Apollo 5 Mission Report

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON, TEXAS
MARCH 1968
• ° • • • ° ° °
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APOLLO SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY
Mission Spacecraft Description Launch date Launch site
PA-I BP-6 First pad abort Nov. 7, 1963 White Sands

Missile Range,
N. Mex.
A-001 BP-12 Transonic abort May 13, 1964 White Sands

Missile Range,
N. Mex.
AS-101 BP-13 Nominal launch and May 28, 1964 Cape Kennedy,
exit environment Fla.
AS-102 BP-15 Nominal launch and Sept. 18, 1964 Cape Kennedy,
exit environment Fla.
A-002 BP-23 Maximum dynamic Dec. 8, 1964 _rlite Sands

pressure abort Missile Ranga,
N. Mex.
AS-103 BP-16 Micrometeoroid Feb. 16, 1965 Cape Kennedy_

experiment Fla.
A-003 BP-22 Low-altitude abort May 19_ 1965 White Sands

(planned high- Missile Range,
altitude abort) N. Mex.
AS-104 BP-26 Micrometeoroid May 25, 1965 Cape Kennedy_

experi_lent and Fla.
service module
RCS launch
environment
PA-2 BP-23A Second pad abort June 29, 1965 White Sands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
AS-105 BP-gA Micrometeoroid July 30, 1965 Cape Kennedy,

experiment and Fla.
service module
RCS launch
environment
A-004 SC-002 Power-on tumbling Jan. 20_ 1966 White Sands

boundary abort Missile Range,
N. Mex.
AS-201 SC-009 Supercircular Feb. 26, 1966 Cape Kennedy,

entry with high Fla.
heat rate
AS-202 SC-011 Supercireular A1ig. 25, 1966 Cape Kennedy,

entry with high Fla.
heat load
(Continued inside back cover)

MSC-PA-R-68-7
APOLLO 5 MISSION REPORT
Prepared by: Apollo 5 Mission Evaluation Team
A_prove_
by:__ _ _,_r---
George MI Low
_-_7
Manager
Apollo Spacecraft Program
March 27, 1968
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON, TEXAS
iii
CONTENTS
Section Page
TABLES ........................ ix
FIGURES ....................... xi
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .............. xxii
1.0 S_ '_[_RY ....................... i-i
2.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION ................. 2-1
2.1 PLANNED MISSION ................ 2-1
2.2 ACTUAL MISSION ................. 2-1
3.0 TRAJECTORY DATA ................... 3-1
3.1 LAUNCH ..................... 3-1
3.2 ORBIT ..................... 3-2
3.2.1 Trajectory Profile Analysis ...... 3-2
3.2.2 Lunar Module/S-IVB Stage

Separation . . ............ 3-3
3.2.3 Maneuver Profile Analysis ....... 3-4
4.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE SUMMARY .......... 4-1
5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE ........ 5-1
6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE ............... 6.1-1
6.1 STRUCTURES ................... 6.1-1
6.1.1 Loads ................. 6.1-1
6.1.2 Vibrations ............... 6.1-3
6.2 THERMAL CONTROL ................ 6.2-1
6.2.1 Launch Phase Thermal Response ..... 6.2-1
6.2.2 Control Engine Plume Impingement .... 6.2-1

iv
Section Page
6.2.3 Descent Stage Heat Shield ........ 6.2-2
6.2.4 Abort Staging .............. 6.2-3
6.2.5 Ascent Stage Structure ......... 6.2-4
6.2.6 Second &scent Engine Firing ....... 6.2-5
6.3 LANDING GEAR .................. 6.3-1
6.4 PYROTECHNIC ............. . ..... 6.4-1
6.5 ELECTRICAL POWER ................ 6.5-1
6.6 MISSION PROGRAMMER ............... 6.6-1
6.7 INSTRUMENTATION ................. 6.7-1
6.7.1 Development Flight Instrumentation . . . 6.7-1
6.7.2 Operational Instrumentation ....... 6.7-3
6.7.3 Calibration ............... 6.7-4
6.7.4 Launch Vehicle Instrument Unit ..... 6.7-4
6.8 COMMUNICATIONS ................. 6.8-1
6.8.1 LM Cormnuaications Performance ...... 6.8-1
6.8.2 LM/Network Communications System

Performance .............. 6.8-2
6.9 RADAR ...................... 6.9-1
6.10 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL .............. 6.10-i
6. i0. i Summary ................. 6. i0-i
6.10.2 Integrated System Performance ...... 6.10-1

v
Section Page
6.10.3 Primary Guidance, Navigation, and

Control System Performance ...... 6.10-5
\
6.10.4 Stabilization and Control System
Performance ............. 6.10-7
6.11 REACTION CONTROL ................ 6.11-1
6.11.1 System Pressures and Temperatures 6.11-1
6.11.2 Propellant Utilization ......... 6.11-3
6.11.3 Control Engine Performance ....... 6.11-5
6.12 DESCENT PROPULSION ............... 6.12-1
6.12.1 Start Characteristics ......... 6.12-1
6.12.2 Transient Characteristics ....... 6.12-2
6.12.3 Engine Throttle Response ........ 6.12-2
6.12.4 Steady-State Characteristics ...... 6.12-2
6.12.5 Shutoff Valve Phasing ......... 6.12-3
6.12.6 Propellant Quantity Gaging ....... 6.12-4
6.12.7 Supercritical Helium

Pressurization ............ 6.12-4
6.13 ASCENT PROPULSION ............... 6.13-1
6.13.1 Propellant Loading ........... 6.13-1
6.13.2 Steady-State Performance ........ 6.13-1
6.13.3 Chamber Pressure Oscillations ..... 6.13-2
6.13.4 Propellant Pressurization ....... 6.13-4
6.14 CREW STATION .................. 6.14-1
6.15 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL ............. 6.15-1

vi -,
Section Page
6.I5.1 Cabin Pressure ............. 6.15-1
6.15.2 Water System .............. 6.15-2
6.15.3 Heat Transport Section ......... 6.15-2
6.16 CONSUMABLES .................. 6.16-1
6.17 ABORT STAGING ................. 6.17-1
7.0 FLIGHT CREW ..................... 7-1
8.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION ................ 8-1
9.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE ............. 9-1
9.1 FLIGHT CONTROL ................. 9-1
9.1.1 PrelatmLch Operations .......... 9-1
9.1.2 Powered Flight ............. 9-2
9.1.3 Orbital Flight ............. 9-3
9.2 NETWORK PERFOR_NCE .............. 9-14
9.2.1 Telemetry ............... 9-14
9.2.2 Tracking ................ 9-14
9.2.3 Command ................ 9-14
9.2.4 Mission Control Center Central

Processors .............. 9-15
9.2.5 Miscellaneous Problems ......... 9-15
9.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS .............. 9-17
i0.0 EXPERIMENTS ..................... i0-i
ii.0 CONCLUSIONS ..................... ii-i
12.0 ANOMALY SUMI_ARY ................... 12-1

___ vii
Section Page
12.1 ERRATIC FREON COOLING DURING COUNTDOWN ..... 12-1
12.2 PREMATURE SHUTDOWN OF THE FIRST DESCENT

ENGINE BURN ................. 12-2
12.3 ABRUPT CHANGE IN CABIN PRESSURE LEAK RATE .... 12-3
12.4 OUT-OF-PHASE INDICATION FROM DESCENT ENGINE

PROPELLANT SHUTOFF VALVES .......... 12-4
12.5 ABRUPT CHANGES IN RECEIVED UHF SIGNAL

STRENGTH ................... 12-4
12.6 EXCESSIVE CONTROL ENGINE PROPELLANT USAGE 12-5
12.6.1 Discrepant Manifold Pressure

Indications ............. 12-5
12.6.2 Inadvertent Closure of Oxidizer

Shutoff Valve ............ 12-6
_- 12.6.3 Thrust Chamber Failure ......... 12-6
12.6.4 High Cluster Temperatures ....... 12-7
12.7 FAILURE OF DESCENT STAGE FIBERGLASS

THERMAL SHIELD ................ 12-7
12.8 INSTRUMENTATION DISCREPANCIES ......... 12-8
12.8.1 Adapter Panel Deployment ........ 12-8
12.8.2 Separation Distance Monitors ...... 12-8
12.8.3 Pressure and Temperature Sensors .... 12-9
12.8.4 Vibration Measurement ......... 12-9
13.0 VEHICLE AND SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION ........... 13-1
13.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES .......... 13-3
13.2 LUNAR MODULE .................. 13-4
13.2.1 Structures ............... 13-6

viii
Section Page
13.2.2 Thermal Control ............ 13-7
13.2.3 Pyroteci_ics .............. 13-8
13.2.4 Electrical Power ............ 13-9
13.2.5 Instrumentation ............ 13-10
13.2.6 Communications ............. 13-12
13.2.7 Guidance and Control .......... 13-15
13.2.8 Reaction Control ............ 13-18
13.2.9 Descent Propulsion ........... 13-19
13.2.10 Ascent Propulsion ........... 13-21
13.2.11 Environmental Control ......... 13-23
13.3 LAUNCH VEHICLE ................. 13-52
13.3.1 S-IB Stage ............... 13-52
13.3.2 S-IVB Stage .............. 13-52
13.3.3 Instrument Unit ............ 13-53
13.4 ADAPTER AND NOSE CONE ............. 13-56
13.5 WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA ............ 13-60
14.0 VEHICLE HISTORIES .................. 14-1
15.0 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS ................. 15-1
16.0 REFERENCES ...................... 16-1
17.0 DISTRIBUTION ..................... 17-1

=_- ix
TABLES
Table Page
2-1 APOLLO 5 MISSION EVENTS .............. 2-3
_ 3-1 DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL

PARAMETERS ................... 3-6
3-11 LAUNCH PHASE PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY

PARAMETERS ................... 3-7
3-111 ORBITAL PHASE PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY

PARAMETERS ................... 3-9
3-1V MISSION PROGRAMMER SEQUENCES III AND V STATE

VECTOR COMPARISON ................ 3-12
3-V NAVIGATION STATE VECTOR COMPARISONS ........ 3-13
3-VI ORBITAL ELEMENTS ................. 3-14
6.1-1 LM MAXIMUM LOADING CONDITIONS ........... 6.1-7
6.1-11 LM OUTRIGGER LOADS AT END OF S-IB BOOST

(MAXIMUM AXIAL ACCELERATION) .......... 6.1-8
6.1-111 LM/ADAPTER INTERACTION LOADS AT END 0F S-IB

BOOST (MAXIMUM AXIAL ACCELERATION) ....... 6.1-9
6.I-IV PEAK SURFACE PRESSURES AT STAGING ......... 6.1-10
6.I-V VIBRATION MEASUREMENTS .............. 6.1-11
6.I-VI VIBRATION LEVELS TO WHICH EQUIPMENT MOUNTED ON

THE AFT EQUIPMENT RACK WAS TESTED AT 210 Hz . . 6.1-12
6.6-1 MISSION PROGRAMMER SEQUENCE III .......... 6.6-2
6.6-II MISSION PROGRA_M_R SEQUENCE V ........... 6.6-4
6.7-1 USABLE PULSE CODE MODULATED DATA ......... 6.7-5
6.8-1 S-BAND RF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ........... 6.8-7
6.8-11 NETWORK/LM S-BAND TRANSMISSION COMBINATION

SUMMARY ..................... 6.8-9
f
X
Table Page
6.10-1 STATE VECTOR COMPARISON AT 00:10:00.86 IN LM-I

INERTIAL COORDINATE SYSTEM ........... 6.10-8
6.10-11 PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS DURING MISSION

PROGRAMMER SEQUENCE III ............. 6.10-9
6.10-111 PRELIMINARY INERTIAL _ASUREMENT UNIT ERROR

SOURCES ..................... 6.10-10
6.10-1V INFLIGHT BIAS COMPUTATION ............. 6.10-11
6.10-V LM-I MAJOR MODE TIMELINE ............. 6.10-12
6.11-1 ASCENT PROPELLANT USED BY THE REACTION CONTROL

ENGINES ..................... 6.11-10
6.11-11 REACTION CONTROL ENGINE INJECTOR TEMPERATURES . . . 6.11-11
6.12-1 DESCENT ENGINE TRANSIENT CHARACTERISTICS ..... 6.12-6
6.12-11 SUPERCRITICAL HELIU_ HEAT EXCHANGER

PERFORMANCE ................... 6.12-7
6.13-1 ASCENT ENGINE TRANSIENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY ..... 6.13-5
6.16-1 CONSUMABLES .................... 6.16-2
13.2-1 LM-I INSTRUmeNTATION PARAMETERS .......... 13-25
13.5-1 MASS PROPERTIES .................. 13-61

r
xi
FIGURES
Figure Page
2-1 Planned and actual Apollo 5 mission ........ 2-7
2-2 Apollo 5 mission detailed timeline
(a) 00:00:00 to 02:00:00 ............. 2-8

(h) 02:00:00 to 04:00:00 ............. 2-9
(c) 04:00:00 to 06:00:00 ............. 2-10
(d) 06:00:00 to 07:00:00 ............. 2-11
(e) 07:00:00 to 08:00:00 ............. 2-12
3-1 Apollo 5 mission ground track ........... 3-15
3-2 Trajectory parameters during the launch phase
(a) Latitude, longitude, and altitude ...... 3-16

(b) Space-fixed flight-path angle and velocity . 3-17
(c) Earth-fixed flight-path angle and velocity . 3-18
.... (d) Mach number and dynamic pressure ....... 3-19
3-3 Statistical summary of tracker residuals ..... 3-20
3-4 Space-fixed velocity, flight-path angle, and

altitude during the orbital phase ........ 3-21
3-5 Apogee and perigee altitude profile ........ 3-22
3-6 Space-fixed velocity, space-fixed flight-path

angle, and altitude during maneuvers
(a) Second and third descent engine firings,

and first ascent engine firing ....... 3-23
(b) Second ascent engine firing ......... 3-24
6.1-1 Launch winds ................... 6.1-13
6.1-2 Comparison of adapter body loads at the LM/adapter

interface with limit design body load
capabilities .................. 6.1-14
6.1-3 Comparison of adapter body loads at the adapter/

instrument unit interface with limit design body
load capabilities ................ 6.1-15
f
xii
Figure Page
6.1-4 Adapter vent pressure ................ 6.1-16
6.1-5 Lift-off accelerations
(a) X-axis translation and rotation, and Y-axis

translation ................. 6.1-17
(b) Y-axis rotation_ and Z-axis translation and
rotation ................... 6.1-18
6.1-6 S-IB shutdown
(a) X-axis translation and rotation, and Y-axis

translation ................. 6.1-19
(b) Y-axis rotation and Z-axis translation and
rotation ................... 6.1-20
6.1-7 LM/adapter interaction loads sign convention and

strut identification ............... 6.1-21
6.1-8 Typical outrigger strut launch loads ........ 6.1-22
6.1-9 Ascent stage base heat shield pressure measurement

locations ..................... 6.1-23
6.1-10 Descent stage upper surface pressure measurement

locations ..................... 6.1-24
6.1-11 Comparison of navigation base vibration response at

lift-off to current flight vibration and actual
qualification test levels ............. 6.1-25
6.1-12 Comparison of the landing radar antenna vibration

response at lift-off to current flight vibration
criteria and acceptance vibration test
responses ..................... 6.1-26
6.1-13 Comparison of ascent stage oxidizer tank bottom

cover vibration response at lift-off to current
flight criteria .................. 6.1-27
6.1-14 Comparison of ascent stage aft equipment rack

vibration response at lift-off to current flight
vibration criteria ................ 6.1-28
P
xiii
Figure Page
6.1-15 Vibration measurements during mission programmer

sequence III
(a) Instrumentation/telemetry noise floor

(engines not operating) ..... ...... 6.1-29
(b) Descent engine thrust chamber, ascent engine
support structure, and inertial measurement
unit during ignition and 10-percent throttle
for descent engine third firing ....... 6.1-30
(c) Descent engine thrust chamber, ascent engine
thrust chamber, ascent stage support
structure, and inertial measurement unit
during abort staging ............. 6.1-31
(d) Ascent engine thrust chamber, ascent engine
support structure, and inertial measurement
during shutdown of first ascent engine
firing .................... 6.1-32
6.2-1 Descent stage quadrant I control engine plume

impingement sensor locations and configuration. . . 6.2-6
6.2-2 Descent stage quadrant III control engine plume

impingement sensor locations and installation . . . 6.2-7
6.2-3 Descent stage insulation blanket temperatures

during LM/S-IVB stage separation
(a) Sensors GB3033T and GB3025T .......... 6.2-8

(b) Sensors GB3031T and GB3021T .......... 6.2-8
(c) Sensor GB3023T ................. 6.2-9
(d) Sensors GB3027T and GB3029T .......... 6.2-10
6.2-4 Descent stage base heat shield sensor locations . 6.2-11
6.2-5 Descent stage upper surface temperature

instrumentation .................. 6.2-12
6.2-6 Temperature measured on upper surface of descent

stage ....................... 6.2-13
6.2-7 Ascent stage heat shield sensor location ...... 6.2-14
6.2-8 Cabin floor and ascent engine cover temperatures 6.2-15
6.2-9 Cabin wall temperatures ............... 6.2-16

xiv
Figure Page
6.2-10 Ascent stage helium tank temperature ........ 6.2-17
6.2-11 Temperature of steerable S-band antenna ....... 6.2-18
6.2-12 Temperature of VHF inflight antenna ......... 6.2-19
6.5-1 Electrical power characteristics .......... 6.5-2
6.5-2 AC voltage transients ................ 6.5-3
6.5-3 Battery load sharing during mission programmer

sequence III ................... 6.5-4
6.8-i Communication system configurations ......... 6.8-10
6.8-2 Received unified S-band downlink carrier power,

Carnarvon, revolution i .............. 6.8-11
6.8-3 Primary to secondary unified S-band system

switchover, Texas_ revolution i .......... 6.8-12
6.8-4 Received unified S-band uplink carrier power,

Texas, revolution I................. 6.8-13

Texas, revolution 1................. 6.8-14

MILA, revolution ]-2 ............... 6.8-15

MILA, revolution ]-2 ............... 6.8-16

Redstone, revolution 2 .............. 6.8-17

Redstone, revolution 2 .............. 6.8-18

Guaymas, revolution 2 ............... 6.8-19

MILA, revolution 2-3 ............... 6.8-20
xv
Figure Page

MILA, revolution 2-3 ............... 6.8-21

Carnarvon, revolution 3 .............. 6.8-22

Carnarvon, revolution 3 .............. 6.8-23

Goldstone, revolution 4 .............. 6.8-24



Texas, revolution 4 ................ 6.8-27

Texas, revolution 4 .............. . . 6.8-28

Hawaii, revolution 5 ............... 6.8-29
6.8-21 Recemved unified S-band downlink carrier power,

Hawaii, revolution 5 ............... 6.8-30
6.8-22 Typical range code acquisition sequence (128 inte-

grations per step) ................ 6.8-31
6.8-23 S-band RF spectrum ................. 6.8-32
6.8-24 Turned-around unified S-band up-data signal-to-noise

ratio, MILA, revolution 1-2 ............ 6.8-33
6.8-25 Turned-around unified S-band up-voice signal-to-noise

ratio, Guaymas, revolution 2 ........... 6.8-33
6.8-26 Turned-around unified S-band up-voice signal-to-noise

ratio, MILA, revolution 2-3 ............ 6.8-33
6.8-27 Unified S-band PCM bit error probability,

Carnarvon, revolution i .............. 6.8-34
f
xvi
Figure Page
6.8-28 Unified S-band bit error probability_ Guaymas,

revolution 4 .................. 6.8-34
6.8-29 Unified S-band PCM bit error probability, Hawaii

revolution 5 .................. 6.8-34
6.8-30 Total received VHF power, Guaymas, revolution 4 . 6.8-35
6.8-31 Total received VHF power, Texas, revolution 4 . 6.8-36
6.8-32 VHF PCM bit error probability, Carnarvon,

revolution I .................. 6.8-37
6.8-33 VHF PCM bit error probability, Guaymas,

revolution 4 .................. 6.8-37
6.8-34 VHF PCM bit error probability, Hawaii

revolution 5 .................. 6.8-37
6.8-35 Total received UHF and VHF power, Carnarvon,

revolution i .................. 6.8-38
6.10-i LM/S-IVB stage separation sequence of events 6.10-13
6.10-2 Spacecraft dynamics - separation and maneuver to

cold-soak attitude ............... 6.10-14
6.10-3 Gi_al angle comparison - maneuver to cold-soak

attitude .................... 6.10-15
6.10-4 Typical limit cycle during cold-soak attitude

hold ...................... 6.10-16
6.10-5 Pitch and roll phase plane ............ 6.10-17
6.10-6 Spacecraft dynamics - maneuver to attitude for first

descent engine firing .............. 6.10-18
6.10-7 Gimbal angle comparison - maneuver to attitude for

first descent engine firing ........... 6.10-19
6.10-8 Spacecraft dynamics - maneuver to attitude for

second descent engine firing .......... 6.10-20
6.10-9 Gimbal angle comparison - maneuver to attitude for

second descent engine firing .......... 6.10-21
xvii
Figure Page
6.10-10 Spacecraft dynamics - mission programmer

sequence III .................. 6.10-22
6.10-11 Mission programmer sequence Ill .......... 6.10-23
6.10-12 Abort staging dynamics .............. 6.10-24
6.10-13 Spacecraft dynamics - second ascent engine

firing
(a) Ignition and initial portion of firing,

with rate control ............. 6.10-25
(b) Contro_ propellant depletion ......... 6.10-26
6.10-14 Inertial measurement unit coefficient history
(a) X-axis accelerometer ............. 6.10-27

(b) Y-axis accelerometer ............. 6.10-28
(c) Z-axis accelerometer ............. 6.10-29
(d) X-axis gyro ................. 6.10-30
_-- (e) Y-axis gyro ................. 6.10-31
(f) Z-axis gyro ................. 6.10-32
6.10-15 Inertial measurement unit prelaunch alignment

orientation ................... 6.10-33
6.10-16 Launch phase velocity comparisons
(a) X-axis .................... 6.10-34

(b) Y-axis .................... 6.10-35
(c) Z-axis .................... 6.10-36
6.11-1 Manifold pressure during system activation

sequence .................... 6.11-12
6.11-2 Manifold pressures at main A closure ....... 6.11-13
6.11-3 B system manifold pressures at propellant

depletion .................... 6.11-14
6.11-4 Helium B tank pressure (corrected to 70 ° F) during

period of propellant depletion ......... 6.11-15
6.11-5 Manifold pressures during A system reactivation . . 6.11-16

xviii
Figure Page
6.11-6 Manifold pressures during period of A system

reactivation and crossfeed valve opening .... 6.11-17
6.11-7 Manifold pressures after interconnect valve

closure ..................... 6.11-18
6.11-8 Propellant expended ................ 6.11-19
6.11-9 Performance of propellant quantity measuring

device ..................... 6.11-20
6.11-10 Engine chamber pressures during first firings

(separation sequence) .............. 6.11-21
6.11-11 Chamber pressure of engines 4-down and 4-up during

high propellant usage following first ascent
engine firing .................. 6.11-22
6.11-12 Engine 4-up chamber pressure at B system oxidizer

depletion .................... 6.11-24
6.11-13 Ignition pressure spike (detonation) in engine

3-down during operation with two-phase oxidizer
at 50 psia manifold pressure and with helium in
fuel manifold .................. 6.11-24
6.11-14 Cluster temperatures during the mission ...... 6.11-25
6.11-15 Cluster i and engines 1-down and 1-forward injector

head temperatures at LM/S-IVB stage separation. . 6.11-26

head temperatures during mission programmer
sequence III .................. 6.11-27
6.11-17 Cluster 2 and engines 2-down and 2-up injector head

temperatures during mission programmer
sequence III .................. 6.11-28

head temperatures during second ascent engine
firing ..................... 6.11-29
6.11-19 Comparison of thermal response of clusters 3 and 4

to control engine activity during second ascent
engine firing .................. 6.11-30
xix
Figure Page
6.12-1 Chamber pressure during start sequence of descent

engine firings ................. 6.12-8
6.12-2 Descent propulsion parameters during transition

from lO-percent throttle to full throttle
(typical of second and third firings) ...... 6.12-9
6.12-3 Chamber pressure during second descent engine

firing ..................... 6.12-10
6.12-4 Descent engine schematic ............. 6.12-11
6.12-5 Supercritical helium supply pressure during first

6.12-6 Supercritical helium supply pressure during second

6.12-7 Supercritical helium supply pressure during third

_- descent engine firing .............. 6.12-14
6.12-8 Supercritical helium supply pressure during coast

period between second and third firings ..... 6.12-15
6.13-1 Chamber pressure during ascent engine firings
(a) First firing ................. 6.13-6

(b) Second firing ............... 6.13-7
6.13-2 Ascent engine chamber pressure oscillations .... 6.13-8
6.15-1 Pressure of cabin and internal pressure of cabin

pressure relief valve .............. 6.15-4
6.15-2 Cabin pressure profile .............. 6.15-5
6.15-3 Water/glycol pump inlet temperature ........ 6.15-6
6.16-1 Water usage .................... 6.16-3
6.16-2 Electrical power consumption ........... 6.16-_
6.16-3 Ascent engine propellant usage .......... 6.16-5
6.16-4 Descent engine propellant usage ......... 6.16-6

f
xx
Figure Page
6.16-5 Reaction control propellant usage ......... 6.16-7
6.17-1 Abort staging characteristics ........... 6.17-2
6.17-2 Abort staging sequence, pyrotechnic system A 6.17-3
9.1-1 Real-time decision logic ............. 9-13
13.0-1 Apollo 5 space vehicle .............. 13-2
13.2-1 Lunar module configuration ............ 13-30
13.2-2 Ascent and descent stages of LM-I ......... 13-31
13.2-3 Dimensions of lunar module ............ 13-32
13.2-4 _ ascent stage structure ............. 13-33
13.2-5 LM ascent stage structure (top view) ....... 13-34
13.2-6 Aft equipment bay structure ............ 13-35
13.2-7 Descent stage structure (top view) ........ 13-36
13.2-8 Descent stage structure (side views) ....... 13-37
13.2-9 Locations of explosive devices .......... 13-38
13.2-10 AC power system (contact positions shown are

as-flown) .................... 13-39
13.2-11 DC power system (contacts shown in as-flown

configuration) ................. 13-40
13.2-12 Operational instrumentation functional block

diagram ..................... 13-41
13.2-13 Development flight instrumentation data conditioning

and processing system .............. 13-42
13.2-14 Development flight instrumentation data transmission

system ..................... 13-43
13.2-15 Development flight instrumentation ranging and

tracking RF system ............... 13-43
xxi
Figure Page
13.2-16 Commumication system schematic .......... 13-44
13.2-17 Control paths
(a) Primary guidance, navigation, and control 13-45

(b) Backup .................... 13-46
13.2-18 Reaction control system .............. 13-47
13.2-19 Descent propulsion system schematic ........ 13-48
13.2-20 Ascent propulsion propellant/pressurization

schematic .................... 13-49
13.2-21 Ascent engine schematic .............. 13-50
13.2-22 Schematic of environmental control system ..... 13-51
13.3-1 S-IB stage .................... 13-54
13.3-2 S-IVB stage .................... 13-55
13.4-1 Location of lunar module within adapter ...... 13-57
13.4-2 Adapter panel separation lines .......... 13-58
13.4-3 Nose cone jettison controller, schematic diagram

of system A of a redundant A and B system .... 13-59
14-1 LM-I history at Bethpage ............. 14-2
14-2 LM-I history at Kennedy Space Center ....... 14-3

xxi i
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ac, AC alternating current
ADIA drift due to acceleration along the input axis
ADOA drift due to acceleration along the output axis
ADSRA drift due to acceleration along the spin reference

axis
a.m. ante meridian
amp-hr ampere hours
amps amperes
ANT Antigua tracking station
ASC Ascension tracking station
BDA Bermuda tracking station
CAL California tracking station
cm/sec centimeter per second
cm/sec 2 centimeter per second per second
CRO Carnarvon tracking station
CSQ Coastal Sentry Quebec tracking ship
CYI Canary ]islands tracking station
D down firing
dB decibel
dBm decibels
dc, DC direct current
deg degree
o F degree Fahrenheit
f xxiii
o R degree Rankine
DFI Development Flight Instrumentation
deg/sec degree per second
E East
FA_U Eraseable Memory Unit
e.s.t, eastern standard time, fifth time zone west of

Greenwich
F force
f fore/aft firing
fd doppler frequency
fig. figure
FM Frequency Modulation
ft feet
ft-lb foot pound
ft/sec feet per second
ft 3 cubic feet
g gravity, 32.2 ft/sec 2
GBI Grand Bahama Island tracking station
GDS Goldstone tracking station
G.m.t. Greenwich mean time
GWM Guam tracking station
GYM Guaymas tracking station
HAW Hawaii tracking station
hr hour
i
xxiv -
Hz hertz, equivalent to one cycle per second
in. inch
in-lb inch pounds
k kilo-, ]000
KSC Kennedy Space Center, Florida
ib pounds
ib/hr pound per hour
ib/ft 2 pound per square foot
ib/ft 3 pound per cubic foot
ib/min pound per minute
ib/sec pound per second
lh-sec pound-seconds
LH 2 liquid hydrogen
LM Lunar Module
LTA Lunar Module Test Article
M mega-, 1,000,000
m milli-, 0.0001
_RU milli Earth radius units
MIL Merritt Island tracking station
MILA Merritt Island Launch Area
min minute
MLA Merritt Island tracking station
MSC Manned Spacecraft Center
msec millisecond
XXV
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
MSFN Manned Space Flight Network
N North
NBD null bias drift
N2H 4 hydrazine
N204 nitrogen tetroxide
n. mi nautical mile
NRZ non return to zero
nx, ny, nZ loads along the X, Y, and Z axes
o.d. outside diameter
PA-I ascent propulsion test article
PAT Patrick Air Force Base tracking station
P chamber pressure
c
PCM pulse code modulation
PCMTEA pulse code modulation and timing electronics

assembly
p.m. post meridian
PM phase modulation
ppm parts per million
psfa pounds per square foot_ absolute
psia pounds per square inch, absolute
psid pounds per square inch, differential
q dynamic pressure
R radius
f
xxvi
rad radian
rad/sec 2 radians per second
range zero integral second before lift-off
RED Redstone tracking ship
ref. reference
RF radio frequency
RKV Rose Knot Victor tracking ship
RX_ Ry, RZ reactions along X, Y, and Z axes
rms root mean square
s side firing
scc/hr standard cubic centimeter per hour
sec seconds
S-IB Saturn IB, launch vehicle
S-IVB Saturn second stage
sq. in. square inch
T time of lift-off
TAN Tananarive tracking station
TEL IV telemetry station at KSC
TEX Texas tracking station
time referenced to range zero
U up firing
UDMH unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine
UHF ultrahigh frequency
v volts
xxvii
V ac volts
V dc volts direct current
VHF very high frequency
WHS White Sands tracking station
WTN Watertown tracking ship
XA spacecraft body stations, in.
X, Y, Z axes
angle of attack
AV change in velocity
I--
i-i
i. 0 SUMMARY
The Apollo 5 mission, the first mission of a flight configuration

lunar module (LM-I), was successfully flown on January 22 and 23, 1968.
The primary objectives of the Apollo 5 mission were to flight-verify the
ascent and descent propulsion systems and the abort staging function for
manned flight. These objectives were met.
Lift-off occurred at 22:48:08 G.m.t. (05:48:08 p.m.e.s.t.). The

S-IVB stage inserted the lunar module/S-IVB combination into an earth
orbit after i0 minutes 3 seconds of powered flight. The lunar module
loads and vibrations measured during this phase of the flight were within
the design capability of the structures. Cooling commenced after S-IVB
stage cutoff, and the equipment temperatures were properly regulated by
the coolant system for the remainder of the mission. The lunar module
was separated from the S-IVB stage at 00:53:50, using the control engines.
Separation disturbances were small. The lunar module was maneuvered to
a cold-soak attitude which was maintained by the guidance system until
early in the third revolution. A minimal control engine duty cycle was
required to maintain the desired attitude.
Midway through the third revolution, the first descent engine firing
was initiated. The planned duration of this firing was 38 seconds; how-
ever, after only 4 seconds, the guidance system shut down the engine.
Both the guidance system and the propulsion system operated properly, and
the premature shutdown resulted from incomplete systems coordination.
After the premature shutdown, a planned alternate mission which

provided minimum mission requirements was selected. At approximately
06:10:00, the automatic sequencer within the onboard mission programmer
initiated the sequencing for the second and third descent engine firings,
the abort staging, and the first ascent engine firing. Attitude rate
control was maintained with the backup control system. The descent engine
gimballed properly and responded smoothly to the commands to full throt-
tle. The thermal aspects of the supercritical helium pressurization sys-
tem could not be adequately evaluated because of the short duration of
the three descent engine firings. During abort staging, all system op-
erations and vehicle dynamics were satisfactory for manned operations.
After the first ascent engine firing, the primary control system was
reselected to control the spacecraft attitudes and rates. Because the
primary system had been passive during the abort staging sequence, the
computer program did not reflect the change of mass resulting from stag-
ing. Therefore, computations of control engine firing times were based
on the mass of a two-stage vehicle and resulted in an extremely high pro-
pellant usage by the control engines, eventually causing propellant
1-2
depletion. Because of excessive control engine activity, the control

engine cluster temperatures exceeded the upper red-line limits but with-
out any detrimental effects.
The reaction control system was subjected to abnormal operating con-

ditions as a result of low manifold pressures after propellant depletion.
Continued operation under these abnormal conditions resulted in three
malfunctions within the system; none had any appreciable effect on the
mission.
The second firing of the ascent engine, initiated by the automatic

sequencer, began at 07:44:13 and continued until thrust decay at 07:50:03.
During the initial portion of the firing, attitude rate control was main-
tained using propellants from the ascent propulsion tanks through inter-
connect valves to the control engines. However, the sequencer automat-
ically closed the interconnect valves, thus depleting control propellants.
With the loss of rate control s the vehicle began tumbling while the as-
cent engine was firing. All tracking was lost within 2 minutes after
thrust decay. The lunar module had been in a retrograde orientation
during the controlled portion of the firing, and trajectory simulations
show that the lunar module entered over the Pacific Ocean soon after
firing. The predicted point of impact was approximately 400 miles west
of the coast of Central America.
The overall performance of the lunar module was good and met all
requirements for manned orbital flight. All operational systems were
successfully verified, and the abort staging sequence was demonstrated.
r
2-1
2.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION
2.1 PLANNED MISSION
The Apollo 5 mission was planned to consist of two descent engine

maneuvers, two ascent engine maneuvers, and an abort staging. The over-
all planned and actual missions are shown in figure 2-1 and the event
times are given in table 2-1. The first descent engine maneuver duration
was to be 38 seconds (26 seconds at 10-percent throttle and 12 seconds at
full throttle). The second descent engine maneuver thrust profile was
to be representative of the profile expected for lunar landing. The
profile was to consist of five phases extending over 734 seconds. The
abort staging sequence was to be initiated at the end of the random
throttling phase with the descent engine operating at full throttle and
controlled by the guidance computer. The abort staging sequence was to
include descent engine shutdown and ignition of the ascent engine for a
5-second firing.
The second ascent engine maneuver, to propellant depletion (approxi-

mately 445 seconds), was to be the termination of the primary mission.
Extended mission activities were planned to continue until the remaining
consumables were expended.
2.2 ACTUAL MISSION
The actual mission is compared with the planned mission in fig-

ure 2-1. All major events during the actual mission are shown in
figure 2-2.
Lift-off occurred at 22:48:08 G.m.t. (05:48:08 p.m. e.s.t.) on

January 22, 1968 (fig. 2-1). The lunar module was separated from the
S-IVB stage at 00:53:50 and was maneuvered to a cold-soak attitude. After
two and a half revolutions, the first descent engine maneuver was initi-
ated by a discrete from the guidance computer. As planned prior to flight,
the maneuver was begun with less than normal pressure in the propellant
tanks. However, as a result, the computer shut down the engine after only
4 seconds because the thrust buildup did not satisfy the programmed
velocity/time criteria. Both the guidance system and the propulsion
system operated properly, and the premature shutdown was the result of
incomplete systems coordination.
After the premature shutdown, an alternate mission --the minimum

mission requirements sequence --was selected. The major differences
between the planned and the alternate mission were deletion of the
734-second descent engine firing and substitution of mission programmer
control for guidance computer control during all firings.
2-2
A 33-second firing of the descent engine was initiated at 06:10:46

by an automatic sequence within the mission programmer. The sequence
continued with a third descent engine firing, an abort staging, and the
first ascent engine firing. The sequence was stopped by ground command
after the first ascent engine firing.
A second mission programmer sequence was used to initiate the second

ascent engine firing. The firing was planned to continue until propellant
depletion. During the initial portion of the firing, rate control was
maintained by the control engines, using propellant from the ascent pro-
pulsion system through interconnect valves. _%e sequencer automatically
closed the interconnects, and since the control engine propellants were
already depleted, the vehicle began to tumble, Vehicle rates became of
such magnitude that propellants could not flow into the engine, and
helium ingestion caused thrust decay prior to propellant depletion. All
tracking was lost about 2 minutes after thrust decay, thus terminating
the mission.
2-3
TABLE 2-1.- APOLLO 5 MISSION EVENTS
I
Mission elapsed time_ |
Event hr:min:sec I
Planned Actual t
Launch Phase
Range zero - 22:48:08 G.m.t. 00:00:00 00:00:00

Maximum dynamic pressure 00:01:14.2 00:01:11.5
S-IB stage inboard engine cutoff 00:02:19.3 00:02:19.0

S-IB stage outboard engine cutoff 00:02:22.3 00:02:22.3
S-IB/S-IVB stage separation 00:02:23.6 00:02:23.5
S-IVB stage start command 00:02:25.0 00:02:24.9
• S-IVB stage cutoff signal 00:09:58.4 00:09:53.3
Orbital Phase
Orbital insertion 00:10:08.4 00:10:03.3
Nose cone jettison 00:10:43.5 00:10:38.5

Adapter panel deployment 00:19:58.5 00:19:53.5
Initiate +X translation 00:54:01.5 00:53:50.1
LM/S-IVB stage separation 00:54:06.5 a00:53:55.7

Initiate maneuver to cold-soak attitude 00:55:53 00:54:32.3
Initiate maneuver to attitude for first 03:55:31 03:55:09.6
descent engine firing
+X translation 03:59:47 03:59:33.9
"Engine on" discrete 03:59:54 03:59:41.4

Engine on 03:59:54 a03:59:41.7
"Engine off" discrete 04:00:32 03:59:45.6

IEngine off 04:00:32 a03:59:45.7
aBecause of parameter sample intervals, the events shown could

f have occurred any time in the second p_evious to the time shown.
TABLE 2-1.- APOLLO 5 MISSION EVENTS - Continued
Mission elapsed time,

Event hr:min:sec
Planned Actual
Mission Programmer Sequence III
Sequence III initiate 06:10:00
+X translation on 06:10:05 06:10:07.4
+X translation off 06:10:15 06:10:17.5

+X translation on 06:10:20 06:10:22.4

+X translation on 06:10:31 06:10:33.4
Descent engine on (second firing) 06:10:39 a06:10:41.7

Descent engine to full throttle 06:11:05 06:11:07.8
Engine off 06:11:12 a06:11:14.7

+X translation on 06:11:36 06:11:38.4
Descent engine on (third firi_:g) 06:11:44 a06:11:46.7
Descent engine to full throttle 06:12:10 06:12:12.8
Abort staging 06:12:12 06:12:14.3
Descent engine off 06:12:12 a06:12:14.7

Ascent engine on (first firin ) 06:12:12 06:12:14.7
Ascent engine off 06:13:14 06:13:14.3
aBecause of parameter sample intervals, the events shown could

have occurred any time in the second previous to the time shown.
2-5
TABLE 2-1.- APOLLO 5 MISSION EVENTS - Concluded
Mission elapsed time,

Event hr:min:sec
Planned Actual
Mission Program_er Sequence V
Sequence V initiate 07:43:55

+X translation on 07:43:57 07:44:00.3
Ascent engine on (second firing) 07:44:09 07:44:12.7
Engine fire override command 07:44:15

+X translation on 07:45:08 07:45:11.3

Ascent engine thrust decay 07:50:03

NASA-S-68-1922
I
o_
Planned
_1 Abort
staging I EZZ7-1
/ Second First [ Iascent [
--4 descent ascent _--4 enqine I= _ Extended
|engine engine I Ima-neuver I ---- mlsslon
(38-sec) I maneuver _laneuverl Irma _.... _I activity
I
j Ic734-sec)
CS-sec,
J_
(22:48:08['--=I Lunar module/l'---1Maneuver to Initiate first
G.m.t. I IS-r_Bstage
I Ic°ld-s°ak descent
Jan. 22, _ separation _ attitude engine
1968) J I I I maneuver
I
End first
ldescent engineI ISecond
.
descentl
. .
I Abort staging ] I
I [-----[eng,ne f,nng _ Third descent t Firstascentll Second ascent
i___s%_,
er i l_-sec, i leng'nef'r'ng
(28-sec) engine firingF"_
(60-sec) I I engine firing
Figure 2-1.- Planned and actual Apollo 5 mission.

NASA-S-68- 1923
Rev Time Rev Time
-- -- 00:00:00 ----01:00:00
MIL
00:03:15 LM environmental control

-- BDA water valve open --
-- 00:i0:05 Orbit insertion --

00:I0:38 Nose cone jettison
-- CYI
-- 00:19:55 Adapter panel deploy -- HAW
-- -- RKV
i -- 00:30:00 --01:30:00
TEX (01:55:12 -_ Primary S-bandof[

-_01:53:29 _ Secondary S-band on
,,01:55:35 -_ Control engine propellant
-- -- MIL crossfeed close (command
sent to verify crossfeed
is closed)
-- -- BDA
CSQ
-- CRO 00:50:57 Main solenoid valves --

opened
00:50:50 Helium squibs opened
"_ , 00:53:50
00:53;55 First separatio_
Primary S-band onfiring on
-- 00:53:56 LM/S-IEB separation --
00:54:00 First separation firing off
00:54:05 Second separation firing on
00:54:10 Second separation firing off
00:54:52 Maneuver to cold-soak
-- -- 01:00:00 attitude -- --02:00:00
,_ • Ground command
(a) 00:00:00 to 02:00:00.
Figure 2-2.- Apollo 5 mission detailed timeline.

2-8
NASA-S-68- 1924
Rev Time Rev Time
-- 02:00:00 F-- 03:00:00
--
I2
TEX
MIL
BDA
-- CSQ
-- CRO
2 -- 02:30:00 -- @3:30:00
CSO
-- -- 03:55:10 Initiate maneuver to descent
CRO engine firing attitude
j/05:59:34 +X translation on
RKV _ _ 03:59:42 Descent engine start for
-- -- 03:00:00 -- --04:00:00103,59 • •42 +X
first translation
firing off
-_ Ground command /k03159146 Descent engine shutdown
(b) 02;00:00 to 04:00:00,
Figure2-2.- Continued.
_f
NASA-S-68- 1925 2-9

Rev Time Rev Time
-- 04:00:00 ---- 05:00:00
-- HAW 04:25:00 Begin alternate mission C --
04:28:55 Select mission

-- 04:50:00 programmer sequence m -- 05:50:00
RKV CRO
-- GYM -- 05:35:01 • Computer timer update

for second ascent engine firing
TEX
-- MIL
BDA
-- ANT
for mission programmer

sequence ]I]
_ 04:52:00
04:51:31 Select
Initiate minimum
attitude deadband
maneuver
4
05:00:00 ASC -- -- 06:00:00

Ground command
(c) 04:00:00 to 06:00:00.
Figure 2-2.- Continued.
f
2-10
NASA-S-68- 1926
Rev Time Rev Time
------ 06:00:00 06:00:28 • Ascent battery -- -- 06:30:00

to backup
06:00:46 • Master ann ON (pyro
bus activated)
ASC
-- RKV 06:05:34 -_ Select backup control --

(rate damping only)
06:10:00 -.I<Mission programmer
sequence ]]_ initiated
GOS 06:10:07 +X translation on
06:10:18 +X translation off
GYM 06:10:22 +X translation on
06:10:27 FX translation off
06:10:33 +X translation on
06:10:42 Descent engine second
06:10:46 +× translation off

4 '
06:11:08 Descent
Start
engine to --
maximum thrust
06:11;15 Descent engine shutdown
06:11:38 +× translation on
06:11:47 Descent engine third
start
06:11:51 +X translation off 06:44:00 Control engine system B -
06:12:13, Descent engine to
--06:15:00 maximum thrust -- 06:45:00 thruster 4-up last
MIL 06:12:14 Abort stage (descent observed operating
engine shutdown,
XN NGBI ascent engine start)
06:13:14 Ascent engine shutdown
(stops mission programmer

06:13:39 sequence
• Select 111
backup control
I k 06:14:05 _ Select (high
guidance primary
propellant
f 06:17:11 • Control engine system

-- ._NT __ usage
beg_n)
A propellant valves closed
C_t06:21:56 C°ntr°l
depleted
engine system Bfuel
I,,06:22:20 Control engine system B
oxidizer depleted
06:25:58 -_ Navigation update
_ 06:30:00 -- -- 07:00:00
_< Ground command

(d) 06:00:00 to 07:00:00_
Figure 2-2.- Continued.

_f
2-11
NASA-S-68- 1927
Rev Time Rev Time
--07:00:00 -- --07:30:00
-- CRO -- HAW
/07:40:59 _4Ascent engine sysLem A

propellant interconnect
valves opened
07:42:17 _AscenLenginessystem B
07:09:41 _< Mass update propellant interconnect
-- (not completed) -- valyes opened
07:10:14 _ Control engine system 07:42:59 -,14
Control engine system B
B propellant valves closed -.,,m---- propellant valves opened
07:10:53 .1< Control engine system 07:43:58 -.14
Mission programmer
A propellant valves opened sequence _initiated
07:12:24 ,14 Control engine 07:44:00 +X translation on
propellant crossfeed 5 07:44:13 Ascent engine second start
valves opened 07:44:15 • Engine start override
WTN 07:44:17 +X translation off
--07:15:00 --07:45:00 07:45:11 +X translation on
RKV 07:45:27 +X translation off
07:46:42 Control engine propellant
crossfeed valves closed;
system A fuel depleted
interconnect valve closed;

07:46:43 Ascent engine systemA
system A propellant
valve opened
07:46:53 Ascent engine system B
-- -- GYM interconnect valve closed_
system B propellant valve
opened
07:48:06 Control engine systemA
oxidizer depleted
i07:50:03 Second ascent engine
,Jl firing thrust decay
-- -- |107:52:10 Final communication with
Ix ascent stage
/
------ 07:230:00 I08:00:00
Ground command
(e) 07:00:00 to 08:00:00.
Figure 2-2.- Concluded.

f
3-1
3.0 TRAJECTORY DATA
A comparison of the planned and actual trajectories of the Apollo 5

mission is presented in this section. The trajectories referred to as
planned are preflight-calculated trajectories obtained from references i
and 2. The actual trajectories are based on tracking data from the
Manned Space Flight Network and on the actual spacecraft data. Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) supplied the trajectory data for the launch
phase up to the time of lunar module/S-IVB separation, and a detailed
analysis is presented in reference 3. The orbital analysis in this sec-
tion is based on the preliminary best estimate trajectory data generated
in 21 days after the end of the mission; the final trajectory data will
be released in supplement 2 to this report.
The earth model for all trajectories and analyses of the trackers
contained geodetic and gravitational constants representing the Fischer
ellipsoid. The state vectors for the events are based on results from
the orbital analysis in section 3.2. These vectors are _n the Geographic
Coordinate system defined in table 3-1. The ground track of the orbit
and the location of the tracking network sites for this mission are shown
in figure 3-1.
3.1 LAUNCH
Launch phase conditions were nominal as shown in figure 3-2. Mach i

occurred at 00:00:59.8 at an altitude of 24 574 feet and was approximately
0.2 second earlier than expected but occurred at the planned altitude.
The maximum dynamic pressure of 655 ib/ft 2 occurred at 00:01:11.5. This
was 2.7 seconds earlier and 2862 feet lower in altitude than planned.
The actual cutoff times for the inboard and outboard engines were
within 0.3 second of the planned times. The conditions at outboard en-
gine cutoff_ as presented in table 3-11, were ii ft/sec low in velocity,
2339 feet high in altitude_ and 0.23 degree high in flight-path angle,
when compared with the planned conditions. The S-IVB stage engine cutoff
was 5 seconds earlier than planned but was within the 3-sigma limits.
The velocity and flight-path angle were low by 2 ft/sec and 0.01 degree,
respectively, and altitude was high by 766 feet, when compared with the
planned conditions in table 3-11. Orbital insertion occurred i0 seconds
after S-IVB stage engine cutoff. The insertion conditions listed in
table 3-11 were based on launch vehicle powered-flight data and S-IVB
stage first-revolution tracking data.
3-2
The Goddard Space Flight Center provided tracking solutions of the

S-IVB stage after lunar module/S-IVB stage separation. A lifetime of
15 hours 32 minutes was computed for the S-IVB stage, with predicted
entry in the 10th revolution near the east coast of Australia.
3.2 ORBIT
3.2.1 Trajectory Profile Analysis
Trajectory reconstruction was divided into the four free flight

phases defined by the following maneuvers: (i) lunar module/S-IVB stage
separation, (2) first descent engine firing, (3) second descent engine
firing (mission programmer sequence III), and (4) second ascent engine
firing (mission programmer sequence V).
The preliminary C-band evaluation is based on individual station

performance for each tracker used in calculating the trajectory profile.
Figure 3-3 is a summary of the C-band evaluation in the form of residual
statistics. The bias magnitude was calculated as the mean value of the
residuals for the observations in a given phase. The noise magnitude was
calculated as the rms value of the residuals. All residuals were ob-
tained by subtracting the observed values from the computed values for
each tracker, based on the data fit.
The preliminary S-band evaluation is based on total system perform-

ance rather than on individual station performance. This evaluation was
accomplished by comparing the orbital vectors obtained from selected
S-band data with comparable C-band data.
During the pre-separation phase, the data from the two Bermuda track-
ers and Tananarive provided a usable fit, although not as good as desired.
However, at Tananarive there appeared to be a 0.06-degree azimuth bias,
which was subsequently rejected (fig. 3-3). S-band data were not avail-
able for this phase; therefore, no comparisons can be made between the
S-band and C-band state vectors.
Phase i extended from lunar module/S-IVB stage separation to the

first descent engine firing. As shown in figure 3-3, a good data fit was
obtained with data from Antigua, Bermuda, Patrick, Merritt Island, and
the first pass over White Sands. White Sands, Merritt Island, and Ber-
muda exceeded the theoretical noise limits, but the bias was well within
theoretical limits and the data were acceptable. A comparison of the
converged S-band and C-band state vectors for this phase agreed within
150 feet in position and 0.21 ft/sec in velocity.
Phase 2 extended from cutoff of the first descent engine firing to

the second descent engine firing. Here again, as shown in figure 3-3, a
3-3
good fit was obtained with data from Grand Bahama, Merritt Island, Car-
narvon, and White Sands. The converged S-band and C-band state vectors
agreed within 420 feet in position and 0.62 ft/sec in velocity.
Phase 3 (first ascent engine firing to second ascent engine firing)

- had greater inaccuracies because of low radar elevation angles and the
excessive firing cycle of the control engines. Tananarive and Ascension
provided sufficient C-band tracking data for satisfactory orbit determin-
ation, even though Tananarive again had an undesirable azimuth bias. For
the first time, Ascension data were usable. _ The Ascension S-band resid-
uals (the only S-band data) for phase 3 agreed favorably with the two
C-band residuals for this phase.
Tracking data which were available but not used in the best estimate
trajectory were deleted for various reasons. Canary Island data in the
pre-separation phase were inconsistent with the other three stations. In
phase i, the Carnarvon range data degraded the solution, and White Sands
appeared to be locked on a side-lobe of the antenna during the second
pass. In phase 2, the Hawaii data were inconsistent with the fit, and
Ascension data contained discontinuities in range and azimuth similar to
the range discontinuity exhibited for the high ellipse portion of the
-- Apollo 4 mission.
Time histories of space-fixed velocity, flight-path angle, and alti-

tude for the four trajectory phases previously described are presented in
figure 3-4. Figure 3-5 shows a profile of apogee and perigee altitudes
during the mission.
3.2.2 Lunar Module/S-IVB Stage Separation
The separation conditions contained in table 3-111 were obtained by

simulating the separation sequence using a phase i vector and integrating
this back through the sequence by using platform gimbal angles and accel-
eration data, and actual spacecraft mass characteristics. The validity
of this simulated solution is indicated by comparing an orbital analysis
pre-separation-phase vector to a phase-i vector at the time of separation,
then comparing the pre-separation-phase vector to the simulation, and
finally comparing the phase-i vector to the simulation. The pre-
separation-phase vector and the phase-i vector agreed to within 7200 feet
in position and 6 ft/sec in total velocity. The pre-separation-phase and
simulation vectors agreed to within 7900 feet in position and 8 ft/sec
in total velocity. The phase-i and simulation vectors agreed to within
600 feet in position and 2 ft/sec in total velocity. The separation con-
ditions computed by MSFC agreed with the conditions in this report to
within 3200 feet in position and 5 ft/sec in velocity; however, the MSFC
conditions were computed using complete first revolution tracking data
on the S-IVB stage only.
_m
3-4
3.2.3 Maneuver Profile Analysis
The actual event time history of the maneuvers performed during the
two mission programmer sequences is shown in table 2-1. Figure 3-6 shows
space-fixed velocity, flight-path angle, and altitude for mission pro-
grammer sequences III and V. Figure 3-1 shows the simulated ground track
for entry of the ascent stage. Table 3-1V presents a comparison of state
vectors reconstructed from guidance and navigation accelerometer data,
radar tracking data (best estimated trajectory), and the simulated tra-
jectory program. Table 3-V includes state vector comparisons between
the onboard guidance computer_ the real time computer complex, and the
best estimated trajectory. The three times chosen for the comparisons
in table 3-V were (i) orbital insertion, (2) immediately prior to the
onboard-computed first descent engine firing, and (3) the state vector
time for the navigation update sent prior to the second ascent engine
firing.
Mission progrs_mmer sequence III maneuvers.- The mission programmer

sequence III maneuvers were reconstructed using two independent post-
flight trajectory programs. The two reconstruction programs used in
extrapolating the maneuvers were the guidance and navigation trajectory
reconstruction program which processes accelerometer data, and a quasi _-
six-degree-of-freedom operational trajectory simulation program. The
guidance and navigation accelerometer reconstruction program, which is
considered the most reliable source for generating the maneuver recon-
struction, did not include the finalized set of inertial measurement unit
performance errors including misalig_lents, but did include the preflight-
predicted accelerometer scale factor and bias terms. The mission pro-
grammer sequence III maneuver profile is shown in figure 3-6. The third
and most accurate method of determining the conditions at the beginning
and end of a maneuver is integration of the free flight tracking vector
(best estimated trajectory) to the specific event. The comparisons of
state vectors derived from the three data sources are presented in
table 3-1V for the first ascent engine firing (abort staging) and cut-
off of the first ascent engine firing. A state vector established from
tracking data during free flight phase 2 at 06:09:52 was used to ini-
tialize the simulated sequence III maneuver. Actual gimbal angles for
sequence III maneuvers were implemented into the simulation program to
provide an equivalent six-degree-of-freedom o_ital integration/attitude
control profile. The thrust profiles for the second and third descent
engine firings and the first ascent engine firing were based on chamber
pressures, vehicle propellant weights, and the rate of propellant usage.
During the start and shutdown of the first ascent engine firing, the
simulated results agree closely with the guidance and navigation recon-
struction and the radar tracking (best estimate trajectory) conditions,
as can be seen from table 3-1V.
3-5
The conditions presented for the tracking vector comparison at abort

staging were obtained from the NORAD skin tracking vector of the descent
stage integrated back to the time of abort staging. The best estimate
tracking vector presented for cutoff of the first ascent engine firing
was determined by integrating a phase-3 vector back to cutoff. This vec-
" tor agreed with the guidance and navigation accelerometer reconstructed
and simulated state vectors. The orbital elements at the completion of
the first ascent engine firing are presented in table 3-VI.
Mission programmer sequence V maneuver.- The second ascent engine

firing was initiated at a retrograde orientation with a subsequent de-
crease in velocity up to the time of reaction control propellant deple-
tion. Gimbal lock occurred at 07:47:30, after which time the accelerom-
eter and angle data were meaningless. The maneuver profile for the second
ascent engine firing to the time of gimbal lock, shown in figure 3-6, was
obtained from the guidance and navigation accelerometer reconstruction
program. Using a state vector from phase 3, the maneuver profile for the
second ascent engine firing was also reconstructed by means of the simu-
lation program which used gimbal angles and the actual thrust profile to
the time of gimbal lock. The comparison of the results at gimbal lock
between the two programs is good. The differences shown are attributed
" to control engine thrust effects on the state vector, and radical changing
of the gimbal angles, and the uncertainty in the preliminary thrust pro-
file.
The position and velocity vector at gimbal lock obtained from the
guidance and navigation accelerometer reconstruction program was inte-
grated to ascent stage impact, assuming a ballistic entry. Another pro-
file was reconstructed, using the position and velocity vector from the
trajectory simulation program results at gimbal lock, by integrating a
tumbling non-thrusting ascent stage to thrust decay and then a ballistic
entry to impact. The results of these two cases, representing the con-
ditions at thrust decay, entry (400 000 feet), and the impact coordinates
are shown in table 3-1V. The impact coordinates are within approximately
ii0 n. mi. The ground track of the second ascent engine firing and the
entry of the ascent stage that immediately followed are shown in fig-
ure 3-1. The solid line represents the maneuver profile based on the
guidance and navigation accelerometer reconstruction of the program and
the dashed line shows the simulation from gimbal lock to impact.
Several simulations were made in order to determine the dispersion

of the impact point caused by ascent engine thrusting during the time
from gimbal lock to thrust decay (153 seconds). In these cases, atti-
tude rates as high as 25 deg/sec in all axes were simulated. The dis-
persion in the impact points was no greater than 135 n. mi.
3-6
TABLE 3-1.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AN]) ORBITAL PARAMETERS
Trajectory parameters Definition
Geodetic latitude Spacecraft position measured posi-

tive north from the equator to the
local vertical vector, deg
Longitude Spacecraft position measured positive

east from the Greenwich meridian to
the local vertical vector, deg
Altitude Perpendicular distance from the ref-
erence ellipsoid to the point of
orbit intersect, ft
Space-fixed velocity Magnitude of the inertial velocity

vector referenced to the earth-
centered, inertial reference coor-
dinate system, ft/sec
Space-fixed flight-path angle Flight-path angle measured positive

upward from the geocentric local
horizontal plane to the inertial
velocity vector_ deg
Space-fixed azimuth Azimuth of the projection of the
inertial velocity vector onto the
local geocentric horizontal plane,
measured positive eastward from
north, deg
Apogee Predicted maximum altitude above the

oblate earth model, n. mi.
Perigee Predicted minimum altitude above the

oblate earth model, n. mi.
Period Time required for spacecraft to com-

plete 360 degrees of orbit rotation
(perigee to perigee, for example), min
Inclination Angle between the orbit plane and

the eouator, deg
_- 3-7
TABLE 3-11.- LAUNCH PHASE PLANNED AND
ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS
Condition Planned Actual
S-IB Stage Inboard Engine Cutoff
Time from range zero, hr:min:sec ....... 00:02:19 00:02:19
Geodetic latitude, deg North ......... 28.69 28.68
Longitude, deg West ............. 80.03 80.03
Altitude, ft ................. 192 979 194 228
Altitude, n. mi ............... 32 32
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec ......... 7578 7563
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg ...... 27.85 28.12
Space-fixed heading angle, deg E of N .... 75.71 75.78
S-IB Stage Outboard Engine Cutoff
Time from range zero, hr:min:sec ....... 00:02;22 00:02:22
Altitude, ft ................. 203 675 206 014
Altitude, n. mi ............... 34 34

3-8
TABLE 3-11.- I_&UNCH PHASE PLANNED AND ACTUAL
TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS - Concluded
S-IVB Stage Engine Cutoff
Altitude, ft ................. 535 400 536 166
Altitude, n. mi ............... 88 88
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec ......... 25 661 25 659
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg ...... 0.0 -0.01
Insertion (S-IVB Stage Cutoff Plus i0 Seconds)
Altitude, ft ................. 535 441 536 233
Altitude, n. mi ............... 88 88

3-9
TABLE 3-111.- ORBITAL PHASE PLANNED AND
ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS
LM/S-IVB Stage Separation
Geodetic latitude, deg South ......... 31.54 31.50
Longitude, deg East ............. 106.81 106.04
Altitude, ft ................. 733 098 728 707
Altitude, n. mi ............... 121 120
...... Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec ......... 25 454 25 458
Ignition of First Descent Engine Firing
!Longitude, deg East ............. 103.12 102.52
Altitude, ft ............ ..... 706 396 704 041
Altitude, n. mi ............... 116 116
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg ...... -0.18 -0.14

3-10
TABLE 3-111.- ORBITAL PHASE PLanNED AND ACTUAL
TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS - Continued
Condition I Planned I Actual
Cutoff of First Descent Engine Firing
Longitude, deg East ............. 105.65 102.79
Altitude, ft ................. 703 857 703 716
Altitude, n. mi ............... 116 116
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg ....... 0.05 -0.14
Ignition of Second Descent Engine Firing
Time from range zero, hr:min:sec ....... 06:10:42
Geodetic latitude, deg North ......... 28.14
Longitude, deg West ............. 115.95
Altitude_ ft ................. 570 883
Altitude, n. mi ............... 94
Space-fixed flight-path angler deg ...... 0.13
Space-fixed heading angle, deg E of N .... 105.39

i-
3-11
TABLE 3-111.- ORBITAL PHASE PLANNED AND ACTUAL
TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS - Concluded
Cutoff of First Ascent Engine Firing
Altitude, ft ................. 571 155
Altitude, n. mi ............... 94
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg ...... -0.36
Ignition of Second Ascent Engine Firing
Altitude, ft ................. 699 611
Altitude, n. mi ............... 115
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg ...... -1.51

3-12 _--
__ABLE 3-1V.- MISSION PROGRA!,[[_[ER SEQUENCES III AND V STATE VECTOR CO_@PAR!SON
Vector description Time, iVelocity, Flight-path Heading Lat-tude Longitude, Altitude,

and source hr:min:see ft/sec angle, deg angle, de s deg deg n. mi.
First ascent engine firing 06:12:14.7

o11 (abort stage)
Accelerome_er reconstructed 25 800 0.218 1C8.48 26.28 -109.49 94.6
Skin tracking (NORAD) 25 795 0.326 IC8.81 26.06 -109.32 93.9
Simulated 25 794 0.212 108.48 26.28 -109.48 94.8
Firs_ ascent engine firing 06:13:14.7

off (thrust to zero)
Accelerometer reconstructed 26 311 -0.366 -10.08 24.90 -105.41 94.8
Best estimate trajectory 26 319 -0.359 110.09 24.91 -105,41 94.0

(phase 3)
Simu] :_ ed 96 321 0.452 110.08 24.89 -105.37 94.6
G_mha] Lock 07:47:29,9
Acce]erometer reconstructed 24 803 -]-77 105.55 27.16 -136.87 96.1
Simula_ea 24 792 -1.65 10p.p8 27.19 -137.00 96.6
_hrust decay 07:50:03.0
AcceleromeLcr reconstructed 24 965 -2.39 110.18 24.02 -126.78 72.8
SimulaLe_ 24 951 -2.27 110.23 24.04 -126.92 74.7
Entry (400 000 feet)
Accel_u'cmeter reconstruc%ed 07:50:LI.6 25 016 -2.511 ii1.24 23.10 -124.31 65.8
Simula_e_ 07:50:54.3 25 016 -2.46 111.62 22.80 -123.64 65.8
Impact
Accelerometer 18.i0 -112.85
Simul_ted 17.22 -11]..21

TABLE 3-V.- NAVIGATION STATE VECTOR COMPARISONS
Inertial
Time, Flight-path Heading Latitude_ Longitude_ Altitude,
Vector description hr:min:sec velocity,
ft/sec angle, deg angle, deg deg deg n. mi.
Insertion 00:10:03.3
Guidance computer 25 682 -0.049 85.08 31.81 -61.85 87.7
Best estimate trajectory 25 686 0.006 85.91 31.56 -61.81 88.2

(pre-eeparation)
Real time computer complex 25 685 -0.001 85.94 31.55 -61.80 88.1
(instrument unit)
Prior to first descent 03:15:28

engine firing
Guidance computer 25 669 0.087 107.47 27.39 -65.52 89.9

(phase i)
Real time computer complex 25 656 0.152 107.62 26.87 -66.24 92.3
Navigation update vector 06:21:21
Guidance computer 25 621 0.184 120.41 10.58 -74.89 96.0

(phase 3)
Real time computer 26 213 1.3_0 120.07 9.94 -75.12 109.8
complex a
aThis real time computer complex vector was the navigation update.
CO
I
CO
3-14 --
TABLE 3-VI.- ORBITAL ELEMENTS
Phase Dndition Planned Actual
Insertion Apogee, n. mi ............ 123 120
Perigee, n. mi ....... ; • • • 88 88
Period, min ........... 88.45 88.39
Inclination, deg .......... 31.62 31.63
LM/S-IVB Apogee, n. mi ............ 121 120

stage sep-
aration Perigee, n. mi ........... 97 90
Period, min ........... 88.58 88.43
Inclination, deg .......... 31.62 31.63
Completion Apogee, n. mi ........... 174 120

of first
descent Perigee, n. mi ........... 116 92
engine
firing Period, min ........... 89.95 88.47
Inclination, deg .......... 31.62 31.64
Completion Apogee, n. mi ............. 519

of first
ascent Perigee, n. mi ........... 93
engine
firing Period, min ........... 96.07
Inclination, deg .......... 31.48

NASA-S68-1928
ApogoTrackingNetwork
8B
Station Station
Merrif_island, Florida GuamIsland

PatrickABB,Florida CoastalSentryQuebec (ship)
70 GrandBahamaIsland Hawaii
BermudaIsland Watertown(ship)
AnliguaIsland BoseKnotVictor (ship]
60 Redstone (ship) Pt. Arguei[o,California
GrandCanaryIsland Goldstone,California
AscensionIslands Guaymas,Mexico
SO Tananarive,Madagascar WhiteSands New_,_exico
Carnarvon,Australia CorpusChristi, Texas
40
30
20
N °to
2o
30
4o
50
6o
70 I
90 IO0 110 120 13O 140 150 IdP 170 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 log go go 70 60 50 dO 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80 gO
East West Longitude,dog West East
Figure
g-L-Apollo
B mission
ground
track. L_)
I
F-'
3-16
:: ! )
NASA-S-68- 1930
48x I03
I
36 44
32 40
28 36
24 / 32
20 __ 28
&
i ios
_: ]6 _ 24
= ]2 20
8 16
4 12
g 8
-4 L 4
0
00:00:00 00:01:00 00:02:00 00:03:00 00:0.4:00 00:05:00 00:06:00 00:07:00 00:08:00 00:09:00 00:10:00 00:11:00
Time, hr:min:sec
LO
I
(b) Space-fixed flight-path angleand velocity.
Figure 3-2.- Continued. -4
LO
NASA-S-68-1931 I
H
Co
48×1°3 ' I I I I I I I I
S-IB stageoutboard Actual
enyme-'cutoff .... Planned--
90 r 44 -_- ,
80 - 40
\ II
i:
i
I \ \
,
70 36 i i
IS-IB stageinboard S-]:#Bstagecutoff
60 32 ,, 1,1'en0,ne
\ I li'
_'
,_ 50 I- _ 28 \_ I Earth-fixed
.,-F ' 'flight-Datha gle
_
_: 40 _ 24I_II II \_%1 , I l 1I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I
x
_ ,,_ Earth-fixedvelocity
_' _ Insertion
20 16 .7 i
_, ./ ; i
g _ _ _ / / _ i I i
10 12 f I _--_ 7- _ i
I i _ J" I
II
Earth-fixedvelocity_, i- P" _ _ Earth-fixedflight-path angle-_
-ioL 4 f/
O0:OO:O0 0_01:00 00:02:00 00:03:00 O0:(YI:OG 00:.05:00 00:06:00 O0:O7:OO 00:.08:00 00:09:00 00:10:00 00:11:00
Time, hr:min:sec
(c)Earth-fixedflight-pathangleandvelocity,
Figure3-2.-Continued.
NASA-S-68-i1932
12
800 ]
700
600
500
40o ==
.-
E
300 5
200 4
i00 3
0 L 2
0
00:00:00 O0:OhO0 00:02:00 00:03:00 00:.04:00 00:05:00 00:06:00 00:07:00 00:08:00 00:09:00 go:lO:.OO 00:11:00
Time, hr:min:sec
(d)Machnumberanddynamicpressure, b°
i
F-J
Figure3-2.- Concluded. _0
3-2O
NASA-S-68- 1933
i
Radars ....... Theot:etical limits
FPS-]6: BDA-], TAN, WHS IRejec!ed
FPQ-6: BDA-2, PAT, ANT, CRO I
0.04 TPO_18: MLA, GB!, ASC I
o O O _ O 4>
e3 L 0 .......... L ..... _>-
-0. O4 i
I
I
I
.o-!f
.__
_
_&
I00
e a
•
I
I
i
1
[] E a D [] [] [] []
[]
=
_-
-10 _
0
o I '
0 .............
@
T
I
I
• LPhasel
Qt
--Pre-separatl°n--4-----ibeparadon
I ©
I
(3
to first
<>-'---_5 .......
................
i
I
I
I
----4--_to
11 O
© i
_'(_'--'-'_
Phase 2
(First descent
engine firing
second
.......
i
_
I Phase 3
1....
II 0
I (First ascent
lengine firing to
----if'second ascent
0
""
phase I descent engine firing) I descent engine

I engine firing)
I I firing)
o,o
o_- [
_'-'-0 "-'_c>-'r-_ .....................
<i> 0 0 _ ..... _-'-6 ......... _>
.....
"5 [] []
m-
_ °.°2I
E
_, 0
[] _
r3
_ [3 I []
j 0 I,D _Q
= so[
0 d) Q 0 I _ o Q l
I I I
1 I 1
i I 11 I J_ I I t ! I I I I l I I
BDA-] BBA-2 TAN WHS MLA PAT BDA-2 ANT WHS MLA GBI CRO ASC TAN
Figure 3-K - Statistical summary of tracker residuals,

NASA-S-68-,1934
26.4x 103
PI sal 1
--Actual 1 p ce-fixed __
- Planned
' \ velocjity i_
4 26.0- I_---J ..... I \ I Missi°n
_Space-fixedvelocity i _ / programmer_ __
] _,,j sequence_T
3600> 103 3 25.6 -..,,j.._j /f _-_ _ 1" //_ _ . _ J '-"/ /l\l

t/[_ start
3200 2 25.2 , -
j i
2,0g
___: 24, I r I ....
2400
=
_ 0 ,_ 24.4 /
Space-fixed flight-path angle
" -f _ %-,.
.... im
,/ V I_
__ 2000 - _ 1 × 24.0 ........ LM/ ]_ First descent Mission programmer

< _- _. stag ratio engine firing sequenceIT[ start
1600 -2 23.6 --. i --

I
--- |
I
1200 3 23.2-- -._ --
Space-fixed
800 -4 I 22.8 --- -- I '

zAIttud.e / , angle
400 -- 22.4 _?'_ _-_ II Altitude_"

00:00:00 01:00:.00 02:00:00 03:00:00 04:00:00 05:00:00 06:0&00 07:00:00 08:00:00
Time, hr:min:sec bo
I
I",3
Figure 3-4. - Space-fixed velocity, flight-path angle, and altitude during the orbital phase. _'
3-22 -"
NASA-S-68- 1935
520
480 I
44O
4OO
360
E
E 320
_- 280
240
200
160
120
80
00:00:O0 Oh00:.
O0 02:00:O0 03:00:.O0 04:00:O0 05:00:O0 06:00:O0 07:013:.
O0 08:00:O0
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 3-5.- Apogeeand perigeealtitude profile.

(a) Secondand third descentengine firings, and first ascentengine firing, co
I
ro
Figure3-6. - Space-fixedvelocity, space-fixedflight-path angle, and altitude during maneuvers. LO
3-24
4-1
4.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
The launch vehicle, AS-204, satisfactorily placed the lunar module

into orbit on January 22, 1968. All assigned mission objectives were
_ met and no flight anomalies occurred affecting mission accomplishment.
A detailed analysis of launch vehicle performance is contained in ref-
erence 3.
The launch vehicle rolled from 90 to 72 degrees east of north be-

tween 00:00:09.2 and 00:00:37.9. The programmed pitch attitude profile
was accomplished between 00:00:09.2 and 00:02:15.3, at which time an
essentially constant pitch attitude was maintained until the initiation
of active guidance. Active guidance was initiated 16.0 seconds after
separation of the S-IB/S-IVB stages. Shutdown of the S-IB stage engine
occurred at 00:02:22.3 (0.i second earlier than predicted). At S-IB
stage engine cutoff, the actual trajectory parameters compared with nom-
inal were 10.8 ft/sec low in space-fixed velocity, 0.40 n. mi. high in
altitude, and 0.011 n. mi. less in range.
Separation of the S-IB/S-IVB stages occurred at 00:02:23.5, followed

___ 1.4 seconds later by ignition of the S-IVB stage. All ullage rockets
functioned as expected and were successfully jettisoned.
S-IVB stage engine cutoff occurred at 00:09:53.3 (5.1 seconds earlier

than predicted). The nose cone/adapter separation sequence was initiated
45.2 seconds after S-IVB stage engine cutoff and adapter panel deployment
was initiated at 00:19:53.5 (both events were 5.0 seconds earlier than
predicted). The lunar module separation sequence was started at
00:53:55.2.
At S-IVB stage engine cutoff, the actual trajectory parameters com-

pared with nominal were 2.3 ft/sec less in space-fixed velocity,
0.ii n. mi. high in altitude and 16.3 n. mi. greater in range.
All portions of the orbital safing experiment on the S-IVB stage

were performed successfully, including propellant venting, propellant
dump, and stage/engine pneumatic supply dump. The hydrogen start bottle
was not scheduled to d_ap.
5-1
5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE
(This section is not applicable.)

-_ 6.1-1
6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE
6.1 STRUCTURES
-. 6.1.1 Loads
Adapter and lunar module loads and lunar module/adapter interaction

loads were calculated for the critical design loading conditions; lift-
off, S-IB midboost, and end of S-IB boost. Lunar module accelerations
and plume impingement pressures during abort staging were examined. Com-
parisons with design and predicted values were made where appropriate.
Lateral loads during thrust buildup are caused by the steady drag
load from ground winds and vehicle dynamic excitation from wind gusts,
vortex shedding, and unsymmetric S-IB engine thrust buildup. These ex-
citations result in a large constraining shear and moment at the base of
the launch vehicle before release. The lateral loads after lift-off are
caused primarily by the sudden removal of the constraining shear and mo-
ment at release. Typically, large axial dynamic oscillations result
from the S-IB engine thrust buildup and the release of tension in the
launch vehicle hold-down arms.
Before and during lift-off, the ground winds were light (4 to

5 knots) with almost no gusts. There was no evidence of vortex shedding
and none was predicted at the observed wind speeds. Each pair of dia-
metrically opposite S-IB outboard engines, the usual source of unsymmet-
ric thrust buildup excitation, ignited almost simultaneously; therefore,
the loads experienced at lift-off were low.
The winds aloft (fig. 6.1-1) during the boost phase were not severe,
and the maximum calculated angle of attack due to winds was 1.92 degrees
in the maximum dynamic pressure region.
The maximum axial acceleration and compressive loads were experienced

in_aediately prior to S-IB inboard engines cutoff. The end-of-boost axial
acceleration for this mission was 4.35g, very close to the nominal pre-
diction of 4.38g, and well within the design value of 4.90g.
Adapter loads.- The adapter loads were calculated from the lunar
module accelerometer data at lift-off and at the end of S-IB boost
(figs. 6.1-2 and 6.1-3). These loads were well below the limit load
capabilities and agree closely with the predicted loads.
6.1-2
Adapter loads during the maximum q_ region of flight determined

from the calculated angles of attack and actual lunar module accelera-
tion were also well below limit capabilities. The adapter internal vent
pressure (fig. 6.1-4) was determined from launch vehicle measurements lo-
cated in the S-IVB stage forward skirt. Predicted pressures within the
adapter (based on actual trajectory and measured ambient pressure) showed
close agreement with actual pressures.
Lunar module loads.- Six [Linear accelerometers (three translational

and three rotational) were mounted on the ascent stage 76 inches from
the lunar module center of gravity (launch configuration). Figures 6.1-5
and 6.1-6 show accelerations measured by these accelerometers at lift-
off and at S-IB shutdown, respectively. These two conditions represent
the most severe low-frequency oscillations experienced during the flight.
Maximum lunar module load factors in the lateral and longitudinal

directions are shown in table 6.1-I. The table shows that for all phases
of the mission, the maximum measured load factors encountered were less
than design. Close agreement is shown between predicted and measured
values_ within instrumentation accuracy.
Loads experiemced during descent and ascent engine start-up are

critical for the respective engine support structure. Strain gage in- _-
strumentation (GA2524S) on one of the descent engine upper support struts
was used to obtain load data from lift-off to abort staging. This in-
strumentation was calibrated to measure axial force in the strut. Igni-
tion of the descent stage engine at the lO-percent throttle setting
caused only small load oscillations and the transition to full throttle
was smooth. The maxim_ compressive force recorded was 3240 pounds dur-
ing both firings at full throttle. The predicted value for these struts
(based on a thrust of 9840 pounds at full throttle) is 3085 pounds com-
pression.
The critical loads for ti_e ascent engine support structure are a
function of the engine start-up transient. The chamber pressures for
the first and second ascent engine firings were 164 and 178 psia, res-
pectively, as compared with the design value of 178 psia. The thrust
rise times for both firings are shown in table 6.13-1 in section 6.13.
These times are longer than those used for design (0.013 second); conse-
quently, the loads experienced were less Severe than the design condi-
tions.
Lunar module/adapter interaction loads.- The 16 outrigger struts

were instrumented with strain gages to provide continuous load data.
The lunar module/adapter interaction loads (fig. 6.1-7) were determined
by summing the strut loads FI, F2_ F3, and F4 to obtain the reactions
RX, Ry, and R Z at each of the four adapter support points. A typical
6.1-3
outrigger strut load time history is shown in figure 6.1-8. The measured
strut loads for the end of S-IB boost, which were the maximum loads ex-
perienced on any strut during this flight, are shown in table 6.1-11. A
comparison of the measured, predicted, and design loads for the struts
shows that in all cases, the measured loads were less than allowable
loads. The predicted outrigger strut loads based on data from the six
linear accelerometers agree well with the measured strut loads; this im-
plies that the analytical model used for the design analysis was reason-
ably accurate. These predicted values were determined for inertia
effects only. The apex-fitting reactions determined from the strut loads
are shown in table 6.1-111, which is a comparison of the calculated and
design interaction loads. All of the significant calculated loads were
less than the design loads. Two of the calculated reaction loads slightly
exceeded the design loads for the end of S-IB boost condition. However,
the difference between the calculated and design loads for the -Y apex Ry
and RZ reactions was within the accuracy of the instrumentation used
for the measured loads. In any event, a greater design load does exist
for another end-of-boost design condition.
Abort sta@ing.- Abort staging pressure measurements on the ascent

stage lower surface and the descent stage upper surface are shown in
figures 6.1-9 and 6.1-10, respectively. Table 6.1-1V shows the peak
pressures measured on the ascent and descent stage surfaces, with the
design limit pressures and ground test results from White Sands included
for comparison. The peak pressures measured during the flight were all
lower than the design limit condition. The maximum measured pressure
of 2.01 psia occurred on the +Y side of the ascent stage midsection base
heat shield about 47 milliseconds after peak ascent engine chamber pres-
sure. The descent stage pressures peaked from i0 to 50 milliseconds
after peak ascent engine chamber pressure. The ascent stage base heat
shield pressures peaked from 25 to 130 milliseconds after peak ascent
engine chamber pressure (see section 6.17). Ground tests (ref. 4) showed
that the peak heat shield pressure occurred 0 to 15 milliseconds after
peak ascent engine chamber pressure. The design and ground test pres-
sures are all for zero separation distance.
The following facts also indicate that no structural damage occurred

to the ascent stage during the abort staging:
a. The rate of cabin pressure decay remained constant.
b. The pressure and temperature measurements (GAII33P and GAIII3T)

in the cavity between the ascent stage structure and the base heat shield
remained constant.
6.1-4 --"
6.1.2! Vibrations
The vehicle was instrumented with vibration accelerometers having

the ranges and frequency responses shown in t_Dle 6.I-V. Additional
instrumentation information is contained in section 13.2 and reference 4.
An adequate analysis of the flight vibrations during the transient con-
ditions associated with engine starts and shutdowns cannot be conducted
because many of the vibration measurements were time-shared. As a result,
only intermittent data were obtained: the time-shared channels provided
1.25 seconds of data during each period of 3.9 seconds, and the oscilla-
tions induced by engine starts and shutdowns decayed to very low levels
in 3.9 seconds.
Examination of oscillographs for the launch and boost phases of the

flight shows that the maximum vibration occurred at lift-off in response
to launch vehicle noise. Lift-off vibrations were significant for a
duration of approximately 8 seconds. The absence of significant vibra-
tions during boost is attributed to the relatively clean aerodynamic
configuration of the Apollo 5 nose cone and adapter. Power spectral den-
sity analyses of data recorded during lift-off were prepared for the fol-
lowing critical equipment areas:
a. Ascent stage oxidizer tank bottom cover (X and Y axes)
h. Ascent stage oxidizer tank support strut (Z axis)
c. Descent stage oxidizer tank upper cover (X, Y, and Z axes)
d. Landing radar antenna (normal to the plane of the antenna)
e. Ascent engine support structure (sides i_ 2, and 3)
f. Navigation base (inertial measurement unit) (roll, pitch, and

yaw axes)
g. Ascent stage aft equipment rack (X, Y, and Z axes)
h. Assent stage tunnel equipment area (i, 2, and 3)
i. Descent engine thrust chamber (X, Y, and Z axes)
Most of the vibration levels measured in the 22 areas of the ve-

hicle were below the current lunar module flight vibration criteria de-
rived from the lunar module test article-3 (LTA-3) test data. However,
data from 4 of the 22 exceed the current flight vibration criteria when
compared as measured, or exceed the criteria when scaled to design limit
levels. The factors of safety which were applied to the mission levels
6.1-5
to obtain design limit levels for the acceleration spectral densities

were 1.32 for the equipment and 1.52 for the tanks. (The respective
safety factors for the vibration amplitudes are 1.3 and 1.5.) In addi-
tion, the measured vibrations were scaled to the worst combination of
Saturn V and Saturn IB levels to obtain maximum mission levels. This
was accomplished by assuming a one-to-one relationship between sound
pressure and vibration acceleration measured on the Apollo 4 and 5 mis-
sions. Of the four measurements, only two - the aft equipment rack and
the landing radar antenna - exceed the current flight criteria by sig-
nificant margins, and those only in narrow frequency bands. However,
when compared on a root-mean-square basis (that is, square root of the
area under the acceleration spectral density curve), none of the measured
vibrations exceed the current flight vibration criteria.
Lunar module equipment qualification tests have been conducted to

at least one of three sets of criteria, depending on when the equipment
was procured. (i) Equipment procured prior to the end of 1966 (comple-
tion of LTA-3 testing) was tested to analytically derived vibration cri-
teria. (2) Equipment procured between the end of 1966 and the end of
1967 was tested to vibration criteria derived from the LTA-3 test data.
(3) After the end of 1967, an acceptance vibration test program was be-
- gun, and some equipment was acceptance-tested to higher vibration levels
than used in the qualification tests. This equipment was given a delta
qualification test to provide an adequate margin.
Comparisons made in the subsequent paragraphs will be to current

flight vibration criteria (derived from LTA-3 test data) and to the ac-
tual levels to which the equipment was qualified.
Vibration of the navigation base (inertial measurement unit) ap-

proached the flight vibration criteria (LTA-3) as measured and exceeded
the criteria when scaled to design limit conditions, as shown in fig-
ure 6.1-11. However, neither the measured nor the scaled vibrations ex-
ceeded the level to which the inertial measurement unit was subjected
during qualification testing. No data are presented for the pitch-axis
vibration because measurement GG6002D did not function properly.
Vibration response of the landing radar antenna exceeded the flight

vibration criteria (LTA-3), as shown in figure 6.1-12. However, during
acceptance vibration tests, the landing radar antenna was exposed to
vibrations in excess of those measured in flight.
Figure 6.1-13 compares the response of the ascent stage oxidizer

tank bottom cover to the flight vibration criteria (LTA-3). The criteria
are exceeded at frequencies of 96 and 160 Hz. Vibrations at those fre-
quencies are similar to those measured on the LTA-10R descent stage oxi-
dizer tank and are considered to have no effect on the structural integ-
rity of the tank and its support structure. During the tank qualification
6.1-6
test_ a response at 150 Hz was also noted at the same measurement loca-
tion. Since this response far exceeded the LM-I response, no further
testing is required.
Vibrations measured on the aft equipment rack exceeded the flight

vibration criteria at a frequence of 210 Hz and, when scaled to design
limit levels, also exceed the criteria at 40 Hz (fig. 6.1-14). Each com-
ponent on the aft equipment rack was qualification-tested for the ascent
and descent engine operation levels, which cow, red the 40 Hz peak. All
but two of the components attached to the aft equipment rack had been
tested to levels at 210 Hz (table 6.I-VI) which exceed the flight vibra-
tion criteria (LTA-3). Additional tests are not believed necessary for
the two components (battery and digital uplink assembly) for the follow-
ing reasons: First, the abort electronics assembly was not installed on
LM-I. The absence of this mass would tend to result in higher vibration
responses. Second, the affected components are mounted on different cold-
rails than the one where the flight measurement was located. LTA-3 trans-
missibility data indicate attenuation at 210 Hz from the location of the
flight measurement to the locations of the battery and the digital uplink
assembly.
Orbit.- Vibrations were _significant during steady-state descent --

and ascent engine firings. Figure 6.1-15 presents typical vibration data
for the following four orbitaJ flight conditions:
a. Control, descent, and ascent engines not operating (instrumen-

tation/telemetry noise floors)
b. Third descent engine firing (start and i0 percent throttle)
c. Third descent engine firing (full throttle), abort staging,

and first ascent engine firing
d. First ascent engine firing, including shutdown transients
Ascent engine ignitions produced a short-duration discrete frequency

oscillation of approximately 55 Hz on the inertial measurement unit roll
axis. Ignition for the second firing produced 1.5g on the roll axis.
The ascent engine shutdown produced high frequency oscillations of the
thrust cha_oer, but data in figure 6.1-15 indicate that these oscilla-
tions were not transmitted to equipment. Comparison of power spectral
density analyses of inertial measurement unit and ascent stage aft equip-
ment rack vibrations to lunar module criteria show that steady-state
firings of the ascent and descent engines produced insignificant vibra-
tions.
Low-frequency vibration.-- No significant low-frequency vibrations

(20 Hz or less) were observed during the mission.
TABLE 6.1-1.- LM MAXIMUM LOADING CONDITIONS
Flight condition Load Predicted Measured Design a
Lift-off
Maximum lateral
acceleration Longitudinal load factor, g . . . -- 1.20 1.60
Lateral load factor, g ..... 0.25 0.20 0.65
Maximum longitudinal
acceleration Longitudinal load factor, g . . . 1.60 1.48 1.60
Lateral load factor, g ..... -- 0.03 0.65
Maximum q_ Longitudinal load factor, g . . . 2.00 2.00 2.00
Lateral load factor, g ..... 0.09 0.12 0.30
End of S-IB boost Longitudinal load factor, g . . . 4.38 4.35 4.90
Lateral load factor, g ..... 0.i0 0.07 0.i0
Abort staging Longitudinal load factor, g . . . -- 1.20 --
Lateral load factor, g ..... -- Not detectable --
aDesign values are for Saturn V conditions.

-q
6.1-8
TABLE 6.1-11.- LM OUTRIGGER LOADS AT END OF S-IB BOOST
(MAXIMUM AXIAL ACCELERATION)
Measured Predicted Allowable

Apex Strut load, load, load,
klb klb klb
+Y i -12.47 -14.27 -23.3

2 •7.01 16.39 21.0
3 21.50 21.53 25.3
4 -16.03 -16.45 -23.3
+Z • -13.16 -13.70 -23.3 --_

2 16.91 16.74 21.0
3 17.84 17.07 21.0
4 -12.64 -13.22 -23.3
-Y i -15.61 -16.25 -23.3
2 21.36 21.51 25.3

3 15.63 •6.52 21.0
4 -12.63 -14.14 -23.3
-Z • -12.18 -13.51 -23.3
2 16.88 17.07 21.0
3 18.01 16.70 21.0
4 -13.12 -13.97 -23.3

"-- 6.1-9
TABLE 6.1-111.- LM/ADAPTER INTERACTION LOADS AT END OF
S-IB BOOST (MAXIMUM AXIAL ACCELERATION)
Calculated Design
Apex Reaction loada_ load (70 ° F),
klb klb
+Y RX 35.98 41.19
Ry -2.70 -4.42
RZ -0.37 -1.18
+Z RX 32.45 36.55
Ry -0.66 -1.62
_-- RZ -2.44 -3.87
-Y RX 34.77 41.06
Ry 3.78 3.75
RZ 0.45 -0.43
-Z RX 32.53 36.72
Ry -0.12 -0.88
RZ 2.O5 -5.09
acalculated from measured loads in table 6.1-II_
s _
6.1-10
TABLE 6.1-1V.- PEAK SURFACE PRESSURES AT STAGING
N',I-Imeasurement number -i Design limit PA-I test data_

(see figs. 6.1-9 and 6.1-10) peak sure_ psia pressure, psia Run 7A-007
(Pc:d64 psia) (Pe=178 psia) (Pe=193 psia)
Ascent stage base heat shield
GB0801P 69 1.33 --
GB0802P 0 28 1.49 --
GB0803P 21 2.26 --
GB0804P 82 2.02 --
-y
GB0806P !.17 1.56 --
GBOS07P i.31 2.90 2.20
G30808P 0.56 2.16 0.99
OB0809P 0 71 3.28 2.12
OB0811P 0.29 1.08 --
GB0312P 01 2.25 3.65
+y GB0813P 1.5 2.45 .....
GB08!4P O 3.19 3.06
GB0815P 2 2.98 2.69
GB08!6P 4 0.66 0.86

-Z
GB0622F 0.59 0.84 0.80
Run 7A-004
psia)
Descent stage upper stage (Pc=166
+Y GB0903P 3 2.34 1.64
GB0904P 5 0.63 --
I GB09OIP 3 2.34 0.77
-Y GBO905P 6 1.51 0.64
I GB0907P
GB0902P 7
5 1.85
0.90 1.07
1.56
NOTES: i. Pc is ascent engine peak chamber pressure

2. LM-L pressures are peak values and did not occur at the smne time
3. Design pressures are based on ]/!O-scale model data
4. Both design and PA-I pressures shown are for zero separation distance
5. PA-I data shown were obtained from approximately the same locations
as LM-] measurements
6. PA-I tests simulating LM-i were run at _._ite Sands. Test run 7A-007
was used for ascent stage pressure comparison. Test run 7A-004 was the only run
on which ±Y descent stage surface pressures were obtained for peak engine chamber
pressure conditions.
6. i-ii
TABLE 6.I-V.- VIBRATION MEASUREMENTS
Number Measurement description Range, Frequency

response, Time-shared
g Hz
GAI5OID Vibration, ascent engine support structure, side i 30 i000 Yes
GAI502D Vibration, ascent engine support structure, side 2i 30 i000 Yes
GAI503D Vibration, ascent engine support structure, side 31

i
30 !000 Yes
GAI571D Vibration, ascent engine oxidizer tank, X axis i0 ].60 No
GAI572D Vibration, ascent engine oxidizer tank, Y axis i0 ii0 Yes
GAI573D Vibration, ascent engine oxidizer tank, Z axis I0 llO Yes
GA2681D Vibration, descent engine oxidizer tank, X axis I0 ]i0 No
GA2682D Vibration, descent engine oxidizer tank_ Y axis !0 ]i0 Yes
GA2683D Vibration, descent engine oxidizer tank, Z axis i0 i10 Yes
GA360ID Vibration, ascent stage aft equipment bay, X axis 20 i000 Yes
GA3602D Vibration, ascent stage aft equipment bay, Y axis 20 i000 Yes
GA3603D Vibration, ascent stage aft equipment hay, Z axis 20 !000 Yes
GA3661D Vibration i, tunnel equipment area 30 2000 Yes
GA3662D Vibration 2, tunnel equipment area 30 2000 Yes
GA3663D Vibration 3, tunnel equipment area 30 2000 Yes
CG6001D Vibration, navigation base, roll 2 2000 Yes
GG6002D Vibration, navigation base, pitch 2 2000 Yes
GG6003D Vibration, navigation base, yaw 2 2000 Yes
GN7559D Vibration, landing radar antenna i0 ii0 Yes
GN7691D Vibration, rendezvous radar dish antenna i0 ]i0 Yes
GP280ID Vibration, ascent engine thrust chamber, X axis 163 2000 No
GP2802D Vibration, ascent engine thrust chamber, Y axis 35 2000 No
GP2803D Vibration, ascent engine thrust chamber, Z axis 35 2000 No
GQ7301D Vibration, descent engine thrust chamber, X axis 141 2000 No
GQ7302D Vibration, descent engine thrust chamber, Y axis 141 2000 No
GQ7303D Vibration, descent engine thrust chamber, Z axis 141 2000 No

6.1-12
TABLE 6.I-VI.- VIBRATION LEVELS TO WHICH EQUIPMENT MOUNTED ON THE
AFT EQUIPMENT RACK WAS TESTED AT 210 Hz
Test level
Component at 210 Hz,
g2/Hz
S-band power amplifier 0 075

S-band transceiver 0 075
VHF transceiver 0 075
Signal processor assembly 0 1
Digital up-link assembly 0 005
Caution and warning electronics assembly 0 075
Signal conditioning electronics assembly 0 067

Pulse code modulation and timing electronics assembly 0.075
Abort electronics assembly 0.075
Attitude and translation control assembly 0.075
Ascent stage battery 0.005

Electrical control 0.067
General-purpose inverter 0.075

Rendezvous radar electronics assembly 0.095
Note: _-i vibration data at 210 Hz scaled to the design limit

level was 0.012 g2/Nz.
'_ / "1
NASA-S-68- 1938
70×
13o
\
<
60 _ _'_
50 I _
= 40 /
;_ /
to _ I I
I I I I I , , I __@@__
0 20 40 60 80 10O 120 180 270 0 90 180
South West North East South
Wind speed, ft/sec Direction, deg
(a) Magnitude. (b) Direction. o-_
I
Figure 6.1-1.- Launch winds. _'
t.O
NASA-S-68-1939
I
5o,1o
_ I I [ I
0 Lift-off (calculated)
I ]
_, Lift-off (predicted)
/.,' Maximum qc_(calculated)
40 Z'_,Maximum qc_(predicted)
L. End of S-ZB boost (calculated)
End of S-IB boost (predicted)
•" _o I I I
_ I I ! I I I I I I
° i
_
:5 20
J "_"
/ _ /----Limit load envelope
/ .,
-600 -500 -400 -300 -200 -I00 0 I00 200 300X 103
Axial load, lb
Figure 6.1-2.- Coml)anson of adapter body leads at the LM/adapter interface

with limit design body load capabilities.
NASA-S-68-1940
50 _ 106
0 Lift-off (caLculated)
[] Lift-off (predicted)
Maximum q_ (calculated)
40 ,_ Maximum q_ (predicted)
['& End of S-TB boost (calculated)
/_ End of S-IB boost (predicted)
i
•_ 30
E /
,/"/., /_ Limit load envelope
o
-600 -500 -400 -300 -200 -lO0 0 100 200
\. 300 400 × 103
Axial load, Ib
o'x
I
Figure 6.1-3 .- Comparison of adapter body loads at the adapter/instrument unit F_
interface with limit design body load capabilities, ",.n
6.1-16
NASA-S-68-1941
2000
\
.... Measured
-- P Predicted
1800
1600
1400 \\
looo
1200 \
1
8OO
\\
600
4O0
\
200
% \ \
o 0 20 40 60 80 100
I 120
Til/le, sec
Figure 6.1-4.- Adapter refit plessure.

6.1-17
NASA-S-68- 1942
-8 - X-axis translation i
- I
I
-4 --
I
="
0 - I
0 -:. -- _ _
- Lift-off
< 4 - 22:48:08.36 G.m. t.
8-
16 - X-axis rotation I
I
I
8- I
-o I
.o_ _ I
L_
- I
< -16 - !I
-1.6 -- Y-axis translation i

I
- I
-0.8 I
I
=" i
I
¢_) I
0.8 i
I
I
1.6 i
I I l I I I I I i I I l l
-2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Time from range zero, sec
(a) X-axis translation and rotation, and Y-axis translation.
Figure 6. i-5. - Lift-off accelerations.

6.z-18
NASA-S-68-1943
16 F i
-8 - Y-axis rotation II
"_ -- I
0
8 - Lift-off
o 22:48"08.36G.m.t.
16-
1.6 --
C 0.8 - Z-axistranslation
0
_,2 -- I
< -0.8 - I
I
- I
-1.6 I
I
I
-]6 i
% ,I
-_ -8 Z-axis rotation I
,___ 0 - --..------- _ /'vk /v_/_

,_
o_
(:D
<
16 -
I I I I I I , I I I I [ ,
-2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -I.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Timefrom rangezero, sec
(b) Y-axis rotation, andZ-axis translation and rotation.

Figure6.1-5. - Concluded.
6.1-19
NASA-S-68-1944
-8-i iI i
X-axis translation
!- i !
-4 i Inboardenginecutoff I Outboardenginecutoff
="
._o I I
0 I J,
'_
(__
- I -- --
¢_)
< 4- ....... i
- I I
8- i i
i !
16- i I
_ X-axis rotation I II
-= 8- I I
I I
- J w
"_ -8- I II
,-,
,-, !
< - I I
-16 - I I
I
1.6- I
I I
_ Y-axis translation I I
0.8- I i
U I !
._o - I I
I
o
e
co
o --_ _ f% ..,---,.
_ _/%_w-
< -0.8 - I
I
I
-1.6 I
I
i I I I I I -----J
138 139 140 141 142 143
Timefrom rangezero, sec
(a) X-axis translation and rotation, and Y-axis translation.
Figure6.1-6. - S-IB shutdown.
6.1-20
NASA-S-68- 1945
i I
¢M -16 - I I
G) Y-axis rotation I I
I Inboard engine cutoff I Outboard engine cutoff
-o,_ -8- I I
- I I
E i
.o 0 -- r -- _ .... : T_,_,7777 ,,,,,;,,,,,,,_,,,_ - - -- _ .....
"_ I I
<
I I
- I I
16- I I
1.6 .- I I
Z-axis translation I I
- I I
, 0.8 - ! I
=
0 I I
"-- I I
-- I I
I I
< -0.8 - I I
- I I
-1,6 - I I
-16 - J I
Z-axis rotation I I
- I I
-8 - I I
I I
o 0 _ ,, v
A v -
c_)
16 -
I I I I I , I I
138 139 140 141 142 143 144
Time from range zero, sec
(b) Y-axis rotation and Z-axis translation and rotation.
Figure 6.1-6.- Concluded.

6.1-21
Rx
R. Ry RZ , Ry
Allloads
shown positive
P LM/adapter interaction
load sign convention
RZ
F1
F_
F2 Typical outrigger
strut identification
Figure 6.1-7.- LM/adapter interaction loads sign conventionand strut identification.

0
°
NASA-S-68- 1948
-Z
GBO816P
GBO809P •
GBO622P
-y GBOE GBO808P +y
• GBO807P
DGBO815P
D GBO81OP_• GB0623
GBO8OIP
GBO802P GBO803P
• • II1P
eGBO621P_
• GBO817P • GBO812P
-_GBO818Pe
GBO813P
Nodataobtained +Z
GBO814P
o_
Figure6.1-9.- Ascent stage base beat shield pressure measurementlocations.

rO
L,O
6.1-24
NASA-S-68-1949
-Z
GBO_.O_ GBOgO_P.
GBO904P • _ GBO907P
GBO902P
+Y GBO903P \ •
GBO906P_
+Z
-/"t<No data obtained
Figure 6.1-10.- Descent stage upper surface pressure measurement.tocat.ions.

6.1-25
NASA-S-68-1950
o.i I !
+" I
-+ ----
0.01
IIIII
_ Measured on Apollo
(-4ol Corrected to design
>_ limit level
._- Actual quail ficatatio_
test level
o.ooi
o_
g
_ ---
0.0001
0.00001
10 100 1000 10 000
Frequency, Hz
Figure 6.1-ii.- Comparison of oavigation base vibration response aL

lift-off to current flight vibration and actual qualification test levels.
y
6.1-26
NASA-S-68-1951
0.001
0.0001
i0 i00 I000 i0 000
Frequency,Hz
Figure 6.1-12.- Comparison of the landing radar antenna vibration response

at lift-off to current flight vibration criteria and acceptance vibration
Lest responses.
r
6.1-27
NASA-S-68- 1952
0.1
LM flight
vibration
0.01
-- N 0.001
0.0001
0.00001
i0 I00 1000 I0 000
Frequency, Hz
Figure 6.1-13.- Comparison of ascenL stage oxidizer Lank bottom cover

vibration response at lift-off to currenL flight criteria.
6.1-28
NASA-S-68- 1953
0.i
0.01
_7
0.001
o
0.0001
0.00001
i0 I00 i000 i0 000
Frequency, Hz
Figure 6.1-14.- Comparison of ascent stage aft equipment rack vibration

response at liFt-off to current flight vibration criteria.
6.z-29
NASA-S-68-1954
Note: Measurementdescriptions are givenin table6.I-E.
GG6OOID GG6OO2D GG6OO3D GG6OOID

2=
!I GG6003D '-- "_"
I I I _ I
06:i0:27 06:i0:28 06:10:.
29 06: i0:30 06:.i0:31 06:10:.32
Time, hr:min:sec
(a) Instrumentation/telemetry noise floor (enginesnot operating).
Figure6. 1-15.- Vibration measurementsduring mission programmersequenceI-i-[.

6.2-1
6.2 THERMAL CONTROL
6.2.1 Launch Phase Thermal Response
Lunar module.- During the launch phase, all LM structural and thermal
protection temperatures remained within 5° F of predicted values, based
on 15 measurement locations for water and propellant tank temperatures
and 47 locations for structural and thermal protection temperatures.
Adapter.- The thermal environment for the adapter during the boost
phase was determined from the response of 12 thermocouples on the inner
and outer skin of the adapter. The maximum recorded temperature was
185 ° F and occurred at 00:02:07 on the outer skin at longitudinal station
XA670, 7 degrees from the +Y axis. This peak temperature was considerably
less than the design limit of 490 ° F.
No correlation was made between flight data and the analytical pre-
dictions for the adapter temperatures because the aerodynamic configura-
tion was unique for this mission and because the temperature levels were
well below design limits.
6.2.2 Control Engine Plume Impingement
The effect of the control engine plumes impinging the descent stage
thermal protection during thrusting of down-firing engines was determined
by the temperature sensors located as shown in figures 6.2-1 and 6.2-2.
The predicted temperatures were higher than the actual temperatures dur-
ing withdrawal of the lunar module from the adapter (fig. 6.2-3). This
was attributed to the following conditions:
a. The thermal mass of the sensor was not considered in the pre-
dictions.
b. The predictions were based on a solar soak prior to plume im-

pingement; this primarily affected internal temperatures.
c. Sensor GB3023T (fig. 6.2-1) was covered by two layers of foil,

and sensor GB3027T was covered by a layer of Kapton.
Tests were made to determine the effect of the thermocouple mass.

The results showed that the effective Inconel skin thickness for the
thermocouple was 5.5 mil. Temperature measurements from sensor GB3033T,
which was attached to a 1.25-mii Inconel sheet, were compared with the
postflight analysis data (fig. 6.2-3(a)), using the 5.5-mii effective
s
6.2-2
thickness, for the LM/S-IVB stage separation. The correlation is very

good. Sensor GB3031T, also attached to Inconel foil, showed good cor-
relation with postflight data (fig. 6.2-3(b)) during the LM/S-IVB stage
separation.
Sensor GB3023T was covered by foil (fig. 6.2-1). Figure 6.2-3(c)

compares the flight data with post-test analyses. One further assumption
was made in this analysis. It was assumed that exhaust gases pressurized
the space between the foil layers which covered the sensor. A pressure
of 0.015 psi, equivalent to that behind the plume shock off the ascent
stage tank bay, was assumed. The differences between the data and the
analysis were within the accuracy of the instrumentation. Internal sen-
sors, such as GB3021T and GB3022T, were not affected to the extent the
surface sensors were, because they were located beneath insulation
(figs. 6.2-1 and 6.2-2) and experienced slower heating rates.
Internal sensor GB3029T (fig. 6.2-3(d)) recorded approximately the

same temperature response as outboard sensor GB3027T. This is not rea-
sonable because the internal sensor was covered by an additional eight
layers of Kapton.
The maximum temperatures recorded during +X translations for the

second and third descent stage firings and during abort staging were as
follows:
Maximum
Time,
Sensor number temperature, hr :min :sec
o F
GB3033 830 06 :ii:57

GB3023 630 06:10:54
GB3031 230 06 :i0:55
GB3025 85 06:12:00
GB3021 40 06:12:12
6.2.3 Descent Stage Heat Shield
The thermal measurement locations on the descent stage heat shield

are shown in figure 6.2-4. The first descent engine firing was of in-
sufficient duration and thrust level to affect the heat shield. The
second descent engine firing resulted in nominal temperature rises of
40 ° F on the heat shield surface. Measurements located beneath the
6.2-3
insulation blanket showed no soak-back effects on the titanium structure.

The data acquisition time for the third descent engine firing was in-
sufficient to determine effects on the base heat shield. The descent
engine cavity temperatures remained at a nominal 72 ° F until the measure-
ment lines were severed at abort staging.
6.2.4 Abort Staging
Temperature data for the abort staging sequence were reviewed for
the following areas: the descent stage blast deflector and top surface,
and the ascent stage heat shield, ascent engine compartment, and cabin
cover.
Blast deflector temperature measurements at the locations shown in

figure 6.2-5 were lost at the time of the ascent engine firing. These
temperatures remained at a nominal 70 ° F during the orbital portion of
the mission. A temperature rise of 680 ° F was predicted for the
3.7-second separation period after engine firing, but no data were re-
ceived. During the ground tests of ascent propulsion test article i
(PA-I), the measurements at comparable locations were also lost.
Descent stage top surface sensors were located as shown in fig-

ure 6.2-5. All temperatures remained in the range of 60° F to 70 ° F
throughout the mission until abort staging occurred. The temperature
measured by GB0401T, located on the +Z deck, increased from 75 ° F to
200 ° F in 0.i second at staging. The temperature then dropped to 140 ° F
in 0.i second. The temperature measured by GB0402T rose from 60 ° F to
ii0 ° F in 0.i second. The temperature measured by GB0403T remained at
68 ° F throughout this period. These three sensors were attached to the
outboard face of the tank bay upper aluminum decks facing the fiberglass
cover. The fast temperature response recorded by sensors GB0401T and
GB0402T was indicative of ascent engine exhaust gas impingement on the
sensors which indicated a break in the fiberglass shield. The recorded
temperatures are shown in figure 6.2-6.
Ascent stage heat shield thermocouples GB0302T, GB0303T, GB0304T_

and GB0305T were lost at the time of engine firing. No instrumentation
losses, such as those on the blast deflector, were experienced on the
ascent stage during ground tests. Measurements CB0301T, GB0306T, and
GB0307T continued to function and showed no response to ascent engine
firing. The measurements were located on the inner face of the heat
shield, which was covered with an insulation blanket (fig. 6.2-7) and
were not expected to show any response. Temperature measurement GAIII3T,
located on the outer surface of the heat shield structure but beneath the
insulation blanket, remained at a nominal 69 ° F. A rise in temperature
would have indicated an insulation blanket failure.
6.2-4
Preflight predictions, made on a nominal 5-second engine firing,

indicated that the ascent engine cover temperature would rise i0 ° F. The
actual firing was 60 seconds _d resulted in a rise from 57.5 ° F to 75 ° F
on cover measurement GB0201T (fig. 6.2-8).
Ascent engine compartment temperatures GB0601T, GB0602T, and GB0603T

(fig. 6.2-7) were affected by engine nozzle backface temperature, which
reached 150 ° F. The measurements were located under an insulation blanket
on H-film and Mylar and showed no response to the abort staging. Predic-
tions, which assumed gaseous flow, showed a rise of i0 ° F for a 5-second
firing; consequently, it is concluded that the backflow of hot gases did
not occur.
6.2.5 Ascent Stage Structure
Ascent stage structural temperatures were obtained from three meas-

urements (GBO203T, GB0204T, and GB0205T) located on the cabin floor and
walls. Sensor GB0203T, located on the cabin floor_ decreased 3 ° F during
the 3-hour attitude hold and remained at a nominal 54 ° P until abort
staging. The temperature then rose in a similar manner as the ascent
engine cover measurement GB0201T_ and reached 71 ° F at the time of the -
second ascent engine firing (fig. 6.2-8). The close thermal conduction
relationship between the cover and cabin floor contributed to the similar
responses. Measurements GB0204T and GBO205T, located on the cabin wall,
decreased 14.5 ° F and 5 ° F, respectively, during the attitude hold
(fig. 6.2-9). Although located on the walls, these measurements are
close to the cabin roof and docking tunnel and are not considered indica-
tive of total cabin wall temperatures. During the 3-hour attitude hold,
the docking tunnel experienced a cold environment which, through conduc-
tion, influenced these sensors.
Ascent stage fuel and oxidizer tank measurements, GP0718T and

CPI218T, varied only 3 ° F during the mission. These data are within
3° F of the preflight predictions.
Ascent stage helium tank temperature measurements, GP02OIT and

GPO202T, remained within 8 ° F of preflight predictions until the first
ascent engine firing. A temperature drop of 28 ° F for sensor GP0201T
and a drop of 18 ° F for sensor GPO202T were caused by helium gas expan-
sion resulting from pressurization of the propellant tanks with the
helium gas (fig. 6.2-10). The temperature then rose to 51 ° F prior to
the second ascent engine firing. Measurements GP0201T and GP0202T dropped
to -98 ° F and -90 ° F, respectively, again because of helium expansion, as
was expected for the ascent engine firing to propellant depletion.
6.2-5
The reaction control system propellant tank temperature measure-

ments GR2121T and GR2122T remained at a nominal 66° F throughout orbital
flight. Reaction control system helium tank temperatures, GRI089T and
GRI099T, remained at 60 ° F until the time of the second descent engine
firing. At this time, these measurements dropped 20 ° F and 30 ° F, be-
cause of helium expansion.
Descent stage fuel tank temperature measurements, GQ3718T and

GQ3719T, remained at 70 ° and 73 ° F, respectively. Oxidizer tank tempera-
tures GQ4218T and GQ4219T remained at 71 ° F throughout the orbital flight.
Sensors GB3727T, GB3728T, and GB3729T were located on the S-band

steerable antenna, and sensor GB3733T measured the VHF inflight antenna
temperature. Figure 6.2-11 shows the cyclic data for measurements
GB3728T and GB3729T. Minimum temperatures at the end of the 3-hour
attitude hold were in the -28 ° to -35 ° F range. The cyclic variations
(fig 6.2-11) were expected because of the environmental cycling during
orbit. There was no evidence of control engine plume impingement.
The VHF inflight antenna temperature measurement GB3733T, received

solar heating during the 3-hour attitude hold. The orbital temperature
cycling is clearly shown in figure 6.2-12. There was no evidence of
plume impingement indicated.
6.2.6 Second Ascent Engine Firing
Data were lost about 8 minutes after initiation of the second ascent
engine firing. This did not allow sufficient time to assess engine fir-
ing effects on the ascent stage heat shield, engine compartment, or
cover.
6.2-6
NASA-S-68-1958
l.25 rail lnconel foil

/ .----Sensor
Sensor / / GB3033T
GB3025T__
I.J,ay,erOt5 m,.ll __--8 layers Kapton
z r-- _IO.Smil
GB3o33T
nZ:::o'r°'es_t/
_
_--_ _il
T221ayers
j_ammn zeo
--GB3025T Mylar
F---Sensor
_/ , _ / \ /GB3023T
1 _ \ 0.5 rail nickel foil /
_ I / _ and Inconel mesh _1........ 1._ 1.25 rail Inconel
I _ / ._ / I _ap j..v_vv_v__
"'_'_'><'<'<Xvvvvvw__. --r13 layers 0.5 mil
L "_'_ l n3i_rfO: 5annd

il /_ -] 4aluminized Kapt°n
I _ / Inconel mesh----/ _-- ] [25 layers
-...j p-<_ GB3023T I_ / J-aluminized ....
/ Sensor Mylar
_°°_T/ _o_Tq "q_F1 layer

5 rail Kapton
Descent stage quadrant I _ i -_8 layers
. _]+0.5 rail Kapton
I-_L 25aluminized
layers
(typical installation Mylar

-- Thermocouple tab /
_Lo Kapton, _e#_ _r29 T
(GB3025T, GB3029T; GB3027T, GB3021T)
Figure 6.2-1.- Descent stage quadrant T control engine plume impingement

sensor locations and configuration.
6.2-7
NASA-S-68-1959
1.25 railIncone[foil
---,_,_ GB303IT
/_
--/ ""_ /__ 2layers0• 5 rail -'_
I........ • IF
....... j 8 layers 0.5 rail
/ _ _ n,cko,
fo,iaad - T alom
n_zed
_ \ Inconel
mesh_ _ __Kapton
_ /1 j_aluminized
_," "b" _ GB3021T -z
Descent stage quadrant 111
_ fSpot weld
3 rail "Perma Braze" tab

_'_ _ Insulation
/ _ _ (magnesium oxide) .
1.25 rail ,nconel--_-_'- ' / _ _1_ Thermocouple wire

,/
,, s oe,
_ (310 or 304 stainless steel)
_ Spot weld_ 0.025 inch o.d.
(GB3033T, GB3023T, GB3021T)
Typical outboard thermocoupie
Figure 6.2-2.- Descent stage quadrant TITcontrol engine plume impingement

sensor locations and installation.
6.2-8
NASA-S-68-1960
700
oo_ -- III
II
600 -- Iil
III D SensorGB3033T
500 -- _ Sensor GB3025T
400 -- effect_ of [hermocouple

_ " -- Preflight prediction for
sensor GB3033T
oLu 300 -- \\_ .............. Post.flight prediction with
200 --
ool-
_ 1 0
o
0 J I I I LS
00:52:00 00:54:00 00:56:00 00:58:00 01:00:00 01:30:00
Time, hr:min:sec
(a) Sensors GB3033T and GB3025T,
800 -
[] GB3031T
............... PosLflight prediction with

effect of thermocouple
600 -- I Preflight prediction for
sensor GB3031T
700--
500- !I"_ _GBso2_T
w- 400 - i \
= I \
500 - I
t-- 200 -
100
o _-_ u
-i00 L I I I
00:52:00 00:54:00 00:56:00 00:58:00 01:00:00
Time, hr:min:sec
(b) Sensors GBSOS1T and GBSO21T.
Figure 6.2-5.- Descent stage insulation blanket temperal.Lires

during LM/S-LqB stage separation.
']
NASA-S-68-1962
1500 --
,. II
8oo-
\ [] SensorGB3023T
600 -- thermocouple and gas pressure

................ Preflight
Postflight prediction
prediction for 1.25
with railof
effect
Inconel foil
I-.-
400 -
200 --
o I I I I I
00:53:00 00:54:00 00:55:00 00:56:00 00:57:00 00:58:00
Time,hr:min:sec
(c) Sensor GB3023T. o_

Ix)
I
Figure 6.2-3.- Continued. v3
NASA-S-68-1961 I
800 -
Preflight prediction
700 - 0 Sensor GB3027T
[] Sensor GB3029T
Location of sensors shown on figure 6.2-1
600 -
.o 400 -
/'4
, \
_-& 300 - 1 _--...... GB3029T

_, GB3027T/
200 -
I000 -
-
-zoo I I I I I I
00:53:00 00:54:00 00:55:00 00:56:00 00:57:00 00:58:00 00:59:00
Time,hr:min:seo
(d) Sensors GB3027T and GB3029T.

NASA-S-68-1963
Flange
heat
- Bellows
(H-film)
GA2OO6T
,p/-- Sta. +X 131.14
_GA2OOIT H-film blanket 0
Engine backface
Titanium
nozzle _,_ GA2OO5T structure
extension.-_" _ GA2OO8T
Nickel-fiberfrax
insulation _ 9
%kk- Sta. +X 116.34

GA2OIOT
at R=77 in -------,--
GA2OO4T
I i I i I I I I I I I
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Radiust in.
r_
Figure 6.2-4.- Descent stage base heat shield sensor locations. I
NASA-S-68-1964 M
Blast deflector
GBO522T
-- _ O-- --'-0---- Q-
GBO402T IGBO521T GBO403T
I
I
I
1
I
TGBO4OZT
Figure 6.2-5.- Descent stage upper surface temperature instrumentation.

"\ !
NASA-S-68-2094
400 -
d GB0401
© GB0402
[] GB0403
Maximumoperatinglimi[
300 ------
u- 200
o _2_
E
_ 100
0 --
: _, _,
LM/S-1VB separation _First descent Abort staging_
}engine firing
A
_ 1 0 0
I I I i I /I
/ / I I I
00:00:00 01:00:00 02:00:00 03:00:00 04:00:00 05:00:00 06:12:00 06:12:10 06:12:20
Time, hr:min:sec
I
Figure 6.2-6.- Temperaturemeasuredon uppersurface of descent stage. L.O
NASA-S-68-1965
i
-Z _
GBO603T
GBO
GAlll3T. • GBO304T _+Y
-Y GBO3OIT--
GBO306T
Failed at engine ignition +Z \ LGBO305T

GBO6OIT _.__ Failed at engine ignition
GBO307T
1 layer of 5-rail H-fih_ _ Typical crossection
External insulation _iii:::!_::i!ii::ii_!i!i!i::i::ii;i;i_iiiiiiiiiiii::!i)iii_ii;ii_iiiii_i_i_i_ii_i_i_i_i_!_i_iiiiiiiiiiii!i_i_i_!}`_`

Note: GAllZ3T located beneath O,O06-in, aluminum-_v__.._.........: ............... , 7-'Mylar
insulation blanket.
lntornal
insulation %
1 layer of O,5-mil H-film J _- Thermocouple

Figure6,2-7,- Ascent stage heat shield sensor locations.
!
NASA-S-68-2095
90 -
Maximum allowable temperature
(including soak-back after long- 0 GBO201T, engine cover
duration ascent engine firing): [] GBO203T, cabin floor
Data reading +4°F
130 ° F Floor
80 200 ° F Cover
=.
E
60
I--- ', r _
50
40 I I I I I I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time, hr
o_
ro
Figure 6 , 2-8.- Cabin floor and ascent engine cover temperatures, i
_-_
xJ]
C7_
NASA-S-68-2096 L_
I
Oh
90 -
Maximum allowable temperature _ GBO204T
(including soak-back after long- A GB0205T
duration ascentengine firing): Data reading +4°F
130 ° F
80 -
o 70 -
qJ
K
60
50
40 I I I I t I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time, hr
Figure 6.2-9.- Cabin wall temperatures.

NASA-S-68-2097
80 -
o 0 --
-40 - OGPO201T
GPO202T
Maximum allowabletemperature: 90°F
-80 -
[]
-120 I I I I I I I I
0 1 2 , 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time, hr
o",
b,)
I
Figure 6.2-10.- Ascent stage helium tank temperatures. -.q
NASA-S-68-2098 o_
h3
l
Co
160 - : ::
! L M/S-]]ErB separation Second descent-'i
engine firing =
First descent -:Abort
m
staging
engine firing Third descent= Second ascent

120 engine firing _ engine firing
Maximum allowable temperature: 140 ° F

u_
o 80 © GB3728
._ "' GB3729
=.
°
_-
_
40
[]IIN
%
-40
01 0
I
1
I
2
I
3
"
4
Time, hr
I
5
I
6
I
7
I
8
Figure 6.2-11.- Temperature of steerable S-band antenna.

NASA-S-68-2099
240 -
: Second descent=i
:LM/S-]]ZB separation engine firing =:iAbort staging
Ii
Firs[ descent engine firing Third descent ::i Second ascent

200 engine firing ;_%,
ii engine firing
II;
(_ GB37_33T
160--
LL
120 -
E
F-
_o _ ___ _
I I I I I I I I
0 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0",
Time, hr ro
I
IJ
Figure 6.2-12.- Temperature ofVHF inflightantenna. ,,o

_-- 6.3-1
6.3 LANDING GEAR

6.4 PYROTECHNIC
There was no indication of malfunction of any pyrotechnic devices.

(See section 13.2 for locations of pyrotechnic devices.)
f
6.5-1
6.5 ELECTRICAL POWER
The characteristics of the dc and ac power were within expected

limits throughout the mission. The dc and ac bus voltages and the total
current during the mission are shown in figure 6.5-1. During the second
ascent engine firing, the high control engine activity increased the
total current to 87 amperes, decreasing the bus voltages to 28.8 volts.
The ac voltage remained between 117.6 and 118.1 volts at 400 Hz for
a no-load condition. The ac voltage transients shown on figure 6.5-2
were associated with the inverter response to the load variations of the
descent engine gimbal motor, the only load on the ac bus. These transient
rms voltages corresponded to peak values of 145 to 188 volts and were
within the specified peak transient limits of 90 to 225 volts.
Figure 6.5-3 shows the battery load sharing during mission programmer
sequence III. One of the two ascent batteries was commanded "on" prior
to abort staging, at which time this battery shared approximately 40 per-
cent of the total load with the descent stage batteries. The ascent bat-
teries were cooled to approximately 38 ° F before abort staging; the
predicted temperature was 40 ° F. After abort staging, the ascent battery
temperatures rose to approximately 49 ° F, as expected. The descent
battery temperatures were controlled within a range of 55° F to 60 ° F by
the coolant system as expected.
NASA-S-68- 1966 om
x.n
119 ' I
r ! i 1 i l ',
o2 1
< I
117
m
_ 29
I I h I |
c_ i : i
I
28
I
i00 I
Abort
I staging [
8o b I /
40 _ --_ I
I
20 1 ',1
00:00:00 01:00:00 02:00:00 03:00:00 04:00:00 05:00:00 06:00:00 07:00:00 08:00:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.5-1.- Electrical power characteristics.
, ]
NASA-S-68-1967
L26 ]
124
122
120
>
118
<
116
114
112
Ii0
06:10:00 06:10:40 06:11:20 06:12:00 06:12:40 06:13:20
Time, hr:min:sec
o'-,
Figure 6.5-2.-AC voltage transients. ,,.n
I
bo
5°1 r ! i ! r jI !I i r
40 j _
_E3o _' _ i Battery

_
°
P r"" "--- .,.. As'earl i
_ _J _
1o : r
Bat:ery
0 I i i
06:00:00 06:02:00 06:04:00 06:06:00 06:08:O0 06:10:O0 06:12:00 06:I4:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure6.5-3. - Batteryload sharing during missionprogrammersequenceI]]:.

6.6-1
6.6 MISSION PROGRAmmER
The mission progrsmmer performed all required functions throughout

the mission. From lift-off until 06:10:00, the mission programmer was
operated in the primary mode with the guidance computer in control. At
06:10:00, the backup mode was activated in which the mission programmer
controlled all sequencing. Sequences III and V were utilized
(tables 6.6-1 and 6.6-11). Periodically through the mission, the ground
command capability was utilized, and except for the periods of abnormal
signal strength, performance was nominal (see section 6.8).
6.6-2
TABLE 6.6-1.- MISSION PROGRAMMER SEQUENCE ili
Sequence Function
elapsed time, Functions Remarks
min:sec description
00:00 Sequence start by ground command Approximately 06:10:00

(programmer start); primary
S-band on
00:01 Master arm on Pressurizes reaction Reaction control tanks

control t_qks if not were pressurized prior
Reaction control propellant already accomplished to this sequence
valves open
00:03 Reaction control pressurization

valves open •
00:05 +X translation on
00:i0 Lunar module/adapter separation

arm
Lunar module/adapter separation
fire
00:15 +X translation off Separates itu_ar module Lunar module was sepa-
from the adapter if rated from the adapter
00:20 +X translation on not already accom- prior to this sequence
plished
00:21 Descent propellant quantity gage

arm
00:22 Descent propellant quantity gage

on
00:23 Descent engine arm
00:25 +X translation off
Manual throttle to i0 percent
00:39 Descent engine start First descent engine Second descent engine
firing firing accomplished by
this sequence
01:05 Manual throttle to i00 percent
01:12 Descent engine shutdown
01:14 Manual throttle to 30 percent
01:35 Descent engine arm
01:36 +X translation on Accomplished by this

sequence
Manual throttle to i0 percent
6.6-3
TABLE 6.6-1.- MISSION PROGRAMMER SEQUENCE III - Concluded
Sequence Function
elapsed time Functions description Remarks
min:see
01:44 Descent engine start Second descent engine Third descent engine
firing firing accomplished by
this sequence
02:10 Manual throttle to i00 percent
02:11 Abort stage arm
02:12 Abort stage fire Abort staging and Abort staging and first
first ascent engine ascent engine firing
accomplished by this
sequence
SEQUENCE STOPPED AT THIS POINT BY GROUND COMMAND (ABORT GUIDANCE SELECT)
if
6.6-4
TABLE 6.6-11.- MISSION PROGRAMMER SEQUUgNCE V
Sequence Function
elapsed time, Functions description Remarks
min:sec
00:00 Sequence start by ground co1_mand Approximately 07:43:58

(programmer start)
Master arm on
00:02 +X translation on Accomplished by this

sequence
00:07 Abort stage arm
00:14 Abort stage fire

Ascent engine arm
Ascent engine start First ascent engine Second ascent engine
firing firing accomplished
by this sequence
01:14 Ascent engine shutdown
01:24 Ascent engine start Second ascent engine Engine kept burning by
firing ground comlaand (engine
on)
01:33 Ascent/reaction-control propel-

lant interconnect arm

lant interconnect A open
Reaction control propellant A
closed

lant interconnect B open
Reaction control propellant B
closed
01:54 Reaction control crossfeed open
02:43 Reaction control c_ossfeed closed
02:44 Reaction control propellant A

open
Ascent/reaction-control propel-
lant interconnect A closed
02:54 Reaction control propellant B

open
Ascent/reaction-control propel-
lant interconnect B closed
Ascent propellant depletion Thrust decay

6.7-1
6.7 INSTRUMENTATION
6.7.1 Development Flight Instrumentation
The performance of the development flight instrumentation and the

associated major equipment items was satisfactory, with few exceptions.
Satisfactory performance was obtained from 268 measurement sensors, ex-
cept during abort staging when Ii measurements failed to provide data
and four other staging measurements were questionable. In addition,
three measurements (GN7691D, GG6002D, and GBO522T) were defective prior
to launch, and four 0-35 psid propulsion measurements (GQ3666P, GQ4116P,
GPO616P, and GPIII6P) were expected to provide questionable data due to
lack of inline pressure suppression devices to prevent transducer damage
from pressure transients during engine startup and shutdown. (Suppres-
sion devices have been installed on LM-3 to prevent sensor damage.)
Measurements GN7691D, GQ3666P, and GQ4116P operated partially during the
flight, and some qualitative data were obtained.
Structural data obtained during the boost phase were satisfactory.

Fifteen structural measurements were automatically switched out of the
telemetry downlink at LM/S-IVB separation (00:53:55.5), and 18 other
measurements were switched into the downlink. The 8.5-second inflight
calibration sequence occurred at 00:54:17.6. The data channel contain-
ing engine chamber pressure measurement GR5039P had an 8 percent clipping
at the lower level. This clipping did not affect the measurement reading
when engine chamber pressure data were above 8 percent. The clipping was
not observed during inflight calibration of the associated isolation am-
plifier and was probably caused by a sensing diaphragm restriction in one
of the two thrust chamber pressure transducers.
Data obtained during the descent engine firings were satisfactory.

At 06:12:14.7, during the abort staging sequence, 12 measurements were
automatically switched out of the telemetry downlink, and replaced by
ii others.
The 15 measurements which failed to provide data or were question-

able during abort staging are discussed in the following paragraphs.
The four interstage separation distance measurements (GB3102H

through GB3105H) failed to function; no cause for these failures has
been determined.
Five temperature measurements also failed during abort staging. The

descent stage blast deflector measurement (GB0521T) failed coincident
6.7-2
with ignition for the first ascent engine firing; immediately thereafter,
the ascent stage bottom surface measurements (GBO302T through GB0305T)
also failed. The most likely cause of these failures was detachment of
the thermocouple mounting tabs or breakage of the small thermocouple
wires as a result of flexure of the heat shield material. Delicate
mountings are inherent in high-response thermocouple installations; how-
ever, the installations on LM-3 will be improved.
Two of the 26 interstage pressure measurements (GB0817P and GB0818P)

failed to provide data during abort staging. The response of these meas-
urements to the relatively slow static pressure decay was considerably
delayed from the other interstage pressure measurements, and their appar-
ent failure to sense the rapid pressure rise during abort staging is at-
tributed to an obstruction in the pressure tubing or transducer orifice.
Four other interstage pressure measurements (GB0621P, GB0623P,

GB0805P, and GB0906P) were questionable because the data showed no meas-
ureable pressure rise. With the exception of measurement GB0621P, which
was not telemetered during launch, these measurements responded properly
to the atmospheric pressure decrease during the launch phase. No cause
for the failure is apparent from analysis of the data and system config-
uration. One interstage pressure measurement (GB0814P) had an inter-
mittent output signal throughout the flight; however, the measurement was
valid during staging.
Twelve descent stage measurements (GB0521T, GB0522T, GB0401T through

GB0403T, and GB09OIP through GB0907P) were routed through a 4-foot, 2-inch
ascent stage followup cable to provide descent stage data during abort
staging. With the exception of GB0521T, GB0522T, and GB0906P previously
discussed, the pressure measurements from the followup cable provided
data through the period of maximum interstage dynamics until 06:12:15.6.
At that time, these measurement channels indicated followup cable dis-
connect. Two of the three temperature measurements (GB0401T and GB0402T)
provided data until 06:12:15.4, and the last valid data point for
GB0403T occurred at 06:12:15.3. These temperature measurement readings
were obscured by noise for the next 0.2 second; thereafter, their read-
ings also indicated followup cable disconnect at 06:12:15.6.
Data obtained during the ascent engine firings and the remainder of
the mission were satisfactory.
The qualitative characteristics of the transmitted end-to-end data

varied with ground station acquisition and performance and is discussed
in section 6.8.
F 6.7-3
6.7.2 Operational Instrumentation
The general operation of the 213 total operational PCM measurements

(118 analog and 95 bilevel or digital) was good; however, two descent
engine quantity gaging measurements were faulty prior to launch.
During the prelaunch period, propellant loading quantity gaging

measurements GQ3604Q and GQ4104Q were not indicating correctly for the
descent engine fuel and oxidizer no. 2 tanks. Tests have shown that the
failure of an output transistor in the power converter of the quantity
gaging system could cause an output voltage drop and loss of voltage
regulation and could result in the improper readings noted during the
prelaunch operations. The no. i quantity gaging system, which used a
separate power supply_ operated properly throughout the flight.
During the second and third descent engine firings, an out-of-phase

indication was received from one of the two pairs of propellant shutoff
valves (measurement GQ7498U). This problem has not been resolved, and
further discussion is contained in section 6.12.
Data quality.- A special data quality sub-routine program operating

on the initial phase-i processing tape was used to obtain an accurate
assessment of the PCM data quality, resulting in the percent of usable
PCM data for each station pass. Such an assessment has been useful in
the past to reveal poor data portions due to the loss of PCM synchroni-
zation, sub-par performance of individual Manned Space Flight Network
(MSFN) stations, data processing errors, and other problems.
A tabulation of the stations by revolution for VHF or unified S-band

links and the resulting percent usable PCM data from each is presented
in table 6.7-1. For the TEL IV station during the revolution 3-4 pass,
a usable PCM data quality of only 96.94 percent resulted, which was
1.90 percent lower than the launch phase data and more than 2 percent
lower than the revolution 1-2, 2-3, and 4-5 passes. All passes (revo-
lutions i, 2, and 3) over the ship Coastal Sentry Quebec (CSQ) resulted
in poor quality VHF PCM data being obtained. From table 6.7-1, it can
be seen that usable data of 95.10, 89.55, and 90.52 percentages were ob-
tained from the CSQ for revolutions i_ 2, and 3, respectively. Reasons
for the poor data quality obtained from the TEL IV station during the
revolution 3-4 pass and all passes over the CSQ are being investigated.
The usable S-band PCM data quality is generally comparable to the

usable VHF PCM data quality for the same station pass. The usable VHF
data quality for the Texas station during the revolution 2 pass was
J
6.7-4
99.68 percent while the usable S-band data quality was only 98.07 percent.
This difference was probably caused by variations in the received S-band
carrier power that was obserw_d. The usable S-band data quality for the
Hawaii station during revolution 3 pass was 94.60 percent while the usable
VHF data quality was only 90.00 percent. The reason for this poor PCM
data quality at this station is under investigation.
6.7.3 Calibration
Some bias adjustments were made to descent engine pressure measure-

ments GQ6510, GQ4111, and GQ3501 for the postmission analysis of the
propulsion system; GQ4111 and GQ3501 must read identically under static
conditions and GQ6510 should read zero psia. The magnitude of these
biases were within the end-to-end specification accuracy of the measure_
ments involved. However, the calibrations used to reduce data for these
measurements were derived from instrumentation component specifications.
6.7.4 Launch Vehicle Instrument Unit
The required LM/adapter events data transmitted from the S-IVB in-
strument unit were satisfactory, except for the adapter panel deployment
monitor. The deployment event was transmitted through the instrument
unit with other adapter data. Indications were received from the relays
which fire the pyrotechnics to separate the four panels. However, no
indication was received from the four series-connected limit switches
which monitor the deployment. The instrumentation was verified to be
operating satisfactorily several times at the launch site. Other meas-
urements show that the spacecraft separated from the S-IVB stage without
any abnormal disturbances, thus indicating that the panels were, in fact,
deployed. The panel deployment monitors were used for the first time on
this flight and will not be installed for manned missions.
F 6.7-5
TABLE 6.7-1.- USABLE PULSE CODE MODULATED DATA
Percent usable data

Station Revolution
VHF S-band
TEL IV 1 98.84 X
(launch)
TEL IV 1-2 99.85 X
TEL IV 2-3 99.98 X
TEL IV 3-4 96.94 X
TEL IV 4-5 99.15 99.04
Canary Islands I 99.73 X
Carnarvon i 98.94 99.51
Carnarvon 3 99.47 X
Carnarvon 4 99.93 X
Coastal Sentry Quebec i 95.10 X
Coastal Sentry Quebec 2 89.55 X
Coastal Sentry Quebec 3 90.52 X

Bermuda 2 i00.00 X
Guaymas 4 99.72 X
Texas 2 99.68 98.07

Texas 3 99.05 X
Antigua 4 98.93 X
Antigua 5 98.68 X
Hawaii 3 90.00 94.60
Hawaii 4 99.06 X
Hawaii 5 99.24 X
Goldstone 4 X 99.17
X - not processed or not available.

s
- 6.8-1
6.8 COMMUNICATIONS
The communications system performance was evaluated by analysis of

the lunar module (LM) communications system separately and the LM com-
munications system and Manned Space Flight Network communications equip-
ment as an integrated system. A diagram of communications capabilities
during the mission is presented in figure 6.8-1.
Analysis of the mission data shows nominal performance of all com-

munication channels except the UHF up-data channel.
The overall performance of the unified S-band RF system was satis-

factory (table 6.8-1 and figs. 6.8-2 through 6.8-21) except for large
variations in received carrier power.
The trajectory elements used for predictions were different from

the actual spacecraft attitudes; therefore, the predicted data are not
applicable. A comparison of received and predicted carrier power levels
based on the final best estimate trajectory and actual spacecraft atti-
tudes will be contained in supplement 3.
Computed bit error probabilities for the S-band and VHF pulse code
modulation (PCM) telemetry channels for three station passes indicated
good data reception during periods of adequate received signal powers.
Tests of the turned-around S-band up-voice and up-data subcarriers

were conducted during four station passes. Signal-to-noise ratios were
low during some periods; however, the uplink carrier power levels appeared
adequate to support good up-voice and up-data communications.
Abrupt changes in the UHF received signal strength detected through-

out the mission have been isolated to an intermittent failure in the
flight hardware (see section 12.2).
6.8.1 LM Communications Performance
S-band.- The S-band equipment operation was satisfactory during the

mission. Variations of the telemetered S-band transceiver RF power out-
put data were caused by instrumentation noise, which existed prior to the
flight.
The selected S-band receiver automatic gain control and static phase
errors were nominal. The S-band power amplifier operated satisfactorily,
although the telemetered measurement was inaccurate. The requirement for
this measurement was waived prior to flight.
No degradation of transmitted power, from either the S-band trans-
ceiver or the power amplifier, was detected; therefore, breakdown caused
by corona effects was not apparent.
Pulse code modulation telemetry.- Non-return-to-zero operational

pulse code modulation telemetry data were transmitted satisfactorily
through the VHF and S-band links.
Antenna temperatures.- Temperatures of the S-band steerable antenna,

S-band omnidirectional antenna i, and VHF inflight antenna 2 were within
expected limits throughout the mission.
Development flight instrumentation communications.- Performance of

the development flight instrumentation was nominal during the mission.
Refer to section 6.7 for additional information concerning performance
of this system.
6.8.2 LM/Network Communications System Performance
Unified S-band RF system.- The evaluation of the S-hand RF system

emphasized the periods of the mission associated with S-band transceiver
and power amplifier activation, the descent and ascent engine firings, and
the turned-around up-voice and up-data channel tests. A summary of the
S-band RF system performance during these periods is presented in
table 6.8-1 and in figures 6.8-2 through 6.8-21. Analysis of the recorded
data showed that large variations in received carrier power level occurred
when look angles did not favor the active antenna. As soon as the final
best estimate trajectory and actual spacecraft attitudes are made avail-
able, predicted and measured carrier power levels will be compared to de-
termine whether the noted variation in received carrier power levels can
be eliminated by optimum switching between the two lunar module antennas.
Many of the procedural problems associated with the S-band communications
during the Apollo 4 mission were not experienced during the Apollo 5 mis-
sion. Improvement was apparent in effecting station-to-station handovers
of the S-band uplink.
Unified S-band ran_ing channel.- During prelaunch testing of the

S-band equipment, the Merritt Island S-band site could not obtain correct
range code acquisition when uplink signal combinations 4, 5, and 6 were
utilized (table 6.8-11). Subsequent testing of production models of LM
hardware showed that the problem was caused by insufficient range code
power in the downlink spectrum and improper calibration procedure. The
uplink modulation indices (table 6.8-11) were revised, and the sites were
informed of procedures to be used if acquisition difficulties occurred.
Ranging capability existed throughout the mission. The _# trans-

ceiver was configured for range-code turn-around prior to launch and
remained in this configuration throughout the mission. Also, each uplink
signal combination that was utilized included range code modulation.
f_
6.8-3
The range code acquisition sequences for 31 station passes were ex-
amined. The majority of the data reviewed showed good acquisition se-
quences. Typically, range code acquisition was initiated as soon as
the exciter was locked to the synthesizer and the ranging receiver ac-
quired lock; acquisition of range code was obtained approximately 5 sec-
onds later. A typical ranging code acquisition sequence is shown in
figure 6.8-22. Some of the sites had initial difficulty but obtained
range code acquisition after adjusting an attenuator within the ranging
receiver. This adjustment was determined to be necessary at the Merritt
Island station prior to launch.
Unified S-band up-voice and up-data channels.- The configuration of

the LM S-band transceiver is such that the up-voice and up-data sub-
carriers are turned around in the ranging channel and remodulated on
the downlink carrier (fig. 6.8-23). Therefore, uplink signal combina-
tions which include these subcarriers were transmitted, and the baseband
modulation of the downlink carrier was recorded at selected sites. The
performance of these Channels was evaluated by measuring the postdetection
or predetection signal-to-noise ratio of the turned-around up-voice modu-
lation and by measuring the predetection signal-to-noise ratio of the
turned-around up-data subearrier. Since the measured data are dependent
on the power levels of the received uplink and downlink carrier, the
signal-to-noise ratio that would have been received at the LM would be
better than the measured data indicate. The measured signal-to-noise
ratios were related to the results of word intelligibility and up-data
message acceptance tests performed at the Manned Spacecraft Center in an
attempt to predict channel performance.
During the first orbital pass over the Texas, Merritt Island, and
Bermuda stations, uplink combination 6 (table 6.8-11) was transmitted.
Downlink coverage by the Merritt Island station was from 01:35:25 to
01:42:21. The Texas station transmitted the uplink S-band signal from
01:35:25 to 01:38:00, Merritt Island transmitted the signal from
01:38:08 to 01:41:00, and Bermuda transmitted the signal from 01:41:09
to 01:42:21. The predetection signal-to-noise ratio of the turned-around
up-voice subcarrier did not fall below i0 dB during this downlink cover-
age by Merritt Island. The signal-to-noise ratio was consistent with a
word intelligibility greater than 90 percent. Predetection signal-to-
noise ratios of the 70-kHz subcarrier were also measured for the periods
of Merritt Island coverage when Texas and Bermuda were transmitting the
uplink S-band signal. The signal-to-noise ratio of the unmodulated
70-kHz subcarrier was greater than 12 dB during the pass (fig. 6.8-24).
Based on command module communication system performance test results,
this signal-to-noise ratio was above that required for up-data message
_cceptance.
6.8-4
The up-voice subcarrier transmitted by Guaymas (revolution 2) and

by Merritt Island (revolution 2-3) was modulated by a l-kHz tone. The
variations in the measured signal-to-noise ratio varied from 0 to 22 dB
(fig. 6.8-25), associated with variations in received downlink carrier
power level (fig. 6.8-10). The received uplink power level measured was
satisfactory during this pass, and the degraded signal-to-noise ratios
were caused by variations in received downlink carrier power levels.
The variations of measured signal-to-nolse ratios (fig. 6.8-26) were
time-associated with variations in received uplink and downlink carrier
power level (figs. 6.8-11 and 6.8-12). Although variations in the
received uplink carrier power level were observed, the received uplink
carrier power level was consistent with satisfactory up-voice communi-
cations.
Unified S-band telemetry channel.- The unified S-band telemetry

channel performance was evaluated by computing the probability of a bit
error from the measured frame synchronization word error rate. The frame
synchronization word error rate was determined by dividing the frame
words in error during each 10-second interval of a pass by the number of
frames observed.
Bit error probability calculations were performed for Carnarvon

(revolution i), Guaymas (revolution 4), and Hawaii (revolution 5). The
results of these calculations are shown in figures 6.8-27, 6.8-28, and
6.8-29, respectively. The bit error probabilities for Carnarvon, revo-
lution i, do not correspond to the received dowmlink power levels (see
figs. 6.8-2 and 6.8-27). However, the periods of poor telemetry channel
performance are time-coincident with spikes observed on other data derived
from the magnetic tape utilized in bit error probability computations.
Therefore, the spikes may have caused the frame synchronization errors.
During 12.3 percent of the pass, the bit error probabilities were below
the limit of usable real-time data. However, station records provided
data usable for postmission evaluation 99.51 percent of the pass (see
section 6.7.2).
Bit error probability computations for the Gua_r_as coverage of revo-

lution 4 are presented in figure 6.8-28. The degraded bit error proba-
bility coincident with abort staging was probably caused by the signal
phase perturbations and the received carrier power level changes
(fig. 6.8-17). The bit error probabilities were greater than the limit
of usable real-time data throughout the pass.
The bit error probabilities shown in figure 6.8-29 were better than
design goals for the periods when the received downlink carrier power
level was adequate (see figure 6.8-21 for comparison). Exact time cor-
relation of the bit error probabilities and the received carrier powers
cannot be obtained because the error probabilities represent an average
computed over a 10-second interval.
_- 6.8-5
VHF RF commumications.- The RF power output of the four development

flight instrumentation VHF telemetry links was satisfactory throughout
the flight. The qualitative characteristic of the end-to-end data varied
because of RF transmission conditions at abort staging, periods of low
look-angle elevations, uncontrolled vehicle attitudes, and noise suscep-
tibility of the constant bandwidth telemetry link.
Telemetry dropout occurred at launch vehicle staging for 2 seconds

beginning at 00:02:23.6 because of S-IB stage retrorocket plume atten-
uation. During LM/adapter separation, data dropout occurred for 0.25 sec-
ond. Figure 6.8-30 presents the received 237oS-MHz signal power level
for the Guaymas coverage of the second and third descent engine firings,
abort staging, and first ascent engine firing; a time history of the
received 241.5-MHz signal power level during these events is presented
in figure 6.8-31. As shown in this figure, four cyclic received power-
level nulls (in addition to the transient at abort staging) were observed
during the Texas pass. The cyclic nulls were common to all channels
except the 230.9-MHz channel and are attributed to LM antenna patterns.
The multipath RF transmission problem due to low look angles was

evident during the Hawaii station pass of the fifth revolution. Data
quality received by the Rose Knot Victor during the second ascent engine
_ firing was subjected to repetitive noise bursts because the vehicle was
tumbling. The constant bandwidth link was susceptible to noise because
of large data bandwidths and lower modulation indexes.
VHF PCM telemetry.- The probability of a bit error for the VHF PCM
telemetry channel was computed utilizing the technique described pre-
viously. The results of these computations for Carnarvon (revolution i),
Guaymas (revolution 4), and Hawaii (revolution 5) are presented in
figures 6.8-32, 6.8-33, and 6.8-34, respectively. As shown in fig-
ure 6.8-32, the bit error probability for the Carnarvon pass was satis-
factory throughout the pass. Signal strength records show a recurrent
spike appearing on all traces on that particular stripchart recording.
The spikes which occur before, during, and after the presence of a signal
are coincident with most of the degraded bit error probabilities. The
distribution of these spikes indicates that spurious external signals
were imposed on the magnetic tape at either the receiving or the playback
station. The spikes appear to be affecting all data taken from this
particular tape. A bit error probability greater than the design goal
was experienced for a total of 80 seconds for Guaymas coverage of revolu-
tion 4. If the bit error probabilities associated with acquisition and
loss of signal are discarded, there were no periods when the bit error
probability was worse than the limit for usable real-time data.
--1
6.8-6 -
The bit error probability for Hawaii coverage of revolution 5

(fig. 6.8-34) was better than the limit of us_Dle real-time data through-
out the pass.
S-band and VHF comparisons.- Data from Carnarvon (revolution I)

show that S-band and VHF PCM systems were both affected by spurious
spikes. Data from Guaymas (revolution 4) indicate that the S-band telem-
etry had fewer synchronization word losses than did the VHF telemetry.
Data from Hawaii (revolution 5) indicate that the bit error prob-
ability for the S-band telemetry exceeded that for the VHF. The VHF
system on the spacecraft used a pair of antennas with nearly spherical
coverage, while the S-band system on the spacecraft used a single antenna
providing only unidirectional coverage. This condition explains the
difference in S-band and VHF performance at Hawaii.
These minor differences in bit error probability between the S-band

and VHF systems were as expected for earth orbital missions.
UHF up-data channel.- Abrupt changes of about 34 dB in spacecraft

received UHF signal strength were detected throughout the mission; a
typical example is shown in figure 6.8-35. Corresponding changes did
not occur in the ground received signal strength from the VHF data
transmitters which shared the same two antennas through a diplexer. These
abrupt changes in received power frequently caused the received command
signal power to be below the message acceptance threshold. Consequently,
command transmission had to be delayed or repeated.
The received signal power variations are consistent with an inter-

mittent condition in either the digital co_mmand assei_01y RF stage, the
coaxial cable assembly connecting the diplexer and digital command
assembly, or the internal diplexer connections.
C-band system.- Operation of the C-band system is discussed in

section 3-
TABLE 6.8-1.- S-BAND RF SYST_ pERFORMANCE
Time of Received carrier

Time of
range power presentation
Station Revolution Event two-way receiver Comments
lock_
hr:min:sec lock, Uplink Downlink
hr:min:sec fig. no. fig. no.
Carnarvon i I_/S-IVB separation 00:53:53.6 00:54:23 6.8-2 IReceived uplink carrier power level was at transceiver automatic
and primary S-band gain control saturation level for pass. Downlink carrier power
transceiver activa- level was good during pass
tion
Texas i Secondary S-band 01:33:13 01:33:48 6.8-4 6.8-5 Primary S-band transceiver com_manded "off" at 01:.33:12 (see
transceiver and fig. 6.8-3). Secondary S-band transceiver and power amplifier
power amplifier combination commanded on at 01:33:29. Two-way lock reacquired
activation at 01:33:34 and power amplifier warm-up cycle completed at
01:33:47. Handover from Gua_as to Texas required 9 seconds to
complete. Abrupt change in received downlink carrier frequency
caused Texas receivers to lose lock when handover from Guaymas
was initiated (see fig. 6.8-3).
Merritt i - 2 Turn-around S-band 01:38:00 01:38:20 6.8-6 6.8-7 Single omnidirectional spacecraft antenna did not provide good
Tsland up-voice and coverage for complete pass. Spacecraft antenna nulls caused
up-data tests received uplink and downlink carrier power level variations from
01:39:00 to loss of signal.
Redstone 2 - 01:46:13 01:46:19 6.8-8 6.8-9 Some variations in received carrier power level because of
inopportune spacecraft antenna patterns, but overall signal
quality was good.
Guaymas 2 Turn-aroused S-band 03:06:02 6.8-10 Received do}_link carrier power level variation observed from
up-voice tests 03:05:10 to 03:07:00.
Merritt 2 - 3 Turn-around S-band 03:11:00 6.8-11 6.8-12 Abrupt changes (20 to 35 dB) in received downlink carrier power
Island up-voice tests level during the pass. Abrupt changes caused by spacecraft
antenna gain variations.
Carnarvon 3 First descent 03:57:50 03:58:34 6.8-13 6.8-14 Received uplink carrier power leve_ would have supported good
engine firing S-band communications. Received downlink carrier power levels
were consistent with a good communications channel from 03:58:10
to 04:03: 40. Downlink communications would have been inter-
mittent from 04:03:_0 to loss of signal.
Goldstone 4 Second and third 6.8-15 Received carrier power variations observed during third descent
descent engine engine firing and abort staging. Received carrier power level O_
firings and abort dropped off 7 dB at abort staging only_ variation attributed to
staging propulsion system activity. Co
I
_4
Oo
I
Co
TABLE 6.8-1.- S-BAND RF SYSTE_ PE_,FORJ%%I'ICE

- Concluded
Time of Received carrier

Time of
range power present_tior
Station Revolution Event two-way receiver
lock, Cor_ent s
hr:min:sec lock, Uplink, Downlink
hr:min:sec fffg. no. fig. no.
Guaymas 4 Second and third 06:08:28 06:08:51 6.8-16 6.8-1'[ Received uplink and downlimk carrier power levels good during
descent engine fir- pass. A received downlink c_rrier power level drop of spproxi-
lngs, abort staging mately ]3 dB observed at abort staging.
and first ascent
engine firing
Texas 4 Third descent 06:12:04 6.8-18 6.8-19 A drop in received uplink carrier power level of 9 dB detected
engine Tiring, at abort staging. Received uplink and dowr_link carrier power
abort staging, and levels dropped sharp]y at 06:15:00. The abrupt drop caused
first ascent engine Texas receiver to lose lock. Intermittent two-way lock was
firing obtained between 06:15:18 and 06:17:]0. Variations in received
carrier power levels were cause_ by spacecraft antenna gain
variations.
Hawaii 5 Second ascent 07:88:48 07:38:59 6.8-20 6.8-21 Received nplink and downlink tarrier power level variations
engine Tiring observed from acquisition of signal to 07:48:00. Dowr±link
communications would have been intermittent until 07:43:00.
TABLE 6.8-11.- NETWORK/LMS-BAND TRANSMISSION COMBINATION SUMMARY
Subcarrier Initial carrier Revised carrier

Combination Information Modulation
technique frequency, phase deviation phase deviation,
kHz rad rad
i Carrier
Pseudo random Phase modulation - 1.34 1.34

noise ranging (PM) on carrier
4 Carrier
Pseudo random PM on carrier 0.80 0.38

noise ranging
Voice FM/PM 30 1.85 1.20

5 Carrier
Pseudo random PM on carrier - 0.80 0.38

noise ranging
Up-data FM/PM 70 1.85 1.20

6 Carrier
Pseudo random PM on carrier - 0.50 0.44

noise ranging
Voice FM/PM 30 1.00 1.00
Up-data FM/PM 70 0.76 1.00
oo
NASA-S-68- 1968 co
I
C-band [ Digital Telemetry o
transponders (2) [ assembly

command PCM and development transmitters
flight instrumentation
dividers (2) V_pF:xUe

rHF
! :nsa_eiver
-Z and +Z VHF/U
(paralleled) ',Adapter/LM) _ __.-_
5795 MHz S-band
Spacecraft ..... _- --I ranging

MSFN station 5690 MHz _, 450 MHz
237.SMHz \ S-band
241.5 MHz \ A up-voice
247.3
_i4_
_._ \
0.9 MHz\
MHz /__.
_1 I up-data
radar VHF/PCM/FM (1) digital PCM

tracking telemetry command telemetry
C-band VHF/FM/FM (4) I UHF I S-band
Figure 6.8-1.- Communication system configurations.

NASA-S-68-1969
-40 I I i
--- Actual
.... Predicted
-50 --- " _---
1
-60 --
-7O
-80 ..............
--go> ,_ /_
_ S-bandtransceiver
---activation _i U \
l \I.___
-110 _I---
-120
-130 ....
-140
00:53:00 00:54:O0 00:55:00 00:56:011 00:57:00 00:58:OO 00:59:O0 01:00:O0 o'_
Time,hr:min:sec Co
I
Figure6.8-2.- Received
unifiedS-banddownlinkcarrier power,Carnarvon,revolution1.
NASA-S-68- 1970
Primary transponder Secondary S-band Poweramplifier o'-,
S-band OFF transponder ON warm-up completed CO
(01:33:14.7) (0h33:29.O) I I
I-1
-40 i I I CO
I I
" -t25 F" plink unified S-band I

_- -i33 L , I / receivedcarrier power I
I
I
I
I Transceiver static
10.5 l- I _ phase error J
_ -5.
t.......... f..........
fd (one-way Doppler)
Downlink unified S-band
_ around receiver
1received
carrier power,
no. _ Transponder power onlY_l
E -85 r- / " " I (-90 dBm approximate) I
,\
-130
.-i15_ improvement to
" %-Approximate15dBm
__ -145 approximate -75 dBm
receivedpower
Receiver no. i
100F static phase error-_ ,[

o_- i _ v
!
_, -IO0
--__.._._'_._ .... _, ....._...........
(Z40"_.
2 _-_T2 fd
Ground transmitter Ground transmitter: (two-way Doppler)
15oF frequency
sweep---
X _-centerfrequencyl
-lsoL
°r-__"_____7_--,,
I I I
I I I
I I I
I I I I I I I I I I
0h33:00 01:33:10 0h33:20 0h33:30 0h33:40 01:33:50 01:34:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6. 8-3. - Primary to secondary unified S-band system switchover, Texas, revolution I.
NASA-S-68-1971
-40 I i
i
-50
-70 //-- ,, _ I ,
/
E fl j " ,
_ __GYM_EX'_
! l, ,
TE×/MIL
"-_ -go Jhand°ver

---, lli [ ' mT-hand°ver-
.....
-_ -100
I
-110
-120
Note:
-130 Arrows indicate data are --
off scale
-140 I
01:52:00 01:55:00 01:54:00 01:35:00 01:36:00 01:57:00 01:58:00 01:39:00
Time, hr:min:sec O_
(33
I
Figure 6.8-4. - Receivedunified S-band uplink carrier power, Texas, revolution 1.
Do
oo
I
,
7--
\ _ ..
t ' i
¢'2,.
<<>_ I
_ _ <_
!
I
[
_ I
_ tlll]p 'Ja_od JSlJJ_3 pa^la3al:l
i
NASA-S-68- 1973
-ii0
-120
-130
-140
01:37:00 01:38:00 01:39:00 01:40;00 01:41:00 01:42:00

O_
Time, hr:min:sec
O0
[
Figure 6.8-6.- Received unified S-band uplink carrier power, MILA, revolution 1-2. .1__
OA
NASA-S-68-1974 Co
-40 I
l-J
O_
-50
-60
-70
E
_= -80
_2
-- -90
-100
-Ii0
j
-130
: I
140 - _
01:B5:00 01:B6:00 0h37:00 01:B8:00 0h39:00 01:40:00 01:41:00 0]:42:00 01:43:00
Time, hF:min:sec
Figure 6. 8-7. - Received unified S-band downlink carrier power, MILA, revolution 1-2.
NASA-S-68-1975 -40 !
I
I
-50
-60
-7O
E
e_
_= -80
g_
® -90
-I00
-110
-120
-130 dicate dataare

off scale high
-140
01:46:00 01:47:00 01:48:00 01:49:00 01:50:00 01:51:00 01:52:00
Time, hr:min:sec
co
I
Figure 6.8-8.- Receivedunified S-band uplink carrier power, Redstone, revolution 2. -.1
I_
NASA-S-68- 1976
-40 co
I
Co
-50
-6O
-7O
-8o
-- -90
N -lOO
-II0
-120
-130
-140
01:44:00 01:45:00 01:46:00 01:47:00 01:48:00 01:49:00 01:50:.00 01:51:00 01:52:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.8-9.- Received unified S-band downlink carrier power, Redstone, revolution 2.
NASA-S-68-1977
-40
-110
-120
-130
-140 j_
03:02:O0 03:03:O0 03:04_

O0 03:05:OO 03:06:O0 03:07:O0 03:08:O0 03:09:O0 o",
Time, hr:min:sec
CO
I
Figure6.8-10.- Received
unifiedS-banddownlinkcarrier power,Ouaymas,revolution2. _)_
6.8-2o
'1
NASA-S-68:1979
-40 i
-50
Antenna patterns and

look angles poor
-60
, A
-70 I'v \
-80 ' i
__- / ' i
o_ "_ / tt J
-I00 , 7
-120
-ii0 /
I TEX/, It
_ i MIUBDA
7 1
,_'_ hanc ver _./ handover
-130 /
-140
03:08:
OO 03:
og:
O0 03:1
_.O0 03:1
I:OO OB:
12:
OO 03:1
B:O0 03:14:O0 03:15:0g 03:16:O0
O_
Time, hr:min:sec
CO
I
ro
Figure 6.8-]2.- Received unified S-band downlink carrier power, MILA, revolution 2-3. I_
First descent engine firing
-130 , i
r I
-140 III
03:57:00 03:5&00 03:59:00 04:00:00 04:01:00 04:02:00 04:03:00 04:04:00 04:05:00 04:06:00 04:07:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6. 8-13.- Receivedunified S-band uplink carrier power, Carnarvon, revolution 3.

NASA-S-68-1981
-4O
-- Actual
-50 ..... Predicted
_60
-7O
_= -80 ._"- _'- /----" /--_
°
E -9o
AI/
i
I/lllll/;,
_ -i00
, VV
I ,z ,
-12o Ii
-- r !,,l
-130 .- iI _i
-140 [
03:57:00 03:58:00 03:59:00 04:00:00 04:01:00 04:02:00 04:03:00 04:_:00 04:05:00 04:06:00 04:07:00
o'x
Time, hr:min:sec
(30
I
Figure 6.8-14. Receivedunified S-band downlink carrier power, Carnarvon, revolution 3. bo
NASA-S-68-1982
CO
-40 t
h_
-50
-60
-7O
-80
o
._- -90
g -100
c_
110
I
i
-120
-130
-140 t
06:07:00 06:08:00 06:09:00 06:10:00 06:I h 00 06:12:O0 06:13:00 06:iz_:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6. 8-]5. - Receivedunified S-band downlink carrier power, Gordstone, revolution 4.

NASA-S-68-1983
-40
-ii0
-120
-130
-140
06:08:00 06:09:00 06:10:00 06:11:00 06:12:00 06:13:00 06:14:00
Time, hr:min:sec 0",
(Do
I
ha
Figure6.8-t6.- Received
unifiedS-banduplink carrier power,Guaymas,revolution4. ',..n
NASA-S-68- 1984 0"_
Co
r_
-50
GYM/TEX ......
kl._/ handever
-60 I
I
-70 ......
_ -_o /
\
•-_ -go /
-I00
-Ii0 1
Seconddescentengine firing
I' I
-120 l
_--
I Third descent engine firing
-_llm,,-
n I
/ , ,L,
illF
I
rst ascent engine firing
-130 I
i
I I
I I
-140 I I
06:08:00 06:09:00 06:I 0:0O 06:1I: 0O 06:12:00 06:13:00 06:14:00 06:15:00 06:16:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.8-17.- Receivedunified S-band downlink carrier power, Guaymas, revolution 4.
t
6.8-27
NASA-S-68- 1986
O'_
-60 --- i Third descent engine firing An

.... ' I 1-I I I= r
.... _! -":!.,_
;- J r [i>l' .... --- -'
...... ± I [ _j i
-70 --- :.irst ascent engine fi-ri_ ...... ' ' _
= I
..... I GY I/TEX+_ -- ' p r
ha_ bver - . _.
-80 ....... I , ,
i I\"
-90-- --- /] [I
_._ " L/ I Jl I
o
-100 ....
J
'\ iil1_ --
-110 ...... --
i
-120 / IIII
/, ....... rlli
I
" Vl I
, lIt,
-i50 l , , [
06:1
O:O0 06:1
h O0 06:12:O0 06:13:O0 06:14:00 06:15:O0 06:16:O0 06:17:O0 06:18:O0 06:19:O0
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.8-19.- Receivedunified S-baRddownlink carrier power, Texas, revolution 4.

NASA-S-68- 1987
-40
-ii0
-120
-130
-140
07:38:00 07:39:00 07:40:00 07:41:00 07:42:00 07:43:00 07:44:00 07:45:00 07:46:00
Time, h r:min:sec o',,
Co
I
Figure 6. 8-20. - Receivedunified S-band uplJnk carrier power, Hawaii, revolution 5. IX)
NASA-S-68- 1988
Co
-4°I i ' I _ r I _ I 1 p I i
I
I
---] i I
-50 I L -- -Antennalpatterns and I_
I Secondascent-!engine firing
_ ---
I _ -- lookangles poor __ .._.....
-60 _
-711
E
N -8o ....
•_- -go
I L I i
>
-100 ' '
c_ /
-120
i
-130
-t4o , /' " l/ i ' ' I I

07:38:00 07:39:00 07:40:00 07:41:00 07:42:00 07:43:00 07:44:00 07:45:00 07:46:00 07:47:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.8-21.- Receivedunified S-band downlink carrier power, Hawaii, revolution 5.

NASA-S-68-1989
Step 1 r--Step 2
(states I (state P3)
PI and I F Step .3
P2)_ / |(state P4) _r-100 percentdata
correlatiOnvalid
from thisachieved
point)
] | Step 4 Step 5 j(ranging
o
ioo-
125-,., (stateP5) ] (state P6) i_um._. (state
,--um,_,.,,
P7) _'"
f-A subcode F- B subcode P C subcode
o_ lacquired /acquired _ acquired

75 -
e_
-o
•_. X subcode
"_ acquired -
50 _ Range
_' code
o off
-¢2
"o 25-
"_
o
.,_ 5.5 seconds typical
o - Initiate
I I I I I I I %
0 i 2 3 4 5 6 7
Reference time, sec
o_
co
I
Figure 6.8-22.- Typical range code acquisition sequence (128 integrations persLep).
NASA-S-68- 1990 o_
Oo
l
Do
Center _a
frequency
Up-voice /-_ Up-data

subcarrier // subcarrier
Pseudo-random I I I I
noise ranging
-30 kHz +30 kHz
2101.8 MHz
(a) S-band uplink spectrum.
Center
Turned-around frequency pseudo-random

upl ink noise ranging
subcarriers _ S Turned-around I
-1.024MHz z 1+70 kHz +1,024 MHz

-30 kHz +30 kHz
2282.5 MHz
(b) S-band downlinl< spectrum.
Figure6.8-23.- S-band RFspectrum.

6.8-33
NASA-S-68-1991 NASA-S-68-2092 NASA-S-68-2093
25
F
,
TEx/MIL,III handover
I
I
MtL/BDA
Subcarrier of] with phase-
shift keyed modulai:ion
I
JJ
,
handover
I
I
/"1 I GYM/TEXII bandover
I
I
MIL/BDA
,'
Ilhand°ver
I
I
I-.,, =1 /
I I
I / I
o is I /_ I
°
,-_ '
I / / v '
I
s I I
-_ IO I I
b i i /
I I I IJ
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
V
I I I I
I I I
I I I
I I I /
5
0
I
II
I
II _
I
II t
01:35:20 01:37:20 01:39:20 01:41:20 01:43:20 03:06:00 03:06:40 03:07:20 03:08:00 03:08:40 03:12:00 03:14:00 03:16:00 03:18:00
Time, hr:min:sec Time, hr:min:sec Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.8-24.- Turned-around unified S-band up-data Figure 6.8-25.- Turned_-arouudunified S-band up-voice Figure 6.8-26.- Turned-around unified S-band up-voice
signal-to-noise ratio, MILA, revolution 1-2. signal-to-noise ratio, Guaymas, revolution 2. signal-to-noise ratio, MILA, revolution 2-3.
6.8-34
NASA-S-68- 1992 NASA-S-68- 1993 NASA-S-68- 1994
10_6 Apollo desig_ goal Apollo design goal Apollo design goal
10 -5
&
o i
C_3 _A
10-4
10- 3 Limit of usable real-time data Limit of usabie real-time data Limit of usable real-riffle data
;
00:52:00 00:54:00 00:56:00 00:58:00 01:00:00 06:08:00 06:10:00 06:12:00 06:14:00 06:16:00 07:38:00 07:40:00 07:42:00 07:44:00 07:46;00
Time_ hr:mi_]:sec "FJlne_hr:min:sec Time, hr:nlin:sec
Figure 6.8-27.- Unified S-balld

Carnarvoi], PCM bit
revohltioll 1. error probability, Figure 6.8-28.- Unified S-band bit error probabiliLy, Guaymas, revolution 4. Figure 6.8-29.- Unified S-bal]d PCM bit error probability, Hawaii, revolution 5.
NASA-S-68-1995
-40
-5O
-60
-70
E
cc_
-80
o_
F> 40
N
-i00
-ii0
120
-130
-140
06:08:00 06:09:00 06:10:00 06:1I: 00 06:12:00 06:13:00 06:14:00 06:15:00 06:16:00
Time, hr:min:sec o_
co
I
Figure6.8-30.- TotalreceivedVHFpower,guaymas,revolution4. bo
NASA-S-68-1996
-40 o",
Seconddescent
(20
_ngine firing I
L,O
I O_
-50
-60
-10
"_ -80
> -90
"_ -190
5-
-ii0
-120
-]30
-140
06:i h00 06:12:00 06:13:00 06:14:00 06:15:00 06:16:00 06:17:00 06:18:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.8-31. Total receivedVHF power, Texas, revo[ution 4.

6.8-37
NASA-S-68- 1997 NASA-S-68- 1998 NASA-S-68- 1999
10-°° I-
I
10-6
1
10 -5
10 -4
10-3
10-2
___
_,
_
____
....
______
.................
...............
....
_
Limit of usablereal-time data Limit of usablereal-time data Limit of usable real-time data
00:51:00 00:53:00 00:55:00 00:57:00 00:59:00 06:08:00 06:10:00 06:12:00 06:14:00 06:16:00 07:37:0 07:39:00 07:41:00 07:43:00 07:45:00
Time,hr:min:sec Time,hr:min:sec Time,hr:min:sec
Figure 6.8-_32.- VHF PCM bit error probability, Carnarvon,revolution 1. Figure 6.8-33.- VHF PCM bit error probability, Guaymas,revolution 4. Figure 6.8-34.- VHF PCM bit error probability, Hawaii, revolution 5.
o_
NASA-S-68- 2000 Co
I
-40 L,o
co
-50 ---
-60 ---
, _'_ i\ _ ._, Predicted UHF
-
_iI i '\ -_ _ i/ /
' V I ReceivedVHF
-,0 Total received

/ f _,
_-,#I F
_j-- "_
\\/
',' ,.-_
/L
/ _ p/--carrier
_"
power
f__{
,_- -90 UHFpower -- %_ /_\ /_,/ J
r
\j /
/
' ReceivedVHF X/\
-100 carrier power l_/ /_ _ k / //_ _ _ 7UHF

Totalpower
received i
-110 "_ __ --
-120
I, ¢/_ Adapter/LM antenna switchover

-130
I
I
-140
00:.51:00 00:.52:00 00:.53:00 00:.54:00 00:.55:00 00:.56:00 00:.57:00 00:.58:00 00:.59:00 01:00:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.8-35.- Total received UHFand VHFpower, Carnarvon, revolution 1.

6.9-1
6.9 RADAR

.... 6. io-i
6.10 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
6.10.1 Summary
The primary guidance, navigation, and control system and the stabi-
lization and control system functioned as designed throughout the mis-
sion. Navigation errors at insertion were commensurate with the system
alignment errors existing at lift-off. LM/S-IVB stage separation, the
maneuver to cold-soak attitude, the subsequent attitude hold, the maneu-
ver to the attitude for the first descent engine firing and the initia-
tion of the firing were all performed nominally by the primary system.
The first descent engine firing was ended prematurely by the LM guidance
computer because the descent engine thrust buildup did not meet the pro-
grammed velocity/time criteria. The subsequent attitude hold and ground
commanded maneuver to the attitude for the second descent engine firing
were also performed under primary system control. The second and third
descent engine firings and the first ascent engine firing were performed
by the stabilization and control system with mission programmer sequenc-
ing and were nominal for that system. Control was returned to the pri-
mary system after the first ascent engine firing, and an abnormal limit
cycle occurred because the digital autopilot was configured for control
"_ of an unstaged vehicle. The second ascent engine firing was controlled
by the stabilization and control system and the mission programmer with
nominal results until control engine propellant depletion, when con-
trol authority was lost and the vehicle tum01ed.
6.10.2 Integrated System Performance
Laumch/S-IVB sta_e coast.- Prelaunch gyrocompassing was terminated

and the inertial measurement unit was inertially fixed by the guidance
computer at 00:00:00.86 when sensed acceleration exceeded l.lg. The
computer-determined lift-off was not noted on the ground_ therefore, a
backup colmmand was sent at approximately 00:00:06. All guidance and
control sequencing functions for this period were correct.
The body rate oscillations sensed in the spacecraft during launch

remained less than +0.5 deg/sec. A comparison of spacecraft and launch
vehicle gimbal angles for this phase indicates a maximum difference of
1.3 degrees during maximum dynamic pressure. The differences were with-
in the uncertainties expected from initial misalignment, timing, and ve-
hicle flexure. The guidance and control navigation errors at insertion,
based on a comparison with the best estimate trajectory obtained using
the S-IVB stage guidance system, are listed in table 6.10-1. Although
the component errors are large, they are shown in section 6.10.3 to be
caused primarily by prelaunch alignment errors purposely allowed to
6.10-2
meet a minimum perigee constraint for the second ascent engine firing.
Total velocity at insertion agreed within 2 ft/sec. After sensing S-IVB
stage shutdown, the guidance computer entered an idling mode until the
progrs_mmed LM/S-IVB stage separation sequence was initiated.
LM/S-IVB stage separation.- The separation sequence of events con-

trolled by the guidance computer is shown in figure 6.10-1. A +X trans-
lation began at 00:53:50.11. The best indication of physical separation
was a telemetry noise transient at 00:53:55.2L. This was substantiated
by body rate and translational acceleration'data. Figure 6.10-2 contains
spacecraft dynamics for the separation. Rate transients were less than
0.2 deg/sec in all three axes, and attitude excursions were less than
±1.2 degrees throughout the 20-second +X translation period. There was
no indication of recontact between the two vehicles. The total velocity
change during the separation sequence was 4.1 ft/sec. A detailed study
of separation dynamics will be contained in supplement 6 to this report.
Cold-soak period.- Figure 6.10-2 also shows spacecraft dynamics and

control engine firing commands during the maneuver to the cold-soak atti-
tude. All parameters indicate nominal performance. Figure 6.10-3 com-
pares the commanded gimbal angles with the actual gimbal angles during
the maneuver. Nominal digital autopilot performance during the maneuver
is indicated by the small difference between the actual and commanded
values as shown in the figure. The divergence shown in the Z-axis prior
to the maneuver was caused by residual rate in existence at the termina-
tion of the second +X translation when the attitude deadband was in-
creased from +i degree to +5 degrees.
After the attitude maneuver, the spacecraft entered a wide deadband

attitude-hold period. Figure 6.10-4 contains a typical pattern of the
control engine firing commands initiated by the digital autopilot. As
shown by the occasional relatively long firings, an ideal minimum impulse
limit cycle in pitch and roll did not occur. Figure 6.10-5 shows one
pass through the pitch and roll body-rate/body-attitude phase plane and
indicates unsymmetrical operation with the long firings occurring at each
side of the attitude deadband. This phenomenon was experienced in pre-
flight software verification runs and occurred whenever the pitch and
roll attitude errors were phased such that large errors occurred in both
axes simultaneously. The digital autopilots for LM-3 and subsequent
spacecraft will incorporate logic to prevent this type of operation. De-
tailed analysis of limit cycle operation will be published in supple-
ment 4.
First descent engine firing.- The maneuver to first firing attitude

was calculated by the computer based on the onboard state vector and
targeting parameters and was automatically performed under digital auto-
pilot control. The maneuver dynamics are represented in figure 6.10-6,
_ 6.10-3
and the gimbal angle comparisons are shown in figure 6.10-7. Performance
was nominal.
All events leading up to and including the issuance of the "engine

on" command by the computer were proper. However, the computer commanded
the engine "off" 4.17 seconds later because the descent engine failed
to meet the programmed velocity/time criteria. See section 12.2 for a
more detailed discussion.
Coast between first and second descent engine firings.- The descent
engine shutdown sequence initiated a wide deadband attitude-hold period
controlled by the digital autopilot at the first firing attitude. The
typical limit cycle was unsymmetrical but differed from that during the
cold-soak period. The pitch and roll axes were uncoupled and all firings
were near minimum impuls e duration in all three axes. The asymmetry ex-
perienced is typical of that caused by an external disturbance torque.
The maneuver to the second descent engine firing attitude was initi-
ated by a series of ground commands and was controlled by the digital
autopilot (see figures 6.10-8 and 6.10-9). Response was nominal.
Second descent en@ine firing through abort staging.- The stabiliza-

tion and control system was selected at 06:06:11.7 by ground command.
Because the abort guidance system was not installed, the subsequent maneu-
vers were performed without closed-loop guidance or attitude control.
Only rate damping was available with sequencing provided by the mission
programmer.
Figures 6.10-10 and 6.10-11 contain time histories of pertinent

parameters covering the following events.
a. Three +X translations prior to the second descent engine firing
b. Second descent engine firing, 1G-percent throttle
c. Second descent engine firing, full throttle
d. One +X translation prior to the third descent engine firing
e. Third descent engine firing, 10-percent throttle
f. Third descent engine firing, full throttle
g. Staging dynamics
h. First ascent engine firing
j-
Table 6.10-11 contains selected performance characteristics extracted
from figures 6.10-10 and 6.10-11.
6.10-4
The control engine duty cycle was higher in each case during the
+X translations preceding the descent engine firings than it was after
ignition, indicating that the disturbance torque due to center-of-
gravity offset was greater than that due to thrust vector misalignment.
Body rates remained close to the deadbands during all the firings with
a substantial control margin. One second before the end of the second
+X translation, the descent engine was armed, enabling the engine gimbal
drive actuators to drive in response to the +X translation disturbance
torque. Each time the actuators drove, the ac voltage fluctuated as
shown in figure 6.10-10. This figure and table 6.10-11 show that the
direction of actuator motion reversed after ignition and indicate that
the activity during the +X translation introduced an out-of-trim condi-
tion. The trilmming action during the lO-percent-throttle period reduced
the thrust-vector/center-of-gravity offset to an acceptable level before
the increase to full throttle_ consequently, the resulting disturbance
torques were well within the control engine capability. It would be pos-
sible to exceed the available control authority at full throttle if a
large thrust-vector/center-of-gravity offset was introduced during the
+X translation_ and an insufficient time at 10-percent throttle was
allowed to trim the engine. Measures are being taken to prevent this
problem from occurring on future missions.
Figure 6.10-12 is an expanded plot of spacecraft dynamics during

the staging sequence. The only significant rate disturbances occurred
simultaneously with the ascent engine peak chmnber pressure. The rate
disturbances of +7.7, +2.0, and -0.8 deg/sec in pitch, roll, and yaw,
respectively, converged to deadband values of -0.8, -1.2_ and -0.8 deg/
sec within 2 seconds and remained within these values throughout the
firing. The disturbances predicted from preflight simulations were
-1.5 deg/sec in pitch and +3.5 deg/sec in roll. The significance of the
simulation was that the rates experienced were of the same order of
magnitude as the predictions.
The descent engine thrust during lO-percent throttle was 1221 pounds
as determined from the inertial measurement unit accelerometers_ which
compares reasonably well with 1180 pounds as determined from the thrust
chamber pressure. The ascent engine thrust was 3551 pounds based on the
accelerometers and 3480 pounds based on the chamber pressure. Dynamics
of the staging event are discussed in section 6.17.
Coast period between the first and second ascent engine firings.-
Mission programmer sequence Ill was interrupted after the ascent engine
shutdown, and spacecraft attitude control was returned to the digital
autopilot. High-rate limit cycle operation occurred immediately, causing
excessive propellant usage. This abnormal performance occurred because
the digital autopilot was still configured for control of an unstaged
vehicle. The moments of inertia and predicted angular accelerations
used by the digital autopilot to compute control engine '_on" times are
calculated based on the current value of vehicle mass contained in the
6.10-5
computer erasable memory. For this mission, the current value of mass
(and, therefore, inertia and acceleration) was to be periodically updated
during descent and ascent engine operation and automatically reinitial-
ized at staging. Because of the premature shutdown of the first descent
engine firing, the computer entered an idling mode and the mass update
process did not occur during the second and third descent engine firings
and the staging sequence. Therefore, the control engine "on" times com-
puted by the digital autopilot for a given rate and attitude error were
to correct an unstaged, fully loaded vehicle. The result was rapid os-
cillations of the vehicle as the digital autopilot overcontrolled in an
attempt to keep attitudes within deadband limits. (See section 12.2 for
further discussion.) The oscillations and resultant propellant usage
have been reproduced in simulations.
Second ascent engine firing.- A time history of spacecraft dynamics

for the second ascent engine firing is contained in figure 6.10-13. Im-
mediately after switching from the primary to the backup system, the body
rates converged to near zero in all axes and remained there until the
start of +X translation. About 6.6 seconds after the start of the +X
translation, a high-rate limit cycle began in the pitch axis and contin-
ued until engine start. This high-rate limit cycle was caused by non-
linearities in the pulse ratio modulation circuits in the stabilization
and control system. The possibility of experiencing this type of opera-
tion during +X translation with a light, staged vehicle was predicted
based on hybrid simulation runs. A design change to the pulse ratio
modulation circuits has been approved which will prevent this phenomenon.
Rate damping during the ascent engine firing was nominal although
the 4-up control engine had failed, and rates in all three axes held near
the deadbands. A second +X translation (fig. 6.10-13) occurred 58.6 sec-
onds after engine ignition. This was caused by the mission programmer
sequence V, which included two ascent engine firings, each preceded by
a +X translation. Because an engine start override ground command was
sent after the first ignition, only one firing occurred. The second +X
translation, therefore, occurred while the engine was on. Further,
sequence V called for closing the propellant interconnect valves. The
rates began to diverge and the vehicle began to tumble when the control
propellant was depleted (see fig. 6.10-13). Rates in all axes periodi-
cally exceeded the rate gyro instrumentation saturation level of +25 deg/
sec. Gimbal lock occurred at approximately 07:47:30, as verified by the
gimbal lock alarm.
6.10.3 Primary Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance
The inertial measurement unit and associated electronics performed

properly throughout the mission. Preflight test history for the inertial
I_-- rate integrating gyros and the pulse integrating pendulous accelerometers
6.10-6
is contained in figure 6.10-14. The values used to compute inflight com-

pensation and the compensation values are indicated on the figure. The
affect of drift due to acceleration along the gyro output axis (ADOA),
which is not compensated explicitly, was removed by correcting the null
bias drift (NBD) and drift due to acceleration along the spin reference
axis (ADSRA) terms. The compensation value for drift due to acceleration
along the input axis (ADIA) was not corrected for ADOA because of the
ADIA measurement uncertainty _md the relative insignificance of the ADOA
values.
The final series of prelaunch inertial measurement unit performance

tests showed erratic behavior and large shifts in the ADIA X coefficient.
Because of the uncertainties involved in measuring ADIA while the iner-
tial measurement unit is installed in the spacecraft and because preflight
dispersion analyses for this mission showed the minimum perigee con-
straint for the second ascent engine firing to be very sensitive to neg-
ative ADIA X errors, the compensation value chosen was close to the most
negative excursion measured.
The prelaunch alignment orientation of the inertial measurement unit

is shown in figure 6.10-15. The orientation was chosen, for this mission
only, to avoid exceeding the 3.26g acceleration limit of the acceler-
ometers during boost and to avoid the possibility of gimbal lock during
the planned out-of-plane propulsion maneuvers. The inertial measurement
unit will be powered-down during launch on subsequent missions. The max-
imum acceleration noted was approximately 3.11g in the Y axis at
00:02:18.8.
Figure 6.10-16 contains a comparison of velocity time histories dur-

ing the launch phase computed by the primary guidance, navigation, and
control system; by the S-IVB instrument-unit guidance system, and from
the ground tracking network.
The instrument-unit and Glotrac data agreed within i ft/sec and,

therefore, were used as the standard for this preliminary analysis. The
guidance errors were larger than normally expected but are attributed
largely to the inertial measurement unit misaligmnent at lift-off. The
biased ADIA X compensation, which caused an effective drift, propagated
through the prelaunch gyrocompassing loop into alignment errors in all
three inertial measurement unit axes° The shape of the error propagation
in all three axes is characteristic of a misaligmaent which causes the
accelerometers to sense a disproportionate level of acceleration.
Table 6.10-111 contains a preliminary set of error coefficients.

