THE CITY OF OZAMIZ, represented by the MAYOR, MUNICIPAL BOARD, TREASURER, AUDITOR, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
SERAPIO S. LUMAPAS and HON. GERONIMO R. MARAVE, respondents-appellees.
J. Antonio; July 15, 1975
Taxation – Distinguished from certain kinds of exactions

Short Version: Lumapas, a bus operator, opposed the imposition of a parking fee by Ozamiz City on his buses that were
temporarily parked in Zulueta Street while waiting for passengers to board. According to him, the charge was not a
parking fee but a toll fee in disguise. The local government cannot impose toll fees without the approval of the president;
and as a result, the ordinance imposing parking fee is null and void. The Court held that the fee was a parking fee and not a
toll fee. It is within the City’s power to enact such an ordinance by virtue of its police power. The parking fee was
ultimately for the public’s safety and convenience. The City may charge a fee to cover expenses of supervision and control.

Facts:
 Lumapas is an operator of transportation buses for passengers and cargoes, with Ozamiz City and Pagadian,
Zamboanga del Sur, as terminal points, by virtue of a certificate of public convenience issued to him by the Public
Service Commission.
 The Municipal Board of Ozamiz City enacted Ordinance 466 (An Ordinance Imposing Parking Fees for Every
Motor Vehicle Parked on any Portion of the Existing Parking Space in the City of Ozamiz).
o Sec. 3 thereof defined parking as: "Parking" as used in this ordinance shall be construed to mean, when a
motor vehicle of whatever kind is stopped on any portion of the existing parking areas for the purpose of
loading and unloading passengers or cargoes.
 Lumapas paid P1,259 under protest and filed a complaint against the City of Ozamiz for recovery of parking fees,
alleging that Ordinance 466 was ulta vires and prayed that judgment be issued nullifying the ordinance.
 City of Ozamiz asserted that the parking zone was patrimonial in character; thus, the City was authorized by
Section 2308 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code, and Section 15 (y) of the Charter of Ozamiz City (RA 321) to
impose parking fees.
o Also, the charter authorizes the Municipal Board to regulate the use of streets which carries with it the
power to impose fees for its implementation;
o Pursuant to such power, the Municipal Board passed said ordinance, the purpose of which is to minimize
accidents, to avoid congestion of traffic, to enable the passengers to know the exact time of the departure
of trucks;
o Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Law (RA 2264) likewise empowers the local governments to impose
taxes and fees, except those that are enumerated therein, and parking fee is not among the exceptions;
and
o The word "parking" implies a stationary condition and the parking fees provided for in Ordinance No. 466
are for the privilege of using the designated parking area, which is owned by the City of Ozamiz, as its
patrimonial property.
 Lumapas insisted that Ozamiz City had no power to impose parking fees on motor vehicles parked on Zulueta
Street, which is property for public use.
o Because of this, Ordinance 466 imposing such fees was null and void;
o The use of Zulueta Street as a parking place is only incidental to the free passage of motor vehicles and as
such, the prohibition to impose taxes or fees embodied in Section 59[b] of RA 4136 applies to this case;
o Section 2308[f] of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 15[y] of the Charter of Ozamiz City (RA
321) do not empower the City to impose parking fees; and
o Since the power to impose parking fees is not among those conferred by the Local Autonomy Act on local
government, said City cannot, therefore, impose such parking fees.
 Court rendered judgment declaring the parking fee was in the nature of toll fees for the use of public road and
made in violation of Section 59[b] of RA 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), there being no prior
approval by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
 Hence, the present appeal by certiorari.

