G.R. No.

109373 March 20, 1995 On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 31, a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation."   The petition was approved,
3

PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and members, petitioners, after which creditors filed their claims with the court.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas,  President of
4

NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific Banking the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by
Corporation, respondents. the Central Bank.

G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995 On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees
Organization (Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month
CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash
Corporation , petitioner, equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of
vs. PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, payment of the principal claims of the Union.
5

DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG

KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On
Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents. October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification
of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his
September 13, 1991  but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for
6

reconsideration. This order was received by the Liquidator on December

MENDOZA, J.: 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a Notice of
Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal.
These cases have been consolidated because the principal question On December 23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office
involved is the same: whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.
Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special
proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The Fifth and the Fourteenth In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the
Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite results on this Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more
question and consequently applied different periods for appealing. than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his
September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and
The facts are as follows: executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted
the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.
I.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No.
112991, likewise filed claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC
Proceedings in the CB and the RTC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18.
The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462 common shares, constituted
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged that
under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to their claim constituted foreign exchange capital investment entitled to
Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.
placed under liquidation  and a Liquidator was appointed.
1 2
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order
directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion for
their claim as preferred creditors.
7
reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was filed late.
Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition.
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On
September 30, 1992 he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was III.
denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He received the order denying
his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On October 14, Present Proceedings
1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992
and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this
ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it Court.
had been filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15
days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
of his September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/ Investors'
claim.
1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the suit.
II.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Nañagas
who was without any legal authority to file it.
The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the
trial court denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of
case is a special proceeding governed by Rules 72 to
Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the Court
109 of the Revised Rules of Court.
of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled, rendered
conflicting rulings.
4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding
that the notice of appeal filed by Nañagas was filed on
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now
time.
G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth Division  held in the case of the Union that the
8

proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding and,

therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order 5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that
rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator the second notice of appeal filed on December 23, 1991
was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.
Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division,
therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court and directed the latter On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:
to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on
Appeal he had filed for hearing. 1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the
Pacific Banking Corporation s a Special Proceeding case
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case
Division  ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the
9 the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from
case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.
ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or
final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's
 2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are This section shall not apply in appeals in special
plain stockholders whose right to receive payment as proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals
such would accrue only after all the creditors of the are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of
insolvent bank have been paid. Court.

3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:
US$22,531,632.18 is not in the nature of foreign
investment as it is understood in law. 19. Period of Appeals. —

4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly (a) All appeals, except in habeas
established and proved. corpus cases and in the cases referred
to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken
5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
of PaBC was made with grave abuse of discretion. judgment, order, resolution or award
appealed from.
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in
First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of
whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the Court and other cases wherein multiple
nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 appeals are allowed, the period of
days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a record
with the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal. on appeal being required.
Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of
appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding
from. is an ordinary action similar to an action for interpleader under Rule
63.   The Fourteenth Division stated:
10

BP Blg. 129 provides:

The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63
§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, of the Rules of Court where there are conflicting
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court claimants or several claims upon the same subject
in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the matter, a person who claims no interest thereon may file
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or an action for interpleader to compel the claimants to
decision appealed from: Provided, however, that "interplead" and litigate their several claims among
in habeas corpus cases the period for appeal shall be themselves. (Section I Rule 63).
forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from. An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action
under Rule 62 which, like an ordinary action, may be
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the
all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, preceding rules covering ordinary civil actions which are
together with an index of the contents thereof. not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are
applicable to special civil actions. This embraces Rule 41
 covering appeals from the regional trial court to the Court §2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other
of Appeals. remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a
Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:"  11

