Republic of the Philippines In its Memorandum,3 dated July 26, 2004, the Ombudsman approved the findings in the Joint

SUPREME COURT Decision as regards the petitioners.

Manila
On December 13, 2004, Villaseñor and Mesa filed their separate motions for reconsideration4 of
THIRD DIVISION the Joint Decision.

G.R. No. 202303               June 4, 2014 In the Memorandum,5 dated March 2, 2006, the Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Mesa and those of the other accused, and affirmed in toto the Joint
GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR AND RODEL A. MESA, Petitioners, Decision. Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration, however, was not enumerated as one of the
vs. pleadings resolved.6
OMBUDSMAN AND HON. HERBERT BAUTISTA, City Mayor, Quezon City, Respondents.
On April 18, 2006, Mesa appealed to the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 93891.
DECISION Villaseñor made no appeal, his motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman being yet
unresolved.
MENDOZA, J.:
In the Order7 dated August 23, 2006, pending resolution of Mesa’s appeal and Villaseñor’s
motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman directed the Mayor of Quezon City and the
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government to enforce the Joint Decision
assailing the March 15, 20121 and June 18, 20122 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA). in immediately upon receipt of the order.
CA G.R. SP No. 121378, which dismissed for utter lack of merit the petition to nullify or restrain
the immediate implementation of the June 17, 2003 Joint Decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-01-0376 and OMB-ADM-0-01-0390, directing the dismissal from On September 20, 2011, Villaseñor and Mesa filed a special civil action for certiorari8 before the
the service and one-year suspension of petitioners Gerardo R. Villaseñor (Villaseñor) and Rodel CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 121378, assailing the August 23, 2006 Order of the
A. Mesa (Mesa), respectively. Ombudsman ordering the immediate implementation of the Joint Decision despite the pendency
of Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration and Mesa’s appeal. They prayed that the said order be
annulled and an injunction be issued to restrain its implementation.
The Facts
In the assailed March 15, 2012 Resolution,9 the CA dismissed the petition for utter lack of merit.
The petitioners, along with several others, were administratively charged in connection with the It held that the Ombudsman decision was immediately executory pending appeal and would not
Manor Hotel fire tragedy that took place on August 18, 2001, killing 74 people and causing injury be stayed by the filing of the appeal or issuance of an injunctive relief.
to others. Petitioner Villaseñor was an electrical inspector from the Electrical Division, and
petitioner Mesa was an inspector from the Electrical Engineering Office, both of Quezon City.
In the assailed June 18, 2012 Resolution,10 the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
In OMB-ADM-0-01-0376, petitioner Villaseñor was charged with grave misconduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and gross negligence. In OMB-ADM-00390, both petitioners were
charged with violation of Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Hence, this petition.
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
Issues And Arguments
In its Joint Decision dated June 17, 2003, the Investigating Panel of the Office of the
Ombudsman ruled as follows: Petitioner Villaseñor argues that his constitutional right of not to be deprived of life, liberty and
property without due process of law, was grossly violated by the Ombudsman when:
1. In OMB-ADM-0-01-0376, Villaseñor was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and gross neglect of duty for which he was meted the 1. He was prevented from cross-examining complainant’s witnesses;
penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
2. He failed to receive any copy of any order relative to the preliminary conference of the case;
2. In OMB-ADM-0-01-0390, Mesa was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best and
interest of the service for which he was meted the penalty of one year suspension
without pay.
3. His dismissal from the service was ordered implemented while his motion for reconsideration A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a
remains unresolved. matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to
He argues that the order of dismissal cannot be deemed executory as it has not yet attained comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or
finality on account of his unresolved motion for reconsideration. censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer.

Petitioner Mesa, on the other hand, argues that the order of suspension against him should not [Emphases supplied]
have been implemented pending his appeal with the CA, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule III
of the Office of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure. He argues that Administrative Order From the above, it can be gleaned that the Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases may
(A.O.) No. 17, which took effect on September 7, 2003 and amended said Section 7, should not either be unappealable or appealable. Unappealable decisions are final and executory, and they
be applied to his case because it was promulgated long after the rendition of the order of his are as follows: (1) respondent is absolved of the charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public
suspension on June 17, 2003. Mesa further argues that to apply the amendment to him will give censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one month; and (4) a fine equivalent to
it a retroactive effect which is prohibited under Article 4 of the Civil Code. one month’s salary. Appealable decisions, on the other hand, are those which fall outside said
enumeration, and may be appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within 15
Both petitioners aver that Ombudsman v. Samaniego,11 the case relied upon by the CA, cannot days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the motion for
be applied to their case because the principal basis of the ruling was Section 7, as amended, reconsideration. Section 7 is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop the decision
which they insist is inapplicable to them. from being executory, and that such shall be executed as a matter of course.

The first two issues raised by petitioner Villaseñor do not relate to the assailed CA Resolutions, Petitioner Mesa was ordered suspended for one year without pay, while petitioner Villaseñor
which ruled upon the Order of the Ombudsman implementing the Joint Decision. They are, was ordered dismissed from the service. These are plainly appealable decisions which are
therefore, irrelevant to the present petition. The sole issue before the Court now is, thus: immediately executory pending appeal.

Whether the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal from the service and suspension of one year can The petitioners cannot argue that A.O. No. 17, which makes appealable decisions of the
be implemented pending resolution of petitioner Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration before Ombudsman immediately executory, cannot be applied to them. It is of no moment that A.O. No.
the Ombudsman, and petitioner Mesa’s appeal before the CA? 17 took effect on September 7, 2003, after the Joint Decision was issued against Mesa and
Villaseñor on June 17, 2003. Of note are the facts that the Joint Decision was approved by the
Ombudsman on November 26, 2004; the motions for reconsideration thereto were denied on
The Ruling of the Court March 2, 2006; and the Joint Decision was ordered implemented on August 23, 2006, all after
A.O. No. 17 had already become effective.
The petition must fail.
Article 4 of the Civil Code does indeed provide that laws shall have no retroactive effect. Rules
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by regulating the procedure of courts, however, are retroactive in nature, and are, thus, applicable
A.O. No. 17, dated September 15, 2003, provides: to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. As a general rule, no vested
right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules, hence, retroactive application does
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision.– Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, not violate any right of a person adversely affected.12
and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension
of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in nature and therefore,
executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of may be applied retroactively to petitioners’ cases which were pending and unresolved at the
Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule time of the passing of A.O. No. 17. No vested right is violated by the application of Section 7
43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision because the respondent in the administrative case is considered preventively suspended while
or Order denying the motion for reconsideration. his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. It is important
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or to note that there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.13
receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
The nature of appealable decisions of the Ombudsman was, in fact, settled in Ombudsman v.
Samaniego, where it was held that such are immediately executory pending appeal and may not
be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ.14 The petitioners argue The Ombudsman did not, therefore, err in implementing the orders of suspension of one year
that this particular case cannot be applied to them because it was based on Section 7, as and dismissal from the service against the petitioners.
amended by A.O. No. 17,which cannot be applied to them retroactively. Their argument cannot
be given credence. As already discussed, Section 7 may be retroactively applied in the case of The Court notes, however, that under Section 8 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
the petitioners. Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, the Hearing Officer shall decide a
motion for reconsideration within S days from the date of submission for resolution. Petitioner
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that petitioner Mesa’s appeal cannot stay the implementation of the Villaseñor filed his motion for reconsideration on December 13, 2004, on the same day as
order of suspension against him. petitioner Mesa, whose motion was duly resolved. Whether by oversight or negligence, a period
nearly I 0 years has elapsed without action on Villase11or's motion for reconsideration. The
Petitioner Villaseñor argues that the Ombudsman erred in implementing the order of dismissal Office of the Ombudsman is called upon to be more vigilant in carrying out its functions and in
against him despite his pending motion for reconsideration with the same office. complying with the periods laid clown in the law.1âwphi1

The records show that both petitioners duly filed their respective motions for reconsideration on WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 15, 2012 and June 18, 2012 Resolutions of
December 13, 2004. In the March 2, 2006 Memorandum of the Ombudsman, Mesa’s motion for the Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. SP No. 121378 are AFFIRMED.
reconsideration, among others, was denied. Thus, he appealed to the CA. A review of the said
Memorandum reveals, however, that Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration was not The Office of the Ombudsman is DIRECTED to resolve the motion for reconsideration of
enumerated15 as one of the pleadings submitted for resolution, and nowhere was his liability petitioner Gerardo R. ViIlaseñor in OMB-A DM-0-01-03 76 and OMB-ADM-0-01-0390 with
discussed or even mentioned therein. It is, therefore, apparent that Villaseñor’s motion for immediate dispatch.
reconsideration was never resolved by the Ombudsman, for which reason he has been unable
to file an appeal with the CA. SO ORDERED.

Nonetheless, Villaseñor’s pending motion for reconsideration cannot stop his order of dismissal JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
from being executory. Memorandum Circular No. 01, series of 2006, of the Office of the Associate Justice
Ombudsman, provides in part:
WE CONCUR:
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise known as, the "Ombudsman Rules
of Procedure" provides that: "A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
shall be executed as a matter of course." PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
In order that the foregoing rule may be strictly observed, all concerned are hereby enjoined to
implement all Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions in administrative disciplinary cases,
immediately upon receipt thereof by their respective offices. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice Associate Justice
The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the
Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate implementation of the foregoing MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions. Associate Justice

xxx ATTESTATION

[Emphasis supplied] I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Thus, petitioner Villaseñor’s filing of a motion for reconsideration does not stay the immediate
implementation of the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal, considering that "a decision of the PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course" under Associate Justice
Section 7. As already explained, no vested right of Villaseñor would be violated as he would be Chairperson, Third Division
considered under preventive suspension, and entitled to the salary and emoluments he did not
receive in the event that he wins his eventual appeal. CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, citing In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the Secretary of the DPWH, 529 Phil. 619, 630-631 (2006).
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
14
 G.R. No. 175573, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 140, 143-145.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice 15
 Rollo, pp. 202-203.

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in view or the vacancy in the Third Division, per Special
Order No. 1691 dated May 22.. 2014.

1
 Rollo. pp. 303-304: penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier. and
concurred in by Associate Justice Andres B. Reves. Jr. and Associate Justice
Sesinando E. Villon.

2
 Id. at 305.

3
 Id. at 149-185.

4
 Id. at 193-201.

5
 Id. at 202-234.

6
 Id. at 202-203.

7
 Id. at 332-339.

8
 Id. at 307-329.

9
 Id. at 303-304.

10
 Id. at 305.

11
 G.R. No. 175573, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 140.

12
 Panay Railways Inc. v. Heva Management and Development Corp., G.R. No.
154061, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 1, 8.

13
 Facura v. CA, G.R. No. 166495, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 427, 450-451, citing
Ombudsman v. Samaniego G.R. No. 175573, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 140, 143,
 Republic of the Philippines On October 10, 2000, del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia R. Asperilla (Asperilla),
SUPREME COURT filed an application for exemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform, seeking to exempt
Manila Lot Nos. 854 and 855 from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage.9

SECOND DIVISION On February 19, 2004, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan (Secretary
Pagdanganan) issued an order granting the application for exemption. Citing Department of
G.R. No. 204964               October 15, 2014 Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, Secretary Pagdanganan stated that lands classified as
non agricultural before the enactment of CARP are beyond its coverage.10
REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU AND NOEL AGUSTIN, Petitioners,
vs. On March 26, 2004, farmers in del Rosario’s landholdings, led by Remigio Espiritu (Espiritu),
LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO represented by SYLVIA R. ASPERILLA, Respondents. filed a motion for reconsideration11 of the order. They argued that under Zoning Ordinance No.
13, Series of 1978, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Resolution No. 705, Series of
2001, and Angeles City Council Resolution No. 3300, Series of 2001, the land holdings were
DECISION classified as agricultural, not industrial.12 They argued that as per certifications by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board dated June 1, 2001, May 28, 2001, and November 24, 2003,
LEONEN, J.: the landholdings were within the agricultural zone, and there was no zoning ordinance passed
that reclassified the area into other land uses.13
Lands classified as non-agricultural in zoning ordinances approved by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board or its predecessors prior to June 15, 1998 are outside the coverage of the The motion was given due course by the Department of Agrarian Reform, this time headed by
compulsory acquisition program of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, there Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman (Secretary Pangandaman). Hence, on June 15, 2006, then
has to be substantial evidence to prove that lands sought to be exempted fall within the non- Secretary Pangandaman issued an order14 granting the motion for reconsideration and revoking
agricultural classification. the earlier order of then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Pagdanganan.

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision2 dated September 28, Del Rosario contended that this order was sent to her through Clarita Montgomery in Barangay
2012 and resolution3 dated November 29, 2012 of the Court of Appeals. These orders reinstated Margot, Sapang Bato, Angeles City, and not at Asperilla’s address in Cubao, Quezon City,
the order4 dated February 19, 2004 of then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. which was her address on record. Del Rosario alleged that she only came to know of the order
Pagdanganan approving petitioner’s application for exemption. on January 26, 2007, when the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Pampanga handed her a
copy of the order.15 She then filed her motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 15,
The pertinent facts are as follows: 2006. The motion was dated February 9, 2007.16

In 1978, the City Council of Angeles City, Pampanga, enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series Acting on del Rosario’s motion for reconsideration, Secretary Pangandaman found that the
of 1978, classifying areas in Barangay Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City, as certifications issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board classified the landholdings
agricultural land.5 as agricultural before June 15, 1988.17 Based on the ocular inspections conducted by the Center
for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI), the land remained agricultural and
was planted with sugar cane and corn.18 Accordingly, Secretary Pangandaman denied del
Pursuant to this ordinance, Lutgarda Torres del Rosario (del Rosario) allegedly requested the Rosario’s motion in the order19 dated March 3, 2008.
City Zoning Administrator to exempt from the zoning classification Lot Nos. 854 and 855 located
in Barangay Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City.6 The land is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-11809 withan area of 164.7605 hectares.7 The request was allegedly Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal20 before the Office of the President on March 27, 2008.
approved on March 7, 1980 by Engineer Roque L. Dungca, Angeles City Development
Coordinator/Zoning Administrator, and the lots were allegedly reclassified as non-agricultural or On May 7, 2009, the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
industrial lots.8 Affairs Manuel B. Gaite (Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite), rendered the decision21 dismissing
the appeal for lack of merit.
On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act No. 6657) was
enacted. Del Rosario filed a motion for extension of 10 days to file her motion for reconsideration.22 Citing
Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, and Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,23 the
Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Natividad G. Dizon, denied the
motion in the order24 dated July 14, 2009.
Aggrieved, del Rosario filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals arguing (1) that she Since she was not notified, [del Rosario] was not able to participate in the proceedings leading
was denied due process when the order of Secretary Pangandaman was "erroneously sent to to the issuance of the Pangandaman Order. The absence of notice that resulted in the inability
another address"25 and (2) that the decision of then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void of [del Rosario] to be heard indubitably confirms her claim of lackof due process. [Del Rosario]
since he had been appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission two months prior to indeed was denied her day in the administrative proceedings below. And considering that [del
the rendering of the decision.26 Rosario] was not accorded due process, the Pangandaman Order is void for lack ofjurisdiction.
Hence, contrary to respondents’ submission, it could not attain finality.34
On September 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition. The
Court of Appeals stated that del Rosario was indeed prevented from participating inthe The Court of Appeals, however, did not take into consideration that respondent was still able to
proceedings that led to the issuance of Secretary Pangandaman’s order when the notices were file a motion for reconsideration of Secretary Pangandaman’s order, albeit beyond the allowable
sent to her other address on record.27 It also found that the decision issued by then Deputy period to file. In Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 06,35 Series of 2000:
Executive Secretary Gaite was void since it violated Article VII, Section 13 of the
Constitution.28 The dispositive portion of the decision states: RULE III
Commencement, Investigation and Resolution of Cases
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
07 May 2009, and the Order dated 15 June 2006 are hereby SET ASIDE. Perforce, with the ....
nullity of the said Decision and Order, the Pagdanganan Order granting exemption to petitioner’s
land is REINSTATED.
SECTION 21. Motion for Reconsideration. — In case any of the parties disagrees with the
decision or resolution, the affected party may file a written motion for reconsideration within
SO ORDERED.29 fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, furnishing a copy thereof tothe adverse party. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period to appeal.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,30 petitioners, namely Remigio Espiritu and
Noel Agustin, now come before this court via a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set Any party shall be allowed only one(1) motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the RD or
aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals. approving authority shall rule on the said motion within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. In
the event that the motion is denied, the adverse party has the right to perfect his appeal within
In particular, petitioners argue that respondent was not denied due process as she was able to the remainder of the period to appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the
actively participate in the proceedings before the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Office decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from
of the President.31 They also argue that respondent was not able to present proof that Deputy receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal.(Emphasis supplied)
Executive Secretary Gaite was not authorized tosign the decision and, hence, his action is Despite being filed late, Secretary Pangandaman still gave due course to the motion and
presumed to have been donein the regular performance of duty.32 resolved it on its merits. This is clear from his order dated March 3, 2008, which reads:

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible During the 50th Special CLUPPI Committee-B Meeting, held on 18 December 2007, the Motion
error in itsdecision. She argues that she was deprived of due process when Secretary for Reconsideration filed by Sylvia Espirilla [sic] was deliberated upon and the Committee
Pangandaman’s order was sent to the wrong address. She also argues that the Deputy recommended the DENIAL of the Motion for Reconsideration based on the following grounds:
Executive Secretary Gaite’s decision was void since he had already been appointed to the
Securities and Exchange Commission two months prior.33 ● The certifications issued by the HLURB shows that the subject properties were
classified as agricultural before 15 June 1986 [sic]; and
The issue, therefore, before this court is whether the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the
order of Secretary Pangandaman and the decision of Deputy Secretary Gaite and reinstated the ● Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI Inspection Team, it was
order of Secretary Pagdanganan. found out that the area remained agricultural. In fact, it [is] still dominantly planted with
sugar cane and corn.36 (Emphasis supplied)
This petition should be granted.
While it may be true that respondent was prevented from filing a timelymotion for
Respondent was not deprived of due process reconsideration of Secretary Pangandaman’s order, it would be erroneous to conclude that she
had been completely denied her opportunity to be heard. In Department of Agrarian Reform v.
The Court of Appeals, in finding for respondent, stated that: Samson:37
. . . . In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs when he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009
suffices to meet the requirements of due process.In Casimiro v. Tandog, the Court held: since he is constitutionally prohibited from holding two offices during his tenure. This, however,
is not conclusive since no evidence was presented as to when he accepted the appointment,
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a took his oath of office, or assumed the position.
real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar,
procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s sideor the opportunity to Assuming that Gaite’s appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can be considered
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only a de factoofficer at the time he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009.
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural In Funa v. Agra,41 a petition was filed against Alberto Agra for holding concurrent positions as
due process. the acting Secretary of Justice and as Solicitor General. This court, while ruling that the
appointment of Alberto Agra as acting Secretary of Justice violated Article VII, Section 13 of the
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized toinclude the Constitution, held that he was a de facto officer during his tenure in the Department of Justice:
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or
affected.38 (Emphasis supplied) third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

When respondent filed her motion for reconsideration assailing Secretary Pangandaman’s order, In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting
she was able to completely and exhaustively present her arguments. The denial of her motion Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and
was on the basis of the merits of her arguments and any other evidence she was able to effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is
present. She was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to present her side; hence, there was necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose
no deprivation of due process. ostensible authority emanates from the State. Agra’s official actions covered by this clarification
extend to but are not limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the
It was also erroneous to conclude that respondent was "denied her day in the administrative Department of Justice, and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars
proceedings below."39 Respondent was able to actively participate not only in the proceedings relative to the prosecution of criminal cases.42 (Emphasis supplied)
before the Department of Agrarian Reform, but also on appeal to the Office of the President and
the Court of Appeals. Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his appointment to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he renders during this time is presumed
Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite’s decision is presumed valid, effective, and binding to be valid, binding, and effective.

Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution states: With Gaite being a public officer, his acts also enjoy the presumption of regularity, thus:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
orassistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption in
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, [sic] rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be madein support of the
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their should be in favor of its lawfulness.43 (Emphasis supplied)
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict ofinterest in the conduct of their office.
Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was rendered ultra vires,
. . . . (Emphasis supplied) other than her allegation that Gaite had already been appointed to another office. Unless there is
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the decision dated May 7, 2009 is conclusively
It is alleged that Gaite was appointed Commissioner to the Securities and Exchange presumed to have been rendered in the regular course of business.
Commission on March 16, 2009.40 It is also alleged that he has already lost his authority as
Respondent’s landholdings were agricultural, not industrial development councils as already approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, in
their respective zoning development plans" be exempted from the coverage of the Agrarian
Prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, lands were classified into agricultural, Reform program, this clause was deleted from Section 10 of the final version of the consolidated
residential, or industrial by law or by zoning ordinances enacted by local government units. In bill stating the exemptions from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Heirs of Luna v. Afable:44 We take it that your query has been prompted by the study previously made by this Department
for Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig Jr. and Secretary Vicente Jayme (Memorandum
dated February 14, 1990) which upheld the authority of the DAR to authorize conversions of
It is undeniable that local governments have the power to reclassify agricultural into non- agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses as of June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of the
agricultural lands. Section 3 of RA No. 2264 (The Local Autonomy Act of 1959) specifically Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). [I]t is your position that the authority of
empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or DAR to authorize such conversion existed even prior to June 15, 1988 or as early as 1963 under
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. By virtue of a zoning the Agricultural Land Reform Code(R.A. No. 3844; as amended).
ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land within
itspolitical jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, butalso on the future
projection of needs. It may, therefore, be reasonably presumed that when city and municipal It should be made clear at the outset that the aforementioned study of this Department was
boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an area or district in their cities or based on facts and issues arising from the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
municipalities as residential, commercial, or industrial zone pursuant to the power granted Reform Program (CARP). While there is no specific and express authority given to DAR in the
tothem under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at the same time, CARP law to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands to nonagricultural uses,
reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the because Section 65 only refers to conversions effected after five years from date of the award,
implementation of and compliance with their zoning ordinances.45 (Emphasis supplied) Republic we opined that the authority of the DAR to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural
Act No. 6657 became effective on June 15, 1988, and it covered all public and private lands, lands to nonagricultural uses applies only to conversions made on or after June 15, 1988, the
including lands of the public domain suited for agriculture.46 Upon its enactment, questions arose date of effectivity of R.A.No. 6657, solely on the basis of our interpretation of DAR's mandate
as to the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to approve or disapprove applications and the comprehensive coverage of the land reform program. Thus, we said:
for conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural. Then Agrarian Reform Secretary Florencio
B.Abad (Secretary Abad) was of the opinion that laws prior to Republic Act No. 6657 authorized "Being vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, together with the Department of Local Government and agrarian reform, it is believed to be the agrarian reform law's intention that any conversion ofa
Community Development and the Human Settlements Commission, to allow or disallow private agricultural land to non-agricultural uses should be cleared beforehand by the DAR.
conversions. In response to Secretary Abad’s query, the Department of Justice issued Opinion True, the DAR's express power over land use conversion is limited to cases in which agricultural
No. 44 on March 16, 1990, written by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M.Drilon. The opinion, lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for
reproduced in full, states: agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that these are
Sir: the only instances when the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole in
the R.A. No. 6657, which every landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian
reform program. Hence, it should logically follow from the said department's express duty and
This refers to your letter of the 13th instant stating your "position that prior to the passage of R.A. function to execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a
6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform had the authority to classify and declare which residential, commercial or industrial property should first be cleared by the DAR."
agricultural lands are suitable for non-agricultural purposes, and to approve or disapprove
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses."
It is conceded that under the laws in force prior to the enactment and effective date of R.A. No.
6657, the DAR had likewise the authority, to authorize conversions of agricultural lands to other
In support of the foregoing view, you contend that under R.A. No. 3844, as amended, the uses, but always in coordination with other concerned agencies. Under R.A. No. 3344, as
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is empowered to "determine and declare anagricultural amended by R.A. No. 6389, an agricultural lessee may, by order of the court, be dispossessed
land to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial orsome other urban purpose" and to of his landholding if after due hearing, it is shown that the "landholding is declared by the [DAR]
"convert agricultural land from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes"; that P.D. No. 583, as upon the recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential,
amended by P.D. No. 815 "affirms that the conversion of agricultural lands shall be allowed only commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes."
upon previous authorization of the [DAR]; with respectto tenanted rice and corn lands"; that a
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 13, 1977 between the DAR, the Department of Local
Government and Community Development and the then Human Settlements Commission Likewise, under various Presidential Decrees (P.D. Nos. 583, 815 and 946) which were issued
"further affirms the authority of the [DAR] to allow or disallow conversion of agricultural lands"; to give teeth to the implementation of the agrarian reform program decreed inP.D. No. 27, the
that E.O. No. 129-A expressly invests the DAR with exclusive authority to approve or disapprove DAR was empowered to authorize conversions of tenanted agricultural lands, specifically those
conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses'; and planted to rice and/or corn, to other agricultural or tonon-agricultural uses, "subject to studies on
that while inthe final version of House Bill 400, Section 9 thereof provided that lands devoted to zoning of the Human Settlements Commissions" (HSC). This non-exclusive authority of the DAR
"residential, housing, commercial and industrial sites classified as such by the municipal and city under the aforesaid laws was, as you have correctly pointed out, recognized and reaffirmed by
other concerned agencies, such as the Department of Local Government and Community Based on the foregoing premises, wereiterate the view that with respect to conversions
Development (DLGCD) and the then Human Settlements Commission (HSC) in a Memorandum ofagricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to
of Agreement executed by the DAR and these two agencies on May 13, 1977, which is an approve such conversions may be exercised from the date of the law's effectivity on June 15,
admission that with respect to land use planning and conversions, the authority is not exclusive 1988. This conclusion is based on a liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DAR's
to any particular agency but is a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies. mandate and the extensive coverage of the agrarian reform program.47 (Emphasis supplied)
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 became the basis of subsequent issuances by the
It is significant to mention thatin 1978, the then Ministry of Human Settlements was granted Department of Agrarian Reform, stating in clear terms that parties need not seek prior
authority to review and ratify land use plans and zoning ordinance of local governments and to conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform for lands that were classified as
approve development proposals which include land use conversions (see LOI No. 729 [1978]). non-agricultural prior to Republic Act No. 6657. The subsequent rulings are outlined in Junio v.
This was followed by P.D.No. 648 (1981) which conferred upon the Human Settlements Secretary Garilao:48
Regulatory Commission (the predecessors of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
[HLURB][)] the authority to promulgate zoning and other land use control standards and Following the opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the DAR issued Administrative Order
guidelines which shall govern land use plans and zoning ordinances of local governments, (AO)No. 6, Series of 1994, stating that conversion clearances were no longer needed for lands
subdivision or estate development projects of both the public and private sector and urban already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of Republic Act 6657. Designed to
renewal plans, programs and projects; as well as to review, evaluate and approve or disapprove "streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44," the AO
comprehensive land use development plans and zoning components of civil works and provided guidelines and procedures for the issuance of exemption clearances.
infrastructure projects, of national, regional and local governments, subdivisions, condominiums
or estate development projects including industrial estates. Thereafter, DAR issued AO 12, Series of 1994, entitled "Consolidated and Revised Rules and
Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses." It provided
P.D. No. 583, as amended by P.D. No. 815, and the 1977 Memorandum of Agreement, that the guidelines on how to secure an exemption clearance under DAR AO No. 6, Series of
abovementioned, cannot therefore, be construed as sources of authority of the DAR; these 1994, shall apply to agricultural lands classified or zoned for non-agricultural uses by local
issuances merely affirmed whatever power DAR had at the time oftheir adoption. government units (LGUs); and approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) before June 15, 1988. Under this AO, the DAR secretary had the ultimate authority to
With respect to your observation that E.O. No. 129-A also empowered the DAR to approve or issue orders granting or denying applications for exemption filed by landowners whose lands
disapprove conversions of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses as of July 22, 1987, it is were covered by DOJ Opinion No. 44.49 (Citations omitted)
our view that E.O. No. 129-A likewise did not provide a new source of power of DAR with
respect to conversion but it merely recognized and reaffirmed the existence of such power as Accordingly, lands are consideredexempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 if the
granted under existing laws. This is clearly inferrable from the following provision of E.O. No. following requisites are present:
129-A to wit:
1. Lands were zoned for non-agricultural use by the local government unit; and
"Sec. 5. Powers and Functions. Pursuant to the mandate of the Department, and in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, the 2. The zoning ordinance was approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Department is hereby authorized to: Board before June 15, 1998.

1) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for In revoking the prior order of exemption, Secretary Pangandaman took note of the following
residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses as may be provided by law" considerations:

Anent the observation regarding the alleged deletion of residential, housing, commercial and ● The Certification dated 18 November 2003, of Mr. David D. David, Planning Officer IV
industrial sites classifiedby the HLURB in the final version of the CARP bill, we fail to see how and Zoning Administrator of the City of Angeles states that the City Planning and
this [sic] circumstances could substantiate your position that DAR's authority to reclassify or Development Office, Zoning Administration Unit (CPDO-ZAU) certifies that subject
approve conversions of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses already existed prior to June property covered by TCT No. 11804 is classified as agricultural based on the certified
15, 1988. Surely, it is clear that the alleged deletion was necessary to avoid a redundancy inthe photocopy of Zoning Ordinance, Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978, issued by the
CARP law whose coverage is expressly limited to "all public and private agricultural lands" and Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, Regional Office No. 3 (HLURB-Region III) on
"other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture" (Sec. 4, R.A. No. 6657). Section 3(c) of 03 September 2001;
R.A. No. 6657 defines "agricultural land" as that "devoted to agricultural activity as defined in the
Act and not classified as mineral forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."
● Also, upon verification with HLURB-Region III, we were informed that as per copy of
the approved Zoning Plan of 1978, the subject properties were classified as
 agricultural. The said Zoning Plan of 1978 was approved under NCC Plan dated 24 [Respondents'] argument that the land has ceased to be agricultural by virtue of reclassification
September 1980; and under Ordinance No. 13, series of 1978 cannot be sustained since the records of the case or the
evidence presented thereto are bereft of any indication showing the same. In fact, nowhere was
● Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI Inspection Team, it was it shown that a certified true copy of the said Ordinance was presented before this Office or the
found that the area remained agricultural. In fact, it is still dominantly planted withsugar office a quo.53
cane and corn.50
The factual findings of administrative agencies are generally given great respect and finality by
(Emphasis supplied) the courts as it is presumed that these agencies have the knowledge and expertise over matters
under their jurisdiction.54 Both the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Office of the President
found respondent's lands to be agricultural. We see no reason to disturb these findings.
Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, Secretary Pangandaman also took into
consideration the recommendations of the Center for Land Use Policy, Planning, and
Implementation Committee, thus: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated September 28, 2012 and
resolution dated November 29, 2012 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The order dated
June 15, 2006 of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the decision dated May 7, 2009 of the
During the 50th Special CLUPPI Committee-B Meeting, held on 18 December 2007, the Motion Office of the President are REINSTATED.
for Reconsideration filed by Sylvia Espirilla [sic] was deliberated upon and the Committee
recommended the DENIAL of the Motion for Reconsideration based on the following grounds:
SO ORDERED.
● The certifications issued by the HLURB shows that the subject properties were
classified as agricultural before 15 June 1986 [sic]; and MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
● Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI Inspection Team, it was
found out that the area remained agricultural.1âwphi1 In fact, it [is] still dominantly WE CONCUR:
planted with sugar cane and corn.51 (Emphasis supplied)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Secretary Pangandaman also found that: Associate Justice
Chairperson
The certifications submitted by the [respondents] which is the Certification dated 18 November
2003, of Mr. David D. David, Planning Officer IV and Zoning Administrator of the City of Angeles MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
states that the City Planning Development Office, Zoning Administration Unit (CPDOZAU) Associate Justice Associate Justice
certifies that the subject properties covered by TCT No. T-11804 is classified as agricultural
based on the certified photocopy of Zoning Ordinance, Ordinance No. 13[,] Series of 1978 BIENVENIDO L. REYES*
issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, Regional Office No. 3 (HLURB-Region Associate Justice
III) on 03 September 2001.
ATTESTATION
Such certification was corroborated bya certification issued by the HLURB Regional Director,
Region III, Ms. Edithat [sic] Barrameda in its certification dated 28 May 2001 and 24 November
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
2003. It was stated in the said certification that the subject landholding is within the agricultural
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
zone based on Comprehensive LandUse Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the City Council of
Angeles City approved through HLURB Resolution No. 705 dated 17 October 2001. Also a
certification was issued by Director Barrameda on 01 June 2001, stating therein that, "Duplicate ANTONIO T. CARPIO
copies of the Certification issued by this Board toMs. Lutgarda Torres on 18 December 1991 Associate Justice
and 8 July 1998, respectively are not among the files for safekeeping when she assumed as Chairperson, Second Division
Regional Officer on 03 July 2000.["]52 (Emphasis supplied)
CERTIFICATION
These findings were sustained on appeal by the Office of the President, stating that:
 15
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,  Id. at 30–31.
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. 16
 Id. at 65.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 17

 Id. at 70–71.
Chief Justice
18
 Id. at 70.

19
 Id. at 65–73.

Footnotes 20
 Id. at 74–75.

* Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1844 dated October 14, 2014. 21
 Id. at 76–80.
1
 Rollo, pp. 8-21. 22
 Id. at 81.
2
 Id. at 26-42. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and 23
 222 Phil. 365 (1985) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].
concurred in by Division.
24
3
 Rollo, pp. 81–82.
 Id. at 44. The resolution was penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (Chairperson) and Leoncia 25
Real-Dimagiba of the Fifth Division.  Id. at 31.

26
4
 Id. at 47–52.  Id. at 33.

27
5
 Id. at 27 and 77.  Id. at 31 and 37.

28
6
 Id. at 27.  Id. at 38–39. CONST., art. VII, sec. 13 provides:

7
 Id. at 47. Section 13. The President,Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
8
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
 Id. at 27. shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
9
 Id. at 45. contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
10
 Id. at 49–50. government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
11
 Id. at 53–57.
....
12
 Id. at 54. 29
 Id. at 41–42.
13
 Id. at 54–55. 30
 Id. at 44.
14
 Id. at 58–63.
31 47
 Id. at 19.  Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 (1990).

32 48
 Id. at 20.  503 Phil. 154 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

33 49
 Id. at 106–108.  Id. at 165.

34 50
 Id. at 37.  Rollo, p. 67.

35 51
 Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases.  Id. at 70.

36 52
 Rollo, p. 70.  Id. at 70–71.

37 53
 577 Phil. 370 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division].  Id. at 79.

38 54
 Id. at 380, citing Autencio v. City Administrator Mañara and the City of Cotabato, 489  See Junia v. Secretary Garilao, 503 Phil. 154, 167 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Phil. 752, 760 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division] and Casimiro v. Tandog, 498 Division].
Phil. 660, 666–667 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].

39
 Rollo, p. 37.

40
 See Meet the Management, <http://www.sec.gov.ph/aboutsec/management.html>
(visited September 15, 2014).

41
 G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, 691 SCRA 196 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

42
 Id. at 224, citing Dimaandal v. Commission on Audit, 353 Phil. 525, 533–534 (1998)
[Per J. Martinez, En Banc]; Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.,G.R. No. 154674,
May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 773, 786 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]; Topacio v. Ong, 595
Phil. 491, 506 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]; Señeres v. Commission on
Elections, 603 Phil. 552, 569 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].

43
 Bustillo v. People, G.R. No. 160718, May 12, 2010, 620 SCRA483, 492 [Per J. Del
Castillo, Second Division], citing People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, February 9,
1994, 229 SCRA 795, 799 [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

44
 G.R. No. 188299, January 23, 2013, 689 SCRA 207 [Per J. Perez, Second Division].

45
 Id. at 226–227, citing Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 169913, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 352, 376 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., First Division];
Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 64, 94 (2004)
[Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc.
v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 131481, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 401, 432
[Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].

46
 Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), sec. 4.
 Dissatisfied with the RTC’s directive for the inclusion of the subject claims in the municipality’s
budget, the Municipality of Saguiran partially appealed the order of the RTC to the CA. On
December 14, 2009, the appellate court issued a notice9 requiring the OSG to file a
memorandum for the Municipality of Saguiran within a non-extendible period of 30 days.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The OSG initially moved for a suspension of the period to file the required memorandum,
Manila explaining that it had not received any document or pleading in connection with the case.10 It
asked for a period of 30 days from receipt of such documents within which to file the required
memorandum. On April 23, 2010, the OSG’s motion was denied by the CA on the ground that
FIRST DIVISION the relief sought was not among the remedies allowed under the Rules of Court. The OSG was
instead given a non-extendible period of 90 days from notice within which to file the
G.R. No. 199027               June 9, 2014 memorandum.11 On August 5, 2010, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion12 requesting to be
excused from filing the memorandum on the ground of lack of legal authority to represent the
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), Petitioner, Municipality of Saguiran. It reasoned that the Municipality of Saguiran had to be represented by
vs. its legal officer, pursuant to Article XI(3)(i) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL SUR, Respondents.
On October 18, 2010, the CA issued the assailed Resolution13 denying the OSG’s motion on the
DECISION following basis:

REYES, J.: The OSG alleges:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to "The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), to this Honorable Court, respectfully manifests that it
assail the Resolutions dated October 18, 20102 and August 25, 20113 of the Court of Appeals has no legal authority to represent any of the respondent-appellants [sic] in the above-captioned
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02816-MIN, where the CA denied the OSG's motion to be excused from case as its mandate is limited to the representation of ‘the Government of the Philippines, its
filing for and on behalf of respondent Municipal Government of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
(Municipality of Saguiran) the memorandum, or any other pleading that would be required by the investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyer.’"
appellate court relative to the appeal.
We are at a loss as to how the OSG views a local government unit then if it does not consider
The Antecedents the same part of the Government of the Philippines or an agency or instrumentality thereof; but
to enlighten the said Office, the Supreme Court in Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of
Appeals, Et. Al. held that a local government unit, in the performance of its political functions, is
The Municipality of Saguiran was named a respondent in a petition for mandamus4 filed with the an agency of the Republic and acts for the latter’s benefit.14 (Citations omitted)
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur by the former members of the Sangguniang
Bayanof Saguiran, namely, Macmod P. Masorong, Amrosi MacoteSamporna, Alanie L. Dalama,
Hassan P. Amai-Kurot and Cadalay S. Rataban. Therein petitioners sought to compel the The OSG moved to reconsider, but this was denied by the CA via the Resolution15 dated August
Municipality of Saguiran to pay them the aggregate amount of 726,000.00, representing their 25, 2011.
unpaid terminal leave benefits under Section 5 of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular Nos. 41, Series of 1998 and 14, Series of 1999.5 The Municipality of Saguiran sought The Present Petition
the trial court’s dismissal of the petition through its Verified Answer with Affirmative Defenses
and Counterclaim6 which was signed by Municipal Mayor Hadjah Rasmia B. Macabago and Hence, this Petition for Certiorari founded on the following ground:
Municipal Treasurer Hadji Mautinter Dimacaling.
THE HONORABLE [CA] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
On January 6, 2009, the RTC issued an Order7 dismissing the petition on the ground that the act LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN COMPELLING THE OSG TO REPRESENT THE
being sought by therein petitioners was not a ministerial duty. The RTC explained that the MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL SUR (A LOCAL GOVERNMENT
payment of terminal leave benefits had to undergo the ordinary process of verification, approval UNIT) IN ITS LAWSUIT.16
or disapproval by municipal officials.8 It, nonetheless, directed the Municipality of Saguiran to
include in its general or special budget for the year 2009 the subject claims for terminal leave
benefits.
The OSG argues that the legal officer of a local government unit must represent it in its lawsuits, mandate of a local government unit’s legal officer. Book III, Title V, Article XI, Section 481 of the
citing the provisions of the LGC and jurisprudence which bar local government units from LGC provides:
obtaining the services of a lawyer other than their designated legal officers.
Article Eleven
The Court’s Ruling The Legal Officer

The petition is meritorious. Sec. 481. Qualifications, Term, Powers and Duties.

The OSG’s powers and functions are defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative (a) No person shall be appointed legal officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident
Code), particularly in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof, which reads: of the local government concerned, of good moral character, and a member of the Philippine
Bar. x x x.
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in xxxx
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government- The appointment of legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and city governments and
owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law optional for the municipal government.
office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer.
It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall take charge of the
office of legal services and shall:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the xxxx
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party;
(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer shall:
xxxx
(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the
A cursory reading of this provision may create the impression that the OSG’s mandate under the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in
Administrative Code is unqualified, and thus broad enough to include representation of a local actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the
government unit in any case filed by or against it, as local government units, indisputably, form provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may
part of the Government of the Philippines. Towards a proper resolution of the pending issue, be deployed to represent the adverse party;
however, the OSG’s mandate under the Administrative Code must be construed taking into
account the other statutes that pertain to the same subject of representation in courts. As the x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Court explained in Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction &
Development Corporation:17 Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a local
government unit’s legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may represent the
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a special law on the issue of
persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter. representation in court that is exclusively made applicable to local government units, the LGC
must prevail over the provisions of the Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be law on the subject matter. The Court held in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza,
consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to Jr.:19
form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
"interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so The special act and the general law must stand together, one as the law of the particular subject
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.18 and the other as the law of general application. The special law must be taken as intended to
constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or provision.20 (Citations omitted)
On the matter of counsels’ representation for the government, the Administrative Code is not the
only law that delves on the issue.1âwphi1 Specifically for local government units, the LGC limits Further, the Court ruled in Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation:21
the lawyers who are authorized to represent them in court actions, as the law defines the
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any WE CONCUR:
subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally
understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
portion or section of the state only. Chief Justice
Chairperson
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should,
accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other Associate Justice Associate Justice
general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the
special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than
that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to Associate Justice
give its words any meaning at all.22 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
CERTIFICATION
Given the foregoing, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions which obligated the OSG to represent the Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Municipality of Saguiran. Such ruling disregarded the provisions of the LGC that vested Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
exclusive authority upon legal officers to be counsels of local government units. Even the opinion of the Court's Division.
employment of a special legal officer is expressly allowed by the law only upon a strict condition
that the action or proceeding which involves the component city or municipality is adverse to the
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
provincial government or to another component city or municipality.
Chief Justice

The mere fact that the OSG initially filed before the CA a motion for extension of time to file the
required memorandum could not have estopped it from later raising the issue of its lack of
authority to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. Its mandate was to be traced from existing
laws. No action of the OSG could have validated an act that was beyond the scope of its
authority. Footnotes

It bears mentioning that notwithstanding the broad language of the Administrative Code on the 1
 Rollo, pp. 2-18.
OSG's functions, the LGC is not the only qualification to its scope. Jurisprudence also provides
limits to its authority. In Urbano v. Chavez,23 for example, the Court ruled that the OSG could not 2
represent at any stage a public official who was accused in a criminal case. This was necessary  Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Angelita A.
to prevent a clear conflict of interest in the event that the OSG would become the appellate Gacutan and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring; id. at 22-25.
counsel of the People of the Philippines once a judgment of the public official's conviction was
brought on appeal. 3
 Id. at 27-29.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 18, 2010 and August 4
 Id. at 30-33.
25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02816-MIN are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Legal Officer of the Municipal Government of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, or if there is 5
 Id. at 30-31.
none, the Provincial Attorney of the Province of Lanao del Sur, and not the Office of the Solicitor
General, has the duty to represent the local government unit as counsel in CA-G.R. SP No. 6
02816-MIN.  Id. at 34-36.

7
SO ORDERED.  Issued by Acting Presiding Judge Rasad G. Balindong; id. at 37-38.

8
BIENVENIDO L. REYES  Id. at 38.
Associate Justice
9
 Id. at 39.
10
 Id. at 40-42.

11
 Id. at 7.

12
 Id. at 43-45.

13
 Id. at 22-25.

14
 Id. at 22-23.

15
 Id. at 27-29.

16
 Id. at 8.

17
 G.R. No. 188866, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 756.

18
 Id. at 764, citing Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46, 69-70.

19
 568 Phil. 658 (2008).

20
 Id. at 697.

21
 552 Phil. 101 (2007).

22
 Id. at 110-111.

23
 262 Phil. 374 (1990).
 Henceforth, the only basis for Heads of Offices to allow an employee to continue rendering
service after his/her 65th birthday is a Resolution of the Commission granting the request for
Republic of the Philippines extension. Absent such Resolution, the salaries of the said employee shall be for the personal
SUPREME COURT account of the responsible official.
Manila
xxxx
EN BANC
b) A person who has already reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 can still be appointed
G.R. No. 190147               March 5, 2013 to a coterminous/primarily confidential position in the government.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, A person appointed to a coterminous/primarily confidential position who reaches the age of 65
vs. years is considered automatically extended in the service until the expiry date of his/her
PILILLA WATER DISTRICT, Respondent. appointment or until his/her services are earlier terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

DECISION On April 2, 2004, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 92867 was approved and signed into law, Section 2 of
which provides:
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
SEC. 2. Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended is hereby amended to read as
1
follows:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 are the Decision  dated July 28,
2009 and Resolution2 dated November 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
106031 which annulled and set aside Resolution Nos. 0809423 and 0818464 of the Civil Service "SEC. 23. The General Manager.–At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon thereafter as
Commission (CSC). practicable, the Board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define [his]
duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall not be removed from office, except for cause
and after due process." (Emphasis supplied)
The factual background of this case is as follows:
On June 16, 2004, the BOD approved Resolution No. 19,8 Series of 2004, which reads:
Paulino J. Rafanan was first appointed General Manager on a coterminous status under
Resolution No. 12 issued on August 7, 1998 by the Board of Directors (BOD) of respondent
Pililla Water District (PWD). His appointment was signed by the BOD Acting Chairman and EXTENSION OF SERVICES OF MR. PAULINO J. RAFANAN AS GENERAL MANAGER OF
attested by the CSC Field Office-Rizal.5 PILILLA WATER DISTRICT

On October 4, 2001, petitioner issued Resolution No. 0116246 amending and clarifying Section WHEREAS, the General Manager, Mr. Paulino J. Rafanan, is reaching his age 65 this month of
12, Rule XIII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, as follows: this year the Board, because of his good and honest performance in faithfully carrying out the
policies of the Board resulting in the success of the District’s expansion program, unanimously
agreed to retain his services as General Manager at least up to December 31, 2008 co-terminus
Section 12. a) No person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years can be with the term of the Director last appointed after which period he may stay at the pleasure of the
appointed to any position in the government, subject only to the exception provided under sub- other Board.
section (b) hereof.
THEREFORE, THE BOARD RESOLVED, AS IT HEREBY RESOLVED that the services of Mr.
However, in meritorious cases, the Commission may allow the extension of service of a person Paulino J. Rafanan as General Manager of Pililla Water District is extended up to December 31,
who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, for a period of six (6) months only 2008 as a reward for his honest and efficient services to the District.
unless otherwise stated. Provided, that, such extension may be for a maximum period of one (1)
year for one who will complete the fifteen (15) years of service required under the GSIS Law.
In its Resolution No. 04-1271 dated November 23, 2004, petitioner denied the request of BOD
Chairman Valentin E. Paz for the extension of service of Rafanan and considered the latter
A request for extension shall be made by the head of office and shall be filed with the "separated from the service at the close of office hours on June 25, 2004, his 65th birthday."
Commission not later than three (3) months prior to the date of the official/employee’s Petitioner also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Chairman Paz under its Resolution
compulsory retirement. No. 05-0118 dated February 1, 2005.9
On April 8, 2005, the BOD issued Resolution No. 09, Series of 2005 reappointing Rafanan as position to which he is being appointed/promoted, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed,
General Manager on coterminous status. Said reappointment was signed by Chairman Paz and in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof,
attested by the CSC Field Office-Rizal.10 A year later, the BOD approved Resolution No. 20 while a temporary appointment may be extended to a person who possesses all the
declaring the appointment of General Manager Rafanan as permanent11 but this resolution was requirements for the position except the appropriate civil service eligibility and for a limited
not implemented. period not exceeding twelve months or until a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.

In a letter dated November 19, 2007, Pililla Mayor Leandro V. Masikip, Sr. questioned Rafanan’s Section 14 of the same resolution provides for a coterminous appointment:
coterminous appointment as defective and void ab initio considering that he was appointed to a
career position despite having reached the compulsory retirement age. Said letter-complaint was Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued to a person whose
treated as an appeal from the appointment made by the BOD Chairman of respondent. entrance and continuity in the service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing
authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the
On May 19, 2008, petitioner issued Resolution No. 080942 invalidating the coterminous duration of project or subject to the availability of funds.
appointment issued to Rafanan as General Manager on April 8, 2005 on the ground that it was
made in violation of Section 2 of R.A. No. 9286. Petitioner further observed that the appointment The co-terminous status may be further classified into the following:
was issued to circumvent the denial of the several requests for extension of service of Rafanan.
Rafanan filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by petitioner under its Resolution
No. 081846 dated September 26, 2008. (1) co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the duration
of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the
availability of funds for the same;
Respondent filed in the CA a petition for review with application for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. Insisting that Rafanan’s coterminous appointment was based on CSC Resolution No. (2) co-terminous with the appointing authority - when appointment is co-existent with
011624, respondent contended that petitioner cannot usurp the power of appointment and the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;
removal of the appointing authority, and that petitioner failed to observe due process.
(3) co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-existent with the
In the assailed Decision, the CA reversed the CSC and ruled that the position of General appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the
Manager in water districts remains primarily confidential in nature and hence respondent’s BOD incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
may validly appoint Rafanan to the said position even beyond the compulsory retirement age.
(4) co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is for a specific period and upon
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied. expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.

Hence, this petition submitting the following issues: For the purpose of coverage or membership with the GSIS, or their right to security of tenure,
co-terminous appointees, except those who are co-terminous with the appointing authority, shall
be considered permanent. (Emphasis supplied)
I
Section 23 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, otherwise known as "The Provincial Water
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE Utilities Act of 1973" reads:
POSITION OF GENERAL MANAGER OF A LOCAL WATER DISTRICT IS PRIMARILY
CONFIDENTIAL IN NATURE.
SEC. 23. Additional Officers.–At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as
practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager, an auditor, and an
II attorney, and shall define their duties and fix their compensation. Said officers shall serve at the
pleasure of the board. (Emphasis supplied)
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE APRIL
8, 2005 APPOINTMENT OF RAFANAN IN A CO-TERMINOUS CAPACITY WAS VALID. 12 The provision was subsequently amended by P.D. No. 76813:

Under Section 13, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. SEC. 23. The General Manager.–At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as
292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws and CSC Resolution No. 91-1631 issued on practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his
December 27, 1991, appointments in the civil service may either be of permanent or temporary
status. A permanent appointment is issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall serve at the pleasure of the board. (Emphasis Qualification Standards for the said Position Pursuant to R.A. No. 9286,"16 which applies to
supplied) respondent under local water district Medium Category:

In the case of Paloma v. Mora,14 we held that the nature of appointment of General Managers of D (SG-24) - Medium
Water Districts under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 falls under Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code Education : Master’s degree
of 1987", that is, the General Manager serves at the pleasure of the BOD.
Experience : 4 years in position/s involving management and supervision
As mentioned, Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 was already amended by R.A. No. 9286 which now
provides that the General Manager of a water district shall not be removed from office except for
cause and after due process. Said law, however, cannot be retroactively applied as to preclude Training : 24 hours of training in management and supervision
the BOD from terminating its General Manager at the time the governing law was still P.D. No.
198, thus: Eligibility : Career Service (Professional)/Second Level Eligibility17

Unfortunately for petitioner, Rep. Act No. 9286 is silent as to the retroactivity of the law to Respondent contends that the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9286 is not in conflict with the
pending cases and must, therefore, be taken to be of prospective application. The general rule is coterminous appointment of Rafanan since the latter can be removed for "loss of confidence,"
that in an amendatory act, every case of doubt must be resolved against its retroactive effect. which is "cause" for removal. As to the above-cited CSC Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of
Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested, 2006, the same should be applied only to appointments made after its issuance, and not to
the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a Rafanan who was already the incumbent General Manager before August 17, 2006.
prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a Respondent maintains that since the General Manager of a water district holds a primarily
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. confidential position, Rafanan can be appointed to or remain in said position even beyond the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years.
First, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 9286 which provides that it should retroact to the date of
effectivity of P.D. No. 198, the original law. Next, neither is it necessarily implied from Rep. Act The threshold issue is whether under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 as amended by R.A. No. 9286,
No. 9286 that it or any of its provisions should apply retroactively. Third, Rep. Act No. 9286 is a the position of General Manager of a water district remains as primarily confidential.
substantive amendment of P.D. No. 198 inasmuch as it has changed the grounds for termination
of the General Manager of Water Districts who, under the then Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, "shall In the 1950 case of De los Santos v. Mallare18 a position that is primarily confidential in nature is
serve at the pleasure of the Board." Under the new law, however, said General Manager shall defined as follows:
not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. To apply Rep. Act No. 9286
retroactively to pending cases, such as the case at bar, will rob the respondents as members of
the Board of the Palompon, Leyte Water District of the right vested to them by P.D. No. 198 to x x x. These positions [policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical positions],
terminate petitioner at their pleasure or discretion. Stated otherwise, the new law can not be involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and dependent on other
applied to make respondents accountable for actions which were valid under the law prevailing positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the
at the time the questioned act was committed. good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category be terminable
at the will of the officer that makes them.
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, at the time petitioner was terminated by the Board of
Directors, the prevailing law was Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 prior to its amendment by Rep. Act xxxx
No. 9286.15 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in
In this case, respondent’s BOD reappointed Rafanan as General Manager on April 8, 2005 the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only
when R.A. No. 9286 was already in force and the BOD no longer had the authority to terminate confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy
the General Manager at its pleasure or discretion. which insures freedom of [discussion, delegation and reporting] without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. x x
x.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner assails the CA in upholding the April 8, 2005 reappointment of Rafanan as General
Manager on coterminous status, arguing that the change of phraseology of Section 23 under
R.A. No. 9286 ipso facto reclassified said position from non-career to career position. Petitioner From the above case the "proximity rule" was derived. A position is considered to be primarily
points out that it issued CSC Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of 2006 entitled "Considering confidential when there is a primarily close intimacy between the appointing authority and the
the Position of General Manager Under the Career Service and Prescribing the Guidelines and appointee, which ensures the highest degree of trust and unfettered communication and
discussion on the most confidential of matters.20 Moreover, in classifying a position as primarily duties and responsibilities of a general manager are determined by the board of directors, which
confidential, its functions must not be routinary, ordinary and day to day in character. A position is a clear indication of a closely intimate relationship that exists between him and the board.
is not necessarily confidential though the one in office may sometimes hold confidential matters Fourth, the duties and responsibilities of a general manager are not merely clerical and routinary
or documents.21 in nature. His work involves policy and decision making. Fifth, the compensation of the general
manager is fixed by the board of directors. And last, the general manager is directly accountable
The case of Piñero v. Hechanova22 laid down the doctrine that it is the nature of the position that for his actions and omissions to the board of directors. Under this situation, the general manager
finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy determining or highly is expected to possess the highest degree of honesty, integrity and loyalty, which is crucial to
technical and that executive pronouncements can be no more than initial determinations that are maintaining trust and confidence between him and the board of directors. The loss of such trust
not conclusive in case of conflict. As reiterated in subsequent cases, such initial determination or confidence could easily result in the termination of the general manager’s services by the
through executive declaration or legislative fiat does not foreclose judicial review.23 board of directors. To be sure, regardless of the security of tenure a general manager may now
enjoy, his term may still be ended by the board of directors based on the ground of "loss of
confidence."26 (Emphasis in the original)
More recently, in Civil Service Commission v. Javier,24 we categorically declared that even
petitioner’s classification of confidential positions in the government is not binding on this Court:
We sustain the ruling of the CA.
At present, there is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets definite criteria for
determining primarily confidential positions in the civil service. Neither is there a law that gives We stress that a primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the
an enumeration of positions classified as primarily confidential. positions of the appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence
inherent in their relationship.27 The tenure of a confidential employee is coterminous with that of
the appointing authority, or is at the latter’s pleasure. However, the confidential employee may
What is available is only petitioner's own classification of civil service positions, as well as be appointed or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory retirement age of 65 years.28
jurisprudence which describe or give examples of confidential positions in government.
Among those positions judicially determined as primarily confidential positions are the following:
Thus, the corollary issue arises: should the Court be bound by a classification of a position as Chief Legal Counsel of the Philippine National Bank; Confidential Agent of the Office of the
confidential already made by an agency or branch of government? Auditor, GSIS; Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan; Secretary to the City Mayor; Senior
Security and Security Guard in the Office of the Vice Mayor; Secretary to the Board of a
Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of positions in the civil government corporation; City Legal Counsel, City Legal Officer or City Attorney; Provincial
service made by the legislative or executive branches, or even by a constitutional body like the Attorney; Private Secretary; and Board Secretary II of the Philippine State College of
petitioner. The Court is expected to make its own determination as to the nature of a particular Aeronautics.29 The Court in these instances focused on the nature of the functions of the office
position, such as whether it is a primarily confidential position or not, without being bound by characterized by such "close intimacy" between the appointee and appointing power which
prior classifications made by other bodies. The findings of the other branches of government are insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals
merely considered initial and not conclusive to the Court. Moreover, it is well-established that in of personal trust or confidential matters of state.30
case the findings of various agencies of government, such as the petitioner and the CA in the
instant case, are in conflict, the Court must exercise its constitutional role as final arbiter of all In the case of the General Manager of a water district, Section 24 in relation to Section 23 of
justiciable controversies and disputes. (Emphasis supplied) P.D. No. 198, as amended, reveals the close proximity of the positions of the General Manager
and BOD.
Applying the proximity rule and considering the nature of the duties of the office of the Corporate
Secretary of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), we held in the above-cited case SEC. 24. Duties.–The duties of the General Manager and other officers shall be determined and
that said position in the GSIS or any government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) for specified from time to time by the Board. The General Manager, who shall not be a director,
that matter, is a primarily confidential position.25 shall have full supervision and control of the maintenance and operation of water district
facilities, with power and authority to appoint all personnel of the district: Provided, That the
In holding that the position of General Manager of a water district is primarily confidential in appointment of personnel in the supervisory level shall be subject to approval by the Board. (As
nature, the CA said: amended by Sec.10, PD 768) (Emphasis supplied)

x x x we rule that the position of general manager remains primarily confidential in nature While the BOD appoints by a majority vote the General Manager and specifies from time to time
despite the amendment of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 by R.A. No. 9286, which gave the the duties he shall perform, it is the General Manager who exercises full supervision and control
occupant of said position security of tenure, in that said officer could only be removed from office of the maintenance and operation of water district facilities. The BOD is confined to policy-
for cause and after due process. The nature of the duties and functions attached to the position making and prescribing a system of business administration and accounting for the water district
points to its confidential character. First, the general manager is directly appointed by the board patterned upon and in conformity to the standards established by the Local Water Utilities
of directors. Second, the general manager directly reports to the board of directors. Third, the Administration (LWUA), and it is the General Manager who implements the plans and policies
approved by the BOD. And while the BOD may not engage in the detailed management of the confidence." It is an established rule that the tenure of those holding primarily confidential
water district, it is empowered to delegate to such officers or agents designated by it any positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as
executive, administrative or ministerial power,31 including entering into contracts under confidence in them endures. Their termination can be justified on the ground of loss of
conditions and restrictions it may impose. Moreover, though the General Manager is vested with confidence, in which case, their cessation from office involves no removal but the expiration of
the power to appoint all personnel of the water district, the appointment of personnel in the their term of office.
supervisory level shall be subject to the approval of the BOD. It is likewise evident that the
General Manager is directly accountable to the BOD which has disciplinary jurisdiction over him. The Civil Service Law classifies the positions in the civil service into career and non-career
The foregoing working relationship of the General Manager and BOD under the governing law of service positions. Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and fitness
water districts clearly demands a high degree of trust and confidence between them. The CA to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical
therefore correctly concluded that the position of General Manager is primarily confidential in qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of
nature. tenure.36

Petitioner contends that the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9286 in effect placed the The Career Service shall include37:
position of General Manager of a water district in the category of career service. It posits that
this can be inferred from the removal of the sentence "Said officer shall serve at the pleasure of
the Board," and replaced it with the sentence "Said officer shall not be removed from office, (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate
except for cause and after due process." Accordingly, petitioner said it issued CSC MC No. 13, examination is required;
Series of 2006 prescribing guidelines for the implementation of the new law and qualification
standards for the position of General Manager of a water district, whereby all incumbent general (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these
managers who hold appointments under coterminous status upon the effectivity of R.A. No. include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific
9286 were given two years to meet all the requirements for permanent status. and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and
maintain their own merit systems;
Such interpretation is incorrect.
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant
To our mind, the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9286 merely tempered the broad discretion Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
of the BOD. In Paloma v. Mora32 we noted the change brought about by the said law insofar as Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as
the grounds for terminating the General Manager of a water district. Whereas previously the may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by
General Manager may be removed at the pleasure or discretion of the BOD even without prior the President;
notice and due hearing, the amendatory law expressly demands that these be complied with.
Such condition for the exercise of the power of removal implements the fundamental right of due (4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are
process guaranteed by the Constitution. In De los Santos v. Mallare,33 the Court simply appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of
recognized as a necessity that confidential appointments be "terminable at the will" of the Foreign Affairs;
appointing authority.
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain
It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended a separate merit system;
except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled that
the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are (6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations whether performing
contractual and coterminous in nature.34 Since the position of General Manager of a water governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service;
district remains a primarily confidential position whose term still expires upon loss of trust and and
confidence by the BOD provided that prior notice and due hearing are observed, it cannot
therefore be said that the phrase "shall not be removed except for cause and after due process"
converted such position into a permanent appointment. Significantly, loss of confidence may be (7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled. (Emphasis supplied)
predicated on other causes for removal provided in the civil service rules and other existing
laws. On the other hand, non-career positions are defined by the Administrative Code of 198738 as
follows:
In Tanjay Water District v. Quinit, Jr.,35 we said:
SEC. 9. Non-Career Service. – The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance
Indeed, no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service;
cause provided by law. The phrase "cause provided by law," however, includes "loss of and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of
the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a It may also be mentioned that under Section 3641 of P.D. No. 198, as amended, the L WUA is
particular project for which purpose employment was made. empowered to take over the operation and management of a water district which has defaulted
on its loan obligations to L WUA. As the bondholder or creditor, and in fulfillment of its mandate
The Non-Career Service shall include: to regulate water utilities in the country, LWUA may designate its employees or any person or
organization to assume all powers or policy-decision and the powers of management and
administration to undertake all such actions as may be necessary for the water district's efficient
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; operation. This further reinforces the conclusion that the position of General Manager of a water
district is a non-career position.
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s); In fine, since the position of General Manager of a water district remains a primarily confidential
position, Rafanan was validly reappointed to said position by respondent's BOD on April 8, 2005
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and under coterminous status despite having reached the compulsory retirement age, which is
their personal or confidential staff; allowed under Section 12 (b), Rule XIII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, as
amended by Resolution No. 011624 dated October 4, 2001.
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated July 28, 2009
or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a and Resolution dated November 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106031 are
specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes AFFIRMED and UPHELD. No costs.
the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and
supervision from the hiring agency; and SO ORDERED.