Issue: Was Ozamiz City authorized to impose the tax? YES, by virtue of the police power granted by its Charter.
 Municipal corporations, being mere creatures of the law, have only such powers as are expressly granted to them
and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof, and the power to tax is inherent
upon the State and it can only be exercised by Congress, unless delegated or conferred by it to a municipal
corporation.
 Under Sec. 15[Y] of the Ozamiz City Charter (RA 321), the municipal board has the power "to regulate the use of
streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries and other public places;" and in subsection
[nn] of the same section 15, the authority "to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Charter."
 o By this express legislative grant of authority, police power is delegated to the municipal corporation to be
exercised as a governmental function for municipal purposes.
o In the exercise of such power, a municipal corporation can make all necessary and desirable regulations
which are reasonable and manifestly in the interest of public safety and convenience.
o It is patent that the Municipal Board has been clothed with full power to control and regulate the streets
for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety and welfare through the ordinance.
 By virtue of the statutory grant of authority, the City can regulate the time, place, manner of parking in the streets
and public places.
 The parking fee imposed is minimal in amount, the maximum being only P1.00 a day for each passenger bus and
P1.00 for each cargo truck, the rates being lower for smaller types of vehicles.
o This indicates that its purpose is not for revenue but for regulation.
o By designating a specific place wherein passenger and freight vehicles may load and unload passengers
and cargoes, benefits are accorded to the city's residents in the form of increased safety and convenience
arising from the decongestion of traffic.
 The city may impose a fee sufficient in amount to include the expense of issuing the license and the cost of
necessary inspection or police surveillance connected with the business or calling licensed.
 The fees charged are to cover the expenses for supervision, inspection and control, to ensure the smooth flow of
traffic in the environs of the public market, and for the safety and convenience of the public.

Issue: Does the ordinance charge a parking fee or a toll fee? Parking fee, for the regulation of the use of Ozamiz’s
streets.
 The buses stop on the extended portion of Zulueta Street beside the public market. As soon as they were loaded,
they proceeded to the station where a toll clerk collected the parking fee of P1.00 per bus once a day, before said
buses were allowed to proceed to their destination.
o Lumapas insists that this was not parking, but a toll fee for the use of the street.
o Since toll fees require authorization from the President, the City was not authorized to impose a toll fee in
the guise of a parking fee.
o "Parking" ordinarily implies "something more than a mere temporary and momentary stoppage at a curb
for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or merchandize; it involves the idea of using a portion
of the street as storage space for an automobile.”
 However, Section 3 of Ordinance No. 466 defines the word 'parking' to mean the stoppage of a motor vehicle of
whatever kind on any portion of the existing parking areas for  the purpose of loading and unloading passengers or
cargoes.
 The word "toll" when used in connection with highways has been defined as a duty imposed on goods and
passengers travelling public roads.
 The toll for use of a toll road is for its use in travelling thereon, not for its use as a parking place for vehicles.
 Considering that the buses are only charged the fee when they stop on "any portion of the existing parking
areas for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or cargoes," the fees collected are actually in the nature
of parking fees and not toll fees for the use of Zulueta Street.
o This is clear from the facts which show that fees were not exacted for mere passage thru the street but for
stopping in the designated parking areas therein to unload or load passengers or cargoes.
 It was not, therefore a toll fee for the use of public roads, within the context of Section 59[b] of RA 4136, which
requires the authorization of the President of the Philippines.

Dispositive: CFI reversed. Ordinance valid.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30727 July 15, 1975

THE CITY OF OZAMIZ, Represented by THE CITY MAYOR, MUNICIPAL BOARD, CITY TREASURER, and
CITY AUDITOR, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SERAPIO S. LUMAPAS and HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, respondents-appellees.

Assistant City Fiscal Artemio C. Engracia for petitioner-appellant.

Francisco D. Boter for respondents-appellees.

ANTONIO, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision, dated March 18, 1969, of respondent Judge Geronimo R. Marave, of the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II, Ozamiz City, declaring Ordinance No. 466, series of
1964, of the Municipal Board of the City of Ozamiz, null and void (Civil Case No. OZ-159), and ordering
petitioner to return to respondent Serapio S. Lumapas the sum of P1,243.00, representing the amount collected
as parking fees, by virtue of the ordinance, without costs.