action is defined as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice

by which one party prosecutes another for the Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
redress of a wrong." On the other hand, Section 2 of the prevention or redress of a wrong while special
same Rule states that "every other remedy including one proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence,
fact shall be by special proceeding." action is distinguished from special proceeding in that
the former is a formal demand of a right by one against
To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration
action and a special proceeding, the petition for of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to
assistance of the court in the liquidation of an asset of a recover property from another, his remedy is to file an
bank is not "one to establish the status or right of a party action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of
or a particular fact." Contrary to the submission of the a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special
petitioner, the petition is not intended to establish the fact proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity
of insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank calling for an appointment of guardianship.
had already been previously determined by the Central
Bank in accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent
the petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an
liquidate the assets of the bank and thus the assistance ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or
of the respondent court is sought for that purpose. protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a
party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's
It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be
among the cases categorized as a special proceeding enforced against any person.
under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor
among the special proceedings that may be appealed What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the
under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules. corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their
claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's
of the Rules of Court provide: debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a
declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the
court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another disposition of the corporation's assets.
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation
proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an
action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a
person who has no interest therein.   This is not the case in a liquidation
12
proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, claim were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of
takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the the issue of how much property is available for disposal.
creditors.  He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the
13
Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation
corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of proceeding — payment of all allowed claims in
payment provided by law. accordance with the order of legal priority and the
approved distribution plan.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the
settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of
Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of allowance or disallowance of a particular claim cannot be
all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a
insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals
or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the are allowed by law." The issuance of an Order which, by
claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the its nature, affects only the particular claims involved, and
estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of which may assume finality if no appeal is made
creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment. therefrom, ipso facto creates a situation where multiple
appeals are allowed.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are
allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation. As the A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a
Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly single petition by the Solicitor General with a court of
noted: competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in
the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which claims against the insolvent are required to be filed with
consists of a number of cases properly classified as the liquidation court. Although the claims are litigated in
"claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each
first phase is concerned with the approval and claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative
disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the petition to a particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving
seeking the assistance of the proper court in the the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered
liquidation of a close entity, all money claims against the separate and distinct from the others. Obviously, in the
bank are required to be filed with the liquidation court. event that an appeal from an Order allowing or
This phase may end with the declaration by the disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is
liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without affected, leaving the others to proceed with their ordinary
basis. On the other hand, it may also end with the course. In such case, the original records of the
liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They
claim shall be classified whether it is ordinary or remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of the original
preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either record, a record of appeal is instead required to be
case, the order allowing or disallowing a particular claim prepared and transmitted to the appellate court.
is final order, and may be appealed by the party
aggrieved thereby. Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation
proceedings. Consequently, a record on appeal is
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the
the distribution plan prepared by the duly appointed period to appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a
liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the record on appeal being required. (Record pp. 162-164).
total amount available for distribution to creditors whose
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the
Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the function of the trial court is not limited to assisting in the implementation
23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of
Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on the law invoked by the Union, the court has authority to set aside the
appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a convincing proof that the
stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith."   As this Court held
14

Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:  15

are allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are actually
separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to any claim can There is no question, that the action of the monetary
be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in Board in this regard may be subject to judicial review.
the trial court where other claims may still be pending. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with
the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported or
granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final. liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been
Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith
Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus must be (Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567
affirmed albeit for a different reason. [1971]).

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank
find that the Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition but also of the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he
for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through counsel as he may
Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a retain, in all actions or proceedings or against the corporation" and he
record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these purposes."
receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions or final
resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the
within the extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus bank.
erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's
motion for extension to file a record on appeal. Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for
extension of time to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central
The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Bank was not filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for
Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and its the Central Bank. This contention has no merit. On October 22, 1992, as
decision should, therefore, be affirmed. Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial court in
March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized lawyers of the
Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case.   Conformably thereto
16

Act No. 265, the court merely assists in adjudicating the claims of the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit
creditors, preserves the assets of the institution, and implements the Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I.
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore, as Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC.  17

representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot question the

order of the court or appeal from it. It contends that since the Monetary WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions
Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact appealed from are AFFIRMED.
setting aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their
claims, there was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply SO ORDERED.
with the order of the court.
G.R. No. 192828 : November 28, 2011 The Complaint, captioned as one for " Disinheritance,
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
INC., Petitioners, v. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a]
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary
of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, Injunction, " was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and
MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents.
In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as
RESOLUTION causes of action: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

