Hazop Close Out Report V-8701 Flare Ko Drum Draining Facilities at Ngl-4

PROJECT / CONTRACT NO.
: 4078 / GC18100600
CONTRACT TITLE:
EPIC FOR DEAERATOR AT NGL3, UPGRADE OF PROPANE TRUCK
LOADING SYSTEM IN NGL PLANT AND FLARE KO DRUM (V8701)
DRAINING FACILITY AT NGL4, MESAIEED
DOCUMENT TITLE:
HAZOP CLOSE OUT REPORT
V-8701 FLARE KO DRUM DRAINING FACILITIES AT NGL-4
EPIC CONTRACTOR: ENGINEERING CONSULTANT:
DOHA PETROLEUM CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD., ENERGOPROJEKT ENTEL LTD.

PO BOX: 1744, DOHA, STATE OF QATAR P. O. Box 4769, Doha, Qatar
TEL: +974 4460 0350 / FAX: +974 44601066 Tel: +974 44478571
www.dopet.com Fax: +974 44478572
30.09.2019 2 Re-Issued for Approval RM DV SJ QP

20.08.2019 1 Re-Issued for Comments RM DV SJ QP
09.06.2019 0 Issued for Comments VK DV SJ QP
Date Rev Description Prepared Checked Approved Appd. Q.P.
Document No. 4078-M487-3-17-0002 Page: 1 of 76

Document Title : Doc No. 4078-M487-3-17-0002
HAZOP CLOSE OUT REPORT Rev.: 2

V-8701 FLARE KO DRUM DRAINING Date: 30-09-2019
FACILITIES AT NGL-4 Page: 2 of 28
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction ................................................................................................ 3
2.0 Objectives ................................................................................................... 3

2.1 Project Objective .............................................................................. 3
2.2 Document Objective ......................................................................... 3
3.0 Close Out Actions ...................................................................................... 4
ATTACHMENT-01: Completed HAZOP Close Out Action Sheets


1.0 Introduction
QP’s NGL4 plant processes raw NGL received from the Arab D Recycle
GasPlant (Dukhan Field) and NGL received from NGL-3 Plant. The NGL-4 plant
produces ethane for supply to Q-Chem and QAPCO ethylene units with propane,
butane and condensate/gasoline for export.
The plant has a flare KOD (V-8701) which is prone to carryover of Caustic/ADIP.
Two main causes of Caustic/ADIP carry over to the flare KOD are as following.
1. There is an inherent possibility of Caustic/ADIP carry over due to
routing/connection of PSVs from Caustic and ADIP system to NGL-4 HC
flare system. The PSVs, being a mechanical item, can malfunction and start
passing or popping.
2. Before each turnaround, various vessels/columns of Merox system need to
be depressurized for handing over to the maintenance contractor. Normally
Caustic is drained to the Caustic Tank, but still some caustic can get
entrained with HC and carry over to flare KOD.
Any separator, which can receive two liquid phases, should be designed to have
boot. Since the flare KOD does not have boot, the Caustic/ADIP cannot be
separated from HC effectively. This leads to various operational issues such as
Caustic/ADIP entry to fractionating towers, malfunctioning of level instruments
due to icing leading to plant shutdown and safe draining of accumulated caustic
/ADIP from flare KOD.
To address the above concern, an in-house study was conducted by QP to find
a feasible solution considering various possible options. Installation of a small
pot near to existing KOD was found to be most suitable option considering
various merits / demerits. Subsequently, an in- house FEED has been carried
out for installation of above facilities.
2.0 Objectives
2.1 Project Objective
The objective of the CONTRACT is to resolve various problems faced with NGL-
4 flare KOD operation due to Caustic/ADIP carry over by installing V-8701 flare
KOD draining facilities which contains a small pot and associated piping,
instruments, components etc.
2.2 Document Objective
The scope of the HAZOP Study was limited to facilities related installation of new
Membrane based De-aerator Package at NGL-3 plant.
The session for the HAZOP workshop was undertaken on 8th May 2019 in
conference room- Mesaieed “GOLF CLUB”.

3.0 Close Out Actions
The HAZOP study identified in total 15 recommendations, which are related to

design, safety and improvements on the current design. These are documented
in HAZOP report, doc. No. 4078-HAZOP-0003.
Close out actions are documented in Attachment 1 to this document with further
references to subsequent Attachment 2 - Supporting Documents. A summary
follows:
Action
Recommendations Resp. EPE Action
Nos.
1. Cover methanol injection in DOPET Project P&ID no. 4078-M487-6-51-0011 revised to
Operating Manual and reflect the same.
provide NRV (Note: during
Methanol injection is briefly described in Operating,
hydrate formation, drains
Control and Safeguarding Philosophy, doc. No. 4078-
may be choked)
M487-6-03-0001 as an input for preparation of
Operating Manual, doc. No. 4078-M487-0-22-0001,
where full details will be incorporated.
2. Ensure periodic cleaning of QP Action on QP.

strainer
3. Operating Manual to be DOPET All aspects of operations are briefly described in

prepared for the Caustic Operating, Control and Safeguarding Philosophy,
transfer operation line doc. No. 4078-M487-6-03-0001 as an input for
up/procedure etc. preparation of Operating Manual, doc. No. 4078-
M487-0-22-0001, where full details will be
incorporated.
4. [1] LAH-801 high interface DOPET 1. Note 10: LAH-801 is high priority alarm is included
level to be made a high in PID 4078-M487-6-51-0011-001
priority level alarm 2. Draining after caustic mode operation is
described in Operating, Control and
[2] Operating Manual to also
Safeguarding Philosophy, doc. No. 4078-M487-
capture the point that the
6-03-0001 section 5, as an input for preparation
caustic hold up quantity
of Operating Manual, doc. No. 4078-M487-0-22-
should be drained manually
0001, where full details will be incorporated.
before resumption of the
hydrocarbon mode
operations
5. Same as recommendation DOPET Same as action no. 4.

no. 4.
6. [1] Check potential of DOPET 1. As per Shell DEP 80.45.10.11-Gen, section

Thermal expansion of 3.10.5 Point 4e, the trapped volume is less than
trapped liquid in the section 500 l. Hence Thermal relief valve is not required.
from V-8764 and the Also, the isolated sections of caustic suction and
requirement of TSV discharge lines are drained (as per operating
philosophy - refer HAZOP action #7. Hence as
[2] Operating Manual to per Shell DEP 80.45.10.11-GEN, section 3.10.5,
capture draining of trapped point 2a, thermal relief valve is not required.
liquid
2. Draining after caustic mode operation is

Action
Nos.
described in Operating, Control and Safeguarding
Philosophy, doc. No. 4078-M487-6-03-0001
section 5, as an input for preparation of Operating
Manual, doc. No. 4078-M487-0-22-0001, where
full details will be incorporated.

no. 6.
8. Ensure isolation valve on V- DOPET 87-GV-1114 – isolation valve in vapor balancing line
8701 is Lock Open (LO) 2”-87-GV-0802-11175X between Flare KOD V-8701
and Caustic drain pot V-8764 is made as Lock Open
(LO)
9. [1] Internal Coating periodic DOPET 1. Periodic Inspection and maintenance of internal
inspection/maintenance to be coating is described in Operating, Control and
indicated- include in Safeguarding Philosophy, doc. No. 4078-M487-
Operation/ Maintenance 6-03-0001 section 7, as an input for preparation
Manual
of Operating Manual, doc. No. 4078-M487-0-22-
[2] Ensure adequate 0001, where full details will be incorporated.
provisions for positive
isolation for V-8764 2. Having in mind that reinstatement of coating may
need to be done after relief to flare system in
case of fire (which also leads to plant shutdown
and depressurisation), V-8764 will be available
for purging prior to isolation and vessel
opening/removal and therefore double block and
bleed isolation with spectacle blind / removable
spool, as per guidelines in DEP 31.38.01.11,
Section 8.7.2 Figure / QP Philosophy for Fire &
Safety QP-PHL-S-0001, section 9.3.6, table 1,
are provided.

no. 9.
11. [1] Check maximum DOPET 1. In the event of malfunction of heat tracing (which
temperature possible in the basically the worst case scenario; when ambient
event of malfunction of heat is at maximum + pipe is operating at maximum
tracing system allowable + voltage level at maximum level of its
positive tolerance), then the maximum
[2] Heat tracing safeguarding
uncontrolled pipe temperature shall not exceed
philosophy to be shown on
design temperature of 200°C.This is within
P&ID and details to be
design limit of 230°C and temperature class T3.
included in the Operating
Manual 2. Note 8 “In case of thermostat failure, the
maximum temperature developed by heat tracing
element shall not exceed 200°C” is included in
PID 4078-M487-6-51-0010. Also heat tracing
safeguarding philosophy is updated in 4078-
M487-6-03-0001 – OCSP section 7 and 4078-
M487-0-22-0001 – Operating Manual section 6.4

no. 11.

