Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Hon. Ferdinand J. Marcos G.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996 Davide, JR., J.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Hon. Ferdinand J. Marcos G.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996 Davide, JR., J.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Hon. Ferdinand J. Marcos G.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996 Davide, JR., J.
FERDINAND
J. MARCOS
G.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
RULING:.
“Sec. 15. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. — All existing public
airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or immovable,
belonging to or presently administered by the airports, and all assets, powers, rights, interests and
privileges relating on airport works or air operations, including all equipment which are
necessary for the operations of air navigation, aerodrome control towers, crash, fire, and rescue
facilities are hereby transferred to the Authority: Provided, however, that the operations control
of all equipment necessary for the operation of radio aids to air navigation, airways
communication, the approach control office, and the area control center shall be retained by the
Air Transportation Office. No equipment, however, shall be removed by the Air Transportation
Office from Mactan without the concurrence of the Authority. The Authority may assist in the
maintenance of the Air Transportation Office equipment.”
It may be reasonable to assume that the term “lands” refer to “lands” in Cebu City then
administered by the Lahug Air Port and included the parcels of land the respondent City of Cebu
seeks to levy on for real property taxes. This section involves a “transfer” of the “lands,” among
other things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof, with the
ownership being retained by the Republic of the Philippines.
This “transfer” is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because the
petitioner’s authorized capital stock consists of, inter alia, “the value of such real estate owned
and/or administered by the airports.” Hence, the petitioner is now the owner of the land in
question and the exception in Section 234(c) of the LGC is inapplicable.
Moreover, the petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its
Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the
privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a
taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax.
Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real
property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, even if it be conceded
to be an “agency” or “instrumentality” of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in
view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of
real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to the petitioner.