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JAMIA CLINICAL IV MOOT COURT COMPITITION,2020

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

T.P. No.____/2019
Rathin(PETITIONER 1)
v.
Rachel(RESPONDENT)
WITH
W.P. No.____/2019
Rakshakdayini(PETITIONER 2)
v.
Union of India(RESPONDENT)
AND
SLP No.____/2019
Tauhid-the spiritual life(PETITIONER 3)
v.
State and Rachel(RESPONDENT)

PETITION INVOKEDUNDER ART. 139A OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S

COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................................................7

STATEMENT OF FACTS......................................................................................................8

STATEMENT OF ISSUES...................................................................................................10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...........................................................................................11

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED................................................................................................13

I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE ?........................................................13

1. THE APPEAL FILED BY RATHIN IS NOT MAINTAINABLE...........................................13

(1) ADULTERY IS A GROUND FOR DIVORCE.................................................................13

(2) RATHIN CANNOT TAKE THE DEFENSE OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.....13

(3) PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION...............................................................................14

2. THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY “RAKSHAKDAYINI” IS NOT MAINTAINABLE............14

3. THE SLP FILED BY “TAUHID-THE SPIRITUAL LIFE” IS NOT MAINTAINABLE...........15

II. WHETHER A HINDU MARRIAGE CAN BE DISSOLVED BY THE REQUESTING PARTY ON

THE GROUND OF HIS/ HER CONVERSION TO ANOTHER RELIGION OR RENUNCIATION OF

THE WORLD BY ENTERING ANY RELIGIOUS ORDER AND IT’S BEARING ON THE RIGHT
TO RELIGION?.........................................................................................................................17

III. WHETHER A STATELESS PERSON HAS THE PROTECTION OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE INDIATAN CONSTITUTION, IF SO,
WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF SUCH PROTECTION AND WHAT ROLE HAS A
MARRIAGE TO PLAY IN DETERMINING THE CITIZENSHIP OF SUCH
STATLESS PERSON?..........................................................................................................11

1. ARTICLE 25 IS ENJOYED BY EVERY PERSON..............................................................11

2. RACHEL’S RIGHT TO MOVE TO ISRAEL......................................................................12

3. MARRIAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEED CITIZENSHIP.....................................................13

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IV. WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

PREVAIL OVER DISPUTES OF INTERNATIONAL NATURE, ARISING FROM
PERSONAL LAWS, AND SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF DOMESTIC COURTS
THERE OF?...........................................................................................................................15

1. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS PREVAIL OVER DISPUTES OF

INTERNATIONAL NATURE ARISING FROM PERSONAL LAWS..................................................15

2. SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF DOMESTIC COURTS THEREOF.........................................16

V. WHETHER THE FAMILY COURT FAILED TO APPRAISETHE EVIDENCE APPROPRATELY

AND THE DECREE SO PASSED CAN BE CHALLENGED TO BE STRUCK DOWN?....................19

1. THE DECREE PASSED BY FAMILY COURT IS REASONANBLE.....................................19

2. THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY RATHIN IS INADMISSIBLE...........................................20

3. IRRITRIEVEABLE BREAKDOWN OF MARRIAGE...........................................................20

PRAYER.................................................................................................................................30

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
Bom Bombay
Cal Calcutta
COI Constitution of India
DMC Divorce and Matrimonial Cases
FR Fundamental Rights
HC High Court
HMA Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
Hon’ble Honorable
Ker Kerala
Nag Nagpur
Ors. Others
RCR Restitution of Conjugal Rights
S. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SLP Special Leave Appeal
UOI Union of India
v. versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES REFERRED

Appear
Sr
Title Citation on
no.
page(s)
24. Abdul halimmia v. Sub divisional officer, AIR 1965 Cal 160 23
Katwa&Ors.,
4. Amita v. A.K Rathore AIR 1999 MP 218 14
Anwar v. state of J&K. AIR 1971 SC 337 30
14. Ashok nagar welfare association v. R.K. Sharma (2002) 1 SCC 749 16
12. Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Punjab AIR (2002) SC 1124 16
32. Barker v. Barker AIR 1955 MB 103 29
34. BipinBipinShantilal v. State of Gujarat (2002) 10 SCC 529. 30
9. Gopal Das Mohta v. Union of India AIR (1955) SC 1 15
3. HargovindSoni v. Ram Dulari AIR 1986 MP 57 14
31. Hearsey v. Hearsey AIR 1931 Oudh 259 29
16. Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer AIR 1954 SC 462 17
19. In Re: Ram Kumari (1891) ILR 18 Cal 264 19

18. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State SCC (2018) SC 1690 19
of Kerala
15. Jamshed HormusjiWadia v. Board Trustees, Port AIR 2004 SC 1815 16
of Mumbai
33. John Over v. Muriel A.I. Over (1925) 27 BOMLR 29
251.
5. Josheph shine v. Union of India 2018 SCC 1676 14
8. KarabaiDas Alias Rupa v. Paritosh Das (2002) II DMC 730 15
23. Kennedy v. Mendoza Martinez. (1963) SCC (U.S.) 22 23

2. Mala Rai v. Bal Krishna Dhamala AIR 2016 Sik 28 14

13. ManganbhaiIshwarbhai Patel v. UOI AIR (1969) SC 783 16
36. Ms. JordenDiengdeh v. S. S. Chopra AIR 1985 SC 935. 30

21. National Human Rights Commission v. State of AIR1996 SC 1234 22

Arunachal Pradesh
35. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohl AIR 2006 SC 1675 30
25. NuzhatJahan v. Govt. (NCT Delhi) 2013 SCC (Del) 3042. 23
10. Poppe v. Poppe 144 N.E.2d 72 (1957) 15
7. Pradeep Kumar Nanda v. Sanghamitra Binakar AIR 2007 Ori 60 (SJ) 30
11. Pritam Singh v. The State AIR1950 SC 169 16
22. Punjabrao v. D.P Meshram AIR 1965 SC 1179 22

