Critical Analsis On Contempt of Courts Act

CRITICAL ANALSIS ON CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971
1. CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT AND ITS JOURNEY
In India, almost all the laws replicate the English Statutes and contempt law is no exception
to it. The brief narration of legislative measures of the law of contempt of court in India from
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is useful for the
purpose of present study.
1.2.1 THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1926
In India there was no statutory law of contempt till 1926. Before 1926, the law of contempt in
India followed in entirely, British corresponding law which regulated superior courts of
record. The High Courts in India which were courts of record often adopted British legal
principles enunciated in regard to contempt law. The first legislation to deal with contempt of
courts in our country received statutory recognition in the form of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1926. 11 It was enacted to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing
contempt of courts.
The Preamble to the Act 1 stated:-
“whereas doubts have arisen as to the power of a High Court of judicature to punish
contempt of court and whereas it is expedient to resolve these doubts and to define and limit
the powers exercisable by High Courts and Chief Courts in Punishing contempt of court.”
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, gave statutory powers to the High Courts of Judicature
established by Letters Patent to punish for the contempt of court of the courts subordinate to
them in order to resolve and clarify doubts.2 It is important to note that when the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1926, was in existence in British India, various Indian States also had their
corresponding enactments. These States were Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu,
Rajastha, Travancore-Cochin and Saurasjtra.
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, was subsequently amended in 1937 3 to make it clear that
the limits of punishment provided in the Act related not only to contempt of subordinate
courts but also to all cases. The effect of which was to omit the word "subordinate'' from the
1
Preamble to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926.
2
Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926.
3
The Contempt of Courts (Amendment) Act, 1937.
Preamble of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 and to add a new proviso to Section 3 of the
latter Act in regard to sentence to be imposed. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 did not
contain any provision with regard to contempt of courts subordinate to Chief Courts and
Judicial Commissioner‟s Court and also extra territorial jurisdiction of High Courts in
matters of contempt. So, the State enactments of the Indian States and the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1926 were replaced by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.
The Contempt of Courts Act, 19524, repealed the Contempt of Courts Act, 19265 and
consolidated the provisions relating to the law of contempt so as to make it applicable to the
High Courts. No new powers were vested in the Courts. It merely recognised, defined and
limited the powers that already existed. This Act made two significant departures from the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. First, the expression "High Court'' was defined to include the
Courts of Judicial Commissioner which had been excluded from the purview of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1926 and secondly, the High Courts, including the Court of a Judicial
Commissioner, were conferred jurisdiction to inquire into and „try contempt of itself or of
any Court subordinate to it‟. Irrespective of whether the contempt was alleged to have been
committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction and irrespective of whether the
person alleged to be guilty of committing contempt was within or outside such limits.
Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 conferred the power on the High Courts
including that of the Judicial Commissioner’s Court to punish contempt of subordinate court.
But no High Court could take cognisance of an offence of contempt before subordinate Court
which was punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Section 4 of the Act 6 limited the
punishment to be awarded in case of contempt. In the matter of imposition of punishment for
contempt of Court, Section 4 of the 1952 Act provided:-
“such as otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, a contempt of
court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months,
or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both:
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted
on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court provided further that:
4
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (Act No. 32 of 1952).
5
As amended by the Contempt of Courts (Amendment) Act, 1937.
6
Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in any law for the time being in force, no
High Court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in this section for any
contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.”
Under the Contempt of Courts Act of 1952 three classes of contempt were recognised (i)
scandalising the court; (ii) abusing parties who are concerned in the case; and (iii) prejudicing
against persons before the case is heard, it carried set meaning given to it by judicial
pronouncements of English and Indian Courts. The validity of Contempt of Courts Act of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 was upheld by the Patna and Bombay High Courts.
However the scope of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 Act was not wide enough to define
as to what constitutes contempt of the Court, apart from many other flaws in provisions of the
Act. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, was repealed and replaced by the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 upon the recommendation of the Committee set-up up in 1961 that
overhauled the law of contempt of courts in India.
The law relating to contempt of court as existed prior to the Act of 1971 was somewhat
uncertain and unsatisfactory. Moreover, the jurisdiction to punish for contempt touches two
important fundamental rights including the right to freedom of speech and expression and
right to personal liberty.7 It was, therefore, considered necessary to have the entire law on the
subject scrutinised by a Special Committee. Hence, a Committee was set up in 1961 under
the chairmanship of late H.N. Sanyal8.
(i) HISTORY OF THE COTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971
The Sanyal Committee made a comprehensive examination of the law and problems relating
to contempt of court in comparison with various foreign countries. Evaluating the law
relating to contempt, the doyen of the Indian Bar Mr. Fali Nariman in his speech 9 said the
offence of scandalizing the court is a mercurial jurisdiction in which there are no rules and no
constraints. He and other were perfectly correct in saying there should be certainty in the law,
and not uncertainty. After all, the citizen should know where he or she stands. There are two
reasons for the uncertainty in the law of contempt of court. First, In the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1952 there was no definition of „contempt.‟ Secondly, even when a definition was
7
Report of Committee on Contempt of Courts (1963).
8
H.N. Sanyal, the then Additional Solicitor General of India.
9
Speech delivered on the topic “The Law of Contempt –is it being stretched too far?”
introduced by the Contempt of Courts Act, 197110, there was no definition of what constitutes
scandalizing the court or what prejudices, or interferes with the course of justice. What could
be regarded as scandalous earlier may not be regarded as scandalous today and what could
earlier be regarded as prejudicing or interfering with the course of justice may not be so
regarded today.11
The H.N.Sanyal Committee submitted its report on February 28, 1963 to define and limit the
powers of certain courts in punishing contempt of courts and to regulate their procedure in
relation thereto. The recommendations of the Committee have been generally accepted by the
government after considering the view expressed on those recommendations by the State
Governments, Union Territory Administrations, the Supreme Court, the High Courts and the
Judicial Commissioners. The Joint Select Committee of Parliament on Contempt of Courts 12
examined the issue in detail and the Committee prepared a new bill, the Contempt of Courts
Bill, 1968. The Bill was to give effect to the accepted recommendations of the Sanyal
Committee. The recommendations of the Committee made took note of the importance given
to the freedom of speech in the Indian Constitution and of the need for safeguarding the status
and dignity of courts and interest of administration of justice.13
The recommendations of the Committee have been generally accepted by Government after
considering the view expressed on those recommendations by the State Governments, Union
Territory Administrations, the Supreme Court, the High Courts and the Judicial
Commissioners. On the basis of these recommendations, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 14
was passed which can be described as a comprehensive legislation.
In a very practical move and in an effort to sanctify the ideal of justice, the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971, was enacted to identify and punish those very persons who, in any way, put
an obstacle in the path of the judiciary to deliver justice to the people. One of the basic
principles of a sound judiciary is that everyone is entitled to a free and fair trial without any
prejudice whatsoever. Therefore, any action, either direct or indirect, which is detrimental to
the judicial ideal of justice is sought to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act.
10
11
Justice Markandey Katju, Judge, Supreme Court of India, Vol. XII, 2007 Cri.L.J. , p. 16.
12
Report of Joint Committee on Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 at p. 22.
13
Report of Joint Committee on Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
14
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act No. 70 of 1971). It came into force w.e.f. December 24, 1971.
(ii) OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT
The people of India have a lot of faith in the judiciary which is primarily entrusted with the
duty of administering justice. The primary purpose of giving courts contempt jurisdiction is
then to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts and their image in the minds of the
public. If such confidence and faith were allowed to be shaken then this would have serious
repercussions on the justice delivery system of our country. The law of contempt provides the
necessary tool to the courts to check unwarranted attacks or efforts at undermining the Rule
of Law.
The Hadi Hussain J. in re Nasir Uddin Haider, 15 said that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
has been enacted in order to remove doubts which have arisen as to the powers of a High
Court. The object and purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity
of law courts and their majesty in the minds of public and that this is in no way whittled
down. If, by contumacious words or writing, the common man is led to lose his respect for
the judge, acting in the discharge of its judicial duties, then the confidence reposed in the
course of justice is rudely shaken and the offender must be punished. In essence, the law of
contempt is the protector of the seat of justice more than a person of the judge sitting in that
seat.
The Apex Court in Mohammed Yamin v. Om Prakash Bansal,16 held that the law of contempt
of court is not the law for the protection of judges or to place them in a position of immunity
from criticism. It is law of the protection of the freedom of individuals. Everyone in a well
versed community is entitled to the protection of a free and independent administration of
justice. It is for the press to enlighten the public on what has been done in the branch of
Government fairly and firmly, to criticise, what has been done where criticism appears to be
warranted, but never attempt to influence the course of justice or to undermine the faith of
those who live under protection of the law and the impartial authority of the courts. The press
is justified in making free and fair criticism. The hall of justice is not a cloistered virtue. In
fact, for justice, to shine with its pristine luster, it must be bold, free and subject to public
scrutiny. So, if the press does criticize some public aspects of a judgment, e.g., in the realm of
interpretation of law, severity of sentence, etc., it cannot be contempt. But if there is an attack
on the integrity of judges by imputing motive dishonesty or incompetence, arbitrariness or
want of independence to a judge, it would be exceeding free a fair criticism by the press.
15
AIR 1926 All. 623 at 625
16
1982, Cr. L.J. 322 (Raj.).
The Supreme Court in State v. Rajeshwari Prasad 17, held that the aim of the law of contempt
was to protect those whose duty it was to administer justice between man and man by true
and proper interpretation of law, from insults, annoyance and even obstruction. Persons who
seek justice and persons who help in the administration of justice are all entitled to be
protected.
(iii) SCOPE OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT
It is very much necessary to assess the scope of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, because
the title of the Act often misleads people to think that this piece of legislation tends to protect
the court and the fraternity of lawyers and judges, thereby keeping them above law. Given
that the judiciary is both the prosecutor and the adjudicator, it often leads this legislation to be
misconstrued as a veil of protection for the courts from external criticism. In fact, if it were
so, then it would be nothing but an abuse of the powers of the judiciary and a neglect of the
very ideal of justice that it wishes to protect. The punishment under the contempt law is
inflicted not for the purpose of protecting either the court as whole or individual judges from
a repetition of the attack but of protecting the public. Thus, contrary to the aforementioned
common perception, this act in no way hands over superfluous power to the judiciary.
Moreover, it must be remembered that the power and jurisdiction of the courts under this act
falls under extra-ordinary jurisdiction alone and this acts as a check on the judiciary.
2. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, discuss in detail below:
1.3.1 Preamble
“An Act to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempt of Courts and
to regulate their procedure in relation thereto.”
This Act was enacted 18 to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempt
of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. Thus, the new Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 has been enacted in order to remove doubts which had arisen as to the
powers of a High Court.
1.3.2 Section 1: Short title and extent
A.1.R.1966 All. 588.

