Spec Pro MT Cases (Longer)

Rule 63
2012-2016
 As their petition would disclose, private respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on
remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They,
however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental
action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no
particular, real or imminent threat to any of them.
 In the same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for
declaratory relief, decisions of quasi judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a petition for
declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on
questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court. In
view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter
for a petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial powers or functions
Rule 65
2013
 The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered
by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more
than 30 days. In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.
 There are two instances where a decision, resolution or order of the Ombudsman arising
from an administrative case becomes final and unappealable: (1) where the respondent is
absolved of the charge; and (2) in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary. In the same vein, while petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a
special civil action for certiorari (not Rule 43 as argued) before the Court of Appeals, petitioner
failed to show grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the
petition must fail. There is no showing that the assailed Decision is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The Office of the Ombudsman’s Decision exonerating respondents from the
administrative charges discussed at length and resolved all issues raised by petitioner
 Stronghold made no claim that LTFRB lacked jurisdiction to implement the Program or to issue
the References for each round of bidding to set the parameters for the accreditation of insurance
providers. Rather, it rested its case on the theory that LTFRB acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when LTFRB required in the Third Reference a
minimum capital requirement on a "per insurer" basis. In the first place, the standard under Rule
65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is "grave abuse of discretion" and not mere
"abuse of discretion." Further, LTFRB committed no abuse of discretion, much less a
grave one, in disqualifying Stronghold from the third round of bidding. The Third
Reference, which screens providers of accident insurance for passengers of public utility vehicles
mandated by law, is simply the result of LTFRB’s proper exercise of its power under its charter to
"formulate, promulgate, administer, implement and enforce rules and regulations on land
transportation public utilities."
 For purposes of appeal, the Decision of the Court of Appeals was a final judgment as it denied
due course to, and dismissed, the petition. Thus, petitioner should have filed an appeal by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in this Court.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

Second, even assuming that a petition for certiorari is the correct remedy in this case, petitioner
failed to comply with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. Petitioner essentially
questioned the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Petitioner cannot properly do
that in a petition for certiorari. For petitioner to question the identical findings of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC is to raise a question of fact. However, it is settled that questions of fact cannot be
raised in an original action for certiorari.
 The trial court’s July 13, 2006 Resolution dismissing the case was indeed to be treated as a final
order, disposing of the issue of publication and notice of the foreclosure sale – which is the very
core of petitioner’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 5535 – and declaring the same to be
unnecessary pursuant to the Rural Banks Act, as petitioner’s outstanding obligation did not
exceed P10,000.00, and thus leaving petitioner without basis to maintain her case. This
constitutes a dismissal with the character of finality. As such, petitioner should have availed of the
remedy under Rule 41, and not Rule 65. Besides, if petitioner insists that no foreclosure
proceedings took place, then she should not have filed an action to annul the same since there
was no foreclosure to begin with. She should have filed a different action.
 In view of the foregoing, despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, as amended
by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC - which now disallows an extension of the 60-day reglementary period to
file a petition for certiorari - courts may nevertheless extend the same, subject to its sound
discretion. In this case, (illegal dismissal flight attendants) the CA had already exercised its
sound discretion in granting the extension to file the subject petition thru its Resolution.
Consequently, it could not renege on such grant by rendering another issuance almost seven
months later which resulted in the refusal to admit the same petition. Such course of action is
clearly antithetical to the tenets of fair play, not to mention the undue prejudice to petitioners·'
rights.
 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC
while A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 merely provide for the venue where an action
may be filed. Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect. At most, the error committed by the petitioners
in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue
 The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly involve an
environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken
notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of
the writ of continuing mandamus. A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the
court’s decision."
 The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case
with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No.
7942. The petition filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are
the alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation; the authority of
the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived
indifference of the DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these
matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but
requires an exercise of judicial function. Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely
useless and unnecessary.
 The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach
judicial affidavits. Rule 8 only requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting
evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is
nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if
the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the time
that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached
to the petition/complaint. Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not
a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed.

 Petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was still in its
initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM
issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor
or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the
salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature since there are
still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM. Section 1,
Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: "[a]n aggrieved party may
appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report,
memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and
Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit." From the final order
or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission proper. It is the
decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.
 However, the CA could not excuse his failure to move for reconsideration of the issuance of the
Order of Implementation prior to the filing of the petition for certiorari before it. On the other hand,
petitioner insists that he has filed a motion for reconsideration not once, but twice. The CA is
correct on this point. It is clear that upon receipt of a copy of the Order of Implementation dated
31 March 2004, petitioner immediately filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA
three days later. The motions for reconsideration that petitioner referred to were filed by him in
connection with the Resolution dated 14 March 1995 recommending his dismissal from service.
There are well-settled exceptions to the general rule that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
However, none of them finds application in this case.
 Here, PNB did not at all allege to which of the above-mentioned exceptions this case falls.
Neither did it present any plausible justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior
Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC. Despite this, the CA still took cognizance of PNB’s
Petition for Certiorari and ignored this significant flaw. It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion
for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure. It is a jurisdictional and mandatory
requirement which must be strictly complied with. Thus, PNB’s "failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration with the NLRC before availing of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal
infirmity." In view thereof, the CA erred in entertaining the Petition for Certiorari filed before it. It
follows, therefore, that the proceedings before it and its assailed Decision are considered null and
void.
 The Court finds that the CTA did not gravely abuse its discretion when it granted KCTMPC’s
motion to release since there lies cogent legal bases to support its conclusion that the subject
goods were merely "regulated" and not "prohibited" commodities. It is a standing jurisprudential
rule that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In order to be qualified as "grave," the abuse of
discretion must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. Finding that this
characterization does not fit the CTA’s exercise of discretion in this case, the Court holds that no
grave abuse of discretion attended its grant of KCTMPC’s motion to release.
 Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the
acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had
already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by
the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer
appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait
accompli.
 Furthermore, the Court ruled that the petition should have been filed with the CA pursuant to the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction,
however, does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to
file a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important
reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court.

