ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II v. COURT OF APPEALS and GR No.

152889  March 31, 2001 – In its resolution, the Investigating State Prosecutor found
HON. BASILIO R. GABO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding probable cause to indict the Viudez and others for the crime of murder. 
Judge of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan  September 19, 2001 - 2 Informations for murder were filed with the RTC of
June 5, 2009 Peralta, J. Malolos, Bulacan, which then issued warrants of arrest on the same day.
Digest By: Anit  September 21, 2001 - Viudez filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Power of the DOJ Suspend the Implementation of the Warrant of Arrest, pursuant to DOJ
SUMMARY: Viudez was charged with the murder of Galvez. He filed a petition for Circular No. 70, arguing that all the accused in the said criminal cases had
review before the DOJ to assail the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause against filed a timely petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and, pursuant
him. Nevertheless, an information was filed and an arrest warrant issued against him. to Section 9 of said circular, the implementation of the warrant of arrest
He moved to defer the court proceedings, denied. CA affirmed the trial court. He against Viudez should be suspended and/or recalled pending resolution of
went to the SC. Pending the resolution of the case before the SC, DOJ reversed the the said petition for review.
prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information against Viudez. SC thus  September 28, 2001 - RTC denied the Motion.
declared the case moot for purposes of issuing a TRO against Viudez’ arrest; but still o The warrant against Viudez has been issued and can no longer be
ruled that the pendency of Viudez’ petition for review before the DOJ does not taken back.
suspend the proceedings before the trial court, considering that the determination of o There was no way for the court to recall the warrant in the absence
probable cause for issuing an arrest warrant is the sole function of the judge. of any compelling reason
DOCTRINE: There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which o The court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and the preliminary Viudez hence he had no personality to file any pleading in court
investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or relative to the case until he was arrested or voluntarily surrendered
be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of himself to the court. 
arrest is made by the judge.   The preliminary investigation proper - whether or not o Viudez filed an MR, denied.
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged  October 11, 2001 – Viudez filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
- is the function of the investigating prosecutor. issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the CA
The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of  October 16, 2001 – CA granted a TRO, commanding Judge Gabo to enjoin
probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant of the implementation of the said warrants of arrest.
arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the
 Nov. 12, 2001 - Judge Gabo and the OSG submitted a Comment, arguing
Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in
that the determination of whether to issue a warrant of arrest after the filing
nature.   To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an
of an information was a function that was exclusively vested in respondent
encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge.
Judge.
 December 19, 2001 - CA Decision denied Viudez’ petition for certiorari
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: R45 petition for review on certiorari with
for lack of merit.
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
o The premise of Viudez' conclusion was erroneous because DOJ
injunction assailing the Decision of the CA dismissing the petition for certiorari
Circular No. 70 and the cases he cited did not make it obligatory
filed by Viudez against Judge Gabo, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
for the Judge to grant Viudez' motion
11, Malolos RTC.
o Nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or in any SC
FACTS: circular of this Court was it ever pronounced that when a petition
for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor --
 June 9, 2000 - Mayor Honorato Galvez and his driver were fatally shot in
finding probable cause to indict a respondent -- is filed with the
Barangay San Juan, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. 
Office of the Secretary of Justice, the court which earlier issued
 July 14, 2000 - A complaint for murder against Enrique Viudez II was filed
warrants of arrest, should suspend their enforcement.
by Estrella Galvez, widow of Mayor Galvez, for the killing of the latter and
o Viudez filed MR, denied.
his driver.
 Viudez filed the present petition with the SC.