The accelerometer bias errors shown are the average of three inflight
bias measurements made during three quiescent coast periods with minimal
control engine activity (see table 6.10-1V).
6.10-7
The residual velocity errors after compensating for the preliminary

set of errors are contained in figure 6.10-16. It should be emphasized
that the error coefficients shown are preliminary and subject to revision
in the final inertial measurement unit analysis, which will be issued as
supplement 5 to this report.
All inertial system temperatures and voltages remained within limits

throughout the flight. The vibration levels measured at the navigation
base are discussed in section 6.1.2.
The guidance computer performed as designed throughout the mission.

Table 6.10-V lists the major modes used. All sequencing, including mis-
sion programmer commands, was as planned up to the premature descent en-
gine shutdown and was nominal throughout the mission. No restarts were
noted nor were any rejections of ground updates experienced.
6.10.4 Stabilization and Control System Performance
Performance of the stabilization and control system, consisting of

the control electronics section, was nominal throughout the mission. The
system gains and thresholds derivable from telemetry have been compared
- with preflight values. All values were correct within the calculation
accuracy allowed by the telemetered data. Different time lags were
noted for various pulse ratio modulator channels when two or more con-
trol engines were colmmanded on or off simultaneously. The lags were con-
sistent throughout and were expected.
6.10-8
TABLE 6.10-1.- STATE',VECTOR COMPARISON AT 00:i0:00.86
IN L_I-I INERTIAL COORDINATE SYSTEM
S-IVB/instrument unit
Position Spacecraft guidance best estimate trajectory
PX' ft ........ 15 294 214 15 260 716
Py, ft ........ 14 185 672 14 248 462
PZ' ft ........ 4 948 702 4 887 572
Velocity
VX, ft/sec ...... -15 249.6 -15 370.1
Vy, ft/sec ...... I0 122.6 i0 367.6
VZ, ft/sec ...... 18 015.3 17 774.4
Vtotal, ft/sec .... 25 682.0 25 683.8

TABLE 6.10-11.- PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS DURING MISSION PROGRAMMER SEQUENCE III
Moment unbalamce Gimbal drive actuator

Accumulated
Time, Event velocity Pitch Roll

hr:min:sec change, Pitch, Roll, Direction Direction
ft/sec ft-lb ft-lb of motion position, of motion position,
in. in.
06:06:12 Select backup control path 0.0 - N/A N/A -
06:10:07 +X translation on 0.0 N/A O.I03R N/A 0.719R

+128 -108
06:10:18 +X translation off 2.9 N/A O.103R N/A 0.719R
06:10:22 +X translation on 2.9 N/A 0.103R N/A 0.719N

+128 -108
06:10:27 +X translation off 4.4 Extend O.040R None 0.719R
06:10:33 +X translation on 4.4 Extend O.040E Extend 0.710R

+128 -108
06:10:42 Comand i0 percent throttle
+115 -86 Extend 0.198E None 0.672R
06:10:46 +X translation off 12.0
+48 +32 Retract 0.308E None 0.672R
06:11:08 Command full throttle 38.0
-410 +250 Retract 0.055E Retract 0.672R
06:11:15 Descent engine off 108.4 - 0.277E 0.909R
06:11:38 +X translation on 108.4

+145 -ii0 Extend 0.277N Extend 0.909R
06:11:47 Command i0 percent throttle
+138 -109 Extend 0.055R Extend 0.862R
06:11:51 +X translation off 111.2
-31 -i0 Retract 0.087E None 0.814R
06:12:13 Command full throttle 124.0
-340 -i0 Retract 0.O08E Retract 0.813E
06:12:14 Descent engine off 160.0
- - O.150R 0.846R
06:12:15 Ascent engine on 168.0
-5O -2O3 N/A - N/A
06:13:14 Ascent engine off 855.0 _ _ _ O_
R = retract Oi
E = extend _o
6.10-10
TABLE 6.10-111.- PRELIMINARY INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT
:ERROR SOURCES
Error source Magnitude Specification: Cormment
X bias, cm/sec 2 .... -0.046 0.20 Derived from inflight

bias measurement
Y bias, cm/sec 2 • . • -0.137 0.20
Z bias, cm/sec 2 • • • -0.i01 0.20
YXMSL, arc sec . . . 10 20 Measured values from

factory test
YZMSL_ arc sec . . . -4 20
ZYMSL_ arc sec . . . -:20 20
X ADOA, mERU/g . . . +2.3 N/A Mean of preflight

calibrations
Y ADOA, mERU/g . . . +1.2 N/A
Z ADOA, mERU/g . . . +2.3 N/A
X ADIA, mERU/g . . . 36.7 8 Approximately 30 mERU/g

prelaumch offset
MSL - accelerometer misa!ignment of the first axis toward the

second
ADOA - drift due to acceleration along the output axis
ADIA - drift due to acceleration along the inout axis
r
6.1O-ll
TABLE 6.10-1V.- INFLIGHT BIAS COMPUTATION
X bias, Y bias, Z bias, Total

time,
cm/sec2 cm/sec2 cm/sec2 sec
Carnarvon, passes i, 2, and 3 0.094 0.358 0.019 i0 994

(two revolutions)
Rose Knot Victor, passes i and 2 0.093 -0.357 0.019 5 935

(one revolution)
Merritt Island, passes 1/2 and 2/3 0.095 -0.356 0.019 5 994
(one revolution)
Mean 0.094 -0.357 0.019
Compensation 0.140 -0.220 0.120
Preflight mean 0.151 -0.258 0.120
Bias error -0.046 -0.137 -0.i01

6.10-12
TABLE 6.10-V.- L_-I _L%JOR MODE TIMELINE
Major mode Program description Progrsxl hr:min:sec*

initiation time,
-
P-02 Prelaunch gyrocompassing -00:02:09.1
P-04 Terminate gyroeompassing -00:00:00.i
P-11 Pre launch escape tower jettison boost monitor 00:00:00.9
P-12 Post launch escape tower jettison boost monitor 00.02:38.9
P-13 Coast with S-IVB attached 00:09:56.9
P-OO Guidance computer idling 00:21:54.9
P-14 S-IVB/LM separation 00:49:52.6
P-O0 Guidance computer idling 00:54:09.9
P-15 Cold-soak attitude maneuver 00:54:16.7
P-O0 Guidance computer idling 00:56:46.7 _-
P-27 Ground co.mnand update No data
P-27 Ground command update 01:37:35.9
P-3± Pre descent engine first firing 01:55:03.7
P-41 Descent engine first firing 03:58:34.9
P-27 Ground come,and update 05:34:07.9
P-27 Ground command update 06:25:03.9
P-00 Guidance computer idling 06:25:59.9
P-27 Ground conup_and update 07:11:30.9
P-27 Ground coral_and update 07:13:23.9
*Program initiation times are not corrected for word position in the 2-second downlist.
6.10-13
NASA-S-68-2001
L M/S-]3ZB separation program initiate.." _ N_x_ _x_ ,_N_ _,x_N_ _ _,_'N_ ,_'_ _,'_'_ x_x-,N_xN,_
_"_ ,_N-N_N,_
,_N_ _NN_ _N_'_ X_N'N'_'N_
,N_ N,N_ _x_ _x-_'N_X_NN_x
_ ,x_ _ .N_x_ ,_N_ _ .................
00:49:30 00:50:00 00:50::30 00:51:00 00:51:30 00:52:00 00:52:30 00:53:00 00:53:30 00:54:00 00:54:30
Time, hr:min:see
Figure 6.10-Io- LM/S-]3ZB stage separation sequence of events.

NASA-S .60- 2002 6.10-14
Off r_ On Jet ]U
r_ On Jet 2U i i i• I' I' : E-;.,- [
Oft
Oil _J_-On Jet3U JI II I[ II II " _I "'- ......... ._I
I I I I I I --. I
Off _On Jet4U 10 _- I I I I ..... --
o_ Begin lEnd +X IiBegin +X lEnd maneuver to IIEndmaneuver to
5 -- I translation IIseparation IItranslation Iitranslation I translation iceld-soakattitude Icofd-soakattitude
Z 0 _ .__ Pitch rate _._1 f'-"- _ I
I I I [
_.-5 -- ll ll lI il l
l I } l l
Off _On JetID dO --' I , t I I
Off f-OR Jet20 .... I --
Off _On Jet3D
Off J--On Jet4D 10 ............... " °.
_ 5 I J ' I
Z 0 _ _--_ Roll rate ' ,-" '--
: I
_.-0 l
Off _l_On Jet ]F
Off _J--On Jet 2F dO
Off _-On Jet3F
Off _--On Jet4F 10
Yaw rate I
>_-5 l
l
__-On Jet 1S I
Off _On
Off Jet2S -10 I
"- --
Off _F_On Jet3S

Off _On Jet4S ,_.
] L I I I _ I { { I £ _ I I I I ____ l I ----.L £ I_ I I I I t _--L _ ........ L--_C .......... I _L._.___$ ..... I I J

00:53;40 00:3:55 00:54:00 00:54:15 00:54:25 00:54:35 0&54:45 00:54:55 00:55:03
Time, hr:nlin:sec
Figure6.]O-2.- Spacecraftdynamics - separation and maneuver tocold-soak attitude.

NASA-S-68- 2003
340 ---_\
o; 320 _ ...,,,.,,._..,,,-"
E
r-_ 300
8o IIIIActual
60 -'_ Commanded:--
_
40
20
\ '
-_ 360
-
>-
340 \
320 \
30O
160
o_ 140 ------
--_,
N
c 120 i
x 100 !
80
00:53:50.9 58.9 54:06.9 14.9 22.9 30.9 38.9 46.9 54.9 00:.55:02.9
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure6.10-3. - Gimbalangle comparison- maneuverto cold-soakattitude.

NASA-S-68-2004 o_
O
r
O_
Up
Down
Right
>-
Left
Right
2.
Left
05:00:00 03:02:00 03:04:00 03:06:00 03:08:00 05:I0:00 05:12:00 03:14:00 03:16:00

Time, hr:min:sec
Fi_ure 6.10-4.- Typical limit cycle during cold-soak attitude hold.

NASA-S-68- 2005
0.3
g%
_m 0.2 t
_; o.1
i
i I l
_ 2
-0.i "q [ \Start [ I
0.3 i_
0.2 _ _-°-_ "h-
I
[
-0.2 Stop
-5 -4 -5 -2 -i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 OA
Attitude
error,deg F_
0
I
Figure 6.10-5.- Pitch and roll phase p_ane. -4
i iii
!i I _i
6.10-18
NASA S 68 2006
Oft On Jet IU
Off _ On Jet2U -- ............
Off _--On Jet3U - -.........
Oil _ On Jet4U lO-- - ---
Ii Beginmaneuverto firing attitude EndmaReuver
M
5 I
I Pitch rate
Off -J-- On Jet ]D -]C --

Off _ On Jet2D . ,
Off -]_ On Jei3D --
Off -J_ On Jet4D 10 ----
--
I
5 I
_
o i
= I _-_ Roll rate -- I

Off -J_ On JetIF 2, -5 II -----_ _: - --_ -- II
Off _ On Jet2F lO I I
Off --_ On Jet3F I I
r-On Jet4F ]0 I I
Off I J
I I
5 I I
o; 0 --_ I
....
_.-5 II II
_ On JetIS II II
Off Yawrate
Off --J-- On Jet2S -10
Off --_ On Jet3S
Off _On Jet4S
I _ I I ±.......... I I I I __._._.L I _ _ ..._. __I I I I........ I I ] I I L L I ....... I I I I I I J
03:55:0903:55:10 03:55:15 03:55:20 03:55:25 03:55:30 03:55:35 03:55:40
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure6.10-6. Spacecraftdynamics- maneuverto attitude[or first descentenginefiring.

6.io-19
NASA-S-68- 2007
g, 36° I _ I
_' _ ---1
340 "_-- --
._ _ .....
_Actual Cqremanded
N 320
40 -- --
_ _,_ ,,lm_,,,,_ _
2O
J,
g. 360
_
E 340
,4,.
o
>"
320
__
_ _
/ 4
300
Figure 6.10-7.- Ghnbal angle comparison - maneuver to attitude

for first descent engine firing.
6.10-20
i
NASA S 68_ 2008
Off _ On JetiU
Off r_ On Jet 2U .... _ ..
Off _On Jet3U
Off -J_ On Jet 4U IO , .................
g ! Begin laaneuver to firing attitude End maneuver
I
I Pitch rate
_-s i i
I I
Off -J_- On Jet 1D -10 ......... ..,I
Off _On Jet2D -- ' ....
Off -J_ On Jet 3D .............
Off _On Jet4D 10
5 _ _ _ I
I R011rate \ I
o-5
Off _On Jet 1P
Off _On Jet2F -]0
Off _j---On Jet3F
j---On ]et4F 10
Off --
g5
Yaw rate
Olf _-On JetlS

Off __On Jet2S -]O
Off _On Jet3S
Off ._On Jet4S
L I I I I i I I I .................. • I I J I I I I
04:5t:20 04:51:30 04:51:40 04:51:50 04:52:00 04:52:10 04:52:20 04:52:30 04:52:40
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.10-8. - Spacecraft dynamics - maneuver to attitude for seconddescent engine firing.
6.10-21
NASA-S-68-2009
40 I_ ' .........
. i
320
160 ...............................................
07 120 ..........................
--'_
•_- 80 ........................................
x
40 .............
04:51:20.8 28.8 36.8 44.8 52.8 52:00.8 08.8 ?.6,8 04:52:24.8
Timer hr:lllill :sec
Figure 6.10-9 ,- Ginlba[ angle co)nparison - ma4euver [oaLti[ude

for second descent engine firing,
6.10-22
NASA-S-68-2010
Off jOn Jet lU I i i I i I

, Ii i i
I
i
I ......
I
I
I
I i
Off _On Jet 2iJ ......
_On Jet3U 10 .....................................
Off
Off __j_On JetdU 1.O
._E _ 5 ' Begin IBegn- +X rans a on i I Begin+X translation i_ ......

_'_ ' ' Begn
. - I Ik 1
, I
o O.g _, - _ ....... - ,
[-_-----q ........ ..-_,_.'(,___ ..... _ Pitch rate ,.................... ,Jl
-' -.,liP',. • ,
I
-i " I ' " " I

_,>_ O _ 5 - -_-i_l II _.. _- .... II It _'-'1 _J II Pitch gimbaldrive actuator "_ --'-_ ,-_----_.l"I I
I I I I I I ..... ,.,J l _ I AC bus voltage I I i II Ascentengineoff l
125 _ -]0 I I I I I I l---_.,J.___ _'_ I I I I I h I
_On Jet ID _ -O.g I I I_I I -- I J-- -- -- 7 ----" -- .
Off _j_On Jet2D _ log _ 10 ..... ......
---- ----- _- " ....
........ .............................................................
Oft o_ 1.0
_On Jet3D > -t.O
Off _--OnJet4D _, 75 .E _ 5 ...... "............. _ ............ ----- ...................... ........... ...............
Off _ _ _
50 _ 0.5 ".= Roll rate i ; ,
2B •_=
c -
_ -5 iArm descent ngine iI Comman 10percentthrottle IComm
I ,o,t.rot.e
nd II Commandi0 percentthrottle II
iI II I II I tI I I il
_On JetIF O _ -10 ; l . .; I Roll
gimba,
drive _7__:-[
actuator I I I
Off _- On Jet2F _ -:- a,,:_-----<t .........".-....... :-_
Off _iOn Jet3F ":"J""" ......... _*_"":'_'-" ""
Off _On Jet4P -i
Off lO
I i I I End+Xtranslation I I I i I_ Commandfull throttle i
I End+X translat on IEnd+X translation I I Descentengine off I End+X translation I
I iI i I' I I I
I II II
I1 I
0 _ i I i I Yawrate I I i:"---- Abort stagecommand 1
I I I I I I Ill-_,--- Ascentengine ignition t

-5 I I I I I I II (Peakthrust chamberpressure) I
j_On JetlS I I I I I I Ill I
Off
Off _ On Jet 2S 0 i i I I I 1
Off _On Jet3S
Off _On Jet4S
I I I I I i I I 1 I I I I L I t I I I I
6:i0:10 6:iO:20 6:l&3O 6:10:40 6:10:50 6:lhO0 6:ih i0 6:lh20 6:ii:30 6:11:40 6:lh50 6:12:00 6:12:i0 6:i74
20 6:12:30 6:12:40 6:12:50 6:13:O0 6:13:i0 6:13:20
Time, hr:elin:sec
Figure6. 10-10.- Spacecraftdynamics- mission programmersequence]]]].

'\
NASA S -68- 2011
Second descent Third descent First ascent

I
I engine firing --I +X translation_ i • engine tiring I engine firing _
_,Xlranslation. F-- Full _ I _ • I
_' • _ _ _ I Full throttle I _-Abort staging

rq iI
.___
]
i0 _ I_ ' '
} 0 F 900 r- _
-.... O F
_
----_
tO .........
_" _ _
_
-....
212, --
_
_
" --
"
_
]
..... rate_-
rate_
[ / _- _ ' I
-
x- i
- _ - _ aw
ztitude
600 - -20 _ 140 .... _ "'"
_. 500 _-40 F 120 .......... -- "-. /)

_ _ -
400 - N -60 F I00 ____ __ r- _, _K
,N "
_- , _ itch
300 - -80 80 ..... // "_ titude--
Descent engi //_ - Velocity change " oll '
I00200-0
- -1OO_ __ 402060 ........... _/_ _ _ -- // _" chamber pressure____chamberDescentj
_enginepressure _//--chamber
pressureASCent
engine _ tit
ui_ --"
-i00 - O / \ ....
06:]0:00 06:10:]5 06:IO:gO 06:10;45 06;ii:00 06:lhlg 06:lhgO 06:lh4P 06:12:00 06:12:15 06:12:50 06:12:45 06:13:00 06:15:15 06:15:30 Oh
Time, hr:r;lin:sec
_J
o
I
Figu re 6.1O-ii.- Mission programmer sequence 11I. FO
L*)
6.10-24
6.10-25
NASA S_68_ 2013
Off _r- On Jet 1u

off -J_ On Jet 2u
off _'_°n JetgU....
off r_ On Jet4U lO - .......................................................................................................................................... . ...
1Begin +X translation i Start of hioh rate I Ascent engine II End +X translation I Beg'n +X translation End+X translationl
g 5 I I limit cycle I ignition I I I
I I I I I I
-_' "_!
* 4_i_..... " ;';.>_rA ' : . ' _... 4--.... Pitch rate ,I . I
I I I I l
5 I I I I I
o_ I I I I I
I I I , I
Off -J_ On Jet 1D -10 L ........................................................................................................................................... I
Off _7-- On Jet 30 .............................................................................................................................................
Off _On Jet40 10 .........................
_ 0 --
"I i.............. ;I ..... I
, '
................................ I
, I ! , I '
_- 0 -- "_ _ _-_ .... Roll rate I
I I I
off -Y-- On Jet 1F I I I I
Off _.r_ On Jet2F -]0 --
Off _j_On Jet3F
Off _On Jet4F i0 --
I
I I
l Yaw rate I
I
l I I I I -- i --
_-5 I i I I I
I I I I I I
Off-]_ On Jet 1S I I I I I
I I
I
Off _j_On JetgS -lO i
Off _On JetBS
Off -J_ On Jet 4S
I I I I J J l I L
07:44:O0 0h44:I0 01:44:20 07:44:30 07:44:40 07:44:00 07:45:00 07:45:lO 07:45:20 07:40:30
Time, hr:min:sec
(a) Ignition and initial portion of firing, with rate control.
Figure 6,i0_13, _ Spacecraftdynamics - secondascent engine firing,

6.1o-26
NASA-S-68-2014
Off _---On Jet 1U --

Off _--On Jet 2U 30
Off _2-X)n Jet 3U .............................................................................
............... _'; ---. _"
[--On Jet 4U 20 . . .t Lossof ratecontrol .... --"; ....
Off -- - I .---*'f" "
I j J" "-
10 I " -
I Pitch rate _ :
j
20 _
o_ -I0 ]
J !
jOn Jet ID 15 -20 ........................................................................ J \ ....

Off _On Jet 2D - - - J :--- -- , .- -. '-:.__L l
Off _--On Jet 3D I
Off 10 -30
Off _j--On Jet 4D
5 I
I -- : \
_. 0 I _ R0ll rate
= 20 ' ------ -- _ _"
_On Jet1F I --'----_ ./ i

Off __F_On Jet 2F 15 _ ............. "_. "............ -":
Off _J--On Jet 3F -i0 _'-'-_ :_r .... 7:- _. ..................
Off _j--On Jet4F 10 "--- _ % """"
Off -15 I --"--. / j %
-20 ._ 5 I --_ __ Yawra__te ._..._

I -- __ _ _.------_ \ -I.. _-__._._
-25 _" 0 - - "_
>- -5
_On Jet 1S .................................

Off
Off __[-On Jet 2S -10 ' I I : .... _ ...................
_--On Jet 3S ..........

Off _yOn Jet 4S -15 ................. _ .................
Off i I I I I I L
07:46:55 07:47:05 07:47:15 07:47:25 07:47:35 07:47:45 07:47:55
Time,hr:min:sec
(b)Control propellantdepletion.

'I
NASA-S 68_ 2015
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
_ 0.4
0.2
1000
0
8OO
-0.2
6OO
E
P_ 400
__ 200
m
0
-200
-400
760 720 680 640 600 560 520 480 440 400 360 320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 0
Timebefore
lift-off,
days
(a) X-axis accelerometer. O'x
Figure 6.10 14. - I nertial measurementunit coefficient history.

I
ro
6.1o-28
NASA-S-68- 2017
0.4
2OO
-600
-800
760 720 680 640 600 560 520 480 440 400 360 320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 0
Time before lift-off, days

(c) Z-axis aceelerometer, o-x
Figure 6.10-14.- Continued. oI

IX3
k.c;
-12
40
E -40
-80
4
==
0
< -4
-8
760 720 680 640 600 560 520 480 440 400 360 320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 0
Timebeforelift-off, days
(d) X-axiscjyro.
Figure6.].0-14.- Continued.
!
6.10-31
O'x
NASA_SoS 2020
O
I
L_O
rX)
8 J] _ IZ ,r
.......
8
:_Ji [ I
-d0 [--.. Calculated 1 I ' <>NBD-Nu!r biasdrift
coefficienl Flig ,t
I,t t J / _ ADIA- Accelerationdrift, input axis
(ADOAremoved) Ioa(/- J OADSRA- Accelerationdrift spin referenceaxi!
-2.1 -2. _• • • Values usedto calculateflight load
<>Countdowndemonstrationtest value
4
-80 -0.6 - _
-49. ".... _ (ADOA-Acceleration drift, output axis)
!
760 720 680 640 800 560 520 480 440 400 360 320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 0
Timebefore lift off, days
if) Z-axis gyro.
Figure 6,]0-I4.- Concluded.
}
r
6.10-33
NASA-S-68- 2021
X I (along ]ocaJ vertical
at launch instant)
XSC
XSM _
1..
/ \\ \_ AX,._.__Z Launch
"2;222'
XI' YI' ZI - Launch inertial axes
XsM'YsM' ZSM - IMU stable member axes
XSC' YSC' ZSC - Spacecraft axes
AZ - Launch azimuth = 72 deg
AX I - Shown positive =40deg

AZsM - Shown negative = 30 deg
.... Notes: Orientation angles for stable memberareAX , AZsM

To align SM to the desired orientation, the SM axes
are initially set colinear with launch inertial axes.
The SM is then rotated about X t through the angle,
AX I. Then it is rotated aboutZsM throughthe
angle, AZsM.
Figure 6.10-15.- Inertial measurement unitprelaunch alignment orientation.

NASA-S-68-2022 _,
O
I
L_
14o •
I
. _
L .... i 'I I
LMguidanceminusS [_B .instrument unit, totalerror
120 ! o LN_
guidanceminusGlotracIfinal) i*'"
LMguidanceminusS-EZBinstrumentunit correctedfor gravitycomputationerror /'
LMguidanceminusS-_ZBinstrumentunit compensated
for LMguidanceerror , _
IO0 _
= ...o,_ I
> 40 _-- , , l r ....
20_ I '
I [
i " I i I
: ! I
---..,1_--___1
-20 I
0 413 8r) 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520 560 600
Time,sec
(a)X-axis•
Figure6.10-16.- Launchphasevelocitycomparisons.
NASA-S-68- 2023
4O
-40
Datadropout "_'2 _ _
-12o I
> -16o I I I ' ."-..

-200 I i "
__ [ ]
-WB instrument unit totaI error
i
o LMguidance minus Glotrac (final)
_ 2_ 0
-- ..... LMguidance minus S-]]ZB instrument unit corrected for gravity computation error \,,
LMguidance minus S-WB instrument unit compensatedfor LMguidance error ", ,.
! "".
i2_ 0
I
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520 560 600
Time, sec
(b) Y-axis.
o_
Figure 6.10-16.- Continued. H

o
I
bo
o'x
o
NASA-S-68- 2024 I
L,o
28O
-LMguidance musS - [_ [nst

" ume turn "t"total error
240 c LM guidance minus Olotrac (final) ,,.-'"
...... L_ guidance minus S-WB instrument unit corrected for gravity computation error //f
LM uidalnceminus S-.[2"B instrument unit corn ensa ed for LM guidance error "i
I
: I !
200
F i I i ..-'""
__ ],,!........
L_] ,.
160 .
_ 120 i ..................
° i _S
i Datadropout
40 i : _/ _
o , ...........
0 40 80 ]20 ]60 200 240 280 320 760 400 440 480 520 560 600
Time, sec
(c) Z-axis.
Figure 6. 10-16. - Concluded.

6. ll-i
6.11 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
The reaction control system performance and operation were nominal

until control of the spacecraft was switched to the guidance and control
system after abort staging. At that time, the vehicle mass in the dig-
ital autopilot was configured for control of a two-stage, fully loaded
vehicle_ and the system was colmmanded to deliver propellant at a rate
approximately i0 000 times greater than expected. This operational anom-
aly caused the reaction control system to operate in severe off-limit
conditions, and resulted in failures in the system. Within 3.1 minutes,
the A system propellant had been depleted to 27 percent_ and that system
was isolated to conserve propellant. The B system continued at a rapid
duty cycle until propellant depletion 5 minutes later, at which time
helium started leaking through the collapsed B system fuel bladder. Sat-
isfactory vehicle rates were restored by the B system thrust reduction
resulting from propellant depletion and by isolation of the A system
propellant tanks, thereby compensating for the digital autopilot vehicle
mass-constant error. While the B system was operating with two-phase
oxidizer and helium-ingested fuel, engine 4-up failed. Just after the
A system was reactivated, the main A oxidizer valve inadvertently closed.
-. The ascent propellant interconnect valves were later opened, returning
operation of the control engines to normal until the interconnect valves
were closed. The depletion of all propellants during the last minutes
of the second ascent engine firing allowed the spacecraft to tumble.
6.11.1 System Pressures and Temperatures
The helium pressurization system operated satisfactorily throughout

the mission.
At 108 hours before launch, the two helium tanks were serviced with
1.05 pounds of helium, providing the preactivation conditions of
3099 psia at 74 ° F in tank A and 3168 psia at 73.2 ° F in tank B. A re-
versed differential pressure of 38 psi was applied across the check
valves to increase the valve seating force and thereby prevent the flow
of propellant vapors into the regulator where they could form corrosive
residues. There was no evidence of external helium leakage.
Prior to launch, the propellant tanks were pressurized to 50 psia

with helium, and the manifolds downstream of the main valves were evacu-
ated. This manifold vacuum was maintained until system activation, with
no-evidence of leakage through the engines or main valves.
The activation sequence is shown in figure 6.11-1. The main valves

were opened before the helium isolation valves to decrease activation
P dynamic pressures. After the helium isolation valves were opened, the
_L
6o11-2
manifold pressures increased to a nominal 180 psia with no indication of

pressure overshoots. Throughout the mission, the helium regulator main-
tained the regulator outlet pressure within specification limits of
183 ± 3 psia, even under abnormally high propellant usage rates.
The steady-state manifold pressures remained within specification

limits prior to propellant depletion. The dynamic manifold pressure
fluctuations for a single control engine firing were ±30 psi and were as
high as 170 psi above regulator pressure during the high duty cycling of
the control engines. These pressure oscillations were consistent with
those noted in the ground tests.
After the completion of the first ascent engine firing, attitude

control was switched to primary guidance, which resulted in a high rate
of reaction control propellant cons_nption (see section 6.10). The
A system main valves were closed to conserve propellant. The high engine-
firing rate caused the A system manifold pressures to rapidly decrease to
zero (fig. 6.11-2). The B system manifold pressures remained nominal for
310 seconds; at that time, the fuel was depleted, and 24 seconds later,
the oxidizer was depleted, as expected. The manifold pressure charac-
teristics at that time are presented in figure 6.1]-3. As shown in the
figure, when the fuel pressure had decreased 50 psi, a helium leak
through the bladder slowly restored the fuel manifold pressure to a
nominal 180 psia. The decreased amplitude of the pressure fluctuations
was caused by helium in the fuel manifold. Further evidence of bladder
leakage is shown in figure 6.11-4. The helium pressure is shown to have
continuously decreased after fuel depletion. When the main B valves were
closed, the helium pressure remained essentially constant until the main
valves were again opened, at which time helium pressure again decayed.
The B system oxidizer manifold pressure decreased to 50 psia rather than
to zero because the substantial decrease in engine activity at oxidizer
depletion allowed oxidizer to remain within the manifold. The vapor
pressure of the oxidizer at the temperature of the system heaters was
50 psia.
This manifold pressure condition remained essentially unchanged

until the main A and B valves were reopened just prior to the second
ascent engine firing. The small quantity of B system propellant trapped
in the manifold and the reduced manifold pressures had been sufficient
for control of the vehicle from B system propellant depletion until the
main A valves were opened. The reopening of the main A valves provided
an opportunity to evaluate an activation with 180 psia on the bladder and
zero manifold pressure. Resulting hydraulic transients are shown in
figure 6.11-5. No noticeable detrimental effect on the system was ob-
served.
Opening of the crossfeed valves about 2 minutes after the main A

valve was opened caused the B system fuel manifold pressure to increase
..... 6.11-3
to 180 psia (fig. 6.11-6). However, the A system oxidizer manifold pres-
sure decreased to 80 psia, and the B system oxidizer pressure increased
to the same value. This resulted from the main A oxidizer valve inad-
vertently becoming unlatched and essentially closing at that time. Cur-
rent had been continuously applied to the valve for almost an hour,
supplying sufficient heat to vaporize the oxidizer in the valve. When
the valve was opened, oxidizer vapor was trapped above the upper magnet.
The vapor pressure forced the valve to unlatch when the downstream pres-
sure decreased after the crossfeed valves were opened. Oxidizer leakage
through the valve is indicated by the gradual oxidizer manifold pressure
rise to 115 psia from 80 psia. The oxidizer manifold pressure again de-
creased to about 50 psia as engine firings reduced the manifold pressure
to the oxidizer vapor pressure.
The interconnect valves were opened several minutes prior to the

second ascent engine firing, and both oxidizer and fuel pressures in-
creased to the 184-psia ascent engine propellant feed pressure. During
the second ascent engine firing, the pressures dropped to 170 and 177 psia
in the oxidizer and fuel manifolds, respectively. About i minute after
the second ascent engine firing was initiated, the mission programmer
automatically latched both main A valves in the closed position. About
3 minutes prior to ascent engine thrust decay, the mission programmer
automatically closed the interconnect and crossfeed valves, and reopened
.... the main A valves, as shown in figure 6.11-7. The A system oxidizer was
depleted about 1.5 minutes after the A system interconnect valves were
closed because of the inadvertent closure of the main A oxidizer valve.
During this 1.5-minute interval, 64 pounds of oxidizer were cold-flowed
through the engines, which were commanded on almost continually.
During the period of nominal operating conditions, the propellant

tank temperatures varied between 61 ° and 67 ° F, but the cooling following
control system propellant depletion caused the temperatures to range be-
tween 52° and 67 ° F. Fuel and oxidizer inlet temperatures were 65 ° to
75 ° F, depending upon engine activity. These values were satisfactory.
6.11.2 Propellant Utilization

7,
The quantities of propellant serviced for this mission is shown in

the following table:
Fuel (Aerozine 50) Oxidizer (nitrogen tetroxide)
System Quantity, Time before Quantity, Time before

ib launch_ hr ib launch, hr
A 102.0 ± 1.6 319 203.4 ± 2.5 249
_- B 102.8 ± 1.6 306 203.4 ± 2.5 243

6.11-4
The propellant consumption was normal until spacecraft control was

switched from the backup to the primary control system at 06:14:05.2,
resulting in an extremely high propellant consumption rate (70 ib/min).
The propellant expended by the control engines throughout the mis-

sion is shown in figure 6.11-8. At separation, the quantity of propellant
expended by the A system, as calculated by the propellant quantity measur-
ing device, was about 4 percent higher than had been predicted. The
B system showed essentially the same usage as predicted. The propellant
usage was also calculated by a set of equations permitting consideration
of additional variables not considered by the measuring device. The two
calculated quantities differed as a result of different inputs such as
tank volume, propellant loads, and instrumentation variances. Overshoots
in expended propellants were a result of temperature stabilization lag.
The B system fuel depletiom occurred at 06:21:56, followed by oxi-

dizer depletion 24 seconds later. This indicates an average mixture
ratio of 1.94 compared with 1.99 usable, indicating good propellant uti-
lization. The expected average ratio was 1.98. The B system consumed
287 pounds of propellant (i00 percent of that usable).
The A system fuel depletion occurred at 07:46:42, followed 84 seconds

later by the depletion of the remaining 64 pounds of oxidizer. Fuel de-
pletion preceded oxidizer depletion by such a comparatively long time be-
cause the main oxidizer valve closed without command at 07:12:24 and was
not reopened until 07:46:42. For this reason, no attempt was made to de-
termine A system mixture ratio :for the flight. The A system consumed
273 pounds of propellant (95 percent of that nominally available).
At the time of A system propellant depletion, helium tank A pressure

had decreased by 1478 psi. Depletion of propellant in the B system cor-
responded to a helium tank pressure decrease of 1571 psi, both corrected
to 70 ° F. This difference of about i00 psi is equivalent to approxi-
mately 15 to 20 pounds less propellant being consumed by the A system
and can be related to the 4-percent initial bias. The bias was probably
caused by less propellant than expected having been loaded in the A system
and by accrued system volllme tolerances. Because of the fuel bladder
leak, the B system helium tank pressure eventually dropped from the value
of 1360 psia (70° F) at propellant depletion to 1157 psia (70° F).
The performance of the propellant quantity measuring devices is

shown in figure 6.11-9. The convergence of the A and B system propellant
remaining at approximately 6 hours is due to greater usage by the B system
engines (see section 6.10). The estimated steady-state accuracy of the
measuring devices was ±5 percent.
6.11-5
Specific quantities of ascent fuel and oxidizer consumed by the re-

action control system during these periods are listed in table 6.11-I.
Reaction control system fuel used by the A system between the start of
the second ascent engine firing and the main A valve closure was
1.4 pounds. The amount consumed by the B system was 1.3 pounds.
6.11.3 Control Engine Performance
Control engine performance values were within expected limits for

the various existing operating conditions except for the 4-up engine
failure.
The first control engine firings were normal, as shown in fig-

ure 6.11-10. The small pressure oscillations noted at startup are attrib-
uted to small quantities of helium passing through the injector. En-
trained helium was expected to separate from the propellants during the
initial flash-off period as the propellants were exposed to the manifold
vacuum. The chamber pressure of all four engines was a nominal 97 psia.
When the manifold pressures were nominal, typical engine ignition

delays ranged between 8 and ii milliseconds, measured from engine "on"
indication to the first rise in chamber pressure. The times from engine
"on" indication until the chamber pressure reached 70 percent of nominal
ranged between 16 and 29 milliseconds, which is within the specification
requirement of 30 milliseconds. Shutdown specifications were also satis-
fied.
The effect of manifold line lengths on ignition transients is shown

in figure 6.11-11. Engine 4-up was about three times closer to its pro-
pellant tanks than engine 4-down. Manifold inlet pressures at the en-
gines located near the propellant tanks recovered from the pressure drop
at valve opening about 5 milliseconds sooner than engines on the opposite
side of the vehicle, thereby decreasing the ignition transient buildup
time. The difference in rise time appreciably affected the total impulse
of minimum impulse firings.
Maximum chamber pressures during the 15-millisecond pulses usually

varied between 50 and i00 psia. Chamber pressures on longer pulses were
" between 96 and i00 psia as expected.
During multiengine operation, the effects of manifold pressure

dynamics were evident in chamber pressure. An engine firing at steady-
state level would frequently experience a momentary pressure drop as much
as 30 psi for several milliseconds when an engine in the same system was
commanded "on"_ the manifold pressure surges associated with valve closure
produced the momentary chamber pressure increases. This was expected and
F agreed with the results of ground tests.
6.11-6
The chamber pressure for B system engines decreased to about

80 psia when the fuel manifold pressure dropped to 130 psia at fuel
depletion. After heliu_ began to leak through the bladder, the mani-
fold pressure rose to the nominal 180 psia; engine chamber pressure
also returned to normal. At oxidizer depletion some 24 seconds after
fuel depletion when the manifold pressures dropped to 50 psia, engine ._
chamber pressures dropped to about 40 psia (see fig. 6.11-12). Perform-
ance was quite varied from this time until the ascent propellant inter-
connect valves were opened. Shortly after the oxidizer was depleted and
before the helium leakage in the fuel manifold was purged through the
engines, the engine chamber pressures were about 40 psia. The combustion
instability (±i0 psi) of 300 Hz (characteristic of two-phase flow) also
occurred at this time (fig. 6.11-12). Two-phase flow could be expected
because the oxidizer manifold pressure was equivalent to the vapor pres-
sure of the oxidizer. Later, as helium from the fuel manifold passed
through the engine, chamber pressure showed a sharp drop to about i0 psia
until the bubble was purged; the chamber pressure then returned to 40 psia.
Several minutes later, the chamber pressure of those engines which were
frequently fired was only about i0 psia, with occasional increases to
40 psia. The 10-psia value was indicative of oxidizer cold-flow; 40 psia
indicated combustion.
Continued operation of the B system at these manifold pressures is

believed to have precipitated the failure of up-firing engine 4 sometime
during the 15-minute period between the Ascension and the Coastal Sentry
Quebec stations during revolution 5. Engine 4-up produced no detectable
chamber pressure during the Coastal Sentry Quebec pass nor during the
remainder of the mission. Ground tests have shown that similar operation
enhances formation of explosive compounds which accumulate within the
combustion chamber, even in the vacuum environment. Detonation of these
residues have ruptured combustion chambers. Detonation characteristics
with the 3-down engine were noted during this time, indicating compound
formation (fig. 6.11-13).
After the main A valves were reopened, the A system was commanded
to fire only about 8 pulses of 15 milliseconds duration until the cross-
feed valves were opened. The first two pulses usually exhibited less
than nominal chamber pressure, but by the third pulse, all A system
engines were indicating nominal chamber pressure. After the crossfeed
valves opened, B system engines required about i0 pulses before chamber
pressures above i0 psia were produced. This delay occurred while the
helium was being purged from the manifold. The chamber pressures of
engines in both systems were equal, but because the oxidizer pressure
remained between 50 and 115 psia until the ascent propellant interconnect
valves were opened, engine performance varied between 30 and 70 percent
of nominal. When the interconnect valves were opened and manifold pres-
sures had returned to normal, engine thrust (except for 4-up) returned
to normal. Because of a mass error in the guidance computer, the engines
f_
6.11-7
again were commanded to fire a very heavy duty cycle until vehicle control
was switched from primary guidance to the backup control path. The char-
acteristic instability indicative of gas ingestion occurred twice during
this period but existed for only about i00 milliseconds. When the second
ascent engine firing began, the reaction control system fuel and oxidizer
manifold pressures dropped approximately 6 and 12 psi, respectively. En-
gine chamber pressures were nominal during the interconnect operation
with the ascent engine firing. At this time, the effect of the slightly
lower inlet pressures should have decreased the chamber pressure by about
2 percent; however, the resolution of the data was not adequate to provide
confirmation.
Cluster temperatures.- The temperature variations of the four clus-

ters are presented in figure 6.11-14. The engine heaters maintained the
cluster temperatures above the minimum of 120 ° F throughout the cold-soak
periods. There was no evidence that a heater which had failed before
launch on engine 2-down resulted in any serious degradation of the thermal
control of cluster 2. Temperatures on clusters i and 3 exceeded the
190 ° F upper red-line limit because of the heating rate associated with
the high firing rate experienced after the first ascent engine firing, as
well as during the second ascent engine firing. The high control engine
activity just prior to the second ascent engine firing was partially the
.... cause of the high cluster temperatures. However, the maximum preflight
predicted cluster temperature for the second ascent engine firing was
188 ° F, which is probably low, since the contractor's preflight analyses
predicted lower cluster temperatures for the LM/S-IVB separation maneuver
than actually occurred. In addition, since the cluster temperature sen-
sors were installed near the down-firing engines, the measurements were
more sensitive to the activity of these engines than to the total activity
of all the engines on the cluster. The predictions, however, had shown a
lesser dependence on the activity of the down-firing engines. Therefore,
there is a high probability that the 190 ° F upper red-line cluster tem-
perature limit will be exceeded on future flights. This situation re-
quires re-evaluation of both the upper red-line temperature limit and the
cluster temperature mathematical model.
Figure 6.11-14 shows four areas of heat soakback caused by engine

activity. Because of the lack of data after separation and after the
first descent engine firing, the actual peak temperature was not known
but was estimated to have been 180 ° F, as compared with a prediction of
160 ° F.
Normal temperature rises were experienced during the mission pro-

grammer sequence III until control was switched from the backup control
path to primary guidance at 06:14:05, which resulted in the abnormally
high duty cycles. The subsequent temperature increases on clusters i
and 3 occurred when the heat from the high engine usage rate was con-
ducted to the clusters, causing the temperatures of clusters i and 3 to
6.11-8
exceed the upper instrumentation limit of 200 ° F. Clusters 2 and 4 were

cooler because the down-firing engines in these clusters were A system
engines, which were isolated at 06:17:12 when the main valves were closed,
allowing the injectors to be cooled somewhat from subsequent valve actu-
ations as the residual propellants in the lines were vented. Cluster i
temperature, the highest of the four, probably reached at least 230 ° F.
However, no degradation in engine performance was evident.
Following a normal cooldown, the temperatures again increased from

the control activity associated with the firing activity at the time of
the second ascent engine firing. Cluster I temperature again exceeded
the 200 ° F upper instrumentation limit. Cluster 3 temperature reached
191 ° F, exceeding the upper red-line temperature limit. However, clus-
ter 4 temperature never exceeded 145 ° F, even though the 4-down engine
injector temperature exceeded 200 ° F. This is the only time during the
mission when the cluster temperature did not follow the down-firing en-
gine injector temperature. This low telaperature was the result of pro-
pellant cold-flow through the failed 4-up engine. The cooldown of
clusters 2, 3, and 4 were notably more accelerated than had been experi-
enced earlier. This was a consequence of the expulsion of the 64 pounds
of oxidizer from the A system engines because of the inadvertent closure
of the main A oxidizer valve when the crossfeed valves were opened.
Injector temperatures.- A summary of the instrumented injector head

temperatures during the flight is presented in table 6.11-11. The re-
corded injector head temperatures ranged from a minimum of 84 ° F for en-
gine 2-down to a maximum of 322 ° F for engine l-down. Both the minimum
and maximum recorded temperatures occurred on engines which, at the time,
had no propellant available to them. The minimum injector temperature
of 84 ° F occurred on engine 2-down after the main A valves had been
closed during the period of high control engine firing activity and the
residual A system propellants had been vented through the engines. The
lowest injector temperature measured during the periods when the engines
were supplied with propellants was 132 ° F on engine 3-up (06:11:22) dur-
ing pulsing operation between the second and third descent engine firings.
Therefore, the engine heaters_ under normal operating conditions, main-
tained the instrumented engine injectors above 130 ° F throughout the
mission.
The maximum injector temperature of 322 ° F was recorded on engine

1-down after A system propellant was expended during the high activity
following abort staging, and again after the interconnect valves had
been closed near the end of the second ascent engine firing. In both
cases, the maximum temperature was achieved through heat soakback from
the hot combustion chamber after severe engine firing. The engine throat
will normally attain a temperature of approximately 2200 ° F during con-
tinuous operation. If the engine had been restarted following these
6.11-9
high activity periods, the injector temperature would have rapidly drop-
ped below 300 ° F because of the regenerative cooling effect of the pro-
pellant within the injector.
Typical temperature histories of the instrumented control engine

injector heads during LM/S-IVB stage separation, the second and third
descent engine firings, and the first and second ascent engine firings
are presented in figures 6.11-15 through 6.11-18.
Figure 6.11-15 shows the typical thermal response of the instrumented

1-down and 1-forward injectors and cluster i for the separation maneuver.
Also included in the figures are the predicted responses for the cluster
and the down-firing engine injector. These curves are typical for a
maneuver of this type (hence, the first descent engine firing), for which
the primary engine activity is the +X translation using the down-firing
engines. The cluster temperature was much more responsive to the increas-
ing down-firing engine injector temperature than the predicted curves
show, despite the close agreement between the actual and predicted in-
jector temperature curves.
Figures 6.11-16 and 6.11-17 show the temperature histories of

clusters i and 2 and their instrumented injector heads from the second
descent engine firing through the first ascent engine firing. The tem-
perature histories of clusters 3 and 4 were similar to those of clus-
ters i and 2, respectively, in that similar thermal characteristics
existed but with somewhat smaller temperature excursions. The similarity
existed because clusters i and 3 have vertical down-firing engines on the
B system, while clusters 2 and 4 have vertical down-firing engines on the
A system. The difference between clusters i and 2 is a consequence of
the deactivation of the A system (06:17:11) during the period of high
activity. Prior to this time, all clusters were operated in a similar
manner. The minimum and maximum injector head temperatures were re-
corded during this phase of the mission.
Figure 6.11-18 shows thermal responses of cluster i and its instru-

mented injector heads during the second ascent engine firing. Cluster i
was the only cluster which responded thermally in a normal manner during
this mission phase. The A system engines of clusters 2 and 3 were ex-
tensively cooled by the residual oxidizer coldflow after the intercon-
nects were closed. Approximately 64 pounds of residual oxidizer remained
in the A system because of the inadvertent closure of the main A oxidizer
valve when the crossfeed valve was opened. Cluster 4 temperatures were
also reduced as a consequence of propellant cold-flow through engine 4-up.
Figure 6.11-19 shows the temperature differences between clusters 3 and 4.
Both clusters received comparable engine firing duty cycles (calculated
over 10-second intervals for fig. 6.11-19) and hence should have experi-
enced comparable temperature rises until the interconnect valves were
closed. The fact that cluster 4 was substantially cooler indicates that
engine 4-up was coldflowing propellant.
TABLE 6.11-1.- ASCENT PROPELLANT USED BY THE RF_CTION CONTROL ENGINES
Event Time, Oxidizer, ib Fuel, ib Propellant_ ib Total,

hr:min:sec ib
A B A B A B
A interconnect valves opened 07:40:59
}65.5 66.3 I 32.5 32.9 98.0 99.2 197.2

Second ascent engine start 07:44:13
2.8 2.6 - - 2.8 2.6 5.4
,._a_ A ..... s .... e_ _ .45.00 I 7.8 8.0 I 3.8 4.0 11.6 12.0 23.6
Crossfeed and A interconnect 07:46:43
valves closed, main A valves
opened I - 2.8 1.4 4.2 4.2

B interconnect valves closed 07:46:53
I
Total 76.1 79.7 36.3 I 38.3 112.4 I I18.0 230.4
I I
TABLE 6.ii-II.- REACTION CONTROL ENGINE INJECTOR TE_iPERATURES
Time, Engine injector head temperature, OF

Phase hr:min:sec
1-down 1-forward 2-down 2-up 3-up 4-down 4-forward
From To Hin. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max.
Separation and cold-so_k 00:52:00 01:46:00 147 225 142 171 138 225 138 161 142 171 147 225 138 156
First descent engine 03:54:22 04:28:42 142 225 142 161 142 215 142 171 142 165 134 205 134 1161
firing
3eeond and third descent 06:10:00 06:25:52 142 322 138 200 137 220 137 306 132 176 142 218 138 220
engine firings and first
ascent engine firing a84 a130 a93
_econd ascent engine 07:38:42 07:52:02 134 322 142 195 142 205 142 249 142 239 134 217 134 156
firing
b125 b130 ci03
aTemperatures achieved after venting A system propellants through engines.

bTemperatures achieved after cold-flowing A system residual oxidizer through engines.
eThis temperature achieved from heat transfer to engine 4-up, through which propellant coldflowed throughout the second
ascent engine firing, and from venting B system propellants.
i-J
I
F-,
6.11-12
NASA-S-68- 2025
'_. 150I- IMain valvesopened Helium isolation valvesopenedl
_= i00_ B systemfuel manifold pressure II
5o
0I 200 - " i ' "" /22psla
_100 - B oxidizer manifold
.5_= 50-
150- system /34psia
pressure / J '' "" ......................
x
o 0 ...................
200--
100
A systemoxidizer manifoldpressure
L
250
50-
._ / B2psia
_ 200 ....... --
o _ ................. -....
150- 2-sec
_I00 A system fuel manifold pressure
"= 50- _31psia .

I
O- !
I I I I I , I I I I I i
00.'50::}4.
9 00:50:36.9 00:50:B8.
9 00:50:40.
9 00:50:42.
9 00:50:44.9 00:50:46.9 00:50:48.9 00:50:50.
9 00:50:52.9 00:50:54.9
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.ii-i. - Manifold pressuresduring systemactivationsequence.

6.11-13
NASA-S-68-2026
300 -
250 13systemfuel manifoldpressure

, _ , _ , :, :
200 ,,,_.._ ' ,",t"._,._^_'",,_': ....... _ ' ._ .... ,, . .., ...... . .... .,
-----' ' ',v.--,',,,.',, ,_..... V_,_z_'" _ '_',_"' ,'_,_',' ,¢w,,, ,,/,, ,_,v_,*_ ...... ,,_;,,,',_,_,_%-_,, _, .:_,_,, ,¢X_.,-- ,,,, _,,,;,,r_,._ ;_._ .... ,,_,<av.,,_
150- , , ," , , + ' , .
_ 100 300 - I Pressure oscillations from engine firings

_. B systemoxidizer manifold pressure I
I ' :
50]- 250 ..... , . '.'.. I ":,, ':-, ,
0 I - 200
'_' 150 . .... '. .. . . . • • ,. .. , ,, ..., ,.:.., ;.: ,: ..... _ . . ,'.,

:%• , ., _)_ ( _ • *. .). .,
I
1
tCIose main A valves
250 - _ 50 • : A systemoxidizer manifold pressure ; !
_ 200- 0 .;: , ' :' "" "
= 150- ,., ............. ._ :.,
_- I00-
o_
I
.N
50- 250 A systemfuel manifoldpressure :.-,.
0 _ 200 "', . . ,.. ' ,.' ,, ' ,

'- _.--=,....,.. _...,,c'_,,,,_, .:_a._..:,_,-_,,..,.._', .. :..._._,.-.,.-, ,, ,_.,_,-.._' :v.,._%'.,.,j._<_*.../,'_'_
.,."..'2
150
__ 100 ',
_- 50
I---- I-sec • I| _.._ ...... ,.
_" 0 I I I I I I l I
06:17:07.9 06:17:08.9 06:17:09.
9 06:17:10.9 06:17:1i, 9 06:17:12.
9 06:17:13.9 06:17:14.9
Figure 6.11-2.- Manifoldpressures at main A closure.

NASA-S-68-2027 6.11-14
I I
! i
I i
I, 1 f t. tt .... _ : :4
N. 250
E 200
150
100
cm. i I I I
N 50 I
'_ 0 _ 1B systemoxidizerOeDletion
o I
I
I
I
i
I I
I I
l ,
•_ 250 i Bsystemfuel depletion I
. 200
150
i00
=- 50
-_ Pressureincreasedueto helium
0
eakagethrough tank bladder
= 8 sec _I
I ............. L .... 1.................................... I 1 I _ I
06:21:49.9 06."21.57.9 06"22:05.9 06"22:I3.9 06:22:21.9 06-22:29.9 06:22-37.9
lime, hr:min:sec
Figure 6. 11-3. - B system manifoldpressures at propellant depletion.

