8 - People vs. Chua Ho San 308 SCRA 432 PDF

14/01/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 308
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Chua Ho San
*
G.R. No. 128222. June 17, 1999.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHUA HO

SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Searches and Seizures; Right to

privacy of home and person explicitly ordains that people have the right to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.—Enshrined
in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It
explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary
or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is
the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution bars State intrusions to a
person’s body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of
a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court.—The Constitutional
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course,
forestall reasonable searches and seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or
even an unreasonable search in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person’s body,
personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution
and reiterated in the Rules of Court; “otherwise such search and seizure
become ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the aforementioned
constitutional provision.” This interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and
seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances
of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs
searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
_______________
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa49676841758a0cb003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/23
* EN BANC.
433
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 433
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid

warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2)
arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
Same; Same; Same; The term probable cause had been understood to
mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.—In cases
of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may
without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge
of such fact or as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. The
term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. In People v. Montilla, the Court acknowledged that
“the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges, and
correlatively, for effecting warrantless arrest, has been reduced and
liberalized.”
Same; Same; Same; The search cannot be denominated as incidental to
an arrest.—The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an
arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected
to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the
commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his
immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence
he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be
reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
434
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made—the process cannot be reversed
Same; Same; Same; The search was not incidental to an arrest. There
was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the
exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court.—The search was not incidental
to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not
fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown.
From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. It is
worth mentioning here that after introducing themselves, the police officers
immediately inquired about the contents of the bag. What else could have
impelled the officers from displaying such inordinate interest in the bag but
to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony had indeed been committed
by CHUA—in effect to “retroactively establish probable cause and validate
an illegal search and seizure.”
Same; Same; Same; It cannot logically be inferred from his alleged
cognizance of the “sign language” that he deliberately, intelligently, and
consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search.—CHUA
obviously failed to understand the events that overran and overwhelmed
him. The police officers already introduced themselves to CHUA in three
languages, but he remained completely deadpan. The police hence
concluded that CHUA failed to comprehend the three languages. When
CHUA failed to respond again to the police’s request to open the bag, they
resorted to what they called “sign language.” They claimed that CHUA
finally understood their hand motions and gestures. This Court disagrees. If
CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could
he understand the police’s “sign language.” More importantly, it cannot
logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the “sign language” that
he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such
an intrusive search. This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the
validity of consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases,
the police officers’ request to search personnel effects was orally articulated
to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the
latter fully understood what was requested. In some instances, the accused
even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood
the nature and consequences of such request.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence obtained during an illegal search
tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or
435
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 435
suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any

purpose in any proceeding, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree.—It
was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated substance.
But this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an illegal search
even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or
suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree how
much more of “forbidden fruits” which did not confirm any initial suspicion
of criminal enterprise as in this case—because the police admitted that they
never harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance
as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and
ineffectual to sustain CHUA’s conviction.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy must be proven just like any
other criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable
doubt.—As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, this Court considers them trivial as they refer to
insignificant details which will not affect the outcome of the case. On a
passing note, this Court calls the attention of the trial court regarding its
erroneous appreciation of conspiracy. This aggravating circumstance is
without question unsupported by the records. Conspiracy was not included
in the indictment nor raised in the pleadings or proceedings of the trial
court. It is also fundamental that conspiracy must be proven just like any
other criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable
doubt.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of San

Fernando, La Union, Br. 66.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Terencio R. Yumang, Jr. of M.R. Pamaran & Associates and
Mauro C. Cabading, Jr. for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his

acquittal and the reversal of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La
436

Union, Branch 66, finding him guilty of transporting, without

appropriate legal authority, the regulated substance
1
methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15, Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous 2
Drugs Act of 1972 as further amended by R.A. No. 7659, and
sentencing him to “die by lethal injection.” In view thereof, the
judgment was brought to this Court for automatic review pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7659.
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and
other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID), as Chief of
Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling
the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the
coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a
radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite
(hereafter ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted.
According to ALMOITE, the vessel looked different from the boats
ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. CID and six of his men led by his Chief
Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA), proceeded
forthwith to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with
ALMOITE. CID then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone
male passenger. As it was routine for CID to deploy his men in
strategic places when dealing with similar situations, he ordered his
men to take up positions thirty meters from the coastline. When the
speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both
hands, carried
_______________
1 Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and