The facts of this case, which are not disputed, are as follows:

Respondent Serapio S. Lumapas is an operator of transportation buses for passengers and cargoes, under the
name of Romar Line, with Ozamiz City and Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, as terminal points, by virtue of a
certificate of public convenience issued to him by the Public Service Commission. On September 15, 1964, the
Municipal Board of Ozamiz City enacted the following:

ORDINANCE NO. 466

AN ORDINANCE IMPOSING PARKING FEES FOR EVERY MOTOR VEHICLE PARKED ON

ANY PORTION OF THE EXISTING PARKING SPACE IN THE CITY OF OZAMIZ. Be it ordained
by the Municipal Board of the City of Ozamiz, that:

SECTION 1 — There is hereby imposed parking fees for all motor vehicles parked on any portion
of the duly designated parking areas in the City of Ozamiz;

SECTION 2. — Motor Vechicles' as used in this ordinance shall be construed to mean all
vehicles run by engine whether the same is offered for passengers or for cargoes of whatever
kind or nature;

SECTION 3. — The word "Parking" as used in this ordinance shall be construed to mean, when
a motor vehicle of whatever kind is stopped on any portion of the existing parking areas for the
purpose of loading and unloading passengers or cargoes;

SECTION 4. — For purposes of the fee hereinabove provided, the following schedule of rates
collectible daily from the conductor, driver, operator and/or owner must be observed:

For Passenger

(a) Passenger Bus ........................................................................ P1.00

 (b) Weapon Carrier, Baby Bus & others of similar nature ..... .70

(c) Pick Up, Jeepneys, PU Cars and others of similar

nature ....................................................................................................................... .50

For Cargoes

(a) Cargo Trucks .......................................................................... 1.00

(b) Pick Up, Jeeps, Jeepneys, Weapon Carriers & Others of similar
nature ...................................................................................................................... .70

SECTION 5. — That the City Treasurer or his authorized representative is hereby empowered to
collect the herein parking fees using any form of official receipt he may devise, from the
conductor, driver, operator and/or owner of the motor vehicles parked in said designated parking
areas;

SECTION 6. — Any person or persons, violating any provision of this ordinance shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punished by an imprisonment of not less than two (2) months nor more
than six (6) months, or by a fine in the sum of not less than P100.00 but not more than P400.00
or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court;

SECTION 7. — This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its approval.

Enacted, September 15, 1964,

Approved, October 7, 1964. 1

After approval of the above-quoted ordinance, the City of Ozamiz began collecting the prescribed parking' fees
and collected from respondent-appellee Serapio S. Lumapas, who had paid under protest, the parking fees at
One Peso (P1.00) for each of his buses, from October 1964 to January 1967, or an aggregate amount of
P1,259.00  for which official receipts were issued by petitioner.
2

About four (4) years later, or on January 11, 1968, respondent Serapio S. Lumapas filed a complaint, dated
August 3, 1967  against the City of Ozamiz, represented by the City Mayor, Municipal Board, City Treasurer, and
3

City Auditor, with the Court of First instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II (Civil Case No. OZ-159), for
recovery of parking fees, alleging, among others, that said Ordinance No. 466 is ulta vires, and praying that
judgment be issued (1) nullifying Ordinance No. 466, series of 1964, and (2) ordering the Municipal Board to
appropriate the amount of P1,459.00 for the reimbursement of P1,259.00 he had paid as parking fees, plus
P200.00 as attorney's fees.

On January 25, 1968, petitioner filed its answer, with affirmative defenses  to which respondent-appellee Serapio
4

S. Lumapas filed his reply, dated January 30, 1968. 5

On January 3, 1969, the parties, through their respective counsel, filed the following:

STIPULATION OF FACTS

COME NOW the plaintiff and the defendants, through their respective counsel, and unto this
Honorable Court respectfully submit this stipulation of facts, to wit:

(1) That the area enclosed in red pencil in the sketch is a market site of the City of Ozamiz which
holds the same in its proprietary character as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 51234. This
area is for public use.

