THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6554. December 14, 2005.]

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER , petitioner, vs . ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN,

JR. and THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.

Samuel D. Divina for complainant.

Rogelio A. Vinluan for IBP.

SYLLABUS

1.LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS;

PRESENT PETITION TIMELY FILED; LETTER OF INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
BOARD CHAIRMAN MAY NOT BE DEEMED TO BE THE NOTICE OF RESOLUTION REQUIRED
BY SECTION 12, RULE 139-B, PARAGRAPH C, OF THE RULES OF COURT. — This Court nds
that the letter of the Board Chairman to petitioner's counsel may not be deemed to be the
notice of resolution required by above-quoted Section 12, Rule 139-B, paragraph (c). The
notice of resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers not to an uno cial information
that may be gathered by the parties, nor to any letter from the IBP Board Chairman or even
of the Board, but to the o cial notice of resolution that is supposed to be issued by the
Board, copy of which is given to all parties and transmitted to this Court. As paragraph (d)
which immediately follows paragraph (c) states: (d) Notice of the resolution or decision of
the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court. In its Comment to the present petition, respondent IBP
admits that no such notice has been sent to petitioner: "The Board has not to date issued
the notice of resolution con rming the dismissal of CBD Case No. 02-984 for the reason
that all the relevant records have yet to be completed for transmittal to the Supreme Court.
The complainant will be formally furnished a copy of the resolution upon transmittal of the
records to the Supreme Court." The IBP eventually transmitted to this Court on July 6,
2005 the Notice of Resolution. A copy was supposedly furnished the petitioner; however,
the IBP has not submitted any proof of service. Since no notice has been sent to petitioner,
at least at the time this petition was led, as the August 11, 2004 letter from the IBP Board
Chairman cannot be deemed a notice of resolution, the present petition has been timely
led. Parenthetically, the IBP Board Chairman erred when he stated that the Board may not
act on motions for reconsideration as there is no provision for such motions under the
rules of procedure for disbarment cases.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER-COMPLAINANT'S APPEAL TO THE COURT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF AN OFFICIAL NOTICE OR RESOLUTION IS
JUSTIFIED; THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES HAS GIVEN NO REASON FOR
THE DELAY IN SENDING THE NOTICE OF THE RESOLUTION OTHER THAN THE NEBULOUS
EXPLANATION THAT RECORDS ARE STILL BEING COMPLETED. — While, generally, a party
who desires to appeal from the IBP's dismissal of a disciplinary case should await the
notice of resolution, it bears noting in this instance that the Board, despite issuing a
resolution on the subject complaint on February 27, 2004, failed to send a notice of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 resolution to petitioner. As borne out by the IBP's statement noted earlier, there was still
no notice to petitioner as of February 9, 2005 — almost one year after the dismissal of the
subject complaint. The IBP has given no reason for the delay other than the nebulous
explanation that records were still being completed. In view thereof, petitioner, who had
already con rmed that her complaint was dismissed through a letter coming from the IBP
Board Chairman, cannot be faulted for appealing to this Court notwithstanding the
absence of an official notice of resolution.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE IS NOT A REQUISITE FOR FILING A
DISBARMENT COMPLAINT; PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE IS NOT REQUIRED OF THE
COMPLAINANT, BUT OF HER WITNESSES, IF THERE ARE ANY. — Even granting arguendo
that the earlier resolution "constitutes res judicata with respect to the nding that
Petitioner does not possess personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances for which
Respondent is sought to be administratively liable," personal knowledge is not a requisite
for ling a disbarment complaint. Personal knowledge is required, not of the complainant,
but of her witnesses, if there are any. Oddly enough, the quotation of the same provision by
the Investigating Commissioner who dismissed the earlier disciplinary case against
respondent omitted the phrase "any person," making it appear that complainants must
have personal knowledge of the facts they allege. Moreover, the ruling of this Court in
Navarro v. Meneses III bears reiteration: The argument of respondent that complainant has
no legal personality to sue him is unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
provides that proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
upon the veri ed complaint of any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding
is not con ned to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury
from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and
the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence
submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline su ced to sustain its
resolution and recommended sanctions. While this Court notes petitioner's claim that she
herself has personal knowledge of the facts alleged in her complaint, a ruling on such
allegation is unnecessary in light of the foregoing discussion.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFLICT OF INTEREST; SINCE COMPLAINANT WAS REPRESENTED