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1. Rabindra Prasad v. Sita Devi AIR 1986 Pat 128 14

27. RahmatUllah And KhatoonNisa v State Of U.P. II (1994) DMC 64 25
&Ors.
6. Ramoji v. Kameswari. AIR 1975 A.P. 3 15
17. Sanghamitra Ghosh v. Kajal Kumar Ghosh (2007) 2 SCC 220 18
28. Satya Smt. v.Teja Singh AIR 1975 SC 105 26
20. Trop v. Dulles 365 U.S. 86 22
30. Vishaka&Ors. v. State Of Rajasthan &Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 241 28

STATUTES REFERRED

1. Indian Evidence Act, 1872

2. The Citizenship Act, 1955
3. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
4. The Constitution of India, 1950
5. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

BOOKS REFERRED

1. Arvind P Datar, Commentary on the Constitution of India (2nd Ed., 2010)

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2. Durga Das Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (20th Ed., 2012)
3. Dr. ParasDiwan, Modern Hindu Law (23rd Ed., 2018)
4. Dr. ParasDiwan, Law of Marriage & Divorce (7th Ed., 2016)
5. Kumud Desai, Indian Law of Marriage & Divorce (10th Ed., 2017)
6. Mulla, Hindu Law (21st Ed., 2010)
7. R. K. Agarwal, Hindu Law (25th Ed., 2017)
8. Sriniwas Gupta &PreetiMisra, Marriage Laws & Family Courts Act (12th Ed., 2018)
9. SudiptoSarkar, Code of Civil Procedure (11th Ed.,2011)

WEBSITES REFERRED

1. www.scconline.com
2. www.manupatrafast.com
3. www.lexisnexis.com

U.N. SOURCES REFERRED

1. Convention on Nationality of Married Women, 1957

2. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Person, 1954
3. International Convent for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

I. T.P. No. _____/2019

The Petitioner no.1 has approached this Hon’ble Court under 139A of the Constitution of
India

II. W.P. No. _____/2019

The Petitioner no. 2 has approached this Hon’ble Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India.

III. SLP No. _____/2019

The Petitioner no. 3 has approached this Hon’ble Court under Art. 136(1) of the Constitution
of India.

The Hon’ble SC having the jurisdiction, under art. 139A of the Constitution of India has
clubbed all the three petitions.

Article 139A: Transfer of certain cases

(1) Where cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending
before the Supreme Court and one or more High Courts or before two or more High
Courts and the Supreme Court is satisfied on its own motion or an application made by
the Attorney General of India or by a party to any such case that such questions are
substantial questions of general importance, the Supreme Court may withdraw the case
or cases pending before the High Court or the High Courts and dispose of all the cases
itself:

Provided that the Supreme Court may after determining the said questions of law return
any case so withdrawn together with a copy of its judgment on such questions to the High
Court from which the case has been withdrawn, and the High Court shall on receipt
thereof, proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with such judgment.

The respondents have appeared to the Hon’ble SUPREME COURT OF INDIA in response to
the petitions filed by the Petitioners.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

The Republic of India is an independent “Union of States” and a secular country which
exhibits to the world the principle of “Unity in Diversity”. The Constitution guarantees,
several fundamental rights, broadly corresponding to those recognized in International
Human Rights instruments and direct access to Supreme Court for the enforcement of those
rights.

2. THE PETITION FILED BY TAUHID, MIGRATION AND CHANGE OF

CITIZENSHIPS

Rachel, being a Jew, was a strong supporter of the “Zionist Movement” of Israel. The U.S.
government banned the citizens from supporting any such movements outside the U.S.
territories, in response to the petition filed by “Tauhid-the spiritual life”. Rachel was once
convicted by the Californian court for the offence of smuggling. Rachel was a habitual drug
addict. Rachel and Rathin came in contact at a management college in Delaware city of New
Jersey. When Rathin got drunk, he lost his self-control. Rathin, once in a party drank too
much and committed rape upon a girl in the club. He got arrested and prosecution was
initiated against him, but soon he was acquitted as the evidence was provided showing that,
the girl herself provoked Rathin to commit sexual intercourse with her. Further on, Rachel
voluntarily decided to convert to Hinduism and gave a written undertaking that she would
follow Hinduism till the end of her life. Rathin and Rachel got married according to the
provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in India and registered before the registrar in the
Delaware city of the U.S. When Rathin and Rachel shifted to Stockholm, Rachel relinquished
her U.S. citizenship and became a Swedish citizen. Rathin did not succeed in Stockholm and
the couple shifted to India. Rachel surrendered the Swedish citizenship and applied for the
India citizenship. The India authorities disposed her application and rejected her prayer for
granting her India citizenship keeping in view her past criminal records.

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3. THE RECONVERSION BY EXERCISING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

The will made by Rachel’s father declared that, his property of 17 million dollars shall be
divided equally between his son and daughter, and Rachel would get the property only when
she gets reconverted to Judaism. Rathin developed an adulterous relationship with a married
lady named, Maria, and later on he disclosed it to Rachel. She then filed a complaint in the
criminal court against him for the offence of rape. Later on, Rachel’s faith on Hinduism
weakened and she got reconverted into Judaism by exercising the fundamental right of
freedom of religion enshrined in Article, 25(1) of the India constitution. This was soon after
she came to know about her father’s will.

4. THE DECREE OF DIVORCE

Rachel applies in the family court for the decree of divorce under section 13(1) on the
grounds of (i) Adultery (ii) Conversion and (iii) Renunciation of world. Rathin in his written
statement claimed the defense of privileged communication as against the ground of adultery
for divorce and also filed a counterclaim for the decree of restitution of conjugal rights
against Rachel. When the criminal case was pending, the SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, in
a landmark judgment, in the case of Joseph Shine v. Union of India AIR 2018 SC, declared
that adultery is no longer an offence.Rathin, on the basis of this judgment, filed a petition in
the HC for quashing the criminal case against him. He also filed a petition for quashing the
divorce petition filed against him by his wife Rachel on the same ground as adultery is no
longer an offence.Family Court, passed the decree of divorce in favor of Rachel.