(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. (Emphasis supplied) MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
As can be gleaned, a coterminous employment falls under the non-career service classification
of positions in the Civil Service,39 its tenure being limited or specified by law, or coterminous with WE CONCUR:
that of the appointing authority, or at the latter’s pleasure. Under R.A. No. 9286 in relation to
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987,40 the Chief Justice
coterminous appointment of the General Manager of a water district is based on the majority
vote of the BOD and whose continuity in the service is based on the latter’s trust and confidence
or co-existent with its tenure.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
The term of office of the BOD members of water districts is fixed by P.D. No. 198 as follows:

SEC. 11. Term of Office. -- Of the five initial directors of each newly-formed district, two shall be TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
appointed for a maximum term of two years, two for a maximum term of four years, and one for CASTRO
Associate Justice
a maximum term of six years. Terms of office of all directors in a given district shall be such that Associate Justice
the term of at least one director, but not more than two, shall expire on December 31 of each
even-numbered year. Regular terms of office after the initial terms shall be for six years
commencing on January 1 of odd-numbered years. Directors may be removed for cause only, DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
subject to review and approval of the Administration. (As amended by Sec. 5, P.D. No. 768.) Associate Justice Associate Justice
(Emphasis supplied)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
On the basis of the foregoing, the logical conclusion is that the General Manager of a water Associate Justice Associate Justice
district who is appointed on coterminous status may serve or hold office for a maximum of six
years, which is the tenure of the appointing authority, subject to reappointment for another six
years unless sooner removed by the BOD for loss of trust and confidence, or for any cause JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
provided by law and with due process.1âwphi1
 8
 CA rollo, p. 50.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
9
 Id. at 37.
(No Part)
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE 10
 Id. at 55-56.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
11
 Id. at 37.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN 12

 Rollo, p. 161.
Associate Justice
13
 Promulgated on August 15, 1975.
CERTIFICATION
14
 507 Phil. 697, 708 (2005).
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the 15
 Id. at 710-711.
writer of the opinion of the Court.
16
 Rollo, pp. 83-85.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
17
 Id. at 84.

18
 87 Phil. 289 (1950).

19
 Id. at 297-298.
Footnotes
20
 Civil Service Commission v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, February 22, 2008, 546 SCRA
* No Part.
485, 507.
1
 Rollo, pp. 59-68. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with 21
 Id. at 506, citing Tria v. Sto. Tomas, 276 Phil. 923 (1991) and Ingles v. Mutuc, 135
Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a Member of this Court) and Isaias P.
Phil. 177 (1968).
Dicdican concurring.
22
2  124 Phil. 1022, 1028 (1966).
 Id. at 70-71.
23
3  Civil Service Commission v. Javier, supra note 20, at 501-502; Laurel v. Civil Service
 Id. at 87-90.
Commission, G.R. No. 71562, October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 195, 206.
4
 Id. at 91-94. 24
 Id. at 499-500.
5
 CA rollo, pp. 45-46. 25
 Id. at 504.
6
 Id. at 47-49. 26
 Rollo, p. 66.
7
 AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 198, OTHERWISE 27
 Civil Service Commission v. Javier, supra note 20, at 509.
KNOWN AS "THEPROVINCIAL WATER UTILITIES ACT OF 1973", AS AMENDED.
28
 Id. at 498.
29
 Id. at 508-509, citing Besa v. Philippine National Bank, 144 Phil. 282 (1970); Salazar and hiring of personnel, the purchase of supplies, equipment and materials and such
v. Mathay, Sr., 165 Phil. 256 (1976); Cortez v. Bartolome, No. L-46629, September 11, other actions as may be necessary to operate the utility efficiently.
1980, 100 SCRA 1; Samson v. Court of Appeals, 230 Phil. 59, 65 (1986); Borres v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-36845, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 120; Gray v. De Vera, 138
Phil. 279 (1969); Pacete v. Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
39456, May 7, 1990, 185 SCRA 1; Cadiente v. Santos, 226 Phil. 211 (1986); Hilario v.
Civil Service Commission, 312 Phil. 1157 (1995); Griño v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 91602, February 26, 1991, 194 SCRA 458; and Sec. Gloria v. Hon. De
Guzman, Jr., 319 Phil. 217 (1995).

30
 See Civil Service Commission v. Javier, id. at 506.

31
 Sections 17, 18, 19 & 20, P.D. No. 198, as amended.

32
 Supra note 14, at 711.

33
 Supra note 18, at 297.

34
 Ong v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 184219, January 30, 2012, 664 SCRA 413,
425, citing De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., et al., 197 Phil. 919, 931
(1982) and Civil Service Commission v. Magnaye, Jr., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010,
619 SCRA 347, 357.

35
 G.R. No. 160502, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 529, 545-546.

36
 Civil Service Commission v. Javier, supra note 20, at 497, citing ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec. 7.

37
 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), id.

38
 Id., Sec. 9.

39
 Orcullo, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, 410 Phil. 335, 339 (2001).

40
 CSC Resolution No. 91-1631 dated December 27, 1991.

41
 Sec. 36. Default. - In the event of the default by the district in the payment of principal
or interest on its outstanding bonds or other obligations, any bondholder or creditor
shall have the right to bring an action before the appropriate court to compel the
payment of such obligations. If the bondholder or creditor concerned is the
Administration, it may, without the necessity of judicial process, take over and operate
the entire facilities, systems or properties of the district. For this purpose, the
Administration may designate its employees or any person or organization to assume
all powers of policy-decision and the powers of management and administration,
including but not limited to the establishment of water rates and charges, the dismissal
 Republic of the Philippines About a year later or on August 22, 1996 the Commission on Audit (COA) Resident Auditor
SUPREME COURT issued a Notice of Suspension of payments made to UP TMC personnel, including the second
Manila payment to Dr. Posadas of ₱36,000.00 for his services as TMC Project’s Local Consultant. On
August 23 the Resident Auditor further suspended payment of ₱30,000.00 honorarium per
FIRST DIVISION month to Dr. Posadas as Project Director from September 18 to October 17, 1995.

G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000               November 27, 2013 On September 16, 1996, however, the UP Diliman Legal Office issued a Memorandum to the
COA Resident Auditor, pointing out that the amounts paid the TMC Project personnel "were
legal, being in the nature of consultancy fees." The legal office also "confirmed the authority of
DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO, Petitioners, Dr. Dayco, while he was OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas as project director and
vs. consultant of the TMC Project." Finding this explanation "acceptable," the COA Resident Auditor
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. lifted his previous notices of suspension.

RESOLUTION Notwithstanding the lifting of the suspension, UP President Javier constituted an Administrative
Disciplinary Tribunal to hear and decide the administrative complaint that he himself filed against
ABAD, J.: Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco for grave misconduct and abuse of authority. On August 18, 1998
the Tribunal recommended the dismissal of the two from the service. The UP Board of Regents
This resolves the separate Motions for Reconsideration of petitioners, Dr. Roger R. Posadas modified the penalty, however, to "forced resignation" with right to reapply after one year
and Dr. Rolando P. Dayco of the Court's Decision dated July 17, 2013. provided they publicly apologize. Still, the UP General-Counsel filed with the Sandiganbayan the
present criminal cases.

The Facts and the Case

On June 28, 2005 the Sandiganbayan found both Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco guilty of violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 and imposed on them an indeterminate penalty of
To recall the facts culled from the decision of the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Posadas was Chancellor imprisonment for 9 years and one day as minimum and 12 years as maximum, with the
of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman when on September 19, 1994 he formed a Task accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. The court also found them
Force on Science and Technology Assessment Management and Policy. The Task Force was to guilty of violation of Section 7(b) of Republic Act 6713 and imposed on them the penalty of
prepare the needed curricula for masteral and doctoral programs in "technology management, imprisonment for 5 years with the same disqualification. They were further ordered to indemnify
innovation studies, science and technology and related areas." On June 6, 1995, acting on the the government in the sum of ₱336,000.00.1
Task Force's proposal, UP established the U Technology Management Center (UP TMC) the
members of which nominated Dr. Posadas for the post of Center Director. He declined the
nomination, however, resulting in the designation of Professor Jose B. Tabbada as acting UP In its decision of July 17, 2013, the Court affirmed the decisions of the Sandiganbayan in the two
TMC Director. cases.

Shortly after, Dr. Posadas worked for the funding of the ten new graduate courses of UP TMC. Discussion
With the help of the Philippine Institute of Development Studies/Policy, Training and Technical
Assistance Facility and the National Economic Development Authority, there came into being the 1. The appointments were in good faith
Institutionalization of Management and Technology in the University of the Philippines in Diliman
(the TMC Project), funded at Dr. Posadas’ initiative by the Canadian International Development The bad faith that Section 3(e) of Republic 3019 requires, said this Court, does not simply
Agency. connote bad judgment or negligence. It imputes a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, and
a conscious doing of a wrong. Indeed, it partakes of the nature of fraud.2
Meantime, on October 5, 1995 Malacanang granted Dr. Posadas and fifteen other UP Diliman
officials authority to attend the foundation day of the state university in Fujian, China, from Here, admittedly, Dr. Dayco appears to have taken advantage of his brief designation as OIC
October 30 to November 6, 1995. Before he left, Dr. Posadas formally designated Dr. Dayco, Chancellor to appoint the absent Chancellor, Dr. Posadas, as Director and consultant of the
then UP Diliman Vice-Chancellor for Administration, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) in his absence. TMC Project. But it cannot be said that Dr. Dayco made those appointments and Dr. Posadas
On November 7, 1995, his last day as OIC Chancellor, Dr Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as accepted them, fraudulently, knowing fully well that Dr. Dayco did not have that authority as OIC
"Project Director of the TMC Project from September 18, 1995 to September 17, 1996." In an Chancellor.
undated letter, Dr. Dayco also appointed Dr. Posadas consultant to the project. The
appointments were to retroact to September 18, 1995 when the project began.
All indications are that they acted in good faith. They were scientists, not lawyers, hence
unfamiliar with Civil Service rules and regulations. The world of the academe is usually
preoccupied with studies, researches, and lectures. Thus, those appointments appear to have Chancellor, however qualified he might be, to those enviable positions. But this should have
been taken for granted at UP. It did not invite any immediate protest from those who could have been treated as a mere administrative offense for:
had an interest in the positions. It was only after about a year that the COA Resident Auditor
issued a notice of suspension covering payments out of the Project to all UP personnel involved, First. No evidence was adduced to show that UP academic officials were prohibited from
including Dr. Posadas. receiving compensation for work they render outside the scope of their normal duties as
administrators or faculty professors.
Still, in response to this notice, the UP Diliman Legal Office itself rendered a legal opinion that
"confirmed the authority of Dr. Dayco, while he was OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas as Second. COA disallowances of benefits given to government personnel for extra services
project director and consultant of the TMC Project." Not only this, the COA Resident Auditor, rendered are normal occurrences in government offices. They can hardly be regarded as cause
who at first thought that the OIC Chancellor had no power to make the designations, later for the filing of criminal charges of corruption against the authorities that granted them and those
accepted the Legal Office’s opinion and withdrew the Notices of Suspension of payment that he who got paid.
issued. All these indicate a need for the Court to reexamine its position that Dr. Dayco and Dr.
Posadas acted in bad faith in the matter of those appointments.
Section 4 of the COA Revised Rules of Procedure merely provides for an order to return what
was improperly paid. And, only if the responsible parties refuse to do so, may the auditor then
2. Dr. Dayco chose the most qualified for the project (a) recommend to COA that they be cited for contempt; (b) refer the matter to the Solicitor
General for the filing of the appropriate civil action; and (c) refer it to the Ombudsman for the
The next question is whether Dr. Dayco, believing in good faith that he had the authority to make appropriate administrative or criminal action.4 Here, Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas were not given
the questioned designations, acted with "manifest partiality" in choosing Dr. Posadas among all the chance, before they were administratively charged, to restore what amounts were paid since
possible candidates as TMC Director and Consultant. The answer is no. the Resident Director withdrew his notice of disallowance after considering the view of the UP
Diliman Legal Office.
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection
to favor one side or person rather than another.3 Here, the prosecution presented no evidence If the Court does not grant petitioners’ motions for reconsideration, the common disallowances
whatsoever that others, more qualified than Dr. Posadas, deserve the two related appointments. of benefits paid to government personnel will heretofore be considered equivalent to criminal
The fact is that he was the best qualified for the work: giving of "unwarranted advantage to a private party," an element of graft and corruption. This is
too sweeping, unfair, and unwise, making the denial of most benefits that government
First, Dr. Posadas originated the idea for the project and so he had every reason to want it to employees deserve the safer and better option.
succeed.
Third. In other government offices, the case against Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas would have
Second, he worked hard to convince the relevant government offices to arrange funding for the been treated as purely of an administrative character. The problem in their case, however, is
project, proof that he was familiar with the financial side of it as well. that other factors have muddled it. The evidence shows that prior to the incident Dr. Posadas
caused the administrative investigation of UP Library Administrative Officer Ofelia del Mundo for
grave abuse of authority, neglect of duty, and other wrong-doings. This prompted Professor
Third, the members of the Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management Tabbada, the Acting UP TMC Director, to resign his post in protest. In turn, Ms. Del Mundo
and Policy—his own peers—nominated Dr. Posadas as Director of the UP Technology instigated the UP President to go after Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco. Apparently, the Office of the
Management Center. Ombudsman played into the intense mutual hatred and rivalry that enlarged what was a simple
administrative misstep.
Fourth. The work fell within his area of expertise—technical management—ensuring
professionalism in the execution of the project. Fourth. The fault of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas, who spent the best parts of their lives serving
UP, does not warrant their going to jail for nine to twelve years for what they did. They did not
In the world of the academe, that project was the equivalent of Dr. Posadas’ thesis. Thus, since act with manifest partiality or evident bad faith. Indeed, the UP Board of Regents, the highest
he was a natural choice to head the same, it beats the mind that such choice could be regarded governing body of that institution and the most sensitive to any attack upon its revered portals,
as one prompted by "manifest partiality." did not believe that Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas committed outright corruption. Indeed, it did not
dismiss them from the service; it merely ordered their forced resignation and the accessory
3. The misstep was essentially of the administrative kind penalties that went with it.

The worst that could be said of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas is they showed no sensitivity to the The Board did not also believe that the two deserved to be permanently expelled from
fact that, although Dr. Dayco may have honestly believed that he had the authority to make UP.1âwphi1 It meted out to them what in effect amounts to mere suspension for one year since
those appointments, he was actually appointing his own superior, the person who made him OIC the Board practically invited them to come back and teach again after one year provided they
render a public apology for their actions. The Board of Regents did not regard their offense so ATTESTATION
morally detestable as to totally take away from them the privilege of teaching the young.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
4. The prosecution did not prove unwarranted benefit or undue injury case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 requires the prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Posadas caused "undue injury" to the government or gave him "unwarranted benefits." Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
This Court has always interpreted "undue injury" as "actual damage." What is more, such "actual
damage" must not only be capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree CERTIFICATION
of certainty. A finding of "undue injury" cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence
or upon speculation, conjecture, or guesswork.5 The Court held in Llorente v. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Sandiganbayan6 that the element of undue injury cannot be presumed even after the supposed Attestation, I certify that the conclusions n the above Resolution had been reached in
wrong has been established. It must be proved as one of the elements of the crime. consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Here, the majority assumed that the payment to Dr. Posadas of ₱30 000.00 monthly as TMC MARIA LOURDES P A SERENO
Project Director caused actual injury to the Government. The record shows, however, that the Chief Justice
₱247 500.00 payment to him that the COA Resident Auditor disallowed was deducted from his
terminal leave benefits.7

The prosecution also failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr. Posadas "unwarranted advantage"
as a result of the appointments in question. The honoraria he received cannot be considered
"unwarranted" since there is no evidence that he did not discharge the additional responsibilities Footnotes
that such appointments entailed.
* Designated additional member, in lieu of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners per Raffle dated July 1, 2013.
and to vacate their conviction on the ground of failure of the State to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
** Designated additional member, in lieu of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro, per Raffle dated May 27, 2013.
SO ORDERED.
1
 Rollo, pp. 48-70.
ROBERTO A. ABAD*
Associate Justice 2
 Sison v. People, G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 670. See
also Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 69983, May 14, 1990, 185 SCRA 346, cited
WE CONCUR: in Sidro v. People, G.R. No. 149685, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 182, 194.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN 3
 People of the Philippines v. Aristeo E. Atienza, G.R. No. 171671, June 18, 2012.
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson 4
 Id.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA** 5

 Rollo, p. 406.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
6
 G.R. No. 122166, March 11, 1998.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice 7
 Rollo, p. 406.
 Republic of the Philippines Complainants had filed with the DAR Region IV-A a letter-complaint against respondent,
SUPREME COURT docketed as Case No. A-0400-0168-09. Complainants pointed out that Regional Director
Manila Antonio G. Evangelista (Evangelista) of DAR Region IV-A issued an Order dated October 20,
2009, ruling in their favor. Pertinent portions of said Order read:
FIRST DIVISION
Per Memorandum dated May 19, 2009 of [Legal Officer (LO)] Cleufe S. Eder as noted by Atty.
A.M. No. P-12-3089               November 13, 2013 Raul I. Bautista, the [DAR Provincial Office (DARPO)] Legal Division conducted an
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3591-P) investigation/inspection on the subject lots on May 18, 2009 and the following facts were
established to wit:
HEIRS OF CELESTINO TEVES REPRESENTED BY PAUL JOHN TEVES ABAD ELSA C.
AQUINO and FELIMON E. FERNAN, Complainants, xxxx
vs.
AUGUSTO J. FELICIDARIO, SHERIFF IV, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL 6. That based on that new survey in 2003, [Certificate of Land Ownership Award
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, Respondent. (CLOA)] with No. 00222161/OCT No. M-01182 with an area of 941 square meters was
awarded to Augusto Felicidario on October 2, 2005. Augusto Felicidario conducted his
DECISION own survey to determine the boundaries based on the issued CLOA. It appears that
there was an area of 117 square meters from his original area of 838 square meters,
however, the excess area of 117 square meters belong to Elsa Aquino, Felimon Fernan
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: and Heirs of Celestino Teves. Augusto Felicidario tainted with bad faith instead
proceed[ed] to get the excess area of 117 square meters and placed another mujon,
Before the Court is the Complaint-Affidavit1 of complainants Heirs of Celestino Teves other than the old mujon previously placed during the 1965 survey of 838 square
represented by Paul John Teves Abad), Elsa C. Aquino, and Felimon E. Fernan, accusing meters;
respondent Augusto Felicidario, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court OCC), Regional
Trial Court RTC), Manila, of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer 7. That CLOA/s for Elsa Aquino, Felimon Fernan and [Heirs] of Celestino Teves have
of the Court. not yet been issued to them. They were not aware of the changes in their respective
area of possession until in March 2009 when Augusto Felicidario destroyed the riprap
Complainants alleged that they are the successors-in-interest of the late Celestino Teves to two and the old cyclone wires which serves as the boundary of Elsa Aquino et al. with
parcels of land, initially identified as Lots 263 and 264 of the Sampaloc Townsite in Tanay, Rizal, motive to forcibly get the 117 square meters covering the portions of 54 square meters,
distributed under the Department o Agrarian Reform DAR) Resettlement Project. Lots 263 and 51 square meters, and 12 square meters from Elsa Aquino et al.;
264 measured 965 square meters and 648 square meters, respectively, or 1,613 square meters
combined. The late Celestino Teves and complainants have been in possession of Lots 263 and xxxx
264 since 1960. Lots 263 and 264 are adjacent and contiguous to Lot 268, which has been
occupied by respondent and with an area of 838 square meters. In May 2003, upon the approval
of a new subdivision plan, Lots 263 and 264 were clustered into one lot, designated as Lot 190; In the same Memorandum, LO Cleufe S. Eder stated that the only basis of the claim of Augusto
while Lot 268 was designated as Lot 189.2 Under the same plan, the area of Lot 189 was Felicidario over the portions of the areas of Elsa Aquino and Felimon Fernan is that said portions
erroneously increased from 838 square meters to 941 square meters. Respondent knew of this appeared to be included in his CLOA, where in truth and in fact, was not included in his actual
error but being dishonest, he concealed it from the DAR. Respondent was eventually issued area of possession and occupation. Evidently, Lot 189 (formerly Lot 268) is bounded by old
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-01182, pursuant to Certificate of Land Ownership Award boundaries (muhon), riprap and cyclone wires erected since 1960’s or more that forty-five (45)
(CLOA) No. 00222161, for Lot 189, with a total area of 941 square meters. On the basis of OCT years by complainants which is only adjacent/adjoining to Lot 189 (Lot [268]) of Augusto
No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161), respondent started to unlawfully and forcibly acquire 117 Felicidario who incidentally been in the said premises for a long period of time and fully aware
square meters of complainants’ Lot 190 (disputed area) by (a) altering and installing concrete that he possessed only 838 square meters as evidenced by the Lot Description Survey
boundaries; (b) destroying the riprap and cyclone wires which served as boundary between conducted in December 1966. Complainants and Augusto Felicidario have been good
respondent’s Lot 189 and complainants’ Lot 190; (c) destroying the comfort room, dirty kitchen, neighbors, until the latter on March 29, 2009 received a copy of TCT-CLOA in October 2005
warehouse, and trees in the disputed area; and (d) constructing a concrete fence with steel gate awarding him 941 square meters per new subdivision survey in 2003. Thereafter, Augusto
around Lot 189 and the disputed area. Complainants were helpless in preventing respondent Felicidario threatened to eject Elsa Aquino et al. purposely to acquire the portions of 51 square
from performing the aforementioned acts as respondent bragged that he is a Sheriff of the RTC meters and 12 square meters without a lawful order.
of Manila and threatened complainants with bodily harm.
[Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO)] Samuel S. Solomero concurred with the
recommendation of DARPO-Legal Division that the CLOA issued to Augusto Felicidario be
cancelled/corrected to only 838 square meters as his actual area of possession and further violate the law or a flagrant disregard of established rule; as well as the lack of evidence that
recommended that individual CLOAs be generated/issued in favor of Elsa Aquino, Felimon respondent’s conduct in the exercise of his rights as a private individual debased the public’s
Fernan and Heirs of Celestino Teves in accordance with their actual area of possession. confidence in the courts. Respondent reiterated that he had no hand in the increase of his total
lot area after the new survey. Lastly, respondent averred that complainants, in filing the present
DAR Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1992, specifically paragraph IV, regarding the Modes complaint, was forum shopping with the intention of purposely vexing, harassing, and
of Disposition of Homelots, provides that: intimidating respondent and thereby gain upper ground. Complainants mean to escalate a
private matter to the institution respondent is serving.
"Homelots in barangay sites and residential, commercial and industrial lots in townsites shall be
disposed of by direct sale to actual occupants occupying said homelots". Complainants filed a Reply6 but raised no new matters.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Order is hereby issued: On July 26, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its report7 with the
following recommendations:
1. DIRECTING the PARO to undertake the necessary steps to cause the correction of
[the] area inscribed in OCT No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161) issued in the name of In view of the foregoing, this Office respectfully submits for the consideration of the Honorable
Augusto Felicidario from 941 square meters to 838 square meters; and Court the following recommendations:

2. DIRECTING the PARO and the [Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)] to make 1. the instant administrative complaint against Augusto J. Felicidario, Sheriff IV, Office
the necessary steps for the issuance of individual titles in the names of Elsa Aquino, of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Manila, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
Felimon Fernan and Heirs of Celestino Teves based on their actual area of administrative matter; and
possession.3
2. respondent be found GUILTY of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
The DAR Region IV-A Order dated October 20, 2009 in Case No. A-0400-0168-09 became final Service and be SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay.8
and executory as no motion for reconsideration and/or appeal was filed.4
In a Resolution9 dated September 24, 2012, the Court re-docketed the administrative complaint
Respondent, in his Comment,5 denied complainants’ allegations. He prayed for the outright against respondent as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest within
dismissal of the instant complaint against him since the acts subject thereof are not related to his 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the
official functions as Deputy Sheriff and are not grounds for administrative action. In addition, pleadings filed. Respondent10 and complainants11 submitted their respective Manifestations
respondent explained that as a result of the re-survey conducted by the DAR Geodetic Engineer informing the Court that they were already submitting the case for decision based on the
in May 2003, the area of complainants’ Lot 190 was decreased to 210 square meters, while that pleadings on record.
of respondent’s Lot 189 was increased to 941 square meters. Based on the 2003 re-survey,
respondent was issued OCT No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161) for Lot 189. Respondent has The Court partly diverges from the findings of the OCA. Respondent is guilty of simple
been in continuous actual and physical possession of Lot 189 and religiously paying the real dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but not of grave
estate tax thereon as they fall due. In 2009, respondent applied for and was granted a Fencing misconduct.
Permit by the Office of the Building Official of Tanay. On the strength of the Fencing Permit and
with the assistance of barangay officials, respondent proceeded to place new fences or In Villordon v. Avila,12 the Court defined dishonesty as "intentionally making a false statement on
mujon/markers along the perimeter of Lot 189. Although respondent acknowledged the any material fact[;]" and "a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
existence of the final and executory Order dated October 20, 2009 of the DAR Region IV-A in integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
Case No. A-0400-0168-09, adverse to his interest, respondent maintained that he had been straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
deprived of due process of law because he never received summons or notice relative to said
case, thus, he had already requested the Office of the President for a reinvestigation of the
same. Respondent also mentioned in his Comment that the PARO had already instituted a It is true that respondent did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in 2003
Petition for Correction of LOA No. 00222161/OCT No. M-01182 before the DAR Adjudication which resulted in the increased land area of his Lot 189. Nonetheless, respondent’s actuations
Board (DARAB) Region IV-A, docketed as PARAD Case No. R-0409-0009 to 0010-10. thereafter displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and straightforwardness, not only with his
neighbors, but also with the concerned government agencies/officials.
Respondent argued that the acts imputed by complainants against him were not related to the
performance of his official duties and were not in any manner related to a case in which Complainants and respondent had been awarded and occupying their respective properties
complainants are parties or have legal interests. Besides, a cursory reading of the allegations in under the DAR Resettlement Program since 1966, yet, respondent did not express surprise
the complaint will clearly show the absence of the requisites of corruption or a clear intent to and/or bafflement that the land area of his Lot 189 was significantly increased from 838 square
meters to 941 square meters after the 2003 re-survey. Honesty, fairness, and Respondent’s transgressions may not be related to his official duties and functions, but certainly
straightforwardness, as well as good faith and prudence, would have impelled respondent to reflect badly upon the entire Judiciary. Respondent failed to live up to the high ethical standards
bring the matter to the attention of complainants and the DAR, and inquire and verify with the demanded by the office he occupies. As the Court explained in Marquez v. Clores-Ramos15:
DAR his entitlement to the increased land area, especially when he was well-aware that
complainants had been in possession of the disputed area, and had, in fact, introduced It can not be overemphasized that every employee of the judiciary should be an example of
substantial improvements thereon, for almost four decades. Instead, respondent, undeniably integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of
benefitting from the increased land area of Lot 189, held his peace and already proceeded to honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and
secure a certificate of title in his name for Lot 189, with a land area of 941 square meters. When private dealings with other people, to preserve the Court’s good name and standing. This is
respondent was finally issued OCT No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161), he invoked the same because the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
as justification for occupying the 117-square meter disputed area, destroying complainants’ otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its
improvements thereon, and enclosing Lot 189 (inclusive of the disputed area) within a concrete personnel. Thus, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and every one in the court to
fence and steel gate. Whether or not an error was indeed committed by the DAR officials during maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice. (Citations omitted.)
the 2003 re-survey, resulting in the increased land area of Lot 189, respondent evidently took
advantage of complainants’ ignorance of the situation in order to acquire OCT No. M-01182
(CLOA No. 00222161) with nary an opposition. It bears to stress that the final and executory However, precisely because respondent was not acting in the performance of his official duties,
Order dated October 20, 2009 of the DAR Region IV-A in Case No. A-0400-0168-09 declared he cannot be administratively liable for misconduct, whether grave or simple. The survey of
erroneous the increase in land area of respondent’s Lot 189 after the 2003 re-survey and the cases presented in Largo v. Court of Appeals16 is particularly instructive:
PARO had already instituted proceedings before the DARAB for the correction of respondent’s
OCT No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161). While respondent is seeking to have the final and [T]he administrative offense committed by petitioner is not "misconduct." To constitute
executory DAR Region IV-A Order set aside by the Office of the President, as things stand at misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the
present, the basis for respondent’s legal title to the disputed area is doubtful, at best. performance of his official duties.1âwphi1 In Manuel v. Calimag, Jr., it was held that:
Considering that the increase in land area of Lot 189 was due to the (erroneous) result of the
2003 re-survey of the Sampaloc Townsite by the DAR; that respondent’s dishonesty was Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in
committed through his silence and/or inaction, when the circumstances demanded otherwise, these words: "Misconduct in office has a definite and well- understood legal meaning. By uniform
rather than his active and/or express misrepresentation to the complainants and concerned legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and
public officials; and that respondent committed the dishonesty in his private life and not in the not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at
course of performance of his official functions, the Court holds him guilty of only simple all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer x x
dishonesty. x. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of
an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties
Respondent’s deportment under the circumstances likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the
best interest of the service. In addition to being dishonest, respondent appears to have illegally duties of the office x x x More specifically, in Buenaventura v. Benedicto, an administrative
forced his way into the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines
procedure and processes, especially those concerning the execution of orders and decisions of misconduct as referring ‘to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
the courts. It is difficult for the Court to believe that respondent is completely unaware that even particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer."
as the registered owner of the real property and with the barangay officials’ assistance, he
cannot simply enter and take possession of the disputed area and destroy complainants’ xxxx
improvements thereon. He must first initiate an ejectment case against complainants before the
appropriate court and secure a court order and writ of possession.
In Salcedo v. Inting we also ruled – It is to be noted that the acts of the respondent judge
complained of have no direct relation with his official duties as City Judge. The misfeasance or
The Civil Service law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific acts constitute malfeasance of a judge, to warrant disciplinary action must have direct relation to and be
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the Court defined such an offense in connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of said judge.
Ito v. De Vera13 as acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish
or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest of In Milanes v. De Guzman, a mayor collared a person, shook him violently, and threatened to kill
the administration of justice. In Government Service Insurance System v. Mayordomo,14 the him in the course of a political rally of the Nacionalista Party where said mayor was acting as the
Court further declared that the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of toastmaster. The Court held that the acts of the mayor cannot come under the class of the
the service need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s official functions. As long administrative offense of misconduct, considering that as the toastmaster in a non-governmental
as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the rally, he acted in his private capacity, for said function was not part of his duties as mayor. In
corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. Amosco v. Magro, the respondent Judge was charged with grave misconduct for his alleged
failure to pay the amount of ₱215.80 for the purchase of empty Burma sacks. In dismissing the MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
case, the Court sustained, among others, the argument of respondent Judge that the charge did Chief Justice
not constitute misconduct because it did not involve the discharge of his official duties. It was Chairperson
further held that misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By
uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. So also, a Judge’s Associate Justice Associate Justice
abandonment of, and failure to give support to his family; and alleged sale of carnapped motor
vehicles, do not fall within the species of misconduct, not being related to the discharge of BIENVENIDO L. REYES
official functions. (Citations omitted.) Associate Justice

Now the Court considers the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

On November 18, 2011, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). Under Rule 10, Section 46(E) of RRACCS, Footnotes
simple dishonesty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months for the first offense; six (6) months and one (1) day to one (10 year for 1
 Rollo, pp. 1-7.
the second offense; and dismissal for the third offense. Rule 10, Section 46(B)(8) classifies
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as a grave offense penalized by
2
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal  Complainants mistakenly referred to the parcel of land as Lot 180 in their Complaint-Affidavit.
from the service for the second offense. Rule 10, Section 50 additionally provides that if the civil
servant is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be 3
 Rollo, pp. 10-13.
that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating
circumstances. 4
 Id. at 61. Per Certification dated February 24, 2010 of Regional Director Antonio G. Evangelista.

Based on the foregoing rules, the Court shall apply the penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best 5
 Id. at 39-47.
interest of the service, it being the more serious offense. The Court then considers for purposes
of determining the proper penalty, respondent s simple dishonesty as an aggravating 6
 Id. at 70-75.
circumstance; while respondent s 43 years in government service, 32 of which had been in the
judiciary, as mitigating circumstance. The Court likewise takes into account, for humanitarian 7
reasons, that respondent is almost of retirement age at 64 years. Consequently, the penalty of  Id. at 76-81.
suspension without pay for six (6) months and one (1) day is appropriate under the
8
circumstances.  Id. at 81.

9
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Augusto Felicidario, Sheriff IV of the Office of the  Id. at 82.
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Manila, GUILTY of simple dishonesty and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is suspended for a period of six ( 6) months and 10
 Id. at 85-86.
one (1) day without pay, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely. 11
 Id. at 87.

SO ORDERED. 12
 A.M. No. P-10-2809, August 10, 2012, 678 SCRA 247, 255.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO 13

 540 Phil. 23, 34 (2006).
Associate Justice
14
 G.R. No. 191218, May 31, 2011, 649 SCRA 667, 686.
WE CONCUR:
15
 391 Phil. 1, 11 (2000).

16
 563 Phil. 293, 302-304 (2007).
 Republic of the Philippines respondents for ninety (90) days without pay, effective immediately.8cra1aw The following day, a
Supreme Court committee was constituted to investigate the charges against respondents.
Manila
In their Answer9cra1aw dated May 27, 2002, respondents denied the charges against them.
EN BANC Instead, they averred that petitioner was motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith in charging
them falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for lack of factual and legal
G.R. No. 157383 : August 10, 2010 basis. They strongly expressed their opposition to petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor
and judge.
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager of
GSIS, Petitioner, v. MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M. VELASCO, Respondents. On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition
to Lift Preventive Suspension Order.10cra1aw They contended that the acts they allegedly
committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave misconduct. Consistent with their stand that
G.R. No. 174137 petitioner could not act as the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time, respondents
filed with the CSC a Petition to Transfer Investigation to This Commission.11cra1aw
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System, Petitioner, v. MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M. Meanwhile, the GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to submit to the jurisdiction of the
VELASCO, Respondents. investigating committee and required them to appear at the scheduled hearing.12cra1aw

DECISION Despite their urgent motions, the CSC failed to resolve respondents' motions to lift preventive
suspension order and to transfer the case from the GSIS to the CSC.
NACHURA, J.:
On October 10, 2002, respondents filed with the CA a special civil action for certiotari and
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions filed by Winston F. Garcia (petitioner) in his prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).13cra1aw The case was docketed
capacity as President and General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System, or as CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. Respondents sought the annulment and setting aside of petitioner's
GSIS, against respondents Mario I. Molina (Molina) and Albert M. Velasco (Velasco). In G.R. order directing the former to submit to the jurisdiction of the committee created to hear and
No. 157383, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1cra1aw dated January 2, investigate the administrative case filed against them. They likewise prayed that petitioner (and
2003 and Resolution2cra1aw dated March 5, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. In G.R. No. the committee) be prohibited from conducting the scheduled hearing and from taking any action
174137, petitioner assails the CA Decision3cra1aw dated December 7, 2005 and on the aforesaid administrative case against respondents.
Resolution4cra1aw dated August 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75973.
On January 2, 2003, the CA rendered a decision14cra1aw in favor of respondents, the dispositive
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:chan robles virtual law library portion of which reads:chan robles virtual law library

Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two separate ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents are hereby
Memoranda5cra1aw dated May 23, 2002 from petitioner charging them with grave misconduct. PERPETUALLY RESTRAINED from hearing and investigating the administrative case against
Specifically, Molina was charged for allegedly committing the following acts: 1) directly and petitioners, without prejudice to pursuing the same with the Civil Service Commission or any
continuously helping some alleged disgruntled employees to conduct concerted protest actions other agency of government as may be allowed for (sic) by law.
and/or illegal assemblies against the management and the GSIS President and General
Manager; 2) leading the concerted protest activities held in the morning of May 22, 2002 during SO ORDERED.15cra1aw
office hours within the GSIS compound; and 3) continuously performing said activities despite
warning from his immediate superiors. 6cra1aw In addition to the charge for grave misconduct for
performing the same acts as Molina, Velasco was accused of performing acts in violation of the The CA treated the petition as one raising an issue of gnawing fear, and thus agreed with
Rules on Office Decorum for leaving his office without informing his supervisor of his respondents that the investigation be made not by the GSIS but by the CSC to ensure that the
whereabouts; and gross insubordination for persistently disregarding petitioner's instructions that hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
Velasco should report to the petitioner's office.7cra1aw These acts, according to petitioner, were
committed in open betrayal of the confidential nature of their positions and in outright defiance of Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
the Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism. In the same Memoranda, petitioner 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:chan robles virtual law library
required respondents to submit their verified answer within seventy two (72) hours. Considering
the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner ordered the preventive suspension of
 I. On the requested transfer of the investigation from the GSIS to the CSC, the latter denied the
same for lack of merit. The Commission concluded that the fact that the GSIS acted as the
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN complainant and prosecutor and eventually the judge does not mean that impartiality in the
FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ABUSED THEIR AUTHORITY AND HAVE BEEN resolution of the case will no longer be served.20cra1aw
PARTIAL IN REGARD TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS;
AND IN PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS FROM HEARING AND Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
INVESTIGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS - Rules of Court.21cra1aw The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO. 75973.
SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF THE
RESPONDENTS THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE PARTIAL AGAINST THEM. On December 7, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision22cra1aw in favor of respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chan robles virtual law library
II.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The formal charges filed by the
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING President and General Manager of the GSIS against petitioners, and necessarily, the order of
TO APPRECIATE AND APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE preventive suspension emanating therefrom, are declared NULL AND VOID. The GSIS is
REMEDIES AND THE RULE ON NON FORUM SHOPPING IN PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING hereby directed to pay petitioners' back salaries pertaining to the period during which they were
THE PETITIONERS FROM HEARING AND INVESTIGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES unlawfully suspended. No pronouncement as to costs.
AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.
SO ORDERED.23cra1aw
III.
The CA declared null and void respondents' formal charges for lack of the requisite preliminary
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN investigation. In view thereof, the CA disagreed with the CSC that the question on the propriety
RENDERING A DECISION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO AND COMPLETELY DISREGARDS of the preventive suspension order had become moot and academic. Rather, it concluded that
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE AND WHICH, IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF COURT, the same is likewise void having emanated from the void formal charges. Consequently, the CA
DOES NOT CLEARLY STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED. 16cra1aw found that respondents were entitled to back salaries during the time of their illegal preventive
suspension.
In the meantime, on February 27, 2003, the CSC resolved respondents' Petition to Lift Order of
Preventive Suspension and Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission through Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:chan robles virtual law library
Resolution No. 03-0278,17cra1aw the dispositive portion of which reads:chan robles virtual law
library I.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby rules that:chan robles virtual law library WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY ACCORDED THE REQUISITE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, WERE IN FACT HEARD AND BEING HEARD, AND
1. The Urgent Petition to Lift the Order of Preventive Suspension is hereby DENIED for having WHETHER THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE
become moot and academic. PROCEEDINGS IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUISITE TO THE CONDUCT OF ADJUDICATION.

2. The Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission is likewise DENIED for lack of merit. II.
Accordingly, GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia is directed to continue the
conduct of the formal investigation of the charges against respondents-petitioners Albert WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY
Velasco and Mario I. Molina.18cra1aw INVESTIGATION.

As to the lifting of the order of preventive suspension, the CSC considered the issue moot and III.
academic considering that the period had lapsed and respondents had been allowed to resume
their specific functions. This notwithstanding, the CSC opted to discuss the matter by way of
obiter dictum. Without making a definitive conclusion as to the effect thereof in the case against WHETHER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS REQUIRED IN INDICTMENTS IN FLAGRANTI,
respondents, the CSC declared that a preliminary investigation is a pre-requisite condition to the AS HERE.
issuance of a formal charge.19cra1aw
 IV. The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED JURISDICTION, AS THE those created by special law. As such, the employees are part of the civil service system and are
ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMNARY INVESTIGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on discipline,
BEFORE THE GSIS AND, THEREAFTER, BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, attendance and general terms and conditions of employment.25cra1aw The CSC has jurisdiction
UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; THE GSIS to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees. In addition, Section 37 (b) of
HAVING ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE RESPONDENTS, TO Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines also gives the heads
THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHERS. of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities the authority
to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. As for the GSIS, Section 45, Republic Act (R.A.) 8291 otherwise known
V. as the GSIS Act of 1997, specifies its disciplining authority, viz:chan robles virtual law library

WHETHER THE ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A NON-ISSUE. SECTION 45. Powers and Duties of the President and General Manager. The President and
General Manager of the GSIS shall among others, execute and administer the policies and
VI. resolutions approved by the Board and direct and supervise the administration and operations of
the GSIS. The President and General Manager, subject to the approval of the Board, shall
WHETHER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENTS appoint the personnel of the GSIS, remove, suspend or otherwise discipline them for cause, in
MOLINA AND VELASCO ARE VALID, WELL-FOUNDED AND DULY RECOGNIZED BY LAW. accordance with existing Civil Service rules and regulations, and prescribe their duties and
qualifications to the end that only competent persons may be employed.

VII.
By this legal provision, petitioner, as President and General Manager of GSIS, is vested the
authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for
WHETHER PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS A PENALTY AND, THUS, MAY NOT BE cause.26cra1aw
IMPOSED WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY A HEARING.
However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such power is not without limitations for
VIII. it must be exercised in accordance with Civil Service rules. The Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service lays down the procedure to be observed in issuing a formal charge
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES against an erring employee, to wit:chan robles virtual law library
PERTAINING TO THE PERIOD OF THEIR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION.
First, the complaint. A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given
IX. due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in
cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under
oath.27cra1aw Except when otherwise provided for by law, an administrative complaint may be
WHETHER THE INSTITUTION OF THE RESPONDENTS' PETITION BEFORE THE CIVIL
filed at anytime with the Commission, proper heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities,
SERVICE COMMISSION WAS ENTIRELY PREMATURE.
municipalities and other instrumentalities.28cra1aw

X.
Second, the Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form
and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit
WHETHER THE MISAPPREHENSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS AS REGARDS THE Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt.29cra1aw
PARTIALITY OF THE GSIS COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM
IS BLATANTLY WITHOUT FACTUAL BASIS.
Third, Preliminary Investigation. A Preliminary investigation involves the ex parte examination of
records and documents submitted by the complainant and the person complained of, as well as
XI. documents readily available from other government offices. During said investigation, the parties
are given the opportunity to submit affidavits and counter-affidavits. Failure of the person
WHETHER RESPONDENTS' OBVIOUS ACT OF FORUM SHOPPING SHOULD BE complained of to submit his counter-affidavit shall be considered as a waiver thereof.30cra1aw
COUNTENANCED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.24cra1aw

The petitions are without merit.

Fourth, Investigation Report. Within five (5) days from the termination of the preliminary against them are serious and evidence of their guilt is - in the opinion of their superior - strong
investigation, the investigating officer shall submit the investigation report and the complete can compensate for the procedural shortcut undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the
records of the case to the disciplining authority.31cra1aw record of this case.34cra1aw The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents
without complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least give the respondents
Fifth, Formal Charge. If a prima facie case is established during the investigation, a formal the opportunity to comment violated the latter's right to due process. Hence, the formal charges
charge shall be issued by the disciplining authority. A formal investigation shall follow. In the are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at anytime.35cra1aw
absence of a prima facie case, the complaint shall be dismissed.32cra1aw
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
It is undisputed that the Memoranda separately issued to respondents were the formal charges ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious
against them. These formal charges contained brief statements of material or relevant facts, a jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
directive to answer the charges within seventy two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
that they had the right to a formal investigation and a notice that they are entitled to be assisted void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative
by a counsel of their choice.33cra1aw proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or
administrative) where he stands to lose the same.36cra1aw
It is likewise undisputed that the formal charges were issued without preliminary or fact-finding
investigation. Petitioner explained that no such investigation was conducted because the CSC
rules did not specifically provide that it is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a formal charge. He Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally,
likewise claimed that preliminary investigation was not required in indictments in flagranti as in administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles,
this case. such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.37cra1aw In particular, due
process in administrative proceedings has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's
We disagree. legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested
Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
preliminary investigation is null and void. However, as clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which
complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained
person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from in the records or made known to the parties affected.38cra1aw
receipt. The use of the word "shall" quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the
disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least respondent should be Petitioner contends that respondents waived their right to preliminary investigation as they failed
given the opportunity to comment and explain his side. As can be gleaned from the procedure to raise it before the GSIS.
set forth above, this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required
therein is different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to
petitioner's claim, no exception is provided for in the CSC Rules. Not even an indictment in Again, we do not agree.
flagranti as claimed by petitioner.
It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be
This is true even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself, as in the present case. attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
To comply with such requirement, he could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked.39cra1aw Moreover, while respondents
to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them instead of immediately failed to raise before the GSIS the lack of preliminary investigation, records show that in their
issuing formal charges. With respondents' comments, petitioner would have properly evaluated Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order) filed with the CSC,
both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case respondents questioned the validity of their preventive suspension and the formal charges
against respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges. It is noteworthy against them for lack of preliminary investigation.40cra1aw There is, thus, no waiver to speak of.
that the very acts subject of the administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place the
day before the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore, that the formal charges were In the procedure adopted by petitioner, respondents were preventively suspended in the same
issued after the sole determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a formal charges issued by the former without the latter knowing that there were pending
prima facie case against respondents. administrative cases against them. It is true that prior notice and hearing are not required in the
issuance of a preventive suspension order.41cra1aw However, considering that respondents
To condone this would give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power to judge by himself were preventively suspended in the same formal charges that we now declare null and void,
the nature of the act complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. We, therefore, then their preventive suspension is likewise null and void.
conclude that respondents were denied due process of law. Not even the fact that the charges
Lastly, the CA committed no reversible error in ordering the payment of back salaries during the
period of respondents' preventive suspension. As the administrative proceedings involved in this JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to respondents and the preventive Associate Justice Associate Justice
suspension meted them is baseless. Consequently, respondents should be awarded their
salaries during the period of their unjustified suspension.42cra1aw In granting their back salaries,
we are simply repairing the damage that was unduly caused respondents, and unless we can C E R T I F I C A T I O N
turn back the hands of time, we can do so only by restoring to them that which is physically
feasible to do under the circumstances.43cra1aw The principle of "no work, no pay" does not
apply where the employee himself was unlawfully forced out of job.44cra1aw Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the other issues raised by
petitioner.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 157383 is DENIED while the
petition in G.R. No. 174137 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
Endnotes:
SO ORDERED. *
 On Official Leave
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice cra1cra1aw Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola, with Associate Justices Candido V.
Rivera and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 157383), pp. 37-40.
WE CONCUR:chan robles virtual law library
cra2cra1aw Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola, with Associate Justices Marina L.
Buzon and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; id. at 41.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
cra3cra1aw Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine, with Associate Justices Marina L.
Buzon and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 174137), pp. 69-78.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice cra4cra1aw Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices Renato C.
Dacudao and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; id. at 80-83.

(On Official Leave) TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE cra5cra1aw Id. at 85-89.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
cra6cra1aw Id. at 85-86.

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA cra7cra1aw Id. at 87-88.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
cra8cra1aw Id. at 86 and 89.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice cra9cra1aw Id. at 90-101.

cra10cra1aw Id. at 102-114.
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice cra11cra1aw Id. at 119-122.
cra12cra1aw Embodied in two Orders dated July 30, 2002 and September 24, 2002; id. at 145 cra33cra1aw Section 16, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
and 161.
cra34cra1aw  Pat. Go v. NPC, 338 Phil 162, 171 (1997).
cra13cra1aw Id. at 127-144.
cra35cra1aw  Engr. Rubio, Jr. v. Hon. Paras, 495 Phil 629, 643 (2005).
cra14cra1aw Supra note 1.
cra36cra1aw  Montoya v. Varilla, G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 831, 843.
cra15cra1aw Rollo (G.R. No. 157383), p. 40.
cra37cra1awId. at 841; Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil 486, 491 (1999).
cra16cra1aw Id. at 127-128.
cra38cra1aw  Montoya v. Varilla, supra ar 841-842; Fabella v. CA, 346 Phil 940, 952-953 (1997).
cra17cra1aw Id. at 42-51.
cra39cra1aw  Engr. Rubio, Jr. v. Hon. Paras, supra at 643.
cra18cra1aw Id. at 51.
cra40cra1aw Rollo (G.R. No. 174137), p. 117.
19
cra cra1aw Id. at 48-50.
cra41cra1aw Carabeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 178000 and 178003, December 4, 2009,
20
cra cra1aw Id. at 50. 607 SCRA 394.

cra21cra1aw Rollo (G.R. No. 174137) pp. 232-248. cra42cra1aw Fabella v. CA, supra at 958.

cra22cra1aw Supra Note 3. cra43cra1aw Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., 416 Phil 580, 594.

cra23cra1aw Rollo (G.R. No. 174137) pp. 77-78. cra44cra1aw Id. at 596.

cra24cra1aw Id. at 509-512.

cra25cra1aw  Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa

sa GSIS, G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 622, 629-630.

cra26cra1aw Id. at 637.

cra27cra1aw Section 8, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

cra28cra1aw Section 9, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

cra29cra1aw Section 11, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

cra30cra1aw Section 12, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

cra31cra1aw Section 14, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

cra32cra1aw Section 15, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

 Republic of the Philippines The incident drew the attention of the media and spawned several cases. One was a criminal
SUPREME COURT case for child abuse under Republic Act No. 76103 against Judge Angeles. Another was an
administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by Judge Angeles against Ganias,
FIRST DIVISION Mamauag, Almario, Cariño, Felipe and Garcia. Judge Angeles later impleaded Billedo as
additional respondent.
G.R. No. 149999. August 12, 2005
In her administrative complaint, Judge Angeles alleged:
THE NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD (NAB) OF THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
(NAPOLCOM), Petitioners, 1. On March 2, 1995, respondents Ganias, Almario and Mamauag submitted an Initial
vs. Investigation Report to the District Director, CPDC, and respondent Ganias turned over a Report
P/INSP. JOHN A. MAMAUAG, SPO2 EUGENE ALMARIO, SPO4 ERLINDA GARCIA and to the DSWD merely on the basis of a verbal report of Agnes Lucero on Judge Reyes’ alleged
SPO1 VIVIAN FELIPE, Respondent. maltreatment of Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay "without getting the required sworn
statements of the two (2) girls and Agnes Lucero";
DECISION
2. While the two girls were under police custody, respondents found in the possession of Pacay
several items of jewelry and clothing materials belonging to and stolen from complainant Judge
CARPIO, J.: Angeles. Complainant’s witnesses, Dr. Sagradia Aldova, Oliva Angeles and Mary Ann
Agustin requested the respondents to register in the police logbook the discovery of the stolen
The Case articles but to no avail;

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 6 September 2001 Decision2 of the Court 3. Despite the insistent request of said witnesses and subsequently of the complainant that a
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals set aside the 3 July 1997 Resolution of Philippine National report for qualified theft be entered in the police blotter, respondents maliciously refused to act
Police ("PNP") Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II ("PNP Chief Sarmiento"), the 3 March 2000 upon the incident and conduct further investigation;
Decision and the 30 June 2000 Resolution, both of the National Appellate Board ("NAB") of the
National Police Commission. 4. Respondent’s bad faith and highly irregular conduct in handling the maltreatment charge
against complainant was also manifested when respondents did not give her a chance to explain
The Antecedent Facts her side by not contacting her although her residence is just a few houses away from the police
station;
Very early in the morning of 2 March 1995, Nancy Gaspar ("Gaspar") and Proclyn Pacay
("Pacay) left the residence of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles ("Judge Angeles") in Quezon City. 5. Even before she was informed of the accusations against her, the police leaked the baseless
Gaspar and Pacay were both minors and were later classified as moderate or mild mental maltreatment case against her as shown by the presence of so many people and members of
retardates by the Department of Social Welfare and Development ("DSWD"). Agnes Lucero the media as well as the Human Rights Commission personnel at the police station;
("Lucero") found Gaspar and Pacay wandering around the vicinity of the Philippine Rabbit bus
terminal in Cubao. Gaspar and Pacay narrated to Lucero stories of maltreatment and non- 6. The fact that no case has yet been filed against her shows that the whole event was
payment of salary by Judge Angeles. maliciously manipulated by her detractors to harass and malign complainant with the willing
assistance of men in uniform.4
Around 4:00 a.m., Lucero brought Gaspar and Pacay to the Baler Police Station 2, Central
Police District Command ("CPDC"), Quezon City. At the police station, desk officer SPO1 Jaime The Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division ("ILAD") of the CPDC investigated the administrative
Billedo ("Billedo") recorded the girls’ complaint in the police blotter. On Billedo’s instruction, complaint. After its investigation, the ILAD recommended the dismissal of the charges. In a
SPO1 Roberto C. Cariño ("Cariño") brought Gaspar and Pacay to the East Avenue Medical Resolution5 dated 10 April 1995, the CPDC District Director approved the recommendation and
Center for the requisite medical examination. Later, the two girls were returned to the police dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied with the outcome of her complaint, Judge Angeles moved
station where Cariño interviewed them. Cariño’s Initial Investigation Report was reviewed and for re-investigation of the case before PNP Chief Sarmiento.
signed by SPO2 Eugene V. Almario ("Almario") and approved by P/Insp. John A. Mamauag
("Mamauag"). Later, SPO1 Vivian M. Felipe ("Felipe") and SPO4 Erlinda L. Garcia ("Garcia")
escorted Gaspar and Pacay to the DSWD. P/Insp. Roberto V. Ganias ("Ganias") signed the
Letter of Turnover to the DSWD.
The Ruling of the PNP Chief chose to avail of another remedy thereby effectively foreclosing their right of appeal to NAB in
view of the lapse of the reglementary period for filing the same.
In a Decision6 dated 7 June 1996, PNP Chief Sarmiento ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of P/Insp. John Mamauag, SPO2 Eugene
WHEREFORE, this Headquarters finds: Respondent[s] P/CINSP. ROBERTO GANIAS, SPO1 Almario, SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Jaime Billedo, and SPO1 Roberto Cariño guilty of Serious Neglect of Duty and orders their
dismissal from the police service; P/INSP JOHN MAMAUAG and SPO2 Eugene Almario guilty of SO ORDERED.12
Less Serious Neglect of Duty and orders that both of them be suspended from the police service
for Ninety (90) days with forfeiture of pay; and SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe Mamauag, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision but the NAB denied it in the
exonerated of the charge for insufficiency of evidence.7 NAB Resolution13 of 30 June 2000. Thus, Mamauag, et al. sought relief from the Court of
Appeals.
Judge Angeles filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.8 In a Resolution9 dated 3 July 1997,
PNP Chief Sarmiento modified his previous ruling and ordered the dismissal from the service of The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Mamauag, Almario, Garcia and Felipe ("Mamauag, et al.").
In its Decision of 6 September 2001, the Court of Appeals ruled:
Mamauag, et al. forthwith filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against PNP Chief
Sarmiento, PNP Inspector General Jovencio Sales and Judge Angeles before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101. In an Order10 dated 25 November 1997, the Regional Trial WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Resolution of the PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II
Court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies and for dated 3 July 1997, having been rendered in excess of his jurisdiction is hereby SET ASIDE for
failure to show that respondents abused their discretion. being null and void. Accordingly, the DECISION and RESOLUTION made by the National
Appellate Board dated 3 March 2000 and 30 June 2000, respectively, are also SET ASIDE for
being null and void.
Mamauag, et al. then appealed the PNP Chief’s Resolution before the NAB.
SO ORDERED.14
The Ruling of the National Appellate Board
In finding for Mamauag, et al., the Court of Appeals explained:
In a Decision,11 dated 3 March 2000, the NAB dismissed the appeal for late filing and lack of
merit. The NAB declared:
First of all, the said provision expressly states that "the disciplinary action imposed upon a
member of the PNP shall be final and executory." Nowhere does the said provision grant any
Appellants Mamauag, Almario, Garcia and Felipe, in seeking immediate judicial remedy by way party to move for a reconsideration of any disciplinary action imposed as the remedy provided
of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against appellee and the PNP dismissal authority even thereunder is an appeal of either party of the decision to the National Appellate Board, if
if they have not yet exhausted all administrative remedies available to them had in fact defaulted such involves a demotion or dismissal of a member of the PNP. In fact, since the original
in their right to exercise such later option by omission of their own doing. The right to appeal is decision only suspended petitioners Mamauag and Almario from service and even exonerated
provided for by law and he who seeks to exercise that right must abide with the rules provided Felipe and Garcia, the said decision is not even subject to any appeal. The said decision
therefor. clearly does not involve any demotion nor dismissal which could properly be appealed to
the NAB.
The substantive rule regarding appeals from a decision of dismissal from the police service
imposed by the Chief, PNP is found in Section 45 of RA 6975, which provides in part, thus: Moreover, even under the assumption that a motion for reconsideration is allowed, the one filed
by Judge Angeles should not have merited any consideration from the PNP Chief. Judge
"Section 45. Finality of Disciplinary Decision - …Provided, further, that the disciplinary action Angeles did not have the personality to make such a motion. While Sec. 45 of R.A. 6975 does
imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving … dismissal may be appealed to the National not clearly provide who may appeal (or for that matter make any motion for reconsideration)
Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof." from the decision of the PNP Chief, the last clause mentions "either party  may appeal with the
Secretary" and by the doctrine of necessary implication this extends to said decision of the PNP
It was on a day certain between July 3 1997 (the date of the Resolution of dismissal) and July Chief.
18, 1997 (date of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition) that Mamauag, et al. must have received
a copy of aforesaid Resolution and from that same day, they had ten (10) days within which to It is elementary that in an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness. No private
file their appeal before the NAB had they chosen to exhaust administrative remedies. But they interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense committed is against the
government. As held by the Supreme Court in Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission:
"As correctly ruled by private respondent, petitioner Paredes the complainant is not the party 2. Whether the private complainant in an administrative case has the legal personality to move
adversely affected by the decision so that she has no legal personality to interpose an appeal to for reconsideration, or appeal an adverse decision of the disciplining authority.
the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case, the complainant is a mere
witness (GONZALO VS. D. RODA, 64 SCRA 120). Even if she is the Head of Administrative The Ruling of This Court
Services Department of the HSRC as a complainant she is merely a witness for the
government in an administrative case. No private interest is involved in an administrative
case as the offense is committed against the government." (Emphasis supplied) The petition has no merit.

Obviously, Judge Angeles has no interest which would be directly and materially affected by the Mamauag and Almario argue that the disciplinary action of 90-day suspension imposed on them
decision rendered by the PNP Chief. Not being a proper party to the said case − as she is only a in the 7 June 1996 Decision of PNP Chief Sarmiento has become final and executory.
mere witness − then her motion should not have served as a ground for the re-evaluation of the Mamauag, et al. also argue that private complainant Judge Angeles has no personality to move
administrative case against the petitioners which resulted into a modification of the PNP Chief’s for partial reconsideration of the 7 June 1996 Decision of PNP Chief Sarmiento. Mamauag, et al.
earlier decision. cite Sections 43(e) and 45 of RA 6975 which provide:

On this score, We find the latest ruling of the Supreme Court on this matter: SEC. 43. People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). – x x x

"Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil service Commission and (e) Decisions. –  The decision of the PLEB shall become final and executory: Provided, That a
held the respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who may appeal the decision of the Court of decision involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed by either party with
Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the responden[t] who was declared not the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the decision.
guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan who was merely a witness for
the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party xxx
adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system.
Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. -  The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the
Supreme Court." (Emphasis supplied) PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional
director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the
Applying this to the present case by analogy, had the original judgment been rendered in favor regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of
of the petitioners, it would be the Philippine National Police which would be adversely affected decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP
and thus would be the proper party to appeal such a judgment. Corollary to this, where the involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10)
original judgment is adverse to the petitioners, it is they who could properly appeal the same. In days from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, The regional or National Appellate Board, as
either case, the complainant Judge Angeles certainly has no legal personality to move for a the case may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of
reconsideration of the original decision handed down by the PNP Chief. appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within
said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing
In view of the foregoing, this Court can only rule, as We do now, that the appealed resolution of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
(dated 3 July 1997) was made in excess of the PNP Chief’s jurisdiction rendering it null and
void. Hence, upon the basic legal precept that a void decision or resolution can never attain The Court of Appeals sustained Mamauag, et al.
finality, NAB should have ruled accordingly on the matter. Finding that it did not, the Court’s
remedial power must perforce be exercised to rectify the matter before Us.15 Decisions Appealable Under RA 6975

Hence, the NAB’s recourse to this Court. Section 45 of RA 6975 provides that a "disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the
PNP shall be final and executory." Under Section 45, a disciplinary action is appealable only if
The Issues it involves either a "demotion or dismissal from the service." If the disciplinary action is less than
a demotion or dismissal from the service, the disciplinary action "shall be final and executory" as
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the NAB, raises the following issues: Section 45 of RA 6975 expressly mandates. Thus, a decision imposing suspension on a PNP
member is not subject to appeal to a higher authority.
1. Whether Section 45 of Republic Act No. 697516 (RA 6975) allows the filing of a motion for
reconsideration; Administrative disciplinary action connotes administrative penalty.17 If the decision exonerates
the respondents or otherwise dismisses the charges against the respondents, there is no
disciplinary action since no penalty is imposed. The provision that a penalty less than demotion
or dismissal from service is final and executory does not apply to dismissal of charges or Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city major, as head of the city
exoneration because they are not disciplinary actions. This gives rise to two crucial questions. government, is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension
from work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring
First, can a party appeal from a decision of the disciplining authority dismissing the charges employees.
against a PNP member? Second, if a decision dismissing the charges against a PNP member is
appealable, who can appeal — the PNP or the private complainant, or both? By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where
the respondent is found guilty of the charges files against him. But when the respondent
Before the case of CSC v. Dacoycoy,18 case law held that dismissal of the charges or is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal. (Emphasis
exoneration of the respondents in administrative disciplinary proceedings is final and not subject supplied)
to appeal even by the government. Thus, in Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission,19 et al.,
the Court held: However, in Dacoycoy, the Court modified the rule in Del Castillo and earlier cases by allowing
the Civil Service Commission to appeal dismissals of charges or exoneration of respondents in
Section 37, paragraph (a), of PD 807, the Philippine Civil Service Law, provides: administrative disciplinary proceedings. In Dacoycoy, the Court ruled:

(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely affected who
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil
exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from service disciplinary case. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the
office xxx (Italics supplied). Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the
respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the
Interpreting the above provision, we held in Mendez v. CSC that: Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty
to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of
in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law. (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Office Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not
of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA 318). guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for
the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as ‘The Philippine Civil Service Law’ adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system.
shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
employees from administrative charges. Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence
that "the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee
against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides: take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from
office" and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
xxx xxx xxx thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is
exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule prior
decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions
Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 which
exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v.
contemplates:
Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service
Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority
Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision xxx and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
(italics supplied) (p. 104, Rollo)
Subsequent decisions20 of the Court affirmed Dacoycoy.
The phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against
whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the
Dacoycoy allowed the Civil Service Commission to appeal dismissals of charges or exoneration
form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the
of respondents in administrative disciplinary proceedings. However, Dacoycoy maintained the
instant case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he
rule that the private complainant is a mere government witness without a right to appeal.21 Thus,
is not the respondent in the administrative case below.
case law holding that the private complainant has no right to appeal the decision of the
disciplining authority remains good law. As explained by Justice Jose Melo in his concurring opinion Thus, Judge Angeles has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against
in Floralde v. Court of Appeals:22 Mamauag, et al. by the CPDC District Director in the Resolution of 10 April 1995. The motion for re-
investigation filed by Judge Angeles with the PNP Chief is in substance an appeal from the decision of
However, in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy (306 SCRA 425 [1999]), which incidentally is the CPDC District Director. The PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain Judge Angeles’ appeal in
another ponencia of Mr. Justice Pardo, the majority, with undersigned ponente dissenting, modified the guise of a motion for re-investigation. Since the PNP Chief had no jurisdiction, all actions taken by
the above doctrine by allowing the CSC to appeal in cases where the respondent is exonerated of the the PNP Chief pursuant to the appeal is void. Thus, the Decision of the CPDC District Director
charges. Nevertheless, in both cases, the Court did not deviate from the doctrine that the dismissing the charges against Mamauag, et al. stands and is now final and executory.
complainant, being a mere witness for the government, cannot appeal the decision rendered in
the administrative case. In Paredes, we declared that the complainant is not the party adversely We note that, as found by PNP Chief Sarmiento in his earlier Decision of 7 June 1996, there is no
affected by the decision so that she has no legal personality to interpose an appeal to the CSC. In an evidence on record to hold Garcia and Felipe liable for any misconduct. The 3 July 1997 Resolution of
administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness. No private interest is involved in an PNP Chief Sarmiento stated that Garcia and Felipe "were eye-witnesses to the criminal act" of the
administrative case as the offense is committed against the government. (Emphasis supplied) theft of Judge Angeles’ jewelry. The same Resolution also held that Garcia and Felipe "were active
participants in the cover-up (of the theft) contrary to the assertion that they merely brought minors
Section 91 of RA 6975 provides that the "Civil Service Law and its rules and regulations shall apply to Pacay and Gaspar to the DSWD upon instructions of their superior."
all personnel of the Department." Consequently, case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings
under the Civil Service Law also applies to administrative disciplinary proceedings against PNP The theft, however, happened at the house of Judge Angeles. Garcia and Felipe were indisputably not
members. Even without Section 91, case law on the civil service necessarily applies to PNP members eyewitnesses to the crime of theft, contrary to the finding of the PNP Chief. There is also no evidence
who are embraced in the phrase "civil service"23 under Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 on record of any act showing that Garcia and Felipe participated in any cover-up of the theft. We
Constitution. quote the NAB Decision of 29 July 1997 explaining why there was no cover-up of the alleged theft:

RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining Appellants argue that after minors Pacay and Gaspar narrated and showed signs of their harrowing
authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize "either party" to appeal in the instances that the life under Judge Angeles, and pursuant to standard police practice and the policy of the state to
law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes protect children against abuse, exploitation and discrimination committed by persons having care and
the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when the custody of them, appellant Cariño decided with the approval of Chief Insp. Ganias to bring said minors
disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from to the hospital for medico-legal examination. Thereafter, the minors were placed under the protective
the service is the proper penalty. custody of the DSWD in accordance with Executive Order No. 50, Series of 1986. For performing their
duties pursuant to law and after tending to the needs of said minors as mandated under Sec. 2 of RA
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which 7610, and for refusing to enter in the police blotter a fictitious crime of Qualified Theft and to turn over
previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The said minors to the custody of the complainant, appellants were unceremoniously suspended and
government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the subjected to summary dismissal proceedings.
respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal
hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in It would defy both logic and human nature that a mere SPO1 such as appellant Cariño would refuse
prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,24 decided after Dacoycoy, the the rightful demands of respectable emissaries of a well-known and feared RTC Judge whose
Court declared: reputation precedes her. There is no plausible reason, therefore, for appellant to refuse entry of the
alleged stolen jewelry in the blotter. They are more than aware that they are facing a lawyer and judge
To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of who can make life miserable for them if they refuse to perform their duties enjoined by law. The truth
Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, of the matter is that what was discovered was a coin purse/wallet of Nancy Gaspar placed inside the
the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should "detach himself from cases where paper bag of Proclyn Pacay and which yielded fancy jewelry items, a P20-peso bill and a wristwatch
his decision is appealed to a higher court for review." that according to Gaspar was given her by the private complainant. It was Oliva Angeles and Dra.
Sagrada who took with them the coin purse of Pacay. How the private complainant produced the
alleged stolen jewelry worth ₱26,820.25 is a matter which only they can explain. 26
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as
adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide administrative
cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to PNP Chief Sarmiento’s Decision of 7 June 1996 dismissed from the service Ganias, Billedo, and
review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies," not to litigate. Cariño, suspended for 90 days Mamauag and Almario, and exonerated Garcia and Felipe. All the
respondents initially appealed the Decision to the NAB. The NAB exonerated Ganias, Billedo and
Cariño and advised the PNP Chief "to take note of our findings in the instant case and to act thereon
In any event, a private complainant like Judge Angeles is not one of "either party" who can appeal accordingly" with respect to Judge Angeles’ pending motion for partial reconsideration involving
under Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975. The private complainant is a mere witness of the government Mamauag, et al. The PNP Chief, however, issued his Resolution on 3 July 1997 dismissing from the
which is the real party in interest.25 In short, private complainant Judge Angeles is not a party under service Mamauag, et al., twenty-six days before the NAB Decision of 29 July 1997.
Sections 43 and 45 who can appeal the decision of the disciplining authority.
 11 
The NAB, which is a higher disciplining authority than the PNP Chief, found that the same grave Signed by Commissioners Leo S. Magahum, Jose Percival L. Adiong and Romeo L.
misconduct charged against all the respondents never happened. Thus, the NAB exonerated and Cairme. Rollo, pp. 50-53.
reinstated Ganias, Billedo and Cariño, whom the PNP Chief dismissed from the service in his original
Decision of 7 June 1996. The NAB decision became final and executory on 28 February 1998. 12 
Rollo, pp. 52-53.
Ironically, Mamauag and Almario, whom the PNP Chief originally meted out a lesser penalty of 90-day
suspension but subsequently dismissed on motion for partial reconsideration, have not been 13 
reinstated to their positions up to now. Garcia and Felipe, whom the PNP Chief originally exonerated CA Rollo, pp. 32-33.
but subsequently dismissed on motion for partial reconsideration, have also not been reinstated to
their positions. And yet, as found by the NAB, the appellate disciplining authority superior to the PNP 14 
Rollo, pp. 36-37.
Chief, the same offense of grave misconduct charged against all respondents, including Mamauag, et
al., never happened. 15 
Ibid., pp. 34-36.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals 16 
An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the
promulgated on 06 September 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61711 with MODIFICATION. We REVERSE Interior and Local Government, and For Other Purposes.
the 3 July 1997 Resolution of PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II and REINSTATE the Resolution of 10
April 1995 of the CPDC District Director dismissing the charges against P/Insp. John A. Mamauag, 17 
SPO2 Eugene Almario, SPO4 Erlinda Garcia, and SPO1 Vivian Felipe, who are all entitled to back Villasis v. Pabatao, etc., 200 Phil. 22 (1982).
salaries and other benefits as provided under Section 4827 of Republic Act No. 6975.
18 
366 Phil. 86 (1999).
SO ORDERED.
19 
311 Phil. 340 (1995).
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
20 
Dagadag v. Tongnawa, G.R. No. 161166-67, 3 February 2005; Civil Service
Commission v. Gentallan, G.R. No. 152833, 9 May 2005; Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part. G.R. No. 152574, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 507.

21 
Concurring Opinion of Justice Jose Melo, Floralde v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 146 (2000).
Footnotes
22 
Ibid.
1 
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
23 
Sec. 2(1) provides:
2 
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto
and Eliezer R. De los Santos, concurring. Rollo, pp. 30-37.
"The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
3 
Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
24 
378 Phil. 466 (1999).
4 
CA Rollo, p. 47.
25 
CSC v. Dacoycoy, supra note 18.
5 
Rollo, pp. 58-59.
26 
CA Rollo, pp. 51-52.
6 
Ibid., pp. 60-65.
27 
Section 48 of RA 6975 provides: "SEC. 48. Entitlement to Reinstatement and Salary. — A
7 
Ibid., p. 65. member of the PNP who may have been suspended from office in accordance with the provisions
of this Act or who shall have been terminated or separated from office shall, upon acquittal from
8 
CA Rollo, pp. 159-163. the charges against him, be entitled to reinstatement and to prompt payment of salary, allowances
and other benefits withheld from him by reason of such suspension or termination."
9 
Rollo, pp. 66-68.

10 
Signed by Judge Pedro T. Santiago. Rollo, pp. 69-70.
 Salvador Duran, Sr., Arturo Montano, and Margarita Tugaoen are further ORDERED to jointly
Republic of the Philippines and severally indemnify the Philippine National Police of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).
Supreme Court
Manila SO ORDERED.

Special Second DIVISION Let us briefly recall the facts.

October 22, 2014 On August 11, 1992, the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership (ODC) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) issued two (2) Advices of Sub-Allotment (ASA), amounting to five million
G.R. No. 188487 pesos each, for the purchase of combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE items) for the
PNP’s North Capital Command (CAPCOM).1
VAN D. LUSPO, Petitioner
vs. Upon receipt of the ASAs, P/Supt. Arturo Montano (Montano), Chief Comptroller, North
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent CAPCOM, directed Police Chief Inspector Salvador Duran, Sr. (Duran), Chief, Regional Finance
Service Unit, North CAPCOM, to prepare and draw 100 checks of ₱100,000.00 each, for a total
x-----------------------x of P10,000,000.00. The checks were all dated August 12, 1992 and payable to four different
entities2 that are all owned and operated by Margarita Tugaoen (Tugaoen) who later collected
the proceeds of the checks from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Cubao Branch.
G.R. No. 188547
In her March 5, 1993 sworn statement, Tugaoen admitted that she received the P10 million
SUPT. ARTURO H. MONTANO and MARGARITA B. TUGAOEN, Petitioners worth of checks as payment for the previously accumulated PNP debts and not for any CCIE
vs. items that she delivered.3 P/CInsp. Isaias Braga, Chief Logistics Officer, North CAPCOM, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Rolando Flores, Supply Accountable Officer, North CAPCOM confirmed the non-delivery of the
CCIE.
x-----------------------x
After the PNP, General Headquarters, Office of the Inspector General (GHQ-OIG), and
G.R. No. 188556 subsequently the Ombudsman, conducted an investigation on the CCIE North Capcom
transaction, the Ombudsman for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (now Ombudsman for the
C/INSP. SALVADOR C. DURAN, SR., Petitioner, Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices) recommended the filing of an Information for 100
vs. counts of Malversation of Public Funds against several PNP officials, including the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On January 26, 2004, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed an Information, but this
RESOLUTION was for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,4 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Information alleged that the accused, among others, conspired with each
other and with bad faith and manifest partiality caused undue injury to the government by
BRION, J.: causing the payment of ₱10,000,000.00 to Tugaoen for the CCIE items that were not actually
delivered.
We resolve the present motions filed by C/Insp. Salvador C. Duran, Sr., Supt. Arturo H. Montano
and Margarita B. Tugaoen (accused), seeking reconsideration of our February 14, 2011 After the prosecution presented its evidence, the accused filed a demurrer to evidence, primarily
Decision which reads: questioning the admissibility of the checks (and its accompanying documents) and Tugaoen’s
sworn statements. The Sandiganbayan denied the demurrer to evidence.5 While none of the
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the conviction of Salvador Duran, Sr., Arturo Montano, accused took the witness stand, Montano and Tugaoen maintained the inadmissibility of the
and Margarita Tugaoen in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 20192 is hereby AFFIRMED. evidence.6

The conviction of Van Luspo in Criminal Case No. 20192 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and The Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty as charged.7 The court found that the prosecution
he is hereby ACQUITTED. The bailbond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby successfully established the elements of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. First, the accused are
CANCELLED. public officers, except Tugaoen who, however acted in conspiracy with her co-accused. Second,
the accused acted with evident bad faith by splitting the payment of ₱10,000,00.00 into 100
checks for ₱100,000.00 despite the fact that the ultimate payee is one and the same and Accused Tugaoen’s admission that she did not deliver any CCIE items as contained in her
contrary to the accused’s claim that they are authorized to sign the checks regardless of statement is inadmissible under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.19
amount. At the same time, the splitting of payment violates Commission on Audit (COA) Circular
No. 76-41.8 Court’s Ruling

Second, by issuing the checks, the accused made it appear that there were legal transactions We deny the motions.
between PNP and the four business establishments owned by accused Tugaoen on the
purchase and delivery of CCIE items despite the lack of documents to support these alleged
transactions. Signing the checks is
not a ministerial duty
Third, undue injury is present in the amount of ₱10,000,000.00 for the supposed purchases of
CCIE items that were never delivered to the end-users. Contrary to Duran’s claim, affixing his signature on the checks is not a ministerial duty on his
part. As he himself stated in his petition and in his present motion, his position as Chief of the
Regional Finance Service Unit of the North CAPCOM imposed on him the duty "to be
The Court upheld the conviction of the accused on appeal. The Court ruled that Montano and responsible for the management and disbursement and accounting of PNP funds." This duty
Duran’s bad faith was evident from their "failure to prepare and submit the required evidently gives him the discretion, within the bounds of law, to review, scrutinize, or
documentation ordinarily attendant to procurement transactions and government expenditures, countercheck the supporting documents before facilitating the payment of public funds.
as mandated by Section 4(6) of P.D. No. 1445."9 The element of undue injury was likewise
established by the prosecution’s evidence showing that the North CAPCOM did not receive the
ten million pesos worth of CCIE items despite Tugaoen’s admitted receipt and encashment of His responsibility for the disbursement and accounting of public funds makes him an
the checks. accountable officer. Section 106 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 requires an accountable
officer, who acts under the direction of a superior officer, to notify the latter of the illegality of the
payment in order to avoid liability. This duty to notify presupposes, however, that the
Duran’s Motion for Reconsideration accountable officer had duly exercised his duty in ensuring that funds are properly disbursed
and accounted for by requiring the submission of the supporting documents for his review.
Duran reiterates that his alleged participation in the conspiracy is not sufficient to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The act of issuing 100 checks at P100,000.00 does not prove By relying on the supposed assurances of his co-accused Montano that the supporting
that he conspired with his co-accused because he only acted in accordance with the instruction documents are all in order,20 contrary to what his duties mandate, Montano simply assumed that
and assurance of his superior, co-accused Montano, and in pursuance of his ministerial duty of these documents exist and are regular on its face even if nothing in the records indicate that
preparing and counter-signing the checks.10 In other words, he was acting in good faith in they do and they are. The nature of his duties is simply inconsistent with his "ministerial"
preparing and countersigning the checks.11 argument. With Duran’s failure to discharge the duties of his office and given the circumstances
attending the making and issuance of the checks, his conviction must stand.
Duran argues that he cannot be faulted for the lack of documentation accompanying the
transaction. He claims that the lack of documentation is "none of [his] business"12 since We clarify that the Court’s finding of bad faith is not premised on Duran’s failure "to prepare and
documentation matters pertain to the office of his co-accused, Montano, as Chief Comptroller of submit" the supporting documents but for his failure to require their submission for his review.
North CAPCOM.13 The Court erred in imputing bad faith on him based on "the acts enumerated While the preparation and submission of these documents are not part of his responsibilities, his
by [the] Court" in its Decision because these acts "do not fall within the ambit of his sworn failure to require their submission for his review, given the circumstances, amply establishes his
duties."14 bad faith in preparing and issuing checks that eventually caused undue injury to the government.

Montano and Tugaoen’s Motion for Reconsideration Tugaoen’s statement before the
PNP investigating committee is
Montano and Tugaoen alleged that the Court erred in imputing bad faith on them based on admissible in evidence
documentary evidence that shows the absence of supporting documents15 to the transactions
because these documents are inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. None of the persons On the issue raised by Tugaoen and Montano on the admissibility of the checks and of the
who executed these documents testified in open court.16 The prosecution failed to show that statements made by Tugaoen before the investigating committee, we note that these arguments
Montano and Tugaoen conspired with those charged in the information.17 The splitting of the are mere rehashes of the arguments that they raised before the Sandiganbayan in their Motion
checks cannot be the basis of conspiracy because to begin with, the admissibility of the to Dismiss and in this Court in their Petition for Review. We maintain our ruling that the
secondary evidence of the checks is in question. The accused ask the Court to review the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in this regard.
admissibility of these secondary pieces of evidence.18
In an attempt to prove the applicability of the best evidence rule rather than the exception - headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many
entries in the regular course of business - on the secondary evidence of the checks, Tugaoen investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and
and Montano direct the Court’s attention to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan in another unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
case involving the issuance of checks in the aggregate amount of Php20 million as cash investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and
advances intended as payment for CCIE items for the use of PNP personnel of Region 7. In that means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it,
case, the Sandiganbayan rejected the admissibility of the microfilm copies of the checks out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
presented by the prosecution on the ground that it violates the best evidence rule, and rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in
eventually acquitted the accused.21 such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence xxx.23

We do not and cannot share their positions. Accordingly, contrary to the accused Tugaoen’s claim, the fact that she was "invited" by the
investigating committee does not by itself determine the nature of the investigation as custodial.
It is inappropriate for the accused to rely on a lower court’s decision (although involving some The nature of the proceeding must be adjudged on a case to case basis.
factual similarities with the present criminal case) that was rendered after this Court had already
made its own ruling, affirming the accused’s conviction. To begin with, in our judicial hierarchy, The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the investigation where Tugaoen made her statement
only the pronouncements of this Court are doctrinal and binding on all other courts. There is only was not a custodial investigation that would bring to the fore the rights of the accused and the
one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. Our exclusionary rule under paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
judicial system does not work the other way around. investigator’s reminder to Tugaoen of her Miranda rights during the investigation cannot be
determinative of the nature of the investigation. Otherwise, following the logic of this claim, the
For our present purposes, we are only called upon to determine whether the Sandiganbayan law enforcer’s own failure or even disregard of his duty to inform an individual he investigates of
committed an error of law in convicting the petitioners of the crime for which they were charged. his custodial investigation rights would suffice to negate the character of an investigation as
The legal correctness of its decision in another case does not only lack the force of legally a custodial investigation. Ultimately, the nature of the investigation must be determined
jurisprudence but is not even an issue before us. It would do well for the petitioners not to by appreciating the circumstances surrounding it as a whole.
confuse themselves. With the admissibility of the checks in evidence and the prosecution’s
evidence on the manner and circumstances by which they were prepared, we find no reason to In the present case, the investigation conducted by the PNP GHQOIG, was prompted by the
disturb our finding that conspiracy exists and that the accused acted in bad faith. report from the COA regarding disbursement irregularities for CCIE items in Regions VII and
VIII, North CAPCOM. In short, it was simply a general inquiry to clear the air of reported
The prosecution was also able to prove injury to the government through the testimony of anomalies and irregularities within the PNP which a constitutional body found and reported as
Tuscano (the Supply Accountable Officer of the PNP) that the delivery of P10 million worth of part of its constitutional power and duty. Naturally, this investigation would involve persons with
CCIE items for North CAPCOM in 1992 is not supported by the available record. This testimony whom the PNP had contracts that are subject of the COA scrutiny. That what was conducted is
in turn finds support from accused Tugaoen’s own statement that she did not deliver any CCIE an ordinary administrative (and not custodial) investigation is supported by the fact that the
in exchange for the checks that she encashed (and from the written declarations of P/CInsp. investigating committee also took the statements of other PNP officials who ended up not being
Isaias Braga, Chief Logistics Officer, North CAPCOM, and Rolando Flores, Supply Accountable charged with a crime. In this regard, the Sandiganbayan correctly observed:
Officer, North CAPCOM).
The most crucial question to answer that could have absolved the accused from liability is
Tugaoen though questions the admissibility of her statement before the investigating committee whether the subject purchases of CCIE items were truly "ghost purchases", as contended by the
that she did not deliver any CCIE items in exchange for the checks on the ground that it violates prosecution. It is very ironic that no single end user among thousands of police officers and men
her right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. came forward to attest and declare to the world that indeed he received the CCIE items subject
matter of the case, thereby leaving the prosecution's theory reinforced and unrebutted.
In People v. Marra,22 we held that custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by
law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his The admitted non-delivery of the CCIE items by the supposed contractor, Tugaoen, well
freedom of action in any significant manner. The rule on custodial investigation begins to explains why Duran had to argue in vain that the making and issuance of the checks were
operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and ministerial on his part (despite his clear responsibility for the "management and disbursement
the interrogation is then aimed on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to and accounting of PNP funds"). Accordingly, the fact that none of the persons who executed the
whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions that tend to elicit incriminating documents cited by the Court in its Decision testified in open court is not fatal to the accused's
statements. The situation contemplated is more precisely described as one where – conviction. As we already observed in our February 14, 2011 Decision, the prosecution
sufficiently discharged its burden of proof based on the confluence of evidence it presented
showing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at
best may be termed unequal.1âwphi1 The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
 1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motions for reconsideration are DENIED with  Exhibit "F" of the Prosecution and Exhibit 7 for the Defense; Pre-Trial Order, Records,
FINALITY. Vol. I, p. 387.

2
SO ORDERED.  These entities are: DI-BEN Trading, MT Enterprises, J-MOS Enterprises, and Triple
888 Enterprises.
ARTURO D. BRION
3
Associate Justice  Volume 1, pp. 94-95.

4
WE CONCUR:  Volume 1, pp. 1-3.

5
ANTONIO T. CARPIO  We quoted the Sandiganbayan decision in our February 14, 2011 Decision as follows:
Associate Justice There have been several instances where the courts have accorded due credence to
Chairperson the admissibility of microfilm copies or photostatic copies of microfilmed documents
such as checks and other commercial documents relying on the factual justification that
these checks were microfilmed in the ordinary course of business and there is an
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES ample showing that they were accurate and [have] not been substantially altered.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
xxxx

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Thus, if the witnesses presented attested to the fact that the checks are
Associate Justice microfilmed in the ordinary course of business and that the Photostats have
attained acceptable degree of accuracy, the same are no doubt admissible in
ATTESTATION evidence in lieu of the original, not on the basis of the "best evidence" rule but
because they may be considered as entries in the usual or regular course of
business. This Court may also want to take judicial notice of the fact that one
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the of reliable means to preserve checks and other commercial papers and
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. documents is by way of microfilm.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO In his testimony, prosecution witness Emmanuel E. Barcena has sufficiently
Associate Justice explained the procedure ordinarily adopted by the Philippine Clearing House
Chairperson, Special Second Division when it receives checks from its various clients. According to him, once the
Philippine Clearing House receives checks for processing and captures the
CERTIFICATION same in a microfilm, it generates a report called the Master List and the Detail
List. The data are then eventually stored in a tape and are submitted to Citron
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's (a service provider) to enable the latter to transfer the contents of the tape to a
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolutionhad been reached in microfiche which would then contain all the reports of the PCH. After the
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. transfer of the contents of the tape from the tape or "disc" to microfiche, Citron
returns the microfiche to PCH for archive and future purposes. In case of a
request from the banks or from the courts for any data regarding past
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO transactions involving checks received by PCH from its clients, the PCH will
Chief Justice have a basis where to get the reproduction f the print out.

x x x As what he categorically stated, the microfilming of checks is just one of

the regular or routinary functions being performed by PCH. Hence, the
reproductions or copies of the preserved checks it issues, obtained from its
existing records facility such as microfilms, may, therefore, be considered
Footnotes
admissible in evidence.
6
 Duran was declared to have waived his right to formally offer his evidence (Records,
Vol. IV, p. 473).

7
 Decision promulgated on January 19, 2009 and Resolution promulgated June 30,
2009.

8
 Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 46.

9
 Decision, p. 35.

10
 Rollo, pp. 17-18, 237 (GR No. 188556).

11
 Id. at 26.

12
 Id. at 248.

13
 Id. at 27, 244.

14
 Id. at 245.

15
 Abelardo F. Madridejo, Chief Accountant of North CAPCOM, in a Certification dated
March 23, 1993; The written statement of the PNP Chief Directorate for Material
Services, P/Supt. Jesus Arceo; written statement of State Auditor Erlinda Cargo of
COA-PNP North CAPCOM.

16
 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2, rollo, p. 286 (GR No. 188541).

17
 Rollo, pp. 15-18.

18
 Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 287-291.

19
 Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 9-12; rollo, pp. 293-296.

20
 Rollo, p. 22.

21
 Id. at 301-308.

22
 G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994, 236 SCRA 565.

23
 People v. Uy, G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005, citing Morales, Jr. v. Minister
Enrile, et al., 206 Phil. 466, 488 (1983).
 Republic of the Philippines III. Specific Rules:
SUPREME COURT
Manila x x xx

SECOND DIVISION 3. The step increment adjustment of an employee who is on preventive suspension shall be
withheld until such time that a decision on the case has been rendered. x x x x
G.R. No. 170463               February 2, 2011
Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee privileges under GSIS
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and Board Resolution No. 306 (Resolution No. 306) approving Christmas raffle benefits for all GSIS
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President and General Manager, Petitioners, officials and employees effective year 2002.11 Respondents’ request was again denied because
vs. of their pending administrative case.
ALBERT M. VELASCO and MARIO I. MOLINA, Respondents.
On 27 August 2003, petitioner GSIS Board issued Board Resolution No. 197 (Resolution No.
DECISION 197) approving the following policy recommendations:

CARPIO, J.: B. On the disqualification from promotion of an employee with a pending administrative case

The Case To adopt the policy that an employee with pending administrative case shall be disqualified from
the following during the pendency of the case:
This is a petition for review1 of the 24 September 2004 Decision2 and the 7 October 2005
Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19 (trial court), in Civil Case No. 03-108389. a) Promotion;
In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court granted respondents Albert M. Velasco4 and
Mario I. Molina’s5 (respondents) petition for prohibition. In its 7 October 2005 Order, the trial b) Step Increment;
court denied petitioners Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
and Winston F. Garcia’s (petitioners) motion for reconsideration.
c) Performance-Based Bonus; and
The Facts
d) Other benefits and privileges.
On 23 May 2002, petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct and
placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days.6 Respondents were charged for their On 14 November 2003, respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with
alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees denouncing the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.12 Respondents claimed that they were denied the
alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general manager, benefits which GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306. Respondents also
petitioner Winston F. Garcia.7 sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372.
Respondents claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their
pending administrative cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and that they are
In a letter dated 4 April 2003, respondent Mario I. Molina (respondent Molina) requested GSIS being punished without hearing. Respondent Molina also added that he had already earned his
Senior Vice President Concepcion L. Madarang (SVP Madarang) for the implementation of his right to the step increment before Resolution No. 372 was enacted. Respondents also argued
step increment.8 On 22 April 2003, SVP Madarang denied the request citing GSIS Board that the three resolutions were ineffective because they were not registered with the University
Resolution No. 372 (Resolution No. 372)9 issued by petitioner Board of Trustees of the GSIS of the Philippines (UP) Law Center pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.13
(petitioner GSIS Board) which approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules
and regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step increment and
promotion.10 The pertinent provision of Resolution No. 372 provides: On 24 November 2003, petitioners filed their comment with motion to dismiss and
opposition.14 On 2 December 2003, respondents filed their opposition to the motion to
dismiss.15 On 5 December 2003, petitioners filed their reply.16
A. Step Increment
On 16 January 2004, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and granted
xxxx respondents’ prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.17
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.18 In its 26 February 2004 Order, the trial court Civil Service Commission (CSC) and not with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
denied petitioners’ motion.19 Branch 19.

In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court granted respondents’ petition for prohibition. II
The dispositive portion of the 24 September 2004 Decision provides:
Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the GSIS Board or its President
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondents’ Board Resolution No. 197 of August and General Manager exercising quasi-legislative and administrative functions in Pasay
27, 2003 and No. 372 of November 21, 2000 are hereby declared null and void. The writ of City is outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC-Manila, Branch 19.
preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.
III
SO ORDERED.20
Whether internal rules and regulations need not require publication with the Office of
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 7 October 2005 Order, the trial court denied the National [Administrative] Register for their effectivity, contrary to the conclusion of
petitioners’ motion. the RTC-Manila, Branch 19.

Hence, this petition. IV

The Ruling of the Trial Court Whether a regulation, which disqualifies government employees who have pending
administrative cases from the grant of step increment and Christmas raffle benefits is
On the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court said it can take cognizance of the petition because the unconstitutional.
"territorial area" referred to in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court "does not necessarily
delimit to a particular locality but rather to the judicial region where the office or agency is V
situated so that the prohibitive writ can be enforced."
Whether the nullification of GSIS Board Resolutions is beyond an action for prohibition,
On the merits of the case, the trial court ruled that respondents were entitled to all employee and a writ of preliminary injunction cannot be made permanent without a decision
benefits as provided under the law by reason of their employment. According to the trial court, to ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition.23
deny respondents these employee benefits for the reason alone that they have pending
administrative cases is unjustified since it would deprive them of what is legally due them without The Ruling of the Court
due process of law, inflict punishment on them without hearing, and violate their right to be
presumed innocent.
The petition is partly meritorious.
The trial court also found that the assailed resolutions were not registered with the UP Law
Center, per certification of the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR).21 Since Petitioners argue that the Civil Service Commission (CSC), not the trial court, has jurisdiction
they were not registered, the trial court declared that the assailed resolutions have not become over Civil Case No. 03-108389 because it involves claims of employee benefits. Petitioners point
effective citing Sections 3 and 4, Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Revised Administrative Code of out that the trial court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
1987.22
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:
The Issues
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
Petitioners raise the following issues: officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
I ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
Whether the jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-108389 (Velasco, the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
et al. vs. The Board of Trustees of GSIS, et al., RTC-Manila, Branch 19) lies with the therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. - The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it related the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person in the at the election of the plaintiff.28 Since respondent Velasco, plaintiff before the trial court, is a
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the resident of the City of Manila,29 the petition could properly be filed in the City of Manila.30 The
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of choice of venue is sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides:
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis
supplied)
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original
jurisdiction:
Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondents prayed that the trial court declare all acts emanating from
Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 void and to prohibit petitioners from further enforcing the said (1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
resolutions.24 Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents’ petition corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; x x x
for prohibition. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners also claim that the petition for prohibition was filed in the wrong territorial jurisdiction Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
because the acts sought to be prohibited are the acts of petitioners who hold their principal office Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa,
in Pasay City, while the petition for prohibition was filed in Manila. and Valenzuela and the municipalities of Navotas, San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig, a writ of
prohibition issued by the regional trial court sitting in the City of Manila, is enforceable in Pasay
City. Clearly, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of respondents’ petition for prohibition
Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129)25 provides: because it had jurisdiction over the action and the venue was properly laid before it.

SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. - The Supreme Court shall Petitioners also argue that Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 need not be filed with the UP Law
define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its Center ONAR since they are, at most, regulations which are merely internal in nature –
authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the regulating only the personnel of the GSIS and not the public.
branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or
actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP
exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised with a view to Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the
making the courts readily accessible to the people of the different parts of the region and making UP Law Center’s guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, "interpretative
attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis supplied) regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
Administrative agency and not the public," need not be filed with the UP Law Center.
In line with this, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Order No. 326 defining the territorial
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts in the National Capital Judicial Region, as follows: Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the
authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit
selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules
a. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila – over the City of Manila only. meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of
these resolutions with the UP Law Center.
b. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats at Quezon City – over Quezon City
only. Petitioners insist that petitioner GSIS Board has the power to issue the assailed resolutions.
According to petitioners, it was within the power of petitioner GSIS Board to disqualify
c. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City – over Pasay City only. respondents for step increment and from receiving GSIS benefits from the time formal
administrative charges were filed against them until the cases are resolved.
xxxx
The Court notes that the trial court only declared Resolution Nos. 197 and 372 void. The trial
The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the court made no ruling on Resolution No. 306 and respondents did not appeal this matter.
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case Therefore, we will limit our discussion to Resolution Nos. 197 and 372, particularly to the effects
may be.27 It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real of preventive suspension on the grant of step increment because this was what respondents
raised before the trial court.
First, entitlement to step increment depends on the rules relative to the grant of such benefit. In point Suspension of one day or more shall be considered a gap in the continuity of service. During the
are Section 1(b), Rule II and Section 2, Rule III of Joint Circular No. 1, series of 1990, which provide: period of suspension, respondent shall not be entitled to all money benefits including leave credits.

Rule II. Selection Criteria If an employee is suspended as a penalty, it effectively interrupts the continuity of his government
service at the commencement of the service of the said suspension. This is because a person under
Section 1. Step increments shall be granted to all deserving officials and employees x x x penalty of suspension is not rendering actual service. The suspension will undoubtedly be considered
a gap in the continuity of the service for purposes of the computation of the three year period in the
grant of step increment.34 However, this does not mean that the employee will only be entitled to the
(b) Length of Service – For those who have rendered continuous satisfactory service in a particular step increment after completing another three years of continuous satisfactory service reckoned from
position for at least three (3) years. the time the employee has fully served the penalty of suspension. 35 The CSC has taken this to mean
that the computation of the three year period requirement will only be extended by the number of days
Rule III. Step Increments that the employee was under suspension.36 In other words, the grant of step increment will only be
delayed by the same number of days that the employee was under suspension.
xxxx
This is akin to the status of an employee who incurred vacation leave without pay for purposes of the
grant of step increment.37 Employees who were on approved vacation leave without pay enjoy the
Section 2. Length of Service – A one (1) step increment shall be granted officials and employees for liberal application of the rule on the grant of step increment under Section 60 of CSC Memorandum
every three (3) years of continuous satisfactory service in the position. Years of service in the position Circular No. 41, series of 1998, which provides:
shall include the following:
Section 60. Effect of vacation leave without pay on the grant of length of service step increment. - For
(a) Those rendered before the position was reclassified to a position title with a lower or the same purposes of computing the length of service for the grant of step increment, approved vacation leave
salary grade allocation; and without pay for an aggregate of fifteen (15) days shall not interrupt the continuity of the three-year
service requirement for the grant of step increment. However, if the total number of authorized
(b) Those rendered before the incumbent was transferred to another position within the same agency vacation leave without pay included within the three-year period exceeds fifteen (15) days, the grant of
or to another agency without a change in position title and salary grade allocation. one-step increment will only be delayed for the same number of days that an official or
employee was absent without pay. (Emphasis supplied)
In the initial implementation of step increments in 1990, an incumbent shall be granted step
increments equivalent to one (1) step for every three (3) years of continuous satisfactory service in a Third, on preventive suspension, Sections 51 and 52, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
given position occupied as of January 1, 1990. Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provide:

A grant of step increment on the basis of length of service requires that an employee must have SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
rendered at least three years of continuous and satisfactory service in the same position to which he is subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against
an incumbent.31 To determine whether service is continuous, it is necessary to define what actual such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
service is.32 "Actual service" refers to the period of continuous service since the appointment of the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which
official or employee concerned, including the period or periods covered by any previously approved would warrant his removal from the service.
leave with pay.33
SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension. Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the
Second, while there are no specific rules on the effects of preventive suspension on step increment, administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally
we can refer to the CSC rules and rulings on the effects of the penalty of suspension and approved decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of
vacation leaves without pay on the grant of step increment for guidance. suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be
automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case
is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in
Section 56(d), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides: computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 56. Duration and effect of administrative penalties. - The following rules shall govern in the Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty.38 It is a measure intended to enable the
imposition of administrative penalties: x x x disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from
intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him.39 If the investigation is not finished and a
(d) The penalty of suspension shall result in the temporary cessation of work for a period not decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will
exceeding one (1) year. automatically be reinstated.
Therefore, on the matter of step increment, if an employee who was suspended as a penalty will be JOSE C. MENDOZA
treated like an employee on approved vacation leave without pay,40 then it is only fair and reasonable Associate Justice
to apply the same rules to an employee who was preventively suspended, more so considering that
preventive suspension is not a penalty. If an employee is preventively suspended, the employee is not ATTESTATION
rendering actual service and this will also effectively interrupt the continuity of his government service.
Consequently, an employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment
after serving the time of his preventive suspension even if the pending administrative case against him I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
has not yet been resolved or dismissed. The grant of step increment will only be delayed for the same was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
number of days, which must not exceed 90 days, that an official or employee was serving the
preventive suspension. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Fourth, the trial court was correct in declaring that respondents had the right to be presumed innocent Chairperson
until proven guilty. This means that an employee who has a pending administrative case filed against
him is given the benefit of the doubt and is considered innocent until the contrary is proven. 41 CERTIFICATION

In this case, respondents were placed under preventive suspension for 90 days beginning on 23 May Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
2002.1avvphi1 Their preventive suspension ended on 21 August 2002. Therefore, after serving the certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
period of their preventive suspension and without the administrative case being finally resolved, was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
respondents should have been reinstated and, after serving the same number of days of their
suspension, entitled to the grant of step increment.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
On a final note, social legislation like the circular on the grant of step increment, being remedial in
character, should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons to be benefited. The
liberal approach aims to achieve humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security Footnotes
and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. 42
1
 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 24 September 2004
Decision and the 7 October 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19 in Civil Case 2
 Rollo, pp. 34-37. Penned by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna.
No. 03-108389. We DECLARE the assailed provisions on step increment in GSIS Board Resolution
Nos. 197 and 372 VOID. We MODIFY the 24 September 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of 3
 Id. at 38.
Manila, Branch 19 and rule that GSIS Board Resolution Nos. 197, 306 and 372 need not be filed with
the University of the Philippines Law Center. 4
 Respondent Albert M. Velasco holds the position of Attorney V in the Department of
Investigation.
SO ORDERED.
5
 Respondent Mario I. Molina holds the position of Attorney V in the Legal Department. Sometimes
ANTONIO T. CARPIO appears in the records as "Mario T. Molina."
Associate Justice
6
 Records, pp. 24-28.
WE CONCUR:
7
 Respondent Albert M. Velasco was also charged with violation of rules on office decorum and
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA gross insubordination.
Associate Justice
8
 Records, pp. 35-36.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice 9
 Id. at 19-23. Issued on 21 November 2000.

10
 Id. at 37.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
11
 Id. at 33-34. Issued on 23 October 2002.
12 28
 Id. at 5-18.  Rules of Court, Sec. 2, Rule 4.

13 29
 Id. at 38.  Records, p. 7. In the petition for prohibition, respondent Velasco stated that his residence is "at
639-A Cristobal Street, Sampaloc, Manila."
14
 Id. at 42-46.
30
 See Notre Dame de Lourdes Hospital v. Mallare-Phillips, 274 Phil. 467 (1991).
15
 Id. at 49-52.
31
 CSC Resolution No. 02-1479, Sison, Maricon – Re: Query; Step Increment, 8 November 2002.
16
 Id. at 53-58.
32
 Id.
17
 Id. at 68-70.
33
 Section 28, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1988. Also known as the Revised
18 Omnibus Rules on Leave.
 Id. at 83-88.
34
19  CSC Resolution No. 021564, Traspadillo, John Marlon M. - Re: Step Increment; Suspension as
 Id. at 140.
a Gap in the Service, 17 December 2002.
20
 Rollo, p. 37. 35
 Id.
21
 Records, p. 38. 36
 Id.
22
 SEC. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center 37
 Id.
three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of
38
any sanction against any party of persons.  Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. Section 24 provides:
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. SEC. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office
but is considered to be a preventive measure.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be
39
open to the public inspection.  Juan v. People of the Philippines, 379 Phil. 125 (2000); Gloria v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 744
(1999).
SEC. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
40
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the  CSC Resolution No. 021564, Traspadillo, John Marlon M. - Re: Step Increment; Suspension as
date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the a Gap in the Service, 17 December 2002.
rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of
which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take 41
 CSC Resolution No. 992456, Asperilla, Dominador O. - Re: Special Leave Benefits; Query, 5
appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected
November 1999.
by them.
42
23  Tria v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 96787, 8 May 1992, 208 SCRA
 Rollo, p. 157.
834; Ortiz v. COMELEC, 245 Phil. 780 (1988).
24
 Records, p. 16.

25
 The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

26
 Dated 19 January 1983.

27
 Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 65.
 Republic of the Philippines During the investigation, the FFIB found that Steel Asia fraudulently obtained TCCs worth Two
SUPREME COURT Hundred Forty-Two Million, Four Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand, Five Hundred Thirty-Four
Manila Pesos (₱242,433,534.00).9 The FFIB concluded that Belicena, Malonzo and Andutan – in their
respective capacities – irregularly approved the "issuance of the TCCs to several garment/textile
SECOND DIVISION companies and allowing their subsequent illegal transfer" to Steel Asia.10

G.R. No. 164679               July 27, 2011 On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to
submit their counter-affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the
Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., Respondent. Upon the respondents’ failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman
deemed the case submitted for resolution.
DECISION
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of
Duty.11 Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture
BRION, J.: of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from
reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
Through a petition for review on certiorari,1 the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.12
(Ombudsman) seeks the reversal of the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 28,
2004, in "Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman and Fact Finding and Intelligence After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision,13 Andutan filed a petition for review on
Bureau (FFIB), etc.," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68893. The assailed decision annulled and certiorari before the CA.
set aside the decision of the Ombudsman dated July 30, 2001,3 finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr.
guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
On July 28, 2004,14 the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that
the latter "should not have considered the administrative complaints" because: first, Section 20
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman "may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of";15 and second, the
Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary administrative case was filed after Andutan’s forced resignation.16
Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying
political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998.4 On July 1, 1998, pursuant to THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.5
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Ombudsman asks the Court to overturn the decision
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, of the CA. It submits, first, that contrary to the CA’s findings, administrative offenses do not
DOF; Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao, Chairman and Executive prescribe after one year from their commission,17 and second, that in cases of "capital"
Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (Steel Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President, administrative offenses, resignation or optional retirement cannot render administrative
Steel Asia; Antonio M. Lorenzana, President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and proceedings moot and academic, since accessory penalties such as perpetual disqualification
Eulogio L. Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the and the forfeiture of retirement benefits may still be imposed.18
Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification
of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.6 As government employees, The Ombudsman argues that Section 20 of R.A. 6770 is not mandatory. Consistent with existing
Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, jurisprudence, the use of the word "may" indicates that Section 20 is merely directory or
Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of permissive.19 Thus, it is not ministerial upon it to dismiss the administrative complaint, as long as
the Service.7 any of the circumstances under Section 20 is present.20 In any case, the Ombudsman urges the
Court to examine its mandate under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and hold that
an imposition of a one (1) year prescriptive period on the filing of cases unconstitutionally
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax restricts its mandate.21
Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.8
Further, the Ombudsman submits that Andutan’s resignation from office does not render moot
the administrative proceedings lodged against him, even after his resignation. Relying on
Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 38,22 the Based on the submissions made, we see the following as the issues for our resolution:
Ombudsman argues that "[a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while the public
official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servant’s resignation is not a bar to his I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication."23 It is irrelevant that Andutan had administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?
already resigned from office when the administrative case was filed since he was charged for
"acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of
litigants and the general public."24 Furthermore, even if Andutan had already resigned, there is a II. Does Andutan’s resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
need to "determine whether or not there remains penalties capable of imposition, like bar from
reentering the (sic) public service and forfeiture of benefits."25 Finally, the Ombudsman reiterates III. Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsman’s findings
that its findings against Andutan are supported by substantial evidence. supported by substantial evidence?

THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS THE COURT’S RULING

Andutan raises three (3) counterarguments to the Ombudsman’s petition. We rule to deny the petition.

First, Andutan submits that the CA did not consider Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 as a prescriptive The provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not prohibited from
period; rather, the CA merely held that the Ombudsman should not have considered the conducting an investigation a year after the supposed act was committed.
administrative complaint. According to Andutan, Section 20(5) "does not purport to impose a
prescriptive period x x x but simply prohibits the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been settled
investigation where the complaint [was] filed more than one (1) year from the occurrence of the by jurisprudence.34 In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun,35 the Court, speaking through
act or omission complained of."26 Andutan believes that the Ombudsman should have referred Justice Austria-Martinez, held:
the complaint to another government agency.27 Further, Andutan disagrees with the
Ombudsman’s interpretation of Section 20(5). Andutan suggests that the phrase "may not
conduct the necessary investigation" means that the Ombudsman is prohibited to act on cases [W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe [Concerned Taxpayer
that fall under those enumerated in Section 20(5).28 v. Doblada, Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1342, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 218; Melchor v.
Gironella,  G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476; Heck v. Judge Santos, 467
Phil. 798, 824 (2004); Floria v. Sunga, 420 Phil. 637, 648-649 (2001)]. Administrative offenses
Second, Andutan reiterates that the administrative case against him was moot because he was by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining
no longer in the public service at the time the case was commenced.29 According to Andutan, public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee
Atty. Perez v. Judge Abiera30 and similar cases cited by the Ombudsman do not apply since the but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and
administrative investigations against the respondents in those cases were commenced prior to confidence in our government [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451
their resignation. Here, Andutan urges the Court to rule otherwise since unlike the cases cited, SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].
he had already resigned before the administrative case was initiated. He further notes that his
resignation from office cannot be characterized as "preemptive, i.e. made under an atmosphere
of fear for the imminence of formal charges"31 because it was done pursuant to the Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:
Memorandum issued by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora.
SEC. 20. Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary
Having established the propriety of his resignation, Andutan asks the Court to uphold the investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
mootness of the administrative case against him since the cardinal issue in administrative cases
is the "officer’s fitness to remain in office, the principal penalty imposable being either xxxx
suspension or removal."32 The Ombudsman’s opinion - that accessory penalties may still be
imposed - is untenable since it is a fundamental legal principle that "accessory follows the
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission
principal, and the former cannot exist independently of the latter."33
complained of. (Emphasis supplied)

Third, the Ombudsman’s findings were void because procedural and substantive due process
proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed after
were not observed. Likewise, Andutan submits that the Ombudsman’s findings lacked legal and
one year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.
factual bases.

In Melchor v. Gironella  [G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476], the Court held
ISSUES
that the period stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the
offense but to the discretion given to the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a The Ombudsman argued – in both the present petition and in the petition it filed with the CA –
particular administrative offense. The use of the word "may" in the provision is construed as that Andutan’s retirement from office does not render moot any administrative case, as long as
permissive and operating to confer discretion [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February he is charged with an offense he committed while in office. It is irrelevant, according to the
16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Jaramilla v. Comelec, 460 Phil. 507, 514 (2003)]. Where the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case
words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal since the operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, the public service.
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; National Federation of Labor v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 383 Phil. 910, 918 (2000)]. The Ombudsman relies on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No.
38 for this proposition, viz.:
In Filipino v. Macabuhay [G.R. No. 158960, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 50], the Court
interpreted Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 in this manner: Section VI.

Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision [Section 20(5) of RA 6770)], 1. x x x
respondent's complaint is barred by prescription considering that it was filed more than one year
after the alleged commission of the acts complained of.
An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign pending
decision of his case but it shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the proceeding against
Petitioner's argument is without merit. him. It shall also be without prejudice to the filing of any administrative, criminal case against him
for any act committed while still in the service. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as
petitioner contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer The CA refused to give credence to this argument, holding that the provision "refers to cases
discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be where the officers or employees were already charged before they were allowed to resign or
enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman were separated from service."36 In this case, the CA noted that "the administrative cases were
whether or not to conduct an investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one filed only after Andutan was retired, hence the Ombudsman was already divested of jurisdiction
year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In fine, the complaint is and could no longer prosecute the cases."37
not barred by prescription. (Emphasis supplied)
Challenging the CA’s interpretation, the Ombudsman argues that the CA "limited the scope of
The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the word "may" is the cited Civil Service Memorandum Circular to the first sentence."38 Further, according to the
directory, the negative phrase "may not" is mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when Ombudsman, "the court a quo ignored the second statement in the said circular that
qualified by the word "not," becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in character, contemplates a situation where previous to the institution of the administrative investigation or
is not plausible. It is not supported by jurisprudence on statutory construction. [emphases and charge, the public official or employee subject of the investigation has resigned."39
underscoring supplied]
To recall, we have held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro,
administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act Jr.,40 we held that:
was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year
period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the
administrative investigation. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan  [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654,
658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee
charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the issue administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability
of the Ombudsman’s authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the
employee who had already resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutan’s favor. finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v.
Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis and underscoring
Andutan’s resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an administrative complaint supplied]
against him.
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez,41 we held:
Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the
investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan
because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation [Reyes v. Cristi, A.M. No. P-04-1801, 2 April negate the Ombudsman’s lack
2004, 427 SCRA 8] or retirement [Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the of jurisdiction.
Alleged Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, A.M. No. 2004-17-
SC, 27 September 2004; Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, 13 September 2004] neither The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutan’s removal from the service is
warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the moot, there is an "irresistible justification" to "determine whether or not there remains penalties
service [Tuliao v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1065, 348 Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v. capable of imposition, like bar from re-entering the public service and forfeiture of
Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11 June 1975, 64 SCRA 302; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. benefits."47 Otherwise stated, since accessory penalties may still be imposed against Andutan,
207-J, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 301] nor does it render said administrative case moot and the administrative case itself is not moot and may proceed despite the inapplicability of the
academic [Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533 (1998)]. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s principal penalty of removal from office.
at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case [Flores v.
Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondent’s resignation does not preclude the finding of We find several reasons that militate against this position.
any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable [OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No.
MTJ-03-1511, 20 August 2004]. [emphases and underscoring supplied) First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an administrative
case moot and academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed, this holding must
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the above- be read in its proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,48 indeed, we held:
cited cases, the Court found that the public officials – subject of the administrative cases –
resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed42 or to pre-empt the imminent A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between
filing of one.43 Here, neither situation obtains. the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy,
Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9 May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not
The Ombudsman’s general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him moot and academic, despite the petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if the
by resigning, since he "knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be
would eventually reach him"44 is unfounded. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later
nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold
July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one (1) year any government office and the forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the Ombudsman’s
sweeping assertions in light of these facts. Reading the quoted passage in a vacuum, one could be led to the conclusion that the mere
availability of accessory penalties justifies the continuation of an administrative case. This is a
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the misplaced reading of the case and its ruling.
Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept
the Ombudsman’s position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced Esther S. Pagano – who was serving as Cashier IV at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case. Benguet – filed her certificate of candidacy for councilor four days after the Provincial Treasurer
directed her to explain why no administrative case should be filed against her. The directive
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the arose from allegations that her accountabilities included a cash shortage of ₱1,424,289.99. She
provisions of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the filed her certificate of candidacy under the pretext that since she was deemed ipso facto
Ombudsman’s interpretation that "[a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while the resigned from office, she was no longer under the administrative jurisdiction of her superiors.
public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servant’s resignation is not a bar Thus, according to Pagano, the administrative complaint had become moot.
to his administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication."45 If we agree with this
interpretation, any official – even if he has been separated from the service for a long time – may We rejected Pagano’s position on the principal ground "that the precipitate resignation of a
still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. We believe that this government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does
interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law – which is to improve public not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade
service and to preserve the public’s faith and confidence in the government, and not the administrative liability when facing administrative sanction."49 Our position that accessory
punishment of the public official concerned.46 Likewise, if the act committed by the public official penalties are still imposable – thereby negating the mootness of the administrative complaint –
is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress merely flows from the fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the administrative case against
the same. her. It was neither intended to be a stand-alone argument nor would it have justified the
continuation of the administrative complaint if Pagano’s filing of candidacy/resignation did not
The possibility of imposing reek of irregularities. Our factual findings in Pagano confirm this, viz.:
accessory penalties does not
At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was already notified by the 2004, which annulled and set aside the July 30, 2001 decision of the Office of the Ombudsman,
Provincial Treasurer that she needed to explain why no administrative charge should be filed finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
against her, after it discovered the cash shortage of ₱1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities.
Moreover, she had already filed her answer. To all intents and purposes, the administrative No pronouncement as to costs.
proceedings had already been commenced at the time she was considered separated from
service through her precipitate filing of her certificate of candidacy. Petitioner’s bad faith was
manifest when she filed it, fully knowing that administrative proceedings were being instituted SO ORDERED.
against her as part of the procedural due process in laying the foundation for an administrative
case.50 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphil ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case – notwithstanding
Pagano’s resignation – was her "bad faith" in filing the certificate of candidacy, and not the WE CONCUR:
availability of accessory penalties.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that "fitness to serve in public office x x x is a question Associate Justice
of transcendental [importance]51" and that "preserving the inviolability of public office" compels Chairperson
the state to prevent the "re-entry [to] public service of persons who have x x x demonstrated
their absolute lack of fitness to hold public office."52 However, the State must perform this task
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
within the limits set by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier stated, under the
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Ombudsman’s theory, the administrative authorities may exercise administrative jurisdiction over
subordinates ad infinitum; thus, a public official who has validly severed his ties with the civil
service may still be the subject of an administrative complaint up to his deathbed. This is JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
contrary to the law and the public policy behind it. Associate Justice

Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who committed ATTESTATION
violations while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the "threefold
liability rule," the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
administrative liability.53 Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file
criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutan’s alleged transgressions. In fact, here, the
Ombudsman – through the FFIB – filed a criminal case for Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), ANTONIO T. CARPIO
(e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan Associate Justice
will not only be meted out the penalty of imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual Chairperson, Second Division
disqualification from office, and confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest.54
CERTIFICATION
Conclusion
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
of what assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ability of our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.
RENATO C. CORONA
While we commend the Ombudsman’s resolve in pursuing the present case for violations Chief Justice
allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the
petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an
administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsman’s factual findings.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsman’s petition for review on certiorari, and
AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28,
 19
Footnotes  Id. at 29.

20
* Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 1006  Id. at 29–30.
dated June 10, 2011.
21
 Id. at 33–34.
** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno per
Special Order No. 1040 dated July 6, 2011. 22
 Section VI.
1
 Rollo, pp. 12-74; filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 1. x x x
2
 Id. at 76-83; penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios, and concurred in by 23
An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign
Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Vicente S.E. Veloso. pending decision of his case but it shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceeding against him. It shall also be without prejudice to the filing of any
3
 Id. at 173-188. administrative, criminal case against him for any act committed while still in the service.

4
 Id. at 163. Rollo, p. 57.

5 24
 Id. at 164.  Id. at 59, citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, June 11, 1975.

6 25
 Id. at 22.  Id. at 62-63.

7 26
 Ibid.  Id. at 255.

8 27
 Id. at 77.  Ibid.

9 28
 Id. at 78.  Id. at 256; relying on Ruben Agpalo, Statutory Construction 338 (4th ed., 1998):

10
 Id. at 77-78. The use by the legislature of negative, prohibitory or exclusive terms or words
in a statute is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory.
11
 Supra note 3. A statute or provision which contains words of positive prohibition, such as
"shall not," "cannot," or "ought not," or which is couched in negative terms
12
importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated is
 Id. at 186. mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for
there is but one way to obey the command, "thou shall not," and that is to
13
 Rollo, pp. 189–202. completely refrain from doing the forbidden act.

29
14
 Supra note 2.  Id. at 257.

30
15
 Id. at 81–82.  159-A Phil. 575 (1975).

31
16
 Id. at 82.  Rollo, p. 262.

32
17
 Rollo, p. 26.  Ibid.

33
18
 Id. at 63–65.  Id. at 263.
34 50
 Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, G.R. No. 167982, August 13, 2008, 562  Id. at 631.
SCRA 122, 128.
51
 Rollo, p. 63.
35
 Id. at 128–130.
52
 Id. at 65.
36
 Rollo, p. 82.
53
 Antonio E.B. Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law 478 (2009 ed.). See also
37
 Ibid. Hector S. De Leon and Hector M. De Leon, Jr., The Law on Public Officers and
Election Law 262 (6th ed., 2008).
38
 Rollo, p. 56.
54
 R.A. 3019. Sec. 9. Penalties for violations.  - (a) Any public officer or private person
39
 Ibid. committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6
of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more
40
than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or
 G.R. No. 149072, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 622, 628. forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth
manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.
41
 495 Phil. 10, 16-17 (2005).

42
 See Baquerfo v. Sanchez, supra note 41; and Tuliao v. Judge Ramos, 348 Phil. 404,
416 (1998), citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11 June 1975, 64 SCRA 302,
Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, 22 April 1997, 76 SCRA 301.

43
 See Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., supra note 40; and OCA v. Juan, 478 Phil. 823 (2004).

44
 Rollo, pp. 61–62.

45
An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign
pending decision of his case but it shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceeding against him. It shall also be without prejudice to the filing of other
administrative or criminal case against him for any act committed while still in the
service.

Id. at 57.

46
 Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, supra note 34, at 128, citing Melchor v.
Gironella,  G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; and Remolona v.
Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001). See also Bautista v. Negado, 108
Phil. 283 (1960).

47
 Rollo, pp. 62–63.

48
 Supra note 40, at 628.

49
 Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., supra note 40, at 628, citing Office of the Court Administrator
v. Juan, A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658.
 Republic of the Philippines On June 6, 2003, in a letter8 to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo), the
SUPREME COURT Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), a duly organized
Manila employees union of the LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust Cataquiz and
likewise called for his immediate replacement.
THIRD DIVISION
Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit Complaint9 dated September 5, 2003 before
G.R. No. 183445               September 14, 2011 PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code) and R.A. No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), to wit:
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, Petitioners,
vs.
CALIXTO R. CATAQUIZ, Respondent. Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 in relation to Section 46 b(8) and (27), Chapter VI,
Book V of EO 292.
DECISION
a. That respondent directly transacted with 35 fishpen operators and authorized [the]
payment of fishpen fees based on negotiated prices in violation of LLDA Board
MENDOZA, J.: Resolution No. 28, Series of 1996 as alleged.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court b. That respondent allegedly approved additional fishpen areas in the Lake without the
assailing the January 31, 2008 Decision1 and the June 23, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of approval of the Board and in violation of the existing Zoning and Management Plan
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88736 entitled "Calixto R. Cataquiz v. Office of the President (ZOMAP) of the Laguna de Bay that allows a carrying capacity of 10,000 hectares [of]
and Concerned Employees of the LLDA (CELLDA)," which reversed and set aside the Amended fishpen structures in the lake based on scientific and technical studies.
Resolution3 dated February 10, 2005 of the Office of the President (OP).
c. That respondent allegedly condoned or granted reductions of fines and penalties
The Facts imposed by the Public Hearing Committee, the duly authorized adjudicatory body of the
LLDA. The condonation was allegedly without the concurrence of LLDA Board of
Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was appointed as General Manager of the Laguna Directors.
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) on April 16, 2001.4
d. That respondent allegedly caused the dismissal of some cases pending with the
On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the Management Committee and the rank-and- LLDA without the concurrence of the Public Hearing Committee.
file employees of the LLDA submitted to then Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary Elisea G. Gozun (Secretary Gozun)  their Petition for the Ouster of e. That on June 4, 2002, respondent allegedly appropriated and disbursed the amount
Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager5 on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior and of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) from LLDA funds and confidential
management incompetence. funds without any authority from the Department of Budget and Management.

In response, Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an f. That respondent allegedly contracted the services of several consultants without prior
inquiry into the allegations against Cataquiz. The results of the fact-finding activity were written concurrence from the Commission on Audit.
submitted in a Report6 dated May 21, 2003 in which it was determined that respondent may be
found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations of
several pertinent laws and regulations. Consequently, the investigating team recommended that g. That on December 19, 2001, respondent allegedly appropriated and disbursed LLDA
the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) for proper funds for the grant of gifts to indigent residents of San Pedro, Laguna. Said
investigation. appropriation is not within the approved budget neither was it sanctioned by the Board
of Directors, as alleged.
In her Memorandum7 for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported that there
is prima facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz which may be used to h. That respondent allegedly allowed a Taiwanese company identified as Phil-Tai
pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted that respondent lost Fishing and Trade Company to occupy and utilize certain portions of LLDA facilities
his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz be relieved from his located at Km. 70, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna without any contract nor
position and that he be investigated by PAGC. authority from the LLDA Board.
 i. That respondent allegedly authorized the direct procurement of fish breeders from Cataquiz elevated his case to the CA via a petition for review16 dated March 2, 2005, raising the
Delacon Realty and Development Corporation without the required bidding in same issues presented in his Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial before the OP.
accordance with COA rules and regulations.
The CA promulgated its Decision on January 31, 2008, which reversed and set aside the
Violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713: Amended Resolution of the OP. In so resolving, the CA reasoned that the accessory penalties of
disqualification from employment in the government service and forfeiture of retirement benefits
a. That respondent allegedly solicited patronage from regulated industries in behalf of RVQ could no longer be imposed because the principal penalty of dismissal was not enforced,
Productions, Inc. for the promotion of its film entry to the 2002 Metro Manila Film Festival entitled following the rule that the accessory penalty follows the principal penalty. The CA also agreed
"Home Alone the Riber." with Cataquiz that he could not be held liable for a violation of Board Resolution No. 68 of the
LLDA, which when examined, was found not to be related to fishpen awards. If at all, the
applicable rule would be Board Resolution No. 28, as suggested by Cataquiz himself. Said
Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act 6713: resolution though would be an invalid basis because it was not approved by the President
pursuant to Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 4850 (An Act Creating the Laguna Lake Development
a. That respondent allegedly failed to act promptly and expeditiously on official documents, Authority). Finally, the CA found that the offenses charged against Cataquiz under R.A. No.
requests, papers or letters sent by the public or those which have been processed and 4850 constituted acts that were within his authority as general manager of the LLDA to perform.
completed staff work for his appropriate action.10
Not in conformity, the OP and the PAGC (petitioners) filed this petition for review.
On December 5, 2003, PAGC issued a Resolution11 recommending to the President that the
penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification for re- After the submission of respondent’s comment17 and the petitioners’ reply,18 Cataquiz filed an
employment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be imposed Urgent Motion for Judicial Notice19 dated August 13, 2009 urging the Court to take judicial notice
upon Cataquiz. of the Resolution20 rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)  on November 30,
2004 which recommended the dismissal of the charges against him for violation of R.A. No.
Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then 3019.
assumed the position of Officer-in-Charge/General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of the
LLDA by virtue of a letter of appointment dated December 3, 2003 issued by President Arroyo.12 The Issues

In its Decision13 dated June 29, 2004, the OP adopted by reference the findings and Petitioners cite the following errors as grounds for the allowance of the petition:
recommendations of PAGC. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
I.
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the PAGC, respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz, is
hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, with the accessory penalties of disqualification from
re-employment to government service and forfeiture of retirement benefits, effective immediately The Court of Appeals gravely erred when it reversed in toto the findings of the OP and
upon receipt of this order. PAGC without stating clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor, which is contrary to the
Constitution and the Rules of Court; the findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.
SO ORDERED.
II.
Aggrieved, Cataquiz filed his Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial14 dated August 4,
2004, arguing that: (1) prior to the issuance by the PAGC of its Resolution and by the OP of its
Decision, he was already removed from office, thereby making the issue moot and academic; The Court of Appeals erred because its judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
and (2) he cannot be found guilty for violating a resolution which was foreign to the charges
against him or for acts which did not constitute sufficient cause for his removal in office, as III.
shown by acts and documents which subsequently became available to him, entitling him to a
new trial. The Court of Appeals erred when it went beyond the issues of the case;

On February 10, 2005, the OP issued an Amended Resolution,15 imposing on Cataquiz the

penalties of disqualification from re-employment in the government service and forfeiture of
retirement benefits, in view of the fact that the penalty of dismissal was no longer applicable to
him because of his replacement as General Manager of the LLDA.
 IV. The Court’s Ruling

The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the OP, PAGC and The Court finds merit in the petition.
DENR Fact Finding Committee, [and]
Findings of fact of the appellate court can be reviewed
V.
As a general rule, only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
The OP and PAGC correctly found respondent to be unfit in public service, thus it did not Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.24 Since this Court is not a trier of facts, findings of fact of the
err in imposing the accessory penalties of disqualification from employment in the appellate court are binding and conclusive upon this Court.25 There are, however, several
government service and forfeiture of retirement benefits.21 recognized exceptions to this rule, namely:

Cataquiz, on the other hand, submits the following arguments in his Memorandum:22 (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
I.
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
The dismissal by the Ombudsman of the cases against the respondent under the same
set of facts further constitute the law of the case between the parties which necessitates (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
the dismissal of this appeal and further supports the correctness of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

II. (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

The Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it reversed the amended resolution (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
of the petitioner Office of the President.23 case, and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

The issues can be condensed into four essential questions: (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(1) Whether the CA made an incorrect determination of the facts of the case warranting (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
review of its factual findings by the Court; evidence on which they are based;

(2) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz serves (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
as a bar to the decision of the OP; briefs, are not disputed by the respondents; and

(3) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of disqualification (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
from re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.26 [Emphases
benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC and supplied]
the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively; and
In this case, the findings of the CA are contrary to those of PAGC which recommended
(4) Whether Cataquiz can be charged with a violation of Board Resolution No. 28, Cataquiz’ dismissal for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, in relation to Section 46(b)(27),
despite the clerical error made by the PAGC in indicating the Board Resolution number Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. 292. Likewise, the Investigating Team of the DENR
to be No. 68. also agreed that there exists evidence that could sustain a finding of respondent’s violation of
several laws and regulations.

The result of PAGC’s investigation, however, was simply brushed aside by the CA, without citing
any evidence on which its findings were based. In ignoring the meticulous discussion of PAGC’s
conclusions and in absolving Cataquiz from any wrongdoing, the CA cavalierly declared as (b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
follows:
xxx
The petitioner likewise presented to us in support of his petition the argument that he had
sufficient authority to do what had been complained against him. We have examined the (27) Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
charges against the provisions of R.A. No. 4850 and we found that the said acts could be
sustained because they were within his powers as general manager of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority as implied from express powers granted to him by the law. Moreover, the The one-paragraph pronouncement of the CA that Cataquiz had authority to perform the acts
records of the Authority show that transactions resulting into contracts in the Authority’s trading complained of is grossly insufficient to overturn the determination by PAGC that he should be
activities have been done by previous general managers of the Authority even without prior punished for acts prejudicial to the LLDA committed during his service as General Manager of
approval by the board. Ordinary corporate practices likewise point out to the fact that a general the said agency. It should be emphasized that findings of fact of administrative agencies will not
manager, having the general management and control of its business and affairs, has implied be interfered with and shall be considered binding and conclusive upon this Court provided that
and apparent authority to do acts or make any contracts in its behalf falling within the scope of there is substantial evidence to support such findings.29 Substantial evidence has been defined
the ordinary and usual business of the company, especially so when, relative to a contract that as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
the petitioner had entered into with Phil-Tai Fishing and Trade Company, the Office of the justify a conclusion"30 or "evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the
Government Corporate Counsel had formally acceded thereto.27 conduct of their affairs."31

As plain as that, without any analysis of the evidence on record or a comprehensive discussion After a diligent review of the evidence presented and the pleadings filed, this Court finds that
on how the decision was arrived at, the CA absolved Cataquiz of the acts he was accused of there is substantial evidence to justify the conclusion of PAGC that Cataquiz should be punished
committing during his service as General Manager of the LLDA. with the penalty of dismissal, along with its accessory penalties, for committing acts prejudicial to
the best interest of the government and for giving undue advantage to a private company in the
award of fishpens. Thus, the PAGC was correct when it wrote:
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that decisions must clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Decisions of courts must be able to
address the issues raised by the parties through the presentation of a comprehensive analysis I.
or account of factual and legal findings of the court.28 It is evident that the CA failed to comply
with these requirements. PAGC, in its Resolution dated December 5, 2003, discussing each of [I]n the first allegation, respondent Cataquiz impliedly admitted his direct transaction with 35
the twelve allegations against Cataquiz, determined that he should be dismissed from the fishpen operators and the payment of fishpen fees without conducting a public bidding. In
government service and that he could be held liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, in respondent’s defense, he raised the invalidity of Board Resolution No. 68 [sic] which provides for
relation to Section 46(b)(27), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292, to wit: guidelines in public bidding for fishpen areas. Respondent argued that Board Resolution No. 68
[sic] is an unreasonable exercise of the Board’s legislative power since public bidding has never
R.A. No. 3019 been intended by RA 4850, the enabling law of LLDA.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers The Commission finds the contention of the respondent bereft of merit. Section 25-A of RA 4850
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public authorizes the Board to "formulate, prescribe, amend and repeal rules and regulations to govern
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: the conduct of business of the Authority" and it is the function of the respondent in his capacity
as General Manager "to implement and administer the policies, programs and projects approved
by the Board" pursuant to Section 26 (b) of RA 4850. While it is true that a Board Resolution
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party draws life from the enabling statute, the Commission cannot find any inconsistency between the
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative former and the latter. The Board Resolution No. 68 [sic] is still within the bounds of RA 4850 and
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable is germane to its purpose in promoting a balanced growth of the Laguna Lake. Thus, the validity
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government of the questioned Resolution stands. It becomes now the duty of the respondent to implement
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. the Resolution and not to question its legality nor disregard it.

E.O. No. 292 In the case at hand, respondent’s act of not giving credence to the Board Resolution resulted to
undue prejudice to the best interest of the public service considering that the Authority incurred
Section 46. Discipline: General Provisions. Revenue loss from the direct transaction of respondent Cataquiz amounting to Seven Hundred
Fifty Five Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos ₱755,700.00.
xxx
The presumption that the official duty has been regularly performed was overcome by the fact IV.
that the government was deprived of much needed revenue as a result of the act committed by
respondent Cataquiz. In the same vein, the dismissal of the pending case against Twenty First Century Resources Inc.
by the respondent has no basis in law. Section 26 of RA 4850 clearly enumerates the powers
xxxx and functions of respondent, to wit:

III. "xxx.

The Commission finds that the act of respondent Cataquiz in condoning penalties and reducing a. Submit for consideration of the Board the policies and measures which he believes
the fines imposed by the Public Hearing Committee (PHC) of the LLDA has no basis in law. The to be necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions of this Act;
premise of the respondent citing Section 26 (b) giving him the executive prerogative and Section
4 (a) justifying the condonation and reduction is misplaced. A careful examination of the b. Execute and administer the policies, plan, programs and projects approved by the
aforementioned provisions would reveal that Section 26 (b) does not vest the respondent the Board;
executive prerogative. Said provision gives him the authority to execute and administer the
policies, plans, programs and projects approved by the Board. There is no showing that the
condonation of penalties and reduction of fines has been approved by the Board. Section 26 (b) c. Direct and supervise the operation and internal administration of the Authority. The
is clear in its terms that before respondent executes any policy, program or project, the same General Manager may delegate certain administrative responsibilities to other officers
has to be approved by the Board. Thus, there is no executive prerogative to speak of. of the Authority subject to the rules and regulations of the Board;

The Commission agrees with the contention of the complainant that Section 4 (d) refers to d. Appoint officials and employees below the rank of division heads to positions in the
additional power and function of the Authority and not to the respondent. Of equal importance is approved budget upon written recommendation of the division head concerned using
that Section 4 (d) does not confer him the authority to condone penalties nor reduce fines. Said as guide the standard set forth in the Authority’s merit system;
provision is referring to Orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution. When the law is clear it
needs no further interpretation. e. Submit quarterly reports to the Board on personnel selection, placement and
training;
The contention of respondent Cataquiz that there is nothing in Section 25-A that states that the
approval of the Board is necessary has no leg to stand on. Same provision gives the Board the f. Submit to the NEDA an annual report and such other reports as may be required,
implied power "to do such other acts and perform such other functions as may be necessary to including the details of the annual and supplemental budgets of the Authority;
carry out the provisions of this Charter."
g. Perform such other functions as may be provided by law."
In relation to this is Section 31 of RA 4850 that gives the Board the authority to create such other
divisions and positions as may be deemed necessary for the efficient, economic and effective From the aforementioned section, nowhere can the Commission find any grant of power to
conduct of the activity of the Authority. adjudicate in favor of respondent Cataquiz and the latter cannot hide under the cloak of
‘managerial prerogative’ absent any law that justifies his act of dismissing the case. To reiterate,
The findings of the PHC, although a recommendatory body, must be accorded great respect. the dismissal of the case against Twenty First Century is an act clearly prejudicial to the best
The penalties imposed by the PHC cannot be substituted by the respondent without any basis interest of the service. Consequently, the Authority was deprived of a committed service to the
and the latter cannot simply claim that he has the sole authority to condone penalties and government and this fact cannot be overlooked upon by the Commission.
reduce fines.
xxxx
Evidently respondent’s act of condonation of penalties and reduction of fines was uncalled for.
Thus, his act resulted to undue prejudice to the best interest of the service and will set a VI.
dangerous precedent to the justice system of the government.

The contract of service for consultancy duly signed by the respondent and the legal consultants
of LLDA is not in accordance with Section 212 of the Government Accounting and Auditing
Manual (GAAM) 86 which provides that:
"Payment of public funds of retainer fees of private law practitioners who are so hired and a public officer discharging official functions in transacting with Phil-Tai to occupy and utilize
employed without the prior written concurrence and acquiescence by the Solicitor General of the portions of LLDA facilities locate (sic) at Km. 70 Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna.
Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, as well as the written concurrence of the
Commission on Audit, shall be disallowed in audit and the same shall be a personal liability of Relating to the second element in the instant case, respondent in the exercise of his official
the official concerned." duties allowed Phil-Tai to use the LLDA facility without the concurrence of the Board of Directors
of LLDA where the corporate powers of the Authority lies as explicitly provided in Section 16 of
The contention of the respondent that the LLDA Administrative Section failed to advise him RA 4850.
regarding the requisites laid down by law cannot stand. Occupying an executive position,
respondent is required to exercise diligence in the highest degree in the performance of his Applying the third element, respondent Cataquiz acted with manifest partiality when by reason of
duties. Respondent cannot pass responsibility to other Division which in the first place, he has his office he allowed Phil-Tai to occupy the LLDA facility without any contract and without the
supervision and control of, pursuant to Section 31 of RA 4850. Supervision as defined is the approval of the Board of Directors. The privilege granted was by virtue of a joint venture
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their proposal which was never authorized by the Board as admitted by the respondent in his position
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as paper. In fact the proposal is still awaiting resolution from the board. Partiality is synonymous
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control on the other hand, is the power of with "bias" which excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the than as they are.
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. There
is therefore a given authority to the respondent by law to regulate the acts of the Administrative
Division and respondent cannot simply evade responsibility by invoking the shortcomings of his Manifest means "obvious to the understanding, evident to the mind, not obscure or hidden and is
subordinates. In signing the contract, without verifying compliance of existing laws, respondent synonymous with open, clear, visible, unmistakable, indubitable, indisputable, evident and self-
falls short of the required competence expected of him in the performance of his official evident."
functions. Incompetence, has been defined as ‘lack of ability, legal qualification or fitness to
discharge the required duty; want of physical or intellectual or moral fitness.’ There was manifest partiality when respondent Cataquiz entered a transaction with Phil-Tai
disregarding the requirements set forth by RA 4850 which requires the approval of the Board.
xxxx Worse, the joint venture proposal by Phil-Tai which was accepted by the respondent took place
without any contract at all. The contention of the respondent that Phil-Tai is only given the
authority to conduct a preliminary study and including the technical survey and Pilot testing at
VIII. the aforesaid facility for the purpose of determining its structural integrity and commercial
viability cannot prevail over the records available at hand.
The Commission finds that the transaction entered into by the respondent and Phil-Tai Fishing
and Trade Company is violative of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The elements of Section 3 (e) are The findings of DENR officials in their ocular inspection on May 13, 2003 would disclose that
as follows: Phil-Tai is in actual possession of the LLDA facility and personally witnessed the actual
harvesting of tilapia from the fishpond owned by LLDA. The report of DENR officials contains
1. The accused is a public officer discharging official administrative, or judicial functions that the act of the respondent is prejudicial to the interest of the government mainly because
or private persons in conspiracy with them; there was no contract executed between LLDA and Phil-Tai.

2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official Moreover, the Memorandum from the Division Chief III Jose K. Cariño III of the Community
duty or in relation to his public position; Development Division would reveal that Phil-Tai is introducing exotic aquatic species in one of
the earthen ponds at LLDA Calauan Complex. RA 8550 otherwise known as the Philippine
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross Fisheries Code of 1998 provides that the introduction of foreign crustaceans such as crayfish in
inexcusable negligence; and Philippine waters without a sound ecological, biological and environmental justification based on
scientific studies is prohibited. There is, therefore, an unwarranted act by Phil-Tai which is
prejudicial to the government.
4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party or gave any
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
Applying the fourth element in the case at bar, respondent Cataquiz gave Phil-Tai unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference when he entertained the joint venture proposal without any
Applying the first element, respondent Cataquiz is a public officer within the legal term of RA consideration. In fact, as stated in respondent’s position paper, LLDA was assured by Phil-Tai
3019 which provides that "Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and that in the event the agreement does not materialize, it will remove all its equipment without
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt from damage to the LLDA aqua culture facilities. Be it noted that the assurance was not made in
service receiving compensation, even nominal from the government xxx." Clearly, respondent is writing.
Respondent refused to discern the adverse consequences of the joint venture proposal mention this after the CA had rendered its decision and after the submission of his comment on
considering that no available remedy was left to the government in case of untoward incidents the petition at bench. This is evidently a desperate effort on his part to strengthen his position
that may arise. The transaction entered into is at most unenforceable because the agreements and support the decision of the CA exonerating him from any administrative liability. The Court
therein was (sic) not put into writing. The transaction cannot be tolerated by the Commission and has consistently ruled that issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first time on
the unwarranted benefit that Phil-Tai is enjoying deserves much consideration because it puts appeal.34 Otherwise, to consider such issues and arguments belatedly raised by a party would
the government into a very disadvantageous situation. be tantamount to a blatant disregard of the basic principles of fair play, justice and due
process.35 Therefore, this issue does not merit the attention of the Court.
xxxx
Even if the Court were to overlook this procedural lapse, Cataquiz’ argument would still fail. The
X. Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the charges
against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the administrative case, which
is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned from the Resolution, the charges
The Commission finds that the promotion of the film entry of RVQ Productions by respondent referred to by the Ombudsman were for respondent’s alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of
Cataquiz does not offend Section 7 (d) of RA 6713 which provides as follows: R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds and fraud against the public treasury.36

"Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for
favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly,
official duties, or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which criminally and administratively liable for the same act.37 Obviously, administrative liability is
may be affected by the functions of their office." separate and distinct from penal and civil liability.38 In the case of People v.
Sandiganbayan,39 the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative and criminal
There was no undue solicitation of patronage of the film considering that the tickets sold are liability:
voluntary participation of interested employees. In fact, no monetary consideration was received
nor accepted by the respondent. The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the
following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the
Of important consideration, however, is the use of government vehicles in the delivery of movie procedure observed and sanctions imposed; and second, the principle that a single act may
tickets and the collection of payments thereof to different industrial establishments. Respondent offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give
Cataquiz in his official capacity as the General Manager of LLDA, approved the use of rise to criminal as well as administrative liability.40
government vehicles and drivers for the promotion of the movie.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose
The impropriety of using government property in favor of a (sic) RVQ Production, a private entity administrative action against Cataquiz.41 His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive
cannot be countenanced as this is prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The very upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The pronouncement
purpose of the use of the government property has not been properly served. 32 [Underscoring made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from further administrative
supplied] prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would undermine the very purpose of
administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public service and uphold the time-honored
xxxx principle that a public office is a public trust.42

The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent can be imposed with
Respondent does not bar the finding
of administrative liability. the accessory penalties.

Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him constitutes the Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability.43 Despite his
law of the case between him and the OP which necessitates the dismissal of the petition before removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts committed
this Court. during his service as General Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to suffer the
corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the charges
At the outset, the Court would like to highlight the fact that Cataquiz never raised this issue against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding accessory
before the CA, despite having had ample time to do so. The records show that the Ombudsman penalties is valid.
promulgated its resolution on November 30, 2004, more than three months prior to the filing by
the respondent of his petition before the CA on March 2, 2005.33 Nevertheless, he only chose to
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee.44 As such, he was under the Petitioners, however, claim that it was merely a typographical or clerical error on the part of
direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from PAGC which was unfortunately adopted by the OP.51 Cataquiz apparently will not be unduly
service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the President’s power to remove is prejudiced by the correction of the PAGC resolution. In the counter-affidavit he filed before the
inherent in his power to appoint.45 Therefore, it is well within the authority of the President to PAGC, he was able to exhaustively argue against the allegation that he had violated Board
order the respondent’s dismissal. Resolution No. 28.52 Hence, he cannot feign ignorance of the true charges against him.

Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of In this regard, the Court agrees with the petitioners.
dismissal impossible. Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal, he
insists that the accessory penalties may no longer be imposed on him.46 It is clear from the pleadings submitted before PAGC – particularly in the Affidavit Complaint filed
by CELLDA against Cataquiz and in the Counter-Affidavit submitted by the latter – that the
The respondent is mistaken. resolution referred to as having been violated by the respondent was Board Resolution No. 28,
and not No. 68, as was erroneously indicated in the PAGC Resolution. Thus, pursuant to the
In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia rule that the judgment should be in accordance with the allegations and the evidence
Serafico,47 despite the resignation from government service by the employee found guilty of presented,53 the typographical error contained in the PAGC Resolution can be amended. Clerical
grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of Conduct for errors or any ambiguity in a decision can be rectified even after the judgment has become final
Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal impossible, this Court by reference to the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and conclusions of law
nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits with prejudice to re- by the court.54
employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
A careful perusal of the PAGC’s discussion on the violation of the questioned board resolution
Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.48 where the Court held that: discloses that PAGC was undoubtedly referring to Board Resolution No. 28 which approved the
policy guidelines for public bidding of the remaining free fishpen areas in Laguna de Bay, and
not Resolution No. 68 which had nothing at all to do with fishpen awards. Therefore, the
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner’s separation from government reference to Board Resolution No. 68, instead of Board Resolution No. 28, in the PAGC
service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions – that of separation from service – Resolution is unmistakably a typographical error on the part of PAGC but, nonetheless,
may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on rectifiable.
her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.49
Moreover, the respondent’s counter-affidavit shows that he had knowledge of the fact that he
was being charged with violation of Board Resolution No. 28. He even argued that the said
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification from re- resolution was an invalid and illegal administrative rule. His position was that the resolution
employment in public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can still be issued by the Board of Directors of LLDA was an unreasonable exercise of its legislative power
imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the principal penalty of because the enabling law of LLDA, R.A. No. 4850, did not require the public bidding of free
dismissal because of his removal from office. fishpen areas.55 Then, in his motion for reconsideration before the OP, he argued that the
resolution was invalid because it was never approved by the President, contrary to Section 4(k)
PAGC’s typographical error of R.A. No. 4850 (as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813) which provides:
can be corrected.
(K) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de
One of the charges against Cataquiz is for directly transacting with 35 fishpen operators and Bay.1âwphi1 The Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of
authorizing payment of fishpen fees based on negotiated prices, in contravention of the directive the lake waters for any projects or activities in/or affecting the said lake including navigation,
of Board Resolution No. 28, which requires the conduct of a public bidding. The PAGC construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to impose
Resolution dated December 5, 2003, recommending the dismissal of Cataquiz erroneously necessary safeguards for lake quality control and management and to collect necessary fees for
indicated that he violated Board Resolution No. 68, instead of No. 28.50 The CA then sustained said activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries may be shared
his contention that he could not be found guilty for violating Board Resolution No. 68 of the between the Authority and other government agencies and political subdivisions in such
LLDA because such resolution was not related to fishpen awards and that his right to due proportion as may be determined by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of
process was violated when the OP found him guilty of violating the said resolution. It further the Authority’s Board: Provided further, That the Authority’s Board may determine new areas of
added that even if the respondent was charged with acting in contravention with Board fishery development or activities which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of
Resolution No. 28, the said resolution would be invalid for not having been duly approved by the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking into account the overall development plans and
President. programs for Laguna de Bay and related bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the Authority
shall subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines promulgate such rules
and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de
Bay which shall take into consideration among others the following: socio-economic DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
amelioration of bona-fide resident fishermen whether individually or collectively in the form of Associate Justice
cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master plan for fish construction and operation, Acting Chairperson, Third Division
communal fishing ground for lakeshore town residents, and preference to lakeshore town
residents in hiring laborers for fishery projects. [Emphasis supplied] CERTIFICATION

Regrettably, the CA sustained the respondent’s argument. A careful examination of the Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
abovementioned law shows that presidential approval is only required for rules and regulations that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay. The question then is
whether Board Resolution No. 28 falls under that category of rules subject to approval by the
President. The answer is in the negative. RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

The Revised Laguna de Bay Zoning and Management Plan56 allocated 10,000 hectares of the
lake surface areas for fishpen operators. In the event that the area would not be fully occupied
Footnotes
after all qualified operators had been assigned their respective fishpen areas, the residual free
areas would be opened for bidding to other prospective qualified applicants. Accordingly, Board
Resolution No. 28 simply set forth the guidelines for the public bidding of the remaining free * Designated as additional member per Raffle dated September 12, 2011.
fishpen areas in Laguna de Bay.57 It did not require presidential approval because it did not
regulate any fisheries development activities. Hence, the questioned resolution cannot be ** Designated as additional member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 1028 dated June
declared invalid on the basis of the CA’s ratiocination that the resolution lacked the approval of 21, 2011.
the President.
1
 Rollo, pp. 68-76. Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon and concurred in by Associate
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle.
and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered reinstating the June 29, 2004 Decision of the
2
Office of the President, as amended by its February 10, 2005 Amended Resolution.  Id. at 80-81.

3
SO ORDERED.  Id. at 77-79.

4
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA  Id. at 69.
Associate Justice
5
 Id. at 82.
WE CONCUR:
6
 Id. at 102-114.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
7
Associate Justice  Id. at 99.
Acting Chairperson
8
 Id. at 127.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice 9
 Id. at 116-126.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO** 10

 Id. at 171-173.
Associate Justice
11
 Id. at 168-192.
ATTESTATION
12
 Id. at 196.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. 13
 Id. at 193-194.
14 35
 Id. at 195-213.  Madrid v. Mapoy, G. R. No. 150887, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 14, 28.

15 36
 Id. at 77-79.  Rollo, p. 592.

16 37
 Id. at 214-229.  Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191, 198 (1999).

17 38
 Id. at 541-561.  Id. at 199; Veloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 89043-65, July 16, 1990, 187 SCRA 504.

18 39
 Id. at 573-585.  G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 147.

19 40
 Id. at 589-591.  Id. at 161, citing Paredes v. CA, G.R. No. 169534, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 577.

20 41
 Id. at 592-613.  Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, A.M. No. P-89-290, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA
1, 10.
21
 Id. at 38.
42
 Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161067, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 460, 468,
22 citing Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141336, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 88.
 Id. at 623-657.
43
23  Muring, Jr. v. Gatcho, A.M. No. CA-05-19-P, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 330, 349.
 Id. at 635.
44
24  Republic Act No. 4850 (1966), Sec. 16.
 Modesto v. Urbina, G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010, 633 SCRA 383, 391.
45
25  Larin v. Executive Secretary, 345 Phil. 961, 974 (1997), citing Const. (1987), Art. VII, Sec. 16.
 Magno v. Francisco, G.R. No. 168959, March 25, 2010, 616 SCRA 402, 414.
46
26  Rollo, p. 651.
 Modesto v. Urbina, supra note 24, citing Ontimare, Jr. v. Elep, 515 Phil. 237 (2006).
47
27  A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 186.
 Rollo, p. 75.
48
28  G.R. No. 149072, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 622.
 Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 307,
citing Madrid v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 366 (2000).
49
 Id. at 628.
29
 Salazar v. de Leon, G.R. No. 127965, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 447, 462, citing Perez v.
50
Cruz, 452 Phil. 597, 607 (2003).  Rollo, p. 180.

30 51
 Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 5.  Id. at 692.

31 52
 Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) v. Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA  Id. at 133.
373, 380, citing Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. 154155, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 135, 154; Go v.
Office of the Ombudsman, 460 Phil. 14, 35 (2003). 53
 Locsin v. Paredes, 63 Phil. 87, 91 (1936).
32
 Rollo, pp. 180-191. 54
 Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61250, June 3, 1991,
198 SCRA 19, 29, citing Filipino Legion Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 155 Phil. 616 (1974).
33
 Id. at 592-613 and 214-229.
55
 Rollo, p. 133.
34
 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Shemberg Biotech Corporation, G.R. No. 162291, August 11,
2010, 628 SCRA 70, 76, citing Rasdas v. Estenor, 513 Phil. 664 (2005). 56
 Approved on January 25, 1996 under LLDA Board Resolution No. 5, Series of 1996.
 57
 Rollo, p. 266.

Republic of the Philippines CSC RULING

SUPREME COURT
Manila
The respondent elevated the findings of the CMWD and his dismissal to the CSC, which
absolved him of the two charges and ordered his reinstatement. In CSC Resolution No. 080305,
EN BANC the CSC found no factual basis to support the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty.

G.R. No. 187858               August 9, 2011 In ruling that the respondent was not liable for grave misconduct, the CSC held:

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, Cruz was adjudged guilty of grave misconduct for his alleged utterance of such maligning
vs. statements, "MASASAMANG TAO ANG MGA BOD AT GENERAL MANAGER". However, such
RICHARD G. CRUZ, Respondent. utterance, even if it were true, does not constitute a flagrant disregard of rule or was actuated by
corrupt motive. To the mind of the Commission, it was a mere expression of disgust over the
DECISION management style of the GM and the Board of Directors, especially when due notice is taken of
the fact that the latter officials were charged with the Ombudsman for various anomalous
transactions.5
BRION, J.:

In ruling that the charge of dishonesty had no factual basis, the CSC declared:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision1 and the resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105410. These assailed CA rulings reversed and set aside the
ruling of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in Resolution No. 0803053 that denied respondent Based on the records of the case, the Commission is not swayed that the failure of Cruz to
Richard G. Cruz’s prayer for the award of back salaries as a result of his reinstatement to his record his attendance on April 21 and 22, 2007 and May 5, 2007, while claiming overtime pay
former position. therefor, amounts to dishonesty. Cruz duly submitted evidence showing his actual rendition of
work on those days. The residents of the place where he worked attested to his presence
thereat on the days in question.6
THE FACTS

The CSC, however, found the respondent liable for violation of reasonable office rules for his
The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District (CMWD), was charged with failure to log in and log out. It imposed on him the penalty of reprimand but did not order the
grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General Manager (GM) Nicasio Reyes. He payment of back salaries.
allegedly uttered a false, malicious and damaging statement (Masasamang tao ang mga BOD at
General Manager) against GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors (Board); four
of the respondent’s subordinates allegedly witnessed the utterance. The dishonesty charge, in The CMWD and the respondent separately filed motions for reconsideration against the CSC
turn, stemmed from the respondent’s act of claiming overtime pay despite his failure to log in ruling. CMWD questioned the CSC’s findings and the respondent’s reinstatement. The
and out in the computerized daily time record for three working days. respondent, for his part, claimed that he is entitled to back salaries in light of his exoneration
from the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The CSC denied both motions.
The respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave misconduct, he
stressed that three of the four witnesses already retracted their statements against him. On the Both the CMWD and the respondent elevated the CSC ruling to the CA via separate petitions for
charge of dishonesty, he asserted that he never failed to log in and log out. He reasoned that the review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the CMWD’s petition and this
lack of record was caused by technical computer problems. The respondent submitted ruling has lapsed to finality.7 Hence, the issue of reinstatement is now a settled matter. As
documents showing that he rendered overtime work on the three days that the CMWD outlined below, the CA ruled in the respondent’s favor on the issue of back salaries. This ruling
questioned. is the subject of the present petition with us.

GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the expiration of his CA RULING
preventive suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD Board, found the
respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service.4
Applying the ruling in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA,8 the CA found merit in the respondent’s appeal The respondent’s position
and awarded him back salaries from the time he was dismissed up to his actual reinstatement.
The CA reasoned out that CSC Resolution No. 080305 totally exonerated the respondent from The respondent maintains that he is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries because CSC
the charges laid against him. The CA considered the charge of dishonesty successfully refuted Resolution No. 080305 exonerated him from the charges laid against him; for the purpose of
as the respondent showed that he performed overtime service. The CA thereby rejected the entitlement to back salaries, what should control is his exoneration from the charges leveled
CSC’s contention that the charge of dishonesty had been merely downgraded to a lesser against him by the CMWD. That the respondent was found liable for a violation different from
offense; the CA saw the finding in CSC Resolution No. 080305 to be for an offense (failing to that originally charged is immaterial for purposes of the back salary issue.
properly record his attendance) entirely different from the dishonesty charge because their
factual bases are different. Thus, to the CA, CSC Resolution No. 080305 did not wholly restore
the respondent’s rights as an exonerated employee as it failed to order the payment of his back The respondent also asserts that the Bangalisan ruling squarely applies since the CSC formally
salaries. The CA denied the CSC’s motion for reconsideration. admitted in its Comment to CMWD’s petition for review before the CA that the penalty of
reprimand is not a reduced penalty for the penalty of dismissal imposable for grave misconduct
and dishonesty.12
ISSUE
THE COURT’S RULING
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BACK SALARIES AFTER THE
CSC ORDERED HIS REINSTATEMENT TO HIS FORMER POSITION, CONSONANT WITH
THE CSC RULING THAT HE WAS GUILTY ONLY OF VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE We deny the petition for lack of merit.
RULES AND REGULATIONS.9
The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal,13 of a
CSC’s position government employee who had been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated is settled in
our jurisdiction. The Court’s starting point for this outcome is the "no work-no pay" principle –
public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service. We have excepted from
The CSC submits that the CA erred in applying the ruling in Bangalisan, requiring as a condition this general principle and awarded back salaries even for unworked days to illegally dismissed
for entitlement to back salaries that the government employee be found innocent of the or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that "no officer or
charge and that the suspension be unjustified. CSC Resolution No. 080305 did not fully employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
exculpate the respondent but found him liable for a lesser offense. Likewise, the respondent’s law";14 to deny these employees their back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment after
preventive suspension pending appeal was justified because he was not exonerated. they have been exonerated from the charge that led to their dismissal or suspension.15

The CSC also submits that the factual considerations in Bangalisan are entirely different from The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of the Administrative
the circumstances of the present case. In Bangalisan, the employee, Rodolfo Mariano, a public Code of 1987.
school teacher, was charged with grave misconduct for allegedly participating, together with his
fellow teachers, in an illegal mass action. He was ordered exonerated from the misconduct
charge because of proof that he did not actually participate in the mass action, but was absent Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – x x x.
from work for another reason. Although the employee was found liable for violation of office rules
and regulations, he was considered totally exonerated because his infraction stemmed from an (4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is
act entirely different (his failure to file a leave of absence) from the act that was the basis of the suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive
grave misconduct charge (the unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of the suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal. (italics ours)
students).
This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries since it does not
The CSC argues that in the present case, the charge of dishonesty and the infraction committed expressly provide for back salaries during this period; our established rulings hold that back
by the respondent stemmed from a single act – his failure to properly record his attendance. salaries may not be awarded for the period of preventive suspension16 as the law itself
Thus, the respondent cannot be considered totally exonerated; the charge of dishonesty was authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond question.
merely downgraded to a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.
To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an employee may be
Accordingly, the CSC posits that the case should have been decided according to our rulings in entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges and b) his
Jacinto v. CA10 and De la Cruz v. CA11 where we held the award of back salaries to be suspension must be unjustified.17 The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although
inappropriate because the teachers involved were not fully exonerated from the charges laid an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful
against them. appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his
suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated.
The CSC’s rigid and mechanical application of these two conditions may have resulted from a employees thereupon claimed that under Section 695 of the RAC, the punishment of suspension
misreading of our rulings on the matter; hence, a look at our jurisprudence appears in order. without pay cannot exceed two (2) months. Since the period they were not allowed to work until
their reinstatement exceeded two months, they should be entitled to back salaries corresponding
Basis for award of back salaries to the period in excess of two months. In denying the employees’ claim for back salaries, the
Court held:
The Court had the occasion to rule on the issue of entitlement to back salaries as early as
1941,18 when Section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC)19 was the The fallacy of [the employees’] argument springs from their assumption that the modified
governing law. The Court held that a government employee, who was suspended from work decision had converted the penalty to that of suspension. The modified decision connotes that
pending final action on his administrative case, is not entitled to back salaries where he was although dismissal or resignation would be the proper penalty, the separation from work for the
ultimately removed due to the valid appointment of his successor. No exoneration or period until their reinstatement, would be deemed sufficient. Said decision did not, in the least,
reinstatement, of course, was directly involved in this case; thus, the question of back salaries insinuate that suspension should have been the penalty.
after exoneration and reinstatement did not directly arise. The Court, however, made the general
statement that: x x x [T]he modified decision did not exonerate the petitioners. x x x And even if we consider the
punishment as suspension, before a public official or employee is entitled to payment of salaries
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not withheld, it should be shown that the suspension was unjustified or that the employee was
rendered any service, and the justification for the payment of salary during the period of innocent of the charges proffered against him.26
suspension is that the suspension was unjustified or that the official was innocent. Hence, the
requirement that, to entitle to payment of salary during suspension, there must be either On the whole, these rulings left the application of the conditions for the award of back salaries
reinstatement of the suspended person or exoneration if death should render reinstatement far from clear. Jurisprudence did not strictly observe the requirements earlier enunciated in
impossible.20 (emphasis and underscoring ours) Gonzales as under subsequent rulings, the innocence of the employee alone served as basis for
the award of back salaries.
In Austria v. Auditor General,21 a high school principal, who was penalized with demotion,
claimed payment of back salaries from the time of his suspension until his appointment to the The innocence of the employee as sole basis for an award of back salaries
lower position to which he was demoted. He argued that his later appointment even if only to a
lower position of classroom teacher amounted to a reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC. In Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc.,27 we ruled that the payment of back salary to a
The Court denied his claim, explaining that the reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC government employee, who was illegally removed from office because of his eventual
refers to the same position from which the subordinate officer or employee was suspended and, exoneration on appeal, is merely incidental to the ordered reinstatement.
therefore, does not include demotional appointments. The word "reinstatement" was apparently
equated to exoneration.
Tan was subsequently reiterated in Tañala v. Legaspi, et al.,28 a case involving an employee
who was administratively dismissed from the service following his conviction in the criminal case
In the 1961 case of Gonzales v. Hon. Hernandez, etc. and Fojas22 interpreting the same arising from the same facts as in the administrative case. On appeal, however, he was acquitted
provision, the Court first laid down the requisites for entitlement to back salaries. Said the Court: of the criminal charge and was ultimately ordered reinstated by the Office of the President.
Failing to secure his actual reinstatement, he filed a mandamus petition to compel his superiors
A perusal of the decisions of this Court23 x x x show[s] that back salaries are ordered paid to an to reinstate him and to pay his back salaries from the date of his suspension to the date of his
officer or an employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or actual reinstatement. We found merit in his plea and held:
dismissal is found and declared to be illegal. In the case at bar, [the employee] was not
completely exonerated, because although the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service [The employee] had been acquitted of the criminal charges x x x, and the President had
[ordering separation from service] was modified and [the employee] was allowed to be reversed the decision x x x in the administrative case which ordered his separation from the
reinstated, the decision [imposed upon the employee the penalty of two months suspension service, and the President had ordered his reinstatement to his position, it results that the
without pay]. [emphasis and underscoring ours] suspension and the separation from the service of the [employee] were thereby considered
illegal. x x x.
Obviously, no exoneration actually resulted and no back salary was due; the liability for the
offense charged remained, but a lesser penalty was imposed. x x x [In this case,] by virtue of [the President’s order of reinstatement], [the employee’s]
suspension and separation from the service x x x was thereby declared illegal, so that for all
In Villamor, et al. v. Hon. Lacson, et al.,24 the City Mayor ordered the dismissal from the service intents and purposes he must be considered as not having been separated from his office. The
of city employees after finding them guilty as charged. On appeal, however, the decision was lower court has correctly held that the [employee] is entitled to back salaries.29
modified by considering "the suspension of over one year x x x, already suffered x x x [to be]
sufficient punishment"25 and by ordering their immediate reinstatement to the service. The
The Tañala ruling was reiterated in Cristobal v. Melchor,30 Tan, Jr. v. Office of the suspension unjustified. However, in Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al.,41 the Court had the
President,31 De Guzman v. CSC32 and Del Castillo v. CSC33 - cases involving government occasion to illustrate the independent character of these two conditions so that the mere
employees who were dismissed after being found administratively liable, but who were illegality of an employee’s suspension could serve as basis for an award of back salaries.
subsequently exonerated on appeal.
Abellera, a cashier in the Baguio City Treasurer’s Office, was ordered dismissed from the
In Garcia v. Chairman Commission on Audit,34 the Court held that – where the employee, who service after being found guilty of dishonesty and gross negligence. Even before the period to
was dismissed after being found administratively liable for dishonesty, was acquitted on a finding appeal expired, the City of Baguio dismissed him from the service. On appeal, however, the
of innocence in the criminal case (for qualified theft) based on the same acts for which he was penalty imposed on him was reduced "to two months suspension, without pay" although the
dismissed – the executive pardon granted him in the administrative case (in light of his prior appealed decision was affirmed "in all other respects."
acquittal) entitled him to back salaries from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his actual
reinstatement. When the issue of Abellera’s entitlement to back salaries reached the Court, we considered the
illegality of Abellera’s suspension - i.e., from the time he was dismissed up to the time of his
The above situation should be distinguished from the case of an employee who was dismissed actual reinstatement – to be a sufficient ground to award him back salaries.
from the service after conviction of a crime and who was ordered reinstated after being granted
pardon. We held that he was not entitled to back salaries since he was not illegally dismissed The rule on payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a member of the civil
nor acquitted of the charge against him.35 service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, is already settled in this jurisdiction. Such
payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may
Incidentally, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,36 if the public official or employee is be decreed not only if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension (Sec.
acquitted of the criminal charge/s specified in the law, he is entitled to reinstatement and the 35, RA 2260), but also when the suspension is unjustified.
back salaries withheld during his suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him. In the present case, upon receipt of the [Civil Service Commissioner’s] decision x x x finding
[Abellera] guilty, but even before the period to appeal had expired, [the Baguio City officials]
In Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President,37 the Court clarified that the silence of Section 42 (Lifting of dismissed [Abellera] from the service and another one was appointed to replace him. [Abellera’s]
Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation) of the Civil Service Decree38 on the separation x x x before the decision of the Civil Service Commissioner had become final was
payment of back salaries, unlike its predecessor,39 is no reason to deny back salaries to a evidently premature. [The Baguio City officials] should have realized that [Abellera] still had the
dismissed civil servant who was ultimately exonerated. right to appeal the Commissioner's decision to the Civil Service Board of Appeals within a
specified period, and the possibility of that decision being reversed or modified.42 As it did
Section 42 of P.D. No. 807, however, is really not in point x x x [as] it does not cover dismissed happen on such appeal x x x the penalty imposed by the Commissioner was reduced x x x to
civil servants who are ultimately exonerated and ordered reinstated to their former or equivalent only 2 months suspension. And yet, by [the Baguio City officials’] action, [Abellera] was deprived
positions. The rule in the latter instance, just as we have said starting with the case of Cristobal of work for more than 2 years. Clearly, Abellera’s second suspension from office [i.e., from the
vs. Melchor is that when "a government official or employee in the classified civil service had time he was dismissed up to his actual reinstatement] was unjustified, and the payment of the
been illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal purposes he salaries corresponding to said period is, consequently, proper.43 (emphases and underscoring
is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that ours)
accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held."40
The import of the Abellera ruling was explained by the Court in the subsequent case of Yarcia v.
These cited cases illustrate that a black and white observance of the requisites in Gonzales is City of Baguio44 that involved substantially similar facts. The Court clarified that the award of
not required at all times. The common thread in these cases is either the employee’s complete back salaries in Abellera was based on the premature execution of the decision (ordering the
exoneration of the administrative charge against him (i.e., the employee is not found guilty of employee’s dismissal from the service), resulting in the employee’s unjustified "second
any other offense), or the employee’s acquittal of the criminal charge based on his innocence. If suspension." Under the then Civil Service Rules, the Commissioner of Civil Service had the
the case presented falls on either of these instances, the conditions laid down in Gonzales discretion to order the immediate execution of his decision in administrative cases "in the
become the two sides of the same coin; the requirement that the suspension must be unjustified interest of public service." Unlike in Abellera, this discretion was exercised in Yarcia;
is automatically subsumed in the other requirement of exoneration. consequently, the employee’s separation from the service pending his appeal "remained valid
and effective until it was set aside and modified with the imposition of the lesser penalty."45
Illegal suspension as sole basis for an award of back salaries
The unjustified "second suspension" mentioned in Abellera actually refers to the period when the
employee was dismissed from the service up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Under our
By requiring the concurrence of the two conditions, Gonzales apparently made a distinction present legal landscape, this period refers to "suspension pending appeal."46
between exoneration and unjustified suspension/dismissal. This distinction runs counter to the
notion that if an employee is exonerated, the exoneration automatically makes an employee’s
In Miranda v. Commission on Audit,47 the Court again had the occasion to consider the illegality With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his back wages is in order. A reading of
of the suspension of the employee as a separate ground to award back salaries. Following the the resolution of the [CSC] will show that he was exonerated of the charges which formed the
filing of several administrative charges against him, Engr. Lamberto Miranda was "preventively" basis for his suspension. The Secretary of the DECS charged him with and he was later found
suspended from June 2, 1978 to May 7, 1986. He was reinstated on May 22, 1986. On October guilty of grave misconduct x x x [and] conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service x x x
7, 1986, the administrative case against him was finally dismissed "for lack of evidence." When for his participation in the mass actions x x x. It was his alleged participation in the mass actions
his claim for back salaries (from the time he was "preventively" suspended up to his actual that was the basis of his preventive suspension and, later, his dismissal from the service.
reinstatement) was denied by the Commission on Audit, he brought a certiorari petition with this
Court. However, the [CSC], in the questioned resolution, made [the] finding that Mariano was not
involved in the "mass actions" but was absent because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake
In granting the petition, the Court ruled that since the law48 limits the duration of preventive and interment of his grandmother. Although the CSC imposed upon him the penalty of
suspension to a fixed period, Engr. Miranda’s suspension for almost eight (8) years is reprimand, the same was for his violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because he
"unreasonable and unjustified." Additionally, the Court observed that the dropping of the failed to inform the school or his intended absence and neither did he file an application for leave
administrative case against Engr. Miranda for lack of evidence "is even an eloquent covering such absences.
manifestation that the suspension is unjustified."49 The Court held:
xxxx
This being so, Engineer Miranda is entitled to backwages during the period of his suspension as
it is already settled in this jurisdiction that a government official or employee is entitled to However, with regard to the other petitioners, the payment of their back wages must be denied.
backwages not only if he is exonerated in the administrative case but also when the suspension Although the penalty imposed on them was only suspension, they were not completely
is unjustified.50 (emphases and underscoring ours) exonerated of the charges against them. The CSC made specific findings that, unlike petitioner
Mariano, they indeed participated in the mass actions. It will be noted that it was their
Jurisprudential definition of exoneration participation in the mass actions that was the very basis of the charges against them and their
subsequent suspension.56
The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back
salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. This is the Court’s teaching in City Bangalisan clearly laid down the principle that if the exoneration of the employee is relative (as
Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA.51 In this case, the employee was initially found guilty of disgraceful distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense
and immoral conduct and was given the penalty of dismissal by the City Mayor of Zamboanga. charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to have
On appeal, however, the CA limited the employee’s guilt to improper conduct and been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be
correspondingly reduced the penalty to "six-months suspension without pay with a stern warning considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the
that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely."52 The CA also same. The employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only be entitled to back salaries when
awarded him "full backwages."53 the offense actually committed does not carry the penalty of more than one month suspension or
dismissal.57
We held that the CA erred in awarding back salaries by reiterating the principle that back
salaries may be ordered paid to an officer or employee only if he is exonerated of the charge Bangalisan reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of suspension of a
against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be illegal.54 member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, may be decreed only if the
employee is found innocent of the charges which caused the suspension and when the
The Court had the occasion to explain what constitutes "exoneration" in Bangalisan v. Hon. suspension is unjustified. This pronouncement was re-echoed in Jacinto v. CA,58 De la Cruz v.
CA,55 the respondent’s cited case. In this case, the Secretary of Education found the public CA,59 and Hon. Gloria v. CA.60 Taking off from Bangalisan, the Court in De la Cruz categorically
school teachers guilty as charged and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal. On appeal, the stated:
CSC affirmed the Secretary’s ruling but reduced the penalty imposed to suspension without pay.
However, the CSC found one of the teachers (Mariano) guilty only of violation of reasonable The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered reinstated to the service
office rules and regulations, and only penalized her with reprimand. None of the petitioning after the dismissal orders x x x were commuted by the CSC to six (6) months suspension is
public school teachers were awarded back salaries. already settled.