BY RESPONDENT'S FIRM IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN CASE, RESPONDENT WAS
PERSONALLY BARRED BY THE RULES OF ETHICS FROM REPRESENTING AN INTEREST
CONTRARY TO THAT EARLIER ESPOUSED BY HIS FIRM. — Notwithstanding his
acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan and SEC cases, respondent denies
that he was guilty of representing con icting interests, he proffering that, in the rst place,
the case of Ilusorio in the Sandiganbayan "has been the personal account of Atty. Raval,
separate and apart from the accounts of the law partnership." Not only is this claim
unsubstantiated, however. It is contradicted by respondent's own evidence and
statements. Thus, respondent attached to his Comment to the present petition
documentary evidence consisting of, among other things, two letters to the PCGG, in one
of which he signed on behalf of his rm, and in the other his name appeared as counsel on
behalf of his rm. The subject of both letters was the then pending negotiations between
the PCGG and Ilusorio who was therein identi ed as the client of respondent's rm. In
connection with these letters, respondent claims: "If by chance the signature of the
Respondent appears on some correspondences, it is only because Respondent, in good
faith, accommodated Atty. Raval upon the latter's request who, as then Deputy Secretary of
the Senate of the Philippines, is not authorized to engage in the private practice." Besides
being a imsy excuse by itself, this claim of respondent, being an acknowledgment that he
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 signed correspondences with the PCGG pertaining to the Ilusorio case, only shows that
both he and Atty. Raval collaborated on said case. Furthermore, as earlier noted,
respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented by his rm in the Sandiganbayan
case. In light thereof, respondent was personally barred by the rules of ethics from
representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his rm. So this Court held in
Hilado v. David: . . . If this letter was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney
Franciso and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his rm did give Mrs.
Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the
relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estops him in the same manner and to
the same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained from a
client by a member or assistant of a law rm is information imparted to the
firm . This is not a mere ction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our
case, not only acts in the name and interest of the rm, but his information, by the nature of
his connection with the firm is available to his associates or employers. . . .
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT ADVOCATED AN INTEREST HOSTILE TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT THAT HE HAD PRIORLY
NEGOTIATED FOR COMPLAINANT. — Respondent denies, however, representing
con icting interests on the ground that SB Case No. 009 and SEC Case No. 09-98-6086
are totally distinct from each other. He attempts to distinguish them as follows: 36. SB
Case No. 009, initiated by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan is totally distinct and
separate, and has no relation at all to SEC Case No. 09-98-6086. Said cases involve
different parties and causes of action. 37. In Sandiganbayan Case No. 009, the opposing
parties are the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as plaintiff; Atty.
Potenciano Ilusorio, as Defendant and Third party Plaintiff; and Independent Realty
Corporation (IRC) and Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. (MLDC). 38. The subject matter
in SB Case No. 009 are shares owned by the National Government, through IRC and MLDC,
in the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). 39. SEC Case No. 09-
98-6086 involves a dispute regarding the PHILCOMSAT election of its Board of Directors
and corporate o cers. The foregoing explanation fails to mention, however, that Ilusorio, a
defendant in the Sandiganbayan case, was one of the petitioners in the SEC case, and that
among the grounds Ilusorio relied upon in his petition in the SEC was the existence of the
Compromise Agreement in the Sandiganbayan, which vested in him ownership and voting
rights corresponding to 673 POTC shares. Nowhere is the con ict of interest clearer than
in respondent's Memorandum dated September 28, 1998 led with the SEC wherein he
argued in behalf of Nieto, et al., as follows: A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a
subsequent disposition of the instant Petition by this Honorable Commission would pre-
empt the resolution by the Sandiganbayan of the disputed shares. It would in fact a rm
the ownership by the Petitioners of the said shares subject of the Sandiganbayan case.
This Petition is a premature action to enforce the Compromise Agreement
entered into by Mr. Ilusorio . Clearly, this is beyond the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Commission. Any right to be derived from the Compromise Agreement is clearly inchoate
at this point in time. Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al., in the SEC, he was
advocating an interest hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement
that he had priorly negotiated for Ilusorio. The Board thus erred when, while
acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by respondent's rm in his negotiations with
the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that there was no con ict of interest upon a nding
that the subsequent SEC case "did not in any way involve the validity of the compromise
agreement forged with the PCGG."