5. THE APPEALS AND PETITIONS FILED

Rathin opposed this by producing the written undertaking and filed an appeal before the
Delhi HC. An NGO,“Rakshakdayini” filed a writ petition under article 32, before the SC of
India for quashing the decree of divorce. Then the Islamic International Organization
“Tauhid-The Spiritual Life”filed a petition before the Delhi HC under Article 226(1) of the
India Constitution for preventing Rachel from leaving India for the purpose of joining the
State of Israel but the Delhi HC rejected the petition. Under Article 136 (1), it again filed an
appeal against this decision of Delhi HC that the matter is of “grave public concern”. The
Supreme Court on a prima facie basis clubbed both the petitions. It also withdrew the appeal
of Rathin from Delhi HC in itself and clubbed the petitions.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE?

II

WHETHER A HINDU MARRIAGE CAN BE DISSOLVED BY THE REQUESTING PARTY ON THE

GROUND OF HIS/HER CONVERSION TO ANOTHER RELIGION OR RENUNCIATION OF THE
WORLD BY ENTERING ANY RELIGIOUS ORDER AND IT’S BEARING ON THE RIGHT TO
RELIGION?

III

WHETHER A STATELESS PERSON HAS THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER

THE INDIA CONSTITUTION, IF SO, WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF SUCH PROTECTION AND WHAT
ROLE HAS A MARRIAGE TO PLAY IN DETERMINING THE CITIZENSHIP OF SUCH STATELESS
PERSON?

IV

WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS PREVAIL OVER DISPUTES OF

INTERNATIONAL NATURE, ARISING FROM PERSONAL LAWS, AND SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF
DOMESTIC COURTS THERE OF?

WHETHER THE FAMILY COURT FAILED TO APPRAISE THE EVIDENCE APPROPRIATELY AND
THE DECREE SO PASSED CAN BE CHALLENGED TO BE STRUCK DOWN?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE?

The Respondent Humbly submits that the Petitions filed before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court are not maintainable on the following grounds.
1. The appeal filed by Rathin is not maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as
Rathin has himself accepted that he has committed adultery,. Also Rathin has not right to
take RCR and Privilege communication as his conduct itself creates the reasonable excuse
for Rachel to withdrawn from the his society.
2. The Writ petition filed by Rakshakdayni is not maintainable as, taking divorce on the
basis of conversion is a personal matter between the spouses and there is no infringement
of FR.
3. The SLP filed by Tauhid-the Spiritual life is not maintainable as Rachel being stateless is
moving to Israel so that she could get the citizenship of Israel and live there permanently
this movement of Rachel is creating the extraordinary circumstances of ‘Grave Public
Concern’.

II. WHETHER A HINDU MARRIAGE CAN BE DISSOLVED BY THE REQUESTING PARTY ON THE
GROUND OF HIS/ HER CONVERSION TO ANOTHER RELIGION OR RENUNCIATION OF THE
WORLD BY ENTERING ANY RELIGIOUS ORDER AND IT’S BEARING ON THE RIGHT TO

RELIGION?

A Hindu marriage is a sacramental marriage and as per the provisions of divorce of s13 of
HMA, it is violating Art. 14 of COI which grants ‘equality before law’ as it gives the right to
file divorce only to the ‘other spouse’. Even after performing all the marital duties,
relinquishing citizenship and religion, the marriage eventually has reached such a stage where
it ‘cannot be sustained’ further. Justice has to be granted taking into consideration the fact
that a certain personal law shall not restrict fundamental human rights that are there with a
person just like a shadow.

III. WHETHER A STATELESS PERSON HAS THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

UNDER THE INDIA CONSTITUTION, IF SO, WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF SUCH PROTECTION
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AND WHAT ROLE HAS A MARRIAGE TO PLAY IN DETERMINING THE CITIZENSHIP OF

SUCH STATELESS PERSON?
The Counsel Humbly submits that the COI provides certain human rights as the FR to the
every including stateless person. COI along with UDHR and ICCPR provide right to religion
and right of life and personal liberty to every human being. Respondent has a right to profess
any religion. She also has a Right to nationality and Israel is providing her the Citizenship as
per the Israel law of Return so Moreover a marriage has no role to play in determining the
Citizenship of Stateless person the citizenship act under S. 5 only provides the ground for the
application of citizenship it is not obligatory on the part of India authority or Central
Government to provide Citizenship.

IV. WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS PREVAIL OVER DISPUTES
OF INTERNATIONAL NATURE, ARISING FROM PERSONAL LAWS, AND SCOPE OF

JURISDICTION OF DOMESTIC COURTS THERE OF?

Personal laws are for a person while constitution and human rights are for all. Whenever
personal laws deprive any person from equal status or hamper their life and human dignity,
constitutional principles and human rights shall have to intervene in such cases in order to
ensure that justice is served and human life and liberty is preserved. If there is a conflict
between the two that is not avoidable and is affecting the public order, the personal law shall
have to give way to the law of the land and other human right instruments. Also, while
domestic courts deal with disputes of international nature arising from personal laws and the
domestic law is unclear or is void, international convents, agreements or treaties, be they
ratified or not, shall be taken into consideration to adjudicate such matters and to do the best
in order to preserve the country’s sovereignty and integrity.