(2) That the Zulueta Street is now extended up to the end of the market site passing a row of
tiendas up to the end marked "toilet" in the sketch plan of market site when the market building
was constructed in 1969;
 (3) That on the right side near the row of tiendas and near the toilet and marked with series of x's
and where the buses of plaintiff were parking waiting for passengers going to the south;

(4) That this space marked "rig parking" in the sketch plan marked "x" has been designated by
City Ordinance No. 233 as a parking place marked Exhibit "2";

(5) That the defendant City Government has been collecting parking fees and issued
corresponding official receipts to the plaintiff for each unit belonging to the plaintiff every time it
left Ozamiz City from said parking place but once a day at one peso per unit;

(6) That the total amount of parking fees collected from the plaintiff by the defendant is P1,243.00
as per official receipts actually counted in the presence of both parties;

(7) That the plaintiff made a demand for the reimbursement of the total amount collected from
1964 to 1967 and this demand was received on September 1, 1967, by the City Treasurer and
that the City Treasurer replied by first indorsement dated September 11, 1967, asking for
reference and verification; and

(8) That in reply to said first indorsement, the plaintiff sent a letter to the City Treasurer dated
January 18, 1967, citing cases in support of the demand, and in answer to that letter, the City
Treasurer in his communication dated January 11, 1968, flatly denied payment of the demand.

(9) That the parties will file their respective memoranda within twenty days from today.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered based
upon this stipulation of facts after the parties shall have submitted their respective memoranda or
after the lapse of twenty days from today.

Ozamiz City, December 27, 1968. 6

On the basis of the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, and of the court's finding, after an ocular inspection of the
parking area designated by Ordinance No. 286, series of 1956,  superseding Ordinance No. 234, series of 1953,
7

that it is a municipal street, although part of the public market, said court rendered judgment on March 18, 1969
declaring that such parking fee is in the nature of toll fees for the use of public road and made in violation of
Section 59[b] of Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), there being no prior approval
therefor by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications (now Public Works). Hence, the present appeal by certiorari.

Petitioner now contends that the lower court erred: (1) in declaring Ordinance No. 466, series of 1964, of Ozamiz
City, null and void; (2) in considering parking fees as road tolls under Section 59[b] of Republic Act No. 4136; (3)
in declaring the parking area as a public street and not the patrimonial property of the city; and (4) in ordering the
reimbursement of parking fees paid by respondent-appellee.

Decisive of this controversy is whether the Municipal Board of the City of Ozamiz, herein petitioner-appellant,
had the power to enact said Ordinance No. 466.

Petitioner-appellant, in maintaining the affirmative view, contends: (1)that the ordinance is valid for the fees
collected thereunder are in the nature of property rentals for the use of parking spaces belonging to the City in its
proprietary character, as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 51234, and are authorized by Section 2308 (f) of the
Revised Administrative Code, 8(2) that Section 15 (y) of the Charter of Ozamiz City (Republic Act No. 321)  9 also
authorizes the Municipal Board to regulate the use of streets which carries with it the power to impose fees for its implementation; (3) that, pursuant to such
power, the Municipal Board passed said Ordinance No. 234, the purpose of which is to minimize accidents, to avoid congestion of traffic, to enable the
passengers to know the exact time of the departure of trucks and, for this purpose, the Municipal Board provided for parking areas for which the City has to
have funds for the implementation of the purposes abovestated; (4) that Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Law (Republic Act No. 2264)likewise empowers the
local governments to impose taxes and fees, except those that are enumerated therein, and parking fee is not among the exceptions: and (5) that the word
"toll" connotes the act of passing along the road and the collection of toll fees may not be imposed unless approved by the President of the Philippines upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Public Works, pursuant to Section 59[b] of Republic Act No. 4136; whereas the word "parking" implies a stationary
condition and the parking fees provided for in Ordinance No. 466 is for the privilege of using the designated parking area, which is owned by the City of
Ozamiz, as its patrimonial property.

