Case Number: 10

Title: Barretto (Plaintiff) vs. Gonzalez (Defendant)

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of the City
of Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived together as
man and wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and
since that time have not lived together as man and wife. Of this union four children were born
who are now 11, 10, 8 and 6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both being
represented by attorneys, continued for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to
allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly;
this amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of certain properties to be
put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands, betook himself to
Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion,
which decree was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to
California and returned to these Islands in August 1928, where he has since remained. On the
same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through the forms of marriage with
another citizen of these Islands and now has three children as a result of that marriage.
Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the amount he had agreed to pay
monthly for the support of his wife and four minor children and has not made the payments fixed
in the Reno divorce as alimony. Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila requesting that the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the
decree of divorce issued by the courts of the State of Nevada.
The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 per month for the support
not only of his children but also of his ex-wife, appellee herein, Manuela Barretto. It is also erred
that the plaintiff- appellee, Manuela Barretto, is not entitled to support from her ex-husband,
herein appellant, over and beyond the alimony fixed by the divorce decree. It is also decided that
the defendant- appellant will pay the plaintiff-appellee P3,000 attorney's fees Instead of P5,000.

Issue:
WON the divorced filed in Nevada by the defendant is considered.

Ruling:
No. At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine
Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the
purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he
had entered in 1919. While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize
the validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have
been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion.

Principles:
Article 9- The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country.
Article 11- The prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and
those intended to promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without
effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered
into a foreign country.
Case Number: 30
Title: Quimiging (Plaintiff) vs. Icao (Defendant)
G.R. Number: G.R. No. L-26795
Date: July 31, 1970.

Facts:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In
her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbours in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that
as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff
had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney’s
fees. Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the
complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge
sustained defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend
the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby
girl; but the court, sustaining defendant’s objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly
to this Court.
Although the case in supporting the unborn child was dismissed, the moral damage for the
appellant wasn’t. The defendant was prosecuted and provide a said amount for the damage the
appellant endured according to Art. 21 of the Civil code. Thus, independently of the right to
support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under
the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was
doubly in error. Wherefore, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

Issue:
WON the defendant is obligated to give support for the unborn child.

Ruling:
No. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from it progenitors, particularly of
the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if
as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its
being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls
the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator (Article 854, Civil Code).

Principles:
ART. 742- Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons
who would legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854-The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not in officious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
ART. 40- The conceived child shall be considered born for ail purposes that are favorable to it.
Provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article (i.e., that the foetus
be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb.
ART. 291-
ART. 21- Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
ART. 2219-Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28.
Case Number: 50
Title: Republic (Petitioner) vs. CA (Respondents)
G.R. Number: G.R. No. 103047
Date: September 2, 1994

Facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to
the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig,
Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro
discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19,
1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of
Cardenas. The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted
to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's
efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage. She filed a petition to the Civil registrar with the letter as evidence. The
trial court denied the petition. It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the
parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued." Unsatisfied with the decision,
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local
civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license. As stated earlier,
respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. It declared the marriage
between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel
the subject marriage contract. The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony
in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any
other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the
case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge
of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the
former. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between
private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license. In view whereof, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of
any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.

Issue:
WON the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient
to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

Ruling:
No. At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find
a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.

Principles:
Articles 53-
Article 80-
Article 70-
Case Number: 70
Title: Guillen-Pesca (Petitioner) vs. Pesca (Respondent)
G.R. Number: G.R. No. 136921
Date: April 17, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on
board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got
married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still
a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going
vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their
residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where
they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that
they could stay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-
year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie. It started in 1988,
petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological
incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature
and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker,
staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning.
When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and
kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the
presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the
house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months
later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to
change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about
half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted
herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her
injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities,
and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. This
time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister.
Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional
Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at
the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity. The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and
the foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commiserates
with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that
relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law
has not quite given up, neither should we. Wherefore, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

Issue:
WON the respondent is considered as psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
No. The appellant didn’t showed any signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly
in cognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code;
that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to
meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root
cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an
expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. The burden of proof to show
the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favour of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity

Principles:
ART. 68-
ART. 36-
Case Number: 90
Title:
G.R. Number:
Date:

Facts: