Case Digests: Summary of Doctrines

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Case San Beda College of Law

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POLITICAL LAW
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, execution cannot issue on a
judgment against the state; the rule however does not apply when there is a valid
appropriation as provided by law
The rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where
the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the
satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment
may be legally enforced by judicial processes. (CITY OF CALOOCAN VS. JUDGE ALLERDE, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 107271. SEPTEMBER 10, 2003.)
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER
Sec. 17, Article XII grants the state in times of national emergency the right to temporarily take
over the operation of any business vested with public interest; the right is an exercise of police
power
Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution grants the State in times of national
emergency the right to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public
interest. This right is an exercise of police power which is one of the inherent powers of the State.
Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." It consists of two essential
elements. First, it is an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property. Second, the power is
exercised for the benefit of the common good. Its definition in elastic terms underscores its all-
encompassing and comprehensive embrace. It is and still is the “most essential, insistent, and
illimitable” of the State’s powers. It is familiar knowledge that unlike the power of eminent
domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation for its paramount
consideration is public welfare. (AGAN, ET AL. VS. PIATCO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 155001. JANUARY
21, 2004.)
Right to property; right to bear arms is merely a statutory right and is subject to regulation
under police power
The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The
maintenance of peace and order and the protection of the people against violence are
constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and
in harmony with these constitutional duties (FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ VS. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 157036. JUNE 9, 2004)
TAXATION
The grant of tax exemptions; tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be categorically and
unmistakably expressed
There is no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at
the time via presidential proclamation. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent
the Constitution's imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of Congress. In the same vein, the other kinds of privileges extended
to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate upon. (JOHN HAY, ET AL.
VS. LIM. G.R. NO. 119775. OCTOBER 24, 2003.)
POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

CHAIRPERSON: Jonathan Mangundayao ASST. CHAIRPERSON: Andre Jacobo EDP: Shantel Aceret DIGEST POOL: Jeff Alarilla, Carlo Bautista, Mark Anthony
Bayquen, Ian Camara, Barbara Jill Clara, Ryan Co, Bethany Conde, Beatriz Geronilla, Mary Ann Charisma Gutierrez, Christopher Linag, Hazel Manaog, Leah Merida,
Jeneree Perez, Fred Prieto, Russel Tacla, Ma.Melissa Yoro, Joy Zabala
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San Beda College of Law Case
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POLITICAL LAW
BILL OF RIGHTS
DUE PROCESS
Due process clause in relation to sec. 14, Art. VIII; judge must state the facts and law the
judgment is based
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the
due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just
leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. (PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. VS.
JERRY FERRER. G.R. NO. 148821. JULY 18, 2003.)
Right to due process; no deprivation of right where petitioners were amply accorded
opportunity to register objections to respondent’s offer of evidence
Going by the records, the petitioners were amply accorded the chance and/or opportunity
to register their objections to the private respondent’s offer of evidence. The Order of the trial
court dated 1 June 1994 merely stated that ‘in the interim,’ meaning, from the filing of
petitioners’ motion to recall witness up to the time the trial court would rule on the same, it would
hold action on private respondent’s formal offer. The petitioners filed their Motion to Recall
Witness only on 21 June 1994, which was way beyond the original period given. Therefore, when
petitioners filed the said motion to recall, there was no more period to suspend as it had long
expired on 12 June 1994. (RODSON PHIL., INC., ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. NO.
141857. JUNE 9, 2004.)
Due process; negligence of counsel binds the client and such does not amount to a denial of
due process.
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not
denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals,
petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioner's
former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial and
appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the
effects such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and
executory. (PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR. VS. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 136726.
SEPTEMBER 24, 2003.)
Equal protection of the laws; the equal protection clause is directed principally against undue
favor and individual or class privilege.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or
class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but
merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If
classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies
equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection
guarantee. (THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ASIAN
RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER, ET AL. G.R. NO. 131719. MAY 25, 2004.)
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Effectivity of the bill of rights under the 1973 constitution; bill of rights under the 1973
constitution was not operative during the interregnum;
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were
the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT
CHAIRPERSONS
Maricel Abarentos (Over-all Chairperson), Ronald Jalmanzar (Over-all Vice Chair), Yolanda Tolentino (VC-Acads), Jennifer Ang (VC- Secretariat), Joy Inductivo
(VC-Finance), Elaine Masukat (VC-EDP), Anna Margarita Eres (VC-Logistics) Jonathan Mangundayao (Political Law), Francis Benedict Reotutar (Labor Law),
Romuald Padilla (Civil Law), Charmaine Torres (Taxation Law), Mark David Martinez (Criminal Law), Garny Luisa Alegre (Commercial Law), Jinky Ann Uy (Remedial Law),
Jackie Lou Bautista (Legal Ethics)
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municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during
the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. (REPUBLIC OF THE
PHIL. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN. G.R. NO. 104768. JULY 21, 2003.)
Warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right

Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable." This provision protects not only those who appear to be
innocent but also those who appear to be guilty, who must nevertheless be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried through or
with judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure becomes unconstitutional within the
context of the constitutional provision because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be
clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of
a constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and,
(c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The waiver must be made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. (LUI VS. MATILLANO. G.R. NO. 141176. MAY 27, 2004.)
“Reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is
that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a),
Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
In the leading case of People v. Burgos, this Court held that "the officer arresting a person who has
just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of
that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view." (PEOPLE VS.
NOEL TUDTUD AND DINDO BOLONG. G.R. NO. 144037. SEPTEMBER 26, 2003.)
Illegal search; absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to believe that prior notice
of service of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation, the deliberate
sideswiping of appellant's car was unreasonable and unjustified; waiver of right against
unreasonable searches must be voluntary; particularity of description in the search warrant;
plain view doctrine; elements of the plain view doctrine
Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their
intention and authority to conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable
cause to believe that prior notice of service of the warrant would endanger its successful
implementation, the deliberate sideswiping of appellant's car was unreasonable and unjustified.
All alone and confronted by five police officers who had deprived him of his liberty, he cannot thus
be considered to have "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" waived his right to witness the
search of the house. "Consent" given under such intimidating, coercive circumstances is no consent
within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view
the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENNY GO. G.R. NO. 144639. SEPTEMBER 12, 2003.)
Article III Section 2; right against unreasonable searches and seizures; search warrant must be
issued only upon finding of probable cause

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Based on the testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove
that Executive Judge Ramos put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. The records
only show the existence of an application for a search warrant and the affidavits of the
complainant's witnesses. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAMARIL. G.R. NO. 147607. JANUARY
22, 2004.)
Search warrants must particularly describe not only the place to be searched but also the
persons to be arrested
The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to be
searched, but also the persons to be arrested. We have ruled in rare instances that mistakes in the
name of the person subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the warrant, provided the place
to be searched is properly described. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DEL NORTE. G.R. NO.
149462. MARCH 29, 2004.)
A mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate a search warrant.
A mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the search. In fact,
a “John Doe” warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descripto personae that
will enable the officer to identify the accused. It has also been decided that a mistake in the
identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be
searched is properly described. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS TIU WON CHUA. G.R. NO.
149878, JULY 1, 2003)
Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the
exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists
Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the
exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. For as long as
the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of
the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individual’s right against unreasonable search.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. (PEOPLE VS. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO;
ARNOLD ROBLE AND GERLYN WATES. G.R. NO. 141137. JANUARY 20, 2004.)
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Right to religious freedom; expansive religious freedom requires that government be neutral in
matters of religion
The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in our constitutional
order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a religion, including the morality it
sanctions. The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious.
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society,
however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
neutrality. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject the
respondent's claim of religious freedom to the "compelling state interest" test from a benevolent
neutrality stance — i.e. entertaining the possibility that respondent's claim to religious freedom
'would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense of
religious freedom will be unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest. (ALEJANDRO ESTRADA VS. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR. A.M. NO. P-02-
1651. AUGUST 4, 2003.)
Right of Muslim organizations to classify food fit for human consumption; no compelling
justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of
their religious right to classify a product as halal
CHAIRPERSONS
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The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided
for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food
products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike
EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. (ISLAMIC DA’ WAH VS.
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. G.R. NO. 153888. JULY 9, 2003.)
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Right to be informed of his rights; signing of the inventory by the accused without having been
informed of his right not to sign and to be assisted by counsel is a violation his rights under
custodial investigation
Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged
receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is
unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police
officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a
violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent whereby he was made to admit
the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in
violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence. (PEOPLE VS. BENNY GO. G.R. NO.
144639. SEPTEMBER 12, 2003.)
Constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the miranda principles) do

not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law
enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally
admits to having committed the offense.
Under Article III of the Constitution, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d)
the confession must be in writing.
Constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles)
do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law
enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to
having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12,
are meant to preclude the slightest use of the State’s coercive power as would lead an accused to
admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting
the truth outside the sphere of such power. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERIC GUILLERMO.
G.R. NO. 147786. JANUARY 20, 2004.)
Right to counsel; no deprivation of right when not subjected to custodial investigation

The appellant was not deprived of his right under the Constitution to be assisted by counsel
because the appellant was not subjected to a custodial investigation where he was identified by
the prosecution’s witnesses in a police line-up. Indeed, the appellant even denied that there was
no police line-up and that he was merely with the police officers when the prosecution’s witnesses
arrived in the police station. (PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. VS. QUIRICO E. DAGPIN. G.R. NO. 149560.
JUNE 10, 2004.)
The Miranda doctrine under the 1987 charter took on a modified form where the right to
counsel was specifically qualified to mean competent and independent counsel preferably of
the suspect’s own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter
requirements compared to its American counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in the
presence of counsel.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was undoubtedly apprised of his
Miranda rights under the Constitution. The court a quo observed that the confession itself expressly
states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights. As further proof of the same,
Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was
requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant. Appellant manifested on record his
desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the
investigation was conducted and appellant’s statement taken, he advised appellant of his
constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the questions he
understood freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer. Atty. Giduquio represented

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appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case. (PEOPLE VS. MOJELLO. G.R.
NO. 145566. MARCH 9, 2004.)
An extra-judicial confession must be express and voluntarily executed in writing with the
assistance of an independent and competent counsel
The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-
prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused.
The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel. A waiver in writing, like that
which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without the assistance of a
counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. (PEOPLE VS. PERALTA. G.R. NO. 145176.
MARCH 30, 2004.)
NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Constitutionality of E.O. 81; all assumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality
This Court has to debunk the challenge on the constitutionality of E.O. 81 on the ground
that it violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution as it allegedly allows the DBP to
impose penalties and interest which were not originally agreed upon. It is well-settled that all
presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality, such that one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. (DEV'T. BANK OF
THE PHIL. VS. WEST NEGROS COLLEGE. G.R. NO. 152359. MAY 21, 2004.)
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies
We cannot overemphasize the Court’s policy on prompt resolution of disputes. Justice
delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by
law constitutes a serious violation of Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides: “All persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.” (PETALLAR VS. JUDGE JUANILLO M. PULLOS. A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1484.
JANUARY 15, 2004.)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Elements of double jeopardy and factors to consider whether there was a violation of right to
speedy disposition of cases.
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.Legal
jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are: the length of the delay the reasons for such delay, the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. (DIMAYACYAC
VS. C.A. G.R. NO. 136264. MAY 28, 2004.)
CITIZENSHIP
Qualification of a president; national born; lorenzo pou benefited from the “en masse
filipinization” in 1902.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
CHAIRPERSONS
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“en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship
to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate
or illegitimate. (TECSON VS. COMELEC, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (A.K.A. FPJ) AND VICTORINO
X. FORNIER. G.R. NO. 161634. MARCH 3, 2004.)
By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, she is a Filipino since birth without having to
elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that when the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, the contents of said document may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (REPUBLIC VS. LIM.
G.R. NO. 153883. JANUARY 13, 2004.)
Evidence; inadmissible evidence cannot prove renunciation of citizenship; records were not
attested by the officer charged with custody of such records
Evidence produced by Petitioner Matugas were inadmissible of Barbers alleged
renunciation. The notation in the letter-inquiry of Jesus Agana regarding the citizenship of Barbers
is neither an official publication of the document that contains the record of private respondent’s
naturalization, nor a copy attested by the officer who has legal custody of the record. (MATUGAS
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERT LYNDON S. BARBERS. G.R. NO. 151944. JANUARY
20, 2004.)
SUFFRAGE
Overseas absentee voting act; sec 5(d) is constitutional; the interpretation here of residence is
equivalent to domicile; while sections 18.5,19 and 25 are unconstitutional; COMELEC should
not be allowed to usurp a power which is vested in the legislature; congress has no concurrent
power to enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC
Sec. 5(d) of R.A 9189 is not in violation of Sec. 1, Art. V of the Constitution and is therefore
not unconstitutional. The interpretation here of "residence" is synonymous with "domicile”. Under
our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an
absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is considered
synonymous with domicile.
COMELEC should not be allowed to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to the
Congress. The provisions of the Constitution should be harmonized with The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of
Congress. (MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC. G.R. NO. 157013. JULY 10, 2003.)
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Vacancies; special election; R.A. no. 6645, as amended by R.A. 7166, requires COMELEC: (1) to
call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than
sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a
vacancy in the senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the
office or offices to be voted for
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may
be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
In case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing
the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety
(90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give
notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.

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An election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body
charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give
notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient
number of voters as would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice
misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to
fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void. (ARTURO TOLENTINO VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. G.R. NO. 148334. JANUARY 21, 2004.)
Delegation of legislative power; general rule; delegata potestas delegare non potest; a
delegated power cannot be further delegated
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator's and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less
grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in
view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing
in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. (GONZALES VS. PAGCOR.
G.R. NO. 144891. MAY 27, 2004.)
Ra 9006 (Fair Elections Act); “one subject-one title rule”; an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject
limitation on legislative power; equal protection clause; since the classification justifying
section 14 of rep. act no. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored
upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same
classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the constitution is, thus, not
infringed.
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each
and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislators deemed it proper to treat elective officials and appointive officials differently with
respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to
pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. (RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS VS. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. G.R. NO. 147387. DECEMBER 10, 2003.)
HRET rules; inaction to present evidence within the period required by house of
representatives electoral tribunal (HRET) is a basis for dismissal of election protest
The election protest filed by petitioner is a serious charge which, if true, could unseat
protestee as Representative of her district. Hence, the observance of the HRET Rules in conjunction
with our own Rules of Court, must be taken seriously.
Section 59 of the 1998 HRET Rules, quoted earlier, is explicit. Unfortunately, petitioner did
not comply with it. In fact, despite the lapse of six (6) months (starting October 15, 2002 — initial
date of hearing), she failed to present her evidence. Such inaction shows her utter lack of interest
to prosecute her case. (HOFER VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL. G.R.
NO. 158833. MAY 12, 2004.)
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Powers of the president; validity of executive order reorganizing a public office; president has
authority to reorganize any branch or agency of executive department

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The President, based on existing laws, has the authority to carry out reorganization in any
branch or agency of the executive department. Except where the office was created by the
Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the legislature that brought it into existence. The
exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a
particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. (BAGAOISAN, ET AL. VS. NATIONAL TOBACCO. G.R. NO. 152845 AUGUST 5, 2003.)
Doctrine of qualified political agency; the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the president, can
validly reorganize the DENR.
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:
“Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.” (DENR VS. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES. G.R. NO. 149724. AUGUST 19, 2003.)
Article VII; power of the president to declare a state of rebellion; the power of the president to
declare a state of rebellion springs both from her powers as chief executive and commander-in-
chief
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the
President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not
only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states:
“The executive power shall be vested in the President….”
As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides: “He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.”
Thus, the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers. (SANLAKAS, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. NO.
159085. FEBRUARY 3, 2004.)
JUDICIARY
Supreme Court; jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to act as presidential electorate tribunal is
limited to post-election scenario; COMELEC decision on disqualification cases may be reviewed
by the sc per rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under rule 65[3] of the revised rules of civil
procedure. bolstered by section 7, article ix and section 1, article viii of the 1987
constitution.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up by petitioner Fornier was aptly elevated
to, and could well be taken cognizance of by the SC. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our
people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could
or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land. (TECSON VS. COMELEC,
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE.G .R. NO. 161634. MARCH 3, 2004.)
Judicial review over impeachment proceeding; initiation of impeachment proceeding by the

filing of impeachment complaint; the proceeding is initiated by the filing of the complaint and
referral to the committee on justice
The Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government
in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. Judicial power includes the duty of the

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courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Consulting the records of the Constitutional Convention, according to Fr. Bernas S.J. , under Art. XI
Sec 3 (5), the proceeding is initiated or begins when a verified complaint is filed and referred to
the Committee on Justice for further action. This is the interpretation adopted by the framers of
the fundamental law. (FRANCISCO JR., ET AL. VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ET AL. GR. NO.
160261 NOVEMBER 10, 2003)
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Section 7, article ix-a; each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution.
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of all its
members and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of
statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted constitutional
provision states "all of its members," without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
(ESTRELLA VS. COMELEC. G.R. NO. 160465. MAY 27, 2004.)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Holding of multiple offices; prohibition against double compensation; prohibition extends to
representative acting on behalf of his principal
Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional
office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only
in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. (BITONIO VS. COA. G.R. NO. 147392. MARCH 12, 2004.)
Approval of appointments by the commission; an appointment not submitted to the civil service
commission within thirty days from the date of issuance shall be ineffective
Under Sec. 11 of the said Rules, an appointment not submitted to the Commission within
thirty days from the date of issuance shall be ineffective. In the present case, the alleged
appointment of respondent was submitted to the Commission only after two years and twelve days
after its issuance. The much delayed submission to the Commission was a blatant violation of the
said Rules. (OMNC VS. MACARAIG. G.R. NO. 152017, JANUARY 15, 2004.)
Cases involving personnel actions, affecting civil service employees, are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the civil service commission; decisions of lower officials are appealed to the
agency head then to the CSC.
Cases involving personnel actions, reassignment included, affecting civil service employees
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. It was thus error for the trial
court, which does not have jurisdiction, to, in the first, place take cognizance of the petition of
petitioner assailing his relief as Dean and his designation to another position. (OLANDA VS.
BUGAYONG. G.R. NO. 140917. OCTOBER 10, 2003.)
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Commission On Elections due process; quasi judicial cases must be decided by the comelec by
division, not en banc; requirements for qualification for candidacy of a punong barangay
A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only
act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division.
Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of
Bautista's certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a division for summary hearing.
Section 39 of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read

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and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (BAUTISTA VS. COMELEC.
G.R. NOS. 154796-97. OCTOBER 23, 2003.)
Jurisdiction of the COMELEC; the ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its
legitimate officers is a matter well within its authority
The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon
the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of election. However, the COMELEC erred in resolving who has the authority to endorse
the official candidates of the LDP. To resolve the simple issue, the COMELEC need only to turn to
the Party Constitution. It need not go too far and resolve the root of the conflict between the
party officials. (LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO VS. COMELEC. G.R. NO. 161265,
FEBRUARY 24, 2004)
Jurisdiction of the COMELEC; annulment of result of a plebiscite; power of COMELEC not limited
to mere administrative function of conducting a plebiscite but also to enforce laws relative to
the conduct thereof
When we say the COMELEC has the power to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of a
plebiscite, it necessarily entails all the necessary and incidental power for it to achieve the holding
of an honest and credible plebiscite. It is also mandated to enforce the laws relative to the conduct
of the plebiscite. Hence, the COMELEC, whenever it is called upon to correct or check what the
Board of Canvassers erroneously or fraudulently did during the canvassing, can verify or ascertain
the true results of the plebiscite either through a pre-proclamation case or through revision of
ballots. To remove from the COMELEC the power to ascertain the true results of the plebiscite
through revision of ballots is to render nugatory its constitutionally mandated power to "enforce"
laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite. (MA. SALVACION BUAC, ET AL. VS. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 155855 JANUARY 26, 2004.)
COMELEC resolution 6712 void; COMELEC not authorized to make an unofficial quick count of
the presidential election.
The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation of election
results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. (SIXTO BRILLANTES VS.
COMELEC. G.R. NO. 163193. JUNE 15, 2004.)
Political parties; COMELEC has the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations to
enforce and administer election laws
The COMELEC has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to enforce
and administer election laws. This power includes the determination, within the parameters fixed
by law, of appropriate periods for the accomplishment of certain pre-election acts like filing
petitions for registration under the party-list system. (AKLAT v. COMELEC. G.R. NO. 162203
APRIL 14, 2004.)
COMELEC; Bidding; the award to MPC was highly irregular; exhaustion of administrative
remedies; letter to the chairman serves to eliminate the prematurity issue
The award is invalid, since COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it did the following:
(1) Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding (2) Allowed MPEI
to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory eligibility requirements (3)
Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the issuance by the
BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 (4)
Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there were
violations of the mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec’s own
Request for Proposal on the automated election system. (5) Refused to declare a failed bidding and
to conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of the bidders to pass the technical tests conducted by
the Department of Science and Technology (6) Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in
the conduct of the bidding for the automated counting machines.
Respondents may not have realized it, but the letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin
Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written

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protest against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. (INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMELEC. G.R. NO. 159139. JANUARY 13, 2004.)
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Validity of ordinance; granting of benefits to an auditor where a statute provides otherwise;
coa officials need to be insulated from unwarranted influences so that they can act with
independence and integrity
The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures of government funds. To be able properly to perform their constitutional
mandate, COA officials need to be insulated from unwarranted influences, so that they can act with
independence and integrity. The removal of the temptation and enticement the extra emoluments
may provide is designed to be an effective way of vigorously and aggressively enforcing the
Constitutional provision mandating the COA to prevent or disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and
properties. (RUDY M. VILLAREÑA VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. G.R. NOS. 145383-84 AUGUST 6,
2003.)
The constitution vests in the coa audit jurisdiction over “government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters,” as well as “government-owned or controlled
corporations” without original charters.
The Constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over “government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters,” as well as “government-owned or controlled
corporations” without original charters. GOCCs with original charters are subject to COA pre-audit,
while GOCCs without original charters are subject to COA post-audit. GOCCs without original
charters refer to corporations created under the Corporation Code but are owned or controlled by
the government. The nature or purpose of the corporation is not material in determining COA’s
audit jurisdiction. Neither is the manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a general or
special law. (ENGR. RANULFO C. FELICIANO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. G.R. NO. 147402.
JANUARY 14, 2004.)
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Ombudsman; power of the ombudsman: ombudsman has the authority to dismiss a complaint
outright.
The Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a
complaint. Since the Ombudsman can dismiss a complaint outright for lack of merit, it necessarily
follows that he can also dismiss the complaint for lack of merit after the respondent’s comment to
the complaint (REMBERTO C. KARA-AN VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL. G.R. NO.
147402. JANUARY 14, 2004.)
R.A. 6770 or the ombudsman law; decision imposing suspension of not more than one month’s
salary shall not be appealable; the phrase includes suspension for one month without pay
Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 states: “Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and
unappealable.” We hold that the phrase “suspension of not more than one month’s salary includes
that imposed upon petitioner, i.e., suspension for one month without pay. There is no penalty as
suspension of salary in our administrative law, rules and regulations. Salaries are simply not
suspended. Rather it is the official or employee concerned who is suspended with a corresponding
withholding of salaries following the principle of “no work, no pay.” Or, an official or employee
may be fined an amount equivalent to his or her monthly salary as penalty without an
accompanying suspension from work. (HERRERA VS. BOHOL. G. R. NO. 155320. FEBRUARY 5,
2004.)
Jurisdiction of the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation involving public officers; power of
the ombudsman to investigate public officers is not exclusive
The Constitution does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate
and prosecute cases involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987

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Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive conferment of the power to the
Ombudsman. (HONASAN VS. PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DOJ. G.R. NO.
159747, APRIL 13, 2004.)
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Section 2, Article XII; the alienation of lands of the public domain is prohibited.
The contract entered in to by Public Estates Authority and AMARI violates Section 2 Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. . . . The submerged lands
purchased by Amari are owned by the State and are inalienable.
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State's
inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any
sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution. (FRANCISCO I.
CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION. G.R. NO. 133250. NOVEMBER 11, 2003.)
Large scale mining; contracts involving technical or financial assistance; phrase includes
management by a foreign-owned corporation so long as such contracts provide adequate
protection
From the minutes of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, the Court
concluded that agreements involving either technical or financial assistance are in fact service
contracts, but unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations
acting as contractors on the one hand; and the on the other, the government as the principal or
“owner” of the works. As written by the framers and ratified and adopted by the people, the
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations—as contractors
who would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to full control and
supervision of the State. (LA BUGAL – B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. RAMOS. G.R. NO.
127882. DECEMBER 1, 2004.)
Section 14, Article XIV of 1973 constitution; aliens are disqualified from acquiring private lands
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights
and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. Such being the case, the plaintiff is
subject to the constitutional restrictions governing the acquisition of real properties in the
Philippines by aliens. The petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him
to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. (FRENZEL VS. CATITO. G.R. NO.
143958. JULY 11, 2003.)
Licenses; being a mere privilege a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder; it can be
revoked by the state in the interest of the public
The issuance of a license merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be
amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since
the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural mineral resources are matters
impressed with great public interest. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSEMOOR MINING
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. G.R. NO. 149927. MARCH 30, 2004.)
Prohibition against monopolies; section 19, article XII; the operation of monopolies is not
totally banned by the constitution. However, the state shall regulate them when public interest
so requires.
While embracing free enterprise as an economic creed, the Constitution does not totally
prohibit the operation of monopolies. However, it mandates the State to regulate them when
public interest so requires. In the present case, the two consortia of insurance companies that have
been authorized to issue passenger insurance policies are adequately regulated by the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to protect the riding public. While
individual insurance companies may somehow be adversely affected by this scheme, the paramount

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public interest involved must be upheld. (EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION VS.
LTFRB. G.R. NO. 149717. OCTOBER 7, 2003.)
GOVERNMENT OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
GOCCS are enjoined to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms to handle their cases
and legal matters. but in exceptional cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of the
solicitor general or the government corporate counsel, as the case may be, and the written
concurrence of the commission on audit shall first be secured before the hiring or employment
of a private lawyer or law firm.
It was only with the enactment of Memorandum Circular No. 9 in 1998 that an exception to
the general prohibition was allowed for the first time since P.D. No. 1415 was enacted in 1978.
However, indispensable conditions precedent were imposed before any hiring of private lawyer
could be effected. First, private counsel can be hired only in exceptional cases. Second, the GOCC
must first secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the
Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, before any hiring can be done. And third, the
written concurrence of the COA must also be secured prior to the hiring. (PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL
AUTHORITY VS. CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION. G.R. NO. 155692. OCTOBER 23, 2003.)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative due process; res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings,
not to the exercise of administrative powers.
Due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently
met.
The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case. The
doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers (MONTEMAYOR VS. BUNDALIAN. G.R. NO. 149335. JULY 1, 2003.)
Exhaustion of administrative remedies with purely legal questions; power of courts to review
rule or regulation issued by administrative agency
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making
or quasi-legislative power. (SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. VS. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. G.R. NO. 151908. AUGUST 12, 2003.)
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires an administrative decision to

be first appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be
elevated to a court of justice for review.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the Office of the
President to review any determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows,
indeed requires, an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up
to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. (LAND CAR, INC. VS.
BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC., ET AL. G.R. NO. 154377. DECEMBER 8, 2003.)
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; the law provides for remedies against the
action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts
can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and
directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of
law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law
provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case
at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein.
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(ILOILO CITY ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND APPEALS, ET AL. VS. GGEGATO-ABECIA
FUNERAL HOMES, INC., ET AL. G.R. NO. 157118 DECEMBER 8, 2003.)
R.A.9136: authority of the ERC to allow provisionary increase of electricity rates; authority
must be exercised in accordance with the procedure provided by the applicable law.
The ERC may grant provisional rate adjustments without first conducting a hearing prior to such
grant. However, it is required to conduct a hearing on the propriety of the grant of provisional rate
adjustments within 30 days from the issuance of the provisional order. (FDC vs. ERC. G.R. NO.
161113. JUNE 15, 2004.)
Administrative supervision; limited only to the authority of the department to generally

oversee the operations of such agencies and to ensure they are managed effectively, efficiently
and economically but without interference with day-to day activities
The power of administrative supervision is limited to “the authority of the department or
its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance
of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of
maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not
increase or add to them.” (PEOPLE VS. GARFIN. G.R. NO. 153176. MARCH 29, 2004.)
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

QUALIFICATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Qualifications of public officers; an elective local official, is not barred from running again for
the same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms;
Qualifications of public officers correlated to public corporations; the new city acquired a new
corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality; this does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying the subject constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the
office of the city mayor. as stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City Of Digos is the
same as that of the municipality
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local
government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of
the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. (ARSENIO A. LATASA VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND ROMEO SUNGA. G.R. NO. 154829. DECEMBER 10, 2003.)
DUTIES OF A PUBLIC OFFICER
Duty of judge; duty of sheriff is ministerial in nature; remedy in case of errors of judgment
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative
sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties
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Law and logic decree that administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof.
With respect to respondent Deputy Sheriff, he cannot be blamed for implementing the writ of
execution because when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandate.
(SILVESTRE H. BELLO III VS. AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, ET AL. A.M. MTJ-00-1311 OCTOBER 3, 2003.)
Duties of public officers; duty of the judge not to delay a case

The Supreme Court repeatedly warned judges to dispose of court business promptly,
resolve pending incidents and motions, and decide cases within the prescribed periods for "delay in
the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute." Such exhortation is in fact enshrined in Sec. 15, par. (1),
Art. VIII, of our Constitution, as well as in Rule 3.05, Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which mandates that a magistrate should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. (VICTOR A. ASLARONA VS. ANTONIO T. ECHAVEZ. A.M. NO. RTJ-03-
1803 OCTOBER 2, 2003.)
Duty of a judge; duty of a clerk of court; the determination of whether to require a cash bond,
like the approval of bail or the release of the accused, is purely a judicial function and not
among the mandated duties of respondent clerk.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate "should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities"; and "should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. Since appearance and reality fuse in the performance of judicial
functions, the judge — like Caesar's wife — must not only be pure, but also be beyond suspicion.
The determination of whether to require a cash bond, like the approval of bail or the release of the
accused, is purely a judicial function. It was certainly not among the mandated duties of
respondent clerk. (ROMEO T. ZACARIAS VS. JUDGE MARTONINO R. MARCOS. A.M. NO. MTJ-04-
1520 JANUARY 27, 2004.)
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
Backwages; general rule; a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not
rendered any service
The general rule is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not
rendered any service. No work, no pay. Since petitioner did not render any service during the
period for which he is now claiming his salaries, there is no legal or equitable basis to order the
payment thereof. (BALITAOSAN VS. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS.
G.R. NO. 138238. SEPTEMBER 2, 2003.)
LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
In administrative proceedings, the complainants have the burden of proving, by substantial

evidence, the allegations in their complaints; officers of the court are expected to discharge
their duties, including the safekeeping of court records, with circumspection, diligence and
efficiency.
evidence, the allegations in their complaints. In this case, the complainant, by her failure to show
up during the investigation despite the subpoena issued to her, manifestly failed to substantiate her
allegations against the respondent. As aptly observed by the Court Administrator, "there is nothing
in the records that would support complainant's allegations." (DAVID VS. RILLORTA. A.M. NO. P-
03-1709. JULY 11, 2003.)
Public officers due process; misrepresentation; grave misconduct

The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his
duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and
ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and
entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office,
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he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave
misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his
evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life.
Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the
discipline and morale of the service.” (BERNARDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS. G.R. NO. 124261.
MAY 27, 2004)
Misconduct of sheriff; sheriff is bound to discharge his duties without undue delay
A sheriff is bound to discharge his duties without undue delay, as well as with care and
attention, which any prudent man would do in the management of his affairs. Any person involved
in the administration of justice ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty and integrity in
the public service. Sheriffs, in particular, must show a high regard for professionalism in the
performance of their duties given the delicate tasks reposed in them. (AVELLANOSA VS. CAMASO.
A.M. NO. P-02-1550. OCTOBER 3, 2003.)
Improper solicitation a violation of ra 3019-anti graft and corrupt practices act; the court has
stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of
justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility
Time and time again, the court has stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials
involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed
with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all
times in order to merit and maintain the public's respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to
say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and
uprightness. The respondent's act of demanding money from the complainant hardly meets the
foregoing standard. Improper solicitation from litigants is a grave offense that carries an equally
grave penalty. (VILLAROS VS. ORPIANO. A.M. NO. P-02-1548. OCTOBER 1, 2003.)
Liability of public officers; unbecoming conduct of police officers;

Conduct unbecoming of a police officer' refers to any behavior or action of a PNP member,
irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing
himself as a PNP member, seriously compromises his character and standing as a gentleman in such
a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character; it may also refer to acts or
behavior with any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which is dishonoring or
disgracing himself personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member
and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization. (JENNY
ZACARIAS VS. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, ET AL. G.R. NO. 119847. OCTOBER 24, 2003.)
Disgraceful and immoral conduct of a public officer is a valid ground for suspension.
Instead of rectifying her errant ways after the wife of her paramour had pleaded with her,
she continued the illicit relationship and even abhorrently aggravated the situation by marrying
complainant’s husband. Interestingly, respondent married him after she stated in her Comment
that her relationship with him was purely based on friendship. (GERALDINE P. DIZON VS. HIYASMIN
L. CAMPO. A.M. NO. P-04-1774. FEBRUARY 9, 2004.)
Liability of public officers; willful failure to pay just debts; law prescribes the penalty of
reprimand for the first offense
Grantoza does not deny his indebtedness to Reliways. Thus, while we commiserate with his
unfortunate situation, we cannot condone his failure to pay his just debt. His administrative
liability under the foregoing provision of the Revised Administrative Code is undisputed. The
penalty therefore is not directed at his private life but at his actuations unbecoming a public
official. (RELIWAYS, INC VS. LAMBERTO P. GRANTOZA. A.M. NO. P-04-1812. MAY 28, 2004.)
Liability of public officers; administrative offense of grave misconduct can be committed only
in the exercise of the official function
Respondent cannot be held liable for the administrative offense of grave misconduct
because her offense was not committed in the exercise of her official functions. As held by the
Supreme Court, misconduct must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of

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official duty, which is not so in this case (FRIA V. DE LOS ANGELES. A.M. NO. CA-02-15-P. JUNE
3, 2004.)
Efficiency; Article VIII, section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution and canon 3, rule 3.05 of the
code of judicial conduct direct judges to dispose of their cases promptly and within the
prescribed periods, failing which they are liable for gross inefficiency.
Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the
Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts.
Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of
submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three
months to do so. (FLORESTA VS. UBIADAS. A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1774. MAY 27, 2004.)
Liability of public officers; affidavit of desistance by complainant not a ground for dismissal of
administrative case.
An affidavit of desistance does not divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to
investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint against a court
personnel. The Court has an interest in the conduct and behavior of all officials and employees of
the judiciary. Its efforts cannot be frustrated by any private arrangement of the parties. (JESSICA
NOYNAY-ARLOS VS RODOLFO SEL. CONAG. A.M. NO. P-01-1511)
Dismissal of criminal case not deemed as dismissal of administrative charges.

Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case against
an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
does not foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all
respects. The quantum of evidence required in the latter is only substantial evidence, and not
proof beyond reasonable doubt that is required in criminal cases. (AÑONUEVO JR. AND ESTRELLA
VS. COURT OF APPEALS. G.R. NO. 152998. SEPTEMBER 23, 2003.)
Liability of public officers; the resignation of a judge does not render moot and academic the
The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint
is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge ceased to be in office during the pendency of
this case. The Court retains its jurisdiction to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty
of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications. (VICTORY LINER, INC., VS. JUDGE REYNALDO B.
BELLOSILLO. A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1321. MARCH 10, 2004.)
Public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity.
As can be gleaned from her explanation, respondent knows that falsifying her DTR is a
grave offense, and that she could possibly lose her job if charged administratively. Hence, when
she tampered her DTR, she manifested her lack of integrity and a perverse sense of responsibility.
Indeed, she has fallen short of the degree of discipline exhorted from court personnel (OFFICE OF
THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. LIZA MARIA E. SIRIOS. A.M. NO. P-02-1659. AUGUST 28,
2003.)
Dismissal from service: length of service is an alternative circumstance

Under the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules, dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service are grave offenses punishable by
dismissal from the service. Thus, as provided by law, there is no other penalty that should be
imposed on respondent than the penalty of dismissal. Of course, the rules allow the consideration
of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and provide for the manner of imposition of the proper
penalty. Length of service can either be a mitigating or aggravating circumstance depending on the
factual milieu of each case. Length of service is an alternative circumstance. (CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION VS CORTEZ. G.R. NO. 155732. JUNE 3, 2004.)
Preventive suspension; preventive suspension under section 13 of RA 3019 otherwise known as

the anti-graft and corrupt practices act is mandatory and automatic

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It has been long settled, however, and it bears reiteration that Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public official "shall be suspended from
office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. The rule on the matter is specific and
categorical, leaving no room for interpretation. (BARRERA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R.
NOS. 145233-52. MAY 28, 2004.)
ELECTION LAW
COMELEC
Power to declare failure of elections; conditions before COMELEC can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a failure of elections; causes for failure of elections
Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of elections,
two conditions must concur, namely, (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the
date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2)
the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election. Note that the cause of such
failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes. (ABDUSAKUR M. TAN ET. AL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.
G.R. NOS. 148575-76. DECEMBER 10, 2003.)
Power to declare failure of elections; instances of failure of elections

In Mitmug v. COMELEC, this Court held that before the COMELEC can act on a verified
petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has
taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and second, the votes not cast would affect the
result of the election. (SANGCAD S. BAO VS. COMELEC. G.R. NO. 149666. DECEMBER 19, 2003.)
Power to prosecute election offenses; the prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are subject
to its authority, control and supervision in respect of the particular functions covered by such
deputation; authority under the last paragraph of section 28 of republic act no. 6648 to exempt
those who have committed election offenses
The withdrawal by the petitioner of its deputation of the provincial or city prosecutors may
not be interfered with or overruled by the trial court.
The power to grant exemptions is vested solely on the petitioner. This power is
concomitant with its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses and prosecute
those committing the same. The exercise of such power should not be interfered with by the trial
court. Neither may this Court interfere with the petitioner's exercise of its discretion in denying or
granting exemptions under the law, unless the petitioner commits a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. (COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, VS. HON. DOLORES L.
ESPAÑOL. G.R. NOS. 149164-73. DECEMBER 10, 2003.)
CANDIDATES AND CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
Certificate of candidacy; defects in the certificates of candidacy should have been questioned
on or before the election and not after the will of the people has been expressed through the
ballots.
In Lambonao v. Tero, the Court held that defects in the certificates of candidacy should
have been questioned on or before the election and not after the will of the people has been
expressed through the ballots. It was further held in the said case that while provisions relating to
certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as
regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate. (EDUARDO
T. SAYA-ANG, SR., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 155087. NOVEMBER 28, 2003.)
CANVASS AND PROCLAMATION
Proclamation based on a clerical or mathematical mistake is not valid

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If a candidate's proclamation is based on a Statement of Votes, which contains erroneous
entries, it is null and void. It is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of
office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to annul the proclamation. (MANUEL MILLA VS.
REGINA BALMORES-LAXA. G.R. NO. 151216 JULY 18, 2003)
An incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation

Since the question of Magno's eligibility for the position of Mayor was still pending, the
canvass which excluded Magno from the list of qualified candidates was an incomplete canvass, and
Lorenzo's proclamation, on the basis thereof, was illegal. An incomplete canvass is illegal and
cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation. (LORENZO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 158371. DECEMBER 11, 2003.)
Taking anew of his oath is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in
office and exercise of functions.
The re-taking of his oath of office on November 16, 1999 was a mere formality considering
that his oath taken on May 27, 1997 operated as a full investiture on him of the rights of the office.
Hence, the taking anew of his oath of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City was
not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office and to the exercise of the
functions thereof. (KAGAWADS JOSE G. MENDOZA ET. AL, VS. BARANGAY CAPTAIN MANUEL D.
LAXINA, SR. G.R. NO. 146875. JULY 14, 2003.)
Sec 242 of the omnibus election code; due process; public office is not a property nor a vested
right to public office, nevertheless, due notice and hearing is required.
While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a broad power to enforce all election laws,
the same is subject to the right of the parties to due process. Petitioner cannot be deprived of his
office without due process of law. Although public office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it is,
nevertheless, a protected right. (NAMIL, ET. AL, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. G.R. NO.
150540. OCTOBER 28, 2003.)
Authority to annul canvass and proclamation; COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass
and proclamation which was illegally made. the fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed
office, is no bar to the exercise of such power. it of course may not be availed of where there
has been a valid proclamation.
Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power. It
of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondent's petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and
proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to COMELEC. (LORETTA P. DELA LLANA VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
152080. NOVEMBER 28, 2003)
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
Lack of inner paper seals in election returns is not a proper subject of a pre-proclamation case;
in pre-proclamation cases, the COMELEC is not allowed to look beyond the election returns or
receive evidence aliunde
While the aforesaid grounds (lack of inner and outer paper seals and lack of signatures of
watchers, among others) may, indeed, involve a violation of the rules governing the preparation
and delivery of election returns for canvassing, they do not necessarily affect the authenticity and
genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant their exclusion from the canvassing. The
grounds for objection to the election returns made by petitioners are clearly defects in form
insufficient to support a conclusion that the election returns were tampered with or spurious.
(NANCY SORIANO BANDALA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET. AL. G.R. NO. 159369. MARCH
3, 2004.)

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Given the factual finding of the COMELEC en banc that the nine election returns are spurious in
the manner of their preparation, doubt is cast on the authentic appearance of said returns.
nevertheless, under section 235 of the omnibus election code, a recount of votes may be
resorted to, if the integrity of the affected ballot boxes and their contents has been preserved.
Given the factual finding of the COMELEC en banc that the nine election returns are
spurious in the manner of their preparation, doubt is cast on the authentic appearance of said
returns. Hence, the subject election returns cannot be accorded prima facie status as genuine
reports of the results of the counts of votes. Nevertheless, under Section 235 of the Omnibus
Election Code, a recount of votes may be resorted to, if the integrity of the affected ballot boxes
and their contents has been preserved. Thereafter, new returns shall be prepared which shall be
used by the Board of Canvassers as basis of the canvass. This procedure protects the will of the
electorate. (SALIPONGAN L. DAGLOC VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NOS. 154442-47 DECEMBER
10, 2003)
COMELEC has jurisdiction to go beyond election returns and investigate irregularities in a pre-
proclamation controversy when there is prima facie evidence that returns are not genuine
The doctrine cited by petitioner in the case of Loong v. Commission on Elections
presupposes that the returns "appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face." Where,
as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries
having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC
is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election
return. (LEE VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL. G.R. NO. 157004. JULY 4, 2003.)
ELECTION CONTEST
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not
be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials
Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an
election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who
is the real candidate elected by the electorate. The Supreme Court frowns upon any interpretation
of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the
votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results. (HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN VS.
COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 157249. NOVEMBER 28, 2003.)
COMELEC rules of procedures: interpretation of its provisions; execution pending appeal of

election cases is allowed despite the contrary provisions of the COMELEC rules of procedure.
It is true that present election laws are silent on the remedy of execution pending appeal in
election contests. However, neither Ramas nor Santos declared that such remedy is exclusive to
election contests involving elective barangay and municipal officials as argued by Batul. Section 2
allowing execution pending appeal in the discretion of the court applies in a suppletory manner to
election cases, including those involving city and provincial officials. Section 1 of Rule 41 thereof
expressly provides that “[i]n the absence of any applicable provision in [said] Rules, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect. (FERNANDO U. BATUL VS. LUCILO BAYRON AND COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS. G.R. NO. 157687. FEBRUARY 26, 2004.)
Losing candidate may be proclaimed winner even when he did not participate in the election
protest; COMELEC rules of procedure: COMELEC rules of procedure must be construed liberally.
His elevation to seventh (7th) place is but a necessary consequence of the finding of the
COMELEC that the petitioners had actually obtained less number of votes than as reflected in the
first canvass results. It would be patently ridiculous for the Court or the COMELEC to hold that he
should still be deemed as the tenth (10th) placer when the amended vote totals reveal that he had
garnered more votes than the new eighth (8th) placer.
Election protests are guided by an extra-ordinary rule of interpretation that statutes
providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people

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in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. (ISIDRO IDULZA,
ET AL. VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 160130. APRIL 14, 2004.)
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Local government; local autonomy; the just share of the LGUs in the national tax shall be
automatically released without need of further actions.
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its
distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the
guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time,
as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions,
makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate
that the "just share" of the LGUs "shall be automatically released to them." (PROVINCE OF
BATANGAS VS. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 152774. MAY 27, 2004.)
Local government; local autonomy; to rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to
judges as what respondent COA would like us to do will subvert the principle of local autonomy
zealously guaranteed by the constitution
Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole then, what it seeks to prevent is the dual collection of RATA
by a national official from the budgets of "more than one national agency." We emphasize that the
other source referred to in the prohibition is another national agency. Since the other source
referred in the controversial prohibition is another national agency, said prohibition clearly does
not apply to LGUs like the Municipality of Naujan. National agency of course refers to the different
offices, bureaus and departments comprising the national government. The budgets of these
departments or offices are fixed annually by Congress in the General Appropriations Act. Without
doubt, NCC No. 67 does not apply to LGUs. To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances
to judges as what respondent COA would like us to do will subvert the principle of local autonomy
zealously guaranteed by the Constitution. (LEYNES VS. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT. G.R. NO.
143596. DECEMBER 11, 2003.)
Local legislation; quorum; the principal function and duty of the sanggunian, requires the
participation of all its members so that they may not only represent the interests of their
respective constituents but also help in the making of decisions by voting upon every question
put upon the body.
“Quorum” is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally assembled
in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business or that number which
makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act.
“Majority,” when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half or more
than half of any total. In fine, the entire membership must be taken into account in computing the
quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the constitution merely states that “majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum,” Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as it requires that
the “majority of all members of the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified” shall constitute a
quorum. (MANUEL E. ZAMORA VS. GOVERNOR JOSE R. CABALLERO ET. AL. G.R. NO. 147767.
JANUARY 14, 2004)
Local taxation; the fact that tax exemptions of government-owned or controlled corporations
have been expressly withdrawn by the present local government code clearly attests against
petitioner's claim of absolute exemption of government instrumentalities from local taxation.
In the more recent case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, where
the Basco case was similarly invoked for tax exemption, we stated: "[N]othing can prevent Congress
from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the Government performing
governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to fulfill a constitutional
mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom." The fact that tax exemptions of
government-owned or controlled corporations have been expressly withdrawn by the present Local
Government Code clearly attests against petitioner's claim of absolute exemption of government
instrumentalities from local taxation. (PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CITY OF ILOILO. G.R.
NO. 109791. JULY 14, 2003.)