V. WHETHER THE FAMILY COURT FAILED TO APPRAISE THE EVIDENCE APPROPRIATELY

AND THE DECREE SO PASSED CAN BE CHALLENGED TO BE STRUCK DOWN?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that, the decree of divorce passed by the
family court was reasonable, fair and justified and there was no failure on the part of the
Court as Rathin himself had confessed that he had an adulterous relationship with a married
lady. The evidence produced by Rathin, which was the written undertaking given by Rachel,
cannot be considered as a valid document in the court of law as it was inadmissible. Finally,

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the marriage has come to a point of irretrievable breakdown. It is broken down beyond repair
so further on; the decree of divorce does not need to be challenged.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE ?

1. THE APPEAL FILED BY RATHIN IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

It is humbly submitted before Hon’ble court that the appeal filed by Rathin is not
maintainable on the following grounds.

(1) ADULTERY IS A GROUND FOR DIVORCE

As per the HMA1, adultery is a ground for divorce. The single act of adultery may
constitute a sufficient ground for obtaining divorce2.The offence of adultery can be
established by the circumstantial evidence3 in this matter Rathin’s conduct shows that
he has committed adultery and it can be expected in proof of allegations as in, Mala
Rai v. Bal Krishna Dhamala4.Even a single act of voluntary sexual intercourse by a
party with another person is sufficient to constitute adultery and entitle the petitioner
for divorce.5In HargovindSoni v. Ram Dulari,6the court observed that it is no longer
required that adultery must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts. It is established
by preponderance of probabilities.As per the mentioned facts in the moot proposition,
it is corroboratory implied that Rathin’s disclosure about his adulterous relationship
with Maria and he filed petition for quashing divorce decree on the ground of that
adultery is no longer an offence7, makes it clear that he has committed adultery.

(2) RATHIN CANNOT TAKE THE DEFENSE OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

According to the HMA, no person without anyreasonable excuse can withdraw from
the society of the other. To declare a marriage null and void it has to prove that there

1
S. 13(1) (i), The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
2
R.K Agarwal, Hindu Law (25th Ed., 2017).
3
Rabindra Prasad v. Sita Devi, AIR 1986 Pat 128.
4
AIR 2016 Sik 28.
5
Amita v. A.K Rathore, AIR 1999 MP 218.
6
AIR 1986 MP 57.
7
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SCC 1676.

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is reasonable cause contemplated by S.9(1)8 of HMA which would afford ground

either for Judicial separation or for nullity of marriage or for divorce. 9In this matter
Rathin’s adultery constitutes a reasonable excuse for Rachel from withdrawing the
society of Rathin. The petitioner, if serious in that sense can seek the relief of RCR
but not otherwise. If the wife went away justifiably, there cannot be a decree forcing
her to come back.10 Rathin cannot force Rachel to come back as his adultery gives
reasonable excuse to her to withdrawn from his society. Therefore Rathin cannot take
the defense of RCR.

(3) PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

Rathin in his written statement claimed the defense of Privileged Communication as
against the ground of adultery but this defense cannot be taken as the latter part of
S. 122 of IEA, 187211 states the exceptions to the rule of privilege: viz, in suits
between married persons (i.e. husband and wife), i.e. divorce proceeding or other
cases. In this matter the suit of divorce between Rachel and Rathin is an exception to
the rule of privilege communication.

In Poppe v. Poppe,12it was held that confession of adultery which was designed to
destroy any confidence in the marriage could not have been prompted by affection,
confidence, or loyalty, and hence was not confidential within the meaning of the act.
The present matter clearly shows that Rathin’s disclosure of adultery destroy the
confidence of their marriage so there should not be any privilege communication.
Hence appeal filed by Rathin is not maintainable on ground of above three
contentions.

2. THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY “RAKSHAKDAYINI” IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

The writ petition filed by Rakshakdayini under art.32 13 is not maintainable as there has
not been any infringement of fundamental rights. A person has no right to complain under
Art.32 where no fundamental right has been violated,14 taking divorce after the

8
S. 9(1), The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
9
Ramoji v. Kameswari, AIR 1975 A.P. 3.
10
Karabai Das Alias Rupa v. Paritosh Das, (2002) II DMC 730.
11
S. 122, The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
12
Poppe v. poppe, 144 N.E.2d 72 (1957).
13
Art. 32, the Constitution of India.
14
Gopal Das Mohta v. Union of India, AIR (1955) SC 1.

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conversion of one’s spouse is completely a personal matter there is no infringement of

FR. The infringement of fundamental rights cannot be founded on remote or speculative
ground.15 The SC will issue a writ only at the instance of a party whose fundamental
rights are directly and substantially invaded or are in eminent danger of being invaded. 16
In the present case no fundamental right has been infringed also the matter of divorce is
the personal matter of the spouse petitioner is should not be allowed to file a petition
considering their personal issues.

3. THE SLP FILED BY “TAUHID-THE SPIRITUAL LIFE” IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Courtin the light of the circumstances
that the SLPunder Art 136(1) of COI filed by Tauhid-The Spiritual life is
notmaintainable. As there is neither the substantial question of law involved nor gross
injustice has been done. Rachel is moving to Israel in order to reside there permanently as
Israel government is providing citizenship to her there is no question of law in this matter.

The Special leave appeal confers a wide discretionary power to the on the SC to interfere
in a suitable cases,17power of SLP is an extraordinary power to exercise in a rare and
exceptional circumstances.18.It is humbly submitted that there is no special circumstances
in the movement of Rachel so that would make Hon’ble court to exercise its extraordinary
power.

The present matter can lean on Pritam Singh v. The State19where the court said that “The
power under Art. 136ofCOIare to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional
circumstances only.”Court also emphasised that the “court will not grant special leave,
unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, the substantial and
grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient
gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against.”

15
Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Punjab, AIR (2002) SC 1124.
16
ManganbhaiIshwarbhai Patel v. UOI, AIR (1969) SC 783.
17
Ashok Nagar welfare association v. R.K. Sharma, (2002) 1 SCC 749.
18
JamshedHormusjiWadia v. Board Trustees, port of Mumbai, AIR2004SC1815.
19
AIR 1950 SC 169.