NASA-S-68-2028
1800
Fueldepletion
1600 I] I B system main valves closed t
p,--......
I I
i
1400 _-_
12oo "-,
m
lOOO
80O
600
400 1
06:23 06:30 06:40 06:50 07:00 07:10 07:20 07:30 07:40 07:50 08:00 08:10
Time, hr:min
I
Figure 6,11-4.- Hel iuta B tank pressure (corrected to 70°F) during period of propellant depletion, krlH
NASA-S 68- 2029 O'x
H
300 t 280 psia O_,

Main A vahm reopened
itI_
_-= 200 ':. _ / 180psia
]0g
2 " "/'
A system oxidizer manifold pressure ,.._-,--'-_,'_"-'-'J"
200 # _{ /180 psa
I00 i
/
A system fuel manifold pressure
100 p B system oxidizer manifold pressure
_
o
0L
I I
B system fuel manifold pressure
200 F
W
1-sec
= 1oo
I
=
I
ohi I I I I I I I
07:10:53.9 07:10:54,9 07:10:55,9 07:10:56.9 07:10:57.9 07:10:58.9 07:10_5g,9
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.1l-5. - Manifold pressures during A system reactivation.

6.11-17
NASA-S-68-2_O
i
!
Reopenmain A valves I Opencrossfeedvalves
I
I
250 I
A systemfuel manifoldpressure II
o_ 200 ........ .........
E 150
100
"= 50
200 0 i A systemoxidizer manifold pressure

_. r r
150 _Pressure decreaseresulting
i rapid engine firings
.. . _ //from
d 50 .......
0 '_ 150 i l II _ Pressure rises resulting from main A valveleakage
N 100 I , B s_zer manifold pressure
_ 5o ...........
] i
..... X
'__ :6 ....
-- / N_
_200 8 systemfuel manifold pressure 1_ #_'
"_
= 150_- o Close main B valves I '
lOO
|-
kL
50
0
I
L I ,I I I I I I I I I I
07:09:59,9 07:10:39,
9 07:11:19.g 07:11.59.9 07:12:39.9 07:13:19.9 07:13:5g.9 07:14:39.9 07:15:19.9 07:15:59.9 07:16:39.9
Time. hr:min:sec
Figure 6,ii-6. - Manifold pressuresduring periodof A systemreactivation

and crossfeedvalve opening.
6.11-18
NASA-S-68- 2031
Ascent propellant
depletionoccufred
after 07:50:00
B interconnect valvescfosed
A systemoxidizer
200 depletion
K 150 _e%_
I00
-_ 50 " B systemfuel manifold pressure
200 -- 0 -- ,! : _ ; ""
i_ Ul qrn! ,pk _, , _
t50 %
_I00
:_
_ 50 '" , "_ B systemoxidizer
manifold
pressure '
c_ 200 -- ...... ' ......
..........., ......
m.
150 i
= ! A systemoxidizer manifold pressure
i00 I
A interconnect and crossfeedvalvesclosed_
_, 50 man A valvesopened _ ,-,--_
I
200 -o 0 '
150 - "Y!
_ Approximately64 poundsof oxidizer wascold
= k k_ ___ ..... flowedthrough enginesbetween07:4&42and
_100 - [ I
8-sec O7:48:06
-_
= 50 - A systemfuel manifold pressure . .....
/
0 -- I , ,I I I I . I-. , I- " - _; I / 4 I 07:47:57.1

4 07:48:'
I 05.4
..... 07:48:13.4
07:46:45.4 07:46:53.4 07:47:01.4 07:47:09.4 07:47:17.4 07:47:25.4 07:47:33.4 07:47:41. 07:47:49.4
Time, hnmin:sec
Figure 6. 11-7.- Manifold pressuresafter interconnect valvesclosure.

< ql 'papuadxa _UeliadoJd ql 'papuadxa _UeiladoJd
9O
8O
3O
20
10
0 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time, hr
Figure6. 11-9.- Performanceof propellantquantity measuringdevice.

6.11-21
NASA-S-68-2034
i I
Engine 1-down I I
1oo ,_ >.....';,_.._,:,_
....... ....... ...... ', , _I,_ _
_6o
40
! _ Approximately300Hz combustioninstability, Ill
___ 20 characteristic of two.phaseflow; probablyhelium I _ _, i _,,
0 - _'# evacuated
releasedfrom
manifoldsat
propellantswhen
activationflashed into Engine 2-down I Off time, msec 125 5 5 45 5 5 5 5 55
-_ 8o[- , I_ 1
I
0t- _ Engine3-down I II On time, msec 15 15 15

120 - I I
80 t !
•-- ]
60-- I i
_, 40 - '. I
o_ 20 - Engine&down t I
120 0- _ I I
80 I i [
60 I i
4(] : I ..... ,
I
"_ l
I Off time, msec 125 5 5 45 5 5 5 5 55 ii0 65 55 10 40 55 i0
I
LMIS-TVBstage
1 second I I
_ separation
I I
I I I I I I I I I I J
00.53:50 00:53:51 00.53:52 00:53:53 00:53:54 00.53:55 00.53:56 00:53:51 00:53:58 00:53:59 00:54:00 00.54:01
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6. 11-10.- Engine chamberpressures during first firings {separationsequence).

6.11-22
NASA-S-68- 2035
125 -- Engine 4-down chamber pressure Engine 4-up chamber pressure
i00 --
75
13-
25
I
I Enqine comlnanded on ] Engine commanded Oll
I
I 0.Isec _
1 '
I
I
I
I I I I I I
06:17:10.8 06:17:10.9 06:17:11.0 06:17:11.I 06:17:11.2 06:17:11.3
Time, hr:n/Jn:sec
Figure 6.11-ii.- Chamber pressure of engines 4-downand 4-upduring

high propellant usage following first ascent engine firing.
6.11-23
NASA-S-68-2036
1.25 B systemoxidizer depletion 300 Hzcombustioninstability
100 _ (oxidizer)
'& 75 ',, _ ///" _ \ characteristic of two-phaseflow

t
e4_ F
pproximat - 1.5psia
but increasedto approximately45 _ 20 psiawithin
10secondsas oxidizer manifold pressure increased
from 35to 50psia
/
--, isec _-]
I , I I I J
06:22:1.
8.5 06:22:ig 06:22:19.5 06:22:20 06:22:20.5 06:22:21 06:22:21.5
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure6, 11-12,- Engine4-up chamber pressureat B systemoxidizer depletion.

NASA-S-68-2038
24O
I I
- - Estimated
-- _ Cluster 1-- /
220 -- oCluster 2 / \ /
DCluster 3-- / / Cooling I
OCluster4 I i / from A-_
I I '_ system -
200 Tem)eraturesensor _ oxidizer I
up_erliiit _ _ coldflow'_
_,-\ Heatingfrom high 1 II/

h_ 180 _,-'\ _ i engine duty cycle _. _ 1 II1 _./
_ _--, _,-_, Heatsoakbackfrom \ _ ! _ _, \\ ,
_- Full _ _,_'_ llage maneuvers _,, _ z_
_, \ heating _..or_ _
_ solar _ _ ,_u )_' \
r L / -]3ZBseparation Parti --A system _'<,

120 _l I ! solar , lines venting '_
_-- Cooldown! heating 1II I I
__ from LM ] Secondand third descent I
venting I First descent engine firing; abort staging; -Secondascent
100 j ]_ ! engine firing first ascentenginefiring enginefiring
00:00:00 01:00:00 02:00:00 03:00:00 04:00:00 05:00:00 06:00:00 07:00;00 08:00:00
Time, hr:min:sec
o_
Figure6.11-14.- Cluster temperaturesduring the mission.
I
IX)
NASA-S-68- 2039 o_
260 ! y _3
O",
24O
220
LL
o 200
E
_- 180
160
140
120
00:50:00 01:00:00 01:i0:00 01:20:00 01:30:00 01:40:00 01:50:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure6.11-15.- Cluster landeng[nes 1-downand 1-forward injector head temperaLures
at LM/S-]3ZB stage separation.
NASA-S-68-2040
360 , First Main A I I I I I

ascent closed ........ Estimated__
engine o Engine ID injector head
320 firing f-_. o Engine IF injector head __
J ii // _ . _ "---JA
Cluster I
Switch to I _
primary ,
I ../0 .<c _ -
280 gmdance / ", Heatsoakbackfrom "-Q,(
/ _ - high duty cycle
/D- I I
Initial cooling 0/ Sensor upper limit,
Heatsoakback ? duty cycle ..........

240 -from +X k,_- from high l\x_ Heatingfrom high / / cluster
_ I temperature
& 200 translations / OOC
..L_,{
duty cycle
N..,
/ _ _
s_r__L____
,, Heatingfrom IDI
_ - _- - 4- -- -m-
_ I r./ -and 1Uengines

_ m
160 .C_ _
_ A-- -----_b "_"L:2

I
I
120 B systemfuel
depletion
I
I
80 I I
06:10:00 06:12:00 06:14:00 06:16:00 06:18:00 06:20:00 06:22:00 06:24:00 06:26:00 06:28:00 06:30:00 06:32:00 06:34:00
Time, hr:min:sec
C_
Figure 6.11-16.- Cluster 1 and engines 1-downand I-forward injector headtemperatures

during mission programmersequence]ZI.
b3
-4
OA
NASA-S-68- 2041 H_
I
Co
32O i • i
ascent
First II B system fuel depleted
--engine- . I i #g" ,_ Estimated __
firing Main A valve closed I /C3'" " ... (Z) Engine 2D injector head
280 _ I I r-
?. \ ", []
Z_ Engine
Cluster 2U
2 injector head --
I ,-- from high "

I _/_x Heat soakback \
duly cycle \
-from +X.
U- 240 translat,ons
Heat soakback _
/7.,! _.N. y 1...[Z1."
° o ol -/ng
20o duty
cycle
duty cycle
Cooling from .f .i
jz venting system _
120 Switch to
----guidance
primary _ '_ Amani_ \S
I' _ L._ _- plus 2D from

Heating heater I
2U engine
80 i I I I
06:10:00 06:14:00 06:18:00 06:22'.00 06:26:00 06:30:00 06:34:00 06:38:00 06:42:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure b.ll-17.- Cluster 2 and engines 2-down and 2-up injector head temperatures
during mission programmer sequence TIT.
i
2
6.zl-29
NASA-S-68-2042
340 I i
I I I I ! [
__ - ........ Estimated i ,.
0 Engine 1Dinjector head ] I
[] Engine 1Finjector head _,
320 --A Cluster 1 cf \
• !
\
J
i ! i _[
300 iI Heatsoakback \\
from moment _ \
i imbalancefiring ",,
/ \
260
280 / (
Heatingfrom moment ./
during second
240 engine firing
E imbalancefiringscent _ k_
- _ c/ /- -
220 Cooling /
r- tf .during +X /
translations z Sensor upper limit,
Heatsoakback / IO// / _ _-cluster temperature
,8o f
_/m _/mJ /L..__
Heatingfrom /
II
200
160 -- high
-from
activity]
high_'_
activity= _! // _ II
/
-//tJ_--Z_[ // JI
[3" II
140 __._'i | A and B
.. ©-_ II I interconnects
-A interconnects B interconnects closed
120 opened opened ill
07:38:00 07:40:00 07:42:00 07:44:00 07:46:00 07:48:00 07:50:00 07:52:00 07:54:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.11-18.- Cluster 1 and engines 1-downand 1-forward injector head

F temperaturesduring secondascentengine firing.
6.11-30
NASA-S -68- 2043
"_
_ ,oo 0
!
_-_ 0 I _
+_
<
LU 0
200 IA interconnects +X translation[

i II
__ opened I I
lgO i II II OCluster
[]Cluster 3
4
I I
,I ,
180 i
li
II
'
I
I
+X translation
/
/
I
I
/
/
170
Primary guidance ,_ / Backup
_- control l -- control
160
/
E
150 /
i //
140 . _ _-
_- - A and B
Secondascent interconnects
_ engine firing closed
130
i Jl
I II
: I II
I II
120 I i J I I
07:40:00 07:41:00 07:42:00 07:43:00 07:44:00 07:45:00 07:46:00 07:47:00 07:48:00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.11-1g.- Comparisonof thermal responseotclusters 3 and 4 to control

engine activity during secondascentengine firing.
f 6.12-1
6.12 DESCENT PROPULSION
The first planned descent engine firing was shut down after 4.17 sec-
onds by the guidance computer. Alternate mission C, which included two
descent engine burns, was then implemented. Each of these firings be-
gan with 26 seconds at 10-percent throttle, followed by 7 seconds at
full throttle during the first firing and 2 seconds at full throttle dur-
ing the second firing. The original mission plan required approximately
782 seconds of engine firing time, which included various throttling
activities, and 374 seconds at full throttle. The descent propulsion
system appeared to operate satisfactorily to the extent exercised; how-
ever, the firing times were not of sufficient duration to permit an
accurate determination of the performance of the descent engine or super-
critical helium pressurization system.
6.12.1 Start Characteristics
Figure 6.12-1 shows the variations in chamber pressure for the three
descent engine starts. A nominal start curve, obtained from tests under
normal regulated pressures of 242 psia, is also shown for comparison.
-_ The regulated tank pressures for the second and third firings were about
242 psia and show close agreement with the nominal curve. The quicker
start noted for the third firing may have resulted from the fuel injector
manifold still being partially primed because of the short 32-second
coast period. At the start of the first firing, oxidizer and fuel tank
pressures were essentially as planned, approximately 127 and 132 psia,
respectively. About 1.3 seconds after the "engine on" command, the he-
lium pressurization isolation valves were opened and the tank pressures
started to increase. This pressurization activation delay was designed
into the system to prevent fuel freezing in the heat exchanger. The
pressures were still increasing at the time the computer issued an "en-
gine off" command. The engine was shut down because the impulse re-
quired by the computer was not obtained; the computer required 1440 ib-sec
impulse over a 2-second interval. The engine had obtained a total of
only 1075 ib-sec at the time of cutoff. From the figure, it is evident
that nearly all the 1075 ib-sec impulse was accumulated in the last
2-second interval. The engine-delivered impulse before shutdown was as
_ expected for the existing start conditions.
Figure 6.12-1 shows the results of a special test conducted at the

White Sands Test Facility after the mission. This test utilized similar
initial conditions except that tank pressurization was initiated
0.9 second after the "engine on" command. The resulting initial thrust
level, corresponding to the 10-percent throttle setting_ was somewhat
lower. This initial thrust level varies from engine to engine.
6.12-2
6.12.2 Transient Characteristics
The transient characteristics for the second and third firings, along
with the corresponding ground test and specification values, are shown
in table 6.12-1. Because the steady-state thrust was not achieved during
the first firing, the shutdown impulse was not computed. For the second
firing, the shutdown impulse at cutoff was 1727 ib-sec from "engine off"
initiate to 10-percent thrust. The time to 10-percent thrust from "en-
gine off" was 0.26 second as compared with the specification value of
0.25 second. All other data show the engine transient characteristics
to be satisfactory. The oscillations of chamber pressure were essentially
nonexistent during 10-percent throttle operation, and only insignificant
oscillations were present during full throttle operation (fig. 6.12-2).
6.12.3 Engine Throttle Response
During the second and third firings, mission progran_ner sequence III
commanded the descent engine from the 10-percent throttle to full throttle
at a constant rate. Throttle response of the engine was within the
1.0-second allowable time. Figure 6.12-2 shows chamber pressure and in-
jector actuator position during the transition to full throttle for the
second firing. The engine reached the full thrust level 0.40 second after
the command was initiated for the second firing and 0.46 second for the
third firing. The chamber pressure was within 5 psia of the full chamber
pressure in 0.34 second after the command for the second firing and in
0.4 second for the third firing as compared with acceptance test time of
0.35 second.
The plateau experienced at approximately 70-percent thrust is assumed

to be associated with the engine changing from a cavitating to a non-
cavitating propellant flow and is characteristic of this engine. This
plateau of approximately 70 milliseconds, howew_r, exceeds the i0 milli-
seconds normally experienced in acceptance testing. There was also a
simultaneous pressure increase in the oxidizer and fuel engine interface
pressures. The surge in the interface pressures at the time of the
plateau had not been noted during ground tests; however, the ground data
will be further reduced to determine whether these surges were present.
The cause of the plateau phenomenon will be investigated by additional
ground testing.
6.12.4 Steady-State Characteristics
The chamber pressure characteristics during the second firing are

shown in figure 6.12-3. Characteristics during the third firing were
E
6.12-3
essentially the same. The following table presents some of the parameters
within the engine feed system.
Helium regu- Engine oxidi- Engine fuel Thrust

Event lator outlet zer interface interface chamber pres-
pressure, psiaipressure , psia pressure, psia sure, psia
Corrected Flight Data for Second Firing
Before 241.9 241.9 241.9 0

ignition
ten-percent 239.5 239.5 239_5 12.6

throttle
Full 239.5 220.5 216.0 102.8

throttle
Corrected Flight Data for Third Firing
Before 241.9 241.9 241.9 0

ignition
Ten-percent 239.5 239.5 239.5 12.6
throttle
Full - - -
throttle
No analysis of the flight data was made to determine the steady-state

performance parameters because the short duration engine firings pro-
vided insufficient duration of acceleration data at full throttle and
low propellant usage. The steady-state pressure parameters at 10-percent
throttle and at full throttle were comparable to ground test results.
6.12.5 Shutoff Valve Phasing
The configuration of the propellant shutoff valves is shown in fig-

ure 6.12-4. During the second and third firings, while throttling from
10-percent to full thrust, an out-of-phase indication was received from
one of the two pairs of actuators which control the eight propellant
shutoff valves. The indication remained until the end of each of these
firings.
6.12-4
Each of the four shutoff valve actuators (A, B, C, and D) controlled

one fuel and one oxidizer shutoff valve. The actuators were instrumented
in two pairs, so that an indication was received if actuators A and B or
C and D were not in the same position (open or closed). During the sec-
ond and third firings, the received signal indicated that either A or B
actuator was not fully open. This indication slightly lagged the thrust
plateau and the momentary increase in the oxidizer and fuel interface
pressure as noted under section 6.12.3. The occurrence was nearly iden-
tical on the second and third firings. At present, no conclusions can
be drawn as to whether there is any connection between the pressure
transients and the valve out-of-phase indication. Further evaluation
and special ground tests will be conducted in an attempt to resolve the
problem.
6.12.6 Propellant Quantity Gaging
The flight data show that the quantity gaging system was not indi-
cating correctly for the number 2 fuel and oxidizer tanks; however, this
condition was known prior to flight. A failure investigation has attrib-
uted the effect to a faulty transistor within the gaging system. The
descent engine firing time was not sufficient to permit a full assessment
of system accuracy.
6.12.7 Supercritical Helium Pressurization
Because of the short duration of the engine firings and the lack of
long-duration full-throttle data, it is not possible to evaluate the per-
formance of the supercritical helium pressurization system. Figure 6.12-5
presents the flight data for the first descent engine firing and also data
from a simulation performed at White Sands Test Facility.
As shown in the figure, the supercritical helium tank pressure decay

resulted from the higher than normal helium flow rate required to pres-
surize the ullage in the tanks to the normal operating level. The in-
creased decay indicated by the White Sands simulation data was the re-
sult of a larger ullage volume than was present during flight, and this
caused a greater pressure drop. The White Sands simulation was also not
shut down at 4 seconds but continued at 10-percent throttle level.
Figures 6.12-6 and 6.12-7 show flight data and predicted pressures
from a computer program simulation for the second and third firings,
respectively. The figures indicate that the measured tank pressure was
less than had been predicted by the ground simulation computer program.
The computer simulation accuracy is not known for short firings because
empirically derived coefficients from ground test data were used in the
f
6.12-5
formulations. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether the

apparent low pressure obtained during the flight was actually below
normal. Figure 6.12-8 shows the flight data during the coast period be-
tween the first and second firings. The figure indicates that the steady-
state pressure rise was as predicted (approximately i0 psia per hour).
Table 6.12-11 shows the performance of the helium/helium and helium/

fuel heat exchangers. Although the pressure profiles do not exactly
follow the predictions (figs. 6.12-5 through 6.12-8), the maximum and
minimum temperatures recorded at various stations were well within speci-
fication limits.
TABLE 6.12-1.- DESCENT ENGINE TRANSIENT CHARACTERISTICS
Start - "engine on" to Shutdown - "engine off" to

90-percent thrust 10-percent thrust
Impulse, Time_ Impulse, Time,

ib-sec see lb-see see
Second firing 894 2.66 1727 0.26
Third firing 574 2.13 1820 0.25
Engine 1026 acceptance tests - 2.60 - -

at sea level, 10-percent - 2.42 - -
throttle start
Engine 1026 acceptance tests 982 1.31 - -

at above 100K feet_ 15-percent 1041 1.36 ....
throttle start
Specification limits - 4.0 0.25

TABLE 6.12-11.- SUPERCRITICAL HELIUM HEAT EXCHANGER PERFORMANCE
Measurement Specification First Second Third

value firing firing firing
Temperature, helium/helium heat exchanger >260 a273 a343 a347

outlet, oR
Temperature, helium/fuel heat exchanger >400 a468 a473 a475

outlet, °R
Temperature, engine interface, fuel, °F (b) 71.4 62.0 63.7
Temperature, fuel tank no. i, fuel bulk, OF (b) 70.5 70.5 70.5
Temperature, fuel tank no. 2, fuel bulk_ oF (b) 70.5 72.0 72.0
aMinimum observed value during time period.
bspecification constrains difference between fuel tank temperature and fuel engine inter-
face temperature to be no less than 5° F.
o_
!
6.12-8
NASA-S-68-2044
16
14
F Nominal
Third firing
Shutdown
12 I
__ First firing
/
Engine test at White Sands __
// Test Facility
__- Second firing
5 i
4 /
/
2
/ t! / ,
Nominal is based oil acceptance test data
/- [
0 i 2 3 4 5 6 7
Time from start signal, sec
Figure 6.12-1.- Chamber pressure duriJl(] start sequence

of descent engine firings.
f
6.12-9
NASA-S-68-2045
In phase _ ,,/_ Out of phase

I rl; _- Shutoff valve A and B position
f
%- Shutoff valve C and D position
I
_g_=_ 10_ I
o _-100 _ f Injector actuator throttle position
225 ---'--"'-"-----._,_ [I /-
j Engine fuel interface pressureJ
. _
=_
_ I
o_ 150 I
5O0 I
I Engine oxidizer interface pressure;
,_=
_ 225 _1 _- ,
_= I
Q- I
150 I _- Engine fuel injector inlet pressure
r
_E, 75
O_
o I
I
I ._-f Engine oxidizer injector inlet pressure
150
o_ 75 I
I
I I_-
r
Engine thrust chamberpressure
_ 50
0-
_,_ 100 /_
0 I I J I I "1 I I I
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Referencetime, msec
Figure 6.12-2.- Descent propulsion parametersduring transition from lO-percent

throttle to full throttle (typical of second and third firings).
Oh
I
NASA-S-68-2046 H
o
120
.......... L
i00
i L
80
i
_ L i i L
_ 60
_ i I ' I I i
40
i i i i i
I L
o /
06:10:38 06:10:42 06:10:46 06:10:50 06:10:54 06:10:58 06:11:02 06:11:06 06:11:10 06:11:14 06:11:18
Time, hr:min:sec
Fi(jure 6.12-3.- Chamber pressure during second descent engine firing.

Fuel isolation
Fuel
" - _ 2
Pintle Fuel
Oxidizer control
orifice actuator _pellant
supply
o-,
Pintle shaft Oxidizer
Figure 6.12-4.- Descent engine schematic, r_
i
(Th
NASA-S-68- 2048
hD
I
i000 I I ro
980
J
._ 960 _ _ < Actual
_- 940
Simulation at White Sands test facility using
_ descent propulsion system test article 2
900
....,
880 "--"-
-2 0 2 4 6 8 i0 12 14 16
Time from "engine on u , sec
Figure 6.12-5.- Supercritical helium supply pressure during first descent engine firing,
i p
'I '!
NASA-S-68- 2049
1180 I I I I I I i I I I
_Actual /
1160 .... Predicted / /
/
/'
/
1140 -"
/
/
/
/
1120 --- /
/
[/// ,/
eN Ii00 /
, /
N 1080 /" /
I
1060 _" /
/" /
., /
d , /
1040 _" /_
/"' /
1020 !//1
if /
1000
6:10:40 6:10:44 5:10:48 6:10:52 6:10:.56 6:1L00 &lI:04 &II:08 6:1h12 6:1h16 &11:20 &11:24
Time, hr:min:see
o'x
Figure 6. 12-6. - Supercritical helium supply pressure during seconddescent engine firing.
FJ
ro
I
L,O
NASA-S-68- 2050
OA
1260
Actual
1240 Predicted .._._ ""
1220 jJ
1200 -"
f
= /
f
1180 W'
& I
:_ 1160
1140 /
/
1120
Ii00
06:11:44 :48 :52 :56 06:12:00 :04 :08 :12 :16 06:12:20
Time, hr:min:see
Figure 6.12-7.- Supercri[ical helium supply pressure during third descent engine firing.
NASA-S-68- 2051
1160
1140
1120
I10O
1080
1060
= 1040
E
:z 1020 i
1000
98O
960
94O
3:50:004:00:004:10:004:20:004:30:004:40:004:50:005:00:005:]0:005:2&00 5:30:005:40:005:50:006:00:006:10:006:20:.00
Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6. 12-8. - Supercritical helium supply pressure during coast period belween secondand third firings. rx3
I
_Jq
f
6.13-1
6.13 ASCENT PROPULSION
The alternate mission plan selected resulted in two ascent engine

firings. The first firing was initiated at 06:12:14.7, and the engine
was commanded "off" 60 seconds later.
Propellant interconnect valves A and B were opened at 07:40:59 and

07:42:17, respectively. A 17-second +X translation with the control en-
gines was initiated at 07:44:00.3, and the ascent engine was commanded
"on" at 07:44:12.7 for a final firing to propellant depletion. Inter-
connect valves A and B were closed at 07:46:43 and 07:46:53, respectively.
Thrust decay occurred at 07:50:01, approximately 40 seconds earlier than
predicted.
6.13.1 Propellant Loading
The propellant tanks were serviced with 3170 pounds of oxidizer and
1993 pounds of fuel leaving an ullage volume of 0.5 ft 3 per tank at 90 ° F.
The propellant sample analysis showed the oxidizer density to be 90.22 Ib/
ft 3 at 67.7 ° F and ambient pressure and the fuel density to be 56.40 ib/
ft 3 at 71.4 ° F and ambient pressure.
6.13.2 Steady-State Performance
The performance of the ascent engine has not yet been verified to
have been within the expected accuracy; however, the engine pressure
measurements and the vehicle velocities obtained indicate that the ascent
engine performance was within the nominal predicted tolerances. Chamber
pressure during the two firings is shown in figure 6.13-1.
The oxidizer and fuel propellant tank low-level sensors were un-
covered at 07:49:59.7 and 07:50:00.7, respectively, during the second
firing. Under nominal operating conditions, the low-level sensors are
uncovered when approximately i0 seconds of usable propellant remain in
the tanks; however, thrust decay began at 07:50:01.5. The timing of
these events indicates that propellant slosh resulting from high vehicle
attitude rates caused the propellant tank outlet ports to be uncovered.
An oxidizer-depletion shutdown had been expected. However, when the
propellant in the feed lines (sufficient for approximately i second of
mominal operation) was depleted, as indicated by the engine interface
pressures, helium was ingested into the oxidizer and fuel lines almost
simultaneously, causing thrust decay.
f-
The total ascent engine firing time for the mission was about 40 sec-
onds less than predicted. At least 20 seconds of this time descrepancy
can be attributed to higher-than-expected propellant usage by the control
}
6.13-2
engines through the propellant interconnect valves. As indicated by the

"on" time between low-level sensor uncoverings and thrust decay, an addi-
tional I0 seconds of normally usable propellant was in the tanks at
thrust decay but was unavailable due to the sloshing and high vehicle
rates. The lO-second propellant discrepancy could be easily attributed
to any combination of the following: (i) greater propellant residuals
due to high vehicle attitude rates, (2) higher than estimated control
engine usage of ascent engine propellants, and (3) ascent engine perfor-
mance lower than predicted, but within the predicted nominal tolerance.
The lack of acceleration data after gimbal lock may prevent accurate
determination of the engine performance parameters.
6.13.3 Chamber Pressure Oscillations
An analysis of the start and shutdown transients was performed to

determine the transient total impulses and response times. The results
of this analysis are summarized in table 6.13-1. Engine acceptance test
data and specification requirements, as well as the average of the LM-I
type ascent engines, were used to provide a better interpretation of the
flight data.
There were several significant differences in conditions prior to

the two engine starts. The first firing was an abort staging start with
the propellant tanks in the prelaunch pressurized conditions of 104 psia
in the oxidizer tank and 128 psia in the fuel tank. In the abort start
mode, the pressurization system squib valves are initiated approximately
1.4 seconds before the "engine on" command. Due to the low initial tank
pressures, this delay was insufficient to allow propellant tank pressures
to reach normal operating pressure. At the time of the first "engine on"
command, the propellant tank pressures were approximately 169 psia in-
stead of the nominal 184 to 203 psia. In comparison, the propellant tank
pressures were approximately 185 psia prior to the second engine firing.
Another difference in the two starts was that the fuel line between
the two parallel engine actuator isolation solenoid valves and the four
engine actuator solenoid pilot valves was dry prior to the first start.
The time required to fill this line causes the first start to be slower
than subsequent engine starts.
The data presented _n table 6.13-1 provide a comparison of the en-

gine start transients. The time from the "engine on '_ command until the
engine reached 90 percent of rated thrust was 0.47 (±0.01) second on the
first start and 0.27 (±0.01) second on the second start. The slower en-
gine start transient on the first firing may be attributed, at least in
part, to the lower tank pressures and the dry fuel actuation line.
6.13-3
The start transient and the beginning of steady-state operation

showed high amplitude chamber pressure oscillations on both the first
and second engine starts (fig. 6.13-2). The 400-Hz oscillations which
occurred immediately after the start transient overshoot were character-
istic of this engine during ground testing and were expected on this
flight. The oscillations appear to be a form of low-frequency instability
caused by the coupling of the combustion process with the resonant fre-
quency of the engine feed system. Ground tests have indicated that
helium gas dissolved or entrained in the fuel tends to induce coupled
instability.
The magnitude of the measured 400-Hz chamber pressure oscillations

immediately following "engine on" was 90 to i00 psia peak-to-peak, and
the oscillations were approximately the same magnitude during both
firings. Ground tests with both flight and ground instrumentation have
indicated that the flight instrumentation may possibly amplify the mag-
nitude of the indicated chamber pressure oscillation by a factor of
approximately 2. The oscillations on the second firing lasted approxi-
mately 190 milliseconds. The full duration of the oscillation on the
first firing is not known because telemetry was lost 150 milliseconds
after the oscillation started. At that time, there was no indication
that the oscillation was damping; however, when telemetry was reacquired
-- 310 milliseconds later, the oscillation had been damped. The chamber
pressure overshoot onthe "second start was approximately 20 psi higher
than that on the first start, as can be seen from figure 6.13-1. The
peak of the chamber pressure osCillation was greater than the peak
overshoot during the first start and was approximately equal to the peak
overshoot on the second start.
During the entire steady-state operation of both firings, 400-Hz

chamber pressure oscillations occurred intermittently, as shown in fig-
ure 6.13-2. The chamber pressure oscillation, after the initial oscil-
lation, ranged between 2 and i0 psia peak-to-peak. The oscillations
appeared slightly more severe on the second firing, with the 400-Hz
oscillations increasing to 25 psia peak-to-peak for approximately
200 milliseconds at 19 and 23 seconds into the firing, as shown in fig-
ure 6.13-2. During the remainder of the steady-state operation, for
which data are available, the oscillations generally did not exceed
i0 psia peak-to-peak until shortly before the thrust decay.
Approximately 15 seconds before thrust decay, the 400-Hz oscillations

increased to 60 psia peak-to-peak in both chamber pressure and fuel in-
jector manifold pressure, as shown in figure 6.13-2. The first period
of sustained high magnitude oscillation lasted for approximately 4 sec-
onds, at which time the magnitude decreased to i0 psia peak-to-peak,
which had been observed all through the firing. Between 6.5 and 5.5 sec-
onds before thrust decay, the oscillation again increased to 60 psia
peak-to-peak, and then damped again until 4.5 seconds before thrust decay.
6.13-4
The high magnitude 400-Hz oscillations resumed approximately 4.5 seconds

before thrust decay, then damped when the chamber pressure began to
drop sharply because of helium ingestion.
The final portion of the thrust decay appeared smooth, with no

spikes or other detrimental effects apparent after the damping of the
400-Hz oscillations and the rapid chamber pressure decay. The most det-
rimental effect of the helium ingestion appears to be the excitation of
the high magnitude 400-Hz oscillations. Ground tests have indicated
that the entrainment of helium in the fuel tends to excite 400-Hz os-
cillations. The oscillations may therefore be an indication of pressurant
gas entrainment due to vortexing or slosh caused by the high vehicle
attitude rates experienced during this portion of the mission.
The engine valve position indicators showed that the engine valves
started to close at 07:51:25.8 (85 seconds after the thrust decay) but
were not completely closed when the telemetry signal was lost by the
ground station at 07:52:23. System pressures and temperatures indicate
that some blockage of fluid flow occurred between the propellant tanks
and the engine after the initial thrust decay. This blockage was most
likely caused by small amounts of propellant frozen by cold helium that
was ingested into the feed lines. Although it was not a normal depletion
shutdown, no hazardous or detrimental effects were apparent after the
initial thrust decay.
6.13.4 Propellant Pressurization
The ascent and descent propellant tanks experienced pressure drops

from the time of prepressurization at the launch site (approximately
ii0 hours prior to launch) to the time of final pressurization in flight
(approximately 4 hours after launch). The ascent oxidizer tank experi-
enced the largest pressure decay. This pressure decay was initially
believed to be the result of an oxidizer leak. However, subsequent
analyses have shown that all of the experienced pressure decays could be
attributed to helium diffusion into the liquid propellants.
The flight data indicate nominal propellant pressurization during

the mission. Calculated helium usage during the second firing agrees
with analytical predictions.
Helium flow occurred during the coast between the first and second
firings amounting to approximately 2.5 percent of the total helium
loaded. This helium flow is evidently the result of opening the propel-
lant interconnect valves. During this time, the control engines used
approximately 200 pounds of propellant from the ascent tanks. The amount
of helium flow during the coast would be sufficient, in normal system
operation, to expel approximately 180 pounds of propellant.
TABLE 6.13-1.- ASCENT ENGINE TRANSIENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY
I
Condition Specification First Second Engine Average of 194-1
value firing firing acceptance test type engines
Start transient total impulse from engine start

signal to 90-percent steady-state thrust, --- 57.0 65.5 57.8 62.0
ib-sec .....................
Time from engine start signal to initial thrust

rise, sec .................... --- 0.26 4 0.01 0.15 ± 0.01 0.285 ± 0.005 0.264 ± 0.058
Time from engine start signal to 90-percent 0.400 maximlun 0.47 _ 0.01 0.27 * 0.01 0.351 + 0.016 0.355 4 0.032
steady state thrust, sec ............. - ....
Engine run-to-run start repeatability,

ib-sec ..................... ±35 ±8.5 ±0.4 ±19.0
Shutdown transient total impulse from engine

shutdown signal to 10-percent steady-state --- 257.2 --- 429.4 429.0
thrust, ib-sec ................. I
Time from engine shutdown signal to 10-percent

steady-state thrust_ sec ............ 0.200 maximu_n 0.22 -0.02+0"0 --- 0.285 __ 0.030 0.312 _+0.121
Engine run-to-run shutdown repeatability,

ib-sec ..................... ±75 --- ±15 ±i01
Shutdown transient total impulse from engine

shutdown signal to zero thrust, ib-sec ..... --- 428.2 .........
Oh
Time from engine shutdown signal to zero
thrust, sec ................... --- 3.0 ......... to
I
kT]
NASA-S-68-2052
I
2OO
160
120
c_
a_ 80
40
0
06:12:10 06:12:20 06:12:50 06:12:40 06:12:50 06:13:00 06:13:10 06:13:20 06:13:30
Time, hr:min:sec
(a) First firing.
Figure 6.13-I.- Chamber pressure during ascent engine firings.

NASA-S-68-2053
200
160
.__ 120
a_ 80
4O
07:44:10 07:44:50 07:45:30 07:46:10 07:46:50 07:47:30 07:48:10 07:48:50 07:49:30 07:50:10 07:50:50
Time, hrmfin:sec
(b) Second firing. L.O

I
--,1
6.13-8
NASA-S-68- 2054
_mtia_'iiiiiiiiiiiliiiiiiJiiiliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiimm .......
0
(a) Start transient (typical),
150
<_ 0
_ (b) Steady-state (typical).
t_
o9
o_ 150
0 L _' _ " %_L'_'_7_".r-:_-_:" t r'_. _-::._":t-;.__t" :_.._._L._--._._giit

(c) 19 and 23 seconds into second firing.
150
(d) Prior to thrust decay (typical).

I I I I I I
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0,4 0.5 0,6
Reference time, sec
Figure 6.1.3-2.- Ascent engine chamber pressure oscillations.

6.14-1
6.].4 CREW STATION

6.15-1
6.15 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
The environmental control system performed satisfactorily through-

out the mission. The water/glycol coolant loop temperatures and pres-
sure, and the water usage rate were within preflight-predicted values.
6.15.1 Cabin Pressure
Figure 6.15-1 shows the cabin pressure and the cabin relief valves
internal pressures for the first 30 minutes of the flight. Preflight
ground tests revealed the two cabin pressure relief yalves would open at
slightly different cabin-to ambient pressure differentials;'the forward
hatch relief valve at 5.7 psid and the upper hatch relief valve at
5.5 psid. About 47 seconds after lift-off, the upper hatch relief valve
started to relieve cabin pressure. One second later, the forward hatch
relief valve cracked momentarily then shut because the cabin-to-ambient
pressure differential across the valve was no longer great enough to
cause the valve to open. The upper hatch relief valve continued to re-
lieve pressure until the cabin was sealed-off at 5.6 psia after 00:02:13.
Eighteen minutes later, the internal pressure of the upper hatch valve
was equal to cabin pressure, verifying the valve had closed. The inter-
_- nal pressure of each valve remained slightly above cabin pressure (within
0.3 psia) for the rest of the flight. Each relief valve operated normally.
The requirement that one valve relieve cabin pressure was demonstrated.
Figure 6.15-2 shows the cabin pressure decay for the mission, which
did not remain constant. The calculated equivalent flow area increased
from 0.0014 to 0.0044 square inch at 03:27:00, when the vehicle was in
a quiescent state and had just passed through the dark side of the orbit.
The internal pressure of each cabin pressure relief valve was slightly
above cabin pressure, verifying that the valves did not open. At about
04:38:00, the flow area began to decrease to 0.0026 square inch.
After launch, the upper cabin wall temperatures near the tunnel de-
creased from 60 ° to 52 ° F by 03:10:00. The upper wall temperatures then
slowly increased to about 63 ° F by the end of the mission. The temperature
of the cabin floor remained at about 56 ° P during most of the mission but
increased to about 76 ° F during the last revolution (see section 6.2.5).
The allowable leakage established prior to flight was based on a

leak rate that would maintain a cabin pressure above the mission minimum
requirement of i psia for the second ascent engine firing. This leak
rate was greater than will be allowed for a manned vehicle. There is no
known cause for the leak rate changes shown in figure 6.15-2.
6.15-2
6.15.2 Water System
The water system operated satisfactorily during the flight. After

the two water tanks were serviced, a slow water quantity decay was noted
in tank 2, caused by either a water or a gas leak. A visual inspection
before launch showed no evidence of water, indicating that the leak was
on the gas side of the tank. At launch, the tank 2 quantity measurement
indicated 88 percent due to a tank pressure decrease from about 47.2 to
35 psia. Consequently, all the water was supplied from tank i until
about 00:50:00, when the pressure in the two tanks equalized. The water
usage from each tank was then about equal for the remainder of the mis-
sion.
Water flow was initiated to the sublimator by opening the primary

water solenoid valve at about 3 minutes 15 seconds. The differential
pressure across the water flow control regulator stabilized at 0.58 psid
then gradually increased to 0.7 ± 0.05 psid after about 30 minutes, where
it remained for most of the flight. Water pressure at the inlet to the
sublimator was constant throughout the mission at 5.63 ± 0.05 psia, which
included a 0.28 psia prelauneh correction.
The sublimator inlet water temperature was 60 ° F at launch. _aen

proper water flow to the sublimator was achieved after orbital insertion,
the temperature approached the water tank outlet temperature of about
64 ° F. The temperature then slowly decreased to about 57 ° F as the
st_limator operation and the heat transport section stabilized. The
water tank outlet temperatures remained essentially constant throughout
the flight.
6.15.3 Heat Transport Section
The coolant pump package pressures remained within predicted values

throughout the flight. After insertion, the discharge pressure stabi-
lized at 38.2 ± 0.3 psia until s_ort staging when it increased to
39 + 0.3 psia due to loss of the descent stage battery coldplates. An
increase of 0.8 psia occurred during staging and the second ascent
engine firing and was caused by vehicle acceleration.
The pump package differential pressure was constant at 34 psid after

the first hour and increased slightly to 34.2 psid at abort staging.
The fluctuation during the first portion of the flight was due to
increases in viscosity and density caused by a decrease in the tempera-
ture of the coolant. This pressure rise indicated a normal average
coolant flow of 410 ib/hr before abort staging and 395 ib/hr after
staging.
6.15-3
Sublimator temperature control.- Figure 6.15-3 shows the actual and

predicted water/glycol coolant temperatures at the pump inlet, which is
a direct indication of sublimator performance. The temperature increased
from about 49 ° F at launch to about 56 ° F prior to starting water flow
at 3 minutes 15 seconds. A delay in effective cooling was caused by the
acceleration of the S-IVB stage preventing full water flow from reaching
the sublimator until engine cutoff. Once proper water flow was attained,
the coolant temperature decreased rapidly, then slowly stabilized at
42° F. The sublimator performance was completely satisfactory throughout
4 the mission.
The water/glycol coolant temperature at the pump inlet was within

predicted values during the mission. The decrease at abort staging was
caused by loss of the descent battery heat load located between the sub-
limator and pump inlet. The slow rise after staging was caused by the
increased heat load from the ascent batteries as they warmed up after
being turned on.
The temperature fluctuations (38° to 54 ° F) during prelaunch were

caused by a mixture of nitrogen pressurization gas with the freon used
for vehicle cooling. Injection of the nitrogen was caused by a malfunc-
tion in the ground support equipment.
6.15-4
NASA-S-68- 2055
16
14
!I
12
10
8
-- Forward hat.ch relief valve a.d cabin pressure
o i /
/
/
4 // q Upper hatch relief valve pressure
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 50
Tilue, iI/il]
Figure 6.15-1.- Presstlre of cabiJl amt int.ema[ pressktre of cabin pressure re[ief va[ves.
NASA-S-68-2056
10
%_....,.,... __ 03:27:00
-_ -Relief valve sealoff
(/)
_
=
(z)
_04:38:00
I1
2
I Equivalent leakage areas I
I J i I I
I 0.0014 sq in. 0.0044 sq in.I 0.0026 sq in. [
l I I i I I
0 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time, hr
o_
Figure 6.15-2.- Cabin pressure profile.
KJq
I
XJq
NASA-S-68-2057 c_
60 T
I I
Launch o-,
i
56
52
LL
o
48
_ 44
z
36
32
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time,hr
Figure 6.15-3.-Water/glycol pumpinlet temperature.

f
6.16-1
6.16 CONSUMABLES
The quantities of consumables loaded are shown in table 6.16-1.

The quantity of water remaining in the ascent stage tanks i and 2 through-
out the mission is shown in figure 6.16-1. The difference between the
actual and predicted consumption is consistent with the difference in
predicted and actual electrical power used.
The total usable prelaunch power was 1400 amp-hr in the descent
batteries and 492 amp-hr in the ascent batteries. The actual power
usage during the mission was 264 smp-hr in the descent batteries and
91 amp-hr in the ascent batteries. The predicted and actual power usage
is shown in figure 6.16-2. The difference between predicted and actual
can be attributed to power variations within specific components compared
with predicted values. The higher usage of ascent power was caused by
activity of the control engines.
Based on a nominal propellant flow rate of 11.43 ib/sec, about

87 percent of the ascent propellant remained after the first ascent en-
gine firing. Figure 6.16-3 shows the actual propellant usage. For the
-- second ascent engine firing, propellant depletion shutdown should have
occurred about 40 seconds later than the thrust decay occurred, based on
the nominal flow rate. Usage of ascent propellant by the control engine
system through the interconnects and propellant nonavailability caused
by the tumbling of the spacecraft contributed to the early shutdown.
The only quantity gaging device for the ascent system propellants was the
low-level sensor which was uncovered early because of the spacecraft
tumbling.
Only 2.7 percent of the total descent engine propellants were used
for the three descent engine firings. (See fig. 6.16-4.) The calculated
consumption for the actual mission profile, as based on nominal perform-
ance data, agrees with the actual consumption within the accuracy of the
propellant quantity gaging device.
Figure 6.16-5 presents the control engine consumable history (see

section 6.11 for further details).
6.z6-2
TABLE 6.16-1.- CONSUMABLES
Fuel Oxidizer
Ascent propulsion propellant
Total loaded, ib ............. 1993 3 170
Total usable, ib ............. 1932 3 091
Ullage volume, cu ft ........... 0.5 per tank at 90 ° F ..
Descent propulsion propellant

Total loaded, ib ............. 6957 i0 948
Total usable, ib ............. 6710 i0 736
Ullage volume, cu ft ........... 0.5 per tank at 90 ° F
Reaction control propellant
Loaded, system A, ib ........... 102.0 203.4
Loaded, system B, ib ........... 102.8 203.4
Total loaded, ib ............. 204.8 406.8
Minimum usable, ib ............ 189.0 360.8
Ascent stage water
Loaded, tank i, ib ............ 42.5
Loaded, tank 2, ib ............ 42.5
Total loaded, Ib ............. 85.0

Total usable, ib ............. 80.0
NASA-S-68-
2058
I00
\ \
80 _... _' _._. usage rate minimum
F.Predicted
Tank _ _ _ _ ' _ I_
E _ "' Tank2
_ 4o • _
N Predicted maximum "_
usagerate "_,,
20
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time, hr
Figure 6.16-1.- Water usage, ox

CTX
I
6.z6-_
O3
-- ._ o
I _ _
-- I _ _,
......
....
"__.._'"_;2
..............
_ ....................................
.o
_J _J
D
/ \ h -
g_
g_
_o X
cO
,.0 o
I o o o o c_ o o o o _:_
<_ 'p_Sl_ J_MO d
.IIj-dktl_
f
6.i6-5
NASA-S-68-2102
i00
90
8O
7O
60
.E
_ 5o
o
N 40
30
2O
10
0
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time,hr
Figure6.16-3.-Ascen[engine;):opel
lantusage.
NASA-S-68-2103
l
ZOO
92
90
0 i 2 3 4 5 6 7
Time, hr
Figure 6.16-4.- Descent engine propellant usage.

NASA-S-68-2059
i00
8O
.o
•-= 60
E
r_
2 4O
_ 20
0 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time, hr
o'x
o_
Figure 6,16-5,- Reaction control propellant usage. --4
6.17-1
(
6.17 ABORT STAGING
Abort staging was successfully accomplished and all systems operation

and performance throughout the staging event were satisfactory. The
abort sequence was initiated and controlled by the stabilization and
control system and mission programmer sequence III, with modifications
as detailed in section 6.6. Only rate damping was provided when the
stabilization and control system was used. After switchover to primary
guidance prior to the second ascent engine firing, all rates were near
null, and the spacecraft gimbal angles were 50.7, 213.6, and 8.2 degrees
in yaw, pitch, and roll, respectively.
Figure 6.17-1 shows the parameters associated with the staging event
and certain mission programmer events. The abort stage "fire" and engine
"on" were instrumented events. The other events shown in figure 6.17-1
were derived from the logic times-of-sequence system in figure 6.17-2.
The event times for the two instrumented events are known within 20 milli-
seconds and were within allowable limits. Other event times were within
specification, as demonstrated by the proper functional responses.
The descent engine was shut down at 06:12:14.3, and as the chamber
pressure decayed to about 5 psia, the instrumentation channel was switched
to the ascent engine chamber pressure as shown by the logic sequence.
' Figure 6.17-1 shows the overlap of ascent engine chamber pressure rise
and the descent engine tailoff and was determined by extrapolating the
descent chamber pressure to zero, based on the tailoff characteristics
obtained from the second descent engine firing. The staging bolts were
severed during the thrusting overlap period of the descent and ascent
engines, 30 milliseconds after ascent engine "on." No disturbances were
sensed by angular rates for this event. The ascent engine chamber pres-
sure rose sharply to the start transient peak. At that instant, the
change in pitch rates showed a disturbance torque that was trimmed out by
the control engines. This disturbance torque is discussed in more detail
in section 6.10. The resulting angular rate in pitch and roll was damped
within i second to within the deadband limits. The rates (fig. 6.17-1)
indicate that only a single disturbance occurred which was at the point
of peak chamber pressure. No recontact of the two stages was indicated
at any time.
The highest pressure transients on the ascent stage bottom surface

and the descent stage upper surface are shown in figure 6.17-1. These
peak pressures were within design limits (see section 6.1 for further
discussion). The peaks occurred at least 25 milliseconds after the peak
of ascent engine chamber pressure. At this time, based on guidance
platform accelerations, the stages were estimated to be less than half a
foot apart and separating at a rate of ii.0 ft/sec 2.
6.17-2
NASA-S-68-2060
• 2D
3U
10 nuts;umbilical deadfaced_ N 2U
_ 10 g initiate 4U
"t_ =Q _ 0
. _: _ ---I
0 -10 180
r_
_=_lO t
•= _
_ 0 >- -10 I_ 3D
_- -I0 [_ 16 160 I I I I I J I I P
14 140
2- 0 20
0 0
06:12:14.0 06:12:14.2 06:12:14.4 06:12:14.6 06:12:14.8 06:12:15.0 06:12:15.2 06:12:15.4 06:12:15.6 06:12:15.8 06:12:16.0 06:12:16.2 06:12:16.4 06:12:16.6
I second " I Time, hr:min:sec
Figure 6.17-1.- Abort stagingcharacteristics.

6. ].7-3
Program reader T + 0.021second

NASA-S-68-2061 Programreader assemblycommand T + 0.012second descent/ascent T + 0.409second T + 0.414second T + 0.425second T + 0.449second
assemblycommand ABORTSTAGEFIRE descenten9ine batteryswitch- ascentengine staging blowseparation cut umbilical
ABORTSTAGE ARM T_0 shutdown over on initiated bolts and deadface cable
r
Lo_l o GH1260 DFIdescent _+

+15V_ +28V_o----_ _"_ measurements_ A1
I _28V _"
1 _ [DEI ascent
Commander's
I O
I
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=
I
t
= K2
: measorements
OEI
bus q_-o_
.o II
bus +28V II +28V ' IF°-_
= bus ---o il
K13
J_.L 4CB2 tI _i o_GY 0111 I

System I II --- -- =
engineer's I Pyr0batteryA ! _ ,
bos
+28v , _L--_
M'_° I'1 i
9 •
Pyro bus A _ c---- 121
PyrosystemA
- "arm
K1 Master I GH1283
I
Commander's .. ,I .---o_'c--- -.o_l o---.-_ _ Staging I Staging K circuit
bus +28V _ -- I -- I KSt bolts KSA: bolts 6_ Electrical
Stagin'_ K2 I _ (systemB : (systemB = interrupter
Pyro _ .o I
bus "°I -- "--_ _ I I
-h [ 1
A ,I I Time Time l
-o-.,.o I I 15
delay
msec K3 delay .......
_ Umbilical
I.._O_O__
I
I
I
'I
I
I
I
=
Note:
Pyrotechnic systemB
is redundantto systemA
= 15 msec
'
J-cutter
=
TK I TK 2 Open
isolation
Helium valves
pressurization
Ascent engine Figure 6. 17-2.- Abort stagingsequence, pyrotechnic systemA.