Distribution of Regulated Drugs.—The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, distribute, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug . . .
2 Entitled An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, As Amended, Other Special
Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes.
437
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 437

what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the

road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two
conspicuous in their uniform and issued sidearms, became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke

into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however,
prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm.
Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man
appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the
man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. CID thus
tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then
resorted to what he termed “sign language”; he motioned with his
hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently
understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded
several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline
substances. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he
did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the
man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID
placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the
latter to the police headquarters.
At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the
facial features of the man, that he was probably Taiwanese. CID then
“recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights” to remain
silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response
from the man, CID ordered his men to find a resident of the area
who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime,
BADUA opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline substances which he and
CID suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally
arrived, through whom the man was “apprised of his constitutional
rights.” The police authorities were satisfied that the man and the
interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their uncertainty
as to what language was spoken. But when the policemen asked the
man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and
merely showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon.
CHUA’s
438

bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp
Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory
examination. In the meantime, CHUA was detained at the Bacnotan
Police Station.
Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist
Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the 3
Philippine National Police,
Region I, received a letter request from CID—incidentally her
husband—to conduct a laboratory examination of twenty-nine (29)
plastic packets placed inside a 4 multicolored strawbag. In her
Chemistry Report No. D-025-95, she stated that her qualitative
examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing

28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug.
CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed
the case as Criminal Case No. 4037. However, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, La Union, that the facts of the case could support an
indictment for illegal transport of a regulated drug, the information
was subsequently amended to allege that CHUA “willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously transpor(ted) 28.7 kilos of
[m]ethamphetamine [h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the necessary
permit or authority to transport the same” in violation of Section 15,
Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659.
At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not
guilty. The RTC was satisfied that CHUA understood the amended
information read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking
interpreter, Thelma Sales Go.
Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a
Taiwanese Interpreter through the auspices of the Department of
Foreign Affairs. However, it was only after directing the request to
the Taipei Economic and Cultural
_______________
3 Exhibit “C.”
4 Exhibit “F.” It was completed on the same day of the arrest and search.
439
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 439

Office in the Philippines that interpreters were assigned to CHUA.

Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to
establish the above narration of facts which were culled chiefly from
the testimony of CID, its first witness, and whose testimony, in turn,
was substantially corroborated by witnesses BADUA and
ALMOITE.
Expert witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her
chemistry report in that the contents of the 29 plastic packets
weighing 28.7 kilos sent to her for chemical analysis were pure,
unadulterated methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. She also
explained that they were unwashed, hence they appeared yellowish.
For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through
interpreter Steven Yu. He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan and
was employed in a shipbuilding and repairing company. On 21
March 1995, he was instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong
(hereafter RONG) to board the latter’s 35-tonner ship which would

embark for Nan Au Port, Mainland China where they would buy
fish. Upon arrival at their destination, RONG left the ship, came
back without the fish, but with two bags, the contents of which he
never divulged to CHUA. RONG then showed to CHUA a
document purportedly granting them authority to fish on Philippine
waters. So they sailed towards the Philippines and reached Dagupan,
Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30 a.m., they
disembarked on a small speedboat with the two bags RONG brought
with him from China. While sailing, RONG made several phone
calls using his mobile phone. CHUA heard RONG asked the person
on the other side of the line if he could see the speedboat they were
riding. Apparently, the person on shore could not see them so they
cruised over the waters for about five hours more when finally, low
on fuel and telephone battery, they decided to dock. CHUA
anchored the boat while RONG carried the bags to shore. The tasks
completed, RONG left to look for a telephone while CHUA rested
and sat one and half (1 1/2) meters away from one bag. A child
thereafter pointed out to him that one bag was missing much
440

