Injunction Before The RTC Makati Against Respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA), A

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181970 August 3, 2010

BERNARDO DE LEON, Petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY substituted
by the CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, RAMON ARELLANO, JR., RICARDO PENA and
REYMUNDO ORPILLA, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 182678
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (now PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY),
substituted by the CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, Petitioner, vs. HON. SELMA PALACIO
ALARAS, in her capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 135, Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, and BERNARDO DE LEON. Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: Petitioner De Leon filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC Makati against respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA), a
government-owned corporation. The suit for damages hinged on the alleged unlawful
destruction of De Leons fence and houses constructed on Lot 5155 containing an area
of 11,997 square meters, situated in San Dionisio, Paranaque, which De Leon claimed
has been in the possession of his family for more than 50 years. Essentially, De Leon
prayed that one, lawful possession of the land in question be awarded to him; two, PEA
be ordered to pay damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on Lot 5155;
and, three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA from committing acts which
would violate his lawful and peaceful possession of the subject premises. The court a
quo found merit in De Leon’s application for writ of preliminary injunction and issued the
assailed order.

The Ninth Division of this Court ruled that the court a quo did not act in a capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
against PEA. PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari.

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling Accordingly, in its Decision dated 20 November
2000, the Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a public land so that De Leons
occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not confer ownership or possessory
rights. Prescinding therefrom, no writ of injunction may lie to protect De Leons nebulous
right of possession.
The aforesaid Decision became final and executory as no motion for reconsideration
was filed. In due course, PEA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that
De Leon and persons claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and peaceably
surrender possession of Lot 5155.
ISSUE: WON De Leon can only be removed from the subject land through ejectment
proceedings
RULING: NO De Leon insists that what this Court did in PEA v. CA was to simply
dismiss his complaint for damages and nothing more, and that the RTC erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of execution placing PEA in
possession of the disputed property. He insists that he can only be removed from the
disputed property through an ejectment proceeding.
The Court is not persuaded. As a general rule, a writ of execution
should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is
void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. [21] The settled
general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential
particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it
seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be
executed.[22]

However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership.
[23]
Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of
the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing
that the defeated party’s claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of
ownership.[24] Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of
possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land
independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected. [25] This is precisely what
happened in the present case. This Court had already declared the disputed property as
owned by the State and that De Leon does not have any right to possess the land
independent of his claim of ownership.

In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to
place the prevailing party in possession of the property. [26] If the defendant refuses to
surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper
officer should oust him.[27] No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the
decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the
sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the improvements on
the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. [28] The
removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read
into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the
removal of the improvements.[29]
It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the
decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. [30] In the
present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court and file an ejectment
case simply to establish its right to possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leon’s
claims, the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court did not constitute an
unwarranted modification of this Courts decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a
necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential consequence of this
Courts ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel of land as public and at the same
time dismissing De Leon’s claims of ownership and possession. To further require PEA
to file an ejectment suit to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property
would, in effect, amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.
The Court reminds the De Leon that it does not allow the piecemeal interpretation of its
Decisions as a means to advance his case. To get the true intent and meaning of a
decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and read in this context, but the
same must be considered in its entirety.

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 181970 August 3, 2010

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