G.R. No.

168539               March 25, 2014 alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this
case.5
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB
HENRY T. GO, Respondent. has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by
reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for
consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued
DECISION
that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if
he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with
PERALTA, J.: a public officer.6

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information
Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced
June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended
3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer
Practices Act. with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a
public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a
government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g)
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's of R.A. 3019.
Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government,
through the Department of Transportation and Communications The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
(DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
portions of which read thus:
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several
individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated
was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public
Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court,
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants
the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby
ordered quashed and dismissed.9
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein
respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was
no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the
I
resolution finding probable cause.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND

Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
charged before the SB as follows:
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO
Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
II
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of
the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and
President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE
Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of
the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act
III
7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues,
as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN,
4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
Republic of the Philippines.4
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the hereby declared to be unlawful:
accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his
xxxx x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot
conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two
or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19

The elements of the above provision are:

The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the
Information filed against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically
(1) that the accused is a public officer; admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired
with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-
the government; and conspirators.

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of
disadvantageous to the government.11 the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers
and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would
when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public
found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law
to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v.
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles governing conspiracy,
thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private
respondent.13
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law
whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and
conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an
officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime
the filing of the Information. is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as
the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the
there is no public officer who was charged in the Information and, as tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is
The Court is not persuaded. committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the
perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law,
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of
R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy
between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of
is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to
crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when
him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing
Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly the existence, of the consummated crime and its commission by the
violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy conspirators.
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile
for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. 14 Were it not for Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
his death, he should have been charged. conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or
law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively,
where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing
present case where the public officer has already died, the private is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
person may be indicted alone. himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts
other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of
indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case
conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the
in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration
responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act,
by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x
purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and
them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act
dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or responsible x x x
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and xxxx
confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability
of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene
of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the "[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived
situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he
the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If
the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
out the conspiracy. motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court;
otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that
jurisdiction."
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming
and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them
the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of
viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for
criminal liability. the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the
appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance
xxxx
gives the court jurisdiction over the person."

x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that

Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the
once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in
Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of
respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be
conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating
heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and
for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held
solidarily liable.22 In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance
to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his
posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found
to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after
guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence
the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why
or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary
the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his
matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is
person.
better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent
can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant
24 case involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion  as well as in his
government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which
Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise
has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of
indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in
R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D.
violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into
1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who
another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the
are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said
Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case was
public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for
docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then
Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on
Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary
the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of
Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the
respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before
Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was
no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it
docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31,
does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over
2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the
the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule
part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on January
otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would
11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R.
no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.

The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which
to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his
are mere incidents in the main case and the main case has already
provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation 26 in
been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the
Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's
Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main
contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his
case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a
Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person.
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.
The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in
filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of
his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to
Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
Thus, it has been held that:
forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent
court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the
SO ORDERED.
submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the
question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994
dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court
jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald,
NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN, petitioner,
51 Minn., 534)
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.: in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police had
dispatched. That an entrapment would be made with their
participation, on February 14, 1988. As such, they went to Camp
The chief issue presented for our determination in this petition for
Crame at around 9:00 a.m. and arrived at the vicinity of 733
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the correctness of the
Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00 a.m.; that
decision of 29 March 1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
he is with his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize
110241 which affirmed the decision of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial
items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by
Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 2 finding the petitioner
Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring
guilty of the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) but set
studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy
aside the penalty imposed and ordered the trial court to receive
Bacud (Exh. "C-2"), 1 set of earring diamond worth P15,000 (Exh.
additional evidence on the "correct valuation" of the pieces of jewelry
"C-3") and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000 (Exh. "C-4").
involved for the sole purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed.