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(N.B. LOCAL TAXATION WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE POLITICAL LAW BAR
EXAM)
CARL; power of LGU’s to convert classification of agricultural lands
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 2264, amending the Local Government Code, specifically
empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
in consultation with the National Planning Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines, and
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of
needs. The power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands to residential lands to
non-agricultural lands reclassified is not subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. Section 65 of Rep. Act No. 6657 relied upon by the petitioner applies only to applications
by the landlord or the beneficiary for the conversion of lands previously placed under the agrarian
reform law after the lapse of five years from its award. It does not apply to agricultural lands
already converted as residential lands prior to the passage of Rep. Act No. 6657. (PASONG
BAYABAS FARMERS ASSO., ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. NOS. 142359 & 142980
MAY 25, 2004.)
Power to issue licenses for the operation of cockpits; resolution no. 048 cannot be
implemented because at that time there was no ordinance authorizing the operation of
cockpits
Resolution No. 049, S. 1998, authorizing petitioner to establish, operate and maintain a
cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur cannot be implemented. Since it was Ordinance No. 001, S. 1999
which provided for the collection of application filing fees, ocular inspection fees, mayor’s permit
fees, filing fees for the institution of complaints, entrance fees and special derby assessments for
the operation of cockpits. This Ordinance, however, was withdrawn by the Sangguniang Bayan.
Hence, there being in effect no ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit. (ROLANDO N.
CANET VS. MAYOR JULIETA A. DECENA. G.R. NO. 155344. JANUARY 20, 2004.)

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CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, execution cannot issue on a
judgment against the state; the rule however does not apply when there is a valid
appropriation as provided by law
CITY OF CALOOCAN VS. JUDGE ALLARDE, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 107271. September 10, 2003.]
CORONA, J.:
FACTS: Sometime in 1972, Marcial Samson, City Mayor of Caloocan City, through Ordinance No.
1749, abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and other positions from the plantilla of
the local government of Caloocan. Then Assistant City Administrator Delfina Hernandez Santiago
and the affected employees of the City Government assailed the legality of the abolition before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33.
In 1973, the CFI declared the abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the
dismissed employees and the payment of their back salaries and other emoluments. The City
Government of Caloocan appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondent Santiago and her co-parties
moved for the dismissal of the appeal for being dilatory and frivolous but the appellate court
denied their motion. Thus, they elevated the case on certiorari before the Supreme Court which
held that the appellate court "erred in not dismissing the appeal," and "that the appeal of the City
Government of Caloocan was frivolous and dilatory."
In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan paid respondent Santiago P75, 083.37 in partial
payment of her backwages, thereby leaving a balance of P530, 761.91. In 1987, the City of
Caloocan appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries. Surprisingly, however, the City later
refused to release the money to respondent Santiago.
On February 12, 1991, Judge Mauro T. Allarde, RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 123, issued a
writ of execution for the payment of the remainder of respondent Santiago's back salaries and other
emoluments. For the second time, the City Government of Caloocan went up to the Court of
Appeals and filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to stop the trial court from
enforcing the writ of execution. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the order of issuance
of the writ of execution. The appellate court held that she was entitled to her salaries. And for the
second time, the City Government of Caloocan appealed to the Supreme Court. The petition was
dismissed for having been filed late and for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the
Court of Appeals.
On July 27, 1992, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the
motor vehicles of the City Government of Caloocan for P100,000. The proceeds of the sale were
turned over to respondent Santiago in partial satisfaction of her claim, thereby leaving a balance of
P439,377.14, inclusive of interest. Petitioners filed a motion questioning the validity of the auction
sale of the vehicle and a supplemental motion maintaining that the properties of the municipality
were exempt from execution. In his Order dated October 1, 1992, Judge Allarde denied both
motions and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction three more vehicles of the
City of Caloocan.
On October 5, 1992, the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of
1992, which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by respondent Santiago as back salaries,
plus interest. 7 Pursuant to the subject ordinance, Judge Allarde issued an order dated November
10, 1992, decreeing that:
WHEREFORE, the City Treasurer (of Caloocan), Norberto Azarcon is hereby ordered to
deliver to this Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof, (a) manager's check covering the
amount of P439,378.00 representing the back salaries of petitioner Delfina H. Santiago in
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accordance with Ordinance No. 0134 S. 1992 and pursuant to the final and executory decision in
these cases.
Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however, refused to sign the check intended
as payment for respondent Santiago's claims. This, despite the fact that he was one of the
signatories of the ordinance authorizing such payment.
Thus, in an order dated May 7, 1993, Judge Allarde ordered Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo to
immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of
respondent Santiago. 9 On the same day, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo served a copy of the Notice of
Garnishment on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Sangandaan Branch, Caloocan City.
ISSUE: Is garnishment of the funds of the City of Caloocan valid?

HELD: YES. It is valid.
Petitioner argues that the garnishment of its funds in PNB was invalid inasmuch as these
were public funds and thus exempt from execution. Garnishment is considered a species of
attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant
in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant.
The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any
other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to
garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts
ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially
ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and
execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of
state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature
will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.
The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when
there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the
immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be
levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money
judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced
by judicial processes.
In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance
No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for respondent Santiago's back
salaries plus interest. Thus this case fell squarely within the exception. Essentially, Ordinance No.
0134, Series of 1992, was the "corresponding appropriation as required by law." The sum indicated
in the ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the other budgetary
allocations of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the City's monetary obligation to her.
The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
Police power; Sec. 17 article XII grants the state in times of national emergency the right to
temporarily take over the operation of any business vested with public interest; the right is an
exercise of police power
DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR ET. AL vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.,
[G.R. No. 155001. January 21, 2004]
PUNO J.:
FACTS: The DOTC issued the notice of award for the construction and development of NAIA IPT III
project to the Paircargo Consortium, which later organized into herein respondent PIATCO. Hence,
on July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and PIATCO,
through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” (1997

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Concession Agreement). On November 26, 1998, the 1997 Concession Agreement was superseded
by the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) containing certain revisions and
modifications from the original contract. A series of supplemental agreements was also entered
into by the Government and PIATCO. The First Supplement was signed on August 27, 1999, the
Second Supplement on September 4, 2000, and the Third Supplement on June 22, 2001
(collectively, Supplements) (the 1997 Concession Agreement, ARCA and the Supplements
collectively referred to as the PIATCO Contracts).
On September 17, 2002, various petitions were filed before this Court to annul the 1997
Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements and to prohibit the public respondents DOTC
and MIAA from implementing them. In a decision dated May 5, 2003, this Court granted the said
petitions and declared the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements null and
void. Respondent PIATCO, respondent-Congressmen and respondents-intervenors now seek the
reversal of the May 5, 2003 decision and pray that the petitions be dismissed
ISSUES:
1. Is PIATCO entitled to reasonable compensation for the duration of the temporary
takeover by the GRP, which compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost
for the use of the Terminal, and/or Terminal Complex as provided in Section 5.10(c),
Article V of the ARCA?
2. Are monopolies prohibited by the constitution?
3. Is there an encroachment by the Court in reviewing the PIATCO contracts which are
declared valid by the House of Representatives.
HELD:1. NO, it is not entitled to any compensation. Section 5.10(c), Article V of the ARCA clearly
obligates the government in the exercise of its police power to compensate respondent PIATCO and
this obligation is offensive to the Constitution. Police power cannot be diminished, let alone
defeated by any contract for its paramount consideration is public welfare and interest.
Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution grants the State in times of national
emergency the right to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public
interest. This right is an exercise of police power which is one of the inherent powers of the State.
Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." It consists of two essential
elements. First, it is an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property. Second, the power is
exercised for the benefit of the common good. Its definition in elastic terms underscores its all-
encompassing and comprehensive embrace. It is and still is the “most essential, insistent, and
illimitable” of the State’s powers. It is familiar knowledge that unlike the power of eminent
domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation for its paramount
consideration is public welfare. It is also settled that public interest on the occasion of a national
emergency is the primary consideration when the government decides to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of a public utility or a business affected with public interest. The nature and
extent of the emergency is the measure of the duration of the takeover as well as the terms
thereof. It is the State that prescribes such reasonable terms which will guide the implementation
of the temporary takeover as dictated by the exigencies of the time. This power of the State
cannot be negated by any party nor should its exercise be a source of obligation for the State.
2. NO, monopolies are not per se prohibited. Section 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that the State prohibit or regulate monopolies when public interest so requires. Given its
susceptibility to abuse, however, the State has the bounden duty to regulate monopolies to protect
public interest. Such regulation may be called for, especially in sensitive areas such as the
operation of the country’s premier international airport, considering the public interest at stake.
The grant to respondent PIATCO of the exclusive right to operate NAIA IPT III should not exempt it
from regulation by the government. The government has the right, indeed the duty, to protect the
interest of the public. Part of this duty is to assure that respondent PIATCO’s exercise of its right
does not violate the legal rights of third parties. We reiterate our ruling that while the service
providers presently operating at NAIA Terminals I and II do not have the right to demand for the
renewal or extension of their contracts to continue their services in NAIA IPT III, those who have
subsisting contracts beyond the In-Service Date of NAIA IPT III can not be arbitrarily or unreasonably
treated.
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3. NO, there was no encroachment. There is a fundamental difference between a case in court and
an investigation of a congressional committee. The purpose of a judicial proceeding is to settle the
dispute in controversy by adjudicating the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the case.
On the other hand, a congressional investigation is conducted in aid of legislation. Its aim is to
assist and recommend to the legislature a possible action that the body may take with regard to a
particular issue, specifically as to whether or not to enact a new law or amend an existing one.
Consequently, this Court cannot treat the findings in a congressional committee report as binding
because the facts elicited in congressional hearings are not subject to the rigors of the Rules of
Court on admissibility of evidence. The Court in assuming jurisdiction over the petitions at bar
simply performed its constitutional duty as the arbiter of legal disputes properly brought before it,
especially in this instance when public interest requires nothing less.
Right to property; right to bear arms is merely a statutory right and is subject to regulation
under police power
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004.]
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ J.:
FACTS: In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members
of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime
incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits
to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). Acting on President Arroyo's directive,
respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun
owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of
the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition for
prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the "Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence" (Guidelines) issued
on January 31, 2003, by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP).
ISSUES:
1. Is respondent Ebdane authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines?
2. Is a citizen’s right to bear arms a constitutional right?
3. Is the revocation of petitioner’s PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines a violation
of his right to property?
4. Is the issuance of the assailed Guidelines a valid exercise of police power?
HELD:
1. YES. Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that only Congress can
withhold his right to bear arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR, President Arroyo and
respondent Ebdane transgressed the settled principle and arrogated upon themselves a power
they do not possess — the legislative power. It is true that under our constitutional system, the
powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent
departments: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of
the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. Pertinently, the power
to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in Congress. Congress may not escape its
duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any
attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that "delegata
potestas non potest delegari" — "delegated power may not be delegated." The rule which
forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative body to
delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards,
councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. Such licensing power
includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.

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2. NO. Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms is a constitutionally protected
right. This, he mainly anchors on various American authorities. A provision commonly invoked
by the American people to justify their possession of firearms is the Second Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America. An examination of the historical background of
the foregoing provision shows that it pertains to the citizens' "collective right" to take arms in
defense of the State, not to the citizens' "individual right" to own and possess arms. The right to
bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Our
Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second Amendment. Evidently, possession of
firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms
is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. Being a mere statutory creation, the
right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right.
3. NO. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." Petitioner invokes this provision, asserting that
the revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his "vested
property right" without due process of law and in violation of the equal protection of law.
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision. In evaluating a due
process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property
interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a
certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. A license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority
granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right. Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
4. YES. Assuming that petitioner's PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the
Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of
the State's police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations,
necessary to the common good and general welfare. In a number of cases, we laid down the
test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus: (1) The interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police
power; and (2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Deeper reflection will reveal that the test
merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due process,
equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights. It is apparent from the assailed
Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as
reasonable exercise of the police power. We think there can be no question as to the
reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons as a
police measure well calculated to restrict the too frequent resort to such weapons in moments
of anger and excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation
would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in
any community wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without
being unduly oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its
enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the
state.
POWER OF TAXATION
The grant of tax exemptions; tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be categorically and
unmistakably expressed
JOHN HAY, ET. AL. VS. LIM

[G.R. No. 119775. October 24, 2003.]

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CARPIO MORALES J.:

FACTS: Petitioners assail, in the main, the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 420,
Series of 1994, "CREATING AND DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE AREA COVERED BY THE FORMER
CAMP JOHN HAY AS THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7227." They allege among others that in so far as Presidential Proclamation No. 420 grants tax
exemptions is invalid and illegal as it is an unconstitutional exercise by the President of a power
granted only to the Legislature. Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 reads:
Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. — Pursuant to
Section 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the John Hay Poro Point
Development Corporation shall implement all necessary policies, rules, and
regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in
consultation with pertinent government departments. Among others, the zone
shall have all the applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in
the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that may hereinafter be enacted.
In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents contend that by extending
to the John Hay SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was
established under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the legislative intent of
said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business activity or investment. They underscore
the point that the government's policy of bases conversion cannot be achieved without extending
the same tax exemptions granted by R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to other SEZs.
ISSUE: Is Presidential Proclamation No. 420 unconstitutional?
HELD: YES. During the Senate deliberations on the precursor bill of R.A. No. 7227, it was settled
that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ which was granted by Congress with
tax exemption, investment incentives and the like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid
benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation. The challenged
grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a law granting any tax
exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. In the same
vein, the other kinds of privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for
Congress to legislate upon. Contrary to public respondents' suggestions, the claimed statutory
exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the
language of the law on which it is based; it must be expressly granted in a statute stated in a
language too clear to be mistaken. Tax exemption cannot be implied, as it must be categorically
and unmistakably expressed. If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ
the same tax exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided
in the R.A. No. 7227. (The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and financial incentives
as contained in the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 notwithstanding, the
entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being
repugnant to law or the Constitution.)
BILL OF RIGHTS
DUE PROCESS
Due process clause in relation to Sec. 14, Art. VIII; judge must state the facts and law the
judgment is based
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. JERRY FERRER

G.R. No. 148821. July 18, 2003
DAVIDE, JR.C.J.:
FACTS: Mary Grace was born on July 6, 1984 to spouses Felix Belonio and Felipa Pataksil Belonio at
Banisilan, North Cotabato. The Belonio spouses were lawfully married sometime in 1978 and out of
such union, four children were born, one of whom is Mary Grace. The couple, however, separated.

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When Mary Grace was barely one (1) year and six (6) months old, Felipa Belonio started to live-in
with appellant. She brought her children with her.
Sometime in October 1995, when Mary Grace was already 11 years old, she experienced the
first of a series of sexual abuses from appellant. Thus, from October 1995 to 11 December 1997,
appellant sexually abused Mary Grace, repeatedly and continuously. He imposed his lechery on her
three to four times a week whenever her mother was out of the house.
Mary Grace initially kept to herself the sexual abuses, as she was afraid that appellant
might make good his threat to kill her mother. But Mary Grace finally found the courage to reveal
to her Aunt Glorita Tugade what appellant had done to her. It was on 14 December 1997 when
Glorita Tugade and her brother-in-law Pablito Malagamba confronted Felipa Belonio about Mary
Grace's revelation. Thereafter, they reported the incident to the Wao Police Headquarters as a
result of which appellant was immediately arrested.
On 23 August 1999, the prosecution made its formal offer of evidence. Thereafter, the trial
court set the dates for the presentation by the defense of its evidence. Notices were sent for the
scheduled hearing dates. However, neither appellant nor his counsel appeared on said dates. Thus,
at the hearing of 24 July 2000, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to submit the case
for decision, since the prosecution had long rested its case and the defense had no witnesses to
present. The trial court also considered appellant as having jumped bail since he did not show up in
court.
Thus, the trial court rendered on 28 November 2000, a decision which consisted of a five-
page summary of the testimonial and documentary evidence and which abruptly concluded, that
based on said evidence, the prosecution proved the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt
requiring the imposition of the death penalty.
In his Appellant's Brief, appellant assails the decision of the trial court as res ipsa loquitor
violative of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. He argues that the decision failed to
distinctly point out the applicable law on which it is based and that there is nothing in the decision
that would show how the trial court arrived at its conclusion convicting him of the crime charged.
ISSUE: Was there failure to comply with the rudimentary requirements of due process?
HELD: YES. Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the
due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just
leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to
know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review
by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.
Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the
sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the
justness of his decision.
Right to due process; no deprivation of right where petitioners were amply accorded
opportunity to register objections to respondent’s offer of evidence
RODSON PHIL., INC., ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 141857. June 9, 2004.]
CALLEJO, SR.J.:
FACTS: On July 19, 1990, petitioners Rodson Philippines, Inc. et al., filed a Complaint for damages
against respondent Eastar Resources (Asia) Corporation with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
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The petitioners rested their case after their documentary evidence was admitted by the court. The
respondent then presented one witness, Mary C. Maquilan. On March 29, 1994, the respondent
prayed for time to make their formal offer of evidence. The court granted the respondent’s motion
and gave it a period of fifteen (15) days to do so. The court then granted the petitioners a period of
ten (10) days from service of the said formal offer within which to file their comment thereon. The
respondent filed its formal offer of evidence and sent a copy thereof to the petitioners on June 1,
1994. When the case was called for the presentation of the petitioners’ rebuttal evidence on the
said date, the new counsel for the petitioners manifested her desire to recall the respondent’s
witness, Mary Maquilan, for further cross-examination. The court granted the same, and gave her
fifteen (15) days to do so. The court also gave the respondent a period of ten (10) days from
receipt thereof within which to file its comment or opposition. The court held in abeyance the
resolution of the respondent’s formal offer of evidence until such time that the petitioners’ motion
to recall Maquilan for further cross-examination was resolved. On June 24, 1994, the petitioners
filed their motion to recall Maquilan as a witness for further cross-examination. The hearing of the
petitioners’ motion to recall the witness was set for hearing on March 26, 1996. During the hearing,
the counsel for the petitioners called the attention of the court to the fact that they had not yet
filed their comment on the respondent’s formal offer of evidence because of the pending incident.
The court, for its part, declared that a formal offer of evidence was premature, precisely because
of such pending incident. After the hearing, the court issued an order denying the petitioners'
motion to recall Maquilan as witness for additional cross-examination, without prejudice to the
petitioners’ recalling the latter as a hostile witness on the presentation of its rebuttal evidence. In
the meantime, the petitioners failed to file their comment on the respondent’s formal offer of
evidence. The court, likewise, failed to resolve the said incident despite the denial of the
petitioners’ motion to recall Maquilan for additional cross-examination. On July 17, 1997, the trial
court issued an Order admitting the respondent’s documentary evidence for the purposes they were
offered. On August 25, 1997, the petitioners filed a Motion to Defer the Hearing Set on August 27,
1997, and prayed that they be given a chance to file their written objection to the formal offer of
evidence filed by the respondent. The trial court denied the motion, per its Order dated August 27,
1997. The trial court ruled that the ten-day period given to the petitioners per its Order of March
29, 1994 had long since elapsed. It emphasized that the order holding in abeyance its ruling on the
respondent’s formal offer of evidence did not toll the ten-day period for the filing of the
petitioners’ comment thereon. The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order
but the trial court denied the said motion The petitioners, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, assailing the orders of the RTC. On October 22, 1999,
the appellate court rendered its assailed Decision and dismissed the petition for being devoid of
merit. The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration suffered the same fate and was denied by the
appellate court.
ISSUE: Was the Constitutional Right of the petitioners to due process of law grossly and blatantly
violated by the questioned decision and resolution of respondent, resulting to a serious miscarriage
of justice?
HELD: NO. Going by the records, the petitioners were amply accorded the chance and/or
opportunity to register their objections to the private respondent’s offer of evidence. For as early
as May 27, 1994, the petitioners were already charged with knowledge or notice that they were
being required to file their comments and/or objection to the offer of evidence. Nevertheless, it
appears that action on the offer was put on hold pending the resolution of the motion to recall a
witness. Resultantly, since the disposition of the motion to recall was made the condition sine qua
non for further action on the private respondent’s offer of evidence, the petitioners should have
lost no time in submitting their comment to the offer once, or as soon as the court denied on March
29, 1996, their motion to recall Ms. Maquilan for further cross-examination. To be sure, the
petitioners should not have experienced any difficulty in complying with this order, given the
undisputed fact that, counting from May 27, 1994, they had no less than twenty solid months to do
so. As it was, the petitioners complacently took their own sweet time, so to speak, apparently
secure on their assumption — which turned out to be a bit erroneous — that there was a standing
order from Judge M.A. Ocampo to defer action on the offer of evidence. The Order of the trial
court dated 1 June 1994 merely stated that ‘in the interim,’ meaning, from the filing of
petitioners’ motion to recall witness up to the time the trial court would rule on the same, it would

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hold action on private respondent’s formal offer. The petitioners filed their Motion to Recall
Witness only on 21 June 1994, which was way beyond the original period given. Therefore, when
petitioners filed the said motion to recall, there was no more period to suspend as it had long
expired on 12 June 1994. It would, thus, appear that even during the time that the petitioners were
supposed to file their motion to recall, they had already played fast and loose with court processes.
Even then, as correctly argued by the respondent, there was actually no more time to suspend, as
it had long expired on June 12, 1997, for which reason the respondent’s formal offer of
documentary evidence was truly ripe for resolution. Hence, We hold, that far from gravely abusing
his discretion, the respondent judge acted prudently and judiciously when he declared in his second
assailed order that the Court would stand by its order issued on July 17, 1997 that it was perfectly
all right for it to proceed to act on the defendant’s formal offer of documentary evidence, as
there’s no more legal obstacle for it to do so. Indeed, His Honor exhibited a circumspect and
attentive awareness of the antecedent and attendant circumstances surrounding the case. In
contrast to the posture of petitioners, His Honor displayed the better part of sound legal discretion
in issuing the assailed orders, as these effectively put a halt to the pernicious and dilatory tactics
and maneuverings, of litigants, — or their counsel — which are anathema in this age of clogged
court dockets.
Due process; negligence of counsel binds the client and such does not amount to a denial of
due process.
PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR. vs. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO, ET AL

[G.R. No. 136726. September 24, 2003]
CARPIO J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr., is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air
Transportation Office ("ATO"), Department of Transportation and Communication ("DOTC").
Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. ("Abarca"), and Marilou M. Cleofas are
the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil
Aviation Training Center ("CATC"). The CATC is an adjunct agency of the ATO tasked to train air
traffic controllers, airway communicators and related civil aviation personnel for the local aviation
industry as well as for the Southeast Asian and Pacific region.
Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents,
detailing them to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May 1995. On 29
April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina T.
Lichauco through petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail order. Without acting on
respondents' request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19 July 1995
addressed to Abarca placing him under "preventive suspension" for 90 days without pay pending
investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to
order their return to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed. Respondents
also sought the intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a result, the Ombudsman inquired
from Secretary Garcia the action taken on respondents' request for reconsideration of the detail
order. On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a
memorandum dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother
unit. Secretary Garcia declared that the law does not sanction the continuous detail of
respondents. Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate
respondents to their mother unit.
On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer
for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0139. On 23 February 1996, the trial court granted respondents'
prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction. Even if the case was re-raffled to another branch,
the petitioner failed to comply with the writ of preliminary injunction. The respondents moved to
cite petitioner in contempt and also moved to declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer
within the period prescribed in the trial court's order of 26 January 1996.
On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of
indirect contempt and in default. The non-extendible period granted to petitioner to file his
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memorandum was not complied with for failure of the OSG to file the same on time and because of
this an unfavorable judgment was granted against the petitioner. Meanwhile in an action filed by
petitioner before the Ombudsman against respondent, the Ombudsman found respondent Abarca
guilty of violation of Section7 of RA 6713. Petitioner then appealed the decision of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals, but the latter dismissed it. Hence this instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Was the petitioner denied of his right to due process when the appellate court
dismissed his appeal for failure of the OSG to file the memorandum?
2. Was the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Modesto Abarca, Jr. guilty of violating
Section 7 of RA 6713 rendered the execution of the trial court's decision unjust and
inequitable?
HELD: 1. NO. Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity
was not denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of
Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly,
petitioner's former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however, binds petitioner.
The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve
petitioner of the effects such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming
final and executory. In Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz, 21 which petitioner himself cited, the Court
ruled:”… As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only when the
application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be
called for”. In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to
exempt him from the general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner
did not even attempt to refute the respondents' allegations in the petition for mandamus and
damages.
Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the
OSG's failure to file the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages and to have the order
declaring petitioner in default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another
lawyer. However, petitioner still retained the services of the OSG, despite its apparent lack of
interest in petitioner's case, until the trial court's decision became final. Furthermore, petitioner
cannot now complain of the OSG's errors. Petitioner should have taken the initiative of making
periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court about the status of his case. Litigants
represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of their case. To agree with petitioner's stance would enable every party to render inutile
any adverse order or decision through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on the part of his
counsel. The Court will not countenance such ill-founded argument which contradicts long-settled
doctrines of trial and procedure.
2. NO. In the present case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to the finality of
the trial court's decision. The Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997 while the trial
court's decision became final and executory on 14 June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of the
Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the decision of the
trial court.
Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section
7(d) of RA 6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of the trial court holding petitioner
liable for damages. The action filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is completely
different from the action instituted by respondents before the trial court. The two actions, which
are clearly separate and distinct from each other, presented two different causes of action.
Petitioner's cause of action arose from respondents' alleged violation of certain provisions of RA
6713 whereas respondents' cause of action resulted from petitioner's refusal to recall respondents
to their mother unit at CATC. In the administrative case before the Ombudsman, the issue was
whether respondents were guilty of violating RA 6713. In contrast, the issue in the civil action
before the trial court was whether respondents were entitled to the issuance of the writ of
mandamus and damages.
The findings of the Ombudsman did not render the execution of the trial court's decision
unjust and inequitable. The resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section
7(d) of RA 6713 did not state that petitioner had a valid reason to detail respondents to the Office

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of Undersecretary Cal. In fact, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against Reynaldo Fernando
and Mary Lou Cleofas. Clearly illegal were petitioner's acts of unjustifiably detailing respondents to
the office of DOTC Undersecretary Cal and refusing to comply with the 9 November 1995 directive
of Secretary Garcia to recall immediately respondents to their mother unit.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
Equal protection of the laws; the equal protection clause is directed principally against undue
favor and individual or class privilege.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ET AL vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ASIAN RECRUITMENT
COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER (ARCO-PHIL.), INC
[G.R. No. 131719. May 25, 2004.]
CALLEJO, SR.J.:
FACTS: Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995, took effect on July 15, 1995. The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of
the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council
Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section
6(g) and (i), with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.
According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers
and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II, Section
12 and Article XV, Sections 1 and 3(3) of the Constitution. As the law encouraged the deployment of
skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed
that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad. The following are the
pertinent provisions being assailed by the respondent:
II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

SEC. 6. Definition. — For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any
such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall,
likewise, include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-
licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
XXX
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or by his duly authorized representative;
XXX
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of
the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment.
The appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and
affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The
appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
ISSUES: Is the assailed order unconstitutional as it violated the equal protection clause?
HELD: NO. Respondent suggests that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under
the assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. We do not agree.
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The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or
class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but
merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If
classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies
equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection
guarantee.
Moreover, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. No right is absolute, and
the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a
legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their
conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the
State, the public health and welfare and public morals.
According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within
the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so
use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or
accreditation requirements violate the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under
the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions.
Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they
are deemed fit to practice their trade.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Effectivity of the bill of rights under the 1973 constitution; bill of rights under the 1973
constitution was not operative during the interregnum;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

[G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]
CORONA J.:
FACTS: Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government. EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft
Board tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired. Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various
reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas. On 27 July
1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported
unexplained wealth of Ramas.
Said Resolution revealed that the defendant is the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City
valued at P700,000.00 and another property in Cebu City. The equipment/items and
communication facilities, which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were
confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt and
these items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by
respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Aside from the military equipment/items
and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount
of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine
Army disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. Furthermore, sworn
statements disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by
respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military
equipment/items seized in her house without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns

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the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income. Consequently,
the board recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas be prosecuted and tried for violation of
RA 3019, as amended and RA 1379, as amended. Thus, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture
under RA 1379 against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an
Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff
and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano as co-
defendant.
Unfortunately, Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint and declared that the properties
confiscated from Dimaano’s house were illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by
the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March
1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution)
HELD: NO. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were
the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during
the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity
and propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that
these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional
approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the
people to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous
regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets
or accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No.
3 dated March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware
that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both
constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders.
In sum, during the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and
orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the
authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have
also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The
warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized.
The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant. However,
the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per
se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the
search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
Warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right
LUI VS. MATILLANO

[G.R. No. 141176. May 27, 2004.]
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CALLEJO, SR.J.:
FACTS: Elenito Lariosa was employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise in 1988.
The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao. Adjacent to the said store was another store
owned by Kiao's son, Eli Lui, who also happened to be Ben's nephew. Lariosa chose to live in the
house of Kiao. One day, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the
house of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in Bansalan City, where he
rested until the next day. Lariosa reported for work the day after, or on October 19, 1988, but Kiao
told him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary for the month of
October. On October 27, 1988, Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to collect his
backwages from Ben in the amount of P500.00. Lariosa withdrew his savings from the Mindanao
Savings Bank in Bansalan City and on November 1, 1988, applied for a job at his cousin's place, at
Quimpo Boulevard, Davao City. He bought a radio cassette for P2,500.00 and a pair of Rayban
sunglasses for P900.00. On November 3, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of his fiancee, Nancy, at
New Matina, Davao City, but returned to Bansalan on the same day. On November 4, 1988, he
returned to Nancy's house and stayed there until the next day, November 5, 1988. That day, Ben
informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. He suspected that
Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a former employee, had a duplicate key to the side
door of the United Products Enterprise Store. Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to
admit that he had stolen Ben's money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the
comfort room of the store and pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into
confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Without prior coordination with
the Bansalan PNP HQ, Police Officer Rojas, who was in civilian clothes, Lui, Tan and Mendoza
arrived at the house of the Spouses Matillano at about 3:00 p.m, with the handcuffed Lariosa in
tow. With handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into the house.
They then proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosa's aunt, Paulina Matillano and their other
female relatives. Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two companions, Mendoza and Tan,
to the second floor where her aparador was located. Rojas and the handcuffed Lariosa remained in
the sala. Lui and his two companions then took two mats and two pairs of ladies' shoes belonging to
Paulina and Eulogio, two pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts which
belonged to the latter's children. They also ordered Paulina to open a chest and when she did, Lui
and his companions took her old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old coins.
ISSUE: Was there an illegal search?
HELD: YES. The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns
drawn and with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house
of the respondents. They proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her
vehement protests, and because of petitioner Lui's warning that she might be harmed, respondent
Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the second floor of
their house. The petitioners' contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against
unreasonable search and seizure deserves scant consideration. Under Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable." This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who
appear to be guilty, who must nevertheless be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The
general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried through or with judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure becomes unconstitutional within the context of the
constitutional provision because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right. The
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly
or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing
evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a constitutional
right. In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by
consenting thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not
object to the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties. However,
such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against

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unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui
threatened and intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house
when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have
waived his constitutional right.
Warrantless arrest; “Reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO BOLONG
[G.R. No. 144037. September 26, 2003]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: PO1 Ronald Desierto assigned at Police Precinct, Toril, Davao City, received a tip from their
"civilian asset," Bobong Solier, that appellant Noel Tudtud was involved in the prohibited drug
trade. According to Solier, Tudtud got his stocks of marijuana from Cotabato. The information was
entered in the police blotter, after which PO1 Desierto and other members of the Intelligence
Section of Toril Precinct conducted surveillance on Tudtud for five (5) days. Gathering information
from other secret informants in the vicinity and from Tudtud's neighbors, Solier's tip to the police
was validated.
In the morning of August l, 1999, Bobong Solier informed Precinct officers that appellant
Tudtud went on another trip to Cotabato and was expected to arrive in the afternoon of the same
day with a load of marijuana. A team was immediately formed, which included PO1 Ronald
Desierto, SPO1 Villanueva and PO1 Ramil Floreta. They posted themselves at the corner of Saypon,
MacArthur Highway, Toril, Davao City. They waited from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m., when a Weena
bus stopped and appellants disembarked. Tudtud alighted holding a plastic bag with his right hand
while his left hand was holding a carton box with the markings "King Flakes." Appellant Bolong
helped Tudtud carry the carton box with his right hand.
PO1 Desierto and Floreta approached appellants and identified themselves as police
officers. For security purposes, SPO1 Villanueva stood ten (10) meters away from them. PO1
Desierto and Floreta told appellants that they received information of the arrival of illegal drugs.
They requested appellants if they could be allowed to see the contents of the carton box.
Appellant Tudtud said "okay" and opened the carton box himself. PO1 Desierto and Floreta saw
dried sliced fish on top of the carton box. PO1 Desierto requested Tudtud to take the dried sliced
fish out of the carton box. Inside the box, something was wrapped in a striped plastic bag, while
another bundle was wrapped in a newspaper. PO1 Desierto again requested Tudtud to open the
striped plastic bag and the bundle wrapped in newspaper. When appellant Tudtud opened the
striped plastic bag, PO1 Desierto and Floreta saw leaves, which appeared to be marijuana.
Likewise, the contents of the bundle wrapped with newspaper revealed what appeared to be
marijuana stalks with leaves.
ISSUE: May the marijuana be admitted as evidence?
HELD: NO. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the
police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The question, therefore,
is whether the police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants. Probable cause has been
defined as:
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace
officers making the arrest.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is
that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
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Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense."
In the leading case of People v. Burgos, this Court held that "the officer arresting a person
who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view."
Illegal search; absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to believe that prior notice
of service of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation, the deliberate
sideswiping of appellant's car was unreasonable and unjustified; waiver of right against
unreasonable searches must be voluntary; particularity of description in the search warrant;
plain view doctrine; elements of the plain view doctrine
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENNY GO

[G.R. No. 144639. September 12, 2003.]
CARPIO-MORALES J.:
FACTS: A raiding team composed of SPO1 Fernandez and SPO1 Serqueña, together with PO2
Abulencia, PO3 Noel Adtu and PO2 Gerardo Jimenez, proceeded to appellant, Benny Go’s residence
armed with a Search Warrant of appellant's residence and to seize and take possession of
"METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug paraphernalia and
proceeds."
The police officers arrived at appellant's residence and to enable them to gain entry to the
house, "side swept (sinagi) a little" appellant's Toyota Corolla GLI car which was parked outside.
Jack Go, appellant's son and the only one present at the house at the time, thereupon opened the
door of the house and the policemen at once introduced themselves, informed him that they had a
warrant for the search of the premises, and promptly handcuffed him to a chair. SPO1 Fernandez,
SPO1 Serqueña and PO2 Abulencia entered the house, while PO3 Adtu and PO2 Jimenez remained
outside.
Barangay Kagawads Gaspar Lazaro (Kagawad Lazaro) and Emmanuel Manalo (Kagawad
Manalo) were advised by SPO1 Fernandez to be witnesses to the search and to afterwards sign the
inventory receipt and affidavit of orderly search. As instructed, the two barangay kagawads
proceeded to the upper floor of appellant's house with SPO1 Serqueña and PO2 Abulencia. While
SPO1 Fernandez, who remained downstairs in the sala, instructed the handcuffed Jack Go to
witness the search, the latter refused since "there will be no more left in the sala of the house
anyway there is a barangay official."
In the course of the search of the premises which took place from 6:00 to 11:00 in the
evening, Kagawad Lazaro and PO2 Abulencia recovered "one knot tied transparent plastic bag
containing white crystalline substance" from the drawer of a cabinet.
Also seized from the residence of appellant were the following: (a) "one plastic bag
containing yellowish substance" found by SPO1 Serqueña; (b) a weighing scale discovered by SPO1
Fernandez; (c) assorted documents; (d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a
check writer; (i) several dry seals and (j) stamp pads; 20 (k) Chinese and Philippine currency; 21 (l)
and appellant's Toyota Corolla GLI car (the car).
With the exception of the car, all the seized items were brought to the dining table on the
ground floor of appellant's house for inventory.
After the inventory had been taken, SPO1 Fernandez prepared a handwritten Inventory
Receipt and a document captioned "Affidavit of Orderly Search," the contents of which he read to
appellant. On instruction of SPO1 Fernandez, Jack Go also explained the contents of the documents
to appellant who then signed them as did kagawads Manalo and Lazaro and Jack Go as witnesses.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appellant is correct in questioning the legality of the search of his
residence, the actions of the police officers, as agents of the State, in consideration of
appellant's right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Sections 2
and 3, Article III of the Constitution.

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2. Whether the raiding team was correct in characterizing the seizure of the assorted
documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and
stamp pads as "seizure of evidence in plain view."
HELD: 1. YES, Appellant Benny Go is correct.

In order to enter the premises to be searched, the police officers deliberately side-swiped
appellant's car which was parked alongside the road, instead of following the regular "knock and
announce" procedure as outlined in Section 7 (formerly Section 6), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their
intention and authority to conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable
cause to believe that prior notice of service of the warrant would endanger its successful
implementation, the deliberate sideswiping of appellant's car was unreasonable and unjustified.
While Search Warrant No. 99-99-0038 authorized the immediate search of appellant's
residence to seize "METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug
paraphernalia and proceeds of the above crime," the policemen, by SPO1 Fernandez's admission,
seized numerous other items, which are clearly unrelated to illegal drugs or illegal drug
paraphernalia. Seized or confiscated form the said residence are: (1) undetermined quantity of
white crystalline granules placed inside the transparent plastic envelope, (2) undetermined
quantity of yellowish powder placed inside the transparent plastic envelope; (3) several pieces of
transparent plastic envelopes; (4) one unit Toyota Corolla GLI with Plate No. UPT-658; (5)
P52,760.00 in different denominations; (6) 25,000.00 Chinese Yuan; (7) 67 pieces of Chinese
passports; (8) 28 pieces of assorted bank book; (9) 285 pieces of assorted checks; (10) 53 pieces
rubber stamps and related paraphernalia; (11) one piece Underwood typewriter with Serial No.
9861952; (12) one piece checkwriter; (13) two pieces dry seals; (14) 5 boxes of assorted documents;
(15) 3 bags of assorted documents; (16) weighing scale.
The claim of SPO1 Fernandez and PO2 Abulencia that Jack Go voluntarily waived his right to
witness the search, allegedly because there would be no one left in the sala and anyway barangay
officials were present, cannot be accepted. To be valid, a waiver must be made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. Furthermore, the presumption is always against the waiver of a
constitutionally protected right.
While Jack Go was present from the time the raiding team entered the premises until after
the search was completed, he was, however, handcuffed to a chair in the sala. All alone and
confronted by five police officers who had deprived him of his liberty, he cannot thus be considered
to have "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" waived his right to witness the search of the
house. "Consent" given under such intimidating, coercive circumstances is no consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty.
Thus, in Tambasen v. People, this Court held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police
acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is
to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not
be made and that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547
[1985]; Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42
Phil. 886 [1920]).
The foregoing rationalizations are unacceptable. Admittedly, neither the money nor the car
was particularly described in the search warrant. In seizing the said items then, the police officers
were exercising their own discretion and determining for themselves which items in appellant's
residence they believed were "proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense." This is
absolutely impermissible. It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement
that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers
of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.
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2. NO, the raiding team erred in characterizing the aforesaid items as evidence in plain view.
This Court had the opportunity to summarize the rules governing plain view searches in the
recent case of People v. Doria, supra, to wit:
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion
or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of
such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the
passports, bankbooks, checks, typewriter, check writer, dry seals and stamp pads and other
assorted documents does not fall within the "plain view" exception. The assertions of the police
officers that said objects were "inadvertently" seized within their "plain view" are mere legal
conclusions which are not supported by any clear narration of the factual circumstances leading to
their discovery.
The circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the "plain
view" doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things
belonging to appellant not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly
described, must thus be ordered returned to him.
Article III section 2; right against unreasonable searches and seizures; search warrant must be
issued only upon finding of probable cause
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENHUR MAMARIL

[G.R. No. 147607. January 22, 2004]
AZCUNA J.:
FACTS: The accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC of
Pangasinan, of violation of Section 8 1 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended by RA No. 7659
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972.
After the prosecution formally offered its testimonial and documentary exhibits,
appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion with memorandum contending that: (1) the exhibits
of the prosecution are inadmissible in evidence under Section 2 and Section 3 (2) of Article III (Bill
of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution as the search warrant, by virtue of which said exhibits were
seized, was illegally issued, considering that the judge's examination of the complainant and his
two witnesses was not in writing; and (2) said search warrant was illegally or improperly
implemented. Appellant prayed that all the exhibits of the prosecution be excluded as evidence or
in the alternative, that the resolution of the admissibility of the same be deferred until such time
that he has completed the presentation of his evidence in chief.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was issued in compliance with the law.
HELD: NO. The search warrant was not issued in compliance with the law.
In the case at bar, Castillo the Clerk of Court, who was requested to testify on the
available records kept in their office regarding Search Warrant, presented before the court only the
application for search warrant and the supporting affidavits of the police. Castillo could not
produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge
examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing as required by law.

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Based on the testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove
that Executive Judge Ramos put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. The records
only show the existence of an application for a search warrant and the affidavits of the
complainant's witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona, the Supreme Court held:
“Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it
will be found later that his declarations are false.”
Under the Sec. 2, Art. III and Rule 126, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only
upon a finding of probable cause. PROBABLE CAUSE for a search has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is REQUIRED that: (1) the
judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be
under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions
and answers.
Search warrant; A mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate a
search warrant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS TIU WON CHUA

[G.R. No. 149878, July 1, 2003]
PUNO J.:
FACTS: Appellants Tiu Won Chua and Qui Yaling Y Chua were charged with the crime of illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” in violation of Section 16, Article III of
RA 6425.
Police authorities seized the said prohibited drug in a search conducted inside the
apartment and the vehicle of the appellants. The search warrant used in the said search indicated
that the apartment to be searched was owned by “Timothy Tiu”.
Appellants mainly question the legality of the search conducted. They denied that Timothy
Tiu and Tiu Won Chua is one and the same person. They presented papers and documents to prove
that appellant is Tiu Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu, as stated in the search warrant. They also
question the fact that appellant Qui Yaling was not included in the said search warrant. They
contend that because of the defect in the search warrant, the search conducted, and consequently,
the arrest are illegal.
The RTC convicted the appellants and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the search warrant was legal.
2. Whether or not the search and arrest conducted pursuant thereto was legal.
HELD: 1. YES. Appellants question the propriety of the search warrant issued in the name of
Timothy Tiu and the fact that it did not include Que Yaling. Being fruits of an illegal search, they
argue that the evidence presented cannot serve as basis for conviction. Such contention is not
correct.
There are only four requisites for a valid warrant: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause, (2) probable cause must be determined personally by a judge, (3) such judge must examine
under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and (4) the warrant
must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
A mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the search. In fact,
a “John Doe” warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descripto personae that
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will enable the officer to identify the accused. It has also been decided that a mistake in the
identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be
searched is properly described.
2. YES, the search conducted in the apartment pursuant to the said search warrant was
legal. However, the search conducted in the car was illegal on the ground that it was not part of
the description of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant.
Moreover, the search was not incidental to a lawful arrest. To be valid, such warrantless
search must be limited to that point within the reach or control of the person arrested or that
which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or escaping.
Search warrants; Search warrants must particularly describe not only the place to be searched
but also the persons to be arrested
PEOPLE vs. DEL NORTE

[G.R. No. 149462. March 29, 2004]
PUNO J.:
FACTS: A search warrant was served on a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa, on August 1, 1997, by SPO1
Angel Lumabas, SPO3 Celso de Leon, Maj. Dionisio Borromeo, Capt. Jose, SPO3 Malapitan, PO2
Buddy Perez and PO2 Eugene Perida. As a result of the search, an information against appellant
Priscilla del Norte was filed with the trial court.
SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1, 1997, their group was tasked to serve a search
warrant against a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing at No. 275 North Service Road corner
Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 6425. They
were ordered to forthwith seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of shabu and
marijuana leaves. They coordinated with the barangay officials and proceeded to the house pointed
out to them by the local officials. Upon reaching the house, its door was opened by a woman. SPO3
De Leon introduced themselves as policemen to the woman who opened the door, whom they later
identified in court as the appellant. They informed her they had a search warrant, but appellant
suddenly closed and locked the door. It was only after some prodding by the barangay officials that
she reopened the door. The authorities then conducted the search. They found a bundle of
marijuana wrapped in Manila paper under the bed and inside the room. Appellant was brought to
the police headquarters for further investigation.
On the other hand, appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant against her. She
contended that she lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa, Caloocan City and that on August
1, 1997, she was merely visiting a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner
Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Appellant further contends that the prosecution failed
to establish who owned the house where the search was conducted, and avers that her mere
presence therein did not automatically make her the owner of the marijuana found therein. She
likewise argues that the search warrant specified the name of Ising Gutierrez as the owner of the
house to be searched, and that since she is not Ising Gutierrez, the lower court erred in admitting
the confiscated drugs as evidence against her.
ISSUE: Whether or not the TC erred in admitting the evidence obtained against appellant?
HELD: YES. The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place
to be searched, but also the persons to be arrested. We have ruled in rare instances that mistakes
in the name of the person subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the warrant, provided
the place to be searched is properly described.
In the case at bar, We cannot countenance the irregularity of the search warrant. The
authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search. They did
not conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant. It was only when they implemented the
warrant that they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of the barangay officials informed
SPO3 De Leon that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the same person, but
said barangay official was not presented in court. The authorities based their knowledge on pure
hearsay.

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On the merits, we believe the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution’s witnesses failed to establish
appellant’s ownership of the house where the prohibited drugs were discovered. Except for their
bare testimonies, no other proof was presented.
This is in contrast to appellant’s proof of her residence. The prosecution did not contest
the punong barangay’s certification, Christina’s school ID and the rental receipt, all of which show
that appellant and her family live at 376 Dama de Noche St. There being no substantial contrary
evidence offered, we conclude that appellant does not own the house subject of the search.
Searches and seizures; Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO ET. AL

[G.R. No. 141137. January 20, 2004]
CARPIO-MORALES J.:
FACTS: Police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to the COMELEC gun
ban when a motorcycle with three men on board sped past them. When asked why they sped away,
Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), who was seated behind appellant Arnold Roble (Roble) and in front of
appellant Gerlyn Wates (Wates) on the motorcycle retorted that he is a member of the army
however he failed to present any identification card. . At this point, the police officers noticed that
a big military backpack was slung over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was observed, as were
his co-appellants, to be afraid and acting suspiciously. SPO1 Goc-ong thus asked Vinecario what the
contents of the backpack were. Vinecario answered that it merely contained a mat and proceeded
to pass it to Wates, who in turn passed it to Roble who, however, returned it to Vinecario. SPO1
Goc-ong noticed something wrapped in paper, he told Vinecario to take the same out. Again
Vinecario obliged, albeit reiterating that it was only a mat. SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff
wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario grabbed it, resulting to the tearing off of the paper
wrapper. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in the air. They were charged under Article IV of RA
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No. 7659). The RTC of Davao City found
the appellants guilty.
ISSUE: Is there a valid search and seizure as ordained under Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution?
HELD: YES, there is a valid search. Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they
are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search.
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing
through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and
extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at
the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have
been instruments of some offense.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as
valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to
flee as found in this case. When the appellants sped away after noticing the checkpoint and even
after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when
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interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of
Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a
member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from
proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the
part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the
backpack were instruments of some offense.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Right to religious freedom; expansive religious freedom requires that government be neutral in
matters of religion
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

[A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003.]
PUNO J.:
FACTS: In a sworn letter-complaint complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes,
Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living
with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada
filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes
the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might
appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor answered, saying that when she
entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She
admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for
twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness." Escritor's partner, Quilapio, executed a similar pledge on
the same day. At the time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living with
another woman. Quilapio was likewise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from
his wife. Estrada argued that their religious belief and practice, however, cannot override the
norms of conduct required by law for government employees. To rule otherwise would create a
dangerous precedent as those who cannot legalize their live-in relationship can simply join the
Jehovah's Witnesses congregation and use their religion as a defense against legal liability. The
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Lock departed from the recommendation to dismiss the
complaint. DCA Lock stressed that although Escritor had become capacitated to marry by the time
she joined the judiciary as her husband had died a year before, "it is due to her relationship with a
married man, voluntarily carried on, that respondent may still be subject to disciplinary action." He
recommended that respondent be found guilty of immorality and that she be penalized with
suspension.
ISSUE: Should respondent be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral
conduct or should respondent's right to religious freedom carve out an exception from the
prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable?
HELD: NO, respondent should not be found guilty of gross and immoral conduct without considering
her right to religious freedom. In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government employees
engaged in illicit relations are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which he/she may be
held administratively liable. However, there is a distinguishing factor that sets the case at bar
apart from precedents, i.e., as a defense, respondent involves religious freedom since her religion,
the Jehovah's Witnesses, has, after thorough investigation, allowed her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio based on the church's religious beliefs and practices. This distinguishing factor compels the
Court to apply the religious clauses to the case at bar. The public morality expressed in the law is
necessarily secular for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions. The morality referred to in the law is
public and necessarily secular, not religious. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that
government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is

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inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. In other words, government action, including its
proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular
purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous)
to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not
because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Recognizing the
religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the
Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at
the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
Only one conduct is in question before this Court, i.e., the conjugal arrangement of a
government employee whose partner is legally married to another which Philippine law and
jurisprudence consider both immoral and illegal. Whether an act is immoral within the meaning of
the statute is not to be determined by respondent's concept of morality. The law provides the
standard. The foregoing discussion on the doctrine of religious freedom, however, shows that with
benevolent neutrality as a framework, the Court cannot simply reject respondent's plea of religious
freedom without even subjecting it to the "compelling state interest" test that would balance her
freedom with the paramount interests of the state. The case at bar being one of first impression,
we now subject the respondent's claim of religious freedom to the "compelling state interest" test
from a benevolent neutrality stance — i.e. entertaining the possibility that respondent's claim to
religious freedom 'would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil Service Law; necessarily,
her defense of religious freedom will be unavailing should the government succeed in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest. In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether
respondent's right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing
between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on
the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the
other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion. The second step is to ascertain
respondent's sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious
belief and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid
punishment for immorality. The Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years
of living together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she entered the judiciary.
Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the Jehovah's Witnesses' practice of
securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice. Nevertheless,
should the government, thru the Solicitor General, want to further question the respondent's
sincerity and the centrality of her practice in her faith, it should be given the opportunity to do so.
In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient respondent's evidence on the sincerity of her
religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case at bar cannot still be decided using the
"compelling state interest" test. The case at bar is one of first impression, thus the parties were not
aware of the burdens of proof they should discharge in the Court's use of the "compelling state
interest" test. It is apparent that the state interest it upholds is the preservation of the integrity of
the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. However,
there is nothing in the memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override respondent's plea of religious freedom nor is it shown that the
means employed by the government in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's
religious exercise. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by
the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. Should the Court
prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court's
action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot
therefore simply take a passing look at respondent's claim of religious freedom, but must instead
apply the "compelling state interest" test. The careful application of the test is indispensable as
how we will decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of the respondent who
stands not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God. The case is REMANDED to the Office
of the Court Administrator.

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Right to religious freedom; Right of Muslim organizations to classify food fit for human
consumption; no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations,
like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL. VS. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL.
[G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003]
CORONA J.:
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the
Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001
and the prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim
Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO.
Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and
Development License No. SB-01-085, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary
services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of
national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the
Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) 1 and The World
Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal 2 certifications in the
Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and
also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and
procedures based on the Qur'an 3 and the Sunnah 4 for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and
issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee,
certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its
halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office under Patent No.
4-2000-03664.
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating
the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal'
Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said
article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification
since those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore
could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers
asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109. 6
As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from
it.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and
guidelines on the halal certification scheme because the said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims?
HELD: YES. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive
Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal,
even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to
OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim
Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government
agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human
consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious
freedom of Muslims.
One such government agency designated by RA 7394 is the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFD)
of the Department of Health (DOH). Under Article 22 of said law, BFD has the duty to promulgate
and enforce rules and regulations fixing and establishing a reasonable definition and standard of
identity, a standard of quality and a standard of fill of containers for food. The BFD also ensures
that food products released in the market are not adulterated.

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Furthermore, under Article 48 of RA 7394, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is
tasked to protect the consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales acts or practices
as defined in Article 50. 15 DTI also enforces compulsory labeling and fair packaging to enable the
consumer to obtain accurate information as to the nature, quality and quantity of the contents of
consumer products and to facilitate his comparison of the value of such products.
Through the laws on food safety and quality, therefore, the State indirectly aids Muslim
consumers in differentiating food from non-food products. The NMIC guarantees that the meat sold
in the market has been thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption. Meanwhile, BFD ensures that
food products are properly categorized and have passed safety and quality standards. Then,
through the labeling provisions enforced by the DTI, Muslim consumers are adequately apprised of
the products that contain substances or ingredients that, according to their Islamic beliefs, are not
fit for human intake. These are the non-secular steps put in place by the State to ensure that the
Muslim consumers' right to health is protected. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and
similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim
consumption.
We do not share respondents' apprehension that the absence of a central administrative
body to regulate halal certifications might give rise to schemers who, for profit, will issue
certifications for products that are not actually halal. Aside from the fact that Muslim consumers
can actually verify through the labels whether a product contains non-food substances, we believe
that they are discerning enough to know who the reliable and competent certifying organizations in
their community are. Before purchasing a product, they can easily avert this perceived evil by a
diligent inquiry on the reliability of the concerned certifying organization.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Right to be informed of his rights; signing of the inventory by the accused without having been
informed of his right not to sign and to be assisted by counsel is a violation his rights under
custodial investigation
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENNY GO

[G.R. No. 144639. September 12, 2003.]
CARPIO-MORALES J.:
FACTS: SEE PAGE 39
ISSUE: Whether or not the signing of the inventory receipt was in violation of the rights of an
accused
HELD: YES. After the inventory had been prepared, PO2 Abulencia presented it to appellant for his
signature without any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign such receipt and
to the assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could be used as evidence
against him. Faced with similar circumstances, this Court in People v. Gesmundo stated: It is true
that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that marijuana was found
in her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled "PAGPATUNAY" previously
prepared by the police, is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for having been
obtained in violation of her rights as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of
an offense. The records show that the accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign
the document; neither was she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the fact that
the document may be used as evidence against her."
In People v. Policarpio, this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign
receipts for property allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the
constitutional right to remain silent.
What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent
and that he may refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he refused
to give a written statement unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper
he signed to this effect. However, he was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic bags
of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for
the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila.

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Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged
receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is
unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police
officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a
violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent whereby he was made to admit
the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in
violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.
The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative
of appellant's custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner
by which the raiding team conducted the search of appellant's residence.
Rights of the accused; Constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the
Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through
questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERIC GUILLERMO

[G.R. No. 147786. January 20, 2004]
QUISUMBING J.:
FACTS: Keyser Plastics shared its building with Greatmore Corporation. At around noontime of
March 22, 1998, Campos, security guard of Greatmore Corporation was suddenly interrupted in the
performance of his duties when appellant Eric Guillermo calmly told him that he had killed Victor
Keyser and needed his assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he could
burn it. Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately dashed off to telephone the police. Ten
minutes later, a team from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, arrived at the
crime scene. When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness (Campos),
Guillermo said that he bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell,
he dismembered the body with a carpenter’s saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a
plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of
coconut lumber and a carpenter’s saw. Photographs were taken of the suspect, the dismembered
corpse, and the implements used in committing the crime. When asked as to his motive for the
killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his co-employees. He
expressed no regret whatsoever about his actions. The police then brought Guillermo to the
Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation By merely asking the Guillermo to read what was
written on the board which contains his constitutional rights and after that asking him if he
understood what was written and without providing him with the services of counsel, SPO1 Carlos
proceeded to conduct the custodial investigation.
Keyser’s death shocked the nation. Appellant Guillermo, who was then in police custody,
was interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters, namely: Augusto “Gus” Abelgas of
ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast
nationwide. Appellant admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second
thought. He disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head
and cut up his body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons. When asked why he killed his
employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him properly, and
treated him “like an animal.”
At the trial, appellant Guillermo’s defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged he was a
victim of police “frame-up.”
The trial court convicted Guillermo on the crime of murder and is meted the maximum
penalty and hereby sentenced to die by lethal injection.
Hence, this case was elevated to the SC for automatic review.
ISSUE: Were the evidences presented sufficient to prove Guillermo’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt?
HELD: YES, the evidences presented were sufficient to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Although, the confession appellant made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito

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Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards
laid down by the Constitution, his alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguard
required by the Bill of Rights. Since under Article III of the Constitution, a confession to be
admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the
confession must be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing. The investigating officer
made no serious effort to make appellant aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation
Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. The right of a person
under interrogation “to be informed” implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication that results in an
understanding of what is conveyed. Absent that understanding, there is a denial of the right “to be
informed,” as it cannot be said that the person has been truly “informed” of his rights. Ceremonial
shortcuts in the communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not to be allowed for it
diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation. However, the inadmissibility of
the appellant’s confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not
necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known,
also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited
through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the
Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the State’s coercive
power as would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him
from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power.
The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not
just to the police but also to private individuals. According to the testimony of the security guard,
Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing the appellant called him to say that he had killed
his employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. His admission to Campos was made
while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity
to concoct or contrive a story. His declaration to Campos concerned the circumstances surrounding
the killing of Keyser. Appellant’s spontaneous statements made to a private security guard, not an
agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered by the Miranda principles and, as res gestate,
admissible in evidence against him. Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media,
appellant not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted
his guilt to them.
Right to counsel; no deprivation of right when not subjected to custodial investigation
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. QUIRICO E. DAGPIN

[G.R. No. 149560. June 10, 2004.]
CALLEJO, SR.J.:
FACTS: The appellant Quirico Dagpin was charged with murder in an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads that on March 20, 1996, at about 1:00 o’clock dawn, in Sitio Bababon,
Barangay Diwa-an, City of Dapitan, the above-named accused, armed with a home-made shotgun,
with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with the use of a home-made shotgun one NILO
CAERMARE thereby resulting to his instantaneous death thereafter. The appellant was arraigned,
assisted by counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, the court rendered judgment
finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The appellant avers that the trial
court erred in convicting him of the crime charged on the basis mainly of his having been identified
by Randy, Rona and Rena at the police station on March 27, 1996. He was not assisted by counsel
when the three pointed to him as the culprit in the police station. Hence, according to the
appellant, such identification is inadmissible in evidence. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor
General asserts that Randy, Rona and Rena, saw and recognized the appellant as the person who
shot the victim at the situs criminis. It also maintains that the appellant was not deprived of his
constitutional rights when he was identified by the prosecution witnesses at the police station
without counsel, because he was not then under custodial investigation.

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ISSUE: Was the accused deprived of his right to counsel under the Constitution?
HELD: NO. The evidence on record shows that even before the killing of Nilo on March 26, 1996,
Randy and Rona had already seen the appellant, although they did not know his name. The trial
court gave credence and probative weight to the testimonies of Randy and Rona. The well-settled
rule is that findings of a trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial
judge has a clear advantage over the appellate magistrate in appreciating testimonial evidence.
The appellant was not deprived of his right under the Constitution to be assisted by counsel
because the appellant was not subjected to a custodial investigation where he was identified by
the prosecution’s witnesses in a police line-up. Indeed, the appellant even denied that there was
no police line-up and that he was merely with the police officers when the prosecution’s witnesses
arrived in the police station.
Rights of the accused; The Miranda doctrine under the 1987 charter took on a modified form
where the right to counsel was specifically qualified to mean competent and independent
counsel preferably of the suspect’s own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel likewise
provided for stricter requirements compared to its American counterpart; it must be done in
writing, and in the presence of counsel.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DINDO “BEBOT” MOJELLO

[G.R. No. 145566. March 9, 2004]
YNARES-SANTIAGO J.:
FACTS: Appellant Dindo Mojello was arrested for the rape and death of a certain Lenlen Rayco at
Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound for Cadiz City, On an investigation
conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator of the dastardly
deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. His
confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo Landao.
Batobalanos testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were read to
appellant who later on voluntarily signed it. Appellant’s extrajudicial confession was sworn before
Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence in

compliance with Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: YES. At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on custodial investigation
enshrined in Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine was based on the
leading case of People v. Galit and Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, rulings subsequently incorporated into the
present Constitution. The Miranda doctrine under the 1987 Charter took on a modified form where
the right to counsel was specifically qualified to mean competent and independent counsel
preferably of the suspect’s own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter
requirements compared to its American counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in the
presence of counsel.
Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial investigation has evolved to
provide for more stringent standards than what was originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona. The
purpose of the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as the process shifts from the
investigatory to the accusatory seems to be to accord even the lowliest and most despicable
criminal suspects a measure of dignity and respect. The main focus is the suspect, and the
underlying mission of custodial investigation – to elicit a confession.
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art. III,
Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict

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constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of
the appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was undoubtedly apprised of his
Miranda rights under the Constitution. The court a quo observed that the confession itself expressly
states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights. As further proof of the same,
Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was
requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant. Appellant manifested on record his
desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the
investigation was conducted and appellant’s statement taken, he advised appellant of his
constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the questions he
understood freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer. Atty. Giduquio represented
appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case.
Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the
contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence and
independence in representing appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover, appellant
manifested for the record that Atty. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial
proceedings.
Rights of the accused; An extra-judicial confession must be express and voluntarily executed in
writing with the assistance of an independent and competent counsel
PEOPLE vs. PERALTA

[G.R. No. 145176. March 30, 2004]
PANGANIBAN J.:
FACTS: About 10:00 o’clock in the morning of November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas went to the Theft and Robbery Section of Western Police District Command and filed a
complaint for Qualified Theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia,
Miguelito de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.
Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel punctured currency notes in P100.00 and
P500.00 bills with a face value of Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP
Cash Department during its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks
to the latter. The punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were later
submitted to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department. As a result of the investigation, it
was determined that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured notes already due for
shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were no longer intended for
circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen from the BSP by the above-
named accused.
On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in
front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City, while he was waiting for a passenger bus on his
way to the BSP. Garcia was brought to the police station for investigation. On November 4, 5 and 6,
1992, while in the custody of the police officers, Garcia gave three separate statements admitting
his guilt and participation in the crime charged.
During trial, prosecution presented the extra-judicial confessions bearing the signature of
one Atty. Sanchez after the word “saksi”. The defendant assailed the admissibility of his extra-
judicial confessions alleging that it was obtained as a result of the torture inflicted upon him during
investigations.
ISSUE: Were the extra-judicial confessions admissible?
HELD: NO. It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions that Garcia was
not assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed after the
word “SAKSI.” Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not assisted
Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former had signed the Sworn
Statement only as a witness.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of
duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law
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specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in the
presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is
voluntarily made and that the accused understands its nature and consequences, but also advise
and assist the accused continuously from the time the first question is asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the confession.
Hence, the lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing
of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the
accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel. A waiver in
writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without the
assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. The Constitution states that
“[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of [the aforecited Section 12] shall be
inadmissible in evidence x x x.” Hence, the trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence
the un-counseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof.
NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Constitutionality of E.O. 81; all assumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality
DEV'T. BANK OF THE PHIL. vs. WEST NEGROS COLLEGE

[G.R. No. 152359. May 21, 2004.]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: On December 12, 1967, Bacolod Medical Center (BMC) obtained a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the amount of P2,400,000.00 secured by a mortgage
on two (2) parcels of land. For failure of BMC to pay the loan, DBP instituted on January 30, 1989
an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. On August 24, 1989, the mortgaged
properties were sold at public auction with DBP emerging as the highest and only bidder for the
sum of P4,090,117.36 and the certificate of sale was issued in favor of DBP. Prior to the expiration
of the redemption period on July 11, 1991, BMC and the Bacolod branch office of DBP agreed to peg
the redemption price at P21,500,000.00 representing the compromise settlement of the
outstanding account subject to the approval of DBP’s head office. BMC resolved to pay an
installment of 20% of the compromise amount, or P4,300,000.00, on or before August 31, 1991. In
the meantime, on July 10, 1991, BMC and West Negros executed a Deed of Assignment which
assigned to the latter BMC’s interests in the foreclosed properties and vested upon West Negros the
right to redeem them. While acknowledging that redemption should be based on the outstanding
loan obligation of BMC to DBP, West Negros demanded the reduction of the redemption price from
P21,500,000.00 to P12,768,432.90 allegedly because of excessive interest charges. On November 8,
1991, West Negros requested the Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff to issue the certificate of redemption
in view of the payment to DBP of P4,300,000.00 representing 20% of the compromise amount, with
one percent (1%) interest thereon including other expenses defrayed by DBP at the extrajudicial
sale but DBP refused to do so. It also refused to hand over the TCTs of the foreclosed properties
and caused the registration of its adverse claim thereon. This prompted West Negros to file a
petition against DBP for the surrender of the TCTs or, in the alternative, the cancellation of the
existing TCTs and the issuance of new ones. West Negros alleged full payment of the redemption
price under Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Act 3135. The trial court and Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of West Negros, holding that the applicable legal provisions were Section 30,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Act 3135 such that the redemption price must be the amount of
purchase with one percent (1%) monthly interest thereon including other expenses defrayed by the
purchaser at the extrajudicial sale. DBP raised the matter on Petition for Review on Certiorari
before this Court. In its Decision, the Court declared that “in redeeming the foreclosed property
respondent West Negros College as assignee of Bacolod Medical Center should pay the balance of
the amount owed by the latter to petitioner DBP with interest thereon at the rate agreed upon as
of the date of the public auction on August 24, 1989.” This Motion for Reconsideration asks the
Court to determine the legality of the amount claimed by DBP as the total outstanding obligation
considering that DBP allegedly compounded the interest due and imposed penalties on the principal
amount and interest on expenses even as these were neither expressly agreed upon by the parties
nor imposed from the time of judicial demand in accordance with Article 2212 of the Civil Code.
These circumstances are, according to West Negros, violative of due process. West Negros
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 81 (E.O. 81), which governs the mortgage

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contract between DBP and BMC, as it allegedly violates the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution by giving the DBP the unbridled authority to determine the amount West Negros should
pay at the time of redemption.
ISSUE: Does Executive Order No. 81 violate the Non-Impairment Clause of the Constitution?
HELD: NO. This Court has to debunk the challenge on the constitutionality of E.O. 81 on the ground
that it violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution as it allegedly allows the DBP to
impose penalties and interest which were not originally agreed upon. It is well-settled that all
presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality, such that one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, this Court
does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
Sec. 16. all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies
DORCAS G. PETALLAR vs. JUDGE JUANILLO M. PULLOS et.al.

[A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484. January 15, 2004]
QUISUMBING J.:
Facts: In a complaint-affidavit dated February 7, 2002, Judge Juanillo M. Pullos, former presiding
judge of the MCTC of San Francisco, Surigao del Norte, stands charged by complainant Dorcas G.
Petallar of violating Code of Judicial Conduct for undue delay in rendering a decision in Case No.
137 for Forcible Entry.
Issue: Whether or not the undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a violation of Article III
Sec. 16?
Held: YES. As respondent himself admitted, Case No. 137 was decided only on June 2, 2002 or two
(2) years and some three (3) months beyond the reglementary period. Moreover, he could not even
come up with an explanation for the delay. We cannot overemphasize the Court’s policy on prompt
resolution of disputes. Justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for
decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of Article III, Section 16 of
the Constitution provides: “All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.”
NB:
ART. VIII, SEC. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court,
and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the
record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a
decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Elements of double jeopardy and factors to consider whether there was a violation of right to
speedy disposition of cases.
ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 136264. May 28, 2004.]

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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ J.:
FACTS: An information for falsification of public documents was filed against petitioner along with
some others with the RTC of Quezon City. Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the
information on 2 grounds. First, that the officer who filed the information had no legal authority to
do so, and second, that more than one offense was charged in the information. Pending resolution
of the motion to quash, petitioner was arraigned. The Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City granted the petitioner's motion to quash upon the second ground. Accordingly, the information
was quashed. More than 2 years after the quashal of the information, the Quezon City Prosecutor
filed against the same accused including petitioner 2 informations for falsification of public
documents at the Quezon City RTC. The 2 informations arose from the questioned acts of
falsification subject of the earlier quashed information. Petitioner argued that he would be placed
in double jeopardy as he was indicted before for the same offenses and the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. The RTC judge where the two subsequent
information was filed denied the motion to quash on the ground that the document subject of the
two information later filed was different from the document subject of the information quashed
two years ago. Herein petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari assailing the denial of the
motion to quash the two information, before the C.A. which denied his petition. The C.A. held that
since the information filed two years ago, on petitioner's motion, was quashed on the ground that
more than one offense was charged pursuant to Sec. 3 (e) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Court, he is not placed in double jeopardy by the filing of another Information for an offense
included in the charge subject of the information.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the legal doctrine
that there is double jeopardy.
2. Whether or not petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has
been violated.
HELD: 1. NO. With regard to the first issue, we are in accord with the ruling of the CA that not all
the elements for double jeopardy exist in the case at bench. To raise the defense of double
jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must
be for the same offense as that in the first.Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused .In the present case, although there was a valid indictment (A duplicitous information
is valid since such defect may be waived and the accused, because of such waiver, could be
convicted of as many offenses as those charged in the information and proved during trial) before a
competent court and petitioner, as the accused, had already been arraigned therein, entering a
valid plea of not guilty, the last requisite that the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent, is not present. It should be noted that the termination was upon
motion of petitioner who filed with the court an Urgent Motion to Quash which was granted.
2. NO. As to whether the subsequent filing of the two informations constitutes a violation
of petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases, The S.C. rule in the negative.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are: the length of the delay the reasons for such delay, the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. There is nothing
on record to show what happened during the two-year lull before the filing of the proper
informations. Hence, it could not be ascertained that peculiar situations existed to prove that the
delay was vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and therefore, a violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
CITIZENSHIP

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Qualification of a president; national born; lorenzo pou benefited from the “en masse
filipinization” in 1902.
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., vs. COMELEC, RONALD ALLAN KELLY
POE (a.k.a. FPJ) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
VITUG J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Fornier filed a “Petition for Disqualification of Presidential Candidate FPJ. The
petitioner asserted that respondent Poe is not a citizen, much more a natural-born citizen.
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to
petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage
with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father
and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940.
Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner further contended that
as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American
citizen.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and one of the main
contenders for the May 2004 presidency, a natural-born Filipino
2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition filed before, for failure of the petitioner to
prove the essential requisites for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of FPJ
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
HELD: 1. YES. The question whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy
of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his
place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence,
and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 (1995) must not only be material, but also deliberate
and willful.

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Citizenship; By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, she is a Filipino since birth
without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
REPUBLIC VS. LIM
[G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004]
YNARES-SANTIAGO J.:
FACTS: In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an,
Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan
and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
During the hearing, respondent claims that her surname “Yu” was misspelled as “Yo”. She
has been using “Yu” in all her school records and in her marriage certificate. She presented a
clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to further show the consistency in her use
of the surname “Yu”.
She further claims that her father’s name in her birth record was written as “Yo Diu To (Co
Tian)” when it should have been “Yu Dio To (Co Tian).” Her nationality was entered as Chinese
when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only
her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a
registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child
when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never
married.
Placida Anto, respondent’s mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents
were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughter’s father were never
married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China.
In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local
civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage
between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present. The Republic, through the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it actively participated in the
proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining respondent and her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s petition. The Republic of the
Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: Is the Court of Appeals correct in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent
from Chinese to Filipino despite the fact that he never demonstrated any compliance with the legal
requirements for election of citizenship?
HELD: YES. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement
of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the
provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention “in a statement to be signed
and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.”
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly
an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married.
As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to
become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without
having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when
she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18
years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.

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Evidence; inadmissible evidence cannot prove renunciation of citizenship; records were not
attested by the officer charged with custody of such records
ENGR. ERNESTO T. MATUGAS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROBERT LYNDON S. BARBERS
[G.R. No. 151944. January 20, 2004]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: Private respondent Robert Lyndon S. Barbers filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Governor of Surigao del Norte for the May 14, 2001 elections. On April 10, 2001,
petitioner Ernesto T. Matugas, himself a candidate for the same post, filed with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Disqualify private respondent as candidate. The Petition alleged,
among other grounds, that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen, this was supported by
evidences of Barber’s BID certification involving the travel records stating that he is an American
Citizen and notation in the letter-inquiry of Jesus Agana, a “confidential agent” of the Bureau of
Immigration, addressed to one George Clarke, purportedly of the US Embassy which prove that
Barbers was naturalized as an American citizen on October 11, 1991 in Los Angeles, California.
Subsequently, Barbers garnered the highest number of votes and was later proclaimed the duly
elected governor of Surigao del Norte. Matugas, thus instituted these proceedings for certiorari.
ISSUE: Is Robert Lyndon S. Barbers a citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, qualified to hold such
office?
HELD: YES, Robert Lyndon S. Barbers is a Filipino Citizen and is qualified to hold office as Governor
of Surigao del Norte for the evidence produced by Petitioner Matugas were inadmissible of Barbers
alleged renunciation. The notation in the letter-inquiry of Jesus Agana regarding the citizenship of
Barbers is neither an official publication of the document that contains the record of private
respondent’s naturalization, nor a copy attested by the officer who has legal custody of the record.
Petitioner Matugas did not show if Clarke, the notation’s alleged author, is the officer charged with
the custody of such record. Furthermore, Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that when
the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, as in
this case, the contents of said document may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof. The subject letter-inquiry, which contains the notation, appears to be a
mere photocopy, not a certified copy. On the other hand, the Bid Certification suffers the same
defect as the notation from the supposed ES Embassy official. Said Certification is also a
photocopy, not a certified copy.
Similarly, petitioner in this case cannot “enervate” the COMELEC’s findings by introducing
new evidence before this Court, which in any case is not a trier of facts, and then ask it to
substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of the COMELEC.
The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first
time on appeal, and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be
considered in disposing of the issues of an action. This is true whether the decision elevated for
review originated from a regular court or an administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, and
whether it was rendered in a civil case, a special proceeding, or a criminal case. Piecemeal
presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly justice.
SUFFRAGE
Overseas absentee voting act; sec 5(d) is constitutional; the interpretation here of residence is
equivalent to domicile; while sections 18.5,19 and 25 are unconstitutional; COMELEC should
not be allowed to usurp a power which is vested in the legislature; congress has no concurrent
power to enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC
MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003]

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FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a member of the
Philippine Bar and as a taxpayer, questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003).
The petitioner raises three principal questions:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit
expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
Petitioner claims that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article
V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for
at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding an election.
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-
President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that
the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress?
Petitioner claims that the Sec. 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to proclaim
the winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates
paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution stating that…”the person having the highest
number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress…”
C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25
of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common
Provisions) of the Constitution:…“The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent,
are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit”.
He argues that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power
to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional
body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of government. He
further argues that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be
changed or revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by
the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition
of any interested party, including the legislators.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sec 5(d) of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not Sec. 18.5 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional
3. Whether or not Sec. 19 and 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional
HELD: 1. NO. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 5(d) of R.A 9189 is not in violation of Sec. 1, Art. V
of the Constitution and is therefore not unconstitutional. The interpretation here of "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile”. Under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the
Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines, as
residence is considered synonymous with domicile.
In Ong vs. Republic, the Supreme Court enunciated that domicile means an individual's
"permanent home" or "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends
to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."
Further, the Supreme Court explained that based on the records of the discussions of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being precisely
to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1 to R.A 9189.

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Section 2, Article V stating that “the Congress shall provide a system for….absentee voting
by qualified Filipinos abroad” was added to avoid any problems that could impede the
implementation of its objective to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not
in the Philippines.
The reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year
residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee
voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.
The third more practical reason enunciated by the Supreme Court, is that if the strict
interpretation of Sec. 1, Art. V is followed, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible to give
a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is
impractical because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise — to enfranchise them and
empower them to vote.
2. YES. The Supreme Court held that COMELEC should not be allowed to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to the Congress. The provisions of the Constitution should be harmonized
with The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must
remain in the hands of Congress.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the
authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list
representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates
for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
3. YES. As to the third question raised by petitioner, the Solicitor General himself agreed with
petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that the Congress
has no concurrent power to enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC.
The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 and portions of Section 17.1 are
unconstitutional. Therefore, there is no actual issue forged on this question raised by petitioner.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continue to
be in full force and effect.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Vacancies; special election; R.A. no. 6645, as amended by R.A. 7166, requires COMELEC: (1) to
call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than
sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a
vacancy in the senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the
office or offices to be voted for.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR

RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN
[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004]
CARPIO J.:
FACTS: After Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona as Vice-President , the
Senate passed Resolution No. 84 (“Resolution No. 84”) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in
the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to
be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year
term each, were due to be elected in that election.[1] Resolution No. 84 further provided that the
“Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,” which ends on 30 June 2004. COMELEC
thereafter issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected
Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that “the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a
term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)
years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President.” Respondents Ralph

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Recto (“Recto”) and Gregorio Honasan (“Honasan”) ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in
Resolution No. 01-005.
Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for
Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single
three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005
in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.
ISSUES:
1. Did the COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the
14 May 2001 regular elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645?
2. Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was validly
held on 14 May 2001?
HELD: 1. YES. Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to
fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives “in the manner prescribed by law,”
thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired
term.
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645 . There was
a full compliance with the requirements required by law. That in case a vacancy arises in Congress
at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended by R.A.
7166, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election,
which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the
vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other
things, the office or offices to be voted for.
In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid
without any call by the body charged to administer the election. In a special election to fill a
vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be
held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and
operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is
not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed
to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not
from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of
the time and place of the election.
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but
empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent,
the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will
render the election a nullity.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the
Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate
arising from Senator Guingona’s appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held
at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14
May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s
failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less
invalidate it.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give
notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient
number of voters as would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice
misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to
fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void.

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Delegation of legislative power; general rule; delegata potestas delegare non potest; a
delegated power cannot be further delegated
RAMON A. GONZALES vs. PHIL. AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORP., ET AL.

[G.R. No. 144891. May 27, 2004.]
CARPIO MORALES J.:
FACTS: At bar is a special civil action for prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the creation
of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) as well as the "grant of franchises"
by PAGCOR to 1) Sports and Games Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) to engage in internet
gambling, 2) Best World Gaming and Entertainment Corporation (BEST WORLD) to engage in
computerized bingo gaming, and 3) Belle Jai-alai Corporation (BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming
Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME) to engage in jai-alai operation.
Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed on
September 28, 2000 the instant Petition 1 as a class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court 2 seeking to restrain PAGCOR from continuing its operations and prohibit it and its co-
respondents from enforcing: (1) the "Grant of an Authority and Agreement for the Operation of
Sports Betting and Internet Gambling" executed between PAGCOR and SAGE; (2) the "Grant of
Authority to Operate Computerized Bingo Games" between PAGCOR and BEST WORLD; and (3) the
"Agreement" among PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME to conduct jai-alai operations.
In compliance with this Court's Resolution of October 18, 2000, respondents filed their
respective comments on the petition, to which petitioner filed corresponding replies.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1869, as amended (the PAGCOR Charter), is
unconstitutional for having been issued pursuant to an unlawful exercise of legislative
power by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos?
2. Whether or not the contracts entered into by PAGCOR with its co-respondents are void
for being undue delegations by PAGCOR of its franchise 24 to operate and maintain
gambling casinos, sports, gaming pools and the like?
HELD: 1. The first issue has been rendered moot and academic.
In assailing the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, petitioner does not point to any inconsistency
between it and the present Constitution. Instead, it questions its issuance as an illegal exercise of
legislative powers by then President Marcos.
2. The second issue has already been raised in the Del Mar cases, 25 this Court ruling that
PAGCOR "has a valid franchise to, but only by itself (i.e., not in association with any other person or
entity) operate, maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai," and that, consequently, the
Agreement of June 17, 1999 among PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME was without force and effect. This
ruling was recently reiterated in Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. where This Court
held:
In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former
grants the latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations and
Internet gaming operations. In essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege
to actively participate, partake and share PAGCOR's franchise to operate a gambling
activity. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty
to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily
and whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to
its terms and conditionalities. A corporation as a creature of the State is presumed to
exist for the common good. Hence, the special privileges and franchises it receives are
subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. There is therefore a
reserved right of the State to inquire how these privileges had been employed, and
whether they have been abused.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator's and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise,
much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot
delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non
potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly
authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that "since ADC has no
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franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a
license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila." By
the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not "ride on"
PAGCOR's franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.
RA 9006 (Fair Elections Act); “one subject-one title rule”; an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject
Limitation on legislative power; equal protection clause; since the classification justifying
section 14 of rep. act no. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored
upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same
classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the constitution is, thus, not
infringed.
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, ET. AL vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.
FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., ET. AL
[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003.]
CALLEJO, SR. J.:

FACTS: Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act),
insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)
which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. — Any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petitioners come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the
dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban
on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep.
Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election
Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials,
thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. — Any person holding
a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one
which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate
of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the

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limitation on appointive officials remains — they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and
void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval"
is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code has been validly repealed by Section
14 of Rep. Act No. 9006.
2. Whether Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.
3. Whether or not the Enrolled Bill doctrine is applicable in this case.
HELD: 1. NO, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for
all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that —
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be
so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title
need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law
provides not only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. — The State shall, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal
opportunity for public service, including access to media time and space, and the
equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among candidates
and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is
to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the
other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of
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its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice,
action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the
legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same
was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the
petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its
validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the
provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. NO, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones
and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service,
are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the
effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position
other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or
look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
3. YES, the Enrolled Bill Doctrine Is Applicable In this Case

Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases 51 reveals the Court's consistent
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case
where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress,
e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not
the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or
Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be
resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was
a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and
with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate

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the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.'"
HRET rules; inaction to present evidence within the period required by house of
representatives electoral tribunal (HRET) is a basis for dismissal of election protest
DULCE ANN K. HOFER vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL et.al.

[G.R. No. 158833. May 12, 2004.]
FACTS: Dulce Ann K. Hofer, herein petitioner, and Belma A. Cabilao, herein respondent, were
congressional candidates in the lone congressional district of Zamboanga Sibugay 3 during the May
14, 2001 national and local elections. On May 18, 2001, respondent was proclaimed the duly
elected congressional representative with a total of 55,740 votes, as against petitioner's 43,566, or
a margin of 12,174 votes.
Claiming that massive vote buying, tampering of election returns and other irregularities
were committed in 671 precincts during the voting, counting of votes and canvassing of election
returns, petitioner, on May 28, 2001, filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) an election protest, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-006.
After the issues were joined, the case was set for preliminary conference on September 13,
2001.
During the preliminary conference, both parties, through their respective counsel, agreed
on the following dates of hearing: October 15, 16, 29, 30, November 5, 6 and 18, 2002 at 9:30
o'clock in the morning and 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. The Hearing Commissioner informed them
that they could set succeeding dates later. However, the hearings set on October 15, 16, 30 and
November 5 and 6, 2002 were cancelled at the instance of petitioner. Only the hearing on October
29, 2002 took place.
On February 12, 2003, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the protest for petitioner's
failure to prosecute for an unreasonable period of time.
In a Resolution dated March 27, 2003, the HRET granted the motion and dismissed
petitioner's election protest, ratiocinating thus:
"We find the long delay in the prosecution of this election protest to be inexcusable. A
perusal of the records reveal that out of the 7 hearing dates set by protestant for the
reception of her evidence, 6 settings were postponed through her instance. Only one
hearing on the 29th of October 2002 proceeded, in which hearing the protestant
presented documentary evidence consisting of election documents. It may be stressed
that protestant, despite the lapse of more than 6 months, reckoned from October 15,
2002, has not yet completed the presentation of her evidence. Having exhausted the
period of 20 days and having been granted an extension of 10 days without presenting
all her evidence, protestant is deemed to have slept on her right. Her failure to take
necessary steps to prosecute this case justify its dismissal.”
As provided under Rule 59 of the 1998 HRET Rules, each party is given a limited period of
20 days in the presentation of his evidence, including the formal offer thereof. This requirement in
the presentation of evidence is prompted by the nature of election contest, which should be
decided as soon as practicable. The period of 20 days given to each of the parties may be extended
by the Tribunal upon meritorious grounds and on motion of the party concerned. This time limit
prescribed by the Rules in the presentation of evidence contemplates not only actual period spent
in presenting before the Tribunal, but also the period used in the taking of deposition of the
witnesses under Rule 61 of the 1998 HRET Rules.
Petitioner then filed with the HRET a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: Should the petitioner’s election protest be dismissed?
HELD: YES. The election protest filed by petitioner is a serious charge which, if true, could unseat
protestee as Representative of her district. Hence, the observance of the HRET Rules in conjunction
with our own Rules of Court, must be taken seriously.
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Section 59 of the 1998 HRET Rules, quoted earlier, is explicit. Unfortunately, petitioner did
not comply with it. In fact, despite the lapse of six (6) months (starting October 15, 2002 — initial
date of hearing), she failed to present her evidence. Such inaction shows her utter lack of interest
to prosecute her case.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Powers of the president; validity of executive order reorganizing a public office; president has
authority to reorganize any branch or agency of executive department
DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, ET AL. vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION

[G.R. No. 152845 August 5, 2003]
VITUG J.:
FACTS: President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 29, entitled "Mandating the
Streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration (NTA)," and Executive Order No. 36, amending
Executive Order No. 29, insofar as the new staffing pattern was concerned, by increasing from four
hundred (400) to not exceeding seven hundred fifty (750) the positions affected thereby. In
compliance therewith, the NTA prepared and adopted a new Organization Structure and Staffing
Pattern (OSSP) which was submitted to the Office of the President. The rank and file employees of
NTA Batac, among whom included herein petitioners, filed a letter-appeal with the Civil Service
Commission and sought its assistance in recalling the OSSP. Petitioners, all occupying different
positions at the NTA office in Batac, Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of termination of their
employment with the NTA effective thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Finding themselves
without any immediate relief from their dismissal from the service, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte. The RTC,
ordered the NTA to appoint petitioners in the new OSSP to positions similar or comparable to their
respective former assignments. A motion for reconsideration filed by the NTA was denied by the
trial court in its order. Thereupon, the NTA filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the assailed orders of the trial
court. Petitioners went to the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court issued its resolution denying the petition for failure of petitioners to sufficiently
show any reversible error on the part of the appellate court in its challenged decision so as to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied. Petitioners then submitted a "Motion to Admit
Petition For En Banc Resolution" of the case allegedly to address a basic question, i.e., "the legal
and constitutional issue on whether the NTA may be reorganized by an executive fiat, not by
legislative action."
ISSUE: Can the President, through the issuance of an executive order, validly carry out the
reorganization of the NTA. If so, is the reorganization valid?
HELD: YES. The President, based on existing laws, has the authority to carry out reorganization in
any branch or agency of the executive department. The general rule has always been that the
power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept
that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the
Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the
Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The
exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a
particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. Article VII, Section 17, of the Constitution, expressly grants the President control of all
executive departments, bureaus, agencies and offices which may justify an executive action to
inactivate the functions of a particular office or to carry out reorganization measures under a broad
authority of law. Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 8522 (General
Appropriations Act of FY 1998) has decreed that the President may direct changes in the
organization and key positions in any department, bureau or agency pursuant to Article VI, Section
25, 12 of the Constitution, which grants to the Executive Department the authority to recommend

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the budget necessary for its operation. Evidently, this grant of power includes the authority to
evaluate each and every government agency, including the determination of the most economical
and efficient staffing pattern, under the Executive Department. In the present instance, involving
neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the
general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity,
economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of President motivated and carried
out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this
Court could only but accept.
YES, the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as
valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656
provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of
civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant
increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency
concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation." The
Court of Appeals, in its now assailed decision, has found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the
NTA. These findings of the appellate court are basically factual which this Court must respect and
be held bound.
Doctrine of qualified political agency; the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the president, can
validly reorganize the DENR.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES vs. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES,

[G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003.]
YNARES-SANTIAGO J.:
FACTS: On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the immediate
transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The
Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-14, issued by then
DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.
DAO No. 99-14, which was issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 to improve the
efficiency of the DENR, provided for the redefinition of functions and realignment of administrative
units in the regional and field offices. DAO No. 99-14 read: “The DENR hereby adopts a policy to
establish at least one Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or
Administrative Unit per Congressional District except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) and the National Capital Region (NCR). The Regional Executive Directors (REDs) are hereby
authorized to realign/relocate existing CENROs and implement this policy in accordance with the
attached distribution list per region which forms part of this Order... The supervision of the
Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani shall be transferred from Region XI to XII.”
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees
association, "COURAGE", represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary
injunction. In the meantime, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining
petitioner from implementing the assailed Memorandum.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the power
to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is
executive in nature.
The trial court’s decision ordered DENR to cease and desist from enforcing their
Memorandum Order relative to the transfer of the DENR Regional Offices from Region 12 to Region
11 at Koronadal, South Cotabato for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of

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discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on their part. They were further ordered to
return back the seat of the DENR Regional Offices 12 to Cotabato City.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 was filed before the Court of Appeals which was dismissed outright. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Does the DENR secretary have the authority to reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer
of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato?
HELD: YES, the DENR secretary possesses the authority to reorganize the DENR. The respondents
cannot, by means of an injunction, force the DENR XII Regional Offices to remain in Cotabato City,
as the exercise of the authority to transfer the same is executive in nature.
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:
“Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.”
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article
VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: “The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.”
However, as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to
exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may delegate some of his
powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to
reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising
control over a particular executive department.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be
the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
Article VII; power of the president to declare a state of rebellion; the power of the president to
declare a state of rebellion springs both from her powers as chief executive and commander-in-
chief
SANLAKAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ANGELO REYES ET. AL

[G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: In the wake of the Oakwood occupation (OAKWOOD MUTINY in Makati of July 27, 2003)the
President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring “a
state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court challenging the validity of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
Petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose
rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion.
Petitioners do not challenge the power of the President to call out the Armed Forces. They argue,
however, that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a “superfluity,” and is actually an exercise
of emergency powers. Such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of
Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.

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Petitioners contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. They further submit that, because
of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.
Furthermore, the declaration is a “constitutional anomaly” that “confuses, confounds and
misleads” because “[o]verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general
order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens.” Petitioners also submit that
the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article
VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the
President.
On the other hand, Petitioner Senator assails the subject presidential issuances as “an
unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the
Constitution.” In the main, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion “opens the
door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests” for the crime of rebellion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the President has the power to issue the assailed proclamations.
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to bring suit.
HELD: 1. YES. The President has the power to issue Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not
require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
XXXXX
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of

“graduated power[s].” From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law.
In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, (1) an actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) that public safety requires the
exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
“[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only
criterion is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed
forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’”
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the
President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not
only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
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Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states:
“The executive power shall be vested in the President….” As if by exposition, Section
17 of the same Article provides: “He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”
Thus, the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed
forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of
martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There
is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the “theater of war” or that
military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of
curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised
judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted
to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of
emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) ….
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,
to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon
the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has
exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President,
in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive
powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
2. In the case at bar only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of
Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members, have no legal standing or locus standi to bring suit.
Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino, whose standing this Court rejected in Lacson v. Perez:
… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to
the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim
to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members,
and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the
crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal
rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of
invasion or infringement.
That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily
endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. No such illegal
disbursement is alleged.
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he
can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Again, no such injury is alleged in this
case.

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Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the issues they raise are
of transcendental importance, the petitions must fail.
JUDICIARY
Supreme Court; jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to act as presidential electorate tribunal is
limited to post-election scenario; COMELEC decision on disqualification cases may be reviewed
by the sc per rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under rule 65[3] of the revised rules of civil
procedure. Bolstered by section 7, article IX and section 1, article VIII of the 1987
constitution.
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., vs. COMELEC, RONALD ALLAN KELLY
POE (a.k.a. FPJ) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
FACTS: SEE PAGE 56
ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have original and exclusive jurisdiction in resolving the issue of
presidential qualification being the presidential electoral tribunal?
2. Does the supreme court have jurisdiction to review a disqualification case decided by
comelec?
HELD: 1. NO. The case would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The rules (Rule 12, Rule
13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme
Court en banc on 18 April 1992) categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes
a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
NB:
Petitioner Tecson and Velez cites Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of the citizenship case of FPJ and
in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests
Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario.
election contests consist of either an (1) ELECTION PROTEST OR (2) a QUO WARRANTO which,
although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office.

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A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992,
would support this premise -
“Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
“Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo
warranto shall not include an election protest.
“Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes
may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by
filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within
thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.”
2. YES. It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up by petitioner Fornier was aptly elevated
to, and could well be taken cognizance of by the SC. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our
people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could
or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads –
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power
is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power
“includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
NB:
Before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked:
“Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false” – in consonance with
the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
“Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections” -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any
interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.