to RONG’s dismay when he learned of it. When a crowd started to

mill around them, the police arrived. CHUA then realized that
RONG was nowhere to be found. The police immediately
approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken word, only gestures
and hand movements, they escorted him to the precinct where he
was handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police, led by an
officer who CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the
motor engine of the speedboat and a bag. They presented the bag to
him, opened it, inspected and weighed the contents, then proclaimed
them as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
CHUA denounced the prosecution’s story as a distortion of the
truth. He denied he was ever favored with an interpreter or informed
of his “constitutional rights,” particularly of his right to counsel.
Consequently, his arrest was tainted with illegality and the
methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should have been
regarded inadmissible as evidence. He also maintained that CID
never graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at
Tammocalao beach. BADUA certainly never prevented him from
running away, as such thought failed to make an impression in his
mind. Most significantly, he denied ownership and knowledge of the
contents of the bag, emphasizing that RONG alone exercised
dominion over the same.
Elmer Parong, (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan

member, recalled that on the date in question, he arrived at the beach
with the police. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. He
also remembered hearing from the people congregating at the beach
that CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain policeman
Anneb had chased the latter’s car. He additionally claimed that when
the crowd became unruly, the police decided to bring CHUA to
police headquarters. There, the mayor took charge of the situation—
he opened CHUA’s bag with the assistance of the police, he called
for a forensic chemist surnamed CID to take a sample of the
contents of the bag, and he ordered his officials to find an interpreter.
Throughout the proceedings, photographers were busy taking
pictures to document the event.
441
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 441

Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG, a farmer and resident of

Tammocalao who narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the
beach when two men and a lady arrived. They were about to get a
bag situated near CHUA when they detected the arrival of the local
police. They quickly disappeared. CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE
and PARONG at the beach but not CID.
In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC found
that the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving
that CHUA transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride
5
without legal authority to do so. Invoking People v.
Tagliben as authority, the RTC characterized the search as
incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed the
admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti.
The RTC also noted the futility of informing CHUA of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, considering the
language barrier and the observation that such irregularity was
“rectified when accused was duly arraigned and . . . (afterwards)
participated in the trial of this case.” The RTC then disregarded the
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as these referred to minor details which did
not impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish the credence
conferred on the testimonies thus delivered.
The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his
alleged employer RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in
the illegal trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but with
several other members of an organized syndicate bent on
perpetrating said illicit traffic. Such predilection was plainly evident
in the dispositive portion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, as proven and established

by convincing and satisfactory evidence that the accused had conspired and
acted in concert with one Cho Chu Rong, not to mention Chen Ho Fa, the
Skipper of the 35-tonner ship they used in
_______________
5 184 SCRA 220 [1990].
442

coming to the Country from China and Taiwan, this Court finds the accused
Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 as charged in the Information, and considering the provisions of Sec.
20 of R.A. No. 7659 that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
quantity sold/possessed/transported is ‘200 grams or more’ in the case of
Shabu, and considering, further that the quantity involved in this case is 28.7
kilograms which is far beyond the weight ceiling specified in said Act,
coupled with the findings of conspiracy or that accused is a member of an
organized syndicated crime group, this Court, having no other recourse but
to impose the maximum penalty to accused, this Court hereby sentences the
said accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San to die by lethal injection; to pay
a fine of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00); and to pay the costs.
The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the
Philippine National Police to immediately form an investigating Committee
to be composed by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity, who will conduct
an exhaustive investigation regarding this case to determine whether there
was negligence or conspiracy in the escape of Cho Chu Rong and the two
(2) or three (3) persons who approached the accused in the seashore of
Tammocalao, Bacnotan, La Union, and attempted to take the remaining bag
from accused, as well as the whereabouts of the other bag; and to furnish
this Court a copy of the report/result of the said investigation in order to
show compliance herewith sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
Shabu is ordered turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board for
destruction in accordance with the law.
The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated in
favor of the government and to be turned over to the Philippine National
Police, La Union Command, for use in their Bantay-Dagat operations
against all illegal seaborne activities.
6
SO ORDERED.
Before this Court, CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting
as competent evidence the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine
hydrochloride since they were indubitably
_______________
6 Rollo, 127. Per Judge Adolfo F. Alacar.
443
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 443