Corporal Ignacio Jao, Jr. of the WPD testified that he was with the
The information in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 charged the petitioner
spouses Teodoro Encarnacion, Jr. in the morning of February 24,
with the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in that
1988 and they proceeded to Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila at the stall of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan together with Sgt.
on or about and during the period from February 12, to February Perez. After the spouses Encarnacion recognized the items subject
24, 1988, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said matter of the robbery at the display window of the stall being tended
accused, with intent of gain for herself or for another, did then and by the herein accused, they invited the latter to the precinct and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly buy and keep in her investigated the same. They likewise brought the said showcase to
possession and/or sell or dispose of the following jewelries, to wit: the WPD station. He further testified that he has no prior knowledge
one (1) set of earrings, a ring studded with diamonds in a of the stolen jewelries of the private complainant from one store to
triangular style, one (1) set of earrings (diamond studded) and another.
one (1) diamond-studded crucifix, or all valued at P105,000.00,
which she knew or should have known to have been derived from
Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez of the WPD testified that he reported for
the proceeds of the crime of robbery committed by Joselito
duty on February 24, 1988; that he was with the group who
Sacdalan Salinas against the owner Teodoro and Luzviminda
accompanied the spouses Encarnacion in Sta. Cruz, Manila and
Encarnacion.3
was around when the couple saw some of the lost jewelries in the
display stall of the accused. He was likewise present during the
On the basis of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Teodoro early part of the investigation of the WPD station.5
Encarnacion (one of the offended parties), Cpl. Ignacio Jao, Jr., and
Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez, both of the Western Police District, the trial
The recovery of the pieces of jewelry, on the basis of which the trial
court promulgated on 16 November 1990 its decision, the dispositive
court ruled that no civil liability should be adjudged against the
portion of which reads:
petitioner, took place when, as testified to by Teodoro Encarnacion, the
petitioner "admitted that she got the items but she did not know they
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilty of the were stolen [and that] she surrendered the items and gave them to
accused for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 beyond [his] wife."6
reasonable doubt, the accused Norma Dizon-Pamintuan is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as testified to by Rosito
imprisonment from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of prision
Dizon-Pamintuan, is summarized by the trial court thus:
mayor to NINETEEN (19) YEARS of reclusion temporal.

The defense presented only the testimony of Rosito Dizon-

No civil liability in view of the recovery of the items, subject-
Pamintuan who testified that he is the brother of Norma Dizon-
matter of this case.
Pamintuan and that sometime around 11:00 a.m. of February 24,
1985, he, together with the accused went infront of the Carinderia
With costs.4 along Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila waiting for a
vacancy therein to eat lunch. Suddenly, three persons arrived and
he overheard that Cpl. Jao told her sister to get the jewelry from
The evidence of the prosecution is summarized by the trial court as inside the display window but her sister requested to wait for
follows: Fredo, the owner of the stall. But ten minutes later when said
Fredo did not show up, the police officer opened the display
Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public Works window and got the contents of the same. The display stall was
and Highways testified that he has just arrived at his residence hauled to a passenger jeepney and the same, together with the
located at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque at around 9:45 p.m. accused were taken to the police headquarters. He likewise
of February 12, 1988 coming from the Airport and immediately testified that he accompanied his sister to the station and after
proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver and two investigation was sent home.7
housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from his
case. It was at this point that five unidentified masked armed In convicting the petitioner, the trial court made the following findings:
persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the
house and poked their guns to his driver and two helpers and
dragged them inside his house. That the men pointed a gun at him The prosecution was able to prove by evidence that the recovered
and was made to lie face down on the floor. The other occupants, items were part of the loot and such recovered items belong to
namely his wife, the maids and his driver were likewise made to lie the spouses Encarnacion, the herein private complainants. That
on the floor. Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took such items were recovered by the Police Officers from the stall
away jewelries and other personal properties including cash. After being tended by the accused at that time. Of importance, is that
the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the law provides a disputable presumption of fencing under
the police. He was then interviewed by the Parañaque police and Section 5 thereof, to wit:
was informed that an operation group would be assigned to the
case.
Mere possession of any goods, article, item object, or anything of
value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police District on be prima facie evidence of fencing.
February 15, 1988. Two days later, a group of WPD operatives
came over to his house and he was asked to prepare a list of items
There is no doubt that the recovered items were found in the
of jewelry and other valuables that were lost including a sketch of
possession of the accused and she was not able to rebut the
distinctive items. He was later told that some of the lost items were
 presumption though the evidence for the defense alleged that the anything of value which has been the subject of
stall is owned by one Fredo. A distinction should likewise be made robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence
between ownership and possession in relation to the act of fencing. of fencing.
Moreover, as to the value of the jewelries recovered, the
prosecution was able to show that the same is Ninety Three
Knowledge and intent to gain are proven by the
Thousand Pesos (P93,000.00).8
fact that these jewelries were found in possession
of appellant and they were displayed for sale in a
The petitioner then appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals showcase being tended by her in a stall along
(CA-G.R. CR No. 11024) where she raised two issues: (1) that the Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.9
judgment was based on a mere presumption, and (2) that the
prosecution failed to show that the value of the jewelry recovered is
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that there was
P93,000.00.
not enough evidence to prove the value of the pieces of jewelry
recovered, which is essential to the imposition of the proper penalty
In its challenged decision of 29 March 1993, the Court of Appeals under Section 3 of P.D.
disposed of the first issue in this wise: No. 1612. It opined that the trial court erred in concluding that "the
value of the recovered jewelries is P93,000.00 based on the bare
testimony of the private complainant and the self-serving list he
The guilt of accused-appellant was established
submitted (Exhs. C, C-2 and C-4, TSN, Hearing of October 3, 1993)."10
beyond reasonable doubt. All the elements of the
crime of fencing in violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law of 1979 (P.D. No. 1612), to wit: The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not
commit any reversible error, its decision dated
October 26, 1990 convincing accused appellant is
2. A person, not a participant in said crime, buys,
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
penalty imposed is SET ASIDE and the Regional
sells or disposes, or buys and sells; or in any
Trial Court (Branch 20) of Manila is ordered
manner deals in any article or item, object or
to receive evidence with respect to the correct
anything of value;
valuation of the properties involved in this case,
marked as Exhibits "C", "C-2" and "C-4" for the
3. With personal knowledge, or should be known sole purpose of determining the proper penalty to
to said person that said item, object or anything of be meted out against accused under Section 3,
value has been derived from the proceeds of the P.D. No. 1612. Let the original records be
crime of robbery or theft; remanded immediately.11

