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Stathis Kalyvas: The Logic of Violence in Civil War: Reviews

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REVIEWS

Stathis Kalyvas: The Logic of Violence in Civil War

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, xviii + 485 pages, ISBN: 0-521-85409-1.

The Logic of Violence in Civil War by Stathis Kalyvas is a serious and pioneering at-
tempt to demonstrate the mechanisms that explain violence in the context of civil
war. Kalyvas examines the dynamics of internal wars by focusing on the micro lev-
el and by differentiating between the broad concept of civil war and the phe-
nomenon of civil war violence. He shows that violence in a civil war can neither be
reduced to irrational factors, such as strong emotions or illogical behavior, nor to
pre-existing ideological cleavages. On the contrary, violence against civilians has
its own rationale and logic.
Kalyvas’ study breaks new ground for political science and the study of violence
in two senses. First, his analysis separates the violence-and-civil-war pairing by dis-
tinguishing ‘between violence as an outcome and violence as a process’ (p. 21, em-
phasis in original). While previous studies focused on violence as a direct outcome
of civil wars, Kalyvas understands civil war as an exogenous shock and deals with
violence as a dependent variable. His nuanced theory breaks civil war violence
down into two basic categories. Indiscriminate violence is executed en masse with-
out regard for the actions or preferences of individuals. In contrast, selective vio-
lence describes aggression directed towards individuals who are targeted based on
specific information about their actions.
This distinction between indiscriminate and selective violence leads Kalyvas to a
second novel contribution. Contrary to conventional literature on violence and civ-
il wars, Kalyvas understands the use of violence as rational. For him, violence is the
end product of many individual rational actions by political actors and civilians,
who work to fulfill their interests within a given territorial space. More specifically,
Kalyvas claims that despite the frequency and planning that go into indiscriminate
violence, it often proves to be counterproductive. Faced with death regardless of
their actions, ‘many people prefer to join the rival actor rather than die a defense-
less death’ (p. 160). Since armed groups in civil wars eventually realize that the in-
centives fostered by indiscriminate violence are against their interests, they replace
it with selective violence. Though more costly, as it requires armed groups to col-
lect specific information about individuals, selective violence gives individuals in-
centives to cooperate. Since selective violence requires information about specific
people, which is most easily collected from individual non-combatants, Kalyvas ar-
gues that selective violence is ‘a joint process, created by the actions of both po-
litical actors and civilians’ (p. 209, emphasis in original). Instead of seeing the civil-
ian as a mere pawn caught between the rebels and the state, he shows that non-
combatants are agents in their own right.

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REVIEWS

The key variable in determining the availability of information and thus the abili-
ty of political actors to practice selective violence effectively is control. Kalyvas ex-
plains variance in the level of violence by the degree of control that the warring fac-
tions have over a particular geographic region. Differing levels of control give rise
to different calculations, leading civilians to defection or denunciation. According
to Kalyvas, the logic of violence unfolds as follows: the irregular warfare of civil war
enables contenders to meddle and hide among the civilians. Hiding produces un-
certainty and causes identification and communication problems. To overcome
these obstacles, the competitors use violence to encourage active participation
and denunciations from oppressed civilians. The stronger the actor’s control of the
area, the higher the rate of collaboration and denunciations. Also, the higher the
control, the less likely it is that the actor would resort to violence. Perhaps most
controversially, Kalyvas predicts that the parity of control between the actors ‘is
likely to produce no selective violence by any actors’ (p. 204). This statement holds
for two reasons. Firstly, in areas where control is evenly divided, political actors will
be unable to collect enough information to practice selective violence. Secondly,
they will be loath to engage in indiscriminate violence, for fear of encouraging
mass defections to the other side. While areas of parity may experience large
amounts of direct violence between political actors, as their armed forces come in-
to direct contact with each other, this aspect is exogenous to the scope of Kalyvas’
theory.
The dependent variable of Kalyvas’ hypothesis varies across spatial lines, while
the temporal lines are regrettably not fully developed. Kalyvas tests his theory rig-
orously on the case of the Greek civil war, focusing primarily on the micro level of
the Argolid region in 1943–1944. Lacking in his argument is the intensity of selec-
tive violence, which can also be explained over a period of time. For instance, pre-
war or wartime grievances and feuds that fuel violence on ideological and intimate
levels could decrease over time. Moreover, while Kalyvas explains the role of ac-
tors, he does not give the reader sufficient insight about the long-term impact of
institutions. For example, within certain governmental structures, incumbents
could well determine the logic of violence. Also, different types of political and ju-
dicial institutions, developed in areas controlled by the insurgents, might affect the
use of violence against civilians.
While Kalyvas’ thorough theoretical and methodological approach deserves
much praise, it raises a few additional questions. Though his theory focuses on civ-
il wars, his testing is based on the foreign occupied Greece during World War II.
Since the majority of the combatants fell under Greek sovereignty before the out-
set of hostilities, Kalyvas contends that this case falls within his fairly broad defini-
tion of ‘civil war’, i.e. an ‘armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized
sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of

Perspectives Vol. 16, No. 2 2008 115


REVIEWS

hostilities’ (pp. 5 and 17). However, this is pushing an already broad definition of
civil war to the extreme. Though Kalyvas argues that the war had ‘features parallel
to many civil wars’ (p. 249) despite the Nazi occupation, it would be important to
see his theory tested on a civil war without external occupation.
Furthermore, though the theory focuses on explaining the incidence of selective
violence, this accounts for only half of the homicides in Kalyvas’ dataset (see Table
9.2 on p. 267). This suggests that indiscriminate violence deserves greater atten-
tion, even if it is harder to gain leverage on both theoretically and empirically. How-
ever, despite these concerns, rooted primarily in Kalyvas’ omissions, which may be
addressed in future research, this book is exemplary both as an overview of the civ-
il wars literature in general and as a new approach to the study of violence within
civil wars.
Peter Rožič, Peter J. Verovšek

116 Perspectives Vol. 16, No. 2 2008

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