REYES, J.: First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also
known as Antonio Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy
The Case (Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime
Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1  under Rule 45 common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes).
Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a
red

of the Rules of Court assailing the December 14, 2009

Decision2  and July 8, 2010 Resolution3  of the Court of Appeals common-law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that
Ramon misrepresent edhimself as Antonio's and Lucina's son
red red

(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The dispositive portion of the

assailed Decision reads:  when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth
certificate was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as
is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a
case and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15, criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest
2007 and May 16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the issued against him have remain edunserved as he is at large.
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in Civil Case From the foregoing circumstances and upon the authority of
No. 02-105251.4 Article 9197  of the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents
red

concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence,

red

prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.

The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the
conclusion of the police investigations tagging Ramon as the
The Factual Antecedents
prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the former made an
inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that
Sometime between November 25, 2002  and  December 3, there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The
2002,5  the respondents filed a Complaint 6  against the
respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his
red red

petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two
Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar,
other parcels of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in
Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of  Hongkong, which were in Ramon's possession.
Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles
from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational Sixth Cause of Action .  Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of
attainment, was sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business
him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of
Time Deposit of  P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu
the certificates of title covering two condominium units in Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's
Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the
money but which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon conveyances are null and void ab initio.
also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and
Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares, Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now
exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), manages Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the
from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, Ramon respondents their shares in the estate of Antonio.
had convinced them to execute an Agreement 8  and a red

Waiver9  on August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions

red

The respondents thus prayed for the following in their

stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on the Complaint:  chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the

amount of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, 1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the
Lucina was not informed of the execution of the said defendant RAMON CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen Dy
instruments and had not received any amount from Ramon. Tan Ching from disposing, selling or alienating any property
Hence, the instruments are null and void. that belongs to the estate of the deceased ANTONIO CHING;

Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, xxx

which constitute 60% of the latter's total capitalstock, were
illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name through a 4. x x x
forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing
owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim that he
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered
bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is
his father ANTONIO CHING disqualified as heir and from
baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished
inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father;
into thin air through Ramon's machinations.
b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed
transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of land from the name of his
an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x;
Estate10  adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to
red

the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the said

instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER
executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x RAMON CHING for
eight real properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's
name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of being patently immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic)
sham;
Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety Bond conditioned
to answer for whatever claims which may eventually surface in
connection with the said stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks
Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf. at (sic) PO WING from the names of ANTONIO CHING and
LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIO  CHING's name for
having been illegally procured through the falsification of their On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 16  admitting the red

signatures in the document purporting the transfer thereof; respondents' Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that
Metrobank had already filed Manifestations admitting that as
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the successor-in-interest of Global Bank, it now possesses custody
AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed by x x x of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed willingness to abide
RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and existing by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's
jurisprudence; deposits. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to
assail the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on May 3,
f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed 2006.
by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2) parcels of land x x x to
defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated
one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR Answer with Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended
for having illegally procured the ownership and titles of the Complaint.
above properties;
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order. 17 red

11
x x x. red

On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to

The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss18  the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged
red

12
Dismiss  alleging forum
red shopping, litis pendentia, res ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
judicata and the respondents as not being the real parties in of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the
interest. Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the
respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order 13  denying
red
the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of
the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss. the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action
for declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a
The respondents filed an Amended Complaint 14  dated April 7, probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an
ordinary court.
red

2005 impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-

defendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint also added
a seventh cause of action relative to the existence of a On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order 19  denying the red

Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on grounds: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The

respondents prayed that they be declared as the rightful In the case at bar ,  an examination of the Complaint
owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to would disclose that the action delves mainly on the
them. Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of question of ownership of the properties described in the
a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary
pendency of the case. civil action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the action
seeks to declare the nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit
On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
Answer with Counterclaim. Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by
defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of
establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have
translated this action into a special proceeding was enforcement of their rights against the alleged
nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint. With regard fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon
[to] the prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful Ching. The private respondents also instituted the said
owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be immediately amended complaint in order to protect them from the
released to them, in itself poses an issue of ownership consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by
which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from
evidence. And as emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing or
Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co- alienating the subject properties, including the P4
defendant. Million deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate
court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, which must
As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
during the Pre-trial of this case, one of the issues raised by the jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree
defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether with the trial court that the probate court could not take
or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession? cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon Ching,
Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally given the undisputed fact that there was no will to be
disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the contested in a probate court.
Court , the issue of disinheritance, which is one of the
causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended
after a trial on the merits. And at this stage, it has not complaint and complicates the issue of jurisdiction by
been sufficiently established whether or not there is a reiterating the grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners'
will.20  (Emphasis supplied.)
red earlier pleadings. Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter is determined by the
The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 allegations of the complaint without regard to whether
denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to
the subjects of a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. The recover upon all or some of the causes of action
petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised the issue of asserted therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of the
whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it court does not depend upon the defenses pleaded in the
denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the question of
the Amended Complaint sought to establish the status or rights jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
of the respondents which subjects are within the ambit of a petitioners (defendants).22  Hence, we focus our resolution
red

special proceeding. on the issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended

complaint and not on the defenses pleaded in the motion to
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of the petitioners.
Decision21  denying the petition for certiorari on grounds: 
red chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there

Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations being no compelling reason to still subject the action of
supporting the causes of action of the amended complaint the petitioners in a special proceeding since the
induced us to infer that nothing in the said complaint nullification of the subject documents could be achieved
shows that the action of the private respondents should in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate
be threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon
that their allegations were substantially for the
the issues that it defined during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
02-105251.23  (Emphasis supplied)
red procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having validly submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and having actively
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from
CA through a Resolution24  issued on July 8, 2010.
red
challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents'
Complaint and Amended Complaint. 31 red

The Issue
The Court's Ruling
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25  is anchored on
red

the issue of: We resolve to deny the instant petition.

Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this
Dismiss filed by the PETITIONERS on the alleged ground of the Court directing them to file their reply to the respondents'
RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Comment/Opposition to the instant Petition. While the
Amended Complaint, to wit, (a) filiations with Antonio of prescribed period to comply expired on March 15, 2011, the
Ramon, Jaime and Joseph; (b) rights of  common-law wives, petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file
Lucina and Mercedes, to be considered as heirs of Antonio; (c) a reply only on October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost
determination of the extent of Antonio's estate; and (d) other seven months.
matters which can only be resolved in a special proceeding and
not in an ordinary civil action. Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and
the CA when they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners'
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-105251 was
authority to determine (a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) proper.
the validity of  a waiver of  hereditary rights; (c) the status of
each heir; and (d) whether the property in the inventory is Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the
conjugal or the exclusive property of  the deceased respondents that the petitioners engaged in forum shopping
spouse.26  Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of
red and are already estopped from questioning the RTC's
the contending parties and the respondents' alleged jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the latter
entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant
now in Metrobank's custody are matters which are more Petition is still in order.Although the respondents' Complaint
appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding and not of an and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the
ordinary civil action. disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the
respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil
The respondents opposed27  the instant petition claiming that
red
Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and
the petitioners are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically, not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.
G.R. Nos. 17550728  and 183840,29  both involving the
red red

contending parties in the instant petition were filed by the An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
Further, in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,30  the SC declared that
red settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of
the exercise of  its general jurisdiction  or its limited probate the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised
Rules of Court.32  A special proceeding is a remedy by which a
red undue influence and committed fraud against them.
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit
fact.33  It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a
red of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonio’s estate executed by
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said
or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 34  To initiate a special
red affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a
proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed. resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of
the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected determinative of which court shall properly exercise
only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be jurisdiction.
specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while
the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma
sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument Hugo,37  the Court declared: 
red chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was

ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of
disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the
probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction. plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction
The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set
Complaint, seeking the release in favor of the respondents of up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise,
the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily require the the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is
determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs. the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint
It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be
that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which consulted.
was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the
Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of
alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold the documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be
order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case
Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be said was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly
that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised fraudulent acts of Ramon . In the event that the RTC will find
on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the
ownership of the same, and not on the declaration of their only consequence will be the reversion of the properties
status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No.
that the respondents were parties to the execution of the 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues
Agreement35  and Waiver36  prayed to be nullified. Hence, even
red red relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of
without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a  special
respondents have the standing to seek for the nullification of proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no person  under Rules 73-91 of  the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the
RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement
proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to
recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been
illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained
from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and
Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers
indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out
in a special proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners'

(a) Opposition to the respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution
of Party;38  and (b) Manifestation39  through counsel that they
red red

will no longer file a reply to the respondents'

Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18799             March 31, 1964 ... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of
the petitioner and his late wife, Digna Maravilla, and before any
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, partition of the conjugal property is done, the Court cannot
Negros Occidental, pinpoint which of the property subject of the Will belongs to
ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners, Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by the
vs. special administrator. Hence, although it is true that the
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent. petitioner Herminio Maravilla has an adverse interest in the
property subject of the Will, the Court finds it impossible for the
Jose Gutierrez David, A. Aveto, A. Mirasol and P. C. Ramos for present time to appoint any person other than the petitioner as
petitioners. special administrator of the property until after the partition is
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent. ordered, for the reason that the properties mentioned in the Will
are in the name of the petitioner who is the surviving spouse of
the deceased.
BARRERA, J.:
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
the will, as it was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the
Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 27200-R) wherein, over their objection, raising
presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
the question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate court took cognizance
of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla
and, in consequence thereof, set aside the appointment of petitioner On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with
Eliezar Lopez as a special co-administrator of the estate of the the court a petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion
deceased Digna Maravilla. The pertinent antecedent facts are as Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the
follows: ground that the will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs
of the decedent. Said petition was heard on February 20, at which
hearing, respondent's counsel orally moved for postponement, because
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court
respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been notified and was
of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will
not present. The court ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting
(Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died
of the testimonies of Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was
named as the universal heir and executor.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of
appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal, from the decision denying
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla
probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed
(brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition
from said decision.
to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not
signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting
witnesses and of one another. On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with
the court a petition for the removal of respondent as special
administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was
appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in
opposed by Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an
Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent
order appointing him special administrator of the estate of the deceased,
filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of
for the reason that:
Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had
already been submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was
filed.
1äwphï1.ñët
On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed an opposition. on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less
filed with the court a petition for appointment of Conchita as special co- than P200,000.00 and the decision of the probate court (of February 8,
administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition 1960) is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
February 29. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
and the present case does not involve title to or possession of real
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to estate exceeding in value P200,000.00. 1
appoint Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, (2) approval of
respondent's record appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the
respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring
Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix, and (5) petition to appoint Adelina null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
Sajo as special co-administrator. At said hearing, respondent objected to administrator.
the appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on
grounds that (a) the law allows only one special co-administrator (b) the Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of
order of March 16, 1959 estops the court from appointing Eliezar Lopez said decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
as special co-administrator (c) such appointment is unfair to respondent, appeal.
because owns at least 3/4 of the whole property, conjugal nature, which
would be subjected to the administrate of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue
between two special administrators would ruin the management of the the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same
property, including those of respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was
employed full time in the PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could not
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision
discharge the functions of a co-administrator, and (2) there was merely
appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory
intention on Lopez part to resign from office.
that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co- (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of
administrator in an order dictated open court, to protect the interests of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna
Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla. Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special
administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of that the proceedings had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for co-administrator are merely incidental to the probate or testate
preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on appeal before
special co-administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion
proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special to elevate the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the
administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary amount herein involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still
injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate
make it more specific. jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted,
considering that the properties therein involved are valued at
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special administrator.
Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on
the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be
exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the
for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining
the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has
already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to
dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the issue the writs in question.
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the
Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211, December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see amount of "P90,000.00 more or less", as the amount involved in the
also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L-10663, October 31, case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20).
1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a But this case is inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of
probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the administration of the estate, nor to an order denying probate of a will, but
amount or value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire only to the recovery of a particular legacy consisting of the rentals of a
estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. fishpond belonging to the estate. In an analogous case involving the
Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not administration of a trust fund, the United States Supreme Court held:
having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R.
No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved therein is more than Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed
P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction by the circuit court, in a suit to compel the stockholders of a
to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the fund,
the instant case, which are merely incidental thereto. amounts to more than $5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of
the appeal, which is not affected by the fact that the amounts
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum (Handly
appealable where the amount or value involved is reducible to a et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant's
interest or the value of the entire estate according as the issues on Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as
appeal involve only the appellant's rights or the entire administration of distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive appellate
the estate. ... In a contest for administration of an estate the amount or jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in
value of the assets of the estate is the amount in controversy for Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a
purposes of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it is to be special proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a
observed that respondent's interest as appellant in the probate special proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal.
proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil
whole estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4 case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680,
thereof, or approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced to a N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides
pecuniary standard on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or value that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special
of the matter in controversy, and such amount being more than proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may
P200,000.00, it follows that the appeal taken in said proceedings falls serve to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings.
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and should, Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in
therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1948, as amended. Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)

Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate
annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co- total claim of the parties and not the combined claims against each other
administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the
respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit
administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of that the amount or value involved or in controversy in probate
the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the
It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than rule in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be
noted that respondent claims the whole estate of at least more than 3/4 trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-
thereof. Said claim, reduced to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the administrator. Without costs. So ordered.
inventory, would amount to more than P200,000.00 and, consequently,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by

respondent in his brief, is also inapplicable, because unlike the instant
case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the estate.

While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate
proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which
was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes
immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the value in controversy
exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs",
and that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme
Court, or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which
shall hear the same as if it had originally been brought before it".

On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as

special administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no need
for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-
administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such special
administrator is merely temporary and subsists only until a regular
executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not only be
unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration of the
need for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the
husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the community
property devolves merely to protect the interests of petitioners who, in
the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have
no right to participate in the proceedings at all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82
Phil. 407.)

In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount

involved in the controversy, it is suggested that appropriate steps be
taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving the
probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions
of the Judiciary Act on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is

set aside and another one entered also setting aside the order of the
G.R. No. 168913             March 14, 2007 Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole
issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata
ROLANDO TING, Petitioner, in LRC No. 1437-N.
vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had
ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of
DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA); 4 it
ALCOVER, Respondents. was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced
as basis of respondents’ motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N; 5 and as no
DECISION action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the
lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the
CARPIO MORALES, J.: dormant judgment passé[d] into extinction." 6

In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis
No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First of res judicata.7
Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 The petition fails.
(the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January Decree provides:
29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10,
1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of
corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of decree. – The judgment rendered in a land registration
the spouses Lirio. proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days 8 to be
counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the
same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1 After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon
the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of
Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the
Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)
opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner’s application by Branch 21
of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer2 calling attention to the December In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private
10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the
executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its
of petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata. registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the
whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. 10
RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner’s application on the
ground of res judicata. 31ªvvphi1.nét
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five
Atienza’s application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
is binding on the whole world including petitioner. barred by the statute of limitations[,]

Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure
N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the
issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
of the Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison d’etre why Section 6,
Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral
extension must first be approved by the Land Management Services of THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE
DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET
court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere special work
order.11 We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be
Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision which was proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory
its duty. is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules
to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings,
they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a
conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as
record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the
of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or
administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They fact; in land registration proceedings, the
are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in
ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings." 12 (Emphasis ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
supplied) established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed

As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
Court reading: ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party
had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and to oust him therefrom.
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to
Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,
except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a
writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions,

DENIED.

Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.

SO ORDERED.