 The trial court amply gave respondent sufficient notice and opportunity to attend the pre-trial
conference, but despite this, it neglected its duty to prosecute its case and attend the scheduled
pre-trial hearings. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for dismissing the case. In finding that
the dismissal by the trial court is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the CA committed
reversible error. The rule is clear enough that an order of dismissal based on failure to appear at
pre-trial is with prejudice, unless the order itself states otherwise. It should be considered as
adjudication on the merits of the case, where the proper remedy is an appeal under Rule 41.
Regrettably, the respondent chose the wrong mode of judicial review. In not dismissing the
petition for certiorari outright, and in not ruling that such remedy is the wrong mode of judicial
review, the CA committed grave and reversible error. In view, however, of the huge amount of tax
collectibles involved. and considering that taxes are the "lifeblood of the government:" the
dismissal of the case should be without prejudice.
 In view of the foregoing, the Court finds BPI’s petition to be improper – and hence, dismissible–
as the issues raised therein involve questions of fact which are beyond the ambit of a Rule 45
petition for review. To elucidate, the determination of whether or not due regard was given to the
interests of BPI as a secured creditor in the approved rehabilitation plan partakes of a question of
fact since it will require a review of the sufficiency and weight of evidence presented by the
parties – among others, the various financial documents and data showing Sarabia’s capacity to
pay and BPI’s perceived cost of money – and not merely an application of law.
 Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant petition for
review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the
part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do
so, considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a cross-claim
against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which
is not set up shall be barred.
 More importantly, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court was
already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed CA Decision final
and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are
already precluded from participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause
by filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in their
previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.
 Applying these principles to the case at bar, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
COA in fixing the reckoning point of the period of disallowance at May 3, 2000, since records are
bereft of any showing that it had any knowledge of Labrador’s prior dismissal on May 2, 1997. To
hold otherwise would be simply antithetical to the concept of grave abuse of discretion, much less
countenance a speculative endeavor
 Respondent had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the injunction
(transfer of office) prayed for by petitioner should not be granted. However, the RTC granted the
injunction. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and presented the same
arguments which were already passed upon by the RTC. The RTC already had the opportunity to
consider and rule on the question of the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the injunction.
We found no reversible error committed by the CA for relaxing the rule since respondent's case
falls within the exceptions
 As accurately depicted by the OSG, to compel the issuance of a Notice of Award is tantamount
to a prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Neither can mandamus be issued unless a
clear right of the bidder is shown. Mandamus does not lie if the right is doubtful. Here, as
discussed, Dong-A Consortium has no right to receive the award, since it failed to match the
indicative price. Petitioner cannot be compelled to accept the bid of Dong-A Consortium since this
forced consent treads on the government’s freedom to contract
 The Assistant City Prosecutor then recommended the dismissal of the comlpaint, contending that
the respondents failed to show REGASCO was engaged in selling petitioner’s products or that it
imitated and reproduced the registered trademarks of the petitioners. On appeal, the DOJ
Secretary affirmed the prosecutor’s dismissal. Dispensing with the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, respondents sought recourse to the CA through a petition for certiorari, which
was granted. In the present case, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may already be

dispensed with considering that the questions raised in this petition are the same as those that
have already been squarely argued and passed upon by the Secretary of Justice in her assailed
resolution.
 This Court can very well dismiss the instant petition on account of it being the wrong remedy.
Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by this Court, not via an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45, as is the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64
in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (retirement benefits overpayment case)
 To begin with, the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent.
Well settled is the rule that the special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail
the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying a
motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case
and still leaves something to be done by the court before a case is finally decided on the merits.
Therefore, "the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.”
Even assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying respondent’s motion to dismiss. It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued the
questioned orders as respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed SIX YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS
AFTER SHE FILED HER AMENDED ANSWER.
 It is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the
simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary. In other
words, the collection case can proceed and the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by
respondent only, even without impleading the estate of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of
Manuel is not an indispensable party to petitioner’s complaint for sum of money.
 Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.
 In reviewing the legal correctness of a CA decision rendered under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
the Court examines the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, and not strictly
on the basis of whether the NLRC decision under review is intrinsically correct. In other words,
the Court has to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on
appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. The Court cannot touch on factual questions
"except in the course of determining whether the CA correctly ruled in determining whether or not
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in considering and appreciating the factual issues
before it."
 By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. When the OSG filed its notice of appeal
under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result, the running of the period for filing
of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not tolled.
 On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to
first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into
the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No.
6981 also operates as an acquittal. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not
by the trial court. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in
his case. As such, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of
Ampatuan, Jr., but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-
request. Considering that the Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus
was no longer available as Ampatuan Jr.'s recourse.
 Since the imputation of bias to the Office of the Ombudsman is without support, this Petition for
certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a
temporary restraining order, fails.
 In any event, the OSG correctly argues that a Rule 65 petition is an inappropriate remedy to
question the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to quash an information and, its imposition of

suspension pendente lite. The remedy still available to Tigaz is not the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari, but the continuance of the case in due course.
 In the case at bench, the proper recourse of NLC was to have filed a motion for reconsideration of
the June 22, 2010 Order of the RTC denying its application for injunctive relief. Only after the
denial of such motion can it be deemed to have exhausted all available remedies and be justified
in elevating the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. From this provision,
it is apparent that Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a
petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the
freeze order over their properties.
 Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to Ligot, et al, a review of their petition
shows that the issues they raise (i.e., existence of probable cause to support the freeze order; the
applicability of the 6-month limit to the extension of freeze orders embodied in the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of judgment allegedly committed by the
CA, which fall outside the Court’s limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions.
2014
 The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition
to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. However, said rule is subject to several
recognized exceptions. The NLRC issued a ruling on February 10, 2011 in favor of petitioner
dismissing respondent’s appeal on the ground that the latter failed to file an appeal bond.
However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the NLRC completely reversed
itself and set aside its earlier resolution dismissing the appeal. The NLRC had more than enough
opportunity to pass upon the issues raised by both parties on appeal of the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter and the subsequent motion for reconsideration of its resolution disposing the appeal.
Thus, another motion for reconsideration would have been useless under the circumstances
since the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and
passed upon by the NLRC
 There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as
they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or
order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case,
petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
 On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of
the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order
in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the
CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these
cases.
 Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must
have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction
over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to
transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate
jurisdiction.
 It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the
expiration of the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there
would no longer be any period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become
final and executory. Additionally, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant invoking
liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the rules. Here, the reason
offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private respondent’s
counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and
again, we have held that the excuse of "heavy workload is relative and often self-serving.
Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule." Thus, private
respondent’s motion for extension should have been denied outright.

 In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of
certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary
to the RTC’s ruling
 The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the
assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. An interlocutory order deals with
preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The
assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and
the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is
because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the
ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to
revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings
 An order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari as the
defendant still has an adequate remedy before the trial court – i.e., to file an answer and to
subsequently appeal the case if he loses the case. As exceptions, the defendant may avail of a
petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant or over the subject matter.
 Furthermore, Ting Guan’s failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over its person in the first
motion to dismiss is fatal to its cause. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the RTC when it
filed a motion to dismiss and a "supplemental motion to dismiss" without raising the RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction over its person. The Court categorically stated that the defendant should raise the
affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person in the very first motion to dismiss.
 (Killing of vice mayor) In the instant case, the Order of RTC was received by private complainants
on 14 October 2010. Then the Petition for Certiorari was filed one day after the 60-day
reglementary period for filing the Petition for Certiorari, in violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure since the letter evidencing that the OSG received the documents
erroneously stated that the deadline for filing was 14 December 2010, instead of 13 December
2010. However, looking back at the records, since private complainants had to transmit
documents to the OSG. It clearly shows that they were able to do so promptly. While the OSG
committed glaring errors, Court deems it unjust to penalize private complainants for the
OSG’s carelessness. It is important to point out that private complainants quickly informed the
OSG of the oversight, when the private prosecutors noticed on Page 39 of the petition under the
"Copy furnished:" portion that the names of the private respondents Vicente Espinosa and
Lindsey Buenavista were not among the list of parties who were furnished with copies of the
petition as required by Rule 65.
 Regarding final money judgment against the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, the legal remedy is to seek relief with the COA pursuant to Supreme Court
Administrative Circular. This authority and power can still be exercised by the COA even if a
court’s decision in a case has already become final and executory. In other words, the COA still
retains its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after the issuance of a writ of execution.
(just compensation case Puerto Princesa)
 Bancommerce had to forego the filing of the required motion for reconsideration of the assailed
RTC Order because a) there was an urgent necessity for the CA to resolve the questions it raised
and any further delay would prejudice its interests; b) under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would have been useless; c) Bancommerce had been deprived of its right to due
process when the RTC issued the challenged order ex parte, depriving it of an opportunity to
object; and d) the issues raised were purely of law.
 The OSG contends that the reckoning point should be from the date the Department of Justice or
the court gave it notice of the order of dismissal since, the OSG alone has the authority to
represent the People before the CA. But such a proposition is unfair. There is no reason for the
RTC to serve copy of its judgments or final orders upon the OSG since it does not enter its
appearance in criminal cases before it. In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG
before the CA, the public prosecutor's duty, if he believes that a matter should be brought by
special civil action before an appellate court, is to promptly communicate the facts and his
recommendation to the OSG, advising it of the last day for filing such an action. There is no