17
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971(No. 70 of 1971) enacted by Parliament in the Twenty Second Year (24th
18
December, 1971) of the Republic of India.

Section 1 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 states the short title and extent of the Act. This
Act may be called the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and it extends to the whole of India,
provided that it shall not apply to the state of Jammu and Kashmir except to the extent to
which the provisions of this Act relate to contempt of the Supreme Court. 19 In Shakuntala
Sahadevram Tewari v. Hemchand M.Singhania,20 the Court held that the law of contempt of
courts is for keeping the administration of justice pure and undefiled. While the dignity of the
court is to be maintained at all costs, the contempt jurisdiction, which is of a special nature,
should be sparingly used.
1.3.3 Section 2: Definitions
“In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) 'Contempt of Court' means civil contempt or criminal contempt.
(b) 'Civil contempt' means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ
or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court.
(c) 'Criminal contempt' means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by
signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act
whatsoever which:-
(i) Scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of,
any Court, or
(ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial
proceeding, or
(iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the

administration of justice in any other manner. (d) 'High Court' means the High Court for a
state or a union territory and includes the Court of the judicial commissioner in any union
territory.”
(i) Contempt of Court
In Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, there are four definitions viz., 'Contempt
of Court', 'Civil Contempt' 'Criminal Contempt' and 'High Court'. It was for the first time that
the words 'Contempt of Court' had been defined in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Before
19
Article 370 of the Constitution of India: Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir.
20
(1990) 3 Bom CR 82 (Bom).
the enactment of the present Act the term 'Contempt of Court' was not defined. It was
considered proper that a definition may be assigned to the term and distinction may be made
between civil contempt and criminal contempt. With this view the term 'Contempt of Court'
was defined under Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, mean civil contempt
and criminal contempt. In Queen v. Gray,21 it was held that the law relating to contempt of
court is well settled as act done or writing published which is calculated to bring a court or a
judge into contempt, or to lower his authority, or to interfere with the due course of justice or
the lawful process of the Court, is a contempt of court.
It would be appropriate to examine and analyse some landmark judgments of the Apex Court
relating to contempt of court to know its scope and area. In E.M.S. Namboodripad v. T.N.
Nambiar22, the appeal was against the conviction for contempt of court. The conviction was
based on certain utterances of the appellant, when he was Chief Minister, at a press
conference. Mr. Chief Justice Hidayatullah with whom G.K. Mitter and A.N. Ray, JJ. agreed
speaking for the Supreme Court explained the scope of law relating to contempt and
observed:-
“The law of contempt stems from the right of the courts to punish by imprisonment or fine to
persons guilty of words or acts which either obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of
justice. This right is exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie
curiae and by the superior courts on their own behalf or on behalf of courts subordinate to
them even if committed outside the courts. Formerly, it was regarded as inherent in the
powers of a Court of Record and now by the Constitution of India… There are many kinds of
contempt‟s. The chief forms of contempt are insult to judges, attacks or fair comment on
pending proceedings with a tendency to prejudice fair trial obstruction to officers of the
courts, witnesses or the parties along with the process of the court, breach of duty by officer
connected with the Court and scandalising the Judges or the courts. The last form occurs,
generally speaking, when the conduct of a person tends to bring the authority and
administration of laws into disrespect or disregard. This conduct included all acts which
bring the Courts into disrepute or disrespect, or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty
or challenge its authority.”
Mr Chief Justice Hidayatullah further observed:-
21
1900 (2) QBD 36 (40).
22
AIR 1970 SC 2015.
“The law punishes not only acts which do in fact interfere with the courts and administration
of justice but also those which have that tendency, that is to say likely to produce a particular
result.”
The Supreme Court after citing several works and teaching of Marx and Engels upheld the
sentence of contempt of court. It was that judging from the angle of the courts and
administration of justice, there was not assemblage of doubt that the appellant was guilty of
the contempt of court.
The Supreme Court of India speaking through Mr. Justice I. D. Dua in Aligarh Municipality
v. E.T. Majdoor Union23, has declared that a corporate body can be punished for Contempt of
Court. The Court has held a corporation (Municipal Board in this case) is liable to be
punished by imposition of fine and by sequestration for contempt for disobeying order of
competent Court directed against them. It is command to those who are officially responsible
for the conduct of its fairs.
The Supreme Court in Baradakant v. Registrar, Orissa H.C. 24, has held that the defamatory
criticism of a Judge functioning as a judge even in purely administrative or non-adjudicatory
matters amounted to criminal contempt. The imputations contained in the letters have grossly
vilified the High Court and has substantially interfered with the administration of justice and
therefore, the appellant was rightly convicted of the offence of the criminal contempt.
Where the Assistant Director Public Relations and Information of Madhya Pradesh, published
a press release on the judgment of the Supreme Court conveying to the public that the order
of the High Court has been reversed by the Supreme Court and thereby, impliedly conveying
that the detention of petitioner has been upheld. The court although accepted unconditional
apology because the said news was not published without knowing the correct implications of
the High Court judgment. In accepting the unconditional apology, the Supreme Court on one
hand took notice that the contemner had lack of knowledge or experience the publication of
the press release of the judgment or order of the court, but the court also took notice of the
fact that the contemner did not even take care to take necessary instructions from the persons
who had experience in this area did not sought guidance from the law department of the state
before releasing the version of the judgment. The Supreme Court in Sadhvi Ritumbhara v.
Digvijay Singh,25 considered this as a deliberate act on his part of misleading the public by
23
AIR 1970 SC 1767.
24
AIR 1974 SC 710.
25
AIR 1997 SC 1387.
making misstatement of the contents of the order. But the court rightly pointed out that it was
not a deliberate act on his part with a view to undermine the order of the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court in this case applied the Doctrine of Respondent Superior and held the
Director also responsible for the contempt of the Supreme Court when it declared:-
“Being the Director, it is his duty to see that the directorate functions properly, particularly
when it relates to the issuance of the public information of contents of an order of this court;
unfortunately, he has not done it. It is not clear from this record whether it was brought to
his notice before publishing or matters are passing without his knowledge from his
Directorate side-tracking him. Even the Director himself as Director ultimately bears
responsibility for the acts done by the Directorate.”
It is gratifying to note that superior officers have now been made responsible for their acts,
omissions and commissions, if they commit contempt of court.
The Supreme Court in two leading judgments, Rustom Cawasjee v. Union of India, 26 and
E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T.N. Nambiar,27 which were delivered as early as in 1970 has given
very accurate, correct and well founded account of the law as far as criticism of the courts is
concerned in relation with the Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India and the contempt
of court. It was held that the court like any other institution does not enjoy immunity from
fair criticism. The court cannot claim to be always right, although it does not spare any effort
to be right, according to the best of the ability, knowledge and judgment of the judges. The
judge has to be conscious of his limitations and of all ability because his training and
assistance, he gets from counsel. He has to apt to avoid mistake more than others. While fair
and temperate criticism of the Court including of the Supreme Court even if strong, may not
be actionable, attributing improper motives and tending to bring the judges or court in hatred
would certainly come within the preview and contempt of court.28
It has been rightly held by the Supreme Court29 that the spirit underlying Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution of India must have due play but we cannot overlook the provisions of the
second clauses of the Article. While it is intended that there should be Freedom of Speech
and Expression, it is also intended that in exercise of the right, contempt of the Court shall
not be committed. These provisions are to be read with Articles 129 and 215 of the
26
AIR 1970 SC 1318.
27
AIR 1970 SC 2015.
28
E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T.N. Nambiar, AIR 1970 SC 2015.
29
Rustom Cawasjee v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1318.
Constitution which specially confer on the Supreme Court and the High Courts the power to
punish for contempt of themselves. Article 19 (l)(a) of the constitution guarantees complete
Freedom of Speech and Expression but it also makes an exception in respect of Contempt of
Court. The Supreme Court has held that the guaranteed right on which the functioning of our
democracy rests, is intended to give protection to expression of free opinions, to change
political and social conditions and to advance human knowledge. While this right is essential