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Judicial review over impeachment proceeding; initiation of impeachment proceeding by the
filing of impeachment complaint; the proceeding is initiated by the filing of the complaint and
referral to the committee on justice
FRANCISCO JR., ET AL. VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ET AL.
[GR. No. 160261 November 10, 2003]
CARPIO-MORALES J.:
FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative William D. Fuentabella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund.
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (1 st
case) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justice of this Court for
culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The
complaint was endorsed by Representative Rolex T. Suplico, Ronald B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilanganen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance
with Section 3 (2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.
On October 23, 2003,a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the
second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (1 st Ditrict Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuetabella (3 rd
District Camarines Sur) against the Chief Justice founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by the above mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all
members of the House of Representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et al. filed by
citizens, taxpayers and members of the bar, most of which contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of
the Constitution that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year”.
On October 28, 2003, respondent House through Speaker Jose De Venecia, Jr. and or its co-
respondents, submitted a Manifestation asserting that the court has no jurisdiction to hear , much
less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch
of the government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated
duty to initiate impeachment cases. On the same date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his
own behalf, file a Motion to Intervene( Ex Abudante Cautela) and Comment, praying that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief
Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provision of Article XI of the
Constitution.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through the Senate President Franklin
M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that in so far as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly
premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute
itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment,
which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a “Petition for Leave to Intervene” in GR.
Nos. 160261, 160262, 160277, 160292, 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this
Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and the Court in
a “constitutional deadlock and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in
question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
ISSUES:

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1. Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.
2. Whether the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of judicial review have been
fulfilled.
3. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12 th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution;
4. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article XI.
Of the Constitution.
HELD: 1. YES. The Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government. In the case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Supreme Court held that it
is only the judicial department which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. From
the record of the 1986 Con Com., it is clear the judicial power is not only a power; but moreover it
is a duty, a duty that can not be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political
question doctrine. However, according to Justice Concepcion, there are two kinds. One is truly
political questions and the second is the not truly political questions. The former is beyond the
judicial review pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers. And the latter, the courts could
review by virtue of Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution. The presence of constitutionally
imposed limits on the powers and functions upon political bodies determines whether or not such is
within judicial review. According to Section 3 (8) of Art XI of the Constitution the Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment ONLY to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of this Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Likewise there are limits to such rule making power.
2. YES. Judicial review is subject to the following limitations namely, 1. an actual case or
controversy; 2. the person challenging must have standing to challenge; 3. the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; 4. the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
In the case at bar, Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino et al. sought to join
petitioner Francisco in GR.160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that they
were will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful,” this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with. Sen Pimentel
on the other hand, possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of the
Congress against which the herein petitioners are directed. However, Soriano’s motion to intervene
, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as taxpayer, he failed to meet standing
requirement for bringing taxpayer’s suits as stated in Dumlao vs. Comelec. His being a member of
the Bar does not clothe him such standing.
The requisite of ripeness and maturity of the action has been complied with for the alleged
unconstitutional acts have been accomplished and performed before suit as held in Tan vs.
Macapagal.
The question of justiciability has been discussed in the previous answer to the first issue.
With regard to the lis mota, Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
3. YES. Consulting the records of the Constitutional Convention, according to Fr. Bernas S.J. ,
under Art. XI Sec 3 (5), the proceeding is initiated or begins when a verified complaint is filed and
referred to the Committee on Justice for further action. This is the interpretation adopted by the
framers of the fundamental law. Under sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance (3) by the filing or endorsement

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before the Secretary General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly
contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a different meaning.
4. YES. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one-
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., along with seven associate justices of this court
on June 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representative Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentabella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within one
year.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Section 7, Article IX-A; each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution.
ROMEO M. ESTRELLA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET. AL

[G.R. No. 160465. May 27, 2004.]
CARPIO MORALES J.:

FACTS: From this Court's Resolution of April 28, 2004, private respondent Rolando F. Salvador
seeks a reconsideration.
In his petition for certiorari filed before this Court, petitioner Romeo M. Estrella sought the
nullification of the November 5, 2003 Status Quo Ante Order 1 issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in EAC No. A-10-2002, "Romeo M. Estrella v. Rolando F. Salvador,"
directing the "parties to maintain the status quo ante order, which is the condition prevailing
before the issuance" by the Regional Trial Court of Malolos of a writ of execution for the
enforcement of said court's decision declaring petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Baliwag,
Bulacan.
In the issuance of the questioned COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order, five (5) of the
then incumbent seven 7 members of the COMELEC participated: Commissioners Benjamin Abalos,
Sr., Luzviminda Tangcangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ressureccion Z. Borra and Ralph C. Lantion.
Commissioners Abalos, Tangcangco, Javier and Lantion voted for the issuance of said order,
while Commissioner Borra dissented.
Commissioner Lantion previously inhibited in SPJ No. 21-2002, a case pending before the
COMELEC Second Division involving the same parties, thus necessitating the issuance of an order
designating Commissioner Borra as his substitute. The substitution order was subsequently adopted
in EAC No. A-10-2002. Parenthetically, petitioner had previously filed a Motion for Inhibition of
Commissioner Lantion before the Second Division in SPR No. 21-2002 which was denied, albeit on
Motion for Reconsideration the Second Division, in its Resolution of May 7, 2002, noted that
"Com[missioner] Lantion indicated for the record that he is no longer taking part in the proceedings
in this case."
In the COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order, Commissioner Lantion stated in his
handwriting that "his previous voluntary inhibition is only in the SPR cases and not in the EAC" and
that "as further agreed in the Second Division, [he] will not participate in the Division deliberations
but will vote when the case is elevated [to the] en banc."
In this Court's Resolution of April 28, 2004 now the subject of private respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration, it was held that:
Commissioner Lantion's voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in
the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow

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him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division
is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical, but legally improper and
absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the
questioned order, thus leaving throe (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four
(4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained.
The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement
of a decision or order, as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which provides:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. — (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members
of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business.
The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for
the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.
Private respondent, in seeking a reconsideration of the above-quoted Resolution, cites Cua

v. Commission on Elections wherein this Court ruled:
After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, the Court holds
that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article
IX-A, section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to
affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated
and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited
constitutional provision. . .
Private respondent argues that "[f]ollowing the doctrine laid out in Cua, three (3) votes
would have been sufficient to constitute a majority to carry the decision of the COMELEC En Banc
as provided by the Constitution and the appropriate rules."
ISSUE: Are three (3) votes of the Commissioners sufficient to constitute a majority to carry the
decision of the Comelec En Banc as provided by the Constitution and appropriate rules?
HELD: NO. Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted from Section 7, Article IX-A
of the Constitution which provides:
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. . .
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of all its
members and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of
statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted constitutional
provision states "all of its members," without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
In the case at bar, following the clear provision of the Constitution, counting out
Commissioner Lantion's vote from the questioned COMELEC En Banc resolution would leave just
three (3) votes out of "all" seven (7) members of the COMELEC.
Even former Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, questions the Cua ruling in
light of Section 7, which says "majority of all the Members." He thus concludes that "[t]hree is not
the majority of seven."
For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua
and holds that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter brought before it by a majority
vote of "all its members," and NOT majority of the members who deliberated and voted thereon.
Private respondent's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Holding of multiple offices; prohibition against double compensation; prohibition extends to
representative acting on behalf of his principal
BENEDICTO ERNESTO R. BITONIO, JR vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT et.al.

[G.R. No. 147392. March 12, 2004]

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CALLEJO, SR. J.:

FACTS: In a Letter dated May 11, 1995 addressed to Honorable Rizalino S. Navarro, then Secretary
of the Department of Trade and Industry, Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of the Department of
Labor and Employment designated the petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Director IV of the
Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE, to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of
PEZA. Such designation was in pursuance to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known
as the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA,
the petitioner was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995
to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the
payment of per diems to the petitioner. The uniform reason for the disallowance was that Cabinet
members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their primary office and
receiving compensation therefore was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Civil
Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. On November 24, 1998, the petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration to the COA, positing that the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated August 2, 1991
on the motion for clarification filed by the Solicitor General modified its earlier ruling in the Civil
Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their
Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary
and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the
prohibition. On January 30, 2001, the COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Did the COA correctly disallow the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance
in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor?
HELD: YES. The petitioner’s contentions are untenable. It must be noted that the petitioner’s
presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the
Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no separate or special
appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving
compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the
petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The ex-officio position
being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office. This Court cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary
of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal. As the representative of the
Secretary of Labor, the petitioner sat in the Board in the same capacity as his principal. Whatever
laws and rules the member in the Board is covered, so is the representative; and whatever
prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the representative is, likewise, not exempted.
Thus, his position as Director IV of the DOLE which the petitioner claims is not covered by the
constitutional prohibition set by the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. The petitioner
attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit as his
representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board
at all.
Approval of appointments by the commission; an appointment not submitted to the civil service
commission within thirty days from the date of issuance shall be ineffective.
OCCIDENTAL MINDORO NATIONAL COLLEGE (OMNC) AND OFELIA REBONG VS. VIRGINIA MACARAIG
[G.R. No. 152017, January 15, 2004]
QUISUMBING J.:
FACTS: A certain Virginia Sicat was appointed Assistant Principal of San Jose National High School.
Respondent Virginia Macaraig and four others contested the said appointment on the ground that
being next in rank, they had a preferential right to be appointed to the said position. Upon
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recommendation of the DECS , the Civil Service Commission, canceled Sicat’s appointment and a
permanent appointment was extended to respondent Macaraig who assumed and began discharging
the duties of Assistant Principal.
However, the Office of the President declared the original appointment of Sicat as valid
and effective and ordered the payment to the latter of her salaries which she would have received
were it not for the illegal cancellation of her original appointment.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners OMNC and its President Dr. Ofelia Rebong
for unpaid salaries, benefits, and damages
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Macaraig has a valid and subsisting appointment to the said
position.
HELD: NO. As per resolution of the Office of the President it was ruled that the original
appointment of Sicat was valid and effective. Hence, when respondent Macaraig was given a
permanent appointment, there was no vacant position to which said respondent could be validly
appointed.
Granting that the appointment of the respondent was valid one, the same fell short of a
substantive requirement under the Omnibus civil Service Rules and Regulations. Under Sec. 11 of
the said Rules, an appointment not submitted to the Commission within thirty days from the date
of issuance shall be ineffective. In the present case, the alleged appointment of respondent was
submitted to the Commission only after two years and twelve days after its issuance. The much
delayed submission to the Commission was a blatant violation of the said Rules.
Cases involving personnel actions, affecting civil service employees, are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the civil service commission; decisions of lower officials are appealed to the
agency head then to the CSC.
MENELIETO A. OLANDA vs. LEONARDO G. BUGAYONG, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 140917. October 10, 2003]
CARPIO MORALES J.:

FACTS: Respondent Pedro S. Dulay, Jr. (Dulay), chief security officer of the PMMA, by a March 26,
1998 letter addressed to respondent Bugayong, stated that he heard the radio interview of
petitioner and that in discussing publicly without any clearance from respondent Bugayong the
Memorandum of Agreement between PMMA and PNCC, petitioner violated the PMMA Faculty
Handbook and other civil service rules. Respondent Bugayong found petitioner's explanation
unsatisfactory and suspended petitioner for three months for violation of the PMMA Faculty
Handbook and the civil service rules.
Petitioner thereupon filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales against herein respondents for
quo warranto, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and damages, claiming that there was no valid cause to deprive him of his position as
Dean. RTC of Iba, Zambales dismissed petitioner's petition for lack of cause of action because
plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: NO. Section 13 Rule VII of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (the
Adm. Code of 1987) provides how appeals can be taken from a decision of a department or agency
head. It states that such decision shall be brought to the Merit System Protection Board (now the
CSC En Banc per CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 dated June 29, 1993). It is the intent of the Civil
Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a grievance procedure in Rule XII, Section 6 of the
same rules, that decisions of lower level officials be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil
Service Commission. Decisions of the Civil Service Commission, in turn, may be elevated to the
Court of Appeals. Under this set up, the trial court does not have jurisdiction over personnel
actions and, thus, committed an error in taking jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462. The trial
court should have dismissed the case on motion of petitioner and let private respondent question
RMO No. 52 before the NIA Administrator, and then the Civil Service Commission. As held in Mantala

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vs. Salvador, cases involving personnel actions, reassignment included, affecting civil service
employees, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. It was thus error
for the trial court, which does not have jurisdiction, to, in the first, place take cognizance of the
petition of petitioner assailing his relief as Dean and his designation to another position. This leaves
it unnecessary to dwell on the issues herein raised by petitioner.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Commission On Elections due process; quasi judicial cases must be decided by the comelec by
division, not en banc; requirements for qualification for candidacy of a punong barangay
RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA @ "OCA” VS. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET.AL.

[G.R. Nos. 154796-97. October 23, 2003]
CARPIOJ.:
FACTS: On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in
Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. At first the Election Officer Josefina P. Jareño
("Election Officer Jareño") refused to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy because he was not
a registered voter in Lumbangan. But due to an action for mandamus against Election Officer
Jareño filed by Bautista with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14, she included the
name of Bautista in the certified list of candidates. At the same time, Election Officer Jareño
referred the matter of Bautista's inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the COMELEC Law
Department. On 11 July 2002, the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of
Bautista's certificate of candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The
COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Department's recommendation before the
barangay elections on 15 July 2002.
During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista obtained the highest number of votes
(719) while opponent Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus, the
Lumbangan Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay on 15 July
2002. On 8 August 2002, Bautista took his oath of office as Punong Barangay
Meanwhile, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 on 23 July 2002 and Resolution No. 5584
on 10 August 2002 ("COMELEC Resolutions"). In Resolution No. 5404, the COMELEC en banc resolved
to cancel Bautista's certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc directed the Election Officer to
delete Bautista's name from the official list of candidates. On the other hand, Resolution No. 5584
expressed COMELEC's policy regarding proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being
registered voters in the place of their election.
In a letter, COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco directed Election Officer Jareño
to (1) delete the name of Bautista from the official list of candidates for Punong Barangay of
Barangay Lumbangan; (2) order the Board of Canvassers of Lumbangan to reconvene for the purpose
of proclaiming the elected Punong Barangay with due notice to all candidates concerned; and (3)
direct the proclaimed disqualified candidate Bautista to cease and desist from taking his oath of
office or from assuming the position which he won in the elections. Consequently, Election Officer
Jareño issued on 20 August 2002 an Order deleting the name of Bautista from the list of candidates
for Punong Barangay. The Order also prohibited Bautista from assuming the position and discharging
the functions of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan pursuant to the COMELEC Resolutions. The Board
of Canvassers reconvened on 23 August 2002 and after making the necessary corrections in the
Certificate of Canvass of Votes, proclaimed Alcoreza as the winning Punong Barangay. Alcoreza
thus assumed the post of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan.
On 26 August 2002, Bautista wrote a letter to COMELEC requesting the latter for
reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolutions.
On 9 September 2002, while his letter for reconsideration was still pending with the
COMELEC, Bautista filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order.
ISSUES:
1. Did the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584?
2. Did the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due process when the COMELEC en banc issued
Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584; and
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3. Was it proper to disqualify the winning candidate Bautista because he was not a
registered voter when he ran for Punong Bayan?
HELD: 1. YES Bautista argues that without any disqualification case formally filed against him, the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of his case. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio act
on the issue of his alleged lack of qualification. Even assuming that there was a disqualification
case filed against him, it is the COMELEC sitting in division which has jurisdiction and not the
COMELEC en banc.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., 18 the Court held that it is the COMELEC sitting in division and not
the COMELEC en banc which has jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The
Court held:
. . . The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz:
"Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before election."
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the
Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material
representation in his certificate. Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to
cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases
before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of
votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only
motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are
resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases.
This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:
"Sec. 3. The Commission in Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2)
Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions,
special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in
accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission."
A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only
act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division.
Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of
Bautista's certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a division for summary hearing.
The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy does not merely pertain to
the administrative functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings involve the COMELEC's quasi
judicial functions. The Court discussed the difference between administrative and quasi-judicial
functions in Villarosa v. Commission on Elections:
In the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva Caceres vs.
Martinez, 56 SCRA 148, he noted that
(t)he term "administrative" connotes, or pertains, to "administration, especially
management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the
execution, application, or conduct of persons or things." It does not entail an
opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or
resolution thereon. While a "quasi judicial function" is a term which applies to the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature.

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In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates the
COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by the
COMELEC en banc. Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for
the denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice.
It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of
the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in this case where the
cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer
regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en banc
cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because
it denies due process to the candidate.
2. YES. This Court has explained the nature of due process in Stayfast Philippines Corporation v.
NLRC:
“The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing. . .”
The opportunity to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in
court during a formal hearing. There is due process when a party is able to present evidence in the
form of pleadings. However, the COMELEC did not give Bautista such opportunity to explain his
side. The COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing.
3. YES. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, 38 which took effect on 1 January 1992, an
elective local official, including a Punong Barangay, must not only be a "qualified elector" or a
"qualified voter," he must also be a "registered voter." Section 39 of the Local Government Code
provides:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxx xxx xxx
Bautista admitted in his affidavit 40 dated 24 August 2002 that he was not a registered
voter of Barangay Lumbangan. According to Bautista's affidavit, he was practically out of the
country from 1995 until 2001. When the certified list of voters ceased to be effective and operative
after the barangay elections in 1997, qualified voters had to register again to vote in any election.
Apparently, Bautista failed to register during the general registration of voters conducted by the
COMELEC in 1997 since he was still out of the country during that time.
It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty to ensure his right to vote and to be
voted for public office. As early as 2001, he was already aware that his name was no longer
included in the roster of registered voters. Yet, Bautista chose not to register anew that year
despite his knowledge that he needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run for the office of
Punong Barangay. Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of
Punong Barangay that he lacked one of the qualifications. He therefore made a misrepresentation
of a material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a
registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for
elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself.
Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of a material fact in the
certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy.

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Jurisdiction of the COMELEC; the ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its
legitimate officers is a matter well within its authority
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO VS. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 161265, February 24, 2004]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: On September 25, 2003, the National Executive Council of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) convened and passed a resolution granting full authority to Party Chairman Senator
Edgardo Angara to enter into a coalition agreement with other opposition parties to have an
opposition unity ticket for the May 10, 2004 elections. On December 3, 2003, the LDP, together
with other opposition parties, forged a coalition to form the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP), where it subsequently named Mr. Fernando Poe, Jr. as the standard bearer of the KNP for
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
However, LDP Secretary General Representative Agapito Butz Aquino questions the
authority of the Party Chairman to bind the entire party with the said coalition and instead
endorsed the Certificate of Nomination of Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP Candidate for President. The
Certificate of Nomination was signed by Rep. Aquino as LDP Secretary General.
The General Counsel of the LDP informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only
the Party Chairman or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of
the party’s official candidates and placed Rep. Aquino on an “indefinite forced leave”. The
COMELEC ruled that the candidates endorsed by LDP Chairman Angara are recognized as official
candidates of the LDP “Angara Wing” while the candidates endorsed by LDP Secretary General
Aquino are recognized as official candidates of LDP “Aquino Wing”.
Thus, Sen. Angara moved for this petition for certiorari assailing the COMELEC Resolution
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to hear internal matters involving political
parties
HELD: YES. The COMELEC correctly stated that the ascertainment of the identity of a political
party and its legitimate officers is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this
authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and
function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election. In
the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with
ample “wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure
the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and
honest elections.
However, the COMELEC erred in resolving who has the authority to endorse the official
candidates of the LDP. To resolve the simple issue, the COMELEC need only to turn to the Party
Constitution. It need not go too far and resolve the root of the conflict between the party officials.
It need only resolve such questions as may be necessary in the exercise of its enforcement powers.
Clearly, it is the Party Chairman, who is the Chief Executive Officer of the Party, who has the
authority to represent the party and in all external affairs and concerns and to sign documents for
and on its behalf.
Jurisdiction of the COMELEC; annulment of result of a plebiscite; power of COMELEC not limited
to mere administrative function of conducting a plebiscite but also to enforce laws relative to
the conduct thereof.
MA. SALVACION BUAC, ET AL. vs. COMELEC, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 155855 January 26, 2004]
PUNO J.:
FACTS: In April, 1988, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig Cityhood
Law (Republic Act No. 8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a city.
Without completing the canvass of sixty-four other election returns, the Plebiscite Board of
Canvassers declared that the "NO" votes won and that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig

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to a city. The Board of Canvassers was, however, ordered by the COMELEC en banc to reconvene
and complete the canvass. The Board did and in due time issued an Order proclaiming that the
negative votes prevailed in the plebiscite conducted. Forthwith, petitioners filed with the COMELEC
a petition to annul the results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots
cast therein. They alleged that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes.
The case was docketed as an election protest and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. Private
respondent Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the COMELEC. He claimed that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election
protest. He averred that the jurisdiction to hear a complaint involving the conduct of a plebiscite is
lodged with the Regional Trial Court. The COMELEC Second Division initially gave due course to the
petition and ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case. It treated the petition as akin to an
election protest considering that the same allegations of fraud and irregularities in the casting and
counting of ballots and preparation of returns are the same grounds for assailing the results of an
election. Cayetano moved for reconsideration of the COMELEC Order insisting that it has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition contesting the results of a plebiscite. In a complete
turnaround, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order on November 29, 2001 granting the Motion
for Reconsideration. On appeal, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the ruling of its 2nd Division. It held
that the COMELEC cannot use its power to enforce and administer all laws relative to plebiscites as
this power is purely administrative or executive and not quasi-judicial in nature. It concluded that
the jurisdiction over the petition to annul the Taguig plebiscite results is lodged with the RTC under
Section 19 (6) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which provides that the RTC shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction in cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.
ISSUE: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction to annul the results of a plebiscite?
HELD: YES, the COMELEC has jurisdiction to annul the results of a plebiscite. The case at bar
involves the determination of whether the electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against the
conversion of the municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city in the plebiscite conducted for
the purpose. We hold that the invocation of judicial power to settle disputes involving the conduct
of a plebiscite is misplaced. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defines judicial power as
including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." The case at bar assailing the regularity of the conduct of the
Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial power. It does
not involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its enforcement. There is no plaintiff
or defendant in the case at bar for it merely involves the ascertainment of the vote of the
electorate of Taguig whether they approve or disapprove the conversion of their municipality to a
highly urbanized city. There is no invocation of a private right conferred by law that has been
violated and which can be vindicated alone in our courts of justice in an adversarial proceeding.
Rather, the issue in the case at bar is the determination of the sovereign decision of the electorate
of Taguig. The purpose of this determination is more to protect the sovereignty of the people and
less to vindicate the private interest of any individual. Such a determination does not contemplate
the clash of private rights of individuals and hence cannot come under the traditional jurisdiction
of courts.
In the present case, petitioners filed a petition for revision of ballots cast in a plebiscite.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the petition
considering that the issue raised therein calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its judicial or
quasi-judicial power. According to the COMELEC, there is no law nor any constitutional provision
that confers it with jurisdiction to hear and decide a case contesting the officially proclaimed
results of a plebiscite based on frauds and irregularities. The COMELEC's position is highly
untenable. Article IX-C, Section 2(1) is very explicit that the COMELEC has the power to "enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." To enforce means to cause to take effect or to cause the performance of
such act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect or operation, a plan or measure. When we say
the COMELEC has the power to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of a plebiscite, it
necessarily entails all the necessary and incidental power for it to achieve the holding of an honest
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and credible plebiscite. Obviously, the power of the COMELEC is not limited to the mere
administrative function of conducting the plebiscite. The law is clear. It is also mandated to
enforce the laws relative to the conduct of the plebiscite. Hence, the COMELEC, whenever it is
called upon to correct or check what the Board of Canvassers erroneously or fraudulently did during
the canvassing, can verify or ascertain the true results of the plebiscite either through a pre-
proclamation case or through revision of ballots. To remove from the COMELEC the power to
ascertain the true results of the plebiscite through revision of ballots is to render nugatory its
constitutionally mandated power to "enforce" laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite. It is not
correct to argue that the quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC is limited to contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective Barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction. If the COMELEC has quasi-judicial power to enforce laws relating to elective officials
then there is no reason why it cannot exercise the same power to ascertain the true results of a
plebiscite. All that the Constitution provides is that the COMELEC shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to elective officials. The provision is not a limiting provision in
the sense that it only limits the quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to said cases.
COMELEC resolution 6712 void; COMELEC not authorized to make an unofficial quick count of
the presidential election.
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR. vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 163193. June 15, 2004]
CALLEJO, SR. J.:

FACTS: The case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., a
voter and taxpayer, seeking to nullify, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 approved by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc captioned GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF ADVANCED RESULTS IN THE MAY 10, 2004
ELECTIONS. 1 The petitioner, likewise, prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and,
after due proceedings, a writ of prohibition to permanently enjoin the respondent COMELEC from
enforcing and implementing the questioned resolution.
In their petition-in-intervention, movants-petitioners urge the Court to declare as null and
void the assailed resolution and permanently enjoin the respondent COMELEC from implementing
the same.
The petitioner essentially posits that the counting and consolidation of votes contemplated
under Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8436 refers to the official COMELEC count under the fully
automated system and not any kind of "unofficial" count via electronic transmission of advanced
results as now provided under the assailed resolution.
The petitioners-in-intervention point to several constitutional infractions occasioned by the
assailed resolution. They advance the view that the assailed resolution effectively preempts the
sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution to canvass
the votes for President and Vice-President. Further, as there has been no appropriation by Congress
for the respondent COMELEC to conduct an "unofficial" electronic transmission of results of the May
10, 2004 elections, any expenditure for the said purpose contravenes Article VI, Section 29 (par. 1)
of the Constitution.
On statutory grounds, the petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention contend that the
assailed resolution encroaches upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens' accredited arm, to
conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws.
The COMELEC argues that there is statutory basis for it to conduct an “unofficial” quick
count which they seek to exercise through the procedures prescribed in the assailed decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 is void:

HELD: YES. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation of election
results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. Article VII, Section 4 of the

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Constitution provides in part that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President
duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session,
and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is
not prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is "unofficial," is puerile
and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the
votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from
making an "unofficial" canvass of said votes.
The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the constitutional provision that "no money
shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. By its very
terms, the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election results projected under Resolution
No. 6712 is "unofficial" in character, meaning "not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged
by the government or government body. 38 Any disbursement of public funds to implement this
project is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003
General Appropriations Act. The use of the COMELEC of its funds appropriated for the AES for the
"unofficial" quick count project may even be considered as a felony under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.
In this case, no law has, thus, far been enacted authorizing the respondent COMELEC to transfer
savings from another item in its appropriation, if there are any, to fund the assailed resolution. No
less than the Secretary of the Senate certified that there is no law appropriating any amount for an
"unofficial" count and tabulation of the votes cast during the May 10, 2004 elections.
The assailed resolution disregards existing laws which authorize solely the duly-accredited
citizens' arm to conduct the "unofficial" counting of votes. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166,
as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, 49 and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, 50 the
accredited citizen's arm — in this case, NAMFREL — is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the
election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes, whether for the national or
the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a
copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an "unofficial" count. In addition, the
second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under
the aforementioned laws, are not intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The aforesaid
COMELEC copies are archived and unsealed only when needed by the respondent COMELEC to verify
election results in connection with resolving election disputes that may be imminent. However, in
contravention of the law, the assailed Resolution authorizes the so-called Reception Officers (RO),
to open the second or third copy intended for the respondent COMELEC as basis for the encoding
and transmission of advanced "unofficial" precinct results. This not only violates the exclusive
prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an "unofficial" count, but also taints the integrity of the
envelopes containing the election returns, as well as the returns themselves, by creating a gap in
its chain of custody from the Board of Election Inspectors to the COMELEC. Moreover, the COMELEC
failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in
areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty
days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
Political parties; COMELEC has the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations to
enforce and administer election laws
AKLAT vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 162203 April 14, 2004]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: On Nov. 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a party-list
organization for 2004 elections. The Comelec denied the motion in its questioned Resolution dated
February 13, 2004, on three grounds, namely: (1)the petition was filed beyond the deadline set by
the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 for registration of party-list organizations; (2)the petition was
not one for re-qualification as Aklat was never a registered party-list organization having failed to
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meet the eight-point guidelines set by the Court in the Bagong Bayani case; and (3)that its decision
not to extend the deadline for registration of party-list organizations is valid, the Comelec being in
the best position to make such a determination. Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941,
petitions for registration as a party-list organization may be filed not later than 90days before the
elections. It therefore had until Feb.10, 2004 before the elections on May 10. Hence, its petition,
which was filed on Nov. 20, 2003, was filed within the allowed period. Section 5 of Resolution No.
6320 12 which requires the filing of such petitions not later than Sept. 30, 2003, is null and void as
it amends R.A. 7941.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion by issuing the said
resolution?
2. Whether or not AKLAT met the eight-point guidelines set by the court in the Bagong
Bayani case in establishing its legitimacy as a party list organization?
HELD: 1. NO. The Comelec has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
enforce and administer election laws. This power includes the determination, within the
parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the accomplishment of certain pre-election
acts like filing petitions for registration under the party-list system. This is exactly what the
Comelec did when it issued its Resolution No. 6320 declaring September 30, 2003, as the deadline
for filing petitions for registration under the party-list system. Considering these, as well as the
multifarious pre-election activities that the Comelec is mandated to undertake, the issuance of its
Resolution No. 6320 cannot be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
2. NO. Aklat has not met the guidelines. The guidelines for screening party-list participants, as
enunciated in the Bagong Bayani case(Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC), are as
follows:
“First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. xxx
“Second, major political parties must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives.”
“Third, the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. . .
“Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of
RA 7941. .
“Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. ..
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. . .
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees xxx
Eight, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole xxx”
COMELEC; Bidding; the award to MPC was highly irregular; exhaustion of administrative
remedies; letter to the chairman serves to eliminate the prematurity issue.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

[G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004]
PANGANIBAN J.:
FACTS: In preparation for the 2004 national election, the commission on Elections on October 29,
2002 adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved
to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I -
Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II - Automated Counting and Canvassing System;
and Phase III - Electronic Transmission. This is in connection with the earlier

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May 2001 elections, wherein the counting and canvassing of votes for both national and
local positions were done manually, as no additional automated counting machines had been
acquired for that electoral exercise allegedly because of time constraints.
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172,
which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the
request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an “Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid,” In
the said bidding, the contract of the Phase II of the modernization project was awarded to Mega
Pacific Consortium which was allegedly anomalous.
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma.
Corazon Akol) wrote a letter[14] to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the
award of the Contract to Respondent MPC “due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the
bidding process had been conducted.” Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as
technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the
Petition), they sought a re-bidding. The reason being is that the Report on the Evaluation of the
Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed
marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, on April 15,
2003, promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The Commission publicized
this Resolution and the award of the project to MPC on May 16, 2003.
The case is a Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) to declare null and
void Resolution No. 6074 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), which awarded “Phase II of the
Modernization Project of the Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC);” (2) to enjoin the
implementation of any further contract that may have been entered into by Comelec “either with
Mega Pacific Consortium and/or Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI);” and (3) to compel Comelec
to conduct a re-bidding of the project.
First, Comelec contends that there was nothing unusual about the fact that the Report
submitted by the BAC came only after the former had already awarded the Contract, because the
latter had been asked to render its report and recommendation orally during the Commission’s en
banc session on April 15, 2003. Accordingly, Comelec supposedly acted upon such oral
recommendation and approved the award to MPC on the same day, following which the
recommendation was subsequently reduced into writing on April 21, 2003. Second, The commission
argues that the petition was premature because it failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
the case was elevated, and lastly, that the petitioner does not have legal standing as to the case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Commission on Elections, the agency vested with the exclusive
constitutional mandate to oversee elections, gravely abused its discretion in awarding
the election modernization contract?
2. Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing over the case?
3. Whether or not the case was premature for its failure to exhaust administrative
remedies?
HELD: 1.YES. The court agrees with the petitioner that the award is invalid, since Comelec gravely
abused its discretion when it did the following:
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding 2.
Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory
eligibility requirements3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract
to MPC despite the issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the
assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003[31] 4. Awarded the Contract,
notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there were violations of the
mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec’s own
Request for Proposal on the automated election system. 5. Refused to declare a failed
bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of the bidders to pass the
technical tests conducted by the Department of Science and Technology 6. Failed to
follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the
automated counting machines.
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2. YES. Hangs in the balance is the pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be
no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is “a matter of public concern and imbued
with public interest ”in other words, it is of “paramount public interest” and “transcendental
importance, this fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal
policy of this Court whenever a case involves “an issue of overarching significance to our society.”
Petitioners’ legal standing should therefore be recognized.
3. NO. Respondents may not have realized it, but the letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin
Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written
protest against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The letter was signed by/for,
inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines,
represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is
sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly
because it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.And even without that
May 29, 2003 letter-protest, the Court still holds that petitioners need not exhaust administrative
remedies in the light of Paat v. Court of Appeals. Paat enumerates the instances when the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows:
“(1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction,(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned,(5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter,(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable,(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,(10)
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.”
The present controversy precisely falls within the exceptions listed as Nos. 7, 10 and 11:
“(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (10) when the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.” As already stated, Comelec itself made the
exhaustion of administrative remedies legally impossible or, at the very least, “unreasonable.”
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Validity of ordinance; granting of benefits to an auditor where a statute provides otherwise;
coa officials need to be insulated from unwarranted influences so that they can act with
independence and integrity
RUDY M. VILLAREÑA vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

[G.R. Nos. 145383-84 August 6, 2003
AZCUNA J.:
FACTS: Petitioner, Atty. Rudy M. Villareña, is a State Auditor IV of the COA and assumed the
position City Auditor when Marikina became a city on December 6, 1996. Pursuant to R.A. 7160, the
Local Government Code of 1991, the legislative body of Marikina passed Ordinance No. 21, series of
1995; Ordinance No. 9, series of 1996; and Ordinance No. 200, series of 1996, which approved the
budget allocations for Marikina for calendar years 1995, 1996 and 1997, respectively. Allotted in
each of these were allowances and benefits granted to COA personnel assigned to Marikina,
including petitioner. In line with COA Assignment Orders No. 97-006 and No. 97-051, a Special Audit
Team was constituted by the COA to conduct an examination of the cash and accounts of the City
Treasurer of Marikina, as well as to audit selected financial transactions of the city. In the course
of the examination and audit, the Special Audit Team learned of the allowances given to COA
personnel by the City of Marikina and it declared these to have been received in violation of
Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government and for Other Purposes, COA Memorandum 89-584 and COA
Chairman's Indorsement dated March 23, 1995. Thus, in the Special Audit Team's Confidential

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Report dated June 19, 1997, it was recommended that the COA personnel should be ordered to
stop receiving additional fringe benefits, honoraria, allowances and other forms of compensation
from the City of Marikina and to refund all those previously received. On the basis of the Report, on
July 15, 1997, a formal charge was initiated against petitioner for grave misconduct, gross neglect
of duty, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and/or violation of office
rules and regulations. On August 4, 1998, COA Decision was rendered finding petitioner guilty of
neglect of duty, simple misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. To
challenge this decision, he filed the instant consolidated Special Civil Actions for Certiorari and
Prohibition.
ISSUE: Is State Auditor Rudy Villarena guilty of neglect of duty, simple misconduct and violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations for receiving benefits under a local ordinance where R.A.
6758 provides otherwise?
HELD: YES. Petitioner argues that the adoption of R.A. 7160, providing for the authority of local
legislative councils to grant benefits to national government officials, had the effect of modifying
R.A. 6758, and COA Memorandum No. 89-584, insofar as these do not conform thereto. The Office
of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, points out that R.A. 6758 is a special law while R.A. No.
7160 is a general law. It argues that a general law does not operate to modify or repeal a special
law unless it has been so expressly provided. This Court agrees with the Solicitor General. Since
R.A. 6758 was not expressly repealed by R.A. 7160, has it been impliedly repealed? Implied repeals
are not lightly presumed. The rule is that instead of placing one law against another, in a
destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile the statutes. Accordingly, in
case of a conflict between R.A. 6758 and the Local Government Code, the proper action is not to
uphold one and annul the other, but, if possible, to give effect to both by harmonizing the two. In
the case at bar, the two statutes can easily be harmonized. Under the Local Government Code,
local legislative bodies may provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national
government officials stationed or assigned to their municipality or city. This authority, however, is
not without limitation, as it does not include the grant of benefits that runs in conflict with other
statutes, such as Republic Act No. 6758. The exception stated in these laws must be read together
with the Local Government Code, so as to make both the Code and these laws equally effective and
mutually complementary. Indeed, there are valid reasons to treat COA officials differently from
other national government officials. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds. To be able properly to
perform their constitutional mandate, COA officials need to be insulated from unwarranted
influences, so that they can act with independence and integrity. The removal of the temptation
and enticement the extra emoluments may provide is designed to be an effective way of vigorously
and aggressively enforcing the Constitutional provision mandating the COA to prevent or disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties. The law realizes that such extra benefits could diminish the
personnel's seriousness and dedication in the pursuit of their assigned tasks, affect their
impartiality and provide a continuing temptation to ingratiate themselves to the government
entity, local government unit, government-owned and controlled corporations and government
financial institutions, as the case may be. In the end then, they would become ineffective auditors.
The constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over “government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters,” as well as “government-owned or controlled
corporations” without original charters.
ENGR. RANULFO C. FELICIANO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT ET. AL,

[G.R. No. 147402. January 14, 2004]
CARPIO J.:
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the Commission on Audit’s (“COA”) Resolution and
the Decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The COA denied petitioner Ranulfo C.
Feliciano’s request for COA to cease all audit services, and to stop charging auditing fees, to Leyte

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Metropolitan Water District (“LMWD”). The COA also denied petitioner’s request for COA to refund
all auditing fees previously paid by LMWD.
A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts of LMWD.
Subsequently, LMWD received a letter from COA requesting payment of auditing fees. As General
Manager of LMWD, petitioner sent a reply informing COA’s Regional Director that the water district
could not pay the auditing fees. Petitioner cited as basis for his action Sections 6 and 20 of
Presidential Decree 198 (“PD 198”), as well as Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 (“RA 6758”).
The Regional Director referred petitioner’s reply to the COA Chairman.
Petitioner wrote COA through the Regional Director asking for refund of all auditing fees
LMWD previously paid to COA. He received COA Chairman Celso D. Gangan’s Resolution denying his
requests. Moreover, he filed a motion for reconsideration which COA denied.
Petitioner filed this instant petition. Attached to the petition were resolutions of the
Visayas Association of Water Districts (VAWD) and the Philippine Association of Water Districts
(PAWD) supporting the petition.
The COA ruled that this Court has already settled COA’s audit jurisdiction over local water
districts in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission and Commission on Audit, as
follows:
The above-quoted provision [referring to Section 3(b) PD 198] definitely sets to naught
petitioner’s contention that they are private corporations. It is clear therefrom that
the power to appoint the members who will comprise the members of the Board of
Directors belong to the local executives of the local subdivision unit where such
districts are located. In contrast, the members of the Board of Directors or the
trustees of a private corporation are elected from among members or stockholders
thereof. It would not be amiss at this point to emphasize that a private corporation is
created for the private purpose, benefit, aim and end of its members or stockholders.
Necessarily, said members or stockholders should be given a free hand to choose who
will compose the governing body of their corporation. But this is not the case here and
this clearly indicates that petitioners are not private corporations.
The COA also denied petitioner’s request for COA to stop charging auditing fees as well as
petitioner’s request for COA to refund all auditing fees already paid.
ISSUE: Is a Local Water District (“LWD”) created under PD 198, as amended, a government-owned
or controlled corporation subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA?
HELD: YES. The Constitution and existing laws mandate COA to audit all government agencies,
including government-owned and controlled corporations (“GOCCs”) with original charters. An LWD
is a GOCC with an original charter. Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides for COA’s
audit jurisdiction, as follows:
section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-
audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities;
(c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d)
such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from
or through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to
submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such
measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate
to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and,
for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.
Petitioner seeks to revive a well-settled issue. Petitioner asks for a re-examination of a

doctrine backed by a long line of cases culminating in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service
Commission[5] and just recently reiterated in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit. Petitioner

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maintains that LWDs are not government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters.
Petitioner even argues that LWDs are private corporations. Petitioner asks the Court to consider
certain interpretations of the applicable laws, which would give a “new perspective to the issue of
the true character of water districts.”
Petitioner theorizes that what PD 198 created was the Local Waters Utilities Administration
(“LWUA”) and not the LWDs. Petitioner claims that LWDs are created “pursuant to” and not
created directly by PD 198. Thus, petitioner concludes that PD 198 is not an “original charter” that
would place LWDs within the audit jurisdiction of COA as defined in Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the
Constitution. Petitioner elaborates that PD 198 does not create LWDs since it does not expressly
direct the creation of such entities, but only provides for their formation on an optional or
voluntary basis. Petitioner adds that the operative act that creates an LWD is the approval of the
Sanggunian Resolution as specified in PD 198.
Petitioner’s contention deserves scant consideration.
We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The
Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created
under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created
by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled
corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it
follows that Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are
government-owned or controlled.
Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created under the
Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section
14 of the Corporation Code states that “[A]ll corporations organized under this code shall file with
the Securities and Exchange Commission articles of incorporation x x x.” LWDs have no articles of
incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders or
members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the
directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. This Court has ruled that LWDs are not created under
the Corporation Code, thus: LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their special charter.
Since under the Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations may have special
charters, LWDs can validly exist only if they are government-owned or controlled. To claim that
LWDs are private corporations with a special charter is to admit that their existence is
constitutionally infirm.
Clearly, LWDs exist as corporations only by virtue of PD 198, which expressly confers on
LWDs corporate powers. Section 6 of PD 198 provides that LWDs “shall exercise the powers, rights
and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws.” Without PD 198, LWDs would
have no corporate powers. Thus, PD 198 constitutes the special enabling charter of LWDs. The
ineluctable conclusion is that LWDs are government-owned and controlled corporations with a
special charter.
The phrase “government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters” means
GOCCs created under special laws and not under the general incorporation law. There is no
difference between the term “original charters” and “special charters.”
Furthermore, petitioner forgets that the constitutional criterion on the exercise of COA’s
audit jurisdiction depends on the government’s ownership or control of a corporation. The nature
of the corporation, whether it is private, quasi-public, or public is immaterial.
The Constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over “government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters,” as well as “government-owned or controlled
corporations” without original charters. GOCCs with original charters are subject to COA pre-audit,
while GOCCs without original charters are subject to COA post-audit. GOCCs without original
charters refer to corporations created under the Corporation Code but are owned or controlled by
the government. The nature or purpose of the corporation is not material in determining COA’s
audit jurisdiction. Neither is the manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a general or
special law.
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The determining factor of COA’s audit jurisdiction is government ownership or control of
the corporation.
Certainly, the government owns and controls LWDs. The government organizes LWDs in
accordance with a specific law, PD 198. There is no private party involved as co-owner in the
creation of an LWD. Just prior to the creation of LWDs, the national or local government owns and
controls all their assets. The government controls LWDs because under PD 198 the municipal or city
mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of an LWD for a fixed term of six
years. The board directors of LWDs are not co-owners of the LWDs. LWDs have no private
stockholders or members. The board directors and other personnel of LWDs are government
employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft laws.
ACCOUNTABLILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Ombudsman; power of the ombudsman: ombudsman has the authority to dismiss a complaint
outright.
REMBERTO C. KARA-AN vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL

[G.R. No. 119990. June 21, 2004.]
CARPIO J.:
FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Ombudsman’s Resolution 1995
dismissing petitioner Remberto C. Kara-an’s (“petitioner”) complaint for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019 2 (“RA 3019”) and the Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
wrote then Senator Maceda imputing certain criminal acts to “the present number and
membership” or “the clique of six” in the Board of Directors of the Al-Amanah Islamic Investment
Bank of the Philippines (“Islamic Bank”). The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. We will consider the present petition as one filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since a
reading of the contents reveals that petitioner is imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
Ombudsman for dismissing his complaint. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman’s grave abuse of
discretion lies in his failure to conduct the appropriate investigation in breach of constitutional,
statutory and administrative mandates. Petitioner also points out that EPIB Head Arnau, in his 1st
Indorsement/Letter dated 29 March 1994, named as respondents “the former chairman and
incumbent board members of Islamic Bank” instead of those who processed and approved the
anomalous P250,000 loan to CAMEC in 1986. Petitioner asserts that Arnau could have easily
determined the directors who approved the CAMEC loan by issuing a subpoena duces tecum to
Islamic Bank to produce a copy of the minutes of meeting of the Bank’s Board that approved the
loan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the Complaint was Proper.
HELD: NO. Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. The
Ombudsman has the “sole power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.”
The consistent policy of the Court is not to interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers. The Court explained the rationale underlying its policy of
non-interference in this wise: The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on
the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 of

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the Office of the Ombudsman, otherwise known as the “Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman,” provides that the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation
upon receipt of a complaint. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a preliminary
investigation is proper. 16 Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then
he may recommend its outright dismissal. 17 Since the Ombudsman can dismiss a complaint
outright for lack of merit, it necessarily follows that he can also dismiss the complaint for lack of
merit after the respondent’s comment to the complaint. The Ombudsman, through Graft
Investigation Officer I Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde, acted within her authority in requiring Islamic
Bank’s former chairman and incumbent board members to comment on petitioner’s letter-
complaint since the complaint mentioned Roberto F. De Ocampo and referred to “the present
number and membership of the Bank’s Board” as the ones responsible for the loan. The records fail
to show any abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman in dismissing the complaint after this inquiry.
The Ombudsman did not find prima facie evidence to proceed with the investigation simply because
respondents, except for Farouk A. Carpizo, were not yet directors of the Bank’s Board when the
Islamic Bank approved the CAMEC loan in 1986.
Petitioner cannot also compel the Ombudsman to order the production of certain
documents, 18 if in the Ombudsman’s judgment such documents are not necessary to establish
probable cause against respondents.
R.A. 6770 or the ombudsman law; decision imposing suspension of not more than one month’s
salary shall not be appealable; the phrase includes suspension for one month without pay
RENATO F. HERRERA vs. PLARIDEL ELMER J. BOHOL

[G. R. No. 155320. February 5, 2004]
YNARES-SANTIAGO J.:
FACTS: The case at bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision dated March 15,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63873 which affirmed the decision of the
Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-99-0027 finding petitioner guilty of simple misconduct and suspending
him for one (1) month without pay as well as its Resolution dated September 19, 2002 which denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Renato F. Herrera was a former Director III at the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Central Office, now DAR Regional Director at San Fernando, Pampanga. He approved
in January 1997 a request for shift of item number of respondent Plaridel Elmer J. Bohol, Senior
Agrarian Reform Program Officer at the Bureau of Agrarian Reform Information and Education
(BARIE) of the DAR, from Item 577-1 of Fund 108 to 562-3 of Fund 101. Respondent then drew his
salary under Fund 101 until April 17, 1997 when he was informed by the Department Cashier that
he may no longer draw his salary there under because his item had been recalled and given to one
Gregoria Ancheta. Respondent protested to petitioner but the latter referred him to BARIE Director
Sharon Joy Berlin-Chao, respondent’s immediate supervisor, who allegedly was the one who caused
the recall. Respondent subsequently charged the petitioner in the Office of the Ombudsman with
Grave Misconduct for allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to Gregoria Ancheta and/or Inefficiency
and Incompetence for illegally recalling his item.
On June 11, 1999 the Ombudsman rendered a decision, which finds respondent RENATO F.
HERRERA guilty of Simple Misconduct and is hereby meted the penalty of Suspension for One (1)
Month Without Pay to take effect immediately upon receipt of this Decision by the respondent, the
same being final and executory in accordance with Sections 7 and 10 of Administrative Order No.
07, in relation to Section 25 (sic) of Republic Act No. 6770.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the decision of the
Ombudsman was premature, and contesting some of its factual findings. The Court of Appeals
denied the appeal. It ruled that the questioned decision of the Ombudsman is unappealable citing
Lapid v. Court of Appeals. It also debunked petitioner’s defense of prematurity and his claim that
he did not fail to take measures to correct respondent’s recall. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated September 19, 2002.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty imposed upon him by the Ombudsman, that is, suspension for
one (1) month without pay, is appealable because it is not among those enumerated as final and
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unappealable under Sec. 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of
1989?
HELD: NO, it is not appealable. In enumerating the penalties which are final and unappealable,
Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 states: “Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public
censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and
unappealable.” We hold that the phrase “suspension of not more than one month’s salary includes
that imposed upon petitioner, i.e., suspension for one month without pay. There is no penalty as
suspension of salary in our administrative law, rules and regulations. Salaries are simply not
suspended. Rather it is the official or employee concerned who is suspended with a corresponding
withholding of salaries following the principle of “no work, no pay.” Or, an official or employee
may be fined an amount equivalent to his or her monthly salary as penalty without an
accompanying suspension from work.
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable.
The decision in the cited Lapid case wherein “the punishment imposed upon petitioner,
i.e., suspension without pay for one month, is not among those listed as final and unappealable” is
of no comfort to the petitioner. A reading of the decision will show that the penalty imposed upon
the petitioner therein, Gov. Manuel M. Lapid of Pampanga, was not suspension for one month but
suspension for one year. In fact, in the statement immediately preceding the dispositive portion of
the decision, the Court, after applying Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 and Sec. 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, ruled that “the decision imposing a penalty of one year
suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not immediately executory.”
Jurisdiction of the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation involving public officers; power of
the ombudsman to investigate public officers is not exclusive
HONASAN VS. PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DOJ

[G.R. NO. 159747, April 13, 2004]
FACTS: On August 4, 2003, an affidavit complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ)
by respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano alleging that a crime of coup d’etat was
indeed committed by Senator Gregorio Honasan in connection with the military personnel who
occupied Oakwood on the 27th day of July 2003. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ
sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation.
On August 27, 2003, petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a
Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ’s jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the
imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman
that has the jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel
and the Ombudsman were directed to file their counter-affidavits on or before September 23, 2003.
Hence, Senator Honasan filed a petition for certiorari against the DOJ Panel and its
members, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is the Ombudsman exclusively, not the DOJ, that has jurisdiction to
conduct the preliminary investigation under paragraph 1, Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution?
HELD: NO. The Constitution does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to
investigate and prosecute cases involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive conferment of the power
to the Ombudsman. The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any
Ombudsman case may be exercise by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular
capacities or as deputized Ombudsman Prosecutors.

