268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gutierrez

G.R. Nos. 144907-09. September 17, 2002. *

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL GUTIERREZ,

accused-appellant.
Criminal Procedure;  Plea of Guilty; A formal plea of guilt was insufficient to
sustain a conviction of the aggravated crime charged in the Information.—We are
reminded of People v. Derilo where after enumerating the perils posed by the rule
equating a guilty plea with an admission of all the aggravating circumstances
alleged in the Information, we categorically stated that a formal plea of guilt was
insufficient to sustain a conviction of the aggravated crime charged in the
Information. We ratiocinated that it happens not infrequently that upon arraignment
the accused pleads guilty to the commission of an offense qualified by aggravating
circumstances, when in truth his intention was merely to admit that he committed
the act charged in the complaint without an understanding of the aggravating
circumstances. It is highly unreasonable to assume that an accused, untutored in
the ways of the judicial system, would fully comprehend the allegation that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation attended the
commission of the crimes inasmuch as treachery is a highly technical term the
juridical meaning of which is beyond the understanding not only of the illiterates but
even those who, being educated, are not lawyers.
Criminal Law; Treachery;  Two conditions to sustain a finding of treachery.—To
sustain a finding of treachery, two (2) conditions must be established: (a) the
means, method and form of execution employed by the
_______________

 EN BANC.
*

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VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 269
People vs. Gutierrez
accused gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and,
(b) such means, method or form of execution was deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused to eliminate or diminish the risk to his person from any
defense which the party attacked might offer. Treachery may not simply be
deduced from presumptions as it is necessary that its elements be fully established
as the crime itself.
Same;  Same; Absent any particulars as to the manner with which the
aggression was commenced, or how the act that resulted in the death of the victim
unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.—In the instant case, however, we are
not prepared to rule that treachery attended the killing of Lorelie de la Cruz. As
borne out by the records, prosecution witness Venus Ramos did not actually see
how the stabbing began, how it developed, and how the unfortunate victim
succumbed to death on the second floor of the ancestral house. Venus witnessed
only a portion of the assault, so that she would be unable to paint an accurate
picture of the killing. We have consistently ruled that absent any particulars as to
the manner with which the aggression was commenced, or how the act that
resulted in the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated. Thus,
no matter how truthful the suppositions offered by Venus appear, they do not, as
they cannot produce the effect of aggravating the liability of the accused.
 Same;  Same; Where the meeting between the accused and the victim was
casual and the attack was done impulsively or devoid of any plan, there can be no
treachery even if the attack was sudden and unexpected.—Treachery likewise was
not attendant in the killing of Rializa. The attendant circumstances indicate that the
attack on Rializa was the result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than of a
deliberate, conscious and willful act. We have ruled in a catena of cases that where
the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was
done impulsively or devoid of any plan, there can be no treachery even if the attack
was sudden and unexpected. In treachery, the mode of attack must not spring from
the unexpected turn of events but must have been deliberately thought of by the
offender.

AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,

Bulacan, Br. 11.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
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270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gutierrez

BELLOSILLO, J.:

VENUS RAMOS went to see her sister Analiza de la Cruz in her house in the
family compound at Tibag, Baliuag, Bulacan, on 20 June 1999. Venus’ other
sister, Lorelie de la Cruz, lived next door with their cousin, accused Manuel
Gutierrez, in the family’s two (2)-storey ancestral home. At around 2:30 in
the afternoon while Venus was watching television she heard some noise
coming from the second floor of the old family home. She rushed there but
was immediately greeted upstairs with a gruesome scenario. Her sister
Lorelie was being stabbed mercilessly from behind by their cousin Manuel
Gutierrez. Terrified, Venus retreated and dashed downstairs where she met
her sister Analiza. Upon learning of the incident, Analiza rushed back to her
house next door. Venus ran towards the gate of the compound in an effort to
seek help from the neighbors. When she looked back she chanced upon the
accused also stabbing her cousin Rializa Trabel. The accused next turned his
ire on Rializa’s mother, Lilian Trabel, whom he struck on the ear with a
kitchen knife although the latter was able to evade further harm by seeking
refuge inside her house. Lilian survived the attack, but Rializa and Lorelie
died even before they could receive medical attention.
Accused Manuel Gutierrez was arrested a few hours after the carnage and
was accordingly charged with double murder for the death of Lorelie dela
Cruz and Rializa Trabel and with attempted murder for the wounding of Lilian
Trabel.
The accused initially entered a plea of “Not Guilty” but after the
prosecution had presented its first witness, he changed his plea to “Guilty.”
Before accepting his plea of guilt, the trial court inquired whether he
understood fully the meaning of his plea of guilt and the consequences
thereof. After convincing the court that he understood his plea of guilt and its
consequences, the accused maintained his plea of guilt explaining that he
desperately wanted to give his relatives serenity and peace of mind. Thus
the trial court continued with the reception of the evidence for the
prosecution to determine the proper imposable penalty.
Lilian Trabel narrated in between sobs how her daughter Rializa was
stabbed to death by the accused Manuel Gutierrez. She
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VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 271
People vs. Gutierrez
said that Rializa was roused from her sleep upon hearing some noise from a
neighbor’s house and then darted through her main door. She followed
Rializa but as they were about to step out of the house they were met by the
accused who was already in a belligerent mood. Without saying a word the
accused suddenly stabbed Rializa who could only shout “Jojo,
huwag!” Thereupon, the accused turned his wrath on her and stabbed her on
the head with a kitchen knife. Then she ran back to her house and locked the
door for safety. Once inside, she kept calling out for her daughter Rializa but
she did not get any response.
Thereafter, accused Manuel Gutierrez was convicted of two (2) counts of
murder and one (1) count of serious physical injuries. The court a
quo appreciated the presence of treachery as Lorelie was assaulted from
behind with the accused holding on to her hair. Considering that the assault
happened within the victim’s own house, the trial court opined that there
was every reason to believe that it was sudden and unexpected. Treachery
was likewise found to have attended the killing of Rializa since it was made
upon an unsuspecting victim who did not have any opportunity to defend
herself or to avoid the attack. On the other hand, for the assault on Lilian
Trabel, the trial court held the accused liable only for serious physical injuries
as her wounds required only a month to heal. 1

Consequently, the accused was sentenced twice to suffer the penalty of

death for the killing of Lorelie dela Cruz and Rializa Trabel, and to an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum
to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correctional as maximum for
the attack upon Lilian Trabel resulting in serious physical injuries. The
accused was further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Lorelie dela Cruz and
Rializa Trabel P100,000.00 and Lilian Trabel P5,000.00 as actual damages.
These cases were elevated to us on automatic review in view of the
penalty of death imposed twice upon the accused by the court a quo.
_______________

 Decision penned by Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr., RTC-Br. 11, Malolos, Bulacan; Rollo, pp. 13-17.
1

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272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 People vs. Gutierrez
The accused does not deny his guilt. He faults the trial court for appreciating
the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of Lorelie and Rializa.
He insists that insofar as the stabbing of Lorelie is concerned, Venus Ramos
admittedly did not witness the commencement of the attack thus defeating
the prosecution’s bid to establish treachery as an aggravating circumstance.
The accused also argues that treachery cannot be appreciated in the killing
of Rializa as the evidence shows that the assault upon her was thought of
only seconds after the killing frenzy.
On the part of the government, the Solicitor General asserts that a plea of
guilt amounts to a judicial confession of all the material facts alleged in
the Information, and by pleading guilty to the charges alleged in
the Information, the accused admits not only the commission of the crime
but also the attendant aggravating circumstances alleged therein. Thus, the
accused cannot now be heard to complain that the trial court wrongly
appreciated treachery in convicting him of two (2) counts of murder.
The Solicitor General’s argument is already passe. We are reminded
of People v. Derilo  where after enumerating the perils posed by the rule
2

equating a guilty plea with an admission of all the aggravating circumstances

alleged in the Information, we categorically stated that a formal plea of guilt
was insufficient to sustain a conviction of the aggravated crime charged in
the Information. We ratiocinated that it happens not infrequently that upon
arraignment the accused pleads guilty to the commission of an offense
qualified by aggravating circumstances, when in truth his intention was
merely to admit that he committed the act charged in the complaint without
an understanding of the aggravating circumstances. It is highly unreasonable
to assume that an accused, untutored in the ways of the judicial system,
would fully comprehend the allegation that the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes
inasmuch as treachery is a highly technical term the juridical meaning of
which is beyond the understanding not only of the illiterates but even those
who, being educated, are not lawyers. 3

_______________

 338 Phil. 350; 271 SCRA 633 (1997).

2

 Id., citing People v. Gungab, 64 Phil. 779 (1937).

3

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VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 273
People vs. Gutierrez
Too, it should no longer be assumed that the profession of guilt includes an
admission of the attending circumstances alleged in
the Information considering that Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court
mandates the presentation of evidence in capital offenses where the accused
has entered a plea of guilty. This rule would be rendered nugatory if we were
to determine the liability of the accused for an aggravated crime based on
the dubious strength of a presumptive rule. Thus, although the accused
herein pleaded guilty to the charges alleged in the three (3)
separate Informations, treachery may not be taken against him if the
evidence presented by the prosecution failed to adequately establish its
existence. Hence, the primordial issue to be resolved now is whether the
assaults perpetrated by the accused were attended with treachery.
To sustain a finding of treachery, two (2) conditions must be established:
(a) the means, method and form of execution employed by the accused gave
the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, (b) such
means, method or form of execution was deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused to eliminate or diminish the risk to his person from
any defense which the party attacked might offer.  Treachery may not simply
4

be deduced from presumptions as it is necessary that its elements be fully

established as the crime itself.
In the instant case, however, we are not prepared to rule that treachery
attended the killing of Lorelie de la Cruz. As borne out by the records,
prosecution witness Venus Ramos did not actually see how the stabbing
began, how it developed, and how the unfortunate victim succumbed to
death on the second floor of the ancestral house. Venus witnessed only a
portion of the assault, so that she would be unable to paint an accurate
picture of the killing. We have consistently ruled that absent any particulars
as to the manner with which the aggression was commenced, or how the act
that
_______________

4
 People v. Coscos, G.R. No. 132321, 21 January 2002, 374 SCRA 138; People v. Kinok, G.R. No.
104629, 13 November 2001, 368 SCRA 510; People v. Dumayan, G.R. No. 116280, 21 May
2001, 358 SCRA 26; People v. Magsayac, G.R. No. 126043, 19 April 2000, 330 SCRA 767; People
v. Tadeje, G.R. No. 123143, 19 July 1999, 310 SCRA 426; People v. Serzo, Jr., G.R. No. 118435, 20
June 1997, 274 SCRA 553; People v. Iligan, G.R. No. 75369, 26 November 1990, 191 SCRA 643.
274
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gutierrez
resulted in the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be
appreciated.  Thus, no matter how truthful the suppositions offered by Venus
5

appear, they do not, as they cannot produce the effect of aggravating the
liability of the accused.
Treachery likewise was not attendant in the killing of Rializa. The
attendant circumstances indicate that the attack on Rializa was the result of
a rash and impetuous impulse rather than of a deliberate, conscious and
willful act. We have ruled in a catena of cases that where the meeting
between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was done
impulsively or devoid of any plan, there can be no treachery even if the
attack was sudden and unexpected. In treachery, the mode of attack must
not spring from the unexpected turn of events but must have been
deliberately thought of by the offender. 6

As the meeting between the accused and Rializa was purely accidental,
and in the absence of proof of any evil motive, it becomes obvious that the
accused had no opportunity to plan the killing, much less map the strategy
with which to implement it. No evidence on record supports the theory that
he had previously decided to kill Rializa. There is even no proof that he
purposely sought her out, much less that he had even any motive
aforethought preceding the perpetration of the crime.
We likewise take exception to the view of the trial court denominating the
assault upon Lilian Trabel as serious physical injuries
_______________

