering prejudices. New Liberalism was deeply convinced
through the idea of German enlightenment and particularly through the ideas of Emmanuel Kant
and F.W.G. Hegel. Kant distinguished flanked by a real and rational self, whom he measured
since a higher and a lower self moved through desires provoked through the senses. The higher
self was the genuine locus of freedom. True freedom for Kant was freedom heteronomy i.e.,
subjection to the will of the other and from empirically caused desires. ‘Such independence’ Kant
wrote ‘is described freedom in the strictest, i.e., transcendental sense.’ This is the freedom of the
pure autonomous rational will, rightly according to the purely formal moral law it provides to
itself, obstacles to want satisfaction or limits upon choice are not constraints upon such freedom,
but everything that hinders a moral life based on pure cause. Hegel sought to provide to Kantian
freedom a social and political expression. He argued that freedom expressed in the sphere of the
scrupulous and limited pursuits beguiles itself since freedom. He argued, ‘It is the moral entire,
the state, which is that shape of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on
the condition of his recognizing, believing in and willing that which is general to the entire’.
Thomas Hill Green was to formulate the framework of the new liberal adaptation more anyone
else. He attempted to reverse the words of classical liberalism through drawing attention to the
excellence of the political society and its organizations enabling one to exercise the types of
choices one would wish to exercise. He argued that a society possessing law and government and
which relies not on force, but on the consent of its citizens is the indispensable condition for
freedom. Members of such a society feel morally obligated to one another and it is such concerns
and supports that enable one to create the type of choices that one makes. Citizens under such a
dispensation accept their responsibilities to the state and towards other citizens because their own
lives and liberties get respected and promoted in the procedure. For New Liberals, freedom is a
value to be cherished. Though, a scrupulous type of state and society are the preconditions for the
sustenance of such a value. Freedom needs morally shaped individuals and social organizations
create possible the formation of such individuals. These organizations in turn are expressions of
the action of its members. In Green’s formulation, rights and law were integral to freedom.
Rights safeguard those freedoms which individuals and social clusters claim for them selves and
grant to others. In law the creative cause of the political society is at job, transcending narrow
interests and establishing circumstances, for the nurturing of freedom. The organization of law
guards the rights of citizens. The state removes the obstacles to and gives the condition favoring
moral growth. The state is not merely governmental and legal organizations of a society, but
contains citizens and self-governing associations participating in the creation and execution of
governmental decisions and policy. New Liberalism re-conceptualized human nature from being
a timeless one to a dynamic one. Human nature is shaped and informed through the type of
organizations and supports that nurture and nourish it and these organizations and supports in
turn, reflect the type of human beings that sustain them. New Liberalism opened the method for
economic interventionist policies, welfare events and redistribution of wealth. It provided
arguments and justifications to tackle troubles of unemployment and poverty. It sought a more
equalitarian and cooperative society. The emphasis of the new liberals on the health of
organizations since a pre-requisite for the formation of a robust citizenry was a powerful impulse
for the creation of a welfare state.
Libertarianism
In the past three decades, there has been a continued effort to limit and circumscribe the role of
the state in the economy and society and valorize the role of the market. It has brought into vogue
an adaptation of liberalism described ‘libertarianism’. It asserts the primacy of liberty vis-à-vis
other values. It narrows down liberalism to what is permissible with the subsistence of the
market, in which it sees the embodiment of freedom. Few of the significant spokespersons of
libertarianism are Robert Nozick, Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek. The Libertarians deplore the
welfare state, which they think has become ‘unlimited’. It acts since if it knows what is good for
the citizens rather than let the citizens decide what each one of them thinks is good for himself. It
is critical of governments through majorities, which have degenerated into exercises for the
pursuit of authority through concluding deals with several clusters for the division of spoils.
Majority rule has become a rule based on a coalition of several minority interests. Libertarians,
so, strive to dissociate liberalism from majority rule. Against a situation where governments feel
free to create any law they see fit, libertarians advocate that people should be Free to Choose.
They call for a minimal state, which would be merely concerned with determining, arbitrating
and enforcing the rules of the game. They want to transfer the moral entitlement to the
individuals composing a society from the state, which has approach to arrogate it to itself. The
right to property, which libertarians believe since a matter of convention, is regarded since
central to freedom through them. F.A. Hayek was to say,
‘What our generation has forgotten is that the organization of private property is the mainly
significant guarantee of freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely less for those
who do not. It is only because the manage of the means of manufacture is divided in the middle
of people acting independently that nobody has complete authority in excess of us, that we since
individuals can decide what to do with ourselves’
They feel that the subsistence of liberty leaves room for the unforeseeable and the unpredictable
upon which science and culture rest. They argue that our mainly useful knowledge is inherently
decentralized and accessible to person for rapid version rather than placed at the disposal of the
planners. Changes in the ground situation create the elaborately intended plans archaic. An
individual is bigger equipped to arrive at relevant and suitable knowledge and put it to optimum
exploit rather than welfare state bureaucracies. Markets facilitate rational a locative decisions
through disseminating relevant knowledge. The markets cannot involve coercion since free
mediators freely negotiate themselves in its arena. So, for a free organization to thrive, it is not
sufficient that the rule of law prevails, but that it ensures that the market will job tolerably well.
Equalitarian Liberalism
A significant adaptation of liberalism that has been formulated in recent years has been
equalitarian liberalism. John Rawls’ pioneering job presented in A Theory of Justice and Political
Liberalism has contributed greatly to the elaboration of this perspective. Rawls in A Theory of
Justice is critical of utilitarianism, which employs net aggregate satisfactions to assess the
fairness of public policy and organizations. Rawls feels that such a location runs the risk of
undermining liberty through stipulating a good prior to choice, upholding a shape of
majoritarianism that does not prioritize utility through rights and tending to create human persons
instrumental for the satisfaction of others. Against the utilitarian canons and falling upon the
moral theory of Immanuel Kant, Rawls argues a presently order should be based on the principles
of ‘Self before it’s Ends’ and ‘Right prior to Good’. It is the self by deliberations and choice that
specifies the ends to be pursued rather than sure pre-given ends determining the course a person
should take. Such a perspective is measured deontological since it is not committed to sure prior
ends governing our action. Rawls resorts to the social contract device to formulate the principles
on which all can agree to foundation their social and political organizations. These principles are:
Each person is to have an equal right to the mainly long vital liberty compatible with same
liberty for others,
Social and economic liberties are to be arranged in such a method that they are both the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged and attached to offices and locations open to all under
circumstances of fair equality of opportunity.
Each of these principles has their consequences. The first principle generates specific rights and
duties such since right to speech, assembly, conscience, personal property and political liberties
with regard to voting and holding of office. The second principle regulates the fair sharing of
wealth and authority. Rawls proposes a constitutional, legal, judicial and civil life based upon
these principles. In Political Liberalism, Rawls discovers the conception outlined through him in
A Theory of Justice since not taking into explanation the plural, but reasonable comprehensive
pursuits of life that prevail in a contemporary democratic society. For the purpose, he proposes
the thought of justice since fairness since a free-standing view on which the reasonable methods
of life agree and thereby, discover an overlapping consensus. He modifies the two principles that
he had proposed in A Theory of Justice to an extent. These principles advocate and express an
egalitarian shape of liberalism through emphasizing on three units. These three units are:
The guarantee of the fair value of the political liberties which is not satisfied with their pure
formal value;
Fair equality of opportunity and
The variation principle, according to which the social and economic inequalities are to be
adjusted therefore that greatest benefit accrues to the least advantaged.
Adaptations of the Marxist Custom
Like the liberal custom, the Marxist custom too has many separate expressions since it came to
be expounded and interpreted, took stock of the changing class dealings and applied to separate
and unevenly urbanized civilizations. The following adaptations of this custom are noteworthy.
Marxism
Marxism refers to a body of idea and social practices that took hold of the radical forces directed
against capitalist society from the second half of the 19th century. At the head of these radical
forces was the working class. Karl Marx gave expression to the central center of this idea and
formed the emerging socialist movement. His friend and colleague, Friedrich Engels was his life-
extensive partner in this endeavor. Since a current of idea, Marxism was formulated through
critiquing German Idealism, political economy centered in Britain and the currents of Utopian
Socialism that prevailed in dissimilar quarters. It claimed to be scientific socialism and argued
that socialist practice is directed against the whole capitalist order and can be led only through
the proletariat. It sketched growths that led to the capitalist manner of manufacture, pieced jointly
the several dealings informing it and suggested the role of the proletariat in transforming these
dealings. Given the uneven growth of capitalism, it saw the role of the working class differently
in dissimilar countries. In few, it might join hands with others for a democratic revolution and
elsewhere, it could head an alliance for a socialist revolution. Marx grounded his social
understanding on a separate philosophical and epistemological foundation, which he described
since materialist dialectics and is popularly recognized since Dialectical Materialism. It
distinguished being from thinking and accorded primacy to the former in excess of the latter. Few
of the feature characteristics of this perspective were the following: The manner of being is inter-
related but contradictory. The inter-related and contradictory character of reality begets its
differential and uneven expressions and sets the course of its transformation. There are two types
of transformations: The first is quantitative which does not change the vital features of reality.
The second alters the extremely character of being since the contradictions internal to the
constitution of being discover expression, reconstituting it afresh. Though, new contradictions
inform the being even when it goes by qualitative transformations. The type of contradictions
constituting a substance cannot be foretold, but require to be grasped. Lenin later described it
since the ‘concrete analysis of the concrete situation’. Marx saw human beings since laboring
creating and recreating themselves in the procedure. By his labour, man creatively engages
himself with nature and begets his bonds with other human beings, both associational and
sensuous. Since extensive since productive forces were small urbanized, everyone had to be
productively occupied to eke out his livelihood. With the growth of the means of manufacture,
though, the productivity of labour increased, resulting in surplus. This surplus manufacture,
though, was appropriated through a sure social strata leading to class dealings and class
antagonism flanked by those who produce and those who suitable the social surplus. Marx and
Engels discover sure other contradictions such since flanked by manual and mental labour and
city and countryside since inextricably bound with the above contradiction. Given the class
antagonisms in society, the state emerges to hold the antagonistic classes in check and thereby
enable the reproduction of society. Marx argues that dissimilar civilizations have gone by many
manners of manufacture till the rise of capitalism. A manner of manufacture consists of the
economy made of a specific combination of productive forces and dealings in the middle of
produces, or manufacture dealings. He calls it since the foundation. The spheres of politics, law,
religion and civilization are intimately linked to the foundation and get formed through it. He
calls them since superstructures. In his Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy, he says:
‘In the social manufacture of their subsistence, men inevitably enter into definite dealings,
which are self-governing of their will, namely dealings of manufacture suitable to a given level in
the growth of their material forces of manufacture. The totality of these dealings of manufacture
constitute the economic building of society, the real basis, on which arises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite shapes of social consciousness’
Marx argues that social mediators caught in a scrupulous manner of manufacture pursue growth
of productive forces. Though, when it is not possible to do therefore within the prevailing
manufacture dealings, they resort to changing manufacture dealings thereby precipitating
revolutionary transformation. For Marx, capitalism is the final manner of antagonistic class
dealings. This manner of manufacture develops productive forces to an extent unthinkable
before. It is also a manner that envelops the entire world bringing all the extant units of other
manners of manufacture under its sway. The vital class contradiction in this manner of
manufacture is flanked by the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. There are other classes and strata
within a capitalist society. They begin to get polarized crossways the vital classes in the course of
the growth of productive forces. Marx argued that the polarization of the working class and
peasantry is essential for the pursuit of revolutionary transformation.
Marx argued that capitalism is susceptible to periodic crises resulting in a vast loss of productive
forces. He also felt that beside with the growth of capitalism, there also develops the working
class which initially deals with capital on words set through the latter. Though, since class
dealings turn sour, the working class is no longer prepared to abide through the words set through
capital. When further growth of productive forces, i.e., a state of affairs providing overall
satisfaction to a society, cannot be ensured the politically organized working class will launch its
attack on the prevailing state authority and replace it with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such
a political shift will inaugurate the stage of socialism, which will undermine capitalist dealings
and pave the method for communism. Marx saw communism since a manner of manufacture
where the productive forces belong to the society since an entire and they are urbanized to the
highest stage therefore since to meet requires of each and every one of its members. It makes
human beings free to pursue the type of job, which they relish and believe since the prime want
of their life. Such a society, he feels comes to be governed through the principles ‘From everyone
according to his capability; to everyone according to his require’. Only with communism man
becomes truly fee. Communism can dawn only through putting and end to such age-old
contradictions such since city and countryside and manual and mental labour. It will do absent
with division of labour. Marx idea that communism will lead to the highest growth of the self
beside with the re-composition of the society. Marxism described for a profound critique of the
then existing socialism which he idea were based upon utopian ideals. For him revolutionary
practice is not an act of the will and cannot be launched at any time. It needs the maturation of
the suitable social circumstances. Though, class itself was both a reflection and intensification of
the contradictions of a society.
Leninism
Based on Marxist ideas, socialist parties arose sometimes struggling against existing parties
bearing the label. These parties were committed to a profound transformation of the existing
social dealings by revolutionary transformation. Coincidentally, liberal democracy too at this
level was increasingly becoming inclusive conceding a number of political rights to the workers.
One of the tasks that confronted the nascent socialist parties was to describe their relation with
liberal democracy. There was also the problem of the relation flanked by the socialist party on
one hand and the movement organized approximately deal unions, cooperative, media and
elections. There were also profound changes in the nature of capitalism underway at this level.
How will these changes affect the corpus of Marxist thought? This was a significant issue before
the socialist parties. At the end of the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th, we discover
the rise of national movements struggling for their nationhood. The connection of the socialist
movement to these nationalist struggles was yet to be worked out; and finally since socialism
spread crossways the world unevenly formed through capitalism, the level of the revolution and
the strategy suitable for the similar were significant issues for consideration. Confronted with
these challenges, we discover a strong current of reformism developing within the socialist
movement initially given expression to through Edward Bernstein, a significant ideologue and
leader of the German Socialist party. He described for a revision of Marxism since a number of
its tenets were outdated. He questioned proletarian internationalism and sought to insert the
workers within the nation-state. He did not want the party to lead the movement but instead, the
German Socialist Party; saw the socialist revolution since a continuation and intensification of
the agenda of the liberal democratic revolution. Lenin intervened at this level and attempted to
formulate a feature response to all these questions. Lenin distinguished liberal democracy sharply
from the revolutionary pursuits of the working class and argued that the working class cannot
emancipate itself through expanding the framework of liberal democracy. He described for a
break from the mould of liberal democracy. In his familiar job what is to be done, he argued that
the working class movement without being led through the socialist party will be caught within
the ambit of capitalism. Lenin acknowledged that they were profound changes in the nature of
capitalism, changes which were not accessible to Marx when he wrote on capitalism. Though,
instead of qualifying Marx’s ideas on capitalism, these changes, he argued, confirmed Marx’s
analysis. He termed the great changes underway in capitalism since imperialism, which on
explanation of the contradictions inherent in it opens the door for revolutionary transformation.
Lenin distinguished flanked by oppressed nationalities and oppressor nationalism. He argued that
the oppressed nationalities are struggling against dominant nationalism, which is the mediator of
imperialism. So, he described for a global solidarity flanked by revolutionary movement led
through the working class and oppressed nationalities. The uneven spread of capitalism, Lenin
argued, described for the concrete analysis of the concrete situation that a revolutionary
movement confronts in each country. He submitted Russia to such an analysis and redrafted the
revolutionary design for Russia. Based upon his analysis of imperialism, Lenin argued that
although Russia was not industrialized like Western Europe and the proportion of the workers in
the population since an entire was little, there was no possibility of the further growth of
productive forces in Russia. It would be inserted more and more in the imperialist network. He
measured Russia the weakest link in the imperialist chain since all the contradictions were
concentrated there: It had not gone by an agrarian revolution; its bourgeois was weak; its state
apparatuses were autocratic; there were some civil liberties and the state was hugely dependent
on foreign capital while at the similar time it nurtured the ambitions of being a great authority.
Lenin saw the bourgeois deserting its liberal claims in the wake of the development of the
working class movement since well since under the demands of imperialism. It made him to
stress require for a violent overthrow of the existing state apparatuses therefore since creating
legroom for the exercise of authority through the proletariat. Lenin rejected the manners of
institutionalization of political authority brought in relation to the under liberal persuasion. He
felt that its manners of representation, isolation of powers and periodic elections were meant to
be devices to stay the masses absent from political authority. He argued that the soviets necessity
be the organs of authority under socialism. All powers were to be concentrated in the soviets and
the revolutionary masses should have a direct say in running its affairs. At the similar time, Lenin
stood for a centralized economy with the little industry creation lay for the large. When
centralization and bureaucratization, though, threatened to eat up revolutionary gains, Lenin
described for an autonomous system of worker-peasant alliance to subject these procedures to
revolutionary accountability. There were contradictory stances in these approaches, which were
to tell on the revolutionary credentials of the emerging Soviet state.
Maoism
Mao-Ze-Dong was to raise fundamental questions on revolutionary transformation from the
perspective of colonies and people subjected to colonial power. Colonial power usually enlisted
the support of feudalism and reactionary forces since the social foundation of its support. There
was small autonomous growth of capitalism in the colonies. There was not merely a feeble
bourgeoisie, but a relatively insignificant proletarian foundation. Peculiar strata of bourgeoisie
arose under such circumstances which nurtured it through being the middleman of imperialist
capital. Mao described it since ‘comprador bourgeoisie’. Besides, there were differences in the
nature of colonial power; few were fully colonies and the others were semi-colonies. Mao drew
attention to the issue of the issue of civilization under colonialism wherein the words mores,
beliefs and habits of subject peoples were subjected to marginalization and subordination under
the imperialist civilization. The nature of the revolutionary task in such civilizations, he argued,
was to bring forth a new type of democracy, which he described since New Democracy. For
Mao, this was a radical shape of comprador bourgeoisie. Such a revolution, he felt, necessity
release the masses from age-old bonds they were subject to, release their power and enhance their
capability to determine the course of their own emancipation. It required a conscious effort to
promote nationalist civilization vis-à-vis the imperialist civilization. Who can bring in relation to
such a revolutionary transformation? Mao argued that the bourgeoisie cannot lead such a
revolution in China and the only classes under capitalism which can do therefore were the
proletariat. But given the attendance of the industrial proletariat in China, it can become effective
only through firmly joining itself with the poor peasantry and leading the agrarian revolution.
The task of the Communists Party since the vanguard of the revolution so, was to bring in
relation to an agrarian revolution. Such an agrarian revolution cannot be undertaken through
concentrating on urban revolution, but through shifting in excess of to rural revolution and
joining hands with the struggling peasantry. Urban uprising in the circumstances of China, he
felt, was mere adventurism. How to bring in relation to the agrarian revolution? The strategy, he
suggested was a protracted armed thrash about through liberating areas and moving on to
liberated regions. Guerilla tactics he establishes appropriate to confront the enemy particularly at
the initial levels. Mao also spelled out the strategy of the agrarian revolution in greater detail. It
involved basing oneself firmly on landless and poor peasants, taking in the transitional peasant
and enlisting the support of the rich peasant since much since possible. He also argued that
depending on the type of enemy that the revolution faced, the issues recognized for agrarian
transformation require to be customized. So, one of the biggest shifts that Mao heralded was the
shift of revolutionary locale from urban areas to rural areas; founding a new axis of worker-
peasant alliance and suggesting a specific strategy for the agrarian transformation. Mao argued
that sure conductive external circumstances were needed for the realization of a strategy of this
type for the establishment of new democracy. He felt that the subsistence of the Soviet Union
was such a condition. Otherwise, the agrarian could be nipped in the bud through hostile forces.
For Mao, new democracy was a dissimilar shape of democracy in comparison to liberal
democracy. Liberal democracy was tilted towards capitalism, while new democracy was tilted
towards socialism. New democracy was the shape suitable for colonies/semi-colonies under
circumstances of imperialism and it would make enabling circumstances for the structure of
socialism capitalism. The second biggest innovation of Mao lies in understanding socialist
transformation. He departed significantly from the Russian model in this regard. He argued that
under socialism, primacy necessity place on transforming manufacture dealings rather than
merely developing productive forces. Socialism is a level of transition from capitalism and
communism. Throughout this whole level, there is the class thrash about flanked by the capitalist
row and the communist row of advance. The thrash about necessity not be merely against
subsistence of old capitalist dealings, but against capitalist dealings that constantly emerge from
the contradictory site of socialism. He argued that existing government, party and societal
dealings exclude the masses from asserting their direct and communal manage in excess of
general affairs. So, primacy under socialism necessity is still on the question of authority rather
than on growth. The Cultural Revolution was supposed to be a political revolution under
circumstances of socialism to build socialism. Mao argued that structure socialism should not be
mirrored in the imagery of capitalist growth, since a passive procedure unfolding behind the
masses. It should be a procedure in which the masses directly participate and determine the
course of growths. The free creativity of the masses should discover open expression under
socialism and they should not be subjected to bureaucratically drawn plans. He felt that the state
apparatuses and growth agendas need biggest alteration and reorientation under socialism. It is
necessary that agriculture and industry be urbanized, but they require to feed on each other and
complement from the upwards. So, it was required that the commune, since the self-enough and
independent element under socialism, be urbanized and possessions and recognition be accorded
to it. Mao argued that under socialism, it is necessary to break the division flanked by manual
and mental labour and city and countryside. Labour campaigns were launched to create officers
and professionals undertake sure number of hours of manual job. For Mao, the cultural sphere
became extremely crucial under socialism, advancing or retarding the march towards
communism depending on the significance accorded to it. Values such since the transitional path
of Confucius, he felt, were meant to balance off the extremes and not to strengthen revolution.
These ideas threw China into sustained turmoil. The revolutionary zeal expressed in Mao was to
be contained after his death through policy of modernization initiated through Deng- Ziao-Ping.

INDIAN POLITICAL CUSTOMS

Nature of Early Indian Political Idea
Till recently, several scholars were of the opinion that India did not contribute anything to the
development of political idea. It was whispered that political idea in ancient India, if there was
any, was at best a section of Hindu philosophy or Hindu religion. In other terms, it was idea that
the Hindu science of polity did not have a distinct identity. But if we seem at the notion of
political in several accessible sources, it is clear that ancient Indian thinkers did have a notion of
political separate from either philosophy or religion. This erroneous conclusion that few scholars
came to was because of the information that they have fixed notions of politics and political
science derived largely from the West. If we can describe ‘politics’ since the ‘affairs of a
territorially organized society held jointly through allegiance to a general power’, one can hardly
agree with those who whispered that there was no systematic growth of political idea in ancient
India.
Problem of Nomenclature
The confusion arises because of the big number of similarity words used in ancient India for
politics. There were many names, they were: Rajadharma, which means duties of the ruler,
Kshatravidya, the knowledge that the ruler should have, Rajyasastra meaning stagecraft or the
science of state, Dandaniti, the ethics of awarding punishment, Nitisastra, science of ethics
regulating the lives of both the ruler and the ruled and Arthasastra, the art of acquisition and
maintenance of land.
Concept of Matsyanyaya
In ancient India, we have a word equivalent to the western concept of the state of nature. It is
described Matsyanyaya, the state of large fish devouring the little. In ancient Indian political
idea, we approach crossways the word Matsyanyaya which explains the state of affairs in the
absence of force or danda. Force is held to be the ultimate sanction behind the state.
Dharma and Danda
For Bhikhu Parekh, Hindu political thinkers conceptualized political life in words of two central
concepts namely, dharma and danda. Both are dependent on each other. The word danda means
discipline, force, restraint, constraint or punishment. Dharma is that which holds society jointly.
It is derived from the Sanskrit root ‘dhr’ meaning to hold. Society could be held together when
each individual and clusters does his or its specific duties. This was sought to be achieved
through following the varnashrama dharma. It was so, the duty of the king to uphold
varnadharma. Varnasamkara, i.e., mixture of dissimilar varnas, is to be avoided at any cost.
There is a vivid account of what happens if members belonging to dissimilar varnas do not
adhere to their respective varnas since given in dharmashastras, Arthashastra and Mahabharata.
The dharmashastra writers concentrated on exploring the dharma of individuals and social
clusters, including the government. They, though, did not effort to give political dharma since a
separate and autonomous subject of investigation. What they did was to give a code of conduct
covering the whole human life. Politics was incidental to this largest concern. In contrast to the
come of the dharmasastras, the authors of arthasastras were interested in the system and
mechanaics of danda. The Arthasastra of Kautilya provides us a detailed explanation of the
nature and organization of government, the nature and way of exercising coercive authority, how
authority could be acquired, strategies and mechanics of retaining authority, the possible threat to
the varnas, prakritis or the units of state and the best method to trade with them. The jobs of the
authors of arthasastra were specifically political. The two approaches of dharmasastras and
arthasastra differed largely in their subject matter. The dharmasastras were legalistic and a
religious in orientation, whereas the arthasastras concentrated on organizations and politics and
were secular in orientation. Neither come was complete through it, nor is this fully appreciated
through its followers. The two jointly constitute the Hindu customs of political idea.
Indian Political Idea: Sources
Since has already been pointed out, politics in India was not measured a self-governing and
autonomous discipline. One has to dig out the conceptions of politics from the host of sources,
which trade in relation to the superior questions of human life, largely religious and philosophical
in nature. There is no one text which deals largely with politics. The significant sources for the
studies of politics are:
Vedic literature
Dharmasutras and Smritis
Epics and Puranas
Arthasastras
Buddhist and Jain literature
Coins and Inscriptions
Greek and Chineese accounts
Other literature sources and Epigraphy
Drawbacks and Limitations
Mainly of the sources being religious in nature, it is extremely hard to isolate facts of politics
from it. Dharmasutras provide an idealized picture of society and politics which hardly reflect the
reality. Mainly of the scholars who have Indian political idea have taken the power of these
sources for granted although its time, lay and authenticity are riddled with uncertainties. Yet
another difficulty is that mainly of the jobs on Indian political customs were written throughout
the nationalist movement with a purpose to counter the imperialist ideology of the Western
scholars. The imperialist ideology was urbanized through few Western scholars who made an
effort to revise the ancient Indian history. Their understanding of Indian history was based to
assumptions. They are:
The largest intellectual preoccupation of ancient Indians was philosophy and it lacked in
political or material speculations.
The Indians never knew the feeling of nationality. The practical implications of these conclusions
were dangerous to the demand of self-rule in India. They implied that the Indians were incapable
of maintaining their material world and so, the British should control it for them. The second
implication was that as Indians had no sense of nationhood, it was in keeping with their customs
that they should be subjected to autocratic rule. Indian nationalist historians churned out a host of
literature to counter the imperialist ideology. Bhagavan lal Inderjit, Bhandarkar, R.L. Mitra, B.G.
Tilak and Later K.P. Jayaswal, R.K. Majumdar, B.K. Sarkar came out with own interpretation of
Indian history to prove the falsification of imperialist ideology. They strongly argued that what
was prevalent in ancient India was not autocratic rule, but limited monarchy. K.P. Jayaswal in his
Hindu Polity argued that the ancient Indian polity was partly like the republics of ancient Greece
and party like the constitutional monarchies such since that of Great Britain. He concluded: ‘The
constitutional progress made through the Hindus since almost certainly not been equaled, much
less surpassed through any policy of antiquity’. While appreciating the contributions of
nationalist scholars to inculcate a feeling of self-confidence in the middle of the people
throughout the nationalist movement, one necessity properly understand the limitations of this
come. R. S. Sharma, an eminent historian, has pointed out four significant limitations of this
nationalist and revivalist come to the revise of Indian political idea. They are:
First, through a fulsome adoration of ancient Hindu organizations, it tended to alienate the
Muslims.
Second, the come provides a false sense of past values. It glossed in excess of the information
that, whether it was monarchy or republic, the two upper varnas dominated the two lower varnas
who were usually excluded from all political offices.
Third, several Indians fought shy of the religious characteristics of ancient Indian polity and,
since if to cover a sense of guilt, took too much pains to prove the secular character of the ancient
Indian state. They small realized that even in the Western world, theocracy lived till the first half
of the 18th century.
Fourth, in its zeal to prove itself a Larger culture, it hardly showed any interest in learning the
ancient organizations in the light of the development of primitive tribes since recognized from
anthropology
Features of Indian Political Idea
Political Life Conceived within the Framework of Dharma
One cannot discover in ancient India any classes exclusively dealing with political and social life,
which is comparable to the ‘Republic’ and the ‘Politics’ of Plato and Aristotle. A supernatural
unit is present in all the scripts. The divine is omnipotent and is visible in the formation of
society and government; the divine purpose is to be enforced through the king, divine
punishment reinforces earthly punishment and sometimes supplants it. This is what we discover
in approximately all the texts that trade with the life of the people. But one should not be led to
consider the reality. There was a wide gap flanked by the ‘sastras’, customs and the actual lives
of human beings. The brahminical religion, which is commonly taken since the Hindu religion,
was not all-pervasive. There were non-Brahminical customs, which were materialistic in nature
and which played a significant role in guiding the behaviors of ordinary people. Buddhist
contribution is important in this respect. Since suggested, talk about in relation to the later.
Power of Ethics
The social idea in ancient India not only assures sure fundamental principle of morality, but it
always seeks to direct the material life since well. The king necessity consciously stimulate virtue
and act since a guide to the moral life, morality since stipulated in the dharmasastras. The state
figures substantially in the communal life and the theory of life proceeds to resolve itself into a
theory of morality. In short, political science becomes the ethics of the entire society, a science of
the duty of man establish in the intricate set of dealings in society.
But when it comes to international dealings, one can see the ethical meanings coming to words
with the difficult reality. Dealing in relation to the diplomacy, Kautilya for instance, becomes
realistic in a manner same to Machiavelli. One may notice a sudden fall from ethical heights to
the rankest realism in the similar writer.
The Power of Caste based Social Building on Politics
Caste engaged a prominent lay in all social speculation throughout the later Vedic era and had a
direct bearing on the theory of government. Varnashramadharama in the society was fixed on the
foundation of caste. Each Varna was assigned specific functions. It was the foremost duty of the
king to see that every individual confined himself to performing functions of the varna to which
he was born. Caste was an ascribed status. The individual was not to seek his own interest or
expression; he was not to determine his own ambition or ends. Varnashramadharma exalted the
society at the cost of human values. Much that was personal gave method to communal units. Not
all castes or varnas were equally privileged in their enjoyment of rights and duties assigned to
them. The super varnas – Brahmanas and Kshatriyas – were the ruling class. The duty of an
individual was social. As the varnas were related to each other in such a fashion that jointly they
constituted the social order, if an individual transgressed his duty, he not only violated the order,
he, infect, became antisocial. It was in this method that the Hindu theory would overcome the
anti-thesis of man vs. state or society.
Government since a Partnership of the Upper Varnas
In ancient India, the Kshatriyas, Brahmanas and later the Vaisyas jointly shaped the ruling class.
The Shudras were the serving class. ‘Kshatra’ – the temporal authority derived its strength and
power from ‘Brahma’—the spiritual authority. The Vaisya occupied in such jobs since
agriculture and deal provided the economic foundation of the state. The priest held the highest
status. He was recognized with the God ‘Brihaspathy’ instead of the temporal authority ‘India’.
His function was to interpret dharma and preside in excess of the rituals. Coronation through the
priest was a necessary pre-requisite to the exercise of royal authority. Symbolically, it meant that
the Kshatriya derived his authority from the Brahman. The priest was the chief adviser to the
king. Interestingly, unlike in Europe, priesthood in India did not contend for temporal authority, a
phenomenon that raged in Europe for a substantially extensive era. The power exercised through
the priestly class was of a peculiar type. They had the monopoly of education and were the sole
interpreters of dharma. No one, not even the king could go beyond their prescription. With its
intellectual leadership of the society and religious manage, there was no require for the priestly
class to organize itself into a church or any such spiritual system.
No Clear Distinction Flanked by State and Society
The governmental system and politics were looked at since a section of the superior entire
described society. In other terms, society was at once religious, political, economical and
military. It was usually viewed in a comprehensive manner. The habit of looking at society from
a political angle was not cultivated. Since a result, there was no clear conception of either the
state or the government. Both were interchangeable words.
Monarchy was the Normal Shape of Government
As the four fold division of society entrusted the ruling authority with the Kshatriya caste,
monarchy was the natural outcome. There were also non-monarchical shapes of government.
The Government was not sovereign
From it’s extremely nature of subsistence, the government in ancient India could not be regarded
since sovereign in the Austinian sense of the word. It did not impart validity to the orders: rather,
it shared in its validity. On the contrary, the government had no self-governing subsistence of its
own. The sustenance of the social order was merely its function. Sovereignty was, in fact,
ultimately sourced in the divine will. On the section of the individual, there was no unified
allegiance, no single loyalty except for to society since an entire. Only the pluralistic theory of
sovereignty can grasp the Indian phenomenon.
Other Distinguishing Characteristics
They are:
First, the Hindu custom is simply in-egalitarian. Although it urbanized the thought of the
moral equality of all men, it never urbanized the social, legal and political clusters.
Second, the Hindu custom of political idea is pluralistic in orientation. The Hindu political
writers from the extremely beginning recognized the autonomy of social clusters.
Third, political idea in early India was mainly uncritical and apologetic of the recognized
social order. Mainly Hindu writes justified the caste organization since the caste based
conception of dharma, the mainly fatalist concept of karma, the degradation of the Shudras and
the slaves, the long moral interference of the state and therefore on. It ignored the entire are of
social clash.
Fourth, several Hindu writers wrote largely for the attention of the rulers. Their jobs are
mainly manuals of ethics or management; hence, it is mainly didactic and practical.
Buddhists’ Contributions to Indian Political Customs
Origin of Kingship
In contrast to Brahminical literature, we have a dissimilar adaptation of the origin of kingship in
Buddhist literature. The divine origin theory is not carried. We have innumerable instances in the
Jatakas of elections for the royal office. Few Jatakas include account of the king – elect being
chosen through the purohita or the elders according to his qualities or his Mahajana-Sammata,
meaning one who is carried through all. Usually Kshatriyas of good family were chosen, but
caste was not a bar to this election to royal office. In at least two Jatakas, we discover Brahmans
elected to the royal office. In another Jataka, we discover a low caste man being chosen since a
king. If he proved tyrannical, the remedy was naturally a popular revolt of which we have
innumerable examples. These revolts were justified on the grounds that
The king-ship arose out of a contract flanked by the subjects and the one chosen through
them.
The sovereign rights of the king were limited to the defense of subjects and punishment of
wrong-doers and he was bound through the law.
The people maintained their rights and privileges for an extensive time. They derived their
importance partly from their numbers and partly from their systems.
Democratic Nature of the Buddhist Sangha
Prof. Rhys Davids is of the opinion that the Buddhist Sangha was founded upon democratic
principles. The Buddhist Sangha ‘was a type of republic in which all proceedings were settled
through settlements agreed upon in regular meetings of its members which were held subject to
the observance of sure recognized regulations and the exploit of sure shape of terms. These
shapes and settlements passed were described since Kamma Vacas’.
The democratic nature of the Buddhist order is further illustrated through the information that in
addition to the rules and settlements, we further learn from the Mahavagga and the Culavagga,
that
The Buddhist Sangha had a body of rules concerning the shape of settlements to be moved in
the Assembly
There was a rule of quorum
In cases of variation of opinion it was decided through the votes of the majority
Complicated matters were referred to the decision of committees
Definite rules look to have lived concerning such matters since the votes of the absentees.
Though, there is nothing to prove that the process in the Buddhist Sangha which was simply a
religious order was reflected in the ‘Ganasangha’, which was a political sangha. But in any case,
the political ideas envisaged through the Buddhists were a separate one and differed greatly from
the political idea of either the Dharmasastras or the Arthsastras. It is apparent in the Buddhist
theory of the origin of the state.
Theory of the Origin of the State
The theory of the origin of the state is established in the Dighanikaya. There prevailed a golden
age of harmony and happiness on earth and people being virtuous, led a happy and peaceful life.
But after an extensive era, people became greedy and selfish. Other evils also crept in
subsequently. This ideal state passed absent. Then, the people approached the best man amongst
them and entered into an agreement with him. He was to punish the wrongdoers and in return,
they promised to provide him a proportion of their harvest. Chosen through the people, he was
recognized since the Maha Sammata or the ‘Great Elect’. Therefore, the Dighanikaya challenges
the vedic dogma of divine making of the social order. The must of the rulers’ power was felt
because people became corrupt; consequently, the state came into subsistence. But even then the
criminals and the lawbreakers sustained to operate. In the Angutta Ranikaya, Lord Buddha
stressed the importance of the fear of severe punishment through the ruler since a deterrent to
crimes. The salient characteristics of the Buddhist theory of social development are that it is the
continuous moral and physical decline which necessitated a social and political order. A direct
consequence of this progressive fall of man was the rise of the organizations of property, the state
and society in a successive sequence. It was the further fall of man that led to the organization of
kingship that came into subsistence since a result of the contract flanked by the society and the
mainly distinguished individual. The rise of the social class is explained, in contrast to
Brahminical theory, through a rational principle of voluntary selection of jobs. In this social
order, the Kshatriyas take precedence in excess of the Brahmanas. It is always virtue and
knowledge that determined superiority. As the Buddhists did not consider in the caste
organization, they denied that one of the duties of the king was to uphold Varnashramadharma.
They further denied the restriction of kingship to the kshatriya varna. They did not consider in
the sanctity that bounded the person of the king.
The Principle of Righteousness
In the Buddhist literature, danda does not have a central role. Dharma is to be upheld in more
positive methods. The principle of righteousness is dissimilar from the Brahminical conception
of dharma. It is closer to the Western conception of virtue. Brahminical literature, there is a
dissimilar set of ethical principles for the king. What is adharma to the ordinary people becomes
a dharma to the king, when he is occupied in protecting the social order. This is described
Rajadharma. Both the Bhagavadgita and the Mahabharata provide detailed accounts of the
concept of Rajadharma since separate from dharma to be practiced through the ordinary citizens.
Buddhists too believe the primary purpose of the state to safeguard the social order. But this
order is understood more in moral words and dharma necessity be the average for all the king’s
behaviors. Righteousness is an ethical doctrine since well since a mental discipline. In Buddhism,
there is a total application of the principle of righteousness in guiding both internal since well
since foreign polices. Righeousness is the king to righteous king. The king is bound through
similar set of ethical principles since are his subjects. The king, through instance reasons the
happiness or misery of his people. Political righteousness, therefore conceived, rises
approximately to the stage of a cosmic principle of making. It might seem to be an exaggerated
adaptation, but one cannot deny that the conduct of the king powers the behaviour of his subjects
substantially. The principle of political righteousness is extended to contain the concept of world
ruler or chakravartin. The attributes of this ruler comprise not only the universal supremacy and
successful management at house and abroad. With regard to internal management, righteousness
connotes reciprocal love and affection flanked by the ruler and his subjects. In the sphere of
foreign dealings, the chakravarti’s conquest of the kingdom is achieved not through force but
through righteousness. The principles of righteousness means; right views, right intention, right
speech, right actions, right living, right attempt, right mindedness etc.
Contribution of Muslim Rule to Indian Political Customs
Islamic contribution to Indian political idea can be seen throughout the medieval era. However
the Muslim rulers derived legitimacy for their power from the Kalipha, they had to approach to
words with the regional reality in which all the diktat of a theocratic state could not be practiced.
Here again, like the Hindu political idea, there is no text exclusively on politics. Though, two
significant jobs written in the medieval ages throw little light on the political ideas of Muslim
rulers. In the middle of them are Tarik-IFiroz of Ziauddin Barni and these jobs can be discussed
under three heads, namely, nature of sate, divinity of kingship and the duties of the king.
Nature of State
It can safely be said that the at least in theory, the state was theocratic in nature. The ruler
adopted dual policy one for his co-religious subjects and another for the non- Muslim. It was the
duty of the state to protect the life and property of the Muslims but the non-Muslims had to pay
special tax described ‘Jizya’ to ensure their safety in the sate. Another significant feature of the
state throughout was that the state was recognized with royalty. Abul Fazal ‘no dignity is higher
in the eyes of the God than royalty’. A king was measured since the origin of continuity and
possession. If royalty did not exist, the storm of strife would never subside, nor would selfish
ambition disappear. People do not obey the laws of the state if there is no king, and his
attendance makes the people abstain from violence for fear of being punished.
Divinity of the King
Ain-I-Akbari describes the king since the light emanating from God, and a ray from the sun, the
illuminator of the universe. It is the divine light which communicates from God to the kings
without the intermediate assistance of anyone. Several excellent qualities flow from the
possession of this light. They are:
A paternal love towards subjects
 A big heart
Rising trust in god
Prayer and devotion
Duties of the King
The significant duties of the king are:
To ensure the safety and security of the life and properties of subjects
Punishing those who violate norms of the state
Impart justice to all without favour
Protect the state from external aggression
The king has to lead the people through personal instance. Upon his conduct the efficacy of
any course of action?
The king should abstain from four things; excessive devotion to hunting, incessant play,
inebriety night and day, and consistent intercourse with women.
The king should avoid falsehood since; it is improper in all men, and mainly unseemly in
monarchs.
The king should be ever intent on conquest; otherwise his neighbors rise in arms against him.
The king should always stay his army on its toes, lest from want of training they become self-
indulgent.
Abul Fazal’s Ain-I-Akbari distinguishes flanked by two kinds of king; the true king and the
selfish king. It is said that both have in general, treasury, army, servants, obedient subjects, wise
men and multitude of skilful workmen. Under the reign of the true king, these things are lasting.
He does not attach himself to these things, since his goal is to remove oppression and truth,
faithfulness and sincerity everywhere. On the contrary, a selfish king attaches too much
importance to external shapes of royal authority; hence, everywhere there is insecurity, lack of
faith, oppression and robbery.

REVIEW QUESTIONS
What are the major achievements of Greek political traditions?
How did the Confucian ideology emerge?
What were the major ideas in the Confucian imperial ideology?
How did the values of filial piety and obedience influence the course of Chinese empires?
What do you understand by Khilafat?
What are the various nomenclatures used for the term ‘politics’ in early India?
Explain the concepts of Dharma and Danda.
Discuss in brief the nature and duties of the king found in medieval literature.
 CHAPTER 3
STATE: CONCEPT & PERSPECTIVES ON STATE

STRUCTURE
Objectives.
Meaning and Nature of the State.
State, Civil Society and Community.
Sovereignty.
Review Questions.
OBJECTIVES
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
Understand the meaning state.
Understand the nature of state.
Know the meanings and theories of civil society.
Comprehend the relationship between civil society and community.
Understand the concept of sovereignty.
Critically evaluate the attacks leveled against the concept of sovereignty.

MEANING AND NATURE OF THE STATE

The State and its Derivations
Since has been stated, one characteristic of political science is to trade with the state, the highest
of all human associations. The Greeks used the term ‘polis’ for which the term municipality-
states corresponds mainly closely to the English word ‘Civitas’, which also means the similar
beside with the notion of ‘public welfare’. The Teutons employed the word ‘status’ which shapes
only a section of the phrase. The contemporary word ‘state’ has been derived from the term
‘status’ earlier employed through the Teutons. It was Niccolo Machiavelli who first used the
word ‘state’ in political science. Therefore, it becomes extremely clear that the word state did not
become extremely popular until the sixteenth century. The people livelihood in a greater section
of Medieval Europe did not know the concept of contemporary state. In course of time, the term
became popular and acquired a neutral sense of power.
Meaning and Definition of the State
As the state is one of the significant components in the revise of political science, a clear
understanding of what is meant through the word ‘state’ is significant. From the beginning of
social life, mankind has existed under few shape of power. This power has varied in its nature
and has exercised its function by dissimilar shapes of system. Beneath these differences in the
concrete manifestation of political life may be observed a practical identity of purpose; and
through disregarding non-essential units and modifications that arise because of the demand of
time, lay and conditions, we may discover the extremely essence of state, dissimilar from other
systems.
From a consideration of matters of terminology, we now approach to ask what the state is.
Definitions of the state are, since the German writer Schulze remarked, innumerable. Naturally,
these definitions are colored through the opinions of their authors and are effected through the
point of view from which the state is envisaged. The sociologists view it since a social
phenomenon, while the jurists regard the state since a juridical establishment; writers on
international law emphasize sure units, which the political scientists ignore, and finally
philosophical writers formulate their definitions in abstract words. Though, we should keep in
mind that the state is both an abstract conception and a concrete system, i.e., recognized with
physical units. Therefore, in all these senses, state can be taken to mean the following:
A system of individuals i.e. mankind viewed since an organized element.
Politically organized people of a definite territory.
A system of public law that is monopolistic in excess of the exploit of violence against a
group or population.
A system which in internal matters carries out its functions by a unified set of organizations
recognized since the government.
Units of the State
The state, since said earlier, may be viewed since both a concrete item and an abstract thought. A
concrete item means that it is a specific human group or association and viewed in abstract
words, it is a corporation possessing a juristic personality. The state is collected, so, of both
physical and metaphysical or spiritual units. These units are:
A group of human beings, i.e., population.
A territory upon which they permanently reside.
Internal sovereignty and independence from foreign manage.
A political system or agency by which the communal will of the population is expressed, i.e.,
government.
Students of political science should, therefore, understand that the absence of any one of these
units nullifies the state; all necessity exists jointly. The state is not the people, nor the land nor
the government, but all of them and in addition, the state necessity possess that unity which
makes it a separate and self-governing political entity. These characteristics are general to all
states, irrespective of their historically specific manifestations. For example, it applies to the
Greek Municipality states, the medieval kingdom, the contemporary monarchy and all the other
types of states exists today-liberal democracies, military dictatorships and communist regimes.
Therefore, this account of four units is general to all the states; this does not, though, clearly
throw light on the socio-political meaning of the state.
Distinction Flanked by the State and other Associations
The general man does not create any distinction flanked by the state and several other
organizations like society, government, nation and others. But the legalistic view of the state,
which says that the state is a law creation authority, makes a distinction flanked by the state and
other organizations. The distinction flanked by state and society is quite significant because
society is much wider than the state. In a society, all the social organizations and social
relationships are incorporated, whereas the state only covers a characteristic of society. Several
idealists and monistic writers on politics have not made any distinction flanked by society and
state. But the liberal writers create such a distinction and contend that the state is the servant of
society and is within the society; that society is much older than the state and does not have the
four units like the state; the state is a highly organized organization with sovereignty, while
society may be even unorganized and does not possess sovereignty; the state is not a natural
organization, whereas society is. The Pluralists have always given importance to the distinction
flanked by state and society, because they regard the state merely since an organization, equal to
the other associations of society to serve the specific interests of society. Government is one of
the constituents of the state, but the two words, state and government, have been indiscriminately
used for each other. But since a matter of information, government is only an agency of the state
by which the communal will is formulated, expressed and executed. In words of continuity,
sovereignty and extensiveness, the state is in possession of all these rather than the government.
It is also significant to note that the state is regarded since a recently urbanized organization,
while government is extremely old. Even the mainly primitive human civilizations necessity has
urbanized few elementary shape of government to control the general life of the society. So,
government is a necessary, but not an enough condition for the subsistence of the state. Pluralists
do not create a distinction flanked by the state and other organizations of society and uphold that
the state is like any other association of society. But, usually, the state is distinguished from other
social associations because of its sovereignty. In every liberal democracy, the material
apparatuses of state sovereignty viz.: police, military, bureaucracy and prison have become
stronger. Today, a sovereign state has got tremendous material authority to crush revolts, which
the other associations do not have. The variation flanked by state and nation stroke nationalities
has been a matter of great dispute because contemporary states are also nation-states. But the
students of political science should understand the largest distinction flanked by state and nation,
which is that the foundation of a nation is psychological and cultural unity, while that of a state is
physical and political unity. Nations appeared with the growth of capitalism, whereas states lived
prior to it. The essential units of a state are not the pre-requisites of a nation.
Is this Distinction Real?
But with the emergence of the welfare state, the variation flanked by state and society
approximately disappeared; the distinction flanked by state and government is merely a
technological one and government for all practical purposes, is equivalent to the state. Similarly,
with the emergence of the nation-state, the variation flanked by nation and state is no more
significant and the differences flanked by state and other associations were washed absent
through the pluralists. The behaviors of state necessity are seen with reference to the entire
society. The state should be understood since the entire of the political organization, which is
operating in society to perform sure functions, behaviors and procedures in the entire static legal
organizations having population, definite territory, government and sovereignty. The supreme
authority to create laws is a political organization which performs the functions of maintaining
continuity and equilibrium, policy creation and serving the general welfare functions in society.
Nature of the State: Dissimilar Theories
The state has been envisaged from several points of views. Every theorist conceives and defines
the state in words of his own discipline. Each has given his own theory concerning the origin,
nature, sphere, function and ends of the state. These theories often differ from one another in
shape and object. In this element, we shall create an effort to trade with the several theories
concerning the nature of state.
The Liberal Theory
Before looking into the liberal theory of the origin and nature of the state, it will be proper to
have few understanding of liberalism itself. With the emergence of the new bourgeois class in the
16th and the 17th centuries, the philosophy of liberalism came into being since a progressive
revolt against the reactionary forces represented through feudalism, the church and the monarchy.
It was a voice for the recognition of the consent of the individuals based on individual’s rights
and liberty. Its concept of the individual was that of the ‘possessive individual’ and it was a
political movement for the establishment of a democratic government. This theory is based on
the liberal notion of man, which provides due importance to man since a free agent in this world,
having a free will of his own. Therefore since regards the origin of the state, it assigns due role to
individuals, their natures, behaviors, interests and objectives. The state is seen since a must, an
organization—evil or otherwise—which may set up law and order, peace and justice in society.
The state is there to serve the common interest of society since an entire. It is regarded since an
agency of human welfare, which will close life and property of man. It is regarded since a
contributor to moral and social growth of man. Liberalism distinguishes flanked by state and
society and maintains that state is for society and not otherwise. Liberal views on the functions of
state have been changing from time to time. Throughout the 17th century, the necessities of the
capitalist class—which supported liberalism, were quite dissimilar and throughout the 18th, 19th
and the 20th centuries, the necessities of this class changed, thereby necessitating a dissimilar
role of the state in society. Classical liberalism of the 18th and the early 19th century, which
supported the negative state with minimal functions, changed to contemporary liberalism in the
later half of the 19th and the early 20th century that supported the positive state with welfare
functions. Classical liberalism is also recognized since the theory of ‘liassez-faire’ or the police
state, or the theory of individualism that regards the state since a necessary evil. The state and
individual freedom are seen since each other’s opposite and classical liberalism wants to provide
more freedom to the individual through raising the sphere of his behaviors and decreasing the
sphere of the state. The function of the state is to give physical security to the individual therefore
that he can develop his personality without state interference. In brief, it means minimal state
function and maximum individual liberty. Adam Smith supported this on an economic
foundation and Bentham on a moral and political foundation. Later liberalism or contemporary
liberalism is also described the ‘theory of welfare state’, ‘revisionist’ or ‘reformist liberalism’.
Here, the state is not regarded merely since a necessary evil, but it is assumed that the state can
perform several functions of social welfare, can bring equilibrium and can satisfy socio-
economic demands of the masses. Several thinkers—Mill, Freeman, Hobhouse, Lindsay, Keynes,
Tawney, Cole, Barker, Laski and MacIver—gave the philosophy of the positive functions of the
state. Therefore, the rising democratization of the liberal state by the extension of franchise to all
adults compelled the state to initiate policies of important intervention in the economy. It also
meant transferring possessions from the wealthier to the less prosperous by taxation and state
subsidy. Unlike the minimal state, which was the original shape of the liberal sate, the welfare
state was described upon to create public welfare one of its principal concerns. The welfare state
was not basically a response to electoral pressure, but also a response to the rising awareness in
the middle of general people of their authority, expressed by associations like the deal unions and
public opinion. But the welfare state should not be seen since a radical shift from the classical
minimal state. Rather, we should believe it since an effort to provide maximum concessions to
the people constant with requires of a liberal, capitalist market economy. Liberalism, in the late
20th century, has taken a new turn in the shape of neo-liberalism. It may be regarded since going
back to the ideas of classical political economy. The neo-liberal goal is to ‘roll back the frontiers
of the state’; in the belief that unregulated market capitalism will deliver efficiency, development
and widespread prosperity. The neo-liberal view of the state is established in the scripts of
economists like Friedrick Hayek and Milton Friedman, and philosophers like Robert Nozick.
The Marxist Theory
The Marxist theory of state appeared since a criticism of, and since an alternative to the liberal
theory of state. If liberalism was a socio-economic and political philosophy of the working class,
Marxism was a product of the capitalist economic organization itself. State is the product of
social contract, consent and consensus, and is there to serve the common interest of the entire
society through maintaining law and order, and providing justice and welfare services. According
to the Marxist theory, the state is a product of class division and class thrash about and serves
only the interest of one scrupulous class, because all the classes cannot have a single
interest/general interests. It rejects the state, associates its pressure with the attendance of classes,
and suggests that through a revolution and the establishment of a classless society, the
organization of the state would be done absent with. You should know that in social sciences, the
debate with regard to ‘consensus model’ and ‘clash model’ remained hot for a longtime. The
consensus model on which liberalism is based, maintains that the foundation of society and social
organizations, including the state is shared values, norms, beliefs, interests, ideas and
organizations. The clash theory provides importance to clash and thrash about and draws the
conclusion that the state and several other organizations are the product of clash. Let us examine
cautiously the Marxist assumptions in relation to the nature, function and legitimacy of the state,
which Karl Marx built by his several scripts including ‘Das-Capital’ and ‘The Critique of the
Gotha Programme.’ However Marx himself never formulated a theory of state apart, discussion
of the state is scattered in approximately all the scripts of Marx. Marx was busy with the
historical analysis of the capitalist manner of manufacture; therefore he could not concentrate on
specific issues like the state. But Engels and other Marxist scholars and revolutionaries have
written on this characteristic. The largest points of the Marxian theory of state deserve the
attention of students of political science. Marx made it clear in his early scripts that the state is an
organized authority of one class oppressing the other i.e. the economically dominant minority
class by dominant political dominance rules in excess of the majority working class. Marx
regarded the state since an alienated and parasitical social force and rejected Hegel’s thought of
the state since ‘a march of god on earth’. He never regarded the state since a higher morality
ending conflicts in society and bringing unity and harmony. The state to him was neither equal to
society nor above it, but was merely its product at a sure level of historical growth. Therefore,
Marx believes in a common theoretical framework recognized since ‘Dialectical Materialism’
and in the materialistic interpretation of history. Dialectical Materialism is a more common
philosophical organization from which is derived the more specific theory of historical growth,
which is termed ‘Historical Materialism’ or the materialistic interpretation of history. Marxists
hold that all phenomena that we experience are material, concrete and objective, outside our
mind and consciousness. Also, all the phenomena are characterized through internal
contradictions, leading to conflicts and then, eventually growing to a higher stage of growth. This
entire procedure is termed through Marx since dialectical materialism. So, to understand any
phenomenon, one necessity grasps the method it changes. A capitalist society is one that is based
on the capitalist manner of manufacture, where the capitalists own the means of manufacture and
the motive of manufacture is profit and the workers sell their labour authority to the capitalists
for wages. In such a society politics, civilization, morality and social norms are determined
through the capitalist manner of manufacture and the society is sharply divided into capitalists
and workers. Since the interests of these two classes are opposed to each other, class thrash about
flanked by them is fundamental. The western liberal democracies the USA, England, France,
West Germany, Italy, etc—are examples of such civilizations. For the abolition of classes, Marx
provides the theory of revolution, which is the mainly significant characteristic of the Marxian
theory of state. The task of Marxian philosophy is two-fold to understand the world and to
change it. Marxism does not suggest reforms of the exploitative capitalist organization, but
suggests that it should be in excess of-thrown through a violent revolution and a socialist state
and economy recognized. This socialist state will be a temporary phenomenon; it will abolish
private property and classes; and thereafter, it will wither absent. Therefore, the Marxian theory
of state does not glorify the state; rather it is a theory of its overthrow, it’s withering absent, in a
classless society. Politics and state are sections of the superstructure which is based on the
economic organization or the manner of manufacture of a given society. Marxian theory of the
origin of state is also based on this common view of state and politics. A state originated with the
division of society into classes and with the beginning of the thrash about flanked by classes. The
historical analysis of the origin of state is that the state is through no means an authority forced
on society; rather, it is a product of society at a sure level of growth that is entangled in
contradictions with it. The state has, therefore, originated with the birth of classes and class
thrash about in society and is merely an instrument of use in the hands of a dominant class. With
the help of the state, ruling classes uphold their authority in excess of economically poor classes.
The Gandhian Theory
Let us now attempt to see how Gandhi conceptualized the nature of state. Before briefly
examining it, we should note that it illustrates similarities and differences with the concept of
state establish in Liberal and Marxist perspectives. We may also note that however it is derived
from the Indian custom of thinking on state; it also illustrates few power of western thinking on
the subject. First of all, Gandhi accepts require of the state; however since an advocate of
nonviolence, he does see that the state implies the exploit of violence or coercion. This is because
Gandhi accepts the thought that man is through nature non-violent and that this applies to man in
the ideal sense. Taking a realistic view, he agrees that there is few require of the state as in
practice, men may not possess the ideal qualities of nonviolence and sociability. But having said
this, Gandhi also holds that state since an organization of violence necessity be limited. In other
terms, Gandhi accepts the minimal state. Secondly, Gandhi suggests that the state should be
limited on the foundation of sure thoughts. On the one hand, the power of the state should be
reduced through an organization based on decentralization of authority, in which societies below
the stage of state should have greater autonomy and independence from the central state. The
element of such autonomy should be the village society. That society itself by a procedure of
consensus should decide all decisions affecting the rural society. The Gandhian location is that
insofar since the crucial regional society decisions are taken at that stage, the central state would
be minimal, presumably concerned with the defense of the overall territory under its jurisdiction,
foreign dealings and any other troubles affecting the territory since a entire. The authority of the
state is also minimized in the Gandhian perspective through the ethical norms embedded in the
society since an entire by traditions and customs. Thirdly, and only non-violently, the state is also
limited through moral challenges arising from the individual ‘conscience’ or the ‘inner voice’. In
his great classic job, Hind Swaraj, he held this type of polity in which political powers are
dispersed in excess of a big number of independent village societies, to be a Swaraj Polity.
Gandhi claimed that this was a genuinely Indian political organization evolved in excess of
centuries in India. Though, the Gandhian state cannot be separated from its economic and social
organizations. So, the concept of Swaraj or self-government extends to economic and social
arrangements. Within the rural society itself, Gandhi emphasizes the significance of clusters in
excess of individuals. Therefore, it would be wrong to call Gandhi an anarchist, if through that is
meant a thinker who denies requires of the state. Certainly, he limits the state, but this does not
mean that he dispenses with it. The case of the minimal state is that it involves minimal violence,
and it also means the acceptance of the Gandhian political principle of Swaraj. While Gandhi’s
emphasis on individual conscience has a similarity with the liberal emphasis on individual rights,
it should be differentiated from the notion of individual right. Gandhian rights are not given to
the individual on liberal grounds of individualism, but on moral grounds; that is, the claim that
one has a duty to act morally. The Gandhian notion of Satyagraha or the political action of
protest or resistance to untruth is a moral right and duty, and the Gandhian state is also subject to
this kind of action. Gandhi’s conception of the state resembles the Marxist state in the sense that
both regard the state since an organization of violence. Gandhi also lays emphasis on duties
rather than on rights, given his moral perspective. Further, the Gandhian state rests more on a
moral, communitarian consensus than on any notion of a collectivity of individual wills. In
several methods, the Gandhian state is a distinctively Indian shape of state. Today, Gandhian
units are reflected in the notion of the Panchayat Raj or the ideals of democratic decentralization.
In fact, one of the crucial issues in Indian politics has been whether and to what extent the
Gandhian shape of state can be introduced in India. Summarizing the three perspectives of the
state, we may say that the Liberal state is based on individual rights; that according to the
Marxists, the state is based on class dominance and class use, and the Gandhian state is based on
a moral and communitarian consensus.

STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY

Meanings and Relationships
We shall talk about straight the nature of relationships flanked by the civil society and the state.
The state is in the middle of the mainly significant concepts discussed in political theory. Since
you know, the state is separate from other associations of the society, i.e., government, civil
society, society, nation, etc. The state is supposed to remove the constraints for the growth of the
society since well since give events for social welfare. On the other hand, the Marxist custom
views the state since partisan to the propertied classes. With the concept of civil society gaining
currency, the connection of the state to the civil society has again engaged a significant lay in the
communication of political theory. Recently, especially from the 1980s onwards, the concept of
civil society has acquired a special significance in the communication on political theory. The
rise of new social movements having their systems, building and ideology aiming at social
change and growth in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have generated interest in the
civil society. Both these growths illustrate the erosion in the credibility of the state and
emergence of similarity centers of authority. The origin and development of the civil society
owes a lot to its connection with the state. The nature of the relationships flanked by the civil
society and the state occupies a significant lay in political theory. The recent attention to the civil
society can also be traced to the eruption of social movements or resentment of the people against
the state. Civil society is the legroom which exists flanked by the society and the state. It is
represented through those associations, the NGO’s, individuals, academicians, intellectuals
which stroke who strive for the establishment of democracy in society. As the civil society
organizations exist flanked by the state and the society and question the state, they are usually
referred to since the organizations, which are far from the state. The civil society is measured
both complimentary and sometimes since a substitute for the state organizations. The foundation
of the formation of civil society is secular. Caste and kinship linkages, religion or tribal
mobilization etc. are not the foundation of the formation of civil society. Before we proceed
further, it is essential to note that in the old European custom till the eighteenth century, the
words state and civil society were used interchangeably. Dominique Colas traced the history of
the concept of civil society and establish that during the 16th and the 17th centuries it was used
since a concept opposed to religious fanaticism. At that time, it was the state which opposed the
church since an organization of rights. It means that the state functioned since a civil society or
there was no distinction flanked by them. The civil society was a characteristic of the state. It is,
in-fact, in the following era that these came to be recognized since two separate entities. The
information whether there exists a civil society or not depends on the nature of the connection it
has with the state. This gave rise to many questions in political theory. Is the state subordinate or
Larger to the civil society? Can one exist without the other? Are they inimical or supportive of
each other’s interests? Whose interest does the state serve in comparison to the civil society?
Simply, there are four perspectives which trade with these questions in political theory—
Tocquevillian, Lockean, Hegelian and Marxian. De Tocqueville studies the causes for the
subsistence of democracy in America and its absence in France in his book ‘Democracy in
America’. He observes that it is the nature of the state in both the countries on which the
subsistence or the absence of democracy depends. It was present in America because a liberal
democratic state there allowed the formation of the associations of people, which indicated
attendance of mutual trust in the middle of them. Formation of association dealings is an
indication of the civil society. The civil society in turn reflects democracy. In France, de
Tocqueville observes, that unlike America, there did not exist the civic association or society due
to the despotic or undemocratic nature of the state. In the case of John Locke, the 17th century
thinker of England, the connection flanked by the state and the civil society can be viewed in
words of the relationships flanked by the two entities in the state of nature and after the state of
nature. Since one of the social contractualist thinker, Locke whispered that the state is the result
of a contract which was made in the middle of the individuals who were livelihood in the state of
nature. They enjoyed sure rights, which were entailed to them through nature. But there was no
power which could protect the rights of the individuals, give them security or could regulate their
affairs. Such a power could be the state, which was born out of the social contract which the
individuals made with each other. By this contract, the political society of the state of nature was
transformed into a civil society. Locke, in fact, uses the civil and the political interchangeably. It
is hard to distinguish flanked by the civil and political society of Locke. Suffice it to say that
according to Locke, the civil society was born to close the rights which were already accessible
in the state of nature. Since Neera Chandhoke observes, Locke’s ‘political society’ was a ‘civil
state’ since opposed to the natural. Civil or political society was created to protect the rights
which the individuals had inherited from the nature of the state. Hegel, the German philosopher,
has mainly systematically dealt with the connection flanked by the civil society and the state. In
his book ‘Philosophy of Rights’, Hegel considers the civil society since one of the moments of
ethical life, the other two being the family and the state. This civil society is to be distinguished
from both the family and the state. In the family, Hegel argues, scrupulous interests are
transcended in a natural and unreflective unity, and transactions flanked by the members are
guided through love and concern; while in the state, universality is institutionalized since the
highest shape of ethical life since the ‘actuality of the ethical thought ’. Civil society, through
contrast, is the domain of particularity, of the self-seeking individual concerned with the
fulfillment of his private require. In this level, the ethos of the family i.e., natural love and
altruism disintegrate; but equally, it is here that the principle of universality which the state
comes to embody is establish in an embryonic shape. Civil society since a significant level in the
transition from the unreflective consciousness of the family, to conscious ethical life, becomes
the location where the Hegelian philosophical concern that particularity has to be mediated
through universality, can be realized. The civil society in the Marxian custom symbolizes the
interests of the propertied classes, the bourgeoisie. There are, though, two approaches in the
Marxian custom concerning the civil society. One is the classical come. It is related to Marx, who
inherited the Hegelian perspective on civil society, but he led the analysis further to interrogate
the organization itself. To Marx, it is not only the ground where one man’s selfish interest meets
another man’s selfish interest; it is the lay where the appropriation of surplus labour takes lay.
The historical level necessity be transcended. But Marx, unlike Hegel, rejected the possibility
that any existing organization can do it. Civil society necessity discovers a new agency from
within itself to transcend egoism and self-interest, use and humanity. And given the nature of the
sphere, this transformation had to be revolutionary. Only then could the individual be integrated
into the society and the state. Revolutionary transformation becomes the organizing principle to
civilize civil society. The other within the Marxian paradigm is the Gramscian custom. Gramsci,
although he uses civil society to refer to the private or the non-state sphere, including the
economy, his depiction of civil society is extremely dissimilar from that of Marx. Gramsci’s
largest proposition is that the state cannot be understood without an understanding of the civil
society. Civil society, to Gramsci is not basically a sphere of individual requires, but of systems,
and has the potential of rational self-regulation and freedom. Gramsci insists on its intricate
system, since the ‘ensemble of organisms commonly described ‘private’ where hegemony and
‘spontaneous consent’ are organized’. While Marx insists on the isolation flanked by the state
and the civil society, Gramsci emphasizes the inter-connection flanked by the two, arguing that
whereas the everyday, narrow exploit of the term state may refer to government, the concept of
state in-fact contains units of civil society. The state narrowly conceived of since government is
protected through the hegemony of the dominant class fortified through the coercive state tools.
To Gramsci, political society is the site where the coercive tools of the state is concentrated in
prisons, the judicial organization, the armed forces and the police. Civil society is the ‘site’ where
the state operates to enforce invisible, intangible and subtle shapes of authority by educational,
cultural, religious organizations and other organizations. In fact, the withering absent of the state
is redefined through Gramsci in words of a full growth of the self-regulating attributes of civil
society. It had been first mentioned in the scripts of John Locke. He mentioned that the civil
society appeared since a result of the transformation of the state of nature into a civil society. He
differentiated the civil society from the state of nature and the political society. The civil society
gets transferred into the political society through the laws framed through the general power that
appeared since a result of the contract. Civil society is a society where the rights of individuals
get priority. The civil society is dissimilar from other associations in the sense that unlike the
former, it accords priority to the individual rights. It does not stand outside the state; rather it
appeared with the attendance of the state. It means that the people who were livelihood in the
state of nature, enjoying natural rights to life, liberty and property entered into a social contract
under a general public power, with one another for establishing a presently society in which the
rights of each individual can be protected. The general power has the right to create laws in
relation to the people or the civil society. This civil society is dissimilar from the state of nature
where people enjoyed equal natural rights, but did not have any power to punish the offenders.
Before the formation of the social contract, the society lived since an uncivil society. Therefore,
in the civil society the rights of each individual are protected. In the 19th century when Hegel
elaborated the thought of civil society, it was after almost two centuries of Locke’s. But there
were differences flanked by the concept since devised through the two thinkers. The largest
concern in the Lockean understanding is the particularistic or subjective rights of individuals. He
does not mention anything in relation to the relationships flanked by the particularistic or
subjective rights and universal rights. Hegel on the other hand, believes that a civil society can
exist only if there is ethical order in the society. Ethical order means the subsistence in harmony
of subjective and universalistic laws. The subjective laws originate in the societies, and are
related to the specificity of that society—in relation to the its customs, traditions, lay of the
individual member in the society, his/her relationships with elders, priests, location of women,
etc. These are particularistic. On the other hand, the universalistic laws belong to the laws of the
state, which might be enshrined in the written or unwritten constitution of the state. These laws
are based on the universal principles of rights of individuals—equality, liberty, property and
fraternity. If the universalistic and particularistic rights exist jointly, one does not negate the other
despite the differences existing flanked by them. In fact, then an ethical order exists in the
society. This, in the view of Hegel means that in such an order of coexistence, the civil society
exists. The concept of civil society again came in the currency in the twentieth century. The
disintegration of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1980s revived the interest in
this concept. The loss of faith in the state due to its failure revived the interest in the civil society.
The notion of state came under attack, more specifically, throughout the latter half of the
twentieth century. It came to be seen since an alternative to the state. Even since the Marxists
believe the civil society to be partisan and contributory to the perpetuation of unequal and
discriminatory class dealings, the non-Marxists discover in the civil society a panacea for the
failure of the state. Non-Marxist models of civil society, which view it since an alternative to the
state, belong to the associative model of democracy.
Democracy and Civil Society
Democracy and Civil Society are inseparably related to each other. A healthy liberal democracy
requires the support of a vibrant civil society. The basis of the democracy-civil society nexus
thesis could be traced in Tocqueville’s classic scripts on American politics. In recent years, there
are many scholars who have urbanized this democracy-civil society relation in several models of
democracy. One such model is the ‘Associative Model of Democracy’ since urbanized through
Sunil Khilnani, Paul Trust and Benjamin Barber. The decentralization of authority is the
foundation of formation of civil society. The decentralized elements of authority are inclined
towards trust, association and democracy. But the foundation of the formation of the smaller
societies is secular equality, not astrictive. The advocates of this perspective are critical of the
centralized power of the state, which they discover too imposing. They pin their hopes on the
societies or the decentralization in the western democracies. The perspective of the civil society
is related to that literature which appeared in the wake of the decline of socialist civilizations,
especially in Eastern Europe. Here, the civil society appeared in contrast to the totalitarian state.
The rights of the individuals, which were violated throughout the totalitarian regimes, were seen
to be protected in the civil society. The subsistence of civil society also designates the extent of
democracy in a society, viz., and formal democracy like elections, multi-party organization or a
democratic constitution. It also means, at the similar time, subsistence of democratic norms and
values like coexistence of differences beside with tolerance of each other’s civilization and
views. The institutional notion of democracy is less comprehensive than that of civil society.
Civil society is an arena of contestation and debate. Nero Chandhoke says that civil society is a
legroom where individuals set their norms in association with each other. It resides in the life of
those who question the state’s imposition on them. They create the state respond to their voices.
Each group in the civil society is entitled to uphold its specificity, civilization. These are based
on the principles of freedom and equality. The civil society systems may be described ‘creature
civilizations’, because these associations question the state and strive to make an egalitarian and
democratic order. A new generation of neo-Tocquevillians, the mainly prominent amongst whom
is Robert Putnam, has as the 1990s revived the concept of civil society since the bedrock of
democracy. Putnam popularized a concept described ‘Social Capital’ which stands for
‘characteristics of social systems such since trust, norms and networks’. The linkage flanked by
democracy and social capital takes off from one of Putnam’s well-known revise of the varying
performances of regional government’s crossways North and South Italy. The job argues that
North Italy usually promoted bigger institutional performance than the South, because here
circumstances were historically geared to wider public participation in civic affairs, which itself
resulted from the availability of bigger inter-personal and institutional trust in the society.
Society and Civil Society
Society is a group of people knit into relationships on the foundation of primordial factors, i.e.,
religion, kin, family ties, caste, etc. These set rules for the individuals, which constitute the
society. The nature of the rules of the society in relation to the rights of the individuals and
citizens illustrate the nature of polity and society. The rules of the society are particularistic and
those of the state are universalistic. If there are conflicts flanked by the two sets of rules, the
democratic edifice of the polity gets eroded. But if on the other hand, the rights of the individuals
in a society are in consonance with those of the state, the polity symbolizes democratic traits. The
society exists flanked by the state and civil society. The status of the democratic rights of
individuals within the society—of women, of disadvantaged clusters, of minorities, etc.–depends
on the nature of all the three organizations of state, civil society and society. The sociological
argument on the distinction flanked by society and civil society takes its purest, mainly
systematic and mainly elaborate shape in the job of Ferdinand Tonnies. Tonnies described these
‘real or organic’ life and ‘imaginary or mechanical buildings’—Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.
In Tonnie’s terms, Gemeinschaft is old; Gesellschaft is new. In rural life, society in the middle of
people is stronger and more alive; it is the lasting and genuine shape of livelihood jointly. In
contrast to Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft is transitory and superficial. Gemeinschaft should be
understood since a livelihood organism, Gesellschaft since a mechanical aggregate and an
artifact. Sudipta Kaviraj in an article ‘In search of Civil Society’ points to a relationship flanked
by the two dichotomies: the state and the civil society on one hand, and the civil society and the
society on the other. There are important relationships flanked by these two distinct
arguments in many kinds of examines of Third World politics. It has been argued that the proper
working of a contemporary constitutional state needs a distinction not merely flanked by the state
and the other systems in society, but the sphere of non-state systems being governed through
Gesellschaft like principles.
Feature Characteristics of Civil Society
There have been such diverse examines of civil society, that the word may look to be confusing.
Therefore, seem at the characteristics of civil society may help to comprehend the subject.
Following Diamond, the characteristics of civil society may be enumerated since follows:
First, civil society is the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self generating,
at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state and bound through a legal order or
set of shared rules. It is separate from ‘society’ in common in that it involves citizens acting
collectively in a public sphere.
Second, civil society is concerned with public ends rather than private ends. It is an
intermediary phenomenon standing flanked by the private sphere and the state. Therefore, it
excludes parochial society: individual and family life and inward-looking group action; and it
excludes economic society: the profit-creation enterprise of individual business firms.
Third, civil society is related to the state in little method, but does not seek to manage the
state; it does not seek to ‘govern the polity since an entire’.
Fourth, civil society encompasses pluralism and variety. It encompasses a huge array of
systems, formal and informal, including economic, cultural, informational and educational,
interest clusters, developmental, issue-oriented and civic clusters. In addition, civil society
encompasses what Thomas Metzger calls ‘the ideological marketplace’, the flow of information
and ideas, including those which evaluate and critique the state.
Fifth, it follows from the fourth that civil society does not seek to symbolize the complete set
of interests of a person or a society. Rather dissimilar clusters symbolize or encompass dissimilar
characteristics of interest.
Sixth, civil society should be distinguished from the more clearly democracy-enhancing
phenomenon of civic society. Diamonds argues that civic society is both a broader and narrower
concept than civil society: broader in that it encompasses all manner of associations; narrower in
that it contains only associations structured horizontally approximately ties that are more or less
mutual, cooperative, symmetrical and trusting.

SOVEREIGNTY
The relation of state to state, of a state to its citizens, and of one citizen to another can be
understood only after a further discussion of that feature which distinguishes the state from all
other systems, its sovereignty. Another consideration is the nature of law, as in that shape the
sovereignty of the state manifests itself. The concept of sovereignty is the foundation of
contemporary political science. It underlies the validity of all laws and determines all
international dealings. It may be briefly outlined since follows: The state comes into being when
a self-governing group of people are organized through means of a government which creates
and enforces laws. Within this group, there necessity is supremacy of will and authority. It
necessity include few person or body of persons whose commands receive obedience and who
can, if necessary, execute those commands through means of force. Such a person or body of
person’s exercises sovereignty, and such commands are described laws. Evidently, there can be
no legal limit to sovereignty, as that would imply a higher lawmaking body, and that in turn
would be sovereign. The state, so, is legally sovereign. While possessing unlimited legal
authority, the state grants sure rights and privileges to individuals and sets limits to its own
behaviors. A state may grant a big measure of autonomy to its colonies or may provide long
powers to its regional divisions, and still retain sovereignty, if it can legally withdraw these
delegated powers at any time. A distinction is usually made flanked by internal and external
sovereignty. Writers, especially on international law, speak sometimes of internal sovereignty
since the authority to create and enforce laws in excess of all persons in the territory of a state,
and of external sovereignty since the authority to set up and carry on dealings with other states,
including the authority to declare war and create peace. This conception of external sovereignty
is objectionable, because it implies that a state possesses sovereign authority vis-à-vis other
states, which is not true. Other writers view external sovereignty since the freedom of the state
from subjection or manage through another state. Treaties or the rules of international law
through which states agree to sure limitations on their complete freedom of action does not
destroy their sovereignty, as there is no Larger legal compelling power to enforce them. If a state
is internally sovereign, it necessity of must be legally self-governing externally. Sovereignty,
properly speaking, deals with the internal dealings of a state with its inhabitants; it is a word of
constitutional law rather than of international law. It is a legal concept and deals with positive
law only. In the last analysis, sovereignty rests upon either force or consent or a combination of
force and consent. Men obey because they agree that it is desirable to do therefore. In despotic
states, men obey by fear, while in democratic states the majority of men obey by consent. Force
is only required for the some who refuse to obey. It is this possession of force to support its
commands and to compel obedience that distinguishes the state from all other associations and
that makes it sovereign.
What is Sovereignty?
Like the notion of the state, sovereignty has also undergone changes in historical conditions.
Throughout the 18th and the 19th centuries, the legal notion of sovereignty would have been
enough, but in our times it is not therefore. The state cannot run its affairs on the foundation of
law or command alone. Today, the naked authority of the ruler of earlier times is replaced
through the authority to manage public opinion to enforce sovereignty. Its legitimacy is based
more on its skill to resolve social clash, set up order and serve the common interest of the society.
This provides a proper understanding of the power of the state. Its power rests more on the will
of the people to render obedience than on its coercive authority. This is the liberal meaning of
sovereignty. Though, the liberals do not reject the coercive authority of the state altogether, and
opine that in order to save the socio-economic and political order, its exploit may be legitimate,
when necessary. There is yet another view of sovereignty, which regards sovereignty to be the
authority of one scrupulous class of society in excess of another class. This view is based on a
scientific analysis of society and is the Marxian view. State and sovereignty are the authority of
an economically dominant class, which uses this to further its own interest. Marxism suggests
that sovereignty in a capitalist state should be destroyed through a socialist revolution and it
should be replaced through the sovereignty of the working class— the Dictatorship of the
Proletariat. The state will wither absent in a classless society. In a classless society, sovereignty,
which is a class authority, will have no lay. In the present century, few pluralists and
behaviouralists have given a new interpretation of sovereignty. Authority in a society is not
centralized in the state, but divided in the middle of dissimilar associations and clusters.
Behaviouralists uphold that in a democratic society, authority is shared through competing plural
elite. Therefore, authority is assumed since diffused, rather than centralized, in a democratic
society.
Features of Sovereignty
We shall talk about many key features of sovereignty, which makes it imperative for the citizens
to obey the state. The features of sovereignty may be summarized since follows:
Absoluteness: This means that there can be no legal authority within the state Larger to it,
and there can be no legal limit to the supreme law creation authority of the state. It is absolute in
the sense of not being subject to any restraint, legal or otherwise. In a civil society, although the
laws passed through the sovereign are binding on all associations and citizens, still this does not
mean that there are no practical limitations on the sovereignty of the state. Although sure self-
imposed limitations, internal or external, cannot be legally treated since limitations. These
limitations are overcome through the ‘absolute’ nature of the state.
 Universality: The sovereignty of the state extends in excess of every person and every
association of persons in the state. The evident exception in the case of diplomatic
representatives is an international courtesy, which the state may remove any time.
Permanence: The sovereignty of the state continues since extensive since the state itself
exists. Those who exercise it may change, and the entire state may be reorganized; but
sovereignty, wherever situated, persists. Only through the destruction of the state itself can
sovereignty be destroyed.
Indivisibility: This implies that there can be but one sovereignty in a state. To divide
sovereignty is to destroy it. The exercise of its powers may be distributed in the middle of several
governmental organs, but sovereignty is an element, presently since the state is an element. There
necessity is since several states since there are sovereignties. A divided sovereignty is a
contradiction in words.
The theory of indivisibility of sovereignty has been attacked from several points of view. Writers
on international law speak of section sovereign states, such since protectorates. The theory of
divided sovereignty was held through mainly American thinkers, who viewed the United States
since sovereign with regard to the powers conferred upon the national government, and the states
since sovereign with regard to those powers reserved for them. German writers revived this
theory at the time of formation of the German Empire, but it has now been abandoned. What is
divided in a federal organization is not sovereignty, which resides in the state, but the exercise of
its several powers, which are distributed in accordance with a constitutional organization in the
middle of several governmental organs. More recently the theory of divided sovereignty has been
revived through the pluralists, who deny that the state alone is sovereign and who hold that other
associations in the state, such since churches or economic clusters, are sovereign in excess of
their scrupulous interests.
any external compulsions. The thought was further urbanized through Hobbes who justified its
absolute powers. Rousseau too agreed that sovereignty was absolute and unlimited, although he
situated it in the common will of the people. Finally, in the scripts of John Austin, the legal
theory of sovereignty received its mainly elaborate analysis. He held that in every state, there
necessity be a determinate body, which possesses sovereign authority, that its power is
indivisible and legally unlimited and that its commands alone make law. This theory serves since
the foundation for contemporary jurisprudence, although it has been criticized through several
writers.
Legal and Political Sovereignty
It is significant for the students of political science to understand the row of distinction flanked
by legal and political sovereignty. Legal sovereignty symbolizes sovereignty since the supreme
law creation authority; that is, to issue the highest orders. It is bound neither through moral nor
through natural laws. Laws made through the sovereign are to be obeyed through all
compulsorily. But then the question arises, where does this legal sovereignty lie in the
contemporary state? In a federal state, the legislature cannot create laws on matters assigned to
the states, as powers are decentralized flanked by the center and the states according to the
constitution. Therefore, legal sovereignty does not reside with the legislature. Even the British
parliament, where the king makes any law that it derives, unrestrained through the courts, is also
bound through public opinion and through moral and other laws. To elaborate further, even
dictators like Napoleon, Hitler and Mussolini did not have unlimited powers of law create any
law, is not usually seen. Therefore , to enumerate again, legal sovereignty is determinate and
definite, has supreme and unlimited powers to create laws, its laws are obeyed through all and
involve punishment or disobedience, and finally it being the fountain head of all legal rights, it
alone has the authority to create laws. The mainly explicit report of legal sovereignty is
established in the Austinian theory of sovereignty. Now, we have seen that legal sovereignty
presents merely a legal viewpoint of sovereignty. In every society, there is an unseen authority
behind legal sovereignty. This unseen authority is recognized since political sovereignty, which
is expressed in several shapes like public meetings, processions and demonstrations. If the laws
of the legal sovereign are immoral, this unorganized authority of political sovereignty can compel
the legal sovereign to bow down. Therefore, political sovereignty is unseen and a better
command. It is the revolutionary authority of the alert and conscious people. History has shown
many instances of this revolutionary political sovereignty destroying the legal sovereign; e.g.
Czar Nicholas of Russia was overthrown through Lenin’s political sovereignty in 1917, Chiang
Kai-Shek of China was destroyed through the leadership of Mao-Zedong, and same measures
happened in Iran, South Africa and Rhodesia against despotic regimes. It is the fear of this
sovereignty, which keeps the legal sovereign tight and alert. In a representative democracy, the
variation flanked by legal and political sovereignty can be seen clearly, as the representatives of
people are the legal sovereign and the electorate is the political sovereign. But in a direct
democracy, this variation is not seen as the people are also the legal sovereign since they create
laws themselves. In socialist countries like China and Russia, participation by organized size
systems is sufficient to end the variation flanked by the legal and the political sovereign. Though,
in despotic states, this variation becomes extremely clear- the police, the army, the prisons, lathi,
bullets etc. reflect legal sovereignty; and the people, their systems, size movements and struggles,
strikes, demonstrations etc. reflect political sovereignty. In their thrash about, political
sovereignty predominates. But this is quite impossible in a class divided society because the class
interests of both the classes—property owners and the property less—are diametrically opposed.
Site of Sovereignty
One of the mainly hard questions in political theory is that of the site of sovereignty in the state.
Now, that we know that sovereignty is the essence of the state implies external and internal
independence from other states and involves legal supremacy in excess of persons, the question
of its exact site still remnants. To this, several solutions have been offered, which we would now
be looking into.
Sovereignty of the Monarch
Sovereignty of the state was recognized with the authority of the Monarch in the sixteenth
century. This was therefore because, in order to set up personal independence and supremacy, the
kings underwent struggles that gave rise to the conception of sovereignty. When success was
achieved in excess of rivals, sovereignty was accorded to the kings. The king was the sovereign
and even said, ‘I am the state’. This theory made the king the source of all law and power; he
could do no wrong; subjects were to render passive obedience. Though, contemporary democracy
came to the forefront via revolutions and therefore, destroyed this theory and the kings became
unimportant sections of the government.
Sovereignty of the People
This theory was also recognized since the theory of popular sovereignty, which meant that the
people have the supreme authority and they are the source of all powers. It means that
sovereignty of the states is not based either on God or on naked authority, but only on the
people’s will. The demand for popular sovereignty was raised through the supporters of the
Conciliar Movement throughout the 15th century against the power of the Church. But in
contemporary times, it is associated with the name of Rousseau, who supported it in his theory of
common will throughout the 18th century. The theory of popular sovereignty overthrew the
French monarchy, caused the American Revolution and has been the burning thought behind all
the revolutions against despotism. This theory was also responsible for creation Europe the
graveyard of monarchies. Therefore, popular sovereignty has appeared since a powerful
revolutionary thought in Europe. This principle, in fact, is the foundation of all contemporary
democracies. But the largest difficulty with the principle of popular sovereignty is the assumption
that the entire of the people have one will. This theory does not assume that society is class-
divided and that the interests of dissimilar classes are opposed to each other. In a class-divided
society, there are always two wills-one of the exploiting rich class and the other of the exploited
poor class. These wills can never meet and since such, the entire of the people cannot have a
single will. In view of this, the principle of popular sovereignty becomes vague and
indeterminate. From the legal viewpoint, the principle of popular sovereignty is merely a fiction,
since it does not fit into the realities of contemporary-day political life. The elitist theory of
democracy has proved that popular sovereignty is a bogus principle even in contemporary
democracies. Popular sovereignty can be situated in the electorate or the majority of the
electorate and according to others; it can be situated in unorganized masses. But this view is not
really true. People’s sovereignty is not expressed in elections, but it discovers an expression in
the people’s revolutionary struggles and size movements. In a class-divided society, popular
sovereignty is manipulated through the ruling class or it tries to crush it. In conclusion, it may be
said that popular sovereignty regards authority of the people since the foundation of state
sovereignty. This principle has shaken monarchies, but in European democracies and class-
divided civilizations, this principle does not hold much water now. The 18th century principle of
popular sovereignty in the European world has converted itself into the principle of sovereignty
of the bourgeoisie in the present century.
Sovereignty since Constitution Creation Authority
After the theory of popular sovereignty had successfully accomplished its job of overthrowing
royal sovereignty and establishing democratic governments, it was reexamined in an attempt to
discover a more definite and legal site of sovereign authority. This was the job of a number of
jurists in the nineteenth century, who reached the conclusion that sovereignty is situated in that
body of person/persons who create the constitution of the state or who, once the constitution is
made, possess the legal authority to amend it. This theory, which is essentially juristic in nature,
reasoned since follows: The supreme law in a state is its constitution. This body of principles
creates the framework of government, outlines its powers, and adjusts the relation of the state to
its citizens. Hence, the government is limited in its authority through the constitution, and is
inferior in power to the body that may make or change this fundamental law. Whoever creates
the constitution makes the supreme law of the state and expresses its direct will; so, they may be
sovereign. In few states, the national legislature exercises this authority; in others, a special organ
or a special way of process is required for constitution creation. But a more serious objection
strikes at the root of the evident legality of this theory. The constitution-amending organ does not
posses the legally unlimited authority that is the essence of sovereignty. It can legally do one
item only and that is to amend the constitution. Any effort to go beyond this authority and to
create any other law would be an illegal usurpation of authority. We, therefore, have the
contradiction of the sovereign body being legally limited to the exercise of a single and specific
function. The constitution creation body, so, is not sovereign. It is merely a section of the
government, possessing the legal authority to exercise the limited, however significant, function
of redistributing the total exercise of sovereign authority in the middle of the several other organs
of government.
Sovereignty of Law Creation Authority
This theory locates sovereignty in the sum total of all the lawmaking bodies in the government in
accordance with law. These incorporated courts, administrative officials, the electorate and such
other special bodies. This theory considers state and government since an element each and
sovereignty resides in both of them, but is exercised through the government. Therefore since an
entire, the state is an element but its exercise of authority is to be distributed in the middle of
numerous organs of government. Therefore, this theory avoids the vagueness and loose thinking
of the theory of popular sovereignty. Sovereignty ultimately resides in the state, but only by the
laws made and administered through its government can sovereignty be manifested.
De Jure and De Facto Sovereignty
This characteristic of sovereignty has been recognized through international law. Whenever there
is a political upheaval or a civil war in a country or a same situation, we have two kinds of
government- the legal government, which has been uprooted and the new government which
however not legal, holds actual authority. In such a situation, the question of recognition of
authority arises. De jure sovereignty is one, which is legally competent to issue the highest
command of the state. It has the legal right to exercise sovereign authority and has the obedience
of the masses. A de facto sovereign is the one who has got actual authority and who has real
command to go with it. His power rests on his physical force and manages. He may be a usurping
king, a dictator, a priest, a prophet, or a charismatic leader. In any of these instances, his
authority rests not on law, but on physical force and actual manage. History is full of examples of
de facto exercise of sovereignty. In 1649, Cromwell in England became the de facto sovereign
after he dismissed the extensive standing Parliament. Nepoleon became the de facto sovereign of
France after overthrowing the Directory. Czar Nicolas was overthrown through the Russian
people in 1917 and de-facto sovereign authority came into the hands of the Bolshevik Party
under the leadership of Lenin. Similarly, de jure sovereign Chiang kai-shek was in excess of-
thrown through the Communist Party of China, under the leadership of Mao-Zedong in 1949, and
the socialist state under his leadership became the de facto sovereign in China. Same situations
arose because of military coups in Bangladesh in 1975, Argentina and Lebanon in 1976, Pakistan
in 1977 and again in 2001, Afghanistan in 1978, Iran in 1979 and Uganda in 1980. Same
situations may arise when a civil war takes lay in a country. A de facto sovereign in the extensive
run becomes a de jure sovereign also, because he has the actual authority. It is always the
endeavor of the de facto sovereign to turn himself into a de jure sovereign. Since the actual
authority lies with the de facto sovereign, he is in a bigger location to stake his claim, and be
established since a legal sovereign in the extensive run.
Though, few jurists uphold that sovereignty is a mere legal concept and the distinction flanked by
de facto and de jure sovereignty is a political fiction, because the power of a de facto sovereign is
unlawful. But here one item necessity is understood, viz., that the distinction flanked by de facto
and de jure sovereignty is with regard to the exercise of sovereign authority. It is largely
significant from the viewpoint of international law and diplomacy. This question becomes
significant only in the case of a revolution, a coup, a civil war, etc., in a state because in such
cases there exist too several political claims to sovereignty.
Limitations on Sovereignty
We have already discussed at length that sovereignty is the supreme authority of the state with no
legal limitations. But in actual practice, there are few limitations, which may or should limit the
exercise of its powers.
Moral Limitations
Several early writers argued that sovereignty was limited through divine law, through natural
law, or through moral law. They usually carried the principles of religion, morality and justice
which undoubtedly power the exercise of sovereignty. But the law of gods and of nature
necessity be interpreted through human agencies; they exercise no sovereignty through
themselves. They are not legal limits, but a section of the intellectual atmosphere in which laws
are made. They limit sovereignty only in the sense that a wise state will not enact laws contrary
to usually carried ideas of morality and justice, because of the opposition such laws would
arouse, leading to difficulties in enforcement or even leading to a revolution. Only such laws are
supported through a common consensus of opinion that can be successfully administered. In
contemporary states, several characteristics of life are exempt from governmental interference,
and any state which attempts to exercise its legal authority to interfere in sure dealings of human
life would side a lot of resistance and may even be overthrown through a revolution.
Constitutional Limitations
Few writers have argued that sovereignty is limited through the constitution of the state. They
create a distinction flanked by fundamental or constitutional law and the ordinary laws made
through the government, holding the former to be the higher law, and the latter to be valid only if
they accord with the former. To this point of view, two objections may be raised. The
sovereignty of the state is not limited through the constitution, as the state may legally amend its
constitution whenever it desires. A limitation self-imposed and removable at pleasure is not a real
or a legal limitation. What is limited through the constitution is not the state or its sovereignty,
but the government of the state. But this provision for a legal sharing of the exercise of its
sovereign powers spaces no limitation on sovereignty itself.
In the second lay, there is no such item since a higher law and a lower law. Laws may differ in
the importance of the question with which they trade. Both are exercising that share of the
sovereign authority of the state which its legal organization of system allots to them. The
constitution differs from the other laws in nature and purpose, but not in legal validity. Like other
laws, it is an expression of the sovereign will of the state and not a limitation upon it.
International Limitations
Several writers today hold that the sovereignty of a state is limited through the rules of
international law and through the treaties and conventions into which it enters with other states.
Juristic theory of sovereignty, these restrictions are not legally binding. They are voluntary
limitations, self-imposed, which a state may legally repudiate, and no legal power exists to
enforce them. Sovereign states necessity is, in the last analysis, judges of their rights and
obligations to the other states. They may repudiate their treaties, refuse to be bound through the
carried rules of international law, and declare war in protection of their interpretation of
international rights. International law is not law in the sense that it is the will of a determinate
sovereign, enforceable on subjects. If, since few writers consider, the present tendency is towards
the growth of an international system with unified manage, the result would be a world sovereign
state, with the right to make and enforce law. In that case, what we now call international law
would be law, but it would cease to be international, being the unified will of a world state. What
is now described external sovereignty would cease to exist, being swallowed up through the
internal sovereignty of the world organization. Mainly writers, though, consider that it is more
feasible, under present circumstances, to develop internationalism on the foundation of sovereign
national states. If this is to be done, the traditional theory of external sovereignty and equality of
states necessity be customized to permit a sure degree of international manage. Attacks on the
Theory of Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty since the essence of the state has been severely criticized. One group
of writers contend that sovereignty is not necessary for state subsistence, while another group of
writers denies that sovereignty is the source of law; still an other group denies that sovereignty is
the exclusive possession of the state and argues for the plurality of sovereignties possessed
through several associations. Writers, who uphold that sovereignty is not necessary, hold that
states may be partly sovereign and the test of statehood is the right to govern. These writers were
from Germany, Switzerland and USA and they agreed on claiming statehood but not full
sovereignty. Even the political bodies of today, which posses their own constitution and
government, are not fully sovereign. Few writers regard the doctrine since futile and dangerous
since it leads to unlimited powers; while the others attack the thought of state sovereignty
because of their desire to provide full autonomy to associations other than the state; others
because of their interest in individual freedom. The attack on state sovereignty is precious in
pointing out sure defects in the governmental system of the contemporary state which impede the
exercise of sovereign authority. In the recent past, criticism has been leveled through a group of
jurists against state sovereignty since the supreme and only source of law. The theory that the
sovereignty of the state is legally limited through natural laws, cannot be carried, as the state
judges and observes those principles. Such limitations are not legally binding, but only self-
limiting. This does not mean a limitation on sovereignty. Another attack on the theory holds that
the state’s claim to supreme power is not in accord with actual factors in the intricate world of
today. They discredited the state, opposed the theory of a single and unified sovereignty and
demanded for other agencies, a superior share of social manage. The purpose of such an attack
was to focus on the decentralization of power and greater individual freedom. At present, the
development of economic interests and the strength of economic associations have created
conflicts of power flanked by them and the existing organs of government. The state does not
immediately adapt its system and law to correspond with the new condition. At such a time, the
doctrine of absolute and unlimited power of the state looks dangerous and undesirable. Hence,
pluralism is the natural point of view. The pluralists emphasize the must of learning the actual
facts of political life in a rapidly changing social organization. In this relationship, they point out
the rising importance of non-political clusters, the danger of in excess of interference through the
state with regard to the working of such clusters and the desirability of giving to such clusters
greater legal recognition in the political organization. Nevertheless, this is a problem of the
proper internal system of the state and of the proper scope of its behaviors, and does not imply
the abandonment of the theory of state sovereignty. Somewhere, there necessity is a system of
supreme legal manages and though, much the state may limit its behaviors or reorganize its
internal building, sovereign state still remnants.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
What do you understand by the term state?
What are the salient features of the liberal theory of state?
Explain the Marxist theory of state in your own words.
Enumerate the salient features of the Gandhian theory of state.
What do you understand by civil society? Examine its relationship with the state.
Enumerate and describe the basic characteristics of civil society.
What is Sovereignty?
Describe any two sources of sovereignty.
 CHAPTER 4
POWER, AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY

STRUCTURE
Objectives
Power and Authority
Legitimacy
Political Obligation and Revolution
Review Questions
OBJECTIVES
After going through this chapter, you should be able to:
Understand the concept of power.
Explain the concept of authority.
Explain the concept and the inter-relationship between political obligation and revolution.

POWER AND AUTHORITY

Authority: Meaning of the Concept
Authority is seen in dissimilar walks of life— in the buildings of government management,
bureaucracy, elections, family and society. In the instances of a teacher scolding an erring student
in school, to a powerful state creation war against its neighbor or any terrorist system bombing a
target, authority is used. Therefore it becomes imperative to see what exactly is general in these
examples and how they justify the concept. In political theory, authority is the central issue,
whether it is clothed in law that qualifies it or whether power that renders obedience to it
voluntarily sustains it. Authority is force, exercised through the state in the name of law.
Authority is central to political theory, because it is concerned in relation to the state, which is
force. This is a school of idea belonging to the Realists. On the other hand, the Jurists who regard
the state since a legal association argue that the notion of imperative and Larger force associated
with the state is not arbitrary; but it is qualified force; to put it more basically , it is force
exercised ‘in the name of law’. For the state is closely associated with the notion of authority
exercised in accordance with definite processes and with rules that are recognized. Therefore,
authority is force expressed in words of law; it is force qualified and expressed in a regular and
uniform manner. To further substantiate the concept of authority, the jurists have refined the
concept of the state through identifying it with sure essential attributes. Now according to this,
the state is a political society and in any given political society, there exists a supreme authority
from which the law emanates. This supreme authority which John Austin describes since
‘sovereignty’, distinguishes the state from other associations. The conception of sovereignty
implies that the final power is the state. The significant point here is that there is in the state a
sovereign authority which, whether held through the people or through the prince, is the source
of law. It is authority conditioned through law, whether from the point of view of those in excess
of whom it is exercised or from the point of view of the actual holder of authority. Another
important point which requires to be explained here is that sovereign authority converts the rule
of force into a rule of law. Therefore, Hobbes does not believe the state a phenomenon of force;
but a phenomenon of authority, of which sovereignty is the highest and the mainly complete
expression. The transition from the ‘state of nature’ to the ‘civil state’ is the transition from the
rule of force where there is no security, to that of law, where human dealings are close. Also,
presently since the state is not pure force, therefore sovereignty is not arbitrary will according to
Hobbes. The sovereign representative is entrusted with the authority to procure safety of the
people. Hence, it cannot violate the extremely cause for which it was entrusted with sovereign
authority. Therefore, authorization, not habitual obedience, is what makes the sovereign, which
converts force into authority. Two centuries later, Alexander Hamilton asked, ‘What is authority,
but the skill or faculty of doing an item?’ Throughout the mid-20th century, Harold Lass well and
Abraham Kaplan construed exercises of authority since ‘acts… affecting or determining other
acts’. Shortly thereafter, Robert Dahl defined authority since one actor’s skill to create another do
something that the latter ‘would not otherwise do’. At the similar time, though, Hannah Arendt
argued that authority is not the property of lone mediators or actors, but of clusters or
collectivities acting jointly. Therefore distant since the views of dissimilar authors are concerned,
it surely helps us to understand the meaning of the concept in several perspectives. For Friedrich,
authority is ‘a sure type of human connection’, while for Tawney, ‘it is the capability of an
individual or a group to vary others’ conduct since one desires’. While communist leader Mao-
Zedong idea of authority since ‘flowing from the barrel of the gun’, Gandhi, an apostle of peace,
regarded it since the authority of love and truth. Authority is ascribed to dissimilar things on
dissimilar grounds. For example, we speak of economic authority, military authority, authority of
the brain, political/ executive authority and social authority. The general thread in all these
authority manifestations means ‘skill’ or ‘capability’. Though, we approach to one general
generalization that authority is the sum total of those external powers and pressures which can
create an individual or a body of individuals to move in a required direction.
Distinction Flanked by Authority and Related Themes
The precise connotation of authority became hard, when the word became interchangeable with
many related themes like manage, power, power, force, power, coercion and the like. Keeping
this in mind, that it might make confusion for students of Political Science, it is necessary to
highlight the significant points of distinction flanked by authority and related themes.
Authority since discussed earlier is the capability to conquer, or one’s skill to manage others. In
doing therefore, authority could be based on units like fraud, tactics, manipulation, or even be
derived from legal and constitutional processes. International politics is nothing but a
manifestation of authority thrash about. Force, on the other hand, is dissimilar from authority. It
is the mainly brutal manifestation of authority. The techniques involved in physical force are
restraint, coercion, threat, intimidation, blackmail, terrorism and military power. Therefore
authority can be described latent force, while force is manifest authority. If force stands on one
extreme, power stands on the other. It symbolizes the sublimation of authority. It may be due to
social prestige, intellectual and spiritual eminence, high morality and the like. Therefore, while
power is persuasive, authority is coercive.Coming to the notion of power, it implies moralization
and legitimization of authority by legal or traditional sanctions. It is essentially the institutional
code within which the exploit of authority since a medium is organized and is made legal. An
elaborate analysis of the concept of power will be done later in this element. Finally, speaking of
manage since a theme related to authority also has its own separate characteristic, dissimilar
from authority. It is more comprehensive and less concentrated than authority. Manage could be
of a dissimilar nature like legislative, executive, judicial, financial and the like. Authority is more
intense, when compared to manage. Therefore, we see that because of this variety in the meaning
of the word ‘authority’, its comprehensive revise becomes necessary.
Implications of Authority
From what has been discussed therefore distant, sure implications may be gathered in relation to
the concept of authority.
Authority cannot be merely encircled in a political or economic framework; it is broadly a
social phenomenon.
The distinctness of authority with the other concepts like power, manage, power, prestige,
rights and the like, enables us to understand the concept of authority more precisely and in a
subtle method, which becomes useful for students of political science.
Authority is latent force, force is manifest authority, and power is institutionalized authority.
Authority seems in dissimilar methods on dissimilar occasions, be it either in a formal
system, or in an informal system or in organized/unorganized society.
Authority resides in a combination of numbers, social system and possessions. This is the
source of authority.
The Authority Theory
To say that the state is a sovereign authority is to say that its rules, regulations and laws have
final power. There is no appeal against them to any more ultimate set of rules. In other terms,
within the state the rules made through other associations are subordinate to the power of the
state’s rule. This authority theory of sovereignty is regarded through political theorists, believing
in democracy, since of no relevance to politics for which we require the concept of political
sovereignty to be defined in words of authority instead of legal power. Legal sovereignty treats
the state since a final legal power. From the moral point of view, one may say that the laws of
the state do not have final power. If the conscience of the individual tells him that he ought not to
obey little scrupulous law, then from a moral point of view, he is entitled to disobey; for in
mainly matters of morals, the final power is conscience, when he appeals to a higher law, the
natural law. For instance, when the Greek tyrant, Creon, forbade Antigone to bury her dead
brother, she disobeyed his order on the ground that the higher law, the natural law, required that
the dead should be respected. The discussion on conscientious objection shows that ‘authority’
means not only the skill to have one’s will accepted out, but the skill to do therefore through the
threat of force. In conclusion, we may say that the sovereignty of the state, for the purpose of
politics, should be defined since the supremacy of coercive authority rather than that of legal
power. Because, the one that is sovereign is the one that can substantiate its claim, and the state
certainly does therefore because it possesses the authority of armed force. The authority theory
since said earlier had its first brilliant expression in the ‘Leviathan’ of Thomas Hobbes. He tells
us that man desires authority and even greater authority, which becomes the root reason of
competition in the middle of individuals. But at the similar time, men like to live in peace in
order to enjoy the authority that they possess. Therefore they are disposed to live under a general
authority. In the middle of the leading advocates of this theory in the present century who says
that politics is nothing but a thrash on for authority. The authority theory establishes its concrete
manifestation, when the Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini declared ‘nothing against the state,
nothing above it’ giving birth to the ideology of Fascism. In authority theory, authority is spoken
only in a political sense. Though, authority contains much more, within itself, like the authority
of soul, mind and the authority of one’s ideas. Reference in this context may be made from
Buddha to Gandhi who had displayed their authority of idea and ideology to the world.
Liberal Democratic Theory
In liberal democratic theory, authority has been recognized with developmental and extractive
capacities. In other terms, authority means skill of exploit and growth of human capacities. It has
two characteristics, extractive and developmental, which can be described ethical and empirical
dimensions, respectively. As a man’s skill to exploit and develop his capacities becomes the
‘authority’, it is described man’s developmental authority and it has a qualitative character.
Besides, man should exploit his capacities in a method therefore that he may extract benefits
from others. It leads to the thought of extractive authority. Here, we see that the liberal theory of
authority integrates the thought of political authority with the authority of money. Elections,
propaganda, persuasion, manage- all are governed through the role of money authority. This is
why the destiny of millions is often controlled through a dozen families having monopoly in
excess of the money of the nation. Though, the theory also emphasizes the maximization of
democracy, therefore that values of humanism are not destroyed.
Marxian Theory
The Marxian view, links politics and economics by the instrument of authority. Karl Marx
viewed political authority since being possessed through those who manage the means of
manufacture since compared to the labour force which has small or no manage in excess of such
means of manufacture. This ‘relation of manufacture’, so, determines the sharing of political
authority. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels state that political authority, therefore
described, is merely the organized shape of one class oppressing another and that political
authority is the common and pervasive authority which a dominant class exercises in order to
uphold and defend its predominance in a civil society. Further, class authority ‘does tend to be
taken in excess of through the state itself, and gladly surrenders to it; even in normal
circumstance of advanced capitalism, the state takes in excess of more and more functions
performed through the dominant class having a greater share in the performance of these
functions’. Therefore, Marx sees a secure integration flanked by political authority and the
prevailing socioeconomic organization and regards it since transient — it shall disappear with the
rise of the stateless and classless society.
Michael Foucault on Authority
There are several misconceptions and confusions in relation to the ‘authority’ since a
communication and a practice. In this relationship, Michael Foucault’s path-breaking analysis of
authority requires to be invoked to illuminate the deeper implications of authority since a flow,
manifested in dealings at multiple sites. Foucault’s come to the social phenomenon of ‘authority’
is clearly revealed in the following quotation:
‘Let us not inquire why sure people want to control, what they seek, what is their overall
strategy. Let us inquire, instead, how things job at the stage of on-going subjugation, at the stage
of those continuous and uninterrupted procedures which subject our bodies, govern our gestures,
dictate our behaviours etc. In other terms, rather than inquire ourselves how the sovereign seems
to us in his lofty separation, we should attempt to discover how it is that subjects are slowly,
progressively, really and materially constituted by a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies,
materials, desires, considerations etc.’
Foucault, therefore, moves absent from the sovereignty-centric conception of authority toward
what he calls ‘disciplinary authority’ or the micro mechanisms of authority– –the techniques and
tactics of power–– that, since a closely connected grid of disciplinary coercions, keeps the social
body in a steady state. The state in this situation becomes a super structural Meta authority,
rooted in an entire series of multiple and indefinite authority dealings, and since Foucault argues,
‘The state consists in the codification of an entire number of authority dealings which render its
functioning possible…’ Foucault’s analysis has opened up new methods of looking at authority
in society, not therefore much since a juridical concept since socially networked dealings of
power and subjugation. In general parlance, authority has been viewed in reductionism word. It is
the top-down vision that has always looked at authority since a striking force and a visible and
effective meat-authority. Those who hold authority at the top are favorably stationed to take
advantage of a number of apparatuses and devices– scrupulous techniques, knowledge,
modalities of political authority. In other terms, they have the means of authority to which they
have access because of the strategic locations they inhabit. A senior bureaucrat, because of his
location, can easily accord sanction to a project or stop it when things are not working out to his
satisfaction. In Foucault’s analysis, to ascribe all phenomena of authority to the prevailing
authority apparatuses is a shape of unrealistic reductionism. Authority, in this view, is not what
and where people think it is. In reality, it is the expression of hundreds of micro-procedures
defining several currents coming from a multitude of dissimilar sources. The reductionism view
ignores that ‘the state, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is distant from being able to
inhabit the entire field of actual authority dealings, and further… the state can only operate, on
the foundation of other, already existing authority dealings.’ To understand the real nature of
authority, one has to move absent from the juridical edifice of sovereignty, the state apparatuses
and the accompanying ideologies. Instead attention should be paid to power and the material
operators of authority. One should focus on the shape of subjection and the inflection and
utilizations of their localized organizations and on the strategic apparatuses. Foucault calls this
authority ‘non-sovereign authority, lying outside the shape of sovereignty. It is disciplinary
authority taking the form of closely connected grid of disciplinary coercions designed to assure
the cohesion of the social body. Since Foucault exhorted: ‘we necessity eschew the model of
Leviathan in the revise of authority. We necessity escape from the limited field of juridical
sovereignty and state organizations and instead foundation our analysis of authority on the revise
of the techniques and tactics of power….’
What is Power?
To understand political realities, we should be know the three characteristics of state— force,
authority and power. The notion of state recalls to our mind, authority, which is exercised in
accordance with definite processes and recognized rules. The state is force exercised in the name
of law. Force become authority, when the unit of arbitrariness is removed from its exercise
through definite processes lay down through the laws of the state. The recognition of this
authority exercised since per definite rules implies the recognition of an obligation to submit to
these rules. The term ‘state’ in this sense gives a word of reference for these obligations. It refers
not merely to a force which exists in actual information, or to authority which makes it felt in
accordance with sure rules, but to a power which is established since warranted and justified in
practice.
Classification of Power
The German sociologist Max Weber suggested a three fold classification of the sources of power
in a contemporary state. They are rational-legal, traditional and charismatic power.
Rational-legal power is explicit and has the right to provide orders and to have them obeyed
through virtue of an office held within an organization of deliberately framed rules which set out
rights and duties. Bureaucracy is the best instance of rational-legal power. When a citizen accepts
the power of a bureaucrat, he does therefore not because of anything else but due to the powers
allocated to the official through a legal organization. The office, the individual holds, is
significant and not the individual himself or herself.
Traditional power exists where a person, such since a king or a tribal chief, holds a larger
location of command in accordance with extensive custom and is obeyed, because everyone
accepts the sanctity of the custom. Religious power is of this type.
Charismatic power rests on the possession of exceptional personal qualities that reason a person
to be carried since a leader. There may be qualities of saintly virtue giving their possessor
religious power or qualities of outstanding heroism, intellect, oratory that bring a following of
loyal devotion in politics, in wars and other types of enterprise. The charismatic leader has the
gift of divine grace and extraordinary qualities. Lenin or Mahatma Gandhi got their location on
explanation of their charisma and qualities. Of the three sources, the first two belong to one
group – where the agent and the source of power are dissimilar. Here, the source can be criticized
without criticizing the agent and the agent, so, enjoys a relatively stable location. But in the case
of charismatic power, the source and the agent of power are the similar. Hence, any criticism
against the source can be directed against the agent since well. Therefore the agent does not
enjoy a stable location. A charismatic power tends to be institutionalized. This is what Weber
calls ‘reutilization of charisma’. Weber, though, recognized that none of these categories lived in
pure shape. The British organization is a mixture of traditional and rational-legal sources of
power. India, according to Weber was a combination of rational-legal and charismatic power.
Distinction Flanked by the Concepts of Authority and Power
The concepts of ‘authority’ and ‘power’ are related ones. But a distinction flanked by them is
necessary. Both the words refer to dissimilar properties. But because of their logical grammar
being commonly misconstrued, unnecessary difficulty has arisen. Though, they are the names of
not dissimilar, but related entities of which one somehow depends on the other. When we speak
of an act giving a minister the authority to do this or that, we mean giving him power. Jean Bodin
in his job, The Six Books of Republic says, ‘Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual authority
of a state, that is to say, the supreme authority to command’. His discussion provides the
impression that sovereignty means authority in the ordinary sense of the term. If through absolute
authority, Bodin means the skill to issue effective commands, it would be authority, properly
speaking. If he means the entitlement or the right to issue commands and have them obeyed, it
would be power. His explanation of sovereignty makes it clear that he means power, whereas his
exploit of the expression, ‘absolute authority’ suggests the first. Prof. Raphael in his Troubles of
Political Philosophy distinguishes three meanings of the word ‘authority’. First, the mainly
common meaning of authority is basically skill. We exploit the similar term for the authority of a
dynamo, political authority or will authority. Secondly, we speak of authority in a social context,
when we think of authority since a specific type of skill i.e. the skill to create other people do
what one wants them to do. A man may be able to get others to do what he wants, because he
holds a special office, or because he has the strength to create things hard for them, if they refuse.
The two examples show the exercise of political authority and the second is prominent in
situations of clash. Thirdly, there is coercive authority which is by the threat of Larger force to
create others do what one wants them to do when they are unwilling. Because coercive authority
is therefore prominent in political clash, the term ‘authority’ which at first meant skill of any
type, has approach to be associated with enforcement. Therefore, the word authority has three
meanings, and it can be used either with or without association of empowerment. Authority is
often used to mean power when we speak of giving someone legal powers. A person with
authority holds a special office; this means that he has power and is able through virtue of that
location to get others to do what he tells them to do; his authority is the exercise of power. That is
why the term authority can be used to mean power.
Implications of Power
Power is the right to do an item. The two meanings of right are a) the right here of action and b)
the right of resilience. The right of action is the right to do something; for example, the right of
the worker to strike and the right of the employer to lock out. In this sense, a right is a freedom.
The right of resilience is a claim to do something; for instance, if A has the right to fifty rupees
that B owes him, it is A’s right to receive fifty rupees from B. It is A’s right against B and it
corresponds to B’s obligations to pay up. Now, the power to provide orders is the right of
resilience. For instance, when a minister is authorized through a statute to create regulations, this
not only allows him to do something but also imposes an obligation on citizens to confirm to the
regulations that he may create. Therefore, his power provides him a right to issue them. In both
senses—the right to something and the right to receive obedience – a right of being authorized is
a facility and therefore, an authority. The authority to create other people do what a person needs
may depend on the information that he holds a special office. Through virtue of holding that
office, that person has the power to inquire sure necessities of other people, and they do what he
needs, because they acknowledge his power. His power and others’ acceptance of it are what he
needs. We can, so, think of power since a specific type of skill or authority to create other people
do what one wants them to do. This specific skill or authority is coordinate with coercive
authority. The possession of coercive force is one method of receiving people to do what a
person needs; it is one specific shape of authority. The possession of power, provided it is
acknowledged, is another.
LEGITIMACY
Power and legitimacy have been in the middle of the mainly vital and enduring issues in political
analysis. Political philosophers, political scientists and sociologists have for extensive engaged
themselves with exploring these concepts since useful apparatus for understanding public power
and government. They can, therefore be, seen since reflecting the several strands, which have
historically contributed to their development.
Reference to the Nature of Public and Political Power
Before we analyze these several strands, let us first bear in mind that both power and legitimacy
refer to the nature of public and political power. All human civilizations live through rules, which
provide them cohesion and a distinctive identity. These rules are seen since authoritative and
legitimate, if they are willingly carried through people since binding. While obedience to rules
can be elicited through governments by fear and coercion, forcible extraction of compliance is
not regarded since legitimate.
Power is Legitimate Authority
Let us first attempt to understand what these concepts mean in easy words. Basically put, power
is understood since a shape of authority. While authority denotes the capability or the skill to
affect and change one’s habitation, power refers to both the capability to change since well since
the right to change. Power may, so, be seen since a customized shape of authority, where
authority is acknowledged since rightful. This means that power does not depend on any shape of
coercion or manipulation, and invokes instead, a duty of obedience and compliance. In order to
elicit voluntary or willing obedience, essential to effect changes, power has to place claims to
being right. Legitimacy gives to power, the excellence of correctness and justness, invoking
thereby, obedience and compliance since a matter of duty rather than since an outcome of
coercion and force. Therefore, power when associated with legitimacy, may be idea of since
‘legitimate authority’.
Power and Legitimacy: Both Descriptive and Normative
This common account of the meanings of power and legitimacy should create it clear to us, that
the concepts may be used since both descriptive and normative categories. Since descriptive
categories, they show or define the nature of political system and rule. Since normative
categories, they give the moral average to evaluate claims to a ‘right to rule’. At the similar time,
we necessity keep in mind that the two ideas do not have a fixed meaning. Their meanings have
changed and urbanized historically. At any given historical moment, moreover, the concepts have
been interpreted and defined in contesting methods. Therefore , while Liberals would see
legitimacy since having a positive connotation, Marxists would be less inclined to see legitimacy
since providing any valid moral claims or ‘right to rule’. Liberals and Socialists view power since
rational, purposeful and limited; a view reflected in a preference for legal-rational power and
public accountability. Conservatives, through contrast, see power since arising from natural must,
being exercised ‘from above’ through virtue of unequal sharing of experiences, social location
and wisdom. The justification for power is centered approximately the argument that it is
essential for the maintenance of order, and the only means of escape from the barbarity and
injustice of the ‘state of nature’, a society without political rule.
The Problem of Political Obligation
The issue of legitimacy, or the rightfulness of a regime or organization of rule, is connected
ultimately to one of the mainly fundamental of political debates, the problem of political
obligation. It addresses the following questions: why citizens feel obliged to acknowledge the
power of government, and whether they have a duty to respect the state and obey its laws. In
contemporary political debate, though, legitimacy is also understood in words of political
behaviors and beliefs. In other terms, it addresses not only the question of why people should
obey the state in an abstract sense, but also the question of why they obey a scrupulous state or an
organization of rule and not others. In other terms, it explores the problem of the circumstances
or procedures, which encourage people to obey, or, in other terms, to see power since rightful.
These concerns reflect a shift in focus towards the empirical or practical characteristics of the
concept, i.e., the legal and constitutional contexts within which authority is exercised. We shall
seem at the manner in which power and legitimacy figure in several philosophical customs, and
the several meanings which has been attributed to them in the course of their historical
development. Since suggested, also take up for revise, two prominent and mutually conflicting
formulations, put forward through the sociologist Max Weber, and the political philosopher
Jurgen Habermas. In order to understand the distinction flanked by the two, we necessity keep in
mind the connection flanked by legitimacy and power; that legitimacy transforms authority into
power. Political philosophers treat legitimacy since a rational principle, since indicative of the
grounds on which governments demand obedience from citizens. An exploration of these claims
to legitimacy is more significant than the actual information or obedience.
Towards a Historical Understanding
Divine Conception of Political Power
The thought of legitimacy remained marginal to the understanding of political power, until the
advent of the contemporary age. Before the seventeenth century, it was widely assumed that
political power was divinely ordained and natural, and so, reasonable. Those who upheld this
view whispered in the unquestioned power of one set of people in excess of the other. This power
was continued through the belief that the rulers represented divine will and power, and they alone
knew what was good for the people, and the suitable methods to pursue, this good. From the
seventeenth century, though, legitimacy, which had therefore for remained submerged in the
notion of divine power, started taking form and developing the features, which we associate with
it today.
17th Century: Challenges to the Divine Conception
Seventeenth century thinkers like Thomas Hobbes challenged the assumption of the divine right
of kings to rule, through advocating the view that human beings are, through nature and before
God, free and equal. As all human beings were free and equal, no human could possess, naturally
or divinely ordained, power to rule in excess of fellow human beings. The notion of natural
freedom and equality of all human beings was used to contest and erode the claims to rule
through absolutist monarchies in England and France.
Social Contract Theories
The postulates of natural equality were fitted into contract theories which flourished in the
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, in a method therefore since to give a theoretical and
logical foundation for legitimate government. Contract theorists like Hobbes and John Locke
started from the vital premise that all human beings were and are equal, had power in excess of
their own selves, and had, so, the capability since well since the right to take decisions affecting
themselves. These free and equal human beings, in order to make appropriate circumstances in
which they could exercise economic freedom, take the decision to transfer few of their self-
determination rights to others, authorizing the latter to rule them on their behalf. When this
transfer takes lay on a big level, i.e., a big number of people transfer their natural right to self-
government, political power takes shape. This political power or government, which ensues since
a result of renunciation of sure rights and freedoms, is said to possess legitimacy. The legitimate
authority of the government to rule is demonstrated through the consent of the governed, which is
expressed and renewed periodically. From the seventeenth century therefore, we can see the
thought of legitimacy develop in liberal and republican customs, in the shape of a criticism or a
challenge to the power of the existing absolutist regimes. In both the English and the French
revolutions, the issue of legitimacy may in fact be seen since having become fundamental to the
questions regarding the shape of government that could reasonably and lawfully be obeyed.
Within liberalism, legitimacy of power was made contingent upon an individualist social contract
and the consent of the governed.
Montesquieu’s Alternative Views on Legitimacy
Rejecting the individualist framework of legitimating espoused through the contractualists,
Montesquieu, in his job The Spirit of the Laws, counterpoised alternative shapes of legitimacy.
This alternative shape designed to curtail the arbitrariness of an individualist free will placing the
exercise of power within the social context. Montesquieu incorporated in his framework a
socially responsible role for the state through including units of social reform, constitutionalism,
and the safeguard of vital civil liberties. All of these were seen since contributing towards or
constituting the essence of legitimate power.
Rousseau: Going beyond Montesquieu
Jean–Jacques Rousseau represented the republican challenge to the legitimacy envisaged within
the liberal-individualistic framework. In his theory of false contract in the Second
Communication, Rousseau attempted to build where Montesquieu had left. Pointing to the limits
of a liberal individualist theory of society and politics, Rousseau, like Montesquieu attempted to
cover and therefore, incorporated in his formulation, the broader sphere of social issues. Going
beyond Montesquieu’s formulation though, Rousseau sought to contain within this social sphere,
that did not discover an expression which the liberal framework. The social contract, Rousseau
felt was a deception, by which the rich compelled the poor into submitting to their dominance.
For Rousseau so, legitimacy, could be achieved only by the democratization of political power.
Democratization was to be achieved by the active participation of people, and the recognition of
their social and political requires. In Rousseau’s scheme, the legitimacy of government, and of
the exercise of authority, hinged on the active participation of citizens. The importance of this
alternative thinking to legitimacy lies in the relationship flanked by the self, public commitment
and communal goals, all of which were seen necessary for the subsistence of a republican polity.
Karl Marx’s Views
Karl Marx, though, did not share Rousseau’s optimism in relation to the connection flanked by
active participatory citizenship and political power. For Marx, the contemporary state represented
the interests of the bourgeoisie and was not so, representative of the general will of the people.
The people could at best only ‘imagine’ themselves since citizens since their participation in
‘politics’ was dependent upon and constrained through their subordinate location in a class
differentiated society. Marx felt that in the framework of common will, one was distracted from
the real issues i.e., the evils of society and the in egalitarian buildings of capitalism, which
produced them. Therefore, a capitalist state could never be legitimate and the ‘locus of public
will’; because it was inherently exploitative. In Marx’s framework, so, legitimacy of political
power in a capitalist society was a myth. This conception was based since we have seen, on the
premise that the capitalist state was inherently exploitative and could never so, embody popular
will. Legitimacy was also irrelevant to Marx to the extent that he anticipated a future human
condition in which people would take manage in excess of their own fate and not be dependent
on ‘mystification’s’ to sustain themselves. For Marx, therefore, the overriding concern was not
legitimacy. He focused on capitalist civilizations since an exploitative economic organization,
based on conflicting economic interests flanked by the owners of the means of manufacture and
the wage earning working class. In Marxist analysis, the problem was one of analyzing the
circumstances under which the working class would organize itself into a communal force to
change the capitalist organization. Max Weber’s formulation may be seen since a counter-
perspective. Starting from the opposite end, Weber concerned himself with analyzing the nature
of power and the troubles of securing obedience. It is this concern with power and the means of
securing obedience for the capitalist state which is reflected in Weber’s theoretical formulation
on power organizations in the contemporary world.
Max Weber and His Typology of Power Organizations
Our discussion of power and legitimacy therefore distant has focused on understanding historical
development of the concepts. We concerned ourselves, especially, with exploring power, the
grounds on which legitimacy is claimed, and the rightfulness of such claim since tested against
the carried; in the middle of others, through political philosophers like Hobbes, Montesquieu,
Rousseau and Marx. Sociologists like Max Weber, though, did not concern themselves with
claims to authority that are made. They concerned themselves with practical questions pertaining
to the manner in which legitimacy unfolds, its effectiveness for job of locations of authority, the
circumstances under which legitimacy is realized or eroded, and what happens if it fails.
Legitimacy since a subject of political sociology, therefore , seems at issues such since what are
the social agencies by which legitimacy becomes effective, i.e. how do people acknowledge the
legitimacy of a political power, how do they express this acknowledgement, and the medium or
possessions by which political regimes garner legitimacy.
Weber and the Belief in Legitimacy
Weber’s revise of legitimacy is measured useful for understanding the complexities of political
rule. Weber measured legitimacy since fundamental to a systematic revise of authority dealings.
Weber pointed out, ‘tradition, personal advantage, purely effectual or ideal motives of solidarity’,
were not the enough foundation for its sustenance. In order to sustain a given organization of
power, there was normally a further unit i.e. ‘the belief in legitimacy’. In other terms, where there
is a common recognition of the legitimacy of power, its commands were bound to be followed.
There would, consequently, be no widespread exploit of coercion, or the consistent fear of
subversion or disobedience. Weber’s revise of the organizations of power led him to the
conclusion that there are dissimilar ideas or principles of legitimacy.
Weber’s Ideal Kinds
Weber recognized dissimilar kinds or ‘organizations of power’ based on the type of claims to
legitimacy claimed through each. Weber constructed three ‘ideal kinds’ or ‘conceptual models’,
which he hoped would help create sense of the highly intricate nature of political rule, viz.,
traditional power, charismatic, and legal-rational power. Each of these models represented a
separate source of political legitimacy and corresponding to these, the dissimilar causes why
people obeyed a scrupulous regime. In the first model, i. e., traditional power, extensive-standing
traditions and customs shaped the source of political legitimacy. The sanctity of this legitimacy
derived from the information that such organizations of power had been acknowledged and
obeyed through earlier generations. Examples of traditional organizations of power are patriarchy
or gerontocracy. Such organizations of traditional power can still be seen in civilizations where
hereditary and dynastic organizations of authority and privilege have survived e.g., since in Saudi
Arabia, Morocco and Kuwait and its constitutional shapes such since in England, Netherlands,
and Spain. The second shape, i.e., charismatic power, derived legitimacy from an individual’s
charismatic or appealing personality. The foundation of this appeal did not rest in a person’s
caste, class or other ascriptive attributes. It depended solely on the personal magnetism of the
person creation hem/her acceptable since a leader, alluring people into obedience. Examples of
charismatic power are Mussolini, Hitler, and Napoleon, whose leadership and popularity, unlike
that of other popular leaders like John F. Kennedy, depended less on the power they derived from
their political office, and more on their personal charm. Weber’s third type of legitimacy, legal-
rational, links power to precise and legally defined set of rules. Legal-rational shape of power, for
Weber, is the typical shape of power establish in mainly contemporary states. In such power
organizations, unlike charismatic and traditional shapes, political authority is derived from,
dependent upon, and limited through formal, legal, constitutional rules. It is these rules, which
determine the nature and scope of the office holder’s authority.
David Beetham’s Critique of Max Weber
Weber’s categorization of power organizations is measured an important contribution to
understanding legitimacy of political organizations and patterns of rule in contemporary times,
especially the manner in which contemporary shapes of power are dissimilar from the traditional.
Political Scientists like David Beetham point out, though, that Weber’s three legitimating ideas,
while helping us understands what is distinctive in relation to the contemporary since opposed to
the pre-contemporary organizations of power, are inadequate for characterizing the dissimilar
regime kinds which have lived in the course of the twentieth century. Unlike Weber who would
attempt and fit regimes into the three typologies, or alternatively, Beetham prefers a broad
framework for understanding the procedures and grounds of obedience. His framework consists
of three stages or standards for understanding political power. Political power is legitimate, says
Beetham, to the extent that:
It is acquired and exercised according to recognized rules;
The rules are justified according to socially carried beliefs in relation to the
The rightful source of power, and
The proper ends and standards of government and
The location of power is confirmed through express consent or the affirmation of suitable
subordinates, and through recognition from other legitimate authorities.
These three stages are not alternative shapes or models, but jointly they give the people with
moral grounds for compliance or cooperation with power. Such a framework, feels Beetham, also
gives an understanding of the causes why authority may lack legitimacy. If there is a breach of
rules, the word ‘illegitimacy’ is used; if rules are only weekly supported through societal beliefs,
or are deeply contested, one can talk of a ‘legitimacy deficit’ and if consent or recognition is
publicly with drawn or withheld, one can speak of ‘delegitimation’. Beetham feels that such a
framework fills in another inadequacy of Weber’s analysis. It enables us to understand why
people resist, or the conditions in which political change occurs by challenges to political power
through popular protest and unrest. Seeing legitimacy, since Weber did, since nothing more than
a ‘belief in legitimacy’ focuses attention only on the determination of legitimacy from the
vantage point of those in authority. Beetham’s framework on the other hand, highlights the
procedures by which the ruled provide or withhold recognition and obedience.
Habermas and the Legitimation Crisis
Jurgen Habermas has urbanized an alternative to the Weberian come to legitimacy. In order to do
this, though, Habermas did not adopt an orthodox Marxist location which saw legitimacy since
nothing more than a bourgeois myth, something which could not be achieved in circumstances of
inequality and use which lived in contemporary capitalist civilizations. Habermas admitted that
contemporary capitalist civilizations or liberal democracies do have an organization of drawing
out consent and support of the people. He, so, focused not merely on the inequalities, which
prevailed in capitalist civilizations, but concentrated also on the machinery by which legitimacy
was maintained viz., the democratic organization, the party organization, social and welfare
reforms etc. At the similar time, though, Habermas pointed out the difficulties of legitimating,
which would invariably be faced in a political procedure that produced and continued unequal
class authority.
Crisis Tendencies
In his job, Legitimation Crisis, Habermas recognized these difficulties since ‘crisis tendencies’
within capitalist civilizations. These crisis tendencies appeared since a result of a fundamental
contradiction flanked by the logic of capitalist accumulation and popular pressures unleashed
through democratic politics. Capitalist civilizations, based on the pursuit of profit and producing
class inequalities, have to sustain political continuity through invoking a normal claim to rule. In
such an organization, legitimacy is secured through democratic procedures, which lead to further
demands for social welfare provisions, increased popular participation and social equality. This
in turn puts pressures on the state to expand its social responsibilities, and raises demands for
state intervention for removing inequalities, forcing it to augment expenditure on welfare events.
These pressures lead to augment in taxation and public spending, and constrain capitalist
accumulation through restricting profit stages and discouraging enterprise. Forced either to resist
popular pressures or risk economic collapse, such civilizations discover it increasingly hard and
eventually impossible, to uphold legitimacy. Therefore, a capitalist society is constantly in the
grip of crisis tendencies, which test its skill to sustain itself by the legitimacy that it can elicit by
several democratic organizations. While investing in such legitimating events, the capitalist
organization has to be also on a consistent alert to see that these procedures are not stretched to
the limit where they dismantle the defining principles of the capitalist organization i.e. a class
exploitative organization geared to the extraction of profit or capital accumulation. Capitalist
democracies cannot permanently satisfy both popular demands for social equality and welfare
rights and necessities of a market economy based on private profit. The implication of such
‘crises’ involves a disturbance of integration or cohesion of society and the regulatory buildings
of the capitalist organization.
State Action throughout Crisis
In such scenarios of legitimating crisis, the contemporary state takes recourse simultaneously to
‘organization steering’ and ideological events to legitimize and stabilize the existing buildings.
This involves an ‘uncoupling’ or dissociation of the economic and the political spheres. This
means that the exploitative connection flanked by wage labour and capital is no longer section of
the political sphere. The political sphere in turn becomes less participatory and more impersonal,
bureaucratized, and distanced from the ruled. Such an organization would, though, be held jointly
ideologically through legitimizing ‘universalist’ discourses of rights, justice and citizenship
which provide the rulers the moral claim to rule.
POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND REVOLUTION
Political Obligation and Revolution: The Inter-Relatedness of these Complementary Words
Why do people obey the state since power? Under what conditions should they register their
disobedience? An answer to these questions has been given through a good number of thinkers in
dissimilar methods and they have sought its solution in the inherently good nature of man to the
emphatic affirmation of the Pragmatists. The relation flanked by power and obligation is
inseparable, as one of the essential characteristics of power is the right to receive obedience. We
shall analyze whether there exists a right or a duty to resist the state. It is well-recognized
information that people obey only a legitimate power; otherwise, they may overthrow it.
Therefore, figures the issue of revolution, which may be a peaceful event like the Glorious
Revolution of England of 1688 or a violent outburst like the French Revolution of 1789. A revise
of the thought of revolution, therefore becomes a significant subject in the realm of modern
political theory. This is therefore because politics is called since a revise of the thrash about for
authority, whether through peaceful or violent means, where political obligation and revolution
have significant ramifications
Origin and Nature of the Concept of Political Obligation
The word ‘obligation’ originates from a Latin term ‘obligate’ implying something that binds men
to perform what is enjoined upon them. This has several connotations. In the realm of ethics, it
informs a man to discharge his duties, which he accepts on the foundation of his rational
understanding. In the field of jurisprudence, the social life of men is regulated through law. And
in the world of politics, man is bound to live under little power and obey his command. This is
based on the maxim of general prudence. It follows that the case of political obligation rests upon
issues relating to the nature of power that involves within its fold the entire world of existing
rights, laws, and political system usually.
Features of Political Obligation
Political obligation is, therefore, a frame by which people accept the commands of the ‘men in
power’. This means that it has sure separate features. They are:
Administration of public affairs
Political Legitimacy
Resistance to power
A revise of these features would enable us to understand the nature of political obligation more
clearly.
Administration of Public Affairs
The art of running any government is not simple. It is a hard and long task and any wrong move
or incorrect policy decision would entail serious consequences. On the contrary, a positive and
right step taken through the government for the people would bring good results for the growth of
a nation. Therefore, it becomes a duty of every conscientious person to take serious interest in the
administration of public affairs, government policies and political questions. This interaction
would be for the common good. Political obligation, therefore, calls for honesty, integrity and
public spirit, both on the section of the government and the people.
Political Legitimacy
A revise of the concept of political obligation necessarily leads to the investigation of the related
theme of political legitimacy and effectiveness. The continuity of a democratic political
organization not only depends upon economic growth, but also upon its legitimacy. Legitimacy
contains the capability to produce and uphold a belief that the existing political organizations or
shapes are the mainly suitable for society and is said to rest on the common will. Effectiveness,
on the other hand, is judged on how well an organization performs the vital functions of
government, considered through the reaction of the masses.
Resistance to Power
The thought of political obligation not only tells people to obey power, but also desires them to
be critical in relation to the method power is exercised. The people should scrutinize the action of
their rulers and resist an invasion on their liberties. Therefore, the thought of political obligation
also involves the thought of resistance to power. But of course, the right to protest against the
state necessity be founded on a relation to social well-being in words intelligible to the masses
and the consequences of disobedience should not lead to a total breakdown of the state
organization.
Dissimilar Theories of Political Obligation
Several theories have been enunciated on political obligation. These theories explain the type of
sanctions behind the concept of political obligation.
Divine Theory: Sanction in Faith
This theory is one of the oldest, explaining the causes of obedience to a state’s ruler. It implied
that the ruler has derived his power directly from God. Since such, the people had no right to
rebel even against a wicked ruler. In this method, people are bound through religious injunction
to obey the power of the king. This thought of ‘divine rights of kings’ were prevalent by out the
Transitional Ages. Though, with the advent of new studying in the contemporary age, it lost its
significance.
Criticism of the Divine Theory of Political Obligation
The Divine Theory of political obligation received scathing criticism at the hands of eminent
thinkers like Grotius, Hobbes, Locke who rejected its metaphysical premises and traced the
source of political obligation in consent of the individuals. When the state and the church got
separated due to the development of secularism, temporal powers became supreme to spiritual
powers. Though, the development of democracy doomed this theory. Even the other
metaphysical bases of obligation, like Fascism or Communism, based on the historic mission of a
leader, class or party, received no support from science. They are of the similar religious order
since the divine rights theory. Therefore, the theory lost all its appeal in the contemporary age.
Consent/Contract Theory: Sanction in will of the People
However the thought of contract or consent since a foundation of obligation is quite ancient and
is establish in ancient Hindu idea too, it was largely in the 16th and the 17th century in Europe
that sophisticated theories of contract were urbanized to explain political obligation. The explicit
expression of this theory is established in the scripts of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. They
opine that men who existed in the state of nature entered into a contract whereby political power
came into being, which again was based on the consent of the people. The thought of social
contract, though, took a highly philosophical shape at the hands of Rousseau, who reposed the
information of political obligation in the ‘Common Will’. This meant that man no longer
remnants a slave to his impulses of appetite after entering into a civil society, but he becomes
bound to obey the law of the common good. Therefore, the social contract theory justifies the
conception that the ruling power, if he has to be legitimate, necessity rest ultimately on the
consent of the governed. If the government violates the words of the contract, the people have the
right to resist. The implications of this theory have been in the direction of safeguarding the
rights and liberties of the people and checking the arbitrariness of rulers.
Criticism of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation
However the consent theory had its field day in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries and
even now, has its own significance on explanation of constituting the moral foundation of a
democratic order, its suffers from sure weaknesses. The theory makes the state an artificial
system. Also, the unit of consent since enshrined in few contract made in a hypothetical state of
nature is nothing else than a fiction, not at all legally binding on the existing generation.
Therefore , the people may go to the extent of staging a rebellion on the plea that they withdraw
their consent in since much since the government has committed such an action in violation of
the ‘common will’. The result is that the theory of political obligation is converted into a theory
of rebellion.
Prescriptive Theory: Sanction in Reverence to the Recognized Conventions and Customs
Political power and reverence to it are based on the principle of ‘customary rights’. Power is
legitimate, if it is sanctioned through extensive standing tradition or custom. The people obey
their rulers because the information of obedience has become like a well-recognized convention.
The traditionalists view the state since a delicate building built in excess of the years and which
symbolizes a balance of conflicting interest. Organizations like the state evolve slowly and adapt
gradually to change; hence, it is a matter of duty to accept state power and obey it while working
only for gradual peaceful change. This conservative theory of political obligation has its
affirmation in the scripts of Hegel, who believes that the ideas of morality evolve concretely in
the traditions and organizations of the state. And as the latest level in this procedure is the present
recognized order, it is entitled to receive our obedience. Further, as the state is the embodiment of
an extensive evolved and customary morality, it becomes the duty of everyone to do what the
state expects of one. Burke is one of the best recognized exponents of conservatism who opines
that it is unwise for man to completely disregard tradition and custom. The information of
political obligation is contained in paying unflinching respect to custom, which is a sacrosanct
affair. Therefore, he supported the revolt of American colonialists, which was in favor of
traditional rights of Englishmen, but opposed the French Revolution because it was inspired
through the abstract rights of man ‘divorced from national customs’. Prof. M. Oakeshott is a
modern upholder of the traditionalist view of obligation. Political actions can never be anything
but traditional, because political reflection cannot exist in advance of political action. Politics is
an ability, which is learned through practice rather that by theoretical maxims or organizations.
Hence, even when we effort to comprehend other people’s politics, it is always within our own
framework.
Criticism of the Prescriptive Theory of Political Obligation
Like other theories, the prescriptive theory has its own weaknesses. The source of political
obligation lies not only in paying reverence to well-recognized practices, but also in doing absent
with them. People desire change and in case, their hopes are frustrated, they take to the path of
revolution. Oakeshott has been particularly criticized on the ground that he treats even a
revolution since an experience linked with the past and thereby, makes it a purely conservative
affair. This means that the exponents of this theory would even advise the Negroes of African
countries to accept racial discrimination laws since ‘legitimate’ for they are based on the ‘well-
recognized customs of the realm.’ Though, this is distant from the truth. In-fact, people only
observe their customs, in therefore distant since they have their utility and do absent with them
when their usefulness does not exist.
Idealistic Theory: Sanction in the Rationality of Man
The Idealists trace the source of political obligation in the innate rationality of man. Man is
regarded since a ‘political and rational creature’ and the state since a ‘self—sufficing society’
identical with the entire society. Since such, there can be no antithesis flanked by the individual
and the state. Since a consequence, an individual can seek his best possible growth in society
alone through obeying the command of the state. In other terms, the source of political obligation
is contained in obedience to the state. Both Plato and Aristotle affirmed that the state and the
individuals comprising it ‘shape an organic entire’. Such an affirmation discovers its best
manifestation in the hands of Hegel who specifies ‘liberty’ of the individual with his perfect
obedience to state. Green too says that the thought of political obligation is linked with the case
of moral obligation. He suggests that only those actions should be made obligations, which are
made to serve a sure moral end.
Criticism of the Idealistic Theory of Political Obligation
The idealistic theories have been criticized on the ground of being too abstract. It spaces ordinary
things in a highly philosophical or metaphysical shape that cannot be understood through a man
of standard understanding. Also, the thought of political obligation is not only concerned with
man’s obedience to state, but is also integrally linked with his right to resist abuse of political
power. The idealists are reluctant to accommodate the right to resistance in their doctrine of
political obligation. Even if Green and Bosanquet did recognize the right in sure exceptional
situations, their treatment is vague and uncertain and failed to shake off the weight of English
liberalism. Trietschke even goes to the extent of saying to fall down and worship the state.
Therefore, the thought of political obligation is converted into the injunction of blind worship of
power.
Marxian Theory: Eventual Conversion of Political Obligation into Social Obligation
The Marxian theory of political obligation is simply dissimilar from other theories on the subject.
It sanctions the case of political non-obligation in the pre-revolutionary level, total political
obligation in the revolutionary level and its eventual conversion into social obligation in the post-
revolutionary level. In other terms, the case of political obligation is integrally linked with the
character of power. In Marxian theory of politics, state is decried since a ‘bourgeois organization’
in capitalist society. It means, after a successful revolution, the working class has the instruments
of authority in their hands to consolidate the socialist order in a method preparing its ‘withering
absent’ in the final level of socialism. The thought of political obligation cover the cases of
‘discredited state’ in the period of capitalism, the ‘new state’ in the era of ‘dictatorship of the
proletariat’, and the ‘state proper’ when the ‘classless’ society discovers its culmination in the
‘stateless’ pattern of social subsistence. The starting point of Marxian theory of politics and with
it of political obligation ‘is its categorical rejection of this view of the state since the trustee,
instrument, or agent of society since an entire’. The case of political obligation arises when the
‘new state’ comes into being after the revolution. The noticeable point in this theory is that what
is forbidden in capitalist society is ordained in the socialist order. Not merely this, fundamental
changes take lay that prohibit any opposition to the state at all. The task of the Marxists is to
subordinate the thought of political obligation to the dictates of permanent revolution. In other
terms, the thought of political obligation ceases to exist with the withering absent of the state in
the last level of socialism and discovers its final conversion into the injunction of social
obligation. Therefore, society will be collected of the associations of free and equal producers,
consciously acting upon a general and rational plan.
Criticism of the Marxian Theory of Political Obligation
A critical revise of Marxian theory illustrates that it treats the question of political obligation in a
method distant absent from the real perspective. What is emphatically advocated in the stage of
capitalism is firmly denied in the next level of social growth. People who are exhorted to disobey
the ‘bourgeoisie state’ are commanded not to disobey the state at all after the inauguration of the
new social organization. Therefore, Marx is accused of structure up a theory of political
obligation on the foundation of expediency alone, and he ignores the self-governing individual
whose experience only counts in the determination of his obedience to the laws of state.
Concluding Appraisal of Political Obligation
In a strict sense, the thought of political obligation is not a political, but a moral affair. Though,
the norm of morality differs from time to time, lay to lay and people to people. The dimensions
of political obligation too modify and similarly, the injunctions of popular resistance also differ.
The state is a necessary means to the ends of justice and if it does this on the foundation of a
broad consensus, then there is a type of contractual understanding that in return for what the state
does to promote justice and good, we undertake to obey it.
Revolution: Nature and Implication
The thought of revolution covers not only the political, but also the economic, the social and the
cultural dimensions of human life. A precise definition of the word involves dissimilar
ramifications ranging on the implications of change, whether peaceful or violent, total or
incomplete, minor or biggest. In political theory, it has a typical connotation signifying alteration
in government along with changes in related associations and buildings. In its center meaning, it
‘constitutes a challenge to the recognized political and the eventual establishment of a new order
radically dissimilar from the preceding one’. A possible row of variation flanked by a revolt and
a revolution may, though, be drawn in the affirmation that while both hint at a sudden, jolting and
important change in the existing organization, the former does not imply the thought of
‘profound change’ since does the latter. The means employed to bring in relation to the sudden,
biggest and profound change may modify from purely constitutional or non-violent to those
thoroughly violent and extremist. There also prevails the concept of ‘counter revolution’ when a
revolution takes lay to undo the results of a revolution; for example, the Communist Party of
China, staged a revolution in 1927 and its suppression through the ‘Nationalists’ under Chiang
Kai-Shek was dubbed since a ‘counter revolution’. Therefore, a revolution certainly aims to alter
the building of subordination.
Features of Revolution
It is true that numerous revolutions have taken lay in dissimilar section of the world, yet it is
impossible to set up an objective and common pattern of revolution or even an adequate
definition applicable to all eras. We should, therefore, confine our attention to the implication
and common features of revolution, to gain a bigger understanding of the concept. They are:
Beginning of a procedure
Implies a change
Signifies a coherent programme
Myth to Political leadership
Beginning of a Procedure
Revolution denotes a procedure in which political direction taken through a state becomes
increasingly discredited in the eyes of either the population since an entire or a sure key part of it.
Such a procedure may culminate in a revolutionary event or other behaviors like an outburst,
upheaval, agitation or a change of government through more peaceful means.
Implies a Change
After the procedure has begun, revolution implies a change of recognized order, or government at
a clearly defined point in time through the exploit of armed forces or the credible threat of its
exploit. Moreover, the change should be sudden and not gradual. Here, mere repudiation of
power is not sufficient. Existing power on explanation of being devoid of ‘legitimacy’ should be
replaced through a new one that is ‘righteous’. Since such, it is dissimilar from an action like
disorder, revolt or rebellion.
Signifies a Coherent Programme
Revolution also signifies a more or less coherent programme of change in either political or
social instructions of a state or both, induced through the political leadership after a revolutionary
event, the transition of authority has occurred. In any diversity of revolution whether it is liberal,
communist, quasi-revolutionary, limited or unlimited, proper or sub- revolution, with negative or
positive characteristics — all follow a well- knit code of action and program to get desired results
to the maximum extent possible.
Mythical Status to Political Leadership
Revolution also hints at giving a mythical status to political leadership resulting from a
revolutionary transition, short-word status since legitimate government of the state. For example,
the inauguration of Fascism in Italy in 1922 and Nazism in Germany in 1933 were hailed since
revolutions however they entailed the doom of liberal democracy. The heroes of these nations
were worshipped since ‘prophets’ and people opted for a dictatorship without showing
enthusiasm for replacing a despotic organization with a constitutional government.
Revolution: A Mere Event or a Series of Measures
Revolution is not merely concerned with the overthrow of the recognized order. It is equally
concerned with the establishment of a new one. Therefore, it is not merely an event, but a series
of measures. It begins with a challenge to the existing organization and continues until a new
order is installed. What happens in flanked by the two is said to constitute the levels of
revolution. The dissimilar levels or the series of measures are enumerated below:
A revolution begins when the expectations of the people are extremely high and the great
leaders are occupied in much perfectionist rhetoric. The result is the replacement of the ‘old’ with
the ‘new’.
The second level begins when authority is captured and revolutionary leaders are confronted
with the realities of governance. There prevail differences of opinion, which spot the category of
moderates and extremists. Though, victory rests with the radicals who concentrate authority in
their hands.
Desperate efforts are made to realize revolutionary ideals and goals at all costs. This
engenders a reaction that entails an era of convalescence.
Then follows a state of lull. A period of dissensions and resignations comes to prevail that
creates an extremely fertile ground for the coming up of a dictator.
The last level is one in which slowly revolutionary representations lose their hold and
dictatorship seems since a naked authority. Then, happen a trend towards restoration with
reconciliation flanked by what was overthrown and what was brought about.
Dissimilar Theories of Revolution
Dissimilar theories have approach up to highlight the meaning, nature and reasons of revolution.
We could analyze four theories that effort to explain the concept of revolution.
Liberal Theory
The Liberal theory of revolution emphasizes preserving the status quo in the procedure of
change. That is to say that the notion of change is made coincidental with the preservation of the
existing state of social, economic and political life. Such a notion is well reflected in the political
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Through revolution, Plato meant the establishment of an ideal
state. To Aristotle revolution implied a change in the shape of government through another or
even a change in the kind of rulers, which may amount to a revolution. The trend of approaching
revolution with a sense of apprehension and therefore, an effort at creation the thought of change
in consonance with the existing order, sustained. Further, John Milton connected up the case of
revolution with the maintenance of freedom and went to the extent of choosing a new
government in case the existing rulers deprived the people of their liberty. Though, liberal
interpretation of the meaning and nature of revolution takes a significant turn at the hands of John
Locke. Therefore, the English Revolution of 1688 and the French Revolution of 1789 have been
accused of being reactionary.
Criticism of the Liberal Theory
This theory has been criticized on the ground that thinkers have sought to justify a return to the
past since an act of revolution. Since a result, the liberal theory of revolution has been accused of
being reactionary, anti-change and even counter-revolutionary. Here, the revolutionaries
announced themselves since the protagonists of the ‘rights of man’. But any analysis of events
through which they gave effect to their principles, illustrates clearly that through the ‘rights of
man’, they meant in actual the rights of a limited class of men who owned the instrument’s of
manufacture in society. Therefore, the liberal custom was an intellectual revolution primarily
made in the interest of property owners in the new industrial field.
Marxian Theory
The Marxian theory simply emphasized the thought of ‘Permanent Revolution’. The Marxists
opined that a social revolution takes lay when the existing dealings of manufacture begin to act
since a fetter on the future growth of forces of manufacture. Therefore, for Marx, the biggest
political revolutions of the contemporary age up to this time are to be explained since the result
of extensive-word social and economic growths in which new shapes of economic use approach
up. For him, ‘a political revolution is a social revolution when it involves the clash of social
classes.’ Therefore, Marx hails the ‘bourgeoisie revolution’ whereby the ‘feudal state is
overthrown through the transitional class that has grown up inside it and a new state created since
the instrument of the bourgeoisie rule.’ He hoped that in a democratically advanced country a
socialist revolution might take lay by the battle of the ballot box. In the largest, though, the
burden of Marxian theory is on the exploit of violent means. Not merely this, it also envisages
that the ideas, beliefs, convictions, traditions and the methods of life of the people are changed
therefore since to create them in tune with the norms of the socialist organization. In this method,
a ‘Cultural Revolution’ is launched to brainwash the people. The course of revolution does not
stop even here. It is a permanent affair, which calls for the final level of a ‘stateless society’. This
also implies ‘export of revolution’, which means establishment of international socialism. The
Communist Manifesto ends with these terms of exhortation: ‘Workers of all countries unite.
You have nothing to lose but chains. You have a world to win.’
Criticism of the Marxian Theory
A biggest criticism leveled against this theory is that, it stops after the occurrence of the
‘Socialist Revolution.’ Revolution simply means a change for the bigger. But in a socialist state,
any change is a taboo. Opposition is suppressed and the people are forced to change themselves,
which may not necessarily amount to a change for the bigger. Therefore, Marx’s vision can be
termed since limited. Another weakness in this theory is that the precise connection flanked by
revolutionary political action and Marx’s common theory of socio-economic growth is
optimistically vague. It stands on the elaboration of class war. The theory is problematic since we
discover controversy in the middle of the thinkers. While Trotsky desired ‘export of revolution’,
Stalin cried for ‘Socialism in One Country’. Khruschev, on the other hand, reiterated the
principle of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist state.
Neo-Liberal Theory
The meaning of revolution has a dissimilar connotation and therefore its reasons may not be
exposed in the sphere of economics alone. Many viewpoints have sprung up in this context, all
pinpointing that revolutions are violent civil disturbances that reason the displacement of one
ruling group through another that has a broader popular foundation of support. Historical proof
illustrates that people having nothing like ‘class consciousness’ rise in revolt to change their
destiny. Since such, a revolution would look to be the result of deep-rooted and gradually
evolving political and social malformations rather than a sudden outbreak. Though, in the last
stage, they are sudden and violent. The reason of revolution has been discussed from the stand
point of psychology. David C. Schwartz explained people’s apathy since a factor, which is
recognized since ‘alienation’. On this foundation, he constructs a ‘plausible theory’, which has its
beginning in ‘ambivalence’; then moves on to ‘clash’, thereon to ‘cognitive consistency’ and
finally to ‘adjustment’. Withdrawal from politics is a dangerous symptom, since it cultivates
feelings of apathy for the organization and the result is an outburst of size anger.
Criticism of the Neo-Liberal Theory
The new liberal thinkers of the present century have in a method tried to follow Marx in therefore
distant since he emphasizes the exploit of force in the capture of authority and also rejected him
in therefore distant since he confines his attention only to the parameters of class war. This has
led to the meaning of revolution, having dissimilar connotations. A revolution is not only an
event, since said through the liberal thinkers, in which one class dislodges another and captures
authority. The information, though, is that it also relates to a scrupulous stage of history
extending in excess of a considerable stage of time, but certainly marked through biggest ‘social
and ideological change.’
Idealistic-Liberal Theory
The idealistic-liberal theory lays emphasis on a moral, spiritual and cultural upheaval by which a
group of persons seeks to set up a new foundation for subsistence. If therefore, a revolution is not
merely a political procedure, but a section of the unfolding of human potentiality. A biggest
event of historical significance directed towards a higher moral end is a revolution. Such an
orientation discovers its impressive manifestation at the hands of Hegel. To him, it is the ‘cause’
that plays a decisive section in development. A substance is a thesis; a unit of contradiction
develops within it that may be taken since its ‘antithesis.’ The thrash about flanked by the two
leads to the emergence of the ‘synthesis’, which has a mixture of both thesis and anti-thesis and
symbolizes a higher level of growth – a level which will lead to another higher one and therefore
, the procedure of change will continue. A revolution, so, takes lay on explanation of the
operation of the law of dialectics in which the decisive role is played through the geist.
Therefore, it becomes something central to the procedure in which the ideally rational. This
idealistic-cum liberal interpretation of the thought of revolution is traceable in the political
philosophy of M.N. Roy, who said that revolution means awakening the urge of freedom in man.
Since such, revolution is based on human nature and nothing like violence is needed. It means
reorganizing society on the foundation of freedom and equality remnants a must.
Criticism of the Idealistic Liberal Theory
The theory is criticized on the ground of being too abstract to be understood through a man of
standard comprehension. The purely philosophical adaptation takes the subject of revolution
distant absent from the world of reality. Revolution since a matter of information is a significant
event that changes the pattern of social, economic and political growth. This means, it is purely a
practical affair. It calls for an empirical revise. The value free revise of revolution is, though, a
logical impossibility.
Theorizing Revolution in Recent Social Science Literature
Revolution, which has remained one of the key concepts in social science, has naturally attracted
intellectual attention of scholars and academics in recent years.
Relative Come
The mainly influential exercise in relative come since applied to social revolutions is the job of
Theda Skocpol in her book States and Social Revolutions, which was based on a relative analysis
of French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions. Through following this come, she tried to discover
out the ‘generalizable logic’ behind the revolutions she studied. Her departure from all previous
interpretations of revolution is on her dismissal of any notion of conscious purpose. She
concluded that social revolutions are basically the unplanned product of competing forces.
Dissimilar clusters enter the fray and the outcome is determined through which of them
ultimately wins. Neither individuals, nor clusters, nor even classes act during revolutions with the
logic and consistency which traditional views would demand. Skocpol has, though, been
criticised through people like Michael Taylor, Mancur Olson and others who challenge Skocpol’s
argument that revolution is irrational and seek to demonstrate by their scripts that rational-choice
theory can be applied to revolutionary coalition-structure.
Psychological Come
Ever as the French Revolution, people have sought psychological explanations of why
revolutionaries act since they do. All the earlier explanations of revolutions following the
psychological come like that of Le Bon , Dean Martin revolve approximately the apparently
amoral behaviour of crowds, who act in unknown and unusual methods, which in turn, lead to
rapid and distant-reaching changes in a method that in normal circumstances would be
impossible. All these explanations, though assume that in a revolutionary situation everyone acts
in the similar method and that there is a psychological reason of revolution. But contemporary
psychological theories of revolution under the power of Freud focused attention on the
interaction of the individual with others. There have been few landmark publications like The
Authoritarian Personality, The Revolutionary Personality, or Why Men Rebel. Ted Gurr’s job, in
scrupulous, is a highly formal exercise in psychological come, although, it principally deals with
the notion of political violence. The impulse towards the exploit of violence is establish through
Gurr in a social-psychological concept described ‘comparative deprivation’, which is used to
denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy flanked by the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of
communal value satisfaction. The psychological come has sure inherent limitations, for which
possibly, Gurr moves absent from the psychological toward the sociological while trying to
explain the outcomes of revolution.
Sociological Come
The mainly popular sociological explanations of revolutions are functionalist explanations. The
vital premise of this come is since follows: The continuity of society depends on social order
continuing to fulfill the necessities of its citizens. If it fails to do therefore, the underlying
consensus on the values of society, which enables the government to function is lost, and with the
failure of consensus the method is open for a size rejection of the existing order. There have been
notable jobs following this come like Revolution and the Social Organization, The Natural
History of Revolution etc. The problem with these kinds of account is that they do not explain
why revolutions happen in sure situations, and more importantly, why they do not, in spite of a
congenial situation.
Political Come
The political come to the revise of revolution is simply interpreting revolution through trying to
discover out the factors behind revolution, interpreting the course of revolution and analyzing the
consequences of revolution. The best recognized job in this category is possibly From
Mobilization to Revolution. Tilly’s principal focus is on the procedure of alienation and
regrouping that precedes a revolution, the reasons of a revolutionary situation and on
revolutionary outcomes.
Philosophical Come
Contemporary philosophical explanations of revolution are dominated through Hannah Arendt’s
On Revolution. For Arendt, revolution is one of the mainly recent of political phenomena.
Revolution is the search for freedom and revolutionaries are those who fight for freedom in the
side of tyranny. Freedom is a distinctive excellence; a good in itself which is the highest
attainment of human society to attain. The problem of revolution is that its spirit has failed to
discover suitable organizations in which to express itself. She, so, concludes with the practical
consequences for trying to realize this objective: not party government which she believes to be a
government through an elite chose through the people, but self-government through deputies of
elementary republics.
Concluding Appraisal of Revolution
After discussing the meaning nature and several theories on the subject, the subject of revolution
becomes clear. That is, in a revolution the old recognized sense of rights fades absent and a new
state of affair comes into being. It involves extreme ideas of violence and bloodshed for bringing
in the unit of ‘change’. They include the potential of self-renewal. It may bring in the change of
failure or success, which may signalize the passing absent of a political order. Therefore,
revolution means a combination of rather distant-reaching change designed to erase the real
illness of a society that has reached an impasse.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
Explain how power is conceptualized in political theory.
What are the different types of authority?
What is the implication of authority in politics?
What is political obligation?
How does Max Weber understand authority systems?
Define Political Obligation.
What is the key feature of the Social Contract Theory?
What is the Idealistic Theory of political obligation?
 CHAPTER 5
RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND REVOLUTION

STRUCTURE
Objectives
Rights and Citizenship
Liberty
Justice
Review Questions
OBJECTIVES
In the present unit, we shall study the idea(s) of rights and citizenship. We shall also focus on
criticisms of dominant understandings of rights and citizenship and the alternative
understandings provided by such criticisms.
You shall look at different perspectives on liberty, and try to understand the meanings.
Define the meaning of the concept of justice.
Identify and describe the different theories of the nature of justice.

RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship is commonly understood since referring to the connection flanked by the
individual/communal and the state. This connection is understood since being made up of
reciprocal rights and responsibilities. The mainly commonly carried definition of citizenship
comes from the English sociologist T.H. Marshall who describes it since ‘full and equal
membership in a political society’. Citizenship denotes membership in a political society, which
in our present context is the nation-state. Citizenship would, therefore, signify a specific
characteristic of the connection in the middle of people who live jointly in a nation. It emphasizes
political allegiances and civic loyalties within the society rather than any cultural/emotional
identity.
Origin of the Thought of Citizenship
The origins of the thought of citizenship are usually traced to the ancient Greek and Roman
republics. The term itself is derived from the Latin term ‘civis’ and its Greek equivalent
‘polities’, which means member of the polis or municipality. Though, the manner in which
citizenship is understood today since an organization of equal rights since opposed to ascriptive
privileges deriving from circumstances of birth, took roots in the French Revolution. With the
growth of capitalism and liberalism, the thought of the citizen since an individual bearing rights
irrespective of her/his caste, class, race, gender, ethnicity, etc., became entrenched. As the
nineteen eighties though, globalization and multiculturalism have provided the contexts within
which this notion of citizenship has been challenged. Therefore, the nation is no longer being
seen since the sole element of membership and the ideas of world citizenship and human rights
are being earnestly talked about. Similarly, the individual has been displaced since the center of
citizenship theory and rights of cultural societies and clusters have started gaining ground.
Therefore, it may be said that the thought of citizenship has urbanized in excess of many
historical eras. Its shape and object have not remained the similar, but changed according to
specific historical contexts. The several shapes which citizenship took historically have not,
though, disappeared entirely. They have not only convinced the contemporary meanings of
citizenship, they also exist since dissimilar strands within the bundle of meanings nearby
citizenship.
Growth of the Ideas on Citizenship: Four Historical Eras
The growth of the ideas which surround citizenship can be attributed to four broad historical eras:
classical Graeco-Roman eras ,
late medieval and early contemporary eras including the era of the French and American
Revolutions,
the growths in the nineteenth century corresponding to the rising power of liberalism and
capitalism and,
The contests in excess of the shape and object of citizenship in the late twentieth century with
rising preoccupation with multiculturalism and society rights.
Two dominant strands or customs of rights and citizenship can be seen to have urbanized in
excess of these eras:
civic republicanism characterized through the ideas of general good, public spirit, political
participation and civic virtue and,
Liberal citizenship with an emphasis on individual rights and private interests.
The Marxists and the Feminists have criticized both these customs and have suggested radical
methods of rethinking citizenship. The criticism of liberal/imperial citizenship through Gandhi
and his vision of citizenship based on notions of duties rather than rights constitute another
method of thinking in relation to the citizenship.
Since suggested, talk about the historical growth of the ideas of rights and citizenship, the
modifications which the changing contexts of the late twentieth century have necessitated, the
divisions in the middle of theories on the nature and object of citizenship and rights, and finally,
the alternatives which have been offered to the dominant framework of rights and citizenship.
Historical Growths: Citizenship from Classical to Contemporary Times
Ancient Greece
Greek republics like Athens and Sparta were closely knit, independent political societies
characterized through little populations, minimum social differentiation and easy political
systems, based on notions of familiarity and trust. The thought of citizenship in Greek republics
or municipality-states was based on the principle of active political participation. The political
and public characteristics of a person’s life were seen since more significant than the private and
familial. It may be pointed out, though, that not everybody could participate in the procedure of
governance and not everybody, so, was a citizen. Aristotle called the Greek citizens since ‘all
who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn’. This distribution was confined only
to those having the capability to participate in the procedure of governance, i.e. only the ‘free
native-born men’. Therefore, women, children, slaves, and resident aliens were excluded from
citizenship. In the ultimate analysis, so, the citizens constituted only a little section of the
population.
Ancient Rome
In the Roman custom, the Greek thought of citizenship since active participation was customized
through requires of holding jointly the Roman Empire. Require to incorporate the conquered
peoples into the empire led to the thought of citizenship since a legal status. Therefore, a superior
and more heterogeneous population was integrated into the Roman Empire through subjecting
them to the defense of a uniform set of laws. Women and the lowest classes were, though, denied
the status of citizens. Therefore, citizenship could now be imagined not primarily since
participation in the creation and implementing of laws, but since a legal status involving sure
rights and equal defense of the law. It may, though, be pointed out that these new units of
citizenship while creation possible a degree of inclusiveness, added also a hierarchy of status
through introducing the second-class category of ‘civitas sine suffragio’.
The augment in the level of management also meant that it was not possible for all who had the
status of citizens to participate in the affairs of governance. The features of a citizen, though,
sustained to be marked in a method therefore that citizenship denoted action. The citizens were
required, therefore , to develop qualities of ‘civic virtue’, a word derived from the Latin term
‘virtus’ which meant ‘manliness’ in the sense of performing military duty, patriotism, and
devotion to duty and the law.
The Late Medieval and Early Contemporary Eras
The sixteenth century absolutist states were also concerned with imposing their power in excess
of heterogeneous populations. In this context, a citizen came to be defined through Jean Bodin
since ‘one who enjoys the general liberty and defense of power’. The citizen in this view was
unlike the Greek citizen, not himself and power, but following the Roman custom, someone who
was under the defense of the state. Unlike the Greek and Roman customs, though, citizenship
was a passive thought. Citizenship in this era did not stand for general public responsibilities and
civic virtues. Instead, the notion of ‘general liberty’ became the primary concern of citizenship.
This concern embodied a ‘passive’ or ‘negative’ notion of citizenship. It indicated claims for
‘security’ or defense, which was to be provided through the authorities. What needed to be
protected was one’s physical life, the family and house or conscience and property. This principle
of a ‘general shared liberty’, therefore, recognized the primacy of the individual and his private/
familial world. The defense of power was needed primarily to preserve this private
world/domain. Citizens were, therefore , not political people, the political society was not the
predominant center of their lives but rather the other framework, in which each citizen enjoyed
the liberty of private pleasures and pursuit of happiness and the defense and security of the
private/familial domain in which these pleasures were realized. Therefore, the principle of
imperial inclusiveness can be seen to have brought in relation to the in this era a passive notion of
citizenship since a legal status. Alongside, though, there remained nostalgia or a longing for the
classical notion of citizenship since action, with an emphasis on civil virtue and public duty.
The French Revolution can be seen since a revolt against the passive citizenship of the late
medieval and early contemporary times. The revolution attempted to resurrect the ideals of active
participation against the claims of the monarchical/ imperial state. Separately from attempting to
change the apolitical/ passive lives of citizens, the French revolutionary custom introduced a
significant unit to citizenship, which changed the method in which rights were included into the
notion of citizenship. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens which followed in the
wake of the revolution, brought in the notion of the citizen since a ‘free and autonomous
individual’ who enjoyed rights equally with others and participated in creation decisions which
all had agreed to obey. The manner in which citizenship is understood today since a organization
of horizontal rights since against the hierarchical privileges which accrued to a person through
cause of higher birth, has its roots in the doctrines of the French Revolution. The Declaration was
convinced through the ideas of Jean Jacques Rousseau who in his well-known job ‘The Social
Contract’ wrote not only in relation to the ‘free and autonomous’ citizen and the right of the
citizen to participate equally with others in decision creation, but also recognized the primacy of
the general good in excess of private interests. Therefore, the conception of the citizen
recognized through the French Revolution, combined strands of contemporary liberal
individualism with the classical connotation of citizenship since civic participation.
Contemporary Notions of Citizenship: The Nineteenth and the Twentieth Century Growths
The rising power of liberalism in the nineteenth century and the growth of capitalist market
dealings, though, saw the classical republican understanding of citizenship slip to the backdrop.
The liberal notion of citizens since individuals bearing/ enjoying sure rights in order to protect
and promote private interests gained precedence. Citizenship since a legal status, which gave the
citizen sure rights assuring defense from state interference, was integral to the liberal
understanding of state and politics. It would be suitable to talk about here T.H. Marshall’s
explanation of the growth of citizenship in Britain since outlined in his influential job
‘Citizenship and Social Class’, published in 1950. In this job, Marshall studies the development
of citizenship alongside capitalism and the peculiar connection of clash and collusion which
citizenship shares with it. He describes the growth of citizenship in excess of an era of 250 years
since a procedure of expanding equality against the inequality of social class, which is a
characteristic of capitalist society. Marshall distinguishes three strands or bundles of rights,
which constitute citizenship: civil, political and social. Each of these three strands has a separate
history and the history of each strand is confined to a scrupulous century. Civil rights which
urbanized in the eighteenth century have been defined through Marshall since ‘rights necessary
for individual freedom’. These were ‘negative’ rights in the sense that they limited or checked the
exercise of government authority and incorporated freedoms of speech, movement, and
conscience, the right to equality before the law and the right to own property. Political rights viz.,
the right to vote, the right to stand for elections and the right to hold public office, urbanized
through and big in the nineteenth century and provided the individual with the opportunity to
participate in the political life of the society. Social rights, which were mainly a twentieth century
growth, guaranteed the individual a minimum economic/social status and provided the
foundation for the exercise of both civil and political rights. Social rights, says Marshall are
‘positive’ rights ‘to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in
society’. These standards of life and the social heritage of society are released by active
intervention through the state in the shape of social services and educational organization.
Marshall’s scheme of historical growth of rights in England as the eighteenth century cannot,
though, be held true for other civilizations. Civil rights for instance, were not fully recognized in
mainly European countries until the early nineteenth century. Even where they were usually
achieved, few clusters were omitted. Therefore, although the constitution granted such rights to
Americans well before mainly European states had them, the Blacks were excluded. Even after
the Civil War, when the Blacks were formally given these rights, they were not able to exercise
them. Rights were also denied to the colonized peoples of Latin America, Africa and Asia.
Women did not have the right to vote in mainly countries, including England, till the first quarter
of the twentieth century. The contemporary notion of citizenship since pointed out earlier, seeks
to constitute free and equal citizens. This freedom and equality, which underlies contemporary
citizenship, is sought to be achieved through eliminating ascriptive inequalities and differences.
Therefore, citizens are conceived since bearing rights and exercising their rights equally with
other citizens. Circumstances of equality i.e., circumstances in which citizens are able to exercise
their rights equally are ensured through creation conditions of inequality i.e. race, ethnicity,
gender, caste etc., irrelevant for the exercise of the rights of citizenship. The citizen, therefore, is
the right bearing individual whose caste, race, gender, ethnicity etc. are seen since unrelated to
the status of citizenship. Seen in this manner, citizenship constitutes an overarching identity
concealing all other identities to produce what are described masked/unmarked ‘equal’ citizens of
the nation. In much of liberal theory till mainly of the twentieth century, the bias in favor of the
individual rights bearing citizen pursuing private interests persisted. The thought of citizenship
since outlined in this framework, has a distinctive significance since well since few obvious
limitations.
Significance and Limitation of the Liberal Framework
The generalization of contemporary citizenship crossways the social building means that all
persons are equal before the law and no group is legally privileged. Understood in this manner,
citizenship is an inclusive category. It regards all differences since irrelevant in order to make
free and equal citizens.
Limitation
The provision of citizenship crossways social buildings without regard to differences may in
effect, means overlooking actually existing inequalities. Therefore, whereas formal legal equality
may be assured through the liberal framework, this equality is unlikely to translate itself into
substantive equality, unless the practical skill to exercise rights or legal capacities imparted
through citizenship, are actually accessible to all. In other terms, the liberal framework disregards
the information that those disadvantaged through the existing buildings of inequality viz., class,
caste, race, gender etc., are unable to participate in the society of citizens, on an equal foundation,
despite the information that since citizens they are legal members of the society.
New Contexts and Changing Concerns: Multiculturalism
Till mainly of the twentieth century, the dominant understanding of citizenship sustained to lay
the individual at its center, and citizenship was seen since a legal status indicating the possession
of rights which an individual held equally with others. This dominant liberal model of citizenship
has few practical limitations. Modern debates on citizenship and rights have, so, questioned the
thought that the citizen can enjoy rights self-governing of the contexts/conditions to which s/he
belongs i.e., class, race, ethnicity, gender etc. As the nineteen eighties multiculturalism, plurality,
variety and variation have become important words of reference in thinking in relation to the
citizenship. Given that contemporary civilizations are increasingly being recognized since
multicultural, the dominant liberal understanding of the thought of citizenship has been opened
up for debate. The specific contexts, cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic etc. of citizens are now
seen since determining citizenship in important methods. This ongoing contest aims to
create visible those differences which liberal theory saw since irrelevant for understanding
citizenship. In mainly western civilizations ethnic, religious and racial societies have pressed for
rights which would seem at their special cultural contexts and substantiate the formal equality of
citizenship. A notion of differentiated citizenship has, so, gained currency within citizenship
theory to accommodate requires of specific cultural clusters. The word ‘Differentiated
Citizenship’ was first used through Iris Marion Young in 1989. It advocates the incorporation of
members of sure clusters not only since individuals, but also since members of clusters, their
rights depending in section on this group membership catering to their special requires.
Citizenship Theory Today: Dividing Rows
The notion of individual rights has been counterbalanced through the claims of cultural societies
to special rights catering to their distinctive requires. The centrality of rights in citizenship theory
has also been questioned in few quarters and there seems to be a revival of interest in the
republican custom of citizenship with its emphasis on the primacy of general good and civic
duties in excess of individual/private interests.
Civic Republicanism and the Liberal Custom
The dividing rows in citizenship theory today, in effect, emerge from these two customs of
citizenship, each of which signifies two dissimilar understandings of what it means to be a
citizen. The first i.e. the republican custom, describes citizenship since an office, a responsibility,
a burden proudly assumed; the second i.e. the liberal custom, describes it since a status and
entitlement, a set of rights passively enjoyed. The first makes citizenship the center of human
life; the second makes it its outer frame. The first assumes a closely knit body of citizens, its
members committed to one another: the second assumes a diverse and loosely linked body, its
members committed elsewhere. The citizen is the primary political actor, for the second,
lawmaking and management is someone else’s business, the citizen’s business is private. We
shall see that contests in the middle of citizenship theorists today emanate from these two vital
differences in the conceptualization of the shape and object of citizenship.
Dividing Rows: Individual vs. the Society
One set of division in the middle of citizenship theorists today can be seen beside the rows of the
question, who or what shapes the center of citizenship- the individual or the wider context of
which s/he is a section i.e., the cultural society. We have seen that the liberal notion of
citizenship appeared since a strand in the French revolutionary custom and strengthened with the
development of capitalism. The citizen in liberal theory is the free floating individual and
citizenship is a legal status which enables citizens to enjoy rights equally with other citizens each
of whom, though, pursues separate personal interests. In this view, the circumstances for an equal
enjoyment of rights is laid out through creation irrelevant the scrupulous contexts of individuals
i.e., their special conditions defined through factors of birth viz., race, caste, civilization,
ethnicity, gender etc. This view is counterpoised through the Communitarians who, in the civic
republican custom, assert the importance of the contexts of individuals in determining the extent
to which rights can be enjoyed equally with others. These theorists emphasize that instead of
masking these differences in the allocation of rights, attempt necessity be made to take
explanation of the specificity of the dissimilar conditions of citizens. An rising number of
theorists referred to since ‘Cultural Pluralists’ argue that a big number of ethnic, religious and
linguistic clusters feel excluded from the ‘general’ rights to citizenship. These clusters can be
accommodated into general citizenship only through adopting what Iris Marion Young calls
‘differentiated citizenship’ which means that members of sure clusters should be accommodated
not only since individuals, but also by the group and their rights would depend in section upon
their group membership. Young, in the middle of the mainly influential theorists of cultural
pluralism, asserts that the effort to make a universal conception of citizenship which transcends
group differences is fundamentally unjust to historically oppressed clusters: ‘In a society where
few clusters are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that since citizens persons should
leave behind their scrupulous affiliations and experiences and adopt a common point of view
serves only to reinforce the privileged for the perspective and interests of the privileged will tend
to control this unified public, marginalizing or silencing those of other clusters’.
Dividing Rows: Duties vs. Rights
The second set of divisions follows the similar rows since the first. The contest here is in words
of what are the defining premises of citizenship viz., the primacy of the public/political and civic
life or the primacy of individual interests and differences. The concept of ‘civic virtue’ and
‘good’ citizenship which appeared in the classical Graeco-Roman world forming section of the
republican custom and revived later in Renaissance Italy and eighteenth century America and
France, shapes an integral section of the notion of the citizenship which affords primacy to civic
and public life. Those who subscribe to these ideas provide importance to the notion of active
citizenship. Citizenship in such a formulation becomes constitutive of civic duties, civic action,
public spiritedness and active political participation. Where civic republicanism stresses a stern
adherence to the citizens’ duties towards civic life, the liberal notion provides priority to
individual interests and differences and stresses the citizens’ entitlement to justice and rights. For
them, the richness of private life is of primary importance and citizenship is constitutive
primarily of few fundamental rights. Rights are primary in this formulation and their purpose is
to protect the inner personal world and to give the freedom for private pursuits and individual
creativity without encroachment from conflicting interests. It may be noted here that in the civic
republican custom, rights would be regarded since circumstances which follow the exercise of a
citizen’s duty to participate in the political procedure rather than being the prior condition. As the
nineteen eighties, this issue has been taken up in the rising debate flanked by liberalism and
communitarianism. Communitarian theorists such since Alisdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel
for instance, dismiss the thought of the ‘unencumbered self’ or the de-contextualized individual
of liberal theory. They argue that the ‘politics of rights’ should be replaced through the ‘politics
of general good’ through an ‘embedded self’. In this view liberal individualism, through focusing
on individual rights and entitlements, weakens the bonds that provide cohesion to society.
Critiques and Alternatives: Marxist, Feminist and Gandhian
We mentioned primarily that the skills to exercise rights or legal capacities, which constitute
citizenship, are not accessible equally to all. In other terms, even when all individuals are
formally invested with equal rights through virtue of being citizens, these rights cannot in effect
be enjoyed equally through all. The specific contexts of individuals, their class, gender, their
religious, ethnic and racial identities, power the extent to which rights are actually accessible. It
is this inability of liberal citizenship to take into explanation the contexts, which condition the
exercise of rights, which has been the focus of Marxist and Feminist critiques of citizenship.
Redefining Citizenship: Marxist Critique of Liberal Citizenship
Citizenship was clearly outlined in the 1840s through Karl Marx in his revise of the Constitutions
of the American and French Revolutions, from which contemporary citizenship appeared. Marx’s
objection to contemporary democratic or bourgeois citizenship can be seen in his terms, which
follow: ‘The state in its own method abolishes distinctions based on birth, rank, education and
job when it declares birth, rank, education and job to be non-political distinctions, when it
proclaims that every number of people is an equal participant in popular sovereignty regardless
of these distinctions, when it treats all those units which create up the actual life of the people
from the point of view of the state. Nevertheless, the state allows private property, education and
job to act and assert their scrupulous nature in their own method, i.e., since private property,
education and job. Distant from abolishing these factual distinctions, the state presupposes them
in order to exist’. Marxist criticism of bourgeois citizenship has focused, therefore, on its failure
to address itself to inequalities in contemporary capitalist civilizations. In an inherently unequal
organization, which thrives on producing and perpetuating class inequalities, rights, asserts the
Marxist critique, can only be ‘superficial trappings’ of equality. Civil and political rights were the
products of bourgeois revolutions, and urbanized, since shown through Marshall in his historical
revise, alongside capitalism. While these rights alleviated few ill effects of capitalism, they did
not intend to, and could not so, dismantle the buildings of inequality, which constitute capitalist
civilizations. Attacks in recent decades through a strand of liberal opinion on social rights,
citizenship rights which Marshall illustrates to have urbanized in the twentieth century catering to
the claims of marginalized parts of the population to welfare benefits from the state, prompted
few writers on the left to defend rights. Scholars like Amy Bartholomew have put forward a case
to illustrate that the notion of ‘rich individuality’ and ‘self growth’ in Marx’s notion of ‘human
emancipation’, illustrates Marx’s commitment to rights. Bartholomew argues that Marx’s
criticism of rights is simply directed towards the understanding of rights which specifies it with
the ‘right of man’- the therefore-described natural rights- which act since ‘frontier markers’
separating man from man and the superior society of which he is a section. Rights for Marx
contribute to ‘rich individuality’ i.e., to the creation of the creative individual whose potential is
realized mainly fully within and in harmony with the society.
Feminists redefine Citizenship
Feminists of all strands have criticized the gender neutrality and gender blindness of citizenship
theory i.e., its failure to take into explanation,
The patriarchal character of contemporary civilizations and,
The manner in which gender determines access to citizenship rights.
Feminists have pointed out that mainly historical conceptualizations of citizenship have been
inimical to women, either excluding them from citizenship altogether since in the classical
custom, or integrating them, since in the French Revolutionary custom, indirectly and unequally
since citizen consorts or companions of citizens. Carole Pateman suggests that contemporary
liberal citizenship while not entirely excluding women incorporates them on the foundation of
their socially useful/biologically determined. Incorporation in this manner slots women into
dependent roles since mothers and wives, placing them outside the sphere of politics, and
distancing them from possessions like education, property, occupation opportunities etc., which,
equip individuals for political participation. The gender blindness of citizenship theory has been
therefore pervasive, feminists argue, that any explanation of the development of citizenship can
retain is coherence only through moving women to the margins since aberrations in the common
trend. Ursula Vogel shows this with reference to Marshall’s revise of citizenship. Marshall’s
‘largest story’ of the unfolding of citizenship since the gradual generalization/universalization of
rights, Vogel points out, can remain intact only through ‘including’ women since historical
anomalies i.e., since individuals whose location was ‘ peculiar’ and not relevant to the largest
story. Feminists have not only criticized the gendered conceptualization of citizenship, they have
also appealed for a broadening of the concept therefore since to contain behaviors which are seen
since belonging to the private sphere. The thought is not only to focus on the authority dealings
which permeate the domain of private, but also to question the devaluation of the behaviors of
the private realm. Maternalists like Sara Ruddick and Jean Elshtain would, therefore, like to see
citizenship based on male personalities and features dismantled. They advocate the growth in its
lay of a new moral and ethical notion of citizenship based on ‘feminist ethics of care’ i.e.,
feminine features of love and compassion, dissolving in the procedure, the distinction flanked by
male and female facets of life.
A Gandhian Notion of Citizenship
A Gandhian notion of citizenship can be seen since consisting of units of civic republicanism,
recognized since a commitment to the ‘general good’, civic duty and active citizenship. The
commitment in Gandhi to a society of interests is interspersed, though, with an equally strong
faith in individual autonomy and distrust of the oppressive potential of state authority. Distrust of
the oppressive buildings of the contemporary state, much of which emanated from Gandhi’s
experiences with the colonial state in South Africa and India, formed his commitment to a moral
right of the individual to rebel. Resisting an unjust government was a significant unit of Gandhi’s
‘duties of citizenship’. This is brought out clearly in his enunciation of the rules of ‘civil
disobedience’ which obliged the civil resister to follow sure codes of conduct while voluntarily
breaking law and when imprisoned.
The rational citizen is at the center of Gandhi’s notion of active citizenship. This citizen is,
though, constrained through the commitment to ‘general good’. The largest units of Gandhi’s
notion of the ‘general good’ are:
Societal interests are above individual interests;
Spiritualism is above materialism;
Duties towards society are prior to individual rights against the state or individual interests
against other members of society;
Trusteeship of general possession of manufacture;
Sarvodaya or the uplift of all abolishing distinctions of class, caste, religion, gender etc.,
Faith in ‘shram’ or bread labour therefore that no one is dependent on another for the
fulfillment of their vital requires; and
A moral duty to make a presently society catering to human dignity.

LIBERTY
The Meaning of Liberty
Liberty means freedom from, or absence of restraints. A person may be measured free or at
liberty to do something when his or her actions and choices are not hindered or constrained
through those of another. It is significant to understand that constraints refer to impediments
imposed through political and other authorities. Therefore, imprisonment, bondage or slavery,
subjection to laws, etc., may be seen since referring to circumstances of unfreedom or absence of
liberty. While states of unfreedom like imprisonment or subjection to laws may seem since
constraints on liberty, we know that contemporary democratic social and political systems are
founded on legal and institutional buildings, which aim at ensuring equal consideration of each
individual’s liberty. No society will, so, have an unlimited ‘right to liberty’. Each society will
have a set of restrictions on liberty, which are justified through the information that people accept
those restrictions since the best possible circumstances in which liberty could be maximized. The
‘negative’ nature of liberty seems in two dissimilar senses:
In the first, law is seen since the largest obstacle to freedom. Hobbes, for example, called
freedom since the ‘silence of the laws’. Such a view sees freedom since limited only through
what others deliberately prevent individuals from doing. This understanding would, so, seem to
imply a definite limit upon both law and government. Philosophers like John Locke have,
though, pointed out that a commitment to liberty does not mean that the law should be abolished.
Rather, it means that law should be restricted to the defense of one’s liberty from encroachment
through others. Locke suggested so, that law does not restrict liberty, it rather enlarges and
defends it.
 The second view sees liberty since ‘freedom of choice’. Milton Friedman for instance in his
job, Capitalism and Freedom proposes that ‘economic freedom’ consists of freedom of choice in
the marketplace – the freedom of consumer to choose what to buy, the freedom of the worker to
choose his occupation or profession and the freedom of the producer to choose what to produce
and whom to employ. ‘To choose’ implies that the individual can create unhindered and
voluntary selection from a range of dissimilar options.
While talking in relation to the liberty, a distinction is often made flanked by negative and
positive notions of liberty i.e., flanked by the thought of ‘absence of external constraints’ and ‘the
subsistence of circumstances which enable or facilitate’. To be free or at liberty to do something
is not to be restrained or prevented from doing it. For instance, one may be free or unrestrained to
take up any occupation, yet, one may not have the qualifications or the economic possessions
which may create one’s candidature worthwhile. Political theorists often create this distinction
flanked by liberty since an absence of restraints and the circumstances which create liberty
worthwhile. A starving person, who is legally free to eat in an expensive restaurant, can in fact,
enjoy no liberty on the foundation of the legal freedom. The freedom to eat in this case will need
little positive action through the state. It is this reasoning that has been used to justify social
legislation intended to augment opportunities for individuals. Through such positive action, the
state is said to be not only decreasing inequality, but rising liberty. The negative conception of
liberty is a feature of a strand of English political idea represented through Jeremy Bentham,
James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, Herbert Spencer and the classical and neo-
classical economists who supported the claims of individuals to break free from unnecessary
restraints of arbitrary government. The largest political axiom of negative liberty was that
‘everyone knows his own interest best’ and that the state should not decide the individual’s ends
and purposes. Essential to the doctrine was the sanctity of the contract. Implicit in this
assumption of sanctity was the understanding that the act of entering into a contract, even if the
words of the contract were restrictive of individual freedom, was an expression of liberty, of the
exercise of individual choice. Therefore, to this strand of thinkers, a person’s liberty was a
function of that region in which he was left alone and not related to the excellence of action. The
concept of negative liberty is best understood since a doctrine in relation to the meaning of
liberty. Although negative liberty is often condemned since the ‘freedom to starve’, this
understanding is somewhat misleading. It does not necessarily put a prohibition on state
intervention, but merely holds that this cannot be justified on the ground that it increases
freedom, although arguments from the arena of inequality may be described into force for
justification. Though, the historical relationship flanked by negative liberty and the lasseiz-faire
economics cannot be denied, and mainly of its advocates favored a minimal state. The concept is
neutral in the sense that it is compatible with a wide range of politics, and describes a condition
of liberty without indicating whether it is good or not. Criticisms of the negative notion of liberty
have approach from contemporary liberals, social democrats and socialists. They felt that
capitalism had done absent with feudal hierarchies and legal restrictions, but it had also subjected
big masses of people to poverty, unemployment and disease. Such conditions were seen since
hindering liberty since much since legal restraints and social controls. One of the first liberals to
embrace the positive notion of liberty was T.H.Green, who defined freedom since the skill of
people ‘to create the mainly and best of themselves’. The concept of positive liberty has been at
the foundation of the Welfare State. The thought has acted since the moving force behind social
welfare provisions taken up through states, combining thereby freedom with equality. Mill’s
notion of liberty will be taken up for revise. Mill seems to endorse a negative conception of
freedom, or the individual’s sovereign manage in excess of his/her body and mind. In the
ultimate analysis, though, Mill’s notion of ‘individuality’ brought him closer to a positive notion
of liberty.
J.S. Mill’s Notion of liberty
J.S.Mill’s On Liberty was influential in the academic debates in the 1960s. Mill’s job is seen
since an exposition of the negative concept of liberty. At the foundation of Mill’s arguments for
individual freedom place a strong sense of contempt for tradition, and for legal rules and norms
which could not be rationally justified. It is also sometimes argued that for Mill any free action,
no matter how immoral, had few unit of virtue in it, through the information that it was freely
performed. While Mill measured restraint on individual’s actions evil, he did not believe
restraints to be entirely unjustifiable. He felt, though, that within the society there was always a
presumption in favor of liberty. Any constraints on liberty, so, had to be justified through those
who applied them. For, Mill, the purpose of liberty was to encourage the achievement of
‘individuality’. Individuality refers to the distinctive and unique character of each human
individual, and freedom means the realization of this individuality, i.e., personal development or
self-determination. It was the property of individuality in human beings that made them active
rather than passive, and critical of existing manners of social behaviour, enabling them to refuse
to accept conventions unless they were establish reasonable. Freedom in Mill’s framework, so,
seems not basically since the absence of restraints but the deliberate farming of sure desirable
attitudes. It is because of this that Mill is often seen since gravitating towards a positive
conception of liberty. Mill’s conception of freedom is also rooted in the notion of choice. This is
apparent from his belief that a person who lets others ‘choose his plan of life for him’ does not
display the faculty of ‘individuality’ or self-determination. The only faculty he or she seemed to
possess was the ‘apelike’ faculty of ‘imitation’. On the other hand, a person ‘who chooses to plan
for himself, employs all his faculties’. In order to realize one’s individuality, and attain thereby
the condition of freedom, it was essential that individuals resist forces or norms and traditions
which hindered self-determination. Mill, though, was also of the view that extremely some
individuals possessed the capability to resist and create free choices. The rest were content to
submit to ‘apelike imitation’, existing thereby in a state of unfreedom. Mill’s conception of
liberty can be seen for this cause since elitist, as individuality could be enjoyed only through a
minority and not the masses at big. Mill since other liberals emphasized a demarcation of the
boundaries flanked by the individual and society. While talking in relation to the reasonable or
justifiable restrictions on individual liberty, Mill distinguished flanked by self-concerning and
other-concerning actions, i.e., actions, which affected the individual only, and actions which
affected the society at big. Any restriction or interference with an individual could be justified
only to prevent harm to others. In excess of actions that affected only him, the individual was
sovereign. Such an understanding of legal and societal constraints conveys the thought of a
society in which the connection flanked by individual and society is not ‘paternal’, i.e., the
individual being the best judge of his interests, law and society could not intervene to promote a
person’s ‘best interests’. Similarly, the thought that an act can be constrained only if it harmed
others, rules out the thought that few acts are intrinsically immoral and so, necessity be punished
irrespective of whether they affect anyone else. Yet, the demarcation flanked by the individual
and the society is not strict in Mill in the sense that all acts do affect others in few method, and
Mill whispered that his principle did not preach a moral indifference towards the self-concerning
behaviour of others, and felt that it was permissible to exploit persuasion to discourage immoral
behaviour. Also, Mill strongly whispered in the instrumental value of liberty in the promotion of
social goods. This is especially true of his arguments for the complete liberty of idea, discussion
and expression and the right to assembly and association. Mill felt that all restrictions on free
discussion should be removed because truth would emerge from the free competition of ideas. It
may be pointed out that in today’s catalogue of liberties; freedom of expression is valued
possibly more than economic liberty since a democratic ideal. Free swap flanked by individuals
is undoubtedly a significant exercise of liberty and a society, which forbade all types of liberty
and allowed this, would still be relatively free.
Isaiah Berlin and the Two Concepts of Liberty
In his now classic Two Concepts of Liberty Isaiah Berlin tries to reconcile the negative and
positive notions of liberty, i.e., the notion of liberty since the absence of restraints with the
several views pertaining to its operation within the social context. For Berlin, the ‘negative’
notion of liberty can be understood through addressing the following question: ‘What is the
region within which the subject – a person or group of persons—is or should be left to do or be
what he is able to be, without interference through other persons?’. On the other hand, the
positive sense is concerned with the answer to the question: ‘what, or who, is the source of
manage or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?’ Positive
liberty, on the other hand, does not interpret freedom since basically being left alone but since
‘self-mastery’. The theory involves a special theory of the self. The personality is divided into a
higher and a lower self. The higher self is the source of an individual’s genuine and rational
extensive-word goals, while the lower self caters to his irrational desires which are short-existed
and of transient nature. A person is free to the extent that his higher self, is in command of his
lower self. Therefore, a person might be free in the sense of not being restrained through external
forces, but remnants a slave to irrational appetites; since a drug addict, an alcoholic or a
compulsive gambler might be said to be unreel. The largest characteristic of this concept is its
openly evaluative nature; its exploit is specifically tied to methods of life held to be desirable.
The thought of positive liberty involves a special interpretation of the self and assumes not
presently that there is a realm of action towards which the individual ought to direct
herself/himself. The notion suggests that the individual is being liberated when he or she is
directed towards it. Critics of Berlin’s notion of positive liberty feel that a belief in positive
liberty may involve the thought that all other values, equality, rights, justice etc., are subordinate
to the supreme value of higher liberty. Also, the thought that the higher purposes of the
individual are equivalent to those of collectivities such since classes, nations and race, may lead
to the espousal of totalitarian ideologies.
Marxist Critique and the Thought of Freedom
The Marxist concept of freedom is dissimilar from the liberal views. The largest points of
variation emerge from the Marxist understanding of the individual and society, the connection
flanked by the individual and society, and the Marxist critique of capitalist society. While the
liberal view is based on the centrality of the individual and his freedom of choice, the Marxists
would see the notion of liberty based on the liberal notion of individual and society since
circumstances of unfreedom. For Marxists, the individual is not separated from other individuals
in society through boundaries of autonomous places for the free exercise of choice. They are
rather bound jointly in mutual dependence. The notion of individuality is similarity transformed
into a notion of rich individuality, which emphasizes the social embedded ness of the individual,
the thought that individuals can reach a state of creative quality and develop their capacities only
in a society which seeks the growth of all its members. For the Marxists, so, freedom lies in the
growth of creative individuality, and cannot be achieved in a capitalist society where individuals
are separated through boundaries of self-interest and where they can only imagine themselves to
be free when in reality they are bound through buildings of use. It is only in a society, which is
free from the selfish promotion of private interests that a state of freedom can exist. Freedom,
therefore, cannot be achieved in a capitalist society. These views have been articulated in
Friedrich Engel’s Anti-Duhring and Karl Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844. Engels discusses the notion of freedom since a state of transition from must to freedom.
The state of must is defined through a situation in which the individual is subjected to another’s
will. Engels points out that man have the capability to identify and understand the forces, which
condition and determine his life. Man has, therefore, obtained scientific knowledge in relation to
the laws of nature, which determine his subsistence and also learnt how to live with these laws in
the best possible method. Ironically, man has not been able to break free from the bondage of the
forces of manufacture, which have historically kept him under subjection, or in other terms,
confined him to the realm of must. In order to reach a state of freedom, man not only has to have
knowledge of human history, but also the capability to change it. It is only with the help of
scientific socialism that man can hope to leave the realm of must and enter the realm of freedom.
Freedom is an important component of the thought of the communist society laid down
through Marx and Engels in Communist Manifesto. It was only in a communist society where
there will be no class use that freedom will be achieved. In his job Manuscripts, Karl Marx avers
that the capitalist society is dehumanizing. It not only alienates the individual from his true self, it
separates him from the creative powers of society. Marx proposes that it is only through
transforming those circumstances in which alienation takes lay, can freedom be restored.
Therefore, it was only in a communist society where the means of manufacture were socially
owned, and each member of society worked in cooperation with the other for the growth of all,
that true freedom could be achieved. Therefore, in Marx’s framework, freedom is seen in a
positive sense, denoting self-fulfillment and self-realization, or the realization of one’s true
nature. Marx called the true realm of freedom since ‘the growth of freedom for its own sake’.
This potential could be realized, Marx whispered, only through the experience of creative labour.
Under this framework, Robinson Crusoe, who enjoyed the greatest possible measure of negative
freedom, as no one else on his island could check or constrain him, was a stunted and so unfree
individual, deprived of the social relationships by which human beings achieve fulfillment. This
notion of freedom is clearly reflected in Marx’s conception of ‘alienation’. Under capitalism,
labour is reduced to a mere commodity controlled and formed through de-personalized market
forces. In Marx’s view, capitalist workers suffer from alienation in that they are separated from
their own true nature: they are alienated from the product of their labour, alienated from the
procedure of labour itself, alienated from their fellow human beings, and, finally alienated from
their ‘true’ selves. Freedom is, so, connected to the personal fulfillment which only unlamented
labor can bring about.
Other Modern Ideas on Liberty
Separately from Berlin whose job is possibly the mainly important in the middle of the modern
jobs on liberty, there are other thinkers who have discussed the thought of liberty elaborating
upon the ideas expressed through thinkers on both faces of the ideological divide. Milton
Friedman, like Mill and Berlin was a liberal who in his job Capitalism and Freedom urbanized a
notion of liberty since an important characteristic of capitalist society. The freedom of swap
was an essential characteristic of liberty. To promote this freedom, Friedman required the state to
provide up its concern for welfare and social security and devote itself to maintaining law and
order, protecting property rights, implementing contracts etc. For Friedman, not only was liberty
essential for free and voluntary swap in the middle of individuals, it was only within a capitalist
society that this freedom could be achieved. Moreover, it was economic freedom that provided
the opportune and essential condition for political liberty. In his job The Constitution of Liberty,
F. A. Hayek has propounded a theory of liberty, which emphasizes the negative role of the state.
For Hayek, a state of liberty is achieved when the individual is not subject to the arbitrary will of
another individual. Hayek calls this individual freedom and distinguishes it from other shapes of
freedom, establishing at the similar time the primacy and independence of individual liberty from
other shapes of freedom, including political freedom. Hayek recommends that the original
meaning of liberty since the ‘absence of restraints’ should be preserved. The enlargement of state
intervention in the name of freedom would mean the demise of real liberty which consists in the
freedom of individual from restraints. Another group of thinkers evidently convinced through the
Marxist notion of freedom, emphasized that liberty since practiced in contemporary capitalist
civilizations breeds loneliness. Eric Fromm explained that in contemporary civilizations distance
was brought in relation to the owing to the isolation of the individual from his creative capacities
and social dealings. This isolation generated physical and moral distance in the individual
affecting his mental well-being. It was only by creative and communal job that the individual
could restore himself to society. Herbert Marcuse in his job One- Dimensional Man: Studies in
the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, also explored the nature of alienation in capitalist
civilizations. Marcuse asserts that the creative multidimensional capacities of the individual get
thwarted in capitalist civilizations. Man is able to express himself only since a consumer
constantly occupied in the satisfaction of his physical requires.
JUSTICE
Meaning of Justice
Any discussion of the concept of justice has to take into explanation its multi dimensional
character. The answer to ‘what is justice’ can only be given through indicating guidelines beside
which men have idea of justice and will continue to do therefore. It changes with the passage of
time. Therefore, what was justice in the past may be injustice in the present and vice-versa.
Therefore, there have been the ‘egalitarian’ perception of justice where the highest lay is
accorded to the value of equality; the ‘libertarian’ perception in which liberty is the ultimate
value; the Divine view in which justice is the execution of God’s will, the ‘hedonist’ makes ‘the
greatest good of the greatest number’ the criterion of justice; to the ‘harmonizer’ justice is the
harmonizing of dissimilar units and values to produce a satisfactory balance. Few identify justice
with ‘duty’ or with maintenance of peace and order; others view it since an elitist function.
Therefore, justice concerns the right of the individual since well since the social ordering of
society. It is legal and moral at the similar time. In short, it is an ethical concept.
Justice and Law
The Roman lawyers integrated the ideas of ‘natural justice’ with the positive law of the state.
Since such, the civil law and the law of nations are in conventionality with the law of nature.
This, though, is an abstract stage of jurisprudence. In fact, justice lies in the enforcement of the
positive law. Both law and justice seek to sustain social order. John Austin is the largest
advocate, who tells that the law has to function since an instrument of justice, on the one hand,
and function since an instrument to suppress mischief, on the other. Legally, the management of
justice can be criticized since unjust if it fails to meet the average of fairness required through the
processes of the legal organization, viz. the accused should be informed of the charges leveled
against him; he should be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself etc; while morally, a
law can be described unjust for if it fails to meet the moral ideas of justice. Morality though goes
beyond justice. The symbol of justice is often portrayed since blindfolded because it is supposed
to be impartial. That there should be no discrimination flanked by the two extremes – rich or
poor, high or low. So, impartiality becomes a precondition to justice. Does it mean then that
justice does not need discrimination at all?
Justice and Discrimination
Plato and Aristotle argued for a dissimilar interpretation of justice, ‘proportionate equality’ with
the thought of ‘righteousness’. The philosophical interpretation of justice takes an empirical
direction at the hands of Aristotle who says: ‘Injustices arises when equals are treated unequally’.
This means that if in a democracy there is discrimination on the foundation of sex, it would mean
treating the equals, unequally. Also, it would be unfair to pit a heavy-weight wrestler against a
lightweight one. Therefore, justice needs discrimination on the foundation of differences, which
is relevant to the functions performed. Plato’s theory of justice too implied that the life of people
should conform to the rule of functional specialization. Here, justice becomes another name for
the principal of ‘proper stations’ i.e. a man should practice one item only to which his nature is
best adapted. This has both individual and social characteristics. The highest good of both the
individual and the society is conserved, if we take it for granted that there is nothing bigger for a
man than to do a job that he is best fitted to do, there is equally nothing bigger for the society
than to see that each should be filling the station to which he is best entitled through virtue of the
special unit of his personality. For this the three units of cause, sprit and appetite have been
highlighted for the individual and the state, to stay their proper bounds. Also, normally the law
does not interfere in instances of discriminatory treatment in private life. But if it reasons social
harm, the state would be justified in interfering in it, like in instances of unsociability, where few
clusters are denied human rights. So, a law against it would be presently. Also, the distinct
facilities accorded cannot be truly equal. It is because of this that Dr. Ambedkar demanded the
right of entry to temples for Scheduled Castes and opposed distinct temples, schools or hostels
for them.
Distributive Justice
The thought of Aristotle came to place down the basis of what is described the doctrine of
distributive justice. The essential implication of Aristotle’s account is that justice is either
‘distributive’ or ‘corrective’; the former needs equal sharing in the middle of the equals and the
latter applying wherein remedy for a wrong is provided. The principle that Marx puts forward for
distributive justice in the post- revolutionary socialist society is ‘from each according to his skill
to each according to his job. The thought of distributive justice is reflected in the job of few
recent political economists. In this context, reference to the job of J.W. Chapmen deserves merit,
who seeks to integrate the thought of justice with his principles of ‘economic rationality of man’
and ‘consumer’s sovereignty’ coupled with the individual claim of ‘moral freedom’. To him, the
first principle of justice seems to be the sharing of benefits, which maximize benefits in
accordance with the principle of consumer’s sovereignty. The second principle is that an
organization is unjust, if the material well being of some is purchased at the expense of several. It
implies that justice needs that no one shall gain at the expense of another.
Distributive Justice and Economic Justice
Distributive justice subjects to the condition of common welfare. It demands that the state of
national economy be reshaped in a method that the benefits are made accessible to the general
man. In this method, the thought of economic justice comes to imply a socialistic pattern of
society. The first task of economic justice is to give employment, food, shelter and clothing to
every able-bodied citizen. In regard to this region of satisfying the primary and vital requires of
all, it has been correctly said that freedom is meaningless if it prevents the attainment of
economic justice. Therefore , the liberals consider that economic justice can be attained in society
if the state gives welfare services and there is progressive organization of taxation; a fair return
for job provision of social security like old age pension, gratuity and provident finance. Though,
the Marxist view of justice has its origins in the region of economics. According to Marx, the
positive law of the state is imposed on its members through the power of the class, which
controls the means of manufacture. Law is determined through the economic interest of the
ruling class. When private property is abolished and the working class controls the means of
manufacture, then the laws are bound to reflect the interest of the working class. So, the content
of justice depends upon the class controlling the means of manufacture. When the state withers
absent, since contemplated through the communists, there will be justice without an economic
origin. Contemporary liberals have as extensive given up the doctrine of economic laissez-faire.
Redistributive justice is an integral section of ‘revisionist liberalism’ since advocated through
J.W. Chapmen, John Rawls and Arthur Okun. These writers advocate ‘redistributive justice’ with
its implication of state intervention in the economy in the interest of justice and freedom for all.
Social Justice
Social justice relates to the balance flanked by an individual’s rights and social manage ensuring
the fulfillment of the legitimate expectations of the individual under the existing laws and to
ensure him benefits and defense against any encroachment on his rights. Let us analyze the word,
‘social justice’ in words of the following characteristics of justice, viz. one, the notion of the
predominance of the interest of the society and two, the notion of ‘reform’, or social change.
Predominance of the Interest of the Society
With the decline of the laissez-faire doctrine, a new awareness has urbanized that the rights of an
individual should be reasonably restricted in the interests of the society because the ends of social
justice need the reconciliation of individual rights with that of society interest. It also presumes
that in the event of a clash flanked by the two, the society interest necessity prevails in excess of
individual concerns. Social justice is, therefore, closely connected with the thought of what
constitutes public good or society interest. Today with the penetration of democracy into the
social and economic spheres, society interest has approach to encompass not only the political
but also the social and economic spheres. Therefore, social justice ranges from the defense of
minority political rights to the abolition of unsociability and the eradication of poverty. Since
such, in the backward countries of the world, the thought of social justice enjoins upon the state
to create concerted efforts for the improvement of the downtrodden and weaker parts of the
society.
Reforms or Social Change
Social justice is used to denote system of society on the foundation of ideas of fairness and
equality current at the time. It seeks a revision of social order therefore since to have a more
equitable society. Men by the ages have sought changes in social order, presently since much
since they have also sought to preserve a given social order. Social justice stands for reformative
justice, for revision of the social order and a redistribution of rights to suit current ideas of
fairness. When Aristotle spoke of ‘distributive justice’ he had reformative or what Raphael calls
‘prosthetic’ justice in mind, because its aims were to vary the status quo. A hundred years ago,
justice did not need governments to take care of the unemployed. Charity was supposed to do
that. Due to the operation of notions of ‘reformative’ or ‘prosthetic’ justice, today, it is measured
the state’s duty to take care of the unemployed and give them employment.
Pound’s Illustration of Social Justice
The affirmation of the thought of social justice is extremely well contained in the interpretation
of Dean Roscoe Pound who presents a six-fold illustration of social interest and lays down eight
postulates to ensure social justice. Therefore, the thought of social justice envisages promoting
the welfare of the people through securing a presently social order.
Social Interest:
In common security, e.g., peace, public health, security of acquisitions, etc.;
In security and social organizations, e.g., marriage, religious organizations, etc.;
In common morals, e.g., gambling, drinking, immoral traffic, etc.;
In conservation of social possessions, e.g., food minerals, etc.;
In common progress, e.g., freedom of deal, encouragement of research, etc.;
 In individual rights, e.g., wages circumstances of job, etc.
Jural Postulates:
That no wanton aggression is made through others;
That parties with whom transactions are entered into will act in good faith;
That there will be no hindrance in the enjoyment of one’s acquisitions and creations;
That the person will not be discovered to undue risks and that others will act with due care
and caution;
That dangerous things kept through others shall be carefully and cautiously kept within its
bounds;
That an employee has a right to employment;
That society will share the misfortunes which befall on the individual; and
That proper compensation will be paid to workers for necessary human wear and tear in an
industrial society.
Criticism of Social Justice
Theories of social justice are criticized on three grounds. Firstly, demands for social justice,
through implication, enlarge the behaviors of the state. The state, then, will have to decide, ‘who
gets, what, when and how.’ Where the officers of the state develop vested interests, such
subjective determination is not likely to serve the ends of social justice. Secondly, policies of
social justice and their implementation need curtailment of liberty. How much of liberty should
be sacrificed for how great/little social justice becomes a problem hard to solve. Lastly, it is hard
to assess which are the vital requires that have to be satisfied to fulfill the criteria of social justice
and which justify departure from equality. Though, when the Indian Constitution announces
reservation of seats in legislature, educational organizations and public employment, it entails
departure from equality. Several justifications are offered for these policies in words of justice.
Firstly, that such treatment compensates for the hundred years of deprivations. Secondly, that
these events are necessary for realizing ultimate equality to bring them on an equal footing with
society and thirdly, that justice can be done only if the state comes forward with preferential
policies to help them gain social respect, economic viability and political status.
Procedural Justice
A more narrow view of justice is what is recognized since procedural justice. In this sense, the
word is used not therefore much to prescribe redistribution of wealth or values since to the rules
and processes applied to individual actions. Essentially, it seeks to eliminate arbitrariness in
human actions and supports the rule of law. This conception deals with individuals and not
collectivities. In this view, not sticking to rules and processes, jumping the queue or giving unfair
advantage to few in competition would be unjust. The procedural theorists consider that imposing
criteria for redistribution of wealth would lead to totalitarianism and an unjustified sacrifice of
liberty. It involves consistent intervention through the state to uphold the pattern required through
equality. They feel that even if the state follows a policy of welfare, this has small to do with
justice. Critics of procedural theory of justice argue that mere following of rules does not ensure
a presently result. The rules farmed in a social context are weighed in favor of few clusters. So, a
free competition may not always be a fair competition. Secondly, a free market connection can
be equally coercive for individuals who lack economic authority; for them the liberty of a free
market would be meaningless.
John Rawls’s Theory of Justice
Dissimilar political theories offer dissimilar pictures of what would be a really presently social
order. Two of these theories are, the utilitarian theory, and John Rawls’s theory of justice since
fairness. Utilitarian theory asserts that the social order in which the main number of people can
have the highest satisfaction of their utility is presently. But from its extremely early days, critics
have established great difficulties with utilitarianism. In this background, Rawls’s theory has
offered, an alternative to utilitarianism. Rawls’s book, Theory of Justice provides a final
interpretation of the concept. To talk about Rawls’s theory of justice, his way of approaching
moral troubles necessity be mentioned first, which is in the contract Arian custom of social
philosophy. But at the similar time, Rawls’s way entails that the conclusions of moral reasoning
are always checked and readjusted against intuitive moral notions and this contrasts with others
in the contractarian custom, who uphold that the rules of justice are those that would be agreed to
in a hypothetical setting. Rawls spaces men behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ in a hypothetical
original location where individuals are deprived of the vital knowledge of their wants, interests,
skills, abilities and of the things that generate conflicts in actual civilizations. But they will have
what Rawls calls ‘a sense of justice’. Under these conditions, Rawls argue, people will agree to
accept two principles of justice in the lexical order. First, is the equality principle where each
person is to have an equal right to the mainly long liberty compatible with a same liberty to
others? Here, equal liberties can be concretized since the well-known rights of liberal democratic
regimes. They contain the equal right to political participation, freedom of expression, religious
liberty, equality before the law and therefore on. The second principle is described the variation
principle where Rawls argues that inequalities can only be justified, if it benefits the least
advantaged. John Rawls’s concept of justice has two characteristics to it. Firstly, it postulates a
‘constitutional democracy’, that is, government of laws and one, which is restrained, responsible
and accountable. Secondly, it believes in the regulation of the free economy ‘in a sure method’.
‘If law and government’, writes Rawls’s, ‘act effectively to stay market competitive, possessions
fully employed, property and wealth widely distributed in excess of time, and to uphold the
suitable social minimum, then if there is equality of opportunity underwritten through education
for all, the resulting sharing will be presently’. The ‘redistributionists’ have their critics too.
Therefore, Mare F. Plattner makes two arguments against the view of justice. Firstly, he believes
that although equality is a cherished value, it may not be possible to have it at the expense of
efficiency. According to Plattner, this problem of equality versus increased wealth lands Rawls
into an inconsistency. Therefore, on the one hand, Rawls ‘absolutely refuses to allow that those
who create a greater economic contribution deserve greater economic rewards’. Yet his ‘variation
principle’ nonetheless affirms that it is presently to grant them greater economic rewards insofar
since these serve since incentives to augment their contribution in methods that ultimately benefit
the disadvantaged. The second argument Plattner makes is that the redistributionist wants to
refuse to the individual the reward of his ‘honest industry ‘and instead, considers all produce
since the ‘general asset’ of society since an entire. And this Plattner wants us to consider,
undermines the ‘moral foundations of private property and therewith of liberal society’.
Justice: A Word of Synthesis
Possibly, the best come to justice is to view it since a word of synthesis. The problem of justice is
one of conciliation. The function of justice is the conciliation of dissimilar liberties with each
other; the dissimilar equalities with each other since well since the task of conciliating liberty in
common, in all its shapes, with equality in common, in all its shapes. In brief, justice means the
synthesis of conflicting values and holding these jointly in few states of equilibrium. Several
eminent writers have chosen to take faces in the liberty versus equality tussle. Lord Acton had,
several years ago, made the memorable pronouncement that ‘the passion for equality made vain
the hope of freedom’. The champions of ‘liberty alone’ like W. E. Lecky in his book Democracy
and Liberty claim that, ‘Equality is only attained through a stringent repression of natural
growth’. Actually, liberty and equality both matter; since Carritt puts it, they involve one another.
Freedom has a bigger content if there is equality. And, at the similar time it is freedom that
enables men to demand equality. Provide men liberty and they are sooner, rather than later, going
to inquire for equality. The interlinking flanked by liberty and equality can be brought out in
several methods. Take the case of freedom of speech and vote, both of which can be vitiated
through a grossly uneven sharing of wealth. The prosperous are in a bigger location not only to
contest but also to propagate. The prosperous have easier access to the propaganda tools. Harold
Laski’s terms still ring true: ‘Every effort of an individual to assert his liberty in a society of
unequal will be challenged through the powerful’. In short, we discover that political liberty and
economic democracy have to go hand in hand. And if we analyze many political values, we
discover however apparently they may seem mutually contradictory, on closer examination; they
will be establish to be complementary and interlinked. In any case, it is the function of justice to
synthesize or reconcile the several and often-conflicting values. Justice is the final principle,
which controls the sharing of several rights, political, social and economic in the interests of
liberty since well since equality. Such a concept of justice grows historically since a procedure of
growth of social idea. In this sense, it is a rising concept reflecting social reality and aspiration.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
What do you understand by citizenship?
What are the significant features of the modern notion of citizenship? What are its
limitations?
Distinguish between positive and negative conceptions of liberty.
Critically examine the Marxist critique of liberty.
What is justice?
How does discrimination fit in the concept of justice?
 CHAPTER 6
DEMOCRACY: MEANING AND THEORIES

STRUCTURE
Objectives
Direct and Participatory Democracy
Representative Democracy
Socialist Democracy
Review Questions
OBJECTIVES
After going through the chapter, you should be able to:
Explain the democracy.
Explain the representative democracy
Understand the varied connotations / interpretations of democracy.
Define the concepts of Democratic Socialism and New Leftism.