7-1
7.0 FLIGHT CREW
f_
_- 8-1
8.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION

9-1
9.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE
This section of the report is based upon real-time observations,

unless otherwise noted, and may not agree with the final analysis of the
data in other sections of the report.
9.1 FLIGHT CONTROL
9.1.1 Prelaunch Operations
The Mission Control Center-Houston began flight control support of

the terminal countdown at T minus i0 hours 30 minutes on January 22,
1968. Lunar Module-i (LM-I) cabin closeout had been performed during the
countdown demonstration test at 20:50:00 G.m.t. on January 18, 1968.
Command support of the LM-I and launch vehicle by the Mission Control
Center was nominal.
The Redstone telemetry computer was declared no-go at approximately

T minus 3 hours 30 minutes and remained so until 05:42:00 after lift-off.
Procedures were developed for the launch phase to permit commands to be
transmitted without the use of the telemetry computer and to use local
site printouts for command validation. The redstone telemetry and com-
mand processing had been documented as mandatory for launch; however,
the Flight Director decided to continue to countdown. The command com-
puter was utilized for command support during the launch phase and for
telemetry support during revolutions 2 and 3.
The terminal count progressed as scheduled until T minus 3 hours

30 minutes when attempts were made to increase the freon flow to drop
the glycol temperature from the 55° F level to the desired lift-off
temperature of approximately 35° F. In so doing, freon flow appeared to
be completely lost and the glycol temperature rose as high as 65 ° F. A
hold was called at T minus 2 hours 30 minutes while efforts were made to
correct this problem. The problem was traced to the ground support equip-
ment freon supply and resulted in insufficient freon being avail_01e to
extend the count until the desired termination time, if a high freon flow
was constantly maintained. The areas of concern were the effect of ele-
vated temperature on water boiler start-up, the effect on the temperature
profile prior to water boiler start-up, and whether equipment degradation
might result from operating at elevated temperatures. It was determined
that water boiler start-up would not be jeopardized by a glycol tempera-
ture of 55° F at lift-off, although all efforts should be made to main-
tain the temperature below the maximum red-line value of 45 ° F. Freon
control was eventually regained, and although several variations in the
9-2
glycol temperature occurred, stabilization was maintained at less than

55 ° F. Glycol temperature at lift-off was 48.5 ° F.
The _ was placed on internal electrical power at T minus 42 min-

utes. Variations greater than 15 amperes occurred during prelaunch, and
the current was near the maximum observed level at lift-off (55 amperes).
The inertial measurement unit, with a stabilized glycol temperature of
55 ° F, had a 17-percent heater duty cycle during prelaunch operations.
When the spacecraft was cooled for flight, this heater duty cycle rose
to 27 percent and ranged between 27 and 19 percent for the rest of the
mission. At lift-off, 96 amp-hr had been consumed in addition to the
200 amp-hr (50 amp-hr per battery) that had been predischarged.
9.1.2 Powered Flight
Lift-off occurred at 22:48:09 G.m.t. The space vehicle was in a

nominal configuration at lift-off. Data delays prevented the Guidance
Officer from observing the automatic spacecraft guidance reference re-
lease. As a result, the 5 and ENTER commands were transmitted as a back-
up at 00:00:06 and 00:00:07, respectively. The N'_ cabin pressure began
relieving at approximately 00:00:53. Approximately 60 seconds after
lift-off, the Guidance Officer detected a lunar module guidance computer
navigation error in crossrange. However, the actual trajectory was nom-
inal in that plane. This divergence existed throughout both stages of
powered flight and was expected because of the prelaunch platform align-
ment errors. The total LM battery currents gradually increased from an
average of 43 amperes to a maximum of 65 amperes at 00:02:00. The cur-
rent usage then slowly decreased to an average of 43 amperes. The rise
was attributed to the near-simultaneous actuation of the reaction control
heaters. The S-IB stage inboard and outboard engine cutoffs occurred at
approximately 00:02:00, and staging was confirmed by the trajectory.
The S-IVB stage ignition occurred at 00:02:25, followed by activa-

tion of the propellant utilization system at 00:02:31. The thrust cham-
ber pressure for the S-IVB stage engine indicated a high nominal value
from 00:02:31 until engine mixture ratio cutback occurred at approximately
00:07:48. An attitude error of up to 4 degrees in yaw was indicated
throughout the S-IVB stage firing. This could have been the result of a
thrust vector misaligrmlent, because the vehicle end conditions were nom-
inal. S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at approximately 00:09:53; the
velocity cutoff was normal. The LM cabin pressure had stabilized at
5.5 psia by 00:02:30. The crossrange navigation error first experienced
during the S-IB stage powered flight had reached a 400 ft/sec value at
insertion. Based on data from the Bermuda station, the orbit at inser-
tion was 87.6 by 119.5 n. mi.
9-3
9.1.3 Orbital Flight
First revolution.- Venting of the S-IVB stage was nominal after cut-
off with a slightly greater rat@ of oxidizer ullage decay than had been
expected. The nose cone was jettisoned at 00:10:38. Attitude control
after jettison was nominal; rates and errors were held to dead-band
limits. A nominal pitchover to a posigrade earth rate attitude was ini-
tiated and proper attitude and rates were achieved. The measurement for
the environmental control gaseous nitrogen sphere indicated an off-
nominal pressure decay attributed to a system leak. As the mission pro-
gressed, the pressure decay rate was observed to decrease and ultimately
the pressure followed closely the minimum predicted value for the system.
The Canary Island station acquired telemetry from both the launch
vehicle and the LM at 00:16:59. Deployment of the adapter panels was not
observed at the programmed time. The Booster Systems Engineer sent the
adapter deploy command at about 00:21:11. Command verification was re-
ceived, but no telemetry confirmation of the event was received. Sub-
sequent tape playback and readout verified that the adapter deploy relays
A and B were closed, and the panel deploy monitor indication was not
present. The Coastal Sentry Quebec confirmed that both panel deploy re-
lays A and B had actuated but without a deploy indication. Based on the
two out of three indications, the Flight Director elected to permit the
separation sequence to proceed.
The Coastal Sentry Quebec had intermittent telemetry which was

caused, in part, by radio frequency interference from the ship's ground
communications equipment. To alleviate the problem the teletype B-channel
power was reduced during acquisition. At 00:50:01, the Coastal Sentry
Quebec reported that the counters were disabled and that the intermittent
synchronization problem still existed. Separation was confirmed at
00:50:23:00. The reaction control pressurization sequence was nominal.
Carnarvon acquired telemetry at 00:51:47. The separation sequence

was nominal, with LM/adapter separation occurring at 00:53:54. Rates
were low, with little activity by the reaction control engines. A data
dropout of about 2 seconds occurred as expected at the time of separation.
The primary S-band system operating in the low power mode came on as
programmed. Prior to activation of the reaction control system, the pro-
pellant quantities were showing a bias between the two systems; A system
was approximately 93 percent_ B system was approximately 98 percent at
Carnarvon acquisition. Usage was nominal during separation. The maneu-
ver to the cold-soak attitude was nominal. The final attitudes were
pitch 319.7 degrees, roll 328.5 degrees, and yaw 99.4 degrees and agreed
with those planned.
The Rose Knot Victor acquired the LM at approximately 01:28:16. The

f UHF received-signal strength fluctuated around-65 dBm. It should be
9-4
noted that throughout the mission, the Rose Knot Victor was the only
Manned Space Flight Network station with consistently good telemetry and
command capability. During this pass, all clocks were synchronized.
The Rose Knot Victor also reported reception of intermittent data from
the S-IVB stage.
At approximately 01:29:00, the Guaymas station acquired LM data,

and systems operation was satisfactorY. Glycol temperature was 42.6 de-
grees. The UHF received-signal strength dropped to about -95 to -i00 dBm
at i minute before loss of signal by the Rose Knot Victor.
The Mission Control Center transmitted the primary S-band OFF com-
mand at 01:33:12. The secondary S-band ON command was transmitted at
01:33:28. Secondary S-band data (high power mode) were of good quality
throughout the remainder of the mission. Command sequence to close the
reaction control propellant crossfeed valves was initiated at 01:34:17.
At completion of the command, there was a crossfeed valve OPEN indication
which had not been observed prior to that time but was probably caused
by power being on the valve coils. The Guidance Officer started the
crossfeed valve CLOSE reset command sequence from the Texas station at
01:36:01 and the proper telemetry confirmation was received. During
the pass over the United States, the control cluster i temperature
(156 ° F) was about 18 ° F higher than that of clusters 2 and 3 (137 ° and
138 ° F, respectively) and 8 ° F higher than that of cluster 4 (148 ° F).
This difference was believed to have been caused by exposure to the sun.
Water, electrical, and reaction control propellant usage had been near
nominal through the end of revolution i. 0peration.of the guidance com-
puter had been satisfactory.
The S-IVB stage had been following a nominal time line through the
end of the first revol_ion. The only apparent anomalies were the leak
in the environmental control gaseous nitrogen sphere, the poor telemetry
received, and the fuel ullage pressure indicating zero. The zero fuel
ullage pressure was caused by more fuel being vaporized and vented than
had been expected. The prediction of the lifetime of the gaseous nitro-
gen supply was extended to 05:30:00.
Second revolution.- The Bermuda station acquired data at approxi-

mately 01:41:00. The S-IVB stage was satisfactory for the passivation
experiment and automatic enabling occurred over Bermuda.
The Redstone tracking ship, which had a telemetry computer that had
been faulting since early in the countdown_ had acquisition at approxi-
mately 01:46:40. The UHF signal strength was again marginal. An eval-
uation was made of the available data in an attempt to predict the com-
mand coverage of the firings.
9-5
Carnarvon reported acquisition of the LM telemetry at 02:24:23 and

command handover from the Coastal Sentry Quebec was completed at
02:24:56. At 02:25:10, it was reported from the Mission Control Center
that the S-IVB stage was satisfactory. The liquid hydrogen ullage pres-
sure was considerably lower than expected. At 02:26:19, Carnarvon re-
ported that the launch vehicle was showing flight control computer burn
mode ON which indicates start of passivation. The oxidizer dump began
i second later. At 02:27:41, Carnarvon reported burn mode OFF. The
oxidizer dump was terminated at 02:28:27, and i0 seconds later, the fuel
dump started. At 02:29:04, Carnarvon reported that the oxidizer ullage
pressure had not relieved as much as expected, and the fuel dump was
terminated at 02:31:27. Nominal fuel and oxidizer venting was reported
at 02:31:51. At loss of signal, the fuel ullage pressure was about
zero psia. Attitudes were nominal and steady during passivation.
At 02:48:25, approximately 3 minutes early, Hawaii reported acqui-

sition of signal, but the Mission Control Center was unable to synchro-
nize on the data. It was not determined whether this was actual acqui-
sition of the signal due to multipath or whether it was radio frequency
interference. Actual Hawaii acquisition of signal occurred at 02:51:00.
The S-IVB stage cold helium dump was initiated at 02:52:38 and the dump
sequence was nominal.
During the pass over the Redstone, Canary Island, Carnarvon, and
Hawaii stations, the guidance system status was checked.
The Rose Knot Victor reported the initial UHF received-signal

strength as -105 dBm. The guidance computer time was reported as lagging
i second with variations to i0 seconds; however, no such indication was
noted by any other site.
The handover from the Rose Knot Victor to the Texas station was com-
pleted at 03:05:45. UHF signal strength was poor. The scheduled self-
test of the digital cormmand assembly was postponed until after the pre-
dicted time of signal strength improvement, i_mmediately prior to the
initiation of mission programmer sequence V.
Command handover from Texas to Merritt Island was accomplished at

03:09:12. At 03:12:58, the UHF received signal strength was sufficient
to transmit the digital code assembly self-test command which cued the
program reader assembly. The compare pulse was received at 03:14:40.
Near the time of Merritt Island loss of signal, the Mission Control
Center reported that the S-IVB stage oxidizer vent valve had not closed.
The oxidizer vent valve CLOSE command was transmitted twice at 03:15:05.
It appeared, however, that command had been handed over to Antigua and
that Antigua had not yet acquired the signal. After the mission, it was
reported that the telemetry discrete had dropped out properly.
r •
9-6
Third revolution.- The Ascension Cormmunications Officer reported

that part of the problem with poor telemetry reception by the Coastal
Sentry Quebec was caused by the outgoing teletype traffic; permission
was granted to terminate the summary message channel. The Coastal Sentry
Quebec had acquisition at 03:54:24 and immediately reported that the re-
mote site data processor was out-of-corp_aission. This would prevent con-
firmation of guidance computer program, phase, and display and keyboard
data. However, driven events and analog data could still be monitored.
Based on the prefiring events reported from the Coastal Sentry Quebec,
it was confirmed that the guidance computer had entered mission phase 9
at the nominal time of 03:55:04 and the predicted time of ignition for
the first descent engine firing was 03:59:40. Normal operation of the
vent valves on the S-IVB stage was confirmed.
Carnarvon acquired data at 03:57:58; however, command handover was

delayed, as planned, until after the first descent engine firing ARM sig-
nal at 03:58:42. The firing attitudes of pitch 31.8 degrees and roll
355.6 degrees were close to predicted. Descent engine ignition occurred
at 03:59:40.6, based on the Carnarvon strip chart recorders. At 03:59:57,
immediately after reporting i0 percent throttle, Carnarvon reported a
primary, guidance, and navigation CAUTION indication, which was later
changed to a program CAUTION, and program 00. The engine was commanded
OFF at 03:59:44.8 by the guidance computer. Carnarvon was directed to
make the Mission Control Center prime for command at 04:00:30.
The UHF received-signal strength was -99 dBm when the prime relay
reset command was transmitted unsuccessfully at 04:01:18 and again at
04:01:39. At 04:02:19, the prime relay reset command was transmitted
and was accepted; the descent engine ARM discrete was removed. Trans-
mission of the colmmand sequence Verb 15-Noan 50, to enable display of
the error codes, was started at 04:03:34 and completed at 04:04:26. The
error codes received were 1405, DELTA V MONITOR ALARM, and 315, FORGETIT.
These codes indicated that the guidance computer had commanded shutdown
of the engine because of failure to sense adequate acceleration.
After engine shutdown, the actual orbit was i00 by 119 n. mi. At
04:06:50, the Mission Control Center reported that there were no system
problems that would affect vehicle lifetime. The Flight Dynamics Officer
recommended waiting until the next revolution before starting an alternate
mission. Figure 9.1-1 shows the subsequent real-time logic. The two
prime alternates for this type failure were C and L. There were targets
for L at the Hawaii station, if they had been required for execution
during this pass over the United States. However, they were based on
prelaunch nominal data with no descent engine firing and may not have
been valid. If used, a manual abort staging sequence would have been
required.
/-
9-7
The Flight Director concurred in these recommendations. He further

requested an evaluation of the possibility of retargeting for another
attempt at performing the planned firing for the next pass over the
Coastal Sentry Quebec and Carnarvon. This possibility had been previously
rejected because of the limited coverage available from those sites during
revolution 4.
After Carnarvon loss-of-signal, command plans for the pass over

Hawaii and the continental United States were started. The only commands
required for Hawaii were the guidance and control error reset command,
and the selecting of the mission programmer sequence IIl for alternate
mission C. To insure the vehicle was in a safe condition, the prime re-
lay reset command was to be left in the guidance computer until just
prior to going into an alternate mission. At this time the cause of the
descent engine shutdown was still unknown.
Alternate mission L was not desirable because it could not be re-

targeted to avoid a manual abort staging sequence. The maximum descent
engine firing time available would have been 60 seconds. This did not
satisfy the requirement for a long descent engine firing. Further, if
the manual abort staging sequence were not effective, the descent propel-
lants would be depleted while the vehicle was below the minimum perigee
limit. Because there had been severe commanding problems, attempting
alternate L with a manual abort staging sequence would jeopardize not only
the abort staging test, but also the ascent engine firing to depletion
and the reaction control/ascent feed test.
After Hawaii loss-of-signal during revolution 3, the Guidance Officer

indicated that the attitude for mission programmer sequence III would be
retrograde and recommended using the guidance and control system to es-
tablish an optimum attitude during the pass over the continental United
States. The command sequence started at 04:41:47 and ended at 04:51:30.
The LM went to the commanded attitude of pitch 213.6 degrees, roll 7.8 de-
grees, and yaw 50.9 degrees. As a result of these commands, the digital
autopilot went to minimum deadband and remained there.
The active part of the S-IVB mission ended with the ambient helium
dump during the pass over the continental United States.
Fourth revolution.- Prior to signal acquisition by the Coastal

Sentry Quebec it had been determined that the modified alternate mission
C was the preferred alternate. Based on vehicle attitudes (+X antenna
down), the Rose Knot Victor was predicted to be in the correct position
for maximum command capability. The mission phase and timer uplink for
mission phase 13 was started at Carnarvon, and the uplink was completed
at 05:35:01.
9-8
The abort guidance select command was selected as the mode for in-
terrupting, because if cuing of another sequence were required this com-
mand would have to be transmitted anyway. If failures should prevent
continuing the mission for another revolution, the sequence could be
resumed by sending the mission programmer start command.
It was recommended that mission programmer sequence III not be ter-

minated after the first ascent engine firing. This was a deviation from
the alternate mission Co The reason for the deviation was that the
guidance and control system was still good_ and if the mission programmer
could be interrupted prior to reaching the ascent engine propellant de-
pletion firing, this firing could be performed under guidance control the
next revolution. If the sequence could not be interrupted, the ascent
engine propellant firing-to-depletion coverage would be marginal. It was
also recommended that initiation time be 06:10:00, and that the sequence
be terminated no later than 06:13:32. The latter time was approximately
7 seconds prior to getting into the +X translation for the ascent engine
firing to propellant depletion.
At Hawaii, during revolution 4, the pre-sequence commands were sent

for mission programmer sequence III. Signal strength was very poor at
first, and rejects were received from the vehicle for the first two
attempts at transmitting the prime relay OFF command. Signal strength
improved and the third transmission, at 05:59:37, was accepted. Bat-
tery 5 was commanded ON at 06:00:28 as a precautionary, measure against
switching failure during staging. At that time, battery 5 assumed about
45 percent of the load. Batteries for the explosive devices were com-
manded on line at 06:00:46.
The Rose Knot Victor commanded the LM to the abort guidance mode
at 06:05:34 and commanded mission programmer start at 06:10:00; the se-
quence proceded normally. The Mission Control Center was monitoring the
sequence through the Goldstone and Guaymas stations. Rates were low,
and the sequence continued normally. The abort staging sequence occurred
at about 06:12:14. The resultant orbit, based on White Sands data, was
93.4 by 526 n. mi.
After the cutoff of the first descent engine firing, it was decided
not to continue with the ascent engine propellant depletion firing part
of the sequence. The vehicle had approached within about 8 degrees of
gimbal lock but had returned to a nominal condition. The abort guidance
select command was sent to stop the sequence before any further commands
were executed by the mission programmer. The first command was trans-
mitted at 06:13:40, and a second command was initiated i second later;
both commands were accepted. The primary guidance select command and
the prime relay reset command were sent at 06:14:03 and 06:14:15, re-
spectively. Shortly afterward, an extremely high reaction control pro-
pellant usage rate was reported, but was believed to be the result of _
9-9
the primary guidance control with the digital autopilot using the full
vehicle mass for its control engine command calculations. This had been
discussed before the mission and was expected but not to the extent ob-
served. The Guidance Officer prepared mass update loads, but these were
not available for immediate transmission because the mass values required
would have been a function of the vehicle state and how far sequence III
had progressed.
Two indications believed to be anomalous were noted during se-

quence III. First, during the time the descent engine was armed, the
inverter voltage oscillated between 113 and 124.5 V ac. No gimbal-drive-
actuator fail indications nor other effects were noted as a result of this
fluctuating voltage. Second, at staging, battery 5 carried 86 percent of
the load for about 30 seconds. For the next 5 minutes, both battery cur-
rents sought stabilization levels. This was believed to have resulted
from battery 5 being warmer, battery 6 having a higher charge, and a high
total current load because of control engine activity, although the num-
ber of variables involved prevents any definite conclusions. Thereafter,
both batteries shared the load equally. [Editor's note: Both of these
indications were, in fact, normal.]
A review of the command histories from mission programme_ se-

quence III showed that the abort guidance select command had not been
sent prior to the start "of the +X translation for the second ascent engine
firing. If this is correct, there would have been some 36 seconds of
+X translation, which would have accounted for some of the high reaction
control usage of propellants. Reaction control usage had been as expected
until the time the primary guidance mode was selected.
The guidance computer had been updated with the proper attitude for
the mission programmer controlled engine firings and an erasable memory
update was sent to reenable the proper computer routine, if further
guidance computer controlled firings were to be accomplished. This was
started at 06:16:47, and completed by 06:17:43.
In order to conserve some attitude hold capability, rather than

depleting both systems, the reaction control main A valve was closed at
06:17:09, trapping approximately 34 percent of the propellant. At
06:23:20, it was reported that B system propellants were being depleted
and a recommendation was made that the abort guidance system mode be
used to conserve the propellants. This request was vetoed to preclude
the possibility of a gimbal lock condition, which would have prevented
the use of the guidance and control system for the ascent engine firing-
to-propellant-depletion sequence.
A navigation update load, based on data after engine cutoff, was

started from the Merritt Island station at 06:24:47, and was completed
through the Antigua station at 06:25:58. A verification was received,
9-10
but loss-of-signal occurred prior to the guidance computer telemetry

verification that the load had been accepted; this was confirmed later
at Carnarvon.
Fifth revolution.- At 06:28:10, the network was advised that either

mission programmer sequence V or guidance computer mission phase 13 would
be followed. The starting point for either would be Hawaii and the pro-
pellant depletion firing would not be completed until the Rose Knot Victor
acquired the signal. A 1-minute gap between Hawaii s_id the Rose Knot
Victor would be covered by the Watertown, which was being used on an
engineering evaluation basis; the Watertown had been recording data dur-
ing the previous passes.
At this time (06:28:10), the mass update, target update, and a timer
update for mission phase 13 was still required, and an update to lengthen
the guidance computer acceleration sample period was highly desirable.
The exact cause of the descent engine shutdown was still unresolved, and
if the vehicle were unable to complete the maneuver as planned because of
a similar problem, there would be little range coverage left for subse-
quent attempts. Further, attitude control would be lost when the re-
action control B system propellants were depleted_ consequently, it was
decided to open the A system and the control engine crossfeeds as soon
as possible after the mass update was completed. Tracking data confirmed
a 91 by 532 n. mi. orbit, indicating a fairly long pass at Carnarvon.
However, the time available for all the updates was marginal.
The Coastal Sentry Quebec acquired broken telemetry at 07:10:30 and

telemetry for that pass remained fairly poor. Part of the problem was
apparently caused by a failure of a pulse code modulation power supply
at the station. This prevented the Coastal Sentry Quebec from cuing mis-
sion programmer sequence V as planned.
The first command transmitted from Carnarvon was reaction control

main A valve closed reset at 07:08:06. Uplink of the mass update (EMU i,
load 3701) was started as 07:08:50 and was completed by 07:09:41. The
following commands for the reaction control main shutoff valves were
completed by 07:10:57: main B closed, main B closed reset, main A open,
and main A open reset. The next activity at Carnarvon was to get the
reaction control crossfeed valves opened. The first corr_and, prime relay
off, was sent at 07:11:07, and the crossfeed open colmmands were uplinked
at 07:11:20. The sequence was completed by 07:12:22. The reset commands
were started at 07:13:05 and completed at 07:14:05. After the crossfeed
valves were opened, an uplink (_',_ 2, load 3801) was initiated to in-
crease the sampling period for the delta V monitor routine and to get the
digital autopilot into maximum deadband. However, the data were not
accepted with the load messages because of intermittent drops in UHF
received-signal strength. An attempt was made to send the load through
the display and keyboard commands. The load was still not completed when
the signal was lost.
9-11
During the load attempt to the erasable memory unit, high control
engine activity and occasional high rates were observed. Also, the re-
action control oxidizer pressur@s were low, and it was recommended that
the ascent feed valves be opened prior to executing any firing sequence.
The mass update previously transmitted did not restore normal digital
autopilot operation, because the design of the system is such that the
current mass is ignored until the guidance computer is in an average g
routine.
Hawaii acquired the signal at 07:38:00, and the UHF received-signal

strength was good. The command sequence to open the ascent feed valves
was started at 07:38:31 and completed at 07:42:14. Immediately after
the ascent feed valves were opened, the Guidance Officer sent the cue
for mission programmer sequence V, and the compare pulse was received at
approximately 07:42:38. At 07:42:57, the reaction control main B valve
open command was transmitted to trap as much propellant as possible, in
the event the sequence could not be stopped before the ascent feed valves
were closed. The following command sequence started the mission pro-
grsmmer firing.
Guidance select abort guidance 07:43:07
Mission programmer start (not 07:43:19 Delay in sending second

accepted) command to verify not
accepted.
Mission programmer start 07:43:54

(accepted)
Engine start 07:44:15 First command accepted.

07:44:18
07:44:21
The firing was normal and attitudes were steady. At the time the
ascent feed and reaction control valves were confirmed to be in the nor-
mal configuration for the ascent feed test_ the abort guidance select
command was transmitted. However, Hawaii had loss of signal and the
command was approximately 12 seconds too late. If the first mission pro-
gram_ner start command had been accepted, confirmation could have been
made in time.
The Rose Knot Victor acquired a signal at 07:46:48. Twelve seconds

later, the last ascent feed valve closed. The firing continued with good
attitude stability until approximately 07:47:45. At that time rates
started going off scale high and low in all axes. The Rose Knot Victor
maintained solid telemetry until loss of signal. The firing continued
until depletion, but the time of depletion could not be determined in
9-12
real time. The Rose Knot Victor received approximately 5 pulse code mod-
ulation counts on the chamber pressure measurement after ascent engine
cutoff.
Communications coverage during the sequence was good. This sequence

was nominal except that after reaction control propellant depletion, eight
control engines remained on electrically. This resulted in the total cur-
rent increasing to 81 amperes.
The vehicle structure apparently held during the entire firing.

Cabin pressure was reported as 52 PCM counts at loss of signal at the
Hose Knot Victor. Two commands were transmitted in the blind from the
Texas station in an attempt to put the vehicle in a usable condition for
the postmission test plan.
After an apparent C-band loss of signal during the maneuver, all

sites were instructed to go to a skin-track mode. There was no C-band
acquisition after the completion of the maneuver. Maximum elevation
angle during Guaymas pass was approximately i degree. Only two tracking
sites, Pretoria and Hawaii, would be able to track during the next several
revolutions. The extended mission team then assumed shift duties_ however_
they were unable to acquire the spacecraft. The effort continued until
approximately ii:00:00 G.m.t.
9-13
NASA-S-68-2104
Alternate mission L
3)
q OverUnited States(revolution
Alternate missionL Rejected
(a) Extensive computer uplink commanding reguired:
_rget update, liar(ant(oil vector update_ timer
(1) Computer-controlledmission update, andchange-in-velocitymonUor time change
phase11(seconddescentengine (h) Ahort stage ground command required via UHF
firing; staging; first ascentengine /. _, during firing
(2) After short descentengine firing,

-"L 2- (d)
[o execution o[ nnssion phase 11
Experience with poor UHF signal strength
real-time commandfor abort re) More time required Co verify reason for premature
staging descent engine shutdown
F firing) (c) Hawaii is only site for uplink commands prior
Allowsresumption
of nassionunderconlputer
control Rejected continued through ascentengine phase13(secondascentengine (twoascentengine firings, second continued, closing interconnects
-Accepted q
(a) Extensive
targetOver
con/purer
United
update_
upLink
navigation
commanding
States(revolution
required:
4)
vector update, timer
update, and changed(n-velocity monitor Ume change
[____[
firing to depletion(revolution 4)
Mission programmersequence1"11 /
___.]
firing to propellantdepletion)
Computer-controlledmission ii_
extendedto propellantdepletion)
Mission programmersequence_Z ..---t Mission programmersequencer
(h) Ahort stage grouila command requirea via UHF Rejected Rejected _( Rejected Rejectea
during firing (a) No firings unde_ computer control (a) Extensive computer upHnk commanding reqttired Additional ascent engine restart Might ieopardize Loss of attitude control
(c) Experiellce with poor UHF signal strength (b) Marqiaal gromld station coverage aL ascent (b) Poor coveraqe over MerriLL island (revomtioll 4) tile ascent engine ruing to depletion
(d) Lunar module retrograde attitude required change propellant depletion because of low elevation angle
during pass over United StaLes (revomLion 3) in (c) Short period of coverage only over Camarvon
prep,lration for altenlate inissioll C. CoMputer (revolution 5)
uplink for miss(ca phase 11 complicated by {d} Excessive use o[ reaction control propellant
this altitude change requirenlenL during sequence ]_[ requireg additional ground
(e) New targets [or computer mission phase 11 commands wllich complicated computer uplink
(second descent engine fiUnq) Give Itlaxilritllll plan for mission phase 13
firing of 60 seconds wire possible {hie(mum (el Experience with poor UHF signal sLreltgth
perigee violation. (Mininlum perigee = 100n. mi.
if commands not accepted)
(n Descent ella(lie firing Lime iioL long enough to
Alternate missionC satisfy requirements
_remature shutdownof Mission programmersequence]33 Mission programmersequencelit Mission programmersequencer Real-timecommandfor engine on Real-timecommandto prevent closure
gme (minimum requirementssequence) stoppedafter first ascent engine (secondascentenginefiring to after ignition for first firing of propellant interconnects
firing (revolution 4) ti ring propellantdepletion) (extendfiring to propellantdepletion)
Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted
Use as backup to alternate i/ass(on L Allows I ossibdiLy of executhlg ascent engine Comguter-conLrolled firings not pracUcal One long ascent engine firing Lo depletion I[ ascent/reaction control propenanL interconnects
firing under computer control satisfies mission objective are anowed to close_ attituae control will be lost
Computer-controlledmission phase9 Lastdescentengine firing in

(reschedule of first descentengine missionprogrammersequence]It
firing) Irevolution 4) extendedby real-time command
Rejectea Rejected ,'K This was tile primary plan unLa Lime over Carnarvorl (revoluno. 5)
{a) Experiellce with poor UIfF signal strength (a) Grotmd colnmal/aing too Lime critical (7 sec) was not sufficient to complete uplinks
(b} Extensive computer uplink commanding requirea (b) Experience with poor UliF signal strellgth
(c) Poor grou_ld stance coverage aL Carnarvon (of Descent propenant depletion it all colnlilands
low elevation all(lie) not accepted _ eeal-Unle Colll{lland transmission unsuccessful
(d) No capability at Coastal Sentry Quebec for (d) Marqinal ground sLat(on coverage [or ascent
computer uplink colnmandin9 ellgifle progellanL aepleUo, firing
(e) Sequence could not he rally covered by
Coastal Sentry Quehec
Figure 9.1-1. - Real-timedecision logic.

9-14
9.2 NETWORK PERFORMANCE
Support from the NASA and Department of Defense network stations

was satisfactory. Minor problems were experienced with colmmands, telem-
etry, and radar acquisition. No mission impact resulted from any of the
problems, and no mission capabilities were lost.
9.2.1 Telemetry
The telemetry computer on the Hedstone network ship faulted during

the countdown period and was out of service for the mission. A post-
mission inspection revealed that a wiring error occurred during incorpo-
ration of a modification. The Ascension station did not acquire during
the third revolution because an erroneous acquisition message was trans-
mitted from the Mission Control Center in Houston. At the start of the
third revolution, the playback bit at Carnarvon station was set errone-
ously and resulted in a loss of about 5 seconds of data. Data from the
Guam station during the fourth revolution were not received at the Mis-
sion Control Center. The problem was traced to an operator error in
patching the communications line terminal at Goddard Space Flight Center.
9.2.2 Tracking
The Canary Island station had a range bias of 2000 yards during the
first revolution. The problem was caused by a drifting fine-range ad-
justment, which was corrected before the second revolution. During the
first revolution_ data from the White Sands station were not accepted at
the Mission Control Center because of a tagging error by Goddard. During
the second revolution, the California and _ite Sands stations tracked
an antenna side-lobe signal because of erroneous acquisition messages
from the Mission Control Center. The California station could not sup-
port the mission during the third revolution because a malfunction in
the computer affected the high-speed data.
9.2.3 Command
During a command interface test at the Goldstone station, a load/

clear-load (2507) input was attempted; however, the output was a _F up-
link request for command and service module navigation update (0001).
The problem was caused by simultaneous inputs to the program request
module and the manual entry device. Procedures have been changed to
preclude the problem in the future.
9-15
During the countdown period, an erroneous computer load was sent to

the Carnarvon station. After switching to the standby central processor
(B-system), load control indications showed a load transferred to Car-
narvon. An attempt was made to clear the output buffer by clearing load
4563, the last load sent to Carnarvon, but no action resulted. The prob-
lem was finally corrected by clearing the previous load (2509) in the out-
put buffer and load 4563 was subsequently transferred. It was concluded
that the standby computer processor had dropped the input during the time
the validation was received from Carnarvon for load 2509; as a result,
load 4563 was stacked behind it. The problem is under investigation.
9.2.4 Mission Control Center Central Processors
The output of the polynomial buffer terminal was interrupted

14 times on the standby system and ii times on the online system. These
interrupts were manually cleared, and the buffer terminals were reiniti-
alized within i0 seconds after each occurrence. The buffer terminals
have been subsequently modified so that each has an individual input/
output channel to interface with the central processors.
The central processor guard faulted once at T minus 9 minutes and

at three additional times during the mission. No data were lost except
that at 04:41:00 data from the Pretoria station were not routed to the
real-time computer complex. However, the rotary system permitted all
message traffic to overflow to other teletype machines. The problem is
under investigation.
9.2.5 Miscellaneous Problems
During the countdown period, the Goddard central processors faulted

six times within approximately 40 minutes. Hardware problems were dis-
covered in the A-system. A software problem associated with a collective
message header was also found, but the procedure was changed to eliminate
use of this message header. The computers were returned to service be-
fore launch.
During the countdown period, computer faults occurred at the Texas,

Hawaii, and Carnarvon stations. A fault aiso occurred at the Canary
Island station when the Mission Control Center transmitted a load (GMTLO)
after loss-of-signal at Canary Island. Canary Island was trying to trans-
mit a low-speed summary message at that time. In addition, during re-
ceipt of the GMTLO load, the Mission Control Center executed an S-IVB
history request, and both computers started cycling (went into a loop).
The problems are under investigation.
I
9-16
At approximately 00:18:00, a fuse was blown in the B master instru-

mentation timing equipment. One computer had to be restarted and two
computers had to be switched.
9-17
9.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS

i0-I
i0.0 EXPERIMENTS

j-
ll-1
ii.0 CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the mission data has resulted in the following con-
clusions:
i. The overall performance of the lunar module was good, and based
on the results of the LM-I flight, the lunar module is acceptable for
manned orbital flight.
2. All system operations and vehicle dynamics associated with the

abort staging sequence were satisfactory for manned operation.
3. The start, steady-state, throttling, and shutdown character-

istics of the descent propulsion system were satisfactory for the
engine firings that were performed.
4. The thermal aspects of supercritical helium pressurization sys-

tem could not be adequately evaluated due to the short duration of the
three descent engine firings.
5. The ascent propulsion system exhibited operational character-

istics similar to those noted during ground testing, and the overall
performance of the system was satisfactory.
6. The temperature limits on the control engine clusters were ex-

ceeded with no detrimental effects on system operation.
7. The excessive use of reaction control propellants was caused by

the failure to update the guidance co_uter to reflect the staged-
vehicle mass constants. As a result of the high usage, reaction control
propellants were depleted. Continued operation was outside the design
limits and precipitated three failures.
8. The premature shutdown of the first descent engine firing de-

monstrated a lack of complete systems coordination.
9. Loads experienced during the mission were within design limits

of the structure.
i0. The vibration analysis indicated that the lunar module can sat-
isfactorily withstand vibrations which are expected during launch on a
Saturn V.
ii. The guidance and control systems operated as designed, proving

their capability for withstanding the launch and space environments. The
digital autopilot capability for attitude and +X translation control was
adequately demonstrated. The stabilization and control system maintained
11-2
proper rate control through the descent and ascent engine firings and
the abort staging sequence.
12. The water/glycol coolant system maintained equipment at proper

temperature levels. The coolant system temperature was controlled by
the sublimator, verifying its startup capability and heat rejection
capacity.
- 12-1
12.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY
Analyses of the Apollo 5 mission results have disclosed seven

anomalies and several instrumentation failures. Of the seven anomalies,
one occurred during the countdown, and six during the mission. The
anomalies are discussed in the following sections.
An additional problem was previously reported as an anomaly: The

pressures in the ascent and descent propellant tanks decreased from the
time of prepressurization at the launch site (ii0 hours prior to launch)
to the time of final pressurization in flight (4 hours after launch).
The ascent oxidizer tank pressure showed the largest decay. The pressure
decay was initially believed to be the result of an oxidizer leak. How-
ever, subsequent analyses have shown that all of the pressure decays can
be attributed to helium absorption into the liquid propellants.
12.1 ERRATIC FREON COOLING DURING COUNTDOWN
Statement- Coolant temperatures, which were controlled with the

freon supply ground support equipment, were erratic during the countdown.
Discussion - The water/glycol coolant of the heat transport system

of the lunar module (LM) was cooled prior to launch by two freon boilers
in the environmental control system. The freon was supplied to the
boilers from two freon bottle racks, which were part of the ground sup-
port equipment.
Shortly after freon flow was increased to begin the chilldown of

the heat transport system, the freon delivery pressure to the LM dropped,
and the heat transport system coolant temperature began to increase, in-
dicating loss of freon cooling. Consequently, a hold was called at
T minus 2.5 hours, and rack i was manually shut off. Satisfactory con-
ditions were established with rack 2, and the count was resumed at
T minus 2.5 hours (about 3:15 p.m.).
At approximately T minus 50 minutes (at which time rack i showed a

weight loss equivalent to two bottles of freon), coolant temperatures
again increased. Attempts to increase flow rate by further opening the
freon flow control valve failed to produce any cooling. By lowering the
freon flow rate, the erratic operation of the system ceased but at a
higher vehicle coolant temperature. Tihe LM coolant temperature upper
limits for launch were changed, and the temperature was maintained with-
in the prescribed limits.
12-2
Examination of the freon racks the morning following launch revealed

the following:
a. All bottles in rack 2 were about one-half full.
b. Two bottles in rack i were empty, even though rack i was shut
off at T minus 2.5 hours. All other bottles in rack i were full.
c. The standpipes in two of the full bottles in rack i had dropped

out of the cap block and were resting on the bottom of the bottle.
The temperature problem encountered at T minus 3.5 hours can be ex-

plained by item c. With the standpipe unattached, a direct nitrogen
flow path into the freon manifold was opened. When the nitrogen pres-
sure was increased to begin h_gh freon flow to the vehicle, sufficient
nitrogen mixed with the freon to degrade heat absorption in the freon
boilers.
The two empty bottles in rack i may have inadvertently been left
open when the rack was isolated during the hold at T minus 2.5 hours.
If this was the case, at the time these two bottles emptied, a nitrogen
flow path was opened; the freon was again mixed with nitrogen, resulting
in coolant temperature fluctuations.
Conclusion - The analysis has shown that the reduced cooling capacity
by the freon supply was caused by nitrogen pressurization gas mixing with
the freon. Two factors contributed to the gas mixing: broken standpipes
in two of freon bottles, and depletion of freon in two other bottles.
Freon ground support equipment for prelaunch cooling is not to be

used for manned lunar modules.
12.2 PREMATURE SHUTDOWN OF FIRST DESCENT ENGINE BURN
Statement - The first descent propulsion maneuver, which was con-

trolled by the primary guidance, navigation, and control system, was
scheduled to last approximately 38 seconds. The primary guidance system
commanded the "engine on" as planned at 03:41:139, but 4.17 seconds later,
the guidance system issued an "engine off" discrete with an accompanying
alarm, indicating that the thrust/time criteria programmed in the LM
guidance computer were not met.
Discussion - At the time of "engine on" minus 30 seconds, the guid-

ance system started recording sensed velocity changes from the inertial
measurement unit pulse-integrating pendulous accelerometers. The de-
scent engine thrust monitor was progr_l_ed to turn off the engine if any
.... 12-3
three consecutive 2-second accelerometer samples taken after cormmanded

"engine on" indicated an accumulated velocity of less than 45 cm/sec
each. Because of phasing established at "engine on" minus 30 seconds,
the first accelerometer sample utilized by the thrust monitor was taken
within 0.01 second after commanded "engine on" and therefore represented
only velocity accumulation due to the control engine +X translation. The
+X translation ended 0.5 second after commanded "engine on"_ therefore,
the second sample, taken at "engine on" plus 2 seconds, represented a
combination of velocity accrued from the control engines and from the
start of the descent engine firing. The third sample, taken at "engine
on" plus 4 seconds, was the first that represented descent engine ve-
locity accumulation only. Because none of the three samples met the
45 cm/sec minimum criteria prograrmmed in the guidance computer, the en-
gine was commanded off.
The helium which was used to pressurize the propellant tanks after
activation was stored supercritically in a cryogenic storage vessel. The
vessel was isolated by the three explosive valves which were fired auto-
matically by the pyrotechnic system 1.3 ± 0.3 seconds after the "engine
on" command was given. Therefore, the firing was begun with less than
normal propellant tank pressures, causing a slower thrust buildup.
Conclusion - All data indicate that the guidance system and the
descent engine functioned as designed. The slower than normal thrust
buildup, caused by the start at less than full tank pressure, resulted
in failure of the engine to meet the thrust/time criteria programmed in
the guidance computer.
All logic and circuits that could issue any engine cutoff or
inhibit any engine start will be evaluated to determine which should be
eliminated or altered and which should be retained within the software.
12.3 ABRUPT CHANGE IN CABIN PRESSURE LEAK RATE
Statement - At 03:27:00, the equivalent cabin pressure leak area

abruptly increased from 0.0014 to 0.0044 square inch. After 71 minutes,
the leak area decreased to approximately 0.0026 square inch.
Discussion - The characteristics of the cabin pressure decay from

cabin seal-off until 03:27:00 indicated that a constant leak area ex-
isted during this period. At 03:27:00, the leak area abruptly changed.
Zalculations show that the change in rate was equivalent to a change in
_rea from 0.0014 to 0.0044 square inch. The leak area then decreased
[i minutes later to a value equivalent to about 0.0026 square inch and
remained constant to the end of the mission.
12-4
Conclusion - At the time the leak area first changed, the vehicle
was in a quiescent state, and the available data provide no indication
as to the cause of the change.
The minimum cabin pressure requirement was maintained to the end

of the mission.
12.4 OUT-OF-PHASE INDICATION FROM DESCENT ENGINE
PROPELLANT SHUTOFF VALVES
Statement - During the transition from 10-percent throttle to full

throttle on the second and third descent engine firings, an out-of-phase
indication was received from one of the two pairs of actuators which
control the eight propellant shutoff valves. The indication remained
until the end of both firings.
Discussion - There were four shutoff valve actuators (A, B, C, and

D), each of which controlled a fuel and an oxidizer shutoff valve. The
actuators were instrumented in two pairs, so that an indication was re-
ceived if actuators A and B or C and D were not in the same position
(open or closed). During the transition from 10-percent throttle to full
throttle on the second and third descent engine firings, the signal re-
ceived indicated that either A or B had closed. The indication slightly
lagged an inflection point in the pressure/time curves for oxidizer and
fuel injection pressures and chamber pressure. In addition, almost sim-
ultaneously, pressure rises were noted in the oxidizer and fuel engine-
inlet pressures. The phenomenon was nearly identical on both firings.
Conclusion - At present, no conclusions can be drawn as to whether

there is any connection between the pressure transients and the valve
out-of-phase indication. Ground tests will be made in an effort to de-
termine the cause of this anomaly.
12.5 ABRUPT CHANGES IN RECEIVED UHF SIGNAL STRENGTH
Statement - Abrupt changes were detected in received UHF signal

strength in the spacecraft throughout the Apollo 5 mission.
Discussion - Abrupt changes in spacecraft-received UHF signal

strength of about 30 to 40 dB in the command-link data were detected
throughout the Apollo 5 mission. Corresponding changes did not occur
in the ground-received signal strength from the VHF data transmitters,
which shared the same two antennas through a diplexer. The abrupt
.... 12-5
changes in received power frequently caused the received command signal

power to be below the message acceptance threshold. Consequently, com-
mand transmission had to be delayed or repeated.
Conclusion - The results of the data analysis isolate the fault of

the intermittent operation to the flight hardware. Specifically, the
fault can be isolated either to the RF stage of the digital command
assembly or to the coaxial cable assembly connecting the diplexer and
the digital command assembly.
12.6 EXCESSIVE CONTROL ENGINE PROPELLANT USAGE
Statement - Abnormally high thruster activity and excessive control

engine propellant usage began immediately after primary guidance was se-
lected by command at 06:14:03.
Discussion - Since staging occurred with the vehicle in the backup

guidance mode, the digital autopilot, which is part of the primary guid-
ance system, did not sense vehicle mass change that occurred at staging.
Consequently, when guidance was returned to the primary mode_ thruster
i "on" time for attitude corrections was calculated by the autopilot using
incorrect inertia constants. The result was rapid oscillations of the
vehicle about all axes as the guidance system overcontrolled in an at-
tempt to keep attitudes within the deadband limits. Control propellant
usage increased to an unacceptable rate, and ground controllers isolated
the A system with 30-percent propellants remaining. The propellants in
B system were depleted within 5 minutes, which precipitated the following
four undesirable secondary effects.
12.6.1 Discrepant Manifold Pressure Indications
Statement - Following the propellant depletion in B system, the oxi-

dizer manifold pressure decreased from 180 psia to 50 psia with no appar-
ent decrease in the fuel pressure.
Discussion - Based on serviced quantities of the propellants in

B system and normal mixture ratios during thrusting, the fuel should have
been depleted first. Data showed that the fuel manifold pressure did,
in fact, begin to decay first, but very rapidly increased again. Because
it happened so rapidly, it was not evident until data were available for
the precise time of incidence.
12-6
An oxidizer manifold pressure of 50 psia was indicated after oxidizer

depletion in the B system. At the existing temperature, 50 psia was the
vapor pressure of the oxidizer; therefore, a two-phase oxidizer condition
was present in the manifold. Because of the low duty cycling of the
control engines during this time interval, sufficient liquid remained in
the manifold to sustain the 50-psia pressure until the A system was
turned on and the crossfeed opened.
Conclusion - The fuel depleted first and the fuel bladder collapsed.
Fuel depletion was obscured by the effects of bladder leakage and the
manifold pressure sensor sensing helium pressure.
12.6.2 Inadvertent Closure of Oxidizer Shutoff Valve
Statement - When the control system crossfeed was opened, the A

system oxidizer manifold pressure decreased and the B system pressure
increased.
Discussion - Subsequent to B system propellant depletion, the A

system main valves were co_mmanded open. The crossfeed valves between
the A and B systems were then opened, and the A system oxidizer manifold
pressure immediately decreased to 90 psia and B system pressure increased
to 90 psia. The oxidizer manifold pressure varied between 50 and 115 psia
dependent on the engine duty cycle.
An unlatched valve moved to a null position would not be positively

locked open or closed. This type condition would essentially isolate the
tank but still allow some leakage into the manifold, which would explain
why the manifold pressure varied from 50 psia (the vapor pressure) and
115 psia, depending on the thruster duty cycle.
Conclusion - The abnormal oxidizer line pressures have been attrib-

uted to an inadvertent unlatching of the A system oxidizer shutoff valve
from the open position. A test is planned to determine the effects of
valve operation with the pressure and temperature conditions found at
the shutoff valve during the Apollo 5 mission.
12.6.3 Thrust Chamber Failure
Statement - Over Carnarvon during the fifth revolution, vehicle

rates about the pitch and roll axes _d the lack of detectable chamber
pressure indicated a failure of the 4-up engine.
_- 12-7
Discussion - The up-firing engine iY. cluster 4 was last observed to

be operating over Ascension during the fifth revolution. Groumd tests
have been conducted with manifold pressure conditions similar to those
which existed in the B system between Ascension and Carnarvon (pressures
less than i00 psia with a gas/liquid state); in some of the ground tests,
explosive mixtures were produced within _he engine chambers.
Conclusion - The 4-up engine chamber apparently ruptured during the

fifth revolution.
12.6.4 High Cluster Temperatures
Statement - Temperatures on clusters i and 3 exceeded the 190 ° F

upper red-line limit.
Discussion - The temperature increases om clusters i and 3 occurred

when the heat from the engines experiencing high duty cycle was conducted
back to the clusters. The temperatures exceeded the upper instrumentation
limit of 200 ° F. Because the cluster temperatures sensors were installed
near the down-firing engines, these measurements were sensitive to the
activity of those engines and not of the clusters in general. Clusters 2
and 4 were cooler because the down-firing engines in these clusters were
A system engines, which were isolated shortly before the main valves were
closed. This allowed the injectors to be cooled somewhat from subsequent
valve actuations as the residual propellants _n the lines were vented.
Cluster i temperature, the highest of the four, probably reached at least
230 ° F. However, no degradation in engine performance was evident.
Conclusion - The high cluster temperatures are not considered an

anomaly since they were caused by the increased control engine activity
and would be expected to be high under tlhese circumstances.
12.7 FAILURE OF DESCENT STAGE FIBERGLASS
THERMAL SHIELD
Statement - Two temperature sensors on the upper surface of the

descent stage facing the fiberglass covering the upper surface of the
descent stage showed abrupt temperatures rises at abort staging.
Discussion - The temperature measured by GB0401T, located on the

+Z deck, increased from 75 ° to 200 ° F in 0.i second at staging. The
temperature then dropped to 140 ° F in 0.i second. The temperature
measured by GB 0402T rose from 60 ° to ii0 ° F in 0.i second. The
12-8
temperature measured by GB0403T remained at 68 ° F throughout this period.

These three sensors were attached to the outboard face of the tank bay
upper aluminum decks facing the fiberglass cover. The fast temperature
response recorded by sensors GB0401T and GBOL02T was indicative of ascent
engine exhaust gas impingement on the sensors. The fiberglass shield
was 0.080-inch thick at the center and reduced to 0.050 around the
periphery of the shield.
Conclusion - One possible explanation for the abrupt rise in these

temperatures would be for a break or opening to exist in the fiberglass
shield. A further investigation of this anomaly is in progress at the
time of report publication.
12.8 INSTRUMENTATION DISCREPANCIES
12.8.1 Adapter Panel Deployment
Statement - No adapter panel deployment indication was received

from the event monitor.
Discussion - The adapter panel deployment event was transmitted

through the Saturn instrument unit with other adapter data. Indications
were received from the relays which fire the pyrotechnics to separate
the four panels. However, no indication was received from the four
series-connected limit switches which monitor the physical deployment.
The instrumentation was checked several times at the launch site and
operated satisfactorily. The panel deploy indication instrumentation
was flown for the first time on this flight, ri_e system is not used on
manned flights.
Other measurements show that the spacecraft separated from the

S-IVB stage without any abnormal disturbances, indicating that the panels
were, in fact, deployed.
Conclusion - A number of causes could explain the lack of deploy

indication; no exact cause can be isolated.
12.8.2 Separation Distance Monitors
Statement - The four separation distance monitors did not function

during abort staging.
12-9
Discussion - The separation distance sensors mounted on the ascent

stage, measured up to 4 feet of distance between the ascent and descent
stages.
Conclusion - A number of factors could explain the lack of separa-

tion distance indication; no cause can be isolated.
12.8.3 Pressure and Temperature Sensors
Statement - During the abort staging sequence_ one of the two de-
scent engine blast deflector temperature measurements and four of the
seven ascent stage bottom surface temperature measurements failed. This
is discussed in further detail in section 6.2. Six interstage pressure
measurements did not show any detectable pressure increase.
Discussion - All five thermocouples were spot-welded to the skins.

This method of attachment, required for high thermal response, makes the
thermocoupies susceptible to detachment caused by vibration, panel flex-
ure, temperature conditions, or accidental jarring of the thermocouple
wires.
Six of the 26 interstage pressure measurements showed no detectable

increase in pressure at staging. Five of the six had been monitored on
telemetry during the launch phase, and all five showed proper response
to the change in static pressure. There were no components common to
the six measurements.
Conclusion - A number of causes could explain the lack of pressure

and temperature indications; however, no exact cause can be isolated.
12.8.4 Vibration Measurement
Statement - The rendezvous radar anterma vibration measurement lo-

cated on structure adjacent to the rendezvous radar antenna operated
intermittently during engine firings.
Conclusion - The characteristics of the data indicate an intermit-

tent failure in the transducer signal wires.
x_
13-1
13.0 VEHICLE AND SYST_S DESCRIPTION
The space vehicle (fig. 13,0-1) for the Apollo 5 mission consisted
of an Apollo lunar module (LM-I), a spacecraft/lunar module adapter
(SLA 7)_ a nose cone, and a Saturn S-IB launch vehicle (AS-204). The
combined space vehicle was approximately 181 feet long.
F
13-2
NASA-S-68- 2062
1
Nose cone
135
t _ Spacecraft
Adapter 471
t
Instrument
unit
36 Space
S-11ZB vehicle
701 2172
Launch
vehicle
, [] 1701
S-IB
964
All dimensions are in inches
Figure 13.0-1.- Apollo 5 space vehicle'

_ 13-3
13.1 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES
f
13-4
13.2 LUNAR MODULE
The lunar module (LM) is designed to land two men on the lunar sur-
face and return them to a lunar orbit where the LM will rendezvous and
dock with the command and service modules. The _ is composed of the
ascent stage and the descent stage (figs. 13.2-1 and 13.2-2). The first
flight configuration lunar module (LM-I) was flown on the Apollo 5 mis-
sion. _-i was significantly different from subsequent lunar modules.
Many of the differences resulted from the Apollo 5 mission being an un-
manned flight. The following systems were aboard the LM-I and were op-
erational for this mission:
a. Environmental control (partial)
b. Electrical power
c. Reaction control
d. Ascent propulsion
e. Conmlunications
f. Operational instrumentation
g. Development flight instrumentation
h. Primary guidance, navigation, and control
i. Stabilization and control
j. Pyrotechnics
k. Controls and displays (partial)
i. Descent propulsion
The following significant equipment was added to II_-i for the

Apollo 5 mission:
a. LMmission programmer
b. Development flight instrumentation telemetry
c. C-band transponder
13-5
d. Two freon boilers
e. Scimitar antenna
The following were inoperative on _-i:
a. Oxygen supply and cabin pressure control section of the environ-

mental control system
b. Atmosphere revitalization section of the environmental control

system
c. Secondary coolant loop of the heat transport section
d. VHF inflight antennas
e. S-band steerable antenna
f, Rendezvous radar antenna
g. Landing radar antenna
-- h. S-band omnidirectional antenna (+Z axis only)
i. Selected cabin displays
j. Alignment optical telescope.
The following equipment was deleted from LM-I:
a. Landing point designator
b. VHF transceivers
c. Landing gear
d. Crew provisions
e. Tracking lights
o
f. Abort guidance system
g. Rendezvous radar electronics
h. Landing radar electronics
i. Two attitude controller assen_lies

13-6
j. Two thrust translation controller assemblies
k. Descent stage oxygen -tank
I. Windows (replaced with aluminum plates).
The significant differences listed in the previous paragraphs are

discussed in more detail under the applicable system description in this
section.
13.2.1 Structures
The mass properties of LM--I at earth launch and at separation of

the ascent and descent stages are listed in section 13.5. The overall
D4 dimensions are shown in figure 13.2-3.
Ascent stage.- The ascent stage structure (figs. ].3.2-4 through

13.2.6) consisted of a crew compartment, midsection, aft equipment bay,
tanks, and equipment mountings. The primary and secondary structures
did not include changes for weight reduction but otherwise was identical
to the basic LM design.
Crew compartment: The crew compartment structural shell was cylin-

drical and of semimonocoque construction, composed of aluminum alloy
chem-milled skins and machined longerons. The shell was supported by
formed Z sheet metal rings riw_ted to the structural skin, forming a
structure 92 inches in diameter.
The front face assembly (fig. 13.2-4) incorporated openings in the

structure for two triangular windows and the egress/ingress hatch. The
LM-I windows were replaced with aluminum plates. Two structural beams
extending up the forward side of the front face assembly supported the
structural loads applied to the cabin and were attached to additional
beam structure extending across the top of the cylindrical crew compart-
ment.
Midsection: The midsection structure consisted of a ring-stiffened

semimonocoque shell of construction similar to that of the crew compart-
ment.
The lower deck of the midsection at station +X233.500 provided the

structural support for the ascent engine. The upper deck at station
+X294.643 provided the structural support for the docking tunnel and
docking hatch.
The ascent engine propellant storage tanks were attached to the

+Z27 and -Z27 bulkheads.
- 13-7
Two canted beam assemblies secured to the bottom of the lower deck
and to the +Z27 and -Z27 bulkheads formed the ascent engine compartment.
The engine support members were bolted to the lower deck.
Aft equipment bay: The main supporting structure of the aft equip-
ment bay (fig. 13.2-6) consisted of tubular truss members fastened to
the -Z27 bulkhead. The vertical box beams of the equipment rack assembly
contained integral coldplates for cooling electronic equipment.
Thermal shield support: The aluminized Mylar thermal blankets,

" formed into various sizes and shapes, were secured to standoffs on the
outer surface of the structure. In the midsection and aft equipment bay
areas where the thermal shield could not be attached directly to the pri-
mary structure, an aluminum tubular framework was installed. The thermal
shield was attached to this framework by standoffs similar to those in
the crew compartment.
The base heat shield protected the entire bottom of the ascent stage
from the staging pressures and temperatures.
Descent sta_e.- The descent stage primary structure (figs. 13.2-7

and 13.2-8) was constructed of alumin_n alloy, chem-milled webs, extruded
and milled stiffeners, and capstrips. The main structures consisted of
two pairs of parallel beams arranged in a cruciform, with structural
upper and lower decks. The ends of the beams were closed off by bulk-
heads. The outrigger truss assemblies, consisting of aluminum alloy tub-
ing, were attached at the ends of each pair of beams.
The five compartments formed by the descent stage main beam assem-
blies housed the major components of the descent propulsion system. The
center compartment housed the descent engine, and compartments in the
X and Y beam housed the oxidizer and the fuel tanks, respectively.
13.2.2 Thermal Control
Thermal control was provided by a passive system consisting of pro-

pellants, structures, insulation, and _hermal control coatings. Thermal
control of the electronic equipment was provided by coldplates, which
were part of the environmental control system.
The large thermal mass of the propellants and structures was en-
closed by multilayer radiation superinsulation to reduce the heat loss
to the space environment. This superinsulation was basically a composite
of 25 layers of 0.15-mil aluminized Mylar sheets encapsulated with 0.5-
mil aluminized Kapton (H-film) sheets. A maximum of up to thirteen
layers of 0.5-mil aluminized Kapton was added to the 25-1ayer superinsu-
lation depending on the applicable heating rates in areas exposed to
13-8
impingement by the control engine plume. Thermal shielding was located

outboard from the insulation on both stages and provided protection from
micrometeoroids and additional protection from control engine plume
impingement.
The ascent stage thermal shielding consisted of aluminum panels

varying in thickness from 0.004 to 0.032 inch, depending on the calcu-
lated local heating rates for impingement. The descent stage thermal
shielding consisted of localized panels made up of alternate layers of
nickel foil and Inconel mesh (separator) and an outer sheet of 1.25-mii
Inconel all external to the basic 25 layer blanket and 0.5-mil aluminized
Kapton layers. These panels provided a high-temperature radiative bar-
rier, whereas the alumin_a panels on the ascent stage absorbed the heat
for maximum engine firing conditions. Thermal control coatings were
painted on the exterior of the thermal shielding and on externally ex-
posed structure to maintain w_hicle temperatures.
Thermal protection was also provided on the exterior bottom side

of the ascent stage and the upper exterior surface of the descent stage
for protection from ascent engine firing during stage separation. This
protection consisted of the 25-1ayer radiation superinsulation and sev-
eral outboard layers of 0.5-mil aluminized Kapton plus one outer layer
of 5-mil aluminized Kapton.
The base heat shield thermally insulated the bottom of the descent
stage from engine plume radiation. This insulation was a composite of
alternate layers of nickel foil and Fiberfrax.
13.2.3 Pyrotechnics
The components of the pyrotechnic system and their locations are

shown in figure 13.2-9. The two independent systems, A and B, were
mutually redundant. Each system consisted of the following:
a. Four explosive bolts and four explosive nuts to separate the

ascent from the descent stage
b. Three circuit interrupters for deadfacing electrical circuits

prior to staging
c. An umbilical guillotine for severing the ascent/descent stage

umbilical
d. Thirteen fully redundant pyrotechnic valves for pressurizing

the ascent, descent, and reaction control propellants. The control power
for the A system was from the Commander's bus and the B system was con-
nected to System Engineer's bus. Firing power for the pyrotechnic de-
vices was supplied by a separate pyrotechnic battery for each system.
z- 13-9
13.2.4 Electrical Power
The electrical power system consisted of the following units:
a. Four silver-zinc primary descent batteries (400 amp-hr, 28 V dc)
b. Two silver-zinc primary ascent batteries (300 amp-hr, 28 V dc)
c. Two descent electrical control assemblies
d. Two ascent electrical control assemblies
e. Relay junction box ,
f. Deadface relay
g. Control panel
h. Two circuit breaker panels
i. Two 115 V, 400 Hz inverters, 350 V-amps.
_-- The basic ac power distribution system is shown in figure 13.2-10.