reason the OSG cannot file the petition since the People is given sixty days from notice to the
public prosecutor within which to file such an action before the CA or this Court
 Undoubtedly, applying the aforementioned precepts and pronouncements to the instant case, the
writ of prohibition issued by the Manila RTC in order to restrain acts beyond the bounds of the
territorial limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is null and void.
 (PLDT Case)The Petition for Certiorari should have been filed within 60 days from notice of the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order. Furthermore, in the absence of a
motion for reconsideration, the Petition for Certiorari should have been dismissed. Jurisprudence
consistently holds that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the institution
of a petition for certiorari. Although this rule is subject to certain exceptions, none of which is
present in this case.
 In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case and the person of
the petitioners. Its denial of the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on its
assessment that the evidence sought to be suppressed/excluded is admissible, was also done in
the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. As such, any perceived error in its interpretation of the
law and its assessment of evidence is correctible by appeal, not certiorari, as the same would
only be considered an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It also did not escape our
attention that from the RTC, petitioners made a direct recourse to this Court thereby violating the
principle of hierarchy of courts.
 The appellate court acted within its sound discretion when it re-evaluated the NLRC’s factual
findings (reversed NLRC affirmed LA)and substituted the latter’s own judgment. It is settled that
under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA,
pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, is specifically given
the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.
 It has the power and authority to rule upon the prayer for preliminary injuction. The allegation of
Villarosa that it must be the First Division who must decide on the matter is a result of his own
confusion. In the case at bar, the First Division is the same as the Special Division he is
referring to. What transpired is just a change of name of the First Division to a “special” division
by reason of a temporary vacancy of the positions in the first divisions. Decisions of Comelec
divisions must first be reviewed by Comelec en banc before resort to certiorari to the Supreme
Court may be made. This means that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the
Comelec en banc.
 A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing exceptions was
applicable herein (transfer of Municipal Civil Registrar). Hence, Causing should have filed the
motion for reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure that precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in election offense cases.
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
 Atty. Borromeo never filed a formal withdrawal of appearance prior thereto, conformably with
Section 26 Rule 138 of the Rules. For his failure to observe the proper legal formalities, Atty.
Borromeo remained as Sarmiento’s counsel on record. Fundamental is the rule that until a
counsel’s dismissal or withdrawal is formally made, any court record sent to him binds the client,
despite an internal arrangement between them terminating their professional relationship, as in
this case.
 After receiving on February 25, 2013 a copy of the CA decision, 680 Home filed neither a motion
for reconsideration thereof nor an appeal therefrom. Instead, it waited 58 days after receiving the
assailed decision on April 24, 2013 to institute a certiorari proceeding. Although the petition was
filed within the 60-day period to institute a certiorari proceeding, the long delay negates 680
Home’s claimed urgency of its cause and indicates that it resorted to the present petition for
certiorari as a substitute for its lost appeal.
 In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement
and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible
guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives in the challenged
EO.
 The CA fell into a trap when it ruled that a mayor, an officer from the executive department,
exercises an executive function whenever he issues an Executive Order. This is tad too

presumptive for it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board,
or body which performs it, that determines whether or not a particular act is a discharge of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The first requirement for certiorari is satisfied if the officers
act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character. The assailed EO 10
was issued upon the [mayor’s] finding that Boracay West Cove’s construction, expansion, and
operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the respondent
mayor’s exercise of quasi-judicial functions, against which the special writ of certiorari may lie.
While it may be argued that, under the LGC, Executive Orders issued by mayors are subject to
review by provincial governors, this cannot be considered as an adequate remedy given the
exigencies of petitioner’s predicament.
 In the instant case, the Court cannot but agree with petitioner Republic that this case falls within
the abovementioned exceptions. The questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same
as those already raised and passed upon in the lower court; hence, filing a motion for
reconsideration would be useless and serve no practical purpose. (National Irrigation case-just
compensation)
 The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions,
orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, the petitioners opted for the
wrong mode of appeal.
 In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its
findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence. The onus probandi falls on
the seafarer to establish his claim for disability benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence to
justify the grant of relief. The Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in granting Hipe’s
certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint
for permanent disability benefits for Hipe’s failure to establish his claim through substantial
evidence.
 Jurisdiction over the issue of the constitutionality of the OWWA Omnibus Policies is a question
of law, as issuance was done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative functions
within the confines of the granting law. Hence, contrary to the lower court’s contention, certiorari
under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy in the instant case. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction over
the controversy and it was erroneous for it to dismiss the complaint outright.
 From the denial of the BOI Board of Commissioners’ motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved
party has three options: (a) he may file an appeal directly to the CA via Rule 43 provided that he
shows that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b) absent any of the
exceptions, he may exhaust the available administrative remedies within the executive
machinery, namely, an appeal to the Secretary of Justice and then to the OP, and thereafter,
appeal the OP’s decisions via Rule 43; or (c) he may directly resort to certiorari before the CA
strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why any of the aforementioned
remedies cannot be taken as “adequate and speedy.”
 Martinez still had a motion for reconsideration pending resolution when he filed a petition for
mandamus. Absent any showing that any of the recognized exceptions obtain to the rule requiring
the filing of a motion for reconsideration prior to a petition for mandamus, Martinez may not be
allowed to do so. As acknowledged by Martinez through his signature on the Deputy Sheriff’s
Certificate of Delivery of Possession, the subject lots had already been delivered to him and his
co-parties. The Court held that the CA correctly opined that his remedy was to have Natalia
Realty cited for contempt.
 The Optical Media Board contends that the CA should have dismissed Rigor’s Petition for
Certiorari for being an improper remedy. Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary
cases of the OMB should be taken to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. It is settled that certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