DIRECT AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

Meaning of Democracy
Democracy is a shape of government and an ideal, an aspiration and an average. The center unit
of democracy is self-rule. The origin of the word democracy can be traced back to ancient
Greece. Derived from the Greek term ‘demokratia’, it means rule through the people. In the
literal sense, it rejects the isolation of the two, i.e., flanked by the ruler and the ruled. It is
motivating to note that unlike the words communism and socialism, which has a point of
reference in Marxism, democracy has not been associated with a specific doctrinal source or
ideology. In fact, it is a byproduct of the whole growth of Western culture and so, tends to be
used rather loosely. Therefore, the history of the thought of democracy is rather intricate and is
marked through conflicting and confusing conceptions. It is confusing because ‘this is still an
active history’ and also because the issues are intricate. Though, it has been justified and
defended on the grounds that it achieves one or more of the following fundamental value or
goods like equality, liberty, moral self-growth, the general interest, private interests, social utility
etc.
Several Meanings
Varied meanings have been attached to the term ‘democracy’. Few of them are since follows:
A shape of government in which people rule directly;
A society based on equal opportunity and individual merit, rather than hierarchy and
privilege;
 A organization of decision-creation based on the principle of majority rule;
A organization of rule that secures the rights and interests of minorities through placing
checks upon the authority of the majority;
A means of filling public offices by a competitive thrash about for the popular vote;
An organization of government that serves the interests of the people regardless of their
participation in political life.
An organization of government based on the consent of the governed.
Linking Government to the People
From the dissimilar meanings that are associated with democracy, one item that becomes clear is
that democracy links government to the people. Though, this link can be forged in a number of
methods depending upon the superior political civilization of that society. Due to this, there have
been ideological differences and political debates concerning the exact nature of democratic rule.
Nonetheless, any discussion on democracy tends to address three significant questions:
Who are the people
In what sense the people rule
How distant should popular rule extend
Direct Democracy
Direct Democracy is a shape of self-government in which all communal decisions are taken by
participation of all adult citizens of the state in the spirit of equality and open deliberations.
Deliberations or discussions are significant because decisions arrived at by discussions are bigger
informed, logical and rational. This is because discussions allow a group to reconcile dissimilar
interests, inform members in relation to the several issues and attract on the group’s expertise. In
other terms, debates enable people to both power and to be convinced through the group.
The significant characteristic of direct democracy is the mechanism that ‘all command each and
each in his turn all’. It was achieved in ancient Athens by a shape of government brought in
relation to the since a result of a size meeting. Its contemporary manifestation is the referendum.
‘Gram Sabha’, since envisaged in the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, is an example of direct
democracy in rural India.
Principles Governing Direct Democracy
In a direct democracy, so, the best decisions can never be arrived at by voting. The principle of
direct democracy is to govern by consensus, which emerges from cautious deliberations of
options or alternatives. In the absence of formal representative organizations, people create
decisions themselves by public discussions. In other terms, the following principles apply in
direct democracy:
People are sovereign
Sovereignty is inalienable and cannot be represented
 People necessity express their common will and create decisions directly by referenda
Decisions are to be based on majority rule
To sum up direct democracy is based on direct, unmediated and continuous participation of
citizens in the tasks of government. It obliterates the distinction flanked by government and the
governed and flanked by state and civil society. In direct democracy, state and society become
one. It is an organization of popular self-government.
Merits of Direct Democracy
The merits of direct democracy contain the following:
It heightens manage that citizens can exercise in excess of their own destinies, since it is the
only pure shape of democracy.
It creates a bigger informed and more politically sophisticated citizenry, and therefore it has
educational benefits.
It enables the public to express their own views and interests without having to rely on self-
serving politicians
It ensures that rule is legitimate in the sense that people are more likely to accept decisions
that they have made themselves.
Greek Democracy since Direct Democracy
The classic instance of a direct democracy is that of ancient Athens throughout the 4th century
BC. It can be measured since the only pure or ideal organization of popular participation
recognized therefore distant. It had a specific type of direct popular rule in which all-important
decisions were taken however size meetings. The Assembly or Ecclesia to which all citizens
belonged made all biggest decisions. This assembly met at least 40 times a year to settle issues
put before it. When full time public officials were required, they were chosen on the foundation
of lots. This procedure was adapted to ensure that they were a section of the superior body of
citizens. The posts were, though, not fixed and were rotated in quite a frequency therefore that all
citizens gained experience in the art of governing and therefore, tried to achieve the broadest
possible participation. A council consisting of 500 citizens acted since the executive or steering
committee of the assembly and a 50 strong committee in turn made proposals to the council.
Athenian Democracy: Causes for its Fame
It is significant to understand what made Athenian democracy therefore extra ordinary. Athens,
in fact, symbolized a new political civilization enfranchising the entire citizenry. The citizens not
only participated in regular meetings of the assembly, but they were in big numbers, prepared to
undertake the responsibilities of public office and decision-making. Formally, citizens were
differentiated on the foundation of rank and wealth in their involvement in public affairs. The
demos held sovereign authority, i.e., supreme power to engage in legislative and judicial
behaviors. The Athenian concept of citizenship entailed taking a share in this function,
participating directly in the affairs of the state. Athenian democracy was marked through a
common commitment to the principle of civic virtue which actually meant commitment and
dedication to the republican municipality-state, the subordination of private life to public affairs
and the attainment of general good. In other terms, there was no isolation of public and private
life and individuals could attain self-fulfillment and live an honorable life ‘in and by the poleis,
i.e. the municipality-state. For instance, citizens had rights and obligations but not since private
individuals, rather since members of the political society. There were, therefore, public rights and
good life was possible only in the polis. Therefore, ‘In the Greek vision of democracy, politics is
a natural social action not sharply separated from the rest of life. Rather political life is only an
extension of and harmonious with oneself’. It looks that the Athenians whispered in a ‘free and
open’ political life in which citizens could develop and realize their capacities and ability and the
telos of the general good. And justice meant securing and realization of the citizen’s role and lay
in the municipality-states.
Aristotle’s ‘The Politics’
We discover the mainly detailed and extra ordinary explanation of ancient democracy in
Aristotle’s well-known job The Politics which was written flanked by 335 and 323 BC. His job
examines the claims, ethical standards and aims of democracy and states distinctly, the key
characteristics of a number of Greek democracies. Liberty and equality are connected jointly,
particularly if you claim to be a democrat. Without the subsistence of one, the other is hard to
achieve. There are two criteria of liberty: a) to rule and in turn being ruled and b) livelihood since
one chooses. If one wants to execute the first criterion since an effective principle of government,
it is necessary that all citizens are equal. Without numerical equality, it is not possible for the
majority to be sovereign. Numerical equality here means that everyone has an equal share in the
art of ruling. The classical or the earlier democrats felt that numerical equality was possible to
achieve because a) citizens are paid for their participation in government and so, are not losers
because of their political involvement, b) citizens have equal voting authority and c) in principle,
everyone has an equal opportunity to hold office. In a nutshell, what we can understand from this
is that equality is the practical foundation of liberty and it is also the moral foundation. Therefore,
on the foundation of Aristotle’s explanation, classical democracy including direct democracy
entails liberty and liberty entails equality.
Limitations of Direct Democracy
A distinctive characteristic of direct democracy since practiced in ancient Athens was its
exclusivity. The Municipality-State was marked through unity, solidarity, participation and a
highly restricted citizenship. There was no isolation flanked by public and private life and even
however state and government were inextricably connected with the lives of the citizens, it only
involved a little part of the population. It is motivating to note that the Athenian political
civilization was an adult male civilization, i.e. only men in excess of the age of 20 years were
qualified to become citizens. It was a democracy of patriarchs in which women had no political
rights and even their civic rights were strictly limited. There were also other kinds of residents
who were ineligible to participate in formal proceedings; like ‘immigrants’ who had settled in
Athens many generations earlier, but were not the original inhabitants. Though, the slave
population constituted, through distant, the mainly politically marginalized people. Here, what
we discover is that ‘political equality’ since practiced in Athens did not mean ‘equal authority’
for all. It was rather a shape of equality that was applicable to those having equal status and in the
Athenian context, it was meant for only males and Athenian born. Therefore, several were a
minority of the superior citizenry. Unquestionably, the politics of ancient Athens rested on a
highly undemocratic foundation.
Flaws of Athenian Democracy
What we can conclude from the above account is that democracy practiced through ancient
Athens had serious flaws. If contemporary democracy is based on the market economy, Athens
was a democracy built on slavery; the labour of slaves created the time for the citizen elite to
participate. The lack of permanent bureaucracy contributed to ineffective government, leading
eventually to the fall of the Athenian republic after defeat in war. It is motivating to note that the
mainly influential critic of this shape of democracy i.e. direct democracy was the philosopher
Plato. Plato attacked the principle of political equality on the grounds that the masses are not
made equal through nature and so, cannot rule themselves wisely. This is because they possess
neither the wisdom nor the experience to do therefore. The solution since stated in his well-
known job The Republic was that the government be placed in the hands of a class of
philosopher-kings, the Guardians, whose rule would be something same to what can be described
enlightened dictatorship. At a practical stage, though, the principal drawback of Athenian
democracy was that it could operate only through excluding the size of the population from
political action. This was possible only in little city-states with limited populations and not in
superior contemporary democracies with better populations since they exist today. Despite its
flaws, the Athenian model was crucial in establishing the democratic principle. Finer, ‘The
Greeks invented two of the mainly potent political characteristics of our present age: they
invented:
The extremely thought of citizen since opposed to subject and
They invented democracy.
Direct Democracy in Contemporary Times
The classical model of direct and continuous popular participation in political life has been kept
alive in sure sections of the world, notably in community meetings of New England in the USA
and in communal assemblies which operate in smaller Swiss cantons. The mainly general way
used in recent times is referendum since compared to the size meetings of ancient Athens.
Referendum is a vote in which the electorate can express a view on a scrupulous issue of public
policy. It differs from an election in that the latter is essentially a means of filling a public office
and does not give a direct or reliable way of influencing the content of a policy. A device of
direct democracy, referendum is used not to replace representative organizations, but to
supplement them. They may either be advisory or binding; they may also raise issues for
discussions.
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
What is Representative Democracy?
Limited and Indirect
Representative democracy is a limited and indirect shape of democracy: It is limited in the sense
that participation in government is infrequent and brief, being restricted to the act of voting every
some years. It is indirect in the sense that the public does not exercise authority through itself, but
selects those who will rule on its behalf. This shape of rule is democratic only since distant since
representation establishes a reliable and effective link flanked by the government and the
governed. The strengths of representative democracy contain the following:
It offers a practicable shape of democracy, since big populations cannot actually participate in
the governmental procedure.
It relieves the ordinary citizen of the burden of decision-creation, therefore creation it
possible to have division of labour in politics.
It maintains continuity through distancing the ordinary citizen from politics thereby
encouraging them to accept compromise.
Synonymous with Electoral Democracy
Though, although these characteristics may be a necessary precondition for representative
democracy, they should not be mistaken for democracy itself. The democratic content in
representative democracy is the thought of popular consent, expressed by the act of voting.
Representative democracy is, therefore, a shape of electoral democracy, in that popular election
is seen since the only legitimate source of political power. Such elections necessity respect the
principle of political equality based on universal adult franchise, irrespective of caste, color,
creed, sex, religion or economic status. The center of the democratic procedure is the capability
of the people to call politicians to explanation.
In short, the essence of representative democracy lies in:
Political pluralism
Open competition flanked by political philosophies, movements, parties and therefore on
Dissimilar Views on Representative Democracy
There are dissimilar views on representative democracy. The first implies that in representative
democracy, political authority is ultimately wielded through voters at election time. Therefore,
the virtue of representative democracy lies in its capability of blind elite rule with an important
measure of political participation. Government is entrusted to politicians, but these politicians are
forced to respond to popular pressures through the easy information that the public put them
there in the first lay, and can later remove them. The voter exercises the similar authority in the
political market since the consumer does in economic markets. Joseph Schumpeter summed it up
in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy through describing representative democracy since that
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the
authority to decide through means of a competitive thrash about for people’s vote.
Pluralist
Democracy is pluralist in nature. In its broader sense, pluralism is a commitment to variety or
multiplicity. In its narrower sense, pluralism is a theory of sharing of political authority. It holds
that authority is widely and evenly dispersed in society, instead of being concentrated in some
hands since the elitists claim. In this shape, pluralism is usually seen since a theory of ‘group
politics’ in which individuals are mainly represented by their membership of organized clusters,
ethnic clusters and these clusters have access to the policy procedure.
Elitist
It refers to a minority in whose hands authority, wealth or privilege is concentrated justifiably or
otherwise. Elitism believes in rule through an elite or minority. Classical elitism, urbanized
through Mosca, Pareto and Michele, saw elite rule since being inevitable, unchangeable
information of social subsistence. What is majority rule? Few view democracy since a majority
rule. Majority rule is a practice in which priority is reported to the will of the majority. What is
majoritarionism? Majoritarionism implies insensitivity towards minorities and individuals.
Rival Views
There is a considerable amount of conflict in relation to the meaning and significance of
representative democracy. Few questions raised through scholars are since follows:
Does it ensure a genuine and healthy dispersal of political authority?
Do democratic procedures genuinely promote extensive-word benefits, or are they self-
defeating?
Can political equality co-exist with economic equality?
In short, representative democracy is interpreted in dissimilar methods through dissimilar
theorists. Mainly significant in the middle of these interpretations are advanced through
Pluralism, Elitism, the New Right and Marxism. For several political thinkers, representative’s
democracy is basically larger to every other shape of political system. Few argue that
representative democracy is the shape of government that best protects human rights, because it
is based on the recognition of the intrinsic worth and equality of human beings.
Others consider that democracy is the shape of government which is mainly likely to take
rational decisions because it can count on the pooled knowledge and expertise of a society’s
whole population.
Others claim that democracies are stable and extensive-lasting because their elected leaders
enjoy a strong sense of legitimacy.
 Still others consider that representative democracy is mainly conducive to economic
development and well being.
Few consider that in representative democracy, human beings are best able to develop their
natural capacities and talents. Yet, democracy remnants a job in progress – an evolving aspiration
rather than a finished product.
Fundamental Principles of Representative Democracy
Popular Sovereignty
It means that the ultimate source of all public power is the people, and that the government does
what the people want to be done. Four observable circumstances can be recognized in popular
sovereignty:
Government policies reflect what the people want
People participate in the political procedure
Information is accessible and debate takes lay
Majority rules, i.e., policies are decided on the foundation of what a majority of people want.
Political Equality
Each person carries equal weight in the conduct of public affairs, irrespective of caste, color,
creed, sex or religion. But political thinkers whispered that great inequalities in economic
conditions can eventually turn into political inequality. Robert Dahl describes the problem in
following terms, ‘if citizens are unequal in economic possessions… they are likely to be unequal
in political possessions; and political equality will be impossible to achieve.’ Particularly
significant in contemporary times is the unequal power in manage of information, financial
contributions to electoral campaigns. This unequal power symbolizes a serious barrier in
achieving a complete democracy. The ideal society for the practice of democracy was the one
with a big transitional class – without an arrogant and overbearing prosperous class and without a
discontented poverty-stricken class.
Political Liberty
The citizens in democracy are protected from government interference in the exercise of vital
freedom, such since freedom of speech, association, movement and conscience. It is said that
liberty and democracy are inseparable. The concept of self-government implies not only the right
to vote, right to run for public office but also the right to expression, to petition the government,
to join any political party, interest group or social movement.
In the practice of democracy, though, it has appeared that liberty can be threatened through
democracy rather than being an essential ingredient. Following are the largest criticisms that are
leveled against democracy:
‘Majority Tyranny’ threatens Liberty: Majority tyranny implies the suppression of rights and
liberties of a minority through the majority. It is whispered that unbridled majority rule leaves no
room for the claims of minorities. Nevertheless, the threat of majority tyranny can be
exaggerated. Robert Dahl points out that there is no proof to support the belief that the rights of
ethnic and religious minorities are bigger protected under alternative shapes of political decision-
creation.
Democracy leads to bad decisions: It is argued through few that representative democracy,
which is majoritarian through nature, is not perfect. They say that there is no guarantee that
representative democracy will always lead to a good decision. A majority, like the minority, can
be unwise, cruel and uncaring and can be misled through unscrupulous or incompetent leaders.
Representative Democracy in Practice
Having said this, let us now pay attention to the actual working of representative democracy. The
chief features of a functioning democracy are:
Free and fair elections
Open and accountable government
Civil and political rights
The table given below provides a good thought of these characteristics.

Political Parties: Political parties play a crucial section in the political procedure. In a big
measure, political parties determine the operational character of the democratic organization.
They give a biggest political dynamic for the working of formal organizations of the
organization.
A political party consists of a group of citizens more or less organized, who act since a political
element. Through the exploit of their voting authority, they aim to manage the government and
carry out their common policies. Few of the essential characteristics of a political party are:
People constituting a political party have a sure degree of agreement on fundamental
principles.
They seek to achieve their objectives by constitutional means.
A political party aims to further national interest rather than sectional interest.
It seeks to capture political authority to enable it to further public interest.
Political parties constitute the backbone of democracy and perform the following functions:
 Parties mould public opinion: Political parties stimulate the interest of public on dissimilar
issues troubles such since housing, livelihood standards, education, foreign dealings, budget etc.
Parties play a role in the conduct of elections: Elections to the legislature are held on party
rows. Political parties select appropriate candidates for party tickets. On the day of voting, parties
ensure the maximum turnout of voters.
Political parties shape the government: The party which secures the majority shapes the
government. If no single party secures the majority, then a combination of parties, described
coalition, shape the government.
The opposition acts since a check on government: The opposition party keeps a vigilant eye
on the actions and policies of government and highlights its lapses and failures.
Political parties shape a link flanked by government and people: Parties explain the policies
of government to the people and convey reactions of the people to parliament and public
officials.
Political parties impart education to people: Political parties create the people aware of their
political rights and stakes in government.
Political parties act since a unifying force: Political parties are compelled to seek support of
all parts of people, livelihood in dissimilar sections of the country. Therefore, they act since a
unifying force.
Democracy and Elections
Contemporary democratic states have representative governments. Big mass and population of
contemporary democratic states create it hard to practice direct democracy since a shape of
government. Hence, all contemporary democracies have indirect or representative governments,
which are elected through people. These representatives are chosen through people by elections.
Therefore, elections have assumed an extremely significant role in the formation of
contemporary representative democracy. An election is a contest flanked by dissimilar political
parties for receiving people’s support. At times, an individual can also contest an election since a
self-governing candidate. The advantages of contesting elections since a party candidate are since
follows:
Political parties follow specific policies; so, when a candidate symbolizes a party, it is easier
for voters to know what he stands for.
Party candidates get funds from political parties to organize election campaigns.
Party volunteers may be provided through the party to the candidate throughout the procedure
of electioneering.
Familiar leaders of the party canvass for party candidates and address their rallies.
The Election Procedure
Elections in a democratic organization are based on the principle of equality i.e. one person, one
vote. All persons irrespective of caste, color, creed, sex or religion enjoy sure political rights. In
the middle of these rights, the mainly significant right is the right to vote. In politics, everyone is
equal-every person has an equal say in the formation of government.
Secret Ballot: The voter casts his vote secretly in an enclosure; therefore that no one comes to
know of the choice he has made. In representative democracy, secret voting is preferred;
otherwise, the voter may not exercise his true choice openly due to fear of intimidation and
undue power.
Constituency: Constituencies are marked in order to carry out the election procedure with
efficiency. Constituency is the territorial region from where a candidate contests elections. If
only one person is to be elected from a constituency, it is described a single member
Constituency. If many representatives are elected from the similar constituency, then it is
described a multi-member constituency.
The whole election procedure, e.g. in India, is mannered, controlled and managed through a self-
governing body described the Election Commission. It ensures free and fair elections. The
Election Commission fixes and announces the dates of elections in our country. The Election
Commission has another extremely significant responsibility. It makes certain that the party in
authority does not get undue advantage in excess of other parties. The procedure of election runs
by many formal levels. This procedure includes of:
Announcement of dates
Filing of nomination papers
Scrutiny of applications
Withdrawal of applications
Publication of the final list
Campaigning
Casting of votes
Announcement of results
In fact, the moment the Election Commission announces the dates of elections, political parties
start their behaviors. The first task of political parties becomes the selection of candidates who
are going to contest in elections since their party candidates. Contemporary electioneering is a
cumbersome procedure. It requires a vast system to control it, which is provided through political
parties. Moreover, elections need a reasonable amount of finance, which is also provided through
political parties.
Selection of Candidates
In the functioning of representative democracy, the role of political parties has become both,
indispensable and extremely significant. In fact, political parties have given an organized form to
democratic politics. Political parties field and support their candidates, and organize their
campaigns. Every political party announces specific programmes and promises to implement
these programmes in case it comes to authority. Voters while casting votes for a candidate of a
scrupulous party do therefore knowing fully well the programmes and policies of that party.
Nomination
Once election dates are announced, political parties have to choose their candidates by a
procedure of selection. Then, candidates have to file their nominations to election offices which
are appointed through the Election Commission. There is a last date for filing nomination papers.
After all nominations have been filed, there is a procedure of scrutiny. It is done to check
whether all information given in nomination papers is correct. If there is a doubt or a candidate is
not establishing eligible, his/her nomination paper is rejected. Once the scrutiny is in excess of,
candidates are given a date for withdrawal. The withdrawal procedure makes certain that
There is since small wastage of votes since possible and
That all names printed on ballot paper are those of serious candidates.
Representations
Political parties have representations which are allotted through the Election Commission (EC).
The EC allots representations to each political party and makes certain that they are not same
because they can confuse voters. In India, representations are important for the following
causes:
They are a help for illiterate voters who cannot read names of candidates.
They help in differentiating flanked by two candidates having the similar name.
They reflect ideology of the concerned political party.
Campaigning
Campaigning is the procedure through which a candidate tries to persuade voters to vote for him
rather than for others. Each political party and every candidate tries to reach since several voters
since possible. A number of campaign techniques are involved in election procedure. Few of
these are:
Holding of public meetings which are addressed through candidates and a number of regional
and national leaders of a party.
Pasting of posters on walls and putting up big and little hoardings on roadside.
Distinction of handbills which highlight largest issues of their manifesto.
Taking out procession in support of dissimilar candidates.
Door-to-door appeal through influential people in party and locality.
 Broadcasting and telecasting speeches of several party leaders.
Counting of Votes and Declaration of Results
After voting is in excess of, ballot boxes are sealed and taken to counting centers. Throughout
counting, the candidate or his representative is present. After counting, a candidate receiving an
easy majority is declared elected. At times, easy majority leads to troubles. The elected candidate
symbolizes majority when there are only two candidates, but not therefore if there are three or
more candidates; e.g. if A gets 40 and B, C and D get 20 votes, then A is declared elected. Now,
however A has got 40 votes he does not reflect the majority because 60 votes are actually against
him. Elections are an extremely significant section of democracy because the whole fortification
of a democratic organization depends on how elections are held.
Democracy and Alienation
Alienation amounts to isolation from one’s genuine or essential nature. What passes for
democracy in the contemporary world tends to be a limited and indirect shape of democracy,
thereby alienating the individual citizen. This democracy is small more than, what Joseph
Schumpeter referred to since an ‘institutional arrangement’ for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the authority to decide through means of a competitive thrash about for
peoples’ vote.
This institutional arrangement has been criticized through radical democrats for reducing popular
participation to a close to meaningless ritual, i.e., casting a vote every some years for politicians
who can only be removed through replacing them with another set of politicians. In short, people
never rule and the rising gulf flanked by government and people is reflected in the spread of
inertia, apathy and alienation.
Democracy and Public Opinion
To a great extent, democracy depends on public opinion. In a representative democracy, every
government has to think of what will be the public reaction to its policies. All parties want to
capture and retain authority. Coming back to authority in the next successive election depends on
what people think in relation to the job when the party was in authority.
Strong public opinion plays an extremely important role in capture of authority and forming
government through a single party or a combination of parties, described coalition. If the public
is alert and intelligent and keeps itself informed, government cannot take the risk of disregarding
people’s aspirations. If it disregards their aspirations, it instantly becomes unpopular. On the
other hand, if public is not alert and intelligent, government can become irresponsible? At times,
this might threaten the extremely foundations of democracy. Formulation of Public Opinion:
Public opinion is shaped in several methods and many agencies contribute in shaping public
opinion. For a healthy public opinion, citizens should know what is happening approximately
them, in their own country and in the world at big. A country’s government makes policies not
only in relation to the internal troubles, but has a foreign policy also. A citizen necessity hears
dissimilar opinions in order to create up his/her mind. Therefore for democracy to job well,
citizens require to apprise themselves of several views. In the middle of the agencies, which help
in formulating sound public opinion are the press, the electronic media and the cinema.
Democracy allows a person to contribute his/her share of opinion in decision-making. For all
this, there is a must of free discussion and argument. mDemocratic government provides a lot of
freedom to the ordinary citizen. Though, citizens have to exploit freedom with responsibility,
restraint and discipline. If people have few grievances, they necessity illustrate them by channels
provided through the democratic organization. Acts of indiscipline on the section of citizens
might wreck the democratic set up of an organization.
Gender and Democracy: Participation and Representation
The third wave of democratization which began in the mid 1970s brought in relation to the
competitive electoral politics to several countries in Latin America, East and Central Europe and
sections of Africa and Asia. It was seen since a triumph for democracy since the number of
electoral democracies increased from 39 in 1974 to 117 in 1998. Though, since in the earlier
longstanding democracies, the stages of women’s representation in new democracies are still low
in both legislatures and executives. The thrash about for political citizenship was for an extensive
time a significant goal of women’s movements. The suffrage campaigns that took lay in several
sections of the world in the late 19th and early twentieth centuries were based on the assumption
that right to vote and participate in electoral procedures was an significant section of being a
citizen.
If democracies now guarantee all citizens the right to participate in the political arena, why are
women therefore poorly represented? Does the low participation of women mean that
democracies are undemocratic? Theorists of democratization have a diversity of definitions of
what counts since a democracy.
At one end of the continuum, there is a minimal definition which implies that all that is
needed is competitive elections.
Mid-range definitions also emphasize requires for freedom and pluralism, such since civil
rights and freedom of speech, therefore that state may be measured a liberal democracy.
Neither of these definitions makes the distinction flanked by right to participate and the skill
to participate. Only the more utopian definitions that believe the ‘excellence of democracy’
emphasize that democracy also implies the enjoyment of full citizenship in its broadest sense.
Citizenship is defined not presently in words of civil and political rights, but also in words of
economic and social rights that can facilitate the full participation of all in the political sphere.
Democracy can be vibrant and effective only when citizens take section in an active civil society.
The ‘public’ and the ‘private’: Feminists have argued for an extensive time that there are a
number of troubles with the methods in which democracy is defined, theorized and practiced.
Liberal political theory is based on a division flanked by public and private sphere. Within this
model, men seem since the head of households and since abstract individuals active in public
sphere, while women are relegated annalistically to private sphere. The ‘political’ is, so, defined
since masculine in an extremely profound sense.
In practical words, the manner in which political action is mannered in democracies and nature of
mainly women means that they participate to a distant lesser extent than men, particularly at
higher stages of conventional political action. For instance:
Several women discover approach and object of politics forbidding
Even if they do decide to pursue a political career, women often experience difficulties in
receiving selected on winnable seats on the party’s list
Further, since in other areas of public sphere, women discover that constraints placed on them
through their responsibilities in ‘private’ sphere also reduce their skill to participate in
conventional political action on similar words since men.
It would be incorrect to provide an impression that there is an agreement on nature of democracy.
Lenin, for instance, has argued that liberal democracy is a screen which hides use and power of
the masses. More recently, Carole Pateman has argued that democracy necessity also extend to
the workplace – where mainly people spend a great section of their day – before we can be said
to live under democratic circumstances. A dissimilar kind of criticism of democracy argues,
through pointing out that even democracy can go dangerously wrong. Aristotle reminded us that
for its proper functioning, even a democracy requires a stable organization of law. Democracy
can otherwise become the arbitrary dictatorship of the several, i.e., the mob rule. In a same vein,
De Tocqueville argued that democracy creates the possibility of a new shape of tyranny – the
tyranny of the majority. Madison warned of the danger of factions, which means a group-big or
little – whose interest does not reflect the common interest of the people, and who effort to
subvert the democratic organization for their own purposes. Contemporary democracies tend to
make bureaucratic systems approximately themselves. According to Max Weber, the interest of
the bureaucratic systems creates a tension in democratic practice, since the bureaucracy created
through democracy will have a tendency to choke off the democratic procedure. Pareto argued
that, howsoever democratic a society may claim to be, it will be inevitably ruled through a
powerful elite. But, it can argued that the thought of isolation of Powers and the concept of
Checks and Balances can go an extensive method in avoiding despotism. Moreover, we require
to ensure that those people who create laws do not enforce them also.
Democracy and the Internet
No other invention of this new technical period has proliferated since rapidly since the Internet.
The internet has rapidly accelerated the growth of transnational dealings fostering a type of
mutual power and interdependence. The Internet affects democracy in a number of methods. Its
role in combating totalitarian regimes is, indeed, positive, for it creates access to information and
therefore, undermines the monopoly of the government in question.
But on the other hand, the Internet creates troubles for democracy insofar since it weakens the
state’s regulative capability. The transnational interpretation of civilizations through the Internet
undermines the capability of government to govern effectively. Further, since distant since
national security is concerned, the Internet has opened up new possibilities for asymmetrical
conflicts. States can sustain huge damage from net based attacks, not from other states but from
individuals. Nevertheless, the new information technology will almost certainly, on balance,
reinforce the existing authority buildings rather than weaken them.

SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY
Democracy and Modern Socialism: A Conceptual Framework
Let us first analyze the concept of contemporary democracy before Karl Marx. It is significant to
note that his secure associate Friedrich Engels does not speak in relation to the democracy, but
always in relation to the pure democracy. Through this he meant a bourgeois state, in which
common suffrage prevails, but private property is not touched. It meant that it was either possible
to erect a socialist state directly after the overthrow of feudal and military monarchy or pure
democracy, that is the bourgeoisie capitalistic republic, would first approach into authority. At
that time, people came to accept a democratic state, since a bourgeoisie state governed through a
way of common suffrage. When Marx began his political behaviors, he establishes democracy to
be already a great international movement. The history of European democracy extended back
two and a half millennia. In the republics of ancient Greece, the political shape of democracy was
the contract to aristocracy or oligarchy, to the rule of the ‘minority’ of the rich or noble. In
contrast to this, democracy was the rule of majority, of the masses in common, whereby the
owners of property or the bearers of nobility had no privilege to claim. Greek political science
already engaged itself with the question, whether every state in which will of the majority of
citizens decides is a democracy, no matter what the composition of this majority is and how it
arises or whether a definite class character belongs to a democracy. Aristotle answered the
question therefore: that democracy is nothing more than the rule of poor in the state; presently
since oligarchy is the rule of the rich. In the transitional ages, democratic shapes showed
themselves in urban communes. Throughout transition to contemporary times, the radical
religious sects became the bearers of democratic ideas. Therefore, democratic masses and their
leaders were united in a distrust of contemporary growth, and their view that both republic and
democracy were primarily a moral matter, a moral renewal of the human race, already contained
a condemnation of contemporary economic and social growth. Today, the democratic ideal is
more than a mere composite of individualism, socialism and nationalism. It is based upon the
acceptance and promotion of features of life of each group of men, therefore uniting
individualism with a shape of regionalism or nationalism and on the other hand, it implies a
system of any one group, which is less homogenous than that implied in the earlier shapes of
socialism. For democracy, implies a freedom of voluntary association and the performance
through such associations of several functions which the earlier socialists would have left to the
state. Democracy is to begin with a principle of legitimacy. Authority is legitimate only when it
is derived from power of the people and based upon their consent. From a normative standpoint,
the definition of democracy strictly derives from the literal meaning of the word-’Authority of
the people’. It is recognized positively through the subsistence of urbanized representative
organizations and through the establishment of constitutional government. It presupposes not a
direct exercise of authority, but delegation of authority; that is an organization of ‘manage’ and
‘limitation’ of government. From the time the word ‘demokratia’ was coined in the fifth century
B.C until roughly a century ago, democracy was used since a political concept. Tocqueville was
struck, though, through the social characteristic of American democracy and we therefore speak
of ‘social democracy’. Marxism has popularized the expression ‘economic democracy’ and guild
socialism; Webb’s book ‘Industrial Democracy’ has given currency to the label ‘industrialist
democracy’. The labels people’s democracy, soviet democracy and the like, pose a special
democracy. When the socialist movement revived in Europe in the late 1860’s, mainly socialist
leaders were under the power of Marxism. In 1881, the German Social Democratic Party and in
1897 the Swedish Democratic Social Party, carried public ownership of all means of
manufacture, sharing and swap since their objectives. Other socialist parties adopted the similar
objectives in their constitutions or manifestoes, and even the British labour movement, which had
not carried socialism till 1918, adapted too little extent the aim of public ownership. Now after a
lapse of a small in excess of three decades from the end of the Second World War, the picture is
dissimilar. In all urbanized democratic countries of the West, except for Italy and France,
communist parties have been reduced to nullities, and even the Italian and French communist
parties have been diminishing in strength. In the communist countries of Eastern Europe, there
are rising revisionist tendencies while in Russia itself, there seems to be a rising acceptance of
Khrushchev’s dictum that it is possible for communist parties to ignore the question of means.
On the other hand, social democratic parties have grown in strength in all European countries.
They have either been in authority or have shaped the largest opposition. They no longer seek to
replace the entire capitalist order through an economy based on public ownership of means of
manufacture, sharing or swap. They are reconciled to a mixed economy accompanied through
full employment and social security. The authors of ‘twentieth century’ socialism have stressed
that socialism should be defined in words of vital values of equality, freedom and fellowship and
not in words of any scrupulous means through which those values may be realized. Same
changes have taken lay in the programs of all European Socialists – these parties are taking a
much more discriminating attitude towards public ownership; though, social democracy supports
the public demand that it is necessary to safeguard significant public interests. Therefore, the
socialists in the underdeveloped world can attract few precious lessons from a survey of these
changes in the fortunes of communism and social democracy in Western countries and the altered
objectives of social democratic parties.
Western Liberal Democracy
Contemporary liberal conception of politics acquired a realistic, pragmatic, secular and scientific
orientation. State became the pivotal political system. Rousseau introduced the thought of
popular sovereignty and democracy. It was recognized that within the reach of the people,
organizations such since state, government and semi–official organizations etc began to be
treated since centers of political action. Rights of private property, and individual liberty began to
be asserted. In the advanced liberal concept, the state is viewed since a positive welfare organ.
Liberal democracy assured a competitive party model since essential to symbolize the wishes of
people. This involves eliciting people’s opinion by periodic elections to legislatures. Further,
government is seen since limited and since operating in a world of voluntary associations.
Society is viewed since pluralistic, which means that it is collected of autonomous parts and
associations. Hence, government sets out to rule in general interest. Western liberal democracy is
a political theory that appeared in Europe throughout the seventeenth century and has sustained
to this day since one of the dominant theories and ideologies in the world. This excludes the
socialist countries with dictatorships of dissimilar types. Locke contributed the ideas of limited
government, constitutionalism, individual rights and the rule of law. Bentham’s contribution
place in the utilitarian conception of majority interest calculated in words of individual utility.
Mill contributed the thought of individual liberty, plurality of opinions, and the principle of
growth of individual personality. When we describe the liberal state to be politically democratic,
we should note that it refers not only to the electoral procedure, but also to characteristics like the
rule of law and right to property. In a liberal organization without any written constitution such
since in the United Kingdom, this means the law enacted through parliament is supreme. And the
property rights granted in liberal democratic states prevent the government from creation drastic
changes in economic matters. This is the cause that the radical view criticizes liberal democracy,
for not laying emphasis on economic equality. They described themselves people’s democracy,
which implies that the means of manufacture are socially owned. Therefore, the above provides a
fairly good picture of liberal conception of democracy which is based on a number of
assumptions; first, it holds that an individual is endowed with an autonomous mind, cause and
will; that is, he is a rational being. Therefore, he can decide what is best for him. Second, the
individual is a moral being, which means that they are all equal. Each one should have an equal
opportunity to participate in politics. Third, truth is comparative and multi–dimensional and is
not absolute. So, at a scrupulous moment, truth can be recognized only by a free inter-play of
ideas. That, tolerance is the essence of democracy was strongly argued through Mill in ‘On
Liberty’. Truth in a democracy implies that every one can participate in politics and it is the
government of all people; so, a democratic government acts in the interest of all. Competition in
the middle of leaders and parties ensures popular manage in excess of government and maximum
liberty for individuals. Rule of law, equality before law and vital minimum rights are features of
a Western liberal democracy.
Non-Western Shapes of Democracy
It may be surprising to few those countries like the erstwhile USSR, Communist China, North
Korea and North Vietnam, to name but some claim to be democratic. Indeed, they claim to be the
only true democracies. In order to understand that exact nature of this claim, it is significant to go
back to Marx. He whispered that the politics of the West was characterized through class
conflicts, and that competition flanked by parties would be no more once the feud flanked by
classes ended. True democracy he idea, would exist only where one class predominated,
embodying the overwhelming size of the people. All other shapes of democracy were denounced
since bourgeois. If an authority clash lived on a competitive foundation, therefore that it might be
convinced through wealth, Marx measured that democracy to be bourgeois, and so, unworthy of
any name. Competitive politics is condemned through communists for being a fraud. They
themselves claim to have no other classes because they say that all the exploiting clusters were
eradicated in the early days of the Russian revolution. Soviet lawyers and political apologists
argue that the West’s adaptation of democracy is a sham and fraud because of the subsistence of
an economic organization- Capitalism- which favors the rich.
Socialist Democracy
In the west where capitalism has prevailed, this takes the shape of accommodation of progressive
dilution of the socialist principle. We all know what socialism is. In company with other
ideological concepts, socialism has a double reference. On one hand, it refers to the ideals,
values, properties of what is often described the socialist vision. On the other hand, it refers to
empirical characteristics of social and political organizations which embody the vision. At the
stage of values, the significant ones are those of freedom, equality, society, brotherhood, social
justice, a classless society, co-operation, progress, peace, prosperity, abundance and happiness.
Sometimes, the value components are stated negatively: socialists are opposed to oppression, use,
inequality, strife, war, injustice, poverty, misery and dehumanization. At the stage of
organizations, the adherents and opponents similar would say that socialism is opposed to
capitalist private enterprise organization, which it seeks to replace through a organization of
manage in excess of wealth and property and the social supervision of system of economic
action; this is summarized in the formula, the general or public ownership of means of
manufacture. Names in political communication have shown themselves to be unstable in excess
of times. John Ruskin, for instance, proudly described himself a communist, while he repudiated
socialism, republicanism and democracy. For H.M Hyndman, the word socialism denoted mild,
Christian-liberal do-goodery, while the word social democracy meant for him militant Marxism.
Today, of course, the opposite would be the case. It was Proudhon, not Marx and Engels, who
first described his doctrine ‘scientific socialism’. Bakunin, at one time, held a system which was
described the Alliance for Socialist Democracy. Marx himself in his youth dismissed
communism since being only an ‘imperfect realization of socialism’; later Marxian usage became
more systematic, however never entirely free from ambiguity.
Four Vital Tendencies of Socialism: The Essence of Socialist Democracy
An effort is made in this element to provide a more systematic outline to the tendencies, which
jointly create up socialist idea, reflected in the concept of socialist democracy.
Egalitarianism is the first tendency, which is the classical principle of socialism. The
dominant notion of equality culminates in a conception of society. Politically, egalitarianism
obviously demands complete democracy, but democracy in its easy, classical, unitary sense,
without enduring party divisions.
Moralism, the next tendency, constitutes the Christian principle of socialism; that is, it
stresses on high ideals which seek to bring justice through replacing enmity with mutual help,
and fostering feelings of brotherly love and understandings in the middle of human beings. The
political shape mainly harmonious with moralist values is, again democracy, possibly tempered
through mild notions of paternalism and certainly presupposing a sense of moderation and
responsibility on the section of individual principles. Little and big societies governed through a
majoritarian organization are fitting vehicles for the realization of the moralist ideal.
Rationalism is the third tendency, in on behalf of the principle of enlightenment. Here, the
chief values are individual happiness, cause, knowledge, efficiency in manufacture and the
rational purposeful system of human society in the interest of progress. The political shape that
rationalism leads towards is also democracy, as this tendency tends to acknowledge the
fundamental equality of human beings and believes in self –sufficiency of individual human
cause. It believes, though, that democracy should be tempered with meritocracy, consistent
guidance through experts, scientists, technicians, and intellectual people who are to be trusted
with the promotion of common happiness.
Libertarianism, which could be termed the romantic principle of socialism, is the last of the
vital tendencies in the sense that it is extreme and radical in the middle of socialist principles. It
centers on the ideal freedom, in the sense of total absence of restraint, internal and external. Here,
it would be hard to talk in words of a favored political arrangement. Anarchy is what comes
adjacent to its ideal; but again libertarianism too goes with the acceptance of equality in a
fundamental sense. Libertarianism is the gentlest and the mainly tolerant of socialist tendencies.
These are the four tendencies of socialism, which reflect the essence of socialist democracy.
The comparative weight of each tendency, though, varies from case to case. In other terms, we
discover that one or another tendency assumes predominance in excess of others in the case of a
given country, doctrine, movement or historical era. This is why the predominance of
libertarianism in the Western New left is in a big section due to the rising moderation and
integration of social democracy.
Democratic Techniques and Socialism
The rise of fascism in Europe and the continuance of dictatorship of the Communist Party in
erstwhile Soviet Union also led several socialists throughout the thirties to provide rising
attention to the techniques of democracy under a collectivist regime. While the socialist
movement in common had for several years maintained that collectivism without democracy was
a distant cry from socialism and that there could be no socialism without the accompaniment of
thorough-going democratic processes in the economic, political and social organizations of the
country, there were several who took the location prior to the thirties that all that was necessary
to do was to transfer industry from private to public ownership and democracy would take care of
itself. Experiments in state ownership and manage in communist and fascist countries and even
in lands with a democratic shape of government, both in times of peace and war, proved a rude
awakener to these students of the movement and caused big numbers within and without to think
by methods and means of safeguarding and strengthening the democratic procedure under a co-
operative organization of industry. This examination caused them to place rising emphasis on:
The require for preserving and strengthening democratic forces of the population such since
the deal and industrial-union movement, the consumers and producers co-operatives, labors,
socialist and progressive political parties, educational and cultural movement of the masses, and
for endeavoring to create these movement thoroughly democratic.
The require for bringing in relation to the secure co-operation in the middle of industrial
workers, the therefore-described transitional class, the cultivation population, in the thrash about
for bigger social arrangements.
Require for applying effective democratic techniques to regional, state, and federal
governments therefore since to create them thoroughly responsive to the will of the people.
The require for encouraging, under a co-operative organization of industry, an long
organization of voluntary co-operative enterprises, since a supplement to publicly owned
industries, especially in agriculture, the distributive trades and in cultural action.
Require for establishment within each industry of processes whereby consumers, workers,
and technological and administrative clusters would be adequately represented in determination
of policies.
Require of experimenting with the corporate of public ownership of a semiautonomous
character, and of decentralizing manage and management of public ownership since much since
seemed compatible and socially efficient.
The require for developing administrative processes directed toward efficient, honest, and
democratic management by a sound organization of civil service, public accounting, communal
bargaining, personal dealings etc. Techniques should be devised for stimulating industrial
incentives by a proper organization of rewards for job well done.
Require for freedom of consumer choice.
The must of preserving civil liberties and preventing discriminatory practices against any part
of population because of race, religion, color, or national origin.
Require for co-operating with other countries with a view to eliminate the reasons of war, of
abolishing imperialistic controls, and of raising livelihood standards during the world.
Trend towards Democratic Socialism
The goals of democratic socialism have one item in general; that is to create democracy more real
through broadening the application of democratic principles from political to non-political areas
of society. Freedom of worship and freedom of political associations are still the mainly essential
foundations of democracy. The Socialists concentrate on the promotion of these ‘finer points of
democracy’. In contrast, socialist parties have fought an uphill and usually a losing thrash about
in nations were democracy is not a livelihood item, but an aspiration, a hope, and thought yet to
be realized. This happened for instance, in Germany, Italy and France.
Democratic Socialism in England
England urbanized parliamentary organizations, which were conductive to the development of
socialism. England moved with the times, and brought in relation to the compromise flanked by
democracy and socialism. Socialism was allowed to emerge peacefully without require to have a
bloody revolution. Democracy tolerated the rise of social principles. In Britain, there was no
require for workers to revolt on a size level against the government, since the government itself
took necessary steps to promote their interests. British soil was appropriate for the development
of democratic socialism, while on the other hand, in Russia and China the climate was not
favorable since the government neglected the interests of the poor and tried to suppress them.
Since a result, revolutionary socialism rose and its tide swept the government off its feet.
Democratic socialism has no high priest like totalitarian communism. It has no Marx or Lenin.
The mainly influential socialist thinkers in England have regularly been without any official
location. Their impact has been due to their moral power and felicitous literary approach. The
movement owes much to the ideas of Robert Owen, Sidney and Beartrice Webb, R.H. Tawney,
G.D.H Cole, Harold Laski and several others. But the philosophy still remnants undefined. ‘The
nature and content of democratic socialism cannot through any means be defined. It is a broad
framework wherein we have to fit in our ideas of democracy and socialism in tune with our
political backdrop and cultural and spiritual heritage.’ Therefore there is no definite form of
democratic socialism. It is to be dissimilar in dissimilar countries according to requires and
circumstances. Still we can point out sure broad principles of democratic socialism.
Broad Principles
Democratic Socialism lays great stress on the importance of the superior interests of society since
an entire, against the narrow and selfish interests of the individual. It is against individualism or
laissez-faire, it is a theory of society welfare. It promotes cooperation instead of competition and
removes antagonism flanked by the employer and the employee. Socialism stands for the
principle of economic equality. The state should prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands
of some individuals therefore that the gulf flanked by the rich and the poor classes may not be
wide. Though, democratic socialism does not aim at establishing absolute equality, which is
approximately impossible. Its aim is to remove glaring inequality of wealth through progressive
taxation of the rich. It stands for equitable opportunities for all. Democratic socialism also stands
for general ownership of significant means of manufacture, which are to be utilized for general
good. It is in favor of granting full civil, political and economic rights. The individual is free to
lead his own method of life, outside intervention. It stands for extension of democracy from
political to economic and social meadows. Therefore, there is a desire to widen the foundation of
democracy. If democracy is to be real, it should go distant beyond the frontiers of politics and
enter the economic field. It is against the ownership of land, factories and other means of
manufacture through some at the cost of the society. It necessity be clearly noted that democratic
socialism is not against all shapes of private property, but only against such private property,
which becomes the means of use. It allows little plots of land, homes and other limited property,
since these cannot be put to anti-social uses. In conclusion, we may say that democratic socialism
is neither merely anti-capitalism. ‘There is no use of man through man, no injustice, oppression,
or denial of opportunities.’ One of the extra ordinary results of the victory of democratic
socialism in Britain was the elimination of communism since a significant factor in British
politics. Even in developing countries, democratic socialism gives an alternative to the extremes
of communism and capitalism through bringing in relation to the much needed socio-economic
transformation of civilizations.
New Leftism: Attack on Soviet Marxism
The New Left has a scrupulous feature of its own. It believes in socialism and yet strives to
promote and protect humanism that had become a scapegoat under the ‘socialist’ organization of
the former Soviet Union. That is, while the achievements of socialism is the bedrock of
traditional Leftism, socialism integrated with democracy and humanism is the keynote of, what is
usually recognized since, New Leftism. What keeps the New left at a fundamental variance with
the Old left is its stern emphasis on pursuing positive social and political goals. It believes in
freedom and democracy, and is prepared to fight for these ideas. The New Leftism is a product of
the post–Second World era. Its development is on explanation of three factors: stern reaction
against the adaptation of official Marxism since given through the great comrades of the former
Soviet Union, vehement protest against the social, economic and political create up of affluent
civilizations of advanced Western countries, and extremely strong emphasis on the worth and
dignity of man. That is, the movement came since a result of a multi-stage protest—protest
against Stalinist excesses, against the dogmatic and mechanistic adaptation of Marxism since
given through the Soviet leaders, against centralized and undemocratic methods of doing things
and against anti- humanistic, bureaucratic and bourgeoisie society of oppression. The mainly
recent land spot is the reappearance of the New left, which may be termed ‘New Socialism’. The
fight of the American Negroes for civil rights, the student revolt in France aimed at changing the
education organization, the thrash about of workers in Spain for democratization of the political
organization are few of the momentous measures that inspired New Leftist thinkers to say that
youthful units can bring in relation to the desired state of affairs. What is needed is change:
change towards real democracy, which can be brought in relation to the through youthful parts of
people. This is because they alone can understand the pernicious dimensions of a socialist
organization and then fight for restoration of a free, democratic and dignified life. In brief, the
aim of the New Leftists is to attack the diversity of Marxism that urbanized in the former Soviet
Union. Instead, they think in words of a new diversity of socialism based on practicable portion
of Marxism. Socialism of this kind necessity is in consonance with premises of a democratic
organization. Therefore that people may have the boons of freedom, growth and happiness.
Challenges/Difficulties in the Implementation of Socialism by Democratic Processes
To say that it is possible to achieve a change in excess of to socialist rule with democratic means
does not necessarily imply, though, that it is possible also to implement and uphold socialism
with such means. Communist theory has persistently alleged—and on this point it has not yet
changed—that it is impossible to carry by socialism under a organization of free elections,
freedom of speech, free association and free majority decisions. Soviet theorists do not stand
alone in their contention that the implementation and maintenance of socialism are impossible
with democratic means. Right-wing liberals, like Friedrich Hayek, agree with them on that count.
Their interest is, of course, the opposite: they hope to see democracy maintained and socialism
abandoned. But on the biggest issue under discussion here–whether it is possible to have both
democracy and socialism—he two opponents are agreed. It is impossible, they say. In his ‘Road
of Serfdom’ Hayek predicts that socialism will inevitably lead to the abolition of democratic
liberties. One of his chief arguments is that socialism needs centralized scheduling and that, even
in the event that there is a big majority for socialism, there regularly will be no majority able to
agree on particulars ends and means. In such a case, he says, a democratic parliament ‘cannot
direct’. In appraising the Lenin-Hayek theory of incompatibility flanked by democracy and
socialism, we necessity not underestimate the strength of their combined arguments. They
competently point to grave difficulties and dangers. But they fail to prove the impossibility. Their
allegations are half-true at best. It is a strong argument that those who are to lose their privileges
are likely to rise in violent resistance when a radically socialist legislation issues from a pro-
socialist majority in a democratic legislature. This was strikingly illustrated after the Spanish
Revolution of 1931, when the democratic majority in the newly elected parliament occupied in
simultaneously frontal legislative attacks against all vested interests monarchists, army, church,
large land owners and large industrialists- before it had built up sufficiently strong armed forces
of its own for support of the republican government. Though, there is no justification for a
scientific verdict that it was impossible to avoid a same outcome when an effort is made to carry
by socialism with democratic processes. Another strong argument of this problem is that workers
who have won parliamentary majorities may be impatient in their desire to close tangible benefits
quickly and beyond reasonable limits. In order to cope with this danger, it will be necessary to
educate people in advance therefore since to prepare them for a meaningful exercise of majority
powers. That may not be simple, but it is not necessarily impossible. Finally, it is a weighty
argument when Hayek warns that the majority is likely to split whenever biggest decisions on
scheduling become necessary. But once this danger has been well understood in advance, it may
not be impossible to meet it through proper device, such since a cautious preparation of master
plans and delegation of the authority to create current economic decisions under such plans to
few board or commission. The question of compatibility of democracy and socialism, so, is still
an open one. There is good cause to consider that it is necessary to go all the method beside the
totalitarian road, if a majority should be bent on carrying by socialism, although sure
modifications in the procedure of economic legislation and management will be necessary.
Establishment of a penetrating and reassuring political theory concerning the compatibility of
socialism and democracy could also offer encouragement to whatever tendencies there may
develop in present Soviet Russia or few of its satellites towards introduction of more democratic
organizations. It would create possible a stronger and more precise language in international
political discussion in relation to the both democracy and socialism, and coexistence since well.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
What do you understand by democracy?
What is direct democracy?
Briefly examine Aristotle’s views as given in ‘The Politics’.
Discuss the limitations of a direct democracy. Give an appropriate example.
What do you understand by representative democracy?
Discuss the different views on representative democracy.
What is Popular Sovereignty?
Why are elections important in a democracy?
What is the role of public opinion in a democracy?
What do you understand by non-western forms of democracy?
 CHAPTER 7
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

STRUCTURE
Objectives
Gandhism
Marxism
Fascism
Individualism and Communitarianism
Disadvantaged and Affirmative Action
State and Globalization
Development
Secularism
Review Questions
OBJECTIVES
After going through the chapter, you should be able to:
In this chapter, our aim is to acquire a contextual understanding of the meaning and
significance of the moral-political theory of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi
Discuss the pre-Marxian strands of socialism such as utopian socialism.
Enumerate, describe and discuss the basic postulates of Marxism.
Some general features of fascism and the nature of mobilization to achieve dictatorial aims
The nature of state and society under fascist regimes
Understand the individualistic theory of the nature and functions of state.
Understand the relevance of this debate to contemporary political theory and practice.
Define and explain the meaning of globalization.
Discuss the role of multinational corporations in the context of globalization.
Understand the familiarize you with different aspects of the idea of development
Explain the secularism

GANDHISM
Gandhi’s Scripts
Gandhi’s moral-political ideas can be establish in his books since well, letters and editorials in
the four weekly journals, which he edited or published at dissimilar times throughout his public
life in South Africa and India. These weekly journals were: Indian Opinion, Young India,
Harijan, and Navajivan. Gandhi’s books, few of which were first serialized in his journals, were:
Hind Swaraj, Satyagraha in South Africa, The Story of My Experiments with Truth, Ashram
Observances in Action, A Guide to Health, Discourses on the Gita and Constructive Programme.
Gandhi also wrote and published paraphrases and/or translations of Plato’s Apology, W. Salter’s
Ethical Religion, John Ruskin’s Unto this Last, Henry David Thoreau’s Principles of Civil
Disobedience and Leo Tolstoy’s Letter to a Hindoo. Approximately all of Gandhi’s scripts,
including his numerous speeches, interviews and correspondence, can be establish in the 100
volumes of the Composed Jobs of Mahatma Gandhi.Gandhi’s scripts were produced, not in any
academic setting, but in the midst of actual political struggles through vast masses of people
against racial discriminations, colonialism, economic use, untouchability and communalism.
Gandhi led those struggles in South Africa and India. He also campaigned for them throughout
many visits to England, where, incidentally, he had studied for and passed the bar-at-law
examination. He did few of his script on his days of silence and fasting and throughout many
words of imprisonment in South Africa and India. His well-known book, Hind Swaraj, was
written on board the ship Kildonan Castle throughout a return journey from England to South
Africa in November 1909.