Action
Nos.
13. [1] Provide a Restriction DOPET 1. GLV-1061 is replaced with RO-803.
Orifice on the caustic transfer 2. Note-3 is modified in PID 4078-M487-6-51-0012.
line in lieu of GLV-1061
[2] Modify Note 8 of P&ID
4078-M487-6-51-0012

no. 13.
15. 87-GV-xxx4 to be CSO DOPET Isolation valve 87-GV-1478 is made as CSO. Also,
DBB provided as per action 10 is also made as CSO.
ATTACHMENT-01: Completed HAZOP Close Out Action Sheets
HAZOP ACTION SHEET
Action Sheet No. 1
Project Title: Location: NGL 4
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
Drg No. Rev: Action No. 1

4078-M487-6-51-0010- SH.001-REV.2-P&ID- UNIT 87, FLARE KOD (V-8701)- NGL-4
4078-M487-6-51-0011- SH.001-REV.2- P&ID- UNIT 87, CAUSTIC DRAIN POT (V-8764)- NGL-4
4078-M487-6-51-0012- SH.001-REV.2 - P&ID- UNIT 87, FLARE KOD PUMPS P8701A/B- NGL-4
4078-M487-6-52-0001- SH.001-REV.2- PFD- FLARE/HC LIQUID DISPOSAL AND FUEL GAS FLARE
SYSTEM FACILITY
Action By: DOPET
ACTION
Item: Deviation: Flow Reverse
V-8701 FLARE KOD DRAIN LIQUID OUTLET TO V-8764 CAUSTIC
DRAIN POT TO P-8701 A/B FLARE KOD PUMPS SUCTION HEADER
Cause: During methanol injection
Consequence:
1. Potential backflow of hydrocarbon liquid (Vessel is always full)
Action: Cover methanol injection in Operating Manual and provide NRV (Note: during hydrate
formation, drains may be choked)
By:
REPLY
Project P&ID no. 4078-M487-6-51-0011 revised to reflect the same.
Methanol injection is briefly described in Operating, Control and Safeguarding Philosophy, doc. No.
4078-M487-6-03-0001 as an input for preparation of Operating Manual, doc. No. 4078-M487-0-22-
0001, where full details will be incorporated.
Reply Produced By: Date:

STATUS: ACCEPTED/REFERENCED/REJECTED
Signed for: Date:
INCORPORATED into Design – Reference Doc No.:

4078-M487-6-51-0011 – PID Date:
4078-M487-6-03-0001 – OCSP
4078-M487-0-22-0001 – Operating Manual
By:
INCORPORATED in Field
Signed for: Date
OPERATING CONTROL AND SAFEGUARDING Rev.: 4
PHILOSOPHY – FLARE KO DRUM (V8701) Date : 27-06-2019
DRAINING FACILITY AT NGL4 Page: 7 of 7
6.0 Control Philosophy

Control of caustic transfer operation to V-8323 is completely manual and is described in
Section 5.0 above. During caustic transfer, level in V-8701 shall be monitored.
The Spent Caustic Degassing Drum (V-8323) is provided with LSH and LSL 83-LIH/LIL-
001 which starts and stops the Spent Caustic Pump P-8321. Before diverting caustic to
spent caustic degassing drum (V-8323) from Caustic Drain pot (V-8764), the operator
shall ensure that, there is no flow to spent caustic degassing drum from other sources
like NGL-3, V-8321.
After flow from caustic drain pot via Flare KOD pump starts, the level in spent caustic
degassing drum raises gradually. Caustic pump out rate shall be ensured by new
restriction orifice 87-RO-803, to limit forwarding caustic flow to capacity of downstream
equipment and to prevent end-of-curve operation of P-8701 while in this mode of
operation. Once the level reached LSH, the spent caustic pump (P-8321) auto starts and
pumps out caustic at 27.3 m3/h. The flow from caustic drain pot is maintained until
interface level reaches low low level. After LIL, operator shall stop Flare KOD pump P-
8701.
The spent caustic degassing drum is floating with LP flare header.
7.0 Safeguarding Philosophy

The caustic drain pot is designed for 8.0 barg pressure and -46°C to 230 °C. The caustic
drain pot vessel is floating with Flare KO drum.
Also the vessel is internally lined for caustic service. The caustic / hydrocarbon is not
expected to reach maximum temperature of 200°C, as the maximum operating
temperature of fractionator is 70°C. The maintenance and inspection of the internal
coating shall be carried out in the next available shut down, whenever any relief
exceeding the design temperature of internal coating occurs and as per maintenance
schedule of company. ACTION 1
Methanol injection is provided with NRV on V-8764 to inhibit hydrate formation in HC

which may be cold under certain relief scenarios.
Electrical heat tracing is provided on the level transmitter stand pipes in Flare KOD (V-
8701) and Caustic Drain pot (V-8764) to prevent ice formation during very low
temperature. The electric heat tracing can produce maximum of 65°C with the given
element. This is within the max operating temperature of Caustic Drain Pot.
Doc. No. 4078-M487R-6-03-0001 Rev. 3 Page 7 of 7

Document Title: Doc No. 4078-M487-0-22-0001
Operation And Maintenance Manual for
Rev.: 0
Caustic Drain Pot (V-8764)
Date: 30/03/2020
Page: 7 of 25
6 N6 2 Utility Connection
7 N7 4 HC Outlet
8 M1 42 Manhole
6.4 ELECTRIC HEAT TRACING
Electrical heat tracing is provided on the level transmitter stand pipes in Caustic Drain pot (V-8764) to prevent ice
formation during very low temperature and to avoid freezing. In the event of malfunction of heat tracing (which
basically the worst case scenario; when ambient is at maximum + pipe is operating at maximum allowable +
voltage level at maximum level of its positive tolerance), then the maximum uncontrolled pipe temperature will not
exceed design temperature of 200°C.This is within design limit of 230°C and temperature class T3.
6.5 METHANOL INJECTION
Provision for methanol injection is provided at the top nozzle of Caustic drain pot (V-8764). The Methanol injection
is provided with NRV to inhibit hydrate formation which may be cold under certain relief scenarios. The methanol
injection shall be carried out as per the operational requirement.
6.6 PIPING CONNECTIONS HAZOP action #1

New Caustic Drain Pot (V-8764) is installed next to the Flare KOD (V-8701). Caustic drain pot is floating with Flare
KOD through a vapour balancing line with valve. The Liquid outlet from KOD is connected to Caustic drain pot and
the outlet from Caustic drain pot is connected to the suction of Flare KOD Pumps (P-8701 A/B).
The KOD pump discharge line is connected to Spent Caustic Degassing Drum (V-8323) with restriction orifice (87-
RO-803) and also with a minimum flow recirculation line with restriction orifice (87-RO-802) which is routed back to
Caustic Drain Pot inlet.
7. INITIAL START-UP
The below check list shall be checked before initial start-up / line-up the Caustic Drain Pot (V-8764) and ensure
that the mentioned prerequisites are fulfilled as per the requirement.
SL. NO. DESCRIPTION OBSERVATION
1 Confirm the vessel internal inspection and box-up are completed.
2 Ensure the utility stations are lined-up and ready to utilize.

Check and ensure the instruments are calibrated and the due dates are not
3
expired.
4 Ensure that the instruments (87-LG-801 & 87-LIT-801) are lined-up properly
Ensure that the Electrical Heat Tracing for the level transmitter stand pipe is
5
powered on.
Ensure all the vessel nozzle & pipe flanges are tightened properly with
6
appropriate gaskets.
7 Ensure that the vent and drain valves are in closed condition.
Ensure the vessel is purged with Nitrogen and O2 content is recorded and in
8
acceptable limit.
DOC NO: 4078-M487-0-22-0001 REV. 0 Page 7 of 25

Rev.: 0
Date: 30/03/2020
Page: 9 of 25
8.2 CAUSTIC OPERATION MODE
The operation of transferring ADIP/Caustic from Flare KOD (V-8701) to Spent Caustic Degassing Drum (V-8323)
through Caustic Drain Pot (V-8764) will be carried out as described here.
i. Line-up the HC liquid outlet of from Flare KOD (V-8701) to Caustic Drain pot (V-8764).
ii. Isolate the HC liquid outlet from Caustic Drain pot and line-up the ADIP/Caustic outlet to flare KOD
pump (P-8701A/B) suction.
iii. Then line-up the flare KOD Pump (P-8701A/B) discharge to Spent Caustic Degassing Drum (V-
8323).
iv. Post Caustic mode of operation and before resuming to normal operation mode the caustic hold up
in pump suction piping shall be drained to avoid any caustic carry over.
v. Pre/Post implementation of scheme, the caustic operation mode remains same.
vi. Please refer Appendix-3 - Mark-Up P&ID for Caustic Operation Mode.
In the event of Caustic / ADIP entry in to the Flare KOD (V-8701) and Caustic drain pot (V-8764) the interface level
appears in the level transmitter (87-LT-801). At high level on the Caustic drain pot (V-8764), the interface level
transmitter (87-LT-801) will give an alarm to the control room. The Control room operator will communicate to the
field operator for changing the operation to caustic transfer mode.
8.2.1 START & STOP CAUSTIC OPERATION MODE:
The Start and Stop of Caustic mode operation by manual operation of Flare KOD (V-8701) pump (P-
8701A/B) is depends on the Interface Level Transmitter (87-LIT-801) provided on the Caustic drain pot (V-
8764).
i. START once interface level reaches high or indicates the high alarm in DCS.
ii. STOP once the interface level reaches low or indicates the low alarm in DCS.
Note: The level needs to be continuously monitored during the caustic transfer operation and stop the
pump immediately when the interface level reaches to low alarm value to avoid Hydrocarbon ingress with
Caustic.
The below check list needs to be verified by the field operator before changing the operation to caustic transfer
mode.
SL.
DESCRIPTION OBSERVATION
NO.
1 Ensure that the hydrocarbon liquid from Flare KOD (V-8701) is pumped out.
Ensure that caustic level in Spent Caustic Degassing (V-8323) is at minimum and
2
no other flow from other sources like NGL-3, V-8321.
Ensure that the caustic pump (P-8321) auto starts once the Spent Caustic
3
Degassing (V-8323) level reached LSH.
Ensure the minimum recirculation line from the Flare KOD (V-8701) pump (P-
4
8701A/B) discharge to the Caustic drain pot (V-8764) is lined-up.
Ensure the continuously monitoring is available for Spent Caustic Degassing (V-
5
8323) and Caustic drain pot (V-8764) level
6 Ensure the ADIP/Caustic outlet flow and Methanol injection is required

QATAR GENERAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION
NGL-4 PROJECT VOL. 04
NGL-4 PLANT OPERATING MANUAL SECT. 05
VOLUME 04
AUXILIARY FACILITIES
SECTION 05 : HC DISPOSAL – FLARE
HC DISPOSAL – FLARE NGL4_OM_VOL04_SECT05_RBRev. B Page 1 of 23