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The Constitution, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Sandiganbayan Law do not give the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or
employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies. In other words, the DOJ
Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against public officers involving
violation of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Section 2, Article XII; the alienation of lands of the public domain is prohibited.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
[G.R. No. 133250. November 11, 2003.]
CARPIO J.:
FACTS: This Court is asked to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corporation 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in
Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place
the market price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The
difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion.
The Senate’s Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, conducted extensive public hearings to determine the actual market value of the public
lands sold to the private entity. The Senate Committees established the clear, indisputable and
unalterable fact that the sale of the public lands is grossly and unconscionably undervalued based
on official documents submitted by the proper government agencies during the Senate investigation
The Senate Committees found out that according to the zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the value of the Property is P7,800.00 per square meter; the Municipal Assessor
of Parañaque, Metro Manila, where the Property is located, pegs the market value of the Property
at P6,000.00 per square meter; and according to the appraisal report of the Commission on Audit,
the value of the property is approximately P 21,333.07 per square meter.
In addition, AMARI agreed to pay huge commissions and bonuses to various persons,
amounting to P1,596,863,050.00 (P1,754,707,150.00 if the bonus is included), which indicate that
AMARI itself believed the market value to be much higher than the agreed purchase price. Clearly,
the purchase price agreed to by PEA is way below the actual value of the Property, thereby
subjecting the Government to grave injury and enabling AMARI to enjoy tremendous benefit and
advantage.
Whether based on the official appraisal of the BIR, the Municipal Assessor or the
Commission on Audit, the P1,200 per square meter purchase price, or a total of P1.894 billion for
the 157.84 hectares of government lands, is grossly and unconscionably undervalued.
This gargantuan monetary anomaly, aptly earning the epithet "Grandmother of All Scams,"
is not the major defect of this government contract. The major flaw is not even the P1.754 billion
in commissions the Senate Committees discovered the private entity paid to various persons to
secure the contract, which, by any legal or moral yardstick, obviously constitutes bribe money.
The fatal flaw of this contract is that it glaringly violates provisions of the Constitution
expressly prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain.
ISSUE: Is the government contract entered into by PEA and AMARI violative of the constitutional
prohibition of alienation of lands owned by the State?
HELD: YES. The contract violates Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides: All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. . . . The submerged lands purchased by Amari are owned by the
State and are inalienable.

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Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State's
inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any
sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution.
In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged
lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the
750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still
submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay.
Large scale mining; contracts involving technical or financial assistance; phrase includes
management by a foreign-owned corporation so long as such contracts provide adequate
protection
LA BUGAL – B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. RAMOS

[G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004.]
PANGANIBAN J.:
FACTS: The present petition for mandamus and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the
Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and WMC
(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws.
Counsels for the petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR
stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, 35 giving the DENR fifteen days from
receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary without or in excess of
jurisdiction, claiming among others, in signing and promulgating the DAO No. 96-40 implementing
R.A. No. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows fully foreign owned corporations to
explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary to Section 2,
paragraph 4, Article XII of the Constitution.
Petitioners submit that, in accordance with the text of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, FTAAs should be limited to "technical or financial assistance" only. They observe,
however, that, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully
foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to
the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the mining activity. WMCP
nevertheless submits that the word "technical" in the fourth paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. No. 279
encompasses a "broad number of possible services," perhaps, "scientific and/or technological in
basis." It thus posits that it may also well include "the area of management or operations . . . so
long as such assistance requires specialized knowledge or skills, and are related to the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources." Respondents insist that "agreements involving
technical or financial assistance" is just another term for service contracts. They contend that the
proceedings of the CONCOM indicate "that although the terminology 'service contract' was avoided
by the Constitution, the concept it represented was not." They add that "the concept is embodied
in the phrase 'agreements involving financial or technical assistance.'" And point out how members
of the CONCOM referred to these agreements as "service contracts." WMCP cites Opinion No. 75, s.
1987, and Opinion No. 175, s. 1990 of the Secretary of Justice, expressing the view that a financial
or technical assistance agreement "is no different in concept" from the service contract allowed
under the 1973 Constitution.
On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its decision granting the Petition and
declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 7942, DAO No. 96-40, as well as
the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that the
FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the
subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, which , though permitted under the 1973
Constitution were subsequently denounced for being antithetical top the principles of sovereignty
over our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

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Subsequently, respondents filed separate motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether RA No. 7942 along with its Implementing Rules and regulations are
unconstitutional.
HELD: NO, It is constitutional. Petitioner’s claim that the phrase, “agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance” in Section 2, paragraph 4, Article XII of the Constitution simply
means technical assistance or financial assistance agreements, nothing more and nothing else. They
insist that there is no ambiguity in the phrase, and that the plain reading of paragraph 4 leads to
the inescapable conclusion that with the government is merely an agreement for either financial or
technical assistance only.
We do not see how applying a strictly literal or verba legis interpretation of paragraph 4
could inexorably lead to the conclusion arrived at in the first resolution. The drafter’s choice of
words—their use of the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance—does
not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The use of the word “involving”
signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do with,
otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. A literal and restrictive
interpretation of paragraph 4 suffers from certain integral logical inconsistencies that generate
ambiguities in the understanding of the provision. There has never been any constitutional or
statutory provision that reserved to Filipino citizens or corporations the rendition of financial or
technical assistance to companies engaged in mining or the development of any other natural
resources. As a matter of fact, financial and technical assistance, regardless of the nationality of its
source, would be welcome industry anytime with open arms, on account of the dearth of local
capital and the need to continually update technological know-how and improve technical skills.
The conclusion is clear and inescapable—a verba legis construction shows that paragraph 4
is not to be understood as limited only to foreign loans (or other forms of financial support) and to
technical assistance.
From the ConCon deliberations, the Court concluded that agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance are in fact service contracts, but unlike those of the 1973 variety,
the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and the on
the other, the government as the principal or “owner” of the works. As written by the framers and
ratified and adopted by the people, the Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts
with foreign corporations—as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to full control and supervision of the State.
The concept of control adopted in Section 2 of Article XII must be taken to mean less than
dictatorial, all-encompassing control; but nevertheless, sufficient to give the State the power to
direct, restrain, regulate and govern the affairs of the extractive enterprises. Control by the State
must be on the macro-level, through the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry
standards and similar measures that would enable the government to control the conduct of affairs
in various enterprises and restrain activities deemed not desirable or beneficial.
The end in view is ensuring that these enterprises contribute to the economic development
and general welfare of the country, conserve, the environment, and uplift the well-being of the
affected local communities. Such concept would be compatible with permitting the foreign
contractor sufficient and reasonable management authority over the enterprise it invested in.
The Court has weighed carefully the rights and interests of all concerned, and decided for
the greater good of the greatest number. Justice for all, not just for some. Justice for the present
and the future, not just for the here and now.
Section 14, Article XIV of 1973 constitution; aliens are disqualified from acquiring private lands
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL VS. EDERLINA P. CATITO

[G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003.]
CALLEJO, SR. J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He arrived in the
Philippines in 1974, started engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and married
Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board
without obtaining a divorce. Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a
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vacation where he met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao City. Unknown to
Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a German national.
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to return to the Philippines, and
engage in a wholesome business of her own. Upon their return to the Philippines, Alfred invested
his money and purchased 3 parcels of land in Davao, all of which were registered in the name of
Ederlina since he knew that aliens were not allowed to own real property under Philippine law.
After some time, Alfred and Ederlina’s relationship began to deteriorate. Alfred then proceeded to
file suits against Ederlina to recover his properties; among them was a complaint against Ederlina
with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific performance, declaration of ownership of
real and personal properties, sum of money, and damages. After due proceedings in the RTC of
Davao City, in Civil Case No. 17,817, the trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1995 in
favor of Ederlina. The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the purchaser of the
three parcels of land subject of the complaint was Ederlina. The court further stated that even if
Alfred was the buyer of the properties; he had no cause of action against Ederlina for the recovery
of the same because as an alien, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the
Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was null and void ab initio. On
March 8, 2000, the CA rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC. The appellate
court ruled that the petitioner knowingly violated the Constitution; hence, was barred from
recovering the money used in the purchase of the three parcels of land. It held that to allow the
petitioner to recover the money used for the purchase of the properties would embolden aliens to
violate the Constitution, and defeat, rather than enhance, the public policy
ISSUE: Is the petitioner entitled to recover said properties?
HELD: NO. Petitioner is not entitled to recover said properties because. Section 14, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands in the public domain. Lands of the public domain, which include private
lands, may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold
private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they have also been disqualified
from acquiring private lands. Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were
entered into by him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution;
hence, are null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and
void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. Such being the
case, the plaintiff is subject to the constitutional restrictions governing the acquisition of real
properties in the Philippines by aliens. The petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to
him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. Equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly.
Licenses; being a mere privilege a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder; it can be
revoked by the state in the interest of the public
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.

[G.R. No. 149927. March 30, 2004]
PANGANIBAN J.:
FACTS: The four petitioners, after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits
in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of
high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato
mountain range. Having succeeded in discovering said marble deposits, and as a result of their
tedious efforts and substantial expenses, the petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines for the
issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. After compliance with
numerous required conditions, License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the
herein petitioners.

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Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the Department of
Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners’ License No. 33 was cancelled by him. Because of
the aforesaid cancellation, the original petition was filed to assail the same.
After due hearing, the trial court ruled that the privilege granted under respondents’
license had already ripened into a property right, which was protected under the due process
clause of the Constitution. Such right was supposedly violated when the license was cancelled
without notice and hearing. The cancellation was said to be unjustified, because the area that
could be covered by the four separate applications of respondents was 400 hectares. Finally,
according to the RTC, Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the cancellation of the license, was an
ex post facto law; as such, it violated Section 3 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the license was revoked in violation of respondents’ Constitutional rights.
HELD: NO. The issuance of a license merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may
be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so
since the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural mineral resources are
matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do
not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-
impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-
encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the
demands of the general welfare.
This Court has consistently held that a license may be revoked or rescinded by executive
action when the national interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. Moreover, granting that respondents’
license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by the State in the exercise of police power. The
exercise of such power through Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord with jura regalia, which
reserves to the State ownership of all natural resources. This Regalian doctrine is an exercise of its
sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and of the patrimony of the nation, the
mineral deposits of which are a valuable asset.
Prohibition against monopolies; section 19, article XII; the operation of monopolies is not
totally banned by the constitution. However, the state shall regulate them when public interest
so requires.
EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION (EASCO) vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION

FRANCHISING and REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB)
[G.R. No. 149717. October 7, 2003.]
PANGANIBAN J.:
FACTS: In its desire to improve public service and its assistance to the victims of road accidents
involving public utility vehicles (PUVs), the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LFTRB) conducted a thorough investigation on the sufficiency of existing insurance policies for
PUVs. In the course of its investigation, the Board discovered that insurance coverage of PUVs was
only P50,000.00 for the entire vehicle regardless of the number of passengers or persons killed or
injured.
The Board, then, undertook nationwide consultations among the transport operators and
insurance companies and held meetings with the officials of the Insurance Commission.
Thereafter, the Board issued Memorandum Circular No. 09-011 fixing the insurance
coverage of PUVs on the basis of the number of persons that may be killed or injured instead of the
entire vehicle alone. The coverage is denominated as Passenger Accident Insurance Coverage
(PAIC), which fixes the coverage of P50,000.00 per passenger.
During the effectivity of Memorandum Circular No. 99-011, the Board received several
complaints from various transport organizations such as the FEJODAP, PISTON and the PCDO-ACTO.
The thrust of their complaints are: (1) the proliferation of fake insurance policies; (2) the predatory
pricing among competing insurance firms; (3) the proliferation of fixers in the premises of the
LTFRB endorsing certain insurance companies; and (4) the 'moonlighting' by personnel of the LTFRB
who induced operators to secure their policies from favored companies.
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To address these complaints, the Board held a series of meetings with the officers of
various transport groups composed of operators of bus, jeepney and taxi as well as representatives
of several insurance companies and officials of the Insurance Commission.
In a meeting where herein petitioner Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation (EASCO, for
brevity), the transport groups proposed the creation of [a] 'two-group system' and of [a]
'blacklisting scheme.'
The aforesaid proposal was then referred by the Board to the Insurance Commission for
confirmation. The Insurance Commission approved the proposal of the Board. Thereafter, the
LTFRB issued the herein assailed Memorandum Circular No. 2001-001.
Memorandum Circular No. 2001-001, which amended the previous Memorandum Circular
No. 99-011, addresses the complaints received by the Board coming from the different transport
groups. It reads: “In addressing these concerns, the different transport groups proposed the
creation of a two (2) group system whereby all insurance companies who would like to participate
in the passenger accident insurance program of the LTFRB must join any of the two groups, and
that the passenger insurance requirement of the PUV operators be divided between these two
groups on the basis of the number of their respective LTO license plates.” It also states that the
Board will only accept, as proof of compliance of this program, insurance policies/certificates of
cover duly approved by the Insurance Commission specifically for this project, and issued by any of
the two groups as authorized by the Board.
Claiming that Memorandum Circular No. 2001-001 and the implementing Circulars had
deprived it of its right to engage in the passenger accident insurance business, Eastern Assurance &
Surety Corporation (EASCO) filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals
questioning the validity of those issuances. The CA ruled in favor of the validity of the said circular
as it is a valid exercise of police power. According to the CA, the clear purpose of the condition is
to ensure the benefit of the riding public and pedestrians who may become victims of accidents
involving PUVs. Moreover, the CA found that the Circular had not violated the provisions of the
Constitution on free enterprise, equal protection and substantive due process.
ISSUE: Did the Memorandum Circular violate the constitutional proscription against monopoly as
well as unfair competition and combination in restraint of trade?
HELD: NO. The constitutional provision on monopolies is found in Article XII as follows: " Sec. 19.
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed." While embracing free
enterprise as an economic creed, the Constitution does not totally prohibit the operation of
monopolies. However, it mandates the State to regulate them when public interest so requires.
In the present case, the two consortia of insurance companies that have been authorized to
issue passenger insurance policies are adequately regulated by the Land Transportation Franchising
and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to protect the riding public. While individual insurance companies
may somehow be adversely affected by this scheme, the paramount public interest involved must
be upheld. In any event, all legitimate insurance companies are allowed to become members of the
consortia. Thus, there is no restraint of trade or unfair competition involved.
Intense competition has led insurance companies/agents offering insurance policies for
public utility vehicles to resort to ruinous tactics to sell their services. Notorious agents of these
companies have engaged in predatory pricing — selling the compulsory insurance coverage at an
unbelievable discount of sixty to eighty percent (60 to 80%) off the market rate. The huge coverage
and liability under the "no-fault clause" of the passenger accident insurance are grossly
disproportionate to the small premiums actually being paid.
Moreover, different persons or operators were issued certificates of cover (COC) or policies
bearing the same number. Thus, clams under these policies were not paid, or payments were
unreasonably delayed, resulting in prejudice to the riding public.
The present case shows a clear public necessity to regulate the proliferation of such
insurance companies. Because of the PUV operators' complaints, the LTFRB thus assessed the
situation. It found that in order to protect the interests of the riding public and to resolve problems
involving the passenger insurance coverage of PUVs, it had to issue Memorandum Circular No. 2001-
001 authorizing the two-group system. Subsequently, it promulgated Memorandum Circular No.
2001-010 accrediting PAMI and PAIC II as the two groups allowed to participate in the program.

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GOVERNMENT OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
GOCCS are enjoined to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms to handle their cases
and legal matters. but in exceptional cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of the
solicitor general or the government corporate counsel, as the case may be, and the written
concurrence of the commission on audit shall first be secured before the hiring or employment
of a private lawyer or law firm.
PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY vs. CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION

[G.R. No. 155692. October 23, 2003.]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: PHIVIDEC, through Atty. Adaza who is a private lawyer, filed a complaint for expropriation
against the respondent. PHIVIDEC is a government-owned corporation which was created by
Presidential Decree No. 538. PHIVIDEC, also through Atty. Adaza, filed an Amended Complaint,
which however lacked the prescribed certification against forum shopping.
On 13 October 1999, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the dismissal of the
expropriation case on the grounds of absence of the certification against forum shopping and lack
of authority of Atty. Adaza to represent PHIVIDEC. The motion was denied.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals came out with the assailed Amended Decision. Pointing out
that under Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 9, 13 and COA Circular No. 86-255 the
engagement of a private counsel of a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) requires
the prior written concurrence of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the
Commission on Audit (COA), respectively, the appellate court held that Atty. Adaza's representation
of PHIVIDEC in the expropriation case was not valid.
ISSUE: May PHIVIDEC, a government-owned corporation, be represented by a private lawyer in an

expropriation case?
HELD: As a general rule, NO.
Memorandum Circular No. 9 issued by President Joseph Estrada on 27 August 1998. Section
3 thereof states:
"GOCCs are likewise enjoined to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms to
handle their cases and legal matters. But in exceptional cases, the written conformity
and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the
case may be, and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit shall first be
secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm."
It was only with the enactment of Memorandum Circular No. 9 in 1998 that an exception to
the general prohibition was allowed for the first time since P.D. No. 1415 was enacted in 1978.
However, indispensable conditions precedent were imposed before any hiring of private lawyer
could be effected. First, private counsel can be hired only in exceptional cases. Second, the GOCC
must first secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the
Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, before any hiring can be done. And third, the
written concurrence of the COA must also be secured prior to the hiring.
There are strong reasons behind this public policy. One is the need of the government to
curtail unnecessary public expenditures, such as the legal fees charged by private lawyers against
GOCCs. Precisely, the two whereas clauses of Memorandum Circular No. 9 recite this particular
concern, viz:
WHEREAS, there is a need to reduce government expenditures by minimizing the
expenses of government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) which hire private
lawyers and law firms, considering the high cost of retainers, fees and charges that are
paid to said private lawyers and law firms;

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WHEREAS, one way of realizing savings on the part of government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) is to implement and enforce pertinent laws and regulations which
prohibit GOCCs from hiring private retainers and law firms to handle their cases and
legal matters, and those which direct GOCCs to refer their cases and legal matters to
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) for proper handling.
The other factor is anchored on the perceived strong ties of the OGCC lawyers to their
client government corporations. Thus, compared to outside lawyers the OGCC lawyers are expected
to be imbued with a deeper sense of fidelity to the government's cause and more attuned to the
need to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information.
Evidently, OGCC is tasked by law to serve as the law office of GOCCs to the exclusion of
private lawyers. Evidently again, there is a strong policy bias against the hiring by GOCCs of private
counsel.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative due process; res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings,
not to the exercise of administrative powers.
MONTEMAYOR VS. BUNDALIAN

[G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003.]
PUNO J.:
FACTS: Petitioner is a Regional Director of DPWH facing charges for accumulating unexplained
wealth in violation of Section 8 of R.A 3019. In an unverified letter complaint endorsed to the
Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), private respondent Bundalian charged
that petitioner purchased a house and lot at Bel Aire Drive, Los Angeles, California.
Petitioner argued that the real owner of then subject property was his sister in law and
that the latter only put such property in petitioners name to support their immigration plans to the
US. Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases
filed before the Ombudsman which were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
PCAGC decided against petitioner and ordered his dismissal from service pursuant to RA
3019.
Petitioner submits that he was denied administrative due process when the PCAGC relied
more on the unverified letter of complaint, which is hearsay evidence, than upon his counter
affidavit. He further insists that the PCAGC violated his right to confront and cross examine
because the respondent never appeared in any of the hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a
representative therein.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process in the investigation before the
PCAGC.
2. Whether or not the dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the
administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.
HELD:1. NO. Due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently
met. Petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and
cross examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by
participating in the proceedings before it. His active participation in every step of the investigation
effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due
process requirement.
2. NO. The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case.
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the
exercise of administrative powers
Exhaustion of administrative remedies with purely legal questions; power of courts to review
rule or regulation issued by administrative agency
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003.]
YNARES-SANTIAGO J.:
FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) issued on Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. The following are the important matters:
a) The billing statement shall be received by the subscriber not later than 30 days from end of
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billing cycle; b) No charge for diverted calls ; c) PTEs shall verify the identification and address of
each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards. d) Subscribers shall be updated of the remaining value of
their cards before the start of every call using the cards. e) The unit of billing for the cellular
mobile telephone service whether postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from 1 minute per pulse to
6 seconds per pulse. Upon publication to the Philippine star of the said memorandum it came into
effect after 15 days pursuant to the Memorandum Circular. On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a
Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures
to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. The among
other matters , the Memorandum directed CMTS operators to enforce strict compliance of the MC
13-6-2000 which required verification and identification of prepaid card purchasers.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone
Corporation filed against the NTC Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Umali
and Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity the Billing Circular and the NTC Memorandum,
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case in RTC of QC. Petitioners alleged that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate
the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Dept. of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is
oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of
property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability
of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM
and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and
void ab initio. Then Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention was granted by the trial court. Thus the
TRO was issued. Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. However, when it was raised in
the Appellate Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition, it was granted.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a need to exhaust administrative remedies when questions
raised are purely legal questions.
2. Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction on this matter.
HELD: 1. NO. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making
or quasi-legislative power.
2. YES. As such where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set
of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within
the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
Specifically, B.P. 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a
criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged
with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of
Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the

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constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires an administrative decision to

be first appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be
elevated to a court of justice for review.
LAND CAR, INC. vs. BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC., ET AL.

[G.R. No. 154377. December 8, 2003.]
VITUG J.:
FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Regional Office of the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB), Region XII, a verified application to operate a public utility bus service
from Davao City to Cagayan de Oro City via Butuan City.
Respondents, themselves grantees of certificates of public convenience, opposed petitioner's
application alleging that the route applied for was sufficiently being served by them, and that
"cutthroat competition" would only result if petitioner's application were to be favorably acted
upon.
The LTFRB rendered its decision granting petitioner's application and directing the issuance
of the corresponding Certificate of Public Convenience. Respondents' motion for reconsideration
was denied. Respondents then appealed to the Office of the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC). The DOTC Secretary reversed the decision of the
LTFRB. This time, it was petitioner's turn to move for reconsideration of the DOTC Secretary's
resolution. The motion, however, was denied by the DOTC Secretary. Respondents thereupon
moved for the immediate implementation by the LTFRB of the decision of the DOTC Secretary. The
LTFRB granted respondents' motion and directed petitioner to cease and desist from operating its
buses along the contested route.
Petitioner filed a letter-appeal to the Office of the President seeking to set aside the
resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, Land Car Inc. erred in filing a letter-appeal to the Office of
the President seeking to set aside the resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary, and likewise
filing before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, questioning the same resolution and
order of the DOTC Secretary subject of the letter-appeal addressed to the Office of the President.
HELD: NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the Office of the
President to review any determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows,
indeed requires, an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up
to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be priorly exhausted before the court's judicial power is invoked.
The appellate court correctly ruled that the action of a department head bears only the
implied approval of the President, and the latter is not precluded from exercising the power to
review the decision of the former pursuant to the President's power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. The Office of the President validly acquired jurisdiction over the
case upon the filing therewith of the appeal by herein petitioner, and said jurisdiction is not lost by
the subsequent recourse by the petitioner of the certiorari proceedings before the Court of
Appeals. Jurisdiction which has attached in the first instance continues until the final resolution of
the case. Incongruently, the appellate court, while recognizing to be valid the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Office of the President, ordered the dismissal of the appeal pending with the
said office based on forum shopping.
The decision of the appellate court ordering the dismissal of the appeal taken to the Office
of the President is clearly flawed. It is the latter, not the appellate court, which could dismiss the
case pending before that office. It also behooves courts of justice, if only for reasons of comity and
convenience, to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress is completed so
as to give the administrative office every opportunity to correct its error and to properly dispose of
the case. In fact, the appellate court's order to dismiss the appeal pending with the Office of the
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President could well constitute an undue intrusion into a valid exercise of jurisdiction by the
President over acts of subordinates within that office.
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; the law provides for remedies against the
action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts
can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein
ILOILO CITY ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND APPEALS, ET AL. vs. GEGATO-ABECIA
FUNERAL HOMES, INC., ET AL.
[G.R. No. 157118 December 8, 2003]
YNARES-SANTIAGO J.:
FACTS: The City Council of Iloilo enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 2001-072 which was duly ratified
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Section 41 (3)(d) of said ordinance
provides, among others, for a prohibition to operate a funeral establishment at a minimum radial
distance of at least 25 meters from restaurants, food centers and other food establishments.
Respondent applied with the City Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (CZBAA) of
Iloilo for the issuance of a permit to operate a funeral establishment on a 4-storey building located
between a restaurant and a bakery in the commercial zone of Iloilo City, classified as C2. Invoking
Section 46 of the zoning ordinance which gives the CZBAA the discretion to grant exceptions from
the provisions thereof, respondent contended that since its business is classified under Category II,
i.e., without embalming facilities, it should be excepted from the prohibition to operate a funeral
establishment at a radial distance of less than 25 meters from food establishments.
In Resolution No. 7, the CZBAA of Iloilo denied respondent's application.
Consequently, respondent filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 29 to compel the CZBAA of Iloilo to grant its prayer for exception and to issue
the corresponding permit to operate a funeral establishment under Category II. Respondent claimed
that Zoning Ordinance No. 2001-072 is unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits the operation of
funeral establishments without embalming facilities (Category II) within a radial distance of less
than 25 meters from food establishments; and assuming that the ordinance is valid, the CZBAA
gravely abused its discretion in outrightly denying the application.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies;
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a writ of mandamus directing the CZBAA
of Iloilo to issue a permit to operate a funeral establishment.
HELD: 1. YES. The settled rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of the court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
without practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state
that courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
Petitioner also argues that it is seeking to enforce, through the petition for mandamus, a
clear legal right under the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code
granting tax exemption on properties actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes. But petitioner is taking an unwarranted shortcut. The argument gratuitously presumes
the existence of the fact which it must first prove by competent and sufficient evidence before the
City Assessor. It must be stressed that the authority to receive evidence, as basis for classification
of properties for taxation, is legally vested on the respondent City Assessor whose action is

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appealable to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
if necessary.
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and
directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of
law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law
provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case
at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein.
Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner
should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. Section 55C of Zoning
Ordinance No. 2001-072, which was duly reviewed and ratified by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, categorically provides that "[d]ecisions of the Local Zoning Board of Adjustment
and Appeals shall be appealable to the HLURB."
2. YES. The issuance of a permit to operate a funeral establishment and the grant of exception
from the zoning ordinances is a discretionary act of the CZBAA of Iloilo. Well-settled is the rule
that mandamus may not be availed of to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already taken in the exercise of either. In the
present case, the trial court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the CZBAA of Iloilo by
directing the latter to issue a permit to operate a funeral establishment in favor of respondent. All
that the court can do is to see to it that the licensing authorities have proceeded according to law.
Where an administrative body simply refuses to take any action whatsoever, the court may issue a
writ of mandamus to compel it to take some action, but should not attempt to prescribe the action
to be taken and thereby control the discretion or judgment of the board or officer.
R.A.9136: authority of the ERC to allow provisionary increase of electricity rates; authority
must be exercised in accordance with the procedure provided by the applicable law.
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, ET AL. vs. ERC, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 161113. June 15, 2004.]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Status Quo Order. The Petition assails the order of
respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), provisionally authorizing respondent Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO) to increase its rates by an average amount of twelve centavos (P0.12)
per kilowatt hour.
MERALCO filed with the ERC an Application for an increase in rates. MERALCO also prayed
ex parte for the grant of a provisional authority to implement the increase according to the
schedule attached to its Application.
The ERC, without first resolving the Motions for Production of Documents of NASECORE and
FDC and apparently without considering Lualhati's Opposition, issued an Order provisionally
approving MERALCO's ex parte application for rate increases. At the scheduled date of hearing, the
ERC did not revoke the provisional authority granted. FDC filed the instant Petition. FDC also filed
with the Court an Urgent Motion to Grant Restraining or Status Quo Order Bayan Muna, Bayan, KMU,
Gabriela, Kadamay, Agham, Gabriela Women's Party and the Anak Pawis (petitioners-in-
intervention) filed their Motion to Intervene.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate adjustments under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform
Act of 2001" (EPIRA)
2. Assuming that the ERC has the authority to grant provisional orders, whether the grant
by the ERC of the provisional rate adjustment in question was committed with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
HELD: 1. YES. The law created the ERC in place of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).

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ERC authority is found in Secs. 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. Section 44 provides that the powers and
functions of the Energy Regulatory Board that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby transferred to the ERC. The foregoing transfer of powers and functions shall include all
applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel as may be
necessary.
The principal powers of the ERB relative to electric public utilities transferred to the ERC
are the following:
1. To regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by elective companies;
2. To issue certificates of public convenience for the operation of electric power utilities;
3. To grant or approve provisional electric rates.
It bears stressing that the conferment upon the ERC of the power to grant provisional rate
adjustments is not inconsistent with any provision of the EPIRA. The powers of the ERB transferred
to the ERC under Section 44 are in addition to the new powers conferred upon the ERC under
Section 43. Section 80 of the EPIRA complements Section 44, as it mandates the continued efficacy
of the applicable provisions of the laws referred to therein.
2. YES. Under Section 16(c), C.A. No. 146 and Section 8, E.O. No. 172 in relation to Sections 43 and
80 of the EPIRA, the ERC may grant provisional rate adjustments without first conducting a hearing
prior to such grant. However, it is required to conduct a hearing on the propriety of the grant of
provisional rate adjustments within 30 days from the issuance of the provisional order.
Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR requires the ERC to resolve the motion for issuance of a
provisional order within seventy five (75) calendar days from the filing of the application or
petition. If, within 30 days from the publication of the application or receipt of a copy thereof, an
affected consumer or the Local Government Unit (LGU) concerned files with the ERC a comment on
the prayed for provisional rate adjustment and/or the application itself, the ERC is mandated to
consider such comment in its action on the prayer for provisional rate adjustment. Two postulates
evidently flow from a reading of Section 4(e), Rule 3. First, the publication of the application itself
is required, not merely the notice of hearing issued by the ERC. Second, in granting a provisional
authority, the ERC must consider not only the evidence submitted by the applicant in support
thereof, but also the comments of the consumers and the Local Government Units (LGUs)
concerned.In other words, the ERC must wait for thirty (30) days from service of copies of the
application for rate adjustments on interested parties or from the publication of such application
before it can issue a provisional order. If after the 30th day, no comments are filed by concerned
parties, then and only then may the ERC, if it deems proper under the circumstances, issue a
provisional order on the basis of the application and its supporting documents. In view of the
infirmities which attended the issuance of the November 27, 2003 Order, particularly: (1) the
failure of MERALCO to publish its Application or at least a summary thereof; (2) the failure of the
ERC to resolve the Motions for Production of Documents filed by the oppositors to MERALCO's
Application before acting on the motion for provisional rate adjustment; and (3) the failure of the
ERC to consider the arguments raised by the oppositors in their respective pleadings prior to the
issuance of the assailed Order; the Court declares void the November 27, 2003 Order of the ERC for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Administrative supervision; limited only to the authority of the department to generally

oversee the operations of such agencies and to ensure they are managed effectively, efficiently
and economically but without interference with day-to day activities
PEOPLE vs. GARFIN

[G.R. No. 153176. March 29, 2004]
PUNO J.:
FACTS: On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in
relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the “Social
Security Act for his continued refusal and failure to remit the premiums due for his employee to the
SSS.

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The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City presided by
respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. On September 24, 2001, accused Serafin Saballegue
pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-trial. Three days thereafter, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information was filed without the prior
written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition
contending that the Regional State Prosecutor has already directed the city or provincial prosecutor
to inhibit from handling SSS cases. it was further argued that given the designation of State
Prosecutor Tolentino, the city prosecutor need not participate in the filing and prosecution of the
information in the case at bar.
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss
stating that the Information has not been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of
the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE: Is prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor necessary in filing
an information?
HELD: YES. The power of administrative supervision is limited to “the authority of the department
or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance
of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of
maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not
increase or add to them.” This is distinguished from the power of “supervision and control” which
includes the authority “to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine
priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and
programs.”
The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative
supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and provincial
prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition.
Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is
questionable to say the least.
In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice
designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written
approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case
No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the
information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not
err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

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LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

QUALIFICATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Qualifications of public officers; an elective local official, is not barred from running again for
the same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms;
Qualifications of public officers correlated to public corporations; the new city acquired a new
corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality; this does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying the subject constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the
office of the city mayor. as stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City Of Digos is the
same as that of the municipality
ARSENIO A. LATASA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA

[G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003.]
AZCUNA J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioner's third term, the Municipality of Digos
was declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on
September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to be known as the City of Digos" or the
Charter of the City of Digos. This event also marked the end of petitioner's tenure as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was
mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his
oath as the city mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the
May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefore, and likewise disclosed that
he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now
running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in
the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and/or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein
that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor
of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as
mayor from 1992 to 2001.
On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer, arguing that he did not make any
false representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had
served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that
this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections since
this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent's certificate of candidacy should be cancelled for being
a violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.

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2. Whether the disqualification of a mayoralty candidate would be tantamount to the
transfer of the votes accounted to his name to the second placer making the latter the
winning candidate.
HELD: 1. YES. As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to
choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this
rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local
government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate and
distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded
different treatment consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not
deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However,
he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he
cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of
the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same
group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive
terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception
to the people's freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor
after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the
very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as
chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not
abhorred by it.
2. NO. As held by the SC in Labo, the disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily
entitle the candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of the
elections. As an obiter, the Court merely mentioned that the rule would have been different if the
electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and
efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in
which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. The same, however, cannot be said of the present case.
The SC has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are
cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to be
disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number
of votes to be declared elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidate's
election a nullity. In the present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private respondent
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Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for petitioner Latasa. The second placer is obviously not the
choice of the people in that particular election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the
contested office is thereby created which should be filled by succession.
DUTIES OF A PUBLIC OFFICER
Duty of judge; duty of sheriff is ministerial in nature; remedy in case of errors of judgment
SILVESTRE H. BELLO III vs. AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, ET AL.

[A.M. MTJ-00-1311 October 3, 2003]
FACTS: A letter-complaint dated November 21, 1997 was filed before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by the then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello III charging Judge Augustus C.
Diaz of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 37) with Rendering an Unjust Decision
in Civil Case No. 37-17388, entitled "Spouses Jose B. Luriz and Amelia M. Luriz vs. Victor S. Clavel".
He likewise charged Deputy Sheriff Efren P. Luna of the same court with Grave Abuse of Authority
for implementing the writ of execution issued in said decision.
In the said case, respondent Judge rendered a Decision dated September 15, 1997 ordering
Clavel and "all persons claiming rights under him, or whoever is found in possession of subject
properties" to immediately vacate the subjects lots and restore peaceful possession thereof to
plaintiffs spouses Luriz. However the Complainant claims that the Respondent Judge rendered an
unjust decision because the ejectment case is a personal action against Clavel, the Administrator of
POC, and POC was not impleaded as a party defendant. The POC is the owner of the disputed
property and has been in continuous and peaceful possession of the same since 1953 and as such,
the ejectment decision could only be enforced against Clavel and not against "whosoever is found in
possession of subject properties. The writ of execution issued on a wrongful decision was
wrongfully implemented by respondent Deputy Sheriff resulting in prejudice and irreparable
damage to the Government, POC and its other concerned personnel who were all ejected from the
properties in question.
In his Answer, respondent Judge counters that the decision was rendered based on the
evidence presented and the applicable law. The term or phrase used in the decision is in
accordance with Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides, "may . . . bring an
action in the proper Municipal Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession". Considering that POC is claiming a right to use the property because of Presidential
Proclamation No. 732, and considering further that the named defendant, Clavel, as Administrator
of POC, is using the premises along with the personnel and employees of the POC because of his
sanction, it is but proper to consider the employees and personnel, and other people using the
premises, as claiming rights under Clavel.
ISSUES:
1. Was the decision of the respondent judge correct and within the letter of the law?
2. Was the Deputy Sheriff guilty of Abuse of Authority for implementing the writ of
execution?
3. Is an administrative proceeding a remedy in cases of error of judgment?
HELD: 1. YES. The Solicitor General has no basis for questioning the jurisdiction of respondent
Judge. The lawyers of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) handled the case for the defendant
in the trial court until it was decided. The OSG manifested that it considers the case as a
government case and not a personal case against Clavel alone as a private person. Thus, they are
estopped from claiming that this case is solely against Clavel. Besides, when a government
corporation or agency is sued, it is the officers or administrators who are named as the defendants
or respondents. Clavel being the Administrator of POC should be the one and is in fact the one
named as the defendant.

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2. NO. With respect to respondent Deputy Sheriff, the sheriff cannot be blamed for implementing
the writ of execution because when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial
duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it in accordance with its
mandate.
3. NO. A thorough evaluation of the letter-complaint reveals that the alleged errors committed by
respondent Judge pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. Such errors cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies. This has been well-emphasized in the case of Flores vs. Abesamis, wherein we held:
“…The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as
normal in nature …include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of judgment
or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against
error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e.,
whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter
alia, the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for
inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be… Resort to and
exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures
against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or
criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted
and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into
his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
Law and logic decree that administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof.
Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance
of their duties and functions.
Duties of public officers; duty of the judge not to delay a case
VICTOR A. ASLARONA vs. ANTONIO T. ECHAVEZ

[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1803 October 2, 2003]
BELLOSILLO J.:
FACTS: Complainant Victor A. Aslarona together with his brother and sisters were defendants in
Civil Case No. CEB-23577 for recovery of possession and ownership. Upon receipt of the complaint
they filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action, was
barred by prescription and laches, and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. On 10 December
1999 they also filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and for Contempt of
Court. The motions were submitted for resolution on 28 January 2000. However, despite a motion
for early resolution filed by the defendants in July 2000, it was only after more than twenty (20)
months or on 24 September 2001 that respondent Judge finally resolved the motions with a
consolidated order of denial.
Complainant alleged that such undue procrastination was a manifest and clear act of gross
inefficiency on respondent's part, and that he was clearly ignorant of the law when he rejected as
unmeritorious the grounds relied upon in the Motion to Dismiss. Complainant therefore prayed that
respondent Judge be dismissed from the service for gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the
law with forfeiture of his retirement benefits.
Respondent Judge admitted his delay in resolving the aforementioned motions in Civil Case
No. CEB-23577. However he denied that the same was due to any deliberate intent or refusal to
perform a duty on his part. On the contrary, he claimed that the delay was due simply to his heavy
workload which in fact had already caused him to suffer from a heart ailment. After evaluation of
this case, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended in its Report dated 11 July 2003 that
(a) this case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; (b) respondent Judge be fined P5,
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000.00 for delay in resolving the motions in Civil Case No. CEB-23577 with warning that repetition
of the same offense shall merit a stiffer penalty; and, (c) the charge of gross ignorance of the law
however be dismissed for being premature as there was still a pending motion for reconsideration
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 February 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70454.
ISSUE: Was the rationale of the respondent judge correct in excusing himself for the delay in
resolving the said case in controversy?
HELD: NO. The Court repeatedly warned judges to dispose of court business promptly, resolve
pending incidents and motions, and decide cases within the prescribed periods for "delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute." Such exhortation is in fact enshrined in Sec. 15, par. (1),
Art. VIII, of our Constitution, as well as in Rule 3.05, Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which mandates that a magistrate should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.
In the instant case, respondent Judge failed to act on a Motion to Dismiss and a
consolidated Urgent Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and for Contempt of Court within
a reasonable period. It was only after twenty (20) months and notwithstanding a motion for early
resolution filed in July 2000 that respondent Judge finally resolved the motions with an order of
denial. Clearly, by no stretch of the imagination can such lengthy period of twenty (20) months be
considered as a "prompt" disposition of motions envisioned and mandated in the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Respondent cites his heavy workload as reason for the delay. However, such cannot excuse
him from administrative liability considering that he could have filed a motion for extension of time
as soon as it became clear to him that he could not possibly resolve the motions on time. Such
motions for extensions of time have always been invariably granted by the Court as it is always
sympathetic to the plight of judges who are more often than not beset with heavy caseloads.
Duty of a judge; duty of a clerk of court; the determination of whether to require a cash bond,
like the approval of bail or the release of the accused, is purely a judicial function and not
among the mandated duties of respondent clerk.
ROMEO T. ZACARIAS VS. JUDGE MARTONINO R. MARCOS ET.AL.

[A.M. NO. MTJ-04-1520 JANUARY 27, 2004]
PANGANIBAN J.:
FACTS: Justice Guevara-Salonga summarized the factual antecedents of the matter as follows:
"In an unsworn and undated letter-complaint filed before the Office of the Court
Administrator, the complainant [Romeo T. Zacarias] charged respondents with immorality and graft
and corruption. Complainant averred that he is the accused in a criminal case. Allegedly, he went
to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gerona, Tarlac, to secure a clearance but was informed that
he had already been convicted in the criminal case pending before the said court.
According to the complainant, the respondent clerk summoned him to the chambers of the
respondent Judge. While inside the judge's chambers, respondents allegedly tried to extort money
from him, or in the words used by the complainant, 'there[,] she and Judge Martonino Marcos
[were] asking money from me so that there will be some changes in the decision before it will be
promulgated.'
"Complainant confirmed that he was not able to attend the promulgation of the decision in
the criminal case against him but stressed that he did not receive any notice of said hearing.
Consequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against him 'to serve sentence.' At the hearing, he was
surprised [when] the respondent clerk . . . asked him to post a cash bond in the amount of one
thousand pesos for his provisional liberty despite the fact th[at] he was arrested specifically to
serve his sentence.
"Complainant further alleged that upon some inquiries, he was informed that the
respondent Judge does not approve bailbonds without bribe money and that the respondents are
engaged in an illicit love affair.

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In her Report, Justice Guevara-Salonga held that while complainant had failed to present
any direct and positive evidence of his charges of graft and corruption against respondents, the
records of the criminal case validated and confirmed his accusations. By and large, the following
facts were established by the records: 1) he did not apply for probation; 2) although he had been
arrested to serve his sentence, he posted a cash bond and was subsequently ordered released by
respondent judge; 3) the Release Order of September 28, 2000, as well as the Undertaking
attendant thereto, did not state that the posting of the bond was incident to complainant's
application for probation; and 4) complainant fully served his sentence from September 27 to
October 12, 2000. According to her, these matters of record attested to the fact that the cash bond
had been arbitrarily required by respondents and unduly posted by complainant when all that he
needed to do was serve his sentence.
The investigating justice concluded that the acts of respondents had been irregular,
unlawful, anomalous and totally inconsistent with any claim of good faith in the performance of
their judicial functions. As to the charge of immorality, she recommended that it be dismissed, as
it was based only on vicious rumors and unverified reports.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the actions of the respondent judge were free from all appearances of
impropriety.
2. whether or not the clerk of court was remiss of her duty when she required the accused
to post a cash bond
HELD:
1. NO. Exacting standards of rectitude and propriety are demanded of respondent judge. As the
epitome of integrity and justice, he should comport himself at all times in such a manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear searching public scrutiny. Such is the high price for the
honor bestowed upon those who occupy exalted positions in the administration of justice.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate "should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities"; and "should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. Since appearance and reality fuse in the performance of judicial
functions, the judge — like Caesar's wife — must not only be pure, but also be beyond suspicion.
In this case, respondent judge's September 28, 2000 Order releasing complainant after he
had been arrested "to serve sentence" finds no support in the records. It must be noted that Section
4 of Rule 114 35 of the Rules of Court grants bail, as a matter of right, to all persons in custody
even after conviction by the municipal trial court. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, on
the other hand, provides that "[a] judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or the accused has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal, or the accused has
applied for probation."
On September 28, 2000, the reglementary period for filing an appeal of a judgment of
conviction had not yet lapsed. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that complainant
commenced serving his sentence when he was arrested and confined on September 27. Where the
one accused has not voluntarily and knowingly commenced the service of one's sentence, but has
been confined merely by order of the court after the promulgation of judgment, such sentence
cannot be considered final or the service thereof commenced.
Complainant could have very well applied for probation, therefore, on September 28. Under
Section 4 of the Probation Law, such application must be filed by a qualified defendant, like
complainant, within the period for perfecting an appeal.
Be that as it may, there is regrettably nothing in the records to show that an application for
probation was filed by complainant. Neither did the Release Order indicate that he had been
discharged upon his application for probation.
Moreover, when complainant returned to jail to serve his sentence, respondent judge failed
to substantiate the latter's alleged issuance of a Commitment Order. Observed the investigating
justice:
". . .. Furthermore, respondent Judge's omission in issuing a Commitment Order poses severe
implications against their stance of innocence and compliant performance of duties. Surely, if we
are to be impressed that the complainant was released and thereafter voluntarily returned to jail,
the respondent Judge should have issued a Commitment Order to the jail warden. But then, the
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certification that complainant started to serve the sentence on 27 September 2000 is a clear
indication that he was not released at all after his arrest."
Indeed, the actions of respondent judge were not free from all appearances of impropriety.
His conduct lacked the meticulous care expected of one ever mindful of the image of the judiciary
that one portrays. It is the kind of behavior for which he must be administratively dealt with, as it
erodes public confidence in the judicial system
2. YES. By her own admission, she required complainant to post the cash bond, even though she
had not been instructed to do so by respondent judge. She thereby arrogated judicial power unto
herself. The determination of whether to require a cash bond, like the approval of bail or the
release of the accused, is purely a judicial function. It was certainly not among the mandated
duties of respondent clerk.
It has been stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone charged with the
dispensation of justice is circumscribed by the trust and confidence reposed in a public office. The
image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men
and women who work therein, from the judge to the lowliest clerk.
Clerks of court are key figures in the judicial system. For this reason, they must be
assiduous in performing their official duties and in supervising and managing court dockets and
records. They cannot slacken in their jobs under one pretext or another.
The laxity of respondent clerk in the supervision of court personnel was repugnant to her
role as an adjudicative and administrative officer of the court. Hence, she is subject to disciplinary
action.
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
Backwages; general rule; a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not
rendered any service
BALITAOSAN VS. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS

[G.R. No. 138238. September 2, 2003.]
CORONA J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo Balitaosan was among the public school teachers who were dismissed by
then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño for ignoring the return to work order while participating in the
teacher's mass strike at Liwasang Bonifacio from September to October, 1990.
Records reveal that an administrative complaint was filed against petitioner, together with
a certain Dalangin Sarmiento and Filomeno Rafer, charging them with grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law and Rules of Reasonable Office Regulations,
refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of
the service and absence without leave.
Petitioner failed to give his explanation on the charges against him despite due notice.
Thus, he was meted preventive suspension for 90 days and consequently dismissed from the
service.
Petitioner appealed said decision to the Merit System Protection Board but his appeal was
dismissed for being filed out of time.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission but the appeal and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied.
Petitioner then sought recourse from the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari which
yielded positive results, obtaining for petitioner an order of reinstatement without, however, any
award of backwages in his favor.
Not wholly satisfied with said decision, petitioner moved for its partial reconsideration,
praying for an award of backwages, but the same was denied in the above assailed resolution. Thus,
the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Does the investigation committee have competent jurisdiction?
2. Is the petitioner entitled to backwages for the period during which he was not allowed
to work?

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HELD: 1. YES. The investigation committee have competent jurisdiction.

Petitioner's reliance on the ruling in the case of Fabella, et al. vs. CA, et al. is totally
misplaced. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, in Fabella, the jurisdiction and composition
of the investigation committee was put in issue from the very start. When the Court found the
investigation committee to be without competent jurisdiction, it declared all the proceedings
undertaken by said committee void; therefore, it could not have provided the legal basis for the
suspension and dismissal of private respondents therein.
In the case at bar, however, aside from the catch-all and sweeping allegation of "denial of
due process," petitioner never questioned the competence and composition of the investigating
committee. He belatedly raised this issue for the first time in the petition for review before the
Court of Appeals. Thus, the appellate court acted correctly in rejecting petitioner's argument.
Issues raised for the first time on appeal cannot be considered because a party is not
permitted to change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is unfair to the other party and
offensive to the rules of fair play, justice and due process.
2. NO. The petitioner is not entitled to backwages.

The fact is that petitioner participated in the mass action which in turn resulted in the
filing of charges against him and his subsequent dismissal later on. His reinstatement was not the
result of exoneration but an act of liberality by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, petitioner's claim
for backwages for the period during which he was not allowed to work must be denied.
The general rule is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not
rendered any service. No work, no pay. Since petitioner did not render any service during the
period for which he is now claiming his salaries, there is no legal or equitable basis to order the
payment thereof.
LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

evidence, the allegations in their complaints; officers of the court are expected to discharge
their duties, including the safekeeping of court records, with circumspection, diligence and
efficiency.
EDNA B. DAVID vs. ANGELINA C. RILLORTA

[A.M. No. P-03-1709. July 11, 2003.]
CALLEJO, SR. J.:

FACTS: Before the Court is the sworn Letter-complaint of Edna B. David, charging Angelina C.
Rillorta, Stenographer and Officer-in-Charge, Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Branch 21, with
conduct unbecoming of a public official, grave abuse of authority and bribery.
David, the complainant, avers that she is an employee of the Great Domestic Insurance
Company of the Philippines, Inc., a surety company. David went to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Santiago City, Branch 21, to process the application for bail of one Marlene Agdeppa, an accused
in a criminal case who applied for a bail bond with the Great Domestic Insurance Company.
Rillorta, the respondent, lent the complainant the record of Criminal Case No. 3377 (People vs.
Marlene Agdeppa) in order that David could get the information necessary for Agdeppa's bail
application.
David was able to accomplish the document for the bail bond only at around 4:00 p.m. At
the time, Judge Fe Albano Madrid, the presiding judge of the RTC of Santiago City, Branch 21, had
already left. The respondent thus advised the complainant to return in the morning to secure Judge
Madrid's approval of the bail bond. The complainant went home, inadvertently bringing with her
the said court record.
The next morning, the complainant returned the record to the respondent. Upon returning
the record, the respondent berated and humiliated the complainant in front of other court
employees. The respondent then reported the incident to Judge Madrid, who instructed her staff to
be more diligent in handling court records.

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Aggrieved, the complainant filed the instant complaint against the respondent. As
summarized by the Court Administrator, the complainant likewise alleges that the respondent is
nice only to those litigants who are either rich or well-known in the locality; that she asks for
money, ranging from P1,500.00 to P3,000.00 depending on the amount of the recommended bail,
from the complainant's superior upon approval of the bail bonds; that she imposes excessive legal
fees; and that she does not issue official receipts for sums paid for the issuance of clearances and
that she uses the money collected therefrom to buy snacks and to pay for her ballroom dancing.
The respondent admits that she got angry with the complainant for surreptitiously bringing
home the record of Criminal Case No. 3377 without the knowledge and permission of any court
employee. According to the respondent, this was not the first time that the complainant committed
the same infraction. There was another instance when the complainant also brought home a record
of a case and returned the same only after the lapse of one month despite being repeatedly
reminded about it by the respondent. With respect to the other allegations, the respondent
vehemently denies their veracity.
Upon the recommendation of the Court Administrator, this Court, in the Resolution of
September 23, 2002, referred the matter to Executive Judge Madrid for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The investigating judge submitted her report, stating that all in all the accusations of
David is rather exaggerated brought about by her embarrassment when she was told that she "stole"
the records of a case, which was of her own making because she initially denied any knowledge of
the whereabouts of the records she took. As to the other accusations of abuse of authority and
bribery, there is nothing whatsoever to support them.
ISSUE: Should the respondent be dismissed because of her conduct unbecoming of a public official?
HELD: NO. In administrative proceedings, the complainants have the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in their complaints. In this case, the complainant, by her
failure to show up during the investigation despite the subpoena issued to her, manifestly failed to
substantiate her allegations against the respondent. As aptly observed by the Court Administrator,
"there is nothing in the records that would support complainant's allegations."
The recommendation of the Court Administrator that the Court advise the respondent to be
more careful and circumspect in the discharge of her duties most especially in handling court
records is well-taken. Indeed, as Officer-in-Charge of the RTC of Santiago City, Branch 21, it is
incumbent upon the respondent to ensure "the efficient and timely recording, filing and over-all
management of court records, including the safekeeping of exhibits, documents and all properties
of the said branch, subject only to the supervision and control of the presiding judge." The
respondent is thus expected to discharge her duties, including the safekeeping of court records,
with circumspection, diligence and efficiency.
Public officers due process; misrepresentation; grave misconduct
ARMANDO F. BERNARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL

[G.R. No. 124261. May 27, 2004]
CALLEJO, SR. J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Armando F. Bernardo entered the government service on November 5, 1975 as
Claims Adjuster of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baliuag Branch, a government-owned and
controlled corporation. In 1986, he was the Head of the Loans and Discount Division of the bank. He
also maintained Savings Account No. 28-110 with the said branch. On January 27, 1986, Bernardo
deposited the amount of P500,000 in his savings account. After making the said deposit, he
photocopied that page in his bank passbook where the deposit of P500,000 was reflected and, on
the same day, withdrew the said amount. He also executed, in his capacity as treasurer-in-trust of
the Markay Trading and Manpower Services, Inc. (MTMSI), a Treasurer's Affidavit, falsely certifying
that:
. . . at least 25% of the authorized capital stock of the corporation has been subscribed
and 25% of the total subscription has been paid and received by me in cash or property
in the amount of P500,000.00 in accordance with the Corporation Code.

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On the same day, Bernardo, still in his capacity as treasurer-in-trust of the said
corporation, executed a letter-authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), worded
as follows:
“This is to authorize your office to examine and verify the deposit in the Land Bank of
the Philippines, Baliuag, Bulacan, in my name as Treasurer-in-Trust for Markay Trading
and Manpower Services in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos only
(P500,000.00) representing the paid-up capital of the said corporation, which is in the
process of incorporation…”
On January 30, 1986, the Articles of Incorporation of the MTMSI was registered with the
SEC. 5 Bernardo signed the said articles 6 and was one of its incorporators. It also appears in the
said articles of incorporation that Bernardo was elected as a member of the Board of Directors.
Bernardo also executed an affidavit that he was elected treasurer of the corporation.
It turned out that while Bernardo was an elected treasurer of MTMSI, he never opened an
account with the LBP, Baliuag Branch, for the account of the said corporation. In the meantime,
Bernardo was promoted to the position of Assistant Branch Manager.
On September 18, 1989, the LBP, through its president, Deogracias N. Vistan, filed a formal
charge against Bernardo charging him of gross neglect, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the bank, and serious violation of Civil Service Commission (CSC) rules and
regulations. After due investigation, Bernardo was found guilty as charged. . Bernardo appealed to
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which rendered a decision affirming the resolution of
the LBP, but modified it in that he was found guilty of misrepresentation of a material fact
amounting to dishonesty for engaging directly in a private business without the permission required
by the CSC rules and regulations. It, likewise, affirmed the penalty of dismissal from the service
imposed by the LBP. Bernardo filed a motion for reconsideration as well as a supplement to the said
motion, but the Board denied the same. Bernardo appealed to the CSC, the CSC issued Resolution
No. 92-1834 affirming the penalty meted on him by the MSPB. The CSC absolved Bernardo of the
charge of dishonesty in connection with his execution of the treasurer's affidavit and the letter of
authorization to the SEC. Bernardo filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. When the
case was referred to the Court of Appeals, the same dismissed the case for lack of merit, hence this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the resolution of the CSC that he violated
Section 36(b)(24) of P.D. No. 807, implemented in Section 14, Rule XVIII of the CSC
Rules and Regulations?
2. Was the petitioner deprived of his right to due process when the CA affirmed the
resolution of the CSC finding him administratively guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service based on acts not covered by the
formal charges lodged against him?
HELD: 1. NO. The evidence on record shows that he was not only an incorporator, but was also a
member of the Board of Directors and was, in fact, the treasurer of MTMSI. Even after the
incorporation of the MTMSI, the petitioner remained as a stockholder and a member of the Board of
Directors. He was even elected treasurer of the corporation. He and his wife signed check vouchers
of the corporation during the period of November 16, 1986 to August 24, 1987:
Bernardo claims that his alleged act of engaging directly in a private business without the
required permission was committed only during the incorporation stage of MTMSI. This is, however,
belied by the numerous check vouchers of MTMSI for the period from November 13, 1986 to August
24, 1987 wherein the name and signature of Bernardo or his wife appeared. Thus, the affidavits
issued by Saturnino Dimatangal and Alicia Atienza, who were allegedly Incorporator and Cashier,
respectively, of MTMSI, attesting that only one Maricar Butalid ran and operated the business and
that Bernardo and other incorporators resigned right after its Incorporation, and that Mr. Bernardo
was never seen by Atienza in the office of MTMSI, are of no significance. The finding therefore that
he engaged directly in a private business without prior permission from the head of office as
required by Civil Service rules and regulations is proven. The records of the case are replete with

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facts and documents clearly belying respondent's assertion that he merely attempted to join this
corporation.
The petitioner also admitted that before he engaged in business, he failed to secure the
permission of his employer.
2. NO. The CA was correct in finding that the CSC did not err in finding the petitioner guilty of
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service based on the evidence
on record.
This court rejects the petitioner's contention that there was no legal and factual basis for
the decision of the MSPB and the resolution of the CSC. The respondent LBP adduced the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove the second charge. A cursory reading of the said page would lead one
to conclude that the petitioner had deposited the said amount, without disclosing, however, that
he also withdrew the said amount on the same day. The petitioner thus made a false statement in
his January 27, 1986 Letter to the SEC, when he stated that as treasurer-in-trust of the MTMSI he
had deposited P500,000 in his account in the LBP, Baliuag Branch, when the truth of the matter
was, the money was deposited in the petitioner's personal savings account and was also withdrawn
on the same day.
. . . [I]f a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or
grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office,
they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its
service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because
by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to
commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of
the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his
office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the
victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared
to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee
cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness
of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the
service.”
Misconduct of sheriff; sheriff is bound to discharge his duties without undue delay
AMELIA L. AVELLANOSA vs. JOSE Z. CAMASO

[A.M. No. P-02-1550. October 3, 2003.]
VITUG J.:
FACTS: The instant administrative case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint, dated 16 October
2000, filed by Amelia Lomuntad Avellanosa charging respondent Jose Z. Camaso with failure to
conduct an auction sale pursuant to an order, dated 04 August 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, of
a conjugal lot involved in Civil Case No. CEB-19293. On 04 August 2000, Judge Sarmiento issued an
Order directing herein respondent to put on auction sale a lot in connection with the above-
mentioned civil case. Upon being given a copy of the order, complainant proceeded to talk to the
sheriff. She introduced herself to the latter who asked her, in a rude manner, for a copy of the
description of the subject lot. She informed him that she did not bring a copy with her but they can
get a copy from the court's records. Respondent vehemently refused and insisted that there is no
such copy in his court files. Respondent then suddenly changed the subject and told her he was
directed by Judge Sarmiento to make an accounting of the proceeds of the sale. He read to her a
portion of the directive which states: 'Plaintiff shall render an accounting to the court on the
proceeds . . .' He then started to make an abstract of what he is going to spend, such as 'pamasahe,
merienda, at syempre, ang pagkain ko . . ..; Respondent sheriff finally sat down only after she told
him that all the money she had at that time was P20.00 but she will find a way to meet his
demands if only he will tell her how much she would give him. To this he replied 'Meron ka naman
dyan P140,000.00,' referring to the proceeds of the first auction sale. Attempts were made on
several occasions to see Sheriff Camaso, but to no avail. Thereafter, complainant filed her
grievance with the Office of the Ombudsman with a request for confrontation. The confrontation
was held at the Office of Director Virginia Santiago, during which she ventilated all her grievances

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against the sheriff. The latter denied her allegations and instead made up his own story and tried
to turn the tables on her. The OCA did not give credence to respondent's protestation of innocence,
and it recommended that respondent sheriff be FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 for his failure to
immediately implement the order of the court, dated 04 August 2000, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with severely.
ISSUE: Is Sheriff Camaso guilty of misconduct in failing to promptly implement the auction sale
order?
HELD: YES. The Court accepts the report of the OCA and agrees with its recommendation. A sheriff
is bound to discharge his duties without undue delay, as well as with care and attention, which any
prudent man would do in the management of his affairs. There is no room for any lackadaisical
attitude that betrays efficiency and competence. Neither should he accept, let alone asked for,
gratuities from parties he is bound to serve in the discharge of his office. Even when no outright
demand for money is made, any conduct unbecoming a court official can easily be perceived as
revealing a corrupt intent or as taking an undue advantage of a party's predicament. Any person
involved in the administration of justice ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty and
integrity in the public service. Sheriffs, in particular, must show a high regard for professionalism in
the performance of their duties given the delicate tasks reposed in them. Regrettably, respondent
has fallen short of the requisite circumspection.
Improper solicitation a violation of RA 3019-anti graft and corrupt practices act; the court has
stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of
justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility
ROBERT E. VILLAROS vs. RODOLFO ORPIANO

[A.M. No. P-02-1548. October 1, 2003]
PER CURIAM
FACTS: In a Sworn Complaint-Affidavit dated June 16, 2000, Rodolfo Orpiano, Court Stenographer
III and Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 32, was
charged by Robert E. Villaros with dishonesty, improper solicitation, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
The complainant alleged that in September 1999, he had gone to RTC Branch 32 to inquire
about the status of a case entitled Rosenda Esteban-Villaros vs. Estrella Carambas-Esteban,
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 1031-G. During the said occasion, the respondent allegedly
demanded from him the amount of P1, 500 as payment for the delivery of the summons to the
defendants of the case. According to the complainant, he refused to give in to the demand because
all summons, except for one, had already been served. Instead, he told the respondent that he was
willing to serve the remaining summons personally, so that he would not have to shell out the P1,
500.
The complainant further alleged that the respondent had assured him that the case would
be set for hearing, once the court received all the answers of the defendants. However, his
mother's case had not been set for hearing because of his refusal to give in to the demand of
respondent who allegedly had a reputation for demanding money from litigants. The complainant
further alleged that his brother Efren had likewise been victimized when the respondent demanded
P3, 500 to facilitate the proceedings in an adoption case.
The respondent denied all allegations. He averred that the summons was actually served
and that instead of blaming him, the complainant should have filed the appropriate pleading calling
for the setting of a hearing date. Denying that he had demanded money from anyone, the
respondent averred that complainant’s mother had even come back to thank him for the non-
publication of the alias summons. The executive judge, by virtue of a resolution, investigated the
case. He found no evidence proving that the respondent had actually received the P1, 500 the
latter had allegedly demanded from the complainant. However, there was ample proof that the
respondent committed an indiscretion when he visited the complainant and his mother in their
house to ask for money in connection with Civil Case No. 1031-G. The Investigating judge

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recommended that the penalty of one-month suspension without pay be imposed on the respondent
for violating Section 3(b), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
"Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law."
ISSUE: Is respondent guilty of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act, for soliciting money
from complainant for the alleged delivery of summons?
HELD: YES. The Court finds the respondent administratively liable for improper solicitation and
thus imposes the penalty prescribed by prevailing rules and jurisprudence, which is dismissal from
service on the first offense.
Time and time again, the court has stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials
involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed
with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all
times in order to merit and maintain the public's respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to
say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and
uprightness. The respondent's act of demanding money from the complainant hardly meets the
foregoing standard. Improper solicitation from litigants is a grave offense that carries an equally
grave penalty.
Under Section 52(A) (11) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dismissal is the penalty for improper solicitation at the first offense. Section 58(a) of the
same Rule provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.
Liability of public officers; unbecoming conduct of police officers
JENNY ZACARIAS vs. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, et al

[G.R. No. 119847. October 24, 2003]
FACTS: Sometime in June 1987, Jenny Zacarias, petitioner, then a member of the Western Police
District Command, Manila, was detailed at the Anti-Kidnapping Task Force, Criminal Investigation
Service Command (CISC), Philippine National Police (PNP), Camp Crame, Quezon City.
On November 5, 1991, Chief Inspector Ruben Zacarias, then Chief, Intelligence and
Operations of the Anti-Kidnapping Task Force, issued an order assigning petitioner to be on duty at
the Office of the Special Team, also of the Anti-Kidnapping Task Force. Detained there were
Alfredo "Joey" de Leon, suspected commander of the notorious "Red Scorpion Group" charged with
kidnapping with ransom cases, and Nicanor Attractivo who was charged with robbery and homicide.
At around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of November 8, 1991, the two detainees escaped
while in the custody of petitioner, then the outgoing guard on duty.
The Police Inspector General found that "the escape was an outcome of the laxity and non-
performance of official duty of outgoing duty guard SPO3 Jenny Zacarias when the latter did not
padlock the room where the detainees were temporarily detained before going to the comfort
room. Accordingly, the Police Inspector General recommended that petitioner be summarily
dismissed from the service pursuant to Section 42 of Republic Act No. 6975. 9
Consequently, petitioner was administratively charged with neglect of duty, inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of his duties. On December 4, 1991, the Chief of the PNP,
acting upon the Inspector General's recommendation, rendered a decision dismissing summarily
from the service petitioner effective on the same day.

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On appeal, the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the NAPOLCOM affirmed the PNP Chief's decision.
The NAB held that on the basis of the evidence on hand, petitioner is guilty as charged.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NAB.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, but the Appellate Court
dismissed the petition which, in effect, upheld petitioner's summary dismissal from the service. It
ruled that "the laxity and inefficiency of petitioner as the police guard on duty, resulting in the
escape from his custody of Alfredo de Leon, the notorious leader of the Red Scorpion Group,
constitutes 'conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman' which, under paragraph (c) of Section
42 of the PNP Law, is a ground for summary dismissal.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Respondent Court of Appeals err in holding that administrative offenses of
neglect of duty of inefficiency or incompetency in the performance of official duties
constitute conduct unbecoming of a police officer which may be the proper ground for
summary dismissal from the service under section 24, R.A. 6975?
2. Did the respondent Court of Appeals err in not concluding that petitioner was denied
due process?
HELD: 1. NO. The summary dismissal of petitioner by the PNP Chief and the NAB was anchored on
Section 42 of R.A. 6975 which provides:
"SEC. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors. —
The Chief of the PNP and Regional Directors, after due notice and summary hearings,
may immediately remove or dismiss any respondent PNP member in any of the
following cases:
(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong;
(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there
are reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty of the charges; and
(c) When the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, cited Section 3 of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 promulgated on August 6, 1992 defining the causes
for summary dismissal of erring PNP members, thus:
"Section 3. Causes for Summary Dismissal. —Any of the following can be a
cause/reason for summary dismissal of any PNP member:
A. When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.
xxx
B. When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there
are reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty of the charges.
xxx xxx xxx
C. When the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer.
Conduct unbecoming of a police officer' refers to any behavior or action of a PNP member,
irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing
himself as a PNP member, seriously compromises his character and standing as a gentleman in such
a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character; it may also refer to acts or
behavior with any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which is dishonoring or
disgracing himself personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member
and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization. Petitioner
contends that the charges of neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties against him cannot be classified under any of the three cases enumerated above.
Hence, the Chief of the PNP and the NAB cannot dismiss him summarily from the service. Webster
defines "unbecoming" conduct as "improper" performance. Such term "applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method."
Obviously, the charges of neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties fall within the scope of conduct unbecoming a police officer. Thus,
the Court of Appeals was correct.

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2. NO. On petitioner's contention that he was denied due process, it bears stressing that the
Police Inspector General conducted an investigation wherein the petitioner and other witnesses
were heard. It was only after the investigation that the Police Inspector General recommended to
the PNP Chief that petitioner is dismissed from the service summarily. Consequently, petitioner's
claim that he was denied due process is totally baseless.
The court has consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. And any seeming
defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing. There is no denial that the
essence of due process was sufficiently complied with in the present case.
Disgraceful and immoral conduct of a public officer is a valid ground for suspension.
GERALDINE P. DIZON vs. HIYASMIN L. CAMPO

[A.M. No. P-04-1774. February 9, 2004]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: Complainant alleged that respondent who is a single mother of a nine-year-old child was
having an illicit relationship with her husband, Arnel Dizon. On March 3, 2001, according to the
complainant, her husband admitted his relationship with the respondent who was then already one
month pregnant. She met with respondent in order to beg the latter to leave her husband and
respondent answered “I will” to the plea. However, respondent and complainant’s husband
continued their illicit relationship still. On December 19, 2001, complainant received a text
message from respondent that complainant’s husband loves her and was willing to leave his family
for her.
On March 4, 2002, complainant went to the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac, where she confronted
respondent about the illicit relationship inside the chamber of Judge Panfilo Valdez, Sr. Respondent
allegedly not only admitted her relationship with complainant’s husband but also stated that she
was pregnant. Pleading to respondent that she leave her husband, complainant offered financial
support. Respondent refused the offer, stating that she is working and that all she needs is
complainant’s husband.
Respondent filed a Comment dated March 15, 2002, denying the charges hurled against her.
She alleged that complainant’s husband, a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Capas, Tarlac,
became her acquaintance because of their common place of work. Hence, it was not infrequent
that she and Arnel would be seen talking with each other in public within the compound of the
Municipal Hall. It was only in the year 2001 that she found out that some employees attributed
malice to her acquaintance with Arnel Dizon. Respondent denied having sent text messages to
complainant. She also denied that she was pregnant and claimed she knew nothing about the
alleged admission of Arnel on the matter. To prove the point she submitted a Medical Certificate
dated May 5, 2002, attesting to the fact that she did not get pregnant within the preceding three
months.
On August 15, 2002, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Additional Evidence attaching
thereto a Certification dated August 9, 2002, from the Civil Registrar confirming the marriage that
took place on May 28, 2002, between Arnel T. Dizon and respondent.
On October 15, 2002, complainant filed another Motion to Admit Additional Evidence dated
October 4, 2002, attaching thereto the Application for Marriage License dated May 17, 2002, of
respondent and Arnel.
Respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration dated February 5, 2003,
praying that she be allowed to resign effective as of June 2003. She claimed that several months
after the filing of the administrative complaint, she decided to ask the indulgence of the OCA to
allow her to resign even though, as she claimed, she was an effective and efficient court
stenographer. The recommendation of the OCA allowing her resignation was simply noted pending
the submission of the report of the investigating judge.

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Investigating Judge Arsenio P. Adriano, Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 63, Tarlac City, in his
Report, recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of three (3) months suspension
without pay for immoral conduct.
ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of immorality? If guilty, is the penalty imposed justified?
HELD: YES. The Court affirms the findings of immorality on the part of the respondent reached by
the OCA and the investigating judge. However, the penalty they recommended is lower than what
respondent deserves.
The facts on record warrant the imposition of the penalty of suspension prescribed by the
Civil Service Law for the first offense for disgraceful and immoral conduct, the minimum of which is
6 months and 1 day while the maximum is 1 year.
Instead of rectifying her errant ways after the wife of her paramour had pleaded with her,
she continued the illicit relationship and even abhorrently aggravated the situation by marrying
complainant’s husband. Interestingly, respondent married him after she stated in her Comment
that her relationship with him was purely based on friendship. Respondent cannot feign ignorance
of Arnel T. Dizon’s marital status for he was then a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Capas,
Tarlac. Someone like respondent who works in the same Municipal Hall must have known of, or at
least could have easily verified, the status of Arnel. Even assuming that she was unaware of Arnel’s
married status when they first became acquainted with each other, she should have been put on
guard when a woman claiming to be his wife pleaded to her to abort her illicit relationship for the
sake of the couple’s two children.
By agreeing to marry a man during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to another
person, respondent subjected both herself and her paramour to the risk of criminal prosecution.
Also, while it appears that Arnel had courted respondent, the fact remains that she entertained the
advances of a married man. Respondent’s subsequent filing of an action for the annulment of her
marriage to Arnel does not extenuate her liability.
Liability of public officers; willful failure to pay just debts; law prescribes the penalty of
reprimand for the first offense
RELIWAYS, INC vs. LAMBERTO P. GRANTOZA.

[A.M. No. P-04-1812. May 28, 2004]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: On July 29, 2003, Aurelio P. Vendivel, Jr. filed on behalf of Reliways, Inc. a Complaint-
Affidavit charging the respondent, Lamberto P. Grantoza, with conduct unbecoming a court
employee for the latter's failure to pay his just debts. On April 27, 2001 and again on May 24, 2001,
Grantoza obtained from Reliways two (2) loans with the principal amount of P7,000.00 and
P4,500.00, respectively, or a total of P11,500.00, for which Grantoza executed the corresponding
Promissory Notes and an Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney in favor of Reliways and Vendivel.
According to Vendivel, oral and written demands 2 have been made upon Grantoza but the latter
refused and continues to refuse to pay his debt which, as of May 30, 2003, already totals
P19,427.05 inclusive of interest. Moreover, Vendivel avers that Reliways was forced to lend money
to Grantoza because Reliways then had a pending criminal case with the MeTC, Branch 62, Makati
City, where Grantoza is stationed as a Process Server. Grantoza admits having borrowed money
from Reliways but denies any intention not to pay the same. Further, Grantoza denies knowledge of
Reliways' pending criminal case with the court where he is stationed. The Office of the Court
Administrator evaluated the complaint and found it meritorious. Accordingly, the OCA
recommended that Grantoza be severely reprimanded for his willful failure to pay his just debts,
which amounts to conduct unbecoming a court employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Grantoza should be severely reprimanded for his willful failure to
pay his just debts.
HELD: Grantoza does not deny his indebtedness to Reliways. Thus, while we commiserate with his
unfortunate situation, we cannot condone his failure to pay his just debt. His administrative
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liability under the foregoing provision of the Revised Administrative Code is undisputed. The
penalty therefore is not directed at his private life but at his actuations unbecoming a public
official.
The Omnibus Rules implementing the provisions on the Civil Service of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 classifies willful failure to pay just debts as a light offense and
prescribes the penalty of reprimand for the first offense. Given that this is Grantoza's first offense
since his employment in 1979, he should be reprimanded, although not severely as recommended
by the OCA, considering his position as a Process Server.
Finally, Vendivel's contention that Reliways was "forced" to lend money to Grantoza
because of its criminal case pending in the court where Grantoza is stationed deserves no
sympathy. Between the two of them, Reliways had the upper-hand. What manner of enticement
could Grantoza, a mere process server, have dangled to "force" Reliways to extend him a loan?
Other than his bare allegation, Vendivel does not elaborate. We certainly cannot give credence to
his unsubstantiated claim.
Liability of public officers; administrative offense of grave misconduct can be committed only
in the exercise of the official function
FRIA V. DE LOS ANGELES

[A.M. No. CA-02-15-P. June 3, 2004.]
CARPIO MORALES J.:

FACTS: CA stenographer Josejina Fria (complainant), charged her co-stenographer Gemiliana De los
Angeles (respondent) with grave misconduct arising from the loss of money kept in the drawer of
complainant's table in the office as it is only the respondent who could have stolen the money
because she was on the date prior to the loss the one who is in dire need of the money. Further
delos Angeles has seen Fria count her money on the day prior the loss and she knew that the latter
has locked it in her drawer which could be opened even by a paper clip. Although there was no
eyewitness presented by complainant on the actual taking, several circumstances all point to
respondent as the one who took the money from complainant's drawer.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be liable for grave misconduct?
HELD: NO, respondent cannot be held liable for the administrative offense of grave misconduct
because her offense was not committed in the exercise of her official functions. As held by the
Supreme Court, misconduct must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of
official duty, which is not so in this case (Mariano v. Roxas, AM NO. CA-02-14-P, July 31, 2002;
Apiag v. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47, 59). Hence, respondent may be held liable for conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. But the Court found that evidence presented by the complainant
is not substantial but generally circumstantial. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides for the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be considered sufficient, to wit:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to prove conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, complainant established two circumstances viz: 1) prior to the incident,
respondent was in dire need of money; and 2) respondent was left alone in the office in the late
afternoon of December 20, 2001, and was seen alone in the mezzanine between 11:00 a.m. and
12:00 noon of December 21, 2001.
For the third requisite to seal the circumstantial evidence against respondent, it is essential
that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the person being accused, to the exclusion of others, as
the guilty person.
The circumstances proven by complainant do not completely discount the possibility that,
other than respondent, there could be another who could have stolen the money. As testified by
complainant herself, the drawer of her table could be opened by a paperclip, the bread knife that
lies around in the office, or any key, like that of an officemate's, that fits. Complainant thus failed

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to discharge the quantum of evidence — substantial evidence — to fault respondent. Her complaint
must thus fail. This leaves it unnecessary to dwell on respondent's evidence. Suffice it to state that
the result of the polygraph examination respondent took is in her favor, and her explanation why
she no longer pressed for her request to borrow money from her friends and/or officemates is
plausible.
Efficiency; Article VIII, section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution and canon 3, rule 3.05 of the
code of judicial conduct direct judges to dispose of their cases promptly and within the
prescribed periods, failing which they are liable for gross inefficiency.
DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA vs. ELIODORO G. UBIADAS

[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774. May 27, 2004.]
CARPIO MORALES J.:

FACTS: Complainant faults respondent for dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, on motion of the
accused, by Order 2 of July 9, 1997, Crim. Case No. 212-97, People of the Philippines v. Chia Say
Chaw, et al., for illegal entry.
Complainant alleges that by dismissing Crim. Case No. 219-97 "[d]espite . . . the provision
of P.D. 1599 which established the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines and [the
apprehension of the accused] within the 200 nautical miles of the . . . Zone," respondent "virtually
surrender[ed] our sovereignty and criminal jurisdiction to the Chinese government."
Complainant likewise faults respondent for failure to resolve, as he has yet to resolve, the
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of the abovesaid Order of July 9, 1997, despite the
lapse of more than two years since the filing of the motion. By such failure, complainant charges
respondent with violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins
judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods, and
of SC Circular No. 13 (July 1, 1987) which requires lower courts to resolve cases or matters before
them within three months or ninety days from date of submission.
Respondent, by Second Indorsement-Comment of March 20, 2000, contends that petitioner
has no personality to initiate the complaint against him as he is not a party to the cases subject
thereof.
Respondent counters, on the merits of the charges, that territorial jurisdiction over the
area where the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were arrested — within the vicinity of
Scarborough Shoal — has not yet been established by controlling jurisprudence, given the
conflicting claims thereover by the Philippines and China and the absence of an inter-country
agreement determining the common boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone.
As to his failure to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of his July 9, 1997 Order
dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, Crim. Case No. 212-97, respondent points out that said motion
was filed after the accused were already released from detention. He further points out that during
the pendency of said motion, representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) informed
him that said office was not interested in setting aside the order of dismissal but that it was
suggesting an amendment of the order.
Respondent explains though that since the accused had already been released from
detention and had left the Philippines, and the interest of the DFA was merely for the amendment
of the order of dismissal, the motion had already become academic.
ISSUE: Are the respondent’s acts of dismissal of the criminal case and non-resolution of the Motion
for Reconsideration subject to disciplinary action?
HELD: YES, but only with respect to the non-resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration.
On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges that, as mandated by the
Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know the very law
they are supposed to apply to a given controversy. They are called upon to exhibit more than just
a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and
to maintain the desired professional competence.

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The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, of Crim. Case No. 212-97 on
jurisdictional grounds is, however, a matter for judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a
party aggrieved by the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court, not file an
administrative complaint.
For, as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts
of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous. Only in cases where the error is gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or
incurred with evident bad faith may administrative sanctions be imposed. There is no showing that
this was the case here.
With respect to the non-resolution of the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97 no resolution of which has been issued, complainant, in
his Reply to the Comment of respondent, refutes respondent's explanation in this wise:
When the said motion was filed in Court on July 11, 1997 the Chinese fishermen were
not yet released from detention. It was during the pendency of the motion that the
Chinese fishermen were allowed to leave by the Chief of Police of Subic, Zambales
despite our representation that they should not be released from jail as another case
for illegal fishing was still pending investigation. . . . The representatives from the
Foreign Affairs merely wanted to convey to Judge Ubiadas the serious implications of
his Order of dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the territorial integrity
and national security of our country. In fact, Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon publicly
denounced the Order of dismissal issued by Judge Ubiadas as evidenced of an article
which appeared in the July 13, 1997 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Copy of said
article is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made integral part hereof.
Whether the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were already released at the time of the
filing of the motion for reconsideration did not relieve respondent from resolving it as in fact he
even issued an order stating that it was submitted for resolution.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct direct judges to dispose of their cases promptly and within the prescribed periods,
failing which they are liable for gross inefficiency.
To thus ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are
complied with, this Court laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 which provides,
inter alia, that:
“Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of
the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in
their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve
months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower
courts are given a period of three months to do so.”
Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent is liable for undue
delay in rendering a decision or order which is a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court and which carries the penalty of suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000
but not exceeding P20,000.
Liability of public officers; affidavit of desistance by complainant not a ground for dismissal of
JESSICA NOYNAY-ARLOS VS RODOLFO SEL. CONAG.

[A.M. No. P-01-1511]
VITUG J.:
FACTS: In Administrative Matter No. P-01-1511 Rodolfo Conag, clerk of court of the MTC of
Palompon, Leyte charged Jessica Noynay- Arlos, the court stenographer, with ‘Gross Negligence,
Dishonesty, Immorality, Dereliction of Duty, Misconduct and Falsification of Official Documents.
The complaint drew a response from Noynay-Arlos who, in turn charged Conag in Administrative
Matter No.P-01-1503 with ‘Gross Negligence, Immorality, Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct,

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Dereliction of Duty, Usurpation of Authority, Malversation, Incompetence, Corruption, Dishonesty
and Drunkeness.’
However, the joint affidavit of desistance was filed by the parties with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA). The OCA submitted its report stating that, the withdrawal of a
complaint or the desistance by a complainant does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of an
administrative complaint. The issue in administrative cases is not whether the complainant has a
cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employees have breached the norms and
standards of the judiciary.
ISSUE: W hether or not the affidavit of desistance warrants the dismissal of a complaint.
HELD: NO. The Court agrees with the OCA that the desistance by a complainant does not
necessarily warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint. The overriding need to maintain
the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary demands that the judiciary must do its duty
to root out any misconduct among its employees so long as there is sufficient basis thereof. An
affidavit of desistance does not divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and
ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint against a court personnel. The Court has
an interest in the conduct and behavior of all officials and employees of the judiciary. Its efforts
cannot be frustrated by any private arrangement of the parties.
Dismissal of criminal case not deemed as dismissal of administrative charges.
AÑONUEVO JR. and ESTRELLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS , ALMAZAN, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 152998. September 23, 2003.]
YNARES-SANTIAGO J.:
FACTS: Private respondents Sgt. Rodrigo Almazan and Giovanni Gumalo, both of the Office of the
Resident Ombudsman for MIAA-NAIA/Duty Free Phils., Inc. filed a complaint against Simon
Añonuevo, Jr., Acting Examiner, Estrella, Cosme, Concha, all officers of Bureau of Customs and
NAIA for violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713. They alleged that petitioners, while
assigned at the NAIA customs lanes 9 and 10, received money handed directly or inserted in the
passport of arriving passengers from Detroit, USA. They further alleged that respondents received
their share of the money collected by the petitioners. The Resident Ombudsman Team was able to
record on video a segment of the incident using the surveillance camera. The Ombudsman placed
the four officials under preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay, considering that the
evidence against them was strong. Then the said officials filed their Joint Affidavit and an Urgent
Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension.
Cosme and Concha filed their respective Supplemental Counter-Affidavit and Supplemental
Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension. Cosme denied any allegation relating her to acceptance of the
money. Moreover, Concha asserted his mere passing by the place were petitioners were standing
should not implicate him in the said offense though caught on camera. As such the Ombudsman
Court exonerated and dismissed the cases against Cosme and Concha; but maintained Anonuevo
guilty of the charge against him. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration which prompted the
petitioners t file a special civil action for certiorari. However the Court of Appeals dismissed the
same for failure to comply with technicalities.
In the criminal case pending in the MTC against petitioners, the action was dismissed upon
the motion of the public prosecutor
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case against the accused deems the
administrative case dismissed.
HELD: NO. Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case
against an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence does not foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of
health in all respects. The quantum of evidence required in the latter is only substantial evidence,
and not proof beyond reasonable doubt that is required in criminal cases. Thus, considering the
difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions
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imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other.
It appears that pending the resolution of the administrative disciplinary case, the Office of
the Ombudsman filed an Information for Indirect Bribery against the petitioners before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 48, based on the same set of charges. The Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasay City conducted a reinvestigation of the case and recommended the
withdrawal of the Information for insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
13 On March 8, 2001, the trial court granted the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the Public
Prosecutor.
Petitioners argue that the dismissal of the criminal case for indirect bribery against them
warrants the dismissal of the instant administrative disciplinary case on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence.
This Court is not a trier of facts. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive, as in the case at bar. Substantial evidence, which
is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, suffices to hold one administratively liable. The "substantial
evidence" rule in administrative proceedings merely requires such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners are guilty of violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public officials and
Employees.
Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. — Public officials and employees shall not solicit or
accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything
of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in
connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be
affected by the functions of their office. . . .
Corollary thereto, Section 11 (a) of the same Code reads:
Penalties. (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds
office or employment in a casual, temporary, hold-over, permanent or regular capacity
committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the
equivalent of six (6) months salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year or removal
depending on the gravity of offense after due notice or hearing by the appropriate
body or agency.
Liability of public officers; the resignation of a judge does not render moot and academic the
VICTORY LINER, INC., vs. JUDGE REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321. March 10, 2004]
DAVIDE, JR.C.J.:
FACTS: On 2 March 2000, while a Victory Liner bus bearing Plate No. CWF-935 was cruising along
the National Highway of Dinalupihan, Bataan, it accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana
Bautista Morales. Marciana died the following day. VLI shouldered all the funeral and burial
expenses of Marciana. Subsequently, on 6 March 2000, VLI and the heirs of the victim entered into
an Agreement/Undertaking. On 14 March 2000, after payment by VLI of the claims, Faustina M.
Antonio, the authorized and designated representative of the heirs of the victim, executed a
Release of Claim and an Affidavit of Desistance in favor of VLI and the driver Reino de la Cruz.
However, earlier or on 3 March 2000, two of Marciana’s sons Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy
B. Morales, who were also signatories to the Agreement/Undertaking, executed a Pinagsamang
Salaysay against Reino de la Cruz. On the strength of that document, a criminal complaint was filed
with the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10512.
After preliminary examination, or on 13 March 2000, respondent Judge Bellosillo ordered
the immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest against De la Cruz and fixed his bail at P50,000 to be
posted in cash. He further directed the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to immediately

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impound the bus involved in the accident, which could be released only upon the posting of a cash
bond in the amount of P50,000.
On 30 March 2000, VLI filed a Manifestation and Motion manifesting that it was depositing
to the court under protest a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of its bus. After making the
deposit, VLI’s counsel presented the receipt issued by the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Dinalupihan, to
the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, who then released the bus.
On 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondent’s court a petition to declare null and void the
order directing it to post bond for the release of its bus. This petition was, however, dismissed for
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction.
On that same day also, respondent Judge Bellosillo issued an order directing the Chief of
Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and his deputies and investigators to explain in writing why they
should not be held in contempt of court for, and be administratively charged with, having released
without a court order the Victory Liner bus involved in Criminal Case No. 10512. Thus, the bus was
re-impounded by the police authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Subsequently, on 18 April 2000, respondent Judge acted on VLI’s Manifestation and Motion
dated 30 March 2000 and issued an order for the release of the bus.
On 23 June 2000, VLI filed a verified administrative complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) against the respondent.
In his Report and Recommendation, retired Justice Narciso T. Atienza, the OCA Consultant
to whom this case was referred by the Court, submits that Judge Bellosillo’s resignation, which was
accepted by the Court En Banc effective 27 March 2002, does not render moot and academic the
instant administrative complaint. He finds that the respondent Judge erred in ordering the
impounding of the Victory Liner bus and in requiring a cash bond of P50,000 for its release; in fixing
an excessive bail bond for Reino de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512; and in increasing the bail
bond of Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373 unconscionably from P60,000 to P350,000.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the resignation of respondent judge renders the administrative case
moot and academic.
2. Whether or not the current administrative case is the proper forum in determining the
legality of issue of respondent’s order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release
of its impounded vehicle.
HELD: 1. NO. Verily, the resignation of respondent Judge Bellosillo does not render moot and
academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the
filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge ceased
to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its jurisdiction to pronounce the
respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught
with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications.
2. NO. This administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the legality of
respondent’s order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI
should have raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of
an administrative case. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. As we have said in Santiago v.
Vasquez, the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking a ruling directly from us must be put to a halt.
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly from us
through an administrative case would be to countenance a disregard of the established rules of
procedure and of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade compliance with the
requirements inherent in the filing of a proper petition, including the payment of docket fees.
Public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. LIZA MARIA E. SIRIOS

[A.M. No. P-02-1659. August 28, 2003]
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FACTS: Administrative case on the falsification of daily time record (DTR) committed by Liza Maria
E. Sirios, Clerk III, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Makati City. In her
explanation, Sirios admitted falsifying her DTR for April 2001. She apologized, claiming that she is a
single mother and in dire need of money to pay for the rental/deposit for another apartment to
which she will transfer after she was ejected from her former place. According to her, she was
constrained to commit a grave offense as she was desperate at that time. She regrets and pleads
for understanding. Her daughter is only four years old and she has no means to support her if ever
she loses her job. She promises never to falsify her DTR again.
ISSUE: Is respondent guilty?
HELD: YES. As can be gleaned from her explanation, respondent knows that falsifying her DTR is a
grave offense, and that she could possibly lose her job if charged administratively. Hence, when
she tampered her DTR, she manifested her lack of integrity and a perverse sense of responsibility.
Indeed, she has fallen short of the degree of discipline exhorted from court personnel which we
stressed in Mirano vs. Saavedra, 225 SCRA 77, thus: "Public service requires utmost integrity and
strictest discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and
integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task. By the very nature of their duties and
responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the
principle solemnly enshrined in the 1987 Constitution that a public office is a public trust; and all
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. The conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times,
must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but must be above suspicion. Indeed,
every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty."
Dismissal from service: length of service is an alternative circumstance
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. DELIA T. CORTEZ

[G.R. No. 155732. June 3, 2004.]
PER CURIAM
FACTS: Respondent Delia T. Cortez, Chief Personnel Specialist of the Examination and Placement
Services Division (EPSD) of Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO), was formally charged with
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Respondent Cortez filed an answer vehemently denying the charges against her. The CSC ruled that
respondent was guilty of illegally selling recycled stamps for her own financial gain, an act which
constituted dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. It ordered respondent dismissed from the service with forfeiture of benefits and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service, without prejudice to any civil or
criminal liability in a proper action. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC
denied it.
Respondent promptly filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 . She
raised in her petition the issues of violation of administrative due process and the propriety of the
penalty of dismissal. The Court of Appeals granted respondent's petition. It ruled that the penalty
of dismissal imposed on her was too harsh considering (a) her twenty-one years of service in the
government, (b) the fact that it was her first offense and (c) that no damage was sustained by the
Government. It modified the penalty imposed on respondent from dismissal from the service with
all its accessory penalties to that of forced resignation from the service with entitlement to all the
benefits under the law. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals
petitioner filed the petition at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstances of “length of service” and “first offense” should be
appreciated to mitigate the penalty imposed against the respondent.