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com

 DECISION

CARPIO MORALES , J : p

On petition for review is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Board of Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint led by Erlinda K. Ilusorio-
Bildner (petitioner) against Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr. (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No.
02-984.
In her complaint against respondent, petitioner alleges that on July 15, 1991, her
father, the late Potenciano Ilusorio (Ilusorio), engaged the services of the law o ce of
Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case
No. 0009, 1 "Republic of the Philippines v. Jose L. Africa, et al .," of which Ilusorio was one of
the defendants.
In that civil case, the Republic was claiming, among other properties, shareholdings
in Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) 99% of the shares in the latter
corporation of which appeared to be owned by POTC. Respondent, together with
Attorneys Demaree Raval and Salvador Hizon, actively handled the case for Ilusorio.
While the case was pending, Ilusorio, with the assistance of the law rm of Raval and
Lokin (successor to Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin), entered into a Compromise
Agreement with the Republic which bore the imprimatur of the Sandiganbayan. 2 Under the
Compromise Agreement which, by petitioner's claim, constituted the full, comprehensive
and nal settlement of claims of the parties, the Republic was to get 4,727 POTC shares
while Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares.
Petitioner alleges that during the special stockholders' meeting of PHILCOMSAT
held on August 27, 1998 which was supposed to be a mere informal gathering to
introduce the newly appointed government nominees for PHILCOMSAT to the private
stockholders of POTC, the gathering, through the "high-handed and deceitful maneuvers"
of respondent, was suddenly and without notice transformed into a Special Stockholders
Meeting at which directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT were elected.
Petitioner adds that Ilusorio contested the validity of the meeting by filing before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint, docketed as SEC Case No. 09-
98-6086, against Manuel Nieto, et al. who were purportedly elected directors and o cers
of PHILCOMSAT, 3 in which SEC case respondent appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al.,
contrary to his oath not to represent conflicting interests.
Ilusorio, together with Fidelity Farms, Inc. and Great Asia Enterprises, Inc., had earlier
led with the IBP a disbarment complaint against respondent on the same grounds as
those raised in the present case. However, on account of the death of Ilusorio and the
failure of his children, namely, Maximo Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, and petitioner, to establish
their quali cation to substitute for him, his complaint was dismissed. The dismissal having
explicitly stated that it was without prejudice to the ling of a new complaint by Ilusorio's
children or any person who knows of respondent's unethical acts, petitioner contends that
her present complaint is not barred by such dismissal.
After hearing both parties, IBP Investigating Commissioner Milagros San Juan found
merit in petitioner's complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended for three
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 months. DHETIS