INDEX
1.0 OPERATION
1.1 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION
2.0 PREPARATION AND START-UP
2.1 PREPARATION FOR START-UP
2.2 START-UP
3.0 SHUTDOWN
3.1 NORMAL SHUTDOWN
3.2 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
4.0 DESIGN FEATURES OF PROCESS PROTECTION DEVICES
4.1 CONTROL VALVES
4.2 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN VALVES
4.3 BLOWDOWN VALVES AND DEPRESSURIZATION ORIFICES
4.4 PRESSURE SAFETY VALVES
4.5 LIST OF CONTROLLER SET POINTS
4.6 LIST OF ALARMS AND TRIP SETTINGS
4.7 LIST OF FLOW FACTORS
5.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION
5.1 PFDS
5.2 P&IDS
5.3 PLOT PLANS
5.4 AREA CLASSIFICATION DWGS.
5.5 EQUIPMENT DATA SHEETS
5.6 CAUSE / EFFECTS MATRIX
5.7 INSTRUMENT DATA SHEETS

1.0. OPERATION - HC DISPOSAL – FLARE SYSTEM
1.1. DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION
1.1.1. General
All the hazardous vapours discharged from equipment of all Units are collected in two
separate networks in accordance with the design pressure of the protected equipment:
low pressure header and high pressure header. A third network collects acid discharges
from all units; these acid vapours are sent to the existing acid flare of NGL-3 Complex.
The flare K.O. drum is designed both to separate liquid droplets from gas and to provide
hold-up capacity for all liquid received; most of the liquid is evaporated and burned in the
flare, the remaining is pumped to be recovered.
The flare is multistage type and is designed to burn smokeless up to 15% of the maximum
capacity.
1.1.2. Description Of Operation
Reference is made following P&IDs:
87-GD-B-86586 Flare K.O. drum and pumps

87-GD-B-86587 Flare Stack & Ignition panel
The low-pressure vapour hydrocarbons are collected by the header 28"-GV-87-0031, the
high-pressure hydrocarbons are collected by the header 32"-GV-87-0030; both lines enter
at the top and at a side of the K.O. drum V-8701.
Purpose of the K.O. drum is to separate liquid droplets from vapour and to provide hold-up
capacity for the collected liquid.
The K.O. drum is equipped with the following instrumentation:
 Level glass 87-LG-204.

 Level transmitter 87-LT-004 with indication 87-LI-004 on DCS; high and low level
signals are used for pumps start / stop.
 Low Low level switch 87-LSLL-007 which provide to shutdown the pump P-8701 A/B
and put off electric heater; alarm 87-LALL-007 is also activated on DCS.
 High High level switches 87-LSHH-006 A/B/C which, with two out of three voting
system, activate alarm 87-LAHH-006 on DCS.
 Pressure transmitter 87-PT-008 with indication 87-PI-008 on DCS.
 Local pressure indicator 87-PI-206.
 Local temperature indicator 87-TI-203.
 Temperature transmitter 87-TT-050 with alarm 87-TAL-050 on DCS.
 Temperature transmitter 87-TT-005 providing signal for local indicator 87-TI-005 and
for the temperature controller 87-TIC-005; high and low temperature alarms are also
provided.
 Temperature transmitter 87-TT-004 providing signal to the thyristor control of the
heater E-8701.

Liquid collected in the K.O. drum is mostly composed of low boiling point hydrocarbons;
small quantities collected in the K.O. drum during normal operation or in case of
emergency in limited areas are vaporized and vapour burned in the flare.
Vaporization is performed by means of the electric heater E-8701 having coils inside the
vessel.
Coils are arranged to heat the liquid section of the vessel; ample coils are provided near
the level bridle and liquid outlet to prevent ice or hydrates formation in or near the liquid
outlet, even in the event that one coil is out of service.
A sufficient number of coils are installed so that anyone of the coils may be taken out of
service and the remaining coils provide sufficient surface area to accommodate the
required heat transfer.
The coils are designed to withstand the effects of thermal shock associated with a cold
liquid sludge suddenly entering the vessel and coming in contact with the hot coils.
In addition the coils are designed to handle the thermal stresses associated with the coils
being either partially or completely submerged in the cold liquid.
Liquid contained in the vessel is heated up to 30°C; temperature is controlled by means of

the temperature controller 87-TIC-005 acting on the thyristor control.
The electric heater and the thyristor control are supplied package.
Common alarm 87-XA-103 and heater status on / off 87-XI-104 are shown on DCS.
NOTE: For more details on heater package, please refer to the operating manual of the
package manufacturer.
If the level in the K.O. drum reaches 1500 mm, the high level switch causes the start-up of
the pump P-8701 A or B.
Liquid is sucked through line 4"-GC-87-0090 and transferred to the close drain drum V-
8732 through line 3"-GC-87-0091; the transferred quantity is indicated on DCS by 87-FI-
006.
The pumps, horizontal centrifugal type, one in operation, one stand-by are equipped with
the following:
 Vent line 1"-GV-87-0093 connected to the top of the K.O. drum.
 Recycle line to the K.O. drum 2"–GC-87-0173; the line is provided with spectacle
blind.
 Drain line to closed drain 1"-GC-87-0092; the line is provided with spectacle blind.
 Local pressure indicator 87-PI-207 / 208.
 Remote start / stop switch 87-HS-P8701 A/B.
 Local start / stop switch 87-HS-P8701 A/B.
 Stand by selector switch 87-HS-P8701S.

The selected main pump starts automatically by high level switch when level in the K.O.
drum reaches 1500 mm and stops automatically by low level switch when level in the K.O.
drum reaches 300 mm.
Furthermore pumps are to be protected against too low level by the low low level switch
87-LSLL-007 which provides to stop the pump in case the low level switch fails.
Vapour leave the K.O. drum through line 44"-GV-87-0088 and enters the multistage flare
A-8701; the discharged quantity is totalized by flow totalizer 87-FQ-005 compensated for
pressure by 87-PT-009 and temperature by 87-TT-003.
Flare is multistage type, first stage is directly opened to the atmosphere while the second,
third and fourth stages are closed when there are no discharge in the Relief and
Blowdown network system.
In case of pressure relief or blowdown valves discharge the flowrate in the flare header
increases and consequently the pressure, this causes at different sets the sequential
opening of the stages.
The same happens with the decreasing of the pressure in the main header causing the
sequential closure of the stages.
The first and second stages are multi-tip while third and fourth are conventional type.
The flare-tip is designed to produce a non-luminous and smokeless flame when operating
at less than 15% of the maximum flare capacity.
Material of the tip is AISI 310S necessary to withstand the very high temperature
developed during the burning operations.
The flame front ignition and control panel X-8701, installed at safe distance from the flare
stack outside the sterile area, contains the necessary equipment to remotely ignite the
pilots and monitor the pilot thermocouples.
N° 3 pilot burners are provided; each burner is ignited by means of an individual ignition
line by flame front generator at grade.
Fuel gas supply line along the stack is provided for each pilot.
The three pressure transmitters 87-PT-605 A/B/C, included in the ignition and control
panel, provide a two out of three voting system which provide to alert operators in case of
very low pressure of fuel gas to pilots with alarm 87-PALL-605 shown on DCS.
The pressure of each pressure transmitter is shown on DCS by 87-PI-605 A / 605 B / 605
C; fault alarm 87-XA-605 is activated in case one transmitter reading differs from the other
two.
Fuel gas and instrument air are fed to the ignition panel.
Instrument air is fed through line 2"-AI-88-0094.
Fuel gas, through line 2"-GF-87-0073, is first fed to a K.O. drum, made from 10" pipe, to
separate possible liquid, and then, through line 2"-GF-87-0096 to the ignition panel.
The K.O. drum is equipped with level glass 87-LG-203 and with drain line 1"-GC-87-0097
with the flow orifice87-FI-203 to limit the flow rate; the drain line discharges into the main
header 44"-GV-87-0088 sloped towards the flare K.O. drum V-8701.

2.0. PREPARATION AND START-UP
2.1. PREPARATION FOR START-UP
2.1.1. General
Assumption is made that all preparatory steps described in precommissioning and

commissioning procedure have been completed (see Doc. No. PR-0000-90-09100).
All manways, flanges, plugs and other openings should be surely closed, and blinds
should be installed wherever required, before the Unit is ready for operation.
When all works are completed, the line-up of piping and valves should be made and
checked to be ready for purging and gas admittance.
The preparation of utilities required for the flare system should be carried out ahead of the
system start-up.
NOTE : Start-up of flare system has to be carried out in conjunction with relief and
blowdown system
For the start-up the following utilities must be available:
 Electric power.
 Instrument air.
 Fuel gas.
Running-in of the pumps has to be carried out before start-up of the system.
In the next paragraph guidelines for pumps running-in is described.
2.1.2. Running-In of Pumps
Refer to the Manufacturer's operating instructions for any specific precautions.
The initial run-in of pumps is generally done by circulating water through the new
equipment.
Make level with water in V-8701 and align the following circuit:
V-8701  4"-GC-87-0090  P-8701A/B  3"-GC-87-0091  2"-GC-87-0173 
87-FO-208  V-8701.
Check that the valve on line 2"-GC-87-0091 at V-8732 is closed.
Temporary strainers are installed in the pump suction line, conveniently located for easy
removal and cleaning.
Also screens should be positioned so that no dirt particles gravitate to inaccessible places
when the flow stops.
During the running-in of pumps, the strainers may cause some flow restriction, as debris
collects in them and the flow to the pump will fall of. In this event, it will be necessary to
limit the flow of the centrifugal pumps by throttling the discharge valve. Avoid restricting
too much discharge to prevent internal slippage and excessive heat generation.
Do not let the pump cavitate (i.e. "lose suction") which may damage the pump.
The check of the following items is recommended during the pump running-in:

 Manually rotate pump and driver, verifying they roll freely.
 Check that the running-in water circulation be lined up.
 Fully open the suction valves, venting air from piping and completely filling up with
liquid.
 Establish a flow of cooling fluid where required.
 Check that lubrication be satisfactory.
 Make sure that electric power is available from the switchgear to the starter of the
electric motor driver.
 Pump sealing system should be established and commissioned prior start-up
 Barely open discharge valve on the centrifugal pump.
 Bump start electric motor to confirm correct rotation of the pump
 Start the pump; if the pressure does not build up immediately, shut the pump and
investigate the problem.
 When the discharge pressure has satisfactorily gone up after the start, gradually open
the discharge valve to achieve the desired flowrate, paying attention to not exceed the
rated power of the motor.
 In the event of unusual noise, vibrations, overheating or other abnormal conditions,

shut the pump down immediately and correct the trouble prior to running the pump
again. Do not discontinue checking for abnormal conditions as these may occur after
a long-lasting operation.
 Check the shaft sealing; mechanical seals should show no leakage; A mechanical
seal will show some leakage on start-up, but after the pump has been started and
shut a few times the leakage will stop.
 Operate the pump, directing the flow through all suction and discharge piping circuits.
 Inspect and clean the screens as required.
 Check again, and realign if required, after any piping disturbance, as for suction
screen inspection of pipe flanges have to parted for screen removal.
 When shutting down, close the discharge valve first, thereby maintaining the
discharge pressure while the pump rotates to a stop; this will also help prevent the
pump from rotating backwards should the discharge check valve leak.
 After all lines available to a pump have been suitably flushed, the temporary suction
strainer may be removed, but only after proving to be free from debris on two
successive examinations.
 Water used to run in pumps must be sufficiently flushed from system prior to start-up.