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HELD: NO. Respondent's guilt for the administrative offense charged has long been settled when
she did not question before the Court of Appeals the decision of the CSC finding her guilty of
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Under the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules, dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service are grave offenses punishable by dismissal
from the service. Thus, as provided by law, there is no other penalty that should be imposed on
respondent than the penalty of dismissal. Of course, the rules allow the consideration of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances and provide for the manner of imposition of the proper penalty.
Petitioner CSC is correct that length of service should be taken against the respondent. Length of
service can either be a mitigating or aggravating circumstance depending on the factual milieu of
each case. Length of service is an alternative circumstance. The S.C did not consider length of
service in favor of the respondent because of the gravity of the offense she committed and of the
fact that it was her length of service in the CSC which helped her in the commission of the offense.
Respondent was the Chief of the EPSD, but despite such important and senior position which should
have impelled her to set a good example to her co-employees and other civil servants, respondent
flagrantly and shamelessly violated the law by selling, for her own financial gain, used examination
fee stamps, right in her own office and during office hours. Such flagrant and shameless disregard
of the law by a senior officer seriously undermined the integrity of the CSC, the body mandated by
the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of the civil service.
The gravity of the offense committed is also the reason why we cannot consider the "first
offense" circumstance invoked by respondent. even though the offense respondent was found guilty
of was her first offense, the gravity thereof outweighs the fact that it was her first offense.
Preventive suspension; preventive suspension under section 13 of RA 3019 otherwise known as

the anti-graft and corrupt practices act is mandatory and automatic
BARRERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. Nos. 145233-52. May 28, 2004.]
CARPIO MORALES J.:

FACTS: Henry Barrera (petitioner), the Mayor of Candelaria, Zambales was indicted before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Consequently he was faulted for abuse of authority and penalized with suspension from office
without pay for six months.
Petitioner received on October 3, 2000, a copy of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying his motion for reconsideration of the order for his preventive suspension in the criminal
cases. And he received on October 30, 2000 a memorandum from then Secretary Alfredo S. Lim of
the Department of Interior and Local Government implementing the suspension order.
It is petitioner's contention that the rationale for the suspension under Section 13, R.A.
3019 is to prevent the officer or employee from using his position and the powers and prerogatives
of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with the records, which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. And, so petitioner maintains, since the prosecution failed to
prove, if not substantially allege that he is abusing the prerogatives of the office, intimidating
possible witnesses and/or tampering with documentary evidence during the pendency of the cases
against him, the suspension order should not have been issued at once
ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension under Section 13 of Rule 3019 is mandatory and
automatic?
HELD: YES. It has been long settled, however, and it bears reiteration that Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public official "shall be suspended from
office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. The rule on the matter is specific and
categorical, leaving no room for interpretation. There are no ifs and buts about it. The court has
neither the discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent
the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue
committing malfeasance in office. Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan so teaches.

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ELECTION LAW
COMELEC
Power to declare failure of elections; conditions before COMELEC can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a failure of elections; causes for failure of elections
ABDUSAKUR M. TAN ET. AL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

[G.R. Nos. 148575-76. December 10, 2003.]
CALLEJO, SR. J.:

FACTS: The petitioners aver that the respondents were proscribed from filing their amended
petition for a declaration of failure of elections and/or for the annulment of elections under
Section 6, Republic Act No. 7166 for the reason that the petitioners had already been proclaimed
the winning candidates. They contend that a petition for declaration of failure of elections or for
the annulment of an election can no longer be filed and prosecuted after the winning candidates
had already been proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC). They aver that the
proper recourse of the respondents was to file election protest cases against the petitioners as the
winning candidates. The petitioners also assert that the proceedings in an election protest are not
summary in nature and should be ventilated in a full-blown hearing. The petitioners argue that the
amended petitions of the respondents are election protest cases over which the COMELEC assumes
jurisdiction in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers and should be referred for hearing and
resolution to a Division of the COMELEC as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution
and Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The respondents, for their part, aver that the public respondent took cognizance of the
amended petitions under Section 4, Rep. Act No. 7166 in its administrative capacity and not as a
quasi-judicial body. They also contend that the acts/omissions alleged in the amended petitions are
proper subjects for a petition for a declaration of a failure of election or for the annulment of the
elections. They assert that in a petition for a declaration of failure of election, the public
respondent does not exercise quasi-judicial functions because it does not adjudicate any conflicting
or adverse claims of the contending parties as there are no rights to speak of under which adverse
claims to such rights are made. They argue that in taking cognizance of the amended petitions, the
public respondent was merely performing its duties as an administrative body tasked to ensure
clean, honest, orderly and peaceful elections. The said respondents cited the ruling of the Court in
Loong v. COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC En Banc, now public respondent, is vested with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and resolve the amended petitions before it.
HELD: NO. The amended petitions filed by the respondents herein are election protest cases over
which the public respondent has original exclusive jurisdiction under Section 2(2), Article IX of the
Constitution. The public respondent assumed jurisdiction over the amended petitions in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. Section 4, Rep. Act No. 7166 provides that the COMELEC
sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members may decide, among others, the declaration of
failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Said Section 6, in turn, provides that:
Section 6. Failure of Elections. — If, on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not

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been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect.
In their amended petitions before the public respondent, the respondents herein Abdusakur
Tan, et al., the petitioners therein, substantially alleged that the respondents therein who are the
petitioners in this case were the duly proclaimed winning candidates; that the elections in the
Municipalities of Luuk, Parang and Indanan, Province of Sulu, were marred by massive substitution
of voters, fraud, terrorism and other anomalies, impelling them to file their petitions pursuant to
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 7166 in relation to Section 6, Omnibus Election Code, and reiterated in
Section 2, Rule 26 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended. But Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code lays down three instances where a failure of election may be declared,
namely, (1) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (2) the election in any polling
place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or (3) after the voting and
during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous cases. In all instances there must have been a failure to elect. This is
obvious in the first two scenarios, where the election was not held and where the election was
suspended. As to the third scenario, the preparation and the transmission of the election returns,
which give rise to the consequence of failure to elect, must as aforesaid be literally interpreted to
mean that "nobody emerged as a winner."
Hence, before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
elections, two conditions must concur, namely, (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts
on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and
(2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election. Note that the cause of such
failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes.
In these cases, elections were held in the questioned municipalities. In fact, the very
reason why the respondents filed their amended petitions before the COMELEC on May 30, 2001 was
to impaled the petitioners as the respondents therein who had been proclaimed as the winning
candidates; hence, were indispensable parties to the petitions. In resolving the amended petitions,
the public respondent will have to rule on the validity of the proclamation of the petitioners and
their right to hold office and perform the duties appurtenant thereto. The alleged fraud and
irregularities, granting arguendo that they indeed marred the elections, did not prevent or suspend
the holding of the elections in the aforementioned municipalities including the preparation and
transmission of the election returns. Indeed, these returns were duly canvassed by the respective
municipal boards of canvassers which prepared the corresponding certificates of canvass which
were in turn canvassed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu which, after such canvass,
proclaimed the petitioners herein as the winning candidates in the May 14, 2001 elections.
In their two petitions, petitioners made no specific allegation as to the presence of any of
the three above-mentioned circumstances. They merely enumerated the various acts of alleged
terrorism and fraud. There was no allegation that due to said acts of terrorism and fraud no
election was actually held or that there was suspension of election or even if there was election
held, nobody emerged as a winner. On the contrary, it is apparent that there was an actual
election. What petitioners are saying is that it was not a valid and legitimate elections. The issue is
still pending determination of the COMELEC and the present petition before this Honorable Court is
therefore premature. This Court has made a pronouncement in Bagatsing v. COMELEC, 320 SCRA
817 [1999] that it does not look with favor on the practice of seeking remedy from the Supreme
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Court without waiting for the resolution of the pending action before the tribunal below, absent
extraordinary circumstances warranting appropriate action by this Court.
In sum then, the grounds alleged by the private respondent in his petition before the
COMELEC are those for a regular election protest and are not proper in a pre-proclamation
controversy; nor is such petition one for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of failure
of elections in the municipality of Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC should have ordered the
dismissal of the petition instead of issuing the assailed order. The COMELEC thus committed a grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the same. The error is
correctible by the special civil action for certiorari.
Reliance by the respondents of the ruling of this Court in Soliva v. COMELEC 33 is
misplaced. In that case, the Court ruled that the petition to declare a failure of election filed with
the public respondent was proper despite the proclamation of the winning candidates because the
grounds alleged in the petitions and proved during trial were that the counting of the votes and the
canvassing of the election returns were attended by fraud, intimidation, terrors and harassment. In
this case, there was no allegation of fraud, terror, intimidation and harassment in the counting of
votes and the canvassing of election returns.
The filing of pre-proclamation controversies under §248 of the Omnibus Election Code,
however, is not the only ground for the suspension of proclamation. Two other instances are
provided in R.A. No. 6646, known as "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987," viz.: (1) Under §6 of the
statute, the COMELEC may, upon motion of the complainant in an action for disqualification,
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate if the evidence of his guilt is strong, and (2)
under §7 thereof, the COMELEC may likewise suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate if
there is ground for denying or canceling his certificate of candidacy . . .
Power to declare failure of elections; instances of failure of elections
SANGCAD S. BAO vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 149666. December 19, 2003]
CARPIO MORALES J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Sangcad S. Bao sought re-election as mayor of Butig, Lanao del Sur in the May
14, 2001 elections. Aside from petitioner, the other candidates for mayor were Gorigao Langco
(Langco), Dimnatang L. Pansar (Pansar), and Rasmia U. Salic Romato (Romato).
On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed before the COMELEC a "Very Urgent Petition for
Suspension of Counting of Votes by the Board of Election Inspectors, Canvass of Election Returns
and Proclamation of Winners by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, and Declaration of Failure of
Election in Butig, Lanao del Sur,” naming Pansar, COMELEC Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Ray
Sumalipao, and "COMELEC Deputy" Col. Felix Castro, Jr. as respondents. Petitioner later filed on
May 29, 2001 an "Additional Submission” containing Casidar's "Narrative Report on the Conduct of
the May 14, 2001 National and Local Elections in the Municipality of Butig, Lanao del Sur. On June
4, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Motion to Defer Canvass of Election Returns and Suspend
Proclamation,” reiterating the arguments in his previous petition.
On June 8, 2001, Langco (petitioner-intervenor), filed a petition-in-intervention adopting
the allegations of petitioner and further alleging the occurrence of other irregularities during the
conduct of the elections. When the hearing before the COMELEC ensued, the COMELEC dismissed
the petition of petitioner Bao.
ISSUE: Did respondent COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS committed grave abuse of discretion in not
declaring a failure of election?
HELD: NO. In Mitmug v. COMELEC, this Court held that before the COMELEC can act on a verified
petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has
taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and second, the votes not cast would affect the
result of the election. And in Typoco v. COMELEC, this Court held:
“Clearly then, there are only three instances where a failure of election may be
declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date

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fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; (c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes. In all instances there must have been a failure to elect; this is
obvious in the first scenario, where the election was not held and second where the
election was suspended. As to the third scenario, the preparation and transmission of
election returns which give rise to the consequence of failure to elect must as
aforesaid be literally interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as winner.”
In the present case, the allegations-bases of both the petition and Langco's petition-in-
intervention before the COMELEC are mostly grounds for an election contest, not for a declaration
of failure of election. While there are allegations which may be grounds for failure of election, they
are supported by mere affidavits and the narrative report of the election officer. That petitioner
and petitioner-intervenor were not able to present substantial evidence in support of their
allegations should not be blamed on the COMELEC, for during the June 28, 2001 hearing, Atty. Jose
Ventura Aspiras, collaborating counsel for petitioner, on being informed that respondent Pansar had
not yet received the summons to necessitate the resetting of the hearing, made a "request," which
was granted, that said respondent should just file "an answer or memorandum to abbreviate the
proceedings," and did not object to the COMELEC's pronouncement to consider the petition
submitted for resolution after the filing of the answer or memorandum. Under the circumstances,
petitioner and petitioner-intervenor are deemed to have waived their right to present further
evidence to substantiate their petition. Since, as the following portion of the assailed COMELEC
resolution states, both petitioner and petitioner-intervenor failed to discharge the burden of
proving their allegations, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Power to prosecute election offenses; the prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are subject
to its authority, control and supervision in respect of the particular functions covered by such
deputation; authority under the last paragraph of section 28 of republic act no. 6648 to exempt
those who have committed election offenses
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, vs. HON. DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL.

[G.R. Nos. 149164-73. December 10, 2003.]
CALLEJO, SR. J.:

FACTS: According to the petitioner, COMELEC, the prosecution of election offenses is under its sole
control. Any delegation of its authority to the Provincial or City Prosecutor to prosecute election
cases may be revoked or withdrawn by it, expressly or impliedly, at any stage of the proceedings in
the RTC. The petitioner, through Atty. Michael Valdez of its Law Department, had already entered
his appearance for the petitioner as public prosecutor before the respondent judge. The Provincial
Prosecutor was, thus, ipso facto divested of his authority, as deputized prosecutor, to represent
the petitioner on the motion to dismiss and to prosecute the cases before the respondent judge.
The respondent judge, for her part, avers that COMELEC Resolution No. 00-2453 was
approved only by four of the seven members of the petitioner sitting en banc, and as such, could
not have validly revoked Resolution No. 00-1378 which was, in turn, approved by unanimous vote of
the Commission Members sitting en banc. The judge, behooved the petitioner to conduct a joint
reinvestigation in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 and EO No. 98-219 to ascertain whether the respondents-
appellants in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 were exempt from prosecution for vote-selling.
Finally, according to the respondent judge, Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is contrary to Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, which does not allow the
petitioner to withdraw its deputation of Provincial or City Prosecutors.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC, in the prosecution of election offenses has the authority
to revoke or withdraw delegation of authority to the Provincial or City Prosecutor.
2. May the COMELEC grant election law offenders immunity from prosecution.
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HELD: 1. YES. Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is empowered to
investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the Constitution to
the petitioner of the express power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to
enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
election. Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly
authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The
petitioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government. In Section 2,
Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, all Provincial and City Prosecutors and/or their
respective assistants are given continuing authority as its deputies to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses under election laws and to prosecute the
same. The complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them by the petitioner
or its duly authorized representatives. The respondent's assertion that Section 2, Rule 34, of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is a violation of Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code has been
laid to rest by this Court in Margarejo vs. Escoses, wherein this Court ruled that until revoked, the
continuing authority of the Provincial or City Prosecutors stays.
The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal
contemplation, the acts of the petitioner itself. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any
time by the petitioner, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such revocation or
withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good, or
where it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the petitioner.
The withdrawal by the petitioner of its deputation of the provincial or city prosecutors may
not be interfered with or overruled by the trial court. In this case, the petitioner had resolved to
approve the recommendation of its Law Department and nullified the Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, and directed its Law Department, not the Provincial Prosecutor, to
implement the said resolution and file the necessary motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00
to 7969-00 pending with the respondent judge. The Law Department did file before the respondent
a "Motion to Dismiss" the said cases and a motion for the respondent to, in the meantime, suspend
the proceedings. Atty. Michael L. Valdez, a legal officer of the petitioner's Law Department,
entered his appearance for the petitioner. The Provincial Prosecutor was thereby relieved of his
deputation to represent the petitioner in connection with the said motion. However, the Provincial
Prosecutor refused to give way to the Legal Officer of the petitioner and even opposed the said
motion. The act of the Provincial Prosecutor constituted a defiance of the resolution of the
petitioner and should have been ignored by the respondent judge.
2. YES. Section 261(a)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code penalizes vote-buying and vote-selling and
conspiracy to bribe voters.
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises
money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or
grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or
indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation,
entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or
against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any
aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar election
process of a political party.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. — Two or more persons, whether candidates or not,
who come to an agreement concerning the commission of any violation of paragraph (a)
of this section and decide to commit it.
Not only principals but also accomplices and accessories are criminally liable for
election offenses. 21 Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648 governs the prosecution of
the crimes of vote-buying and vote-selling, thus:
SECTION 28. Prosecution of Vote-buying and Vote-selling. — The presentation of a

complaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer or promise

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by or of the voter's acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives,
leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to
be immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized
legal officers, under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner is mandated to conduct a
preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same. The general rule is
that the petitioner must investigate, charge and prosecute all those committing election offenses
without any discrimination to ensure a clean, orderly and speedy elections. A joint preliminary
investigation thereof must be conducted and the appropriate Information filed in court against all
the offenders. To enable the petitioner to comply with its mandate to investigate and prosecute
those committing election offenses, it has been vested with authority under the last paragraph of
Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648 to exempt those who have committed election offenses under
Section 261 (a) and (b) but volunteer to give informations and testify on any violation of said law in
any official investigation or proceeding with reference to which his information and testimony is
given. The law is an immunity statute which grants transactional immunity to volunteers from
investigation and prosecution for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code.
The power to grant exemptions is vested solely on the petitioner. This power is
concomitant with its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses and prosecute
those committing the same. The exercise of such power should not be interfered with by the trial
court. Neither may this Court interfere with the petitioner's exercise of its discretion in denying or
granting exemptions under the law, unless the petitioner commits a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
CANDIDATES AND CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
Certificate of candidacy; defects in the certificates of candidacy should have been questioned
on or before the election and not after the will of the people has been expressed through the
ballots.
EDUARDO T. SAYA-ANG, SR., ET AL. vs. COMELEC, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 155087. November 28, 2003.]
AZCUNA
FACTS: Petitioners, Eduardo T. Saya-ang, Sr. and Ricardo T. Lara, were candidates for the Office of
Barangay Captain of Barangays Congan and New Aklan respectively for the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) and Barangay Elections. Petitioner Saya-ang filed his
certificate of candidacy in Barangay Congan on June 6, 2002. On the other hand, petitioner Lara
filed his own certificate of candidacy in Barangay New Aklan on June 8, 2002. On July 19, 2002, a
letter-report was submitted by Acting Election Officer Alim to the Law Department of the Comelec
which stated that petitioners herein are not residents of the barangays they wish to be elected in.
In turn, the Law Department of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) submitted its study to the
Comelec en banc on July 9, 2002 recommending the denial of due course to the certificates of
candidacy of petitioners. On the day of the elections or on July 15, 2002, the Comelec, issued En
Banc Resolution No. 5393, which essentially denied due course to the certificates of candidacy of
petitioners herein.
Despite the Resolution, petitioners were still proclaimed as winners on July 16, 2002,
having garnered the most number of votes in their respective barangays. On July 31, 2002,
petitioners took their oath of office before Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr., the First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Sarangani Province.
On August 9, 2002, Pio Jose S. Joson, Deputy Executive Director for Operations of the
Comelec, issued a Memorandum for all Regional Election Directors, Provincial Election Supervisors
and City/Municipal Election Officers. This memorandum directed all election officers to delete the
names of those candidates whose certificates of candidacy were denied due course despite the fact
that said denial did not arrive on time. It also ordered the candidates concerned to desist from
taking their oaths and from assuming the positions to which they have been elected, unless the

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Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order. Lastly, the said memorandum ordered the
Board of Canvassers to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates and
correcting the certificates of canvass and proclamation.
On August 10, 2002, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5584, entitled "In the
Matter of the Policy of the Commission on Proclaimed Candidates Found to be Ineligible for Being
Not Registered Voters in the Place Where They Were Elected and on the Failure/Omission of the
Board of Canvassers to Include Certain Election Returns in the Canvass."
On August 14, 2002, Acting Election Officer Alim, invoking and acting pursuant to Comelec
Resolution No. 5393 and Resolution No. 5584, issued a directive commanding petitioners to cease
and desist from taking their oath of office and from assuming the position to which they were
elected. He also directed the Barangay Board of Canvassers for Barangays Congan and New Aklan to
reconvene immediately and proclaim the duly-elected candidates and to correct the certificates of
canvass and proclamation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the promulgation of the en banc resolution by respondent honorable commission on
elections is patently erroneous stating that in the event that the disqualified candidate is
proclaimed the winner despite his disqualification or despite the pending disqualification case filed
before his proclamation, but which is subsequently resolved against him, the proclamation of said
disqualified candidate is hereby declared void from the beginning.
HELD: YES. The promulgation of the COMELEC is erroneous.
At the very outset, it must be made clear that the Comelec has jurisdiction to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after the elections,
if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, and
provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or taken his oath of office.
Furthermore, a decision by the Comelec to disqualify a candidate shall become final and executory
only after a period of five days:
Sec. 3. Decisions After Five Days. — Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions
to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as
nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections
shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their
promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. In the present case, the
assailed Resolution denying due course to petitioners' certificates of candidacy was
promulgated on June 15, 2002, or on the very day of the elections. On that day,
therefore, the decision of the Comelec had not yet become final and executory since
petitioners still had until June 20, 2002 to file their motion for reconsideration. The
Barangay Board of Canvassers rightly retained petitioners' names in the list of qualified
candidates and could not be faulted from counting the votes cast in favor of the
petitioners. Petitioners were, therefore, validly proclaimed as winners of the elections
on June 16, 2002, having garnered the most number of votes. On the day of the
elections or on June 15, 2002, petitioners, for all intents and purposes, were still in the
running. The Resolution of respondent Comelec ordering their names to be deleted
from the list of qualified candidates only became final and executory on June 20, 2002,
or five days from the promulgation thereof.
Petitioners also maintain that they were never served a copy of the assailed Resolution and
were never given the chance to present their evidence. They claim that they only knew about
Resolution 5393 on August 19, 2002, when they were served a copy of the directive issued by Acting
Election Officer Alim ordering them to cease and desist from taking their oath of office and from
assuming the position to which they are elected. This allegation was not disproved by respondent
Comelec. Instead, it cites Resolution No. 4801, which was published in the Manila Standard and
Manila Bulletin on May 25, 2002, wherein it was stated that the administrative inquiry of the
Comelec on the eligibility of candidates starts from the time they filed their certificates of
candidacy. The Comelec maintains, therefore, that by virtue of the said resolution, all candidates
are deemed to have constructive notice of any administrative inquiry against them. Also, it asserts
that by virtue of its administrative powers, it may motu proprio deny or cancel, without any kind of

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hearing whatsoever, the certificates of candidacy of those who are found not to be registered
voters in the place where they seek to run for public office.
It is clear, however, that under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a
petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice. The same
rules also provide that when the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral
testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their position papers together
with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; and when there is a need for
clarification of certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission en banc or the Division, the
parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants.
The rules providing for the abovementioned summary hearing were mandated to accord due
process of law to candidates during elections. The right to due process is a cardinal and primary
right which must be respected in all proceedings. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair
play, the cornerstone of every democratic society. In any proceeding, the essence of procedural
due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
Finally, the Court notes again that petitioners have already been proclaimed as the winners
in the elections. They have already taken their oaths of office and are, at present, serving their
constituents in their respective barangays. In Lambonao v. Tero, the Court held that defects in the
certificates of candidacy should have been questioned on or before the election and not after the
will of the people has been expressed through the ballots. It was further held in the said case that
while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established
rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps
before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the
electorate. The rationale for this principle was explained in Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, where the
Court said that these various and numerous provisions were adopted to assist the voters in their
participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When voters have
honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers tasked
under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity of the ballot did not do their duty.
CANVASS AND PROCLAMATION
Proclamation based on a clerical or mathematical mistake is not valid
MANUEL MILLA vs. REGINA BALMORES-LAXA

[G.R. No. 151216 July 18, 2003]
CARPIO MORALES J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Milla and respondent Regina Balmores-Laxa were candidates for councilor
of Gerona, Tarlac in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 18, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed as the
eighth winning candidate by the Municipal Board of Canvassers based on the Statement of Votes
and the Certificate of Canvass showing the votes obtained by each candidate.
One month after petitioner's proclamation, respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC
against petitioner and the BOC for correction of entries in the Statement of Votes based on fraud
and irregularities in the canvassing of votes. The petition alleged that the entries for four precincts
in the Statement of Votes did not correspond to the election returns for the respective precincts.
As, by the Certificate of Canvass, petitioner led respondent by 46 votes whereas the
"discrepancy" between the Statement of Votes and the election returns was 350, respondent prayed
before the COMELEC for the correction of errors in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of
Canvass, the declaration as null and void of the proclamation of petitioner, and her proclamation as
one of the duly elected municipal councilors. Petitioner, who in the meantime took his oath of
office on June 29, 2001 and thereafter assumed the position of municipal councilor, prayed before
the COMELEC for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period of five (5) days from date of proclamation.
ISSUE: Does COMELEC have jurisdiction?

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HELD: YES. In holding that it validly assumed jurisdiction over the petition, the COMELEC asserts
that a proclamation that is based on a clerical or mathematical mistake (or a blatant padding of
votes) is not a valid proclamation hence, the same can be challenged even after the proclaimed
candidate has assumed office.
The Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the
proclamation. Any error in the statement ultimately affects the validity of the proclamation. If a
candidate's proclamation is based on a Statement of Votes, which contains erroneous entries, it is
null and void. It is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office
cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to annul the proclamation.
In the case at bar, as the Statement of Votes contained erroneous entries, the COMELEC
rightfully assumed jurisdiction over respondent's petition for the correction thereof and declaration
of nullity of petitioner's proclamation. While our election laws are silent when such and similar
petitions may be filed directly with the COMELEC, the above-quoted Section 5, Rule 27 of the Rules
of Procedure sets a prescriptive period of five (5) days following the date of proclamation. The
COMELEC, however, could suspend its own Rules of Procedure so as not to defeat the will of the
electorate. For adherence to technicality that would put a stamp on a palpably void proclamation,
with the inevitable result of frustrating the people's will, cannot be countenanced.
An incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation
LORENZO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL

[G.R. No. 158371. December 11, 2003.]
YNARES-SANTIAGO J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Sonia R. Lorenzo and respondent Nestor B. Magno were rival candidates for
Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the local elections of May 14, 2001. A certain Carlos Montes,
resident of San Isidro, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of respondent
Magno as a candidate on the ground of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of Direct
Bribery. On May 7, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution disqualifying respondent
Magno. This was affirmed on appeal by the COMELEC En Banc on May 12, 2001. The aforesaid
Resolution was disseminated for implementation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Isidro.
Hence, on May 18, 2001, petitioner Lorenzo was proclaimed as the Mayor-elect of San Isidro.
Meanwhile, respondent Magno brought a petition for certiorari before this Court, assailing his
disqualification by the COMELEC. On October 4, 2002, this Court rendered a Decision reversing and
setting aside the two challenged Resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 7 and 12, 2001, and
declaring that Magno was under no disqualification to run for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in
the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC En Banc thereafter issued a Resolution dated May 13,
2003, wherein it (a) ordered the creation of new Boards of Election Inspectors for all precincts in
the municipality of San Isidro, for the purpose of counting the votes cast for Magno and preparing
new election returns for submission to the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Isidro; and (b)
constituted a new Municipal Board of Canvassers for the purpose of canvassing said election returns
and submitting the results to the COMELEC. Subsequently, on May 22, 2003, the COMELEC partially
modified the above Resolution to order the immediate constitution of a new Municipal Board of
Canvassers, it appearing that the old Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija had
already canvassed all the election returns for all precincts except the votes for Magno. The
COMELEC reiterated the directive in an Order dated June 10, 2003, and ordered the immediate
implementation and execution thereof. Petitioner argues that the COMELEC's order for the canvass
of votes defies this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 147904 that Magno should have filed an election
protest.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC’s order runs counter to the ruling of the Court.
HELD: NO. As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate
for the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto.
This rule, however, admits of exceptions, to wit: xxx and (5) where the proclamation was null and
void. This case falls squarely within the fifth exception to the general rule, i.e. the proclamation of
Lorenzo as Mayor of San Isidro was null and void. As of May 18, 2001, the date on which Lorenzo

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was proclaimed Mayor-elect of San Isidro, the question as regards Magno's qualifications for said
post was still pending, and was raised as an issue before this Court in certiorari proceedings in G.R.
No. 147904. The question of Magno's qualifications for the office of Mayor was not resolved until
October 4, 2002, when we expressly ruled that Magno was qualified for said post. Since the
question of Magno's eligibility for the position of Mayor was still pending, the canvass which
excluded Magno from the list of qualified candidates was an incomplete canvass, and Lorenzo's
proclamation, on the basis thereof, was illegal. An incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot be the
basis of a valid proclamation. In a long line of cases, we have affirmed the power of the COMELEC
to annul an illegal canvass and an illegal proclamation, which respondent COMELEC has implicitly
done in its Resolution of May 13, 2003 and Orders of May 22, 2003 and June 10, 2003.
Taking anew of his oath is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in
office and exercise of functions.
KAGAWADS JOSE G. MENDOZA ET. AL, vs. BARANGAY CAPTAIN MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR.
[G.R. No. 146875. July 14, 2003]
YNARES-SANTIAGO J.:
FACTS: Respondent Laxina was proclaimed as the winner in the 1997 Barangay Elections in Batasan
Hills, Quezon City; he took his oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed office. Although in the
interim, he was unseated by virtue of a decision in an election protest decided against him, the
execution of said decision was annulled by the COMELEC. October 27, 1999, the COMELEC issued a
writ of execution directing Roque Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman. Fermo refused
to vacate the premises. This did not, however, prevent respondent Laxina and his staff from
discharging their functions and from holding office at the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills and appointing a
Barangay Secretary and Treasurer. On November 16, 1999, respondent took his oath of office. The
following day, November 17, 1999, Roque Fermo turned over to respondent all the assets and
properties of the barangay.
ISSUE: Is the taking of an oath of office anew by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local
elective official a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office where the
COMELEC orders the relinquishment of the contested position?
HELD: NO. For purposes of determining the continuity and effectivity of the rights arising from
respondent's proclamation and oath taken on May 27, 1997, it is as if the said writ of execution
pending appeal was not issued and he was not ousted from office. The re-taking of his oath of
office on November 16, 1999 was a mere formality considering that his oath taken on May 27, 1997
operated as a full investiture on him of the rights of the office. Hence, the taking anew of his oath
of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City was not a condition sine qua non to the
validity of his re-assumption in office and to the exercise of the functions thereof.
Sec 242 of the omnibus election code; due process; public office is not a property nor a vested
right to public office, nevertheless, due notice and hearing is required.
DIMALUB P. NAMIL, ET. AL, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET. AL,

[G.R. No. 150540. October 28, 2003]
CALLEJO, SR. J.:

FACTS: The Commissioner-in-Charge for Region XII, Mehol K. Sadain, conducted an investigation on
the matter of having two sets of winning candidates as members of the Sangguniang Bayan for
Palimbang. Law Department recommends to issue an order for the immediate installation of
Respondents being the genuine and valid proclamation and that the petitioners is fictitious and
falsified. Acting on the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain, the public respondent issued
Resolution No. 4615. Petitioners contend that the public respondent's Resolution No. 4615 is null
and void since it was issued without according them due notice and hearing, contrary to the
principle of due process. The public respondent, assert Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code

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and further asserts that the twin requirement of notice and hearing in annulment of proclamation is
not applicable when the proclamation is null and void, citing Utto vs. Commission on Elections.
ISSUE: Is COMELEC authorized to annul an illegal proclamation even without notice and hearing?
HELD: NO. While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a broad power to enforce all election
laws, the same is subject to the right of the parties to due process. Petitioner cannot be deprived
of his office without due process of law. Although public office is not property under Section 1 of
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it is,
nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its
quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others.
The public respondent's reliance on the ruling of this Court in Utto vs. Commission on
Elections is misplaced. The Court, in that case, held that the twin-requirement of notice and
hearing in an annulment of proclamation is not applicable because of the illegality of petitioner's
proclamation. The factual circumstances in the instant petition are far different from those
obtaining in Utto. In the Utto case, a notice of appeal was filed questioning the ruling of the board
of canvassers but, the latter proceeded in proclaiming Utto as the winning candidate. This made
the proclamation illegal. In the present case, nobody questioned the petitioners' proclamation.
Citing Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent argues that the
COMELEC is authorized to annul an illegal proclamation even without notice and hearing because
the law states that it may motu proprio order a partial or total suspension of the proclamation of
any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made. The
phrase "motu proprio" does not refer to the annulment of proclamation but to the manner of
initiating the proceedings to annul a proclamation made by the board of canvassers. The law
provides two ways by which annulment proceedings may be initiated. It may be at the own
initiative of the COMELEC (motu proprio) or by written petition. In either case, notice and hearing
is required. This is clear from the language of the law.
Authority to annul canvass and proclamation; COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass
and proclamation which was illegally made. the fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed
office, is no bar to the exercise of such power. it of course may not be availed of where there
has been a valid proclamation.
LORETTA P. DELA LLANA vs. COMELEC, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 152080 November 28, 2003]
EN BANC
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
FACTS: In the May 14, 2001 elections, petitioner Loretta Dela Llana and respondent Rizalino Pablo,
Jr. were among the candidates for Provincial Board Member, First District of Zambales. The First
District, which comprised the municipalities of Subic, Castillejos and San Marcelino, is allotted
three (3) seats in the Provincial Board.
On May 18, 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed the three (3) winning
candidates. Included was herein petitioner, being the third duly elected member of the Provincial
Board. They obtained the following votes:
1. Jose de Jesus Gutierrez, Sr. 22,926

2. Wilfredo Viloria Felarca 14,458
3. Loreta Panlilio Dela Llana 14,117
Respondent ranked fourth, having garnered a total of 14,093 votes, or 24 votes less than
that obtained by petitioner.
Contesting the election and proclamation of petitioner, respondent, on May 25, 2001,
initially filed with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department, COMELEC, an election protest
docketed as EPC Case No. 2001-6. Respondent alleged that when the Municipal Board of Canvassers
for the Municipality of Castillejos (MBC-Castillejos) canvassed the election returns from various
precincts, the 42 votes he obtained in Precinct No. 29-A-1 was altered and reduced to only 4. Thus,

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he lost 38 votes. These 4 votes appeared in the Statement of Votes by Precinct (Statement No.
2114713 7). When the Zambales Provincial Board of Canvassers canvassed the Certificates of
Canvass of Votes from the three municipalities in the First District, respondent's total votes were
recorded only as 14,093, instead of 14,131 (14,093 + 38) votes. The missing 38 votes, if counted in
his favor, would have been sufficient to have him proclaimed the third member of the Provincial
Board of the First District of Zambales.
Petitioner, in her answer with counter-protest, denied respondent's allegations. By way of
special and affirmative defenses, petitioner alleged inter alia that respondent, "who was then an
incumbent member of the Provincial Board of Zambales, has exercised his influence in all the
precincts in San Marcelino, Zambales, thereby crediting him with more votes than he actually
received." Petitioner thus prayed that "the results in all the precincts numbering in San Marcelino
must likewise be put under protest."
Ultimately in its Resolution, the COMELEC First Division, a) granted respondent's petition
for the correction of manifest errors; b) directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Subic,
Zambales to reconvene and effect the necessary corrections in the Statement of Votes by Precinct
to reflect therein the actual number of votes obtained by respondent in Precinct No. 29-A-1; c)
annulled petitioner's proclamation, being based on an erroneous and/or incomplete canvass of
election returns; and d) ordered petitioner to immediately vacate her post as the third member of
the Provincial Board, First District of Zambales, and to cease and desist from discharging the duties
and functions of that office.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC EN BANC, in its Resolution, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it treated the petition for
election protest filed by herein respondent as a case for correction of manifest errors;
2. Whether or not the COMELEC is justified in its conversion by suspending its own rules
HELD: 1. NO. The Constitution has vested to the COMELEC broad powers, involving not only the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but
also the resolution and determination of election controversies. It also granted the COMELEC the
power and authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, with the primary objective of ensuring
the expeditious disposition of election cases.
Concomitant to such powers is the authority of the COMELEC to determine the true nature
of the cases filed before it. Thus, it examines the allegations of every pleading filed, obviously
aware that in determining the nature of the complaint or petition, its averments, rather than its
title/caption, are the proper gauges.
This was what the COMELEC did when it treated respondent's questioned petition in EPC No.
2001-06 (captioned as an election protest) as a case for correction of manifest errors. The COMELEC
found that the averments therein actually call for the rectification of apparent errors in the
Statement of Votes in Precinct No. 29-A-1 of Castillejos, Zambales.
Indeed, a reading of respondent's petition reveals that what is being sought is the
correction of the manifest errors committed in the Statement of Votes.
In Trinidad vs. COMELEC, we held that "correction of manifest errors has reference to
errors in the election returns, in the entries of the statement of votes by precinct per municipality,
or in the certificate of canvass." Some of the definitions given for the word "manifest" are that "it is
evident to the eye and understanding; visible to the eye; that which is open, palpable, and
incontrovertible; needing no evidence to make it more clear; not obscure or hidden."
The fact that petitioner prayed for annulment of respondent's proclamation in his petition
is immaterial and does not change the nature of the instant petition. "The prayer in a pleading does
not constitute an essential part of the allegations determinative of the jurisdiction of a court. The
question of jurisdiction depends largely upon the determination of the true nature of the action
filed by a party which, in turn, involves the consideration of the ultimate facts alleged as
constitutive of the cause of action therein (Bautista vs. Fernandez, L-24062, April 30, 1971). The
prayer for relief, although part of the complaint, cannot create a cause of action, hence it cannot
be considered a part of the allegations on the nature of the cause of action (Rosales vs. Reyes, 25
Phil. 495; Cabigao vs. Lim, 50 Phil. 844)."
We likewise find unmeritorious petitioner's contention that the COMELEC can no longer
entertain respondent's petition because it was filed 2 days late.
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It bears stressing that in an election case, it is the primary duty of the COMELEC and the
courts to ascertain by all means the will of the electorate. Thus, when the COMELEC treated
respondent's petition as one for correction of manifest errors, it was merely complying with its
duty. Petitioner has put premium on technicalities over and above such noble duty. In Duremdes vs.
COMELEC, we held that the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount,
thus:
"Election contests involve public interest. Technicalities and procedural barriers should
not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true
will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials . . . Laws (and rules)
governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all
means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate."
Instead of dismissing the petition for purely technical reasons, the COMELEC correctly
considered the merits thereof.
In Tatlonghari vs. Commission on Elections, where a similar petition was filed 97 days from
the date of proclamation, we held:
"The argument is devoid of merit. For one thing, records indicate that respondent's assumption of
office was effected by a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and
not through the legitimate will of the electorate. Thus, respondent's proclamation was flawed right
from the very beginning. Having been based on a faulty tabulation, there can be no valid
proclamation to speak of insofar as respondent Castillo is concerned. As this Court once said:
'. . .. Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power. It
of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondent's petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and
proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to COMELEC.”
2. NO, the COMELEC is justified.
Thus, the COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained respondent's
petition by suspending its own Rules of Procedure. This is clearly allowed under Section 4, Rule 1 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:
"Section 4. Suspension of the Rules. — In the interest of justice and in order to
obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or
any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission." (Emphasis supplied)
Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the spirit of Section 6, Article
IX-A of the Constitution which bestows upon the COMELEC the power to "promulgate its
own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices" to
attain justice and the noble purpose of determining the true will of the electorate.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
Lack of inner paper seals in election returns is not a proper subject of a pre-proclamation case;
in pre-proclamation cases, the COMELEC is not allowed to look beyond the election returns or
receive evidence aliunde
NANCY SORIANO BANDALA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET. Al

[G.R. No. 159369. March 3, 2004.]
FACTS: Nancy Soriano Bandala, herein petitioner, and Alejandro G. Berenguel, herein respondent,
were mayoralty candidates in Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental during the May 14, 2001 national

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and local elections. During the canvass of the election returns conducted by the City Board of
Canvassers of Oroquieta City, respondent objected to the inclusion of eighty (80) election returns
on the following grounds: (1) that seventy-one (71) election returns were not secured with inner
paper seals; (2) that seven (7) election returns do not indicate the party affiliation of the watchers-
signatories; and (3) that two (2) election returns have missing pages which contain the list of the
local city candidates.
In an Omnibus Ruling dated May 19, 2001, the City Board of Canvassers overturned the
objection of respondent and included in its canvass the contested election returns. On June 30,
2001, petitioner was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Oroquieta City. Upon appeal, the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued a Resolution dated September 5,
2002 affirming the Omnibus Ruling of the City Board of Canvassers, stating that lack of inner seal of
an election return does not necessarily mean that the same is spurious and/or was tampered with.
Such tampering, or its being spurious must appear on the face of the election return itself. In the
canvassing of election returns, the Board of Canvassers, which is an ad hoc body, need not look
beyond or behind the returns or do an act which would necessitate the piercing of the returns and
the presentation of evidence aliunde. Respondent then filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion
for reconsideration. On August 14, 2003, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution reversing
and setting aside the Second Division's Resolution, by excluding the 101 election returns and
nullifying the proclamation of petitioner Bandala.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUES:
1. May the ground of lack of inner paper seals in the election returns be considered a
proper issue in a pre-proclamation controversy?
2. May the COMELEC look beyond the election returns and receive evidence aliunde in a
pre-proclamation controversy?
3. Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse in discretion in nullifying the proclamation of
petitioner as mayor of Oroquieta City?
HELD: 1. NO. There is a need to emphasize the definition of a pre-proclamation controversy under
Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:
"SEC. 241. Definition. — A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns."
The issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy are enumerated in
Section 243. "SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. —
The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects,
appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns
or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Section 233, 234, 235 and 236 of
this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were
canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved
candidate or candidates."
There being no inner paper seals pasted on 101 election returns coming from numerous
polling precincts, the COMELEC en banc then concluded that the election returns in question
appear to be obviously falsified and/or manufactured, the results of which certainly affected the
standing of respondent. According to the COMELEC en banc, this is an issue (under Sec. 243(b) in
the enumeration) that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy.
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The lack of inner paper seals in the election returns does not justify their exclusion from
the canvassing. Indeed, it is not a proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy.
In the Matter of the Petition to Exclude Election Returns contained in Nine (9) Ballot Boxes,
Amelita S. Navarro vs. Commission on Election, we held:
"While the aforesaid grounds (lack of inner and outer paper seals and lack of signatures
of watchers, among others) may, indeed, involve a violation of the rules governing the
preparation and delivery of election returns for canvassing, they do not necessarily
affect the authenticity and genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant
their exclusion from the canvassing. The grounds for objection to the election returns
made by petitioners are clearly defects in form insufficient to support a conclusion that
the election returns were tampered with or spurious."
2. NO, A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on

their face and the COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and
investigate the alleged election irregularities. In Matalam vs. Commission on Elections, we stressed
that "in a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC, as a rule, is restricted to an examination of
the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate
election irregularities." Thus, the COMELEC acted beyond its jurisdiction when it directed the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Misamis Occidental to investigate and receive evidence "to
determine once and for all the mystery behind the missing inner paper seal of the subject election
returns" or the failure of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs) to paste the inner seals of the
election returns.
3. YES. In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc held that the City Board of Canvassers
acted without authority when it arbitrarily proclaimed petitioner herein as the duly elected mayor
of Oroquieta City, in gross violation of Section 20(i) of Republic Act 7166 which reads:
"Section 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. —
xxx xxx xxx
(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless
authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it
on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation in violation hereof shall be void ab
initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the
election."
Suffice it to state that the above provision applies only where the objection deals with a
pre-proclamation controversy, not where, as in the present case, it raises or deals with no such
controversy. It bears reiterating that the lack of inner paper seals in the election returns is not a
proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy. Respondent's recourse should have been to file
an election protest. Where a party raises issues, the resolution of which would compel the
COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which appear prima facie regular on their face, his
proper remedy is an election protest.
Given the factual finding of the COMELEC en banc that the nine election returns are spurious in
the manner of their preparation, doubt is cast on the authentic appearance of said returns.
nevertheless, under section 235 of the omnibus election code, a recount of votes may be
resorted to, if the integrity of the affected ballot boxes and their contents has been preserved.
SALIPONGAN L. DAGLOC vs. COMELEC, ET AL.

[G.R. Nos. 154442-47 December 10, 2003]
AZCUNA J.:
FACTS: During the May 14, 2001 elections, Bai Susan A. Samad ("Samad"), Salipongan I. Dagloc
("Dagloc") and Kennedy Dilangalen ("Dilangalen") were among the mayoralty candidates in the
Municipality of Kabuntalan, Province of Maguindanao.
During the canvassing of the election returns for the Municipality of Kabuntalan, Samad,
Dagloc and Dilangalen filed their respective objections and oppositions to the inclusion or exclusion
from the canvass of certain election returns from several precincts.

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After the COMELEC en banc has arrived at its decision, petitioner now avers that the
COMELEC en banc excluded the election returns from Precinct Nos. 70A, 71A, 83A and 84A for being
spurious due to the following reasons: (1) the alleged disqualification of some members of the
Board of Election Inspectors in said precincts; and (2) the Board found that the same members of
the BEI were the ones who committed illegal acts, such that the votes reported in the subject
returns do not reflect the true will of the electorate.
Petitioner states that the COMELEC also excluded the election returns from Precinct Nos.
31A, 31B, 32A/32B and 33A/33B for the same reasons advanced in excluding the election returns
from Precinct Nos. 70A, 71A, 72A, 83A and 84A. According to petitioner, the COMELEC made said
conclusion by relying solely on the averments of respondent Samad in SPC No. 01-341 and SPC No.
01-3342, thus:
In SPC No. 01-341 and SPC No. 01-342, Bai Susan Samad questions the inclusion of the
election returns in Precincts No. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B. [She] avers that they are
tampered or falsified and prepared under duress, threats, coercion and intimidation.
An eyewitness and official watcher in Precinct No. 31A, Deduzman Lakim, stated in his
affidavit dated May 19, 2001 that on May 14, 2001, Salipongan Dagloc approached him
and said that he (Lakim) will be killed after the election. Consequently, Lakim and his
co-watchers, namely: Amera Lakim, Asis Abdulla, and Tuansi Sandiale, who were
assigned at Precincts No. 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B, respectively, failed to report
because they were afraid they will be killed by Dagloc.
Lakim narrated that the ballots in said contested precincts were openly tampered and
falsified by Dagloc's supporters. So that the counting of votes were based on tampered and falsified
ballots which, in turn, were the bases reflected on the election return.
Petitioner contends that the aforementioned reasons advanced by the COMELEC for the
exclusion of the nine election returns are not proper issues in a pre-proclamation controversy.
Citing Patoray v. Comelec, petitioner contends that under the Omnibus Election Code, pre-
proclamation controversies are limited to: (1) challenges directed against the composition or
proceedings of the board of canvassers (not the board of election inspectors), or (2) challenges
related to election returns to which a party must have made specific objections.
Petitioner thus contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding the nine election returns because of alleged
disqualification of some members of the BEI and alleged irregularities perpetrated by said
members, which are not proper issues in a pre-proclamation controversy.
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. — the
following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects,
appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same
returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233,
2343, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the
aggrieved candidate or candidates.
On the remedy of spurious election returns

Petitioner contends that even assuming that the subject election returns are spurious, the
remedy is not exclusion, but that provided in Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code.
According to petitioner, while it may be true that the board of canvassers will not be
compelled to canvass election returns which are falsified or spurious, this does not, however, mean
that the board should right away disregard and exclude the election returns and ultimately the
votes cast in the precinct. Hence, petitioner contends that the exclusion from canvass of the nine
election returns by the COMELEC is a clear exercise of grave abuse of discretion.