On appeal to this Court, we awarded back salaries to Mariano. We explained that since the In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, we resolved the issue in the negative on the ground that the
factual premise of the administrative charges against him - i.e., his alleged participation in the teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary
illegal mass actions, and his suspension - was amply rebutted, then Mariano was in effect for the grant of back wages in administrative disciplinary cases.61
exonerated of the charges against him and was, thus, entitled to back salaries for the period of
his suspension pending appeal.
In Hon. Gloria, involving the same factual situation as Bangalisan, the CA awarded the public then Secretary of Education found them guilty and dismissed them from the service. The CSC,
school teachers back salaries - for the period beyond the allowable period of preventive on appeal, ordered the teachers reinstated, but withheld the grant of their back salaries. The
suspension - since they were ultimately exonerated. In affirming the CA, the Court distinguished CSC found the teachers liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
preventive suspension from suspension pending appeal for the purpose of determining the imposed on them the penalty of suspension. The CSC reasoned that since the teachers were
extent of an employee’s entitlement to back salaries. The Court ruled that under Executive Order not totally exculpated from the charge (but were found guilty of a lesser offense), they could not
(E.O.) No. 292, there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are be awarded back salaries.
charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending
investigation62 and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal;63 compensation is due only for the When these cases reached the Court, the issue of the teachers’ entitlement to back salaries was
period of preventive suspension  pending appeal should the employee be ultimately raised. The teachers claimed that they were entitled to back salaries from the time of their
exonerated.64 Citing Floyd R. Mechem's A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and dismissal or suspension until their reinstatement, arguing that they were totally exonerated from
Officers,65 Hon. Gloria ruled: the charges since they were found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In addition,
his suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly Under this factual backdrop, we applied the two conditions and distinguished between the
states that "payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not teachers who were absent from their respective classes because they participated in the illegal
allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his mass action, on one hand, and the teachers who were absent for some other reason, on the
suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified."66 (emphases and underscoring ours) other hand.

A careful reading of these cases would reveal that a strict observance of the second condition With respect to the teachers who participated in the illegal mass actions, we ruled that they were
for an award of back salaries becomes important only if the employee is not totally innocent of not entitled to back salaries since they were not exonerated. We explained that liability for a
any administrative infraction. As previously discussed, where the employee is completely lesser offense, carrying a penalty less than dismissal, is not equivalent to exoneration. On the
exonerated of the administrative charge or acquitted in the criminal case arising from the same second condition, we ruled that their suspension is not unjustified since they have given a
facts based on a finding of innocence, the second requirement becomes subsumed in the first. ground for their suspension – i.e., the unjustified abandonment of their classes to the prejudice
Otherwise, a determination of the act/s and offense/s actually committed and of the of their students, the very factual premise of the administrative charges against them – for which
corresponding penalty imposed has to be made. they were suspended.

Unjustified suspension With respect to the teachers who were away from their classes but did not participate in the
illegal strike, the Court awarded them back salaries, considering that: first, they did not commit
On the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is met upon a showing that the the act for which they were dismissed and suspended; and second, they were found guilty of
separation from office is not warranted under the circumstances because the government another offense, i.e., violation of reasonable office rules and regulations which is not penalized
employee gave no cause for suspension or dismissal. This squarely applies in cases where the with suspension or dismissal. The Court ruled that these teachers were totally exonerated of the
government employee did not commit the offense charged, punishable by suspension or charge, and found their dismissal and suspension likewise unjustified since the offense they
dismissal (total exoneration); or the government employee is found guilty of another offense for were found to have committed only merited the imposition of the penalty of reprimand.1avvphi1
an act different from that for which he was charged.
These cases show the Court’s consistent stand in determining the propriety of the award of back
Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz illustrate salaries. The government employees must not only be found innocent of the charges; their
suspension must likewise be shown to be unjustified.
the application of the two conditions
The Present Case
Both the CA and the respondent applied Bangalisan to justify the award of back salaries. The
CSC argues against this position with the claim that the rulings in Jacinto and De la Cruz, not We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries during the period
Bangalisan, should apply. After due consideration, we see no reason why the cited rulings and he was suspended from work, following his dismissal until his reinstatement to his former
their application should be pitted against one another; they essentially espouse the same position. The records show that the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty against him
conclusions after applying the two conditions for the payment of back salaries. were not substantiated. As the CSC found, there was no corrupt motive showing malice on the
part of the respondent in making the complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the
Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz all stemmed from the illegal mass actions of public school charge of dishonesty was well refuted by the respondent’s evidence showing that he rendered
teachers in Metro Manila in 1990. The teachers were charged with grave misconduct, gross overtime work on the days in question.
neglect of duty, and gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations, among others. The
We fully respect the factual findings of the CSC especially since the CA affirmed these factual
findings. However, on the legal issue of the respondent’s entitlement to back salaries, we are (on leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
fully in accord with the CA’s conclusion that the two conditions to justify the award of back JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
salaries exist in the present case. Associate Justice

The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different Associate Justice
from the act of dishonesty (claiming overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work)
that he was charged with.
CERTIFICATION

The second condition was met as the respondent’s committed offense merits neither dismissal
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand. Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed by the CMWD
until his reinstatement to his former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension RENATO C. CORONA
pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the Chief Justice
respondent is not entitled to any back salaries per our ruling in Hon. Gloria.67

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED. Footnotes

ARTURO D. BRION * No part.

Associate Justice
** On official leave.
WE CONCUR:
1
 Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Mariano C. del Castillo,
RENATO C. CORONA and concurred in by Associate Justices Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa (ret.) and Apolinario D.
Chief Justice Bruselas, Jr.; dated February 20, 2009. Rollo, pp. 32-43.

2
 Dated May 8, 2009; id. at 44-45.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 3
 Penned by Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza; id. at 250-258.

4
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA  CMWD Memorandum No. 31-07 dated June 6, 2007; id. at 60.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
5
 Id. at 72-73.

(no part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN 6
 Id. at 73.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
7
 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 104704, entitled "The City of Malolos Water District v. Civil Service
Commission and Richard G. Cruz." The CA Decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 became final
(on leave) and executory on July 29, 2010, per Entry of Judgment dated January 10, 2011.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 8
 342 Phil. 586 (1997).
9 27
 Rollo, p. 21.  Supra note 15.

10 28
 346 Phil. 656 (1997).  121 Phil. 541 (1965).

11 29
 364 Phil. 786 (1999).  Id. at 551-553.

12 30
 Rollo, p. 282.  189 Phil. 658 (1980).

13 31
 Hon. Gloria v. CA, 365 Phil. 744 (1999).  G.R. No. 110936, February 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 677.

14 32
 This provision uniformly exists in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.  G.R. No. 101105, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 169. The illegality of the dismissal in this case
resulted from the invalidity of the reorganization that authorized the employee’s dismissal.
15
 Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc., 107 Phil. 17 (1960).
33
 343 Phil. 734 (1997).
16
 Hon. Gloria v. CA, supra note 13.
34
 G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 356, 362-363.
17
 Bangalisan v. CA, supra note 8.
35
 Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports, 259 Phil. 1109, 1114 (1989).
18
 Reyes v. Hernandez, 71 Phil. 397 (1941).
36
 Section 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 reads:
19
 Section 260 of the RAC reads:
Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
Payment of salary accruing pending suspension. – When the chief of a Bureau or Office
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
suspends a subordinate officer or employee from duty, the person suspended shall not
funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
receive pay during suspension unless the Department Head shall so order; but upon
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
subsequent reinstatement of the suspended person or upon his exoneration, if death
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
should render reinstatement impossible, any salary so withheld shall be paid, but
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
without prejudice to the application of the disciplinary provisions of section six hundred
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
and ninety-five hereof.
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
20
 Reyes v. Hernandez, supra note 18, at 398. 37
 Supra note 31.
21
 No. L-21918, January 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 79. 38
 Section 42 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 reads:
22
 112 Phil. 160, 166 (1961).
Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the
administrative case against the officer of employee under preventive suspension is not
23
 Gonzales v. Hernandez, ibid., did not specify the cases it relied upon for its pronouncement. A finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the
survey of prior jurisprudence, however, reveals the following as bases: Reyes v. Hernandez, supra date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
note 18; Batungbakal v. National Development Company, 93 Phil. 182 (1953); National Rice and respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the
Corn Corp. v. NARIC Workers’ Union, 98 Phil. 563 (1956); Tabora v. Montelibano, et al., 98 Phil. delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
800 (1956); and Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc., supra note 15. respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
24
 120 Phil. 1213 (1964).
39
 R.A. No. 2260 or Civil Service Act of 1959. Section 35 of R.A. No. 2260 reads:
25
 Id. at 1215.
Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the
26 administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not
 Id. at 1218-1219. finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days
 54
after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the  The Court also relied on Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 which required that an
service. If the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his employee must be exonerated of the charges in order that he may be paid his back salaries. See
position with full pay for the period of suspension. (italics ours) also Yarcia v. City of Baguio, supra note 42, where the Court held that the mere reduction, on
appeal, of the penalty imposed (from dismissal to a fine of six months pay), without however
40 exonerating the employee from the charge (of dishonesty) against him, does not entitle him to
 Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President, supra note 31, at 679.
back salaries.
41
 No. L-23957, March 18, 1967, 19 SCRA 600. 55
 Supra note 8.
42
 Under Section 28 of the Civil Service Rules implementing R.A. No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 56
 Id. at 598-599.
1959), the Commissioner of Civil Service has the discretion to order the immediate execution of
his decision in administrative cases (J. Barredo’s Dissent in Yarcia v. City of Baguio, etc., 144 Phil.
57
351 [1970]).  If the proper penalty imposable for the offense actually committed does not exceed one month,
then there would have been no occasion for a suspension pending appeal since a decision
43 imposing the penalty of suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
 See Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1316, August 31, 2001, 364 SCRA 204, 217,
exceeding thirty days salary is final and not subject to appeal. (See Book V, Section 47, par. 2 of
where the Court awarded back salaries to a Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, whom
Executive Order No. 292; Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of
the Court ordered dismissed from the service for gross misconduct. The resolution of dismissal
the Office of the Ombudsman, dated April 10, 1990, as amended by Administrative Order No.
was immediately implemented. On reconsideration, however, the Court found him guilty of simple
17 dated September 15, 2003 which took effect on November 19, 2003.)
neglect of duty and imposed on him only the penalty of fine. In granting his subsequent request for
back salaries from the time of his dismissal until his reinstatement, the Court considered, among
58
others, the prematurity of the immediate execution of the resolution of dismissal as basis for the  Supra note 10.
award.
59
 Supra note 11.
44
 Supra note 42.
60
 Supra note 13.
45
 Citing Villamor, et al. v. Hon. Lacson, et al., supra note 24, which was also cited in Sales v.
Mathay, Sr., etc., et al., 214 Phil. 153 (1984). 61
 De la Cruz v. CA, supra note 11, at 797.
46
 See Bautista v. Peralta, No. L-21967, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 223, where the Court 62
 Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 51 of E.O. No. 292.
considered the "second suspension" mentioned in Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al., supra note 41,
as a "preventive suspension." At the time, R.A. No. 2260 allows the payment of back salaries for
the entire period of suspension in the event of exoneration. At present, there is a clear legal 63
 Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 47(4) of E.O. No. 292.
distinction between preventive suspension (i.e., suspension pending investigation) and suspension
pending appeal. 64
 The Court ruled that the absence of a provision in P.D. No. 807 and later in E.O. No. 292
allowing the payment of back salaries during the period of preventive suspension, unlike in Act No.
47
 G.R. No. 84613, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 657. 2711 and R.A. No. 2260, evidences a legislative intent to disallow payment of back salaries for the
period of preventive suspension regardless of the employee’s exoneration. But the payment of
48 back salaries per se, that is, without regard to the duration of the payment, has been consistently
 Section 35 of R.A. No. 2260 and Section 42 of P.D. No. 807.
recognized.
49
 Miranda v. Commission on Audit, supra note 47, at 662. 65
 §864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office. - An officer who has been
lawfully suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the period during which he
50
 Ibid. was so suspended, even though it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he was
suspended was insufficient. The reason given is "that salary and perquisites are the reward of
51 express or implied services, and therefore cannot belong to one who could not lawfully perform
 G.R. No. 80270, February 27, 1990, 182 SCRA 785.
such services.
52
 Id. at 788. 66
 Hon. Gloria v. CA, supra note 13, at 762.
53
 Ibid. 67
 The preventive suspension pending the investigation of the charges is not imposed as a penalty
but only to enable the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation; the
 preventive suspension in this regard is a necessary sacrifice, which holding a public office 2007.2 The penalty imposed on him included cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
requires. benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government. Del Castillo filed
a motion for reconsideration, which is pending to this date.

Following the lapse of his six-month suspension or on March 12, 2007 Del Castillo attempted to
reassume his former post of GHQ Chief Accountant. But, he was unable to do so since Moro
declined to yield the position. Consequently, on April 4, 2007 Del Castillo filed a petition for quo
warranto3 against Moro with the Regional Trial Court4 (RTC) of Parañaque City in Civil Case 07-
0111.

Republic of the Philippines

Del Castillo claimed that Moro was merely detailed as GHQ Chief Accountant when the
SUPREME COURT
Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension. Since the latter’s period of
Manila
suspension already lapsed, he was entitled to resume his former post and Moro was but a
usurper. 5
SECOND DIVISION
For his part, Moro pointed out in his Answer6 that his appointment under SO 91 as GHQ Chief
G.R. No. 184980               March 30, 2011 Accountant was a permanent appointment. Indeed, the GHQ had already reassigned Del
Castillo to the PAF Accounting Center even before the Ombudsman placed him under
DANILO MORO, Petitioner, preventive suspension. Del Castillo was, therefore, not automatically entitled to return to his
vs. former GHQ post despite the lapse of his suspension.
GENEROSO REYES DEL CASTILLO, JR., Respondent.
During the pendency of the quo warranto case before the RTC, Del Castillo refused to report at
DECISION the PAF Accounting Center despite a memorandum from the AFP Acting Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel that carried the note and approval of the AFP Chief of Staff.7 Del Castillo insisted
that he could not be placed under the PAF since he was the GHQ Chief Accountant.8
ABAD, J.:

On October 10, 2007 the RTC dismissed Del Castillo’s petition,9 holding that Moro held the
This case is about the right of the petitioner to be reinstated through an action for quo
position of GHQ Chief Accountant pursuant to orders of the AFP Chief of Staff. Moreover, the
warranto  against the present holder meantime that petitioner has appealed from the
RTC found Del Castillo’s reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center valid. Under the Civil
Ombudsman’s decision dismissing him from the service for, among other grounds, misconduct
Service Commission (CSC) Rules, a reassignment may be made for a maximum of one year.
in office.
Since Del Castillo’s preventive suspension kept him away for only six months, he had to return
to the PAF to complete his maximum detail at that posting. Besides, said the trial court, the
The Facts and the Case Ombudsman’s February 5, 2007 Order, which directed Del Castillo’s dismissal from the service
for grave misconduct, among others, rendered the petition moot and academic. The RTC denied
On December 7, 2005 the Ombudsman charged respondent Generoso Reyes Del Castillo, Jr. Del Castillo’s motion for reconsideration.
(Del Castillo), then Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Accounting Center of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct Instead of appealing from the order of dismissal of his action, Del Castillo filed a petition for
prejudicial to the best interest of the service in OMB-P-A-06-0031-A. The Ombudsman alleged certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 103470. On October 13, 2008 the CA
that Del Castillo made false statements in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities from 1996 to reversed the RTC Decision.10 Notwithstanding the procedural error, the CA gave due course to
2004 and that he acquired properties manifestly out of proportion to his reported salary. the petition on grounds of substantial justice and fair play. It held that Del Castillo’s
reassignment exceeded the maximum of one year allowed by law and that SO 91 was void
On April 1, 2006 the GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) Accounting since it did not indicate a definite duration for such reassignment. Further, the CA held as non-
Center by virtue of GHQ AFP Special Order 91 (SO 91).1 Through the same order, petitioner executory the Ombudsman’s dismissal of Del Castillo in view of his appeal from that dismissal.
Danilo Moro (Moro), then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy, took over the position of With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Moro filed this petition via Rule 45 of the Rules
Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center. of Court.

Meantime, on August 30, 2006 the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive The Issue Presented
suspension for six months and eventually ordered his dismissal from the service on February 5,
The key issue in this case is whether or not respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to SO ORDERED.
the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center that he once held.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
The Court’s Ruling Associate Justice

An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against one who WE CONCUR:
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.11 It may be brought by the
Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office.12 In this case, it ANTONIO T. CARPIO
was Del Castillo who filed the action, claiming that he was entitled as a matter of right to Associate Justice
reassume the position of GHQ Chief Accountant after his preventive suspension ended on Chairperson
March 11, 2007. He argues that, assuming his reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center was
valid, the same could not exceed one year. Since his detail at the PAF took effect under SO 91
on April 1, 2006, it could last not later than March 31, 2007. By then, Moro should have allowed ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
him to return to his previous posting as GHQ Chief Accountant. Associate Justice Associate Justice

But, as Moro points out, he had been authorized under SO 91 to serve as GHQ Chief JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Accountant. Del Castillo, on the other hand, had been ordered dismissed from the service by the Associate Justice
Ombudsman in OMB-P-A-06-0031-A. Consequently, he cannot reassume the contested
position. ATTESTATION

Del Castillo of course insists, citing Lapid v. Court of Appeals,13 that only decisions of the I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
Ombudsman that impose the penalties of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
than a month or a fine of one month salary are final, executory, and unappealable.
Consequently, when the penalty is dismissal as in his case, he can avail himself of the remedy
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
of appeal and the execution of the decision against him would, in the meantime, be held in
Associate Justice
abeyance.1avvphi1
Chairperson, Second Division

But, the Lapid case has already been superseded by In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of
CERTIFICATION
Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH.14 The Court held in Datumanong that
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order 7, as amended by Administrative Order 17,15 clearly
provides that an appeal shall not stop a decision of the Ombudsman from being executory. The Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Court later reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.16 Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to
the subject public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed RENATO C. CORONA
possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed.17 Chief Justice

Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after
the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007. As explained above,
that dismissal order was immediately executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no
right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the
GHQ Accounting Center. Footnotes

1
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision  Records, p. 113.
dated October 13, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 103470, and REINSTATES the
October 10, 2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case 07-0111, which dismissed 2
 Rollo, pp. 88-115.
the complaint for quo warranto.
3
 Records, pp. 41-54.
4
 Branch 274. under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying
5
 Records, pp. 47-48. the Motion for Reconsideration.

6
 Id. at 99-111. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the
penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he
7
shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be
 Id. at 121-122. paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal.
8
 Id. at 123.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be
9
 Rollo, pp. 48-54. Penned by Presiding Judge Fortunito L. Madrona. executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure
that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The
10
 Id. at 58-87. Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of
Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok. the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure
shall be ground for disciplinary action against said officer. (Emphasis supplied)
11
 Rule 66, Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. 16
 G.R. No. 159395, May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 75, 93-94.

An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be 17

commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the  Feliciano v. Villasin, G.R. No. 174929, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 348, 366.
Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a

public office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without

being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

12
 Rule 66, Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action.

A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or

unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own
name.

13
 G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738.

14
 G.R. No. 150274, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 626.

15
 Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of
the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review
 expenses or approximately ₱ 4,000.00 a month. It would also mean physical burden on her part
as she would be compelled to wake up early in the morning for her daily travel from Quezon City
to San Fernando, Pampanga, and to return home late at night from San Fernando, Pampanga to
Quezon City. She was of the view that that her reassignment was merely intended to harass and
force her out of the BIR in the guise of exigencies of the revenue service. In sum, she
considered her transfer from Quezon City to Pampanga as amounting to a constructive
dismissal.

Due to the then inaction of the BIR, Pacheo filed a complaint5 dated May 30, 2002, before the
Republic of the Philippines CSC- National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), praying for the nullification of RTAO No. 25-2002. In
SUPREME COURT its July 22, 2002 Order,6 the CSC-NCR treated Pacheo’s Complaint as an appeal and dismissed
Manila the same, without prejudice, for failure to comply with Sections 73 and 74 of Rule V(b) of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.7
EN BANC
In its Letter-reply8 dated September 13, 2002, the BIR, through its Deputy Commissioner for
G.R. No. 178021               January 25, 2012 Legal and Inspection Group, Edmundo P. Guevara (Guevara), denied Pacheo’s protest for lack
of merit. It contended that her reassignment could not be considered constructive dismissal as
she maintained her position as Revenue Attorney IV and was designated as Assistant Chief of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the CIVIL SERVICE Legal Division. It emphasized that her appointment to the position of Revenue Attorney IV was
COMMISSION, Petitioner, without a specific station. Consequently, she could properly be reassigned from one
vs. organizational unit to another within the BIR. Lastly, she could not validly claim a vested right to
MINERVA M.P. PACHEO, Respondent. any specific station, or a violation of her right to security of tenure.

DECISION Not in conformity with the ruling of the BIR, Pacheo appealed her case before the CSC.

MENDOZA, J.: On November 21, 2005, the CSC issued Resolution No. 0516979 granting Pacheo’s appeal, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of Minerva M.P. Pacheo is hereby GRANTED. The Bureau of
which assails the February 22, 2007 Decision1 and the May 15, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Internal Revenue Revenue Travel Assignment Order No. 25-2002 dated May 7, 2002, on the
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93781. The CA reversed the November 21, 2005 Resolution of reassignment of Pacheo to the Legal Division Revenue Region No. 4 San Fernanado,
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) declaring the re-assignment of respondent Minerva M.P. Pampanga, is hereby declared NOT VALID. ACCORDINGLY, Pacheo should now be recalled to
Pacheos (Pacheo) not valid  and ordering her reinstatement to her original station but without her original station. This Commission, however rules and so holds that the withholding by the
backwages under the principle of "no work, no pay." BIR of Pacheo’s salary for the period she did not report to work is justified.

The Facts The CSCRO No. III is directed to monitor the implementation of this Resolution.

Pacheo was a Revenue Attorney IV, Assistant Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of In granting Pacheo’s appeal, the CSC explained:
Internal Revenue (BIR) in Revenue Region No. 7 (RR7), Quezon City.
On the second issue, this Commission finds merit in appellant’s contention that her
On May 7, 2002, the BIR issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO) No. 25- reassignment in not valid.
2002,3 ordering the reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal Division from RR7 in
Quezon City to RR4 in San Fernando, Pampanga. The BIR cited exigencies of the revenue
service as basis for the issuance of the said RTAO. Of pertinent application thereto is Rule III, Section 6 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
series of 1998, dated December 14, 1998, which provides:

Pacheo questioned the reassignment through her Letter dated May 9, 20024 addressed to Rene
G. Banez, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). She complained that the transfer
would mean economic dislocation since she would have to spend ₱ 200.00 on daily travel
Section 6. Other Personnel Movements. The following personnel movements which will not In ANORE, Ma. Theresa F., this Commission ruled:
require issuance of an appointment shall nevertheless require an office order by duly authorized
official. ‘Anore, a lowly salaried employee, was reassigned to an isolated island 15 kilometers away from
her original place of assignment. She has to travel by boat with only one trip a day to report to
a. Reassignment – Movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the her new place of assignment in an office without any facilities, except its bare structure. Worst,
same department or agency which does not involve reduction in rank, status or salary. If the municipality did not provide her with transportation allowance. She was forced to be
reassignment is done without consent of the employee being reassigned it shall be allowed for a separated from her family, look for a boarding house where she can stay while in the island and
maximum period of one year. Reassignment is presumed to be regular and made in the interest spend for her board and lodging. The circumstances surrounding Anore’s reassignment is
of public service unless proven otherwise or it constitutes constructive dismissal. exactly the kind of reassignment that is being frowned upon by law.’

No assignment shall be undertaken if done indiscriminately or whimsically because the law is This Commission, however, rules and so holds that the withholding by the BIR of her salaries is
not intended as a convenient shield for the appointing/ disciplining authority to harass or oppress justified as she is not entitled thereto since she is deemed not to have performed any actual
a subordinate on the pretext of advancing and promoting public interest. work in the government on the principle of no work no pay.

Reassignment of small salaried employee is not permissible if it causes significant financial Accordingly, Pacheo should now be reinstated to her original station without any right to claim
dislocation.’ back salary as she did not report to work either at her new place of assignment or at her original
station.10 [Emphases in the original]
Although reassignment is a management prerogative, the same must be done in the exigency of
the service without diminution in rank, status and salary on the part of the officer or employee Still not satisfied, Pacheo moved for reconsideration. She argued that the CSC erred in not
being temporarily reassigned. Reassignment of ‘small salaried’ employees, however is not finding that she was constructively dismissed and, therefore, entitled to back salary.
allowed if it will cause significant financial dislocation to the employee reassigned. Otherwise the
Commission will have to intervene. On March 7, 2006, the CSC issued Resolution No. 06039711 denying Pacheo’s motion for
reconsideration.
The primary purpose of emphasizing ‘small salaried employees’ in the foregoing rule is to
protect the ‘rank and file’ employees from possible abuse by the management in the guise of Undaunted, Pacheo sought recourse before the CA via a petition for review.
transfer/reassignment. The Supreme Court in Alzate v. Mabutas, (51 O.G. 2452) ruled:
In its February 22, 2007 Decision, the CA reversed the CSC Resolution and ruled in favor of
‘ x x x [T]he protection against invalid transfer is especially needed by lower ranking employees. Pacheo, the fallo  of which states:
The Court emphasized this need when it ruled that officials in the unclassified service,
presidential appointees, men in the government set up occupy positions in the higher echelon
should be entitled to security of tenure, unquestionable  a lesser  sol[ci]itude cannot be meant for WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution nos. 051697  and 060397 dated November
the little men, that great mass of Common underprivileged employees-thousand there are of 21, 2005 and March 7, 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission are REVERSED and
them in the lower bracket, who generally are without connections and who pin their hopes of SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered finding petitioner to have been constructively
advancement on the merit system instituted by our civil service law.’ dismissed and ordering her immediate reinstatement with full backwages and benefits.

In other words, in order to be embraced in the term ‘small-salaried employees’, the latter must SO ORDERED.12
belong to the ‘rank and file’; and, his/her salary would be significantly reduced by virtue of the
transfer/reassignment. ‘Rank and file’ was categorized as those occupying the position of In setting aside CSC Resolution Nos. 051697 and 060397, the CA held that:
Division Chief and below, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 1, series of 1991, dated January 28,
1991. While this Court agrees that petitioner’s reassignment was not valid considering that a
diminution in salary is enough to invalidate such reassignment, We cannot agree that the latter
The facts established on record show that Pacheo belongs to the rank and file receiving an has not been constructively dismissed as a result thereof.
average monthly salary of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱ 20,000.00) under the salary
standardization law and a monthly take home pay of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (₱ 14,000.00). It is well to remember that constructive dismissal does not always involve forthright dismissal or
She has to spend around Four Thousand Pesos (₱ 4,000.00) a month for her transportation diminution in rank, compensation, benefits and privileges. For an act of clear discrimination,
expenses as a consequence of her reassignment, roughly twenty eight percent (28%) of her insensibility, or disdain by an employer may become so unbearable on the part of the employee
monthly take home pay. Clearly, Pacheo’s salary shall be significantly reduced as a result of her that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forgo his continued employment.
reassignment.
The management prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of Neither do we agree with the OSG when it opined that:
discretion and putting to mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. The employer must be
able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. No one in the Civil Service should be allowed to decide on whether she is going to accept or not
any work dictated upon by the exigency of the service. One should consider that public office is
In this case, petitioner’s reassignment will result in the reduction of her salary, not to mention the a public trust and that the act of respondent CIR enjoys the presumption of regularity. To uphold
physical burden that she would suffer in waking up early in the morning to travel daily from the failure of respondent to heed the RTAO would result in chaos. Every employee would put his
Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga and in coming home late at night. or her vested interest or personal opinion over and above the smooth functioning of the
bureaucracy.
Clearly, the insensibility of the employer is deducible from the foregoing circumstances and
petitioner may have no other choice but to forego her continued employment. Security of tenure is a right of paramount value as recognized and guaranteed under Sec. 3, Art.
XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Moreover, it would be inconsistent to hold that the reassignment was not valid due to the
significant reduction in petitioner’s salary and then rule that there is no constructive dismissal The State shall afford full protection to labor, xxx and promote full employment and equality of
just because said reduction in salary will not render petitioner penniless if she will report to her employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to xxx security of
new place of assignment. It must be noted that there is constructive dismissal when the tenure xxx
reassignment of an employee involves a diminution in pay.
Such constitutional right should not be denied on mere speculation of any similar unclear and
Having determined that petitioner has been constructively dismissed as a result of her nebulous basis.
reassignment, We shall resolve whether or not she is entitled to backwages.
In Garcia, et al. v. Lejano, et al., the Supreme Court rejected the OSG’s opinion that when the
In denying petitioner’s claim for backwages, the CSC held: transfer is motivated solely by the interest of the service of such act cannot be considered
violative of the Constitution, thus:
This Commission, however, rules and so holds that the withholding by the BIR of her salaries is
justified as she is not entitled thereto since she is deemed not to have performed any actual "We do not agree to this view. While temporary transfers or assignments may be made of the
work in the government on the principle of no work no pay. personnel of a bureau or department without first obtaining the consent of the employee
concerned within the scope of Section 79 (D) of the Administrative Code which party provides
Accordingly, Pacheo should now be reinstated to her original station without any right to claim that ‘The Department Head also may, from time to time, in the interest of the service, change the
back salary as she did not report for work either at her new place of assignment or at her original distribution among the several Bureaus and offices of his Department of the employees or
station." subordinates authorized by law,’ such cannot be undertaken when the transfer of the employee
is with a view to his removal. Such cannot be done without the consent of the employee. And if
the transfer is resorted to as a scheme to lure the employee away from his permanent position,
Pacheo, while belonging to the rank-and-file employees, is holding a responsible position as an such attitude is improper as it would in effect result in a circumvention of the prohibition which
Assistant Division Chief, who could not just abandon her duties merely because she protested safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the civil service. It is not without reason that
her re-assignment and filed an appeal afterwards. this Court made the following observation:

We do not agree. To permit circumvention of the constitutional prohibition in question by allowing removal from
office without lawful cause, in the form or guise of transfers from one office to another, or from
If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course one province to another, without the consent of the transferee, would blast the hopes of these
the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or young civil service officials and career men and women, destroy their security and tenure of
suspended. The "No work, no pay" principle contemplates a "no work" situation where the office and make for a subservient, discontented and inefficient civil service force that sways with
employees voluntarily absent themselves. every political wind that blows and plays up to whatever political party is in the saddle. That
would be far from what the framers of our Constitution contemplated and desired. Neither would
In this case, petitioner was forced to forego her continued employment and did not just abandon that be our concept of a free and efficient Government force, possessed of self-respect and
her duties. In fact, she lost no time in protesting her reassignment as a form of constructive reasonable ambition."
dismissal. It is settled that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with a
charge of abandonment. The filing of the complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to Clearly, the principle of "no work, no pay" does not apply in this case. As held in Neeland v.
work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment. Villanueva, Jr:
"We also cannot deny back salaries and other economic benefits on the ground that respondent either in her original station or new place of assignment in clear violation of Section 24 (f) of
Clerk of Court did not work. For the principle of "no work, no pay" does not apply when the Presidential Decree (PD)  No. 807.17 Citing jurisprudence,18 the CSC avers that the RTAO is
employee himself was forced out of job. Xxx Indeed, it is not always true that back salaries are immediately executory, unless otherwise ordered by the CSC. Therefore, Pacheo should have
paid only when work is done. Xxx For another, the poor employee could offer no work since he first reported to her new place of assignment and then appealed her case to the CSC if she
was forced out of work. Thus, to always require complete exoneration or performance of work indeed believed that there was no justification for her reassignment. Since Pacheo did not report
would ultimately leave the dismissal uncompensated no matter how grossly disproportionate the for work at all, she is not entitled to backwages following the principle of "no work, no pay."
penalty was. Clearly, it does not serve justice to simply restore the dismissed employee to his
position and deny him his claim for back salaries and other economic benefits on these grounds.
We would otherwise be serving justice in halves."
THE COURT’S RULING
An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back
wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement.
This is only fair and sensible because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally The petition fails to persuade.
dismissed is considered as not having left his office and should be given a comparable
compensation at the time of his reinstatement. It appears undisputed that the reassignment of Pacheo was not valid. In its memorandum, the
OSG initially argues for the validity of RTAO No. 25-2002 authorizing Pacheo’s reassignment
When a government official or employee in the classified civil service had been illegally from Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, however, it specifically prays for the
dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered reinstatement of CSC Resolution Nos. 051697 and 060397, which categorically declared RTAO
as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him No. 25-2002 as not valid. In seeking such relief, the OSG has effectively accepted the finding of
by virtue of the office that he held.13 the CSC, as affirmed by the CA, that Pacheo’s reassignment was indeed invalid. Since the issue
of Pacheo’s reassignment is already settled, the Court finds it futile to pass upon the same at
this point.
The CSC moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the CA in its May 15, 2007
Resolution.
The question that remains to be resolved is whether or not Pacheo’s assignment constitutes
constructive dismissal and, thus, entitling her to reinstatement and backwages. Was Pacheo
Hence, this petition. constructively dismissed by reason of her reassignment?

THE ISSUES The Court agrees with the CA on this point.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED DECISION IS LEGALLY CORRECT IN While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the
DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISED AND employee's prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his
ENTITLED TO BACK WAGES, NOTWITHSTANDING RESPONDENT’S REFUSAL TO removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to
COMPLY WITH BIR RTAO No. 25-2002 WHICH IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect
PURSUANT TO SECTION 24 (F) OF P.D. 807. circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil
Service.19
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SUFFERED A DIMINUTION IN HER SALARY IN
RELATION TO SECTION 6, RULE III OF CSC MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR No. 40, Significantly, Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines
SERIES OF 1998, DATED DECEMBER 14, 1998, AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency
[OF] BIR RTAO No. 25-2002 ORDERING HER REASSIGNMENT FROM BIR RR No. 7 head’s unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued work
IN QUEZON CITY TO BIR RR No. 4 IN SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA. 14 impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur
although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from
In her Memorandum,15 Pacheo asserts that RTAO No. 25-2002, on the pretense of the one position of dignity to a more servile or menial job.
exigencies of the revenue service, was solely meant to harass her and force her to resign. As a
result of her invalid reassignment, she was constructively dismissed and, therefore, entitled to The CSC, through the OSG, contends that the deliberate refusal of Pacheo to report for work
her back salaries and monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her either in her original station in Quezon City or her new place of assignment in San Fernando,
reinstatement. Pampanga negates her claim of constructive dismissal in the present case being in violation of
Section 24 (f) of P.D. 807 [now Executive Order (EO) 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5,
In its own Memorandum,16 the CSC, through the OSG, argues that constructive dismissal is not Section 26 (6)].20 It further argues that the subject RTAO was immediately executory, unless
applicable in this case because it was Pacheo herself who adamantly refused to report for work otherwise ordered by the CSC. It was, therefore, incumbent on Pacheo to have reported to her
new place of assignment and then appealed her case to the CSC if she indeed believed that Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employee’s security of
there was no justification for her reassignment. tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed
Anent the first argument of CSC, the Court cannot sustain the proposition. It was legally without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are
impossible for Pacheo to report to her original place of assignment in Quezon City considering tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.21
that the subject RTAO No. 25-2002 also reassigned Amado Rey B. Pagarigan (Pagarigan) as
Assistant Chief, Legal Division, from RR4, San Fernando, Pampanga to RR7, Quezon City, the The Court is not unaware that the BIR is authorized to assign or reassign internal revenue
very same position Pacheo formerly held. The reassignment of Pagarigan to the same position officers and employees as the exigencies of service may require. This authority of the BIR,
palpably created an impediment to Pacheo’s return to her original station. however, should be prudently exercised in accordance with existing civil service rules.

The Court finds Itself unable to agree to CSC’s argument that the subject RTAO was Having ruled that Pacheo was constructively dismissed, is she entitled to reinstatement and
immediately executory. The Court deems it necessary to distinguish between a detail and back wages? The Court agrees with the CA that she is entitled to reinstatement, but finds Itself
reassignment, as they are governed by different rules. unable to sustain the ruling that she is entitled to full back wages and benefits. It is a settled
jurisprudence22 that an illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back salaries but
A detail is defined and governed by Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years, and not full back salaries from his illegal
Section 26 (6), thus: dismissal up to his reinstatement.

(6) Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed February 22, 2007 Decision and May 15,
issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 93781, are
employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that respondent Minerva M.P. Pacheo is hereby
that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending ordered reinstated without loss of seniority rights but is only entitled to the payment of back
appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the salaries corresponding to five (5) years from the date of her invalid reassignment on May 7,
Commission. [Underscoring supplied] 2002.

On the other hand, a reassignment is defined and governed by E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, SO ORDERED.
Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7), thus:
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
(7) Reassignment.—An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in Associate Justice
the same agency; Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status
or salaries. [Underscoring supplied] WE CONCUR:

The principal distinctions between a detail and reassignment lie in the place where the employee RENATO C. CORONA
is to be moved and in its effectivity pending appeal with the CSC. Based on the definition, a Chief Justice
detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment requires a
movement within the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail
is immediately executory, whereas a reassignment order does not become immediately ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
effective.1âwphi1 Associate Justice Associate Justice

In the case at bench, the lateral movement of Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal Division from TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga within the same agency is undeniably a Associate Justice Associate Justice
reassignment. The OSG posits that she should have first reported to her new place of
assignment and then subsequently question her reassignment. It is clear, however, from E.O.
292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7) that there is no such duty to first report DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
to the new place of assignment prior to questioning an alleged invalid reassignment imposed Associate Justice Associate Justice
upon an employee. Pacheo was well within her right not to report immediately to RR4, San
Fernando, Pampanga, and to question her reassignment.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
 b. The filing fee of Three Hundred (₱ 300.00) has not been paid, or
Associate Justice Associate Justice
c. The appeal does not contain a certification on non-forum shopping.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

8 
Associate Justice Associate Justice Rollo, pp. 125.

9 
Id. at 148-155.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice 10 
Id. at 79-81.

11 
Id. at 82-85.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
12 
Id. at 69.
CERTIFICATION
13 
Citations omitted, id. at 64-69.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the 14 
Id. at 45-46.
Court.
15 
Id. at 279-283.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice 16 
Id. at 254-273.

17 
Footnotes Section 24. Personnel Actions.

1 
Rollo, pp. 59-70. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon with Associate Justice xxx
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring.
(f) Detail. A detail is the movement on an employee from one agency to another without
2 
Id. at 72-73. the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the
case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the
employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to
3 
Id. at 118. the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory
unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.(Underscoring supplied)
4 
Id. at 119-121.
18 
Teotico v. Agda, 274 Phil. 960 (1991).
5 
Id. at 122.
19 
Bentain v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89452, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 644, 648.
6 
Id. at 123-124.
20 
Section 26. Personnel Actions.
7 
Section 73. Requirement of Filing. – The appellant shall furnish a copy of his appeal to the head
of department or agency concerned who shall submit his comment, together with the records, to xxx
the Commission within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Proof of service of the appeal on the
head of department or agency shall be submitted with the Commission.
(6) Detail. A detail is the movement on an employee from one agency to another without
the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the
Section 74. Grounds for Dismissal. – An appeal involving non-disciplinary cases shall be case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the
dismissed on any of the following grounds: employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to
the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory
unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. (Underscoring supplied)
a. The appeal is filed beyond the reglementary period;
 21 
Yenko v. Gungon, G.R. No. 165450, August 13, 2009, 595 SCRA 562, 576-577. THE ANTECEDENTS

22 
Id. at 580, citing Adiong v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 713, 721 (2001); Marohombsar v. Court of On September 20, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) appointed Imelda C.
Appeals, 382 Phil. 825, 836 (2000); San Luis v. Court of Appeals, Tan, Jr. v. Office of the Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM, representing the civilian sector.3 On
President, G.R. No. 110936, February 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 677, 679; Salcedo v. Court of Appeals,
January 25, 2006, PGMA reappointed Roces as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner.4 When
171 Phil. 368, 375 (1978); Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II, 170 Phil. 208,221 (1977); Cristobal
v. Melchor, 168 Phil. 328, 341 (1977). Roces died in September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on July 21,
20085 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA
appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated
him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.6

Republic of the Philippines Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P. de
SUPREME COURT Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners.
Manila Urro’s appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010; while the appointment papers of De Guzman
and Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010.7 On March 9, 2010, Escueta took his oath of office
EN BANC before Makati Regional Trial Court Judge Alberico Umali.8

G.R. No. 191560               March 29, 2011 In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V.
Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory letters to the respondents. The letter uniformly
HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police Commission, Petitioner, reads.
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, in his capacity as the new appointee vice herein petitioner You have just been appointed COMMISSIONER xxx National Police Commission. xxx Attached
HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, National Police Commission, Respondent. is your appointment paper duly signed by Her Excellency, President Macapagal Arroyo.9

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010,10 the petitioner filed
the present petition questioning the validity of the respondents’ appointments mainly on the
HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police Commission, Petitioner, ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.11
vs.
President GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, thru Executive Secretary LEANDRO On March 25, 2010 and April 27, 2010, respondents Urro and de Guzman took their oath of
MENDOZA, in Her capacity as the appointing power, HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, in His office as NAPOLCOM Commissioners before DILG Secretary Puno and Sandiganbayan
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government and as Ex- Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez, respectively.12
Officio Chairman of the National Police Commission and HON. EDUARDO U. ESCUETA,
ALEJANDRO S. URRO, and HON. CONSTANCIA P. DE GUZMAN as the midnight On July 30, 2010, the newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency
appointees, Respondents. Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and
Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional
DECISION Ban on Midnight Appointments." The salient portions of E.O. No. 2 read:

BRION, J.: SECTION 1. Midnight Appointments Defined. – The following appointments made by the former
President and other appointing authorities in departments, agencies, offices, and
Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto,1 and Certiorari and/or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered as
Prohibition2 with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or midnight appointments:
preliminary injunction filed by Atty. Luis Mario General (petitioner). The petitioner seeks to
declare unconstitutional the appointments of Alejandro S. Urro, Constancia P. de Guzman and (a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all appointments bearing dates
Eduardo U. Escueta (collectively, the respondents) as Commissioners of the National Police prior to March 11, 2010 where the appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or
Commission (NAPOLCOM), and to prohibit then Executive Secretary Leandro Mendoza and assumed public office on or after March 11, 2010, except temporary appointments in
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno from enforcing the executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
the respondents’ oath of office. Particularly, the petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted endanger public safety as may be determined by the appointing authority.
as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be allowed to continue in office.
 (b) Those made prior to March 11, 2010, but to take effect after said date or The respondents likewise counter that what the ban on midnight appointments under Section 15,
appointments to office that would be vacant only after March 11, 2010. Article VII of the Constitution prohibits is only the making of an appointment by the President
sixty (60) days before the next presidential elections and until his term expires; it does not
(c) Appointments and promotions made during the period of 45 days prior to the May prohibit the acceptance by the appointee of his appointment within the same prohibited
10, 2010 elections in violation of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. period.19 The respondents claim that "appointment" which is a presidential act, must be
distinguished from the "acceptance" or "rejection" of the appointment, which is the act of the
appointee. Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution is directed only against the President and
SECTION 2. Recall, Withdraw, and Revocation of Midnight Appointments. Midnight his act of appointment, and is not concerned with the act/s of the appointee. Since the
appointments, as defined under Section 1, are hereby recalled, withdrawn, and revoked. The respondents were appointed (per the date appearing in their appointment papers) before the
positions covered or otherwise affected are hereby declared vacant. (Emphasis supplied.) constitutional ban took effect, then their appointments are valid.

THE PETITION The respondents assert that their appointments cannot be considered as midnight appointments
under the Dominador R. Aytona v. Andres V. Castillo, et al.20 ruling, as restated in In Re:
The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted from the Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela, et al.21 and Arturo M. de
date of her appointment in October (should be September) 2004.13 Since she failed to finish her Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al.,22 since the petitioner failed to substantiate his claim
six-year term, then the petitioner is entitled to serve this unexpired portion or until October that their appointments were made only "for the purpose of influencing the Presidential
(should be September) 2010.14 The petitioner invokes Republic Act (R.A.) No. 697515 (otherwise elections," or for "partisan reasons."23
known as the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990) which requires that
vacancies in the NAPOLCOM "shall be filled up for the unexpired term only."16 Because of the The respondents pray for the issuance of a TRO to stop the implementation of E.O. No. 2, and
mandatory word "shall," the petitioner concludes that the appointment issued to him was really a for the consolidation of this case with the pending cases of Tamondong v. Executive
"regular" appointment, notwithstanding what appears in his appointment paper. As a regular Secretary24 and De Castro v. Office of the President25 which similarly assail the validity of E.O.
appointee, the petitioner argues that he cannot be removed from office except for cause. No. 2.

The petitioner alternatively submits that even if his appointment were temporary, a temporary On the other hand, while the OSG considers the respondents’ appointments within the scope of
appointment does not give the President the license to abuse a public official simply because he "midnight appointments" as defined by E.O. No. 2, the OSG nonetheless submits that the
lacks security of tenure.17 He asserts that the validity of his termination from office depends on petitioner is not entitled to the remedy of quo warranto in view of the nature of his appointment.
the validity of the appointment of the person intended to replace him. He explains that until a The OSG claims that since an appointment in an acting capacity cannot exceed one year, the
presidential appointment is "officially released," there is no "appointment" to speak of. Since the petitioner’s appointment ipso facto expired on July 21, 2009.26
appointment paper of respondent Urro, while bearing a date prior to the effectivity of the
constitutional ban on appointments,18 was officially released (per the congratulatory letter dated
March 19, 2010 issued to Urro) when the appointment ban was already in effect, then the PETITIONER’S REPLY
petitioner’s appointment, though temporary in nature, should remain effective as no new and
valid appointment was effectively made. The petitioner argues in reply that he is the legally subsisting commissioner until another
qualified commissioner is validly appointed by the new President to replace him.27
The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of respondents De Guzman and Escueta,
claiming that they were also made in violation of the constitutional ban on appointments. The petitioner likewise claims that the respondents appeared to have skirted the element of
issuance of an appointment in considering whether an appointment is made. The petitioner
THE COMMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS and THE OFFICE asserts that to constitute an appointment, the President’s act of affixing his signature must be
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG) coupled with the physical issuance of the appointment to the appointee – i.e., the appointment
paper is officially issued in favor of the appointee through the President’s proper Cabinet
Secretary. The making of an appointment is different from its issuance since prior to the official
Prefatorily, the respondents characterize Escueta’s inclusion in the present petition as an error issuance of an appointment, the appointing authority enjoys the prerogative to change his mind.
since his appointment, acceptance and assumption of office all took place before the In the present case, the respondents’ appointment papers were officially issued and
constitutional ban on appointments started. Thus, there is no "case or controversy" as to communicated to them only on March 19, 2010, well within the period of the constitutional ban,
Escueta. as shown by the congratulatory letters individually issued to them.

The respondents posit that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to file a petition for quo Given this premise, the petitioner claims that he correctly impleaded Escueta in this case since
warranto since he was merely appointed in an acting capacity and could be validly removed his appointment also violates the Constitution. The petitioner adds that Escueta was appointed
from office at anytime. on July 21, 2008, although then as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner. By permanently
appointing him as NAPOLCOM Commissioner, he stands to be in office for more than six years, The resolution of whether a cause of action exists, in turn, hinges on the nature of the
in violation of R.A. No. 6975.28 petitioner’s appointment. We frame the issues under the following questions:

The petitioner argues that even granting that the President can extend appointments in an acting 1. What is the nature of the petitioner’s appointment as acting NAPOLCOM
capacity to NAPOLCOM Commissioners, it may not be done by "successive appointments" in Commissioner?
the same capacity without violating R.A. No. 6975, as amended, which provides a fixed and
staggered term of office for NAPOLCOM Commissioners.29 2. Does the petitioner have the clear right to be reinstated to his former position and to
oust respondent Urro as NAPOLCOM Commissioner?