to a free society, the Indian Constitution has itself imposed restrictions in relation to contempt
of court. It cannot, therefore, be said that the right abolishes the law of contempt or that
attacks upon judges and courts will be condoned. However, it should also remember that the
judiciary in India is an institution of democracy. We should have strict interpretation of law
of contempt in India because we have written Constitution in which freedom of speech and
expression has been explicitly guaranteed.
(ii) Civil Contempt
Under Section 2(b) 'civil contempt', is defined to mean wilful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, order, direction or any other process of court or wilful breach of an undertaking given
to the court.30 It is basically a wrong to the person who is entitled to the benefit of a court
order. It is a wrong for which the law awards reparation to the injured party; though
nominally it is a contempt of court it is fact a wrong of a private nature. Civil contempt is a
sanction to enforce compliance with an order. It means willful disobedience to any
judgement, decree, writ or other process of court.
(iii) Criminal Contempt
Criminal contempt involves defiance of the court revealed in conduct which amounts to
obstruction or interference with the administration of justice.31 Criminal contempt as defined
by Contempt of Courts Act 1971 means publication whether by words, spoken or written or
by signs or by visible representations or otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act
whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority
of any court; or prejudices or interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to
obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner.32
30
ln Vidya Sagar v. Additional District Judge, Dehradun, 1991 All C.J. 586 at p. 588 the Court held that any
wilful disobedience to the orders of the Court to do or abstain from doing any act or breach of any undertaking
given to the Court is prima-facie civil contempt
31
State of Assam v. V.K.Vishnoi, 1993 (23) A.T.C. 581.
32
In E. Venkaiak v. Government of A.P., 1992 (3) ALT 193 at p. 199, the Court held, "Non caring of the
Warrant issued by the Criminal Court amounts to Criminal Contempt
The present definition of criminal contempt is virtually the definition of contumacious
contempt, which ordinarily requires punishment. Civil contempt is also called contempt of
procedure in English Law and it bears two fold characters implying as between the parties to
proceedings and the liability to submit to form of civil execution. In fact in the matters of
contempt, courts exercise the disciplinary jurisdiction and contemner can be directed to pay
the fine, whereas, whenever there is a contumacious contempt as between the party and the
court, the courts exercise penal jurisdiction and the contemner can be directed to undergo
imprisonment. In civil contempt whenever wilful disobedience to the orders of the court is
done, it is called contumacious contempt.
In re Freston33, it was stated that all contempts are not the same, they are of different kinds.
Some contempts are merely theoretical but others are wilful, such as disobedience to the
injunction or to orders, delivery of documents. In this case there is no privilege from arrest. In
this case attachment was granted for something more than a mere theoretical contempt and
thereafter it was something more than merely civil process, there was therefore, no privilege.
In re Hunt34, where a contemner failed to attend an appointment before the examiner of the
court, it was held that the appellant was guilty of wilful disobedience to the order of the court.
The committal was a punishment for that disobedience and not merely, as the appellant
asserts an inducement to him to comply with the order and he could not by complying with
the order claimed to be released at once ex debito justitiae.
(iv) Distinction between Civil and Criminal Contempt
After careful consideration of the meaning of civil contempt and criminal contempt it
becomes clear that both are differ from each other in different counts.
The Calcutta High Court in Legal Remembrancer v. Motilal Ghose 35, has explained the
difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt. The distinction between civil and
criminal contempt is of fundamental character. While criminal contempt offends the public
and consists of conduct that offends the majesty of law and undermines the dignity of the
Court, civil contempt consists in failure to obey the order, decree, direction, judgment, writ or
process issued by courts for the benefit of the opposing party.
33
(1883) II Q.B.D. 545.
34
(1959) 2 Q.B. 69.
35
ILR 41 Cal. 173.
The Allahabad High Court in Vijay Pratap Singh v. Ajit Prasad 36, has held that a distinction
between a civil contempt and criminal contempt seems to be that in a civil contempt the
purpose is to force the contemner to do something for the benefits of the other party, while in
criminal contempt the proceeding is by way of punishment for a wrong not so much to a
party or individual but to the public at large by interfering with the normal process of law
diminishing the majesty of the court. However, if a civil contempt is enforced by fine or
imprisonment of the contemnor for non-performance of his obligation imposed by a court, it
merges into a criminal contempt and becomes a criminal matter at the end. Such contempt,
being neither purely civil nor purely criminal in nature, is sometimes called suigeneris.
It is submitted that the dividing line between civil and criminal contempt is sometimes very
thin and may became indistinct. Where the contempt consists in mere failure to comply with
or carry on an order of a court made for the benefit of a private party, it is plainly civil
contempt. If, however, the contemner adds defiance of the court to disobedience of the order
and conducts himself in a manner which amounts to abstraction or interference with the
courts of justice, the contempt committed by him is of a mixed character, partaking of
between him and his opponent the nature of a civil contempt.37
A) Cases on Criminal Contempt
Criminal contempt is very serious type of act. Handcuffing, arrest, roping and assault of a
Judicial Officer by Police Officers amount to criminal contempt. If any judicial officer is led
into trap by unscrupulous police officers and is allowed to be assaulted, handcuffed and
roped, the public is bound to lose faith in courts, which would be destructive of basic
structure of an ordered society. If this is permitted rule of law shall be supplemented by
police raj, viewed in this perspective any such incident shall not be a case of physical assault
on an individual judicial officer instead it shall be an onslaught on the institution of the
judiciary itself.
Such an incident shall be clear interference with the administration of justice, lowering its
judicial authority. Its effect will not be confined to one District or State; it has a tendency to
affect the entire judiciary in the country. Such incidents highlight a dangerous trend that if the
police are annoyed with the orders of a presiding officer of a court, he would be arrested on
flimsy manufactured charges, to humiliate him publically.38 It is submitted that the summary
power of punishment for contempt has been conferred on the courts to keep a blaze of glory
36
AIR 1966 All. 305.
37
Ibid. p. 306
around them, to deter people from attempting to render them contemptible in the eyes of the
public. These powers are necessary to keep the course of justice free, as it is of great
importance to society. The power to punish for contempt is vested in the judges not for their
personal protection only, but for the protection of public justice, whose interest requires that
decency and decorum is preserved in courts of justice. Those who have to discharge duty in a
court of justice are protected by the law, and shielded in the discharge of their duties, any
deliberate interference with the discharge of such duties either in court or outside the court by
attacking the presiding officers of the court would amount to criminal contempt and the
courts must take serious cognisance of such conduct.
In Delhi Judicial Service Association Tis Hazari Court v. State of Gujarat 39, Justice K.N.
Singh observed, that the facts of the instant case demonstrate that a presiding officer of a
court may be arrested and humiliated on flimsy and manufactured charges which could affect
the administration of justice. In order to avoid any such situation in future, we consider it
necessary to lay down guidelines which should be followed in the case of arrest and detention
of a judicial officer. No person whatever his rank, or designation may be, is above law and he
must face the penal consequences of infraction of criminal law. A magistrate, judge or any
other judicial officer is liable to criminal persecution for an offence like any other citizen but
in view of the paramount necessity of preserving the independence of judiciary and at the
same time ensuring that infractions of law are properly investigated, we think and the
following guidelines should be followed:-
(a) If a judicial officer is to be arrested for some offence, it should be done under intimation
to the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be.
(b) If facts and circumstances necessitate the immediate arrest of a judicial officer of the
subordinate judiciary, a technical or formal arrest may be effected.
(c) The fact of such arrest should be immediately communicated to the District and Sessions
Judge of the concerned district and the Chief Justice of the High Court.
(d) The Judicial Officer so arrested shall not be taken to a police station, without the prior
order or directions of the District and Sessions Judge of the concerned district, if available.
38
V. G. Ramachandran, The Contempt of Court under the Constitution, 5th edition, Eastern Book Company,
Lucknow, 1983, p.123.
39
1991 AIR SCW 2419.
(e) Immediate facilities shall be provided to the judicial officer for communication with his
family members, legal advisers and Judicial Officers, including the District and Sessions
Judge.
(f) No statement of a judicial officer who is under arrest be recorded nor any punchnama be
drawn up nor any medical tests be conducted except in the presence of the legal adviser of the
judicial officer concerned or another judicial officer of equal or Higher rank, if available.
(g) There should be no handcuffing of a judicial officer. If, however, violent resistance to
arrest is offered or there is imminent need to effect physical arrest in order to avert danger to
life and limb, the person resisting arrest may be overpowered and handcuffed. In such case,
immediate report shall be made to the District and Sessions Judge concerned and also to the