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Furthermore, petitioner contends that the COMELEC should have dismissed SPC No. 01-342
since Samad failed to comply with the mandatory procedure provided in Section 20 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 7166 and Section 38 of Comelec Resolution No. 3848.
Section 20 of RA No. 7166 provides:
Sec. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. — (a) Any
candidate . . . contesting the inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election
returns on any of the grounds authorized under Article XX or Sections 234, 235 and 236
of Article XIX of the Omnibus Election Code shall submit their oral objection to the
chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the questioned return is presented for
inclusion in the canvass. Such objection shall be recorded in the minutes of the
canvass.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Simultaneous with the oral objection, the objecting party shall also enter his
objection in the form for written objections to be prescribed by the Commission.
Within twenty-four (24) hours from and after the presentation of such an objection,
the objecting party shall submit the evidence in support of the objection . . .
Petitioner claims that Samad failed to submit her evidence in support of her objections
within 24 hours from the time such objections were made, which is evidenced by the ruling of the
Board issued on May 26, 2001.
Further, petitioner asserts that Paragraph 8, Section 38 of Comelec Resolution No. 3848
mandates that "[a]ny appeal brought before the Comelec on the ruling of the Board, without the
accomplished forms and the evidence thereto, shall be summarily dismissed."
Petitioner thus contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it did not dismiss SPC No. 01-342 for failure to comply with the
mandatory procedure under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7166 and Section 38 of Comelec
Resolution No. 3848.
ISSUES:
1. Is there a valid ground for a pre-proclamation controversy.
2. What is the proper remedy for spurious election returns
3. Whether SPC No. 01-342 should have been dismissed
HELD: 1. NO. Admittedly, the COMELEC en banc ordered the exclusion of the nine election returns
from the canvass considering partly the reasons aforecited by petitioner. Petitioner, however,
omitted to mention the fact that the COMELEC en banc also gave great weight to the affidavit of
the BEI members assigned in Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, which was attached by Dagloc in his appeal
in SPC 01-282 to prove the supposed regularity of the exercise of the BEIs' assigned task. The
COMELEC en banc held:
We cannot just close our eyes and include in the canvass the subject returns,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the votes reported in the election returns from Precinct
Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B, 70A, 71A, 72A, 83A, and 84A do not reflect the true will of the
electorate. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that in the supposed affidavit of the BEI
members, who were assigned in the different precincts in Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, attached by
Dagloc in his appeal in SPC 01-282 to prove the supposed regularity of the exercise of the BEIs'
assigned task, there were no affiants in Precincts Nos. 83A and 84A; whereas only one member of
the BEI in Precinct Nos. 71A and 72A was named, to wit: Rosalinda Kimbuan and 1Lt. Juan Gullem,
respectively, but both did not sign said affidavit; and only one member of the BEI in Precinct No.
70A, Sandatu Kamson, signed said affidavit. Moreover, no member of the BEIs in Precinct Nos. 31A,
31B, 32A/32B, and 33A/33B signed said affidavit. Neither [were] their [names] even mentioned in
it.
All the circumstances, taken as a whole, made the COMELEC en banc conclude that the
election returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A/33B, 70A, 71A, 72A, 83A and 84A were
spurious.
Moreover, the COMELEC en banc's findings on the nine election returns are anchored on "the
manner of their preparation," which it found to be a sham. The COMELEC correctly held that said
ground is a pre-proclamation issue, citing Sections 241 and 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to Section 235 of the same Code, thus:

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Sec. 241. Definition. — A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question
pertaining to . . . any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns.
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. — The
following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
xxx xxx xxx
canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved
candidate or candidates.
Sec. 235. When election returns appear to be tampered with or falsified. — If the
election returns submitted to the board of canvassers appear to be . . . prepared by
persons other than the member of the board of election inspectors, the board of
canvassers shall use the other copies of said election returns and, if necessary, the
copy inside the ballot box which upon previous authority given by the Commission may
be retrieved in accordance with Section 220 hereof. If the other copies of the returns
are likewise . . . prepared by persons other than the members of the board of election
inspectors, the board of canvassers or any candidate affected shall bring the matter to
the attention of the Commission. The Commission shall then, after giving notice to all
candidates concerned and after satisfying itself that nothing in the ballot box indicate
that its identity and integrity have been violated, order the opening of the ballot box
and, likewise after satisfying itself that the integrity of the ballots therein has been
duly preserved shall order the board of election inspectors to recount the votes of the
candidates affected and prepare a new return which shall then be used by the board of
canvassers as basis of the canvass.
Although the COMELEC en banc noted that Deduzman Lakim, an eyewitness and official
watcher in Precinct No. 31A, stated in his affidavit that the ballots in Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B,
32A/32B, 33A/33B were openly tampered and falsified by Dagloc's supporters, it must be clarified
that the appreciation of ballots is not the ground raised by Samad for the exclusion of the nine
election returns, and it is also not the basis of the COMELEC en banc for excluding said returns.
Further, the aforecited doctrine that "as long as the returns appear to be authentic, and
duly accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them to
verify allegations of irregularities in the casting and counting of the votes," is not applicable in this
case due to the following reasons:
(1) The COMELEC has the authority to review the rulings of the Board of Canvassers in a
pre-proclamation controversy under paragraphs (e) to (f) of section 20 (Procedure in
Disposition of Contested election Returns) of Republic Act No. 7166;
(2) The COMELEC en banc found that the nine election returns are fraudulent in the
manner of their preparation which is a pre-proclamation issue under Sections 241 and 243
of the Omnibus Election Code;
(3) The allegations of irregularity is not in the casting and counting of votes, but in the
preparation of the election returns (i.e., the election returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B,
32A/32B, 33A and 33B were tampered or falsified and were prepared under duress, threats,
coercion and intimidation).
Given the factual finding of the COMELEC en banc that the nine election returns are
spurious in the manner of their preparation, doubt is cast on the authentic appearance of said
returns. Hence, the subject election returns cannot be accorded prima facie status as genuine
reports of the results of the counts of votes. Nevertheless, under Section 235 of the Omnibus
Election Code, a recount of votes may be resorted to, if the integrity of the affected ballot boxes
and their contents has been preserved. Thereafter, new returns shall be prepared which shall be
used by the Board of Canvassers as basis of the canvass. This procedure protects the will of the
electorate.
2. Outright exclusion of election returns on the ground that they were fraudulently prepared by
some members or non-members of the BEI disenfranchises the voters. Hence, when election returns
are found to be spurious or falsified, Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the
procedure which enables the COMELEC to ascertain the will of the electorate.

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The COMELEC, therefore, gravely abused its discretion when it excluded outright the
subject election returns after finding that they were fraudulent returns. Instead, the COMELEC
should have followed the procedure laid down in Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code: ". . .
The Commission shall then, after giving notice to all candidates concerned and after satisfying
itself that nothing in the ballot box indicate that its identity and integrity have been violated,
order the opening of the ballot box and, likewise after satisfying itself that the integrity of the
ballots therein has been duly preserved shall order the board of election inspectors to recount the
votes of the candidates affected and prepare a new return which shall then be used by the board of
canvassers as basis of the canvass."
3. NO. Petitioner is referring to Samad's appeal before the COMELEC of the Board's ruling to include
in the canvass the election returns from Precinct Nos. 31A, 31B, 32A/32B, 33A and 33B. It appears
that Samad submitted her evidence belatedly. It may be presumed that when Samad appealed from
the Board's ruling before the COMELEC, the Board elevated its report and the complete records and
evidence submitted in the canvass in accordance with Section 20, paragraphs (g) and (h) of
Republic Act No. 7166, thus:
(g) Immediately upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board shall make an
appropriate report to the Commission, elevating therewith the complete records and
evidence submitted in the canvass, and furnishing the parties with copies of the report.
(b) On the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board, the
Commission shall decide summarily the appeal within seven (7) days from receipt of said
records and evidence. Any appeal brought before the Commission on the ruling of the
board, without the accomplished forms and the evidence appended thereto, shall be
summarily dismissed.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that official duty has been
regularly performed. Moreover, in their respective resolutions, the COMELEC en banc and the
Second Division evidently decided on the pre-proclamation cases filed before them based on the
records and evidence elevated to them by the Board.
COMELEC has jurisdiction to go beyond election returns and investigate irregularities in a pre-
proclamation controversy when there is prima facie evidence that returns are not genuine
LEE VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL

[G.R. No. 157004. July 4, 2003.]
CARPIO MORALES J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Sally A. Lee and private respondent Leovic R. Dioneda were candidates for mayor
of Sorsogon City, Sorsogon in the May 14, 2001 elections. During the canvassing of the election
returns, counsel for private respondent objected to the inclusion of Election Return No. 41150266
for Precinct No. 28A2 in barangay Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City on the grounds that 1) no entries
were made for the position of congressman, and 2) Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) watchers
were utilized to fill up election returns. In her opposition to private respondent's objection,
petitioner alleged that 1) the omitted entry in the election return pertains to the position of
congressman which cannot be a subject of pre-proclamation controversy, 2) the utilization of the
watchers, who were under the direct supervision of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI), was
limited only to the filling up of the entries affecting the party-list and justified by the severe lack
of personnel to perform the task, and 3) the alleged defect does not affect the integrity of the
election return. The Board of Canvassers (BOC), finding that the 1) questioned election return was
clear and regular on its face, 2) there was no pre-proclamation for members of the House of
Representatives and party list, and 3) the grounds relied upon by private respondent are all
directed against the proceedings of the BEI and not the BOC, ruled for the inclusion of the return.
Private respondent thereupon filed on the same day a notice of appeal of the BOC ruling. On May
19, 2001, the BOC proclaimed the winning candidates, including petitioner as city mayor. Private
respondent thus filed before the COMELEC a petition assailing the ruling of the BOC and praying for
the exclusion of the questioned election return and the annulment of petitioner's proclamation.
Petitioner filed her answer to the COMELEC petition, praying for its dismissal. The COMELEC Second

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Division granted the petition of private respondent and accordingly excluded the questioned return
from the canvass and nullified the proclamation of petitioner. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the COMELEC Second Division Resolution was denied by the COMELEC En Banc,
by Resolutions of February 11, 2003. Petitioner argues that as the case at bar is a pre-proclamation
controversy, the COMELEC is "restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities. She also claims
that contrary to the findings of the COMELEC, there is no evidence on record that an LDP watcher
participated in the preparation of the questioned election return. She posits that the omission of
entries was not done with malice or bad faith nor meant to subvert the true will of the people, and
that the election return in question is clear and regular on its face, duly authenticated by the
signatures and thumbmarks of the six watchers and all the members of the BEI; she posits that an
incomplete election return is not necessarily spurious, manufactured or fraudulent to necessitate
its exclusion. Lastly, she argues that the January 10, 2003 Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division was promulgated without giving her notice, and that were it not for her counsel's
"accidental" visit to the COMELEC on January 13, 2003, said counsel would not have known that said
resolution was already promulgated and the 5-day period from the date of promulgation to file a
motion for reconsideration, as provided under the provision of Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, would have lapsed.
ISSUES:
1. Is the COMELEC without jurisdiction to go beyond the election returns and investigate
election irregularities in a pre-proclamation controversy?
2. Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in rendering the assailed Resolution
despite the clear and apparent lack of factual and legal basis?
3. Whether the COMELEC committed procedural lapses in the promulgation of its
Resolutions?
HELD: 1. NO. The doctrine cited by petitioner in the case of Loong v. Commission on Elections
presupposes that the returns "appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face." Where,
as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries
having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC
is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election
return.
2. NO. As the record of the proceedings before the BOC shows, Gina Labayo, a member of the BEI,
admitted that there were supposed to be entries for the position of congressman but she forgot to
record them as she was extremely tired. Such convenient explanation, without more, does not,
however, appear satisfactory. Moreover, in her Answer to the original petition filed with the
COMELEC, petitioner admitted that pollwatchers, who were not members of the BEI, participated in
the preparation of the election returns.
3. NO. The period for the unsatisfied party to move for reconsideration can be exercised — not
from the date of promulgation, as misconstrued by petitioner, but from her actual receipt of a copy
of the resolution in question.
ELECTION CONTEST
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not
be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials
HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN vs. COMELEC, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 157249. November 28, 2003.]
AZCUNA J.:

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FACTS: Petitioner Saquilayan and respondent Jaro were candidates for the Office of Municipal
Mayor of Imus, Cavite in the May 14, 2001 local elections. After the votes were canvassed,
Saquilayan was proclaimed the winner for having received 27,494 votes against Jaro's 26,746 votes.
On May 28, 2001, Jaro instituted an Election Protest Case (EPC No. 01-02) before the RTC of
Imus, Cavite contesting the results in all 453 election precincts in the Municipality of Imus.
Saquilayan filed his Answer with Motion to Dismiss contending, among other things, that the
election protest failed to state a cause of action. The Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC in
an Order dated July 31, 2001.
Saquilayan questioned the denial before the Comelec's Second Division through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, which was docketed as SPR No. 19-2001. On January 22, 2002, the
Second Division ruled in favor of Saquilayan and ordered the dismissal of the election protest.
Jaro sought a reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the case was elevated to the Comelec
en banc. On February 26, 2003, the Comelec en banc issued the questioned resolution granting
Jaro's Motion for Reconsideration. Saquilayan's petition was thereunder dismissed and EPC No. 01-
02 was ordered to proceed.
Aggrieved, Saquilayan filed the present petition.
The whole the controversy revolves around the following averments contained in Jaro' election
protest:
Grounds for the Protest
6. Protestant hereby impugns the correctness of the results reflected in the election
returns in ALL the 453 protested precincts of the Municipality of Imus, Cavite on the
following grounds:
7.1.Votes in the ballots lawfully and validly cast in favor of protestant were deliberately
misread and/or misappreciated by various chairmen of the different boards of election
inspectors;
7.2.Valid votes of protestant were intentionally or erroneously counted or tallied in the
election returns as votes of protestee;
7.3.Valid votes legally cast in favor of protestant were considered stray;
7.4.Ballots containing valid votes for protestant were intentionally and erroneously
misappreciated or considered as marked and declared as null and void;
7.5.Ballots with blank spaces in the line for Mayor were just read and counted in favor of
protestee;
7.6.Ballots prepared by persons other then the voters themselves, and fake or unofficial
ballots wherein the name of protestee was written, were illegally read and counted in
favor of protestee;
7.7.Groups of ballots prepared by one (1) person and/or individual ballots prepared by two
(2) persons were purposely considered as valid ballots and counted in favor of
protestee;
7.8.Votes that were void, because the ballots containing them were posted with stickers or
because of pattern markings appearing in them or because of other frauds and election
anomalies, were unlawfully read and counted in favor of protestee; and
7.9.Votes reported in some election returns were unlawfully increased in favor of
protestee, such that protestee appeared to have obtained more votes than those
actually cast in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner had a cause of action.
HELD: YES. The Comelec en banc, voting 4-3, ruled that what is applicable to the case is the ruling
in Miguel v. Comelec, not the Pena case. In the Miguel case, therein respondent Eladio Lapuz filed
an election case against James Miguel who defeated the former in the mayoralty race in Rizal,
Nueva Ecija. Lapuz questioned the results in all the precincts on the following grounds:
a) Rampant switching of ballot boxes and stuffing of ballot boxes with fake ballots;
b) Padding of votes in favor of petitioner;
c) Misappreciation of ballots to the prejudice of private respondent;
d) Counting of illegal and/or marked ballots and stray votes in favor of petitioner;
e) Misreading and mis-tallying of ballots or votes;
f) Massive vote-buying;
g) Substitution of votes;

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h) Multiple voting by flying voters and harassment of voters;
i) Massive disenfranchisement;
j) Massive threats, coercion and intimidation of voters.
Therein petitioner Miguel argued that the general allegations of fraud and irregularities
were not sufficient to order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. The Court,
however, found the allegations embodied in the election protest to be serious enough to
necessitate the opening of the ballot boxes to resolve the issue of fraud and irregularities in the
election.
The facts of the present petition are similar to those in Miguel rather than to those in Peña.
In Miguel, there was a controversy between two candidates for municipal mayor, while Peña dealt
with candidates for a congressional district office. Also, one reason that led to the dismissal of the
election protest in Peña was the protestant's failure to specify the 700 out of the 743 precincts
where the alleged anomalies occurred. In both Miguel and the present petition, the protestants
questioned all the precincts in their respective municipalities.
Furthermore, the Miguel case, being the more recent decision, should prevail in case of a
conflict, under the well-established doctrine that a later judgment supersedes a prior one in case
of an inconsistency.
The Court reiterates its pronouncement in Carlos v. Angeles:
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of
the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an
election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. The Supreme Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not
only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results.
No doubt, allowing the election protest to proceed would be the best way of removing any
doubt as to who was the real candidate chosen by the electorate. Barring the proceedings due to
technicalities and procedures accomplishes nothing except possibly to suppress the will of the
majority.
COMELEC rules of procedures: interpretation of its provisions; execution pending appeal of

election cases is allowed despite the contrary provisions of the COMELEC rules of procedure.
FERNANDO U. BATUL vs. LUCILO BAYRON and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

[G.R. No. 157687. February 26, 2004]
CARPIO J.:
FACTS: Before the court are two (2) consolidated petitions for certiorari with prayers for
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Batul and respondent Lucilo R. Bayron
(“Bayron”) were candidates for vice-mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in the 14 May 2001
elections.. The Board of Canvassers th proclaimed Batul vice-mayor of Puerto Princesa City on 21
May 2001. Bayron filed an election protest with the COMELEC. COMELEC First Division constituted
four (4) Revision Committees to conduct the revision of ballots of all the protested precincts. The
revision committees found Bayron as the winner of said election. Batul presented as his first
witness, one Board of Election Inspectors (“BEI”) chairperson who testified that some ballots do not
bear her signature as BEI chairperson. Batul filed a motion to allow him to present 49 more BEI
chairpersons to testify on the genuineness of the signatures of the BEI chairpersons on the revised
ballots. COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying Batul’s motion and motion
for reconsideration. The COMELEC First Division deemed the case submitted for resolution after
Bayron and Batul filed their respective memorandum.Batul filed the first Petition for Certiorari
assailing that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC First Division to deny his right to
present the 50 BEI chairpersons as witnesses. During the pendency of G.R. No. 157687, the
COMELEC First Division decided the merits of the election in favor of Bayron setting aside the
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elction of Batul. And upon motion of Bayron the COMELEC issued a writ of execution of said
decision.Batul filed the second Petition for Certiorari, assailing this time the said decision and the
writ of execution issued by the COMELEC First Division, docketed as G.R. No. 158959.The Court
resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 157687 and 158959 on 5 August 2003. According to Batul in his
first petition, the testimonies of the BEI chairpersons would have proven that there was multiple
substitution of ballots after the election and that many of the ballots found during revision were
spurious as they do not bear the BEI chairpersons’ signatures. The BEI chairpersons’ testimony on
the authenticity of the signatures and genuineness of the ballots is material, relevant and necessary
for a judicious resolution of the case. Batul claims it is in precincts chaired by these 50 teachers
that discrepancies were found during revision between the election returns and the tally board as
against the physical count of ballots in ballot boxes with allegedly missing self-locking seals.
Batul contends the COMELEC First Division violated its own rules of procedure in allowing
immediate execution of its judgment despite the filing of his motion for reconsideration with the
COMELEC en banc. Batul likewise contends that Ramas v. COMELEC and Santos v. COMELEC cited by
the COMELEC First Division to justify execution pending appeal are not applicable to the instant
case since the election protests in those cases involved municipal officials and were filed with the
Regional Trial Court (“RTC”). It was logical to apply Section 2, Rule 39 (“Section 2”) of the Rules of
Court because the decision sought to be executed was that of the RTC. On the other hand, the
instant case involves a city mayoralty position and the election protest is originally and exclusively
lodged with the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COMELEC First Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying Batul’s right to present evidence on his
behalf; and considering the case submitted for resolution without giving Batul the
opportunity to present testimonial (and other evidence) on his behalf, in violation of his
right to due process.
2. Whether or not COMELEC First Division’s act of executing its decision despite a pending
motion for reconsideration is in violation of COMELEC Rules of Procedure and is
contrary to applicable jurisprudence.
HELD: G.R. No. 157687

The COMELEC First Division correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to hear all 50 BEI
chairpersons, as this would not have been feasible and practical given the remaining time until the
next election. Procedural rules in elections cases are designed to achieve not only a correct but
also an expeditious determination of the popular will of the electorate. COMELEC First Division did
not brush aside Batul’s apprehensions that there was a violation of the sanctity of the ballot.
COMELEC stated that it could readily determine whether the ballots are official and genuine by
merely inspecting the secret security marks attached to the ballots. The court does not subscribe to
protestee’s stand that the “physical count cannot prevail and must yield to the actual votes
indicated and duly certified in the election returns and the tally sheet. ”As held in Lerias vs. HRET,
it is only “when the ballots cannot be produced or are not available” that “the election returns
would be the best evidence. ”In the case at bench, the ballots are available, hence they serve as
the primary evidence of the results of the elections in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. The ballots are
the best evidence of the objections raised and an inspection of these ballots is sufficient.
Moreover, there is no better authority than the COMELEC itself to determine the authenticity of the
ballots, having itself ordered and supervised the printing of all the official ballots.
It is true that present election laws are silent on the remedy of execution pending appeal in
election contests. However, neither Ramas nor Santos declared that such remedy is exclusive to
election contests involving elective barangay and municipal officials as argued by Batul. Section 2
allowing execution pending appeal in the discretion of the court applies in a suppletory manner to
election cases, including those involving city and provincial officials. Section 1 of Rule 41 thereof
expressly provides that “[i]n the absence of any applicable provision in [said] Rules, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect. ”There is no reason why the public policy underlying the suppletory
application of Section 2 – to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as determined
by either the courts or the COMELEC – should not apply with equal force to election contests
involving city and provincial officials. Indeed, the number of constituents and the territorial scope

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over which these officials govern underscore the importance of this policy. Something had to be
done to strike the death blow at the “pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest”
technique often, if not invariably, resorted to by unscrupulous politicians who would negate the
people’s verdict against them and persist in continuing in an office they very well know they have
no legitimate right to hold.
Losing candidate may be proclaimed winner even when he did not participate in the election
protest; COMELEC rules of procedure: COMELEC rules of procedure must be construed liberally.
ISIDRO IDULZA, ET AL. vs. COMELEC, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 160130. April 14, 2004.]
TINGA J.:
FACTS: Petitioners Isidro Idulza and Godofredo Cabana were proclaimed as the seventh and eighth
winning candidates for the office of members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City.
Private respondents Miguel Paderanga, Jojac Asuncion and Ciferino L. Garcia, Jr., all losing
candidates for the same office, filed an election protest with the COMELEC against the two
petitioners therein and Besben Maquiso who had placed ninth in the canvass results. An election
protest was filed by three unsuccessful candidates for seats in the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Gingoog City, directed at three proclaimed candidates. The COMELEC found merit in the protest
and ordered the protestees to vacate their posts. be defeated by mere technical objections. The
Petitioners filled a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC En Banc.
Petitioners now come before this Court on a Petition for Certiorari, assailing the Resolutions of the
COMELEC. They assert that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Mortiz
and Bollozos, the former having no participation in the election protest, while the latter having
filed her motion for intervention beyond the period provided by law. They also question the manner
of appreciation by the COMELEC of the contested ballots. 8 Finally, they applied for a Temporary
Restraining Order, which the Court has not granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
resolutions.
HELD: NO. The appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a question of
fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the
supervision of elections all over the country. The findings of fact of the COMELEC when supported
by substantial evidence are final and non-reviewable. Petitioners are unable to point out why the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the contested ballots. Thus,
the Court is bound by the findings of the COMELEC as to how many votes the parties had obtained
in the city council election. The COMELEC had also noted that Mortiz, who had originally placed
tenth (10th), has become the seventh (7th) placer, considering that his original vote total still
surpassed that of the protestants. We are unable to see how such declaration by the COMELEC
could constitute grave abuse of discretion, even if Mortiz had not been a party to the election
protest. He was not a losing candidate elevated into victory, as he apparently was already
proclaimed a duly elected city councilor in May of 2001. The petitioners were dislodged from their
respective seats because the private respondents garnered more votes than them. Mortiz’s vote
total remained unchanged despite the protest. His elevation to seventh (7th) place is but a
necessary consequence of the finding of the COMELEC that the petitioners had actually obtained
less number of votes than as reflected in the first canvass results. It would be patently ridiculous
for the Court or the COMELEC to hold that he should still be deemed as the tenth (10th) placer
when the amended vote totals reveal that he had garnered more votes than the new eighth (8th)
placer. Presumptively, the vote totals as amended after the revision more accurately reflect the
true will of the voters of Gingoog City, and the elevation of councilor Mortiz from tenth (10th) to
seventh (7th) place is in consonance with the electoral mandate.
Election protests are guided by an extra-ordinary rule of interpretation that statutes
providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people
in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. For that reason,
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the Court sustains the allowance by the COMELEC of Bollozos Intervention. Statutory prescription
on the right to intervene in an election protest is provided only by the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, particularly Rule 8, Section 1. The aforementioned rule does state that the motion for
intervention be filed before or during the trial of an action or proceeding. At the same time, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure are to be construed liberally “in order to promote the effective and
efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding” before the COMELEC. The allowance of the motion for
intervention was clearly geared towards fostering honest, credible elections and a just outcome
centered around the proper proclamation of a candidate whom the voters have chosen to serve as
their councilor.
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Local government; local autonomy; the just share of the LGUs in the national tax shall be
automatically released without need of further actions.
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS vs. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 152774 May 27, 2004]
CALLEJO J.:
FACTS: On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 48 entitled "ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION."
The program was established to "facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of LGUs in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies
concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code." The Oversight Committee constituted under
Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 has been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate
rules and regulations necessary for its effective implementation. Further, to address the funding
shortfalls of functions and services devolved to the LGUs and other funding requirements of the
program, the "Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund" was created. For 1998, the DBM was
directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the Oversight Committee based on the
devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG. The initial fund was to be sourced from
the available savings of the national government for CY 1998. For 1999 and the succeeding years,
the corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be incorporated in the annual
GAA. The Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations
governing the equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the LGUs.
Further, under the guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee, the LGUs were
required to identify the projects eligible for funding under the one-billion-peso portion of the
LGSEF and submit the project proposals thereof and other documentary requirements to the DILG
for appraisal. The project proposals that passed the DILG's appraisal would then be submitted to
the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. Upon its approval, the Oversight
Committee would then serve notice to the DBM for the preparation of the Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO) and Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to effect the release of funds to the said
LGUs.
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void the provisos in
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. The petitioner submits that the assailed
provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount of five billion
pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the
release thereof, violate the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991, which mandates
that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them "without need of further
action."
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
HELD: YES. The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted to flesh out the mandate of the
Constitution. The State policy on local autonomy is amplified in Section 2 thereof. Guided by these

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precepts, the Court is of the opinion that the entire process involving the distribution and release
of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the
LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally
prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a
flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the "just share" of the LGUs
"shall be automatically released to them." The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight
Committee.
Local government; local autonomy; to rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to
judges as what respondent COA would like us to do will subvert the principle of local autonomy
zealously guaranteed by the constitution
LEYNES VS. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

[G.R. NO. 143596. DECEMBER 11, 2003.]
CORONA J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes who, at present, is the presiding judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 was formerly assigned to the Municipality
of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court thereof. As
such, his salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn from the
budget of the Supreme Court. In addition, petitioner received a monthly allowance of P944 from
the local funds of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984. On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the
Provincial Budget Officer regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance
by the municipality to petitioner judge. On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously
approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner judge's monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600
starting May 1993. On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of the
P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to petitioner judge and to require the immediate refund of the
amounts previously paid to the latter. She opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant
RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme
Court. The controversy actually centers on the seemingly sweeping provision in NCC No. 67 which
states that "no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source."
ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly provide RATA to its
Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court.
HELD: YES. Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant of the P1,600 monthly allowance by the
Municipality of Naujan to petitioner Judge Leynes. Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole then, what it
seeks to prevent is the dual collection of RATA by a national official from the budgets of "more than
one national agency." We emphasize that the other source referred to in the prohibition is another
national agency. Since the other source referred in the controversial prohibition is another national
agency, said prohibition clearly does not apply to LGUs like the Municipality of Naujan. National
agency of course refers to the different offices, bureaus and departments comprising the national
government. The budgets of these departments or offices are fixed annually by Congress in the
General Appropriations Act. Without doubt, NCC No. 67 does not apply to LGUs. To rule against the
power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges as what respondent COA would like us to do will
subvert the principle of local autonomy zealously guaranteed by the Constitution. In sum, we
hereby affirm the power of the Municipality of Naujan to grant the questioned allowance to
petitioner Judge Leynes in accordance with the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy
and the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Local legislation; quorum; the principal function and duty of the sanggunian, requires the
participation of all its members so that they may not only represent the interests of their
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respective constituents but also help in the making of decisions by voting upon every question
put upon the body.
MANUEL E. ZAMORA VS. GOVERNOR JOSE R. CABALLERO ET. AL

[G.R. NO. 147767. JANUARY 14, 2004]
CARPIO-MORALES J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela
Valley (the Sanggunian), seeks to invalidate all acts executed and resolutions issued by the
Sanggunian during its sessions held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum.
It appears that on February 6, 2001, Vice-Governor Reynaldo Navarro sent a written notice
of a special session on February 7, 2001. Upon the request of Governor Jose R. Caballero, however,
the scheduled special session was reset to February 8, 2001 without the benefit of a written notice.
On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian thus held a special session to, among other things,
allow the Governor to deliver his State of the Province Address. As only seven members of the
fourteen-member Sanggunian were present, no resolution was considered. On February 26, 2001,
the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session during which it issued Resolution No. 05 declaring the
entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and Resolution No. 07 authorizing
the Governor to, on behalf of the province, enter into a construction contract (Contract) with
Allado Construction Company, Inc. (the Allado Company) for the completion of Phase II of the
construction of the capitol building. During the same session, the Sanggunian accepted the letter of
irrevocable resignation submitted by Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto.
While only eight members of the Sanggunian were present at the commencement of the
session on February 26, 2001, the Journal of the Proceedings (Journal) and Resolution Nos. 05 and
07 showed that a total of thirteen members attended it.
Petitioner thus filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nabunturan,
Compostela Valley against the Governor, et al., challenging the validity of the acts of the
Sanggunian on February 26, 2001, alleging that while the Journal and Resolutions indicated the
presence of 13 members, the Sanggunian nonetheless “conducted official business without a
quorum” as only seven of its fourteen members were actually present when the irrevocable letter
of resignation of Board Member Sotto was noted, and the motions to declare the entire province of
Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and to authorize the Governor to enter into the
Contract with the Allado Company were approved.
Petitioner additionally alleged that when the vote respecting Resolution No. 05 was taken,
only the remaining six members voted for the adoption thereof, the then presiding officer Board
Member Rolando Osorio not having cast his vote; that when Resolution No. 07 was taken up,
however, then presiding officer Osorio, relinquished his seat to Board Member Graciano Arafol after
the six members present unanimously voted on the said resolution in the affirmative, following
which Osorio cast his vote as a member also in the affirmative, thereby authorizing the Governor to
enter into the Contract with Allado Company; and that Board Member Arafol thereafter
relinquished his seat as presiding officer to Board Member Osorio who once again assumed the
duties of a presiding officer.
Petitioner furthermore challenged the validity of the special session of February 8, 2001 for
lack of quorum, there being only seven members of the Sanggunian in attendance, and for lack of
written notice sent to all members at least 24 hours before the holding of the special session in
accordance with Section 52 (d)[17] of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).[18]
Respondents, on the other hand, contended that since Board Member Sotto was in the
United States at the time the questioned acts were executed and resolutions adopted, the actual
number of Board Members then in the country was thirteen which should be the basis of the
determination of a quorum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sanggunian complied with the LGC and its Implementing Rules.
HELD: NO. “Quorum” is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally
assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business or that
number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any
valid act. “Majority,” when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half

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or more than half of any total. In fine, the entire membership must be taken into account in
computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the constitution merely states
that “majority of each House shall constitute a quorum,” Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as
it requires that the “majority of all members of the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified” shall
constitute a quorum.
The difference in the wordings of the Constitution and the LGC is not merely “a matter of
style and writing” as respondents would argue, but is actually a matter of “meaning and intention.”
The qualification in the LGC that the majority be based on those “elected and qualified” was
meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof have been proclaimed.
And, while the intent of the legislature in qualifying the quorum requirement was to allow
sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof have been proclaimed and have
assumed office, the provision necessarily applies when, after all the members of the sanggunian
have assumed office, one or some of its members file for leave. What should be important then is
the concurrence of election to and qualification for the office. And election to, and qualification
as member of, a local legislative body are not altered by the simple expedient of filing a leave of
absence.
A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal function and duty of the
sanggunian, requires the participation of all its members so that they may not only represent the
interests of their respective constituents but also help in the making of decisions by voting upon
every question put upon the body. The acts of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the
parameters of the legal provisions aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable and are,
more importantly, null and void. And all such acts cannot be given binding force and effect for they
are considered unofficial acts done during an unauthorized session.
Board Member Sotto is then deemed not resigned because there was no quorum when her
letter of irrevocable resignation was noted by the Sanggunian. For the same reason, Resolution Nos.
05 and 07 are of no legal effect.
Even assuming arguendo that there were indeed thirteen members present during the
questioned February 26, 2001 session, Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province of
Compostela Valley under state of calamity is still null and void because the motion for its approval
was approved by only six members.[49] When there are thirteen members present at a session, the
vote of only six members can not, at any instance, be deemed to be in compliance with Section
107(g)[50] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC which requires the concurrence of
the approval by the majority of the members present and the existence of a quorum in order to
validly enact a resolution.
The motion to grant the Governor authority to enter into the construction contract is also
deemed not approved in accordance with the law even if it received seven affirmative votes, which
is already the majority of thirteen, due to the defect in the seventh vote. For as priorly stated, as
the Journal confirms, after all six members voted in the affirmative, Board Member Osorio, as
acting presiding officer, relinquished his seat to Board Member Arafol and thereafter cast his vote
as a member in favor of granting authority to the Governor.
The LGC clearly limits the power of presiding officers to vote only in case of a tie. While
acting as presiding officer, Board Member Osorio may not, at the same time, be allowed to exercise
the rights of a regular board member including that of voting even when there is no tie to break. A
temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the shoes of the presiding officer could not have
greater power than that possessed by the latter who can vote only in case of a tie.
Lastly, for a resolution authorizing the governor to enter into a construction contract to be
valid, the vote of the majority of all members of the Sanggunian, and not only of those present
during the session, is required in accordance with Section 468 of the LGC in relation to Article
107of its Implementing Rules.
Even including the vote of Board Member Osorio, who was then the Acting Presiding Officer,
Resolution No. 07 is still invalid. Applying Section 468 of the LGC and Article 107 of its
Implementing Rules, there being fourteen members in the Sanggunian, the approval of eight
members is required to authorize the governor to enter into the Contract with the Allado Company
since it involves the creation of liability for payment on the part of the local government unit.

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Local taxation; the fact that tax exemptions of government-owned or controlled corporations
have been expressly withdrawn by the present local government code clearly attests against
petitioner's claim of absolute exemption of government instrumentalities from local taxation.
(N.B. LOCAL TAXATION WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE POLITICAL LAW BAR
EXAM)
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY vs. CITY OF ILOILO

[G.R. No. 109791. July 14, 2003.]
AZCUNA J.:
FACTS: This is an action for the "recovery of sum of money" filed by [respondent] City of Iloilo, a
public corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Hon. Rodolfo T. Ganzon as City Mayor, against petitioner, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), a
government corporation created by P.D. 857.
[Respondent] seeks to collect from [petitioner] real property taxes as well as business
taxes, computed from the last quarter of 1984 up to fourth quarter of 1988.
[Respondent] alleges that [petitioner] is engaged in the business of arrastre and stevedoring
services and the leasing of real estate for which it should be obligated to pay business taxes. It
further alleges that [petitioner] is the declared and registered owner of a warehouse which is used
in the operation of its business and is also thereby subject to real property taxes.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Philippine Ports Authority, a government instrumentality, is exempt
from the payment of real property tax and business tax;
2. Whether Philippine Ports Authority is engaged in business. If in the negative, whether
or not it is exempt from payment of business taxes.
HELD: 1. NO. Concededly, "ports constructed by the State" are properties of the public dominion,
as Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates these as properties "intended for public use." It must be
stressed however that what is being taxed in the present case is petitioner's warehouse, which,
although located within the port, is distinct from the port itself. In Light Rail Transit Authority v.
Central Board of Assessment Appeals et al., petitioner therein similarly sought an exemption from
real estate taxes on its passenger terminals, arguing that said properties are considered as part of
the "public roads," which are classified as property of public dominion in the Civil Code. We ruled
therein that:
. . . [T]he properties of petitioner are not exclusively considered as public roads being
improvements placed upon the public road, and this [separable] nature of the structure
in itself physically distinguishes it from a public road. Considering further that
carriageways or passenger terminals are elevated structures which are not freely
accessible to the public, vis-à-vis roads which are public improvements openly utilized
by the public, the former are entirely different from the latter.
Using the same reasoning, the warehouse in the case at bar may not be held as part of the
port, considering its separable nature as an improvement upon the port, and the fact that it is not
open for use by everyone and freely accessible to the public. In the same way that we ruled in one
case that the exemption of public property from taxation does not extend to improvements made
thereon by homesteaders or occupants at their own expense, we likewise uphold the taxability of
the warehouse in the instant case, it being a mere improvement built on an alleged property of
public dominion, assuming petitioner's port to be so. Moreover, petitioner may not invoke the
definition of "port" in its charter to expand the meaning of "ports constructed by the State" in the
Civil Code to include improvements built thereon. It must be noted that the charter itself limited
the use of said definition only for the interpretation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 857, its by-
laws, regulations and rules, and not of other statutes such as the Civil Code.
Petitioner, however, seeks to be excused from liability for taxes by invoking the
pronouncement in Basco v. PAGCOR 30 (Basco) quoted hereunder:
Furthermore, in the more recent case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Marcos, where the Basco case was similarly invoked for tax exemption, we stated: "[N]othing can
prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the Government

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performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to fulfill a
constitutional mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom." The fact that tax
exemptions of government-owned or controlled corporations have been expressly withdrawn by the
present Local Government Code clearly attests against petitioner's claim of absolute exemption of
government instrumentalities from local taxation.
Petitioner also contends that the term "government-owned or controlled corporations"
referred in P.D. 1931 covers only those not performing governmental functions. This argument is
without legal basis for it reads into the law a distinction that is not there. It runs contrary to the
clear intent of the law to withdraw from all units of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, their exemptions from taxes. Had it been otherwise, the law would have
said so.
2. YES. We affirm the finding of the lower court on petitioner's liability for business taxes for the
lease of its building to private corporations. During the trial, petitioner did not present any
evidence to refute respondent's proof of petitioner's income from the lease of its property. Neither
did it present any proof of exemption from business taxes. Instead, it emphasized its charter
provisions defining its functions as governmental in nature. It averred that it allowed port users to
occupy certain premises within the port area only to ensure order and convenience in discharging
its governmental functions. It hence claimed that it is not engaged in business, as the act of leasing
out its property was not motivated by profit, but by its duty to manage and control port operations.
The argument is unconvincing. As admitted by petitioner, it leases out its premises to
private persons for "convenience" and not necessarily as part of its governmental function of
administering port operations. In fact, its charter classifies such act of leasing out port facilities as
one of petitioner's corporate powers. Any income or profit generated by an entity, even of a
corporation organized without any intention of realizing profit in the conduct of its activities, is
subject to tax. What matters is the established fact that it leased out its building to ten private
entities from which it regularly earned substantial income. Thus, in the absence of any proof of
exemption therefrom, petitioner is liable for the assessed business taxes.
CARL; power of LGU’s to convert classification of agricultural lands
PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSO., ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

[G.R. Nos. 142359 & 142980 May 25, 2004.]
CALLEJO, SR. J.:

FACTS: The Credito Asiatic Incorporated (CAI), as the successor of Lakeview Development
Corporation (LDC) was the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 753,610 square meters located
at Barrio Kabilang-Baybay, Carmona, Cavite. The property was subsequently subdivided into two
parcels of land that was later on develop by CAI into a residential estate where housing projects
would be established. The LDC applied with the Municipal Council of Carmona for an ordinance
approving the zoning and the subdivision of the property.
Subsequently the property was subdivided into residential lots that were issued with
separate certificates of title. To continue with its housing projects, CAI through its contractor
ordered the bulldozing of the property. However, a Complaint was filed praying for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against CAI. The plaintiffs therein alleged that while
the defendant CAI was the owner of the 75.36-hectare land covered by TCT-62972, they were the
actual tillers of the land. A compromise agreement, however, was entered into between CAI and
the plaintiffs whereby the former donated parcels of land in consideration of the execution of
deeds of quitclaims and waivers. As a consequence, the complaint was dismissed.
With the settlement of the civil case, the CAI continued with its development of the rest of
the Hakone Housing Project by causing a survey of the property. However, the CAI was stymied
anew when another complaint was filed before the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals(petitioners
herein). They alleged that they were farmers of Bo. 14, Pasong Bayabas River, Barangay F. De
Castro, GMA, Cavite. The petitioners claimed that since 1961, they had been occupying a parcel of
public agricultural land originally owned by General Dionisio Ojeda with an area of twenty-seven
hectares, more or less, adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River. They tilled the said agricultural lands

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and planted it with rice, corn, vegetables, root crops, fruit trees and raised small livestock for daily
survival.
After due hearings, PARAD Barbara P. Tan rendered a Decision on August 8, 1996 in DARAB
Case No. CA-0285-95 in favor of the defendants.
The PARAD held that the plaintiffs were bound by the order of dismissal of the RTC in Civil
Case No. BCV-87-13. It declared that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 were the kins,
siblings or spouses of the complainants in the case before it. Moreover, the complainants had
executed deeds of quitclaim or waiver covering the portions of the property which they purportedly
occupied. Thus, the complainants had already waived their rights of possession and cultivation over
the portions of the property which they claimed to be occupying. As to the remaining complainants,
the PARAD ruled that they failed to prove that their cultivation and possession, were based on a
valid agricultural tenancy. It held that the complainants were merely farm helpers of their
relatives. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board which reversed the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (PARAD). On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of PARAD was reinstated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property subject of the case may be classified as agricultural land.
HELD: YES. The property is considered an agricultural land under the law.
Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to
agriculture as conferred in the said law and not classified as industrial land. Agricultural lands are
only those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it covers all private lands devoted to or
suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long before the law took effect, the
property subject of the suit had already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-
agricultural or residential land
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These
include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by
government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing
Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined "agricultural
land" thus —
. . . Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A.
6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans
and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential,
commercial or industrial use.
The ruling in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR was reiterated in National Housing Authority v.
Allarde, and Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, where the Court
stated, viz:
“The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is
an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance
is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribed,
defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present
and future projection of needs.”
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 2264, amending the Local Government Code, specifically
empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
in consultation with the National Planning Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines, and
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of
needs. The power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands to residential lands to
non-agricultural lands reclassified is not subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. Section 65 of Rep. Act No. 6657 relied upon by the petitioner applies only to applications
by the landlord or the beneficiary for the conversion of lands previously placed under the agrarian
reform law after the lapse of five years from its award. It does not apply to agricultural lands
already converted as residential lands prior to the passage of Rep. Act No. 6657.

166
Digests
POLITICAL LAW
Cockfighting although authorized by law is still a form of gambling. Gambling is essentially
antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and self-reliance. As has been
previously said, a statute which authorizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly
construed, and every reasonable doubt resolved so as to limit rather than expand the powers and
rights claimed by franchise holders under its authority.
Power to issue licenses for the operation of cockpits; Resolution no. 048 cannot be
implemented because at that time there was no ordinance authorizing the operation of
cockpits
ROLANDO N. CANET vs. MAYOR JULIETA A. DECENA

[G.R. No. 155344. January 20, 2004]
YNARES-SANTIAGO J.:
FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, passed Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998
which authorizes the establishment, operation and maintenance of a cockpit. Rolando N. Canet,
relying on Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed an application for a
mayor’s permit to operate, establish and maintain a cockpit in Sitio Cabuya, San Roque, Bula,
Camarines Sur. Respondent Mayor Julieta Decena denied the application on the ground, among
others, that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to give licenses for the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits as well as the regulation of cockfighting and
commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, she cannot issue
the said permit inasmuch as there was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing
the same.
On July 26, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Mayor with the Regional
Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch XXXI.RTC ruled in favor of Canet and issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering and commanding the Mayor to approve and issue
forthwith the Mayor’s permit. The CA, upon petition for certiorari and prohibition annulled and set
aside the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
ISSUE: Can the Municipal Mayor be compelled to issue the necessary business permit to petitioner
absent any municipal ordinance which would empower her to do so?
HELD: NO, the Municipal Mayor cannot be compelled.

The power of the Sangguniang Bayan to authorize and license the establishment, operation
and maintenance of cockpits and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks
notwithstanding any law to the contrary and provided that existing rights should not be prejudiced,
emanates from Section 447(a) (3) (v) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Resolution No. 049,
S. 1998, authorizing petitioner to establish, operate and maintain a cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur
cannot be implemented. Since it was Ordinance No. 001, S. 1999 which provided for the collection
of application filing fees, ocular inspection fees, mayor’s permit fees, filing fees for the institution
of complaints, entrance fees and special derby assessments for the operation of cockpits. This
Ordinance, however, was withdrawn by the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, there being in effect no
ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit. Suffice it to state in this regard that to compel
respondent to issue the mayor’s permit would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions of
Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also be an undue encroachment on
respondent’s administrative prerogatives.
It should, furthermore, be borne in mind that cockfighting although authorized by law is
still a form of gambling. Gambling is essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national
productivity and self-reliance. As has been previously said, a statute which authorizes a gambling
activity or business should be strictly construed, and every reasonable doubt resolved so as to limit
rather than expand the powers and rights claimed by franchise holders under its authority.

CHAIRPERSONS

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