I. Nature of petitioner’s appointment

a. A staggered term of office is not inconsistent with an acting appointment

THE COURT’S RULING
The petitioner asserts that contrary to what appears in his appointment paper, the appointment
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit. extended to him was really a regular appointment; thus, he cannot be removed from office
except for cause. The petitioner argues that the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of Commissioner or, at the very least, the "successive appointments" of NAPOLCOM
judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and Commissioners in an acting capacity contravenes the safeguards that the law - R.A. No. 697533 -
appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party intends through the staggered term of office of NAPOLCOM Commissioners.
raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.30 Notably, the petitioner does not expressly claim that he was issued a permanent appointment;
rather, he claims that his appointment is actually a regular appointment since R.A. No. 6975
Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents’ appointments in does not allegedly allow an appointment of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner in an acting capacity.
light of E.O. No. 2 and the subsequent filing before the Court of several petitions questioning this
Executive Order. The parties, however, appear to have overlooked the basic principle in At the outset, the petitioner’s use of terms needs some clarification. Appointments may be
constitutional adjudication that enjoins the Court from passing upon a constitutional question, classified into two: first, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made.34
although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground.31 In
constitutional law terms, this means that we ought to refrain from resolving any constitutional Under the first classification, appointments can either be permanent or temporary (acting). A
issue "unless the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case." basic distinction is that a permanent appointee can only be removed from office for cause;
whereas a temporary appointee can be removed even without hearing or cause.35 Under the
Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action." This last requisite of judicial review is second classification, an appointment can either be regular or ad interim. A regular appointment
simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of is one made while Congress is in session, while an ad interim appointment is one issued during
our co-equal branches of the government. Ultimately, it is rooted in the principle of separation of the recess of Congress. In strict terms, presidential appointments that require no confirmation
powers. Given the presumed validity of an executive act, the petitioner who claims otherwise from the Commission on Appointments36 cannot be properly characterized as either a regular or
has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the constitutional an ad interim appointment.
question he raised is determined by the Court.32
In this light, what the petitioner may have meant is a permanent (as contrasted to a temporary or
In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents’ appointments is not the lis mota of acting) appointment to the office of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner, at least for the duration of the
the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the unexpired portion of his predecessor (Roces).
petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition – a quo warranto
against respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for quo warranto, a Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary
discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments of the respondents is rendered completely appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or
unnecessary. The inclusion of the grounds for certiorari and/or prohibition does not alter the where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved.37 The President’s
essential character of the petitioner’s action since he does not even allege that he has a power to issue an acting appointment is particularly authorized by the Administrative Code of
personal and substantial interest in raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).
respondents are concerned.
 CHAPTER 5 vacancies in offices whose holders are appointed on staggered basis. Under Presidential
POWER OF APPOINTMENT Decree (P.D.) No. 189,43 (the charter of the PTA, as amended by P.D. No. 56444 and P.D. No.
140045), the members of the PTA’s governing body are all presidential appointees whose terms
Section 16. Power of Appointment. - The President shall exercise the power to appoint such of office are also staggered.46 This, notwithstanding, the Court sustained the temporary
officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws. character of the appointment extended by the President in favor of the PTA General Manager,
even if the law47 also fixes his term of office at six years unless sooner removed for cause.
Section 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. –
Interestingly, even a staggered term of office does not ensure that at no instance will the
appointing authority appoint all the members of a body whose members are appointed on
(1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government staggered basis.
service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer
regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, The post-war predecessor of the NAPOLCOM was the Police Commission created under R.A.
absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy; No. 4864.48 Pursuant to the 1987 constitutional provision mandating the creation of one national
civilian police force,49 Congress enacted R.A. No. 6975 and created the NAPOLCOM to
exercise, inter alia, "administrative control over the Philippine National Police." Later, Congress
(2) xxx enacted R.A. No. 8551 which substantially retained the organizational structure, powers and
functions of the NAPOLCOM.50 Under these laws, the President has appointed the members of
(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year. the Commission whose terms of office are staggered.

The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of Under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6975, the NAPOLCOM Commissioners are all given a fixed term
official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a of six years (except the two of the first appointees who hold office only for four years). By
permanent or another appointee. An acting appointee accepts the position on the condition that staggering their terms of office however, the four regular commissioners would not vacate their
he shall surrender the office once he is called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his offices at the same time since a vacancy will occur every two years.
term of office is not fixed but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority. His separation
from the service does not import removal but merely the expiration of his term — a mode of Under the NAPOLCOM set up, the law does not appear to have been designed to attain the
termination of official relations that falls outside the coverage of the constitutional provision on purpose of preventing the same President from appointing all the NAPOLCOM Commissioners
security of tenure38 since no removal from office is involved. by staggering their terms of office. R.A. No. 6975 took effect on January 1, 1991. In the usual
course, the term of office of the first two regular commissioners would have expired in 1997,
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature39 and the limitations on or qualifications in while the term of the other two commissioners would have expired in 1995. Since the term of the
the exercise of this power are strictly construed.40 In the present case, the petitioner posits that President elected in the first national elections under the 1987 Constitution expired on June 30,
the law itself, R.A. No. 6975, prohibits the appointment of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner in an 1998, then, theoretically, the sitting President for the 1992-1998 term could appoint all the
acting capacity by staggering his term of office. R.A. No. 6975, on the term of office, states: succeeding four regular NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The next President, on the other hand,
whose term ended in 2004, would have appointed the next succeeding Commissioners in 2001
Section 16. Term of Office. – The four (4) regular and full-time Commissioners shall be and 2003.
appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary. Of the first four (4)
commissioners to be appointed, two (2) commissioners shall serve for six (6) years and the two It is noteworthy, too, that while the Court nullified the attempt of Congress to consider the terms
(2) other commissioners for four (4) years. All subsequent appointments shall be for a period of of office of the then NAPOLCOM Commissioners as automatically expired on the ground that
six (6) years each, without reappointment or extension. there was no bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM,51 a provision on the staggering of
terms of office is evidently absent in R.A. No. 8551 - the amendatory law to R.A. No. 6975.
Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office is to minimize the appointing authority’s Section 7 of R.A. No. 8551 reads:
opportunity to appoint a majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure
the continuity of the body and its policies.41 A staggered term of office, however, is not a Section 7. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:
statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment.
It does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary appointments that the "SEC. 16. Term of Office. – The four (4) regular and full-time Commissioners shall be appointed
Administrative Code grants. by the President for a term of six (6) years without re-appointment or extension."

Ramon P. Binamira v. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr.,42 involving the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA),
is an example of how this Court has recognized the validity of temporary appointments in
Thus, as the law now stands, the petitioner’s claim that the appointment of an acting nothing repugnant between the petitioner’s acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of
NAPOLCOM Commissioner is not allowed based on the staggering of terms of office does not the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the
even have any statutory basis. other.

Given the wide latitude of the President’s appointing authority (and the strict construction against b. R.A. No. 6975 does not prohibit the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in
any limitation on or qualification of this power), the prohibition on the President from issuing an filling up vacancies in the NAPOLCOM
acting appointment must either be specific, or there must be a clear repugnancy between the
nature of the office and the temporary appointment. No such limitation on the President’s The petitioner next cites Section 18 of R.A. No. 6975 to support his claim that the appointment of
appointing power appears to be clearly deducible from the text of R.A. No. 6975 in the manner a NAPOLCOM Commissioner to fill a vacancy due to the permanent incapacity of a regular
we ruled in Nacionalista Party v. Bautista.52 In that case, we nullified the acting appointment Commissioner can only be permanent and not temporary:
issued by the President to fill the office of a Commissioner of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) on the ground that it would undermine the independence of the COMELEC. We
ruled that given the specific nature of the functions performed by COMELEC Commissioners, Section 18. Removal from Office. – The members of the Commission may be removed from
only a permanent appointment to the office of a COMELEC Commissioner can be made. office for cause. All vacancies in the Commission, except through expiration of term, shall be
filled up for the unexpired term only: Provided, That any person who shall be appointed in this
case shall be eligible for regular appointment for another full term.
Under the Constitution, the State is mandated to establish and maintain a police force to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, the Congress enacted R.A. No. 6975, creating the NAPOLCOM with the following Nothing in the cited provision supports the petitioner’s conclusion. By using the word "only" in
powers and functions:53 Section 18 of R.A. No. 6975, the law’s obvious intent is only to prevent the new appointee from
serving beyond the term of office of the original appointee. It does not prohibit the new appointee
from serving less than the unexpired portion of the term as in the case of a temporary
Section 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall exercise the appointment.
following powers and functions:
While the Court previously inquired into the true nature of a supposed acting appointment for the
(a) Exercise administrative control and operational supervision over the Philippine purpose of determining whether the appointing power is abusing the principle of temporary
National Police which shall mean the power to: appointment,56 the petitioner has not pointed to any circumstance/s which would warrant a
second look into and the invalidation of the temporary nature of his appointment.57
xxxx
Even the petitioner’s citation of Justice Puno’s58 dissenting opinion in Teodoro B. Pangilinan v.
b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and administration; Guillermo T. Maglaya, etc.59 is inapt. Like the petitioner, Pangilinan was merely appointed in an
acting capacity and unarguably enjoyed no security of tenure. He was relieved from the service
c) Render to the President and to the Congress an annual report on its activities and after exposing certain anomalies involving his superiors. Upon hearing his plea for
accomplishments during the thirty (30) days after the end of the calendar year, which reinstatement, the Court unanimously observed that Pangilinan’s relief was a punitive response
shall include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in the organization and from his superiors. The point of disagreement, however, is whether Pangilinan’s lack of security
administration of police agencies in the municipalities, cities and provinces throughout of tenure deprives him of the right to seek reinstatement. Considering that the law
the country, and recommendations for appropriate remedial legislation; (Administrative Code of 1987) allows temporary appointments only for a period not exceeding
twelve (12) months, the majority considered Pangilinan to be without any judicial remedy since
at the time of his separation, he no longer had any right to the office. Justice Puno dissented,
d) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty (60) days before arguing that Pangilinan’s superiors’ abuse of his temporary appointment furnishes the basis for
the commencement of each calendar year, a crime prevention program; and the relief he seeks.

e) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act In the present case, the petitioner does not even allege that his separation from the office
and as the President may direct. [Emphasis added.] amounted to an abuse of his temporary appointment that would entitle him to the incidental
benefit of reinstatement.60 As we did in Pangilinan,61 we point out that the petitioner’s
We find nothing in this enumeration of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that would appointment as Acting Commissioner was time-limited. His appointment ipso facto expired on
be subverted or defeated by the President’s appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM July 21, 2009 when it was not renewed either in an acting or a permanent capacity. With an
Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee. Viewed as an expired appointment, he technically now occupies no position on which to anchor his quo
institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances54 will show that the NAPOLCOM warranto petition.
has always remained as an office under or within the Executive Department.55 Clearly, there is
c. The petitioner is estopped From this perspective, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed
from claiming that he was permanently appointed office as a condition precedent to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the respondents’
appointments. The petitioner’s failure in this regard renders a ruling on the constitutional issues
The petitioner’s appointment paper is dated July 21, 2008. From that time until he was apprised raised completely unnecessary. Neither do we need to pass upon the validity of the
on March 22, 2010 of the appointment of respondent Urro, the petitioner faithfully discharged the respondents’ appointment. These latter issues can be determined more appropriately in a proper
functions of his office without expressing any misgivings on the character of his appointment. case.
However, when called to relinquish his office in favor of respondent Urro, the petitioner was
quick on his feet to refute what appeared in his appointment papers. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Under these facts, the additional circumstance of estoppel clearly militates against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
A person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity, extended and received without any
protest or reservation, and who acts by virtue of that appointment for a considerable time, ARTURO D. BRION
cannot later on be heard to say that the appointment was really a permanent one so that he Associate Justice
could not be removed except for cause.62
WE CONCUR:
II. An acting appointee has no
cause of action for quo warranto
against the new appointee RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
The Rules of Court requires that an ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of
action,63 which is defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the
other which causes the latter injury. While a quo warranto is a special civil action, the existence ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
of a cause of action is not any less required since both special and ordinary civil actions are Associate Justice Associate Justice
governed by the rules on ordinary civil actions subject only to the rules prescribed specifically for
a particular special civil action.64
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public
office.lihpwal Generally, quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the
proper party-plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
CASTRO
another. We stress that the person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf Associate Justice
Associate Justice
must show that he is entitled to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at
any stage.65 Emphatically, Section 6, Rule 66 of the same Rules requires the petitioner to state
in the petition his right to the public office and the respondent’s unlawful possession of the LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
disputed position. Associate Justice Associate Justice

As early as 1905,66 the Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful,
the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office.67 His failure to ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of action; it is not even Associate Justice Associate Justice
necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his appointment, continues
in the undisturbed possession of his office.68
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly
does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition.69 The essence of an acting
appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing
authority.70 The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right71 to the office for his suit Associate Justice
to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.
 17
CERTIFICATION  Rollo, pp. 18-19.

18
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions  The constitutional ban on appointments started on March 10, 2010.
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court. 19
 Rollo, p. 160.

RENATO C. CORONA 20
 G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962, 4 SCRA 1.
Chief Justice
21
 A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408.
Footnotes
22
1
 G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No.
 Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, and G.R. No. 191420, March 17, 2010.
2
 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 23
 Rollo, p. 166.
3
 Rollo, p. 201. 24
 Docketed as G.R. No. 192987.
4
 Id. at 202. 25
 Docketed as G.R. No. 192991.
5
On July 31, 2008, the petitioner took his oath of office before DILG Secretary (and 26
 Citing Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292; and Pimentel, Jr. v.
NAPOLCOM Chairman) Ronaldo V. Puno; id. at 10. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587.
6
 Id. at 33 and 180. 27
 Rollo, pp. 222-223.
7
 Id. at 337 and 179. 28
 Id. at 268.
8
 Id. at 162. 29
 Id. at 279-280.
9
 Id. at 336, 338 and 340. 30
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338
SCRA 81.
10
 Id. at 11.
31
 Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516 (1946).
11
 Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.
32
 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
12
 Rollo, pp. 149 and 162.
33
 R.A. No. 6975, Section 16 reads:
13
 Id. at 201.
Section 16. Term of Office. – The four (4) regular and full-time
14
 Ibid. Commissioners shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation
of the Secretary. Of the first four (4) commissioners to be appointed, two (2)
15
 An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department commissioners shall serve for six (6) years and the two (2) other
of the Interior and Local Government, December 13, 1990. commissioners for four (4) years. All subsequent appointments shall be for a
period of six (6) years each, without reappointment or extension.
16
 Section 18, R.A. No. 6975.
 R.A. No. 8551, Section 7 reads: Section 2. Section 23 is hereby amended by adding a new Section to read as
follows:
Section 7. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as
follows: "Section 23-A. General Manager. Appointment and Tenure. The General
Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall
"SEC. 16. Term of Office. — The four (4) regular and full-time serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided,
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President for a term of six (6) years That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor
without re-appointment or extension." shall have been appointed and qualified."

46
34
 See Marohombsar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126481, February 18, 2000, 326  Sections 14-16 of P.D. No. 564 reads:
SCRA 62.
Section 14. Board of Directors Composition. The corporate powers and
35
 Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr., G.R. No. 93711, February 25, 1991, 194 SCRA 390. functions of the Authority shall be vested in and exercised by a Board of
Directors, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall be composed of:
36
(a) the Secretary of Tourism as Chairman; (b) the General Manager of the
 See Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992, 208 SCRA 254. Authority as Vice Chairman; and (c) three (3) part-time members who shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman of the Board may
37
 Cabiling v. Pabualan, G.R. Nos. L-21764 and L-21765, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 274, at the same time be appointed by the President as General Manager of the
citing Tañada and Carreon, Philippine Political Law, 1961 ed. Authority.

38
 Achacoso v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA 235. Section 15. Term of Office. The term of office of the part-time members of the
Board shall be six years. Of the part-time members first appointed, one shall
39
 Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, supra note 24. hold office for six years, one for four years, and the last one for two years. A
successor to a member whose term has expired shall be appointed for the full
40
term of six years from the date of expiration of the term for which his
 Sarmiento III v. Mison, No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549. predecessor was appointed.

41
 Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 ed. p. 301. Section 16. Vacancy Before Expiration of Term. Any member appointed to fill
a vacancy in the Board occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which
42
 G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 154. his predecessor was appointed shall serve only for the unexpired portion of
the term of his predecessor.
43
 AMENDING PART IX OF THE INTEGRATED REORGANIZATION PLAN BY
47
RENAMING THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND TOURISM AS THE DEPARTMENT  P.D. No. 1400.
OF TOURISM, AND CREATING THE DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM WITH A
PHILIPPINE TOURIST AUTHORITY ATTACHED TO IT IN LIEU OF PHILIPPINE 48
 AN ACT CREATING THE POLICE COMMISSION, AMENDING AND REVISING
TOURIST COMMISSION; May 11, 1973. THE LAWS RELATIVE TO THE LOCAL POLICE SYSTEM, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES; August 8, 1966. Section 3 of R.A. No. 4864 reads:
44
 REVISING THE CHARTER OF THE PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY
CREATED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 189, DATED MAY 11, 1973; Sec. 3. Creation of Police Commission. To carry out the objectives of this Act,
October 2, 1974. there is hereby created a Police Commission under the Office of the President
of the Philippines composed of a chairman and two other members, to be
45
 FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 564, AS AMENDED, appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE PHILIPPINE TOURISM Appointments, and who shall hold office for a term of seven years and may not
AUTHORITY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; June 5, 1978. Section 2 of P.D. be reappointed. Of the members of the Police Commission first appointed, one
No.1400 reads: shall hold office for seven years, another for five years and the other for three
years. The Chairman and members of the Police Commission may only be
removed from office for cause.
49 62
 Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution.  Cabiling, et al. v. Pabulaan, et al., 121 Phil. 1068 (1965); and Marohombsar v.
Alonto, Jr., supra note 33.
50
 See Canonizado v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, January 25, 2000, 323 SCRA 312.
63
 Section 1, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
51
 Id.
64
 Section 3(a), par. 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.
52
 85 Phil. 101 (1949); Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192
65
SCRA 358.  Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, 593 SCRA 68.

53 66
 As amended by R.A. No. 8551.  Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18 (1905).

54 67
 R.A. No. 4864 (AN ACT CREATING THE POLICE COMMISSION, AMENDING AND  Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 817.
REVISING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO THE LOCAL POLICE SYSTEM, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES, August 8, 1966); P.D. No. 765 (PROVIDING FOR THE 68
 Castro v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. L-17915, January 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 196,
CONSTITUTION OF THE INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE AND FOR OTHER citing Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18.
PURPOSES, August 8, 1975); E.O. No. 1040 (TRANSFERRING THE NATIONAL
POLICE COMMISSION TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, July 10, 1985); E.O. 69
No. 379 (REALIGNING THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER  Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88498, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 637.
THE INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE PURSUANT TO SECTION 31, CHAPTER 10,
BOOK III OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 202, November 24, 1989). 70
 Achacoso v. Macaraig, supra note 36; and Quitiquit v. Villacorta, 107 Phil. 1060
(1960).
55
 When the Police Commission was reorganized as the National Police Commission in
1972, the latter was under the Office of the President. In 1975, it was transferred to the 71
 Carillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-24554, May 31, 1967, 77 SCRA 170.
Ministry (now Department) of National Defense. Ten years later, it was placed
again under the Office of the President. In 1991, a new NAPOLCOM was created
"within the Department [of Interior and Local Government.]" Later, Congress enacted
R.A. No. 8551 making the NAPOLCOM an "agency attached to the Department [of
Interior and Local Government] for policy and program coordination."

56
 Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr., supra note 33.

57
 In Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr. ibid, the Court found that there are several reasons
which indicate that the maneuverings of the appointing authority were mala fide
undertaken. Significantly, the Court found that what was actually issued to the
appointee is not an acting but an ad interim appointment, which is actually a permanent
appointment.

58
 Later, Chief Justice.

59
 G.R. No. 104216, August 20, 1993, 225 SCRA 511.

60
 Dissenting Opinion of Justice (later, Chief Justice) Puno; 225 SCRA 522.

61
 Ibid.
 Ong died on May 22, 2009 during the pendency of the instant petition.4 Admittedly, Ong's death
rendered the prayer for reinstatement in the petition for quo warranto as moot and academic.
However, substitution5 was sought because in the event that the Court would rule that Ong was
indeed entitled to the position he claimed, backwages pertaining to him can still be paid to his
legal heirs. Per Resolution6 issued on January 10, 2011, we granted the motion for substitution.
The deceased petitioner is now herein substituted by his wife Elizabeth, and children, Samuel
Jr., Elizabeth and Carolyn, all surnamed Ong.

Antecedents Facts

The CA aptly summarized the facts of the case before the filing of the petition for quo
warranto as follows:

The petitioner [Ong] joined the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as a career employee in
1978. He held the position of NBI Director I from July 14, 1998 to February 23, 1999 and NBI
Director II from February 24, 1998 to September 5, 2001. On September 6, 2001, petitioner was
appointed Director III by the President. His appointment paper pertinently reads:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT "x x x
Manila
Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, the following are hereby appointed to the NATIONAL
SECOND DIVISION BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE co-terminus with the appointing
authority:

G.R. No. 184219               January 30, 2012

xxx

SAMUEL B. ONG, Petitioner,
vs. SAMUEL B. ONG - DIRECTOR III
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL., Respondents.
(vice Carlos S. Caabay) [DEPUTY DIRECTOR]
DECISION
x x x"
REYES, J.:
On June 3, 2004, the petitioner received from respondent Reynaldo Wycoco Memorandum
The Case Circular No. 02-S.2004 informing him that his appointment, being co-terminus with the
appointing authority's tenure, would end effectively at midnight on June 30, 2004 and, unless a
new appointment would be issued in his favor by the President consistent with her new tenure
Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by effective July 1, 2004, he would be occcupying his position in a de facto/hold[-]over status until
Samuel B. Ong (Ong) to assail the Decision2 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on August his replacement would be appointed.
5, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88673, the dispositive portion of which reads:
On December 01, 2004, the President appointed respondent Victor A. Bessat as NBI Director III
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition for quo warranto filed in this case as replacement of the petitioner. Consequently, respondent Wycoco notified the petitioner that,
is hereby DENIED. effective on December 17, 2004, the latter should cease and desist from performing his
functions as NBI Director III in view of the presidential appointment of respondent Bessat as
SO ORDERED.3 petitioner's replacement. The petitioner received the aforementioned notice only on January 27,
2005.7 (underscoring supplied and citations omitted)
On February 22, 2005, Ong filed before the CA a petition for quo warranto. He sought for the authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the
declaration as null and void of (a) his removal from the position of NBI Director III; and (b) his duration of project or subject to the availability of funds. "
replacement by respondent Victor Bessat (Bessat). Ong likewise prayed for reinstatement and
backwages. The co-terminous status may thus be classified as follows:

The CA denied Ong's petition on grounds: xxxx

A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or (2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority –
exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well- when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure; x x
founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.8 Where the action is filed by a x
private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position,
otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.9
xxxx
Section 27 of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, classifies the appointment status of
public officers and employees in the career service into permanent and temporary. A permanent Thus, although petitioner's appointment is co-terminous with the tenure of the President, he
appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the President and his appointment may be recalled
he is being appointed, including appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the anytime. The case of Mita Pardo de Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.14 delineated
provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. In the absence of the nature of an appointment held "at the pleasure of the appointing power" in this wise:
appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a
temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power is in essence temporary in nature.
position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility; provided, It is co-extensive with the desire of the Board of Directors. Hence, when the Board opts to
that such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replace the incumbent, technically there is no removal but only an expiration of term and in an
replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. expiration of term, there is no need of prior notice, due hearing or sufficient grounds before the
incumbent can be separated from office. The protection afforded by Section 7.04 of the Code of
x x x In Cuadra v. Cordova,10 temporary appointment is defined as "one made in an acting By-Laws on Removal [o]f Officers and Employees, therefore, cannot be claimed by petitioner.
capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary character and its terminability at pleasure by
the appointing power." Thus, the temporary appointee accepts the position with the condition All told, petitioner's appointment as well as its consequent termination falls within the ambit of
that he shall surrender the office when called upon to do so by the appointing authority. The the discretion bestowed on the appointing authority, the President. Simply put, his appointment
termination of a temporary appointment may be with or without a cause since the appointee can be terminated at any time for any cause and without the need of prior notice or hearing
serves merely at the pleasure of the appointing authority. since he can be removed from his office anytime. His termination cannot be said to be violative
of Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. When a temporary appointee is required to
In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure presupposes a permanent relinquish his office, he is being separated from office because his term has expired.15 Starkly
appointment. As held in General v. Roco,11 two requisites must concur in order that an employee put, upon the appointment of respondent Bessat as his replacement, his term of office had
in the career executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit: 1) CES eligibility[;] and 2) already expired.
appointment to the appropriate CES rank.
Likewise, it is inconsequential that the petitioner was replaced by another non-CESO eligible,
In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner is a non-CESO eligible. At best, therefore, respondent Besat. In a quo warranto proceeding[,] the person suing must show that he has a
his appointment could be regarded only as temporary and, hence, he has no security of tenure. clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent that right, the lack of
Such being the case, his appointment can be withdrawn at will by the President, who is the qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.16
appointing authority in this case, and "at a moment's notice."12
Indeed, appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer
Moreover, a perusal of the petitioner's appointment will reveal that his appointment as NBI in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
Director III is co-terminous with the appointing authority. Correlatively, his appointment falls should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
under Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Revised Administrative faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This
Code of 1987 which provides that:13 is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide.17
"Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued to a person whose
entrance and continuity in the service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing
In sum, quo warranto is unavailing in the instant case, as the public office in question has not co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure. The last paragraph of
been usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held by respondent Bessat. The petitioner had no legal Section 14 states that appointments which are co-terminous with the appointing authority shall
right over the disputed office and his cessation from office involves no removal but an expiration not be considered as permanent.
of his term of office.18
The OSG also points out that in issuing MC No. 02-S.2004, Wycoco did not remove Ong as
Hence, the instant petition ascribing to the CA the following errors: Director III but merely reminded the latter that after June 30, 2004, his appointment shall lapse
into a  de facto/hold-over status unless he was re-appointed. Ong's colleagues applied for re-
I. appointment. Bessat was in fact re-appointed as Director II on August 13, 2004. Subsequently,
on December 1, 2004, the President appointed Bessat as Director III, effectively replacing Ong.
THE CA ERRED WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE VALIDITY OF THE PETITIONER'S
REMOVAL BY RESPONDENT WYCOCO AS NBI DIRECTOR III (DEPUTY Further, the OSG claims that when Ong accepted promotional appointments in the Career
DIRECTOR).19 Executive Service (CES) for which he did not have the required eligibility, he became a
temporary employee and had impliedly abandoned his right to security of tenure.
II.
Our Ruling
THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SINCE THE PETITIONER HELD A CO-
TERMINOUS APPOINTMENT, HE IS TERMINABLE AT THE PLEASURE OF THE The petition is bereft of merit.
APPOINTING POWER.20
MC No. 02-S.2004 did not remove Ong from the position of Director III.
21  22 
Citing Ambas v. Buenaseda and Decano v. Edu, the instant petition emphasizes that the Assuming arguendo that it did, the defect was cured when the President, who was the
power of removal is lodged in the appointing authority. Wycoco, and not the President, issued appointing authority herself, in whose hands were lodged the power to remove,
Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 02-S.2004 informing Ong that his co-terminous appointment as appointed Bessat, effectively revoking Ong's appointment.
Director III ended effectively on June 30, 2004. The issuance of MC No. 02-S.2004 was
allegedly motivated by malice and revenge since Ong led the NBI employees in holding rallies in MC No. 02-S.2004,30 addressed to Ong, Bessat, Deputy Director Nestor Mantaring, and
July 2003 to publicly denounce Wycoco. Hence, Bessat's assumption of the position was null Regional Director Edward Villarta, in part reads:
and void since it was technically still occupied by Ong at the time of the former's appointment.
Records indicate your appointment status as "co-terminus" with the appointing power's tenure
It is further alleged that it was erroneous for the CA to equate "an appointment co-terminous with which ends effectively at midnight of this day, 30 June 2004.
the tenure of the appointing authority with one that is at the pleasure of such appointing
authority."23 Citing Alba, etc.. v. Evangelista, etcl.,24 Ong's counsel distinguished a "term" as "the Unless, therefore, a new appointment is extended to you by Her Excellency GLORIA
time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right" from a "tenure" which MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, consistent with her new tenure effective 01 July 2004, your services
"represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office". Ong's appointment, shall lapse into a de facto/hold[-]over status, to ensure continuity of service, until your
from which he cannot be removed without just cause, was co-terminous with the President's replacements are appointed in your stead.31
tenure which ended not on June 30, 2004, but only on June 30, 2010.
On December 1, 2004, the President appointed Bessat as Ong's replacement.32 Bessat was
Section 2(b), Article IX-G of the 1987 Constitution and Jocom v. Regalado25 are likewise cited to notified on December 17, 2004. Wycoco furnished Ong with a Notice,33 dated December 20,
stress that government employees, holding both career and non-career service positions, are 2004, informing the latter that he should cease from performing the functions of Director III,
entitled to protection from arbitrary removal or suspension. In the case of Ong, who started his effective December 17, 2004.
employment in 1978 and rose from the ranks, it is allegedly improper for the CA to impliedly infer
that the President acted in bad faith by converting his supposed promotional appointment to one
removable at the pleasure of the appointing authority. It is argued that in the hands of the appointing authority are lodged the power to remove. Hence,
Wycoco allegedly acted beyond the scope of his authority when he issued MC No. 02-S.2004.
In its Comment26 to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the
replacement of Ong by Bessat was fair, just and in accord with the doctrine enunciated in Aklan This Court notes that MC No. 02-S.2004 did not in effect remove Ong from his post. It merely
College v. Guarino,27 and with Sections 1328 and 14,29 Rule V, Civil Service Commission (CSC) informed Ong that records of the NBI showed that his co-terminous appointment had lapsed into
Resolution No. 91-1631 issued on December 27, 1991. Section 13 substantially provides that a de facto/hold-over status. It likewise apprised him of the consequences of the said status.
only a temporary appointment can be issued to a person who does not have the appropriate civil
service eligibility. Section 14(2), on the other hand, defines a co-terminous appointment as one
Be that as it may, if we were to assume for argument's sake that Wycoco removed Ong from his Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment,
position as Director III by virtue of the former's issuance of MC No. 02-S.2004, still, the defect takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board. x x x
was cured when the President herself issued Bessat's appointment on December 1, 2004. The
appointing authority, who in this case was the President, had effectively revoked Ong's At this juncture, what comes unmistakably clear is the fact that because petitioner lacked the
appointment. proper CES eligibility and therefore had not held the subject office in a permanent capacity,
there could not have been any violation of petitioner’s supposed right to security of tenure
Ong lacked the CES eligibility required for the position of Director III and his appointment inasmuch as he had never been in possession of the said right at least during his tenure as
was "co-terminus with the appointing authority." His appointment being both temporary Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services. Hence, no challenge may be offered against his
and co-terminous in nature, it can be revoked by the President even without cause and at separation from office even if it be for no cause and at a moment’s notice. Not even his own self-
a short notice. serving claim that he was competent to continue serving as Deputy Director may actually and
legally give even the slightest semblance of authority to his thesis that he should remain in
This Court likewise finds no error in the CA's ruling that since Ong held a co-terminous office. Be that as it may, it bears emphasis that, in any case, the mere fact that an employee is a
appointment, he was removable at the pleasure of the appointing authority. CES eligible does not automatically operate to vest security of tenure on the appointee
inasmuch as the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service, except first and
second-level employees, pertains only to rank and not to the office or position to which they may
It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended be appointed.[45]39 (underscoring supplied and citations omitted)
except for cause provided by law.34 However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled
that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are
contractual and co-terminous in nature.35 1âwphi1 The Court is categorical in the Amores case that an appointee without the requisite CES
eligibility cannot hold the position in a permanent capacity. Temporary appointments are made if
only to prevent hiatus in the government's rendition of public service. However, a temporary
In the case at bar, Ong's appointment as Director III falls under the classifications provided in (a) appointee can be removed even without cause and at a moment's notice. As to those with
Section 14(2) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code, to wit, that eligibilities, their rights to security of tenure pertain to ranks but not to the positions to which they
which is "co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure"; and (b) were appointed.
Sections 13(b)36 and 14(2)37 of Rule V, CSC Resolution No. 91-1631, or that which is both a
temporary and a co-terminous appointment. The appointment is temporary as Ong did not have
the required CES eligibility. Ong never alleged that at any time during which he held the Director III position, he had
acquired the requisite eligibility. Thus, the right to security of tenure did not pertain to him at
least relative to the Director III position.
The case of Amores v. Civil Service Commission, et al.38 is instructive anent the nature of
temporary appointments in the CES to which the position of Director III held by Ong belonged.
The Court declared: The next logical query to be resolved then is whether or not Ong, as an appointee holding a
position "co-terminus with the appointing authority," was entitled to remain as Director III until the
end of the President's tenure on June 30, 2010.
An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is  temporary
where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil We likewise rule in the negative.
service eligibility.
Both Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code
xxxx and Section 14 (2) of Rule V, CSC Resolution No. 91-1631 define a co-terminous appointment
as one co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure.
x x x Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make
an appointment in the career executive service a permanent one. x x x In Mita Pardo de Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.40 cited by the CA in its decision,
we sustained the replacement of an incumbent, who held an appointment at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. Such appointment was in essence temporary in nature. We categorized the
Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES incumbent's replacement not as removal but rather as an expiration of term and no prior notice,
positions in the government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity due hearing or cause were necessary to effect the same. In Decano v. Edu,41 we ruled that the
in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure
appointment is at best merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent against removal without cause. Further, in Carillo vs. CA,42 we stated that "one who holds a
obtention of the required CES eligibility. x x x temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the
pleasure of the appointing authority, there being no need to show that the termination is for
xxx cause."
In Ong's case, his appointment was temporary and co-terminous. The doctrines enunciated in ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
the cases of Mita Pardo de Tavera, Decano, and Carillo apply. Hence, no legal challenge can be Associate Justice
properly posed against the President's appointment of Bessat as Ong's replacement. The CA
correctly ruled that in quo warranto proceedings, the petitioner must show that he has a clear ATTESTATION
right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another and in the absence of the said right, the
lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial. Stated differently, where
a non-eligible holds a temporary appointment, his replacement by another non-eligible is not I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
prohibited.43 case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

We note that Ong's counsel had painstakingly drawn distinctions between a term and a tenure. It ANTONIO T. CARPIO
is argued that since Ong's appointment was co-terminous with the appointing authority, it should Associate Justice
not had lapsed into a de facto status but continued until the end of the President's tenure on Chairperson, Second Division
June 30, 2010.
CERTIFICATION
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Revised Administrative Code and CSC Resolution
No. 91-1631, a co-terminous appointment is defined as one "co-existing with the tenure of the Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
appointing authority or at his pleasure." Neither law nor jurisprudence draws distinctions that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
between appointments "co-existing with the term of the appointing authority" on one hand, and to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
one "co-existing with the appointing authority's tenure" on the other. In the contrary, under the
aforecited rules, tenure and term are used rather loosely and interchangeably. RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

In Ong's case, the issues needed to be disposed of revolve around the concepts of temporary
and co-terminous appointments. The distinctions between term and tenure find no materiality in
the instant petition. Besides, whether or not the President's term ended on June 30, 2004 or her
tenure ceased on June 30, 2010, the fact remains that she appointed Bessat as Director III, in
effect revoking Ong's temporary and co-terminous appointment. Footnotes

This Court recognizes Ong's lengthy service rendered to the government and deeply * Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order No. 1174 dated
commisserates with his earlier plight. However, we cannot grant Ong the reliefs he sought as January 9, 2012
law and jurisprudence clearly dictate that being a temporary and co-terminous appointee, he had
no vested rights over the position of Director III. 1 
Rollo, pp. 8-22.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision rendered by the Court of 2 
Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
Appeals on August 5, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88673 is AFFIRMED. Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring; id. at 24-32.

SO ORDERED. 3 
Id. at 31.

4 
BIENVENIDO L. REYES Id. at 107-108.
Associate Justice
5 
Id. at 99-102.
WE CONCUR:
6 
Id. at 114.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
7 
Associate Justice Id. at 25-26

8 
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Mendoza v. Allas, 362 Phil 238, 244 (1999).
Associate Justice Associate Justice
9 
Id. (b) Temporary Status. In the absence of appropriate eligibles in the area willing and able
to assume the position, as certified by the CSRO Regional Director concerned, and it
10  becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment
103 Phil 391 (1958).
shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he
is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: provided, That such
11 
403 Phil 455, 462 (2001). temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be
replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
12 
Caringal v. PCSO, 509 Phil 557 (2005).
xxx
13 
Cited in Paloma v. Mora, 507 Phil 697, 708 (2005).
29 
Section 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued to a person whose
14  entrance and continuity in the service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing
197 Phil 919, 931 (1982). authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the
duration of project or subject to the availability of funds.
15 
Achacoso v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA 235, 240.
The co-terminous status may be further classified into the following:
16 
Carillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-24554, May 31, 1967, 77 SCRA 170, 177. (citations omitted)
xxx
17 
Rimonte v. Civil Service Commission, 314 Phil 421, 430 (1995).
(2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority – when appointment is co-existent with
18 
Supra note 2 at 27-31 the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;

19 
Rollo, p. 11. xxx

20 
Id. at 13. For purposes of coverage or membership with the GSIS, or their right to security of
tenure, co-terminous appointees, except those who are co-terminous with the appointing
21 
authority, shall be considered permanent. (underscoring supplied)
G.R. No. 95244, September 4, 1991, 201 SCRA 308.
30 
22 
Rollo, p. 36.
187 Phil 754 (1980)
31 
23 
Id.
Rollo, p. 14.
32 
24 
Id. at 37.
100 Phil 683 (1957).
33 
25 
Id. at 38.
G.R. No. 77373, August 22, 1991, 201 SCRA 73.
34 
26 
Supra note 14.
Rollo, pp. 53-68
35 
27 
Civil Service Commission v. Magnaye, Jr., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 347,
G.R. No. 152949, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 40. 357.

28 
Section 13. Appointment in the career service shall be permanent or temporary. 36 
Supra note 28.

(a) Permanent Status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets 37 
Supra note 29.
all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed/promoted, including
the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and
38 
standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. G.R. No. 170093, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 160.

39 
xxx Id. at 167-170.
 40 
Supra note 14. accomplish her task because it was found out that the land is government property. When
petitioner failed to return the ₱50,000, respondent sued her for estafa. Respondent also filed an
41 
Supra note 22. administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public officer against
petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.
42 
Supra note 16.
The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and
43 
Civil Service Commission v. Engineer Ali Darangina, G.R. No. 167472, January 31, 2007, 513 suspended her from office for six months without pay. The Ombudsman ruled that petitioner
SCRA 654. failed to abide by the standard set in Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the government
of the benefit of committed service when she embarked on her private interest to help
respondent secure a certificate of title over the latter’s land.4

Upon motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman, in an Order5 dated March 15, 2004, reduced
the penalty to three months suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner’s
acceptance of respondent’s payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer. Her act fell
short of the standard of personal conduct required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public
officials shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers
Republic of the Philippines of undue patronage. The Ombudsman held:
SUPREME COURT
Manila x x x [petitioner] admitted x x x that she indeed received the amount of ₱50,000.00 from the
[respondent] and even contracted Engr. Liberato Patromo, alleged Licensed Geodetic Engineer
THIRD DIVISION to do the surveys.

G.R. No. 178454               March 28, 2011 While it may be true that [petitioner] did not actually deal with the other government agencies for
the processing of the titles of the subject property, we believe, however, that her mere act in
accepting the money from the [respondent] with the assurance that she would work for the
FILIPINA SAMSON, Petitioner, issuance of the title is already enough to create a perception that she is a fixer. Section 4(b) of
vs.
[R.A.] No. 6713 mandates that public officials and employees shall endeavor to discourage
JULIA A. RESTRIVERA, Respondent. wrong perception of their roles as dispenser or peddler of undue patronage.

DECISION
xxxx

VILLARAMA, JR., J.: x x x [petitioner’s] act to x x x restore the amount of [₱50,000] was to avoid possible sanctions.

Petitioner Filipina Samson appeals the Decision1 dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of
x x x [d]uring the conciliation proceedings held on 19 October 2002 at the barangay level, it was
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422 and its Resolution2 dated June 8, 2007, denying her agreed upon by both parties that [petitioner] be given until 28 February 2003 within which to pay
motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Ombudsman in finding petitioner guilty of
the amount of ₱50,000.00 including interest. If it was true that [petitioner] had available money to
violating Section 4(b)3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct pay and had been persistent in returning the amount of [₱50,000.00] to the [respondent], she
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
would have easily given the same right at that moment (on 19 October 2002) in the presence of
the Barangay Officials.6 x x x. (Stress in the original.)
The facts are as follows:
The CA on appeal affirmed the Ombudsman’s Order dated March 19, 2004. The CA ruled that
Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the Population Commission contrary to petitioner’s contentions, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act complained
with office at the Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite. of is a private matter. The CA also ruled that petitioner violated the norms of conduct required of
her as a public officer when she demanded and received the amount of ₱50,000 on the
Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to representation that she can secure a title to respondent’s property and for failing to return the
have the latter’s land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System. amount. The CA stressed that Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 requires petitioner to perform and
Petitioner said that the expenses would reach ₱150,000 and accepted ₱50,000 from respondent discharge her duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and
to cover the initial expenses for the titling of respondent’s land. However, petitioner failed to
skill, and to endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of her role as a dispenser and peddler of On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was
undue patronage.7 dismissed, she cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may
proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues: criminal charges.17

1. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over a case involving a private dealing by a For proper consideration instead is petitioner’s liability under Sec. 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713.
government employee or where the act complained of is not related to the performance
of official duty? We quote the full text of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713:

2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and
liable despite the dismissal of the estafa case? employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and
execution of official duties:
3. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in not imposing a lower penalty in view
of mitigating circumstances?8 (a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall
always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All
Petitioner insists that where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official government resources and powers of their respective offices must be
duty, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Petitioner also imputes grave abuse of discretion on employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically,
the part of the CA for holding her administratively liable. She points out that the estafa case was particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
dismissed upon a finding that she was not guilty of fraud or deceit, hence misconduct cannot be
attributed to her. And even assuming that she is guilty of misconduct, she is entitled to the (b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and
benefit of mitigating circumstances such as the fact that this is the first charge against her in her discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
long years of public service.9 intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of
Respondent counters that the issues raised in the instant petition are the same issues that the their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
CA correctly resolved.10 She also alleges that petitioner failed to observe the mandate that public
office is a public trust when she meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and (c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to
received an amount for undelivered work.11 the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged.
We affirm the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable. We hasten to add, They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing
however, that petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer. acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue
favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or
On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions
complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose
them.12 Section 13(1),13 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can terms are coterminous with theirs.
investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under Section
1614 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the (d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to
Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or
by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section 1915 of R.A. No. 6770 also states preference.
that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions
which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or (e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend
employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise
The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or provided by law or when required by the public interest, public officials and
employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be employees shall provide information on their policies and procedures in clear
related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does and understandable language, ensure openness of information, public
not distinguish, neither should we.16 consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions,
simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and
 develop an understanding and appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions that she would work for the issuance of the title is already enough to create a perception that
prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas. she is a fixer.

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all On its part, the CA rejected petitioner’s argument that an isolated act is insufficient to create
times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of those "wrong perceptions" or the "impression of influence peddling." It held that the law enjoins
locally-produced goods, resources and technology and encourage public officers, at all times to respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to
appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain law, good customs, public order, public policy, public safety and public interest. Thus, it is not
and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion. the plurality of the acts that is being punished but the commission of the act itself.

(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit Evidently, both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4(A) of R.A. No. 6713 as broad
themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of enough to apply even to private transactions that have no connection to the duties of one’s
public accountability, and manifest by deed the supremacy of civilian authority office. We hold, however, that petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A)(b) of
over the military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty R.A. No. 6713. The reason though does not lie in the fact that the act complained of is not at all
to country above loyalty to persons or party. related to petitioner’s discharge of her duties as department head of the Population Commission.

(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead In addition to its directive under Section 4(B), Congress authorized19 the Civil Service
modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge Commission (CSC) to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement R.A. No.
in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form. 6713. Accordingly, the CSC issued the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (hereafter, Implementing Rules). Rule V of the
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) Implementing Rules provides for an Incentive and Rewards System for public officials and
observance of these standards including the dissemination of information programs employees who have demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their
and workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular progression steps, to a observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713, to wit:
limited number of employees recognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding in
their observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and experimentation RULE V. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS SYSTEM
on measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in
raising the general level of observance of these standards. SECTION 1. Incentives and rewards shall be granted officials and employees who have
demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of
Both the Ombudsman and CA found the petitioner administratively liable for violating Section conduct laid down in Section 4 of the Code, namely:
4(A)(b) on professionalism. "Professionalism" is defined as the conduct, aims, or qualities that
characterize or mark a profession. A professional refers to a person who engages in an activity (a) Commitment to public interest. - x x x
with great competence. Indeed, to call a person a professional is to describe him as competent,
efficient, experienced, proficient or polished.18 In the context of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No.
6713, the observance of professionalism also means upholding the integrity of public office by (b) Professionalism. - x x x
endeavoring "to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue
patronage." Thus, a public official or employee should avoid any appearance of impropriety (c) Justness and sincerity. - x x x
affecting the integrity of government services. However, it should be noted that Section 4(A)
enumerates the standards of personal conduct for public officers with reference to "execution of (d) Political neutrality. - x x x
official duties."

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - x x x

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman concluded that petitioner failed to carry out the standard of
professionalism by devoting herself on her personal interest to the detriment of her solemn
public duty. The Ombudsman said that petitioner’s act deprived the government of her (f) Nationalism and patriotism. - x x x
committed service because the generation of a certificate of title was not within her line of public
service. In denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman said that it would (g) Commitment to democracy. - x x x
have been sufficient if petitioner just referred the respondent to the persons/officials incharge of
the processing of the documents for the issuance of a certificate of title. While it may be true that
(h) Simple living. - x x x
she did not actually deal with the other government agencies for the processing of the titles of
the subject property, petitioner’s act of accepting the money from respondent with the assurance
On the other hand, Rule X of the Implementing Rules enumerates grounds for administrative (i) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people;
disciplinary action, as follows:
(j) Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt,
RULE X. GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTION except as otherwise provided in these Rules;

SECTION 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative disciplinary action prescribed under (k) Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and papers within
existing laws, the acts and omissions of any official or employee, whether or not he holds office a reasonable time from preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in these
or employment in a casual, temporary, hold-over, permanent or regular capacity, declared Rules;
unlawful or prohibited by the Code, shall constitute grounds for administrative disciplinary action,
and without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities provided herein, such as: (l) Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or
to act promptly and expeditiously on public personal transactions;
(a) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office. x x x. (m) Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and disclosure of
business interests and financial connections; and
(b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee,
consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise (n) Failure to resign from his position in the private business enterprise within thirty (30)
regulated, supervised or licensed by his office, unless expressly allowed by law; days from assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises, and/or failure to
divest himself of his shareholdings or interests in private business enterprise within
(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the sixty (60) days from such assumption of public office when conflict of interest
Constitution, law or regulation, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to arises: Provided, however, that for those who are already in the service and a conflict of
conflict with his official functions; interest arises, the official or employee must either resign or divest himself of said
interests within the periods herein-above provided, reckoned from the date when the
(d) Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a conflict of interest had arisen.
regular or pending official transaction with his office, unless such recommendation or
referral is mandated by (1) law, or (2) international agreements, commitment and In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,20 this Court had the occasion to rule that failure to
obligation, or as part of the functions of his office; abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its
implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action, to wit:
xxxx
The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The
(e) Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to him provision commands that "public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their
by reason of his office and not made available to the public, to further his private duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said
interests or give undue advantage to anyone, or to prejudice the public interest; provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by
public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political
neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy
(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713
loan or anything of monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and rewards to
connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their
affected by the functions of, his office. x x x. observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the mandated
incentives and rewards system, officials and employees who comply with the high standard set
xxxx by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect the same favorable
treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to be
(g) Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code for any purpose contrary to sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the
morals or public policy or any commercial purpose other than by news and Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts
communications media for dissemination to the general public; "declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least
twenty three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary action.
Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of
(h) Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation or them. (Emphasis supplied.)
preference;
Consequently, the Court dismissed the charge of violation of Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 in respondent’s allegation that petitioner received an amount for undelivered work is not entirely
that case. correct. Rather, petitioner failed to fully accomplish her task in view of the legal obstacle that the
land is government property.
We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo. Thus, we reverse
the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved of any administrative liability.
No. 6713. In so ruling, we do no less and no more than apply the law and its implementing rules
issued by the CSC under the authority given to it by Congress. Needless to stress, said rules But first, we need to modify the CA finding that petitioner demanded the amount of ₱50,000 from
partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if written in the law itself. They have the force respondent because respondent did not even say that petitioner demanded money from
and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set her.26 We find in the allegations and counter-allegations that respondent came to petitioner’s
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.21 house in Biñan, Laguna, and asked petitioner if she can help respondent secure a title to her
land which she intends to sell. Petitioner agreed to help. When respondent asked about the cost,
But is petitioner nonetheless guilty of grave misconduct, which is a ground for disciplinary action petitioner said ₱150,000 and accepted ₱50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses.27
under R.A. No. 6713?
We agree with the common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that, in the aftermath of the
We also rule in the negative. aborted transaction, petitioner still failed to return the amount she accepted. As aptly stated by
the Ombudsman, if petitioner was persistent in returning the amount of ₱50,000 until the
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, preliminary investigation of the estafa case on September 18, 2003,28 there would have been no
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves need for the parties’ agreement that petitioner be given until February 28, 2003 to pay said
any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard amount including interest. Indeed, petitioner’s belated attempt to return the amount was
established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is intended to avoid possible sanctions and impelled solely by the filing of the estafa case against
only simple.22 Conversely, one cannot be found guilty of misconduct in the absence of her.
substantial evidence. In one case, we affirmed a finding of grave misconduct because there was
substantial evidence of voluntary disregard of established rules in the procurement of supplies For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct
as well as of manifest intent to disregard said rules.23 We have also ruled that complicity in the unbecoming a public officer. In Joson v. Macapagal, we have also ruled that the respondents
transgression of a regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue constitutes simple misconduct therein were guilty of conduct unbecoming of government employees when they reneged on
only as there was failure to establish flagrancy in respondent’s act for her to be held liable of their promise to have pertinent documents notarized and submitted to the Government Service
gross misconduct.24 On the other hand, we have likewise dismissed a complaint for knowingly Insurance System after the complainant’s rights over the subject property were transferred to the
rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the law, and grave misconduct, since the sister of one of the respondents.29 Recently, in Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J.
complainant did not even indicate the particular acts of the judge which were allegedly violative Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we said that unbecoming conduct means
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.25 improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of
social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.301avvphi1
In this case, respondent failed to prove (1) petitioner’s violation of an established and definite
rule of action or unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and (2) any of the aggravating elements This Court has too often declared that any act that falls short of the exacting standards for public
of corruption, willful intent to violate a law or to disregard established rules on the part of office shall not be countenanced.31 The Constitution categorically declares as follows:
petitioner. In fact, respondent could merely point to petitioner’s alleged failure to observe the
mandate that public office is a public trust when petitioner allegedly meddled in an affair that SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
belongs to another agency and received an amount for undelivered work. accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.32
True, public officers and employees must be guided by the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that public office is a public trust. However, respondent’s allegation that petitioner Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to respondent after failing
meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency is a serious but unproven accusation. to accomplish the task she had willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued
Respondent did not even say what acts of interference were done by petitioner. Neither did her for estafa, thus reinforcing the latter’s suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her money.
respondent say in which government agency petitioner committed interference. And causing the Although the element of deceit was not proven in the criminal case respondent filed against the
survey of respondent’s land can hardly be considered as meddling in the affairs of another petitioner, it is clear that by her actuations, petitioner violated basic social and ethical norms in
government agency by petitioner who is connected with the Population Commission. It does not her private dealings. Even if unrelated to her duties as a public officer, petitioner’s transgression
show that petitioner made an illegal deal or any deal with any government agency. Even the could erode the public’s trust in government employees, moreso because she holds a high
Ombudsman has recognized this fact. The survey shows only that petitioner contracted a position in the service.
surveyor.1ihpwa1 Respondent said nothing on the propriety or legality of what petitioner did.
The survey shows that petitioner also started to work on her task under their agreement. Thus,
As to the penalty, we reprimanded the respondents in Joson and imposed a fine in Jamsani- CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Rodriguez. Under the circumstances of this case, a fine of ₱15,000 in lieu of the three months Associate Justice
suspension is proper. In imposing said fine, we have considered as a mitigating circumstance Chairperson, Third Division
petitioner’s 37 years of public service and the fact that this is the first charge against
her.33 Section 5334 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service CERTIFICATION
provides that mitigating circumstances such as length of service shall be considered. And since
petitioner has earlier agreed to return the amount of ₱50,000 including interest, we find it proper
to order her to comply with said agreement. Eventually, the parties may even find time to Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
rekindle their friendship. Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
and its Resolution dated June 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422, as well as the Decision dated RENATO C. CORONA
January 6, 2004 and Order dated March 15, 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-03-0552-F, Chief Justice
and ENTER a new judgment as follows:

We find petitioner GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer and impose upon her
a FINE of ₱15,000.00 to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman within five (5) days from finality
of this Decision.
Footnotes

We also ORDER petitioner to return to respondent the amount of ₱50,000.00 with interest 1

 Rollo, pp. 126-142. Penned by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired
thereon at 12% per annum from March 2001 until the said amount shall have been fully paid.
Member of this Court) with the concurrence of Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez and
Vicente S.E. Veloso.
With costs against the petitioner.
2
 Id. at 145-146.
SO ORDERED.
3
 SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in
Associate Justice the discharge and execution of official duties:

WE CONCUR: xxxx

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES (b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and
Associate Justice discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
Chairperson intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of
ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
4
 Rollo, pp. 37-38.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
5
Associate Justice  Id. at 40-45.

6
ATTESTATION  Id. at 42-43.

7
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the  Id. at 141.
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
8
 Id. at 12.
9
 Id. at 13-16. The Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, x x x.
10
 Id. at 73.
20
 G.R. No. 176127, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 476, 484.
11
 Id. at 74.
21
 See Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562
12
 See Santos v. Rasalan, G.R. No. 155749, February 8, 2007, 515 SCRA 97, 102. SCRA 251, 288-289, citing Eslao v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 108310,
September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 161, 175, Sierra Madre Trust v. Sec. of Agr. and
13
Natural Resources, Nos. L-32370 & 32767, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 384 and People
 Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, v. Maceren, No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450.
and duties:
22
 See Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, September 30, 2005,
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission 471 SCRA 589, 603.
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. 23
 Roque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179245, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 660, 675.
xxxx 24
 Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Organo, G.R. No. 149549, February 26, 2004, 424
14
SCRA 9, 17.
 SEC. 16. Applicability. - The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer 25
or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.  Diomampo v. Alpajora, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1880, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 534,
539-540.
15
 SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints 26
relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:  Rollo, pp. 20-21, 73-76.

27
xxxx  Id. at 27-28.

28
(2) Are x x x unfair x x x;  Id. at 23.

29
xxxx  A.M. No. P-02-1591, June 21, 2002, 383 SCRA 403, 406-407.

30
(6) Are otherwise irregular x x x.  A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010, p. 22.

31
16
 See Santos v. Rasalan, supra note 12 at 102, citing Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio, G.R.  Pablejan v. Calleja, A.M. No. P-06-2102, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 562, 569.
Nos. 118813-14, April 8, 1997, 271 SCRA 67, 74.
32
 Sec. 1 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
17
 Bejarasco, Jr. v. Buenconsejo, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1417, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA
33
212, 221.  Rollo, p. 44.

18 34
 Reyes v. Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc., G.R. No. 154499, February 27,  Sec. 53. x x x Mitigating x x x Circumstances.
2004, 424 SCRA 135, 144, citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.
xxxx
19
 SEC. 12. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations, Administration and Enforcement of
this Act. - The Civil Service Commission shall have the primary responsibility for the j. Length of service in the government
administration and enforcement of this Act. x x x.
 xxxx service vehicles in 2001.9 On January 17, 2002, the committee designated the DPWH Internal
Audit Service (IAS) as its Technical Working Group to conduct the actual investigation.10

In the course of its investigation, the DPWH-IAS11 learned that the emergency repairs and/or
purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles basically undergo the following documentary
process:

I. Determination of repairs and/or spare parts needed

a. The end-user requesting repair brings the service vehicle to the Motorpool Section,
CESPD for initial inspection and preparation of Job Order; and
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila b. Based on the Job Order, the SIT conducts a pre-repair inspection (to determine the
necessity of repair and whether the repair is emergency in nature) and prepares a Pre-
Repair Inspection Report, with a recommendation for its approval by the CESPD Chief.
SECOND DIVISION
II. Preparation and Approval of Requisition for Supplies and/or Equipment with accompanying
G.R. No. 169042               October 5, 2011 documents (Job Order and Pre-Inspection Report)

ERDITO QUARTO, Petitioner, a. The Procurement Section, Administrative Manpower Management Service (AMMS)
vs. prepares the Requisition for Supplies and Equipment (RSE), the Canvass Quotation of
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO, CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR three Suppliers, the Certificate of Emergency Purchase, and the Certificate of Fair
DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO, LUISITO M. TABLAN, RAUL B. BORILLO, and LUIS A. Wear and Tear;
GAYYA, Respondents.
b. The end-user signs the RSE with the recommending approval of the concerned head
DECISION of office; and

BRION, J.: c. The AMMS Director approves the RSE.