By the now assailed Resolution of February 27, 2004, however, the IBP Board of
Governors set aside the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and dismissed the
complaint.
No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon petitioner. Petitioner,
nonetheless, learned about the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and the
setting aside thereof by the Board of Governors, prodding her to write a March 10, 2004
letter to the Board in her own name requesting "that the Board take up the matter once
more" and asking for "the remanding of the case against Atty. Luis Lokin to the Board of
Governors." In the same letter, petitioner stated that the very brief time it took the Board to
review the case and resolve it in respondent's favor con rms the information she received
that a former IBP official had been intervening for respondent.
By letter of April 16, 2004 bearing the signatures of all its members, the Board of
Governors denied what it considered as petitioner's malicious and reckless allegations,
stating that it was "constrained to deny [petitioner's] request for a remanding or a
reconsideration of the case" as there was no provision for a reconsideration of any such
case either in Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court or in the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline.
Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Samuel Divina, then wrote a letter of July 19, 2004 to
Atty. Jose Anselmo Cadiz, Chairman of the IBP Board of Governors and concurrently
National President of the IBP, informing him that petitioner had not been noti ed of any
nal action on her complaint, and attaching thereto as further evidence a document for its
consideration in the event that no such action had yet been taken.
Replying, the Board Chairman, by letter dated August 11, 2004, stated that the Board
could no longer act on petitioner's July 19, 2004 letter, otherwise it would, in effect, be
considering the letter as a motion for reconsideration which is not provided for by the
rules of procedure for cases of the kind. And the Chairman referred petitioner's counsel to
the Board's April 16, 2004 letter to her.
Atty. Divina thereupon sent a letter dated August 18, 2004 to Atty. Rogelio Vinluan,
National Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP, requesting for a copy of the Notice of
Resolution of the Board of Governors and of the Investigation Report of Commissioner
San Juan, so that petitioner may appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
Atty. Divina later sent Atty. Vinluan another letter, dated August 27, 2004 , stating
that upon further reading of the August 11 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, it appeared
that it was the Chairman's intention that the said letter be treated as a Notice of Resolution
and, therefore, petitioner had until September 2, 2004 to le a Petition for Review (since
the August 11 letter was received on August 17, 2004). Instead of asking for the Notice of
Resolution as in his previous letter, Atty. Divina only requested in his August 24, 2004 letter
for a copy of the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and the record,
if any, of the deliberations of the IBP indicating the basis for reversing her ndings. This
letter, according to petitioner, was simply ignored.
Petitioner thus led the present petition on September 2, 2004 to which respondent
has already filed his Comment.
Before delving into the merits of this case, the procedural issues raised by
respondent against the petition will first be addressed.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 Respondent contends that the petition was led beyond the 15-day reglementary
period, as petitioner should be deemed to have received notice of the challenged IBP
resolution, not on August 17, 2004 when her counsel received the August 11, 2004 letter of
the IBP Board Chairman, but on March 10, 2004 when she wrote the Board admitting
having acquired knowledge of the reversal of Commissioner San Juan's recommendation.
Hence, respondent claims, petitioner had only until March 25, 2004 to le a petition for
review.
Respondent further contends that even on the assumption that the petition was
timely led, the same should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper, it being
based not on a resolution of the IBP Board, but merely on a letter of the IBP President,
contrary to Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction
imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition,
reprimand, or ne) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing
such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the
complaint or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
(Underscoring supplied)

This Court nds that the letter of the Board Chairman to petitioner's counsel may
not be deemed to be the notice of resolution required by above-quoted Section 12, Rule
139-B, paragraph (c). The notice of resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers not
to an uno cial information that may be gathered by the parties, nor to any letter from the
IBP Board Chairman or even of the Board, but to the o cial notice of resolution that is
supposed to be issued by the Board, copy of which is given to all parties and transmitted
to this Court. As paragraph (d) which immediately follows paragraph (c) states:
(d)Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all
parties through their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court. HIETAc

In its Comment to the present petition, respondent IBP admits that no such notice
has been sent to petitioner: "The Board has not to date issued the notice of resolution
con rming the dismissal of CBD Case No. 02-984 for the reason that all the relevant
records have yet to be completed for transmittal to the Supreme Court. The complainant
will be formally furnished a copy of the resolution upon transmittal of the records to the
Supreme Court." 4
The IBP eventually transmitted to this Court on July 6, 2005 the Notice of
Resolution. A copy was supposedly furnished the petitioner; however, the IBP has not
submitted any proof of service.
Since no notice has been sent to petitioner, at least at the time this petition was
led, as the August 11, 2004 letter from the IBP Board Chairman cannot be deemed a
notice of resolution, the present petition has been timely filed.

Parenthetically, the IBP Board Chairman erred when he stated that the Board may
not act on motions for reconsideration as there is no provision for such motions under the
rules of procedure for disbarment cases. For Pimentel, Jr. vs. Atty. Llorente 5 instructs:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 . . . The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading or not under Rule 139-B, §12(c) has been settled in Halimao v.
Villanueva, in which this Court held:
"Although Rule 139-B, §12(C) makes no mention of a motion for
reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such
motion is prohibited. It may therefore be led within 15 days from notice to
a party. Indeed, the ling of such motion should be encouraged before
resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to
correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of
facts or misappreciation of the evidenced." (Underscoring supplied)