2.1.3. Start-up Summary
The main steps in the start-up procedure of the Flare System are the following:
 Lining-up of the circuits.
 Purging with nitrogen.
 Ignition of the pilot burners of the flares.
 Commissioning of all instrumentation of the System, establishing normal operating

conditions.
2.1.4. Final Preparation
Before beginning the start-up, it should be established that all the following preliminary
preparations and checks have been completed:
 The plant piping has been thoroughly washed-out of debris.
 All manways, flanges, plugs and other openings should be securely closed and blind
should be installed as required.
 The instrument air and electrical power system should be in service and ready for use.
 The required checks for pumps and drivers are already carried out according to
Manufacturer's instructions.
 Check bearing oil levels on pumps.
 Control valves and bypasses blocked-in.
 All utilities in service.
 All drains and vents closed.
Check in particular the:
 Position of the thermocouples in the Pilot Nozzles.
 Venturi Shutter Settings
 PCV Settings.
 Fuel Gas Strainers.
 Pressure Alarm and Gauges.
 Safety Valve.

The complete Flare System should be checked to ensure that it is gas-tight and that drain
valves are installed at all low points.
The Flare Ignition System (and also the Flare Pilots) incorporates small-diameter orifices
that are located at the inlet to the spark generator ignition chamber. It is essential that
these systems be thoroughly cleaned to avoid the possibility of blockage of the orifices by
pipe scale and debris that would otherwise render the systems inoperative.
The following procedure should be implemented:
 Open the drain valves at all low points in the System to remove any accumulated
water or condensate and check that all lines are self-draining back to the drain points
and free of pocket.
 Check that all the Pilots are set correctly.
When all this works and checks have been completed all interested department should be
notified in advance when the unit will be ready for operation.
2.2. start-up
2.2.1. General
The procedure contained in this manual describes, in general terms, the steps which
should be followed for placing the Flare System on stream.
Safety is most important aspect of Flare Operation. It is essential that operating and
Commissioning Personnel are conversant with not only the following instructions but also
with instructions relating to the upstream Process Facilities.
Particular care must be taken at all times to ensure that flammable or explosive mixtures
do not accumulate in the Flare System headers. This means that after the initial start-up
air must be excluded and prevented from entering any part of the Flare feeder pipes
during operation or maintenance.
The dangers inherent in lighting gas / air mixtures in a Flare Relief System must be well
understood and it is essential to follow safe procedures in order to eliminate the possible
creation of hazardous situations during which an explosion could occur.
Purging with nitrogen of the system has to be performed in conjunction with the Fuel Gas
System and the relief and blowdown Network System.
2.2.2. Purging With Nitrogen
 Close valves on 87-PCV-609.
 Close valves on suction of pumps P-8701 A/B.
 Close valve on line 3"-GC-87-0091 at V-8732.
 Close valves on drain lines of the pumps P-8701 A/B.

 Close valves on vent lines of pumps P-8701 A/B.
 Close drain and vent valves on lines and equipment.
 Perform purging of the whole blowdown & relief system together with flare system
injecting nitrogen from every fuel gas purging point (every lateral end)
 Confirm purging have been performed at every blowdown and relief connection to
flare header
When analysis of samples taken along the network and from the K.O drum show oxygen
content less than 2%, purging can be considered completed.
Proceed as follows:
 One by one involve in the nitrogen purging the other stages of the flare opening the
relevant control valves.
 Contemporary with the Blowdown and Flare System, the Fuel Gas System has been
purged, including the fuel gas line to ignition panel X-8701.
 Check the oxygen content in the flare KO drum less than 2%
 The system is now ready to receive fuel gas, as described in the operating manual of
the "Relief and Blowdown Network System" and, subsequently, to ignite the pilots and
establish purge gas flow.
2.2.3. Testing The Flare Pilot And Ignition System
It is important that the three Ignition Lines all have suitable drain valves at every low point.
 Remove water from Ignition Lines.
 Confirm purge of fuel gas line to ignition panel by checking the O2 level upstream of
the ignition panel.
 Push the Ignition Pulse Generator (IPG) box button and then strike the plunger of the
Unit. Check that a spark is being generated by viewing through the inspection port.
 Open valves on fuel gas pressure control valve 87-PCV-609; leave closed valves to
pilots and to ignition panel.
 Open valves on instrument air pressure control valve 87-PCV-608.
 Select the 3-way Ignition Distribution valve on the Flare Ignition Lines.
 Commence the supply of ignition gas and ignition air, i.e. open the gas and air line ball
valves and adjust the two pressure regulating valves to achieve the pressure
suggested by the manufacturer at the mixing chamber gas jet (air and gas).
 Allow 30-60 seconds for the Ignition Line to the Flare Pilot to fill with the desired gas /
air mixture, then push the box button. A flame front should be produced which will

travel up with the Ignition and ignite the Pilot. A loud "pop" should be heard as it
leaves the Ignition pipe at the Flare Trip.
 If no flame front is produced, decrease the air pressure step by step.
 Repeat until a loud "pop" is heard followed by a Pilot Flame.
 Once the Pilot has been ignited select another Pilot.
 When all the pilots are lit, mark down the gas and air pressure settings.
 Then close off the ignition gas and check that the Control Panel indicates all pilots are
"ON".
 This completes the Operational Check. Ignition and pilot Gas Lines should now be
isolated at the main gas and air supply lines to stop the Pilots.
2.2.4. Establishing A Continuous Purge
After the Flare System purge and the operational check of the Flare Pilot and Ignition
System, and to avoid any air ingress into the Flare risers, a Continuous Purge Gas flow
has to be established.
The Gas Seal is a device specially designed to prevent the ingress of air into the Flare
Riser, with significant purge gas savings.
This device is installed at the base of the Flare Tip such that its correct functioning cannot
be influenced by wind gusts.
For the proper operation of this device, it is necessary to have a continuous flow of purge
gas (fuel gas) containing no oxygen and being above dew point.
2.2.5. Starting-up The Flare System
A Flare Relief System cannot be considered commissioned until a relief situation is

initiated by one of the upstream process System which the Flare is designed to protect.
The entire Flare Relief System must therefore have been purged free of air before the
Process Plant approaches an operating condition where a relief situation may occur.
 Check that the Flare System Purge procedures have been carried out as per Para.
2.2.2.
 Be sure that the Flare and the Flare headers are oxygen free.
 Ensure that the Stack area is cleared of personnel and that the necessary authority
has been obtained to commission the Flare.
 Check that the Continuous Fuel Gas Purge for the Unit Headers is in operation.

 Having satisfactorily completed the purging sequence the Pilot Ignition / Fuel Gas and
Air supplies should be allowed to flow and the Pilots lit as described in the previous
Paragraph.
 On PCS check the signals, which indicate that the pilots are lit.
 When the Pilots have been proved alight the Ignition gas and Ignition Air should be
isolated at the Ignition panel.
 The Flare System can now be considered commissioned and the flare gas allowed to
the stack.
NOTE) Before leaving, ensure that all personnel are aware that the Gas Flare Unit is live, and
take all necessary precautions to prevent personnel climbing the Stack. In addition
ensure all upstream process facilities are properly purged with nitrogen to relief
blowdown valve before opening and put into service.
 Dry and purge the system from the pumps P-8701A/B to the closed drain vessel V-
8732.
 Ensure that the closed drain vessel is ready to be put in operation.
 Open valves on suction and discharge lines of pumps P-8701 A/B; open valve on
transfer line to V-8732 3"-GC-87-0091.
 Put the pumps on automatic ON / OFF control with one pump in operation and one
spare.
 Prearrange the electric heater E-8701 for automatic operation, with 87-TIC-005 set at
30°C.

3.0. SHUTDOWN
3.1. NORMAL SHUTDOWN
Except for particular equipment items, i.e. a pump, a thermocouple, a valve, an

instrument, etc., which may have to be isolated or removed for inspection or maintenance
from time to time (according to QGPC procedures), there is no normal shutdown
envisaged as the flare system has to be in service at all times as long as any system
handling gas in the Complex remains in operation.
3.2. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
3.2.1. General
Operating emergencies occur when one or more plant equipment or utility fail, or when
normal operation is no longer possible due to uncontrolled reasons.
The emergencies that may affect a plant cannot be exactly classified as their duration and
extent vary widely.
Emergency procedures depend mainly on the experience and judgement of the operator.
The quick indication of a utility or equipment failure is very important.
The duration of the failure is an important factor in the selection of the emergency
procedure.
Some emergencies can be foreseen and, when economically feasible, the unit has been
designed to avoid many of the obvious cases or operating emergencies.
Other emergencies, such as rupture of lines or vessels, cannot be made failsafe and
require the immediate shutdown of the unit.
Any emergency shutdown procedure must be brief in order to be efficient.
It should be borne in mind that failure to apply the correct operating practice during an
emergency could lead to a bigger hazard.
3.2.2. Power Failure
A general power failure will cause the shutdown of all the process units and in that case
an increased flow rate of hydrocarbon released to the Blowdown and Flare System may
be expected.
The system is designed to face such an emergency, but care has to be taken to check the
liquid level in the K.O. drum V-8701, since the flare K.O. drum pumps are electric driven
and also the electric heater will not operate to evaporate light hydrocarbons.
3.2.3. Instrument Air Failure
The instrument air failure will not affect the operation of the flare.
In case one pilot is spent, it can be lit only when instrument air availability is restored.
3.2.4. Fuel Gas Failure
Fuel gas is used as purge gas and to maintain lit pilots.

