BEFORE THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL

PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI

M.A. NO. 567 OF 2016 AND M.A. NO. 1220 OF 2016

IN
ORIGINAL APPLICATION No. 21 OF 2014, 95 OF 2015 AND 303
OF 2015

Vardhman Kaushik Vs. Union of India & Ors

And
Sanjay Kulshrestha Vs.Union of India & Ors
And
Supreme Court Women Lawyers Association Vs. Union of India
& Ors
IN THE MATTER OF:

M.A. No.567 of 2016

1. Ministry of Heavy Industries & Public Enterprises,

Department of heavy Industry, Through its Secretary,
Room No. 117, Udyog Bhawan,
New Delhi- 110011
…..Applicant

M.A. NO. 1220 OF 2016

1. Harvinder Sekhon

…..Applicant

Vs.
1. Union of India
Through its secretary
Ministry of Environment and Forest
Paryavaran Bhawan,CGO Complex
Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110003

2. Government of NCT of Delhi

Through Secretary
Delhi Secretariat
Indraprastha Estate, Delhi-110002

3. CENTRAL POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD

Through its Chairman
Parivesh Bhawan, CBD-cum-Office Complex
East Arjun Nagar,
Delhi-110032

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4. Delhi Pollution Control Committee
Through the Chairman
4th Floor, ISBT Building,
Kashmiri Gate, Delhi-110006

5. Ministry of Housing and Urban Development

Though Secretary
118-C
(M/O HUPA)
Niram Bhawan
Maulana Azad Road,
New Delhi, 110011

6. Ministry of Petroleum
Government of India
Through Secretary
A Wing, 2nd Floor,
Shastri Bhawan,
Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road,
New Delhi-110001

7. Ministry of Transport and highways

Through Secretary
Transport Bhawan,
1, Parliament Street
New Delhi-11001

…..Respondents

Counsel for Applicant :

Mr. Sanjay Upadhyay, Adv with Ms. Upama Bhattacharjee and
Mr. Saumitra Jaiswal, Advs for applicant

Counsel for Respondents:

Mr. Narender Pal Singh, Adv. with Mr. Dinesh Jindal, LO, Delhi
Pollution Control Committee
Mr. Dinesh Kumar Garg, Adv. and Mr. Dhananjay Garg, Advs. for
State of Uttarakhand
Mr. Gautam Singh and Mr. Rudreshwar Singh, Advs. for State of
Bihar and BSPCB
Mr. Sarthak Chaturvedi and Mr. Rohit Pandey, Advs. for
Andaman & Nicobar Island
Mr. Pradeep Misra and Mr. Daleep Dhyani, Advs. for UPPCB
Mr. V. K. Shukla, Adv. for State of MP.

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 Ms. Puja Kalra, Adv. for SDMC
Ms. Sakshi Popli, Adv. for NDMC.
Mr. Raja Chatterjee and Mr. Chanchal Kumar, Ganguli and Mr.
Piyush Sachdev for State of West Bengal.
Mr. Mukul Singh, Adv. for Ministry of Environment, Forest and
Climate Change
Mr. Ravindra Kumar, Adv. and Mr. Gudipati G. Kashyap, Adv. for
NOIDA & GNIDA
Ms. Aruna Mathur, Mr. Avneesh Arputham, Mr. Amit Arora and
Ms. Anuradha Arputham, Advs. For State of Sikkim & Pollution
Control Board
Mr. Nishe Rajen Shonker and Ms. Anu K. Joy, Advs. for State of
Kerala.
Mr. Daleep Poolakkot, Adv. for State of Goa
Mr. Rajiv Bansal, Mr. Kush Sharma and Mr. Anirudh Chadha,
Advs.
Mr. Rajkumar Maurya, Adv. for Mr. Balendu Shekhar, Adv. in
M.A.
Mr. Sharad Singh, Adv. and Mr. Atul Jha, Adv. for State of
Chhattishgarh
Ms. Priyanka Swami, Adv. for Ghaziabad Nagar Nigam
Mr. Jayesh Gaurav, Adv. for JSPCB.

Counsel for the applicant in M.A. No. 567/2016

Ms. Pinki Anand, ASG with Mr. Balendu Shekhar, Adv.

In M.A. no. 1220/2016

Party in person

Present:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Swatanter Kumar,(Chairperson)
Hon’ble Dr. Justice Jawad Rahim (Judicial Member)
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Raghuvendra S. Rathore (Judicial Member)
Hon’ble Mr. Bikram Singh Sajwan (Expert Member)

JUDGMENT

Per Dr. Jawad Rahim J.

Reserved on: 20th July, 2017

Pronounced on: 14th September, 2017
1. M.A. No. 567 of 2016 is by the Union of India through the

Ministry of Heavy Industries, Public Enterprises and

Department of Heavy Industries seeking permission to

implead in Original Application 21 of 2014 and also to

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 modify or recall the orders passed by this Tribunal on 18th

July, 2016 and 20th July, 2016, respectively

2. Mr. Harvinder Sekhon, party in person, has also moved M.A.

No. 1220 of 2016 for similar reliefs.

3. There are several other applications which are filed and

pending seeking different directions in relation to orders of

this Tribunal dated 18th July, 2016 and 20th July, 2016 on

which this order will have bearing.

4. In the first lap we have taken M.A. No. 567 of 2016 and 1220

of 2016 for consideration.

5. We have heard substantially, Ms. Pinki Anand, Learned ASG

for the applicant in M.A. No. 567 of 2016 and Mr. Harvinder

Sekhon in M.A. No. 1220 of 2016 and Learned Counsel for

the applicant, in supplementation to the factual matrix and

the documents filed.

6. The factual and legal issues raised has received our serious

consideration.