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Hence it is submitted thatHon’ble Court will not exercise its overriding powers unless the
existence of exceptional and special circumstances shown.20 Inthe present case Rachel’s
neither shows neither thespecial circumstances nor substantial and grave injustice. She is
moving to Israel so that she could leave there a peaceful life. Therefore the Court will
dismiss the appeal when it finds out there was no proper case for granting special leave.

20
Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462.

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II. WHETHER A HINDU MARRIAGE CAN BE DISSOLVED BY THE REQUESTING PARTY ON THE
GROUND OF HIS/HER CONVERSION TO ANOTHER RELIGION OR RENUNCIATION OF THE
WORLD BY ENTERING ANY RELIGIOUS ORDER AND IT’S BEARING ON THE RIGHT TO

RELIGION?

A Hindu marriage is a sacramental marriage and is not a contract. As per the provisions laid
down in S. 13 of the HMA, it grants only the ‘other spouse’ the right to file the divorce on
various grounds as mentioned in the particular provision. This is in violation of Art. 14 of the
COI which states that “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India” as only one spouse can exercise this
particular section.

1. DIVORCE SHOULD BE GRANTED TO RACHEL

As per the factsheet21, the marriage has reached such a stage that ‘it cannot be sustained’.
Even if divorce is not granted to Rachel, then also such a sacred relationship cannot work
without having faith, confidence and trust on the partner and his/her religion. It is clearly
mentioned that ‘she lost on her husband because of whom her faith in Hinduism
weakened. It should also be noted that it was only in the period when Rachel left her
parental home due to some differences with her parents and started living under the same
roof with Rathin, that she started taking a keen interest in Hinduism and ‘got so
influenced’ that she decided to convert.

The Hon’ble Court also cannot ignore the fact that Rachel performed all her marital duties
to her best capability. She converted to Hinduism on Rathin’s parent’s condition to
Hinduism in order to marry Rathin, left job and citizenship of Stockholm and
‘unwillingly’ decided to apply for India’s citizenship. When Rathin disclosed to her about
his adulterous relationship with Maria, she was shattered but did her best to remain calm
and to support him during the initial stages of his criminal trial. It was only after a series
of acts that she started losing faith in her husband and in his religion. It is more of an
‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ that the marriage cannot work any further due to
conduct of other spouse and due to distrust because of that conduct. The matrimonial
bond between the parties is beyond repair.22

21
¶19, Moot Proposition.
22
SanghamitraGhosh v. Kajal Kumar Ghosh, (2007) 2 SCC 220.

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2. CONVERSION SHOULD NOT BE A BARRIER TO DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

The COI, under Art 25 grants every person the freedom to practice, profess and propagate
any religion. Here, in our case, Rachel’s statelessness cannot be ignored. She lost faith in
her husband and Hinduism. Now she has adopted the religion which she had followed
since her childhood and was a staunch supporter of Judaism. She had no reason to stay in
India. Also, as per the laws of Israel, she could apply for Israel’s citizenship keeping in
mind her statelessness. Constitutional Morality in a secular polity would comprehend the
freedom of every individual, group, sect, or denomination to practice their religion in
accordance with their beliefs, and practices.

Here, the fundamental right of, human dignity and personal liberty have to be given
superiority over the Hindu personal law. Constitution recognizes religious beliefs and
faiths; its purpose is to ensure a wider acceptance of human dignity and liberty as the
ultimate founding faith of the fundamental text of our governance. It has given full effect
to modern notions of individual freedom to choose one’s way of life and to do away with
all those undue and outmoded interferences with liberty of conscience, faith and belief. It
is also aimed at ensuring human dignity and removing all those restrictions which prevent
a person from living his own life so long as he did not interfere with similar rights of
others. The freedom to believe, the freedom to be a person of faith and the freedom of
worship, are attributes of human liberty. While the Constitution is solicitous in its
protection of religious freedom as well as denominational rights, it must be understood
that dignity, liberty and equality constitute the trinity which defines the faith of the
Constitution.23The conversion into another religion would fall under the shade of
‘professing’ any religion and it is a right guaranteed by the constitution and every person,
be it a citizen or non-citizen, has the right to exercise it.

It should also be noted that she had filed divorce on three grounds; i) adultery ii)
conversion iii) renunciation of the world. Even if that certain personal law has no as such
laid down the provision that the ‘other’ spouse too can file divorce on the grounds
enshrined in S. 13(i) of the HMA as in our case it is conversion to another religion 24 and
renunciation of the world, but the Court cannot ignore her ground that her husband had

23
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State Of Kerala, SCC (2018) SC 1690.
24
In Re: Ram Kumari, (1891) ILR 18 Cal 264.

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committed adultery in the initial stage of her marriage. This is a valid ground. Moreover,
the Court should also involve the angle of ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’.

In our case, the Hon’ble Court has to take into consideration the fact that Rachel’s dignity
and liberty over a certain personal law that was never hers. Governing and imposing a law
that she had accepted under influence and restricting her from exercising Art.21 and
Art.25 of COI which were with her since the day she came to life, is unjust, unfair and
unreasonable.

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III. WHETHER A STATELESS PERSON HAS THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE INDIATAN CONSTITUTION, IF SO,
WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF SUCH PROTECTION AND WHAT ROLE HAS A
MARRIAGE TO PLAY IN DETERMINING THE CITIZENSHIP OF SUCH
STATLESS PERSON?

It is most humblysubmitted before the Hon’ble Court that, there isprotection of fundamental
right to a stateless person under the India constitution. Marriage has no role to play in
determining the citizenship of such stateless person.

“Stateless person” is defined in theConvention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 25 as

a person who is “not recognized as a national by any state under the operation of its
law.”India is not liable to abide by their terms as India has not acceded/ ratified/ adopted/
signed the conventions. Hence the term stateless person is not clear in India, under S. 2(3)
(a)26, foreigners is defined as “a person who is not a citizen of India”this has a large ambit
and it includes stateless person as well.