“forbidden fruits”; (2) granting weight and credence to the

testimonies of prosecution witnesses despite glaring inconsistencies
on material points; and in (3) appreciating conspiracy between him
and an organized syndicate in the illicit commerce of prohibited
drugs since this was not alleged in the information.
The Solicitor General traverses CHUA’s contentions by asserting
that: (1) the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of
search and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately preceding
to and contemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated
the police action; and (2) that there was an effective and valid
waiver of CHUA’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures
since he consented to the search.
We reverse the RTC.
Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of
home and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable
7
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said
right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the
exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in
violation of8 said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and
seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable
search in any particular case is purely a judicial question,9
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
Verily, the rule is, the Constitution
_______________
7 Article III, Section 2, Constitution. This constitutional guarantee covers the right
against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint on physical liberty. See 1
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., The Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary 85
(1st ed. 1987) [hereafter 1 BERNAS].
8 Art. III, Sec. 3, Constitution.
9 See Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211, 216 [1989].
444

bars State intrusions to a person’s body, personal effects or residence

except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in
compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court; “otherwise such search and seizure
become ‘unreasonable’ within 10
the meaning of the aforementioned
constitutional provision.” This interdiction against warrantless
searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless
searches and11 seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2)
seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver 12
or consent
searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest,
for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with
a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2)
13
arrests
effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
_______________
10 See People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557, 565 [1994].

11 See Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132 [1925]; Harris v. United States, 390
US 234 [1968]; Chimel v. California, 395 US 752 [1969]; Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 US 443 [1971]; Moreno v. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439 [1909]; People v.
Veloso, 48 Phil. 168 [1925]; People v. Kagui Malasagui, 63 Phil. 221 [1963]; Papa v.
Mago, 22 SCRA 857 [1968]; See also the recent cases of People v. Encinada, 280
SCRA 72 [1997]; People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 [1997]; People v. Fernandez,
239 SCRA 174 [1994].
12 Terry v. Ohio, 20 L Ed 2d, 896 adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188
SCRA 288 [1990]; See also People v. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557 [1993].
13 Rule 113, Sec. 5 provides: Sec. 5.—Arrest, without a warrant; when lawful—A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
445
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 445

This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless

arrest, search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar
constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.
Expectedly and quite understandably, the prosecution and the
defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident. But

this Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and his bag searched
without the benefit of a warrant.
In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private
person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting 14
officer, therefore,15must have personal knowledge of such fact or as
recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief
that the 16person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to
_______________
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another . . . .
14 See People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986].

15 People v. Encinada, supra note 11 at 85; People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703
[1998]; People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988]; People v. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA
751 [1988]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991]; People v. Tangliben,
supra note 5; Posadas v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12; People v. Malmstedt, 198
SCRA 401 [1991].
16 People v. Encinada, supra note 11 at 85-86.
446

believe that17an offense has been committed

18
by the person sought to
be arrested. In People v. Montilla, the Court acknowledged that
“the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges,
and correlatively, for effecting warrantless arrest, has been reduced
and liberalized.” Noting that the previous statutory and
jurisprudential evidentiary standard was “prima facie evidence” and
that it had been dubiously equated with probable cause, the Court
explained:
[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts (referring to prima

facie evidence and probable cause) were clarified and set aright, at least on
the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court
which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to ‘engender a well
founded belief’ as to the fact of the commission of the crime and the
respondent’s probable guilt thereof. It has the same meaning as the related
phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the
investigating fiscal ‘finds cause to hold the respondent for trial,’ or where ‘a
probable cause exists.’ It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the
right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally
19
authorized.” (emphasis supplied)
Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no facts on
record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA’s
participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have
spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The
RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated
mainly its decision on the finding that “accused was caught red-
handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended.” In short,
there is no probable
_______________
17 1 BERNAS 87. As applied to searches, probable cause refers to the existence of

facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is
in the place to be searched.
18 Supra note 15.
19 People v. Montilla, supra note 15 at 720-721.
447
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 447

cause. At least in People v. Tangliben, the Court agreed with the

lower court’s finding that compelling reasons (e.g., accused was
acting suspiciously, on the spot identification by an informant that
accused was transporting prohibitive drug, and the urgency of the
situation) constitutive of probable cause impelled police officers
from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest. In the case at bar, the
Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive
of probable cause—persistent reports of rampant smuggling of
firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA’s watercraft differing

in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise
over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA’s illegal entry into the Philippines
(he lacked the necessary travel documents or visa), CHUA’s
suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police
authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high
seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute “probable
cause.” None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating
20
the
pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential
report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of
prohibited drug and/or the 21
time and place where they 22 will
transport/deliver the same, suspicious
23
demeanor or behavior and
suspicious bulge in the waist —accepted by this Court as sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no
classified information that a foreigner would disembark at
Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question.
CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or
agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not auto-
_______________
20 People v. Claudio, supra note 15; See also People v. Lacerna, supra note 11.
21 People v. Maspil, Jr., supra note 15; People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra note 15.
22 People v. Tangliben, supra note 5; Posadas v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12.
23 People v. Malmstedt, supra note 15.
448

matically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. And

despite claims by CID and BADUA that CHUA attempted to flee,
ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely walking and oblivious
to any attempt at conversation when the officers approached him.
This cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the claim, thus:
Q How far were you when the accused put the bag on his shoulder?
A We were then very near him about three meters away from the
male person carrying the bag.
Q To what direction was he facing when he put the bag on his
shoulder?
A To the east direction.
Q In relation to you, where were you.
A With the company of Sgt. Reynoso and Maj. Cid we approached

the accused and when Maj. Cid went near him, he spoke in
Tagalog, English and Ilocano which accused did not understand
because he did not respond.
Q When Maj. Cid was talking, what was the accused doing at that
time?
A He was walking.
Q To what direction he was walking?
A He was walking to the east direction. (sic)
Q He was walking away from you or going near you?
A He was going away from us. That is why Sgt. Reynoso held the
right arm of the accused.
Q Was Sgt. Badua able to hold the right arm of the accused?
24
A Yes sir and he stopped.
True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was

not obvious to the police. But gossamer to the officers’ sense
perception and view were CHUA disembarking from a speedboat,
CHUA walking casually towards the road, and CHUA carrying a
multicolored strawbag. These acts did
_______________
24 TSN, 6 March 1996, 12-13.
449
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 449

not convey any impression that he illegally entered Philippine

shores. Neither were these overt manifestations of an ongoing
felonious activity nor of CHUA’s criminal behavior as clearly
established in CID’s testimony, thus:
Q Was the accused committing a crime when you introduced

yourselves?
A No, sir.
Q No, so there was no reason for you to approach the accused
because he was not doing anything wrong?
A No, sir, that is our objective, to approach the person and if ever
or whatever assistance that we can give we will give.25
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an

arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be
effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used
in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the
area within his immediate control where26
he might gain possession of
a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede
the search. The process cannot be reversed.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines

the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in
a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there
be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be
27
reversed.
To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no

warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest
28
did not fall under the
exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as
_______________
25 TSN, 22 February 1996, 19-20.