Chief Justice of the High Court. But the burden would be on the Police to establish the
necessity for effecting physical arrest and handcuffing the judicial officer and if it be
established that the physical arrest and handcuffing of the judicial officer was as unjustified,
the police officers causing or responsible for such arrest and handcuffing would be guilty of
misconduct and would also be personally liable for compensation and/or damages as may be
summarily determined by the High Court.40
The above guidelines are not exhaustive but these are minimum safeguards, which must be
observed in case of arrest of judicial officer. These guidelines should be implemented by the
State Government a well as by High Courts. The court accordingly, directed that a copy of
the guidelines shall be forwarded to the Chief Secretaries of all the State Governments and to
all the High Courts with a direction that the same may be brought to the notice of the
concerned officers for compliance.
Similarly in D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal 41, the Supreme Court of India laid down
certain rules to be followed at the time of the arrest of the person. Non adherence of the rules
shall render the person liable for contempt of court. The Court observed:-
“Failure to comply with the requirements herein above mentioned shall apart from rendering
the concerned official liable for departmental action, also render him liable to be punished
for contempt of court and the proceedings for contempt of courts may be instituted in any
High Court of the country, having territorial jurisdiction over the matter.”42
40
1991 AIR SCW 2419.
41
A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 610.
42
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 610
(v) High Court
Besides contempt of court, civil contempt and criminal contempt, other definition in Section
2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is that of High Court. The High Court is also defined
to mean High Court for State or Union Territory which includes the Courts of Judicial
Commissioner in any Union territory.43
High Courts of India are at the top of the hierarchy in each State but are below the Supreme
Court. These courts have control over a state, a union territory or a group of states and union
territories.44 Below the High Courts are secondary courts such as the civil courts, family
courts, criminal courts and various other district courts. The High Courts are the principal
courts of Original Jurisdiction in the state, and can try all offences including those punishable
with death.45 Article 214 of the Constitution of India posits that there shall be a High Court
for each of the states. In addition to that, Article 231 of the Constitution empowers the
Parliament to set up one High Court for two or more states. For example, Gauhati High Court
has jurisdiction over the State of Tripura and some other states of North- East India besides
its jurisdiction over the State of Assam. However, works of most High Courts consists of
appeals from lowers Courts and summons, petitions in terms of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.46 The precise jurisdiction of each High Court varies from each other.
A High Court is composed of a Chief Justice and as many other judges as the President of
India may from time to time deems it necessary to appoint. 47 The President can appoint
additional judges also for a maximum period of two years. 48 The number of judges in a court
is decided by the dividing the average institution of main cases during the last five years by
the national average. The average rate of disposal of main cases per judge per year in that
High Court is also taken into consideration. Ordinarily, the judges remain in office till the age
of 62.49 In appointing the chief Justice of High Court, the President consults the Governor and
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In appointing other Judges the President consults the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of the High Courts of India.50
43
It is important to note here that at present there is no Courts of Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory.
44
Article 230 of the Constitution of India: Extension of Jurisdiction of High Courts to Union Territories.
45
Article 225 of the Constitution of India: Jurisdiction of existing High Courts.
46
Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Power of High Courts to issue certain Writs.
47
Article 216 of the Constitution of India: Constitution of High Courts.
48
Article 224 of the Constitution of India: Appointment of additional and acting Judges
49
Article 217 of the Constitution of India: Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court.
50
Re Presidential Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1; See also S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149; Union
of India v. Sankalchand Seth, AIR 1977 SC 2328.
Though the judges of the High Courts of India can remain in office till the age of sixty two,
the judges may resign from their posts prematurely by applying in writing to the President. 51
Besides, the judges of a High Court can be removed from office on various grounds like
misdemeanour and corruption.52 The judges of the High Court may be transferred to another
High Court of another State.53 The judges of the High Court must be an Indian citizen and
must have ten years of experience in adjudication or in legal practice. 54 To ensure
independence of judiciary, a special mode of removal of the judge has been prescribed in the
Constitution of India. The proposal of removal of the judges must be passed by a two thirds
majority of the members present in the Legislature. The proposal then shall have to be sent to
the President for his assent. The President will then ask the judge to resign.55
The High Courts of India act as the Court of Original Jurisdiction and the Court of Appellate
Jurisdiction at the same time. As a Court of original Jurisdiction the High Court can try
original cases.72 The Constitution has vested the High Court with Power of trying revenue
cases also. The High Court in every state is the Highest Court of appeal in respect of any
criminal or civil cases of the State. The High Court may either give its verdict on
constitutional point only or leave it to the lower court concerned to pass verdict on the other
issues or try the cases as a whole.
The Union Parliament has been empowered to either enlarge or restrict the jurisdiction of the
High Court. The High Courts of India have the power of superintendence over all the lower
Courts of a State except the Military Tribunals.56 The High Court can also issue various writs
in order to safeguard the fundamental rights of the citizens of India. 57 The writs are in the
nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto and Certiorari. Apart from
all these, the High Court has the authority of making laws regarding the appointment of its
own officials and other internal affairs. As the head of the judiciary in the state, the High
Court has got administrative control over the subordinate in the state. The High Court is a
Court of Record.58 This means that all records regarding all cases that come to the High Court
51
Article 217(1) (a) of the Constitution of India: a judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the
President, resign his office.
52
Article 217(1) (b) of the Constitution of India: a judge may be removed from his office by the President in the
manner provided in clause (4) of Article 124 for the removal of a judge of the Supreme Court.
53
Article 222 of the Constitution of India: Transfer of a judge from one High Court to another.
54
Article 217 (2) and Article 217 (2) (a) of the Constitution of India.
55
Article 217(1) (b) of the Constitution of India: a judge may be removed from his office by the President in the
manner provided in clause (4) of Article 124 for the removal of a judge of the Supreme Court.
56
Article 227 of the Constitution of India: Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Courts.
57
Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Power of High Courts to issue certain Writs.
58
Article 215 of the Constitution of India: High Courts to be Courts of Record.
are kept with the extreme care possible and these records are later referred to in dealing with
other cases. The 42nd Amendment59, curtailed the jurisdiction of the High Courts in various
spheres. However, the 44th Amendment60, restored the Original Jurisdiction and position of
the High Courts.
1.3.4 Section 3: Innocent publication and distribution of matter not contempt
According to Section 3 of the Act,61 which deals with certain exceptions, a person shall not be
guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has published 62 any mater which interferes
or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the course of justice in connection
with any civil or criminal proceeding pending at the time of publication, if at the time he had
no reasonable grounds for believing that the proceeding was pending. 63 Further a person shall
be guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has distributed a publication containing
any such matter as is mentioned, if at the time of distribution he had no reasonable grounds
for believing that it contained or was likely to contain any such matter as aforesaid64:-
Provided that this provision shall not apply in respect of the distribution of –
(i) Any publication which is a book or paper printed or published otherwise than in
conformity with the rules contained in Section 3 of the Press and Registration of Book Act,
186765;
(ii) Any publication which is a newspaper published otherwise than in conformity with the
rules contained in section 5 of the said Act.66
Judicial proceedings treated to be pending For the purposes of section 3 of the Act, a judicial
proceeding:-
(A) is said to be pending:-
59
The Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976.
60
The Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978.
61
Section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971.
62
Whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise.
63
Section 3(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
64
Section 3 (3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
65
Section 3 of the Press and Registration of Book Act, 1867 (Act 25 of 1867).
66
Proviso to Section 3 (3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
(i) in the case of a civil proceeding, when it is instituted by the filing of a plaint or
otherwise,
(ii) in the case of a criminal proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
or any other law
(a) Where it relates to the commission of an offence, when the chargesheet or