In another vein, respondent claims that the petition is premature as it is not based
on a notice of resolution of the Board, hence, it should be dismissed for being
inappropriate and improper.
While, generally, a party who desires to appeal from the IBP's dismissal of a
disciplinary case should await the notice of resolution, it bears noting in this instance that
the Board, despite issuing a resolution on the subject complaint on February 27, 2004,
failed to send a notice of resolution to petitioner. As borne out by the IBP's statement
noted earlier, there was still no notice to petitioner as of February 9, 2005 — almost one
year after the dismissal of the subject complaint. The IBP has given no reason for the delay
other than the nebulous explanation that records were still being completed. In view
thereof, petitioner, who had already con rmed that her complaint was dismissed through a
letter coming from the IBP Board Chairman, cannot be faulted for appealing to this Court
notwithstanding the absence of an official notice of resolution.
Respondent also challenges the quali cation of petitioner to le this case on the
ground of her purported lack of personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the complaint.
He invokes the resolution of the IBP in the prior disbarment case against him, where
petitioner — who therein sought to be substituted in place of her deceased father — was
held to be without the requisite personal knowledge to pursue the complaint.
Even granting arguendo that the earlier resolution "constitutes res judicata with
respect to the nding that Petitioner does not possess personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances for which Respondent is sought to be administratively liable," personal
knowledge is not a requisite for ling a disbarment complaint. Section 1, Rule 139-B
states:
SECTION 1. How instituted. — Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the veri ed complaint of any
person . The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of
and shall be supported by a davits of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, personal knowledge is required, not of the complainant, but of her

witnesses, if there are any. Oddly enough, the quotation of the same provision by the
Investigating Commissioner who dismissed the earlier disciplinary case against
respondent omitted the phrase "any person," making it appear that complainants must
have personal knowledge of the facts they allege. 6

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com

 Moreover, the ruling of this Court in Navarro v. Meneses III 7 bears reiteration:
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to
sue him is unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that
proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines upon the veri ed complaint of any person. The right to institute a
disbarment proceeding is not con ned to clients nor is it necessary that the
person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment
proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the
proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence submitted by complainant
before the Commission on Bar Discipline su ced to sustain its resolution and
recommended sanctions. (Underscoring supplied)

While this Court notes petitioner's claim that she herself has personal knowledge of
the facts alleged in her complaint, a ruling on such allegation is unnecessary in light of the
foregoing discussion.
Segueing to the merits of the petition, respondent admits that his rm represented
Ilusorio in Sandiganbayan Case No. 009 8 and that he represented Manuel Nieto, Jr. and
Lourdes Africa in SEC Case No. 09-98-6086. 9 The Court notes, however, that besides
Nieto and Africa, respondent represented Salvador Hizon as well, as indicated in his
Memorandum submitted to the SEC 1 0 and as found by the Committee on Professional
Responsibility, Discipline and Disbarment of the IBP. 1 1
Notwithstanding his acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan and SEC
cases, respondent denies that he was guilty of representing con icting interests, he
proffering that, in the rst place, the case of Ilusorio in the Sandiganbayan "has been the
personal account of Atty. Raval, separate and apart from the accounts of the law
partnership." Not only is this claim unsubstantiated, however. It is contradicted by
respondent's own evidence and statements.
Thus, respondent attached to his Comment to the present petition documentary
evidence consisting of, among other things, two letters to the PCGG, in one of which he
signed on behalf of his rm, and in the other his name appeared as counsel on behalf of his
rm. 1 2 The subject of both letters was the then pending negotiations between the PCGG
and Ilusorio who was therein identi ed as the client of respondent's rm. In connection
with these letters, respondent claims: "If by chance the signature of the Respondent
appears on some correspondences, it is only because Respondent, in good faith,
accommodated Atty. Raval upon the latter's request who, as then Deputy Secretary of the
Senate of the Philippines, is not authorized to engage in the private practice." 1 3 Besides
being a imsy excuse by itself, this claim of respondent, being an acknowledgment that he
signed correspondences with the PCGG pertaining to the Ilusorio case, only shows that
both he and Atty. Raval collaborated on said case. SEHDIC