26 See Preston v. US, 11 L Ed. 2d at 780-781; 376 at 367 [1964].
27 Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, 175 [1997].
28 See People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, 410 [1988].
450

already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a
fishing expedition. It is worth mentioning here that after introducing
themselves, the police officers immediately inquired about the
contents of the bag. What else could have impelled the officers from
displaying such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out
evidence and discover if a felony had indeed been committed by
CHUA—in effect to “retroactively establish probable cause and
validate an illegal search and seizure.”
The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a
consented search, a legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obtrusive searches. It is fundamental, however, that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly,
29
that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. CHUA never
exhibited that he knew, actually or constructively of his right against
unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the same.
This can be inferred from the manner by which the search was
performed, thus:
Q Together with your Chief Investigator, what was the first thing
that you did when you approached him (CHUA)?
A We introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.
Q Okey, in the first place why did you introduce yourselves?
A That is normal practice in our part, sir.
***
Q If it is possible. Okey (sic) now, after introducing yourselves
what did you do?
A He did not answer me and he did not utter any word.
Q When he did not utter any word. What else did he do?
A I asked again a question that if he can open his bag sir.
_______________
29 See People v. Burgos, supra note 14 at 16 [1986] citing Pasion Vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 [1938].
451
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 451

Q And did he understand your question when you requested him to

open his bag?
A No, sir, there is no answer.
Q No answer?
A Yes, sir, no answer.
Q And when there was no answer what did you do next?
A I used sign language sir.
Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you
demonstrated that sign language of opening the bag mr. (sic)
witness?
A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made an action like
this sir.
***
SHERIFF:
The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the straw bag and
then manifesting a sign to open the zipper of the straw bag
moving his right hand from left to right or from the opening to
the end of the zipper.
COURT: From the start of the zipper where you open it up to the
end of the zipper.
Witness: Yes, sir, and then I made a motion like this.
(The witness repeating the motion described on record.)
COURT: Did you open that personally?
WITNESS:
A No, your honor.
Q Now, mr. (sic) witness, why did you request the accused to open
the bag?
A Because it is our duty also to inspect his belongings sir.
Q Why, why was it—no, I reform my question your honor. Is it
normal procedure for you to examine anybody or to request
anybody to open his bag?
A The fact that he was a foreigner, sir, it is also our duty to inspect
the baggage, it is our routine duty of a police (sic), sir.
Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to request a person to
open his bag?
A Yes, sir.
452

Q Okey, (sic) you did not ask the accused, mr. (sic) witness, to
open his bag?
A No, sir.
Q But you simply requested him to open the bag?
30
A Yes, sir.
CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and

overwhelmed him. The police officers already introduced
themselves to CHUA in three languages, but he remained
completely deadpan. The police hence concluded that CHUA failed
to comprehend the three languages. When CHUA failed to respond
again to the police’s request to open the bag, they resorted to what
they called “sign language.” They claimed that CHUA finally
understood their hand motions and gestures. This Court disagrees. If
CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how
could he understand the police’s “sign language.” More importantly,
it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the

“sign language” that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously
waived his right against such an intrusive search. This Court is not
unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless
searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers’ request
to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and
in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully
understood what was requested. In some instances, the accused even
verbally replied to the request demonstrating31that he also understood
the nature and consequences of such request.
_______________
30 TSN, 22 February 1996, pp. 19-22.

31 In People v. Montilla, supra note 15 at 722, the accused was asked about the
contents of the bag and he replied that they contained personal effects. The officers
then asked him to open the traveling bag and he voluntary submitted to the search. In
People v. Lacerna, supra note 11 at 575-576 [1997], the accused expressly gave his
permission to have his luggage searched. In People v. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462, 470
[1992] the accused replied to the police’s query for a search with “[y]ou can see the
contents of the bag but those are only clothings.” In People v. Ramos, supra note 12,
the testimony of
453
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 453