On the other hand, respondent-appellee insists (1) that Ozamiz City has no power to impose parking fees on
motor vehicles parked on Zulueta Street, which is property for public use and, as such, Ordinance No. 466
imposing such fees is null and void; (2) that granting arguendo that Zulueta Street is part of the City's public
market site, its conversion into a street removes it from its category as patrimonial property to one for public use;
10 (3) that the use of Zulueta Street as a parking place is only incidental to the free passage of motor vehicles
for, as soon as the buses are loaded with passengers, the vehicles start their journey to their respective
destinations and pay the toll clerk at a station about one hundred; (100) feet ahead along Zulueta Street before
they are allowed to get out of the City and as such, the prohibition to impose taxes or fees embodied in Section
59[b] of Republic. Act No. 4136 applies to this case; (4) that Section 2308[f] of the Revised Administrative Code
providing that the "proceeds on income from the ... use or management of property lawfully held by the
municipality" accrue to the municipality, does not grant, either expressly or by implication, to the municipality, the
power to impose such tax, (5) that Section 15[y] of the Charter of Ozamiz City (Republic Act No. 321) which
authorizes the City, among others, "to regulate the use of a street," does not empower the City to impose
parking fees; besides, said section contains a proviso, i.e., "except as otherwise provided by law", which, in this
case, is Republic Act No. 4136; and (6) that, since the power to impose parking fees is not among those
conferred by the Local Autonomy Act on local government, said City cannot, therefore, impose such parking
fees.

After the filing of its brief, or on December 10, 1969, the petitioner- appellant, through its counsel, First Assistant
City Fiscal Artemio C. Engracia, filed the following Manifestation, dated November 27, 1969, praying that the
decision of the lower court be reversed in view of the approval by the President of the Philippines upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Public Works of the ordinance in question that validates the same, to wit:

1. That the decision of the lower court, marked Annex "E" of the petition, declaring Ordinance No.
466, series of 1964, of Ozamiz City, marked Annex "G" of the petition, null and void is based on
the non-compliance with the provisions of Section 59[b] of Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise
known as The Land Transportation Law, which requires the approval by the President of the
Philippines upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Public Works of such kind of
ordinance..

2. That the President of the Philippines has now approved the Ordinance in question. A certified
copy of said approval is hereunder quoted.

xxx xxx xxx

4th Indorsement
Manila, September 26, 1969

Respectfully returned to the Mayor, City of Ozamiz, hereby approving, as recommended in the
3rd indorsement hereon of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Ordinance No.
466, series of 1964, of that city, entitled: "AN ORDINANCE IMPOSING PARKING FEES FOR
EVERY MOTOR VEHICLE PARKED ON ANY PORTION OF THE EXISTING PARKING SPACE
IN THE OZAMIZ."

By Authority of the President:

(Sgd.) FLORES BAYOT
Assistant Executive Secretary

3. That the approval by the President of the Philippines is based upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Public Works. A certified copy of said recommendation is hereunder reproduced:

3rd Indorsement
June 3, 1969

Respectfully forwarded to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, Malacañang,

recommending favorable action, in view of the representations herein made, on the within letter
dated March 21, 1969 of Mayor Hilarion A. Ramiro, Ozamiz City, requesting approval No. 466,
series of 1964, passed by the Municipal Board, same city regarding the collection of fees for the
privilege of parking vehicles in the lots privately-owned by said City.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA

Secretary
 4. That the action of the Secretary of Public Works is based upon the findings of the
Commissioner of the Land Transportation Commission. A certified copy of the same is herein
reproduced:

xxx xxx xxx

2nd Indorsement
May 16, 1969

Respectfully returned to the Honorable Secretary, Department of Public Works and

Communications, Manila, with the statement that this Commission interposes no objection on the
approval of Ordinance No. 466, series of 1964, of Ozamiz City, considering that the schedule of
rate collectible from the conductor, driver, operator and/or owner as stated under Section 4
thereof appears to be reasonable.

It may be stated in this connection that on the Decision of the CFI of Misamis Occidental, Branch
II, dated March 18, 1969 under Civil Case No. OZ(159), the said Ordinance was declared null
and void for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 59[b] of R. A. 4136, regarding the
required "approval by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications."

(Sgd.) ROMEO F. EDU

Commissioner

The rule is well-settled that municipal corporations, being mere creatures of the law, have only such powers as
are expressly granted to them and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof, and
the power to tax is inherent upon the State and it can only be exercised by Congress, unless delegated or
conferred by it to a municipal corporation. As such, said corporation has only such powers as the legislative
department may have deemed fit to grant. By reason of the limited powers of local governments and the nature
thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms
used in granting said powers must be construed against the municipality.  11

The implied powers which a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise are only those necessarily
incident to the powers expressly conferred. Inasmuch as a city has no power, except by delegation from
Congress, in order to enable it to impose a tax or license fee, the power must be expressly granted or be
necessarily implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly conferred upon the city.