Fuel gas failure leads to pilots extinction and to subsequent danger conditions.

The three pressure transmitters 87-PT-605 A/B/C are provided to alert the operators when
the pressure of fuel gas to pilots becomes too low.
If normal fuel gas pressure cannot be restored in short time, the whole Plant has to be
shutdown as soon as possible.
3.2.5. Plant Level 0 Blowdown
Level 0 represents the highest level of shutdown for the Plant, typical scenarios at this
level is a major fire, which could not be contained, or a significant gas release into the
atmosphere.
The activation of total Plant blowdown initiates immediately the level 2 shutdown
(shutdown of all the plant) and then starts the sequential Plant depressurisation.
Total plant depressurisation will cause the maximum flowrate discharge in the flare
system.
Fuel gas system is at the end of the Plant depressurisation sequence.

4.0 DESIGN FEATURES OF PROCESS PROTECTION DEVICES
4.1 CONTROL VALVES
a) Pressure Control Valves

FLOWRATE ACTION
BODY
INSTR. DESIGNATION/ (L:m3/hr, V:Sm3/hr) ON
Phase SIZE
TAG NO. DESCRIPTION AIR
MIN. MAX. (inch)
FAILURE
Instrument Air Supply to
87-PCV-608 V - 50 1 FC
Ignition Transformer
87-PCV-609 L.P Fuel Gas Supply to V 9 14 1 FC
Ignition Transformer
87-PV-601 A-8701 2nd Staging Valve V - 195000kg/h 12 FC
87-PV-602 A-8701 3rd Staging Valve V - 330000kg/h 16 FC
87-PV-603 A-8701 4th Staging Valve V - 770000kg/h 30 FC
4.2 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN VALVES
- No Emergency Shutdown Valves are in this unit.
4.3 BLOWDOWN VALVES AND DEPRESSURIZATION ORIFICES
- No Blowdown Valves and Depressurization Ofifices are in this unit
4.4 PRESSURE SAFETY VALVES
- No Pressure Safety Valves are in this unit
4.5 LIST OF CONTROLLERS SET POINTS
INSTR. EQUIP./UNIT SERVICE / CONTROLLER SETTING

TAG NO. AFFECTED FLUID POINT
87-PIC-601 Flare Header 1 Stage Flare Gas 1.5 bar g
87-TIC-005 V-8701 Hydrocarbons 30 C

4.6 LIST OF ALARM AND TRIP SETTINGS
INSTR. EQUIP./UNIT SERVICE / ALARM, START,

TAG NO. AFFECTED FLUID STOP & TRIP SETTING
87-LAHH-006 V-8701 Hydrocarbons 2200 mm
87-LALL-007 V-8701 Hydrocarbons 300 mm
87-TAH-005 V-8701 Hydrocarbons 180 C
87-TAL-005 V-8701 Hydrocarbons 15 C
87-TAL-050 V-8701 Hydrocarbons 10 C

87-TAH-
X-8702 Pilot Tip Pilot-Failure 200 C
601/602/603
87-PALL-605 L.P Fuel Gas Header Pressure Hydrocarbons 0.8 bar g
4.7 LIST OF FLOW FACTORS
INSTR. FLOW FACTOR “1” OF FULL CHART SCALE

LOCATION
TAG NO. 0 – 100 0 - 10
Flare Header 44’-GV-87-

87-FE-005A 7475 Sm3 /hr 74750 Sm3 /hr
0088
Flare Header 44’-GV-87-
87-FE-005B 7475 Sm3 /hr 74750 Sm3 /hr
0088
87-FE-006 Condensate from V-8701 0.34 m3 /hr 3.4 m3 /hr
87-23-203 Gas Condensate 0.012 m3 /hr 0.12 m3 /hr

5.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION
5.1 PFDS

5.2 P&IDS

5.3 PLOT PLANS

5.4 AREA CLASSIFICATION DWGS.

5.5 EQUIPMENT DATA SHEETS

5.6 CAUSE / EFFECTS MATRIX

5.7 INSTRUMENT DATA SHEETS
- Refer to the VOL.04, SECT.02, 5.7 “Instrument data sheets”

Mathusoothanan Ramanathan
From: Sen M. Joy <senmjoy@dopet.com>

Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2019 13:18
To: 'Mathusoothanan Ramanathan'
Cc: 'Antony T. Devasahayam'; 'Shirish Puri '
Subject: FW: RE: HAZOP ACtion Sheet for Strainer cleaning at Caustic Dain Pot
Attachments: 4078-M487-3-17-0002-1 Action 2 QP.pdf; NGL-4 Flare KOD pump.pdf
Dear Mr. Mathusoodan,

Pls, note below email from QP.

Regards,
Sen M. Joy
Project Manager
DOPET
T: (+974) 44600350 Ext.: 244, F: (+974) 44601066, M: (+974) 50369057
Doha - Qatar, www.dopet.com
Disclaimer: This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the
system manager. Please note that any views or opinions presented in this email are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of DOPET. The company accepts no liability for any damage
caused by any virus transmitted by this email.

From: Mohammed Sabaan Msmar Abujarada Al-Jassim [mailto:m_aljassim@qp.com.qa]
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2019 1:11 PM
To: Sen M. Joy
Cc: Arun Subramaniyan; Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Yousef Al-Shafeai; Saleem Kaja Hussain
Subject: Fw: RE: HAZOP ACtion Sheet for Strainer cleaning at Caustic Dain Pot
sen
Please note safety comments on HAZOP close out their is no issue with close out just note this comment to arun for
his signature.
regards,
Mohammed Sabaan Msmar Abujarada Al-Jassim

Sr. Project Engineer (Dev)
Onshore Projects
P.O. Box 3212 | Doha, Qatar | T: +974 40135832 | M: +974 | F: +974 | E-mail: m_aljassim@qp.com.qa
----- Forwarded by Mohammed Sabaan Msmar Abujarada Al-Jassim/PN/VP/QatarPetroleum on 26/09/2019 01:08 PM -----
From: Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Yousef Al-Shafeai/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum

To: Mohammed Sabaan Msmar Abujarada Al-Jassim/PN/VP/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Cc: Ali Abduljabbar A A Saifaldeen/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC, Abdulaziz Jawad Dawood Asad
Abdulla/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Date: 25/09/2019 07:32 AM
Subject: Fw: [EXTERNAL] RE: HAZOP ACtion Sheet for Strainer cleaning at Caustic Dain Pot
Bu Sabaan,
Kindly, find in the below emails Safety and Operations feedback about the HAZOP action for
1
strainer cleaning.
Regards,
Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Y. Al-Shafeai
Senior Process Engineer OEP/12(M)
Operations Engineering
Tel: +974 40145680 | Mob & QPsms: +974 55298766 | P.O. Box: 110115 | E-mail: alshafeai@qp.com.qa
----- Forwarded by Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Yousef Al-Shafeai/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum on 25/09/2019 07:25 AM -----
From: Mahfooz Ali/OHM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum

To: Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Yousef Al-Shafeai/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Cc: Abdulaziz Jawad Dawood Asad Abdulla/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC, Mohammed Sabaan Msmar Abujarada Al-
Jassim/PN/VP/QatarPetroleum@QGPC, Faisal Mohd Ameen Zaman/OHM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Date: 24/09/2019 02:57 PM
Subject: Re: Fw: [EXTERNAL] RE: HAZOP ACtion Sheet for Strainer cleaning at Caustic Dain Pot
Dear Mohammed,
Kindly note that as per HAZOP action item , periodic cleaning of strainer is
required to avoid potential cavitation , which can lead to pump damage.
Further caustic stream may contain debris , which can result in strainer
clogging . Therefore it is suggested to start with the initial frequency of once a
month and observe the condition over a period of time. Based on the debris
collection we can further decided on adjusting the frequency of cleaning of
strainer.
Regards
Mahfooz Ali
Safety Engineer (Loss Prevention) OHS/1(M)
Health, Safety & Environment (Mesaieed Opern)
P.O. Box 3212 | Doha, Qatar | T: +974 40146319 | M: +974 55223076 | F: +974 | E-mail: ma_ali@qp.com.qa

To: Mahfooz Ali/OHM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Date: 18/09/2019 02:49 PM
Dear Mahfooz,
For your review and advice, where during the running of pumps, the strainers may cause some
flow restriction, as debris collects in them and the flow to the pump will fall off, in this event, it will
be necessary to clean pumps strainers. Refer to the attachment.
Note, there are a caustic stream will be pumped out through the pump after the modification.
Regards,
2
----- Forwarded by Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Yousef Al-Shafeai/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum on 18/09/2019 02:46 PM -----
From: Salah Abdalla Maki Abdelsalam/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum

To: Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Yousef Al-Shafeai/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Cc: Shaheen Abdulla Shaheen Alateiq Al-Dosari/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC, Khamis Mohd Khamis Al-
Kubaisi/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Date: 17/09/2019 07:27 AM
Dear Bu-Ahmed,
No further comment from operation, but you need to get safety feed back also on below
HAZOP action point prior to close.
Regards,
Salah Abdalla Maki Abdelsalam

Sr. Process Engineer (NGL-4) - ONN/2(M)
Gas Processing NGL-3/4 & GSF
P.O. Box 50070 | Doha, Qatar | T: +974 40145647 | M: +974 55574657 | F: +974 40139561 | E-mail: abdelsalam@qp.com.qa
----- Forwarded by Salah Abdalla Maki Abdelsalam/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum on 17/09/2019 07:23 AM -----
From: Khamis Mohd Khamis Al-Kubaisi/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum

To: Salah Abdalla Maki Abdelsalam/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Cc: Ezzeddine Salem Ben Bouzidi/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Date: 17/09/2019 07:22 AM
Subject: Re: Fw: [EXTERNAL] RE: HAZOP ACtion Sheet for Strainer cleaning at Caustic Dain Pot
Dear Bu-Mohammed,
No comments from my side.
Best Regards,
A/ONN/1(M)
Khamis Mohd Khamis Al-Kubaisi
Sr. Process Engineer ( NGL-3 & GSF ), ONG/2 (M)
Gas Processing NGL-3 / 4 & GSF

P.O. Box 50070 | Doha, Qatar | T: +974 40145287 | M: +974 55449555 | F: +974 44293558 | E-mail: kham_alkubaisi@qp.com.qa
From: Salah Abdalla Maki Abdelsalam/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum

To: Khamis Mohd Khamis Al-Kubaisi/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Cc: Ezzeddine Salem Ben Bouzidi/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
3
Date: 15/09/2019 02:20 PM
Dear Bu-Mohammed,
Below document reviewed from my side with no comment.
Kindly confirm if any comment from your side.
Regards,
Salah Abdalla Maki Abdelsalam

Sr. Process Engineer (NGL-4) - ONN/2(M)
Gas Processing NGL-3/4 & GSF
P.O. Box 50070 | Doha, Qatar | T: +974 40145647 | M: +974 55574657 | F: +974 40139561 | E-mail: abdelsalam@qp.com.qa
----- Forwarded by Salah Abdalla Maki Abdelsalam/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum on 15/09/2019 02:17 PM -----

To: Salah Abdalla Maki Abdelsalam/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Cc: Ali Abduljabbar A A Saifaldeen/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC, Abdulaziz Jawad Dawood Asad
Abdulla/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC, Khamis Mohd Khamis Al-Kubaisi/ONM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum@QGPC
Date: 04/09/2019 01:53 PM
Dear Salah,
For your review and advice, where during the running-in of pumps, the strainers may cause some
flow restriction, as debris collects in them and the flow to the pump will fall off, in this event, it will
be necessary to clean pumps strainers. Refer to the attachment.
Due to there are a caustic stream will be pumped out through the pump, I suggest to cleaning it
once a month or in case of clogging of the strainers.
Regards,
----- Forwarded by Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Yousef Al-Shafeai/OEM/OMM/VO/QatarPetroleum on 04/09/2019 01:34 PM -----
From: "Sen M. Joy" <senmjoy@dopet.com>

To: "'Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Yousef Al-Shafeai'" <alshafeai@qp.com.qa>
Cc: "'Mohammed Sabaan Msmar Abujarada Al-Jassim'" <m_aljassim@qp.com.qa>, "'Shirish Puri'" <shirishp@dopet.com>
Date: 02/09/2019 05:58 PM
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: HAZOP ACtion Sheet for Strainer cleaning at Caustic Dain Pot
Dear Mr. Shafeai,

Soft reminder on the HAZOP ACTION sheet.
4

Regards,
Sen M. Joy
Project Manager
DOPET
T: (+974) 44600350 Ext.: 244, F: (+974) 44601066, M: (+974) 50369057

Disclaimer: This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have
received this email in error please notify the system manager. Please note that any views or opinions presented in this email are solely those of the author and do not
necessarily represent those of DOPET. The company accepts no liability for any damage caused by any virus transmitted by this email.

From: Sen M. Joy [mailto:senmjoy@dopet.com]
Sent: Thursday, ---, 2019 6:07 PM
To: 'Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Yousef Al-Shafeai'
Cc: 'Mohammed Sabaan Msmar Abujarada Al-Jassim'; 'Shirish Puri'
Subject: HAZOP ACtion Sheet for Strainer cleaning at Caustic Dain Pot

Dear Mr. Shafeai,

As per our discussion & meeting yesterday for the sign off on the HAZOP action sheet.

Kindly return the same duly signed on next Wednesday 4th Sept while we meet for weekly meeting.

Regards,
Sen M. Joy
Project Manager
DOPET
T: (+974) 44600350 Ext.: 244, F: (+974) 44601066, M: (+974) 50369057

Disclaimer: This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have
received this email in error please notify the system manager. Please note that any views or opinions presented in this email are solely those of the author and do not
necessarily represent those of DOPET. The company accepts no liability for any damage caused by any virus transmitted by this email.

This e-mail and any attachments are confidential to the addressee and may also be privileged. If you are not the
addressee of this e-mail, you may not copy, forward, disclose or otherwise use it in any way whatsoever. If you have
received this e-mail by mistake, please e-mail the sender by replying to this message, and delete the original and any
printout thereof.
5
HAZOP ACTION SHEET
Action Sheet No. 3
HAZOP STUDY REPORT

SYSTEM FACILITY
Action By: DOPET
ACTION
Item: Deviation: Flow No/Less
Cause: Incorrect line up from V-8701 to pump suction
Consequence:
1. Potential cavitation/damage to pump
Action: Operating Manual to be prepared for the Caustic transfer operation line up/procedure etc.
By:
REPLY
All aspects of operations are briefly described in Operating, Control and Safeguarding Philosophy,
doc. No. 4078-M487-6-03-0001 as an input for preparation of Operating Manual, doc. No. 4078-
M487-0-22-0001, where full details will be incorporated.

Signed for: Date:

4078-M487-6-03-0001 – OCSP Date:
By:
Signed for: Date
V-8701, total plant shutdown takes place. KOD is also equipped with an electric heater
controlled by temperature.
Spent Caustic Degassing Drum V-8323 is used to receive spent caustic from C3 Caustic
Pre-wash Drum V-8321. This operation is carried out intermittently. Level in V-8323 is
controlled in on/off mode operation of Spent Caustic Pumps P-8321A/B.
4.2 Proposed Facilities
New Caustic Drain Pot V-8764 shall be installed next to the Flare KO drum (V-8701). The
Liquid outlet from V-8701 is connected to Caustic drain pot with valve. The outlet from
Caustic drain pot is connected to the suction of Flare KO drum Pumps (P-8701 A/B). The
Caustic drain pot is floating with Flare KOD through a vapour balancing line.
Provision for methanol injection is provided at the top nozzle of Caustic drain pot.
V-8764 is provided with Level gauge 87-LG-801 and interface level transmitter 87-LIT-
801.
New Piping is provided on the KOD pump discharge line and connected to spent caustic
degassing drum (V-8323) with RO. This line shall be utilized for caustic transfer to
degassing drum. Caustic pump out rate shall be ensured by installation of new restriction
orifice 87-RO-803, to limit forwarding caustic flow to capacity of downstream equipment
and to prevent end-of-curve operation of P-8701 while in this mode of operation.
The new KOD pump discharge line to V-8323 is provided with minimum flow recirculation
line with restriction orifice 87-RO-802 and is routed back to Caustic Drain Pot inlet.
Electrical heat tracing is provided to the level bridles in Flare KOD and Caustic Drain Pot
to avoid freezing.
Note: V-8764 HC Liquid outlet piping and isolation of existing Liquid HC line 4"-GC-87-
0090-L01B from V-8701 to P-8701A/B shall be implemented in future in the next
available shutdown. Until this piping is implemented, V-8701 liquid outlet shall be lined to
V-8764 and to existing pump suction. Existing pump suction isolation valves at HC line
shall be open. Caustic pot liquid outlet isolation valve shall be closed. This may result in
partial caustic carryover with HC stream and slower caustic level build up in V-8764.
Once level builds up, existing pump suction isolation valves at HC line shall be closed
and Caustic pot liquid outlet isolation valve shall be opened.
5.0 Operation Philosophy

The operating, control and safeguarding philosophy for the proposed Caustic Drain Pot
(V-8764) is in line with existing facilities. All control and safety required with the
installation of Caustic Drain Pot is developed for safe operation and control.
The FACILITY is designed to be operated manually as the occurrence of ADIP/Caustic
entry to flare KOD is expected only once or twice in a year, as per historical data.
Two modes of operation are envisaged:
1. Normal Mode of operation – transfer of V-8701 liquids to V-8732. This operation shall
be carried out as per existing SOP, with following specifics”

a. Prior to implementation of HC liquid outlet from V-8764 and existing line 4"-
GC-87-0090-L01B isolation, the liquid outlet from V-8701 shall be lined up to
caustic pot V-8764 and to P-8701A/B suction. V-8764 liquid caustic outlet to
P-8701A/B suction is closed. P-8701A/B discharge is line up to V-8732.
b. Post implementation of HC liquid outlet from V-9764 and existing line 4"-GC-
87-0090-L01B isolation, the liquid outlet from V-8701 shall be lined up to
caustic pot V-8764. V-8764 liquid HC outlet is lined up to P-8701A/B suction
and P-8701A/B discharge is line up to V-8732. Valve on existing line 4"-GC-
87-0090-L01B shall be closed. This line 4"-GC-87-0090-L01B shall be used to
bypass V-8764 during maintenance works.
2. Caustic Mode of operation – transfer of V-8701 liquids to V-8323 via V-8764 caustic
outlet. This operation shall be carried out as described here. Liquid outlet of V-8701 is
lined up to caustic pot V-8764. V-8764 liquid HC outlet closed and caustic outlet is
lined up to P-8701A/B suction and P-8701/B discharge is line up to V-8323. for
Pre/Post implementation of scheme, the operation philosophy of caustic transfer
remains same.
Note: Post Caustic mode of operation and before resuming to normal HC mode of
operation, the caustic hold up in pump suction piping shall be drained to avoid any
caustic carry over.
During normal operation, there will not be any caustic / ADIP expected in flare KOD. The
Caustic Drain pot is full of Hydrocarbon. The interface level transmitter will show ZERO
reading. In the event of Caustic / ADIP entry in to the Flare KOD, the caustic / ADIP will
enter to the Caustic drain pot and interface level appears. At high high level, the interface
transmitter will give alarm in control room.
The field operator will be informed by CCR. Operator shall ensure that hydrocarbons
from V-8701 is pumped out before changeover to caustic transfer mode starts. Operator
shall also ensure that caustic level in V-8323 is at minimum and no other flow to V-8323.
The field operator will manually close V-8764 HC liquid outlet isolation valve, open V-
8764 caustic outlet, change the pump (P-8701A/B) discharge line up towards Caustic
Degassing Vessel (V-8323) instead of Gasoline Off-spec and Closed Drain Drum (V-
8732). By lining up discharge line to V-8323, new pump minimum circulation line will also
be in service and routed to Caustic Drain Pot (V-8764).
After changing the pump discharge and minimum recirculation line up, pump will be
started on manual mode by the field operator. The transfer rate shall be limited by new
restriction orifice, 87-RO-803, which shall be installed in new transfer line. The remaining
pump out flow is flowing back to caustic drain pot via minimum flow recirculation orifice
87-RO-802.
The pump shall be stopped by operator (by pressing manual stop pushbutton) when the
interface level reaches to low low alarm value (LIL), to avoid Hydrocarbon ingress with
Caustic.