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  January 9, 2002 – Judge Gabo ordered the issuance of an alias warrant of  The Office of the State Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw the
arrest against Viudez. Informations, which the RTC granted on October 23, 2002.
 September 13, 2002 – DOJ sustained Viudez’ petition for review.  Furthermore, in a Resolution dated May 6, 2002, SC already resolved to
o DISPOSITIVE: [t]he Chief State Prosecutor is directed to move, issue a TRO as prayed for by Viudez. 
with leave of court, for the withdrawal of the information for  These developments would necessarily render the instant petition moot and
murder (2 counts) against Mayor Enrique V. Viudez II and Eulogio academic.
Villanueva immediately.  However, as implored by Viudez, SC still rendered its decision on the
 September 19, 2002 - Viudez filed a Manifestation informing the SC that merits of the case in the interest of justice.
the Secretary of Justice had already sustained his petition for review. 2) PENDENCY OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE DOJ DOES NOT
 November 6, 2002 – In his Reply to the Comment of the OSG, Viudez STAY CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS OR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARREST
reiterated that with the SOJ’s resolution of his petition in his favor, the case WARRANT
may already be moot and academic.  Viudez: DOJ Circular No. 70, paragraph 2 of Section 9, provides that the
appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of
VIUDEZ’S ARGUMENT: The Decision of the CA was issued with grave abuse of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. 
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that DOJ Circular No. 70 o The suspension of proceedings in court, as provided in the said
promulgated on July 3, 2000 was plainly a directive of the Secretary of Justice to the circular, includes the suspension of the implementation of warrants
accused and the trial prosecutor to ask the Court to suspend the proceedings thereon of arrest issued by the court.
during the pendency of the appeal. Circular No. 70 had the force and effect of law.   SC: Viudez is wrong.
The same department circular stated that its promulgation was in line with recent  The preliminary inquiry, which is the determination of probable cause for
jurisprudence.   purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge.  
 The preliminary investigation proper - whether or not there is reasonable
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT: [OSG] The determination of whether to issue a ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged - is the
warrant of arrest after the filing of an information was a function that was function of the investigating prosecutor.
exclusively vested in respondent Judge.  Respondent Judge, therefore, was in no way  Baltazar v. People: The task of the presiding judge when the Information is
obliged to defer the implementation of the service of the warrant simply because a filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-
petition for review was filed by Viudez before the Secretary of Justice to question existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.  
the filing of the information against him. Respondent Judge did not need to wait for o Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead
the completion of the preliminary investigation before issuing a warrant of arrest, for a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense
Section 4, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the head of the charged in the Information or any offense included therein has
office to whom the warrant of arrest has been delivered for execution shall cause the been committed by the person sought to be arrested.  
warrant to be executed within 10 days from receipt thereof. o In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules
ISSUE: W/N a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of
of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
Justice concerning a finding of probable cause will suspend the proceedings in the
o A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
trial court, including the implementation of a warrant of arrest (NO)
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
and that it was committed by the accused.  
HELD:
o Probable cause demands more than suspicion but requires less than
1) CASE WAS MOOTED BY THE DOJ’S RULING FAVORABLE TO VIUDEZ
evidence that would justify conviction.
 The Secretary of Justice had already resolved the petition for review and
ordered the withdrawal of the informations for murder filed against the  The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause
same Viudez with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, ruling that there was no for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely
probable cause for the filing of the said informations.   charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial.

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  The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, Dimatulac v. Villon, and Solar Team
determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent Entertainment, Inc. v. How.
implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the  SC: WRONG. A close reading of the factual antecedents in Ledesma, Solar
resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the Team Entertainment, Inc., Dimatulac and Marcelo clearly show that a
finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature.  common issue among them is whether the arraignment of an accused may
o To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an be deferred pending resolution by the Secretary of Justice of a petition for
encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge.  review on the finding of probable cause, to which this Court ruled in the
 CASE AT BAR: It must be emphasized that Viudez filed with the trial court affirmative. 
a motion to suspend proceedings and to suspend the implementation of the o Nowhere in the said decisions did it state that the implementation
warrant of arrest in pursuance of a DOJ circular, and not a motion to quash or enforcement of the warrant of arrest was also deferred or
the warrant of arrest questioning the issuance thereof.  suspended, as herein Viudez prays for.  
 Thus, Viudez did not contest the validity or regularity of the issuance of the  Viudez: The dispositive portion of Roberts directed the deferment of the
warrant of arrest. Viudez merely wanted the trial court to defer the issuance of the warrant of arrest pending resolution of the petition for
implementation of the warrant of arrest pending the resolution by the review by the Secretary of Justice when it ruled that, in the meantime,
Secretary of Justice of the petition for review that he filed citing the respondent Judge Asuncion was directed to cease and desist from further
directive contained in Section 9 of DOJ Department Circular proceeding with Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and to defer the issuance of
 The directive in Sec. 9 of DOJ Circ. No. 70 is directed specifically at the warrants of arrest against the petitioner.
appellant and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy  SC: This observation is inaccurate, if not erroneous.
to ensure that the proceedings in court are held in abeyance.  o What was adjudged as premature in Roberts was the respondent
o Nowhere in the said provision does it state that the court must hold judge's denial of the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer
the proceedings in abeyance.  arraignment, on the ground that the case was already in his court
o Therefore, the discretion of the court whether or not to suspend the for trial; and to follow whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice
proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon may have on the matter would undermine the independence and
the motion of the appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains integrity of his court, which was still capable of administering
unhindered.   justice.
 This is in consonance with the doctrine that once a complaint or information o In dispelling the ground relied upon by the respondent judge, SC
is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the ruled that the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the
conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the information, on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review
said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before reversing the finding of the investigating prosecutor, was the
it.   proper remedy. 
 CASE AT BAR: Judge Gabo merely exercised his judicial discretion when o Therefore, what was disapproved was not the denial per se of the
he denied Viudez' motion to suspend the implementation of the warrant of motions, but the reasoning behind it.  
arrest.  Consequently, the CA was correct when it found no whimsicality or o It was from that premise that SC ordered in the dispositive portion
oppressiveness in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion in issuing the of its decision to defer the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
challenged orders. o Of more importance still was the fact that, whereas the questioned
JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY VIUDEZ RELATES TO SUSPENSION OF motions in Roberts were for the suspension of proceedings and
ARRAIGNMENT; NOT SUSPENSION OF COURT deferment of arraignment, the issue in the instant case is the
PROCEEDINGS/IMPLEMENTATION OF ARREST WARRANT suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest, which SC
 Viudez: The suspension of the proceedings in court, including the did not rule upon in the former case.
suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending a resolution
of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice, is in consonance with the decisions PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT; TRO/WRIT OF
of the SC in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DENIED FOR MOOTNESS.

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