Furthermore, as earlier noted, respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented
by his firm in the Sandiganbayan case. 1 4 In light thereof, respondent was personally barred
by the rules of ethics from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his
firm. So this Court held in Hilado v. David: 1 5
. . . If this letter was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney
Franciso and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his rm did
give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore
demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 estops him in the same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had
written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or
assistant of a law rm is information imparted to the rm . This is not a
mere ction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our case, not
only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of
his connection with the rm is available to his associates or employers. . . .
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent denies, however, representing con icting interests on the ground that
SB Case No. 009 and SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 are totally distinct from each other. He
attempts to distinguish them as follows:
36.SB Case No. 009, initiated by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan is
totally distinct and separate, and has no relation at all to SEC Case No. 09-98-
6086. Said cases involve different parties and causes of action.
37.In Sandiganbayan Case No. 009, the opposing parties are the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as plaintiff; Atty.
Potenciano Ilusorio, as Defendant and Third party Plaintiff; and Independent
Realty Corporation (IRC) and Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. (MLDC).
38.The subject matter in SB Case No. 009 are shares owned by the
National Government, through IRC and MLDC, in the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC).
39.SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 involves a dispute regarding the
PHILCOMSAT election of its Board of Directors and corporate officers. 1 6

The foregoing explanation fails to mention, however, that Ilusorio, a defendant in the
Sandiganbayan case, was one of the petitioners in the SEC case, and that among the
grounds Ilusorio relied upon in his petition in the SEC was the existence of the
Compromise Agreement in the Sandiganbayan, which vested in him ownership and voting
rights corresponding to 673 POTC shares. 1 7
Nowhere is the con ict of interest clearer than in respondent's Memorandum dated
September 28, 1998 led with the SEC wherein he argued in behalf of Nieto, et al. as
follows:
A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a subsequent disposition of the
instant Petition by this Honorable Commission would pre-empt the resolution by
the Sandiganbayan of the disputed shares. It would in fact a rm the ownership
by the Petitioners of the said shares subject of the Sandiganbayan case. This
Petition is a premature action to enforce the Compromise Agreement
entered into by Mr. Ilusorio . Clearly, this is beyond the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Commission. Any right to be derived from the Compromise Agreement
is clearly inchoate at this point in time. 1 8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an
interest hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had
priorly negotiated for Ilusorio.
The Board thus erred when, while acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by
respondent's rm in his negotiations with the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that there
was no con ict of interest upon a nding that the subsequent SEC case "did not in any way
involve the validity of the compromise agreement forged with the PCGG." 1 9
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated February 27, 2004
is SET ASIDE. Respondent Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of Three (3) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely. CaHAcT

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE L. AFRICA, MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, POTENCIANO ILUSORIO.
2.Ilusorio's Petition in SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 states that the Compromise Agreement was
approved on June 8, 1998 (Rollo at 111). Respondent's Memorandum in the same case
likewise states that the Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement, but that there was a
pending motion to vacate the order (Rollo at 124).
3.POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, KATRINA ENRILE DELA CALZADA, FIDELITY FARMS, INC.,GREAT
ASIA ENTERPRISES and JAKA INVESTMENTS CORP. vs. RONALDO SALONGA, MANUEL
NIETO, JR., LOURDES AFRICA, HONORIO POBLADOR III, SALVADOR HIZON, BENITO
ARANETA, CARMELO P. AFRICA, JR. and EDGARDO VILLANUEVA.
4.Rollo at 383-384.
5.393 Phil. 544, 550-551 (2000).

6.Commissioner Pedro Magpayo, Jr. quotes Section 1, Rule 139-B as follows:

"SECTION 1. How instituted. — Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of and shall be supported by affidavit,
of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts." (Rollo at 362, emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

7.285 SCRA 586, 592-593 (1998).

8.Respondent states in his Comment: ". . . the position that he [respondent] took in the SEC case
has no relation or connection at all to the position that his Firm espoused in SB Case No.
009 in representation of Atty. Ilusorio." (Rollo at 347, underscoring supplied).

9.The Respondent states in his Answer (With Motion to Dismiss): "When the Respondent
represented Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. and Lourdes Africa against the renegade faction of the
Ilusorio family, the representation was in relation to the August 27, 1998 Special
Stockholders' Meeting of PHILCOMSAT wherein the Respondent has an interest to
protect . . ." (IBP Rollo at 105).

10.Rollo at 129.
11.Id. at 851-852, Vol. 2.
12.Id. at 366-368, Vol. 1.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 13.Id. at 350-351, Vol. 1.
14.Vide note 8.
15.84 PHIL 569, 580 (1949).
16.Rollo at 345-346, Vol. 1.
17.Id. at 111-112.

18.Id. at 126.
19.Id. at 384.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com