2015
 In the case before us, the CA clearly ignored certain compelling facts and misread the evidence
on record by relying on the LA’s erroneous appreciation of facts. The NLRC acted well within its
jurisdiction in finding that Lumahan had not been dismissed. Otherwise stated, by reversing the
ruling that there was no dismissal to speak of, the CA committed a reversible error in finding
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. (illegal dismissal security guard)
 However, under exceptional cases, the Court has held that the 60-day period may be extended
subject to the court’s sound discretion. In this case, the RTC itself recognized the existence of a
law which mandated the transfer of ownership over the lot to CBSUA. In addition, records show
that CBSUA has, all the while, been in possession of the subject land. Thus, it would serve the
interest of substantial justice for the CA to rule upon the merits of this case rather than dismiss
the petition before it on a mere procedural technicality.
 Sifting through the issues and other matters raised in the present petition, it becomes apparent
that the crucial question calling for this Court's Resolution pertains to the CA's appreciation of the
issue and evidence presented by the parties, and not the alleged grave abuse of discretion
committed by the appellate court in rendering its Decision. Therefore, the issue in the present
controversy clearly falls under the classification of errors of fact and law - questions which may be
passed upon by this Court only via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Albeit it must
be made clear that questions of fact may only be reviewed by this Court under exceptional
circumstances like when the findings of facts of the CA are at variance with those of the trial
court, as in this case.
 The denial of a motion to dismiss generally cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari, as this remedy is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal which is
available only after a judgment or order on the merits has been rendered. Only when the denial
of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion can the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari be justified.
 The 60-day period for filing the petition for certiorari with the CA should be counted from the
receipt by the petitioner's counsel of a copy of the NLRC Decision on November 19, 2009. When
a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon
said attorney; and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is
not notice in law.
 It cannot be denied that the forfeiture case involving the subject TCTs was filed before the CFI-
Pasig while the complaint/petition for cancellation of lis pendens and quieting of title was filed
before the RTC-Branch 57. There is likewise no dispute that the CFI Pasig tried and decided the
forfeiture case. Therefore, it was the CFI-Pasig that had jurisdiction over the main action or
proceeding involving the subject TCTs, not the RTC-Branch 57. Hence, the RTC-Branch 57 had
no jurisdiction over the respondents’ complaint/petition. It is also to be noted that when the
respondents filed their motion to admit their amended and supplemental petition before RTC-
Branch 57, the decision in LRC Case No. M-5469 rendered by the RTC-Branch 138 had likewise
attained finality.
 Indeed, there is no law, rule or jurisprudence that mandates the automatic dismissal of a forfeiture
case after an acquittal in the criminal case for malversation. The CA itself recognized that it had
no bearing. In fact, it wrote that it was not within the thrust of a petition for certiorari. The remedy
of the respondents is to file the necessary motion or action before the court having jurisdiction
over the main case, if still permitted by the rules.
 Moreover, a finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is a finding of fact which is generally not
reviewable by this Court. Only when there is a clear case of grave abuse of discretion will this
Court interfere with the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman. As a general rule, the Court
does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of the existence or absence of probable
cause. As the Court is not a trier of facts, it reposes immense respect to the factual determination
and appreciation made by the Ombudsman
 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) which seeks to declare
the illegality and unconstitutionality of the Members ' Contribution for Capital Expenditures

(MCC), later renamed as Reinvestment Fund for Sustainable Capital Expenditures (RFSC), which
is being imposed by on-grid Electric Cooperatives (ECs ), pursuant to the Rules and Resolution of
the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) allowing for the same. Petitioners also did not
comply with the rule that “there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.” Since petitioners assail the validity of the ERC issuances and seeks to
declare them as unconstitutional, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules is the
appropriate remedy.
 Although not captioned as a "motion for reconsideration," Spouses Espinosa’s motion to stay
execution directly challenged the RTC’s order of execution pending appeal insofar as it allowed
the inclusion of the awards for moral and exemplary damages. Thus, when the RTC denied
Spouses Espinosa’s motion to stay execution, it was already the second time the trial court had
passed upon the issue of execution pending appeal. Both RTC orders dealt with the same issue,
i.e., the propriety of execution pending appeal. Under these circumstances, the filing of a motion
for reconsideration of the order denying the stay of execution pending appeal by Spouses
Espinosa could not be considered a plain and adequate remedy but a mere superfluity.
 However, a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to question the sheriff's actions. The
special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. lt is not available as a remedy for the correction of acts
performed by a sheriff during the execution process, which acts are neither judicial nor quasi-
judicial but arc purely ministerial functions. The more appropriate remedy would have been a
petition for prohibition filed under Section 2 of Rule 65.
 With the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the application for judicial
reconstitution, nothing more was left for the RTC to do in the case. The correct recourse for the
petitioner was to appeal to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of
the denial of its motion for reconsideration. (UP case)
 The petitioners were not candidates seeking for public office but are private individuals asserting
their fundamental right to expression; thus the case pertains not to the quasi-judicial power of
COMELEC but to its acts of implementing election laws. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC
in the implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and letter, the
COMELEC was allegedly enforcing election laws.
 Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has “full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . . filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
clearly and specifically raised in the petition.” In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents
prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of
others in future similar cases. The case before this court involves an active effort on the part of
the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a rare occasion when private
citizens actively engage the public in political discourse. cases of first impression warrant a direct
resort to this court. The time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was
filed during the 2013 election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future
cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution.
 As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is mandatory before the filing of a petition for
certiorari. Sen. Estrada, however, failed to present a compelling reason that the present Petition
falls under the exceptions. Evidently, when the Ombudsman gave Sen. Estrada copies of the
counter-affidavits and even waited for the lapse of the given period for the filing of his comment,
Sen. Estrada failed to avail of the opportunity to be heard due to his own fault. Thus, his failure
cannot in any way be construed as violation of due process by the Ombudsman, much less of
grave abuse of discretion. He has not filed any comment, and still chooses not to.
 The OSG correctly argued that the respondents, in their official capacities as Chairperson and
Members of the CHR, did not engage in judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They did not
adjudicate the rights and obligations of the contending parties but simply undertook to initiate the
investigation of the allegations against Quisumbing. It was at most, an exercise of fact-finding
investigation, which is entirely distinct and different from the concept of adjudication. The power
to initiate an investigation and to refer the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman is within the

power of the CHR as an entity with its own distinct personality and is recognized by no less than
the Constitution. Thus
2016
 Petitioner did not elevate the case to the Civil Service Commission proper. Instead, he filed a
special civil action for mandamus before the RTC. He invoked an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies: when the question is purely legal. He argued that because
the PARO II position did not require CES eligibility and was not declared to be a CES position,
respondent can be compelled through mandamus to change his status from temporary to
permanent. However, the dismissal of the petition for mandamus was warranted by the doctrine
because the issue raised by petitioner is not a purely legal question. Since doubt has risen (WON
position requires CES) as to the truth or falsity of the alleged fact, it cannot be said that the case
presents a purely legal question.
 In the present case, the respondents effectively argued that the terms of the RTC’s May 6, 2008
judgment are not clear enough such that the parties’ agreement must be examined to arrive at
the proper interpretation. The respondents, however, did not give the RTC an opportunity to
clarify its judgment. The respondents filed a special civil action for prohibition before the CA
without first filing a motion to stay or quash the writ of execution before the RTC. Hence, the
petition for prohibition obviously lacked the requirement that no "other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy" is available. Thus, the petition should have been dismissed.
 The recourse to the petition for prohibition did not amount to forum shopping.
The two cases filed collectively by the respondents are similar only in that they involve the same
parties. The cases, however, involve different causes of actions. The petition for review on
certiorari was filed to review the merits of the RTC's judgment. On the other hand, the petition
for prohibition respects the finality of the RTC's judgment on the merits but interprets the
dispositive portion in a way that would render the execution unnecessary. Thus, the elements of
forum shopping are not present in the two cases
2017
Rule 66
2017
 Since General merely holds an acting appointment, he clearly does not have a cause of action
to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and
its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. General, in a quo warranto
proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal
deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition
must fail.
2013
 De Castro likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as
rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. De Castro’s excuses are not special and
important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere
speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot
be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts.
2016