All the FR is provided to Citizens but some of them provided to ‘person’ which includes a
stateless person as well.

1. ARTICLE 25 IS ENJOYED BY EVERY PERSON

As per the COI certain fundamental rights are provided to person in general but they are
limited only the bare reading of article 25 of COI 27 guarantees every person has a right to
practice, profess and propagate any religion and the protection of article extends to all
‘persons’, not merely citizens.28 Rachel’s faith in Hinduism was weaken because of the
circumstances around her so she is reconverting into Judiam to follow the faith which she
believes in. Freedom of religion or belief is expressly recognized in Article 18

25
U.N. General Assembly, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Person, Resolution 526 A (XVII), (26/
04/1954) available at https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crim es/D oc.24_co nv
ention%20stateless.pdf, last seen on 06/09/2019.
26
Foreigners act, 1946.
27
Art. 25, the Constitution of India.
28
Anwar v. state of J&K, AIR 1971 SC 337.
RESPONDENT TC-31

UDHR29and, inter alia, further defined in Article 18(1) ICCPR 30. Article 27 ICCPR
refers, inter alia, to religious minorities and stipulates that persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right to profess and practice their religion to which
India is a party and having ratified them.in this matter Rachel is converting to another
religion in order to profess her religion.

InPunjabraov. D.P Meshram31 it was said that if a person makes a public declaration that
he has ceased to belong to his own religion and has accepted another religion, he would
be taken as professing the other religion.

InNational Human Right Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh32 Court laid down
that our constitution provides life and liberty to every human being and by virtue of this,
the Constitution also provides right to practice, profess and propagate any religion to
every human being.

In the present matter Rachel is using her FR guaranteed under the COI and no one could
take away her basic FR from her.

2. RACHEL’S RIGHT TO MOVE TO ISRAEL.

According to Art. 13 of UDHR, “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including
his own, and to return to his country”and as per the Art. 21 of COI and Art. 3 of UDHR,
Rachel has the right of life, personal liberty and security. She has all the right to move to
Israel in order to settle there.
In the case ofTrop v. Dulles,33 it was held that an individual who lack a nationality or an
effective citizenship is therefore among the world’s most vulnerable to human rights. In
the present case Rachel is in the most vulnerable position and Rachel has a liberty to
settle in any country in the world also as per the Israeli law S. 1 of the Law of Return 34
“Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh [immigrant].”

29
U.N. General Assembly, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A, (10/12/1948)
available at https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html, last seen on 01/09/2019.
30
U.N. General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Resolution 2200A (XXI),
(16/12/1966) available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, last seen on
02/09/2019.
31
AIR1965 SC 1179
32
AIR1996 SC 1234
33
365 U.S. 86.
34
The Law of Return, 1950.

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S. 235of citizenship law of Israel, states that ‘every oleh under law of return become Isreali
National’ so that Isreal is providing citizenship to every Jew who is immigrating to Isreal
in order to reside there permanently.
In the present case Rachel is stateless and in the most vulnerable state. She wants to move
to Isreal in order to reside there permanently, also Israel govt. is providing her citizenship
she has all the rights to go to Israel. No one could arbitrarily deprive her from her right to
life and personal liberty.

3. MARRIAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEED CITIZENSHIP

Marriage has no role in determining the citizenship of stateless person as per the
S. 5(1)(c) of The Citizenship Act of 195536 simply provides an opportunity to a Non-
Indian spouse to apply for the citizenship same as his or her spouse but sec 14(1) of  the
Citizenship act says that,“The prescribed authority or the Central Government may, in its
discretion, grant or refuse an application under [section 5, 6 or section 7A] and shall not
be required to assign any reasons for such grant or refusal.” Neither the word stateless is
defined in The Citizenship Act, nor it isanywhere mentioned that marriage determines the
citizenship of stateless person. The right of citizenship is a most precious right 37 and also
a foreigner has no fundamental right to become a citizen of a country. 38 Rejection of
Rachel’s application for India is not admissible as per the law prescribed in India and it is
not binding upon the govt. to provide citizenship to a stateless spouse of one of its citizen.
If a person applies for the citizenship of INDby virtue of marriage to a citizen of India or
by registration otherwiseof the Act shall cease to be a citizen of India if he is deprived of
the citizenship by an order of the Central Government under this section. 39 Rachel is
ceased to be a citizen of India as per the order given by the govt. because of this she has
become stateless and now she is going to Israel to the citizenship of Israel.
In the case ofNuzhatJahan v. Govt. (NCT Delhi)40it was held that the final is taken by the
govt. on the said citizenship application of the petitioner.

35
The citizenship law, 1952.
36
S. 5(1)(c), The Citizenship Act, 1955.
37
Kennedy v. Mendoza Martinez, (1963) SCC (U.S.) 22.
38
Abdul halimmia v. sub divisional officer, katwa and Ors, AIR 1965 Cal 160
39
S. 14, The citizenship Act, 1955.
40
NuzhatJahan v. Govt. (NCT Delhi), 2013 SCC (Del) 3042.

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In the case Abdul Halim Mia v. Sub Divisional officer, katwa and others:41 In this case the
rejection of application of appellant for citizenship was justified as sec 5 of citizenship act
is an executive and political act and the legislature have thought to fit to leave the
discretion in such matter entirely with the Govt.
In the present case the India government rejects her application of registration of
citizenship on the basis of past criminal record. Hence Rachel’s marriage with Rathin
didn’t play any role in determining the Citizenship.