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and mandamus1 filed by Erdito Quarto (petitioner) III. Repair of Vehicles
assailing the Ombudsman’s January 7, 20042 and November 4, 20043 resolutions which granted
Luisito M. Tablan, Raul B. Borillo, and Luis A. Gayya (collectively, respondents) immunity from
prosecution, resulting in the respondents’ exclusion from the criminal informations filed before a. The end-user selects the repair shop/auto supply from accredited establishments;
the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner seeks to nullify the immunity granted to the respondents, and
to compel the Ombudsman to include them as accused in the informations for estafa through b. The selected repair shop/auto supply repairs the service vehicle and issues the
falsification of public documents4 and for violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.5 corresponding sales invoice and/or official receipt;

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS c. The end-user accepts the repair and executes a Certificate of Acceptance;

The petitioner is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division (CESPD),6 Bureau d. The SIT conducts a post-repair inspection (to check if the vehicle was repaired and
of Equipment (BOE), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila. As whether the repair conformed to specifications) and prepares a Post-Repair Inspection
CESPD Chief, he is also the Head of the Special Inspectorate Team (SIT) of the DPWH.7 The Report, with a recommendation for its approval by the CESPD Chief. The Motorpool
respondents are members of the SIT.8 and the end-user would prepare the Report of Waste Materials also for the signature of
the CESPD Chief; and
On January 9, 2002, DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to investigate
alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH e. The Assets and Supply Management and Control Division recommends payment of
the expense/s incurred.
The processing of the payment of claims for reimbursement follows the above process. 5.2 x x x since we assumed our duties as members of the SIT xxx, we observed that [the]
DPWH vehicles were being sent to the repair shop in violation of the prescribed guidelines
Based on this procedure, the DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several governing the emergency repair of a service vehicle. In most instances, service vehicles are
emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which immediately brought to a car repair shop of the end-user’s choice without bringing it first to the
were approved and paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in government [Motorpool Section, CESPD, BOE] for the preparation of the required job order by [Gayya] of the
losses of approximately ₱143 million for this ten-month period alone.12 Motorpool Section and the pre-repair inspection to be conducted by the SIT. After the purported
repairs are done, SIT members are made to sign a post-repair inspection report which already
includes a typed-in recommendation for the payment of repairs, and the signature of the Head of
Thus, Atty. Irene D. Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the Ombudsman13 a the [SIT] indicating his alleged concurrence with the findings of the SIT despite the absence of
Complaint-Affidavit14 and a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit15 charging several high-ranking an actual inspection. The post-repair inspection report is accompanied by the following
DPWH officials and employees – including the petitioner, the respondents, and other private attachments, to wit: a) a falsified job order signed by the head of the [SIT] and the Chief of the
individuals who purportedly benefited from the anomalous transactions – with Plunder, Money Motorpool Section x x x [and] e) an empty or falsified [p]re-repair inspection report[.]
Laundering, Malversation, and violations of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code.16
5.3 Initially[,] we tried to curb the above anomalous practices being perpetrated by suppliers and
Atty. Ofilada imputed the following acts to the petitioner: officials of the DPWH x x x [by making] known [our] objections to the questionable job orders for
the proposed repairs of DPWH service vehicles[,] thus:
With dishonesty and grave misconduct, [the petitioner] x x x approved four (4) job orders for [the]
repairs [and/or] purchase of spare parts of [the vehicle assigned to Atty. Ofilada,] noted the a. On July, 9, 1999, [Tablan] wrote the Head of the SIT a memorandum x x x stating
certificate of urgency of said repairs [and/or] purchase[,] concurred with both the pre-repair and that the job orders for [several identified vehicles] x x x violated the prohibition against
post repair inspection reports thereon, participated in the accomplishment of the supporting splitting of job orders x x x. [Tablan recommended for public bidding the proposed
Requisition for Supplies and Equipment (RSE) x x x[,] and participated in the approval of the repairs for the said vehicles].
disbursement voucher authorizing payment of said repairs as necessary and lawful [even if said
vehicle was never referred to the Motorpool Section, CESPD for repair].
b. In connection with the job orders involving [several identified vehicles] x x x Tablan
and Borillo wrote the Head of the SIT a Memorandum x x x recommending that the
The documents relating to [this vehicle] were filed within a period of one month (between whereabouts of the end-user be verified, and the service vehicle be re-inspected and/or
September to October 2001) [and] were used to authorize the payment of said non existent disposed of.
ghost repairs to the damage and prejudice of the [DPWH.]17 (emphases ours)
c. Since the July 9, 1999 Memorandum was returned to x x x Tablan without any action
On the other hand, Atty. Ofilada charged the respondents with the following: being undertaken by the SIT Chief, [Tablan and Borillo] reiterated the recommendation
for the public bidding of the proposed repairs described therein[.]
With dishonesty and grave misconduct, [respondents] as members of the [SIT] xxx
accomplished and signed Pre-Repair Inspection and Post Repair Inspection Reports in support 6. In our attempts to perform our sworn duties, however, we incurred the displeasure of
of the four job orders [and made] it appear that the vehicle was inspected prior and after the the suppliers, the head of [SIT] and other officials of the DPWH who threatened various
alleged repair [although they knew that the vehicle was never turned over for inspection]. The administrative sanctions against us if we should not accede to their wishes. x x x
accomplishment of the Pre-Repair and Post-Repair Inspection Report[s] led to the preparation of
the Request for Supplies and Equipment which was the basis of the preparation of the
disbursement vouchers ultimately authorizing the payment of the said repairs thru 7. In addition to the foregoing, there are other factors which conspired to prevent us
reimbursement scheme to the damage and prejudice of the DPWH. from properly performing our duties. For one, the DPWH processes an average of
3,000 repairs per calendar year. Given the staggering number and extent of repairs,
including the volume of paperwork, it was practically impossible for [us] to implement
x x x the [P]re-[R]epair and [P]ost-[R]epair [I]nspection [R]eports of the [SIT] xxx are fictitious the rules which proved too tedious under the circumstance. As such, a "short-cut" of the
and falsified as no actual inspection could have transpired[.]18 (emphasis ours) rules was necessary to accommodate the demands of the end-user, the suppliers, our
superiors, and other executives of the DPWH. x x x
The petitioner denied the allegations against him, claiming that he merely relied on his
subordinates when he signed the job orders and the inspection reports.19 In contrast, the 8. The anomalous practices of the DPWH executives and suppliers in the purported
respondents admitted the existence of irregularities in the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts repair of DPWH service vehicles were indeed more widespread and rampant in the
of DPWH service vehicles, and offered to testify and to provide evidence against the DPWH year 2001. As a precautionary measure, we took the initiative of photocopying these
officials and employees involved in the anomaly in exchange for their immunity from sets of falsified documents as they were presented to us before we affixed our
prosecution. The respondents submitted: respective signatures thereon. We grouped these documents into Sets A and B[.]
 xxxx The petitioner argues that the Ombudsman should have included the respondents in the
informations since it was their inspection reports that actually paved the way for the commission
11. x x x That the service vehicle x x x has not been actually inspected by [Tablan and of the alleged irregularities.24 The petitioner asserts that the respondents’ criminal complicity
Borillo] is attested to by the pre and post repair inspection reports initially bearing the clearly appears since "no repair could have started" and "no payment for repairs, ghost or not,"
signature of the head of the SIT as concurring official without the required signatures of could have been made without the respondents’ pre-repair and post-repair inspection reports.
Borillo and Tablan. More importantly, these DPWH officials did not bother, in a majority By excluding the respondents in the informations, the Ombudsman is engaged in "selective
of cases, to "cover their tracks" when they prepared and signed the pre and post repair prosecution" which is a clear case of grave abuse of discretion.
inspection reports on the same dates. Based on proper procedure, a post repair
inspection report is to be accomplished only after the preparation and approval of the The petitioner claims that before the Ombudsman may avail of the respondents as state
Job Order, pre-repair inspection report, RSE, Cash Invoice and Acceptance by the end- witnesses, they must be included first in the informations filed with the court. Thereafter, the
user. In this case, the RSE, Cash Invoice and Certificate of Acceptance are dated much Ombudsman can ask the court for their discharge so that they can be utilized as state witnesses
later than the post-repair inspection report. Since xxx there was no actual pre-repair under the conditions laid down in Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court since the court has
and post-repair inspection conducted, the foregoing sample instances paved the way the "sole province" to determine whether these conditions exist.
for the "ghost repairs" of DPWH service vehicles, to the detriment and prejudice of the
government. These conditions require, inter alia, that there should be "absolute necessity" for the testimony of
the proposed witness and that he/she should not appear to be the "most guilty." The petitioner
12. Because of the anomalous transactions, the joke circulating around the DPWH is claims that the respondents failed to comply with these conditions as the Ombudsman’s
that we are actually the directors of the DPWH since we are the "last to sign," so to "evidence," which became the basis of the informations subsequently filed, shows that the
speak. That the signature[s] of the [respondent] SIT members are merely pro forma is respondents’ testimony is not absolutely necessary; in fact, the manner of the respondents’
all the more pronounced in a sample set consisting of a number of pre-repair inspection participation proves that they are the "most guilty" in the premises.
reports for a particular month in 2001. The pre-repair inspection reports of the service
vehicles indicated therein are empty of any findings and bear the signature of the head THE COMMENTS OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE RESPONDENTS
of the SIT as concurring official. All the foregoing documents above detailed negate the
convenient excuse proffered by DPWH executives that they sign the documents only
after the SIT had inspected the service vehicle and prepared the pre and post repair The Ombudsman counters that RA No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) expressly grants
inspection reports. him the power to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses. Given this power, the
Ombudsman asserts that Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which presupposes that
the witness is originally included in the information, is inapplicable to the present case since the
xxxx decision on whom to prosecute is an executive, not a judicial, prerogative.25

14.1 xxx the above examples are only a representative sampling of the extent of the The Ombudsman invokes this Court’s policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman’s exercise
anomalous transactions involving DPWH service vehicles which can be considered of his discretion in matters involving his investigatory and prosecutorial powers.26 The petitioner’s
"ghost repairs." There are more instances wherein [we] are willing to testify to in claim that the respondents are the "most guilty" is a matter of defense which the petitioner may
exchange for immunity from prosecution.20 (emphases ours) raise not in this proceeding, but in the trial proper.27

After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the On the other hand, the respondents submit that the Ombudsman has ample discretion in
Sandiganbayan21 several informations charging a number of DPWH officials and employees with determining who should be included in the information on the basis of his finding of probable
plunder,22 estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of Section cause. The courts can only interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his discretion in case of a
3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents’ request for clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, which the petitioner failed to establish.28
immunity in exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
THE PETITIONER’S REPLY29
The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan, questioning the
Ombudsman’s grant of immunity in the respondents’ favor. The Sandiganbayan, however,
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and advised the petitioner to instead question the While conceding that the Ombudsman has the power and the discretion to grant immunity to the
Ombudsman’s actions before this Court.23 Hence, this present petition. respondents, the petitioner asserts that this power must be exercised within the confines of
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which requires, inter alia, that the proposed witness
must not appear to be the "most guilty." By ignoring this provision and extending immunity to the
THE PETITION respondents whose false reports ultimately led to the payment for supposed repairs, and who
are, thus, the "real culprits,"30 the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion – a fatal defect
correctible by certiorari.
Amplifying on the respondents’ "guilt," the petitioner cites the DPWH’s decision in an If, on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an indictment
administrative case which the Civil Service Commission affirmed, finding the respondents guilty some individuals while impleading all others, the remedy of mandamus lies44 since he is duty-
of dishonesty and grave misconduct involving the same set of facts.31 bound, as a rule, to include in the information all persons who appear responsible for the offense
involved.45
OUR RULING
Citing the cases of Guiao v. Figueroa46 and Castro, Jr., et al. v. Castañeda and Liceralde,47 the
We dismiss the petition on two grounds: first, the petitioner did not avail of the remedies petitioner argues for the inclusion of the respondents in the criminal informations, pointing out
available to him before filing this present petition; and, second, within the context of the Court’s that the respondents accomplished the inspection reports that allegedly set in motion the
policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory documentary process in the repair of the DPWH vehicles; these reports led to the payment by
powers, the petitioner failed to establish that the grant of immunity to the respondents was the government and the consequent losses.
attended by grave abuse of discretion.
In Guiao and Castro, we ruled that mandamus lies to compel a prosecutor who refuses (i) to
I. The petitioner did not exhaust remedies available in the ordinary course of law include in the information certain persons, whose participation in the commission of a crime
clearly appears, and (ii) to follow the proper procedure for the discharge of these persons in
order that they may be utilized as prosecution witnesses.
As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus), Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court require, as a pre-condition for these remedies, that there be no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown These cited cases, however, did not take place in the same setting as the present case as they
that he moved for a reconsideration of the assailed resolutions based substantially on the same were actions by the public prosecutor, not by the Ombudsman. In the present case, the
grounds stated in this present petition.32 Neither did the petitioner file a motion for the inclusion Ombudsman granted the respondents immunity from prosecution pursuant to RA No. 6770
of the respondents in the informations before filing the present petition.33 These are adequate which specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or
remedies that the petitioner chose to forego; he bypassed these remedies and proceeded to proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in
seek recourse through the present petition.34 the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives." The pertinent provision –
Section 17 of this law – provides:
Similarly, the petitioner has not shown that he filed the present petition with this Court within the
sixty-day reglementary period35 from notice of the assailed Ombudsman’s resolutions. He did not Sec. 17. Immunities. – x x x.
do so, of course, since he initially and erroneously filed a certiorari petition with the
Sandiganbayan. We remind the petitioner that the remedy from the Ombudsman’s orders or Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent
resolutions in criminal cases is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 6536 with this Court.37 provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents
The petition likewise fails even on the merits. or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding
being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the
furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under
II. The respondents’ exclusion in the informations is grounded on the Ombudsman’s grant of this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal
immunity prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from
office. [emphasis ours]
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law
upon the respondent.38 In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus To briefly outline the rationale for this provision, among the most important powers of the State
may only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the is the power to compel testimony from its residents; this power enables the government to
manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised.39 secure vital information necessary to carry out its myriad functions.48 This power though is not
absolute. The constitutionally-enshrined right against compulsory self-incrimination is a leading
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no exception. The state’s power to compel testimony and the production of a person’s private books
different from an ordinary prosecutor in determining who must be charged.40 He also enjoys the and papers run against a solid constitutional wall when the person under compulsion is himself
same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a sought to be penalized. In balancing between state interests and individual rights in this
finding of probable cause (that must be established for the filing of an information in court)41 and situation, the principles of free government favor the individual to whom the state must
the degree of participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on yield.491avvphi1
these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses
his discretion,42 i.e., when his action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal A state response to the constitutional exception to its vast powers, especially in the field of
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.43 ordinary criminal prosecution and in law enforcement and administration, is the use of an
immunity statute.50 Immunity statutes seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err
an individual’s constitutional right against self-incrimination51 (considered the fount from which all in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more
statutes granting immunity emanate52) and the legitimate governmental interest in securing than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. [emphasis ours]
testimony.53 By voluntarily offering to give information on the commission of a crime and to testify
against the culprits, a person opens himself to investigation and prosecution if he himself had RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the Ombudsman to
participated in the criminal act. To secure his testimony without exposing him to the risk of grant immunity, subject to "such terms and conditions" as he may determine. The only textual
prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can be given immunity from prosecution.54 In limitation imposed by law on this authority is the need to take "into account the pertinent
this manner, the state interest is satisfied while respecting the individual’s constitutional right provisions of the Rules of Court," – i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.64 This
against self-incrimination. provision requires that:

III. Nature of the power to grant immunity (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative.55 The
exclusive power of Congress to define crimes and their nature and to provide for their (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
punishment concomitantly carries the power to immunize certain persons from prosecution to committed, except the testimony of said accused;
facilitate the attainment of state interests, among them, the solution and prosecution of crimes
with high political, social and economic impact.56 In the exercise of this power, Congress
possesses broad discretion and can lay down the conditions and the extent of the immunity to (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
be granted.57 points;

Early on, legislations granting immunity from prosecution were few.58 However, their number (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
escalated with the increase of the need to secure vital information in the course and for
purposes of prosecution. These statutes59 considered not only the importance of the testimony (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
sought, but also the unique character of some offenses and of some situations where the turpitude.
criminal participants themselves are in the best position to give useful testimony.60 RA No. 6770
or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 was formulated along these lines and reasoning with the vision This Rule is itself unique as, without detracting from the executive nature of the power to
of making the Ombudsman the protector of the people against inept, abusive and corrupt prosecute and the power to grant immunity, it clarifies that in cases already filed with the
government officers and employees.61 Congress saw it fit to grant the Ombudsman the power to courts,65 the prosecution merely makes a proposal and initiates the process of granting immunity
directly confer immunity to enable his office to effectively carry out its constitutional and statutory to an accused-witness in order to utilize him as a witness against his co-accused.66 As we
mandate of ensuring effective accountability in the public service.62 explained in Webb v. De Leon67 in the context of the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit
Act:
IV. Considerations in the grant of immunity
The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of
While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the authority to implement is whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally
a constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function. Mapa, Jr. v. impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the
Sandiganbayan63 is instructive on this point: power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted
immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this
process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already
achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the
who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. [emphasis ours]
the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude
the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be Thus, it is the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of
extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms.68 This
judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the
be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. In reviewing the exercise administration of justice,69 largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings
of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For and evaluation. On this point, the Court’s pronouncement in the 1918 case of United States v.
the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the Abanzado70 is still very much relevant:
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at the very convincingly establish that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity
outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in regard to in order to fully establish his case.78
the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If
that were practicable or possible there would be little need for the formality of a trial. He must As a last observation, we note the unique wording of the grant of the power of immunity to the
rely in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in Ombudsman. It is not without significance that the law encompassed (and appears to have
coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge pointedly not separated) the consideration of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
is requested"; as to the availability or nonavailability of other direct or corroborative evidence; as Court within the broader context of "such terms and conditions as the Ombudsman may
to which of the accused is "most guilty," and the like. determine." This deliberate statutory wording, to our mind, indicates the intent to define the role
of Section 17, Rule 119 in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion. It suggests a broad grant of
Notably, this cited case also observes that the Rules-provided guidelines are mere express discretion that allows the Ombudsman’s consideration of factors other than those outlined under
declarations of the conditions which the courts ought to have in mind in exercising their sound Section 17, Rule 119; the wording creates the opening for the invocation, when proper, of the
discretion in granting the prosecution’s motion for the discharge of an accused.71 In other words, constitutional and statutory intents behind the establishment of the Ombudsman.
these guidelines are necessarily implied in the discretion granted to the courts.
Based on these considerations, we shall now proceed to determine whether the petitioner has
RA No. 6770 recognizes that these same principles should apply when the Ombudsman directly clearly and convincingly shown that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting
grants immunity to a witness. The same consideration – to achieve the greater and higher immunity to the respondents.
purpose of securing the conviction of the most guilty and the greatest number among the
accused72 – is involved whether the grant is secured by the public prosecutor with active court Va. Absolute necessity for testimony of the respondents
intervention, or by the Ombudsman. If there is any distinction at all between the public
prosecutor and the Ombudsman in this endeavor, it is in the specificity of and the higher priority
given by law to the Ombudsman’s purpose and objective – to focus on offenses committed by Under the factual and legal situation before us, we find that the petitioner miserably failed to
public officers and employees to ensure accountability in the public service. This accounts for clearly and convincingly establish that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting
the Ombudsman’s unique power to grant immunity by itself and even prior to the filing of immunity to the respondents. While he claims that both conditions (a) and (d) of Section 17,
information in court, a power that the public prosecutor himself generally does not enjoy.73 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court are absent, we observe his utter lack of argument addressing the
"absolute necessity" of the respondents’ testimony. In fact, the petitioner simply concluded that
the requirement of "absolute necessity" does not exist based on the Ombudsman’s "evidence,"
V. Extent of judicial review of a bestowed immunity without even attempting to explain how he arrived at this conclusion.

An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this Court of the Ombudsman’s We note in this regard that the respondents’ proposed testimony tends to counteract the
exercise of discretion. Like all other officials under our constitutional scheme of government, all petitioner’s personal defense of good faith (i.e., that he had no actual participation and merely
their acts must adhere to the Constitution.74 The parameters of our review, however, are narrow. relied on his subordinates) in approving the job orders and in his concurrence with the inspection
In the first place, what we review are executive acts of a constitutionally independent reports. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, the respondents narrated the accused DPWH
Ombudsman.75 Also, we undertake the review given the underlying reality that this Court is not a officials/employees’ flagrant disregard of the proper procedure and the guidelines in the repair of
trier of facts. Since the determination of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the DPWH service vehicles which culminated in losses to the government. Particularly telling is the
Rules of Court is highly factual in nature, the Court must, thus, generally defer to the judgment of respondents’ statement that a number of pre-repair inspection reports for a particular month in
the Ombudsman who is in a better position (than the Sandiganbayan or the defense) to know 2001 bear the petitioner’s signature despite the fact that these reports are not supported by
the relative strength and/or weakness of the evidence presently in his possession and the kind, findings from the respondents as SIT members.79 This kind of statement cannot but impact on
tenor and source of testimony he needs to enable him to prove his case.76 It should not be how the Ombudsman viewed the question of "absolute necessity" of the respondents’ testimony
forgotten, too, that the grant of immunity effectively but conditionally results in the extinction of since this testimony meets the defense of good faith head-on to prove the prosecution’s
the criminal liability the accused-witnesses might have incurred, as defined in the terms of the allegations. Under these circumstances, we cannot preempt, foreclose, nor replace with our own
grant.77 This point is no less important as the grant directly affects the individual and enforces his the Ombudsman’s position on this point as it is clearly not without basis.
right against self-incrimination. These dynamics should constantly remind us that we must tread
softly, but not any less critically, in our review of the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity.
Vb. The respondents do not appear to be the "most guilty"
From the point of view of the Court’s own operations, we are circumscribed by the nature of the
review powers granted to us under the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We rule on the basis Similarly, far from concluding that the respondents are the "most guilty," we find that the
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and address mainly the Ombudsman’s exercise of circumstances surrounding the preparation of the inspection reports can significantly lessen the
discretion. Our room for intervention only occurs when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise degree of the respondents’ criminal complicity in defrauding the government. Again, this is a
of discretion is shown. Necessarily, this limitation similarly reflects on the petitioner who comes matter that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his discretion, could not have avoided when he
to us on the allegation of grave abuse of discretion; the petitioner himself is bound to clearly and considered the grant of immunity to the respondents.
We note, too, that while the petitioner incessantly harped on the respondents’ role in the subject to the command of paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,87 the
preparation of the inspection reports, yet, as head of the SIT, he was eerily silent on the Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory
circumstances surrounding this preparation, particularly on the respondents’ explanation that and prosecutory powers (among them, the power to grant immunity to witnesses88), and
they tried "to curb the anomalous practices"80 in the DPWH. We are aware, of course, that the respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, "beholden to no one,
present petition merely questions the immunity granted to the respondents and their consequent acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public
exclusion from the informations; it does not assail the finding of probable cause against the service."89 Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman90 best explains the reason behind this policy:
petitioner himself. This current reality may explain the petitioner’s silence on the respondents’
assertions; the respondents’ allegations, too, still have to be proven during the trial. However, The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
these considerations are not sufficient to save the petitioner from the necessity of controverting the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
the respondents’ allegations, even for the limited purpose of the present petition, since his functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
counter-assertion on this basic ground (that the respondents bear the most guilt) is essential and dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard
critical to the viability of his petition. to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped
if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
In considering the respondents’ possible degree of guilt, we are keenly aware of their admission prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
that they resorted to a "short-cut"81 in the procedure to be observed in the repairs and/or by a private complainant.
purchase of emergency parts of DPWH service vehicles. To our mind, however, this admission
does not necessarily result in making the respondents the "most guilty" in the premises; not even Following this policy, we deem it neither appropriate nor advisable to interfere with the
a semblance of being the "most guilty" can be deduced therefrom. Ombudsman’s grant of immunity to the respondents, particularly in this case, where the
petitioner has not clearly and convincingly shown the grave abuse of discretion that would call
In sum, the character of the respondents’ involvement vis-à-vis the crimes filed against the for our intervention.
DPWH officials/employees, coupled with the substance of the respondents’ disclosures, compels
this Court to take a dim view of the position that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
in granting immunity to the respondents. The better view is that the Ombudsman simply saw the
higher value of utilizing the respondents themselves as witnesses instead of prosecuting them in
order to fully establish and strengthen its case against those mainly responsible for the criminal SO ORDERED.
act, as indicated by the available evidence.1avvphi1
ARTURO D. BRION
VI. The respondents’ administrative liability has no bearing at all on the immunity granted to the Associate Justice
respondents
WE CONCUR:
The fact that the respondents had previously been found administratively liable, based on the
same set of facts, does not necessarily make them the "most guilty." An administrative case is ANTONIO T. CARPIO
altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition in the former does not Associate Justice
necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same Chairperson
set of facts.82 The most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents have
been found to be administratively guilty by substantial evidence – the quantum of proof required
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
in an administrative proceeding. The requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(which RA No. 6770 adopted by reference) that the proposed witness should not appear to be
the "most guilty" is obviously in line with the character83 and purpose84 of a criminal proceeding,
and the much stricter standards85 observed in these cases. They are standards entirely different BIENVENIDO L. REYES
from those applicable in administrative proceedings. Associate Justice

VII. The policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutory powers ATTESTATION
cautions a stay of judicial hand
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers, freed, to the extent possible within our
governmental system and structure, from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention, and
insulated from outside pressure and improper influence.86 Consistent with this purpose and
 12
ANTONIO T. CARPIO  Id. at 23.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division 13
 OMB-C-C-02-0507-H.

CERTIFICATION 14
 Filed on August 7, 2002.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's 15
 Dated October 9, 2002; rollo, pp. 17-68.
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. 16
 Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI.
RENATO C. CORONA 17
Chief Justice  Rollo, p. 28.

18
 Id. at 30-31.

19
 Id. at 83-84.
Footnotes 20
 Id. at 94-101.
1
 Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 21
 Id. at 257-284.
2
 Rollo, pp. 103-135. 22
. On January 20, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, Second Division dismissed, without
3
prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges, Criminal Case No. 27969, for lack of
 Id. at 178-222. probable cause; id. at 235-256.
4
 Criminal Case Nos. 28098-28100; id. at 257-284. 23
 Id. at 285-292.
5
 Criminal Case Nos. 28251-28253; id. at 424, 426. 24
 Relying on Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
6
 Id. at 77. 25
 Rollo, p. 413.
7
 Id. at 80, 84. 26
 Ibid.
8
 The SIT members represent different divisions/services in DPWH, viz.: the Supplies 27
 Id. at 415.
Property Management Division, the Administrative Manpower and Management
Service, the Asset and Supply Management and Control Division, the Comptrollership 28
and Financial Management Service, and the CESPD-BOE; id. at 80-81.  Id. at 479.

29
9
 Per Department Order No. 15, Series of 2002; id. at 21, 70.  The petitioner replied thrice (dated November 21, 2005 and May 15, 2007 and
October 4, 2007) to the Ombudsman’s and the respondents’ Comments.
10
 Id. at 70. 30
 Rollo, p. 425.
11
 January 7 and March 1, 2004 resolutions of the Ombudsman; id. at 117-119, 150- 31
151. Petitioner’s Reply; id. at 464-466.  Id. at 468, 500.
32 48
 Section 7, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of  In United States v. Kastigar (406 U.S. 441), the United States Supreme Court noted that "the
the Ombudsman) allows the filing of a motion for reconsideration in criminal cases. power to compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth
Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him, and
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." The Sixth Amendment is
33
 Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November 9, 1993, 227 SCRA 627. substantially reproduced in Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.

34
 See Delos Reyes v. Flores, G.R. No. 168726, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 270. 49
 See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843C.A.D.C., 1990; and Cruz, Isagani, Philippine
Constitutional Law, pp. 307-308, 2007 ed.
35
 See rollo, pp. 6-7; Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
50
SC reads:  The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal, civil, or administrative (Rosete v.
Lim, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 125.
SEC. 4. When and Where to file the petition. — The petition shall be filed not later than
51
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for  CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Section 17.
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial 52
 Varon, Joseph A., Searches, Seizures and Immunities, p. 731.
of the motion.
53
36  United States. v. Kastigar, supra note 48.
 RULES OF COURT.
54
37  Commission on Elections v. Hon. Espanol, 463 Phil. 245 (2003).
 Baviera v. Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098, October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 281; Estrada v. Desierto, 487
Phil. 169 (2004); Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, 473 Phil. 372 (2004); Mendoza-Arce v.
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), 430 Phil. 101 (2002); and Kuizon v. Hon. Desierto, 406 Phil. 55
 A legislature is empowered to deprive a witness of the constitutional privilege against self-
611 (2001). incrimination by according him complete immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the
testimony relates (81 Am. Jur. 2d § 142, the power to suspend a criminal law by the tender of
38 immunity to a witness is a legislative power, citing Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 NY 244).
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 3.
56
39  Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA 783.
 Under exceptional circumstances however, as where there is gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority, courts may direct the exercise of this discretion.
See Angchangco, Jr. v. Hon. Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766 (1997). 57
 Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 512 Phil. 590 (2005).

40
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado, G.R. No. 164538, August 9, 2010, 627 58
 In Philippine constitutional law, the concept of immunity is firmly established. For one, although
SCRA 88. the 1935 Constitution did not provide for the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it was considered part
of the legal system brought to the country by the Americans (Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987
41 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 2003, p. 1268). On the other hand,
 Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 390 Phil. 917 (2000).
the President’s immunity from suit is recognized as early as 1910 in Forbes, etc. v. Chuoco Tiaco
and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534 (1910). Similarly, the parliamentary immunity of the Members of
42
 Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 303; and Congress already exists under Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
Angeles v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133077, September 8, 2006, 501 SCRA 202.
In the field of ordinary law enforcement and criminal prosecution, relatively few immunity
43
 See Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 542 (2003); and D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra, 328 laws were enacted then: Commonwealth Act No. 83 (Securities Act, October 26, 1936);
Phil. 1168 (1996). RA No. 602 (Minimum Wage Law, April 6, 1951); RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring
Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property Found to have been Unlawfully Acquired by
44 any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor, June 18,
 Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., G.R. No. 95136, October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA 405.
1955); and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 63 (Amending Certain Sections of Act
Numbered Twenty-Four Hundred and Twenty-Seven, otherwise Known as the
45
 REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 110, Section 2. Insurance Act, as Amended, November 20, 1972).

59
46
 94 Phil. 1018 (1954).  PD No. 749 (Granting Immunity from Prosecution to Givers of Bribes and Other Gifts and to their
Accomplices in Bribery and Other Graft Cases against Public Officers, July 18, 1975); PD No.
47 1731 (Providing for Rewards and Incentives to Government Witnesses and Informants and other
 111 Phil. 765 (1961). Purposes, October 8, 1980); PD No. 1732 (Providing Immunity from Criminal Prosecution to
Government Witnesses and for other Purposes, October 8, 1980); PD No. 1886 (creating the
Agrava Fact-Finding Board, October 22, 1983); 1987 Constitution, Article XIII, Section 18(8) exercised" and "to rest the manner of the enforcement of these conditions in the sound
(empowering the Commission on Human Rights to grant immunity); RA No. 6646 (An Act judicial discretion of the courts."
Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other Purposes, January 5, 1988);
Executive Order No. 14, August 18, 1986; RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989, November 17, 69
 In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan (supra note 56, at 802), the Court ruled that the court’s business is to
1989); RA No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, April 24, 1991); RA No. 7916
be an "impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution"
(The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, July 25, 1994); RA No. 9165 (Comprehensive
since due process "demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, June 7, 2002); RA No. 9416 (An Act Declaring as Unlawful Any
among all litigants."
Form of Cheating in Civil Service Examinations, etc., March 25, 2007); and RA No. 9485 (Anti-
Red Tape Act of 2007, June 2, 2007).
70
 Supra note 68, at 664.
60
 See United States v. Kastigar, supra note 48; and Chua v. CA, 329 Phil. 841 (1996).
71
 Id. at 667.
61
 Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 396 (2005).
72
 People v. Feliciano, 419 Phil. 324 (2001).
62
 See CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Section 13.
73
 Under RA No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act), the grant of immunity to a
63 witness who has participated in the commission of a crime is merely one of the consequences of
 Supra note 56, at 802.
the witness’ admission into the Witness Protection Program administered by the Department of
Justice (Sections 10 and 12, RA No. 6981).
64
 See Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman, 518 Phil. 251 (2006).
74
 Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 512 Phil. 590 (2005).
65
 Depending on how broad the statutory power to grant immunity is worded, the power to grant
immunity may be exercised even during the trial of the criminal case. In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan 75
 The pertinent sections of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution read:
(supra note 56, at 800-803), the Court, taking into account the exclusivity of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government’s power to grant immunity, ruled that while the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction to review the PCGG-granted immunity, it can only determine the "procedural Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the
regularity" thereof and nothing more. Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized
probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been
66 candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The
 Section 17, Rule 119 reads:
Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines.
Discharge of accused to be state witness.—When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions
resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
as provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this Constitution.
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied[.] Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and
Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the
67 same salary which shall not be decreased during their term of office.
 G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 652, 685.

68 Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years
 In United States v. Enriquez (40 Phil. 603, 608 [1919]), the Court ruled that the "sole and
without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election
principal object of the law (Act 2709) is, not to restrain and limit the action of the prosecuting
immediately succeeding their cessation from office.
officer, but especially to impose conditions whereby an accused, already charged in the
information, may not be arbitrarily and capriciously [be] excluded therefrom x x x and to remedy
the evil consequence of an unreasonable and groundless exclusion which produces the real Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved
impunity perhaps of the most guilty criminal and subjects to prosecution the less wicked, who have annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. (emphases ours)
not found protection in whims and arbitrariness unlike others who have secured unfounded and
unjust exclusion when they really deserved severe punishment."
Under Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is
envisioned as "protector of the people" to function essentially as a complaints and action
Likewise, in United States v. Abanzado (37 Phil. 658, 664 [1918]), the Court said "that it bureau. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No. 175573, September 11,
was not the intention of the legislator xxx to deprive the prosecution and the state of the 2008, 564 SCRA 567, 573.) The Philippine Ombudsman is considered at "a notch
right to make use of accomplices and informers as witnesses, but merely to regulate the above other grievance-handling [investigative] bodies" (Department of Justice v. Liwag,
exercise of that right by establishing the conditions under which it may properly be G.R. No. 149311, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 83, 96) given independence that is
 83
never enjoyed by his predecessors; by giving him an "active role" in the enforcement of  In a criminal case, the accused is indicted for an act which constitutes an offense against the
laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and related offenses (Uy v. State; thus, criminal cases are brought in the name of the People of the Philippines (Rule 110,
Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 154, 172 [2001]); by making his recommendation to a Section 2, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). In an administrative (disciplinary) case, the
concerned public officer of taking an appropriate action against an erring subordinate as respondent is charged for an act or omission which constitutes an infraction of civil service rules
not merely advisory but actually mandatory within the bounds of law (Ledesma v. Office and regulations necessary to maintain the standards in government service.
of the Ombudsman, 503 Phil. 396, 407 [2005]; Section 13[3], Article XI of the 1987
Constitution; Section 15[3] of RA No. 6770). The Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority 84
 The purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. On the other hand, the
extends over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
purpose of administrative (disciplinary) proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based
instrumentalities and agencies, except for impeachable officers, members of Congress
on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust (Judge Caña v. Gebusion, 385
and the Judiciary (Section 21 of RA No. 6770). As the Ombudsman is expected to be an
Phil. 773 [2000]). Since their purpose is different, the kind of penalty imposable is likewise different
"activist watchman," (Office of the Ombudsman v. Lucero, G.R. No. 168718, November
consistent with their respective purpose.
24, 2006, 508 SCRA 106, 115) his actions, though not falling squarely under the broad
powers granted him by the Constitution and RA No. 6770, but are reasonable in line
with his official function, and consistent with law and with the constitution, have been 85
 The quantum of proof required in criminal proceedings is proof beyond reasonable doubt;
upheld by the court (Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, supra). whereas in administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is all that is required. The technical
rules of criminal procedure together with all the rights of an accused come to the fore in criminal
76 cases, unlike in administrative proceedings where technical rules of evidence and procedure are
 See People v. Ocimar, GR No. 94555, August 17, 1992.
not strictly applied (Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21 [2000]).
77
 Commission on Elections v. Judge Español, 463 Phil. 240 (2003). See Brown v. Walker, 161 86
 Quiambao v. Desierto, G.R. No. 149069, 20 September 2004, 482 Phil. 157; The Presidential
U.S. 591, 595 (1896). The grant of immunity simply "operates" as a conditional pardon. Pardon
Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, G. R. No.
and immunity are conceptually different from each other. Unlike pardon which the President may
136192, August 14, 2001.
grant only after conviction by final judgment (Section 19, Article VII, 1987 Constitution), immunity
may be granted even before the filing of an information (See Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan, supra
note 57) or even during the trial of the criminal case (See Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 56). 87
 Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution reads:
Under the 1981Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, pardon may be granted at any time after the
commission of the offense, whether before or after conviction. The 1987 Constitution reverted to
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which require "conviction" or "final conviction" before pardon
may be established by law.
may be granted. Specifically, the 1987 Constitution requires conviction by final judgment to
prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power (See
People v. Salle, Jr., G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995, 250 SCRA 590). While immunity would Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
substantially have the same effect as pardon, there will be no "derogation of judicial power" involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
considering that the immunity is granted not purely for immunity’s sake but, most importantly, for whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
the purpose of securing the conviction of the other accused who are the most guilty. of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

78
 Should the petitioner clearly and convincingly establish that the Ombudsman gravely abused his 88
 Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 158613-14, February 22, 2006.
discretion in granting immunity to the witness, the latter cannot invoke double jeopardy once he is
subsequently included in the information, even assuming that all the other requisites of double 89
jeopardy exist (Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). Double jeopardy  Quiambao v. Desierto, G.R. No. 149069, 20 September 2004, 482 Phil. 157; The Presidential
may be invoked only if the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted, or the case Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, G. R. No.
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Since the grant of 136192, August 14, 2001.
immunity operates as a conditional pardon (for the offenses covered by the immunity) and, thus,
requires acceptance by the grantee (Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitution of the 90
 G.R. Nos. 103446-47, August 30, 1993.
Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, p. 810), it is clear that the dismissal of the case
against the immune witness is with his express consent.

79
 Rollo, p. 99.

80
 Supra note 20.

81
 Rollo, p. 96.

82
 People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 147.
 G.R. No. 166495 is a petition for certiorari filed by Roque Facura (Facura) and Eduardo
Tuason (Tuason) assailing the Resolutions1 dated September 22, 2004 and January 4, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902, which granted the applications for
preliminary mandatory injunction filed by Atty. Rodolfo De Jesus (De Jesus) and Atty. Edelwina
Parungao (Parungao) by ordering their reinstatement to their former positions despite the
standing order of dismissal issued by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) against them.

G.R. No. 184129 is an appeal, by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, filed by De Jesus, from the Decision2 dated May 26, 2005 and Resolution3 dated
Republic of the Philippines August 6, 2008 of the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902, which affirmed the Review and
SUPREME COURT Recommendation4 dated January 26, 2004 and Order5 dated April 20, 2004 issued by the
Manila Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-02-0496-J, which dismissed De Jesus from the government service
with prejudice to re-entry thereto.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. 184263 is another appeal, by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
G.R. No. 166495               February 16, 2011 Rules of Court, filed by the Ombudsman, from the Decision dated May 26, 2005 and Resolution
dated August 6, 2008 of the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902, for ordering the reinstatement of
Parungao as Manager of the Human Resources Management Department (HRMD) of the Local
ROQUE C. FACURA and EDUARDO F. TUASON, Petitioners, Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), thereby modifying the Review and
vs. Recommendation6 dated January 26, 2004 and Order7 dated April 20, 2004, issued by the
COURT OF APPEALS, RODOLFO S. DE JESUS and EDELWINA DG. Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-02-0496-J, which dismissed Parungao from the government service
PARUNGAO, Respondents. with prejudice to re-entry thereto.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x These consolidated cases arose from a Joint Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Ombudsman by
Facura and Tuason against De Jesus and Parungao for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
G.R. No. 184129 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave
misconduct, falsification of official documents, being notoriously undesirable, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, EDUARDO F. TUASON, LOCAL WATER UTILITIES The Facts
ADMINISTRATION (LWUA), represented by its new Administrator Orlando C.
Hondrade, Respondents. The LWUA is a government-owned and controlled corporation chartered under Presidential
Decree (P.D) No. 198, as amended. De Jesus was the Deputy Administrator for Administrative
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Services of LWUA, while Parungao was its HRMD Manager for Administrative Services.

G.R. No. 184263 De Jesus was dismissed from the service per LWUA Board Resolution No. 0618 dated March
28, 2001. Through Board Resolution No. 069 dated April 17, 2001, the Board denied his motion
for reconsideration and prohibited De Jesus from acting on any matter as head of Administrative
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
Services. On April 18, 2001, De Jesus appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to nullify
vs.
Board Resolution Nos. 061 and 069.
EDELWINA DG. PARUNGAO, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former 7th
Division), Respondents.
On August 20, 2001, pending resolution of his petition with the CSC, De Jesus filed a petition for
reinstatement with a newly-reconstituted LWUA Board, which granted it on September 4, 2001
DECISION
through Board Resolution No. 172.9 De Jesus then withdrew his petition with the CSC on
September 5, 2001.
MENDOZA, J.:
Under the CSC Accreditation Program, particularly under CSC Resolution No. 96770110 dated
For resolution before this Court are the following: December 3, 1996, LWUA has been granted the authority to take final action on appointment
papers effective January 1, 1997. Under LWUA Officer Order No. 205.0111 dated September 25, Ma. Geraldine Rose D. Buenaflor - August 20, 2001
2001, LWUA Administrator Lorenzo Jamora (Administrator Jamora) granted De Jesus the
authority to sign/approve and issue appointment papers of appointees to vacant plantilla Michael M. Raval - August 20, 2001
positions in LWUA which have been previously cleared or approved in writing by the
Administrator or the Board of Trustees.
Albino G. Valenciano, Jr. - August 20, 2001
12
Prior to the grant of authority to De Jesus to sign appointment papers, in a letter  dated August
27, 2001 signed by Administrator Jamora, LWUA requested the Department of Budget and Noelle Stephanie R. Badoy - June 19, 2001
Management (DBM) for authority to hire confidential staff for the LWUA Board of Trustees. The
request was to seek exemption for LWUA from Administrative Order No. 5 which prohibited the Kristina Joy T. Badoy - June 19, 2001
hiring of new personnel in order to generate savings.
Jesusito R. Toren - October 15, 2001
While awaiting the reply of DBM on his request, Jamora, in an inter-office memorandum13 dated
October 23, 2001, directed the Office of Administrative Services (OAS), headed by De Jesus, Ma. Susan G. Facto - October 10, 2001
and the Investment and Financial Services, to process the payment of the salaries and
allowances of his two (2) newly appointed confidential staff who reported to him effective
October 10, 2001. Upon receipt of the said inter-office memorandum, the OAS forwarded it to Ma. Lourdes M. Manaloto - August 20, 2001
the HRMD headed by Parungao for appropriate action.
Marc Anthony S. Versoza - August 20, 2001
On December 11, 2001, LWUA received a reply letter14 from DBM granting the request to fill
positions for the LWUA Board’s confidential staff. On the same day, on the strength of said letter On December 20, 2001, Administrator Jamora issued an inter-office memorandum19 to the
of approval, LWUA board members issued their respective inter-office memoranda15 and accounting department on the matter of payment of back salaries of the said confidential staff,
letter16 containing the retroactive appointments of their confidential staff, as follows: Board stating therein that as approved by the DBM in its letter, the hiring of such personnel was
Chairman Francisco Dumpit appointed Michael M. Raval and Ma. Geraldine Rose D. Buenaflor authorized retroactive to their employment date, thus, ordering the immediate payment of their
effective August 20, 2001; Trustee Bayani Dato, Sr. appointed Albino G. Valenciano, Jr. back salaries and other remunerations. On the same day, a LWUA disbursement voucher20 was
effective August 20, 2001; and Trustee Solomon Badoy appointed Kristina Joy T. Badoy and prepared and processed by the Accounting Department, and Administrator Jamora thereafter
Noelle Stephanie R. Badoy effective June 19, 2001. On December 18, 2001, Trustee Normando approved the release of a Land Bank check amounting to ₱624,570.00 as part of the cash
Toledo also issued an inter-office memorandum17 appointing, effective August 20, 2001, Marc advance amounting to ₱692,657.31, for the payment of the back salaries.
Anthony S. Verzosa and Ma. Lourdes M. Manaloto. These inter-office memoranda and letter
directed De Jesus to prepare their appointment papers. They bore the written concurrence of
The appointments of the subject confidential staff were reflected in the Supplemental Quarterly
Administrator Jamora as agency head and mandated appointing authority of LWUA employees
Report on Accession for June and August 2001 and Quarterly Report on Accession and
under the LWUA charter. Upon his receipt of the aforesaid inter-office memoranda and letter, De
Separation for October to December 2001 which were submitted to the CSC on January 8,
Jesus forwarded them to the HRMD for the preparation and processing of the corresponding
2002.
appointment papers.

On January 25, 2002, HRMD and OAS issued a Memorandum21 for Administrator Jamora on the
As HRMD head, Parungao forwarded the said documents to the Personnel Division to have
subject of the appointment papers of the nine (9) confidential staff of the Board. De Jesus and
them transformed into formal appointment papers, otherwise known as CSC Standard Form No.
Parungao called his attention to the requirements under CSC Resolution No. 96770122 of the
33. The encoded standard forms indicated the names and positions of the confidential staff and
submission to the CSC of two (2) copies of the Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) within the
the dates of signing and issuance of the appointments, which were the retroactive effectivity
first fifteen (15) days of the ensuing month together with the certified true copies of the
dates appearing in the inter-office memoranda and letter issued by the Board member. The
appointments acted on, and appointments not submitted within the prescribed period would be
concerned HRMD staff and Parungao affixed their initials below the printed name of De Jesus
made effective thirty (30) days prior to the date of submission to the CSC. It was explained that
who, in turn, signed the formal appointment papers as respresentative of the appointing
the appointment papers with retroactive effectivity dates violated the provisions of CSC Res. No.
authority. The nine (9) appointment papers18 bore Serial Nos. 168207, 168210, 168213, 168214,
967701 and Rule 7, Section 11 of the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments. For said reason,
168215, 168216, 168217, 168287, and 168288.
LWUA accreditation could be cancelled and the Administrator be held personally liable for the
invalidated appointments. It was suggested instead that the appointments be re-issued effective
In Office Order No. 286.01 dated December 13, 2001 and Office Order No. 001.02 dated December 12, 2001, the ROPA be dated January 15, 2002, and the earlier retroactive
December 20, 2001 issued by De Jesus and Parungao, it was stated therein that the following appointments be cancelled, as advised by a CSC Field Director in a previous informal
nine (9) personnel were appointed retroactively to the dates indicated below: consultation. It was also proposed that the salaries and benefits already paid be made
on quantum meruit basis, based on actual services rendered as certified by the Board members.
Therefore, for the purpose of meeting the monitoring and reportorial requirements of the CSC in DBM on the retroactive implementation of the authority granted to LWUA in the previous letter of
relation to the accreditation given to LWUA to take final action on its appointments, De Jesus approval.
and Parungao, with the prior approval of Administrator Jamora, re-issued the appointments of
the Board’s nine (9) confidential staff. The appointment papers23 were now all dated December Meanwhile, on November 20, 2001, in relation to the earlier appeal of De Jesus (which he
12, 2001, with Serial Nos. 168292, 168293, 168294, 168295, 168297, 168298, 168299, 168301, withdrew upon his reinstatement by the newly reconstituted LWUA Board), the CSC issued
and 168304 and were transmitted to the CSC. Resolution No. 011811,26 which remanded the case to LWUA for the conduct of an investigation
regarding De Jesus’ dismissal, to be finished within three (3) calendar months, failure of which
On February 28, 2002, Administrator Jamora again wrote a letter24 to the DBM clarifying whether would result in the dismissal of the case against De Jesus.
its December 11, 2001 letter, approving the hiring of the confidential staff of the LWUA Board,
had retroactive effect. It was explained that the said confidential staff had started rendering On August 15, 2002, the CSC issued Resolution No. 02109027 ruling that CSC Resolution No.
services as early as August 20, 2001, when the Board assumed office because their services 011811 had not been rendered moot and academic by the reinstatement of De Jesus by the
were urgently needed by the trustees. LWUA Board. It further declared the reinstatement as illegal, null and void. The Board was
directed to recall the reinstatement of De Jesus, and LWUA was ordered to continue the conduct
Meanwhile, the LWUA Accounting Department, in a Brief to the Legal Department dated March of the investigation on De Jesus as earlier directed, within three (3) calendar months from
2, 2002, sought its legal opinion on the subject of the first payment of salary of the confidential receipt of the resolution. For failure of LWUA to conduct an investigation within the required
staff. The Legal Department replied that a letter had been sent to the DBM seeking clarification period, CSC Resolution No. 03050428 was issued dated May 5, 2003 considering the dismissal
on whether the previous DBM approval retroacted to the actual service of the confidential staff. case closed and terminated.

Thereafter, the Internal Control Office (ICO) of LWUA issued a memorandum dated May 10, Complaint of Facura and Tuason
2002, questioning the issuance of the retroactive appointment papers. It pointed out that since
the appointment papers submitted to the CSC indicated December 12, 2001 as effective date, On October 18, 2002, Facura and Tuason filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint29 before the
the appointment of the involved personnel to the government service should be considered Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman against De Jesus and
effective only on said date, with their salaries and other compensation computed only from Parungao charging them with: 1) violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; and 2) dishonesty,
December 12, 2001. Thus, there was an overpayment made as follows: gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, being notoriously
undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the fabrication of
Ma. Geraldine Rose D. Buenaflor - ₱107,730.09 fraudulent appointments of nine (9) coterminous employees of LWUA.

Michael M. Raval - ₱111,303.16 Facura and Tuason alleged that the retroactive appointment papers were fabricated and
fraudulent as they were made to appear to have been signed/approved on the dates stated, and
Albino G. Valenciano, Jr. - ₱107, 730.09 not on the date of their actual issuance. They further alleged that with malice and bad faith, De
Jesus and Parungao willfully and feloniously conspired not to submit the fraudulent appointment
papers to the CSC, and to submit instead the valid set of appointment papers bearing the
Noelle Stephanie R. Badoy - ₱157, 210.34 December 12, 2001 issuance date.

Kristina Joy T. Badoy - ₱163, 130.69 They questioned the issuance of the fraudulent appointments in favor of the nine (9) confidential
staff, to the prejudice of the government in the amount of ₱692,657.31, as these were used as
It was further recommended that the Legal Department conduct an investigation to identify the basis for the payment of their back salaries. They also alleged that De Jesus’ reinstatement was
person liable to refund to LWUA the overpayments made to the subject personnel and that the illegal and that he had lost authority to sign any LWUA documents effective upon the issuance of
Accounting Department take appropriate actions to recover the overpayment. LWUA Board Resolution Nos. 061 and 069. Thus, the actions undertaken by him in signing the
fraudulent appointments were all misrepresented and, therefore, unlawful. They further alleged
On June 5, 2002, LWUA received DBM’s reply letter25 on June 5, 2002, informing Administrator that contrary to law, De Jesus continued to receive his salary and benefits as Deputy
Jamora that the previously granted authority on the hiring of the confidential staff to the LWUA Administrator of LWUA despite having already been dismissed. They cited the string of criminal
Board may be implemented retroactive to the date of actual service rendered by the employees and administrative cases against De Jesus before the trial courts and the Ombudsman.
involved.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit,30 De Jesus and Parungao alleged that they were mere rank-and-
In a Brief to Administrator Jamora dated July 26, 2002, signed by De Jesus and initialed by file employees who had no knowledge of or participation in personnel matters; that their actions
Parungao, the issues raised by ICO in its Memorandum on the retroactive appointments of the in issuing the two sets of appointments were all documented and above-board; that as
concerned confidential staff and overpayments were deemed clarified with the reply letter of the subordinate employees, they had no discretion on the matter of the retroactive appointments of
the nine confidential staff specifically requested by the Board members; and that the re-issuance backsalaries, to the prejudice and damage of the government, was also cited as another
of the second set of appointments effective December 12, 2001 was duly approved by deliberate concealment and distortion with false narration of facts.
Administrator Jamora. They denied any financial damage on the part of LWUA since the
retroactive payment of salaries was justified under the DBM letter approving the hiring of The Ombudsman also viewed the second set of appointment papers as to have been issued for
personnel retroactive to the date of actual services rendered by them. no apparent reason and designed to legalize the illegal appointments issued in June and August
2001. Thus, dishonesty on the part of De Jesus was found to be present for acting against a
The Ruling of the Ombudsman series of orders issued by the CSC and for the falsification of the illegal appointment papers.

The complaint was originally referred to the Ombudsman’s Preliminary Investigation and The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Administrative Adjudication Bureau – B, and assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer I Vivian Magsino-Gonzales (Pros. Magsino-Gonzales). After evaluating the documents Aggrieved, De Jesus and Parungao filed a petition for review with the CA on July 5, 2004 which
on file, Pros. Magsino-Gonzales dispensed with the preliminary conference and preliminary was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84902, praying, among others, for the issuance of a
investigation of the case. In her Decision dated September 30, 2003, she recommended the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the
outright dismissal of the case, ratiocinating that the Ombudsman did not have the jurisdiction to implementation of the order of dismissal against them. The CA, in its Resolution dated July 20,
resolve the issues of fraudulent appointments of the nine confidential staff and their alleged 2004, deferred action on the application for TRO and gave Facura and Tuason time to comment.
overpayment to the damage of LWUA and the government and to decide on the status of De
Jesus as a dismissed employee which, in her view, belonged to the primary jurisdiction and
technical expertise of the CSC. After the petition to the CA was filed, LWUA implemented the order of dismissal against De
Jesus and Parungao. Administrator Jamora issued Office Order No. 151204 notifying De Jesus
and Parungao of their dismissal from the LWUA effective at the close of office hours on July 23,
Said recommendation was disapproved by the Ombudsman and the case was referred for 2004.
review to Special Prosecution Officer Roberto Agagon (Special Pros. Agagon) of the Preliminary
Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau – A. Without conducting a preliminary
conference or investigation, Special Pros. Agagon came up with the assailed Review and On August 12, 2004, the CA granted the application for TRO so as not to render the issues
Recommendation finding De Jesus and Parungao guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, gross raised in the petition moot and academic. On August 24, 2004, Facura and Tuason filed their
neglect of duty, and falsification, the dispositive portion of which reads: Manifestation with Extremely Urgent Motion for Dissolution of the issued TRO because the act to
be enjoined, the implementation of the dismissal order, was fait accompli.
WHEREFORE, respondents Rodolfo S. De Jesus and Edelwina DG. Parungao are meted out
the penalty of Dismissal from the service with prejudice to re-entry into the government service. On September 22, 2004, the CA issued the assailed Resolution denying Facura and Tuason’s
motion to dissolve the TRO, and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in favor of De Jesus and Parungao, which reads as follows:
On March 24, 2004, Facura and Tuason filed their Motion for Reconsideration but the same was
denied in the assailed Order dated April 20, 2004.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Motion to Dissolve TRO filed by respondents is
hereby DENIED. Accordingly, let writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue enjoining LWUA
The Ombudsman found that during De Jesus’ dismissal from the service at the LWUA, and and the Office of the Ombudsman from enforcing the assailed Order and are thereby directed to
despite the advice of the CSC to await the final resolution of his appeal, De Jesus illegally maintain and/or restore the status quo existing at the time of the filing of the present petition by
issued appointments to several co-terminous employees in June and August 2001. The reinstating petitioners to their former positions pending the resolution of this case upon the filing
appointments were found to have been prepared and issued by De Jesus and Parungao after of petitioner’s bond in the amount of P40,000.00 each, which will answer for whatever damages
the former had been terminated from LWUA, therefore, without authority to sign/act on any respondents may sustain in the event that the petition is not granted.
official LWUA document/official matter, which fact he was fully aware of, thereby making the
solemnity of the documents questionable. All said appointments were, thus, found to be
fraudulent, illegal, and of no legal force and effect. Since these were also prepared and initialed The CA found that the right to appeal from decisions of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty
by Parungao, a conspiracy to commit falsification through dishonesty was found to have been other than public censure or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one month or a
present. fine equivalent to more than one month’s salary, granted to parties by Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770 (the Ombudsman Act) should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending
appeal citing Lopez v. Court of Appeals.31 The right to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
It was also found that the DBM approved the LWUA request on retroactivity of payment of back was deemed to be in order because De Jesus’ and Parungao’s right to be protected under R.A.
salaries because not all facts attendant to the illegal appointments had been disclosed to said No. 6770 was found to exist prima facie, and the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such
office. The deliberate concealment of the illegal appointment papers was dishonest. The right.
attachment of the illegal appointments to the LWUA Disbursement Voucher for payment of
On October 4, 2004, Facura, Tuason and LWUA moved for the reconsideration of the In its Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration filed by Facura, Tuazon and De Jesus,
September 22, 2004 Resolution, which motion was opposed by De Jesus and Parungao. Their the CA ruled, among others, that the case of De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan32 could not be used as
Motions for Reconsideration were denied by the CA on January 4, 2005, as follows: basis to absolve administrative liability, as the present case was not limited solely to falsification
and preparation of the two sets of appointment papers. The CA found that De Jesus failed to
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the respondents’ respective Motions for comply with CSC rules due to his failure to submit the first set of appointment papers to the
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 22 September 2004 are hereby DENIED. Petitioner De CSC. Dishonesty was found present when De Jesus submitted the first set of appointment
Jesus’ Most Urgent Motion to Deputize the Philippine National Police to Implement the Injunctive papers to the DBM and the second set to CSC to comply with reportorial requirements, ensuring
Writ dated 29 September 2004 is GRANTED and accordingly the said entity is hereby deputized that the DBM was unaware of what the CSC was doing and vice versa. The CSC resolutions
to implement the injunctive relief issued by this Court. dismissing the complaint against De Jesus were found to have no bearing as the dismissal case
was already before the CSC for resolution when De Jesus affixed his signature. Thus, De Jesus
had no authority to sign the appointment papers and by doing so, he defied the CSC directive
Facura and Tuason then filed the present Petition for Certiorari with this Court questioning the recalling his reinstatement. Violation of CSC rules on appointment was found to be distinct from
above-mentioned Resolutions of the CA, docketed as G.R. No. 166495. Pending resolution of misrepresentation of authority to sign appointment papers.
the said Petition, the CA rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902, dated May 26, 2005,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
Hence, the present Petitions for Review on Certiorari separately filed by De Jesus and the
Ombudsman, docketed as G.R. Nos. 185129 and 184263, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Review and
Recommendation and Order are MODIFIED hereby ordering the reinstatement of petitioner
Parungao as Manager of the Human Resource Management Department of LWUA with back THE ISSUES
pay and without loss of seniority. The dismissal of petitioner De Jesus from the government
service with prejudice to re-entry thereto is AFFIRMED. The issues presented for resolution by Facura (now deceased) and Tuason in G.R. No. 166495
are as follows:
Facura, Tuazon and the Ombudsman filed their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration,
while De Jesus filed his Motion for Reconsideration. These were denied by the CA in its a. Whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman’s decision in administrative cases
Resolution dated August 6, 2008. carries with it the suspension of the imposed penalty;

The CA believed that at the time De Jesus signed the two sets of appointment papers, the CSC b. Whether or not petitioners were heard before the issuance of the writ of preliminary
had not divested itself of jurisdiction and authority over his dismissal case. Thus, he mandatory injunction; and
misrepresented his authority to do so as his dismissal was still in effect and for resolution by the
CSC. The CA agreed with De Jesus that it was his ministerial duty to comply with the request of c. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the writ of preliminary mandatory
the Board members. However, he failed to perform his ministerial duty, for if he had in fact done injunction.
so, the second set of appointments would not have been issued as the first set of appointments
with retroactive effectivity dates would have already been submitted to the CSC.
The assignment of errors presented by De Jesus in G.R. No. 184129, are as follows:
The CA further found the request for approval to the DBM to apply the earlier granted authority
to hire retroactively as a disingenuous attempt to provide a semblance of legality to the intended I
retroactive appointments. It held that the approval or disapproval of appointment to the
government was the sole office of the CSC, and not the DBM, as the LWUA authority to take THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
final action on its appointments was by virtue of CSC’s accreditation program. De Jesus’ failure CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT AND/OR RES JUDICATA ARISING FROM SC
to submit the retroactive appointment papers as prescribed under the CSC accreditation was DECISION DATED OCTOBER 17, 2007 IN G.R. NOS. 164166 & 164173-80 AND CSC RES.
viewed by the CA as a concealment of such retroactivity and, thus, dishonesty. To its mind, the NOS. 03-0504, 07-0146 & 07-0633.
CSC was deliberately made unaware of what the DBM was doing, and vice versa.
II
Parungao was exonerated by the CA after having been found that she took steps to clarify the
matter with the CSC, informed her superiors about her misgivings and the legal effects of the THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING PETITIONER TO HAVE
retroactive appointments, and published such retroactive appointments in the LWUA Quarterly ACTED IN GOOD FAITH WHEN HE OBEYED THE PATENTLY LAWFUL ORDERS OF HIS
Reports on Accession, thus, demonstrating her good faith. SUPERIORS.
 III The issue of whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman decision in an administrative case
carries with it the immediate suspension of the imposed penalty has been laid to rest in the
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN STILL RELYING ON CSC RES. NO. 01- recent resolution of the case of Ombudsman v. Samaniego,33 where this Court held that the
1811 AND RES. NO. 02-1090 AFTER HAVING BEEN RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC BY decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by
CSC RES. NO. 03-0405. the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ, to wit:

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,34 as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, provides:

SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge,
and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension
IV of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final,
executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER TO HAVE Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule
COMMITTED AN ACT OF DISHONESTY IN RELATION TO THE CSC ACCREDITATION 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision
PROGRAM. or Order denying the motion for reconsideration.