Rev.: 0
Date: 30/03/2020
Page: 9 of 25
8323).
8764).
Caustic.
mode.
SL.
NO.
2
3
4
5

ACTION #4
DOPET
DOPET
HAZOP ACTION SHEET
Action Sheet No. 5
HAZOP STUDY REPORT

SYSTEM FACILITY
Action By: DOPET
ACTION
Item: Deviation: Flow No/Less
Cause: Pump trip (Caustic transfer mode)
Consequence:
1. Interface level build up in V-8764 leading to caustic slip into the pump suction header. On subsequent
resumption of hydrocarbon mode transfer, this will result in slip of this hold up quantity into the
hydrocarbon system and subsequent downstream process upset
2. Transient level build up in V-8701- no significant consequence
Action:
[1] LAH-801 high interface level to be made a high priority level alarm
[2] Operating Manual to also capture the point that the caustic hold up quantity should be drained
manually before resumption of the hydrocarbon mode operations
By:
REPLY
1. Note 10: LAH-801 is high priority alarm is included in PID 4078-M487-6-51-0011-001
2. Draining after caustic mode operation is described in Operating, Control and Safeguarding
Philosophy, doc. No. 4078-M487-6-03-0001 section 5, as an input for preparation of Operating
Manual, doc. No. 4078-M487-0-22-0001, where full details will be incorporated.

Signed for: Date:

4078-M487-6-51-0011 - PID Date:
4078-M487-6-03-0001 – OCSP
By:
Signed for: Date
remains same.
caustic carry over.
87-RO-802.
Caustic.

Rev.: 0
Date: 30/03/2020
Page: 9 of 25
8323).
v. Pre/Post implementation of scheme, the caustic operation mode remains same. Hazop action # 5
8764).
Caustic.
mode.
SL.
NO.
2
3
4
5

HAZOP ACTION SHEET
Action Sheet No. 7
HAZOP STUDY REPORT

SYSTEM FACILITY
Action By: DOPET
ACTION
Item: Deviation: Pressure More
Cause: Thermal expansion of trapped liquid in the section from V-8764 till pump (completion of caustic
transfer mode)
Consequence: 1. Line overpressure with LOC and HSE impact.
Action:
[1] Check potential of Thermal expansion of trapped liquid in the section from V-8764 and the
requirement of TSV
[2] Operating Manual to capture draining of trapped liquid
By:
REPLY
1. As per Shell DEP 80.45.10.11-Gen, section 3.10.5 Point 4e, the trapped volume is less than 500 l.
Hence Thermal relief valve is not required. Also, the isolated sections of caustic suction and
discharge lines are drained (as per operating philosophy - refer HAZOP action #7. Hence as per
Shell DEP 80.45.10.11-GEN, section 3.10.5, point 2a, thermal relief valve is not required.
2. Draining after caustic mode operation is described in Operating, Control and Safeguarding
Philosophy, doc. No. 4078-M487-6-03-0001 section 5, as an input for preparation of Operating
Manual, doc. No. 4078-M487-0-22-0001, where full details will be incorporated.
Signed for: Date:

4078-M487-6-51-0011 - PID Date:
4078-M487-6-03-0001 – OCSP
By:
Signed for: Date
remains same.
caustic carry over.
87-RO-802.
Caustic.

Rev.: 0
Date: 30/03/2020
Page: 9 of 25
8323). Hazop Action # 7
8764).
Caustic.
mode.
SL.
NO.
2
3
4
5

Action #8
DOPET
DOPET
HAZOP ACTION SHEET
Action Sheet No. 9
HAZOP STUDY REPORT

SYSTEM FACILITY
Action By: DOPET
ACTION
Item: Deviation: Temperature More
Cause: High temperature hydrocarbon streams from upstream (close to 200 deg.C- expected during fire
case upstream only)
Consequence: Potential damage to internal coating of V-8764 (design T 100 deg.C)
Action:
[1] Internal Coating periodic inspection/maintenance to be indicated- include in Operation/ Maintenance
Manual
[2] Ensure adequate provisions for positive isolation for V-8764
By:
REPLY
1. Periodic Inspection and maintenance of internal coating is described in Operating, Control and
Safeguarding Philosophy, doc. No. 4078-M487-6-03-0001 section 7, as an input for preparation of
Operating Manual, doc. No. 4078-M487-0-22-0001, where full details will be incorporated.
2. Having in mind that reinstatement of coating may need to be done after relief to flare system in
case of fire (which also leads to plant shutdown and depressurisation), V-8764 will be available
for purging prior to isolation and vessel opening/removal and therefore double block and bleed
isolation with spectacle blind / removable spool as per guidelines in DEP 31.38.01.11, Section
8.7.2 Figure / QP Philosophy for Fire & Safety QP-PHL-S-0001, section 9.3.6, table 1 is provided.
Signed for: Date:

4078-M487-6-03-0001 – OCSP Date:
By:
Signed for: Date

like NGL-3, V-8321.
8701.

ACTION 9
coating shall be carried out in the next available shut down, whenever any relief
exceeding the design temperature of internal coating occurs and as per maintenance
schedule of company.
temperature. The electric heat tracing can produce maximum of 65°C with the given
element. This is within the max operating temperature of Caustic Drain Pot.

Rev.: 0
Date: 30/03/2020
Page: 12 of 25
10. MAINTENANCE
The design life of Caustic Drain Pot shall be 30 years considering stipulated routine maintenance, with due note
being taken of the dusty, hot, humid, sandy, salt-laden atmosphere of the State of Qatar.
10.1 VESSEL INSPECTIONS: TYPE AND FREQUENCY
TYPE OF
SERVICE FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION
INSPECTION
Caustic / ADIP After each high temperature relief (above design temperature of coating)
External & Internal
/ HC along with periodic maintains as per client schedule
Note: 1. External inspection may lead to an internal inspection or shut down if deficiencies are found. Internal
inspection may also require replacement of pressure retaining components.
Note: 2. Caustic Drain Pot is internally lined for caustic service. The caustic / hydrocarbon is not expected to reach
maximum temperature of 200°C, as the maximum operating temperature of fractionator is 70°C. The maintenance
and inspection of the internal coating shall be carried out whenever any relief exceeding the design temperature of
internal coating occurs and as per maintenance schedule of company.
10.2 VESSEL EXTERNAL INSPECTION HAZOP action # 9
An external inspection is conducted while the system is operating and includes the below
 Examination of system components, including structural attachments, vessel connections, inlet piping,
outlet piping, drain piping, piping supports, and appurtenances.
 Identifying evidence of leakage or inadequate insulation or other coverings.
 Review name plate data from pressure vessel
 Review the working pressure of the vessel
 Visually inspect the vessel for damage, modifications, weldments, etc. to validate vessel integrity
10.3 VESSEL INTERNAL INSPECTION
An internal inspection is conducted once the pressure has been released and the system is open for inspection. It
includes inspecting for corrosion and wear around
 Welded seams, nozzles and areas adjacent to welds
 Vessel connections
 External fittings or controls
 Coating inspection
10.4 PRESSURE TEST
A pressure test is required for a new pressure system or an existing pressure system after repair. The hydrostatic
pressure test is required to ensure the mechanical integrity over a period of time.
Hydro test Pressure at site is 16.34 barg.

HAZOP ACTION SHEET
Action Sheet No. 10
HAZOP STUDY REPORT

SYSTEM FACILITY
Action By: DOPET
ACTION
Cause: High temperature hydrocarbon streams from upstream (close to 200 deg.C- expected during fire
case upstream only)
Consequence: Potential damage to internal coating of V-8764 (design T 100 deg.C)
Action:
[1] Internal Coating periodic inspection/maintenance to be indicated- include in Operation/ Maintenance
Manual
[2] Ensure adequate provisions for positive isolation for V-8764
By:
REPLY
1. Periodic Inspection and maintenance of internal coating is described in Operating, Control and
Safeguarding Philosophy, doc. No. 4078-M487-6-03-0001 section 7, as an input for preparation of
Operating Manual, doc. No. 4078-M487-0-22-0001, where full details will be incorporated.
2. Having in mind that reinstatement of coating may need to be done after relief to flare system in
case of fire (which also leads to plant shutdown and depressurisation), V-8764 will be available
for purging prior to isolation and vessel opening/removal and therefore double block and bleed
isolation with spectacle blind / removable spool, as per guidelines in DEP 31.38.01.11, Section
8.7.2 Figure / QP Philosophy for Fire & Safety QP-PHL-S-0001, section 9.3.6, table 1, are
provided.
Signed for: Date:

4078-M487-6-51-0010, 11 & 12 – PID Date:
By:
Signed for: Date
Action #10
ACTION #10
ACTION #10
ACTION #10
Action #10
ACTION #10
ACTION #10
Action #10
ACTION #10 ACTION #10
DOPET
HAZOP ACTION SHEET
Action Sheet No. 11
HAZOP STUDY REPORT

SYSTEM FACILITY
Action By: DOPET
ACTION
Cause: Malfunction of heat tracing control
Consequence: Possibility of exceeding design T of heat traced areas with LOC and HSE impact
Action:
[1] Check maximum temperature possible in the event of malfunction of heat tracing system
[2] Heat tracing safeguarding philosophy to be shown on P&ID and details to be included in the
Operating Manual.
By:
REPLY
1. In the event of malfunction of heat tracing (which basically the worst case scenario; when ambient
is at maximum + pipe is operating at maximum allowable + voltage level at maximum level of its
positive tolerance), then the maximum uncontrolled pipe temperature shall not exceed design
temperature of 200°C.This is within design limit of 230°C and temperature class T3.
2. Note 8 “In case of thermostat failure, the maximum temperature developed by heat tracing element
shall not exceed 200°C” is included in PID 4078-M487-6-51-0010. Also heat tracing safeguarding
philosophy is updated in 4078-M487-6-03-0001 – OCSP section 7.