challan is filed, or when the Court issues summons or warrant, as the case may be,
against the accused, and
(b) in any other case, when the Court takes cognisance of the matter to which
the proceeding relates, and in the case of a civil or criminal proceeding, shall be
deemed to continue to be pending until it is heard and finally decided, that is to say, in
a case where an appeal or revision is competent, until the appeal or revision is heard
and finally decided or, when no appeal or revision is preferred, until the period of
limitation prescribed for such appeal or revision has expired;
(B) which has been heard and finally decided shall not be deemed to be pending merely by
reason of the fact that proceedings for the execution of the decree, order or sentence passed
therein are pending.
The Court in M. R. Prashar v. Dr Farooq Abdullah 67, held that the liberty of free expression is
not to be compounded with a licence to make unfounded allegations of corruption against
judiciary. The abuse of the liberty of free speech and expression carries the case nearer the
law of contempt. In Managing Director Vamin v. O. P. Bensal, 68 it was held that a defence of
truth or justification is not available to the publisher of a newspaper in proceedings for
contempt of Court. The publication of reports of proceedings before a court of law must be
true, accurate and without malice.69
1.3.5 Section 4: Fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding not contempt
According to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 a person shall not be guilty of contempt of
court for publishing a fair and accurate report of the judicial proceeding or any stage thereof.
The words “judicial proceeding” means day-to-day proceedings of the court. In Subhash
Chand v. S.M. Aggarwal,70 the Court held that the media reports must represent a fair and
67
(1984) 1 Cr. LC 433.
68
(1982) Cr. LJ 322 (Raj).
69
Wasuddeoraoji v. A D Mani, AIR 1951 Nag. 26.
70
1984 Cr. L.J. 481.
accurate report of judicial proceeding and not be a one-sided picture. It is very essential that
while reproducing the court proceedings, no words may be added, omitted or substituted. 71 In
re Progressive Port and Dock Workers Union,72 the Court held that fair and accurate reporting
of the judgment is essential for the healthy administration of justice.
1.3.6 Section 5: Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt
The fair criticism of judicial act is not contempt. The nature and circumstances under which
allegations are made, the extent and the character of the publications and similar other
considerations have to be taken into account in order to determine whether the act
complained of amounts to contempt. In re Guljari Lal,73 it was held that no action is called
for, if the criticism is reasonable and is offered for the public good.
The Privy Council in State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant Tripathi, 74 observed that a fair
comment on the judgment of a court could not constitute contempt. In Advocate General v.
Abraham George,75 it was held that judgments are open to criticism that must be done without
casting aspersions on the judges and the judges and the Courts and without adverse comments
amounting to scandalising the Courts. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahma Prakash, 76 the
Apex Court held that the criticism of a judge must take the form of reasonable argument or
exploitation; must be made in good faith and free from the imputation of improper motives.
In State v. Bhavani Prasad,77 the Court held that the publication in newspaper of reports of
proceedings before a Court of law must be true.
The Supreme Court on 15 July, 2010 78 dismissed a contempt petition filed against Union
Minister Kapil Sibal for allegedly making contemptuous remarks against the judiciary. A
Bench comprising Justices J M Panchal and A K Patnaik said the article in the newspaper,
which had quoted Sibal's message on judiciary and legal fraternity published in a magazine,
did not impair administration of justice or bring it to disrepute.
1.3.7 Section 6: Complaint against presiding officers of subordinate Courts when not
contempt
71
E. T. Sen v. E. Narayanan, AIR 1969 Del. 201
72
1984 Cr LJ 1061 (Ker).
73
1968 MPLJ 725
74
AIR 1936 PC 141.
75
1976 Cr. LJ 158.
76
AIR 1950 All 556
77
AIR 1954 Nag 36.
78
www. zeenews.com./news 641275 html.
A complaint or report about a judicial officer of his dishonesty, partiality or other conduct
unbecoming of a court, made to an authority to which it is subordinate, is not contempt of
court if all reasonable care is taken by the makers to keep it confidential. 79 In re Court on its
Own Motion,80 the Court held that immunity is provided to a citizen making a complaint to
the High Court against a presiding officer of a subordinate court so long as the complaint is
made in good faith.
States are divided into districts (zillas), and within each a judge presides as a district judge
over civil cases. A Sessions Judge presides over criminal cases. The judges are appointed by
the Governor in consultation with the state's High Court. District Courts are subordinate to
the authority of their High Court. There is a hierarchy of judicial officials below the district
level. Many officials are selected through competitive examination by the state's public
service commission. Civil cases at the sub-district level are filed in Sub-District Courts 81.
Lesser criminal cases are entrusted to the Courts of subordinate magistrates functioning under
the supervisory authority of a district magistrate. All magistrates are under the supervision of
the High Court. At the village level, disputes are frequently resolved by panchayats or lok
adalats.82
1.3.8 Section 7: Publication of information relating to proceeding in chambers or in camera