 The instant special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case. It cannot
be claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the
claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal
duties and not to try disputed title. There is likewise a final and executory resolution of the
COMELEC declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the
winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque.
Rule 67
2013
 However, the authority to resolve ownership should be taken in the proper context. The
discussion in Republic was anchored on the question of who among the respondents claiming
ownership of the property must be indemnified by the Government. Thus, such findings of
ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be construed as final and binding on the
parties. By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that
it is taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or
interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for
the taking.
 Considering the dismissal of the expropriation case for failure of the NPC to prosecute, it is as if
no expropriation suit was filed. Hence, pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, NPC is deemed “to
have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in
Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation.”
Nevertheless, just compensation for the property must be based on its value at the time of the
taking of said property, not at the time of the filing of the complaint. Consequently, the RTC
should have fixed the value of the property at the time NPC took possession of the same in 1990,
and not at the time of the filing of the complaint for compensation and damages in 1994 or its fair
market value in 1995. The RTC formed a panel of commissioners in determining the just
compensation of the property. Although this is not required considering the Court’s
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals, nonetheless, its constitution is not improper.
“The appointment was done mainly to aid the trial court in determining just compensation.
 In this case, the Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners substantially
complies with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It is immaterial that the RTC appointed a
committee instead of three persons to act as commissioners, since the PAC is composed of three
members – the Provincial Assessor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer.
Considering their positions, we find each member of the PAC competent to perform the duty
required of them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. The mere fact that they are
government officials does not disqualify them as disinterested persons, as the provincial
government has no significant interest in the case. If Napocor found the appointment of the PAC
to be objectionable, it should have filed its objections early on and not belatedly raise them in its
appeal with the CA.
 While the provisions of the Rules of Court apply to Special Agrarian Court (SAC) proceedings, it
is clear that, unlike in expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court, the appointment of a
commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of
one of the parties.
 In this case, we deem it proper to reckon petitioner’s cause of action to have accrued only upon
his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not at the time he was forcibly ejected from the
landholding in 1980. For as long as the intimidation and threats to petitioner’s life and limb

existed, petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of this juridical
tie. Since the threats and intimidation ended with Chioco’s death, petitioner’s obligation to file a
case to assert his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within the prescriptive
period commenced.
 The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but,
conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discon-tinuance of the
proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and equitable. In the present case,
[NAPOCOR] admits that the expropriation of the land in question is no longer necessary for public
use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the case should have been dismissed there.
It now appearing positively, by resolution of [NAPOCOR], that the expropriation is not necessary
for public use, the action should be dismissed even without a motion... The moment it appears
in whatever stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint
should be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or
litigation.
2014
 Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by the CA
was to determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and enjoyment of
the property when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the case was remanded to
the RTC for the purpose of computing the damages, the case was not considered a new case
where an amendment of the complaint may still be allowed.
2015
 No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant consequential
damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot of private
respondent suffers from impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be
awarded to private respondent
Rule 68
2013
 Act No. 3135 has no requirement for the determination of the mortgaged properties’ appraisal
value. Nothing in the law likewise indicates that the mortgagee-creditor’s appraisal value shall be
the basis for the bid price. Neither is there any rule nor any guideline prescribing the minimum
amount of bid, nor that the bid should be at least equal to the properties’ current appraised value.
What the law only provides are the requirements, procedure, venue and the mortgagor’s right to
redeem the property. When the law does not provide for the determination of the property’s
valuation, neither should the courts so require, for our duty limits us to the interpretation of the
law, not to its augmentation.
 Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the
satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) To waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an
ordinary claim;
(2) To foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and

(3) To rely on the mortgage exclusively (extrajudicial foreclosure), foreclosing the same at
anytime before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency
 In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties
previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the
third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim
against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified ,the probate court of the
outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently
restructuring the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-
judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to
recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
 As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon
filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province
where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No.4118.
 Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure is not a legal ground for
refusing the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession. A pending action for annulment of
mortgage or foreclosure (where the nullity of the loan documents and mortgage had been
alleged) does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession. It reiterated the well-established rule
that as a ministerial function of the court, the judge need not look into the validity of the mortgage
or the manner of its foreclosure, as these are the questions that should be properly decided by a
court of competent jurisdiction in the pending case filed before it. That the issuance of a writ of
possession remains a ministerial duty of the court until the issues raised in the civil case for
annulment of mortgage and/or foreclosure are decided by a court of competent jurisdiction has
long been settled
 There are exceptions to the rule that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function:
(1)Gross inadequacy of purchase price
(2)Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor
(3) Failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to mortgagor
 As correctly held by the RTC and upheld by the CA, the date "December 31, 1988" refers to the
last day when owners of foreclosed properties, like petitioners, could submit their payment
proposals to the bank. The letter was very clear. It was about the availment of the liberalized
payment scheme of the bank. Here, there is no estoppel to speak of. The letter does not show
that the Bank had unqualifiedly represented to the Hojases that it had extended the redemption
period to December 31, 1988. Thus, the Hojases have no basis in positing that the public sale
conducted on November 4, 1988 was null and void for having been prematurely conducted.
 In contrast, proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, as the name already
suggests, are not suits filed in a court. They are commenced not by the filing of a complaint, but
by submitting an application before an executive judge who, in turn, receives the same neither in
a judicial capacity nor on behalf of the court. Necessarily, the orders of the executive judge in
such proceedings, whether they be to allow or disallow the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage, are not issued in the exercise of a judicial function but, issued by the RTC
Executive Judge in the exercise of his administrative function to supervise the ministerial duty
of the Clerk of Court as Ex Officio Sheriff in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
 As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of
"special circumstances or compelling reasons."
 As a rule, a petition for the issuance of a writ possession may not be consolidated with any other
ordinary action. It is well-settled that a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex-parte,

summary and non-litigious by nature; which nature would be rendered nugatory if such petition
was to be consolidated with any other ordinary civil action. Even though Esteban filed his original
Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ Possession still within the redemption period, Espinoza
would nevertheless apply. Esteban’s subsequent filing of his Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession at a time that he was already absolute owner of the auctioned lots supplemented his
earlier Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ Possession—thus making his application for a writ
of possession similar to that in the Espinoza case.
 The ministerial duty of the trial court does not become discretionary upon the filing of a complaint
questioning the mortgage. Corollarily, any question regarding the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale and the resulting cancellation of the writ may, likewise, be determined in a
subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135.
 It cannot therefore be disputed that Centeno is a mere successor-in-interest of Sps. Centeno.
Consequently, he cannot be deemed as a "third party who is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor" under legal contemplation. Hence, the RTC had the ministerial
duty to issue – as it did issue – the said writ in the Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara’s favor.
 The alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of
Possession as this does not affect PNB’s right to possess the subject property.
 The remedy of a writ of possession, a remedy that is available to the mortgagee-purchaser to
acquire possession of the foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made available to a
subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and after determining that the subject property is
still in the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a third party
during the redemption period, a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without hearing. In other
words, if the purchaser is a third party who acquired the property after the redemption
period, a hearing must be conducted to determine whether possession over the subject
property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the possession of a third party holding
the same adversely to the defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is in the possession
of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of
possession is no longer available to such purchaser, but he can wrest possession over the
property through an ordinary action of ejectment.
2014
 Petitioners insist that respondents committed fraud when the officers of MFI were made to sign
the deed of real estate mortgage in blank. As a notarized document, the deed carried the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and had in its favor the
presumption of regularity. Consequently, petitioners' contention of absence of consent had no
firm moorings. It remained unproved. The contract is considered voidable and may be annulled
within four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud. The discovery of fraud is reckoned
from the time the document was registered in the Register of Deeds in view of the rule that
registration was notice to the whole world. Thus, because the mortgage involving the seven lots
was registered on September 5, 1984, they had until September 5, 1988 within which to assail
the validity of the mortgage. But their complaint was instituted in the RTC only on October 10,
1991
 It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either
during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. The
ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial
foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a

purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by
adverse title or right.
 The Court illumined that "the phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the property adversely
to the judgment obligor’ contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by
adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. Notably, the property
should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to
the judgment obligor. The general rule as herein stated – and not the exception found under
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules – should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their claim over the
subject property on their purported purchase of the same from its previous owner, i.e., Sps.
Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the original mortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be seriously
doubted that Sps. Alindog are only the latter’s (Sps. Gutierrez) successors-in-interest who do not
have a right superior to them.
 Aside from their postulation that as title holders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners
of the improvements built thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence
to prove their ownership of the property. In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the
ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition. Worthy to note is
the fact that the building in litigation was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and
not in the Spouses Garcias’. While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute credible proof of claim of title over the
property.
2015
 The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property
to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of
securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects are attained,
immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if mistakes or
omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to
depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or
omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made pursuant thereto.
 The errors pointed out by the spouses appear to be harmless. The evils that can result from an
erroneous notice did not arise. There was no intention to mislead, as the errors in fact did not
mislead the bidders as shown by the fact that the winning registered bid of P396,000.00 is over
and above the real amount of indebtedness of P209,205.05. The erroneous designation of an
entity as the mortgagor does not invalidate the notice of sale.
Rule 70
2013
 Evidently, the Spouses Marcelo engaged in forum shopping by filing separate cases for unlawful
detainer based on a single claim of ownership over Lot 3976. Said act is likewise tantamount to
splitting a cause of action which, in this case, is a cause for dismissal on the ground of litis
pendentia.
 As earlier stated, the DENR-NCR had canceled the MSA filed by the spouses Marcelo in its
Decision dated July 11, 2007. The Department found that the spouses Marcelo failed to satisfy
the requirements for the acquisition of Lot 3976 under the Public Land Act. Nonetheless, the
declaration by the DENR-NCR that Lot 3976 is still part of the public domain does not mean that
neither of the parties is entitled to the possession of the subject properties. Considering that the
Silverios are in actual possession of the subject portions of Lot 3976, they are entitled to remain

on the property until a person who has a title or a better right lawfully ejects them. The ruling in
this case, however, does not preclude the Silverios and the spouses Marcelo from introducing
evidence and presenting arguments before the proper administrative agency to establish any
right to which they may be entitled under the law.
 In the present case, the respondents-spouses stopped paying since 2001. However, the late
Esteban only sent a demand in October 31, 2005. Due to respondents-spouses’ failure to comply,
the unlawful detainer case was instituted on December 6, 2005, or within the one-year
prescriptive period. Based on the foregoing and as petitioner correctly posits, the case was then
properly filed because it was filed within the said one-year prescriptive period counted from the
date of the last demand and not from the date of dispossession
 The TCT of respondent Looyuko is, therefore, evidence of indefeasible title over the property and,
as its holder, he is entitled to its possession as a matter of right. Thus, the partnership
agreements and other documentary evidence presented by petitioner William are not, by
themselves, enough to offset Looyuko’s right as registered owner. It must be underscored,
however, that this adjudication on ownership is merely provisional and wouldnot bar or prejudice
the action between Jimmy and Looyuko involving their claimed shares in the title over the
property.
 In the case at bar, as the CA rightly points out in its Resolution dated 28 November 2008, Felix
and Rosita never objected to the introduction of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes containing
the testimony of Tan Po Chu, which were records of Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. As shown by the
records and as Felix and Rosita admitted in their Reply, the testimony was already introduced on
appeal before the RTC. In fact, it was Felix and Rosita themselves who specifically cited Civil
Case No. Q-95-22865, referring to it both by name and number, purportedly to bolster the claim
that they were constrained to sue, in order to compel delivery of the title
 The subsequent acquisition of ownership by any person is not a supervening event that
will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. True it is that the sole issue
in an action for unlawful detainer x x x is physical or material possession. Such issue of physical
or material possession was already passed upon by this court during trial.
 In the present case, while there is an identity in the facts between the two actions, involving as
they do the same lease contract, the issues and the relief prayed for are different so that the
causes of action remain entirely distinct from each other. In the unlawful detainer suit, the issue
is who between the parties has a better right to physical possession over the property or
possession de facto and the principal relief prayed for is for Stop and Save to vacate the property
for failure to pay the rent. In contrast, in the annulment of lease contract, the issue is the
validity of the lease contract, where Stop and Save puts in issue Dominga’s ownership
 Evidence shows that as early as the 1950s, Bonifacio already had possession of the subject lot
and even built a bungalow-type house thereon. Despite his migration to Hawaii, Bonifacio never
relinquished said possession over the house and lot. Consistent with Article 524 of the Civil Code,
it is well-settled that “it is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself
occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act.” Thus, the Sps. Gurieza’s
stay on the subject lot was only made possible through the mere tolerance of Bonifacio.
 While indeed Tormil, as the victor in the unlawful detainer suit, is entitled to the fair rental value
for the use and occupation of the unit in the building, such compensation should not be reckoned
from the time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but from the time of the demand to vacate.
Indeed, it is inconsistent to demand payment of rentals during the period of tolerance.
 In the present case, the complaint was for recovery of possession, preliminary mandatory
injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining order with damages and attorney’s fees. Based
on the allegations in respondents’ complaint, it is clear that the case involves only the issue of

physical possession or unlawful detainer. However, in this case, the unlawful withholding of
possession of the land before the filing of the complaint with the RTC lasted only for more or less
three months. Also, neither of the parties brought forth the issue of ownership which was the
reason given by the RTC for taking cognizance of the action. Clearly, the RTC erred in not
dismissing the case before it. Under the Rules of Court, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an
action whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2014
 As what took place in the case at bar, the final judgment in the ejectment case was not bar to this
subsequent action to quiet respondents’ title in order to settle ownership over the 9,478-square
meter property.
 It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the
land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that
plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of action fails.
 The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry
was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed
between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of
unlawful detainer is fatal.
 The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants
have entered the subject property and occupied the same", as correctly found by the MCTC and
CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely
and without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful
detainer.
2015
 The allegations of the petitioners’ complaint did not show that they had permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the portion of their property by the respondents; or how the respondents’ entry had
been effected, or how and when the dispossession by the respondents had started. All that the
petitioners alleged was the respondents’ “illegal use and occupation” of the property. As such, the
action was not unlawful detainer.
 A boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment
case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the
property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute
cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which
are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
2016
 The suit is only filed against the possessor(s) of the property at the commencement of action, and
not against one who does not in fact occupy the land. To determine who should be made a party-
defendant, The court simply looks at who committed the acts amounting to forcible entry and
remains in possession of the subject property.
 Ejectment suits are actions in personam wherein judgment only binds parties who had been
properly impleaded and were given an opportunity to be heard. The MCTC judgment was only

