Business Law Assignment
Business Law Assignment
Business Law Assignment
Assignment#1
FACTS: M left hospital $2.8 million. Hospital named unit after him. In September 1998,
widow was presented with a formal proposal that outlined the project and the hospital's
interest in honouring her and the memory of Dr. Marquis by naming the new critical care unit
after them. Widow signed pledged to leave more money over 5 years. She died within the
first year and her estate refused to pay the balance of $800,000.
REASONS: Milanetti reaffirmed that Canadian courts follow English common law
concerning pledges, namely that a promise to subscribe to a charity is not enforceable in the
absence of consideration. Brantford held that their commitment to name the entirety of the
new unit in honour of Dr. and Mrs. Marquis constituted bona fide consideration. While there
was clear evidence that Mrs. Marquis was adamant that Dr. Marquis' recognition in the
coronary care portion of the unit be retained, including his name and picture, it did not find
the larger naming opportunity to be of vital importance to Mrs. Marquis in her decision to
pledge the funds as it was at the suggestion of the hospital. As the decision to name the unit
in honour of the Marquis' was still subject to board approval, it was difficult to say that this
constituted bona fide consideration.
Based on the foregoing, most particularly the evidence of all of the plaintiff’s witnesses
details the humble and modest nature of Mrs. Marquis, the court finds as a fact that she never
sought the naming of the unit as a condition for making the pledge. It was merely gratitude.
Widow did not bargain for the naming.
CASE 2:
Wood v Lucy Duff-Gordon 118 N.E. 241 (U.S. N.Y., 1917)
RATIO: A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an
obligation,' imperfectly expressed.
FACTS: Defendant was a fashionable woman and designer capable of increasing the sales
of certain goods by her endorsement. Defendant entered into an exclusive agreement with
Plaintiff allowing him to place her endorsement and market defendant’s designs and keep
half of the profits. Plaintiff claimed she broke the contract by placing endorsements without
his knowledge and keeping all the profits too herself.
ISSUE: Is there an enforceable contract even when there is no express promise by one of the
parties?
REASONS: Duff-Gordon claimed that there was no corresponding request to her promise –
she did not request anything from Wood, thus there was no consideration. Wood did not bind
himself to anything, and therefore there was no contract. However, Cardozo, writing for the
majority, said that it goes without saying that anyone who contracts to do this type of thing
will do his or her best. Wood's promise to render accounts and to give DuffGordon 50% of
the profits inherently implied that he would use reasonable effort to implement the
agreement.
CASE 3:
Eastwood v Kenyon (1840), 11 Ad. & E. 438, 113 E.R. 482 (Q.B.)
FACTS: John Sutcliffe died and left Eastwood as the guardian to his infant daughter, Sarah.
Eastwood borrowed money to pay for Sarah's education and Sarah promised to pay him back
when she came of age and paid one year's interest to him. Sarah then married Kenyon who
also promised to pay Eastwood back. Kenyon failed to do so and Eastwood sued. Kenyon
said that he will pay the money after he got a child from Sarah.
DECISION: No contract was found to have existed. Consideration made in the past is no
consideration at all.
REASONS: The court found that on the facts there was nothing more than a benefit
voluntarily conferred by Eastwood and an express promise made by Kenyon to repay the
money. Kenyon promised to pay the promissory note, but Eastwood gives nothing back but a
thank you. How can doing something in the past affect a current promise? Taking care of
Sarah was not done at Kenyon’s request, it simply couldn’t be. There is no link. Note
however that if Eastwood sued Sarah, that would be enforceable because she reaffirmed the
contract after she became an adult, as an exception to the common law rule of infant
contracts.
CASE 4 :
Lampleigh v Brathwait (1615), Hobart 105, 80 E.R. 255 (K.B.)
RATIO: A promise made after performance can be enforced, only if it was understood by the
parties that there will have some kind of reward prior the performance (contract quantum
meruit – a reasonable amount). To be enforceable, (1) the act performed must have be at the
request of the promisor, (2) it must be understood that payment would be made, and (3) if
payment, promised in advance, would have been enforceable (i.e. the contract can not be
illegal).
FACTS: Brathwait killed a man and then requested Lampleigh seek a pardon for this crime
from the King. Lampleigh rode around the country to obtain this pardon, after which
Brathwait promised to pay Lampleigh £100.
ISSUE: Can a promise to pay after a request has been fulfilled be binding?