not contempt except in certain cases
Section 17 of the Act83 deals with the situation where a person publishes a fair and accurate
report of a judicial proceeding before any court sitting in chambers or in camera it shall not
be contempt of court except under the following cases:
(a) where the publication is contrary to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in
force;
(b) where the court on ground of public policy or in exercise of any power vested in it,
expressly prohibits the publication of all information relating to the proceeding or of
information of the description which is published;
79
re Guljari Lal, 1968 MPLJ 725 (MP).
80
1973 Cr LJ 1106 (P & H).
81
Sub-District Courts also known as Munsif.
82
Panchayats or Lok Adalats also known as People’s Courts. It is very relevant to mention here that now the
Gram Nayala Act, 2009, has been passed under which more Judicial Powers have been given to Village
Panchayats.
83
(c) where the Court sits in chambers or in camera for reason connected with public order or
the security of the State, the publication of information relating to those proceedings;
(d) where the information relates to a secret process, discovery or invention which is an issue
in the proceedings.
1.3.9 Section 8: Other defences not affected
Since a proceeding in contempt is a quasi-judicial proceeding, the precise nature of contempt

must be set out in the motion.84
1.3.11 Section 10: Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts
Section 10 of the Act authorises the High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts in
accordance with the same procedure and practice as it has the power to punish for its
contempt. The proviso takes away the power of the High Court to punish for contempt in
respect of the subordinate Courts where such contempt is an offence punishable under the
Indian Penal Code, 1860. The phrase 'Courts subordinate to it' used is wide enough to include
all Courts which are judicially subordinate to the High Court even though administrative
control over them under Article 235 of the Constitution does not vest in the High Court. 85 In
E. Chandra v. Member Secretary, MMDA,86 It is further submitted that the power of
committal for contempt must be wielded with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety
and only with the object of seeing that the dignity and authority of the Court are not imposed.
The Apex Court in The Emperor v. J.P. Swadhin, 87 held that If the act is punishable under the
Indian Penal Code, 1860, as contempt of Court then that act cannot form the subject of
contempt proceedings by the High Court. In N. K. Gupta v. Umraomal Agarwalla, 88 the Court
observed that the High Court cannot take cognisance of 'contempt' which is punishable under
the Indian Penal Code.
1.3.12 Section 11: Power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders found outside
jurisdiction
This section provided for the extra-territorial jurisdiction of High Courts to commit a person
for contempt even though the alleged act was committed outside its territorial jurisdiction of
84
Nazamunnissa Shaukat Ali v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1990) 1 Mah LR 329 (Bom).
85
S. K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. Luckhnow v. Vinay Chandra Mishra, 1981 Cr. L.J. 283 at p.
286.
86
(1990) 1 MLJR 537.
87
AIR 1938 All 358.
88
AIR 1951 Cal 489.
the concerned High Court.89 This section expands the ambit of the authority beyond with was
till then considered to be possible but it does not confer anew jurisdiction. In Sukhdev Singh
v. Teja Singh 90the Apex Court held that it merely widens the scope of existing jurisdiction of
a very special kind.
1.3.13 Section 12: Punishment for contempt of Court
Ordinarily the punishment prescribed under the Act is simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with
both. There is a proviso appended to Section 12 which provides that the accused may be
discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the
satisfaction of the Court.91 The apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is
qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.92 Previously apology if conditional
was not accepted. Now the law has been amended by this provision which says that an
apology shall not be rejected merely because it is conditional. This was necessary because
often it was felt that the alleged contemnor was convinced that he had not committed any
contempt of court, and yet he did not want to contest the finding to the contrary given by the
court. In such circumstances, if the contemnor explained his point of view and then submitted
that if the court was of the opinion that contempt was committed, he apologised. Similarly,
many other situations could arise in which conditional apology was offered.
Now the position is made clear that apology will not be rejected for the simple reason of
being conditional. Facts have to be examined before the same can be rejected. Another
important feature of the section is that in civil contempt’s, sentence of imprisonment is to be
inflicted only when it is considered that sentence of fine will not meet ends of justice.
Corporations have also been declared as capable of being punished.
Sometimes personal considerations affect the award of punishment under contempt matters.
In Hoshiam Shavaksha Dolikuka v. Thrity Hoshie Dolkuka93, the Court felt that imposition of
any kind of punishment on the father for whom daughter has a lot of affection is likely to
upset her and cause her mental distress. In the unfortunate and acrimonious dispute between
the husband and the wife, the main concern in the instant case has been the welfare of the
child. Only taking into consideration the fact that the welfare of the child is likely to be
89
State v. V. Adilakshmi Amma, 1954 Cr. LJ 988 (Ori).
90
AIR 1954 SC 186 (190)
91
92
Explanation to Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
93
(1982) 2 SCC 577 at p. 582.
affected, the court was of the opinion that under the present circumstances and in the situation
now prevailing one should let off the father with a reprimand and a warning, although he has
been rightly found guilty of having committed contempt of court by the Bombay High Court,
in the hope that the appellant in future will not do any such act as may constitute contempt of
court and will try to serve the cause of welfare of the minor daughter by carrying out the
directions given by the court.
The Supreme Court in R. K. Garg v. State of H.P. 94, held that the contemner had suffered
enough in mind and reputation and no greater purpose was going to be served by subjecting
the contemner to a long bodilly suffering. The punishment in this case was reduced to one
month imprisonment from six months whereas the fine was enhanced from Rs. 200/- to Rs.
1000/-.
1.3.14 Section 13: Contempts not punishable in certain cases
The law does not take into consideration the trival matters even though such matters in the
technical sense may be covered under law. The contempt law is also developed on this
cardinal rule of law that minor matters must be ignored.
It is submitted that every infraction of court's order is not contempt of court. 95 Thus, this
section in unambiguous and in clear terms declares that only wilful and deliberate
disobedience of court's order or substantial interference in courts order is to be punished. A
party (or person) can be committed for contempt only owing to any willful or deliberate or
reckless disobedience of the order of the court. 96 Technical contempt‟s are to be ignored.97
But the contempt by a senior lawyer could not be ignored. The vituperative language was the
outcome of a defeated Advocate which appeared to be a very serious matter to the High
Court. The matter becomes more serious when it has happened in a mofussil place where
there are one or two courts and a few lawyers, and the litigating public is mostly illiterate or
poorly educated, therefore under such circumstances contempt is not to be ignored or allowed
to pass by.98
1.3.15 Section 14: Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High
Court
94
(1981) 3 SCC 166 at p. 167.
95
H.S. Butalia v. Subhas Saksena, 1974 Cr LJ 828 (Cal).
96
Jiwani Kumari v. Satyabrata Chakraborty, AIR 1991 SC 326.
97
Baradakanta Mishra v. The Registrar, Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 SC 710.
98
Rama Dayal, Markarha v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1978 SC 921 at p. 929.
Section 14 of the Act99 deals with procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme
Court or a High Court. Where contempt –
(a) is committed in the presence or hearing of the Supreme Court or the High Court,
or
(b) is not committed in the presence or hearing of the Supreme Court or the High
Court, but a complaint is made immediately before the alleged contemnor leaves the precincts
of that court, then the procedure laid down in this section has to be adopted.100
1.3.16 Section 15: Cognisance of criminal contempt in other cases
Section 15 of the Act, 1971, deals with cognisance of criminal contempt in certain cases. The
Court can take action - (a) On motion by the Advocate-General himself; or (b) On motion by
anyone with the consent of the Advocate-General; or (c) On report by a subordinate court, in
cases not covered by Section 14 of the Act. In Berely v. Xavier, 101 it was held that procedure
of making a reference cannot apply in a case when the presiding officer of a subordinate court
himself is guilty of contempt of court.
Nobody has a right to compel the subordinate Court to make a reference to the High Court. 102
In re K. L. Gauba,103 it was held that contemner has no right to produce defence to establish
the truth of his allegations. In V. K. Kanade v. Mandho Godkari, 104 it was held that a negative
fact cannot be proved.
Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, empowers the High Court in the case of
any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, to take cognizance on a reference made to it by
the subordinate court, or on a motion made by the Advocate-General, or in relation to a
Union Territory by the notified Law Officer.
1.3.17 Section 16: Contempt by judge, magistrate or other person acting judicially
Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, deals with contempt by judge, magistrate or
other person acting judicially. It is not only that an outsider or a third person is to be held
liable for contempt of court. The Presiding Judge of the Court can also be held liable for
contempt under the contempt law. To establish contempt it would depend upon the facts and
99
Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
100
Mansiha Mukherjee v. Aashoke Chatterjee, 1985 Cr LJ 1224.
101
1988 Cr LJ 90.
102
Jomon v the state of Kerala, (1987) IJ Reports 273 (Kerala).
103
AIR 1942 Lah 105; see also Re Ram Mohanlal, AIR 1935 All 38.
104
(1990) I Mah LR 544 (Bom).
circumstances of each case. In B. N. Choudhary v. S.M. Singh, 105 the Court held that steps in
contempt should only be taken when there is real and grave danger which may result in the
obstruction of justice or scandalising the court.
In Harish Chandra v. Justice S. Ali Ahmed, 106 it was held that in respect of Supreme Court or
High Court there is no question of any judge being liable for contempt of his 'Own Court', in
other words, the Court-room should be where such Judge is presiding. Thus a Judge of
Subordinate Court can be said to have committed contempt of his own Court i.e. the court in
which such Judge is presiding. If the framers of the Act wanted to include even the Supreme
Court and High Court Judges under Section 16, then in normal course it was expected that it
should have been specifically mentioned that a Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court
can be held liable for contempt of the Supreme Court or the High Court. It has been made
clear in Sub-Section 2 of Section 16 that nothing in this Section shall apply to any
observations or remarks made by a judge, magistrate or other person acting judicially,
regarding a subordinate court in an appeal or revision pending before such judge, magistrate
or other person against the order or judgment of the subordinate court.
The Supreme Court in Baradakanta v. The Registrar, Orissa High Court,107held that a judge
can foul judicial administration by misdemeanors while engaged in the exercise of the
functions of a judge. In B.N. Choudhary v. S.M. Singh, 108 the Apex Court held that the
magistrates should be conscious of their heavy responsibilities and should not act in a manner
prejudicial to the litigants.
1.3.18 Section 17: Procedure after cognisance
Section 17 of the Act, 1971, deals with procedure after cognizance. Contempt proceedings
are quasi criminal in nature.109 The Supreme Court in M.R. Parashar v. Dr Farooq
Abdullah,110 held that the position of a contemner is that of an accused person. Notice of
every proceeding under the Act shall be served personally on the person charged, unless the
court for reasons to be recorded directs otherwise.111 The notice shall be accompanied112 (a) in
the case of proceedings commenced on a motion, by a copy of the motion as also copies of
105
(1967) Cr.L.J. 1141 (Pat).
106
1987 Cr. L.J. 320 at p. 328.
107
AIR 1974 SC 710.
108
(1967) Cr.L.J. 1141 (Pat)
109
Sheoraj v. A.P. Batra, AIR 1955 All 638
110
1984 Cal LJ 337 (SC).
111
112
the affidavits, if any, on which such motion is founded; and (b) in case of proceedings
commenced on a reference by a subordinate court, by a copy of the reference. The court may
if it is satisfied that a person charged under the Act is likely to abscond or keep out of the way