4. With intent to gain for himself or for another; Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner contends that:

have been established by positive and convincing I

evidence of the prosecution . . .
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
... MANIFESTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE
CAÑEBA, IN BLATANT DISREGARD OF
The fact that a crime of robbery has been APPLICABLE LAW AND WELL-ESTABLISHED
committed on February 12, 1988 is established by JURISPRUDENCE.
the testimony of private complainant Teodoro T.
Encarnacion who immediately reported the same
to Parañaque Police Station of the Southern II
Police District (TSN, Hearings of October 3, 1988,
November 9, 1988 and January 11, 1989; Exh. A)
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
and submitted a list and sketches of the jewelries
MANIFESTLY ERRED IN REMANDING THE
robbed, among other things, from their residence
CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR RECEPTION
located at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque,
OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
Metro Manila (Exh. C,
DETERMINING THE CORRECT PENALTY TO
C-1 to C-4 and D).
BE IMPOSED.12

The second element is likewise established by

On 23 February 1994, after the public respondents had filed their
convincing evidence. On February 24, 1988,
Comment and the petitioner her Reply to the Comment, this Court
accused-appellant was found selling the jewelries
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
(Exhs. C-2, C-3 and C-4) which was displayed in a
respective memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
showcase in a stall located at Florentino Street,
Sta. Cruz, Manila. [Testimonies of Teodoro
Encarnacion (id. supra); Cpl. Ignacio Jao (TSN, The first assigned error is without merit.
Hearing of February 13, 1989) and Pfc. Emmanuel
Sanchez (TSN, Hearing of June 4, 1989)].
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law),
is "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
On the element of knowledge that the items are another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article,
and of intent to gain for herself or for another, the item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known
Anti-Fencing Law provides: to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft."
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere
possession of any good, article, item, object, or
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it
liable as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that
Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental
obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the
the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article constitutional presumption of innocence.19
60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement
agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of government
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere
and private properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have
possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value
become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen
facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to
properties," P.D.
have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who
the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no
profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the
other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of
accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as
her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This
such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However,
presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined
in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes
in the fundamental law.20 In the early case of United States vs.
a principal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of
Luling, 21 this Court held:
robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are
separate and distinct offenses.13 The state may thus choose to
prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory
although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable crimes, that no constitutional provision is violated
considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 by a statute providing that proof by the state
creates a presumption of fencing14 and prescribes a higher penalty of some material fact or facts shall
based on the value of the property.15 constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that
then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the
purpose of showing that such act or acts are
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
innocent and are committed without unlawful
intention. (Commonwealth vs. Minor, 88 Ky., 422.)
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
In some of the States, as well as in England, there
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the exist what are known as common law offenses. In
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys made so by statute. The state having the right to
and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or declare what acts are criminal, within certain well
anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of defined limitations, has a right to specify what act
the said crime; or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what
proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt,
and then to put upon the defendant the burden of
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article,
showing that such act or acts are innocent and are
item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
not committed with any criminal intent or intention.
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

In his book on constitutional law,22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz said:

4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or
for another.
Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of
innocence may be overcome by contrary
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth
presumptions based on the experience of human
elements were duly established. A robbery was committed on 12
conduct [People vs. Labara, April 20, 1954].
February 1988 in the house of the private complainants who
Unexplained flight, for example, may lead to an
afterwards reported the incident to the Parañaque Police, the Western
inference of guilt, as 'the wicked flee when no man
Police District, the NBI, and the CIS, and submitted a list of the lost
pursueth, but the righteous is as bold as a lion.
items and sketches of the jewelry taken from them (Exhibits "C" and
Failure on the part of the accused to explain his
"D"). Three of these items stolen, viz., (a) a pair of earrings and ring
possession of stolen property may give rise to the
studded with diamonds worth P75,000.00 (Exhibit "C-2"); (b) one set of
reasonable presumption that it was he himself who
earrings worth P15,000.00 (Exhibit "C-3"); and (c) a chain with crucifix
had stolen it [U.S. vs. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]. Under
worth P3,000.00 (Exhibit "C-4"), were displayed for sale at a stall
our Revised Penal Code, the inability of an
tended to by the petitioner in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz,
accountable officer to produce funds or property
Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly manifested an
entrusted to him will be considered prima
intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
facie evidence that he has appropriated them to
his personal use [Art. 217]. According to Cooley,
The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution the constitutional presumption will not apply as
proved the existence of the third element: that the accused knew or long as there is "some rational connection
should have known that the items recovered from her were the between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. presumed, and the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as
to be purely arbitrary mandate" [1 Cooley, 639].
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance,
consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of
something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No.
within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity.16 When knowledge of 1612. She relied solely on the testimony of her brother which was
the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary, even
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of
existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. 17 On the jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.23
other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon
he was a licensed dealer or supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No.
assumption that such fact exists.18 Knowledge refers to a mental state
1612 provides that "all stores, establishments or entitles dealing in the
of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind
buy and sell of any good, article, item, object or anything of value We do not agree with the petitioner's contention, though, that a remand
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before for further reception of evidence would place her in double jeopardy.
offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary There is double jeopardy when the following requisites concur: (1) the
clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first
National Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or jeopardy must have validly been terminated, and (3) the second
entity is located." Under the Rules and Regulations 24 promulgated to jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. 29 Such a
carry out the provisions of Section 6, an unlicensed dealer/supplier concurrence would not occur assuming that the case was remanded to
refers to any person, partnership, firm, corporation, association or any the trial court.
other entity or establishment not licensed by the government to engage
in the business of dealing in or supplying "used secondhand articles,"
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED by setting aside
which refers to any good, article, item, object or anything of value
the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether
11024 insofar as it sets aside the penalty imposed by Branch 20 of the
the same has actually or in fact been used.
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 and
orders the remand of the case for the trial court to receive evidence
We do not, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that there is with respect to the correct value of the properties involved. The
insufficient evidence to prove the actual value of the recovered articles. decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED subject to the
modification of the penalty which is hereby reduced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day
As found by the trial court, the recovered articles had a total value of
of Prision Mayor maximum as minimum to Eighteen (18) years and
P93,000.00, broken down as follows:
Five (5) months of Reclusion Temporal maximum as maximum, with
the accessory penalties of the latter.
a) one earring and ring studded with diamonds
(Exh. "C-2") — P75,000.00
SO ORDERED.

b) one set of earring (Exh. "C-3") — P15,000.00

c) one gold chain with crucifix (Exh. "C-4") —

P3,000.00

These findings are based on the testimony of Mr.

Encarnacion 25 and on Exhibit "C,"26 a list of the items which
were taken by the robbers on 12 February 1988, together
with the corresponding valuation thereof. On cross-
examination, Mr. Encarnacion re-affirmed his testimony on
direct examination that the value of the pieces of jewelry
described in Exhibit "C-2" is P75,000.0027 and that the value
of the items described in Exhibit "C-3" is P15,000.00,
although he admitted that only one earring — and not the
pair — was recovered. 28 The cross-examination withheld
any question on the gold chain with crucifix described in
Exhibit "C-4." In view, however, of the admission that only
one earring was recovered of the jewelry described in Exhibit
"C-3," it would be reasonable to reduce the value from
P15,000.00 to P7,500.00. Accordingly, the total value of the
pieces of jewelry displayed for sale by the petitioner and
established to be part of the proceeds of the robbery on 12
February 1988 would be P87,000.00.

Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 1612 provides that the penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon the accused if the value of the property
involved is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00,
and if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
of prision mayor should be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional P10,000.00; the total penalty which may be
imposed, however, shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the
penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty
pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be
imposed. The maximum penalty that can be imposed in this case
would then be eighteen (18) years and five (5) months, which is within
the range of reclusion temporal maximum. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence law which allows the imposition of an indeterminate penalty
which, with respect to offenses penalized by a special law, shall range
from a minimum which shall not be lower than the minimum prescribed
by the special law to a maximum which should not exceed the
maximum provided therein, the petitioner can thus be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor maximum, as minimum to eighteen (18) years and
five (5) months of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum, with the
accessory penalties corresponding to the latter.

In the light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside
the penalty imposed by the trial court and in remanding the case to the
trial court for further reception of evidence to determine the actual
value of the pieces of jewelry recovered from the petitioner and for the
imposition of the appropriate penalty.