Under Sec. 15[Y] of the Ozamiz City Charter (Rep. Act No. 321), the municipal board has the power "... to
regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries and other public
places; ...", and in subsection [nn] of the same section 15, the authority "To enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of the
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such
others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Charter ..." By this express legislative grant of authority, police power is delegated to the municipal corporation to
be exercised as a governmental function for municipal purposes.

It is, therefore, patent that the City of Ozamiz has been clothed with full power to control and regulate its streets
for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety and welfare. Indeed, municipal power to regulate the use
of streets is a delegation of the police power of the national government, and in the exercise of such power, a
municipal corporation can make all necessary and desirable regulations which are reasonable and manifestly in
the interest of public safety and convenience.

By virtue of the aforecited statutory grant of authority, the City of Ozamiz can regulate the time, place, manner of
parking in the streets and public places. It is, however, insisted that the ordinance did not charge a parking fee
but a toll fee for the use of the street. It is true that the term " parking" ordinarily implies "something more than a
mere temporary and momentary stoppage at a curb for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or
merchandize; it involves the idea of using a portion of the street as storage space for an automobile."  12

In the case at bar, the TPU buses of respondent-appellee Sergio S. Lumapas stopped on the extended portion
of Zulueta Street beside the public market (Exhibit "X-1" of Exhibit "X", Development Plan for Ozamiz Market
Site),and that as soon as the buses were loaded, they proceeded to the station, about one hundred (100) feet
away from the parking area, where a toll clerk of the City collected the "Parking" fee of P1.00 per bus once a
day, before said buses were allowed to proceed to their destination.

Section 3 of the questioned Ordinance No. 466 defines the word "'parking' to mean the stoppage of a motor
vehicle of whatever kind on any portion of the existing parking areas for the purpose of loading and unloading
passengers or cargoes."   (Emphasis supplied.)
13

The word "toll" when used in connection with highways has been defined as a duty imposed on goods and
passengers travelling public roads.   The toll for use of a toll road is for its use in travelling thereon, not for its
14

use as a parking place for vehicles.  15

It is not pretended, however, that the public utility vehicles are subject to the payment, if they pass without
stopping thru the aforesaid sections of Zulueta Street. Considering that the public utility vehicles are only
charged the fee when said vehicles stop on "any portion of the existing parking areas for the purpose of loading
or unloading passengers or cargoes", the fees collected are actually in the nature of parking fees and not toll
fees for the use of Zulueta Street. This is clear from the Stipulation of Facts which shows that fees were not
exacted for mere passage thru the street but for stopping in the designated parking areas therein to unload or
load passengers or cargoes. It was not, therefore a toll fee for the use of public roads, within the context of
Section 59[b] of Republic Act No. 4136, which requires the authorization of the President of the Philippines.

As adverted to above, the Municipal Board of Ozamiz City is expressly granted by its Charter the power to
regulate the use of its streets. The ordinance in question appears to have been enacted in pursuance of this
grant. The parking fee imposed is minimal in amount, the maximum being only P1.00 a day for each passenger
bus and P1.00 for each cargo truck, the rates being lower for smaller types of vehicles. This indicates that its
purpose is not for revenue but for regulation. Moreover, it is undeniable that by designating a specific place
wherein passenger and freight vehicles may load and unload passengers and cargoes, benefits are accorded to
the city's residents in the form of increased safety and convenience arising from the decongestion of traffic.

Undoubtedly the city may impose a fee sufficient in amount to include the expense of issuing the license and the
cost of necessary inspection or police surveillance connected with the business or calling licensed.

The fees charged in the case at bar are undeniably to cover the expenses for supervision, inspection and
control, to ensure the smooth flow of traffic in the environs of the public market, and for the safety and
convenience of the public.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and Ordinance No. 466, series of 1964 declared valid.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.