41
Supra 38.

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IV. WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS PREVAIL

OVER DISPUTES OF INTERNATIONAL NATURE, ARISING FROM PERSONAL
LAWS, AND SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF DOMESTIC COURTS THERE OF?
Personal laws are for a person while constitution and human rights are for all. Whenever
personal laws deprive any person from equal status or hamper their life and human dignity,
constitutional principles and human rights shall have to intervene and prevail over personal
laws. while domestic courts deal with disputes of international nature arising from personal
laws and the domestic law is unclear or is void, international convents, agreements or treaties,
be they ratified or not, shall be taken into consideration to adjudicate such matters and to do
the best in order to preserve the country’s sovereignty and integrity.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS PREVAIL OVER DISPUTES OF

INTERNATIONAL NATURE ARISING FROM PERSONAL LAWS

Law has got to be interpreted keeping in view the basic and fundamental principles of the
law of the Constitution of India and in particular the concept of justice, social and
economic and political enshrined in the Constitution and principle of equality before law
and equal treatment of law keeping pace with rationality or to say the reason and free
from any type of bias or discrimination on the ground of sex or religion. 42The idea that
personal laws of religions should be beyond the scope of judicial review, and that they are
not subject to the Constitution, is inherently abhorrent.
  The Court has jurisdiction to decide the question relating to the declaration of law as
well as in case of conflict between the Constitution and the personal law it is for the
Court to prefer the Constitutional Law but every effort should be made to find out in the
first instance--the harmony between the Constitutional provision and the personal law. If
the conflict is not avoidable then in that case the provisions of the Constitution will
definitely have to prevail and to that extent statutory law or the personal law or
customary laws may be said to be not operative.43
Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the extent of consistency with the
Constitution, shall be applicable, and in case of any conflict with the Constitution of India
the provisions of Constitution of India or its basic and fundamental features or structure,
the provisions of personal law shall have to give the way. Thus in any case, where there is
a conflict between constitutional principles and personal laws, the personal law shall be

42
RahmatUllahAndKhatoonNisavs State Of U.P. And Ors.,II (1994) DMC 64.
43
Ibid.

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protected but to the extent that life and human dignity is serving justice. Whenever any
person is being deprived of any of them because of any personal law, the Constitutional
fundamentals shall prevail in order to safeguard their basic human rights.

2. SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF DOMESTIC COURTS THEREOF

India conflict of laws may require that the law of a foreign country ought to be applied in
a given situation for deciding a case which contains a foreign element. Such recognition
is accorded not as an act of courage but on consideration of justice.44 Art. 51(c) of the
COI, deals with the promotion of international peace and security endeavors the State to
‘foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised
peoples with one another’. The India law has no laid down provisions or principles
governing issues of such complexity as of our case. And most importantly they involve
foreign elements of citizenship and statelessness. Indian citizenship laws play no role in
determining citizenship of stateless persons because of their marriage with an India
citizen. Also, there are no laws that deal with the status and protection of stateless persons
in India.
Our notions of genuine divorce and of substantial justice and the distinctive principles of
our public policy must determine the rules of our private international law. 45 It is implicit
that the foreign law must not offend against our public policy. If there is deficiency in the
Constitutional system, it has to be removed and the State must equip itself with the
necessary power. In some jurisdictions, the treaty or the compromise read with the award
acquires full effect automatically, the Municipal law, notwithstanding. Such treaties and
awards are self-executing46.
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that
“everyone has the right to a nationality” and that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”Enshrining citizenship and
the right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of citizenship as human rights in and of
themselves, article 15 of the UDHR establishes the bedrock legal relationship between
individuals and states. While all states are bound to respect the human rights of all
individuals without distinction, an individual's legal bond to a particular state through
citizenship remains in practice an essential prerequisite to the enjoyment and protection of

44
Satya Smt. v.Teja Singh, AIR 1975 SC 105
45
Supra 4.
46
MaganbhaiIshwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCC 400

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the full range of human rights.‘The right not to be stateless, or the right to a nationality, is
widely recognized as a fundamental human right.’47
Art 9, Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women states
that,“States parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain
their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor
change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the
nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the
husband.”48
Art 16 of ICCPR states that ‘Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law’. Art 2.1 states that ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.’
The Convent specifically ensures that an alien shall be entitled to the following human
rights, inter alia; Right to life (Art 6), Right to liberty and security of person (Art 9),
Right to human dignity (Art 10), Freedom of movement (Art 12), Equality before the law
(Art 14,26), Right to privacy (Art 17) and Freedom of thought and religion (Art 22). As
India has ratified this international convent, therefore an alien cannot be deprived of any
of these rights.
When it comes to the India’s jurisdiction, the COI clearly mentions that Entering into
treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements
and conventions with foreign countries49.
In the absence of domestic law occupying the field, to formulate effective measures the
contents of International Conventions and norms are significant for the purpose of
interpretation. Any International Convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights
and in harmony with its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning
and content thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional guarantee. This is implicit
from Art. 51(c) that enables the power of the Parliament to enact laws for implementing
the International Conventions and norms by virtue of Art. 253 read with Entry 14 of the
47
MirnaAdjami, &Julia Harrington, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume no. 27, Refugee Survey Quarterly(2008),
https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article/27/3/93/1515115, last seen on 9/9/19.
48
U.N. General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
resolution 34/180, (18/12/1979) available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cedaw.aspx ,
last seen on 09/09/19.
49
Schedule 7, the Constitution of India.

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Union List in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Art. 73 is also relevant. It provides
that the executive power of the Union shall extend to the matters with respect to which
Parliament has power to make laws. The executive power of the Union is, therefore,
available till the parliament enacts to expressly provide measures needed to curb the
evil.50
Art. 24 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women51 states that “States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the
national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Convention.”
The international conventions and norms are to be read into them in the absence of
enacted domestic law occupying the fields when there is no inconsistency between them.
It is now an accepted rule of judicial construction that regard must be had to international
conventions and norms from construing domestic law when there is no inconsistency
between them and there is a void in the domestic law.52
Thus, while examining the scope of jurisdiction of such complex cases, India cannot
deprive any person from their human rights. While dealing with conflict of laws and
disputes involving constitutional principles and human rights on one end of the rope, and
the other side has personal laws, human rights principles shall prevail no matter what.
And the jurisdiction has to be based on most appropriate consideration of justice,
safeguarding the human dignity and security of an individual.

