Bachrach Motor V Icarangal

Bachrach Motor v.
Icarangal, 68 Phil 287 (1939)
Petitioner: BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., is the creditor.

Defendant: ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL is the debor. ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL with one Jacinto Figueroa, executed
a promissory note and in security for its payment, executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land.
Defendant: Oriental Commercial Co., Inc. who acquired the property which was the subject of the
mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, at the public auction.
NAME OF THE ACTION: An action to foreclose the mortgage.
FACTS: On June 11, 1930, defendant herein, Esteban Icarañgal, with one Jacinto Figueroa, for value received,
executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a promissory note for P1,614, and in security for its
payment, said Esteban Icarañgal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Pañgil, Laguna, which was
duly registered on August 5, 1931, in the registry of deeds of the Province of Laguna. Thereafter, promissor’s
defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments; wherefore, plaintiff instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for the collection of the amount due on the note. Judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff. A writ of execution was subsequently issued and, in pursuance thereof, the provincial sheriff of Laguna, at
the indication of the plaintiff, levied on the properties of the defendants, including that which has been mortgaged
by Esteban Icarañgal in favor of the plaintiff.
The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by virtue of
a writ of execution issued in civil case No. 88253 of the municipal court of the City of Manila, the property which
was the subject of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at
the public auction on May 12, 1933. By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the
property and, in consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied.
Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage.
RULING OF LOWER COURTS: The trial court dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered
plaintiff took the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected to
sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment of
which the mortgage was constituted as a security?
RULING: Yes, plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage.
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This
single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the
creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But
both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a
single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary
to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action
for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single
cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of
the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the
creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to
foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so
much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
The creditor’s cause of action is not only single but also indivisible, although the agreements of the parties,
evidenced by the note and the deed of mortgage, may give rise to different remedies. The cause of action should
not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. And considering, as we have shown, that one of the
two remedies available to the creditor is as complete as the other, he cannot be allowed to pursue both in
violation of those principles of procedure intended to secure simple, speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice.

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Bachrach Motor v.

Icarangal, 68 Phil 287 (1939)

Petitioner: BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., is the creditor.

NAME OF THE ACTION: An action to foreclose the mortgage.

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