Few Powers which Formed Gandhi’s Political Idea

For a historical-contextual understanding of Gandhi’s moral-political theory, it is necessary to
bear in mind that throughout the years from 1905 to 1918, his attitude towards the British
imperial organization went by a protracted procedure of change from loyal support to, first,
disenchantment and, then, to radical opposition. Few of the measures which contributed to this
change in Gandhi’s political ideology were: the Partition of Bengal, racial discriminations against
Indians in South Africa, the Rowlatt Acts, the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre and the Khilafat issue.
The change in Gandhi’s political thinking throughout this era was also convinced through the
following books, which he read.
Critical Scripts on Contemporary Culture
Throughout this era, Gandhi read the jobs of Tolstoy, Ruskin, Carpenter, Maitland, Salter,
R.P.Dutt, Dadabhai Naoroji, etc. Of these, Leo Tolstoy’s The Kingdom of God is within You and
The Gospel in Brief and John Ruskin’s Unto This Last had an extremely great impact on Gandhi.
They and to a lesser extent, the scripts of other authors contributed to his becoming disenchanted
with contemporary western culture. From these scripts, Gandhi also derived few normative ideas
of an alternative to the individualistic, utilitarian and authoritarian principles on which the
imperial/colonial government rested. Gandhi’s ideas of swaraj and sarvodaya, meaning self-
realization by service to others, were greatly convinced through Tolstoy and Ruskin.
Hindu Religious Philosophy
Gandhi also studied the Bhagavad Gita and many other holy books of Hinduism, few of which
were recommended to him through his Jain mentor, Rajchand Mehta, also described
Raychandbhai. These were books on yoga, advaita vedanta, Jainism, Buddhism, Samkhya, etc.
These books led Gandhi to espouse a set of religiously inspired norms or principles of personal
and communal conduct, e.g., the values of satya, ahimsa, aparigraha and samabhava. Gandhi saw
in them an alternative or corrective to the dominant, contemporary/western values or principles
of individualism, utilitarianism and violence. In the Bhagavad Gita, for example, he establish an
‘infallible guide of conduct.’ The hymns of Narsinh Mehta, a saint-poet of the fifteenth century,
also instilled in him the value of service to others, especially the poor and the needy. These
readings and the aforementioned measures turned Gandhi into a radical opponent of the
imperial/colonial government in 1919-20. At a special session of the Indian National Congress
held at Calcutta in 1920, Gandhi successfully moved a settlement on non-co-operation against the
government. India’s goal, he said, is nothing less than swaraj.It was by this procedure of change
in his thinking and actions throughout this decisive stage in his life that he urbanized his moral-
political theory and practice of satyagraha, swaraj and sarvodaya. Jointly, these seemed to him to
be providing an emancipator alternative to the political theory of colonial/imperial modernity. He
also whispered that his conception of swaraj and sarvodaya is an emancipator alternative to
illiberal traditionalism since well.
Swaraj: Inward Freedom and Outward Freedom
Through Swaraj, Gandhi meant both outward or political freedom and inward or spiritual
freedom. In ‘outward freedom,’ he incorporated national political independence and
parliamentary swaraj. They are shapes of outward freedom in that they seek to free people from
external manage or rule through others, be they foreigners or one’s own compatriots.
Through ‘inward freedom,’ he meant freedom from such inner impediments since ignorance,
illusions, selfishness, greed, intolerance and hatred. These impede or obstruct the individual’s
self-realization or achievement of moksha, i.e. the atman’s realization of its identity with the
Brahman or paramatman. Hence, he writes: ‘Government in excess of self is the truest Swaraj; it
is synonymous with moksha or salvation.’ Gandhi made an original contribution, both in theory
and in practice, with regard to both these kinds of swaraj. He talked of his ideal of swaraj since a
square, of which the four inseparable faces are:
Political independence;
Economic independence;
Non-violence in social dealings and moral obligations toward others; and
Truth since dharma.
Gandhi’s account deserves quoting:
Let there be no mistake in relation to the concept of swaraj. It is complete independence of
alien manage and complete economic independence. Therefore at one end, you have political
independence, at the other the economic. It has two other ends. One of them is moral and social;
the corresponding end is dharma, i.e. religion in the highest sense of the word. It contains
Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc., but is Larger to them all. You may recognize it through the
name of Truth that pervades everything and will survive all destruction and all transformation.
Moral and social uplift may be recognized through the word we are used to, i.e. non-violence. Let
us call this the square of swaraj, which will be out of form if any of its angles is untrue. In the
language of the Congress, we cannot achieve this political and economic freedom without truth
and non-violence, in concrete words without faith in God and hence, moral and social elevation.
Independence and Parliamentary Swaraj
The first component of Gandhi’s conception of swaraj since outward freedom is national political
independence. He made a greater contribution than any other single individual to the transfer of
political authority from the imperial government to the Indian national leadership. He is rightly
described the ‘Father of the Nation’. While maintaining that national political independence was
an essential meaning of his conception of swaraj, Gandhi argued that it is only an incomplete or
partial meaning or component of it. In his view, a fuller or deeper conception of swaraj ‘is
infinitely greater than and contains independence.’ That fuller conception of swaraj contains,
besides national political independence, the following additional components: a ‘parliamentary or
democratic swaraj’ and swaraj since self-realization by service to others.In 1931, Gandhi
declared that he was ‘wedded to adult suffrage.’ On another occasion, he said: ‘Swaraj of a
people means the sum total of the swaraj of individuals.’ He elaborated it in the following terms:
Through Swaraj I mean the government of India through the consent of the people since
ascertained through the main number of the adult population, male or female, native-born or
domiciled…. [R]eal swaraj will approach not through the acquisition of power through some but
through the acquisition of the capability through all to resist power when it is abused. In other
terms, swaraj is to be obtained through educating the masses to a sense of their capability to
regulate and manage power.
What is conveyed in the above passages is a model of what Gandhi described ‘parliamentary or
democratic swaraj,’ for the achievement of which, he devoted a considerable section of his
political job. In Hind Swaraj , Gandhi had taken an very negative view of the value or role of the
organizations of contemporary culture, namely, the parliament, law-courts, the police, the
military, machinery, hospitals, railways, etc. These organizations of contemporary culture, he
said, were divorced from morality, whereas, through contrast, ‘the tendency of Indian culture is
to elevate the moral being.’ In lay of the organizations of contemporary western culture, he put
forward an alternative ideal of ‘real house rule … [namely] self-rule and self-manage’ through
the individuals in accordance with the spiritual values of truth and non-violence.
Though, within a year of his active involvement in mobilizing the Indian masses into the freedom
thrash about, Gandhi made an incomplete revision of his earlier views on the organizations of
contemporary culture. That revision was due not only to his active involvement in the freedom
thrash about, but also to the criticisms which several political thinkers and political leaders had
made of Gandhi’s booklet. At any rate, within in relation to the a year of his final return to India
from South Africa in 1915, Gandhi came to adopt a rather positive attitude towards the
organizations of contemporary life, including the parliament, law-courts, machinery, railways
and hospitals. Rather than dismissing them outright since he had done in his Hind Swaraj, he now
reluctantly incorporated them in what he described his ‘pardonable programme for the
achievement of parliamentary swaraj.’He said that his Hind Swaraj was to be taken, not since ‘an
effort to go back to the therefore-described ignorant dark ages’, but since an effort to analyze
contemporary culture ‘in the level of ethics.’ He declared that in the name of his ideal swaraj, he
would not dream, since he had been accused of doing, ‘of no railways, no machinery, no army,
no navy, no laws and no law courts.’ He would rather have them re-structured therefore that they
operate ‘for the benefit of the people,’ and ‘not since now for draining the masses arid.’ He now
viewed ‘parliamentary’, i.e., ‘democratic swaraj’ since an extremely necessary and precious
component of his conception of comprehensive swaraj. ‘Therefore distant since I can see,’ he
wrote in 1920, ‘Swaraj will be a Parliament chosen through the people with the fullest authority
in excess of fund, the police, the military, the navy, the courts and the educational organizations.’
Since to the organizational characteristics of ‘parliamentary swaraj,’ Gandhi preferred it to be a
village-based, decentralized set-up, in which all but the lowest stage of government was to be
indirectly elected through the immediately lower stage. This decentralized, village-based model
of parliamentary/democratic swaraj was not the model that was favored through the Congress
and adopted through the Indian Constitution. The Constitution, though, does incorporate few
therefore-described Gandhian organizations such since the village panchayats. Moreover, the
personal and civil liberties since well since the democratic rights component of the liberal-
democratic political philosophy of the Constitution are vital to Gandhi’s own moral-political
philosophy.
Few Characteristics of Parliamentary Swaraj
In his practical and theoretical job for establishing Parliamentary Swaraj, Gandhi concentrated on
endowing it with four characteristics: universal adult franchise, civil liberties, minority rights,
and a primary commitment to justice for the poor and the exploited. These, he whispered, are the
necessary ingredients of parliamentary swaraj. Gandhi regarded personal and civil liberties to be
the ‘basis’ and ‘breath’ of Parliamentary Swaraj. In a speech before the all India Congress
Committee in September 1940, he said, ‘Freedom of speech and pen is the basis of Swaraj’. It is
the ‘only means’, he added, for the non-violent method of attaining swaraj.
The well-known Karachi Settlement of the Congress on Fundamental Rights which was drafted
through Jawaharlal Nehru, in consultation with Gandhi, was moved for adoption through Gandhi
himself who included several suggestions and revisions made through Gandhi. In fact, Gandhi
was the mover of the settlement. The settlement incorporated a mainly impressive list of personal
and civil liberties and democratic, political rights.
Regarding the primacy of personal and civil liberties, Gandhi wrote:
 Civil liberty constant with the observance of non-violence is the first step towards Swaraj. It
is the basis of freedom. And there is no room there for dilution or compromise. It is the water of
life. I have never heard of water being diluted.
Now, let us turn to the Minority Rights component of the Gandhian conception of Parliamentary
Swaraj. Gandhi was acutely aware of the danger of parliamentary democracy lapsing into
majoritarian tyranny in excess of, or intolerance of, minority clusters or societies. While he held
resolutely to the procedural, majority rule principle of democratic government, he was equally
committed to its other, twin or inseparable principle, namely the principle of the guarantee or
defense of fundamental, cultural or religious rights of minority societies. In 1931, he said:
It has been said that Indian Swaraj will be the rule of the majority society, i.e., the Hindus.
There could not be a greater mistake than that. If it were to be true, I for one would refuse to call
it swaraj and would fight it with all the strength at my command, for, to me Hind Swaraj is the
rule of all the people, is the rule of justice. Whether under that rule the ministers were Hindus or
Mussalmans or Sikhs, and whether the legislatures were exclusively filled through the Hindus or
Mussalmans or any other society, they would have to do even-handed justice. And … no society
in India require have any fear of Swaraj being monopolised through any other…
Gandhi maintained that ‘matters of first rate importance’ to the religious and cultural life of the
minority societies should be kept outside the purview of the democratic, procedural principle of
majority rule. Extremely insightfully, he wrote:
Democracy is not a state in which people act like sheep. Under democracy, individual liberty
of opinion and action is jealously guarded. I, so, consider that the minority has a perfect right to
act differently from the majority.
The golden rule of conduct … is mutual toleration, seeing that since suggested, never all
think similar and we see Truth in fragment and from dissimilar angles of vision. Conscience is
not the similar item for all. Whilst, so, it is a good guide for individual conduct, imposition of
that conduct upon all will be an insufferable interference with everybody’s freedom of
conscience.
An extremely special characteristic of Gandhi’s conception of parliamentary/democratic swaraj is
the justice of its vital organizations, which seeks to promote the welfare of all through giving
primacy to the interests of the poor and needy. ‘A non-violent organization of government,’ he
said, ‘is clearly impossibility therefore extensive since the wide gulf flanked by the rich and the
hungry millions persists.’ Let us quote him again:
Economic equality…is the master key to non-violent independence. …It means the leveling
down of the some rich in whose hands is concentrated the bulk of the nation’s wealth, on the one
hand and a leveling up of the semi-starved naked millions on the other. A non-violent
organization of government is clearly impossibility therefore extensive since the wide gulf
flanked by the rich and the hungry millions persists.
Gandhi often spoke of his ideal of swaraj since ‘the poor man’s swaraj.’ At the time of
independence in 1947, he advised his countrymen to adopt a preferential come to the poor not
merely at the public-policy stage, but at the personal stage since well. He said:
I will provide you a talisman. Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self becomes too much
with you, apply the following test. Recall the side of the poorest and the weakest man whom you
may have seen, and inquire yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any exploit to
him. Will he gain anything through it? Will it restore him to manage in excess of his own life and
destiny? In other terms, will it lead to swaraj for the hungry and spiritually starving millions?
Gandhi’s conception of social/distributive justice, which he often referred to in words of
‘economic excellence,’ is rooted in his trusteeship doctrine of property. He whispered that
statutory trusteeship is a shape of organizing economic life, which, without depriving the
individuals of their legitimate incentives for greater productivity and without depriving the
society of the increases in wealth, brings in relation to the a non-violent, equitable sharing of
wealth. In March 1946, Gandhi wrote: ‘Supposing India becomes a free country tomorrow, all
the capitalists will have an opportunity of becoming statutory trustees.’ He further stated:
Since for the present owners of wealth, they would have to create their choice flanked by
class-war and voluntarily converting themselves into trustees of their wealth. They would be
allowed to retain the stewardship of their possessions and to exploit their talent to augment the
wealth, not for their own sake but for the sake of the nation and so, without use. The state would
regulate the rate of commission which they would get commensurate with the service rendered
and its value to society. Their children would inherit the stewardship only if they proved their
fitness for it.
In an article entitled ‘Theory of Trusteeship’, Gandhi wrote:
I am not ashamed to own that several capitalists are friendly towards me and do not fear me.
They know that I desire to end capitalism approximately, if not quite, since much since the
mainly advanced socialist or even the communist. But our ways differ, our words differ. My
theory of ‘trusteeship’ is no makeshift, certainly no camouflage. I am confident that it will
survive all theories. It has the sanction of philosophy and religion behind it.
Sarvodaya: Swaraj since Self-Realization by Social Service
Let us begin this part through noting that while swaraj conveys Gandhi’s thought of freedom,
sarvodaya conveys his thought of equality. We may also note that Gandhi’s doctrine of
sarvodaya is a corrective to utilitarianism, communism and the doctrines which justify
inequalities and exclusions on the foundation of caste, race, color, gender, etc. ‘Sarvodaya’ is the
title, which Gandhi gave to his paraphrase of John Ruskin’s Unto This Last. In that book, Ruskin
gave a moralistic critique of the science of political economy of self-interest. He brought out the
role of ‘social affection’ in our lives. Reading Ruskin brought in relation to the ‘an instantaneous
and practical transformation’ of Gandhi’s life. He learned three lessons from Ruskin’s book,
namely:
That the good of the individual is contained in the good of all;
That a lawyer’s job has the similar value since the barber’s in since much since all have the
similar right of earning their living from their job; and
That a life of labour, i.e., the life of the tiller of the soil and the handicraftsman is the life
worth livelihood.
Of these three principles, the first is the largest principle of sarvodaya. It is also the source of the
other two principles. Gandhi clarified that he had recognized the first principle before reading
Ruskin’s book, which only served to confirm it and provide it a contemporary articulation. A
good trade of Gandhi’s ideas on sarvodaya were derived, since in the case of swaraj, from the
holy books of Hinduism. There are many steps in Gandhi’s thinking on sarvodaya. They are:
Our aim in life is self-realization or moksha.
Self-realization or moksha means identification of the self or atman with Brahman or God.
This needs a discipline or yoga of self-purification.
The method of realizing our identification with Brahman or, in other terms, the method of
finding God is to see God in all his making or manifestation.
Love or service of all is the method to self-realization or moksha in this world.
Conveying these ideas, Gandhi wrote since follows:
Man’s ultimate aim is the realization of God, and all his behaviors, political, social and
religious, have to be guided through the ultimate aim of the vision of God... The immediate
service of all human beings becomes a necessary section of the Endeavour basically because the
only method to discover God is to see Him in His making and be one with it. This can only be
done through the service of all.
2 am impatient to realize myself, to attain moksha in this extremely subsistence. My national
service is section of my training for freeing my soul from the bondage of flesh. Therefore
measured, my service may be regarded since purely selfish. For me, the road to salvation lies by
incessant toil in the service of my country and there by, of humanity.
Gandhi derived several of these ideas from the holy books of Hinduism. In them, he establish a
clear enunciation of the value of ‘disciplined rule from within,’ which he understood to be the
‘root meaning’ of swaraj. He wrote:
The root meaning of swaraj is self-rule. Swaraj may, so, be rendered since disciplined rule
from within…. ‘Independence’ has no such limitation. Independence may mean license to do
since you like. Swaraj is positive. Independence is negative…. The term swaraj is a sacred term,
a Vedic term, meaning self-rule and self-restraint, and not freedom from all restraint which
‘independence’ often means.
Gandhi interpreted the Bhagavad Gita since depicting the futility of war and violence. Besides
non-violence and truth, the other principles of morality which the Gita teaches are: tapas, dana
and yajna. He saw a ‘gospel of service’ in the third chapter of the Bhagavad Gita. It taught him to
desire the welfare of others. In his Discourses on the Gita, he pointed out that the Lord or
Brahman dwells in all, including ‘the lame, the crippled and the afflicted.’ On the thought of
service to all, Gandhi was also deeply convinced through his parents, the teachings of the
Vaishnava saint-poets, especially, Narsinh Mehta, and the scripts of Ruskin and the non-
conformist Christians, especially Leo Tolstoy. Gandhi whispered that without self-restraint or
self-purification, we could not render moksha-oriented service to others. Refuting the charge that
these are ideals for the ascetics, he said that they are meant ‘for acceptance through mankind in
common.’ He wrote:
No worker who has not overcome lust can hope to render any genuine service to the reason of
Harijans, communal unity, Khadi, cow-defense or village reconstruction. Great reasons like these
cannot be served through intellectual equipment alone; they call for spiritual attempt or soul-
force.
Gandhi, the terrain on which the relationship flanked by one’s moksharealization and one’s
disinterested service of all takes lay is the field of politics; namely, the field of ‘toil in the service
of my country and there through of humanity.’ This relationship flanked by moksha-realization
and service-centered politics was a consistent theme in Gandhi’s scripts and public job.
Appropriately, he concluded his Autobiography with the following report:
To see the universal and all-pervading Spirit of Truth side to side, one necessity be able to
love the meanest of making since oneself. And a man who aspires after that cannot afford to stay
out of any field of life. That is why my devotion to Truth has drawn me into the field of politics;
and I can say without the slightest hesitation, and yet in all humility, that those who say that
religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means. Identification with
everything that lives is impossible without self-purification; without self-purification, the
observance of the law of ahimsa necessity remain an empty dream.
In a ‘Foreword’ he wrote to Gokhale’s Speeches, Gandhi urged the sadhus, rishis, munis, maulvis
and priests to become political sanyasis. He also described upon political workers to become
spiritually and morally occupied. In his ‘Last Will and Testament’, he recommended the
disbanding of the existing Congress system and its flowering into a Lok Sevak Sangh. He wished
that its members would, thereby, devote themselves to the remaining tasks of the programme of
swaraj and sarvodaya, which he delineated since follows:
India has still to attain social, moral, and economic independence in words of its seven
hundred thousand villages since distinguished from its municipalities and cities.
Gandhi also stipulated that the loksevaks would abjure untouchability and necessity consider in
‘the ideal of inter-communal unity, equal respect and regard for all religions and equality of
opportunity and status for all irrespective of race, creed or sex.’ Gandhi’s moral-political
conception of sarvodaya is a corrective both to Western utilitarianism and to the inequalities and
exclusions of the traditional caste organization. His critique of utilitarianism can be establish in
his Introduction to his Sarvodaya, which was his paraphrase of Ruskins’s book, Unto This Last.
Gandhi wrote:
People in the West usually hold that the entire duty of man is to promote the happiness of the
majority of mankind, and happiness is supposed to mean only physical happiness and economic
prosperity. If the laws of morality are broken in the conquest of this happiness, it does not matter
extremely much. Again, since the substance sought to be attained is the happiness of the
majority, westerners do not think there is any harm if this is secured through sacrificing a
minority. The consequences of this row of thinking are writ big on the side of Europe.
In 1926, Gandhi brought out the variation flanked by utilitarianism and sarvodaya in the
following terms:
A votary of ahimsa cannot subscribe to the utilitarian formula. He will strive for the greatest
good of all and die in the effort to realize the ideal. He will so be willing to die, therefore that the
others may live. He will serve himself with the rest, through himself dying. The greatest good of
all inevitably contains the good of the greatest number, and so, he and the utilitarian will
converge in several points in their career, but there does approach a time when they necessity
section company, and even job in opposite directions. The utilitarian to be logical will never
sacrifice himself. The absolutist will even sacrifice himself.
Satyagraha versus Passive Resistance
Satyagraha is the name of the Gandhian, non-violent method of political action to resist and
change untruthful and violent organizations of social or political authority. Throughout 1906-14,
Gandhi successfully used such a method of political action to resist the policy of racial
discrimination, which the British colonial government of South Africa had adopted against the
Indian immigrants. In India, he led several regional satyagraha campaigns, few notable ones
being those of Champaran, Ahmedabad, Vaikom, Bardoli and Kheda. He also led a number of
all-India satyagraha movements, beginning with the one against the Rowlatt Act in 1919. Gandhi
acknowledged that his theory of satyagraha was convinced too little extent through Henry David
Thoreau’s scripts. In Thoreau, ‘On the Duty of Civil Disobedience’, Gandhi establish
confirmation of his views on coercive characteristics of state and on the individual’s obligation to
his own conscience. ‘From Thoreau and Ruskin’, Gandhi wrote, ‘I could discover out arguments
in favor of our fight.’ Gandhi’s initial struggles against racial discriminations in South Africa
were called since ‘Passive Resistance’. But, he soon establish the English word to be
unsatisfactory, partly because it was not intelligible to ordinary Indians and partly because it did
not convey the special feature of his way of political thrash about. Hence, in 1906, he invited the
readers of his weekly, Indian Opinion, to suggest an alternative name. The best of the suggestions
received was sadagraha, meaning ‘firmness in a good reason.’ Gandhi changed it to satyagraha
since it conveyed his preferred thought of ‘truth force’ He explained his choice in the following
terms:
Truth implies love, and firmness engenders and so serves since a synonym for force. I
therefore began to call the Indian movement ‘satyagraha’ that is to say, the force which is born to
Truth and Love or non-violence, and gave up the exploit of the phrase ‘passive resistance.’

Gandhi distinguished flanked by body-force = brute-force = the force of arms from soul force =
love force = truth force. He referred to the former since the way of violence, which, he said, is
celebrated in and through contemporary culture. Satyagraha, he said, relies on soul-force or truth-
force and is suitable to swaraj. He wrote:
Satyagraha…. is a way of securing rights through personal suffering; it is the reverse of
resistance through arms. When I refuse to do an item that is repugnant to my conscience, I
exploit soul-force. For example, the Government of the day has passed a law, which is applicable
to me. I do not like it. If through by violence I force the Government to repeal the law, I am
employing what may be termed body-force. If I do not obey the law and accept the penalty for its
breach, I exploit soul-force. It involves sacrifice of self.
Gandhi, satyagraha was both practically necessary and morally desirable for the Indian Freedom
Movement. He said that as the ‘English are splendidly armed’; it would take several, several
years for the Indians to arm themselves in a matching or effective manner. More than this
practical difficulty, Gandhi disapproved of the immorality of the way of violence. He pointed out
that ‘to arm India on a big level is to Europeanize it’ or, in other terms, to continue to be seduced
through the morally flawed contemporary European culture. Gandhi, the distinctive
characteristics of satyagraha, in comparison with ‘passive resistance,’ are since follows:
While the passive resisters harbor hatred toward their adversaries, the satyagrahis view their
opponents with love.
The passive resisters, unlike the satyagrahis, may harass and injure their opponents.
Satyagrha, unlike passive resistance, can be offered even to one’s adjacent and dearest ones.
Passive resistance is a resistance through the weak and helpless, and it does not exclude the
exploit of violence, whereas satyagraha is a moral-political action through the strong, and it
excludes the exploit of violence. Believing themselves to be weak, the passive resisters would
tend to provide up the thrash about at the earliest opportunity. ‘On the other hand,’ Gandhi wrote,
‘if we offer satyagraha believing ourselves to be strong, two clear consequences follow.
Fostering the thought of strength, we grow stronger and stronger every day. With the augment in
our strength, our satyagraha too becomes more effective and we would never be casting in
relation to for an opportunity to provide it up.’
Few Evaluative Comments on Satyagraha
Regarding Gandhi’s theory and praxis of satyagraha, many critics uphold that non-violence and
self-suffering are impractical ways against violent oppression. The Gandhian method, they
method, is ‘other-worldly’ and ‘anti-humanist’. Gandhi maintained that non-violence and self-
suffering were ‘not for the unworldly, but essentially for the worldly.’ He did admit that these
principles were extremely hard to practice, but insisted that we require to, and can, stay on
moving beside these rows. ‘Perfect non-violence whilst you are inhabiting the body, he wrote, ‘is
only a theory like Euclid’s point or straight row, but we have to Endeavour every moment of our
lives’. Gandhi rightly maintained that it is desirable and possible to bring in relation to the
predominantly non-violent society. It may still be objected that satyagraha demands of the
satyagrahis, self-suffering even unto death. It is true that self-suffering is a biggest unit of
satyagraha. Though, self-sacrifice is also involved in case of violent resistance. Sacrifice even
unto death is, therefore, the general unit in both violent and non-violent resistance against
oppression. That is why Gandhi approved of the exploit of satyagraha only in cases of clash in
excess of fundamental issues and only after all milder ways of nonviolence have failed. ‘I should
be deeply distressed,’ he wrote in 1921, ‘if on every conceivable occasion every one of us were
to be a law onto oneself and to scrutinize in golden levels every action of our future National
Assembly. I would surrender my judgment in mainly matters to national representatives.’ But
when a situation of violent oppression persists even after all milder ways of non-violent
resistance have been tried, Gandhi maintained that self-suffering even unto death of the
nonviolent fighter for truth is a bigger assertion of individual freedom than is the death in- defeat
of the violent resister.
Gandhi has himself given many explanations of the merits of the satyagraha method of political
resistance and social transformation, in comparison with the ways of violence. In 1924, reacting
to rumors that he was likely to be invited to visit the Soviet Union, Gandhi wrote:
I do not consider in short violent cuts to success. Those Bolshevik friends who are bestowing
their attention on me should realize that though much I may sympathies with and admire worthy
motives, I am an uncompromising opponent of violent ways even to serve the noblest of reasons.
There is so, really no meeting ground flanked by the school of violence and myself.
Two years later, Gandhi gave the following account of the real variation flanked by violent and
non-violent ways:
My non-violent resistance is activated resistance on a dissimilar plane. Nonviolent resistance
to evil does not mean absence of any resistance whatsoever, but it means not to resist evil with
evil but with good. Resistance so, is transferred to a higher and absolutely effective plane.
Leo Tolstoy’s The Kingdom of God is Within You exerted a tremendous power on Gandhi’s
views on the repressive character of the contemporary state and his commitment to non-violent
resistance. Gandhi acknowledged that reading Tolstoy made him realize the ‘infinite possibilities
of universal love’ and made him a ‘firm believer in ahimsa’. Gandhi and Tolstoy corresponded
with each other. In his last letter to Gandhi, Tolstoy acknowledged that his satyagraha movement
in South Africa was a new and mainly significant manner of emancipator thrash about through
the oppressed. Like Tolstoy, Einstein too has written in deep appreciation of Gandhian
satyagraha. In a tribute published in a festschrift for Gandhi’s seventieth birthday, he wrote:
Gandhi is unique in political history. He has invented an entirely new and humane technique
for the liberation thrash about of an oppressed people and accepted it out with the greatest power
and devotion. The moral power which he has exercised upon thinking people by the civilized
world may be distant more durable than would seem likely in our present age with its
exaggeration of brute force. For the job of statesmen is permanent only in therefore distant since
they arouse and consolidate the moral forces of their peoples by their personal instance and
educating power.

MARXISM
Marxism usually refers to the ideas of the German philosopher, Karl Marx. But Marxism does
not mean exclusively the ideas of Marx. It contains the ideas of Marx, Friedrich Engels and their
supporters, who call themselves Marxists. Therefore, Marxism refers to the body of ideas, which
predominantly contains the ideas of Karl Marx. Marxism is a livelihood philosophy. Marxist
thinkers are continuously contributing to the philosophy of Marxism. Therefore, it is said that
Marx is dead, but Marxism is still alive. The Marxist philosophy lived even before the birth of
Karl Marx. This is the cause David Mclellan has written three volumes on Marxism, viz.,
Marxism before Marx; Idea of Karl Marx and Marxism after Marx. Similarly, the Polish thinker
Leszek Kolakowski has authored three volumes on Marxism. The point once again is that
Marxism does not mean only the ideas of Karl Marx.
Utopian and Scientific Socialism
Since said earlier, Marxism lived before Marx. These are recognized since the early socialist
thinkers. Karl Marx calls them Utopian Socialists. They were utopian, because their diagnosis of
the social ills was correct, but their remedy was wrong. It was impracticable, and so, they were
described utopian. The world ‘utopia’ was derived from a novel of Thomas Moore titled,
‘Utopia.’ It refers to an imaginary island, described Utopia, where a perfect socio-economic-
political organization lived. There was no use and people were happy. Few significant utopian
socialist thinkers are Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, Louis Blanc, Saint Simon, Sismondi and
Proudhon. Marx calls his socialism since ‘Scientific Socialism’. It is scientific, because it offers
the economic interpretation of history through by the scientific methodology of dialectical
materialism. It explains not only the true reasons of use, but also offers the scientific remedy of
revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat to cure the social ills of use. It not only offers
scientific causes for class division and also thrash about in society, but also gives for a scientific
mechanism to set up a classless and use less society.
Evolutionary and Revolutionary Socialism
Socialism is further divided into evolutionary and revolutionary socialism. Evolutionary
socialism does not consider in revolution and wants to attain socialism by peaceful means.
Evolutionary Socialists have faith in parliamentary democracy and want to bring social change
by the ballot. They eschew violence and therefore, are opposed to a violent revolution. They also
do not subscribe to the dictatorship of the proletariat and advocate a peaceful democratic
transition from a class divided to a classless society. Fabian Socialism, Guild Socialism,
Democratic Socialism are all several kinds of evolutionary socialism. Revolutionary socialism,
on the other hand, believes in class thrash about, revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Social change cannot be peaceful. It has to be violent. A peaceful revolution is a contradiction in
words. Revolution is the midwife of social change, and this revolution necessity be violent.
Revolutionary Marxism is usually recognized with the scientific socialism of Karl Marx.
Syndicalism is also a kind of revolutionary socialism. Evolutionary socialism also traces its roots
from the ideas of Karl Marx and Engels. They have talked in relation to the withering absent of
the state. Exponents of evolutionary socialism have picked up the theory of withering absent of
the state, and argued that slowly by peaceful means, social change can be effected and an
exploitation less and classless society can be recognized. Though, the critics of evolutionary
socialism do not accept this thesis, and argue that the thought of withering absent of the state
applies only to the socialist state or the dictatorship of the proletariat and not to the capitalist
state. It will never wither absent. It has to be smashed by a violent revolution. So, the logic of
evolutionary socialism is flawed.
Vital Principles of Marxism
The vital tenets of Marxism are the following: dialectical materialism, historical materialism, the
theory of surplus value, class thrash about, revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat and
communism.
Dialectical Materialism
Dialectical materialism is the scientific methodology urbanized through Marx and Engels for the
interpretation of history. Here, Marx has borrowed heavily from his precursors, particularly, the
German philosopher Hegel. Dialectics is an extremely old methodology, employed to discover
truth through exposing contradictions, by a conflict of opposite ideas. Hegel refined it through
developing the trilogy of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. It is popularly recognized since the
Dialectical Triad. Progress or development takes lay by the dialectical procedure. At every level
of development, it is characterized through contradictions. These contradictions induce further
changes, progress, and growth. The thesis is challenged through its anti-thesis. Both include units
of truth and falsehood. Truth is permanent, but falsehood is transitory. In the ensuing clash of the
thesis and the anti-thesis, the truth remnants, but the false units are destroyed. These false units
constitute contradictions. The true units of both the thesis and the anti-thesis are fused jointly in a
synthesis. This evolved synthesis throughout the course of time becomes a thesis and therefore, it
is again challenged through its opposite anti-thesis, which again results in a synthesis. This
procedure of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis continues until the level of perfection is reached. In
this evolutionary procedure, a level will approach, when there will be no false units. These will
be destroyed at dissimilar levels of development. It will constitute the perfect level and there will
be no contradictions and therefore, there will be no further development. The dialectical
procedure will approach to an end after arriving at the perfect truth. It is the contradictions, which
move the dialectical procedure and a complete elimination of contradictions spots the end of the
dialectical procedure itself. For materialism, Marx is highly indebted to the French school of
materialism, largely the French materialist thinker Ludwig Feuerbach. It is the matter, which is
the ultimate reality and not the thought. The latter is a reflection of the former. How we earn our
bread determines our ideas. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their subsistence
but, on the contrary, it is their social subsistence that determines their consciousness. Marx has
observed that ‘Hegel’s dialectics was standing on its head and I have put it on its feet’. Hegel has
urbanized dialectical idealism. For him, it is the thought, which ultimately matters. Thought lies
in the foundation or the sub-building, which determines everything in the superstructure. Society,
polity, economy are in this superstructure which is formed through the prevalent dominant ideas
of the age. Ultimately it is the thought, which matters, and the other things are only its reflection.
Marx replaced thought with matter. According to Marx, the material or the economic forces are
in the substructure and the thought is a section of the superstructure. Thought is the reflection of
material forces. The economic forces determine the thought and not vice versa. Therefore, Marx
has reversed the location of thought and matter. This is the cause that he claims that ‘in Hegel it
was upside down and I have corrected it’. The foundation or the substructure consists of the
forces of manufacture and the dealings of manufacture. These two jointly constitute the manner
of manufacture. When there is a change in the forces of manufacture because of growth in
technology, it brings changes in the dealings of manufacture. Therefore, a change in the manner
of manufacture brings a corresponding change in the superstructure. Society, polity, religion,
morals, values, norms, etc. are a section of the superstructure and formed through the manner of
manufacture.
Historical Materialism
Historical materialism is the application of dialectical materialism to the interpretation of history.
It is the economic interpretation of world history through applying the Marxian methodology of
dialectical materialism. The world history has been divided into four levels: primitive
communism, the slavery organization, feudalism and capitalism. Primitive communism refers to
the earliest section of human history. It was a property less, exploitation less, classless and
stateless society. Means of manufacture were backward, because technology was undeveloped.
The society owned the means of manufacture. They were not under private ownership and
therefore there was no use. Stone made hunting weapons, the fishing net and hooks were the
means of manufacture. The whole society owned these. Manufacture was limited and meant for
self-consumption. There was no surplus manufacture and therefore there was no private property.
As there was no private property, there was no use. As there was no use, there was no class
division. As there was no class division, there was no class thrash about. As there was no class
thrash about, there was no state. It was, therefore, a communist society, but of a primitive kind.
However life was hard, it was characterized through the absence of use, clash and thrash about.
Technology is not static; it evolves continuously. Technical growth results in the improvement of
manufacture. This leads to surplus manufacture, which results in the emergence of private
property. Means of manufacture are now not under the society, but private ownership. Society is,
therefore, divided into property owning and property less classes. Through virtue of the
ownership of the means of manufacture, the property owning class exploits the property less
class. Class division in society and use lead to class thrash about. As there is class thrash about,
the dominant class that is the property owning class creates an organization described the state to
suppress the dissent of the dependent class that is the property less class. Therefore, the state is a
class instrument and a coercive organization. It protects the interests of its creator that is the
property owning class. In the beginning, this society is divided into masters and slaves. Masters
are the haves and the slaves are the have notes. The slaves carry out the entire manufacture job.
The masters live on the labour of slaves. They use the slaves and whenever the slaves resent, the
state comes to the rescue of the masters. Therefore, the state serves the interests of the master
class. It uses its coercive powers to suppress the voice of the slaves. The slave organization is
succeeded through feudalism. Technical growth leads to changes in the means of manufacture
and this brings in relation to the corresponding changes in the dealings of manufacture and the
superstructure. The slave organization is replaced through the feudal manner of manufacture and
it is reflected in the society, polity, morality and the value organization. The division of society
into feudal lords and peasants characterizes feudalism. The feudal lords own the means of
manufacture, that is land, but the peasants carry out the manufacture job. Through virtue of
ownership of the land, the feudal lords get a vast share of the produce without doing anything.
Therefore, the feudal lords are like parasites, which thrive on the labour of peasants. Feudal lords
use the peasants and if the peasants ever resist their use, their resistance is ruthlessly crushed
through the state, which protects and serves the interests of the feudal lords. The peasants are a
dependent and exploited class, whereas the lords are a dominant and exploiting class. Capitalism
succeeds feudalism. Technical growth continues and therefore there is change in the forces of
manufacture, which leads to a mismatch flanked by the forces of manufacture and the dealings of
manufacture, which is resolved by a bourgeois revolution. Therefore the contradiction flanked by
the forces of manufacture and the dealings of manufacture is resolved. The feudal manner of
manufacture is replaced through the capitalist manner of manufacture. Division of society into
the bourgeois and the proletariat class characterizes capitalism. The bourgeois class owns the
means of manufacture, but the proletariat class carries out the manufacture. Proletariats are the
industrial workers. They sell their labour in lieu of meager wages. It is usually an existence wage,
which is enough only to support them and their families, therefore that an uninterrupted supply of
labour force can be maintained. Manufacture is not for consumption through the self, but for
profit. The desire to maximize profit leads to a reduction in wages and a rise in working hours.
This further deteriorates the lot of the working class, which is eventually pushed into a situation,
where it has nothing to loose except for its chains. This paves the method for the proletariat
revolution.
Theory of Surplus Value
Marx has urbanized the theory of surplus value to explain the use in the capitalist society. Here,
Marx was convinced through the theories of classical economists. He subscribed to the labour
theory of value. The value of a commodity is determined through the amount of labour consumed
in its manufacture. Labour is also a commodity. It can be bought and sold like other
commodities. Out of the four factors of manufacture, labour is the mainly basic. In its absence,
the other factors of manufacture are useless. Land, capital and system are the other factors of
manufacture. It is the application of labour to these factors of manufacture, which makes them
productive. In the absence of labour, they are sterile. If a wage is paid in proportion to the
amount of value created through a laborer, then there is no use, But this is not the case in
capitalism. Labour is unique in the sense that it creates more value than is required for its
maintenance. The variation flanked by the value created through the worker and the value paid to
the worker, since wages, constitute the surplus value and the profit of the capitalist. For example,
if a worker has created a value of say Rs. 25,000 in a month and has been paid Rs. 15,000 since
wages, then the remaining Rs. 10,000 will constitute the profit of the capitalist. Therefore, the
worker always creates more value than he is actually paid. This surplus value created through the
worker is the profit of the bourgeois, which has been defended through the classical economist,
because it leads to capital accumulation, which is invested further in new industries and
enterprises and leads to development and prosperity. For the Marxists, it is the use of the
workers, which has to be abolished. With the development of capitalism and the rise in
competition, the wages of the workers continue to fall and reach the level of existence stage.
Existence wage is the minimum possible wage; beyond this the wage cannot be reduced. It is the
minimum possible wage for the subsistence and perpetuation of the labour force. Therefore, cut
throat competition in capitalism leads to deterioration of the lot of the proletariat. This intensifies
class thrash about and eventually leads to revolution.
Class Thrash about
According to Marx, the history of all hitherto existing society has been the history of class thrash
about. Except for the primitive communist level, all historical ages have been characterized
through the antagonism flanked by the dominant and dependent classes or the haves and the have
notes. This antagonism is caused through class contradictions; it is the result of use through the
property owning class of the property less class. During history, there have been two contending
classes in every epoch. In the slavery organization, they were the masters and the slaves, in
feudalism, the feudal lords and the peasants and in capitalism, the bourgeois and the proletariat.
The masters, the feudal lords and the bourgeois are the owners of the means of manufacture.
Though, it is the slaves, the peasants and the proletariat, who carry out manufacture, but their
produce is taken absent through their exploiters and in return, they are given presently sufficient
for their subsistence. Through virtue of the ownership of the means of manufacture, the property
owning class exploits the property less class. This is the largest source and reason of class thrash
about. The interests of the contending classes are irreconcilable. No compromise or
rapprochement is possible flanked by the contending classes. The inherent contradictions of
contending classes of every epoch can be resolved only by the annihilation of the exploiting
classes.
Revolution
Class thrash about paves the method for revolution. Class thrash about is imperceptible, but
revolution is perceptible. Intensification of class thrash about prepares the ground for revolution.
Class thrash about is an extensive drawn affair, but revolution is short, swift and violent. In the
terms of Marx, ‘revolution is the indispensable mid-wife of social change’. Transition from one
historical level to another occurs by revolution. Feudal revolution brought an end to the slavery
organization; the bourgeois revolution ended feudalism and the proletariat revolution will bring
an end to capitalism. Therefore, any epoch creation social change is always brought in relation to
the through a revolution. Revolution occurs when there is incompatibility flanked by the means
or forces of manufacture and the dealings of manufacture. To resolve this incompatibility,
revolution occurs, which brings corresponding changes in the dealings of manufacture and the
superstructure to create it compatible with the forces or means of manufacture. Technical growth
brings changes in the means of manufacture. The handbill provides you a society with the feudal
lord, and the steam-mill, a society with the industrial capitalist. Proletarian revolution will be the
last revolution in the annals of history. Revolution occurs to resolve contradictions. Therefore
revolution will not take lay, if there is no contradiction in society. After the proletarian
revolution, there will not be any further revolution, because there will be no contradiction.
Though, revolution will take lay only when the forces of manufacture have fully matured.
Revolution cannot be advanced or postponed. It will happen when the forces of manufacture
have matured and do not match the dealings of manufacture. Revolution brings an end to this
mismatch. The sequence and direction of social development cannot be changed. No level can
overleap other level. No level can be short-circuited. Primitive communism will lead to the
slavery organization, the slavery organization to feudalism and feudalism to capitalism.
Dictatorship of the proletariat or socialism will succeed capitalism, which is the penultimate level
of social development. Dictatorship of the proletariat will eventually lead to the establishment of
communism. With the proletarian revolution, revolution itself will approach to an end.
Dictatorship of the Proletariat
The proletariat revolution will lead to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is
also recognized since the socialist state. The state tools created through the bourgeois to oppress
the proletariat will be taken in excess of through the proletariat themselves. Now, the table will
be turned and the proletariat will exploit the state tools against the bourgeois. The bourgeois will
attempt to level a counter-revolution to restore the old organization and therefore, the coercive
organizations of the state are needed to restrain the bourgeois. The state has always been the
instrument of oppression. The dominant class to oppress the dependent class has created the state.
It is a class instrument. The state protects and serves the interests of its creator, which is the
property owning class. This class has always been in a minority, whether it is the masters or the
feudal lords or the capitalists. Therefore, a minority has been oppressing a majority viz., the
slaves or the peasants or the proletariat by the coercive organs of the state. Under the dictatorship
of the proletariat, for the first time the state comes under manage of the majority. Now, for the
first time, the state’s coercive tools is used through the majority against the minority. According
to Marx, all states have been dictatorships and therefore the socialist state is no exception. It is
also a dictatorship. The state has always been used through one class to suppress the other class.
In the socialist state, the proletariat class will exploit the coercive organs of the state such since
the army, the police, prison, judicial organization etc., against the bourgeois class. Marx argues
that if democracy means the rule of the majority, then the proletariat state is the mainly
democratic state, because for the first time in the annals of history, authority comes into the
hands of the majority. Before the proletariat state, authority has always been in the hands of the
minority. Therefore if majority rule is the criterion, then only the proletariat state can be
described a democratic state.
Communism
Under the livelihood care of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the socialist state will blossom
forth into communism. Socialism is a transitory level. It will pave the method for the eventual
emergence of communism. Which is stable and permanent? This will be the stage of social
development. After the establishment of communism, there will be no further social change. The
dialectical procedure will approach to an end. A perfect, rational social organization will be
recognized, free from antagonisms and contradictions. There will be no class contradictions and
therefore, no class thrash about. In fact communism will be a classless, stateless, private property
less and exploitation less society. In a communist society, there will be no private property in the
shape of private ownership of the means of manufacture. The means of manufacture will be
under the ownership of the society. Cooperation and not cutthroat competition will be the
foundation of communist society. Manufacture will be for consumption and not to earn profit.
Profit motive will be replaced through social requires. As there will be no private property, there
will be no use. As there will be no use, there will be no class division, no property owning and
property less class, no haves and have notes or no dominant and dependent class. As there is no
class division, there is no class thrash about and therefore no require of the state. This is the cause
why a communist society will be a classless and stateless society. State is the instrument of use.
It is a class instrument and a result of class division in society. As there is only one class of
workers in communism and no other class to suppress or oppress, there will not be any require of
the state. It will become redundant in a communist society. It will be relegated to the museum.
The state, though, will not be smashed; it will slowly wither absent. Communist society will be
governed through the Louise Blanc principle of ‘from each according to his capability to each
according to his require’. There will be no lay for parasites. He who will not job will not eat also.
There will be only one class of workers. The whole society will be converted into the working
class. There will be no lay for use. It will be an egalitarian society. There will be harmonious
connection in the middle of the people.
Theory of Alienation
There have been two separate phases in the Marxist philosophy. Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, present the human side of Marxism. In the Manuscripts, capitalism has
been analyzed without reference to class antagonism, class thrash about and violent revolution.
Here, the evil powers of capitalism have been explained by alienation and loss of identity and
freedom. These views of Marx have been recognized with a younger Marx. There occurs an
epistemological break in Marx’s philosophy with the script of Communist Manifesto in 1848.
The later Marx is recognized since mature Marx, who urbanized the theory of scientific
socialism. Marx’s earlier ideas were exposed only in 1932, with the publication of the
Manuscripts. The theory of alienation is a significant Marxian concept. The Hungarian Marxist
George Lukas had urbanized the theory of alienation entirely on his own even before the
publication of Manuscripts in 1932. Though, the concept of alienation became popular only after
the publication of the Manuscripts. Marx has recognized four stages of alienation. Firstly, man is
alienated from his own product and from his job procedure, because the worker plays no section
in deciding what to produce and how to produce it. Secondly, man is alienated from nature. His
job does not provide him a sense of satisfaction since a creative worker. Under mechanization,
job tends to become increasingly reutilized and monotonous. Thirdly, man is alienated from other
men. The competitive character of the capitalist organization forces everyone to live at someone
else’s expense and divides society into antagonistic classes. Lastly, man is alienated from
himself. The realm of must dominates his life and reduces him to the stage of an animal
subsistence, leaving no time for a taste of literature, art, and cultural heritage. The capitalist
organization subordinates all human faculties and qualities to the circumstances created through
the private ownership of capital and property. The capitalist himself, no less than the worker,
becomes a slave of the tyrannical rule of money.
Theory of Freedom
Since a humanist philosophy, Marxism is primarily a philosophy of human freedom. Freedom
consists not only in securing material satisfaction o f human requires, but also in removing the
circumstances of dehumanization, estrangement and alienation. The capitalist organization is
characterized through must since opposed to freedom. Must refers to the circumstances under
which the inevitable laws of nature govern the life of man. These laws of nature exist self-
governing of man’s will. Man can acquire scientific knowledge of these laws, but cannot change
them at his will. Freedom does not consist in an escape from must. Freedom lies in the
knowledge of these laws of nature and the capability to create these laws job towards the definite
end of the emancipation of human society. Therefore, a sound knowledge of the productive
forces operating behind the capitalist organization and a programme to create these forces job
toward human ends were essential instruments of human freedom. Only a programme of socialist
revolution would accomplish humanity’s leap from the kingdom of must to the kingdom of
freedom. The emancipation of human society and the realization of true freedom is possible only
with the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of communism.
A Critical Appraisal and an Overview
Marxism has been subjected to severe criticism. It has simplified the class division of society into
two classes, the haves and the have notes. This is distant from the reality. Society is extremely
intricate and is divided into numerous clusters. There is no clear cut division of classes since
envisaged through Marxism. Moreover, there exists a vast transitional class. Marxian thinkers
predicted that with the advancement of capitalism, the transitional class would disappear and
merge with the proletariat class. But this has not happened therefore distant and there is no
possibility of it ever happening. In fact, the reverse has happened; the transitional class has
strengthened its location and increased its mass. Marxists also predicted the narrowing of the
capitalist class. Here again, presently the opposite has happened. Instead of shrinking, the
foundation of the capitalist class has been enlarged. Marx predicted the accumulation of capital,
but there has been the dispersal of capital. The condition of the proletariat class has not
deteriorated since predicted through Marx. Therefore, the actual working of the capitalist
organization has proved the Marxist theory of classes to be wrong. Marxists had predicted that
the inherent contradictions of capitalism would lead to its collapse. But this has not happened
therefore distant. No advanced capitalist organization has collapsed. Capitalism has proved its
resilience. It is the socialist organization, which has collapsed in several sections of the world.
Capitalism has the tremendous capability of version. This is the largest cause for its subsistence.
Marx failed to assess capitalism correctly. According to Marx, the proletarian revolution will
happen only when capitalism has matured. There is no chance of the proletarian revolution
occurring and succeeding in a backward feudal society. But this is exactly, what has happened in
reality. Revolution has taken lay only in feudal civilizations such since Russia, China, Vietnam,
Cuba etc. This was the largest issue of debate flanked by two factions of Russian Marxists, the
Mensheviks led through Plekhanov and the Bolsheviks led through Lenin. Ultimately, the
Bolsheviks prevailed in excess of the Mensheviks, but the latter were closer to classical Marxist
teachings. According to Marx, his teachings can lessen the birth pangs, but cannot short route the
several levels of social development. Though, Lenin and Trotsky in Russia and Mao in China
recognized communism in a feudal society without going by the procedure of first establishing
capitalism. To resolve this obvious contradiction, Trotsky urbanized the ‘theory of Permanent
Revolution’. He fused the bourgeois revolution with the proletarian revolution in his theory.
These two revolutions can happen simultaneously in the view of Trotsky. However this looks to
be a more practical view, it does not confirm to the vital Marxian principles. The Marxian theory
of economic determinism has been severely criticized. It is not only the economic factor, but
other factors also that are equally significant in bringing in relation to the social change. If
economy determines polity, society, morality, value organization etc., then economy itself is
formed through these. It is a two method procedure. Economic forces are not immune to the
powers of polity, society, civilization, religion, values, norms etc. If the foundation or the
substructure forms the superstructure, then the superstructure also forms the substructure.
Therefore, the theory of economic determinism cannot be carried. Later Marxist thinkers like
Gramsci carried the significant role of the superstructure. The Marxian concepts of the
dictatorship of the proletariat and communism suffer from many flaws. After the proletarian
revolution, the proletariat will seize the state tools from the bourgeois. With the establishment of
communism, the state will become redundant and will slowly wither absent. This has not
happened. In socialist society, the state In fact became all-powerful. Instead of weakening, the
state has consolidated its location and there is no possibility of its fading absent. The Marxian
dream of a stateless society will never be realized. The state will continue to play a leading role
in a socialist and communist society and there is no possibility of it ever being relegated to the
museum. The socialist state wherever it has been recognized, has either been overthrown or
discredited. Wherever, it is still surviving, it has been compelled to introduce wide-ranging
changes, which do not confirm to the teachings of classical Marxism. The collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe, disintegration of the Soviet Union and economic reforms in
China have led thinkers like Francis Fukuyama to write the obituary of Marxism. Fukuyama in
his well-known book End of History proclaims the triumph of capitalism in excess of
communism in the post-cold war world. With the victory of capitalism in excess of communism,
history has approach to an end. Here, Fukuyama talks of history in the Hegelean sense. After
capitalism, there will be no further economic and political development. Capitalism is the mainly
rational and perfect organization. It is the mainly perfect ideology and philosophy. Therefore
ideological and philosophical development comes to an end with the emergence of capitalism. Its
largest challenger communism has been defeated and this further proves its claim that it is the
best possible social, economic and political organization ever evolved through humanity. It is
extremely hard to accept the thesis propounded through Fukuyama. The importance of Marxism
lies in two meadows. Firstly, it has been used since a tool for social analysis. Secondly, it
provides a voice to the voiceless. It is the philosophy of the poor, the oppressed and the
suppressed people. If the contribution of Marxism is analyzed in these two meadows, since
suggested, reach the conclusion that it is still relevant and has not become redundant since
claimed through the liberal critics. Marxism since a come of social analysis is still relevant since
it was in the past. Its importance since a way of social analysis will never diminish, irrespective
of whether the socialist state survives or not. Marxism since an ideology has definitely lost its
edge, but it has not become completely redundant. Since extensive since use will continue,
people will be oppressed and suppressed, Marxism will remain relevant. Marxism since a
philosophy of the exploited and the oppressed will continue to inspire the masses to strive for
their emancipation. Therefore there is no question of its defeat and irrelevance. In fact the
organizations, which have collapsed, were not organized on classical Marxian principles. They
were a variant of Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism. Therefore it is the Leninist-Stalinist
organizations, which have collapsed in Europe and elsewhere and not classical Marxism.
Marxism since a come will continue to be used through scholars for social analysis and the
exploited-oppressed people will continue to espouse Marxist philosophy for their emancipation.
Here, Marxism will never become irrelevant. It will always give an alternative philosophy to
liberalism. Marxism will also act since an effective check on the excesses of liberalism. It will
mitigate the rigors of the capitalist organization.