50
Vishaka&Ors.v. State Of Rajasthan &Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 241.
51
Supra 52.
52
Ibid.

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V. WHETHER THE FAMILY COURT FAILED TO APPRAISETHE EVIDENCE APPROPRATELY

AND THE DECREE SO PASSED CAN BE CHALLENGED TO BE STRUCK DOWN?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that, the decree of divorce passed by the
family court was fair and justified and there was no failiure on the part of the Court. The
evidence provided by Rathin is invalid.Therefore, the decree does not needs to be challenged.

1. THE DECREE PASSED BY FAMILY COURT IS REASONANBLE

According to the S. 13 (1) (i) 53 of HMA, adultery is a ground for divorce. To get upto the
proof of adultery, we can consider the general rule which is that, the circumstances must
be such as would lead the guarded judgement of a reasonable and just man to the
conclusion. The facts are of not of a complicated nature, but determinable upon common
grounds of reason. It is in consequence of this rule that it is not necessary to prove a fact
of adultery in time and place.54The family court passed the decree in favour of Rachel as
the main ground which Rachel had was that, her husband on an earlier occasion had an
adulterous relationship with a lady and it is a valid ground for divorce.
Confessions or admissions of adultery are admissible in connection with other relevent
evidence on a charge of adultery. As Rathin has confessed that, in the earlier priod of
their marriage he had an affair with a married lady,55 it can be considered as a proof.In
John Over v. Muriel A.I. Over,56 the confession of the wife was considered and the court
was satisfied over it.

“Rathin claimed the defense of privileged communication as against the ground of

adultery for divorce.”57 This statement clearly reflects that he has committed adultery and
now, for the sake of saving the marriage he is taking a defence of privileged
communication.

53
Supra 1.
54
Hearsey v. Hearsey, AIR 1931 Oudh 259; Barker v. Barker, AIR 1955 MB 103.
55
¶ 16, Moot Proposition.
56
(1925) 27 BOMLR 251.
57
¶ 20, Moot Proposition.

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2. THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY RATHIN IS INADMISSIBLE

The admissibility of facts helps in deciding whether a particular piece of evidence will
help in concluding a case. The admissibility of evidence is a question of Law and it is
decided by the Judge as per S. 136 of the Indian evidence Act, 1872.

In this case, Rachel got reconverted to Judaism,58 it is clear from this fact that she
couldn’t accept Hinduism wholeheartedly and the written undertaking was just for the
purpose of marriage.Thus, the written undertaking produced before the Court by
Rathin, should be considered as inadmissible as it was not legally stamped or signed
and the statement is itself violating the rights of Rachel provided under Art.21 and 25
so,an objection should be raised on it.When there an objection is raised on the
admissibility of a document and the objection is sustained, the court can exclude such
evidence from consideration, there is no illegality in adopting such a course.59

3. IRRITRIEVEABLE BREAKDOWN OF MARRIAGE

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage is the situation that exists when either or both
spouses are no longer able or willing to live with each other, thereby destroying their
husband and wife relationship with no hope of resumption of spousal duties.
The SC in Naveen Kohli v.Neelu Kohli60recommended to the UOI to
seriouslyconsider bringing an amendment in the HMA, 1955 toincorporate
irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce.Earlier, in Ms. Jorden
Diengdeh v. S. S. Chopra61the Supreme Court observed that, “it appears to be
necessary to introduce irritrieveable breakdown of marriage and mutual consent as
grounds of divorce in all cases. In our case Rathin and Rachel’s marriage has reached
a point of irritrieveable breakdown and it cannot be sustained anyhow.

The Orissa HC has held62 that, till the time that the legislature ammends the section,
irretriveable breakdown of marriage can be considered as a ground for dissolving the
marriage under Art.141& 142 of the COI. It is submitted that until the section is
ammended, the grounds mentioned therin would govern.

58
¶ Moot Proposition.
59
BipinShantilal v. State of Gujarat,(2002) 10 SCC 529.
60
AIR 2006 SC 1675.
61
AIR 1985 SC 935.
62
Pradeep Kumar Nanda v. SanghamitraBinakar, AIR 2007 Ori 60 (SJ).

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Once the marriage has broken down beyond repair, it would beunrealistic for the law
not to take notice of that fact, and it would beharmful to society and injurious to the
interest of the parties.63From the facts it can clearly be seen that, Rachel is not at all
willing to live with Rathin as he is not a trustworthy person and he cannot be trusted
any more. Therefore there is no possibility of repairing this bond.

63
217th Law Commission of India Report, Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage –Another Ground for Divorce,
12(2009), available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report217.pdf.

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 PRAYER

In the light of the legal precedents and principles cited; and in light of the provisions of the
Constitution applied and arguments advanced; may this Hon’ble Court be pleased to adjudge,
declare and hold:

1. That the Petitions filed by “Rathin”, the writ petition filed by “LP filed by “Tauhid-
the spiritual life”is not maintainable in the Hon’ble Court.

2. That decree of divorce in favor of Rachel bearing on her Right to Religion.

3. That Rachel should be allowed to enjoy the basic fundamental right provided to every
person and allowed her to move to Israel.

4. That constitutional principles and human rights shall prevail over personal laws and
India shall abide by international convents while domestic law stays unclear.

5. That The Evidence provided by Rathin should not be considered and the Decree
passed by Family Court should not be struck down.

And pass any other order, direction, or relief that it may deem fit in the best interests of
justice, fairness, equity and good conscience.

ALL OF WHICH IS MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Counsel on the behalf of Respondent