The basic dc power distribution system is shown in figure 13.2-11.
Descent batteries.- Four descent bs_teries supplied power to the

LM dc buses. The initially high voltage characteristics of a fully
charged battery required a tap at the o_put of 17 cells and a tap at
the output of 20 cells to maintain the bus voltage within specification
limits, depending on the discharge state of the batteries. Each LM-I
descent battery was pre-discharged 50 a_p-hr in order to utilize the
high voltage tap without the danger of excessive voltages.
Ascent batteries.- Two ascent batteries supplied power to the dc

buses, after they were sequenced ON at staging.
Descent electrical control assembly.- The two descent electrical

control assemblies provided electrical protection and control of descent
batteries. A cmrrent-sensing system within the control assemblies would
have automatically disconnected a descent battery in the event of an over-
current between 200 and 2000 amperes. An indication of reverse current
between 6 and i0 amperes also would have been provided by the current
sensing devices through pulse code modulation data.
Control circuits within the electrical control assembly normally

would provide a selection of either the 20-cell or 17-cell taps of each
descent battery to the distribution system. For LM-I both the high and
13-10
low voltage-select contacts were tied together and connected to only the
high-voltage battery tap. Instrumentation for measuring battery current
and voltages was included in the descent electrical control assemblies.
Ascent electrical control assembly.- Two ascent electrical control

assemblies provided electrical protection and control of each ascent
battery identical to those described for the descent electrical control
assemblies. In addition, two contactors allowed selection of each bat-
tery to feed either or both of the dc buses. With the batteries selected
in the normal position (see control assemblies 3 and 4 on figure 13.2-11)
overcurrent protection would be provided. In figure 13.2-11, battery 5
is shown commanded to the backup position.
Relay junction box.- External/internal power control was located

within the relay junction box. This junction box (in conjunction with
the deadface relay) deadfaced the main power cables between the ascent
and descent stages, as shown in figure 13.2-11.
The launch umbilical tower latching relay, which was controlled

from the ground support equipnent, connected ground power to the LM elec-
trical loads when the lunar module batteries were not in use.
DC buses.- The two dc buses (Commander's and Systems Engineer's) r

were connected electrically by the crosstie wire system, through the
crosstie circuit breakers (fig. 13.2-11). The five circuit breakers
which were slugged, are as follows:
4CB17
4CB18
Battery feed tie
4CB25
4CB26
4CB179 LMmission programmer
AC power.- The 400-Hz 117 V ac power was supplied from one of two
solid-state inverters (fig. 13.2-10). Both inverters were supplied with
dc power through the mission programmer from the Commander's bus.
13.2.5 Instrumentation
Operational instrumentation.- The operational instrumentation system

(fig. 13.2-12) consisted of sensors, a signal conditioning electronics
assembly, a caution and warning electronics assembly, and a pulse code
modulation and timing electronics assembly.
f-
13-11
Electrical output signals from some instrumentation sensors were

conditioned to the proper voltage and impedance levels within the signal
conditioning electronics assembly. Other signals which were precondi-
tioned and were not processed by the signal conditioning electronics
assembly, together with event information in the form of bi-level inputs,
were routed to the pulse code modulation and timing electronics assembly.
Signals from critical parameters were also routed to the logic elements
of the caution and warning electronics assembly, which in turn controlled
displays and warning lights.
The pulse code modulation and timing electronics assembly sampled

the incoming analog and bi-level information according to a pre-programmed
matrix. The individual sampling rates were determined by the frequency
response of the parameter being measured and intelligence desired. The
analog to digital converter translated the signal voltages into eight-
bit words which gave a resolution of one part in 254. Bi-level inputs
such as an "on" and an "off" event were converted to a bit state (one or
zero) in the digital multiplexer section of the pulse code modulation
and timing electronics assembly. Eight, events can be represented in an
eight-bit word.
Each frame contained 128 eight-bit words and 50 frames of pulse code
- modulation data were transmitted per second. Synchronization and timing
signals to other spacecraft systems and a serial time code for mission
elapsed time was also generated within the pulse code modulation and
timing electronics assembly.
The words representing the converted analog signals, event functions,

and time were stored in the output registers and were read-out serially
into the bit stream. This bit stream modulated both S-band and VHF telem-
etry transmitters providing the measurement link to the ground stations.
The design of the LM-I operational instrumentation was similar to

the design of the system for the manned vehicles. If the caution and
warning assembly monitoring the control engines sensed an electrically
failed "on," the system would have automatically isolated propellants
going to the failed control engine and a second control engine which ob-
tained its propellants from the same propellant lines. On a manned ve-
hicle, the caution and warning system would merely illuminate a light in
the cabin and the flight crew would be required to take corrective action.
The caution and warning system also provided discrete status information
for failures within the control electronics system. The data storage
electronics assembly (voice recorder) was not installed on LM-I.
Development flight instrumentation.- The development flight instru-

mentation supplemented the operational instrumentation in certain areas
for validating systems design. The basic components and their operational
13-12
relationships are shown in figures 13.2-13, 13.2-14, and 13.2-15. A

list of all measurements is contained in table 13.2-1.
Six development flight instrumentation measurements were commutated

into the operational pulse code modulation system. Eight operational
measurements were transmitted both by the FM/Z'_ link and the operational
pulse code modulation.
Three mission measurement periods existed: from lift-off to LM/

S-IVB separation, from LM/S-IVB separation to ascent/descent stage sepa-
ration, and from stage separation to end of mission. A different set of
measurements was activated during these periods by means of automatic
inflight switching.
The FM composite outputs from modulation packages were routed to

10-watt VHF FM transmitters as shown. A fifth VHF transmitter was used
to transmit the operational pulse code modulation signals simultaneously
with pulse code modulation signals on S-band. The RF transmitter outputs
were routed to the UHF/VHF scimitar antenna (fig. 13.2-14). Launch phase
measurement signals were transmitted through two scimitar antennas
mounted on the adapter. At LM/S-IVB stage separation, the signals were
switched to the LM-mounted scimitar antennas.
Two parallel C-band transponders allowed real-time measurements of

vehicle azimuth, elevation, and slant range to be made by ground radar
stations. A dual pulse-code interrogation signal (5690 MHz) from ground
radar triggered a single-pulse reply (5765 MHz) from the 500-watt trans-
ponder. Each transponder drove two cavity-backed helix antennas through
a power divider. The interrogation signal was also received by these
antennas and was isolated from the transmitter by means of a ferromagnetic
diplexer located within the transponder.
13.2.6 Cormmunications
Radio frequency communications were provided between LM-I and the

Manned Space Flight Network by the LM communication system, the develop-
ment flight instrumentation, and the DHF command receiver system.
The development flight instrumentation, described in section 13.2.5,

consisted of instrumentation equipment, VHF transmission equipment, and
C-band tracking equipment. This system provided prime tracking data and
the flight qualification data required for lunar mission preparation.
The UHF command system received signals in a modulated serial digital

format for ground control of selected systems. The receiver, or digital
command assembly, was part of the lunar module mission programmer and
is described in section 13.2.7.
r
13-13
The cormmunications system included all S-band and signal processing

equipment necessary to verify compatibility with the network stations
with respect to tracking and ranging data, RF uplink (with simulated up-
voice and up-data), and the transmission of PCM data.
Tracking and ranging.- The S-band transponder, providing a ranging

and tracking backup to the C-band system, received coded pseudo-random-
noise signals from the network stations in the selected phase-locked-loop
receiver. These signals were routed to the selected pulse modulation
transmitter for in-phase-coherence retransmission back to the stations.
The retransmitted signal received by the stations was compared with the
originally transmitted signal, and range was determined by the time re-
quired for the signal to travel from the stations to the lunar module and
return. Once the range had been established accurately by the pseudo-
random-noise code, the code was discontinued and the range was updated
continually by a technique employing the Doppler frequency shift caused
by lunar module velocity rates. The phase-locked-loop in the lunar mod-
ule receiver insured the accuracy of the Doppler tracking signal by com-
paring the phase of the received signal with the phase of a local oscil-
lator and then altering the local oscillator frequency to bring it in
phase with the received signal.
-- RF uplinks.- The S-band up-voice function was simulated by modula-

ting the 30-kHz subcarrier with a l-kHz tone. The uplink data function,
planned for use on LM-4 and subsequent vehicles, was simulated by an un-
modulated 70-kHz subcarrier. The uplimk signals were transmitted by the
network stations to the lunar module, turned around in the ranging chan-
nel, and modulated onto the downlink S-band carrier transmitted from the
lunar module to the station.
Pulse code modulation data.- Operational pulse code modulation te-

lemetry data were transmitted to the network stations through both the
S-band and development flight instrumentation communications, with the
development flight instrumentation being the prime mode (see sec-
tion 13.2.5).
Ma_or component functional description.- The following communica-

tions equipment is shown in figure 13.12-16:
a. RF electronic equipment (S-band transponder and power amplifier)
b. Signal processing equipment
c. Antenna equipment.
The S-band transponder assembly consisted of two identical phase-

locked receivers, two phase modulators with drivers and multiplier chains,
and a frequency modulator. The nominal power output was 0.75 watt. The
13-14
operating frequencies of the S-band equipment were 2282.5 MHz (transmit)

and 2101.8 MHz (receive). A power amplifier increased the S-band trans-
mitted output to 14.8 watts. The amplifier consisted of a primary and
secondary amplitron with associated power supplies and an input and an
output isolator.
The circuit breaker for the primary power amplifier power supply re-
mained open during the LM-I mission. This provided a low-power primary
mode and a high-power secondary mode. During the portion of the mission
when the primary mode was selected, the power m_plifier was used in the
feed-through mode, resulting in an insertion loss of 3.2 dB, maximum.
When the secondary system was selected, 28 V dc was supplied to the sec-
ondary power supply. The transmitter output was supplied to the power
amplifier input and was amplified through the secondary power amplifier.
The diplexer, connected directly to the output of the power amplifier,
permitted duplex transmission and reception using one antenna.
Signal processor assembly: The signal processor assembly was the

common acquisition and distribution point for all data received and trans-
mitted by the communications system. The signal processor assembly con-
sisted of an audio center at each flight crew member position and a pre-
modulation processor. The premodulation processor accepted pulse code
modulation data and timing from the instrumentation system and provided
proper signal modulation, mixing, and switching to insure signal proces-
sing in accordance with the selected mode of operation.
The data were routed to a bi-phase-modulator where the phase of the

telemetry subcarrier frequency was controlled. Each logic-level change
of the pulse code modulation data changed the bi-phase-modulator output
by 180 degrees. The bi-phase-modu!ator output was supplied to the mixing
network where it was combined with other signals processed in the pre-
modulation processor.
Two 512-kHz clock signals were provided by the instrumentation sys-

tem to the communication system. The 1.024-MHz telemetry subcarrier was
generated from a 512-kHz square wave (reference signal) from the PCM
section of the pulse code modulation timing electronics assembly. This
512-kHz square wave was routed to a frequency doubler with a 1.024-MHz
sine wave output, phase-referenced to the pulse code modulation non-
return-to-zero data which modulated the 1.024-MHz subcarrier. The bi-
phase-modulator output reflected the change in logic-level by a 180-degree
change in subcarrier phase. The modulated subcarrier was routed through
a 1.024-MHz band-pass filter to the mixing network.
Antenna equipment: The communications system antenna equipment con-

sisted of two S-band inflight antennas_ an S-band steerable antenna, and
two VHF inflight antennas.
f
13-15
The S-band inflight antennas were omnidirectional, one located on

the forward section and one located on the aft section of the LM. The
antennas were right-hand circularly polarized radiators that collectively
covered 90 percent of the sphere with a gain of -3 dB at the nominal
S-band frequencies. The aft inflight antenna was used during the mis-
sion.
The S-band steerable antenna was a 26-inch diameter parabolic re-

flector with a point source feed consisting of a pair of cross-sleeved
dipoles over a ground plane. This antenna was installed but not used
for LM-I.
The VHF inflight antennas were not used on LM-I.
13.2.7 Guidance and Control
The guidance and control system provided attitude control, guidance,

and navigation capabilities for the lunar module. The system consisted
of the following:
a. Primary guidance, navigation, and control system

/--
b. Stabilization and control system
c. Lunar module mission programmer
Two means of spacecraft control were provided (fig. 13.2-17): a

primary guidance and control path, which provided attitude control, and
a backup path, which provided angular rate control. The primary path
used the sensing and computing components of the primary guidance system
with the control electronics section of the stabilization and control
system and the mission programmer, q_he backup control path comprised the
stabilization and control system and the mission programmer. The backup
path was to be used in the event the mission could not be completed using
the primary guidance system. The mission control capability of the back-
up path consisted of fixed sequences of system function commands pre-
stored on tape.
Primary _uidance_ navigation_ _id control system.- The primary guid-

ance system consisted of an inertial system and a computer. When used
in conjunction with certain other systems, the primary guidance system
could perform the following functions:
a. Establish an inertial reference
b. Provide prelaunch alignment of the inertial measurement unit by

._ a computer-controlled gyrocompassing program
13-16
c. Provide a means of calculating position and velocity of the

spacecraft
d. Generate and issue attitude control and thrust commands to main-

tain the spacecraft on a satisfactory trajectory.
The inertial system consisted of the following components:
a. Inertial measurement unit
b. Pulse torque assembly
c. Electronic coupling data unit
d. Power servo assembly
Three pulse-integrating pendulous aecelerometers were mounted on

the stable member along orthogonal axes. Prior to launch, the stable
member was aligned in azimuth by means of a gyrocompassing routine and
in a desired orientation with respect to launch accelerations. The sta-
ble member was fixed with respect to inertial space at launch. During
the mission a change in the spacecraft position about the stable member
was sensed by resolvers mounted on the gimbal axes. These angular meas-
urements (gimbal angles) were transmitted to the guidance computer where
they were compared with the desired spacecraft attitude. Attitude error
signals generated by comparing actual attitude to desired attitude were
transmitted to the attitude and translation control assembly for attitude
corrections. The logic in this assembly determined attitude correction
required by the control engines of the descent engine gimbal assembly as
appropriate for the flight phase. Acceleration of the spacecraft was
sensed by the accelerometers which supplied incremental velocity pulses
to the computer.
The computer was used for primary guidance, navigation, and control
system data processing and computations and performed the following major
functions:
a. Calculated steering signals and generated engine on-off and

throttling commands, descent engine gimballing commands, and control
engine jet commands to control spacecraft attitude and maintain a re-
quired trajectory
b. Positioned the stable member in the inertial measurement unit

to a coordinate system defined by internal computer programs for launch
and maintained this attitude reference during flight
c. Served as a primary guidance failure detection monitor and as

a status and performance monitor for critical systems.
13-17
To accomplish these functions the compiler accepted as major inputs:
a. Inertial measurement unit gimbal _igle increments from the elec-

tronic coupling data unit
b. Velocity increments from the accelerometers
c. Vehicle status from the control electronics system
d. Real-time commands from the digital1 command assembly.
Stabilization and control system.- The stabilization and control

system consisted of the following assemblies of the control electronics
section:
a. Attitude and translation control assembly
b. Descent engine control assembly
c. Rate gyro assembly
d. Gimbal drive actuators
The control electronics section was designed to use the 16 reaction

control engines to control the vehicle about all vehicle axes. The con-
trol electronics section could operate in both the primary guidance
control path and the backup control pe_h. When operating in the primary
guidance path, the control electronics logic implemented the control
signals originating from the guidance comp_er as follows:
a. Converted control engine com_<ands to the required electrical

power to operate the control engine selenoid valves
b. Converted on-off commands to the descent engine gimbal drive

actuator to required electrical power
c. Routed on-off commands to the descent engine
d. Routed throttle co_ands to the descent engine.
The rate gyro assembly measured the spacecraft rates. When operating
in the backup control path, the control electronics section provided
rate damping for vehicle stabilization.
13-18
Mission _rogrsmuner.- The mission programmer executed the functions

normally performed by the flight crew and was composed of the following
components:
a. A program reader assembly which stored a contingency sequence

of commands
b. A digital con_nand assembly that provided the uplink capability

from the ground stations to the guidance computer, the program assembly,
or certain relays in the program coupler assembly
c. The program coupler assembly which provided the interface for

commands from the guidance computer, program reader assembly, digital
command assembly, and the lunar module systems
d. A power distribution assembly that provided the 28 V power dis-

tribution and current protection for the mission programmer components.
The mission programmer provided the following capabilities:
a. Open-loop sequencing of system functions upon command from the

guidance computer or digital command assembly
b. A sequence of commands to lunar module systems by the program

reader assembly upon command from the digital command assembly.
The mission programmer had three modes of operation: primary, back-

up, and ground command. In the primary mode, the lunar module system
functions were controlled by the guidance computer; in the backup mode,
by the program reader assembly; and in the ground command mode, by
digital commands from the gro_Id network stations. The ground command
capability could also be used during the primary mode of operation to
provide the data inputs to the guidance computer to initiate system
functions. The capability to select alternate sequences during the
backup mode was also provided by the ground command capability.
13.2.8 Reaction Control
The reaction control system (fig. 13.2-18) was composed of two

parallel, independent systems, A system and B system. Each system con-
tained identical components with the associated valves and plumbing nec-
essary to deliver and control the propellants to the control engines.
Normally both systems were operated together. The arrangement of the
engines was such that rotational control in all axes was provided when
the systems were isolated.
13-19
All helium pressurization components, propellant tanks, main shut-

off valves, and propellant-servicing quick-disconnect couplings were
arranged into an independent module for each system. Sixteen identical
engine assemblies, arranged in clusters of four, were mounted on four
outriggers equally spaced around the ascent stage.
When a system was activated, squib-actuated isolation valves were

opened and allowed high pressure helium from the helium tank to pres-
surize the propellant tanks. The A system and the B system each con-
tained an oxidizer tank with 206-pound capacity, and a fuel tank with
103-pound capacity. The propellants used were nitrogen tetroxide (oxi-
dizer) and Aerozine 50 (fuel).
Normally open solenoid propellant main valves, located just down-

stream of the propellant tanks in each system, were capable of isolating
the tanks of either system in case of an upstream malfunction or deple-
tion of propellants. These valves were operated in pairs (fuel and oxi-
dizer) for each system by prime commands from the guidance computer,
commands from the mission programmer_, or real-time commands from the
ground.
--4 Normally closed solenoid valves_, in a crossfeed arrangement, allowed

the fuel and oxidizer manifolds of the A system to be interconnected with
the respective manifolds of the B system. In addition, normally closed
valves interconnected the respective fuel and oxidizer manifolds of the
ascent propellant system with the reaction control system propellant
manifolds. These valves normally would be opened to supply the ascent
stage propellants to the reaction control manifolds during ascent engine
firing. The control engine feed lines contained isolation valves which
could isolate the propellants from a malfunctioning control engine.
The 100-pound thrust engines were radiation cooled. The cluster

assembly and the cluster support strips were covered by a thermal shield
to maintain passive temperature control for the propellant lines. Two
redundant resistance wire heaters were attached to each engine to main-
tain engine temperatures within the safe operating range.
13.2.9 Descent Propulsion
The descent propulsion system (fig. 13.2-19) consisted of a liquid-

propellant rocket engine, two fuel tanks, two oxidizer tanks, and the
associated propellant pressurization and feed components. The engine was
throttleable between thrust levels of 1050 and i0 500 pounds. The engine
was mounted in the center compartment of the descent stage through a gim-
bal ring arrangement which allowed gimballing within ±6 degrees to pro--
vide trim in pitch and roll.
13-20
The propellant tanks were pressurized by helium stored supercriti-

cally in a cryogenic vessel. Squib valves isolated the supercritical
helium supply until the initial _ engine start. After activation of the
valves, the supercritical helium passed through the first loop of a two-
pass fuel/helium heat exchanger located in the engine fuel feed line.
The warmed helium was routed back through a heat exchanger inside the
cryogenic vessel where heat was transferred to the supercritical helium
remaining in the vessel, thereby maintaining the pressure. The helium
was then routed through the second loop of the fuel/helium heat exchanger
before passing to a regulator which reduced the pressure to a suitable
level, approximately 235 psi, for introducing into the tanks.
A second squib valve was fired 1.3 seconds after engine start. This
delay provided time for the fuel to circulate through the heat exchangers
and prevent fuel freezing by establishing fuel flow prior to helium flow.
A pressure relief valve in each helium supply line prevented tank over-
pressurization; a burst disk upstream of each relief valve prevented
helium leakage during normal operation. Each pair of oxidizer tanks and
each pair of fuel tanks was manifolded into a common discharge line.
Total propellant capacity was 17 800 pounds. The propellant tanks were
interconnected by a double crossfeed piping arrangement (fig. 13.2-19)
to maintain positive pressure halance across the helium and the propel-
lant portions of the tanks. A capacitance-t_pe quantity gaging system
provided propellant quantity information during thrusting.
The descent engine (fig. 13.2-19) used hypergolic propellants con-

sisting of a 50-50 fuel mixture of hydrazine (N2H 4) and unsymmetrical
dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), with nitrogen tetroxide (N204) as the oxidizer.
Engine controls, mounted integral to the injector end, included a gimbal
ring, a variable-area injector, flow control and shutoff valves, and a
throttle actuator. The thrust chamber consisted of a composite ablative-
cooled nozzle (area ration 16:1) and a crushable radiation-cooled nozzle
extension (area ratio 49:1). The ablative components were encased in a
titanium shell and jacketed in a stainless-steel-foil/glass-wool-composite
thermal blanket.
The fuel and oxidizer were piped directly into the flow control
valves and then into a series-parallel ball valve assembly controlled by
four actuators. After engine start had energized the solenoid operated
pilot valves, fuel was introduced into the valve actuators and caused the
ball valves to open, allowing propellant flow to the injector. For en-
gine shutdown, the solenoid-operated pilot valves were de-energized, the
spring-loaded actuators closed the ball valves, and residual fuel from
the actuator cavities was vented overboard.
13-21
The mechanical throttling scheme utilized variable-area, cavitating-

venturi, flow-control valves mechanically linked to a variable-area in-
jector as shown in figure 13.2-19. This scheme permitted separation of
the propellant flow control and propellant injection functions so that
each could be optimized without compromising the other. Two separate
flow-control valves metered the fuel and oxidizer simultaneously. The
throttling was controlled by an electrical linear servo actuator powered
by three redundant dc motors. Throttling between i0 and 60 percent was
achieved through hydraulic decoupling; movement of the pintle would re-
duce the venturi exit pressure to the vapor pressure of the propellent,
inducing cavitation. The valves then functioned as cavitating venturis,
and downstream pressure fluctuations did not affect the flowrates.
The injector consisted of a faceplate and fuel manifold assembly

with a coaxial feed tube and a movable metering sleeve. Oxidizer entered
through the center tube and exited between a fixed pintle and the bottom
edge of the sleeve. Fuel was introduced into an outer race, and the fuel
aperture was an annular opening between the side contour and the injector
face. As the metering sleeve moved, both propellant apertures changed in
area and maintained close-to-optimum injection conditions at any thrust
level.
13.2.10 Ascent Propulsion
The ascent propulsion system (fig. 13.2-20) consisted of a restart-

able pressure-fed liquid propellant rccket engine and a propellant and
pressurization storage system. The ascent engine was fixed-mounted and
developed a constant thrust of 3500 pounds. The engine used hypergolic
propellants consisting of a 50-50 fuel mixture of hydrazine (N2H4) and
unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), with nitrogen tetroxide (N204)
as the oxidizer. Figure 13.2-20 shows the primary engine components
that controlled propellant flow to the engine which consisted of an in-
jector, two trim orifices, four electromechanical flow control actuators,
and eight propellant shutoff valves. The valve package assembly, similar
to the descent, consisted of eight shutoff valves, which were series-
parallel redundant, in both the fuel and oxidizer feed lines. Each fuel-
oxidizer pair was simultaneously opened or closed on a common crankshaft
by a hydraulic actuator that used fuel as the actuating medium.
The engine consisted of a structural shell with mounts and ablative

material in the thrust chamber and in the nozzle extension for cooling.
The ablative material for the combustion chamber and nozzle throat, to
the region where the expansion ratio was 4.67, was a refrasil phenolic
backed with an insulator of asbestos phenolic. The nozzle utilized as-
bestos phenolic for ablative material for the extension from the regions
of expansion ratio of 4.6 to 45.6. The combustion chamber and nozzle
_ extension were bonded together and wrapped with fiberglass for structural
13-22
support. The combustion chamber and throat were encased in an aluminum

alloy casing, which served primarily as a mounting surface for engine
components.
The injector assembly consisted of propellant inlet lines, a fuel

torus manifold, an oxidizer manifold, and an injector orifice plate assem-
bly. The injector assembly was a fixed orifice type with a baffle for
damping any induced combustion disturbances. The injector assembly face
was divided into three combustion zones: the primary, the barrier, and
the baffle. The primary zone employed impinging triplets (two fuel and
one oxidizer) which were spaced in concentric radial rings on the injec-
tor assembly face. The barrier zone utilized fuel-on-oxidizer impinging
doublets, which operated off-ratio (fuel-rich) to provide a barrier of
low-temperature gases near the ablative chamber wall. The baffle zone
(1.25 inches downstream from the injector face) utilized impinging doub-
lets (fuel-on-oxidizer) placed in radial position relative to the injec-
tor face.
There were two titanium storage tanks for the ascent engine, one for
oxidizer and one for fuel. The tanks were spherical and had a combined
capacity of approximately 5000 pounds of propellant. Each tank was
equipped with a helium diffuser at the inlet to provide even pressuriza-
tion at the helium/propellant interface. A series of vanes were arranged
at the tank outlet of each tank. These devices allowed unrestricted pro-
pellant flow from the tank to the engine under normal pressurization but
would not allow reverse flow of propellant from the outlet line back into
the tank under zero g conditions or even at the maximum negative g-load
expected. The propellant tanks did not have a quantity gaging system
but did have low-level sensors to monitor propellant quantities when
propellants were depleted to a level equivalent to approximately i0 sec-
onds of burn time.
The outflow from each tank was divided into two paths. The main
path passed through a trim orifice and a filter to the engine shutoff
valve. The other path led to normally closed solenoid valves intercon-
necting the ascent and reaction control propellant systems. Opening
these valves would permit the use of ascent propellants by the control
engines.
The gaseous helium that was used for pressurization of the propellant
feed system was stored in two tanks at approximately 3500 psi and ambient
temperature. A normally closed squib valve in the line immediately down-
stream of each storage tank isolated the heliu_rlsupply until the initial
ascent engine start.
13-23
Each parallel helium flow path contained a filter to trap any debris
resulting from squib valve actuation. After the filter, each helium flow
path contained a normally open latching solenoid valve and two pressure
regulators or reducers. The upstream regulators in each flow path were
set to a slightly lower pressure than the downstream regulators, and the
two series regulators in the primary flow path were set to a slightly
lower pressure than their corresponding regulators in the redundant flow
path. The pressure settings of the four regulators varied from 172 psi
to 194 psi with the primary-path controlling regulator set at approxi-
mately 184 psi. In normal operation, the upstream regulator in the pri-
mary flow path was the controlling element. Downstream of the pressure
reducers, the helium flow paths were manifolded together and then divided
into two separate tank pressurization paths, each having a quadruple
check valve.
13.2-11 Environmental Control
The function of the environmental control system was to provide ac-

tive thermal control for the electrical/electronic components. The major
components consisted of the ascent oxygen tanks, the primary coolant
circuit with heat rejection from one sublimator, water supplied from the
ascent water tanks, and a cabin pressure relief valve (fig. 13.2_22).
During prelaunch, two freon boilers maintained thermal control in

the water/glycol (65 percent water, 35 percent glycol) circuit. In flight,
cooling of the water/glycol was provided by the water sublimator. Three
minutes after launch, the mission programmer commanded a solenoid valve
open which initiated water flow to the sublimator. During normal flight
operation, the glycol temperature from the sublimator should range from
32 ° to 45 ° F.
The design of the water p_essure regulators and ascent oxygen tanks
was modified from the manned configuration. During sublimator operation,
water flowed from both ascent water tanks through the primary water pres-
sure regulators to the sublimator. The redundant water pressure regulator
could have been selected through the mission programmer. The two ascent
oxygen tanks provided a reference of about 4.0 psia to the water pressure
regulators.
The capability to select either of two glycol pumps had been deleted
from the mission programmer, and to preclude loss of cooling in the event
of a single glycol pump failure, both pumps were operating.
13-24
The lunar module cabin was at atmospheric pressure, or slightly above,

prior to launch. During the launch phase, the cabin pressure relief valve
opened and allowed cabin pressure to bleed to 5.6 psia (nominal). After
the relief valve closed, the cabin pressure continued to decay as a func-
tion of cabin leak rate.
I_-2
T_LE _3.9-I.- L_._-I

I[ISTRU_IENTAI'ION
pAB._4_JI_RS
Electrical power subsyste_ Gu:dance and _a-¢_gazLon concluded
GC0071V AC bus voi_age_ v r_s *I022069-15H+087 I_2300m PI!'Atemperature, °F iu32101 1511+-2_

GCOI55F AC b_s frequency. Ez _04±069_15H (_C-2301TRa_e gyro temperature, _' _031069-1511
GC0_01V _a_tery I voltage, V de 1019101-1_H (_6020T PI_A calibra_iom mo_-e _em_erature, o_ L0_910__LSH
GC02_2V Ba_te_g 2 voltage, V de i011101-15_ (_GqOCIX L_C wa_ning _O32098HL5_+ 96
GC02037 Ba_terg 3 vol_ge. V de I021L0]-15_ _9002X Inertial sensing system war_ing I032098GL5_+i96
GC020_ Battery _ voltage, V de 1015101_15_ _90_3X PGI_CSw_rn_ng ±032098Ft5_+196
GC02057 Battery 5 voltage. V de i_63037 15H+CI_
GCO206V Battery 6 voltage. V dc 10LOO37_LSH+036 St_lizatLon a_d control
GCO3OIV Co_a_der's bus voltage, V de i_3306_ 15H+131
GC0302V System Engineer's bus voltage, V de i033101 !5H+132 _1204X Th_ottle_ut of de_e_t *I037098HISE
GCI201C Battery i curr_nt_ A IG24191-15H+096 (_HI214X RC_ AUTO on eo_and 20_098HL_E+I93
GC1202¢ _tery 2 current, A 1O32O69 15N+12'I GHI217X RC_ AUTO o_f eo_and _037¢98GL5_
GC±203C Ba_ter_ 3 current, A I01706_-15H+06_ _1230X AP_ arm eo_.an_ I047C9_15E
GC1294C Ba_te_ 4 current, A L0!_069 Z511+071 I_HI240V X _ranslaticn co_an_. V d_ II0106_-15H
GC1205C B_tery 5 current, A 1018L01-15H+072 _124(V Yaw error co_an_, V dc 11O3O68 15H
GC1206C Battery 6 cur_e_t_ A _020069--5H+079 (_124_V Pi_ch error eo_nd. V de !011066 L5H
GC_36_X Battery i nigh tap. off/_ 103_096NI5E _HI249V _o_ e_ror eo_n_. ¥ de --_i098-_511
GC4362X B_tery i low tap. off/on 103_098G!5E 6HI_6_X A2_!; on 51DI02LHISE+043
GC_363X Ba_te_ 2 _Lgh t_p, off/on I03>096_15E _NI283X Abo_t _t_ge eo_anded _I_IO_.6L5E+U43
GC_364X Battery 2 low _a_, off/on IO35096EISE I_III2_6XEngiI1efir_ override 1037G98F±5E
GC_65X _a_t_j 3 high tap. off/o_ I03509_D15_ _111301X DP_ o_ IO_9098GISE+I_3
GC4_66X B_tter_,"
3 l_w t_p, off/_n I035_96C15E _HI3!_' Ma:_ua]thrust co_n_, V dc 1035OO5 15H+137
GC_367X Batte_ 4 high ta_ off/on !03_098_15E I_NI3_3V _i_ch GDA pesition. V rms ii0403_-i_H
GC4368X Ba_ter¥ _ low _p, off/_n I035_9_AI5E _NI31_V Roll 3DA positLon. V rms II04036-L_H
GO4369X Battery 5, Co_nder's b_, off/on 1039_98H±SE _1323X ?_:,chtrim fa±i I02909_F±5E+I93
6C437_X Battery _, System E_g_eer's hu_, off/on IG3_0_dFISE GHI330X Roll _rim fall 1029098EI>E+L93
GC_372X Batt_. 6, System _ng_e_'_ hu_, _ff/o_ -G3_)C98_I_E GHI331V Au_,c,_at_e _hru_ eo_a_. V _/_ LI03036-LS_
GC9961U _atte_, i _ifanction I039C98_15E _I3_X _P_ arm (DECA _u_p_t) I_4709_GI5E
GC9963U Battery 3 malfunc_io_ I0_4100F15_ GHL415V Je_,arLwr 4 up outpu_ 2201006AI5E
G_9964U Battery _ _ifunc_ion 103_lOOElS_ GHI419V Jet d_'iver4 d_ o_t_ut 2201006_15E
GC9965U Battery 5 ma_f_c_io_ 103_I00DI5E G_II420V Jet dr_ver 4 forward output _20_006C15E
CC9966U B_tte_y 6 malfunction I034100C15_ _HI_21V JeL drLver 4 side o_t_ut 2201UO6DI_E
GHI422V Jet drlve_ 3 up outp_ 220 006EI5E
Envlronmen_al e_trol system GII!423V Jet driver 3 _own output 220_O06P'>E
G_I424V Jet driwr 3 aft_output 2201006GI5E
GF2021P Prima_a'glycol _um_ dLfferen_% _L42_V J_ _rLver 3 si_ output 220_O06H_SE
pressure, psid _016069 i_H+_63 G![I!_26VJeL driver 2 _p o_tpu_ 220!007A-5E
- GF2041X LO'_glycol level IC04095FI_E+_4 _]_-427V Jet _rive_ 2 down output _20_UOTBL_E
GF3_71P C_bLn pressure, p_La 1022_01-i_H+_8 GNI_2_V JeL driver 2 af_ o_t_ut 220_007C _E
G?35_2P A_eent o_._'ge_tank i _ess_re. psia 104_OL-±_ _ GHI429V Jet _'iver 2 sLOe output 220±O07D±5E
_F3583P Ascent o_gen t_nk 2 _ressure_ p_ia I_41037_15H GIII_3_V JeL _rLv_r i u_ outpu_ _20100_EI_E
GF3591P Upper hatch relief valve pressure, _$L_ I_5C069 _5H+I_J _HI_31V 0et driver i _w_ output 220±007F 5E
GF41OIP Primary water reg___tcr d_fferentlal G_I_43_'lJ_t_driv_ I _r_ output 2_01@07_L5_
p_essure, psid IC3_037 15H+146 _H!_337 Jet_driver i side o_tp_t 220±00711__E
GF4511T Prima_j water bo_ier _ater GH 461V _aLe uwr_ assem_:_yyaw rate, V r_ ii_3034-!5_+050
temp_ra_ure_ oF ]05_005-I_H+I_7 GHI_62V Rate gy_ asse_y pi_ch ra_e, V rms Ii0_034 L_I+_4
6F451.1T SuL_ wa_r boiler i_let te_eratu_e. _F IC46005-_SH+t89 GH±463'! _e _r_ assembly roll ra_e. V rm_ 11O4O67 15_+0-)5
GP458_Q A_c_nt wa_r tank i _uartity, % _C06037-!_H+022 :_H603X De_db_n_ select 10_709_LSE
GF4583Q Ascent wa_er ta_ 2 _ar.tity. % IC07037 _H+326 GHL60_X AU_0 control mode IO37098Z!SL
GF9997U Glycol _p pressure, p_!a I003069_ _II+011 GHI60_X At_tude hold I037098D_5E
CF999c_U G1_'eoltemperature, °F I03C069-15_+I19 GHL621X AG_;s_,lee_ I029_SDISE+!93
,_HI_96X Un_alanced couples I037398C15E
Guidance a_d navigation
In_tr_ment_ti_n
GGO_01X PG_ICS dow_link _ata "5101121-i5S
GGI040V 130 V _e pulse torqu_ _f_re_ce. '_de I001_69-15H GL030O Fr_e _ynehr_ni_tion _ identL£icatio_ "51010_i-151+001
GGIIIOV 2.5 V de telemetry bi_s, V &e I007005-!5_ Fc,'_t LdentLfic_tLon 1OO1O05 !51+C05
GGI201V I_ 28 V _c 8_0 Hz, V rm_ i03_0__7511+196 I_,O_IV _5_ c_llbrat_on, V de -I03999-!5_+052
GGI331V Rate _ro 2_ 7 sup_17 3.2 k_z, V rms 1002_37-_5H 15_ calLb_aticn, V dc _04099 1511
_OL513X _ standby/of_ !008_98_L5_ _L,_s_on _Lap_ed _ime _IOL_33-15D+033
0G1523)[ LGC o_erate !O08396G!5E C_:_trol elcctrenics _c p_er _i!_Lre 009_98_15E+ 6_
GG2OC!V X PIPA output i_ phase, V rms 5_01058_!5H ,_L_O27X _cl_r,,±eleet_o_c_ dc p_er _aL_ure O09098G 5E+l_b
GO2_4LV Z PIPA output L_ phase. V rms 5_01_59_-_H I_L4_21M D_'!]ealibrat_o_ o_ 10_LICCF!SE

GG210_V Inner gi_al se_vo error i_ pha_e. V rm_ -201017-_5H GL_222X _/S_ _e_ara_ion -04_.ICCEI5E
GG21±CC In_ global _o_que moto_ e_r_ent. A 12O1O55 15H
GG2112V Inner global resolver output _£ne, _ rms 1202G99-L5H+048 As_e_t_io!_ su_s_em
GG_II3¥ In_er _imoal resolver o_tp_t
eosLne. V _ !202067-_SH+G47 GP00_IP _e i_ _k I _r_ssure. psia _i040_37 !511+158
GO212-V Inner
exp_nde_,
gi_al VIX
_m_
resolver sine 201022-15N G_0002_
G_0025_ He ii_
i_ _.k
_egul_or
2 _ressure,
pressure,
psiapsi_ i025037 L_H+_39
_O_006_ -5_
GG2137V
O82140C _id_l_
MLddl_ gLmbal
gLObal to_ue
_ervo e_ro_
motor in
_urre_t.
_hase, A
V _s 12O1O5 15H
12O1O3" G_O_OIT
G_O202T _Ee_L_
1_e _a_k 2
_:k i _e_ra_ure.
_empera_ve. cF
_F _03510±_5_
00_3( _SH_CI_
G62142V Middle gimb_l resolver outp_a_s_:e, V _s I02034-15H+046 G_0318X _ei_ _] val_e i closed 10_gC96EI5E
GG_2143V M_d_le gLmbal resolver ou_p'_t I_P0718'_Fu_l 1_em_erature, °F -032_C5-15H+12>
eo_Ll_e,V rm_ !L02_56 ±_N GP0908X Fu_l low _0291C_H_5E+I_4
GO2151¥ Middle gLmbal IX reso±ver s_e GPI21_T OxL_er ten_pera_ure,°F I03L_37-!5_I_4
_:_anded, V rm_ i201018_L5H GPL408X OxL_er low -0291COGI5E+I94
GG216_V 0ute_
CG2170C S_t_r gi_al
glObaL torque
s_r_o error
motc_ in
c_rrent,
p_ase, A
V rms 22O1O2 151_
-201G23 15H ,_PL5_I_ ©xL_i_r.
_P1503_ Fuel _re_ure.
_s±a psia i0!7037-151_
-0-70C5 15_I+065
GG2172V O_ter giffoaLr_solwr output s_ne, V rms 2103067-15H+0_I GP_OlC_ _h_u_t eh_be_ pre_u_e, p_L_ L0_5037-]5_+_7_
G_2173V 0_t_,_gLObal revolver output _P2997U P_opell_t v_Ives _e ta _o_iticn _20L34CH_5E
co_in_ V rms ZIC4C33 1511
O_218!V O_ter gi_oal _ _e_olver sine Deaf.on _b_vstem
expande_, V _ 12@i0_4-15_
GG22±gv Pitch attitude e_rcr, V _ms _]C4068 1511 GQ_018_ ile _ _gul_o_ pressure, _La _!0_2005-±_H+3-_5
GG2249V Yaw a_itude _ror. V r_ !]02100_15H I_Q330_X H_I_ _ank i el¢_ed IO_409Q_I_E
GG2279V Rol_ _t_tud_ _rr_r. V r_ !]03066-15_ ,_Q330±x _e i_ t_nk 2 _pe_ I04409_EISE
f _LoadSng m_her fo_ats _e sho_. on page 13-29.

13-26
T,'_LE 13.2-I.- Lr4-1 INSTRU_._NTATION pAJ_AJ4]_ERS - ConLinued
(a) Gperational Instr_len_ation Concluded
De_._n*_ F,ropul:iD_: subsystem _ c_

onclu_ed Re_ction control sub.-stem _ con_laded
G_,_4_p Hcl[u:_ pre_succ, psia _I002069_!5H+007 GR6OO3T Quid 2 tenpec _ure_ °F *i022005_15H+0_5
_;:_602Q Fuel _a_:k i quantity. _ I028005-15H+!0_ GR600_T Quad • temperanure, °F i023005-15H+089
_:i_6_4_ Fue_ tank _ quantity, _ 1O27O37 15H+I06 OR9609U RCS main A closed IOI3098FISE+I22
:_:i_611P Fue pressure, p3ia !024069-15H+O95 0_9610U RCS main B closed 1013098EI5E+I22
:]:_Ii_- L Fue _n_:k i _emperature. °F I002G05 15H G_9611U A_eent feed A o_en IOI3098DI5E+I22
_:'_" [9_' Fue: _ank 2 _e:r,pe_'ature. _F !031037-15H GR9612U Ascent feed _ o_en I013098_15E+122
_Q_,i07_I O_[:_zer _ank ± qu_nti_y, _ !04_037_15H+170 GR9613U Crossfeed ope_ IOI3098BI5E+I22
_:_I0_Q Oxi,_!zer t_k 2 :_uanti_3', _ !035037-15H+i3_ 0_9661U _A i_ola_ion valve closed I04809_HI5E
_4111_' Oxi,_zer pre_ure, psia i005101 15H+02_ GR9662U 4B isolation .i_Ive closed I04_O9_15E
j_,_21_![ _ 0xl,i!zer t_nk i _em_erature_ CF 1001101-15H GR9663U 3A isolation valve c!o_ed 104_09_FI5E
_.219T Oxi,_izer t_nk 2 _emnerature, CF 100_101 15E GR9664U 3B isolation valve 21osed 1048098EI5E
_:_J,_.55X Fro_l±ant io_ IO3_098CI_E GR9665U 2A i_olat_on valve _Iosed 1048098DI5E
J_6515_' rhr:_ cha_,_ber pressure_ l_ia 1O2O1O1 15_+38C GR9666U 2B isolation valve cl_sed I048098C15E
_li6_J_H '7ar!_L_le i,_ectcr a_tua_or _osi_ion, _ _05C037-15H+198 GR9667U IA isolation valve _!o_e& I048098B15 E
:_If_6_I 1:ro_ll_nt '.ra_v_ delta p_iticn 1038098E:!SE GR9666U IB i_olat!cn valve _l_se_ I04_096AISE
_i_'_gu Pro_ellant _alves del_a position !33809_C15E
Cor_uni¢ at ions _3_ _l
I_e_,_t±oI: _cn_',_ sab_em _T344JX DCA uplink _rif_, w_rd "5101097-15D
_!C_'f _y_._ A h, ii_:;, t_,_k surface OT9992B S-band sta_e phras±ng errcr, de_ II01066-15H
t,:_:erat _re. °F IC35069-._5H+139 GT0993E S-band transmitter _F power, W 1050101-15H+20G
_IG_O _ys_m B _ro_eiian_ quantity, _ IC3!I01 !5H G'f099nV S-band receiver si_,a!, V dc II01067-15H
Ui_IC9_' Sy_t_ _ _.i_ tank s_rf_ce
t_er_l_ure_ _F I040069-.!5H+!59 Stabili_a_ion _id control (L!.'_)
_!!Ii0i?
_i_llO:_ System,_mB
Sy_T A he!
h,i _ pre_sure_
um pres_ure_ _sia
p_±a i033037_15H
1033'305 !5_I+!29 G_51_IV PRA compare _510!08_HISE
_Z_2OI_ Sys_m A regulator pressure, p_ia I030005--15H+I±7 GW5!537 PRA clock on II0510CHI5E
,_1202P System _ regulator _re_ure, ps±_ I036069..15H+I_3
OE_I_± S_'s.en A f_e_ temperature, °F ]01_037.-15H+070 rotechnic _u_sy_em
_E_2122i System '_ fuel temperature, _F 1O2OO37 15H+OY8
L_220IP $3-_m A f_el ma_ifold _re_u_'e, Fsia i00_069 15H+015 GY035:)X Abort comm_nds _I01_096EI_+!23
_2202P S¥_L_m _ f_e[ manifold pressure, _ia ±00410!--15_+016 Gy0111X Emergency detection arm A cn IOIL098OI5E+I23
;_32OIP System A oxidizer m_.ifo!d pressure, _sia !006C69 15E+023 GY0112X _ner_,_ncy dete_tion arm B ¢n !014098FI5E+I23
:_202p S "s_e:_ E o>:i_izer m_,ifoLd pressure, p_a !01CIO1--15H+_40 GY012LX Sta_i_g relay _'_f±,'_ L014C98EI5E+I23
,_60011 ¸ Qu_ 4 _e_,_rature, o_ 1003E05--!5H+_09 GY0!22X Sta_ing relay B fi_'e 1014098DI5E+I23
L_6032_' _u_i: 3 _emperatl,re. OF I01CC05 15H+037
(b) Development Fligh_ In_,_entati_n
:_tr,_ctures Structures - concluded
_.OC_3_ _" ±_._ing ,-i_ i t_n_r_ure, °_' _D _XX_O5 GA20061' D_seent stage h_a_ _ie±d
_A_C_L:[ _ ±_nding rig 2 temperate-e, _F C-14X- _ _emperature 6_ °F
(_A0065[ Z _,,_d!ng _pex ! _em_era_ure. °F C I_X 14 GA200_T D_,_ee,_t stage hea_ shiel_
_AO2OI_ De_:ent engi e c_vi_y _empera_ure i. °P C I_X 20 _e_era_ure 7, o _C 14X-33
_..C202L De_,:e_t e_gine cavity _emper_ture 2, oF C 14X 21 GA200BT _escen_ st_g_ hea_ _hie!d
G_C20_' De_nt e_g_e cavity temperature 3. °F C-14X-2_ _em_era_ure 8, c_ C 14X-35
(_C204T De_:ent engine cavity _em_era_ure _, °F C_II_X_24 GA23C_JT _e_cent stage _,eat _hield
_AO6Olg 3e_,. oocst strut I +Z_ k±_ C-05X/I temperature 9, °_ C 14X-36
GACd02S Be:,1_ boos_ stru_ 2 +Z, kl_ C_06X/I GA231_T De_ce_t stage _eat shield
(_',C603S Be_ boost _trut 3 +Z_ klb C 09X/! temperature I0. _F C-14X-38
(_4G60_S Be,,,_ _o_s_ strut 4 +Z, klb C O7X/! GA2524S De.cent e_gine su_or_ strut n_ klb E-15M/l,2
_¢605S Be_,_ bo_st strut i -Z klb • 05X/! GA2681D DPS _.gen t_nk 1 vibraticn X, g E-fIX
O'0606S Be_:_ bo_s_ strut 2 Z_ k±_ D-O6X/I GA2682D DPS o_rge_ _ank I _!bratf_n Y. g C-fIX O_
G_060/S Be_m boo_ _trut 3 Z, kl_ D-07X/__ GA2683D DPS _.gen tank i vibration Z, g D-fIX-03
G'._60_S Be_,. boost _trut L -Z, klb D-08X/I GA300_ X-a×is a¢ceieration i. g C-1OX
_'._609S Beam boos_ strut i +Y. kl_ D 09X/I GA3302A X a:_is acceleration _. r_/sec/_ec C-15X
_061OS Beam boost ,_trut _ +Y_ klb D_IOX/! GA30_A Y-axi_ acceleration i, g D-10X/2,3
(;'._611S Be_,m boos_ _trut 3 +Y, klb _-05X/± GA300_IA Y-a×is acce!era_ion 2, rad/see/sec D-15X
CA0612_ Be_L_ boos_ strut L +y, klb E-O6X/! GA_OO5A Z-a×is acceleration i. g D-O6X/2,3
_AC6!3S Be_:, bo_st _trut i Y. kl_ E OTX/! GA3DO6A Z-axis acceAer_tion 2. ra_Jsec/sec E-14X
:_061_+S Be_,:, bo_s_ strut 2 -Y, klb E-08X/i GA36¢ID Af% equipment bay _ibraticn X, g A-O2C-OI
(;AG6!5S Be_. boost _trut 3 _Y, kl_ _-09X/! GA3602D Aft equipment bay vibratien Y. g A 02C O2
G_C616S B_,,_ bo_ _trut 4 -Y. klb C-08X/! GA3603D Aft equipment bay vibration _ g A-02C-O3
(_,'_Ii13[ A_nt _age he_t shield top OA3661D Tunnel equipment area vibration i_ g A-03C-01
t,_:_pe_atur_, _F C 14X-26 GA3662D Tunnel equi_oi_en_ area vibration 2_ g A-03¢-02
(_ALI33_ AScE_nt _tage hea_ _h_eld to_ GA3663D Tunnel equi_i_en_ a_'ea vibration 3, g A-03¢-03
_,ressure, _sla E EXX 2_
GAI_O!D As_,_nt engine support vibration I. g A-10C-OI n_r_Lo_ ¸n_mi_s
GAIS02_ As_:_t e_g_ne support vibration 2. g A-IOC-O_
OAI_0J_J A_n_ engine support vi_ranion 3. g AwlOC-O_ OB02OIT A$_ent engine cone _emperature !_ °F _-14X-44
I_,',I_TLI_ f_S o_yge_ t_nk v_bration X, g E-12X GBO203T Cabin tunnel temperature, °F C-14X-47
GAI572t AE_ oxygen tank vibration Y, g C-fIX O2 GB0204_ Cabin skin temperature i, °F D-EXX-69
_AI573D APS oxygen t_k vibration Z. g D-IIX 0_ G_0205T Cabin skin temperature 2_ °F C-!_X 50
_.2001_ Descent stag,, hea_ shield GB03OIT Ascent _age _otto:_ surfac_
t,_m_erature i_ _' C 14X 43 _em_erature !, °l_ D-EXX 19
(;A2002_ _ De ,_,,nt st_ hea_ shield GBO302r Ascent _ag_ bottc:_ surface
t.:_pe_.ature 2, _F D-EXX_I_ temperature 2. °IL' D-_XX_21
:_20_3f J_es,:_n_ _t:ig_ neat shie!_ G30305T As_ent _t_ge bottc:_ surface
t,,_pe_'_ur_ ]. _F C-14X _ temperature 3. °F D-EXX-23
:;A_O_4T Ee:_n_ st_g_ n,,_t _hie!d GB030_T Ascent stag_ bottof_ surface
t_m_erature 4. °F D-EXX-7_ temperature _. oF D-EXX 25
_2:_5'7 De_ ent _tag_ h_at _hie!d GB_305'-' Asc_n_ stage bottom surfa_e
_ _pe_._ure 5. °F _ ±4X 27 temperature 5, °7 D EXX-26
*L_ading n_ber romans are shown on page 13-29.

r
13-27
TAJ_LE 19.2-!.- L_bl INSTRUMEKTATI0J n._L_4ET_R_- Continued
(b) D_veiopment Flight Ius_r_E1en_&t±on- Continued
T_ermodyn_ics continued _her_ _ c.o_luaed
CBC306T As_ent stage bottom surface G33035T Aft _qu_pment bay nkin t_peratu_e, _F *_-1_X-25
te_eratur_ 6, o_ *D_EXX_28 9_3936T Dese_nt s_age _2 panel skin
_B0307_ A$_ent _tage bottom surface te?Jperature,°F 8-14X-66
temi:erature7, o_ D-E×X-30 _E3102_ Znt_rstage separation distance
GB0_gIT Descent stag_ top surface monitor i_ ft C-EXX-09B05172
temperature i, _ • EXX 36 GB3103_ interstage separation distance
GBC4G2T Descent stage top surface mcnitor 2, f_ C-EXX-I0315273
temperature 2, °v D-EXX-_4 G_3_04H _nters_age sep_atlon distance
GBO_OBT Descent s_age top surface mcnitor 3, ft C-EXX-11325374
temt:era_ure3, o_ D-EXX_32 G_3105]I _n_eratage separation distance
GB0521T Descen_ stage bla_ _eflect_ monitor 4, _t C-EXX-12335_75
temperature l, _ D EXX 4O G_3727T _tenna suppor_ boom _e_erature l, °F C-±_X-57
GB0522T Descent sta_e blast _eflect_r G_3728T Steeraol_ S_band _r_tennatemoerature 2, _F D_EXX_87
temperature 2, _ D EX_42 G_B(29T Steerable S-b_nd anteuna temperature 3_ °F D-EXX-80
GBC691_ Ascent engine _omfartmen_ G_3703T $-bana _i antenna _empera_ure. _F _ -4X 6O
temperature l, o_ D EX_46 G_B733T VHF infli_ht a_enna temperature, cF D-EXX-76
GBO602T As_ent _ngine compartment G_6G01T Electronics package c¢_d plates
temperature 2, c_ D EX_48 _emne_a_ure l, °F C-±_X-63
GBO60_T A_cent engine co_partment G_6002T Electronics _ackage cold plates
_em_eratur_ 3, CF D-E×X-53 _p_ra_ur_ 2_ °F D-EXX-82
GBO621P Ascent engine ccnpartmer.t
Free,
sure !_ psla C-08X/2_ Eiec_ _
GBO62_P A_e_t engine comoart_nt
pren_ure 2. psla C 0_Y GC35_lT Battery 1 te_erature. °F *C l_X O3
3BO623P Ascent e_gine conpartm_,_t GC3502T Battery 2 te_Ferature. _F C-14X O4
p_e_sure 3. p_la C 03X _C35CBT Battery B temperature. _F C-I_X-07
GBOSOIP Ascent stage bottom s_rface GC3504T _at_e_ r 4 temgerature, _F C-I_X-!0
pressure _, psla E_OSX/2,3 GC3595T Ba_t_r_-5 temperature, °F C-I_X_I3
GBOSO2P A_ent stage bottom surface GC3506T Battery 6 te_eratu_e, °F C I_X 16
prensu_e 2, _s_a D-07X/_,3
GBO_03P As_ent s_age bottom s_rfac_ Env±rc_mental c_nt_ol _ub_yntem
pressure 3_ psla D_O2X
GB0_04p Ascent _tage bottom _hrfa_e _252_T Frimary water boiler gZyco_
pre_u,'e 4, _la D-O3X _e_perature, CF *D EXX_85
GBOBO5P Ascent stage bottom surface GF2621T Cabin heat exch_.ngerglycol
pressure 5_ psla E 03X in-et tenperatar_, _F C-1LX-69
_-- 8BO_06P A_cent s_age bottom surface GF278_T _ege_er_tive he_t ex_ha_ger
p_e_ure 6, p_a C-02X _lycol outlet temperature, _F C 1LX-73
GBOS07P Ascent _tage bottom _urface GF2_41T Regenerative he_t exchanger
pressure 7, psla C-05X/2,3 _ycol inle_ te_perature_ °F C-1LX-$2
GB_808P Ascent stage bottom surface GF287±T Cabin neat exchanger glycol
pressure 8_ psla C-96X/2_3 o_tle_ temperature, °F D-EXX-52
OBO_0_P Asce_ stage bottom _urface CFLI09_ Redundant water regulators (_S)
pressure 9, p_a C-OIX/2,B _ dif_e_e_t±al pressure, p_d E EXIT1
C_9_IIP Ascen_ stage hot_c_ surface GF456_T De_c_t w_te_ tank outlet
pressur_ ll, _sl_ D 04X temperature, °F C-14X-75
G_0812p Aseen_ stag_ bottom surface GF4562T Ascent water _a_k 1 outl_
pressure 12_ _sla D-05X/2,3 tezperature_ _F D-EXX-SL
OBO_13P Ascen_ sta_e bottom surface GF456BT Ascent water _a_k 2 outl_
pressure 13, _la C EXX 13345576 te_perature_ _F
OBO_I4P A_ce_ sta_e bottom surface GF_996U Glycol pu_E1prate _lect, kx_L E_EXX_I9
pressure 14, p_ia C _X_14355677
CB0_ISP As_en_ sta_e bot_c_ _urface Gu_d_Jee and _vi_ation
_ressure 15_ _sla C-E×X-15365778
OB0816P Ascen_ sta_ bottom surface GCllllV DFI telemet_ bian voltage, V dc *E-EXX-97
pressure 16, psia C-EXX-16375879 OG222OV Inner gii_ibal
CDU fine error, V rr'_ C-EXX-27
OB0817P Ascen_ stage oottcm surface 0_2259V _i_le gi_bal CDU fine error, V rms C-EXX-29
_ressure 17_ _la C EXX_l'I3_59_0 GG2289V Outer gi_b_l CDU fine error_ V rms E-EXX-O9
OB0818P Ascen_ stage bottom _urface GC2303X IMU blower off/on E-EXX-11
pressure 18, psia C-E×_-!839608_ GC_llV Radar shaft CDU fine, V rms E-EXX-28
OBC_0_p Descent _tage _o_ _urface GC332!V _ad_r _runnlo_ CDU fine, V rms E-EXX-87
pressure l, p_a C EXX 19406182 OC6O0iD _av_ga_ion ba_e roll vlbratlo_, g A-95C 91
OB0902P Descent s_age to_ _urfa_e CC6C92D Navi_atio_ base pitch vibration, g A-05C-O2
pressur_ 2, psia C-EYD_-20416283 O_6COBD Navi_ion ba_e yaw vib_atlon, _ A_05C-9_
OBOg0_P _es_ent stage toF surface
pressur_ 3, psla C-EXZ-21_L26381_ $ta_i=i_ation and control
G_09OLF Desce:,t_tage to_ _urface
_re_ure _, paia C EX_224_6485 O_14_OV •Pitch t_m error, V d_ *D_EY_70
GB0905P Descent s_age t_ surface GE1452V Rol_ trim error, V dc D-EXX-71
pressure 5, psla C-E_X-23_46586
GB0906_ De_t _age _o: surface In_ru_m_n_ation
_ressu_e 6, _sla C_EXX-244566_(
GBog_TP Jescent s_a6e top surface GL02B6× 50-Fp_ star_ signal *C-14X-58
_ressure 7_ psia C_E_ 254667_8 GLG237X 2_kpps blt synchorniza_ion signal C 1_X_59
GB302±T De_ce_t _ta_e blanke_ interna_ GLO2B_X 59-ppn stop signa_ C-I_X-6!
tei1_eraturei, _F D-EXX-72 GL02_IV 1200-_p$ syach_oni_a_ion signal C-l_X_
GB3023_ Descent stage _ianke_ surface GL02_2V 50-pps s_op signal C-l_X-49
_emoerature i, °F C-_4_-51 GLO251U Timing electronics synchronization
3B30_5_ Descent stage _!_:_ke_±_tern_i _o-go/go C-14X-62
temperature 2. _ D EXX _14 GL0802X LGC serial data to FC_EA C 14X 65
_B_O_7_ De,cent stage blanket _urface
_e_,eratu_c 2_ °F D EX_ B8 _uic_nce and navigation (radars)
8_BO2_T _esce_t stage bla:_ke_internal
_empera_ur_ 3_ _F D-_XX-66 G_7559D La_din_ _adar antenna v±bratJon, g *D-11X-O1
_B303_T _es_e_ stage b!anke_ surface G_7564T Landing _adar antenna temperature, _F C-14X-55
_em_,er_tur_3. _ C_14X_54 G_7565T Landing radar antenna temFerature, _F C_14X-56
G_O_T Descent stag_ blanke_ surface GN7691D Rendezvous radar an_e_ua dish vibration, g C-llX-O1
r _empero.ture_, °F C-14X-29 G_7721T _endezvous radar antenna _enperature 3_ _F D-EXX-75
G_:77__ _en_ezv_u_ radar antenna te_era_ur_ _ _F C-lhX-52
*Loading nu_,ber formats are ahown on pmge 13-29.
13-28
TABLE [3.2-1.- LM-- INSTRLU'E_,TATIG_[

PA_AMbTEFS - Concl_ ed
(b) Develo_r,lenz
Flight In_trm_e_t_tlo_ - Co_iclu_ed
3PO01_i _eg_ator I i_le_ _res_ure, p_ia *E-ICX/3 GR43221 4B _ue! injector surface
_o02J_ _ _egu_ator 2 ±n!e_ _res_ure_ p_=a _O4X/3 tm_pera_re, o_ *C-_LX 79
_P0025_¸¸ Heli_'E.
regulator _r_s_ure_ _sla C-12X/3 GR4_23_ 3A _u_ injector surface
_050!? Fuel t_nk ullage _ssure, p_ia _-EXX-72 temperature, _F D _: 61
_0616_ _ue! t_nx/enginc diffe_enti_l G_4325T 2B _uel inject.orsurface
pressure, _s±_ E-EX_-24 tem_eratur,,_oF D EXX 17
GPI00_: O.K%'g_tu_ ul ag_ ore_sure, _s_a E-E×X 2 GR4327_ ]A fu_! njector surface
GP!O04__ O_%'g_nre_ief va!w pressure, _sia E EXZ-2_ t_m_erature, oF D-FMX 6_
GPII_6_¸ O_g_n tan_/engine d±f_ere_ti_i G_424T 3_ o×_diz_r L_j_etor surface
_'_ss_re, psi_ E EXX 26 temperature, °F C-I_X-72
GPI5OIF Fuel i,res_ur_,_ia C.-13X/3 GRL435T 3_ _xld±_er valve temperature, _F C-I_X-_7
G_]50_ ¸ Oxidizer pressure, ps±a _ _3X/3 GR4h41T 4D fuel ±_e_or _r_ce temperature, CF C 14_7_
GF20011: Fuel _njee=or pressure, p_ia E-13X/3 GR4_4_T ID f_c! i_j_,_,_or sur_a_e te,,ipe_a_ure_
_ C 14X-_
GP201U? T_rus_ chamber _re_ure, _s±a E-!6X/3 GR457_T 4D injector _:_a__e_erature, o_ D-EXX-56
GP270_I T_ru_ _hamber wall _em_e_ature l, oF _-EXX-51 GR45{IT LF injector h_ad temperature_ _ D-EXX-_
GP270_' Thru_ _hal.berwall =emp_rature 2, OF D EXX 5_ GR4577T 2U ±_jector head t_moerat_re, _F D-_XX-_F
CP270_ Thr_ _h_m_er wall _emp_,_ature3, °F D Z<X 55 GR4_7_T 2D i_j_etor head temperature, _F • _×X-81
(]P270_.
¸' Thrus_ throbberwall _@_'a_ure 4, _F D EXX 57 GR_I5_T !D i_jector _ead te,L_at_r_ _F D-EXX-_8
GP_706' Ir:Jee_cr_urface temperature, °F _-E_X-5_ _45831' IF i_jec_or :_ad te_._erature,cF D-EXX 74
GP_80__ T_.ru_'_ _h_mbe_ vibration X. g A-04C/3 G_501__ _.Bfuel i_±e_ pressure, psia C-EXX O6
GP2802_ _hrus_ chamber v_bra=ion Y, g rm_ A 08C/3 GRSOI3_ 3A f_e[ inle_ pressure, p_±a C EXX-08
GP28C5_ _h_us_ eh_mbor v_br_io_l Z, g r_ A C9C/3 G_50!_P 3B f_el i_ e_ pressure, ps_a E-EXX-29
GI{50_5P 2A _uel z_!_ pressure, p_i_ E 09X/2_3
L___ent propul_i_,__ub_y_ten GR5OI6P 2B fuel inter pressure, ps_a C-EXX-26
GR50±TP L_ fuel i_ e_.pres_ure_ ps_a C-_ZXX-2_
(_Q3009_'_{eg_iator1 _nle_ pr_ssu_'e,psia *E-fOX/I,2 GR50!3P B fuel in-e_ pressure, p_a D O9X/2_3
_331C_ ¸ _,_g_i_tor2 inlet pressure, _sia E-C4X/I,2 GR5oIgP 4A _x±d!zer _nle_ _e_ur_ _a _-EXX 3O
GQ301_' H__i_m re_u!ato_ pressure, psia C-12X/I,2 0_5020F 4_ ox±d±ze_ _nlet pressure, psla E-EXX 31
_]Q345U='_eli_m _em_eratur_, °F J-EXX-6C GR5021P 3A _x_±zer _let _r_ssure, _sla E EXX __2
GQ345_ _ i_el!_ he_ e×_h_::gerinle_ C_502_F 3_ oxi_±zer !,_let_res_ur_, _la C-EXX-46
temperature, _F D EXZ O3 GR5023P 2A cx±_±zer !_let p_e_sure_ _la E-I_X/3
:_Q_45_:
¸ _e i_ h_a_ _xchan_e_ _utle_ GR502"P 2B oxidizer _nlet p_ess_e, _a E-EXX 51
te_<ue_atu_e._ D EXX 0_ _RSC2_P -A oxi_ze_ _nlet pressure_ psla E 3XX-_2
:_Q_!._:_Fue- heat exeh_nge_"ou_ et GR5C26p _B o×i_e_ _nlet pre_u_e_ psl_ C 09X/_,3
_mp_ature_ _F _-_XX O6 GRSC3±P 4U thrust chamber _re_ure, p_a A C6C
_Q34(6.' _elL_ =a_k _empe_ature, Op D EXX O_ GRSC32P 4D _hrust cL_mber pressure, ps-a A-C6C
<_50]:' Fue_ t_nk i ullage p_essure, p3ia E _XX-33 O_5033P 4F _hr_t cka_ber pressure, _sza D 16X/2,3
_3505_ _ Fue relic= va v_ pre3sure, p_ia E-E_X-3< GRS03_P 4S thrust chamber pr_ssur_ psla _ 06X/_3
_Q_611_¸ Paei pres_are_ p_ia C 13]<¸12,2 GR5335_ 3_ thrust ch_b_r _ressure, ps_ A 01C
G_666_' _uel t_nk 2/eng_a_ differe_ti_A GR5036P 3D thrust eh_,m_erpressure, _sza A-01C
pressure, FSi_ E _-35 GR5037P 3F thrust _han_er pressure, os=_ D-16X/2,3
G_dl]i ¸ Puel t_mpera_ure, °F D EXX 67 GRSO36P 3_ tarust chamber pre_sure_ _s=a E 07X/_,3
C_._O0]_
¸ Ox_d±z_- =a:ik i _ll_ge G_5039P 2U =h_ust ca_m_e_ p_e_ur_, ps=a D 12X
_r,ssur_, _sia E EXX-I_ _R_O40p 2D thrust ch,_er pressur,_,o_=a D-I_X
<_GOS_ ¸ ©xid_r relief valve ±_11et GR50_±? 2F Lhrust _h_er pressure, p_=a C 16X/2,3
pressure, _s_a E-EXX-41 G_>O42p 2$ t_rus_ chu_L_erpressure, p'_=a E 07X/2,3
G_411±i¸ O×_ize_ _r_ssur_, psia _-_3X/I_2 gRSO_3P ]U =_rust c_.oer pressure, ps_ A 07C
G:_'L_ Oxidizer _,ak ]/cn_e _f_er_ntial _ L_'X 36 GR_O_4P IE t_r_sL c_=_er pressure, ps a A-07C
_Q4311_ Ox_dlz_ =_z_erat_r_ _F _-EXX-6o GR>0LSP IF t_ru_t ch,_,_erFre_ure, p_=a C 16Z/2,3
G_5011 _ Fu_l !_jec_r _ressure, _si_ E_ 3X/I,2 G_5046P I_ t_ru_ c_E_er pr_ssur_ psza _06X/2_3
c_Q_5u£_
¸ Oxidize_ [_jee=or p_s_ur_, p_ia _ _X/l,2
GQ{2±I± Desc_n_ e=gLne he_t sh_el_ _G2_4C S-b_.:.,_

_cw_r amplifier , _ *E-_XX-3_
_e_:ipe_a_ure
i. °F E-E×X-63 GT0225C S-b_-_ cc_er amplif±er 2, mA E E×X _3
_I{2L2= Des_nt _g_n_ h_at shield
GQ7213 D_scent ens±ne heat _h±el_

_er,_p_ra=ure
_ • _F D EXX _5
G@I21_¸ i_e_c,_nt_±n_ he_t shield
t_mpera_u_e _, _F D EXX-73
CQI3CI _'_t _h_r_er vi_r'_t_omX, g rms A _4C/i,9
COI3C_ _hru_t c_am_er vibra_o_ Z, _ _'_ A 090/1,2

13-29
LO%DING NU[,_ER FOR_TS
(a) Operational Inst r_ent ation
Ex_%_le : I133"-!9_27H+121"
33 li_ - _ i + 127
S_ibol indicates that leasuremen_ _isc appears on 1.6 Kbs oitsDresm

_ Low Bit R_te Word Numbe_" (i _00)
Type of reco*'ding
H = High level analog
L = Low level analog
E = Parallel digital
S = serial digital
E = P_.,'aliei digital event
I = Fr_m_ synchronization and ID
Link assoeiated with 3SE and Flight ResTonse Eq'_.ipment
i = CSN Carry-on _easu,'ements
2 = CSM A_rborne _,leasurements
3 = CSM GSE Measurements
4 = LN C_r-_%,-on [.(easuremen_s
5 = Lbi FCX Telemeter }4easuremer.ts
6 = _i OgE Me_su=-ements
7 = LM Sup_lenen%al 14easu_,e_enss
@ = NSC Therm_i-Vaeu_ Facility M_a_uremen_s
9 = csM R&E Keasurements
Intcrleaver Channel Z_umber (i I)
Bit _oslticn within one $-bi% data woi'd whenever the m_.sui'ement apoe_rs_ (A-H) _ = t4gBLS3
First word position (time slot) within the first prime frame where the me__sarement appe_i's (l i26)
First pl-ime fi'ame where measurement appea_'s (]-5C)

t
Niobe=- of zeros that folio,* the first digit in samoie rate
First digit of sample _'a_e
(h) _evelopment _light Instrmvsntation
Ex_i_ple : A-16X-88/2,3
A 16X B8 /2,3
Co_nutator segment(s) r.umber when applicaole (I 93)

I _ Applicable mission Fhr.ses (i = Launch & BOOSt; 2 = Des:en_ phase; = As_ent phase)
IRIG Channel N_.her (i i6)_ (A-hi o_" (iC-iOC]
_4 _F 5ink K_bei" (A E)
P
13-30
NASA-S-68- 2065
Overhead
S-band steerable docking
antenna -----_._,,_ ' dow tenna (2)
Rendezvous \_j
radar g tunnel
S-band in[light
antenna -_ _ .------- Ascent stage
F- Control
antenna cluster
Ingress/
egress L_
hatch
Scimitar _._ _(_
iBm \_ eng,,e
Forward "_
(+Z) _ _1
Descent Descent
engine stage
skirt
Figure 15.2-1.- Lunar module configuration.