FASCISM
Common Explanations and Characteristics of Fascism
Fascism has been interpreted in multiple methods. A favorite Marxist location is to explain it
since a violent, dictatorial instrument of monopoly fund capital, which appeared in the shape of
brutal attack on workers, rights in an era of intensification of class thrash about and acute crisis in
the capitalist economy. Another interpretation views fascism since the product of cultural and
moral breakdown in the aftermath of brutality and savagery of World War I. Oswald Spengler
wrote his Decline of the West in 1918 and argued that Western culture, characterized through
industrialism had reached an era of decline in the 20th century. Spengler attacked the rational
strains of modernity in order to celebrate the ‘Philosophy of Life’ since an alternative. Wilhelm
Reich, a neo-psycho analyst, in his Size Psychology of Fascism explains Fascism since a result of
extreme neurotic or pathological impulses that place dormant in the patriarchal family set-up.
Another liberal interpretation traces fascism since a product of size society where traditional
solid identities based on kinship, religion, craft and guild and residence break down and a new
amorphous size-society is created. Few others relate it to a unique expression of transitional-class
radicalism against monopoly business homes’ profit-motive. Lastly, it has been seen since a
shape of Bonapartism or an autonomous authoritarian state led through a charismatic leader self-
governing of any specific class-interests or class-power. Fascism appeared since a radical
movement based on the rejection of liberalism, democracy and Marxist socialism. Though, it
differed from the conservative authoritarian clusters. The conservative right invoked traditional
legitimacies based on the church, the monarchy, kinship etc. whereas the Fascists wanted a
radical institutional change and mobilized people in the name of Organic Nationalism, a belief in
the harmonious collectivity of nation privileged in excess of all other shapes of human-
identification. Since in the human body, the structural connection of the several organs or
sections of the body to each other only serves to describe and delimit their roles; therefore in the
organic view of the fascist state, the state since the embodiment of national will takes precedence
in excess of the identities and rights of the individuals. This view also accounts for the deep-
rooted hostility of fascism to inter-nationalism and to systems and movements based on inter-
nationalism such since communism, freemasonry, the League of Nations and to the multi-
national Jewish society. In common, Fascism symbolized the rejection of political civilization
inherited from Enlightenment and its ideas such since rationalist materialism, the philosophy of
individualism and pluralism. The fascist opposition to the democratic-bourgeois organizations
and values did not rule out their exploit of size, constitutional and plebiscite shapes of politics,
but they made exploit of these democratic organizations only to wreck them from inside and in
order to undermine their value. Fascism was opposed, in all its shapes, to the notion of
democracy based on respect for pluralism, individual autonomy and the subsistence of civil and
political liberties. The size- mobilization of fascists was based on the pattern of militarization of
politics. They made exploit of military insignia and terminology in their mobilization. Since
military-systems are based on unity of command and order and perfect subordination of rank and
file to the higher command, therefore the fascist systems had their quasi-sacred figure of the
leader-the Duce in Italy and the Fuhrer in Germany whose will was supreme in all matters.
A party militia was often used to reinforce the sense of nationalism and wipe out opposition to
their dictatorships. The extreme stress on the masculine principle or male-dominance in the
fascist ideology and the exaltation of youth were also related to this militarization of politics.
Another important characteristic of fascism was the system of few type of regulated, class-
collaborationist, integrated national-economic building. The thought of corporatism since a
society of people free from class-clash appeared in reaction to the development of individualism
and the new centralizing states. It was a residue of the feudal ideology of mystical ‘society’ of
personal ties. But slowly it acquired a contemporary, class-collaborationist shape. The ideology
of societal corporatism whispered in giving full autonomy to the corporations, but fascist
ideology accentuated state corporatism or the complete subordination of corporations to the
requires and requirement of the fascist state.
Ideological Strands of Fascism
At the ideological stage, there was no single unifying thought that guided the fascist movement
and state. Fascism appeared from heterogeneous borrowings from several ideas. The vital
ingredient of fascism was a type of synthesis of organic nationalism and anti-Marxist ideas. The
power of Sorel’s philosophy of action based on intuition, power and élan was also discernible in
the pattern of fascist size-mobilization. The fascists also tried to apply Darwin’s ideas to the
growth of society. They whispered that people in any society compete for subsistence and only
Larger individuals, clusters and races succeed. This belief directly fed into the anti-Jewish
politics or anti-semitism practiced largely under German fascism, but also elsewhere. Such
application of Darwin’s ideas in the realm of society came to be recognized since ‘Social
Darwinism’. Adolph Hitler’s autobiographical report in Mein Kampf made out an explicit case
for the application of such Social-Darwinist racial ideas. In this book, Hitler characterized
parliamentary democracy since a sin against ‘the vital aristocratic principle of nature’ and
depicted all human civilization since the exclusive product of the creative Aryan race and
condemned the Jewish society since inferior and lacking in creativity. The size–extermination of
millions of Jews grew out of this insanity of Nazi ideology in Germany where totally impersonal
bureaucratic ‘extermination’ of a people classified since a species of inferior inhuman was put
into practice. The political theorist Carl Schmitt wrote his critiques of parliamentary democracy
in the 1920s arguing for a plebiscitary dictatorship. The Philosopher Martin Heidegger attacked
Western modernity for its technical violence and for a contempt of being. In several methods,
these philosophies of the right were to become justifications for the Fascist and Nazi regimes in
the 1930s. Fascism in Italy appeared since the convergence of three dissimilar trends. The radical
Syndicalist Confederation of Deal Unions split in 1914 in excess of the issue of Italian
participation in war. The Syndicalists had whispered in the ‘self– emancipation’ of the
‘producers’ by regulation at factory stage. The workers associations or syndicates would replace
the state at a suitable time and these would act since the instruments of self–government. Now
the right wing syndicalists moved towards extreme nationalism. They called nations in class
words, i.e., since ‘plutocratic’ or having colonies or ‘proletarians’ or ‘have not’ nations without
colonies. Italy was called since a proletarian nation. The Futurists who rejected traditional norms
and existing organizations and exalted ‘violence’, and who were fascinated through speed,
authority, motors and machines or all the contemporary technical possibilities, contributed a
second biggest ideological factor. Mussolini’s ‘socialistic’ views and ideas on ‘national
revolution’ was the third biggest ideological strand of Italian fascism. This heterogeneity of ideas
beside with regional political exigencies was responsible for variations in the shape of the fascist
movement and state.
Social Bases of Fascism
Since suggested, define the nature of political and institutional forces that helped in the growth of
the fascist movement and state and continued it.
War, Diplomacy and Nationalism
World War I provided the sociological and psychological circumstances for the crystallization of
the fascist state. It revealed the capability of nationalism in the mobilization of masses and
economic possessions. It further demonstrated the importance of unity of command, of power,
and moral mobilization and propaganda in the service of the contemporary state. After the war,
fascism appeared since a vision of a coherent and reunited people, mobilized on the foundation of
an entire communal liturgy of songs and torch- light procession, highlighting the cult of physical
force, violence and brutality. At the Versailles, the victorious Allied powers tried to extract the
words of defeat from Germany. Severe reparations were imposed on Germany. Germany’s
military might was reduced to 100,000 men. Germany also suffered in words of territorial
possessions including loss of its colonies. Discontent in excess of the severity of the Allies’ peace
words and conflicts and squabbles in excess of the newly drawn frontiers contained seeds of
future conflicts. There was no mechanism to adjudicate rival claims and resolve conflicts. The
League of Nations lacked the executive powers to impose peaceful solutions. Hitler was ready to
exploit military force to achieve union with Austria and to get enough ‘livelihood legroom’ for
the German people. Italian fascism claimed colonies for a ‘proletarian’ Italy. Japanese militarists
demanded an ‘equitable sharing of world possessions’ and were willing to favor a military action
to achieve their aim. Nationalism, war and diplomacy forced individuals and clusters within
national boundaries to take faces. It also made it possible to restrict the public democratic
legroom. Any person or group could be recognized since the ‘national enemy’ or ‘traitors’ and
wiped out for not owing allegiance or loyalty to the fascist ‘national’ state. Earlier defeat was
attributed to the betrayal of these units in the fascist propaganda.
The Economic Crisis of 1929
World War I resulted in size destruction, of possessions both physical and human, and hence,
productive capacities of civilizations involved in it. Reconstruction and ‘recovery’ in Europe
after the war was financed through US loans. The procedure went on smoothly till a crisis began
in the US in excess of the rapid drop in agriculture prices. Since the world agriculture
manufacture began to rise with ‘recovery’ in Europe, North American agriculture was hit through
a rapid drop in the prices and several faced bankruptcies. Soon the stock markets in America
were affected in October 1929. Since a result of the global integration of the markets, the crash
affected all the economies. Plantations, farms and factories closed down throwing millions out of
occupations and restricting output. The Industrialists who had taken advances and loans from
banks and financial organizations establish it hard to repay. Several banks and financial
organizations started facing bankruptcies. With millions out of occupations and factories, there
was no demand for goods and services since the purchasing authority of the people deteriorated.
The economies showed no sign of recovery. In such conditions, re-militarization advocated
through fascist leaders created occupations not only in the armies, but also in the armament
industries. Since this stimulated a demand for goods and services, the fascist programme
appealed to people in crises-ridden times-especially when it also satisfied their ‘national pride’.
The Political Mobilization for Fascism
The initial programme of fascists in Italy, launched since ‘Fasci Di Combattimento’ described
for the installation of a republic and reflected demands for radical democratic and socialistic
reforms including confiscation of vast war- time profits of capitalists, the suppression of large
joint-stock companies and land for landless peasants. These leftist units of the programme were
dropped in 1920 and only an emotive mixture of strident patriotism, justification of war, a
concern for national greatness and aversion to the socialist party were retained. The development
of fascist squads, with the support and connivance of state officials and army was directly
connected to actual or perceived threats of the left. The support of the traditional conservative
elites such since army officers, bureaucrats, and businessmen was utilized and left its imprint on
the fascist party and state. In order to achieve a broader mobilization of people, the military kind
militia, semi-military propaganda kind systems and regimented fascist deal unions were also
created. The Party and its grand Council controlled all these systems. Similarly, chauvinist
sentiment and popular radical demands in Germany were used through Hitler’s fascist system,
the German National Socialist Worker’s Party in order to gain size political support. It described
for a greater Germany with land and colonies, the annulment of the treaty of Versailles,
nationalization of large monopoly business, profit distribution in large enterprises, the abolition
of unearned incomes and agrarian reforms. German fascism capitalized on the rising unease
created through the Great Depression of 1929 and its impact on the German economy. They
made exploit of the political instability of the Weimer republic, whose own constitution was used
since an instrument to subvert it from within. All these factors created circumstances for the rise
of the Nazi Party, the system of German fascism. It had a scrupulous appeal for those patriotic
Germans whose national pride had been hurt through the defeat of Germany in World War I and
its subsequent humiliation at Versailles.
The Question of Hegemony and Coercion
The German fascist state associated with the Fuhrer Adolph Hitler earned for itself the distinction
of being the mainly barbaric and destructive regime that used industrial techniques for the
execution of intended size murder and genocide. The secret state police office, or ‘Gestapo’ since
it came to be recognized in Germany was created in 1933 under the Prussian Interior Ministry,
and rapidly attained autonomy from the provincial government. From 1934, Heinrich Himmler
became the head of this nation-wide fascist organ of terror. Its Prussian part was headed through
Reinhard Heydrich, who was also in charge of the SD, a party intelligence system affiliated to the
dreaded SS, with a nation-wide network of informers. It became the internal disciplinary
executive of the German fascist state. Such systems of terror acquired the complete authority of
life and death in excess of every German. Any opposition to the fascist state was ruthlessly
suppressed. Absolute authority was concentrated in the hands of the Fuhrer. The exploit of a
rational bureaucratic mechanism in order to exterminate the gypsies, Jews and political
opponents by concentration camps is a familiar characteristic of the fascist state. Similarly, in
Italy, Spain and other fascist regimes, every effort was made to dismantle democratic
organizations of the civil society and replace them with institutionalized dictatorships based on
the personal command of the dictators. All this necessitated more and more regimentation of the
civil society. Few scholars even characterize fascism since a ‘totalitarian state’ or a state, which
acquires day-to-day manage in excess of the life of its citizens. But despite the dictatorial rule,
fascism made exploit of sure consent-structure experiments. At the ideological stage, exploit of
nationalist sentiments and even anti-Semitism had a popular sanction behind it. Separately from
this, few new ways were also tried. The fascist state in Italy created the Opera Nazinale
Dopolavoro in 1925. Its largest concern was the system of leisure time for the working people. It
ran a vast network of regional clubs and recreational facilities with libraries, bars, billiard halls
and sport grounds. The Dopolavoro circles arranged concerts, plays, films illustrates, and
organized picnics and provided cheap summer holidays for children. Through the 1930s, there
were in relation to the 20,000 such circles in Italy. Moreover, although the Syndical Law of 1926
brought labour under the manage of the state in the interest of manufacture and confirmed the
fascist deal unions in their monopoly of negotiations with employers and banned strikes, the
fascist state also introduced few welfare schemes for the workers in the 1930s. Family
allowances were given in 1934, mainly to compensate for the loss of income resulting from the
imposition of a forty-hour week. Insurance against sickness and accident was included into wage
agreements, and later in the 1930s, Christmas bonus and holiday pay were introduced. All such
events were meant to set up legitimacy of the state that had abolished civil liberties and
democratic rights. Compared to Italy, German labour was more tightly regimented under the
Nazi regime.
State and Society under Fascism
The fascist state appeared since the institutionalization of personal dictatorship. In Italy, all
opposition parties and systems were banned in October 1926. The Public Safety Law made the
security of the state take precedence in excess of personal liberties. The Fascist Party itself was
bureaucratized and syndicalism ideas were suppressed within the party. Several industrialists
from North Italy including the owner of Fiat Company, Giovanni Oienyale, had financed
Mussolini’s fascist system. Private capital was a beneficiary of the fascist manage of labour. The
‘Corporate State’ was formally created in 1934 with 22 combined corporations of employers and
employees, but they lacked the real authority to take economic decisions. State intervention in the
economic life of the Italian nation was marginal in the early section of fascist regime. The Great
Depression and require to fulfill imperialist ambitions, especially in the Mediterranean Sea and
Africa for its aggressive nationalist-militarist project led to an increased state intervention in the
economic life. The basis of the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction in the 1930s reflected this
trend of economic regulation in the service of contemporary warfare. Though, even in 1940, IRI
possessed only in relation to the 17.8% of the total capital assets of Italian industry. The state, in
scrupulous, focused on the development of chemical, electrical and machine industries and gave
impetus to modernization by electrification of railways and telephone and radio industry.
Though, compared to Germany, investments in military-manufacture were low despite the
regime’s rhetoric of Italy ‘being in a permanent state of war’. Moreover, despite early radical
denouncements of the monopoly capitalist class, the fascist state helped in cartelization, i.e.,
making of big industrial federations. Mussolini also tried to appease the Church. Big grants were
made for the repair of war-damaged churches. In 1923, religious education was made
compulsory in all secondary schools. The Roman question was finally settled in 1929. The
Lateran Pacts were signed with the Church, giving virtual manage of religious-education to the
Church and the Pope’s right to govern the Vatican was established. The Church’s largest place
system, Catholic Action, was guaranteed freedom provided it stayed out of politics. The personal
absolutism and party’s manage of social life was more stringent in Germany. In Italy, large
business, industry, fund, army and professional bureaucracy retained a big degree of autonomy
and fascism came to authority on the foundation of a tacit compromise with these recognized
organizations and elites. In Germany, the Enabling Act became the legal foundation for Hitler’s
dictatorship. Legislative authority was transferred to the executive. The bureaucracy was purged
of politically undesirable and ‘non-Aryan’ units. The federal character of the state was destroyed.
The vital constitutional rights were suppressed. The ‘rule of law’ was transformed into the ‘rule
of leader’. The extra-legal notion of the Fuhrer, to whom bureaucracy and the army swore
‘unconditional obedience’, assumed crucial importance in the administrative functioning and
signified burial of constitutionalism. The will of the leader became the foundation for the
legitimacy of law. The independence of the judiciary was totally destroyed. Furthermore, the
press was totally controlled. Liberal and Jewish-owned newspapers and the Socialist Press were
forced to secure down. Any kind of literature, and art that was establish antithetical to the fascist
perception was banned. The cultural life of citizens by propaganda and education became one of
the chief goals of the Nazi regime. All education was transformed in accordance with fascist
ideals. Text- books were re-written. Jews were forbidden to teach and racial theories of ‘Aryan-
German’ master race supremacy became a section of the curricula. The fascist state in Germany
also attempted to achieve a complete regimentation of labour. ‘Trustees’ appointed through the
owners fixed wages. A labour front was created in October 1934. It operated not since a deal
union, but since a propaganda machine, and incorporated employers and professionals since
members. Its stated aim was the maximization of job, and the fascists controlled it. The fascist
state’s attitude to women was based on ultra-conservative patriarchal sentiments. The social role
of women was defined through the slogan of ‘Kids, Kitchen and Church’. The mainly oppressive
characteristic of fascism in Germany was a systematic persecution of Jews. The ideology of Nazi
party in Germany was informed through a strong hatred of the Jews and an intense obsession
with the maintenance of the Aryan purity of the German Master race. The Jews were stereotyped
since inferior, racially impure and a source of all ills of Germany. They were deprived of
citizenship, spaces in the universities and management. Their businesses were attacked. They
were subjected to all sorts of unprecedented discrimination. Later on, millions of them were sent
to concentration camps and massacred throughout World War II. Italian fascism in contrast,
lacked any systematic policy of racial anti-semitism, at least, up to 1937. Though, in November
1938, under the power of the Nazis, racial anti-Jews laws were also passed in Italy.

INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM

Individualist versus Communitarian Location
In responding to this question, individualists and communitarians hold dissimilar and apparently
conflicting locations. While the individualists see political reality since being formed through
decisions and actions of free and rights-bearing individuals, communitarians emphasize the
connection flanked by the person and the society and see this connection to be the foundation of
politics. This debate may then be characterized since one flanked by those who favor individual
rights and autonomy and those who emphasize the bonds of society in political life.
Relevance in the Indian Context
The debate flanked by individualism and communitarianism is particularly relevant to the Indian
context. The Indian Constitution deviates from the traditional liberal framework, which
guarantees individual rights and ignores the rights of society membership. It endorses and accepts
the twin ideals of individual autonomy and society membership. The Constitution contains both
the guarantee of individual civil rights and liberties and the principle of equal respect for all
societies. A revise of the debate flanked by individualism and communitarianism is, so, also
significant for understanding few of the questions and issues in modern Indian political theory
and practice. It would be helpful to note that there are dissimilar diversities of individualism and
communitarianism. In this element, we shall revise few of the key arguments and themes
contained in these theoretical locations. We begin with an introduction to the meaning and origin
of liberal individualism. We then go on to understand few of the largest arguments of
individualistic perspective, namely, the conception of self and understanding of the nature and
functions of the state. This is followed through an introduction to the communitarian critique of
liberal individualism. We, then, analyze the locations held through communitarians on the
conception of the person and the nature and functions of the state.

Meaning and Growth of Individualism

Individualism is one of the many theories of connection flanked by the citizen and the state and
of the proper scope of state behaviors. Other theories of this connection, which oppose the theory
of individualism are socialism, sarvodaya, fascism and communitarianism, which since
suggested, revise later in this element. What distinguishes individualism from these other theories
is its emphasis on the individual since the primary element in political and social theory. Few of
the largest advocates of individualism have been Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Herbert Spencer
and more recently, F.A. Hayek and Robert Nozick. In India, Mahadeo Govind Ranade and the
Swatantra Party largely supported the individualistic view.
Atomism and Methodological Individualism
The concept of individualism is one of the largest characteristics of liberal political idea, the
other characteristics being universalism, egalitarianism, secularism and the isolation flanked by
the public and the private. The thought of individualism covers a wide diversity of ideas,
attitudes and doctrines. At the heart of these ideas and doctrines is the systematic according of
primacy to the individual in excess of any social group, society or communal. The individual is
regarded since an end in itself while political, economic and social organizations are measured
since a mere means to that end. This thought of individualism is described ‘Atomism’—a view
of society constituted through individuals for fulfillment of ends, which are primarily
individualistic and which exist antecedently or prior to any scrupulous shape of social life.
Individualism also refers to the doctrine in relation to the centrality of individual to any political
theory or social account. This doctrine is described ‘Methodological Individualism’ – a doctrine
that asserts that no account in social science or history can be fundamental unless based upon
facts and characteristics of individuals, their properties, goals, beliefs and actions. In other terms,
social wholes or the aggregate pattern of behavior necessity always be explained in words of the
individual. More importantly, the theory of individualism relates to the principle of laissez-
faire—French phrase that means ‘leave alone’ or ‘allow to do’. The principle of laissez faire is a
principle of economic individualism and is a section of the broader theory of connection flanked
by the state and the citizen. It was the battle cry of tradesmen, moneylenders and little
manufacturers of 18th century France and England, who felt constrained through the controls and
regulations of the mercantilist state. The mercantilist state was characterized through a great trade
of state intervention in the economy. In contrast, economic laissez-faire stood for the policy of
non-intervention or minimal intervention through state in the economic sphere. The economy, it
was felt, should be left to operate in accordance with the demand and supply mechanism of the
market. Laissez-faire or economic individualism, in other terms, stands for limited government
and free deal.
Views of Contractualists including John Rawls
Individualism is essentially a contemporary phenomenon that began to take form in the 17th
century in the scripts of Hobbes and Locke. As the times of Hobbes and Locke, liberal political
theory has made it its primary purpose to explore the connection flanked by the individual and
the state. All individuals have inalienable rights. Government derives its powers from the consent
of those who are to be governed. This consent is expressed through and recognized on the
foundation of a social contract flanked by the governed and those who govern. The distinctive
characteristic of the individualistic location, though, is the claim that the parties to the social
contract are essentially people acting since individuals, and not since representatives of a cultural
or communal group. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau spoke of a number of men establishing the
state by a social contract and were explicit in relation to the eliminating associations and clusters
intermediate flanked by the individual and the state. In fact, Rousseau maintained that if the
Common Will is to be truly expressed, it is essential that there are no subsidiary clusters within
the state. The mainly recent biggest exponent of the contractarian point of view, John Rawls,
similarity assumes that the parties in the ‘Original Location’ who job out the principles of justice
are individuals who speak for themselves. Moreover, the justice that they speak of is only for
individuals. While Rawls does illustrate little concern for social classes, he does not raise the
question of whether society/clusters should be measured since entities with claims to justice.
Views of Utilitarians
Emphasis on the individual is not confined to the social contract perspective in liberal political
idea. In speaking of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, utilitarians such since Jeremy
Bentham and J.S.Mill also had individuals in mind. In fact, in his job On Liberty, Mill
accentuated the liberty of the individual and require of the state to keep out of private concerns.
Similarly, those who speak of the consent of the governed usually take it since an obvious
assumption that the consent is to approach from individuals. Further, the theories of democracy
which trade with the concept of one man-one vote, one vote-one value and majority rule clearly
have individuals in mind. Individualism has guided much of contemporary liberal political idea.
Though, the theory of individualism is not universally carried or is free of criticism. Political
theory today is deeply divided in relation to the connection flanked by the state and the citizen
since well since in relation to the proper scope of state behaviors. Since suggested, analyze few
of the biggest assumptions in relation to the liberal individualism, which have approach under
attack from communitarianism.
The Individualist Conception of the Self
Central to the theory of individualism is its conception or understanding of the self. In fact,
individualism builds its understanding of dealings flanked by the state and the citizen since well
since the proper scope of state behaviors on the foundation of its conception of the self. Since
suggested, revise the individualist conception of the self or person. In the individualist view,
people are free, rational and capable of self-determination. People are rational in that they are the
best judges of their interest. They are capable of self-determination; that is, they are capable of
determining their own conception of good life. A person’s conception of good life is his set of
beliefs and values in relation to the how he should lead his life and in relation to the makes life
worthwhile. People are free in the sense that they possess the skill since well since the right to
question their participation in existing social practices and to opt out of them, should these
practices no longer remain worthwhile. Individuals, in other terms, are free to question and reject
or study any scrupulous social relation. We, since individuals, have the skill to detach ourselves
or step back from any scrupulous social practice and question whether we want to continue
pursuing it or not. No scrupulous task or end is set for us through society; no end is exempt from
a possible revision or rejection through the self. A person’s goals, aims and ends are always
things that he chooses to attach himself to and so, detach himself from, when they are no longer
worthy of such attachment. A person is, therefore , related to his ends, goals through an exercise
of will. Rawls expresses this argument in the following phrase:
‘The self is prior to the ends, which are affirmed through it’.
In the individualist view then, individual freedom of choice is needed precisely to discover out
what is precious in life, to shape, analyze and study our beliefs and values. People necessity have
necessary possessions and liberties needed to live their lives in accordance with their beliefs and
values without being penalized. They necessity also have cultural circumstances necessary to
acquire an awareness of dissimilar views in relation to the good life and to acquire a skill to
analyze these views intelligently. On the foundation of the conception of the individual since
free, rational and capable of self-determination, individualists develop their theory in relation to
the connection flanked by the citizen and the state and of the nature and functions of the state.
The Individualist Theory of the Nature and Functions of the State
The individualist theory of the nature and functions of the state is based on its conception of the
self since free, rational and self-determining. As individuals are free, rational and capable of self-
determination, their interests are bigger promoted through letting them choose for themselves
what sort of life they want to lead. Individual interests are harmed through attempts through the
state to enforce a scrupulous view of good life. In the individualist view, the conception of the
self since free, rational and self-determining necessarily needs a conception of the state since
neutral and minimalist. The primary value in the political order for individualism necessity, then,
be the neutrality of the state. In fact, a distinctive characteristic of liberal individualism is its
emphasis on the state since a neutral and minimal political power.
A neutral state may be defined since a state, which does not favor, protect, promote or contrarily,
discriminate against or penalize any scrupulous individual conception of good. Rather, such a
state gives a neutral framework within which dissimilar and potentially conflicting conceptions
of good can be pursued. It is committed to tolerating dissimilar views and conceptions of good
life held through its citizens. In other terms, the neutral state does not enforce a scrupulous
conception of good life. Instead it stays out of the peoples’ decisions concerning the best method
to lead their lives, thereby leaving each individual free to pursue his/her own conception of good
or method of life.
Functions of State and Government
What are the legitimate functions of state and government? In the individualistic view, people
have their natural or pre-political freedom. Government arises out of the consent of the governed.
State is not a natural entity; rather, it is an artificial but necessary construct. State, In fact, is
defined since a necessary evil. As it is a necessary evil, the government that rules the least is
measured the best. The functions and role of state are, so, limited to guarantee and defense of
individual rights and freedom. In other terms, the role of state is minimal and limited to the
maintenance of law and order and the provision of security to its citizens, beyond which they
should be left free. The state should interfere in the liberty of citizens only to prevent one
individual from unnecessarily interfering in the liberty of others. In the individualist view, a state
that defines its duties beyond that of security and the defense of individual rights restricts
freedom and the self-determination of its citizens. Individualism, therefore , sees an inverse
relation flanked by the expansion of state behaviors and the enlargement of the sphere of
individual rights and freedom. The individualist conception of self, its understanding of
connection flanked by the state and the citizen and the proper scope of state behaviors have been
criticized through a number of theoretical perspectives, few of which are fascism, sarvodaya,
communism and feminism. Though the mainly profound critique of the individualist perspective
is establish in the theory of communitarianism.
Communitarianism: An Introduction
As the 1980s, the theory of liberal individualism has establish it’s mainly distinctive and
intensives challenge and critique in what has been labeled since communitarianism. The word
communitarian was first elicited through Michael Sandel in his job Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice in which he urbanized a critique of the liberal individualist foundations of John Rawls’s
theory of liberal justice. Few of the other communitarian critics of liberal individualism are
Alisdair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor. These communitarian thinkers are
highly inspired through Hegel and Rousseau. Communitarians are first and foremost concerned
with society. Two or more people constitute a society when they share a general conception of
good and see this good since partly constitutive of their identity or selves. Such a ‘constitutive
society’ may be a secure friendship, family connection, neighborhood or even a comprehensive
political society. Communitarians insist that each of us since individuals develops our identity,
talents and pursuit in life only in the context of a society. We are through nature social beings. As
the society determines and forms the individual nature, political life necessity start with a
concern for the society, and not the individual. In other terms, the locus of philosophical concern
in reflecting on the ideal and the presently state necessity be the society and not the individual.
The largest fault of liberal individualism according to communitarian thinkers, is then that it is
mistakenly and irreparably individualistic. The liberal conception of the connection flanked by
the individual and the state is unduly limited since well since misrepresentative of the true nature
of society. In the communitarian view, it is not sufficient to think in words of a two-stage
connection; with the individual at one stage and the state at the other. Clusters and societies
inhabit an intermediate location flanked by the individual and the state and should be
incorporated in the middle of the types of rights-and duty-bearing elements whose inter-
relationships are explored. Through emphasizing rights and freedom of individuals in excess of
society, liberal individualism neglects the importance of society membership and identity to
social and political life. It ignores the extent to which the society/society in which people live
forms who they are and the values they have.
Although communitarian critics focus on dissimilar characteristics of liberal individualism, it is
possible to identify few of the largest themes and arguments, such since the critique of the
liberal-individualist conception of self and its understanding of the nature and functions of the
state.
The Communitarian Critique of the Individualist Conception of the Self
A great trade of communitarian idea has presented itself in words of an explicit reference to and a
rejection of the individualistic conception of self. The common form of this communitarian claim
is that individualistic political theory takes us to be too far/distinct from our social ends and
conceptions of the good in a method that basically fails to correspond to the method in which we
actually relate to these ends.
Two Largest Limitations of Individualism
Communitarians point to two largest limitations of the liberal individualist understanding of the
self since detached and distinct from social ends: first, it devalues, discounts and downgrades the
importance of the society; and second, it presupposes a defective conception of the relation
flanked by the self and its ends. Concerning the first criticism, communitarianism challenges
liberal individualism for downgrading and discounting the importance of the society and more
specifically, for ignoring the extent to which it is the society or the society which people live in
that form who they are and the values they have. Individualism understands people to be self-
enough outside of society and not in require of any society context in order to develop and
exercise their capacities for self-determination. In other terms, individualism does not recognize
the importance of society membership in shaping a good life for the individual. Communitarians
argue that the liberal picture of individuals picking and choosing their conceptions of the good is
facile. Sandel and MacIntyre argue that Rawls exaggerates our capability to stand back from and
question our social roles and views the self since ‘unencumbered’. On the contrary,
communitarians argue that the self is ‘embedded’ in existing social practices. For
communitarianism, though, the society is a fundamental and an irreplaceable ingredient in the
good life of the person. Though resilient and self-governing people may be human subsistence
outside social and society life is unthinkable. People are not Robinson Crusoes able to live in
complete and permanent separation. Rather individuals are constituted, and their identity formed,
through the society to which they belong. We, since human beings, are essentially members of a
family, religion, tribe, race and nation. Since such, rather than being far from social and society
ends and values, we have a history and are placed in specific social conditions. The attachments
and the moral engagements from these society membership determines ‘who we are’ and form
‘the values we have’. Communitarians, therefore , criticize liberal individualism for producing a
scrupulous conception of self, which is divorced from the social reality that constitutes it. Since
for the second criticism, communitarianism criticizes individualism for holding a mistaken or a
false understanding of the connection flanked by the individual self and its ends. Individualism
understands ‘the self to be prior to its ends’ in the sense that individuals reserve the right to
question, study and reject their mainly deeply held convictions in relation to the nature of good
life, if these are establish to be no longer worth pursuing. To accept this understanding of self is
to see oneself since disembodied, unencumbered and distribution a voluntary connection with
one’s social ends and attachments. They oppose this voluntaristic picture of the connection
flanked by the self and its ends assumed through individualism. This picture ignores the method
we are embedded or located and partially constituted through social roles and society
membership. Criticizing the individualist conception of the self, communitarians inquire whether
we can really step back from scrupulous values that we have and change them for new ones, or
are we rather made the extremely people that we are through the values that we endorse therefore
that detachment is impossible? Human beings, they argue, are essentially social beings. Since
such, we neither choose nor reject our social and society ends and attachments; rather we
discover them. We are neither free nor standing at an aloofness from our social and society ends;
instead, we discover ourselves situated/ located in them. For example, we do not choose our
family, caste or nation; we discover ourselves situated in them. We, then, determine our
conception of the good and ends given our lay, location and situation in a family, religion and
nation. We are never free from all social roles and society identities. Our membership of social
clusters and societies determine and constitute our identity and understanding of good life. We
cannot always stand back and opt out of social dealings and society membership. Our social
dealings and roles, or at least few necessity be taken since given. As these goals are constitutive
of me since a person, they have to be taken since given in deciding what to do with my life; the
question of good in my life can only be a question of how best to interpret their meaning. It
makes no sense to say that they have no value for me, as there is no ‘me’ standing behind them,
no self prior to their ends or constitutive attachments. The self is constituted through and not
prior to its ends’. In this method, communitarians denounce the historical, asocial and
disembodied conception of the person establish in individualism. This conception overlooks the
method in which it is the type of society in which people live that affect their understanding, both
of themselves and of how they should lead their lives. A precious life, they argue, is one that is
filled with commitments and dealings. And what makes them commitments is precisely that they
are not the sort of things that people can question every day. The Communitarian Critique of the
Thought of State Neutrality The other largest focus of communitarian critique of liberal
individualism is the latter’s understanding of the nature and functions of the state. Liberal
individualists characterize the state since a minimal and neutral political power, whose functions
are limited to defense of individual rights and maintenance of law and order. As individuals are
free, rational and capable of self-determination, the primary value in political order ought to be
neutrality of the state. A neutral state is one that is not committed to any scrupulous conception
of the good, and remnants equidistant from and tolerant of all conceptions of the good.
Communitarians oppose this relationship flanked by individual self-determination and state
neutrality. The view that the state should be value-neutral and individuals should be free to create
their own choices stems from an atomistic belief that autonomy is protected only when
judgments in relation to the good life are taken out of political realm and made on an individual
foundation. Rejecting such ‘atomism’, communitarians argue that, in reality, individual
judgments need distribution of experiences, provide and take of communal deliberation and
communal evaluation of shared practices. In other terms, individual choices in relation to the
good life can only be exercised in a scrupulous sort of society and not a cultural marketplace
guided through freedom and neutrality, of the kind guaranteed through liberal individualism. The
communitarian perspective, so, argues for abandonment of liberal neutrality in favor of politics
of the general good. Communitarians conceive of the general good since a substantive conception
of good life that defines the society method of life. Rather than being neutral to dissimilar
individual conceptions of good life, the general good gives standards through which individual
preferences and values are evaluated. In other terms, the general good shapes the foundation on
which individual conceptions of good are ranked, and the weight given to an individual’s
conception depends on how much it conforms or contributes to the general good. In the
communitarian view then, a presently state is not one that remnants neutral towards all individual
conceptions of good. Rather, a presently state is one which encourages its citizens to adopt
conceptions of good that conform to the general good, while discouraging conceptions of good
that clash with it. The nature of the state should not be neutral or minimalist; rather it ought to
play a role in guiding its citizens in leading a good life. Hence, while liberal individualism
encourages each person to describe and seek his own ‘good’, communitarianism believes that a
political building has a significant role to play in defining and in helping people seek the ‘good’.
Further, communitarians argue that the general good is required not only for guiding people’s
decisions in relation to the good life, but also for establishing a presently and legitimate political
society. According to Taylor, the thought of the general good is required to enable citizens to
accept the demands of justice demanded through a welfare state. At the heart of the theory of
justice in a welfare state is the claim that the privileged ought to sacrifice a portion of their rights
and rewards for the sake of others. For example, in a liberal capitalist society, the propertied
classes are required to sacrifice few of their property for the benefit of the non-propertied and for
sustaining a presently society. According to Taylor, though, the demand for such a sacrifice, in
an individualistic society would look improper since citizens would be required to sacrifice their
rights for the sake of those with whom they share no society identity or general method of life. If
we are distanced from a society or a shared method of life, we would necessarily be unwilling to
shoulder the burdens of liberal justice. In the communitarian view then, justice is rooted in a
society whose primary bond is the shared understanding of the good of both man and society.
DISADVANTAGED AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Justifications for Affirmative Action
Since Oliver Wendell Holmes said, ‘There is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of
unequals.’ Here, arises require for such positive discrimination which would create humanity
more humane and progressive. Aristotle in his Nichomchean Ethics wrote, justice is equality,
since all men consider it to be quite separately from any argument. Indeed, in Greek, the term
equality means justice. To be presently is to be equal and to be unjust is to be unequal. According
to Aristotle, equality means that things that are similar should be treated similar and things that
are unalike should be treated unalike. Injustice arises when equals are treated unequally and also
when unequals are treated equally. Affirmative action becomes essential in righting societal
inequities. It is based on the ‘principle of redress’; that undeserved inequalities call for
rectification. As inequalities of birth are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow
compensated for. According to Rawls, therefore , in order to treat all persons equally and to give
genuine equality of opportunity, society necessity provide more attention to those born into or
placed in less favorable social locations. Affirmative action was recognized since a section of
society’s efforts to address continuing troubles of discrimination; the empirical proof presented
in the preceding pages designates that it has had a somewhat positive impact on remedying the
effects of discrimination. Whether such discrimination still exists today, is a central unit of any
analysis of affirmative action.
Proof of Continuing Discrimination
There has been an undeniable human progress in several areas. Nevertheless, the proof is
overwhelming that the troubles affirmative action seeks to address are widespread. To take the
instance of the U.S. society, where the concept of affirmative action appeared, the marked
differences in the economic status of the blacks and the whites, and flanked by men and women,
clearly have social and economic reasons in addition to common discrimination.
One respected way to isolate the prevalence of discrimination is to exploit random testing, in
which individuals compete for the similar occupation, apartment, or few other goal. For instance,
the Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. mannered a series of tests flanked by
1990 and 1992. The tests revealed that the Blacks were treated significantly worse than the
equally qualified Whites of the time. Similarly, researchers with the National Bureau of
Economic Research sent comparably matched resumes of men and women to the restaurants in
Philadelphia. In high priced eateries, men were more than twice since likely to receive an
interview call and five times since likely to receive an occupation offer since compared to the
women testers.
The Justice Department had mannered a same testing to uncover housing discrimination. These
tests also revealed that the Whites are more likely than the Blacks to be shown apartment
elements, while the Blacks with equal credentials are told that nothing is accessible. As the
testing began, the Justice Department brought in excess of 20 federal suits resulting in resolutions
totaling more than $1.5 million. A recent revise through the Glass Ceiling Commission, a body
recognized under President Bush and legislatively sponsored through Senator Dole, accounted
that:
White males continue to hold 97 percent of senior administration locations in Fortune 1000
industrial and Fortune 500 service industries. Only 0.6 percent of senior managers are African-
Americans, 0.3 percent are Asians and 0.4 percent are Hispanic.
African-Americans hold only 2.5 percent of top occupations in the private sector and African-
American men with professional degrees earn only 79 percent of the amount earned through their
white counterparts. Comparably located African-American women earn only 60 percent of the
amount earned through the white males.
Women hold only 3 to 5 percent of senior stage administration locations—there are only two
women CEOs in Fortune 1000 companies.
The fears and prejudices of lower-rung white male executives were listed since a principal
barrier to the advancement of women and minorities. The statement also establish that, crossways
the board, men advance more rapidly than women.
The unemployment rate for African-Americans was more than twice that of the Whites in
1994. The median income for black males working full-time, full year in 1992 was 30 percent
less than that of the white males. Hispanics fared only modestly bigger in each category. In 1993,
Black and Hispanic men were half since likely since white men to be managers or professionals.
In 1992, in excess of 50 percent of African-American children under 6 and 44 percent of
Hispanic children existed under the poverty stage, while only 14.4 percent of white children did
therefore. The overall poverty rates were 33.3 percent for African-Americans, 29.3 percent for
Hispanics and 11.6 percent for Whites.
Black employment remnants fragile—in an economic downturn, black unemployment leads
the downward spiral. For instance, in the 1981-82 recessions, black employment dropped through
9.1 percent while white employment fell through 1.6 percent. Hispanic unemployment is also
much more cyclical than unemployment for the white Americans.
Unequal access to education plays a significant role in creating and perpetuating economic
disparities. In 1993, less than 3 percent of college graduates were unemployed; but whereas 22.6
percent of the Whites had college degrees, only 12.2 percent of African-Americans and 9.0
percent of Hispanics had such a degree.
The 1990 census reflected that 2.4 percent of the nation’s businesses were owned through the
Blacks. Approximately 85 percent of these black owned businesses had no employees. Even
within educational categories, the economic status of minorities and women fall short. The
standard woman with a master’s degree earns the similar amount since the standard man with an
associate degree.
These gaps in, arguably, the mainly urbanized society in the world today amply justify
require for a constructive programme, therefore that rampant inequality and injustice in society
could be fought with vigor and commitment.
Theoretical Issues
Given the seriousness of the problem, approximately all thinkers from Liberals to Libertarians
and Marxists to Social Democrats have tried to address the issue in their own method. There is a
common agreement in the middle of them that equality of individual conditions is impossibility.
John Rawls makes a substantial case for reducing inequalities since he concedes that, if
inequalities benefit everybody through drawing out socially useful talents and energies, then they
would be acceptable to all. Libertarians, on the other hand, are clear in their minds that equality
in individual conditions is not even desirable, for it would thwart incentives and development.
They do talk in relation to the equality of opportunity and equality before the law, but equality in
the sense commonly understood is clearly undesirable for them. The argument is that an equal
world is inimical to development and incentives. The rapid economic advance that we have
approach to anticipate looks in a big measure to be a result of unequal conditions. Karl Marx’s
view on equality turns out to be rather indifferent towards the thought of equality of individual
conditions, in the sense of equal sharing of commodities and income. He would rather prefer to
eliminate class distinctions, therefore that oppression and use may be eliminated and all social
and political inequality arising from them would disappear through itself. In the first stage of
communism, he envisages inequality emerging from the equal right to labour, but in the final
level of communism, he envisaged a world where equality in the sense of sharing of goods or
income would cease to have a meaning. Social Democrats and Fabians are in favor of a
substantial measure of equality, but they do not want to do absent with the vital framework of
free market capitalism, believing that few shape of inequality is not only desirable for the
purpose of extensive word development, but is also a section of the natural order of things.
In addition to their concept of equality and its relevance for human development, their views in
relation to the ensuring justice are also enlightening, however since has been noted, everybody
will have a dissimilar conception of justice like the concept of equality. In the Rawlsian scheme
of things, the conception of justice ensures that the societal dispensation is intended in such a
method that it improves the condition of the least advantaged members of society. In fact,
Rawlsian justice is geared exclusively towards improving the lot of the worst off members of
society. Rawls talks of ensuring equality of opportunity, because it ensures that the fate of the
people is determined through their choices and not through their conditions. ‘My aim is to
regulate inequalities that affect people’s life chances and not the inequalities that arise from
people’s life choices’, which are an individual’s own responsibility. Rawls seeks to ensure a
scheme of things that Prof Dworkin calls ‘endowment insensitive and ambition sensitive’
dispensation. An organization is presently if it takes care of the redressed of undeserved
inequalities and as the inequalities of birth are undeserved, these inequalities are somehow to be
compensated for. Libertarian thinkers like Hayek and Friedman have recognized the difficulty of
ensuring equality of individual conditions, but at the similar time, they have argued for the
elimination of moral and political inequality. They have centered their discussion on ensuring
‘equality of opportunity and equality before the law’. The presupposition is that this ensures
justice and enhances individual freedom. The principle of ‘equality of opportunity’ is that every
person has an equal chance to do what he wishes and has the capability to do. For Marx, a
presently organization is one, wherein all class distinctions have been abolished. It is not
necessarily an organization where equality prevails, for equality which is fundamentally a
bourgeois thought , has no lay in the report of working class demands and objectives. As the state
is an instrument, used through the dominant class to suppress and use the dependant class, the
state in the hands of the Proletariat shall be the medium to be used against bourgeois and other
reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces for affecting a radical redistribution of possessions.
Social democrats are in favor of ensuring an organization , wherein a substantial measure of
equality is guaranteed without doing absent with the vital framework of market capitalism. Those
who specifically addressed the question also feel require for a positive action for alleviating the
sufferings of the disadvantaged group since a necessary step for social growth. R.H Tawney is
strongly in favor of substantial redistribution and in scrupulous, public provision for education,
for all children to create them capable of freedom and more capable of fulfilling their personal
differences and enlargement of personal liberties. Joining the stream of such thinkers, Amartya
Sen emphasizes this characteristic in his advocacy of ‘Vital Capacity Equality’. He says that
‘Individual claims are not to be assessed in words of the possessions or primary goods persons
respectively hold, but in words of the freedom they enjoy to choose flanked by dissimilar
methods of livelihood therefore that they can have cause to value public action to improve
nutritional intake, life expectancy and reduce morbidity and infant mortality therefore since to
enhance individuals capabilities.’ Adopting predictive postures, Mr. Edley explores the potential
shapes that affirmative action could take in the future. This theorist presents three models of
affirmative action: First, there is the ‘color blind vision’ of affirmative action. This adaptation
would entail race-based events since a remedy only for people who could prove they are direct
‘victims of discrete acts of discrimination.’ The second adaptation of affirmative action would be
described the ‘opportunity and antidiscrimination’ adaptation. It would seek to give equal
opportunity for minorities, but would not need equal results. This adaptation acknowledges that
the harms of racism make ‘economic and social disparities in the middle of races.’ This
adaptation of affirmative action would seek to correct these harms. Finally, a third adaptation
would be described ‘remediation plus inclusion.’ This adaptation is the ‘preferred’ come of the
thinker and essentially suggests that variety alone constitutes ‘a compelling state interest.’
These models provide incite for a neo-world order which is likely to accommodate plurality since
an instrument of progression instead of use. Require for a neo-theoretical framework could be
understood from the information that the discriminatory attitude has become more subtle,
subconscious and sophisticated; therefore it has to be addressed at that stage. This could not be
understood in words of sheer inequalities, which present too simplistic a perception of the
disadvantaged. There are three key units where affirmative action programmes have an edge in
excess of the traditional notion of positive equality.
First, affirmative action programmes are pro-active, including policies and processes for ensuring
a diverse applicant pool. Affirmative action does not mean quotas for hiring and promotion,
which are in fact illegal. Nor does it necessarily mean preferential hiring. The goal is to
assemble, in a self-conscious and active method that can counteract the effects of subtle bias, a
diverse pool of fully qualified candidates for hiring or promotion. Second, the mainly general
characteristic of affirmative action programmes is the emphasis on recordkeeping and
identification of accurate availability statistics therefore that systems can accurately gauge their
progress toward their variety goals. The subtle procedure of underlying discrimination can be
recognized and in accessible under the structured circumstances of the laboratory. Though, in
organizational decision-creation, in which the controlled circumstances of an experiment are
rarely possible, modern bias presents a substantial challenge to the equitable treatment of
members of disadvantaged clusters. Not only are the perpetrators of bias often unaware of their
motives, research has demonstrated that the victims of discrimination may also not recognize that
they have been personally discriminated against. Systematic monitoring of disparities beside
consensually carried dimensions can reveal the cumulative effects of modern shapes of bias that
are more apparent than the impact that can be determined in any scrupulous case. Third,
affirmative action policies are outcome-based; issues of intentionality are not central.
Demonstrating intentionality, which is typically a biggest issue of concern for equal employment
opportunity programmes, is problematic because of modern shapes of bias. These biases
commonly happen unintentionally. To put it in a more simplified manner, in excess of the past 25
years social psychologists have recognized and documented the subtle nature of modern shapes
of bias. In contrast to the direct and easily discernible traditional shapes, modern biases are
expressed, often unintentionally, in indirect and rationalizable methods. Because of the subtle
nature of modern bias, passive equal opportunity employment policies may not ensure a fair and
unbiased treatment of traditionally disadvantaged clusters. Policies intended to protect
disadvantaged individuals and clusters from one kind of discrimination based on overt anti-out-
group actions may be ineffective for addressing biased treatment based on in-group favoritism
that may characterize aversive racism. In contrast, affirmative action, with its focus on
documenting and responding to disparities at the aggregate stage and its emphasis on outcomes
rather than intention, addresses few of the particularly problematic characteristics of subtle biases
that permit disparities to persist despite people’s good intentions.
Affirmative Action: A Global Perspective
However the concept originated in the United States, yet it had an important appeal beyond its
borders. While affirmative action laws in the USA are a result of confusing mixtures of case law,
statutory law and executive orders, spaces such since India, Malaysia, Namibia and South Africa
have written affirmative action into their constitutions. In Malaysia and India, affirmative action
receives strong support from the government since a means to normalize opportunities for
minorities that have endured years of racial oppression.
Affirmative Action in India
India has been practicing affirmative action in its essence, longer and more aggressively than any
other lay in the world. However conservative opponents of the USA based affirmative action
routinely misstate its nature through referring to it since set asides and quotas, in India quotas are
the rule. They have been applied widely in the educational and the employment arena as the
1950s for deprived members of the caste organization, such since the untouchables. For instance,
in India’s parliament, the ‘outcaste’ and other indigenous tribes are guaranteed a number of seats
numerically proportional to their demographic representation. It is with the lofty aim of
alleviating the sufferings of the underprivileged and exploited parts of Indian society and for
reconstruction and transformation of a hierarchical society emphasizing inequality into a
contemporary egalitarian society based on individual attainment and equal opportunity for all that
the protective discrimination programme was devised under the Indian Constitution. Though, this
ideal of egalitarianism did not approach in relation to the in a day or two; rather it was the
culmination of an extensive procedure of change in the traditional pattern of a medieval caste
ridden society. These changes were, in fact, the culmination of an extensive drawn procedure of
transformation in the traditional patterns of a caste-ridden society. Two factors worked since
catalysts in the procedure; the indigenous reforms and western powers. The founding fathers of
the Indian Constitution were aware of the prevailing miserable and appalling circumstances of
backward clusters who had remained distant behind and segregated from the national and social
mainstream and had sustained to be socially oppressed and economically exploited for centuries
due to several kinds of disabilities. These handicaps, resulting from societal arrangements such
since caste buildings and group suppressions, constitutionally authorized preferences and
protective discrimination, created a lot of confusion and conflicts leading to heated debates, court
cases, street violence and social unrest. India, the major democratic organization of the world,
with a thousand million plus population and a mind-boggling diversity, an organization which
boasts of more than 5000 years of history and sustained culture and a hoary past, has been
experimenting with protective discrimination programmes on an unprecedented diversity.
Reservations in occupations, educational organizations, legislatures and in regional independent
organizations, bigger recognized since Panchayati Raj organizations for scheduled castes,
scheduled tribes, other backward classes and now women has been a grand experiment through
any average . It may also be noted that scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward
classes are an entire cluster of thousands of castes spread in excess of the length and breadth of
the country. Though, it has succeeded to little extent in achieving the target it had set before itself
57 years ago.
Affirmative Action in Malaysia
However India has the oldest affirmative action programme, Malaysia’s implementation is
measured the mainly successful. Malaysia has achieved success without require for quotas, where
‘Malay majority has now become carried since the norm in education and government
employment.’ The Malaysian organization has created a virtual re-sharing of wealth where
several Malays, previously having only a 1% stake in the Malaysian economy in 1969 now have
more than a 20% stake. In comparable USA words, this would be like distributing all the shares
of stock traded on the New York Stock Swap to black people in proportion to their representation
in the USA population.
Affirmative Action in Namibia and South Africa
Namibia and South Africa have recently rewritten their constitutions and have same
organizations, however they have borrowed affirmative action language from the USA laws. For
instance, South Africa’s Constitution basically contains the following language: ‘Affirmative
Action is allowed.’ It is also pointed out, though, that affirmative action programmes abroad are
not completely devoid of trouble. In India, several of the upper caste members are beginning to
create same argument to those of the USA conservatives and Malaysia’s organization is
vulnerable to corruption. It is significant to know here that the applicability of the affirmative
action concept is much broader than in the USA.
Affirmative Action in the United States of America
Despite the subsistence of equal defense clause under the 14th amendment, racial discrimination
had sustained in the USA up to the mid 20th century. Though, this discrepancy flanked by its
ideals and its treatment of the Black people began to be corrected approximately the 1950s and
mainly notably, in 1954. The United States Supreme Court came out strongly against the
segregation of the blacks in schools. The first step since reflected in the decisions of the courts
and civil rights laws of the Congress merely removed the legal and quasi-legal shapes of racial
discrimination. These actions while not producing true equality or even opportunity socially
dictated the next step; a positive exploit of governmental authority to make the possibility of real
equality. The decision in Brown overturning Plessey foretold that all publicly enforced,
sponsored or supported racial discrimination was beyond the pale, that equal defense was not a
bounty, but a birthright. A decade after Brown, the Congress joined the movement to eliminate
segregation through enacting the Civil Rights Act in 1964, which prohibited in common words
discrimination against any person on the grounds of race, color or ethnic origin regarding any
programme or action getting federal funds. These attempts have been viewed since mandating
affirmative action programmes by racial classification. The decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the Allan Bakke case and the debates that took lay in its wake have further re-
enforced the constitutionality of the affirmative action programme in the USA.
Though, the heated debates, judicial pronouncements and academic and philosophical
discussions in the United States are referred to and indeed, they are helpful in understanding
several an intricate and complicated issue of India’s protective action programme, which is
distant more hard to handle in view of India’s varied and several hued civilizations. Reference
may be made to Justice Krishna Iyer’s pronouncements in the Thomas Decision that repairing
the handicaps of the Blacks in America was comparable to the troubles of repairing the handicaps
of the Harijans in India. Similarly, Justice Iyer referred to Schlesinger v. Ballard Case since
illustrative of the high judicial punch in understanding the classificatory clue to the promotion of
employment of equality. In fact, the USA Supreme Court upheld a classification in favor of a
female naval officer through applying the rational foundation test in this case, which was much
like the reasonable foundation classification being employed through the Indian Supreme Court
right as the Gopalan and Champakam Dorairajan cases. A rider may be added here lest the
context be forgotten that however, the affirmative action programme for historical injustices in
India is roughly comparable with the remedial events being adopted in the USA for the Blacks
and Negroes, but the context of ‘historical injustices’ is absolutely dissimilar in India from that in
the United States of America and the plight of Blacks is dissimilar in several compliments from
the plight of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India. The dynamics of civilizational
context are absolutely dissimilar in India.
Affirmative Action in France
A term in relation to the French constitutional scheme of protective discrimination would not be
out of lay here. The French equivalent of the affirmative action programme in the United States
or in India is the concept of Fraternity, which is directed towards helping the poor and the
disadvantaged members of society. The declaration of 1793 in Article 21 states that public
assistance is a sacred debt. Society owes its subsistence to those who are unable to job. The
Girondin proposal for rights contained the report that equality consists in everyone being able to
enjoy the similar rights. However the organization of equality that has been followed in the Fifth
Republic has served the French mentality since well, peculiar and contradictory since it is,
though the type of lay equality enjoys in the American and the Indian organization is unlikely to
be achieved in the French organization, either in socio-political debates or constitutional
litigation in Conseil Constitutionnel.
Critique of the Concept
Several people are opposed to affirmative action because they consider it violates a sense of
fairness. This is a result of the ‘Presently World Phenomenon’. Stanley Coren unambiguously
denounces the concept with equal vigor and force. People tend to feel that the world is, with
some bumps here and there, pretty much a fair lay, where people usually get what they deserve
and deserve what they get. This notion of a presently world results from our training since
children that good is rewarded and evil is punished. A natural conclusion can be drawn from this
type of reasoning: Those who are rewarded necessity be good, and those who suffer necessity
deserve their fate. In row with these gestures, the following points are raised against affirmative
action and positive discrimination:
Merit Argument
The Meritorian principle dictates that social goods should be allotted on the foundation of one’s
merit or skill, whether natural or acquired. Leaving aside the common intricacies in the
application of the principle in such matters since admission to the organizations of higher
education or appointment to the state’s services, it envisages that the candidates are selected on
the foundation of their individual merit, i.e., their skill in words of attainment of sure grades or
spots in an objective test, usually a test of intelligence plus knowledge held for that purpose.
Supporters of this principle claim that it assures best justice in therefore distant since it allocates
the rewards or goods on the foundation of an objective criterion having nothing to do with such
personal features of an individual such since his birth, race, color, sex, caste etc. This principle
assures the selection of the mainly able persons from amongst a big number for the limited goods
or opportunities accessible for sharing. It also assures a strong society and its overall progress,
since distant since it gives a stimulus for difficult job and the growth of Larger mental and
physical capacities. At the outset, it seems to be a weighty argument but a closer examination
reveals its weaknesses. The notion of merit itself is subjective. What is merit after all? Merit has
no fixed or definite meaning free from variations. It is nothing but a criterion to achieve few pre-
determined social objective or value or to satisfy a sure perceived social require. It does not
manage the objective value or require, but is controlled through them. Prof. Dworkin does not
say that merit is unimportant; the thrust of his argument is that merit itself can be defined in such
a method since to create method for scrupulous types of persons in view of social demands and
requirements. It is indeed determined in words of perceived social objectives, values or requires
and is bound to change with the changes in the latter. In the terms of Justice Krishna Aiyar of the
Indian Supreme Court, ‘The extremely orientation of our selection procedure is distorted and
those like the candidates from the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes who, from their birth,
have a traumatic understanding of India have, in one sense, more capacity than those who have
existed under affluent conditions and are callous to the human lot of the sorrowing masses.
Elitists, whose sympathies with the masses have dehydrated up, are from the standards of the
Indian people least appropriate to run government and least meritorious to handle state business,
if we envision a service state in which the millions are the consumers… Sensitized heart and a
vibrant head, tuned to the tears of the people, will speedily quicken the growth requires of the
country and a sincere dedication and intellectual integrity….not degrees of Oxford or Cambridge,
Harvard or Standford or same Indian organizations are the biggest components of merit or
suitability.’ The thrust of the entire argument is that the concept of efficiency should be related to
our developmental requires and irrelevance or inadequacy of the existing test organization to
determine efficiency should be discovered.
Rights Argument
Articulation of the affirmative action is also criticized on the ground that it is a violation of the
theory of rights. It is usually argued that affirmative action in favor of one group is
discriminatory against others who are denied the similar benefits, and this is itself a denial of
equality, which is the right of every individual since an individual and not since a member of any
group and so, cannot be denied to him basically because he is labeled since a member of an
advanced group etc. because another individual is labeled since belonging to a backward group.
Every citizen has a constitutional right that he is not made to suffer disadvantages, at least in a
competition for any public benefit, because the race or religion or sect or area or other natural or
artificial group of which he is a member is the substance of prejudice or contempt. Prof Andre
Betielle, in an incisive article on ‘Distributive Justice and Institutional Well Being’ articulates a
critique of the ‘group rights’ argument. He argues that at a deeper stage, the caste organization
has changed fundamentally. The moral claims of castes in excess of their individual members
have weakened at all stages of society, and especially in the urban transitional class where the
battle in excess of benign discrimination is being fought. It will be safe to say that no caste today
has the moral power to enforce on its transitional class members any of its traditional sanctions.
Having freed themselves from the moral power of their caste, such individuals are now able to
exploit it instrumentally for economic and political advantages. He further argues that it is hard to
see how the thought that castes and societies have rights to proportionate shares in public
employment can be made compatible with the working of a contemporary society committed to
economic growth and liberal democracy. It is true that caste continues to operate in several
spheres of social life; but it does not do therefore any longer since a matter of right. The
sustained subsistence of caste is one item; its legitimacy is a dissimilar item altogether. The effort
to invest the caste organization with legitimacy through claiming that its constituent elements
have rights and entitlements is bound to be defeated in the end; but in the meantime it can reason
enormous harm to society and its organizations. The persistent exploit of the language of rights in
public debates for and against reservations is bound to lead to an augment in the consciousness of
caste, and in that method to defeat the vital objective of affirmative action which is to reduce and
not augment caste consciousness. All parties to the debate say that they wish to dismantle the
building of caste. Though, caste is not a material edifice that can be physically dismantled and
destroyed. It exists all in the consciousness of people, in their deep sense of divisions and
isolation on one hand and of rank and inequality on the other. Prof. M.P. Singh attempts an
account through saying that sure castes have been uniformly excluded for thousands of years
from goods and opportunities, which they would have certainly desired basically because they
belonged to that caste. It is true that no classification based on birth should ordinarily be
supported since today sure castes and backwardness are identical. For instance, scheduled castes
and tribes are descriptive of backwardness and nothing else. For thousands of years, they have
been treated since untouchables and denied the right of association with other members of
society. They have suffered all types of indignities and disabilities not since individuals, but since
members of a group or caste and that entitles them to special treatment since members of a group
without violence to the right of equality of the non-members. The individual’s right to equality in
this situation is given due recognition in therefore distant since the members of the group can
compete in the middle of themselves for the limited goods accessible for sharing or allocation.
This leaves us in a peculiar situation; if the caste criterion is used for providing protective
discrimination, caste divisions are enhanced and identity based on class or caste rows is
underlined. Further, on the other hand, if caste identities are overlooked in public employment
and for admission in educational organizations of higher studying, they are deprived off an
opportunity to overcome their disabilities caused due to use and deprivations of hundreds of
years. The solution seems to be lying somewhere in flanked by—the golden mean. Flexibility is
the essence in the design and application of policies to redress disparities that have arisen
because of several reasons.
Efficiency Argument
It is implicit in the thought of positive discrimination that a less meritorious person is preferred
to another who is more meritorious. The supporters of this argument stress on the point that if for
redressing grievances of the past, we undermine the efficiency of public organizations, we would
be doing unimaginable harm to the generations to approach. Though, the proponents of this
argument should also understand that through segregating some parts from public legroom could
do more harm than the quest for efficiency, which they seek to achieve at the cost of social
fragmentation.
Balkanization Argument
It has been noted that positive discrimination underlines class, caste and race differences and
enhances social divisions, which are already acute in the Indian sociopolitical organization and in
the United States of America. Affirmative programmes tend to consolidate a caste ridden and
racially conscious society already divided into racial and ethnic clusters, each entitled since a
group to few proportionate shares of possessions, careers or opportunities. In India, due to the
history of partition and the resulting massacre of approximately one million people, the argument
that positive discrimination tends to divide people revives the history of the tragedy of partition.
The communal virus, which started with the Ramsay Mc Donald award, culminated in the
partition of the subcontinent and the generation of issues which remain unresolved to this day.
Even the history of positive discrimination has not been a smooth one. Now, the economically
weaker parts amongst the forwards too are challenging reservations. Demands through Christians
and Muslims for reservations, however subdued now, are being made. That turns the entire
concept of positive discrimination into a political tool, seeking to perpetuate the policy of
reservations and dividing the people rather than encouraging them to stand on their own and
compete in a world of quality. All this leads to an acute type of anxiety in relation to the integrity
of the country. The proponents of positive discrimination respond to this kind of argument
through terming it since a displaced argument trying to discredit the affirmative action
programme. Their argument is that failure on the implementation front should not be the cause to
discard the policy itself. Prof. Dworkin responding to the argument of balkanization in the
American context, dispels the fear that affirmative action programmes are intended to produce a
balkanized America, divided into racial and ethnic sub-nations. They exploit strong events to
uplift the weaker and the deprived or else they will fail, but their ultimate goal is to lessen and
not augment the importance of race in American social and professional life. Prof. Dworkin
writes, ‘American society is currently a racially conscious society; this is the inevitable and
apparent consequence of a history of slavery, repression and prejudice. Black men and women,
boys and girls, are not free to choose for themselves in what roles or since members of which
social group others will characterize them. They are black, and no other characteristic of
personality or allegiance or ambition will therefore thoroughly power how they will be perceived
and treated through others, and the range and character of the lives that will be open to them. The
tiny number of black doctors and other professionals is both a consequence and a continuing
reason of American racial consciousness… The immediate goal is to augment the number of
members of sure races in these professions. But their extensive word goal is to reduce the degree
to which American society is overall a racially conscious society.’

STATE AND GLOBALIZATION

Globalization and its Context
For our clarity, same sounding words like globalization and globalize necessity be classified. The
word globalization refers to a procedure, where since globalize is a word which refers to a set of
ideas, values, practices which seek to uphold the goals of what has been taking form in the name
of globalization today. In a nutshell, globalize means an ideology or a framework of justification
for globalization. It is also significant to dispel few of the misperceptions of globalization of the
present day. In few quarters, globalization is understood in a generic sense that globalization has
been in subsistence since a thought and a practice as the time immemorial. This understanding
lacks a proper historical sense, since it does not recognize the specificity of globalization in the
present context. Globalization emerges out of an intricate historical procedure engendered
through the logic of capitalist expansion. It seeks to thrive on a specific type of political and
cultural habitation at the global stage. It has brought in relation to the profound changes at stages
ranging from global, national, and local to regional. It has changed the world radically
throughout a decade or two. It implies homogenization of values and cultures at the cultural
stage. And it subscribes to a global political order seeking to marginalize or cut short the
sovereign authority of the nation-state in the political sense of the word. Paradoxically,
globalization also celebrates variety and fragmentation at the regional stage. Universal at the
global and fragmentation at the regional since a feature characteristic makes globalization since
homogenous since contradictory. There are two apparently contradictory trends that can be
discerned in the present globalizing world. First, states look to be giving up sovereignty in their
rush to sign local trading and political agreements. Second, clusters are agitating for greater
sovereignty within existing states, intent on few measure of independence. Is the world becoming
more integrated or is it becoming more fragmented? Are we becoming more international or
more regional? The answer, in all cases, is manifestly yes. The North American Free Deal
Agreement , the single European market and the newly emerging multilateral agency, the World
Deal System (WTO) are all steps towards greater integration. The international economy’s move
towards globalize is inexorable. Consumerist capitalism requires ever-expanding markets and
ever more efficient methods of producing and distributing goods and services. Transnational
companies are becoming increasingly adept at finding methods of circumventing national borders
in their search for cheap labour, and efficient sourcing of raw and processed materials.
Similarly, ethnic, caste, class, gender, tribals and ecological clusters in South Asia or in other
regions of the world have been struggling for greater autonomy within the existing states. The
regional assertions have truly become a global phenomenon. Culturally, the thought of national
identity for individuals or clusters is fast eroding in favour of fortification of ethnic, local, caste
and religious identities.
Dimensions of Globalization
Economic Globalization
What does globalization mean today? In the current context, economically speaking, it means the
homogenization of prices, products, wages, rates of interest and profits to become the similar all
in excess of. Under the pretext of free markets, transparency and flexibility, the therefore-
described ‘electronic herd’ moves huge amounts of capital in and out of countries to the political
and economic advantage of the western countries wishing to draw foreign capital and gain the
benefit of today’s and tomorrow’s technology.
Political Globalization
In political words, globalization means reordering of the nation-states in a manner that adheres to
global integration. The sovereignty of nation-states is expected to be subsequent to that of the
global order. A global state order is supposed to be the desired goal. Marginalization of the
nation-state is the major challenge in the procedure of globalization of the world.
The globalization of the world is upheld in an intricate organization of laws and regulations. The
regulatory regimes of the IMF, the World Bank and the other international fund organizations ,
the GATT and the WTO are fast emerging since a new world government for enforcing uniform
policies, obligations, and conditionality approximately the world. These organizations are critical
in perfecting this organization, which the individual nation-states are to abide through. Another
significant political dimension of the procedure is that national governments are being constantly
pressed to alter their own laws therefore since to create them more compatible with the emerging
organization of global governance. The objections of the weak nation-states to the regulatory
regimes of organizations such since the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO, seldom matter.
Globalization and Civilization
Another biggest region in understanding the procedure of globalization is civilization.
Globalization, in its fundamental sense, also means universalization of values. Universalization
of values necessity be understood at variance with universal values. Universalization of values
presupposes that there is a sure type of global order towards which all the values, practices and
customs of varied nations, regions and localities necessity be molded. Globalization seeks to
build upon absolute homogenization of values and cultures. Cultural globalization constantly
seeks to integrate regional and national cultures with global civilization largely dominated
through the West. When we seem at cultural globalization in relationship with economic
globalization, it becomes clear that the expansion of the capitalist market hinges on the
integration of regional markets facilitated through the global transformation of regional cultures.
Anthony Giddens, a renowned sociologist observes that the organizational groups in words of
world capitalism, industrialization and contemporary nation-states universalize global networks
and also produce time-legroom distanciation that makes the regional-global interface an intricate
problem. ‘Globalization can, then, be defined since intensification of world wide social dealings
which link far localities in such a method that regional happenings are formed through measures,
several miles absent and vice-versa’. Globalization, since a cultural expression, refers to
compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world since an entire.
The rise of information age necessity be seen since concomitant to the culturalization procedure
crossways the globe. All the dimensions of globalization are aptly characterized – ‘material
exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize and symbolic exchanges globalize’.
Nation-State and Sovereignty
It is significant to understand the foundation of political empowerment of the nation-state in the
contemporary age, and to reflect on its relatively brief history. The nation-state is called since
citizens and government which operate within geographically separate borders. To warrant the
hyphen, the nation-state needs a self-conscious belief on the section of its citizens that the
communal has an authority greater than the mere agglomeration of a given country’s population.
The nation-state symbolizes the citizen, provides him a sense of belonging to a coherent entire. It
needs the marriage of civil management and self-conscious patriotism. The nation-state embodies
the hopes and aspirations of its citizens, who owe it allegiance.
Definition and Meaning of the State
There is a great trade of agreement amongst social scientists since to how the state should be
defined. A composite definition would contain three units. First, the state is a set of
organizations; these are manned through the state’s own personnel. The state’s mainly significant
organization is that of the means of violence and coercion. Second, these organizations are at the
centre of a geographically- surrounded territory, usually referred to since a society; crucially, the
state seems inwards to its national society and outwards to superior civilizations in which it
necessity create its method; its behaviour in one region can often only be explained through its
behaviors in the other. Third, the state monopolizes rule creation within its territory; what we call
since sovereignty. This tends towards the making of a general political civilization shared
through all citizens.
Sovereignty
The state’s exclusive claim to create laws/rule-creation authority is often referred to since
sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty has been a key thought in the development of the
contemporary world and the all powerful nation-state. Initially, it was purely the state’s power to
exercise legal violence in order to uphold order. But slowly, the sovereign nation-states assumed
more legitimate claims in excess of the exclusive power within its territorial boundaries through
adding concepts like social justice. Therefore , citizens have urbanized expectations from their
nation-states’ skill to resolve their troubles. Objectivity in the exercise of power lends legitimacy
to the acts of the nation-state. The state is autonomous and sovereign, and carries a universal
image in a given national society.
Sovereignty Under Threat
Though, the nation-state enters into a crisis in the late twentieth century with the advent of
globalization since the nation-state’s skill to act independently has been strained through the
external forces at the global stage and internal forces at the regional stage. It questioned the
extremely validity of the meta-narratives of their subsistence like the nation-state. Nation-states
are through the forces of global integration and regional fragmentation.
The mainly significant structuring of connection in peoples’ lives has been their connection with
the nation-state. The nation, the people who have hitherto had a privileged link to the state, has
this no longer, because states are neither able to negotiate with global forces on their own, nor
capable of forging a sense of unity in the middle of their citizens who choose to live by exclusive
identities. The third world countries feel this more intensely, because the skill of the state on
both the fronts is more prominent. Citizens are seeking new shapes of system, which involve
asserting their identities in dissimilar methods. The effects are manifold. Regional societies,
seeking a greater share of possessions, will sometimes see that their interests lie in underpinning
nation states, at other times in subverting them. International systems will seek greater
legitimacy, and one method is to be certain that the sponsoring countries have legitimacy of their
own. The recent phenomenon of world summits has been a case in point to explain how the
regional societies are seeking to become trans-border entities. The Vienna Summit of Human
Rights Clusters, the Beijing Summit of Women Clusters, the Rio Summit of Ecological Clusters,
Durban Summit against Racism or the World Social Forum (WSF) are all mobilizing regional
societies crossways nations on the rows of ethnic, caste, gender, ecological issues. They raise
questions of social justice beyond the preview of nation-states and connect them with global
procedures. For example, the track record of human rights within a country should be good
sufficient to deserve a loan, aid or grant from any global lending agency or donor agency, since
human rights records figure since a crucial issue in international lending transactions. This
explains how the nation-state is coming under pressure from both the domestic and the global
forces.
Globalization, State and the MNCs
The global integration is mainly visible in the spheres of manufacture, fund and commerce.
Multi-National Corporations , operating beyond national boundaries, increasingly power global
economy. Unlike the factory-centered manufacture of Fordism which was harbored on
protectionist policies of nation states, the present global financial operations, what are
characterized since ‘post-fordism’, are controlled through the MNCs. With the breakdown of the
earlier international organization and the subsequent global acceptance of neo-liberal thinking
based on deregulation, privatization, and liberalization, there has been a virtual proliferation of
MNCs in the last three decades. Globalization of modern vintage is mainly visible and
pronounced in the media and on the economic front. An important and rising segment of a rising
number of national economies is receiving integrated into the global market. Financial markets
and capital flows are able to soar above international boundaries and bypass sovereign state
controls at will. International deal accounts for 20 percent of the global output and is estimated to
be worth $5 trillions per annum. Cross border transactions, FDIs and MNCs are rising in
importance in determining the economic destiny of nations and are for the mainly section, not
amenable to state manage. The top five hundred international companies are responsible for a
vast and rising share of global manufacture. The sect oral sharing of the top 500 corporations in
the year 2000 reveals a motivating trend. The maximum number of corporations belong to the
banking and financial sectors. This clearly illustrates the rising clout of international banks and
financial organizations since well since the phenomenal rise of fund capital in recent years. The
rationale of the MNCs entering the fund sector is obvious, since quick profits could be reaped
from speculative investments in global financial markets rather than creation extensive-word
investments in the economy. In words of the number of MNCs, petroleum refining, automobiles,
telecommunications, food and drug stores, and electronic industries follow banks. The rising
economic power through the MNCs has recognized corporate rule on a global level. However the
MNCs may not completely erode the sovereignty of nation-states since is idea in few quarters, it
is certainly shaping the policy options before these states, particularly in the developing and the
underdeveloped countries. The MNCs still need the state to create decisions for their entry into
these nations. The state has to give facilities and ensure political, social and economic continuity
for smooth transactions of these MNCs in these nations. On their own, they neither have the
authority nor the competence to mould the global economy in their favor. Rather, the MNCs seek
the support of nation-states and international governmental systems to form the modern global
economy.
Globalization, State and Regionalism
The political corollary of this evident shift towards economic liberalism is proving distant more
complicated. If the hallmark of the late 1980s was the turn to the market, in politics it was the
revival of nationalist tensions on a grand level and the weakness of organizations charged with
handling the world economy. Few efforts have been made to make new political buildings that
transcend national borders. The European Union (EU) instituted a single market within its twelve
member countries at the end of 1992. In addition, it is struggling to make a political and
monetary union with the underpinning of economic cooperation. Distant Eastern governments are
discussing plans that would augment political cooperation within the area, in row with rising
economic ties. The US, its Free Deal Agreement with Canada and Mexico already in lay, is now
ready to extend the FTA concept to South America since well. Nearer house, since we know
from the experience of the SAARC countries in recent times, South Asia Free Deal Agreement
has been a compelling exercise on the section of these countries, in spite of differences flanked
by them and more particularly, the animosity flanked by Pakistan and India. SAFTA is a step
towards a monetory union of South Asia. The information that the possibility of a monetary
union of the countries has been measured seriously in the SAARC summit of January, 2004 at
Islamabad, designates what direction SAARC seeks to move. Such trading links will be followed
through attempts to fashion a political unit. Efforts to introduce such liberal tenets during much
of the urbanized and the developing world have made it easier for local economic bodies to
emerge elsewhere. These local bodies can be seen since the embryo of a multinational political
correlative to the increasingly global economy.
Globalization and its Dualism
Why is globalization encountering therefore much resistance from several interest clusters?
Foremost in the middle of them are the environmentalists, labour leaders, cultural traditionalists,
religious leaders of dissimilar persuasions, and non-governmental systems. In spite of this rising
resistance, under the leadership of the West and its economic authority, globalization is
proceeding at a relentless pace. Globalization involves the mainly fundamental centralized
restructuring of socio-economic and political dealings as the industrial revolution. Yet the
profound implications of these changes have rarely been discovered to serious public scrutiny or
debate. Despite the big level global reordering of the world, neither the world leaders, nor the
educational organizations, nor the size media have made any credible attempt to define what is
being formulated, or even to explore the multidimensionality of its effects, particularly on the
developing countries. In excess of the last decade, we have witnessed a series of unforeseen
measures: end of the Cold War; ambitious market reforms in what were formerly intended
economies; and acceleration of the procedure of economic integration in Western Europe, North
America and East Asia and the increased exploit of protectionist events through mainly biggest
traders. Its vital principle revolves approximately the absolute primacy of exponential economic
development and an unregulated free market, with require for free deal to stimulate development.
Free deal breaks down the barriers to import substitution that tend to promote economic self-
sufficiency. It favors export-import-oriented economies with their accelerated privatization of
public enterprises, and an aggressive promotion of consumerism, which when combined with
global growth, correctly reflects a Western vision. Furthermore, this guiding principle of the new
international economic building also assumes that all countries – even those whose cultures are
since diverse since Egypt, India, China, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Sweden and Brazil to name
some, necessity now line their growing boats in unison. The net result of this procedure is the
unleashing of powerful forces that foster the development of a Western cultural uniformity in
products and services. Economic globalization will lay continuous pressure on developing
nations to abandon regional customs and dismantle programmes geared to developing more self-
enough economies. A good instance of this type of pressure from the West has been happening in
Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, banking has been privatized and the country is now permitting direct
foreign investment in the insurance sector. Banks which were earlier nationalized for the explicit
purpose of helping the needy and the rural sector, have been on the wane. It has become perilous
for developing countries to uncritically embrace globalization. Its negative consequences are
seldom mentioned. Instead, lack of economic growth is typically blamed on bad government,
corruption and cronyism. A blind acceptance of the ideology of globalization is unacceptable,
naïve and downright dangerous from the point of view of the developing countries.
Division of the World into Two Camps
The procedure of globalization tends to divide the world into two camps. The West argues that
the benefits of globalization are inclusive and benefit both the urbanized and the underdeveloped
nations. The developing countries tend to view globalization with much more skepticism, if not
with abject cynicism. Let us take seem at their respective locations on globalization. The Western
claims for the benefits of globalization are that it:
Gives considerable capital investment for both institutional and individual growth.
Gives increased employment opportunities to citizens of developing countries.
Increases the possibilities of improving the well-being of the masses by education.
Stimulates infrastructure growth, such since roads, authority plants and contemporary
electronic communications and
Involves technology distribution through advanced nations to developing ones at no cost to
the developing countries.
This procedure will eventually lead to equalizing working circumstances, standards, attitudes and
values globally. In contrast, developing nations argue that globalization is delivering
substantially less than has been promised. According to them:
Globalization has recapitalized the developing countries through taking out more money in
profits than what has been invested in these countries;
Rather than bringing in more investment capital, several MNCs resort to borrowing from
regional creditors, therefore depleting scarce capital possessions that might have been used
through indigenous business;
The promise of benefits from new technologies is more likely to disappoint in the extensive
run because the dependence it creates stifles innovation in the developing countries;
With globalization and multinational corporations comes a slick, polished brand of
advertising that encourages consumerism and the importation of luxury goods. Success in
marketing the products and services of MNCs tends to reduce domestic investments that are basic
to domestic economic development.
Under globalization, MNCs can counter mercantilist restrictions on deal through establishing
subsidiaries abroad. In effect, it allows them to bypass deal barriers, and continue manufacture
and collecting profits at the expense of the developing countries.
Since of now, there seems to be small scope for any radical alternatives to the emerging world
capitalism. With the emergence of multilateral organizations like the World Deal System, every
country has virtually been dragged into the world economy and is slowly opening its economy.
Countries such since Mexico, which a decade ago relied on state manage and ownership, are
privatizing heavily; Thailand is balancing its budget; Peru is lowering tariffs. Therefore also the
countries in the South Asia area, which however started off a small late in the early nineties, have
been increasingly going the liberalization method and opening up their economies. Twentieth-
century economic liberalism champions private ownership, a reduced role for the state in
business, fewer deal barriers, lower taxes, and a common reliance on the market since the mainly
efficient distributor of possessions in a given economy. The problem in understanding
globalization lies in its dualism that governs the present world order. If globalization refers to a
unified world, it is also equally true that the world is increasingly divided into two unequal
sections- the rich and the poor nations, in which the more advanced western nations are taking
advantage of the therefore described free deal and the openness advocated through the new
global order. The porous ness of national boundaries is working in favor of the advanced nations.
This iniquitous world order has dissimilar implications for dissimilar nations. Many serious
studies point that the issues of inequality and justice are going to be the mainly significant
concerns of the emerging global order. Globalization affects nation-states adversely, particularly,
in the third world, in economic, political and cultural words. Dominated through the West, the
international market provides small scope to the southern countries to negotiate with the words
of deal. However MNCs have trans-border operations, their interests are still tied up with their
parent countries, often the advanced western countries. The MNCs are not therefore
multinational in their interests. With the coming of the information age, the world has further
shrunk into what Marshall McLuhan calls the Global Village, where national boundaries become
more porous in political and cultural words. Therefore , it brings more anxieties and concrete
worries in relation to the political and cultural onslaughts through the West on the more
vulnerable third world nations. The global economic order combined with the New Information
Order is likely to strengthen the nation-state in advanced countries and weaken the state in the
third world. This dualism and contradiction are going to characterize the nation-state in the
emerging global order.
An Appraisal
The comparative decline of the nation-state’s sovereignty in the sphere of global economy is
creating a democratic deficit, largely in the third world countries where the expectations of the
state are extremely high and the state capacities are low. The citizens continue to hold their
national governments accountable on issues in excess of which the states have no autonomous
manage. The strong sense of allegiance to the nation-state borne through its citizens, and
urbanized by the anti-colonial struggles, has not yet weakened in row with the decline of the
autonomy of national governments. Despite the advent of the ‘global village’, individuals
therefore distant feel small allegiance to emerging supranational bodies such since the European
Union. It is all the more distant fetching to anticipate the belongingness of the citizens in the
South to such supranational bodies. Similarly, it is hard to imagine the emerging identities within
a nation to command the citizen’s loyalty since wholesomely since the state. Yet one can see that
the democratic deficit in the third world is going to make tensions on a much higher level.
Globalization puts more severe strains on the third world state on economic, political and cultural
fronts than the West, given its iniquitous order. Neither the nation nor the state is in relation to
the disappear since a result of global procedures. For a start, there are no substitute buildings that
can perform all the functions traditionally associated with the nation-state. At the similar time,
people are not prepared to provide up a state-centered nationalism altogether, because
nationalism is historically embedded and culturally experienced. Even if they are prepared to
provide up, it is only to divide their loyalties increasingly on the rows of multiple identities. Yet,
it can not be understood since the disintegration of the state for identities can not be a substitute
for the nation-state. Patterns of allegiance are shifting, and multiple loyalties will be the
inevitable result. Certainly, however the nation-state does not disappear, it may not remain the
method it has been. The shapes and manners of the citizens’ allegiance to it change.

DEVELOPMENT
The thought of growth is commonly understood since a procedure of economic development and
changes or improvements in the lives of people. If one were to inquire people what the mainly
regularly mentioned units would in all probability pertain to economic organizations and
indicators of economic development, viz., industrialization, technical advancement, urbanization,
augment in wealth and standards of livelihood, etc. It is quite likely that ‘westernization’ would
also recur in mainly responses, if not explicitly, then in all probability since a reference point for
comparison. The identification of growth with features associated with the ‘west’ or the
‘contemporary’ is, though, not basically a matter of general perception. The association has roots
in the history of the thought of growth itself. It is this association which has contributed towards
shaping the dominant understanding of the word, and has also generated contradictions, conflicts
and debates approximately the thought in the past many years. We can, so, begin our
understanding of the concept through recognizing that the thought of growth took form in a
specific historical context and has evolved in excess of time. Human society has always
experienced change and moved from easy to intricate shapes of social and political system and
economic behaviors. The thought of growth pertains to a specific shape of economic
development and social and political buildings. This thought took form in the contemporary era
in the context of the breakdown of feudal socio-economic buildings and the development of
capitalism. We shall analyze the development of the thought since it appeared in contemporary
Europe and spread since a guiding principle determining relationships in the middle of peoples
and nations. We shall also see how this connotation had significant socio-economic and political
ramifications for the rest of the world.
Modernity and Growth
Rise of Capitalism: Genesis of Growth
The concept of growth is seen since having appeared with the rise of capitalism. Before the rise
of capitalism, there lived agricultural civilizations regulated through feudal dealings. Society was
hierarchical and one’s status of birth determined one’s location in the social hierarchy. Feudal
property dealings place less emphasis on profit and were guided primarily through self-
sufficiency, sustenance and reciprocity. The rise of capitalism with its emphasis on economic
development, manufacture output, profit, freedom of deal etc, provided the material
circumstances within which the thought of growth started taking form.
Enlightenment Custom
Simultaneously, the intellectual custom of the time, the ‘Enlightenment Custom’ since it is
usually referred to, redefined the notion of the individual. The individual, within the new
intellectual custom, came to be idea of since having the faculty of cause, and possessing the
capability to take rational decisions. The fate of this thinking individual was no longer ordained
through divine forces, nor was the individual bound so, to remain confined to the relationships
which were prescribed through feudal society. This rational individual, skeptical of the slow and
relatively stagnant socioeconomic relationships, since well since the hierarchical foundation of
social and political system, struggled to break free. Capitalism based on the principle of free
enterprise and profit, fed ideas of progress and growth. With the emphasis on spectacular
material progress and profit creation, it was only logical that feudal relationships were
undermined, and simultaneously, the corresponding buildings of rule, dismantled. This
dismantling achieved only after a prolonged political thrash about for individual freedom, and
autonomy from existing feudal organizations, also gave rise to political ideals of liberty, freedom
and a liberal notion of democracy. In its birth alongside capitalism, though, the thought of
growth was primarily recognized with progress, and the first formulations of growth since
progress were establish in the jobs of classical political economists like David Ricardo and Adam
Smith.
Views of Jorge Larrain on Growth
Jorge Larrain points out that the concept of growth is not only closely bound up with the
development of capitalism, each stage of capitalism can be seen since having a specific set of
notions in relation to the growth. Larrain sees capitalism since having urbanized in three largest
levels from 1700 and specifies the corresponding theories of growth for each stage. These three
levels are:
Age of Competitive Capitalism ,
Age of Imperialism and
Late Capitalism.
The Age of Competitive Capitalism
The age of competitive capitalism was marked through the struggles of the new industrial
bourgeoisie to free themselves from the last vestiges of feudalism and to gain political authority.
This was also the time when capitalism, from its emergence in Britain, started expanding all in
excess of the world in search of markets. Karl Marx points out that in its first levels of growth,
industrial capital sought to close a market through force i.e., by the colonial organization.
Classical political economy, represented through Adam Smith and David Ricardo, whispered that
capitalism was the absolute or the perfect shape of manufacture, i.e., it could give the mainly
conducive circumstances for development. They whispered that international deal was significant
for rising productivity. The absoluteness and clash-free conceptualization of capitalism was,
though, subjected to review when working class struggles appeared. It was in the context of these
struggles that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels presented their critique of capitalism. They saw in
the working class struggles a manifestation of the inner contradictions in capitalism and the
possibility of its demise and replacement through a more advanced manner of manufacture.
The Age of Imperialism
The second level or the age of imperialism was marked through monopolistic manage of the
market through vast corporations, the export of capital from industrial centers to the margin, the
latter’s manage of both raw material manufacture and capital accumulation and, the firm
entrenchment of capitalism since the predominant manner of manufacture. The neo-classical
theory of growth gained primacy throughout this level. It worked with the assurance that the
capitalist manner of manufacture had strong roots and an inherent power to sustain itself. Neo-
classical theorists measured the market since perfect, and remained concerned with the
procedures which continued it i.e., the microeconomics of ascertaining what was to be produced,
how much, and at what price. The Marxists in the meantime sought to enlarge their traditional
critique of capitalism. Rosa Luxemburg, Bukharin, Hilferding and Lenin, while believing that the
inherent features of capitalism contributed to growth, also accommodated the colonized countries
in their framework. They emphasized that since extensive since the colonial bond was not
broken, the growth of colonized countries would remain arrested. In the context of the series of
depressions which culminated in the economic crisis in 1930, the neo-classical theory, was
shaken through the idea of John Meynard Keynes who advocated that state intervention was
required to ameliorate the effects of depression.
The Level of Late Capitalism
The level of late capitalism began in 1945 and can be seen since divided into two phases, the
earlier ending in 1966 and the later stage continuing till 1980. This level was marked through the
manufacture of contemporary consumer goods and till 1966, the era was characterized through
economic expansion and growing profits. The era was also important for the procedure of
decolonization, and the emergence of newly self-governing countries all in excess of the world,
and the subsequent introduction of issues of social progress and economic growth on the agenda
of the latter. In this context modernization theories sought to explain the procedure of growth
since the transition from the traditional society to the contemporary or industrial society.
Historically, the transition occurred first in urbanized civilizations and the others were expected
to follow the similar patterns of changes.
The Marxist theories in this stage attempted to understand and explain the causes for
underdevelopment in newly self-governing countries even after the rupture of colonial bonds.
Therefore , the theory of imperialism explored the internal effects of the introduction of
capitalism in third world civilizations. Paul Baran argues that in these countries, imperialist
powers enter into alliance with the regional oligarchies and since a result basic economic
possessions are partly siphoned off to the metropolis and partly squandered in luxury
consumption, preventing accumulation and growth. Imperialist countries, the theories propose,
are simply opposed to the industrialization of underdeveloped countries and attempt to uphold
the old ruling class in authority. Through 1966 the level of late capitalism enters a new stage,
marked through the slowing down of economic development and a falling rate of profit. In this
stage, the neo-liberals launched an attack on the Keynesian policies, accusing the state of
excessive intervention and slowing down development by heavy taxation to support welfare
policies. In Latin American countries, the theories of dependency were skeptical in relation to the
liberating role of national bourgeoisies and proposed that the procedures of industrialization in
the third world are the vehicles of imperialist penetration and generate a dependence on
transnational companies. Ander Gunder Frank in scrupulous, questioned the Marxist and liberal
theories, both of which claimed that capitalism was a manner of manufacture able to promote
growth everywhere. Frank rejected this thought and maintained that capitalism is to be blamed
for the continuous underdevelopment of Latin American countries as the sixteenth century. Frank
conceives of capitalism since a world organization within which the metropolitan centers control
to expropriate the economic surpluses from satellite countries by the mechanism of the
international market, therefore producing growth in the former and underdevelopment in the
latter. Third world countries are underdeveloped because they are dependent within the world
capitalist organization. Hence, growth can only happen when a country breaks out of the
organization through means of a socialist revolution. The growth theories, which arose in the
1970s, illustrate the power of Frank, especially Samir Amin and A.Emmanuel’s Theory of
Unequal Swap and I.Wallerstein’s World Organization theory. For Wallerstein, all the states
within the world organization could not develop simultaneously through definition because the
organization functions through virtue of having an unequal center and peripheral regions. A
motivating characteristic, which Wallerstein adds, is that the role of being a peripheral or a semi-
peripheral nation is not fixed. Center countries and peripheral countries could become semi
peripheral and therefore on. What remnants definite, though, is the unequal nature of the world
organization.
Redefining Growth
At the time when scholars in the West were trying to affirm the potential for growth in
capitalism, or in the case of Marxist theorists, looking at both the dynamism and contradictions
within capitalism, few strands of idea started to redefine the concept of growth.
Radical Critique of Growth
A more radical critique of growth started emerging in the 1970s. This critique started from the
vital assumption that growth in its current usage is inextricably associated with capitalist growth
and expansion. Capitalist expansion has historically resulted in the concentration of wealth in
some nations and poverty for others. This critique took cognizance of the notion of growth,
which recognized it solely with capitalist growth, and the principle that there is a single path to
growth to be followed through all. Scholars like Arturo Escobar, Wolfgang Sachs and Gustavo
Esteva point out that the association of ‘growth’ in the dominant orthodoxy with development
and modernization, remained an influential ideology of nation structure in the newly self-
governing countries after the Second World War. During the post-war era the meanings and
purposes of growth since understood in these countries could not break free from the notion of
growth since it had appeared in Europe in the 16th century. Wolfgang Sachs shows this lucidly
when, script in the early 1990s, he says that the last forty years can be described the ‘age of
growth’. Like a towering lighthouse guiding sailors towards the coast, growth was the thought
which oriented the emerging nations in their journey since sovereign nations after they had been
freed from colonial subordination. This quest for growth through the new nations, though, did
nothing to liberate them from the hierarchy of the world order, brought in relation to the and
continued through the logic of capital. After independence the thought of growth therefore
sustained to mean growth therefore since to fit into a world capitalist economy.
Rise of the USA and the Issue of Growth
It is important so, that soon after independence, mainly of these nations, which embarked on the
course of growth, came to be labeled since ‘underdeveloped’. Through the end of World War II,
the United States assumed a formidable centrality in the world. To create its location explicit and
binding, the United States laid down in precise words its connection of power and benevolence,
with the new nations. Gustavo Esteva points out that with this pronouncement of Truman’s
policy, a big size of humanity, and the formerly colonized countries were put under a blanket
label of ‘underdeveloped’. The label not only condemned the newly self-governing countries to a
new subjection, it affirmed the continuation of a hierarchy’s world organization resting on the
edifice of capitalist growth.
Emergence of the Third World and the Concept of Growth
With the 1970s, the Third World appeared since an important political block, which preferred to
steer clear of allegiance to any ideological block and subscribing to neither the capitalist, nor the
socialist path of growth. The new social movements, which appeared all in excess of, the world,
began questioning the existing policies of growth, seeking a more plural path of growth, where
the requires and aspirations of regional regions could be taken into explanation. The new social
movements, e.g., the habitation, workers, women’s movements etc., sought to attract attention to
the manner in which existing growth patterns resulted in the marginalization of big parts of
population, or incorporated the several parts of the population in an unequal method. The existing
frameworks of growth were contested.
Democratization of growth patterns were sought at two stages:
Within countries and
In the middle of countries in order to promote a more egalitarian economic and political
order, where past historical predominance of nations could be checked and the growth of each
nation and each person could be achieved.
Vital Requires Come
The ‘vital requires’ come to growth is so, to give opportunities for the full physical, mental and
social growth of the individual. Vital requires, so, incorporated ‘require for self-determination,
self-reliance, political freedom and security, participation in decision-creation, national and
cultural identity, and a sense of purpose in life and job’. The definition of vital human requires
sheltered five largest areas: vital goods for family consumption; vital services; participation in
decision creation; the fulfillment of vital human rights; and productive employment.
Growth within the Neo-liberal Framework
In the 1980s, growth, both since a procedure and since a goal, came to be framed in words of the
prevailing neo-liberal ideas. These ideas proposed that economic freedom, free markets, private-
sector initiatives and the cutting absent of regulations would give the circumstances and
incentives for unleashing entrepreneurial energies, rejecting thereby the ideas of the 1960s and
1970s which saw a key role for the state in scheduling, sharing and the provision of vital human
requires. This thinking in relation to the growth reasserted the ‘primacy of economic
development’, rather than social growth or the elimination of poverty, arguing that in the
extensive run development would take care of poverty. Through the end of the 1980s, though, it
became evident that the withdrawal of the state from social growth and distributive role, had
imposed heavy costs on the poor with respect to increases in vital food prices since well since
medical and educational services.
Right to Growth
In the meantime, the right to growth, was adopted through the Common Assembly of the United
Nations on 4th December, 1986. This right not only included the extremely essence of human
rights, it provided a rich starting ground for a new quest of human rights, which would shape the
foundation for an egalitarian world order. The right to growth encapsulates the right to self
determination and sovereignty, and asserts that all rights, civil, political, economic, social and
cultural, are equally significant and should be promoted and protected equally. It also brings in
the significant supposition that international peace and security are essential units for the
establishment of circumstances conducive to the right to growth. While asserting require for
equality of opportunity, the mainly important contribution of the declaration is its
emphasis on the human person since the source and subject of rights. The individual was the
central subject of the growth procedure, and growth policy should create him the largest
participant and the largest beneficiary.
The following center ideas which constitute the right to growth, signify few radical shifts in the
thought of growth:
The declaration makes the right to growth in effect the right of all human persons,
everywhere, and of humanity since an entire, to realize their potential.
It asserts the certainty of the human person since the source and subject of rights.
It aims at the constitution of a presently human society through remapping the trajectories of
growth.
Underlying the Declaration is also the notion of duty of all human beings, to thrash about to
make and uphold circumstances where authentic human, social and civilization growth is
possible.
It is simultaneously then, the duty of the state to give the circumstances in which the human
person is able to exercise his/her rights and duties
World Growth Statement 1991
Traces of this comprehensive view of growth can be seen in the World Growth Statement 1991.
The Statement defined growth since both ‘economic growth’ constituting a sustainable augment
in livelihood standards that encompass material consumption, education, health and habitation
defense, and in a broader sense since including other significant and related attributes since well,
like equality of opportunity, political freedom and civil liberties. The overall goal of growth was
so seen since rising the economic, political, and civil rights of the people crossways gender,
ethnic clusters, religions, races, regions, and countries.
In the discussion therefore distant, we have seen that the definition of growth has no longer
remained narrowly focused on economic development. It has been enlarged to contain social and
human growth. It has also incorporated in its scope a notion of growth, which is a product of, and
also seeks to set up democracy by popular participation. This notion of growth has establish its
mainly comprehensive theoretical articulation in Amartya Sen’s formulation of ‘growth since
freedom’.
Amartya Sen on Growth
For Sen, expansion of freedom is viewed since both the primary end and the principal goal of
growth. Growth needs, so, the removal of biggest sources of unfreedom i.e., poverty, tyranny,
poor economic opportunities, systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities,
intolerance or over activity of repressive states. Amartya Sen also opposes the thought that
political freedoms require to be postponed until socio-economic growth has been achieved. He
argues that political freedoms and such other freedoms, such since the freedom from disease and
ignorance are essential components of growth. Sen specifies five categories of ‘instrumental
freedoms’ which jointly promote growth. These ‘instrumental freedoms’ are:
Political freedoms: which enable people to participate in forming government and influencing
its policies,
Economic facilities: which constitute the opportunities for people to exploit possessions,
Social opportunities: which refer to the arrangements within society for health care and
education, which facilitate participation in political and economic life,
Transparency guarantees: these guarantees refer to circumstances of public trust achieved by
transparency in public affairs,
Protective security: this instrumental freedom gives social safety and security which prevents
people from becoming poor and destitute.

SECULARISM
Understanding the Indian Require for and Debates in Relation to the Secularism
To understand these, let us start through asking: how best to understand the Indian require for,
and debates in relation to the secularism. It is obvious that secularism since a concept, principal
and a set of practices appeared first in a dissimilar historical context viz., in the West. It is only in
the last 100 years, more therefore in the 50 years i.e. as the adoption of the Constitution in 1950,
that secularism has become a topic of debate in Indian society. And in the last 10-15 years it has
also become a matter of serious disputes and contentions. In the case of India, because she joined
late in the history of growth of contemporary ideas and their actualization, we have to inquire
two kinds of questions. These are: why do we require secularism? What can be the relevant shape
of secularism for India? And, this first question has become significant because there is a part of
people in India, both in the middle of intellectuals and political activists, who consider and argue
that we can do without secularism. Their argument goes like this: our customs are pluralistic and
flexible and can so, be a bigger source of toleration; it is a resource with us in our own history.
We do not so, need imposing secularism, an alien concept, on our society. While we all agree
that our customs are plural and flexible, we need to understand that the view that secularism is
unnecessary in India is deeply mistaken, because these plural customs cannot sustain democracy
under the present conditions.
Western Context of Secularism
It is significant to go into the origins of secularism or the western context. This method we can
have a picture of historical differences, which can then suggest a possible range of answers to
these questions. There are things or conditions in the history of Europe, out of which two
principles of understanding emerge in relation to the thought of the secular. Europe saw, during
the transitional ages and right up to the transitional of the 17th century, a biggest thrash about
flanked by the Roman Catholic Church and the states of the time for supremacy. This clash for
supremacy flanked by these two biggest organizations, both, highly organized and powerful, has
approach to be recognized since the ‘Church vs. the State’ controversy. Then, from the
transitional of the 16th century with the rise of Protestantism, there came in relation to the
intolerant debate flanked by the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant sects. This urbanized
into a biggest war flanked by the two in the early 17th century and was fought out for 30
extensive years, killing and maiming millions of people all in excess of Europe. This was
recognized since the ‘30 Years War’ or the ‘Sectarian War’, which ended with the Treaty of
Westphalia where a Modus Vivandi was arrived at flanked by the two warring clusters. This
Modus Vivandi gradually, in excess of time, grew into a principle of political order and got
disseminated in the middle of the political class. Secularism came to be the principle which
enunciated isolation flanked by the State and the Church. The other item of importance was the
transformation of religion into a personal matter, which then, went on to reinforce the isolation
principle. Within the Protestant movement, several churches were emerging, each with its own
separate doctrine and emphases. It came to be carried that nobody ought to interfere in relation to
the church one chose to belong to. Belief was to be a matter of one’s conscience, something
personal and private to the individual. The principle of putting church/religion on one face and
state/politics on the other, jointly with the principle of conscience since a matter private to the
individual person, became the foundation of the rise of secularism since a doctrine. In other
terms, religion was to be kept out of public affairs and policy creation, which were to be the
exclusive domain of politics and the state. It is obvious that one cannot attract any direct lesson
from the western experience because India never had a church or a powerful organized state. The
Maurya or the Mughal empires were episodic, that is, such a state was not a continuous
attendance. The thought of conflict flanked by the church and the state is so, alien to Indian
Culture. Our context and historical heritage are extremely dissimilar. Therefore, require for and
the circuit of secularism have to be also necessarily dissimilar. But the importance of the
principle of conscience, in a dissimilar method however, could not be denied.
Historical Sociology of the Require for Secularism in India
Our secularism is primarily directed against two evils; first, the religious strife flanked by
dissimilar religious societies and its extreme shapes like communal violence and riots; and,
secondly, the danger of religious societies overwhelming the state, each with its own view of
‘good life’ since valid for others, too. Both arose since a problem in the second half of the 19th
century. Sometimes, these become disproportionately significant and at other times recede into
insignificance. Why did this occur? The answer will provide us the historical sociology of how
the require arose for secularism in India. After India came under colonial rule, two changes
closely linked to each other, took lay in the Indian society. One pertained to the type of structural
changes that came in relation to the other to the method our social life was organized. Both had
distant reaching consequences.
Structural Changes: Modernization and its Consequences
The first had to do with modernization – bourgeois property, long deal, industry, urban life,
capital accumulation, contemporary education, etc. Colonial modernization was deeply
exploitative, creating uneven divisions flanked by regions and societies, but nevertheless, leading
to the economic integration of the country, uniform administrative manage and a rising cultural
harmonization by codification of traditions and their applications crossways dissimilar sections.
This had some significant consequences. It was creating greater and greater parallel flanked by
India and the global structural circumstances. It also led to the procedure of individuation, that is,
persons bound within societies gradually becoming individuals. These two growths jointly, then,
became the foundation of new mental capacities. To take one example, receptivity to ideas from
anywhere in the world appeared. We all are aware of how ideas of equality, rights, dignity of
person and therefore on, became a cherished possession of the people in India since much since
they were to others anywhere else in the world. It is shown in the growth of printing, the rising
importance and popularity of newspapers, periodicals and books in the life our society. Issues
were raised and hotly debated. There was a proliferation of discussion not only at the stage of the
elite, but at dissimilar popular stages. Nobody then divided the ideas into those, which were of
foreign origin and those which were of Indian origin. They debated these ideas since new and of
interest and relevance to the Indian society. It looked since if everybody is talking to everybody
else in excitement. Since a result of this, secondly, extremely big number of persons, bound
earlier within societies of ritual status or religious beliefs, were let loose from these prior bonds.
This is how, what we call today ‘masses,’ were created; people of a new type. Several
implications flowed out of this. Masses were presently not an undifferentiated pool of people. It
took several structural shapes like the formation of new classes, viz., the capitalist and the
workers, contemporary landlords and the farmers and property less agricultural labour;
professional clusters like lawyers and accountants and doctors and therefore on. This has had a
lasting impact on the social fabric of life in India. It is not that the old approach, pre-
contemporary societies like jatis or little religious clusters did not survive but their internal shape
was deeply altered. These got differentiated in words of income and skills, unlike earlier. New
interests appeared within these societies which jostled with one another. Earlier, the societies
existed face through face without competition and enjoyed a great trade of regional autonomy in
how they existed. That regional autonomy began to lose ground and today it is lost.
Changes in the System of Social Life
There also took lay, on a big level, efforts at redrawing the society boundaries and efforts at
unifying them to confront the perceived onslaught of the contemporary world and in the similar
procedure, to gain benefits for the societies. Resistance to modernity and bargaining for its
advantages were and are, paradoxically, two faces of the similar coin. The outcome of both these
changes: society was no more the loosely held variety, livelihood, and section unreflectively,
through itself. It now faced its alternative, the singular other, modernity. To handle this threat and
to defend itself, several of the numerous societies, each related to the superior customs in
dissimilar methods also posed diverse notions of the social good. Not only did each of these
notions of good competed with one another, but also the conception of good entailed in
modernity and which was clouded through the colonial depredations.
This was the source of enormous strain on the inherited capacities of people to handle
interpersonal, intra-society and inter-society dealings. This happened in excess of and above the
new competition generated through the establishment of colonial economy and management
beside with the thrash about for share in authority in the new social arrangement, taking form
then. The situation required interlocutors for swap of opinions and ideas and the adjudication of
diverging interests and diverse notions of good flanked by these extremely differently positioned
worlds. Successful mediation required either people placed outside the numerous societies or
those who could think beyond the limits of these societies, each of which was receiving more and
more unified since well since assertive. Old approach dialogue, since used to take lay flanked by
nearest societies enjoying regional autonomy, would no more do flanked by people, now more
and more far from one another and challenging things from the world, which was unfamiliar to
old kind of transactions. All this was to sap the traditionally built-in possessions including those
of tolerance and mutual perseverance. Agreements or understanding reached through those,
claiming to symbolize these differently positioned worlds, always proved to be fragile and
unlashing. In other terms, dialogical deals by the efforts of interlocutors have the character,
especially in situations of social transition, of being provisional. This is a situation in which old
approach dialogue flanked by the nearest societies does not job and the interlocutors become
unequal to the task required. So, something other than all these communally based competing
notions of good was required; a value and a mechanism at the similar time, to intercede in the
side of the competing notions of good since well since interests were also needed. Compulsions
from within this situation triggered require for what is now described the ‘Secular Doctrine of
Governance’. It was required in excess of and above everything, to seek a manner of doing things
in the public life in a method therefore that the competing, and often irreconcilable, conceptions
of good do not vitiate every situation of public interactions in the middle of the people. Few
method of being secular, a principle of being outside of and at an aloofness from these competing
notions of good, was require generated from within the alterations taking form at the extremely
several intersections of society. One can so, argue that the principle of secularism is an internally
propelled emergence and therefore becomes an attendance, irrespective of our choice. It is now
clear that require for secularism arose within and out of the changes in the internal social dealings
and constitutive characteristics, which create up Indian society. If a require for a new principle or
a value or a concept, whether it be secularism or rights or equality or whatever, arises within a
society, then it should be obvious that the concept or the principle is neither alien nor can it be
looked at since an imposition. In a world sure principles or values and the concepts by which
these are expressed do tend to develop roots in civilizations like ours. This is because of their
internal requires even if originating in the West.
Suitable Adaptation of Secularism for India
Such being the case, we should also be clear that ours is not a settled society like France or
Germany etc., we are in a middle level and so, the meaning of or what type of secularism we
shall get will also be dictated through the specific characteristics of this level. Here, the social
buildings and belief and norms of the old society, however still present, are rapidly changing or
giving method to new characteristics. Let us take two examples. In our marriage organization, the
circle of endogamy is fast expanding and gradually, in several instances, the unit of choice is
entering. People may no longer want to be governed entirely through old, religious traditions or
rituals. They may want defense for what they desire. To provide another instance, we do not
want, any more, to be ruled through the decisions of our caste panchayats. We, instead, prefer to
be ruled through the elected panchayat. People may not want to be overwhelmed through caste
and ritual status, since can occur in the working of the old caste panchayats. If we stay both these
and such others in mind , it becomes clear that these are situations where numerous new kinds of
conflicts and social demands emerge. What one wants to stress here is that all the situations of
transitions are also the ones where new conflicts abound and these conflicts are flanked by the
old and the new or the confusions and uncertainties generated through these. Old methods of
doing things, of resolving conflicts based on customary notions, will not do since these became
inadequate or irrelevant because these were meant to handle little, recurring conflicts flanked by
regional societies livelihood nearest to one another. There is no simple application of these on
levels since big since in contemporary politics. Such is the situation prevailing under
circumstances of transition. Now, given the ever-changing character of conflicts, it is never
sufficient to have merely principles and mechanisms. What is needed is a creative working out of
policies and initiatives to meet the ever-changing newness of the clash situations flanked by
religions and ethnic societies and flanked by dissenters from within these societies. The last may
take up locations against their own societies. Secularism, under such circumstances of shifting
confliction communal equations, needs cautious and flexible application. It is no panacea in the
sense that it cannot do without sensibly idea out social and economic policies or administrative
events. But there is no other substitute, since we have seen in the case of customs and traditions,
principle to act in these situations. We can, so, say that this is a hard situation, but not that it is an
impossible principle or that we cannot realize a secular society in India. If we stay this distinction
in mind viz. flanked by ‘the hard’ and ‘the impossible’, then we can bigger understand that
secularism takes a zigzag circuit by the setbacks to its applications in India. Having approach this
distant, let us inquire: what should secularism mean for India? In other terms, what is a suitable
adaptation for us? Within their recognized domains, they function self-governing of directions
from the other. In America, this came to be recognized since the ‘wall of isolation’. This now is
usually seen in the West since the universal model of secularism. Can this adaptation of
secularism be the suitable model for India?
Culture Differences
In trying to understand this, let us stay the following things in mind. One, no two cultural belts or
societies are similar. Culture in contemporary India is extremely dissimilar from what it is in the
West or what it was when secularism since a principle arose. But there is more in India, which
goes to create it unique, extremely dissimilar, and sui generis. Let us seem at this briefly, because
this will have a bearing on how we conceive secularism. The boundaries of religion in Hinduism,
or what made it socially recognizable since a separate religion, have never been dogma or
enjoined belief, even however few powerful beliefs are consistently held, like Karma or Moksha
or Varna. What made Hinduism recognizably separate were a set of ritually prescribed practices,
enjoined on members differentially in words of Varna or caste and Jati rank. These practices
were deeply embedded in social buildings and marked out that scrupulous social building
through their sheer attendance. Since suggested, not go into the details but mention only some
which are directly relevant for the issue under discussion. Notions of purity and pollution,
untouchability, regulation of social aloofness flanked by human beings in words of caste, right to
temple entry or drawal of water from wells and several others like these are based on religious
scriptures or therefore it is whispered. These were extensively practiced in India and have distant
from disappeared in the present times. We still read news of torture being inflicted on people of
lower castes for breaking these ritual rules or on women, who go out of bounds from the limits
prescribed through the custom.
Western Isolation Unworkable in India
Given these characteristics, ‘isolation’ since practiced in the West, will basically not be feasible
in India; may well be impossibility. In creation democracy actual, every manner of institutional
isolation has to be informed through sure normative concerns, values that underlie that isolation.
India seeks to ensure equality flanked by individuals and make circumstances that guarantee the
dignity of person. These are foremost in the middle of several others that our Constitution talks
about. Now seem at this. The exclusion of Dalits from temples or village wells is qualitatively
not of the similar type since that of Blacks in America from same things. In our case, it enjoyed a
scriptural i.e. religious sanction. Such is not the case with the Blacks in America. If the American
state legislates to outlaw such practices, it does not become a matter of interference in religion,
whereas in India, when the state legislates to outlaw such practices of untouchability or enhance
the status of women, several people consider, and strongly therefore, that the state is interfering
in religious matters. Several reforms of the Hindu laws have been viewed in this manner. Several
of these practices are in clash with the normative requirement of the Indian Constitution that
every Indian irrespective of caste or creed or gender be treated since equal and ensure dignity to
all persons. This aim, cannot be ensured and/or realized without legislating several a practice,
viewed since section of religion, since illegal. The ‘wall of isolation’ flanked by the state and the
church or politics and religion, since in the American Constitution, is out of contention. It
basically will not job in the case of India. And that is why, we described it an impossible ideal.
Several people discover secularism impossible for India because they, beside with Donald Smith
– the first significant commentator on Indian secularism – job implicitly with such a conception
of secularism.
Isolation Principle: Reworking Required in the Indian Context
If it is now possible to concede that few intervention, strictly regulated according to neutral
principles is necessary, then we can say that isolation since a foundation of secular state in India
has to be a re-worked adaptation of the western principle. Implanting western notions uncritically
will not do. Dissimilar circumstances, with their specific difficulties, demand creative
application. Blind adherence to the western principles or the easy rejection of the tested models
and practices is not the answer. We have a difficult situation at hand. We have to guarantee that
the several values of the Constitution, which we all cherish, have to be actualized in our social
life. Secondly, democracy needs that we all become citizens, because, without citizenship,
democracy is not realizable. We so, need interventions in matters which, in our context, are taken
to be religious. But, from the other face, we need few shape or degree of isolation, because
citizenship is not realizable without few shape of a secular ideal. Citizenship calls for, at its
minimum, two circumstances; viz. people with guaranteed or entrenched rights and that persons
be defined independently of religious values of any scrupulous society. The ideas of treating the
worth of the individual independently of religion is a secular ideal and of utmost importance in
the Indian context. Any other consideration in treating the worth of the individual other than
being human is offensive to democracy. We have dignity and worth basically because we are
human, and not because we are human plus Hindu, or Muslim, or Christian, or Sikh. It may be
true that several of us derive a lot of meaning from our religions as that makes for a ‘good’ life.
Secularism is an arid principle; it is not meant for higher meanings. Since a arid principle, it is
meant to in excess of see that conflicts flanked by these higher meanings and beliefs do not
become matters of public contention and that they are kept out of political life and policy creation
at any stage of state action. In the Indian situation, politics and religion should be like strangers
approach side to side and not like in America, where they are barred from seeing each other
through a ‘wall’ that stands flanked by them. But since they remain strangers, they do not
become intimate. What secularism in India demands is the absence of intimacy flanked by the
two, as that happens in communal politics whether of Hindutva, represented through the Sangh
Parivar, or of the Muslim League or the Akali Dal and therefore on. The superior and more
widespread the religious group, the greater the danger it poses to the country’s integrity. We
necessity seem at the danger of communal forces in India in this perspective, given to us through
our own history of religious strifes. Require for secularism is crucial, if we want to live our every
day life in a civil manner. And every day life is significant.
Reworked Solution: Principled Aloofness
We can now sum up the discussion through saying, in agreement with Rajeev Bhargava, that in
the Indian adaptation of secularism, the principle of isolation has to be understood since one of
principled aloofness flanked by religion and politics. Here, aloofness in principle has to be seen
since independence of politics from religion, but not necessarily vice versa. This means that state
action, political decision creation and policy choices are free of the interference of religion. But
this does not mean that politics and state action will have nothing to do with require of religious
reforms. The one method isolation has to be guaranteed. This allows for both intervention and
abstention. Intervention has to be prudently decided on the foundation of issues involved. To
reiterate, at the end, all practices , even if sanctified through religion viz. untouchability, caste
discriminations, polygamy, exclusion of women from public life, etc., have to be outlawed
immediately. These are blatantly offensive to the normative order of the Constitution, which is
based on the consensus of values evolved by intense popular participation throughout the
freedom thrash about. Several, which are mildly offensive like the Dwijas only wearing the
sacred thread, women not being allowed to plough the meadows, etc., may be tolerated for few
time to approach and people can be persuaded to provide these up. The state here should be
interventionist but in a neutral sense, neutral in the sense, that it takes the standpoint of the whole
Indian humanity and not the viewpoint of any one religion or society. It should not be helping or
giving any advantage to any religion. It should be basically carrying out the injunctions of the
Constitution, which created it for precisely this purpose. Its neutrality should be ensured through
a regime of Equality, Rights and Dignity in the similar measure for all. Indian Constitution has
created a truly secular state for our coexistence since citizens. Secularism is no doubt a principle
of isolation of religion from state and politics; it is not presently a pragmatic require. But
isolation has no single, easy meaning. It has to be given meaning and actualized in relation to the
context and the practices embedded in it. Each context has dissimilar necessities and these make
their own compulsions, which cannot be ignored. It is clear from our discussion that secularism is
not something any more alien to the Indian society, but has through now become its internal
require. What, though, is alien is the uncritical tendency to extract the history and meaning of
secularism from the West and to pose that since the only model applicable to the rest of the
world. This is something, which we necessity absolutely avoid since few of its critics fail to.

REVIEW QUESTIONS
Briefly trace the influences which shaped Gandhi’s socio-political thought.
Discuss Gandhi’s critique of modern western civilization.
Briefly enumerate the methods of Satyagraha.
Distinguish between Evolutionary and Revolutionary Socialism.
Explain in your own words the meaning of Dialectical Materialism.
What is the theory of surplus value?
Discuss either the theory of alienation or the theory of freedom.
Examine the contemporary relevance of Marxism.
What are the different ways in which fascism has been interpreted?
Explain what ideological strands contributed to the growth of fascism.
What is the fundamental difference between Individualism and Communitarianism?
Discuss the views of contractualists on Individualism.
Discuss the functions of the state in the individualist theory.
How has the concept of affirmative action been defined?
What are the critical aspects of affirmative action?
What do you understand by globalization?
Discuss the threats to state sovereignty in the wake of globalization.
How development commonly is understood?
What is the Indian context of secularism?
Is the western version of secularism applicable to India?
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