Signed for: Date:

4078-M487-6-51-0010 - PID Date:
4078-M487-6-03-0001 – OCSP
By:
Signed for: Date
Please note our response as below;

Understand that the design temperature of pipe itself is 200°C as per the datasheet
received (and we have provided our compliance as well inour offer, kindly refer Annexure-
9, point #4.6).

Therefore, we confirm that in the event of malfunction of heat tracing (which basically the
worst case scenario; when ambient is at maximum + pipe is operating at maximum
allowable + voltage level at maximum level of its positive tolerance), then the maximum
uncontrolled pipe temperature shall not exceed design temperature of 200°C.

We may provide reports from our design software Trace Calc Pro during detail
engineering.

With Best Regards,

Vijit Saxena | Product Manager

Tel : +974 44466379
Fax : +974 44433573
Mobile : +974 33445267
Email : vijit@petroconecc.com
PO Box : 22006 | Al Waab City | Salwa Road | Doha | Qatar
Web : www.Petroconecc.com

IMS Certified (ISO9001:2015, ISO14001:2015 & OHSAS18001:2007)
Our Environment is our Future: Please print only if needed

From: Vijit Saxena
Sent: 25 July 2019 17:39
To: Imran Sabir Baig <imransabir@dopet.com>
Cc: Sen M. Joy <senmjoy@dopet.com>; Shyju Varghese <shyjuvarghese@petroconecc.com>; Sarah Hassaan
<sarah@petroconecc.com>
Subject: RE: Electrical Heat Tracing Technical Clarification and Acceptance / PCC/VS/0686‐2019/Dopet dated
13//2019

Dear Sir,

Please find our revised techno – commercial attached along with filled TQ sheet and supporting
docs as received from the manufacturer.

We hope you will find everything in order.

Looking forward for your positive response.

With Best Regards,

3
HAZOP ACTION SHEET
Action Sheet No. 12
HAZOP STUDY REPORT

SYSTEM FACILITY
Action By: DOPET
ACTION
Cause: Malfunction of heat tracing control
Consequence: Possibility of exceeding design T of heat traced areas with LOC and HSE impact
Action:
[1] Check maximum temperature possible in the event of malfunction of heat tracing system
[2] Heat tracing safeguarding philosophy to be shown on P&ID and details to be included in the
Operating Manual.
By:
REPLY
1. In the event of malfunction of heat tracing (which basically the worst case scenario; when ambient
is at maximum + pipe is operating at maximum allowable + voltage level at maximum level of its
positive tolerance), then the maximum uncontrolled pipe temperature shall not exceed design
temperature of 200°C.This is within design limit of 230°C and temperature class T3.
2. Note 8 “In case of thermostat failure, the maximum temperature developed by heat tracing element
shall not exceed 200°C” is included in PID 4078-M487-6-51-0010. Also heat tracing safeguarding
philosophy is updated in 4078-M487-6-03-0001 – OCSP section 7 and 4078-M487-0-22-0001 –
Operating Manual section 6.4
3.
Signed for: Date:

4078-M487-6-51-0010 – PID, 4078-M487-6-03-0001 – OCSP Date:
By:
Signed for: Date
ACTION #12
DOPET
DOPET
OPERATING CONTROL AND SAFEGUARDING Rev.: A

like NGL-3, V-8321.
8701.

coating shall be carried out, whenever any relief exceeding the design temperature of
internal coating occurs and as per maintenance schedule of company.
ACTION #12
temperature. In the event of malfunction of heat tracing (which basically the worst case
scenario; when ambient is at maximum + pipe is operating at maximum allowable +
voltage level at maximum level of its positive tolerance), then the maximum uncontrolled
pipe temperature shall not exceed design temperature of 200°C.This is within design limit
of 230°C and temperature class T3.
Doc. No. 4078-M487R-6-03-0001 Rev. A Page 7 of 7

Rev.: 0
Date: 30/03/2020
Page: 7 of 25
6 N6 2 Utility Connection
Action #12 7 N7 4 HC Outlet
8 M1 42 Manhole
6.4 ELECTRIC HEAT TRACING
Electrical heat tracing is provided on the level transmitter stand pipes in Caustic Drain pot (V-8764) to prevent ice
formation during very low temperature and to avoid freezing. In the event of malfunction of heat tracing (which
basically the worst case scenario; when ambient is at maximum + pipe is operating at maximum allowable +
voltage level at maximum level of its positive tolerance), then the maximum uncontrolled pipe temperature will not
exceed design temperature of 200°C.This is within design limit of 230°C and temperature class T3.
6.5 METHANOL INJECTION
Provision for methanol injection is provided at the top nozzle of Caustic drain pot (V-8764). The Methanol injection
is provided with NRV to inhibit hydrate formation which may be cold under certain relief scenarios. The methanol
injection shall be carried out as per the operational requirement.
6.6 PIPING CONNECTIONS
New Caustic Drain Pot (V-8764) is installed next to the Flare KOD (V-8701). Caustic drain pot is floating with Flare
KOD through a vapour balancing line with valve. The Liquid outlet from KOD is connected to Caustic drain pot and
the outlet from Caustic drain pot is connected to the suction of Flare KOD Pumps (P-8701 A/B).
The KOD pump discharge line is connected to Spent Caustic Degassing Drum (V-8323) with restriction orifice (87-
RO-803) and also with a minimum flow recirculation line with restriction orifice (87-RO-802) which is routed back to
Caustic Drain Pot inlet.
7. INITIAL START-UP
The below check list shall be checked before initial start-up / line-up the Caustic Drain Pot (V-8764) and ensure
that the mentioned prerequisites are fulfilled as per the requirement.
SL. NO. DESCRIPTION OBSERVATION
1 Confirm the vessel internal inspection and box-up are completed.
2 Ensure the utility stations are lined-up and ready to utilize.

Check and ensure the instruments are calibrated and the due dates are not
3
expired.
4 Ensure that the instruments (87-LG-801 & 87-LIT-801) are lined-up properly
Ensure that the Electrical Heat Tracing for the level transmitter stand pipe is
5
powered on.
Ensure all the vessel nozzle & pipe flanges are tightened properly with
6
appropriate gaskets.
7 Ensure that the vent and drain valves are in closed condition.
Ensure the vessel is purged with Nitrogen and O2 content is recorded and in
8
acceptable limit.

ACTION #13
DOPET
DOPET
ACTION #14
DOPET
DOPET
ACTION #15
DOPET
DOPET

Hazop Close Out Report V-8701 Flare Ko Drum Draining Facilities at Ngl-4

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What is the objective of the project?

What is the objective of the project?

What issues were addressed by installing the new facilities?

What issues were addressed by installing the new facilities?

PROJECT / CONTRACT NO.

EPIC CONTRACTOR: ENGINEERING CONSULTANT:

DOHA PETROLEUM CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD., ENERGOPROJEKT ENTEL LTD.

30.09.2019 2 Re-Issued for Approval RM DV SJ QP

Document No. 4078-M487-3-17-0002 Page: 1 of 76

HAZOP CLOSE OUT REPORT Rev.: 2

1.0 Introduction ................................................................................................ 3

2.0 Objectives ................................................................................................... 3

3.0 Close Out Actions ...................................................................................... 4

ATTACHMENT-01: Completed HAZOP Close Out Action Sheets

HAZOP CLOSE OUT REPORT Rev.: 2

2.1 Project Objective

2.2 Document Objective

HAZOP CLOSE OUT REPORT Rev.: 2

3.0 Close Out Actions

The HAZOP study identified in total 15 recommendations, which are related to

2. Ensure periodic cleaning of QP Action on QP.

3. Operating Manual to be DOPET All aspects of operations are briefly described in

5. Same as recommendation DOPET Same as action no. 4.

6. [1] Check potential of DOPET 1. As per Shell DEP 80.45.10.11-Gen, section

HAZOP CLOSE OUT REPORT Rev.: 2

7. Same as recommendation DOPET Same as action no. 6.

10. Same as recommendation DOPET Same as action no. 9.

12. Same as recommendation DOPET Same as action no. 11.

HAZOP CLOSE OUT REPORT Rev.: 2

14. Same as recommendation DOPET Same as action no. 13.

HAZOP STUDY REPORT

Drg No. Rev: Action No. 1

Reply Produced By: Date:

INCORPORATED into Design – Reference Doc No.:

6.0 Control Philosophy

7.0 Safeguarding Philosophy

Methanol injection is provided with NRV on V-8764 to inhibit hydrate formation in HC

Doc. No. 4078-M487R-6-03-0001 Rev. 3 Page 7 of 7

6.4 ELECTRIC HEAT TRACING

6.5 METHANOL INJECTION

6.6 PIPING CONNECTIONS HAZOP action #1

SL. NO. DESCRIPTION OBSERVATION

1 Confirm the vessel internal inspection and box-up are completed.

2 Ensure the utility stations are lined-up and ready to utilize.

DOC NO: 4078-M487-0-22-0001 REV. 0 Page 7 of 25

8.2 CAUSTIC OPERATION MODE

8.2.1 START & STOP CAUSTIC OPERATION MODE:

6 Ensure the ADIP/Caustic outlet flow and Methanol injection is required

DOC NO: 4078-M487-0-22-0001 REV. 0 Page 9 of 25

NGL-4 PLANT OPERATING MANUAL SECT. 05

SECTION 05 : HC DISPOSAL – FLARE

HC DISPOSAL – FLARE NGL4_OM_VOL04_SECT05_RBRev. B Page 1 of 23

NGL-4 PLANT OPERATING MANUAL SECT. 05

1.1 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION

2.0 PREPARATION AND START-UP

2.1 PREPARATION FOR START-UP

3.1 NORMAL SHUTDOWN

3.2 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN

4.0 DESIGN FEATURES OF PROCESS PROTECTION DEVICES