avoiding service of the notice, order the attachment of his property of such value or amount
as it may deem reasonable.113
Every attachment shall be effected in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, for the attachment of property in execution of a decree for payment of money, and if,
after such attachment, the person charged appears and shows to the satisfaction of the court
that he did not abscond or keep out of the way to avoid service of the notice, the court shall
order the release of his property from attachment upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as
it may think fit.114
Any person charged with contempt under the Act may file an affidavit in support of his
defence, and the court may determine the matter of the charge either on the affidavits filed or
after taking such further evidence as may be necessary, and pass such order as the justice of
the case requires.115
The criminal contempt of court undoubtedly amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui
generis and hence for such offence, the procedure adopted both under the common law and
the statute law even in this country has always been summary. However, the fact that the
process is summary does not mean that the procedural requirement, viz., that an opportunity
of meeting the charge, is denied to the contemner. The degree of precision with which the
charge may be stated depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific
allegations is made clear or otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific allegation, it is
not always necessary to formulate the charge in a specific allegation. The consensus of
opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike is that despite the objection that the Judge
deals with the contempt himself and the contemner has little opportunity to defend himself,
there is a residue of cases where not only it is unjustifiable to punish on the spot but it is the
only realistic way of dealing with certain offenders. This procedure does not offend against
the principle ofnatural justice, viz., nemo judex in sua causa 116 since the prosecution is not
aimed at protecting the Judge personally but protecting the administration of justice. The
threat of immediate punishment is the most effective deterrent against misconduct. The Judge
113
114
115
116
Nemo judex in sua causa means no one can be a judge in one’s own case. It is a principal of Natural Justice.
has to remain in full control of the hearing of the case and he must be able to take steps to
restore order as early and quickly as possible, the time factor is crucial. Dragging out the
contempt proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the main proceedings which paralyses
the court for a time and indirectly impede the speed and efficiency with which justice is
administered. Instant justice can never be completely satisfactory yet it does provide the
simplest, most effective and least unsatisfactory method of dealing with disruptive conduct in
Court. So long as the contemner's interests are adequately safeguarded by giving him an
opportunity of being heard in his defence, even summary procedure in the case of contempt
in the face of the Court is commended and not faulted.
In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India,117 it was held that although the
contempt is in the face of the court, the procedure adopted is not only summary but has
adequately safeguarded the contemner's interests.
1.3.19 Section 18: Hearing of cases of criminal contempt to be by benches
According to Section 18 of the Contempt of Courts Act, every case of criminal contempt
under Section 15 of the Act shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two
Judges. It is relevant to point out that this provision shall not apply in case of the Court of a
Judicial Commissioner118.
It is submitted that the intention of the proceedings is different from the hearing of the
contempt case; therefore, there is nothing unlawful if the proceedings under the Act are
initiated by a single judge. In Court on its Own Motion v. Kasturi Lal 119, the Punjab and
Haryana High Court held that a single Judge of the High Court is in no way barred from
initiating proceedings for criminal contempt and Section 18 of the Contempt of Courts Act
present no impediment to the exercise of the limited power.
Section 18 has no bearing or relevance to either the taking of cognisance under Section 15 or
to the initiation of proceedings and issuance of notice under Section 17. The words 'heard and
determined' as used in Section 18 are not to be read as individual isolated words, but
conjointly as a phrase. The legal phrase 'heard and determined' is not to be applied to any and
every step taken in the contempt jurisdictions but has obvious relevance only to the final trial
and adjudication of criminal contempt. It would be manifest that this phrase would have little
relevance to the preliminaries of procedure laid out in Sections 15 and 17. It is only when the
117
Writ Petition (civil) 200 of 1995, dated 17/4/1998.
118
It is important to point out that now there was no Court of a Judicial Commissioner.
119
AIR 1980 P&H 72.
contemner has appeared and a final adjudication of the matter is to be made then the
provisions of Section 18 and the phrase 'heard and determined' is attracted. It is at this stage
only that the Legislature in its wisdom has provided that the same should be heard and
determined by a Bench of two or more Judges. The proceedings under Section 15 involve no
determination as such nor do the proceedings under Section 17 decide anything till the
contemner appears and makes his defence. Mere cognisance of criminal contempt under
Section 15 and the initiation and notice to the contemner under Section 17 are thus obviously
different from and in essence distinct from the final hearing and determination, which has
been provided for under section 18 of the Act, 1971.120
1.3.20 Section 19: Appeals
Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, deals with appeals. Right to appeal to higher
court against the decision of lower court has been specifically given in the present Act. Prior
to this, the position was not clear. Appeals were heard by the Privy Council on the ground
that the action in the contempt of court cases was made in the name and on behalf of the
Sovereign hence the Privy Council could hear the appeal.
The Apex Court in S. P. Wahi v. Surendra Singh 121 held that it is not each and every order
passed during the contempt proceedings that is appealable. In Subhash Chandra v. B.R.
Kakkar,122 it was held that when the High Court acquits the contemner, no appeal lies. If the
order of committal for contempt of court is made –
(a) By a single judge of the High Court, an appeal lies to a division bench thereof; or
(b) By a division bench of the High Court, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court, as of a
statutory right.123
1.3.20 Section 20: Limitation for actions for contempt
It has been clearly laid down in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that it is a
time bound programme. In V. R. Kanade v. Madhao Gadhari, 124 it was held that no Court
shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the
expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
120
Court on its Own Motion v. Kasturi Lal, AIR 1980 P&H 72, at p. 73.
121
1983 Cr LJ 1426
122
(1992) 2 Punj LR 46 (P & H)
123
(1984) 2 Crimes 880 (SC).
124
(1990) 1 Mah LR 544 (Bom); See also The State of Bihar v. Ambika Roy, 1991 Cr. L.J. 82.
committed. In Golcha Avertising Agency v. The State of Maharashtra, 125 the Court observed
that no intervening event or order stops the running of time specified in this section. In Abdul
Hamed v. S. Radhakrishnan,126 it was observed that the delay in initiating contempt
proceedings cannot be condoned. In Krishanlal Chhoteylal, 127 it was held that the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971, had its own provisions relating to limitation and the provisions of the
Limitation Act, 1963, did not apply.
Article 215 of the Constitution of India, no doubt, empowers every High Court to punish
contempt of court subordinate to it, but the Contempt of Courts Act lays down how that
power has to be exercised. Article 215 of the Constitution of India and relevant provisions of
the Contempt of Courts Act has to be read together. In Om Prakash jaiswal v. D.K.Mittal, 128 it
was held that the High Court cannot take cognizance of contempt of itself if the period of one
year has already elapsed.
1.3.23 Section 22: Act to be in addition to, and not in derogation of, other laws relating to
contempt
According to Section 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the provisions of the Act are in
addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of
Courts. The provisions incorporated in the Act are supplemental to already existing law of
contempt.
An act or action which was not contempt of court before the Act came in force shall not be
punishable as contempt of court under the Act. The provisions incorporated in the Act are
supplement to already existing law of contempt as interpreted by the Supreme Court and
different High Courts.129
1.3.25 Section 24: Repeal
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (32 of 1952) is hereby repealed. This Section repealed the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1952130 with effect from 24-12-1991 which had already repealed the
Contempt to Courts Act, 1926131 with effect from 14-3-1952.
125
(1990) 2 Bom CR 262 (Bom).
126
1989 LW (Cri) 237.
127
(1987) 13 AIR 44.
128
1990 All. L.J. 116 at p. 120.
129
Harish Chandra Misra v. S. Ali Ahmed, AIR 1986 Pat 65.
130
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (Act No. 32 of 1952).
131
The Contempt to Courts Act, 1926 (Act No. 12 of 1926).
The present Act repeals the earlier Act only so far as procedure is concerned. The offence of
Contempt of Court remains punishable today, as it was in the past.
1.4 THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2006
Recently, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been amended and Section 13 has been
substituted by a new Section. This Act may be called the Contempt of Courts (Amendment)
Act, 2006.132
In the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for Section 131 133, the following Section shall be
substituted, namely:-
“Section 13: Contempts not punishable in certain cases
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force,-
(a) no Court shall impose a sentence under this Act for a contempt of Court unless it is
satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends
substantially to interfere with the due course of justice;
(b) the Court may permit, in any proceeding for contempt of Court, justification by truth as
a valid defence if it is satisfied that it is in public interest and the request for invoking the
said defence is bona fide.”
New Section 13 (b) states: “The courts may permit, in any proceedings for contempt of court,
justification by truth as a valid defence if it is satisfied that it is in public interest and the
request for invoking the said defence is bona fide.” With this statutory amendment now
defence of truth can be pleaded in contempt of Court proceedings if such an assertion of fact
was in the public interest and is bona fide. This initiative by the legislature though a small
step in a move to change the pre-judge notion approach of the judiciary, is a right step, for it
recognized the need for balance in excising the power of contempt jurisdiction by the courts
and the right of the citizen to express and hold ideas.
1.5 CONCLUSION
The contempt power in a democracy is only to enable the court to function effectively, and
not to protect the self-esteem of an individual judge. The foundation of judiciary is based on
the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice.
132
It is enacted by Parliament in the fifty-seventh Year of the Republic of India (17th March, 2006), Act no. 6 of
2006.
133
Section 13: Contempts not punishable in certain cases
When the foundation itself is shaken by acts which tend to create disaffection and disrespect
for the authority of the court by disrupting its working, the edifice of the judicial system gets
eroded. Judiciary by punishing the guilty infuses faith in the supremacy of law and
omnipotence of justice. Every offender is to be punished for contumacious acts under the
relevant contempt laws, but it is extremely important to make it sure by the judiciary that
these provisions are not to be misused.
It can be adequately inferred that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is of paramount
importance in the context of sustaining the concept of justice. It aides to make the process of
administering justice expeditious as well as upholds the dignity and faith the people have
bestowed in the judicial system of the country. In itself, it abstains from any form of
arbitrariness. It gives every organization or individual charged under the act reasonable
grounds to defend it or himself, as the case may be. The restrictions, it imposes, is just and
fair in them. Moreover, it recognizes the equal footing of all people in the country by
bringing the judiciary and its officials within its ambit.
During the course of discussion it has been found several loopholes/contradictions in the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. So it is submitted that for the desired results
these loopholes should be pleased by making necessary amendments in the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971.