5
 People v. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, 21 November 2001, 370 SCRA 123; People v. Bantiling, G.R.
No. 136017, 15 November 2001, 369 SCRA 47; People v. Bautista, G.R. Nos. 96618-19, 11 August
1999, 312 SCRA 214; People v. Mantung, G.R. No. 130372, 20 July 1999, 310 SCRA 819; People v.
Borreros, G.R. No. 125185, 5 May 1999, 306 SCRA 680; People v. Bahenting, G.R. No. 127659, 24
February 1999, 303 SCRA 558; People v. Patamana, G.R. No. 107938, 4 December 1995, 250
SCRA 603; People v. Misoln, 87 Phil. 826 (1950).
6
 People v. Santillana, G.R. No. 127815, 9 June 1999, 308 SCRA 104; People v. Tavas, G.R. No.
123969, 11 February 1999, 303 SCRA 86; People v. Belga, G.R. Nos. 94376-77, 11 July 1996, 258
SCRA 583; People v. Malazzab, G.R. No. 39136, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 123; People v.
Abalos, 84 Phil. 771 (1949); People v. Calinawan, 83 Phil. 647 (1949); US v. Namit, 38 Phil.
926 (1918).
275
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 275
People vs. Gutierrez
for the reason that the medical certificate estimated the healing period of
one (1) month for her wounds. Article 265 of The Revised Penal Code, in
relation to par. (4), Art. 263 thereof, provides that where the incapacity of
the victim or his required medical attendance is from ten (10) to thirty (30)
days the offense would be less serious physical injuries, and if for more than
thirty (30) days, it would be serious physical injuries. 7

Article 13 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that when the law speaks of
months it shall be understood that they are of thirty (30) days. Applied in the
present case, the one (1) month healing period provided in Lilian’s medical
certificate should thus be interpreted as referring to thirty (30) days of
incapacity. The liability therefore of the accused for the wounding of Lilian
Trabel should fall under Art. 265 of The Revised Penal Code for less serious
physical injuries, and not under par. (4), Art. 263, of the aforesaid law.
Treachery should not also aggravate the liability of the accused as the
attack upon Lilian, similarly to that of her daughter Rializa, was devoid of any
predetermination.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attendant to the
assault, and taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty for the crime of less serious physical injuries should be taken
from arresto menor in any of its periods, which is from one (1) day to thirty
(30) days, as minimum, and arresto mayor medium, which is two (2) months
and one (1) day to four (4) months, as maximum, or a straight penalty of two
(2) months will suffice.
_______________
 7
 Art. 263. Serious physical injuries.—Any person who shall wound, beat or assault another,
shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer: x x x x 4. The penalty  of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correctional in its minimum period, if the physical
injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for
more than thirty days.
Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries.—Any person who shall inflict upon another physical
injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended party
for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be
guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor x x x x
276
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gutierrez
In light of our finding that treachery did not qualify the killings of Lorelie and
Rializa to murder, the accused could only be held liable for homicide. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in both assaults, the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term imposable upon the
accused for each killing should be within the range of prision mayor or from
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and the maximum should
be within the range of reclusion temporal medium or from fourteen (14)
years eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months.
We see no need to modify the civil indemnity of the accused. Apart from
the award of civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00, or
P50,000.00 each for the heirs of Lorelie dela Cruz and Rializa Trabel, each
set of heirs is likewise entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00.  We delete however the award of actual damages to Lilian
8

Trabel as no competent proof was presented in support thereof. 9

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accordingly,

accused Manuel Gutierrez is found guilty instead of two (2) counts of
homicide for the death of Lorelie dela Cruz and Rializa Trabel and is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months
and twenty (20) days of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium,
as maximum, for each of the killings. For the assault upon Lilian Trabel, the
accused Manuel Gutierrez is found guilty of less serious physical injuries and
is sentenced to a straight prison term of two (2) months.
_______________

8
 People v. Alba, G.R. No. 130523, 29 January 2002, 375 SCRA 69; People v. Bulan, et al., G.R.
No. 133224, 25 January 2002, 374 SCRA 618; People v. Costales, G.R. Nos. 141154-56, 15
January 2002, 373 SCRA 269; People v. Cañares, G.R. No. 132743, 22 November 2001, 370 SCRA
241; People v. Caboquin, G.R. No. 137613, 14 November 2001, 368 SCRA 654.
9
 People v. Lab-eo, G.R. No. 133438, 16 January 2002, 373 SCRA 461; People v. Dianos, G.R.
No. 119311, 7 October 1998, 297 SCRA 19; People v. Obello, 348 Phil. 82; 297 SCRA 191 (1998).
277
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 277
People vs. Dawaton
Accused Manuel Gutierrez is further ordered to pay the heirs of Lorelie dela
Cruz and Rializa Trabel P50,000.00 each as death indemnity, and another
P50,000.00 each for moral damages, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, 
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and C
allejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Judgment modified.
Note.—The presence of treachery may not be simply assumed from the
mere fact that the fatal wounds were found at the back of the deceased.
(People vs. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680 [1999])

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