/-
13-31
NASA-S-68- 2066
Upper hatch-- .._ Electronic equipment
Aft equipment bay
I_ :ygen
(environmental control
system)
/ Ascent engine
"_ tank
Control _ Control engine
engine ' helium tank
cluster
engine
helium tank
Forward engine
oxidizer tank
hatch \ _.
tank
cove
Insulation
Fuel tank Descent
and micro-
Engine engine meteoroid shi.eld
ward
interstage
fitting
lizer tank
Oxidizer
Adapter attachment
point (
--uel tank
Gimbal Helium tank

ring
Descent l
engine
skirt
--- Figure 13.2-2.- Ascent and descent stages of LM-1.-

13-32
Figure 13.2-3.- Dimensions of lunar module.

NASA-S-68-2068
Docking tunnel
Midsection
Aft equipment bay
Control engine
cluster dew
Forward
Aft iriterstage fitting interstage
Ascent engine fiLLing
propellant tank Front face assembly
Crew compartment
L,O
I
Figure 13.2-4.- LM ascent stage structure.

13-34
NASA-S-68- 2069
Control
engine
Figure 13.2-5.- LM ascent stage structure (top view).

13-35
NASA-S-68-2070
_, +Y
-Z 27.000 (red
__-Z 31.000 (red _',
" Equipment rack assembly __
glycol fittingsq _ % ,
+X272.000(ref) 4) ,I- _ , _ ,'f " ' ,_
/ ........
t
fWl.
I
I I
_i ,--
I
----
/
/
_•
""T
_-4 / ........
',,
i ...... I IF
......... 4-- I ,- / _"- _ ....
:-_-............
......
_ _::q, :-::: : ............
..., T" _+X 233.500 (red
.f
Figure 13.2-6.- AFtequipmenl, bay s[ructure.

NASA-S-68-2071
I
Ouadrant 1-[ Ouadrant [
Water _ _,' gger
Fuel
Figure 13.2-7o- Descent stage structure (top view),

13-37
NASA-S-68- 2072
i
Figure 13.2-8.- Descent stage structure (side views).
13-38
NASA-S-68-2073
RCS system
helium pressurization
Ascent propulsion system
helium pressurization valve
Battery and relay

box (system B)
Three deadface
connectors
(circuit interrupter)
Descent propulsion system

helium pressurization valve
Interstage
umbilical
i cutters
Explosive devices Interstage

control panel explosive
bolts
Battery and relay box

(system A)
Figure 13.2-9.- Locations of explosive devices.

NASA-S-68- 2074
I Inverter 1
1
Single phase
Commander's
28 V dc Inverter 2 o
Off _ t. To descent
control
Mission O il / 5amp engine control
programmer Inverter i _L_ assembly
i I
System
engineer's __f7 _:::_I
'nverter2_) 1
iI .[
bus
Inverter 19 I 5 amp
Lu°°Vdc
.
Inverter 2
AC bus
400 Hz
tt I15 Vac rms
Mission Mission Mission

prograrnmer programmer programmer
control control control
to
I
Figure 13.2-10o- AC power system (contact positions shown are as-flown).

NASA-S-68- 2075
_ bO
I
Descent stage Ascent stage
O
I- ---- -I ,-----'1
I -_ I Re,ay
junction ' ""--¢
I I box System engineer's
Battery I Not used"l-_ 4ighl bus 28 V dc
T"' 'i Ill,

-
(typical)
--
T--- Low Co°G

_r°i
I! -- ,111
i J.
Lowl
I
iControl
I'
ill Control
assembly 3
Control
assembly 4
el
=1
Battery 2 I !" li = I Battery5 1 l Battery6 1 1<
.....
lassembly11
l
I
I I
I I I
I .2.
--a
cGS]E
r programmer programmer
ol i_, Mission
control Control Mission
control
lassembly 21- --
owor,,lI ,og,e 100 ampl- _
I I I_. J
BaLtery 3 I FCo_L_"_-- 1
I GiE i "
-I-I
= I --4il "-'
I I,I Commander's bus "-I
I I Control
I Battery
4 II II logic _ ,', Dead
face 28 V dc
I I -(-.- relay
i I
L .... I ,
Figure 15.2-11.- DC power system (contacLs shown in as-flown configurat-ion).
i
NASA-S-68-2077
Pulse code modulator and time eiectronics assembly
1024 KPPS sync signal from m _ _,--Sync and timing

LM guidance computer _ _,_ Timing electronics _ Mission elapsed time signals to other
I / I
Pulse code modulation I subsystems
'
[ Discrete and parallel digital data I _ Digital data
from LM
Transducers analog signals I -- guidance
and sensors (0 to 5 V dc) I ------] [ computer
Conditioned _ High level _ High L_ Analog to -- _ Digita _ Output --_51 200 bits
analog speed I digital multi- registc per second data
Eleotrical analog multiplexer gates I converter ptexer and to VHF and
signals signals (coder) i buffer_ S-band trans-
(0 to 5 V do) _,. [ iI mitters
Signal cond iti°ning I _ _ Geting

electronics assembly commands
Contains: I Timing
Attenuators Drive
signals
Demodulators Coder
Amplifiers c°rnmands [ t
Converters Reference Analog commands I
Buffers [ multiplexer
voltage Gate and driver Programmer -- _ Command and
sync signals
calibrator [ drivers commands to other sub-
Caution and warning data systems
electronics assembly
Caution and waroing I Caution and warning status ]
k,o
I
Figure 13.2-12.- Operational instrumentation functional block diagram. _

FJ
NASA-S -68- 2078 {f
rk_
Aerospace Response
Industries (Hz)
I transducers
Pressure Association
channel
Part of Vibration tC 1000
transducers
Vibration signal
main 2 (3 by 1 1/4:
commutator G rei 5C, 3C
2C 2000
1000
conditioner (b) and 10C 4C 2000
trensducers Vibration 6C ZOO0

I vibreUon ]_ -- I
commutator H I--m.-Channel 2C, 5C
7C 2000
1000 _ To transmitter
A
2 (5 by 1-1/4)1 and 5C 8C 1000
(b)/ 9C 1CO0
-- Channel 4C, t0C 1000
7C, 8C, and 9C
Modulation package D (constant bandwidth)
[ Pressure _l-_.--Channel 2, 3, 4, 10, 13, and 16 Instrumentation Hz

J._.._ ---'/N'l- Inter-Range]Response
Group
2 8
[ RPM F- Part of
_ 3
4
5
''
14
20
Stain
I signal
main _ _-_--Chanoel 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, and 15 7
6 35
25
8 45 _ To transmitter E
conditioner 9 60
Accelerationl (3) I0 80
vibration _ .---if I...l_--Channel 9, 11, and 12 11 110
12 160
Voltage- _ --'--I commutator

High level F 15
14 450
330
current @ /9o
// by lOc)
( LChannel E 16
15E 2100
220
600
Modula{ion package C (proportional bandwidth)
Temperature
signal
conditioner I Inter-range Response
Low level
(88 channel) commu[ator A I| lnstrumentatior
Group Hz
90 by l-l/4["a'- / Channel 14 2 8
Events (d) / 5 11
4 14
5 2O
Accelere[ion Channel 9, and 10 6

7 25
55
8 45 _ To transmitter C
Strain Channel 5, 6, 7, and 8 9 60
Par[of I0 80
nlain Ii II0
Pressure I'm
---------'q
(66) conditioner
signal 2, 3, 4,12,and 15 12
15 220
160
High level 14 3.30
15 450
commutator B _ Channel E 16 600
90 by I0
(c) E 2100
I JL Channel 15, and 16
i I l/2of
vibration -_,--Channel ii
J t commutator I
Modulation package A (proportional bandwidth)
Tempereturel__
sensors I I :Temperature
iog:Id_lt
io,1er hi Low level I
commutatorD l,--,,l_-Channel
E
i
[AcceleretionJ._-
j Channel 8, 9, and 10
r Inter-range Response
lnstrumentatior Hz
Group
•"'I'-- Channel and 15 2 8
I Strain _
I 5, 6, 7, 12, 3 ii
Part of 4 14
main 5 2O
I Pressure /_ signal _Channel 2, 3, 4, 13, and 14 6 25
conditioner 7 35
Vibration 9 60
10 80
5 V dc 12 160
re ference
supply Channel 11 13 220
11 110
I 15 450
I 16 600
25 V dc | E 2100
reference
supply
Modulationpackage B (proportional
bandwidth)
Notes:
(a) Numbers in( ) indicate relative and notabsolutenumbersof measurementparameters_

(b) Commutatorhas two setsof threeinputs.Each ofthethreeinputsissampled
sequentially for 1-1/4 seconds.
(c) Commutator has 90 inputs. Each input is sampled at a rate of 10 times per second.
(d) Commutator has 90 inpu[s. Each input is sampled at a rate of 1-1/4 times per second.
Figure 13.2-13.- DeveJopment flight instrumentation data conditioning and processing system.
_f
13-)43
NASA-S-68-2079
I UHF command
I_ Transmitter A Ii==. receiver

] Modulation package D 230.9MHz! L - 450 MHz
" Ii
Modulation package C I,_ Transmitter
257.3 /
aHz E L--=_-- --_ I--RF switch
I Modulation package
package B
A
Transmitter
241.5 MHz I o L,--m
r"-"---
plexer
C
I Modutation
......
P:q
247.8
Transmitter
MHz
D I
C ,_Transmitter BI
I[-----
I|
o1237.8
u
M.z/ 1 Adapter
"P r transmitter I _ower
I L._
I
,J
[
Figure 13.2-14.- Development flight instrumentation data transmission system.
NASA-S-68-2105
_7
[ Po_,er
divider
I rPower
divide,
I
I I
C-band r C-band 1
transponder A | transponder B I
r Figure 13.2-15.- Development flighLinstrumenLation ranging and tracking RFsysLem.
F_
NASA-S-68- 2080 2282.5 MHz (transmit)

2101.8 MHz (receive) _-
To MSFN .L"
f
S-band S-band"
infl ight infl igbt
S-band antenna antenna
steerable (omni) (omni)
-Z
Pseudo random S-band transponder ond power

[Signal process 1 noise ranging, S-band L amplifier
I-nae ui_menr I ....
..2 q .f..... smlulateaup-volce, I receiver 1i % Antenna

' _ i land simulated up-data select switch
PCMTEA ! I t##f'#._ I . I , ',
( nstrumen- _ I S-band
-,,-.-I
• I I
•
tahon sub-I, , t , and
vo,ce t 1 receiver 2 FI 1
'I I I PCM/NRZ , f I I
system II _ I I " - -I Phase / ',
I I I_#_Z_od-
_ modulator 1 [_ / S-band / I' L. --'1
driver and h I
]
/
II:Ece'ss_
I
III
I
- f
/
I - Freauency I 9 "_c_'_'imultiplier
I modulator _
1%1_
;
_ -_ _lr--
l' ......' I' l_ 4S-band iplex
V I
_ I Phase /
driver and Il,-.JI"
multiplier , _I II , I
To developmental _ modulator 2 r_ / ', Secondary Primary I
flightinstrumentation PCM/NRZ ' -- power power I
transmitter and timing _ i supp y supp y I
Pseudo random noiseranging,simulated'_ I
l____ up-voice and simulated up-data '
'_ Mission programmer control
Figure 13.2-16.- Communication system schematic.

NASA-S-68- 2081
Vehicle d_
Primary guidance, navigation

and control subsystem Retract
Gimbal trim commands Extend drive ---'1

I Inertial measurementunit Gimbal t
t _l actuator
Couplingdataunit Automaticthrottle Descent Automaticthrottle

l
t _ Status and switching commands control

engine Engine °n/°ff
LM guidance computer Engine arm assembly
t Subsystem
Uplink commands LM mission control

UHF upl inkb., programmer
Control engine _ Automatic engine on/off Descent

engine /_ /1_ Ascent
engine engine
arm engine
on/off
translation Stabil ization

conLrol and control
assembly assembly J Ascent engine on/off I-
Control engine on/off commands
(a) Primary guidance, navigation, and control.

Figure 13.2-17.- Control paths. '_
NASA-S-68- 2082
UHF uplink i
commands Retract o_
dynamics Rate I GimbaI trim commands I IThrottle
Vehicle I ""
Manual throttle Descent
assembly I commands
actuator
commands
assemb y Y I control Engine on/off

ratesB°dy +X translation I LM mission I ,,... _lSUbsystem_-
,._
I programmer J control
Engine Descent Ascent Descent Descent
on/off engine engine engine engine
arm arnl arm on/Off
T 1'
control assembly I
I and control
assembiy
f-- Ascent engine on/off
Jet on/offcommands r-_
Control
(b) Backup. engine

13-h7
NASA-S -68-2083
Fonvard left cluster assembly_,,,,_, =.mm_ Helium

-Fue_ fill disconnect ........ _aam Oxidizer
Fuet bleeddisconnect 7 ,............. Fuel
Fuel tank vent disconnect _ / N,C Normally closed

tleRum lest disconnect -_ /-- Fuel service disconnect NO Normally open
Helium fill vent disconnect _ -- _ _' _'_*,_4" SR4582T

PQMD \ Cluster I
_ Fuel 3R4583T
_N GR2461X
1085Q _* Regulatorassembly_ L femperature transducer
Fuel propellant tank _
;RS025P
Helium source temperatu re L Restrictor
Helium source pres s-ur;-_'_lOlP I _ N.O. bar, sducererature
Oxidizer ,..,,_.,_ _ iniector head
Pressure bansdu_
GN12OIP
GRIOOIX
_; _ Cluster]][
Fuel ascent interconnect filter _ GR7002X
Fromascent propellant supply _"
Fuel ascent intercomlect va
Fuel crossfeed valve-

/ OR32OlP
_ _
GRS024P
I
.......
3R4577T
=_H_.
_N_
u._ " Right hand aft cluster assembly __...l_f
___ ._,_,__ N.C GR2201P 3R3202P =_)m_r_ .................. ,,,,_£TlJq _GR4574T

N.C. il _er :_ _'_ _)GRSO14P va,ve _
rli_ _--
Oxidizer ascent interconnect liltel " _I. ! _" " .._.,_,_^ - " J--..F- Cluster_Z
f
__662_. " N 0 femp transducer oxidizer valve "
Oxidizer ascent interconnect u_,_t_ ZS

Oxidizer crossfeedvalve ORSOI3P GR4323T
PQ_D
OR4573T
_Q _._ GRSO2IP
Heliumtank-_L_ -_ OR2122T O R2462X L ..... __
System B _,_ Temperature transducer ..F fi°"2"ardri_ght cluster assembly

i_ Oxidizer main shutoff valve (N.O.)- fuel valve _ I
Temperature transducer-O Y[_0_gT
GRil_]l)2p
GRllO2P I _LHeliu filter pressure relief valve _ _' OR426]X ORSOHP
"_ Pressure tfansducer--/ _ _ _l 70T

Ifelium initiating OR1202PI GR5OIgP I Cluster E_
Pressure transducer J
:uel isolation , GR4262X
Helium quad check va Oxidizer tank venl disconnect -/
Oxidizer bleeddisc( _nect 1
/ valve GRSOI2P GR4322T
Oxidizer fill disconnect _ service disconnect Oxidizer isolation valve GR5020P L ......
P_opellant inlet filter Pressure transducer propellant inlet
Figure 13.2-18. - Reactioncontrol system.

's!;eLuaqaswats,_suo!slndoJd),uaasa(]-"6I-Z "_[ aJn6!j
- 13-49
NASA-S-68- 2085
•Helium _
filters
_ •_I_ Explosive
valves valves
Solenoid
reducers check
val yes
__3
Explosive
valves Explosive@
valves L[ '__
.... Relief valve Relief valve
Burst disk Burst
Fuel
Filter Filter
(fuel) (oxidizer)
ori lice orifice

,m To actuator
To isolation To control
control valves engine
o engine
Figure 13.2-20.- Ascent propulsion propellant/ pressurization schematic.

13-50
Ball
Actuator valves
shown
closed
demonstrate
redundancy Trim orifices
\ A\ /i\ / \ /iX /
/71\\ Combustion chamber /11_",,
Figure 13.2-21.- Ascent engineschemaLic.

NASA-S-68-2087
water
tanks
(_ Ascent (_
Ascent
Exhaust steam Ground service

equipment Vent
Ir II _reoo
]r
F--_--_
W ater _
sublimator Battery_
cold plates Freon boiler I
' ' ' ' ' ' II Accumulator
. Glycol _I
pump t__Power
package j_-supply
- • Freon I
Vent _
Fre°n--I boiler I
Ground
support _
q ..... I Critical
electronics
I
]1,-
-
,_e_no_'_o
_----_heatexchanger Cold plate _
ood
Ca_'_e_
t
exchanger
te
LD
I
MR
Figure 13.2-22.- Schematic of environmental control system. H
13-52
13.3 LAUNCH VEHICLE
The flight of launch vehicle AS-204 was the fourth flight to qualify
and flight test the Saturn-IB vehicle. It was the first flight of the
lunar module with the Saturn-IB launch vehicle. The space vehicle
(fig. 13.0-1) was approximately 181 feet long and consisted of an S-IB
stage, an S-IVB stage, an instrument unit, an adapter, a nose cone, and
a lunar module.
13.3.1 S-IB Stage
The S-IB stage was 80.3 feet long and 21.4 feet in diameter
(fig. 13.3-1). A cluster of eight uprated H-I engines powered the S-IB
stage and produced a total sea-level thrust of 1 600 000 pounds. Each
of the four outboard engines gimballed in a ±8-degree square pattern to
provide pitch, yaw, and roll control. _e inboard engines were canted
3 degrees and the outboard engines 6 degrees outward from the vehicle
longitudinal axis.
Fuel (RP-I) and oxidizer (liquid oxygen) were supplied to the engines
from nine propellant tanks arranged in a cluster. Oxidizer and fuel tank
pressurization modules regulated the tank pressures during ground opera-
tion and S-IB stage flight. Nominal stage propellant loading capacity
was 884 000 pounds.
Eight fins attached to the base of the S-IB stage provided vehicle
support and hold-down points prior to launch and provided inflight sta-
bility. The area of each fin was 53.3 square feet. Each fin extended
radially approximately 9 feet from the outer surface of the thrust struc-
ture.
Additional systems on the S-IB stage included: (a) flight control,

(b) hydraulic (which gimballed the outboard engines), (c) electrical,
(d) environmental control (which thermally conditioned the aft compart-
ment of instrument canisters F1 and F2), (e) data acquisition, (f) range
safety, (g) propellant utilization, and (h) four solid-propellant retro-
grade motors. Guidance and contr_l commands for the S-IB stage were
received from the instrument unit.
13.3.2 S-IVB Stage
The S-IVB stage (fig. 13.3-2) was 58.4 feet long and 21.7 feet in
diameter. A single gimbal-mounted J-2 engine powered the vehicle during
f
13-53
the S-IVB stage portion of powered flight. The engine was mounted on the
thrust structure and could be gimballed in a ±7-degree square pattern.
The engine provided 200 000 pounds total thrust at vacuum conditions when
the propellant mixture ratio was a nominal 5:1.
The tanks, fuel forward and oxidizer aft, were separated by a common
bulkhead. The fuel (liquid hydrogen) tank consisted of a cylindrical con-
tainer with a bulkhead at each end. The oxidizer (liquid oxygen) tank
consisted of the section between the cor_Lon bulkhead and an adjacent bulk-
head and enclosed by the structural skin.
Oxidizer and fuel tank pressurization modules regulated the tank

pressures during ground operations, S-IB boost phase, and S-IVB boost
phase. The pneumatic control system used ambient helium to operate the
control valves. Nominal propellant loading capacity was 228 500 pounds.
The auxiliary propulsion system of the S-IVB stage provided roll

control during S-IVB powered flight, attitude stabilization and reorienta-
tion after burnout, and attitude control during coast or maneuvering. The
modules were mounted on opposite sides of the S-IVB aft skirt.
Additional systems on the S-IVB stage included (a) flight control

.... (which included auxiliary attitude control and thrust vector control),
(b) hydraulic (which gimballed the J-2 engine), (c) electrical, (d) ther-
moconditioning (which thermally conditioned the electrical/electronic
modules in the forward skirt area), (e) data acquisition and telemetry
(which acquired and transmitted data for the evaluation of stage perfor-
mance and environment), (f) ordnance (used for rocket ignition, stage
separation, ullage rocket jettison, and range safety), (g) propellant
utilization, and (h) three ullage motors. Guidance and control commands
were received from the instrument unit.
13.3.3 Instrument Unit
The instrument unit was located just forward of the S-IVB stage.
It was a three-se_aent, cylindrical, unpressurized structure 260 inches
in diameter and 36 inches long. The cylinder formed a part of the vehicle
load-bearing structure and interfaced with the S-IVB stage and the adapter.
Various launch vehicle telemetry and tracking antennas were mounted on
the instrument unit. The instrument unit housed electrical and mechanical
equipment that guided, controlled, and monitored vehicle performance from
lift-off to atmospheric entry of the instrument unit.
NASA-S-d8- 2088 I_
GO
I
/4, Fin
antenna Oxidizer fill and drain J
,,
'
radiation assembly e trunk Accessdoor f" //
3 places typical 8 places_ (corrugated)
line barrel
line Oxidizer intercennector line-
/,.
v vu_oa,u
._o niH_k rrl
" ] engine
...... "_ :cant angle
Spider _
beam_ © ,3 ° inboard
cant angle
:_ ' _ shield
Distributor '_ _ \/' \ manifold
assembl \ _ "
/-Lube oil drain
Vehicle '_./ _,' _-- Fuel manifold
erection d rain
/ lition monitor
target
/ valve drain
I _Anti-slosh baffles interconneetor line Oxidizer seal
t compartment F- 1O5inch oxidizer _Vehicle erection target cavity drain
-Fuel pressurization manifold containers Fuel fill and drain e from heat
Anti-slosh Outboard fuel suction ' II exchanger outboard
typical for eight Inboard fuel suction I
70 inch container_ Inboard oxidizer suction
-- Forward surface of
Outboard oxidizer suction
Corrugation
h Heat shield
fuel containers Fuel fill

--Forward surface of and drain
oxidizer containers line
-- Aft surface of
spider beam
L S-IB stage
forward
Figure 13.3-I.- S-Z_stage.
NASA-S-68-2089
J-2
V Maintenance
propulsion
i system
C2)
Forward skirt Tangent point i
aft bulkhead _. skirt
Hydrogen ,xidizer Common _ Ixidizer tank access
_ulkhead I vent platforms
I
I dizer
.... _ suction
..... l line
_ee
! '_ I D
"¢° ' F'_.: "
i , n tunnel \,
probe Access door LH 2 suction line

Forward kuxiliary .oxidizer mass
bulkhead
--8 helium spheres LH 2 chill down rocket
(4 per row as shown) return line
•Forward skirt vent H

co
4 places I
,o7
Figure 13.5-2.- S-I_B stage. ,,_q
13-56 -
13.4 ADAPTER AND NOSE CONE
The adapter structure was an aluminum honeycomb truncated conical

shell (fig. 13.4-1). The aft section had four attachment points for
the lunar module. The forward section was four panels (fig. 13.4-2)
which were separated by a mild detonating fuse explosive train about •
9 minutes after the nose cone had been jettisoned. Control engines ro-
tated each panel about an aft hinge line to the open position, where
each was retained by a cable retention system.
The spacecraft/lunar module adapter controller accepted commlands

from the launch vehicle instrument unit to initiate nose cone jettison
and adapter panels deploy. The controller also accepted commands from
the lunar module mission programmer to initiate separation of the lunar
module from the adapter. For a schematic of system A (system B is re-
dundant), see figure 13.4-3.
The two controllers were mounted 90 degrees apart within the adapter
below the panels. The sequencer logic was powered by a 5 amp-hr battery
and the pyrotechnic devices by a 0.75 amp-hr battery. A total of four
batteries were installed: one 5 amp-hr and orie 0.75 amp-hr battery to
power system A, and a duplicate of each to power system B.
The nose cone (fig. 13.4-2) was furnished by the Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC). It was a conical shell constructed of aluminum
skin, stringers, and ring frames with a cone angle of 25 degrees. The
nose cone was detached from the adapter by pyrotechnic devices and was
separated from the adapter by 16 springs.
f
13-57
NASA-S-68-2063
Separation cone
LM-1
Forward
Interface deadface
cable cutter
Panel hinge
Aft panels--,,, VHF/UHF

antennas (2)
Contro
at unit
,, command antennas
Launch vehicle
digital computer
S-T_TB
instrument
unit
"f Figure 13.4-1.- Location of lunar module within adapter,

_o
Nose cone 0 _"

Separation line I
O_
I
0"
O0
I
Forward r,o
adapter _, oo',
panels 4_
Blast
shield
panels __ P .
Figure 13.4-2.- Adapter panel separation lines.
i i
r
, I •
NASA-S-68- 2076
."ELF"
-I
Safelogicbus Imission I +28v
instrument
/ / /,l._
(ground support _ ' unit telemetry __0/I _ 0_' Fi4.5-._9£i-0 "J
, _ LM/adapter separaL on command power I I \ i',_'z_..'_. /
equipment) KI_K2 Jpr°grammerl
!
I ---'_"'
I o Ii
_ -- -- --I
+28V insLrument
unit teleX'
_K1
_'_i_mpfrv_
z.2
Logic
1___ [
i.j_
I
....
/ / Adapter panels deploy command
power _--0_1
I
0_0_10_
I
_'L_;_'_',a_l
\ '=_'=_' P'_"='°/ I
:
battery
(5 amp. hr)
I , _ O I
Nose cone +28V ,nstrument ,,_I Z7 _ _eploy A / I
_mmand unit telemetry __r,.*_l___ K2
I -_-
Arnllogicbus I , ll.stru_&tiK_lzl _K2 power /Inslrume0t\ I =
(ground support_j---_ , unit i "_1_11 -- / / / ,,nil- _l_m_f,,X I
I--____.--I I _ ', >-O'1 O"O/I O_ .... ___"T_"_
'_''' _1
eqmpment) _L_ I --- I / i "\ '.'_?,7%"_
-_""""'"" / "'I
KZ -T- K2 II 'I II II _1
I -'_ I
Safe pyre bus
(ground support
1(o.75am-piN__'l I--"-_,
P I ,L- ,oJ
equipment KI____K2
separation _
HJ
Figure 13.4-3.- Nose cone jettison controller, schematic diagram of system A of a redundant A and B system, bo
I
kJq
',.o
13-60
13.5 WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA
The spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo 5 mission are summa-
rized in table 13.5-1. These data represent the actual conditions as
determined from postflight analyses of the expendable items loaded and
used during the flight.
The weight and the center of gravity were measured for each stage
prior to stacking. Inertia values were calculated for the actual weight
data obtained. All changes subsequent to measurement and prior to launch
were monitored and the mass properties were revised as required.
The mass properties and expendable items loaded at launch did not
vary significantly from the predicted values used to establish the opera-
tional trajectory. As a result_ updating of mass properties and trajec-
tory data was not required prior to launch.
The variations in mass properties were determined for each signifi-

cant mission phase from lift-off through the end of the second ascent
engine firing. The usage of exT)endables was based on postflight analysis
of the mission data. All available ascent and control engine propellants
were depleted during the second ascent engine firing, and the vehicle
became uncontrollable.
TABLE 13.5-1.- MASS PROPERTIES
Center of gra,lity, in. Moment of inertia, Jslug-ft 2
X Y Z Ixx lyy Izz
Launch
Ascent stage 4 613 257.5 -0.6 0.7 2 560 i 2 412 1 494
Reaction control propellant 612 ib

_eight, 276.9 0.0 1 0.0 292 32 268
Ascent propellant 5 150 227.1 -0.2 0.0 3 547 13 3 546
Descent stage 3 353 157.3 12.8 0.7 2 359 1 487 1 642
Descent propellant 17 800 159.2 0.0 0.0 ii 259 7 118 4 627
Total _ at launch 3] 528 186.8 1.2 0.2 20 126 22 474 23 096
Launch to first descent
engine firing
LM/adapter umbilical -6 209._ 89.0 -29.2 0 0 0
Reaction control propellant -27 291.9 i 8.2 -0.5 15 2 14

Environmental control
-23 302._ i -7.6 -4.2 4 i 3
consumables
-_ Total LM at first descent

31 472 186.6 1.2 0.2 20 096 22 338 22 937
engine firing

to first coast
Descent propellant -15 403.C 0.0 I 3.6 9 185 185
Total LM at first coast 31 457 186.5 1.2 0.2 20 086 22 371 22 971
First coast to second descent

engine firin_
Reaction control propellant -32 291.] 13.9 -1.8 14 0 ii
-i0 301.8 0.0 0.0 2 0 i
consumables
Total _4 at second descent

engine firing 31 415 186.3 1.2 1
m
0.2 20 070 22 266 22 853
Second descent engine firing

to third firing
Descent propellant -306 181.8 0.0 0.0 193 93 49
Reaction control propellant -54 287.3 4.9 I -0.5 25 i 20
Total LM at third descent

3]. 055 186.2! 1.2 0.2 19 851 22 053 22 064
engine firing
r
13-62
TABLE 13.5--1.- MASS PROPERTIES - Concluded
Center of gravity, in. Moment of inertia, slug-ft 2

Weight, ib
X Y Z I I I
XX yy zz
Third descent engine firing

to abort staging
Descent propellant -179 187.6 -0.3 O.0 113 40 15
Reaction control propellant -15 257.0 -3.0 -l.0 7 • 6
Total LM at abort staging 30 861 186.2 1.2 0.2 19 732 21 998 22 628
Abort sta i_n_ to second coast
Descent stage (jettison) -3 347 157.3 •2.8 0.7 2 359 1 487 l 642
Descent stage propellsnt

(jettison) -17 300 158.3 0.0 0.0 i0 944 6 909 4 488
Ascent engine propellant -682 242.6 0.0 0.0 468 38 430
Reac<ion control propellant 3 288.7 -14.8 14.8 i 0 1
Total LM at second coast 9 529 242.8 -0.5 0,4 5 849 3 063 5 382
Second coast to second ascent

e__ine firin_
Environmental control -8 300.9 0.0 0.0 i 0 i

Cons UIf_ble s
Reaction control consumables -377 276.0 4.6 C.5 177 16 159
Total LM at second ascent

engine firing 9 144 241.4 -0.7 0.4 5 669 2 947 5 121
Second ascent_irin_
to end of firin_
Ascent propellant -4 282 225.5 0.0 0.0 2 946 3 2 930
Reaction control propellant -53 267.4 -44.5 I_.7 2 2 0
Nozzle ablation -i0 220.2 0.0 0.0 0 0 0
-1 300.2 0.0 0.0 0 O 0
consumables
Total _,] at end of second 4 798 255,3 -0.9 0.7 2 698 2 505 • 725
ascent stage firing
14-1
14.0 VEHICLE HISTORIES
Figure 14-1 shows the history of the _-i at Bethpage, New York.
Figure 14-2 shows the history of the _q-i at Kennedy Space Center.
9
1)4-2
,!_<!
!
NASA-S -68- 2090
June July August Septenlber October November Decenlber 1966 1967 January February March April May JuRe July
5 12 19 20 3 lo 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 2s 21 9116123130161131201271411111812_I 11 81isl 221291sl 12119126121,_2119126121 9116123130171141211281411111812_I 21 9116123130
Spacecraft acceptance review ,_ CusLon]er acceptance readiness review •
Development flight instrumentation (DFI) harness installation
Ascent stage Cold flow I Ascent stage cold flow
| Ascent stage engine functional and blowdown
Electrical system h]stallaLion I Ascent interstage leak Lest
Electrical continuity tests DFI renlove, Lest and install new harness
Manufacturing and system installation _ Install ascent stage hetium regulators I

Ascent sta{le engine installation I I Pack and ship
Electrical continuity tests [] Tub installation I Weigh andgravity

center of determine
Mate [] Tub area sell off | Demate
_ Manufacturing and system installation I G&N functions _ qnicl<

Cabin disconnect rework
leak Lest and
inspection and rework _ Drain and dry

Electrical continuity tests _ _ Final engineering evaluation
acceptance Lest (plugs in) _
_ NASA shal(edown
DFI fix and test • Final engineering
ance test- plugs evaluation
out accept-
Manufacturing and system installation I Modifications and rework I Drain and dry I Retest and work off discrepancies
emate I Mate ascent stage to descent stage

Cold flow Modifications and rework _ Drain and dry
Descentstage _ Electrical continuity tests Final

test - engineering
plugs in evaluation acceptance [] I EPS rework
inspection and rework

Reconfigure I _ NASA shakedown
I Top deck rework
Final engineering evaluation acceptance
test dry run [] Install helienl ii]odule
Demate, modification and rework I • Descent sLage cold flow
Ascent stage vibration tests 1 I Pre-instailationtest

engine
package installation
Rework • [] Descent stage
] Balance of cold flow
Mated vibration tests I [] Structural rework for staging
Figure 14-1,- LM-1 historyaLBeLhpage,

1.4-3
NASA-S -68- 2091 Weekendingdates
June
25 21 91 July 161 231 30 61 August
181 201 27 31 September
i0[ 17[ 24 ii 81 OcLober
151 221 29 51 Novelober
121 191 26 31 December
101 17I
1967 241 31 7[January 141
1968 2112_
APS modifications at contractor's Long Island facility __ APS reinstallation and leak checl< I Nose cone tnate
A
_
MSC flight
readiness review
_IL NASA headquarters
-- flight readiness review
• Ascent stage received and inspected I APS engine installation and APS he]lure regulator replacement I Mate stages [] Test preparation I RCS leak check
[] Torque check propellant sysLem and check gamma fittings _ Ascent stage leak checks [] Test preparation _ Integrated systems test I Data processing and evaluation
I Ascent stage ECS leak test _ Replace descent stage heat exchanger I Reverification test IMissionsimulation preparations | Emissivity and rel:lectivity test
_Ascentl)ropuJsion systenl (APS) leak Lest _Water managenlentsystem rework [] Prop e]jantjeak test I [] I MJssio'] simulation ISofLware ,ntegratJon LesL(MCC-H)
I Remove APS engine I s eu at on test cpugs

n) I Move and ,,,ate stages I Mission simulation test (plugs in) []i integrationMCC-"
softwaretest [] Ordnance installation (space vehicle)
Program coupler m Hardware check (launch vehicle)

[] Move and n]ate stages I Probleol resolution I seLup
GSE configuration I Remove APS hardware "mlnitiator
resistanceinstallation
check and explosive devices m assembly reverification
IAPS load preparation

I TesL preparaLion I Maximum design operating pressure test I Development l:light instrnnlentaLion modil:icaLions I Move preparation llOyd,all test no.Z preparation Iand dry l:irP, g
mlHypergolic servicing setup-l:oel

Combined system test and OPS rework [] Reverification tests ICabin leak checks I Overall test no. 1 I and oxidizer
IDemate and ,,love stages I Mission simulation test (plugs in) | Move l:or SLA ,,,ate [] Overall Lest
11o. 2 preparation
I Reoonl:ig Ure I lesp ectiOn I Overa" test rio. 2 I APS _oading
I Polarity test I Remove and modify inertial measurement unit I Reconfigure and evaluation RP-I loading
(launch vel, icle
I Reconfigure I LM/SLA ,,late I Systenl verification

[] Water
--servicing
Descent stage rework and leak checks • Mission simulation test (plugs out) I SLA assembly Flight readiness test I I Inspection closeout I
(space vehicle)
Descent propulsion system (DPS)leak test • Problem resolution I SLA pyrotechnics installation Countdown demonstration test
• Descent stage ECS leak test I Descent stage leak check I Move preparation Recycle I
J
ITorque check propellant system a,d c]eck gannna fittings I Denlate stages I Move to launch complex 37 Countdown []
• Descent stage received and inspected I Remove DPS hardware I Move to polarity I:ixture Launch ,1_
/_ DPS modifications at contractor's Long Island facility DPS reinstallation and leak check
Figure 14-2,- LM-]- history at Kennedy Space Center,
r
15-i
15.0 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS
The following table lists the s1_plemental reports to be published

for the Apollo 5 mission:
Responsible Expected
No. Subject analysis publication
manager date
i General Supplement (anomalies T.J. Grace 5/6/68

closeout, errata, and minor
supplemental information)
2 Apollo 5 Postflight Trajectory D.J. Incerto 5/1/68

Reconstruction
Volume I - Analysis
Volume II - Trajectory
3 Detailed Analysis of S-band A.D. Travis 5/3/68

f Communications
4 Analysis of Digital Autopilot J.F. Hanaway 4/30/68

Performance
5 Apollo 5 Guidance and Navigation J.F. Hanaway 4/15/68

Error Analysis - Final Report
6 Dynamics of LM/S-IVB Stage J.F. Hanaway 5/1/68

Separation
7 Detailed Analysis of _escent R.B. Ferguson 5/22/68

Engine Performance
8 Detailed Analysis of Ascent R.B. Ferguson 5/22/68

Engine Performance
Supplemental reports will not be distributed to all persons who

receive the Mission Report. Persons who do not receive supplements may
request a specific supplement from BF66, Manned Spacecraft Center,
Houston, Texas.
16-m
16.0 REFERENCES
i. Chrysler Corporation, Space Division: AS-204/LM-I Launch Vehicle

Operational Flight Trajectory. Revision i TN AP-67-255
July 25, 1967
2. Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo V Mission, AS-204/LM-I Spacecraft

Operational Trajectory. IN 67 FM-194 (3 volumes) December 29, 1967
3. Marshall Space Flight Center: Apollo V Mission Report, Launch

Vehicle (This report has not yet been released; therefore, no
report number can be cited.)
4. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp: LM Instrumentation Installation

Photographs, LM-I. LED-360-423 June 23, 1967
5. Manned Spacecraft Center: PA-I Static Firing. PA I-7A-005, MSC

WSTF, Las Cruces, New Mexico. January 3, 1968
6. Office of Manned Spaceflight: Apollo Flight Mission Assignments (U)

OMSF Confidential Document M-D _ 500-11, SE 010-000-i, November 14,
1966
7. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Manned Spacecraft

Center: Apollo Report. SPD7-R-002, Revision 5, December 4, 1967
17-i
17.0 DISYRIBUTION
Addressee _ Addressee
Na=ional Aeronautics an_ Space A_,dni_ra_ion Natlona! Aeronautics ard _paee Ad_,tnistration
Washi_gton_ D. C. 205_6 i,lan_ed
S_aeeeraft Center
Houston, Texas 77058
_/$. C. Pniiiips i A_O!!O ApF1!cations Progr_ ¸ Office

_/G. H. Hage 1 Attention: _/_. F. '_om_son
MA/W. C. Schneider i KA/J, E. Roberts/_I.B. Mitchell •
_,_O/J. K. Holeomb i F2/Manager. F_ture Missions Project Office i
l,_/Progr_IL Control Director • _24/Manager.Mission Opera_ions Office 2
_R/G. C. White • KP/Manager, Program Control Office i
_,_'_S/_.
L. Wa_ner i KS/Manager, Systems _Jglneering Office i
_._T/L.Eay 5 KT/_,:anager,
Test C_eration_ Office 1
MC/_SF F_eld Center Develcl_men_Director i _/M_,ager, Orbital W_rksho_ ProJee_
_ID/E.Ccrtri_h_ ! Office 1
I _/. Savage i Reliablii_y and _al_ty Ass_anee Cff±ce

MT/Advance Manned Hi_slons Frogram D!reetor 2 A_tention: NA/A. C. Bond 8
i_/M.C. Ad_ i
S/J. E. Na_gle ] Apollo Spacecraft Progr_ Office
T/G. 14. _._zynskl I 0ffiee of Progr_n Manager
USS IC/I_A_AHeadauarters Libr_-y 2 Attention: _A/O. F.
PA/E. M. M.
LowRees i
PA/K. _. Kleinknech_ i
PA/C. l{.Bolender i
PA/S. H. Si_pkinson i
?A/G. _. S. Abbey i
_A/H. W. Tin,all i
3
National Aer_autic_ _d $_ace A_inistrat!on PA/A_olI_ Files
Xanned $_acecraft Ce_er ?D/Chief, Systems _gineering Division I_
Hog,ton, Texa3 77O58 PE/Chief, _ Project Engineering _ivision 5
PF/Chief, C&SM fro_ee_ E_gi_eerin_ Division 3
0ffiee of _irectcr PT/Chief_ Test Divisio_ 15
Attention: _/H, R. _ilruth i PP/Chief, Progr_ Control Divisicn 3
AB/G. S. Trlmble i
AC/P. E. Purser i fI_A-_ASPO
r AG/D. Collins i Gr_an _ireraft _nglneering _orooration
_H,R. O, Piland i Beth_age, N_w York i171_
A_tentlcn: P_/A. Hobokan 10
Legal Office
A_ention: AL_/_. F. Ma_the_s i NASA-_J_SP0
_or_h _eriean Rockwell Corporation
Public Affairs _ffice 12214 Lakewood _ivd.
Attention: '_P/P.Haney _ Downey, Califor_ia 9O241
_/J Riley Attention: PC/';.H. Gra_r 13
AP6/Ht_torica_ Of_iee 7-
APS/_ission Planning an_ O_er_tions Fligh_ Safe_y Office
Office i A_enti_n: SA/A. C, 3ond 5
Director of A_min!st_aticn Director =_ S_ience an_ Applleatio_s

Attention: BA/P. H. _i_beek 2 Attention: _A/W. _. _e_s i
3F6/Re_roduc_io_ Servi_e_ 3ranch i TD/Hana_er, Lunar Su_'faeeProject Office i
BF66/_istribution 0_eration S_etion TF/Hanager, Test and Opera=ions O_fiee 2
3M4/Security Branch i TG/Chi_f_ Space Physics Division 1
3M_/Technical !nfcrmation ?reparati_n
Branch _ ASPO Acting M_ager, K$0
BM6/Library Processes _£fiee 16 Kennedy Space Center, Florida
Attention: PSK/A, E. Mor_ 2
Director of Flight Cre'_O_eraticns
Atte_tion: CA/D. K. $1ayton i Goddard Space Flight Cen_er Liaiso_ Offi_e_ OSF-L i
CB/Chief, Astronau_ Office _ A_tention: GSF-L/'4.B. Easter i
CF/Chief, Flight Crew Suppor_ Division
Marshall Space Flight Center _esident Liaison _ff_ce
Dire=tot of Medtcai Research and Operations A_tention: _L/J. T, N_ilton 1
Attention: DA/C. A. Berry, M._. 4
DB/Ch_ef, 3iomedlcal Research Office 2 _angley _ese_rch Center Liaison Office
DE/Chief, Medteal Operation_ Cffice i A=tention: R_/A. T. Mattson i
D_rec_or cf Engineering _nd Development DOD Manager's Liaison Office

A_tenticn: EA/_. A. Fage_ 5 Attention: Z_2/Cmdr. R. E. Oolopy i
% LB/Chief, !nfcrmaticn Systems Division i0
EC/Chief, Cre_ S_r_t_msDivfsion 6 _'_ASA_1_s Research _enter
_D/Chief, Co_l_u_attsnand Analysis D_vi_ion _ l._offe_tFiel_, California _4035
EE/Chief, instrumentation and Electronic Attention: G. Gcodw!n 1
Syst_m_ Division i0 H.J. Allen 1
EG/Chief_ Ouid_.ce an_ Oontroi Dfvision i0 _11esResearch C_nter Libra,, 6
_!'/Chief,_:ro_ulsionand Power _ivis_s_ !2
ES/Chief_ Structures and Mechanics Division 15 Eastern Test Range
ET/Chi_, Advanced Spacecra_ Technology Patrick Air Force Base_ Fio_ida
Division 3 Attention: Major General V. _. K_ston i
Colonel R. Olson, _OD Manager 3
_ireetor of Flight C_erations
A_ten_ion: FA/C. C. Kraft, Jr, i _A_A Elec_ronics Research Center
FC/Chief, Flight Control Division LO _65 T_ch_o_ogy Square
FL/Chief, Landing _a _ecove_ Division 5 g_hridge, Massachusetts O2139
_/3hlef. _,_issionPlanning and Analysls Attention: J. C. EL_s i
Division
_L/_hief, Flight Support Division 3 N_SA f'lightResearch Center
_ Post 0ffi_e Box 273
Edward_, Ca_ifcrnla 93523
Attention: P. F. Bikle i
17-2
Addressee No_ies A_!dressee
_;ASAOoddard Space Flight Center Gru_nan Aircraft Eng±_eerAng Corporaticn

Gree_,belt,:i_z_rland
20771 Kennedy Space Cente,',Florida
Attention: DiR/John F. Clark i Attention; _. X. Sku,-:a
506/M. I.I.Thor_son • IC
5C61W. P. Varso_ i Gr_z_an Aircraft _glneerJng _orporatio_
550/T. Roberts i !7_0 NASA Boulevard
8C0/0. _._.Covington I Houston_ Texas 77058
8CI/H. F. Tho_scn ! Attention: J. _. Bux_cn ]0
81C/_lannedFlight EY.glneeringDivision 5
820/Xanned Flight Operation_ Division 6 TRW, Incorporated
830/Manned Fli_t P!_ning and Analysis Space Park Dri1_e
Division 5 Houghton.Yexas 77'05!!
8h0/_ASA Co_._ica_ion5 Division 5 Attention: HI 2O58/7,._o_n_io_m 6
G_ddard Space Fl±gh_ Ce_er Libra_,r 3 ,.L
Jet Propulsion La_orat_r7
John F. Ke :edv Sp ce Center, N_A Pasadena, California
_;ASAKe_ned. S_ace
Attenti,_n: Cen_er,
_2/R. Florida 32899
O. Mi_dletoa i Attention: DIR!W. H. '_cker±,_ i
AP-SCO/S. T. Beddingfield i North _eric_n Rockwell Ccr_oratio_
AT-S3CTK E. McCoy i 12214 Lakewood Blv&.
CD/Dr. K. IL Deb_ 1 Downey, Callfor_ia 9024O
D_,'G M. Preston i
IN/K. S_ndler i Attention: Z. Z. _._yer_ 25
Z0/R. A. Petrone I _orth hner!can Rockw,,llCo._oration

LOIW. J. Kale,an _ K_,_ne.lv
Space Cent_r_ Flor_da
rS/J.
LS/A. J.
X. Will_is
Busch !i At_en_ion_ B. Heil_ 5
L$ _;NG/_.T. S_seen I North _r_er_canRock,eli Co,pora_ion

iS-CAS-42/John F. Ke_,_edyS_ace Center 181-0_ASA Bo_!evard
Lib "a_," 6 Suite 201
_ou_ton, Texas 77_56
:_ASA_i_ _cs_arch Center Attent±on: W. P. $hor_ 3
C!eY_d, _)_io_L35 _e Boeing Ccmpa_

Attent_,,_.:D_-ec_o_- i S_ace Divlsio_ Houston
Lewis Research Cen_er Library 6 P. 0. Box 5871.7
Houston, Texas 7705_
_ASA George ,2._ar_hall $_ace Fligh_ Center A_tenti_n: N. J. McClellan
liuntsv_lle_'\labia _5812 i0
A_te_tion: M-Dir/W. yon Bra_ 1 General Electric _oi_]_ r
!-X0/F. A. Speer i i_30 NASA Bculevar_
H_cro-F/J. p. Lin_erg 6 P.O. _ox 58L08
Ma,'saal! $_ace F!ignt Center Libra_ r 6 Houston, Texas 7705_
Attention: L. W. Warzecha IG
;;,_A_rI_c
Whlt,,_ands _._is_ile
_ange
_. O. _rawe,¸ _
:as C_-uc_s,_ew M_xic_ S80CI
Attent±_r1: _A/_. L. _a_nes 5
_ASA-Hf_PO
_assachus_tu_ in_t±t_t_ of Techno]o_
,'5Cam_rid_,,Parkway
;_ambridge,Xa_sa_husetts 02142
Attcnti_,_: E_442/A. C. Metzger 2
_assachusetLs Insti_C¢ of Technolo_ r

r'5Cam_ridg, Parkway'
,_amb,'_dge_
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Attenci,,:_:D. C. Hc_ 3
_A_A _SPC
_lilwa-_kee,
1,,'iscons±n
5323C
AC Electronics D_v[sion, General 1%t_rs Corporation

_ilwaukee, '_lisconsln5_2C0
Attenti,,,,:H. Br_, 3
",mold E_ ,_erig Dcve!_ment Center

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APOLLO SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY
(Continued from inside front cover)
Mission Spacecraft Description Launch date Launch site
Apollo _ SC-017 Supercircular Nov. 9, 1967 Cape Kennedy,

LTA-10E entry at lunar Fla.
return velocity
Apollo 5 LM-I First lunar Jan. 22, 1968 Cape Kennedy,

module flight Fla.

Apollo 5 Mission Report

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MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

Mission Spacecraft Description Launch date Launch site

PA-I BP-6 First pad abort Nov. 7, 1963 White Sands

A-001 BP-12 Transonic abort May 13, 1964 White Sands

A-002 BP-23 Maximum dynamic Dec. 8, 1964 _rlite Sands

AS-103 BP-16 Micrometeoroid Feb. 16, 1965 Cape Kennedy_

A-003 BP-22 Low-altitude abort May 19_ 1965 White Sands

AS-104 BP-26 Micrometeoroid May 25, 1965 Cape Kennedy_

AS-105 BP-gA Micrometeoroid July 30, 1965 Cape Kennedy,

A-004 SC-002 Power-on tumbling Jan. 20_ 1966 White Sands

AS-201 SC-009 Supercircular Feb. 26, 1966 Cape Kennedy,

AS-202 SC-011 Supercireular A1ig. 25, 1966 Cape Kennedy,

(Continued inside back cover)

APOLLO 5 MISSION REPORT

Prepared by: Apollo 5 Mission Evaluation Team

March 27, 1968

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .............. xxii

1.0 S_ '_[_RY ....................... i-i

2.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION ................. 2-1

2.1 PLANNED MISSION ................ 2-1

2.2 ACTUAL MISSION ................. 2-1

3.0 TRAJECTORY DATA ................... 3-1

3.1 LAUNCH ..................... 3-1

3.2 ORBIT ..................... 3-2

3.2.1 Trajectory Profile Analysis ...... 3-2

3.2.2 Lunar Module/S-IVB Stage

3.2.3 Maneuver Profile Analysis ....... 3-4

4.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE SUMMARY .......... 4-1

5.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE ........ 5-1

6.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE ............... 6.1-1

6.1 STRUCTURES ................... 6.1-1

6.1.1 Loads ................. 6.1-1

6.1.2 Vibrations ............... 6.1-3

6.2 THERMAL CONTROL ................ 6.2-1

6.2.1 Launch Phase Thermal Response ..... 6.2-1

6.2.2 Control Engine Plume Impingement .... 6.2-1

6.2.3 Descent Stage Heat Shield ........ 6.2-2

6.2.4 Abort Staging .............. 6.2-3

6.2.5 Ascent Stage Structure ......... 6.2-4

6.2.6 Second &scent Engine Firing ....... 6.2-5

6.3 LANDING GEAR .................. 6.3-1

6.4 PYROTECHNIC ............. . ..... 6.4-1

6.5 ELECTRICAL POWER ................ 6.5-1

6.6 MISSION PROGRAMMER ............... 6.6-1

6.7 INSTRUMENTATION ................. 6.7-1

6.7.1 Development Flight Instrumentation . . . 6.7-1

6.7.2 Operational Instrumentation ....... 6.7-3

6.7.3 Calibration ............... 6.7-4

6.7.4 Launch Vehicle Instrument Unit ..... 6.7-4

6.8 COMMUNICATIONS ................. 6.8-1

6.8.1 LM Cormnuaications Performance ...... 6.8-1

6.8.2 LM/Network Communications System

6.9 RADAR ...................... 6.9-1

6.10 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL .............. 6.10-i

6. i0. i Summary ................. 6. i0-i

6.10.2 Integrated System Performance ...... 6.10-1

6.10.3 Primary Guidance, Navigation, and

6.11 REACTION CONTROL ................ 6.11-1