rendered against Fr. Gudmalin and the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province, not against the
petitioner Vicariate of Tabuk. Since the judgment was not rendered against the petitioner, it has
no legal personality to ask for annulment of the judgment. Understandably, the petitioner feels
aggrieved because it claims ownership over the subject lot that the MCTC ordered Fr. Gudmalin
to turn over to the respondents. However, from a purely legal perspective, the MCTC judgment
did not prejudice the petitioner. The petitioner may still avail of the plenary action of accion
reinvindicatoria wherein the issue of its ownership may be thoroughly threshed out in a full-blown
trial after which complete reliefs may be granted to the proper parties.
 Indeed, while a tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by the sale, alienation, or transfer of
the legal possession of the landholding, the same may nevertheless be terminated due to
circumstances more advantageous to the tenant and his/her family. Here, records show that
Miraflor, who brokered the sale between the heirs of Teresita and Irene, voluntarily executed,
days prior to the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale, her Pagpapatunay before
the BARC Chairman stating that she and her parents have already received a ‘sufficient
consideration’ for her to release her former landlord and the purchaser of the lot from liability
 An allegation of tenancy before the MTC does not automatically deprive the court of its
jurisdiction. Basic is the rule that: x x x the material averments in the complaint determine the
jurisdiction of a court. x x x a court does not lose jurisdiction over an ejectment suit by the simple
expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties. The court continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate the evidence,
precisely to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing, tenancy is shown to
exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
 Also, albeit the claim of respondents that they are using the property as their vacation house, that
claim is not substantiated by any corroborative evidence. Therefore, respondents failed to
discharge their burden of proving the element of prior physical possession.
2017
 The record showed that the respondents' TCTs were issued on February 21, 2005. Thereafter,
the demand to vacate was made against the petitioners on March 16, 2005, which is the
reckoning point of the petitioners' unlawful possession. Thus, the filing of the ejectment complaint
on April 21, 2005 is within the one-year reglementary period. Indeed, the cause of action of
Spouses Tan was to recover possession of the subject properties from Spouses Gaela upon the
latter's failure to comply with the former's demand to vacate the subject properties after the
latter's right to remain thereon terminated. Spouses Tan initiated the ejectment suit in the MeTC
well within the one-year period from the date of the last demand. Thus, the possession of
Spouses Gaela, although lawful at its commencement, became unlawful upon its non-compliance
with the respondents' demand to vacate.
 Petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof of its legal basis for
occupying the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For several years,
petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's possession by allowing it to continue using its building and
conducting business on the property. Petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property in
November 2007. This presents a clear case of unlawful detainer based on mere tolerance.
Petitioner proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based on its ownership. This, in turn, is
hinged on its position that the property reverted back to the petitioner when the donation was
revoked as provided in the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation . At the risk of
repetition, the breach of the condition in the donation causes the automatic revocation. All the
donor has to do is to formally inform the donee of the revocation. Judicial intervention only

becomes necessary if the donee questions the propriety of the revocation. Even then, judicial
intervention is required to merely confirm and not order the revocation.
 It is settled that the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. In this case, it is undisputed that the Deed of Sale, through which ownership over the
property had been purportedly transferred to the petitioner and Vilma, was executed in 1996.
However, it is perfectly obvious that Honorata could not have signed the same as she passed
away as early as 1994. If any, Honorata's signature thereon could only be a product of forgery.
This makes the Deed of Sale void and as such, produces no civil effect; and it does not create,
modify, or extinguish a juridical relation.
 The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the action is premised on

the termination of lease due to expiration of the terms of contract. The complaint must be
brought on the allegation that the lease has expired and the lessor demanded the lessee to
vacate, not on the allegation that the lessee failed to pay rents.The cause of action which would
give rise to an ejectment case would be the expiration of the lease.
 Admittedly, the Complaintin this case alleges that petitioner's verbal consent and tolerance was
withdrawn due to respondents' ''continuous failure and adamant refusal to pay rentals". However,
respondents' Answerto the Complaint admitted that they only had a month-to-month lease since
1969. They contend that they had been continuously paying their monthly rent until sometime in
2002, when petitioner refused to receive it. Thus, as early as 2002, petitioner, as the lessor,
already refused to renew respondents' month-to-month verbal lease. Therefore, respondents'
lease had already long expired before petitioner sent her demand letters.
Rule 71
2011
 The act of Cruz in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant off the
record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The accusation in the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by Cruz to the court is derogatory, offensive and
malicious. It is a direct affront to the integrity and authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of
public respect and confidence, which ultimately affects the administration of justice. Furthermore,
assuming that the conclusion of Cruz is justified by the facts, it is still not a valid defense in cases
of contempt. "Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was
justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always
be observed and enforced."
2013
 In this case, the acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting the public
auction sale of petitioner’s real properties, were neither intended to undermine the authority of the
court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of Branch IX. He merely performed a
ministerial function which he is bound to perform under Sections 176 and 177 of RA 7160. (real
property tax case) Neither did petitioner avail of the remedy of paying the assessed real property
tax under protest as prescribed in Section 252 of RA 7160. Suffice it to say that the availment of
these remedies could have prevented respondent’s issuance of the Warrants of Levy and the
conduct of the subsequent public auction sale of petitioner’s properties
 Not bound by judgment in the other case; no res judicata. In Civil Case No. 3514, the action was
directed against Benjamin E. Martinez, Jr. and Francisco P. Martinez in their capacities as Mayor
and Chief of the Permit and License Division of the Municipality of Balayan, Batangas,

respectively. On the other hand, respondent, in the instant case, is being sued in his capacity as
Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Batangas. While the defendants in both cases similarly
sought to enforce the tax obligation of petitioner, they were sued under different capacities.
Moreover, there is no identity in the causes of action between the two cases.
 In the Verification and Non-Forum Shopping Certification attached to the instant petition and
executed by Lucena, she admitted that there are five other pending actions for indirect contempt
which she filed relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388. She, however, claims that the issues in the
other five petitions are different from that raised before this Court now. Lucena's claim cannot be
sustained.
2014
 The CA erred in holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed
Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over
the subject property patently anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-
established in law and jurisprudence. The grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies
with its directive to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Ting free from any liens and
encumbrances. Thus, Sps. Ligon’s attachment lien against Sps. Baladjay as well as their
successors-in-interest should have been preserved, and the annotation thereof carried over to
any subsequent certificate of title,
 Examining the petition, the Court finds that Ligon failed to sufficiently show how the acts of each
of the respondents, or more specifically, Judge Laigo, constituted any of the acts punishable
under the foregoing section tending towards a wilful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. In issuing the Assailed Orders, Judge Laigo merely performed his judicial functions
pursuant to the December 9, 2004 Decision in the Makati City Case which had already attained
finality.
 The RTC reiterated the said order with a warning that failure of the defendants to comply with all
the requirements of the said will result in this court citing all the defendants in contempt of court.
Instead, the court has the duty to inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her
right to due process. This formal charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the
respondent to explain why he or she should not be cited in contempt of court. In this case, the
proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court’s mind, the September 3,
2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. The
penalty mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of
possible non-observance of the long-overdue order to produce and make available for inspection
and photocopying of the requested records/documents.
 Even if we are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final order of a court
in a case of indirect contempt," this would still not work to petitioners’ advantage. The recourse
provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person adjudged in indirect
contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the September
3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.
 In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and
counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol
Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and
in the case at bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. Respondent’s willful
disregard and defiance of this Court’s ruling on a matter submitted for the second time before his
office cannot be countenanced. By acting in opposition to this Court’s authority and disregarding

its final determination of the legal issue pending before him, respondent failed in his duty not to
impede the due administration of justice and consistently adhere to existing laws and principles
as interpreted in the decisions of the Court.
 An original action for certiorari is an independent action and is neither a continuation nor a part of
the trial resulting in the judgment complained of. The CA therefore committed error in dismissing
petitioners’ indirect contempt petition, on the ground of pendency of the appeal and certiorari filed
by Ricardo Jr. It need not wait for the Court to resolve the same before the petitioners’ contempt
charge may be heard.
 Elisa Angeles alleged that respondents committed contempt for defying the order of the trial court
to elevate the records of her case to the Court of Appeals. The court ruled that Contrary to Elisa
Angeles allegations, the records show that respondents were merely implementing the orders
issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 69213 and that no stay order was issued against the
enforcement of the subject writ of execution. There is no sufficient showing of acts committed by
respondents which may constitute contempt, such as among others, refusing to obey [a] lawful
order of the court or act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which tends to hamper the orderly
proceedings and lessen its efficiency
 In the case at bench, the respondents committed several acts which constituted indirect
contempt. The CDA issued the September 1, 2009 Memorandum stating that it had jurisdiction
over ZAMECO II and could reinstate the former members of the Board of Directors. The CDA
officials also issued Resolution No. 262, S-2009 and Special Order 2009-304 to interfere with the
management and control of ZAMECO II. Armed with these issuances, the other respondents
even tried to physically takeover ZAMECO II on October 22, 2013. These acts were evidently
against the March 13, 2009 decision of this Court and, thus, constituted indirect contempt against
the Court. These contemptuous acts are criminal in nature because these obstruct the
administration of justice and tend to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court enumerates the acts which amount to indirect contempt. Worse, the
respondent-officials of the CDA, fully aware of the Court’s pronouncement, attempted to reinstate
respondents Dominguez, et al. despite the existence of substantial evidence that warrant the
latter’s removal from office. Glaringly, this grave allegation was never refuted by the respondents.
Dominguez, et al. were found unfit to hold office yet the respondents relentlessly endeavoured to
return them to the seat.
 The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the
case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide
G.R. No. 199462. As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be
an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This is merely a
reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the
charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said
statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or
does not even tend to, influence the Court. As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the
respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their
petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had
passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or
insult on the dignity of the Court either.
2015
 Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite
granted by the trial court, which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA that
respondent’s act was not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in actually

providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent continued
shouldering the full cost of their education and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping
with the family’s social status. Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial and
appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to offset the substantial amounts he
had spent or paid directly to his children. Judgment for support does not become final. The right
to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional.
 Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is different from using a deceased
partner's name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased partner's
name as long as there is an indication that the partner is deceased. This ensures that the public
is not misled. On the other hand, the retention of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name
may mislead the public into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law. The use of
the name of a person who is not authorized to practice law therefore constitutes contempt of
court.
2017
 Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to keep private and
confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4, 2014, and there was no
proceeding to keep private. As for the Press Statement made on November 4, 2014, a close
examination reveals that it does not divulge anything that merits punishment for contempt. The
Press Statement declared only three (3) things: first, respondent AFP filed a disbarment
complaint against petitioner; second, petitioner is a lawyer, and thus, must conduct himself
according to the standards of the legal profession; and third, petitioner's "unlawful conduct" is
prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, this Court agrees with respondents, that they should not be faulted for releasing a
subsequent press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they filed against petitioner. The
statements were official statements made in the performance of respondents' official functions to
address a matter of public concern. It was the publication of an institutional action in response to
a serious breach of security. Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be
punished for responding publicly to such public actions
 As a party in G.R. No. 203241, Serra cannot feign ignorance of the Court's decision and
restraining order in that case. The TRO was issued on 3 December 2012 while the decision was
promulgated on 10 July 2013. By virtue of the TRO, which was made permanent, Serra was
enjoined to perform any act to remove RCBC from the subject property. Yet, by defaulting on his
loan obligation with Andueza, and Andueza's foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, Serra in
effect allowed the removal of RCBC from the subject property. Serra's conduct tended to impede
the administration of justice by effectively allowing RCBC to be removed from the premises of the
subject property, in contravention of the clear directive in the decision and restraining order in
G.R. No. 203241. Therefore, Serra is guilty of indirect contempt and accordingly fined P30,000.
Serra also claims that "he can no longer execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [RCBC]
because the subject property was already foreclosed and sold in public auction in favor of
Spouses Eduardo and Dina Andueza x x x." In other words, Serra alleges that a supervening
event - the foreclosureNo. 203241. The Court is not convinced that a supervening event occurred
which would effectively prevent the execution of the decision in G.R. No. 203241. While the
foreclosure sale proceeded on 24 September 2014, after the finality of the decision in G.R. No.
203241, the real estate mortgage in favor of Spouses Andueza was executed on 21 September
2011 while G.R. No. 203241 was pending. Serra could not possibly be unaware that a foreclosure

sale would likely transpire since he was the mortgagor who defaulted on his loan obligation.
Clearly, Serra performed acts intended to defeat and circumvent the conclusive effects of the final
decision in G.R. No. 203241. Serra defaulted on his loan obligation and did not lift a finger to
prevent Andueza or any person for that matter from removing RCBC from the subject property
Despite being non-parties in G.R. No. 203241, Spouses Andueza have notice of the pendency of
such action. On 14 February 2013, RCBC had the TRO issued by this Court annotated on OCT
No. 0-232 under Entry No. 2013000087. Therefore, Spouses Andueza have actual knowledge of
the Court's TRO in G.R. No. 203241 prior to their filing of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
of the subject property on 13 August 2013. Further, the decision in G.R. No. 203241 was
promulgated prior to the Spouses Andueza's initiation of foreclosure proceedings. Spouses
Andueza cannot therefore invoke lack of knowledge of RCBC's interest over the subject property
when they filed the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure. In other words, the Spouses Andueza's
act of instituting the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, which would ultimately result in removing
RCBC from the subject property, obviously tended to impede the administration of justice and
thus constitutes indirect contempt of court. Thus, Spouses Andueza are likewise adjudged guilty
of indirect contempt and fined P30,000.
 In the case at bar, when the Deed was executed on December 1, 2009, Eddie claimed that he
was abroad while Verona was already unconscious. Vida did not directly refute these allegations
and instead pointed out that the Deed was pre-signed in April of 2008. The foregoing
circumstances reduced the Deed into the category of a private instrument. Besides, the extant
circumstances surrounding the controversy constitute preponderant evidence suggesting that
forgery was committed. Eddie promptly filed a criminal case for falsification of documents and a
civil case to nullify the Deed. Later, the Office of the Davao City Prosecutor found probable cause
to indict Vida for falsification. Consequently, the issue of ownership cannot be disregarded in the
unlawful detainer case. It bears stressing though that while the RTC aptly resolved the issue of
ownership, it is at best preliminary and shall not be determinative of the outcome of the two other
cases filed by Eddie against Vida.

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Spec Pro MT Cases (Longer)

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Rule 63

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

 The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the action is premised on

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION DOCTRINES (longer version)- BARRION

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