It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated

substance. But this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an
illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming
initial information or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely
considered inadmissible for any purpose
32
in any proceeding, the same
being the fruit of a poisonous tree how much more of “forbidden
fruits” which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal
enterprise as in this case—because the police admitted that they
never harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated
substance as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain CHUA’s conviction.
_______________
police officers that accused “voluntarily allowed himself to be frisked and that he
gave the gun to the officer” remained unrebutted. In People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA
325, 354 [1996], the Court validated the consented warrantless search against
accused-appellant Pua who gave written permission to the search of his luggage,
taking careful note that Pua understood both English and Tagalog and that he had
resided in Vito Cruz, Manila. In People v. Fernandez, supra note 11 at 83, “the
accused-appellant came out of the house and gave himself up to the police, the owner
of the house turned over his luggage to said police authorities. With the acquiescence
of accused-appellant, his suitcase was searched and it yielded the subject firearm and
ammunition. He then signed and acknowledged a Receipt certifying one homemade
shotgun with one (1) live ammunition and one (1) empty shell was confiscated from
him. In People v. Kagui Malasugui, supra note 11, Kagui voluntarily surrendered to
the police authorities a couple of bracelets belonging to the deceased victim. When
asked if he had anything else to surrendered, he, in a quaking voice answered in the
negative. The police then conducted a body search which he did not objected to which
search resulted in the production of additional personal effects belonging to the
victim. In the last two cases cited, the accused therein unequivocally consented to the
search.
32 See People v. Cuizon, supra note 31 at 339; People v. Rodriquez, 232 SCRA
498 [1994]; See also the concurring and dissenting separate opinion of Chief Justice
Andres R. Narvasa in People v. Malmstedt, supra note 15 at 422.
454

Indeed, the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported

methamphetamine hydrochloride cannot be quickly dispelled. But
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police
officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the Constitution and the
rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise
their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have
blundered. “There are those who say that . . . ‘the criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered.’ . . . In some cases this
will undoubtedly be the result. But . . . ‘there is another
consideration—the imperative of judicial integrity.’ . . . The criminal
goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its
own laws,33 or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own
existence.”
As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, this Court considers them trivial as they refer
to insignificant details which will not affect the outcome of the case.
On a passing note, this Court calls the attention of the trial court
regarding its erroneous appreciation of conspiracy. This aggravating
circumstance is without question unsupported by the records.
Conspiracy was not included in the indictment nor raised in the
pleadings or proceedings of the trial court. It is also fundamental that
conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal 34
accusation,
that is, independently and beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 4037 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE

and accused-appellant CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence not being
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
_______________
33 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643, 659 [1961].

34 Dans, Jr. v. People, 285 SCRA 504, 533 [1998]; See also People v. Hilario, 284
SCRA 344, 454 [1998].
455
VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 455

People vs. Sagaysay
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., No part. On official leave.
Panganiban, J., On leave.
Judgment reversed and set aside, accused-appellant acquitted.
Notes.—The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable

arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a
validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. (Malacat vs.
Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 [1997])
Instances where warrantless searches may be effected: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) search incidental to
a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop-and-frisk.” (Ibid.) In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made. (Ibid.)
——o0o——
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14/01/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 308

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHUA HO

Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Searches and Seizures; Right to

VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 433

People vs. Chua Ho San

includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid

434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Chua Ho San

VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 435

People vs. Chua Ho San

suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of San

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his

436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Union, Branch 66, ﬁnding him guilty of transporting, without

1 Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and

VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 437

what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the

suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke

438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing

VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 439

Ofﬁce in the Philippines that interpreters were assigned to CHUA.

(hereafter RONG) to board the latter’s 35-tonner ship which would

440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

to RONG’s dismay when he learned of it. When a crowd started to

Elmer Parong, (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan

VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 441

Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG, a farmer and resident of

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, as proven and established

5 184 SCRA 220 [1990].

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

6 Rollo, 127. Per Judge Adolfo F. Alacar.

VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 443

“forbidden fruits”; (2) granting weight and credence to the

444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

bars State intrusions to a person’s body, personal effects or residence

10 See People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557, 565 [1994].

VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 445

This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless

defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident. But

14 See People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986].

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

believe that17an offense has been committed

[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts (referring to prima

17 1 BERNAS 87. As applied to searches, probable cause refers to the existence of

VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 447

cause. At least in People v. Tangliben, the Court agreed with the

ﬁrearm and other contraband articles, CHUA’s watercraft differing

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

matically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. And

A With the company of Sgt. Reynoso and Maj. Cid we approached

True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was

24 TSN, 6 March 1996, 12-13.

VOL. 308, JUNE 17, 1999 449

not convey any impression that he illegally entered Philippine