Critical Analsis On Contempt of Courts Act

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Critical Analsis On Contempt of Courts Act

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Critical Analsis On Contempt of Courts Act

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CRITICAL ANALSIS ON CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971

1. CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT AND ITS JOURNEY

1.2.1 THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1926

The Preamble to the Act 1 stated:-

1.2.2 THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1952

1.2.3 THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971

(i) HISTORY OF THE COTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971

(iii) SCOPE OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT

2. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

1.3.2 Section 1: Short title and extent

A.1.R.1966 All. 588.

December, 1971) of the Republic of India.

1.3.3 Section 2: Definitions

“In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:

(a) 'Contempt of Court' means civil contempt or criminal contempt.

(iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the

(i) Contempt of Court

Mr Chief Justice Hidayatullah further observed:-

(ii) Civil Contempt

(iii) Criminal Contempt

(iv) Distinction between Civil and Criminal Contempt

A) Cases on Criminal Contempt

1.3.4 Section 3: Innocent publication and distribution of matter not contempt

(A) is said to be pending:-

(a) Where it relates to the commission of an offence, when the chargesheet or

1.3.6 Section 5: Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt

1.3.8 Section 7: Publication of information relating to proceeding in chambers or in camera

1.3.9 Section 8: Other defences not affected

Since a proceeding in contempt is a quasi-judicial proceeding, the precise nature of contempt

1.3.13 Section 12: Punishment for contempt of Court

1.3.14 Section 13: Contempts not punishable in certain cases

1.3.16 Section 15: Cognisance of criminal contempt in other cases

1.3.18 Section 17: Procedure after cognisance

1.3.19 Section 18: Hearing of cases of criminal contempt to be by benches

1.3.20 Section 19: Appeals

1.3.20 Section 20: Limitation for actions for contempt

1.3.25 Section 24: Repeal

1.4 THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2006

“Section 13: Contempts not punishable in certain cases

You might also like