V An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS DO having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO COLLATERALLY RULE AGAINST PETITIONER’S TITLE AS emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF LWUA.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a
VI matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to
comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE AS MITIGATING censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer. [Emphases supplied]
CIRCUMSTANCES THE EDUCATION AND LENGTH OF SERVICE OF PETITIONER IN THE
IMPOSITION OF SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
The Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately
executory pending appeal.35 It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the CA. This
VII rule is similar to that provided under Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN STILL FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF
MISREPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY AFTER EXONERATING ATTY. EDELWINA DG. In the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
PARUNGAO. Secretary of the DPWH,36  we held:

The issue presented for resolution by the Ombudsman in G.R. No. 184263 is as follows: The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested
right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other
EVIDENCE EXISTS AGAINST RESPONDENT PARUNGAO FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no
OFFENSE OF DISHONESTY WHICH WARRANTS HER DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE . such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one
can be said to have any vested right in an office.
THE RULING OF THE COURT

Following the ruling in the above cited case, this Court, in Buencamino v. Court of
G.R. No. 166495
Appeals,37 upheld the resolution of the CA denying Buencamino’s application for preliminary
injunction against the immediate implementation of the suspension order against him. The Court
stated therein that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
application for injunctive relief because Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of De Jesus and Parungao would be violated as they would be considered under preventive
of the Ombudsman was amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003. suspension, and entitled to the salary and emoluments they did not receive in the event that they
would win their appeal.
Respondent cannot successfully rely on Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which
provides: The ratiocination above also clarifies the application of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in relation
to Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The CA, even on terms
SEC. 12. Effect of appeal ― The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or it may deem just, has no discretion to stay a decision of the Ombudsman, as such procedural
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such matter is governed specifically by the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
terms as it may deem just.
The CA’s issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal
In the first place, the Rules of Court may apply to cases in the Office of the Ombudsman imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rule-
suppletorily only when the procedural matter is not governed by any specific provision in the making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution, and
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.38 Here, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, is categorical, an appeal shall not stop promulgate its own rules of procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders nugatory the
the decision from being executory. provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman The CA, however, cannot be blamed for so ruling because at that time the Court’s rulings were
to promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the not definite and, thus, nebulous. There were no clear-cut guidelines yet. Even the initial ruling in
Ombudsman Act of 198939 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to Samaniego on September 11, 2008, stated in effect that the mere filing by a respondent of an
"promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, appeal sufficed to stay the execution of the joint decision against him. The Samaniego initial
functions and duties" and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require. For ruling merely followed that in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,42  where it was
the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in stated:
an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render nugatory the [O]nly orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month,
or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public
supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12,40 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent
decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision in to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period
is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. Specialis derogat to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order,
generali. When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The
said case must prevail over the other.41 [Emphases supplied] fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should
generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential
nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. [Emphasis in the
Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as original].
amended by Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in providing that an appeal shall
not stop an Ombudsman decision from being executory. This rule applies to the appealable
decisions of the Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty imposed is other than public Having ruled that the decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory pending appeal,
censure or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one month, or a fine equivalent The Court finds it unncessary to determine whether or not Facura and Tuason were heard
to more than one month’s salary. Hence, the dismissal of De Jesus and Parungao from the before the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
government service is immediately executory pending appeal.
G.R. Nos. 184129 & 184263
The aforementioned Section 7 is also clear in providing that in case the penalty is removal and
the respondent wins his appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive The Court now looks into the issue of whether De Jesus was rightfully dismissed from the
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by government service, and whether Parungao was righfully exonerated by the CA.
reason of the removal. As explained above, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an
office, or an absolute right to hold office, except constitutional offices with special provisions on Conclusiveness of Judgment
salary and tenure. The Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman being procedural, no vested right
De Jesus contends that under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment and/or res judicata, The Court agrees with De Jesus insofar as the finding regarding the falsification of official
the present case is bound by the decision of this Court in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.43 documents is concerned.

The original complaint filed with the Ombudsman by Facura and Tuason spawned two cases, an The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
administrative proceeding docketed as OMB-C-A-0496-J, which is the subject of this present
case, and a proceeding for the determination of probable cause for the filing of criminal charges Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by
docketed as OMB-C-C-02-0712-J. a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
As to the criminal charges, probable cause was found to be present by the Ombudsman, and
nine (9) informations for falsification of public documents were separately filed against De Jesus xxx
and Parungao with the Sandiganbayan docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27894-27902. After his
Motion to Quash was denied, De Jesus filed a petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as
G.R. Nos. 164166 & 164173-80, entitled De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.44 This petition was (b)In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
resolved on October 17, 2007 in favor of De Jesus with the finding that the evidence could not as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
sustain a prima facie case. His Motion to Quash was granted for lack of probable cause to form parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action
a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. The Court stated that there was no reasonable or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present, finding that nothing capacity; and
in the two sets of appointment papers constituted an absolutely false narration of facts.
(c)In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
As a result, the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan were consequently dismissed on deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face
March 14, 2008.45 Copies of the decisions of this Court and the Sandiganbayan were submitted to have been so adjudged, or which actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
to the CA through a Manifestation with Most Urgent Ex-Parte Motion on April 24, 2008. thereto.

De Jesus cited the case of Borlongan v. Buenaventura46 to support his argument that this The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of
administrative case should be bound by the decision in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.47 In competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies
Borlongan, similar to the situation prevailing in this case, the complaint-affidavit filed with the and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the
Ombudsman also spawned two cases – a proceeding for the determination of probable cause same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
for the filing of criminal charges, and an administrative case subject of the petition. In said case, necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a
this Court found that its factual findings regarding the proceeding for the determination of judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
probable cause bound the disposition of the factual issues in the administrative case under the cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or
principle of conclusiveness of judgment, as both the probable cause proceeding and the demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same.50 The first rule which
administrative case require the same quantum of evidence, that is, substantial corresponds to paragraph (b) of Section 47 above, is referred to as "bar by former judgment";
evidence. Furthermore, the factual backdrop in the proceeding for the determination of probable while the second rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c), is known as "conclusiveness of
cause, which this Court declared as insufficient to hold respondents for trial, was the same set of judgment."51
facts which confronted this Court in the administrative case.
As what is involved in this case is a proceeding for the determination of probable cause and an
On the other hand, the Ombudsman, Tuason and LWUA raised the jurisprudential principle that administrative case, necessarily involving different causes of action, the applicable principle is
the dismissal of a criminal case involving the same set of facts does not automatically result in conclusiveness of judgment. The Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon
the dismissal of the administrative charges due to the distinct and independent nature of one City52 explained such, to wit:
proceeding from the other. They further countered that the only issue resolved in De Jesus was
the absence of mens rea, which was not a mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment- states that a fact or question which was in
official documents as an administrative offense;48 and although it was found that there was no issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
absolutely false narration of facts in the two sets of appointment papers, the issue in this competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that
administrative case was not limited solely to falsification of official documents. It was further action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future
contended that the evidence and admissions in the administrative case were different from the action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
evidence in the criminal case, thus, the findings in the criminal case could not bind the jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains
administrative case. Finally, they argued that the doctrine of res judicata would only apply to unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to administrative matters.49 be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or Ombudsman also admits this fact. Indeed, petitioner admits having signed two sets of
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and appointment papers but nothing in said documents constitutes an absolutely false narration of
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first facts. The first set was prepared and signed on the basis of the inter-office memoranda issued
suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not by the members of the Board appointing their respective confidential staff conformably with the
required but merely identity of issue. DBM approval. There was no untruthful statement made on said appointment papers as the
concerned personnel were in fact appointed earlier than December 12, 2001. In fact, the DBM
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, also clarified that the authority to hire confidential personnel may be implemented retroactive to
210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez v. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction the date of actual service of the employee concerned. In any case, Jamora authorized the
between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same issuance of the second set of appointment papers. Following the CSC Rules, the second set of
claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of appointment papers should mean that the first set was ineffective and that the appointing
particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or authority, in this case, the members of the Board, shall be liable for the salaries of the appointee
cause of action. whose appointment became ineffective. There was nothing willful or felonious in petitioner's act
warranting his prosecution for falsification. The evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima
facie case and it is evident that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and petitioner's guilt.56 [Emphasis supplied]
adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the
subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final
judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although Hence, the finding that nothing in the two sets of appointment papers constitutes an absolutely
such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally false narration of facts is binding on this case, but only insofar as the issue of falsification of
presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not public documents is concerned, and not on the other issues involved herein, namely, the other
have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled acts of De Jesus and Parungao which may amount to dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave
that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. service, as charged in the complaint.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried Contrary to Tuason and LWUA’s contentions, the factual finding of this Court in De Jesus as to
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has the absence of falsification is based on the same evidence as in this administrative case. There
been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive are, however, other evidence and admissions present in this case as cited by Tuason and
upon the parties and those in privity with them. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the LWUA which pertain to other issues and not to the issue of falsification.
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.53 Meanwhile the doctrine in Montemayor v. Bundalian57 that res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, has been
Although involving different causes of action, this administrative case and the proceeding for abandoned in subsequent cases58 which have since applied the principle of res judicata to
probable cause are grounded on the same set of facts, involve the same issue of falsification of administrative cases. Hence, res judicata can likewise be made applicable to the case at bench.
official documents, and require the same quantum of evidence54– substantial evidence, as was Thus, given all the foregoing, the factual finding in De Jesus that there was no false statement of
similarly found in Borlongan, and correctly relied upon by De Jesus. facts in both sets of appointment papers, is binding in this case.

It was ruled in De Jesus that there was no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite Even granting that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable to the case at
criminal intent or mens rea was present. Although the presence of mens rea is indeed bench, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings in De Jesus based
unnecessary for a finding of guilt in an administrative case for falsification of official on a careful review of the evidence on record. The existence of malice or criminal intent is not a
documents,55 it was expressly found by this Court in De Jesus that there was no absolutely false mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of official documents as an administrative
narration of facts in the two sets of appointment papers. The pertinent portion is quoted offense. What is simply required is a showing that De Jesus and Parungao prepared and signed
hereunder as follows: the appointment papers knowing fully well that they were false.59

Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification. In The Court, however, believes that in this case, at the time each set of appointment papers were
this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens made, De Jesus and Parungao believed they were making true statements. They prepared and
rea was present. The Ombudsman assails the first set of documents with dates of appointment signed the first set on the basis of the inter-office memoranda issued by the Board members
earlier than December 12, 2001. Clearly, the first set of CSC Form No. 33 was prepared earlier appointing their respective confidential staff conformably with DBM approval. The second set
as shown by the serial numbers. The first set has serial numbers 168207, 168210, 168213, was prepared to correct the retroactive appointments to conform to the CSC reportorial
168214, 168215, 168216, 168217, 168287 and 168288; while the second set has serial requirements, and the same was also approved by Administrator Jamora. There was no reason
numbers 168292, 168293, 168294, 168295, 168297, 168298, 168299, 168301 and 168304. The for De Jesus and Parungao to believe such to be false. Irregular it is perhaps, not being in
conformity with the CSC rules on accreditation, but not false. Therefore, this Court finds that no Duties under the CSC Accreditation Program
falsification of official documents occured.
The CA also found that De Jesus failed to comply with the CSC rules under the Accreditation
Legality of Reinstatement and Authority to Sign Program due to his failure to submit the first set of retroactive appointment papers to the CSC.
Such failure was said to constitute a concealment of the retroactivity from the CSC and, thus,
The CA held that, as evinced from CSC Resolution No. 011811, which ordered LWUA to dishonesty on his part. Parungao, on the other hand, was reinstated by the CA after having been
conduct an investigation, the CSC had not divested itself of jurisdiction and authority over De found that she took steps to clarify the matter with the CSC; that she informed her superiors
Jesus’ dismissal case at the time he issued and signed both sets of appointment papers. The about her misgivings and the legal effects of the retroactive appointments; and that she
CA ruled that in doing so, he defied the CSC directive recalling his reinstatement. published such retroactive appointments in the LWUA Quarterly Reports on Accession, thus,
demonstrating her good faith.
De Jesus argues that, his title is not open to indirect challenge and can only be assailed in a
proceeding for quo warranto; and that absent any judicial declaration, he remained to be a de De Jesus argues that, as Deputy Administrator, it was not his responsibility to comply with the
jure officer, and even if he were only a de facto officer, his acts were done under color of CSC rules under the Accreditation Program. He contends that the CA itself recognized this fact
authority and, thus, valid and binding. De Jesus further argues that the pendency of his appeal when it stated that it was the responsibility of the LWUA Administrator to know and implement
to the CSC did not render his reinstatement illegal, as he had no choice but to rely on the the terms and conditions of accreditation. The CA even further stated that it was the Human
regularity of the LWUA board resolution which reinstated him, and this reinstatement should Resources Management Officer who had the responsibility of preparing and submitting the
have rendered superfluous the CSC resolution ordering investigation. He further contends that it appointment papers with the ROPA.
was wrong for the CA to rely on the CSC resolutions which were interlocutory. Since CSC
Resolution No. 030504 ultimately dismissed the case against him and in effect nullified his prior On the other hand, Tuason and LWUA argue that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 286, the
dismissal from LWUA, he should be considered as never having left his office. Said CSC Office of the Deputy Administrator has direct supervision over the HRMD, and so De Jesus
resolution should have also rendered the previous CSC resolutions moot and academic. should be held liable for failure to submit the first set of appointment papers in accordance with
the CSC rules.
De Jesus also cites CSC Resolution Nos. 07-0633 and 07-0146, which relate to other
complaints filed against him, and which recognize the legality of his reinstatement and affirm Under CSC Resolution No. 96770160 granting LWUA authority to take final action on its
CSC Resolution No. 030504 as res judicata. He argues that this case should be bound by the appointments under the CSC Accreditation Program, the following was said to have been
three aforementioned CSC resolutions under the principle of res judicata. violated:

A brief review of the relevant facts is necessary to resolve the issue at hand. LWUA dismissed 6. That for purposes of immediate monitoring and records keeping, the LWUA shall
De Jesus on March 28, 2001. He appealed to the CSC on April 18, 2001. He was reinstated on submit within the first fifteen calendar days of each ensuing month to the CSFO two
September 4, 2001 and so withdrew his appeal with the CSC the next day. Notwithstanding, in copies of the monthly Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) together with certified true
connection with his appeal, the CSC issued Resolution No. 011811 on November 20, 2001 copies of appointments acted upon;
ordering LWUA to investigate. The two sets of appointment papers were signed by De Jesus in
December 2001. It was only on August 15, 2002 that the CSC issued Resolution No. 021090, 7. That failure to submit the ROPAs within the prescribed period shall render all
which recalled De Jesus’ reinstatement and declared it illegal and void. However, De Jesus title appointments listed therein lapsed and ineffective;
was conclusively established on May 5, 2003 by CSC Resolution No. 030504, which finally
dismissed the case against him.
8. That appointments issued within the month but not listed in the ROPA for the said
month shall become ineffective 30 days from issuance;
Thus, prior to the CSC resolution recalling his reinstatement and declaring it illegal and void, De
Jesus cannot be faulted for relying on the LWUA board resolution reinstating him as Deputy
Administrator. Furthermore, the CSC resolution recalling his reinstatement and declaring it illegal xxx
and void was issued only after the appointment papers were prepared and signed. Thus, there
was no misrepresentation of authority on the part of De Jesus when he signed the appointment As culled from the CSC letter61 dated November 11, 1996, addressed to then LWUA Admistrator
papers because he did so after he was reinstated by the LWUA Board and before such De Vera, which accompanied CSC Resolution No. 967701, the following responsibilities under
reinstatement was declared illegal and void by the CSC. the CSC Accreditation Program were reiterated thus:

More important, the dismissal case against him was ultimately dismissed, thereby conclusively The LWUA Administrator/appointing authority shall:
establishing his right to his title and position as Deputy Administrator of LWUA.
- Take final action on all appointments that he issues/signs;
 - Exercise delegated authority to take final action on appointments following the terms The authority to exercise the delegated authority to take final action on appointment papers is
and conditions stipulated in the Resolution and within the limits and restrictions of Civil lodged in the LWUA Administrator. The only duty of De Jesus is to sign appointment papers
Service Law, rules, policies and standards; previously approved by the Administrator or Board. Thus, De Jesus’ duty to sign appointment
papers is only ministerial in nature, while the discretionary power to take final action on
- Assume personal liability for the payment of salaries for actual services rendered by appointments remains lodged in the LWUA Administrator. De Jesus is, thus, bound only to sign
employees whose appointments have been invalidated by the CSNCRO. appointment papers previously approved by the LWUA Administrator or Board, in accordance
with LWUA Office Order No. 205.01, having no power to exercise any discretion on the matter.
On the other hand, the Human Resources Management Officer shall:
In exercising his ministerial duty of signing the appointment papers, De Jesus obeyed the
patently lawful order of his superior. CSC Resolution No. 967701 does not charge De Jesus with
- Ensure that all procedures, requirements, and supporting papers to appointments the duty to know and comply with the rules of the Accreditation Program, that being the province
specified in MC No. 38, s. 1997 and MC Nos. 11 and 12, s. 1996 have been complied of the LWUA Administrator and HRMO, as expressly provided for in the CSC letter. Therefore,
with and found to be in order before the appointment is signed by the appointing so long as the appointment papers were approved by the Administrator or Board, the order to
authority; sign them is patently lawful. Hence, De Jesus cannot be faulted for obeying the patently lawful
orders of his superior. Furthermore, there is no evidence on record to indicate that he acted in
xxx bad faith, as what he did was in conformity with the authority granted to him by LWUA Office
Order No. 205.01.
- Prepare and submit within the first fifteen calendar days of each ensuing month to the
CSFO concerned two copies of the monthly ROPA together with certified true copies of The same, however, cannot be said of Parungao. As HRMO, she was expressly charged with
appointments issued and finally acted upon; and the duty to prepare and submit within the first fifteen calendar days of each ensuing month to the
CSFO concerned two copies of the monthly ROPA together with certified true copies of
xxx appointments issued and finally acted upon. Thus, she must necessarily be aware that failure to
submit the ROPAs within the prescribed period shall render all appointments listed therein
lapsed and ineffective, and that appointments issued within the month but not listed in the ROPA
[Emphases supplied] for the said month shall become ineffective 30 days from issuance. Knowing this, she should
never have given her approval by initialing the first set of retroactive appointments as she should
Under LWUA Office Order No. 205.01,62 Administrator Jamora authorized De Jesus to sign have known that they would be ineffective under the CSC accreditation rules.
appointment papers of appointees to vacant plantilla positions in LWUA which were previously
approved by the Administrator or the Board of Trustees. Thus: No Dishonesty, Mere Confusion

In the exigency of the service and to facilitate/expedite administrative works, the Deputy With the finding that the request for approval of the DBM to apply the earlier granted authority
Administrator, Administrative Services, is hereby authorized under delegated authority to act on retroactively was a disingenuous attempt to provide a semblance of legality to the intended
and sign for and in behalf of the Administrator, documents such as Office Orders, Appointment retroactive appointments, the CA held that the approval or disapproval of appointment to the
Papers, Inter-Office Memoranda and other administrative documents including communications government was the sole office of the CSC, and not the DBM. Furthermore, dishonesty was
to CSC and/or DBM relating to filling up of vacant positions, either by promotion or recruitment, found present when De Jesus submitted the first set of appointment papers to the DBM and the
as well as transfer of personnel, which have been previously cleared/approved in writing by the second set to the CSC, apparently to ensure that the DBM was unaware of what the CSC was
Administrator, or by the Board of Trustees, as the case may be. Also delegated is the authority doing and vice versa.
to act and sign for and in behalf of the Administrator, the Notice(s) of Salary Adjustment (NOSA)
and Notice(s) of Salary Increment (NOSI). [Emphases supplied]
A careful perusal of the records will show that the request for approval to the DBM,
characterized by the CA as an attempt to provide a semblance of legality, was the act of
It is clear from the above that the responsibility to submit within the first fifteen (15) calendar Administrator Jamora and not of De Jesus or Parungao. The request letter63 to the DBM was
days of each ensuing month to the CSFO two copies of the monthly ROPA together with signed by Jamora. Therefore, neither De Jesus nor Parungao can be held liable for the act. The
certified true copies of appointments acted upon lies with the Human Resources Management Court also failed to find any evidence on record that De Jesus deliberately ensured that DBM
Officer (HRMO), namely, Parungao. Even granting that De Jesus, as Deputy Administrator, has was unaware of what the CSC was doing and vice versa. It has already been discussed that De
direct supervision over the Human Resources and Management Department, it is the HRMO Jesus’ only duty was to sign the appointment papers in accordance with the LWUA office order
who is expressly tasked with the duty to submit to the CSC the ROPA with true copies of granting him authority to do so. All responsibilities relating to the reportorial requirements pertain
appointments finally acted upon. Therefore, De Jesus, as Deputy Administrator, cannot be held to Parungao as the HRMO.
liable for such failure to submit the first set of appointment papers with the ROPA as prescribed
under the CSC accreditation rules.
Furthermore, the appointment papers provided to the DBM were referenced by Administrator fact that it is the CSC which has authority over appointments, and not the DBM. Had she given
Jamora in his request letter, and not by De Jesus or Parungao. The first set of appointment the proper attention to her responsibility as HRMO, the first set of appointment papers would
papers was never submitted to the CSC not because the retroactivity of the appointments was never have been issued, thereby avoiding the present predicament altogether.
being concealed, but precisely because it was realized that such did not comply with the
reportorial requirements. Given the foregoing, there could have been no dishonesty on the part When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully
of De Jesus and Parungao. perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for
the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence,
Instead, it appears that the root of the dilemma in the case at bench lies in confusion rather than caution and attention which careful persons use in the management of their affairs.69 Parungao
dishonesty.1awphi1 This confusion pertains to the misunderstanding of the roles of the CSC and failed to exercise such prudence, caution and attention.
the DBM vis-a-vis the issuance of appointment papers. Such confusion can be gleaned from the
brief to Administrator Jamora signed by De Jesus and initialed by Parungao, stating that the Simple neglect of duty is classified under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
issues on the retroactive appointments and overpayments were deemed settled with the reply Service as a less grave offense punishable by suspension without pay for one month and one
letter of the DBM on the retroactive implementation of the authority previously granted. day to six months. Finding no circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty of
six months, and considering her demonstrated good faith, the Court finds the imposition of
The CA correctly stated that the approval or disapproval of appointment to the government is the suspension without pay for one month and one day as justified.
sole office of the CSC, and not the DBM, as the very authority given to LWUA to take final action
on its appointments is by virtue of CSC’s accreditation program.64 Thus, the DBM approval to WHEREFORE,
retroact its previously granted authority to hire the LWUA confidential staff is subject to an
appointment validly issued in accordance with CSC rules. In other words, the DBM approval for
retroactivity presupposed valid appointments. DBM’s approval was mistakenly understood to (1) in G.R. No. 166495, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2004
pertain to both the back salaries and the validity of the staff’s appointments when, in fact, DBM’s and January 4, 2005 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
approval related only to LWUA’s authority to hire and not to the validity of the appointments of hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
the hired personnel. Therefore, back salaries should only have been due upon the effectivity of issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902 is ordered DISSOLVED.
valid appointments, which is within the authority of the CSC to approve, and not of the DBM.
(2) in G.R. No. 184129, the petition is GRANTED, and in G.R. No. 184263, the petition
Dishonesty refers to a person’s "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed May 26, 2005 Decision and August 6, 2008
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902, are
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."65 The absence of dishonesty on hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
the part of De Jesus and Parungao is supported by their good faith in complying with the orders
of Administrator Jamora. Their good faith is manifested in several circumstances. First, their brief a. ordering the reinstatement of Rodolfo S. De Jesus as Deputy Administrator
to Administrator Jamora, stating that the issues on the retroactive appointments and of the LWUA with full back salaries and such other emoluments that he did not
overpayments were deemed settled with the reply letter of the DBM, demonstrates that they receive by reason of his removal; and
actually and honestly believed that the letter had in fact resolved the issue. Second, their
memorandum66 to Administrator Jamora explained that the appointment papers with retroactive b. finding Human Resources Management Officer Edelwina DG.
effectivity dates would be violative of the provisions of CSC Res. No. 967701 and CSC Omnibus Parungao GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and hereby imposing the penalty
Rules on Appointments Rule 7, Section 11. Third, an informal consultation67 was held with the of suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay.
CSC Field Director to seek advice regarding the retroactive appointments, wherein it was
suggested that the appointments be re-issued effective December 12, 2001, hence, the
issuance of the second set of appointment papers. Finally, such retroactive appointments were SO ORDERED.
published in the LWUA Quarterly Reports on Accession. The foregoing circumstances are
apparently contrary to any intention to defraud or deceive. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Parungao - Guilty
Of Simple Neglect of Duty WE CONCUR:

Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from ANTONIO T. CARPIO
an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference.68 In this regard, the Court finds Associate Justice
Parungao, as HRMO, guilty of simple neglect of duty. Given her duties under the CSC Chairperson
Accreditation Program, she should have been aware of the reportorial requirements, and of the
 4
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*  Id. at 252-267. Penned by Special Prosecution Officer Roberto T. Agagon, approval
Associate Justice Associate Justice recommended by Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio G. Apostol, and approved by Hon.
Victor C. Fernandez.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
5
Associate Justice  Id. at 296-311. Penned by Special Prosecution Officer Roberto T. Agagon, approval
recommended by Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio G. Apostol, and approved by Deputy
Ombudsman Victor C. Fernandez.
ATTESTATION
6
 Id. at 252-267.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
7
 Id. at 296-311.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
8
Associate Justice  Id. at 449-452.
Chairperson
9
 Id. at 407-411.
CERTIFICATION
10
 Id. at 204-206.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the 11
 Id. at 177.
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
12
 Id. at 168-169.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice 13
 Id. at 170.

14
 Id. at 171-172.

15
 Id. at 173-174.
Footnotes
16
 Id. at 176.
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta,
per raffle dated September 29, 2010. 17
 Id. at 175.
1
 Rollo (G.R. 166495), pp. 235-237, 307-314. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina 18
 Id. at 178-186.
Guevara-Salonga with Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate
Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring.
19
 Id. at 187
2
 Rollo (G.R. 184129), pp. 73-99. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-
20
Salonga with Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice  Id. at 193.
Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring.
21
 Id. at 485-487.
3
 Id. at 101-105. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga with
Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas 22
 Id. at 204-206.
Peralta, concurring.
23
 Id. at 195-203.
24 45
 Id. at 207.  Rollo (G.R. 184129), p. 406.

25 46
 Id. at 208.  G.R. No. 167234, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 405.

26 47
 Id. at 412-419.  Supra note 32.

27 48
 Id. at 420-423.  Ombudsman v. Torres, G.R. No. 168309, January 29, 2008, 543 SCRA 46, 60.

28 49
 Id. at 244-251.  Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158 (2003).

29 50
 Id. at 212-223.  Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26, 2010.

30 51
 Id. at 224-236.  Alamayri v. Pabale, G.R. No. 151243, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 146.

31 52
 438 Phil. 351 (2002).  G.R. Nos. 76265 and 83280, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 88, 99-100.

32 53
 G.R. Nos. 164166 & 164173-80, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 394.  Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26, 2010.

33 54
 G.R. No. 175573, October 5, 2010.  Borlongan v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 167234, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 405,
415-416.
34
 Administrative Order No. 7, dated April 10, 1990.
55
 Supra note 48.
35
 Buencamino v. CA, G.R. No. 175895, April 12, 2007, 520 SCRA 797.
56
 Supra note 32 at 405-406.
36
 G.R. No. 150274, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 626, 636-637.
57
 453 Phil. 158, 169 (2003).
37
 G.R. No. 175895, April 12, 2007, 520 SCRA 797.
58
 Borlongan v. Buenaventura, supra note 54; Executive Judge Basilia v. Judge
38
 See Section 3, Rule V, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Becamon, 487 Phil. 490 (2004); Atty. De Vera v. Judge Layague, 395 Phil. 253 (2000).

59
39
 Republic Act No. 6770.  Supra note 48.

60
40
 SEC. 12. Effect of appeal. – The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final  Rollo (G.R. No. 184129), pp. 469-471.
order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct
61
otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. [Emphasis supplied]  Id. at 467-468.

41 62
 Supra note 36.  Id. at 177.

42 63
 G.R. No. 169241, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 574.  Id. at 207.

43 64
 Supra note 32.  Id. at 91.

44 65
 Id.  Re: Failure of Various Employees to Register their Time of Arrival and/or Departure
from Office in the Chronolog Machine, A.M. No. 2005-21-SC, September 28, 2010.
 66
 Rollo (G.R. 184129), pp. 485-487. On October 16, 2001, in Civil Case No. 2607-S, the trial court declared Armando in default and
rendered a decision ordering him to pay the total amount of ₱1,107,210.90, plus fine and
67
 Id. at 486. interest at the rate of 3% per month and the cost of collection. Armando filed a petition for
prohibition before the CA alleging that he should not be made to pay said loan as the same had
68
long been fully paid as shown by 1] Official Receipt No. 141084 in the name of petitioner
 Salumbides v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010. evidencing payment of the amount of ₱764,865.25, and 2] the Certification issued by Martinez.
When directed to file its comment, CABMPCI failed to comply. Its non-compliance was deemed
69
 Id. to have been a waiver to refute the claim of payment contained in the petition.5 Thus, on October
30, 2002, the CA promulgated a decision nullifying the RTC decision on the ground that the
Republic of the Philippines obligation had already been settled.6
SUPREME COURT
Manila On December 9, 2002, Martinez filed an administrative case with the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charging petitioner with Violation of Section 7(d) in relation to
SECOND DIVISION Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.7

G.R. No. 188630               February 23, 2011

In the end, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct
and imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification for re-
FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, employment in the government service.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Ombudsman denied it.

DECISION
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA. The CA found merit in the
petition and reversed and set aside the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. The CA ruled that
MENDOZA, J.: the Ombudsman erred in applying R.A. No. 6713, without recognizing the fact of membership
and its privileges. It further stated that Martinez failed to prove that petitioner had used undue
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Filomena L. Villanueva influence in soliciting the loan. It noted that Martinez, in her capacity as the general manager of
(petitioner) seeking to reverse and set aside the (1) November 13, 2008 Resolution1 of the Court CABMPCI, allowed the petitioner to obtain a loan, much less obtain a passbook, although she
of Appeals (CA) which dismissed her petition for review for lack of jurisdiction; and (2)  its June was allegedly not qualified to become a member.8
25, 2009 Resolution2 denying her motion for reconsideration.
Martinez filed a motion for reconsideration while the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to
The Facts: Intervene and For Reconsideration. The CA denied both motions in its August 8, 2005
Resolution.9
Petitioner was the Assistant Regional Director of the Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA) of Region II, a position lower than Salary Grade 27. Aside from those cases, a criminal case was also filed against the petitioner for violation of
Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 6713 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Claveria, Cagayan
(MCTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 3111-CL.
Records show that on various dates in 1998, the petitioner and her husband Armando
Villanueva (Armando) obtained several loans from the Cagayan Agri-Based Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. (CABMPCI). Armando defaulted in the payment of his own loan. Because of On March 24, 2006, the MCTC promulgated its decision in Criminal Case No. 3111-CL
this, CABMPCI, represented by its General Manager, Petra Martinez (Martinez), filed a civil case convicting the petitioner and imposing the penalty of five (5) years of imprisonment and
for collection of sum of money against Armando before the Regional Trial Court of Sanchez disqualification to hold office (Section 11, R.A. No. 6713).
Mira, Cagayan (RTC),  docketed as Civil Case No. 2607-S. To support its claim, CABMPCI
presented a certification, received and signed by petitioner, attesting that she and Armando Petitioner appealed the MCTC Decision to the Regional Trial Court of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan
promised to settle their obligation on or before February 28, 2001.3 (RTC). The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3082. On November 22, 2007, the RTC
affirmed the MCTC Decision.
During the pendency of the civil case before the RTC, Martinez filed an administrative complaint
for Willful Failure to Pay Just Debt against petitioner before the CDA. It was docketed as CDA- Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.
Administrative Case No. 2002-002.4
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) then filed a Manifestation and Motion contending that The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court on February 1,
the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the petition. 2010.12

Petitioner, in her Comment, argued that the issue of jurisdiction could not be raised for the first On March 29, 2010, petitioner filed her Motion for Leave and to Admit attached Second Motion
time before the CA in view of the failure of the Provincial Prosecutor to bring out the same when for Reconsideration.13
she appealed the MCTC Decision to the RTC. She claimed to have availed of the remedy
provided under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court in good faith. Finally, she contended that the On April 28, 2010,14 the Court granted said motion and further resolved to: (1) grant the motion
essence of true justice would be served if the case would be decided on the merits. and set aside the Resolution dated October 14, 2009; and (2) reinstate the petition and require
the OSG to comment thereon within 10 days from notice.
The CA, however, agreed with the OSG. In its November 13, 2008 Resolution,10 the CA
dismissed the petition. The CA made the following justification: The OSG then filed a Manifestation and Motion15 stating, among others, that it is the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner’s case, thus, it is the
(1) At the time petitioner committed the crime charged, she was holding a position Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) that has the duty and responsibility to represent the
lower than salary grade "27." The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate People in cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and in all cases elevated from the
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court. The OSG prayed that: (1)  the Manifestation be
the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction. (CA cited noted; (2)  it be excused from further participating in this case; (3)  petitioner be ordered to furnish
Moll v. Buban, G.R. No. 136974, August 27, 2002); the OSP with a copy of the petition together with its annexes; and (4)  the OSP be given a fresh
period within which to file its comment.
(2) The OSG had timely raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction considering that the law
does not contemplate the remedy of appeal from the decision of the MTCC [sic] directly On August 25, 2010, the Court resolved to: (1)  note the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion and
to the Sandiganbayan; and grant its prayer to be excused from further participating in the present case; (2)  direct the
Division Clerk of Court to furnish the OSP with a copy of the petition and its annexes;
(3) Petitioner’s good faith and the merits of her case cannot in any way vest CA with and (3)  require the OSP to file a comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt of
jurisdiction. copy of the petition and its annexes.16

After the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on June 25, 2009, she filed the Eventually, the OSP filed its Comment.17 Primarily, it pointed out that the dismissal of petitioner’s
subject petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. appeal by the CA was proper as it was indeed the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over
the case; that the negligence of counsel binds the client; and that the right to appeal is a mere
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. As the petitioner
On October 14, 2009, the Court resolved to deny the petition11. Thus: failed to perfect her appeal in accordance with law, the RTC resolution affirming the MCTC
Decision was rendered final and executory.
The Court resolves to NOTE petitioner’s Compliance and Explanation dated 22 September 2009
with Resolution dated 12 August 2009, apologizing to this Court for the clerical error on the date The Court’s Ruling
mentioned in paragraph 2 of the affidavit of service of the motion for extension of time to file
petition for review on certiorari which was typed as 21 July 2009 instead of 23 July 2009, and
submitting documents relative thereto. There is no quibble that petitioner, through her former counsel, had taken a wrong procedure.
After the RTC rendered an adverse decision, she should have sought relief from the
Sandiganbayan in conformity with R.A. No. 8249.18 Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan
Acting on the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated 13 November 2008 shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
and 25 June 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31240, the Court further resolves regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
to DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any jurisdiction as herein provided. Thus:
reversible error in the challenged resolutions as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
Moreover, pursuant to Rule 45 and other related provision of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court, only petitions which comply
strictly with the requirements specified therein shall be entertained. Herein petitioner failed to A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
state the material date of filing of the motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution in Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
violation of Section 4[b] and 5, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5[d], Rule 56. Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of Thus, it appears that the filing of the criminal case against petitioner was merely an afterthought
the commission of the offense: considering that the civil case against her husband and the administrative case against her were
resolved in the couple’s favor.
x x x           x x x          x x x
In light of what has been shown, the Court is inclined to suspend the rules to give the petitioner
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27' a chance to seek relief from the Sandiganbayan. The Court likewise makes exception to the
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned general rule that the mistakes and negligence of counsel bind the client. Doubtless, the filing of
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, the appeal before the CA by the petitioner’s former counsel was not simple negligence. It
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, constituted gross negligence.1avvphi1
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
It bears stressing at this point, that the rule which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, client may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in outright deprivation of
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original the client’s liberty or property, or where the interests of justice so require. In rendering justice,
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. (Emphases supplied)19 procedural infirmities take a backseat against substantive rights of litigants. Corollarily, if the
strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is not
without power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of procedure.25 The Court
Pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its own internal rules. Section 2, Rule XI, takes note of settled jurisprudence which holds that:
Part III of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan reads:
The function of the rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in procedure is imputed to and
SEC. 2. Petition for Review. – Appeal to the Sandiganbayan from a decision of the Regional binding upon the client, as any other procedural rule, is to serve as an instrument to advance the
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by a Petition for Review under ends of justice. When in the circumstances of each case the rule desert[s] its proper office as an
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to
admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.
This was strictly applied by the Court in the cases of Melencion v. Sandiganbayan20 and Estarija
v. People,21 where it ruled that the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the x x x           x x x          x x x
petitions erroneously filed before it.
The court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
Thus, in this case, the CA was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Section 2 purposes of justice require it.26
of Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court provides, among others, that "an appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but
shall be dismissed outright." This has been the consistent holding of the Court. The Court also takes note that the petitioner has no participatory negligence. The resulting
dismissal by the CA was utterly attributable to the gross negligence of her counsel. For said
reason, the Court is not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice. "Where
The peculiar circumstances of the case, however, constrain the Court to reconsider its reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its
position and give the petitioner a chance to bring her case to the Sandiganbayan. The Court application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property or where the
notes that the CA eventually decided the administrative case filed against petitioner in her interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the
favor.22 This administrative case (where only substantial evidence is required) is so intertwined lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence."27
with this criminal case (where evidence beyond reasonable doubt is required). The CA pointed
out that Martinez had issued an Official Receipt and Certification that petitioner had indeed paid
her loan. The said receipt was signed by Martinez herself as the General Manager of CABMPCI, "Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the
attesting to the payment of the loan.23 The CA further ruled that Martinez failed to prove that the rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of
petitioner exerted undue influence in obtaining the loans. the lower court's findings of fact, the other elements that are to be considered are the following:
(1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
Records also bear out that the earlier civil case against Armando, the petitioner’s husband, was rules, (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, (5) the
also finally resolved in his favor since the obligation had already been settled.24 This civil case is other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby."28 All these factors are attendant in this case.
also intertwined with the administrative and criminal cases filed against petitioner. In the case of Tiangco v. Land Bank of the Philippines,29 it was written:

Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or Associate Justice
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid
application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is WE CONCUR:
empowered to suspend their operation.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Petitioner’s liberty here is at stake. The MCTC convicted her and imposed upon her the penalty Associate Justice
of five (5) years imprisonment and the disqualification to hold office. This MCTC decision was Chairperson
affirmed by the RTC.30 If she has to suffer in prison, her guilt must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, availing all the remedies provided for under the law to protect her right. It is
highly unjust for her to lose her liberty only because of the gross negligence of her former ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
counsel. Associate Justice Associate Justice

With the dismissal of the administrative case against the petitioner, it is in the interest of ROBERTO A. ABAD
substantial justice that the criminal case against her should be reviewed on the merits by the Associate Justice
proper tribunal following the appropriate procedures under the rules. Our legal culture requires
the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any ATTESTATION
crime and deprived of his life, liberty or even property, not merely substantial evidence. It is not
enough that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or a probability of guilt. The primary
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
consideration is whether the guilt of an accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
has been consistently held that:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond doubt.
Associate Justice
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility
Chairperson, Second Division
of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. On the whole, the meager evidence for the
prosecution casts serious doubts as to the guilt of accused. It does not pass the test of moral CERTIFICATION
certainty and is insufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption of innocence.31
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
At this juncture, the Court takes opportunity to state that it is not countenancing the inexcusable I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
negligence committed by petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Santos M. Baculi, in handling case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
petitioner’s case. He is, accordingly, warned to be more careful and meticulous in the discharge
of his duties to his clients. RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
It need not be overemphasized that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients in
their counsel requires from the latter a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients,
his profession, the courts and the public. Every lawyer should, therefore, serve his client in a
meticulous, careful and competent manner. He is bound to protect the client’s interests and to
do all steps necessary therefor as his client reasonably expects him to discharge his obligations
diligently.32 Footnotes

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 1
 Rollo, pp. 32-35. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon with Associate
CR No. 31240 dated November 13, 2008 and June 25, 2009, are hereby SET ASIDE. In the Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.
interest of justice, petitioner Filomena L. Villanueva is given the chance to file the necessary
petition for review before the Sandiganbayan, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. 2
 Id. at 36-37.

SO ORDERED. 3
 Id. at 40.
4 25
 Id.  See the case of Rutaquio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143786, October 17, 2008,
569 SCRA 312, 320.
5
 Id.
26
 Aguilar v. CA, 320 Phil. 456, 462 (1995).
6
 Id. at 12, 40.
27
 People v. Almendras, 449 Phil. 587, 609 (2003).
7
 Id. at 41, 210-213.
28
 Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil 665, 674 (2003); and Ginete v. Court of
8
 Id. at 38-46. Appeals,  357 Phil. 36, 54 (1998).

29
9
 Id. at 47.  G.R. No. 153998, October 6, 2010.

30
10
 Id. at 32-35.  Rollo, pp. 49-50.

31
11
 Id. at 66-67.  People v. Bansil, 364 Phil. 22, 34 (1999).

32
12
 Id. at 86.  Villaflores v. Limos, A.C. No. 7504, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 140, 148.

13
 Id. at 88-116.

14
 Before the effectivity of the new Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (May 4, 2010).

15
 Rollo, pp. 119-127.

16
 Id. at 128-129.

17
 Id. at 184-210.

18
 "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the
Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Thereof, and for
other Purposes."

19
 See the case of Moll v. Hon. Buban, 436 Phil. 627, 635-636 (2002).

20
 G.R. No. 150684, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 345.

21
 G.R. No. 173990, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 464.

22
 Rollo, pp. 38-46.

23
 Id. at 45.

24
 Id. at 40.
 Section 5. National Electrification Administration; Board of Administrators; Administrator.

(a) For the purpose of administering the provisions of this Decree, there is hereby established a
public corporation to be known as the National Electrification Administration. All of the powers of
the corporation shall be vested in and exercised by a Board of Administrators, which shall be
composed of a Chairman and four (4) members, one of whom shall be the Administrator as ex-
officio member. The Chairman and the three other members shall be appointed by the President
Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines to serve for a term of six years. x x x
SUPREME COURT
Manila
xxxx
EN BANC
The Board shall, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, have the following specific
powers and duties.
G.R. No. 187107               January 31, 2012
1. To implement the provisions and purposes of this Decree;
UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA (UNICAN), represented by its representative
BIENVENIDO R. LEAL, in his official capacity as its President and in his own individual
capacity, EDUARDO R. LACSON, ORENCIO F. VENIDA, JR., THELMA V. OGENA, BOBBY xxxx
M. CARANTO, MARILOU B. DE JESUS, EDNA G. RAÑA, and ZENAIDA P. OLIQUINO, in
their own capacities and in behalf of all those similarly situated officials and employees 5. To establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis of merit, technical
of the National Electrification Administration, Petitioners, competence and moral character, and, upon the recommendation of the Administrator to
vs. organize or reorganize NEA’s staffing structure, to fix the salaries of personnel and to define
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA), NEA BOARD OF their powers and duties. (Emphasis supplied.)
ADMINISTRATORS (NEA BOARD), ANGELO T. REYES as Chairman of the NEA Board of
Administrators, EDITHA S. BUENO, Ex-Officio Member and NEA Administrator, and Thereafter, in order to enhance and accelerate the electrification of the whole country, including
WILFRED L. BILLENA, JOSPEPH D. KHONGHUN, and FR. JOSE VICTOR E. LOBRIGO, the privatization of the National Power Corporation, Republic Act No. (RA) 9136, otherwise
Members, NEA Board, Respondents. known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law), was enacted, taking
effect on June 26, 2001. The law imposed upon NEA additional mandates in relation to the
DECISION promotion of the role of rural electric cooperatives to achieve national electrification.
Correlatively, Sec. 3 of the law provides:
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Section 3. Scope. - This Act shall provide a framework for the restructuring of the electric power
The Case industry, including the privatization of the assets of NPC, the transition to the desired competitive
structure, and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and
private entities. (Emphasis supplied.)
This is an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the implementation of
Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and September 3, 2003, respectively, otherwise
known as the National Electrification Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by Sec. 77 of RA 9136 also provides:
respondent NEA Board of Administrators (NEA Board).
Section 77. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOE shall, in consultation with the
The Facts electric power industry participants and end-users, promulgate the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of this Act within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, subject to the
approval by the Power Commission.
Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated from their employment with the
implementation of the assailed resolutions.
Thus, the Rules and Regulations to implement RA 9136 were issued on February 27, 2002.
Under Sec. 3(b)(ii), Rule 33 of the Rules and Regulations, all the NEA employees and officers
Respondent NEA is a government-owned and/or controlled corporation created in accordance are considered terminated and the 965 plantilla positions of NEA vacant, to wit:
with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 269 issued on August 6, 1973. Under PD 269, Section 5(a)
(5), the NEA Board is empowered to organize or reorganize NEA’s staffing structure, as follows:
Section 3. Separation and Other Benefits. 3. The assailed NEA Board resolutions were issued in good faith.

(a) x x x

(b) The following shall govern the application of Section 3(a) of this Rule: The Court’s Ruling

xxxx This petition must be dismissed.

(ii) With respect to NEA officials and employees, they shall be considered legally terminated and The procedural issues raised by respondents shall first be discussed.
shall be entitled to the benefits or separation pay provided in Section 3(a) herein when a
restructuring of NEA is implemented pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to This Court Has Jurisdiction over the Case
Section 5(a)(5) of Presidential Decree No. 269. (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts,
Meanwhile, on August 28, 2002, former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo issued Executive pursuant to which the instant petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court first
Order No. 119 directing the NEA Board to submit a reorganization plan. Thus, the NEA Board rather than with this Court directly.
issued the assailed resolutions.
We explained the principle of hierarchy of courts in Mendoza v. Villas,1 stating:
On September 17, 2003, the Department of Budget and Management approved the NEA
Termination Pay Plan.
In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly
Thereafter, the NEA implemented an early retirement program denominated as the "Early with the Court, violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
Leavers Program," giving incentives to those who availed of it and left NEA before the effectivity
of the reorganization plan. The other employees of NEA were terminated effective December 31,
2003. Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
Hence, We have this petition. choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this
Court made the following pronouncements:
The Issues
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Petitioners raise the following issues: Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction
is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
1. The NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA employees; unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There
is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
2. Executive Order No. 119 did not grant the NEA Board the power to terminate all NEA writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
employees; and issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
3. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith. of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
On the other hand, respondents argue in their Comment dated August 20, 2009 that: This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
1. The Court has no jurisdiction over the petition;
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to
2. Injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed resolutions of the NEA this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important
Board have long been implemented; and reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does the employment of the entire
plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from The meat of the controversy in the instant case is the issue of whether the NEA Board had the
employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention. power to pass Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 terminating all of its employees.

Moreover, the Court has made a similar ruling in National Power Corporation Drivers and This must be answered in the affirmative.
Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) v. National Power Corporation (NPC).2 In that case, the
NPC-DAMA also filed a petition for injunction directly with this Court assailing NPC Board Under Rule 33, Section 3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all
Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125, both dated November 18, 2002, directing the NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a
termination of all employees of the NPC on January 31, 2003. Despite such apparent disregard reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of
of the principle of hierarchy of courts, the petition was given due course. We perceive no PD 269 through which the reorganization was carried out, viz:
compelling reason to treat the instant case differently.
Section 5. National Electrification Administration; Board of Administrators; Administrator.
The Remedy of Injunction Is still Available
(a) For the purpose of administering the provisions of this Decree, there is hereby established a
Respondents allege that the remedy of injunction is no longer available to petitioners inasmuch public corporation to be known as the National Electrification Administration. x x x
as the assailed NEA Board resolutions have long been implemented.
xxxx
Taking respondents’ above posture as an argument on the untenability of the petition on the
ground of mootness, petitioners contend that the principle of mootness is subject to exceptions,
such as when the case is of transcendental importance. The Board shall, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, have the following specific
powers and duties.
In Funa v. Executive Secretary,3 the Court passed upon the seeming moot issue of the
appointment of Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime xxxx
Industry Authority (MARINA) while concurrently serving as Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications. There, even though Bautista later on was appointed as 5. To establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis of merit, technical
Administrator of MARINA, the Court ruled that the case was an exception to the principle of competence and moral character, and, upon the recommendation of the Administrator to
mootness and that the remedy of injunction was still available, explaining thus: organize or reorganize NEA’s staffing structure, to fix the salaries of personnel and to define
their powers and duties. (Emphasis supplied.)
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Thus, petitioners argue that the power granted unto the NEA Board to organize or reorganize
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. does not include the power to terminate employees but only to reduce NEA’s manpower
However, as we held in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, supervening events, whether complement.
intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave
violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases Such contention is erroneous.
moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.
In Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation,4 the Court upheld the dismissal
of all the employees of the NPC pursuant to the EPIRA Law. In ruling that the power of
As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception reorganization includes the power of removal, the Court explained:
to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition
yet evading review. (Emphasis supplied.)
[R]eorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of one’s position
Similarly, in the instant case, while the assailed resolutions of the NEA Board may have long through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of
been implemented, such acts of the NEA Board may well be repeated by other government economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good
agencies in the reorganization of their offices. Petitioners have not lost their remedy of faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. (Emphasis supplied.)
injunction.

Evidently, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Board’s powers and
The Power to Reorganize Includes the Power to Terminate may not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith.
 Petitioners Failed to Prove that the NEA Board Acted in Bad Faith Petitioners failed to prove such facts. Mere allegations without hard evidence cannot be
considered as clear and convincing proof.
Next, petitioners challenge the reorganization claiming bad faith on the part of the NEA Board.
Next, petitioners state that the NEA Board should not have abolished all the offices of NEA and
Congress itself laid down the indicators of bad faith in the reorganization of government offices instead made a selective termination of its employees while retaining the other employees.
in Sec. 2 of RA 6656, an Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and
Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization, to wit: Petitioners argue that for the reorganization to be valid, it is necessary to only abolish the offices
or terminate the employees that would not be retained and the retention of the employees that
Section 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid were tasked to carry out the continuing mandate of NEA. Petitioners argue in their Memorandum
cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a dated July 27, 2010:
bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or A valid reorganization, pursued in good faith, would have resulted to: (1) the abolition of old
other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the positions in the NEA’s table of organization that pertain to the granting of franchises and rate
following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a fixing functions as these were all abolished by Congress (2) the creation of new positions that
result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an pertain to the additional mandates of the EPIRA Law and (3) maintaining the old positions that
aggrieved party: were not affected by the EPIRA Law.

(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing The Court already had the occasion to pass upon the validity of the similar reorganization in the
pattern of the department or agency concerned; NPC. In the aforecited case of Betoy,7 the Court upheld the policy of the Executive to terminate
all the employees of the office before rehiring those necessary for its operation. We ruled in
(b) Where an office is abolished and other performing substantially the same functions Betoy that such policy is not tainted with bad faith:
is created;
It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution found by Congress was to
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of pursue a policy towards its privatization. The privatization of NPC necessarily demanded the
appointment, performance and merit; restructuring of its operations. To carry out the purpose, there was a need to terminate
employees and re-hire some depending on the manpower requirements of the privatized
companies. The privatization and restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good faith as
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned its primary purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient. (Emphasis
and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original supplied.)
offices;
Evidently, the fact that the NEA Board resorted to terminating all the incumbent employees of
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. NPC and, later on, rehiring some of them, cannot, on that ground alone, vitiate the bona fides of
(Emphasis supplied.) the reorganization.

It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it. As the Court WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July
ruled in Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications, Inc.,5 "According to jurisprudence, ‘basic is the 10, 2003 and September 3, 2003, respectively, issued by the NEA Board of Directors are hereby
principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the UPHELD.
same.’ " Moreover, in Spouses Palada v. Solidbank Corporation,6 the Court stated, "Allegations
of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence."
No costs.
Here, petitioners have failed to discharge such burden of proof.
SO ORDERED.
In alleging bad faith, petitioners cite RA 6656, particularly its Sec. 2, subparagraphs (b) and
(c).1âwphi1 Petitioners have the burden to show that: (1) the abolished offices were replaced by PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
substantially the same units performing the same functions; and (2) incumbents are replaced by Associate Justice
less qualified personnel.
WE CONCUR:
 RENATO C. CORONA ** No part.
Chief Justice
1 
G.R. No. 187256, February 23, 2011.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE 2 
G.R. No. 156208, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 138.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 3 
G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308, 319; citations omitted.

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA 4 

G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
5 
G.R. No. 165381, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 338, 361.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
6 
Associate Justice Associate Justice G.R. No. 172227, June 29, 2011.

7 
Supra note 4.
ROBERTO A. ABAD* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO* BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.