7. Before we advert to all such contentious issues, it is

necessary to refer to the genesis of this action. It is

incorporated below briefly as a prelude.

PRELUDE

The Hon’ble Supreme Court invoking the mandate of Article

39, 47 and 48 of the Constitution, which castes a duty on the

State to secure health of the people, including public health,

and prevent degradation and to improve the environment,

examined the condition of Ambient Air quality and the cause

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 for Air pollution in the capital of this Country. Being of the

prima facie opinion that quality of air was steadily degrading

and no effective steps were taken by the Administration as a

result of failure of the Government to discharge its

constitutional obligation, on 23rd September, 1986, Hon’ble

Supreme Court directed the Delhi Administration to file an

affidavit specifying the steps taken for controlling pollution

emissions, smoke and noise from vehicles plying in Delhi.

Since then the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been continuously

endeavouring to secure pollution free environment for the

citizens and with this objective prevailed upon the Government

to take several actions. Those directions have become the

harbinger for subsequent actions.

Meanwhile, The Hon’ble Supreme Court, accepting Bhure Lal

Committee report which was constituted by Union of India

under Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, by

its order dated 28th July, 1998 fixed the time limit within

which to switch over to CNG was to take effect and use of

Diesel in the Vehicles was to be stopped. This order was in

continuation of earlier order dated 21st October, 1994.

8. On record, the Union of India filed several statements before

the Hon’ble Supreme Court to persuade it to permit use of

Diesel as a fuel and canvased extensively the disadvantage of

CNG which the Hon’ble Supreme Court described as

“Baffling Response of Union of India to the problem”.

However, Hon’ble Supreme Court acceded to the request of

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 the Central Government to extend the time limit for change

over from Diesel to CNG periodically and extended the time

granted from 1st September, 2001 and then to 31st January,

2002.

9. During the period 2001, while seeking extension of time from

the Court, the Central Government appointed R.A.

Mashelkar Committee to examine the ill-effect or benefits of

use of Diesel to CNG as a fuel and the Committee in its

report expressed its opinion that choice of fuel shall be left to

the users. When the report was placed before the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in unequivocal

terms described the report as “insensitive and factually

incorrect”, and declined to accept the recommendations of

R.A. Mashelkar Committee.

10. Consequently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its Judgement

in the case of Vellore Citizen’s Welfare Forum V. Union of India

and ors. (1996) 5 SCC 647, elucidated the Precautionary

Principle and the Polluter Pays Principle.

11. The principles so evolved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are

baseline for further adjudication in this field and adopting

pragmatic approach, the Apex Court examined the adverse

impact on environment vis. a vis. economic development.

12. Accepting recommendations by Bhure Lal Committee, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court held time to time directions to the

Union of India were necessary. It took note of the fact that

Union of India never opposed the changeover of the CNG but

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 has sought for various directions through I.A. 116 in the said

case which the Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected on 27th April,

2001.

13. While rejecting the application, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

took note of Government’s callous attitude and apathy towards

degradation of air quality and the adverse impact on the

environment consequent to use of diesel, among other factors.

14. At this juncture, while dealing with the request of the Union of

India, in M.A. No. 567 of 2016 filed through the Ministry of

Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Department of Heavy

Industries, (the applicant in M.A. No. 567 of 2016) we shall,

thus begin referring to the observation of the Hon’ble Apex

Court, in the order referred to above.

12.The recommendations made by the Bhure Lal Committee and

the directions issued in 1998 have not been challenged by the
Union of India. The directions issued by the Bhure Lal
Committee are statutory and continue to be in force. It is not,
therefore, open to the Union of India to seek variation of the
same without any justificable reason. Prior to the filing of the
affidavit of 26th April, 2001, the Union of Inida never opposed
the change over to CNG. Its application being I.A. No. 116 for
variation was dismissed on 27t April, 2001. In the order dated
17th September, 2001, this Court observed, while dealing with
another application being I.A. No. 142 in which prayer (d) was
that the bus operators should have an option of using either
CNG or diesel with 0.05 sulphur content, that “we do not see
any justification to grant prayer (d) at this stage”. Mr. Rohtagi,
Addl. Solicitor General submitted that the use of the expression
“at this stage” mean that such a request could be met or made
at a subsequent point of time and that is why the present
application filed on 5th February, 2002 for modification had
been filed by the Union of India. The said plea of Mr. Rohtagi
cannot be accepted and is not in accordance with the orders
passed by this Court. As already noticed, a prayer to this effect
was first made by the Union of India in I.A. No. 116. In the
order of 27th April, 2001, it was observed that the Court did not
think that any modification of its order dated 26th March, 2001
was required. The application was disposed of and the request
for modification was not accepted. While disposing of the
application I.A. No. 142 it was first observed in the order as
follows:
Our order dated 28-7-1998 with regard to conversion of
entire city bus fleet (DTC and private) to single fuel mode

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 of CNG (direction ‘G’) does not require any modification
or change. That direction stands.

15. What emerges therefrom is the fact that after long exercise

from 1994 and considering the expert opinion report of Bhure

Lal Committee, the Hon’ble Supreme Court opined Diesel was

not a fuel of choice compared to CNG and thus to prevent the

pollution of air and its adverse effect directed conversion.

Emphatically, it could be observed that use of Diesel as a fuel

was to be discontinued and accordingly several directions are

issued. Thus, the entire exercise has been carried out to

prevent vehicles using diesel as a fuel.

16. It is in this context that the case of M.C. Mehta vs. Union of

India WP (Civil) No. 13029 of 1985 gains importance when the

Union of India approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court to

modify its directions regarding conversion of CNG on the same

grounds as urged now, the Hon’ble Supreme Court by its

Judgement dated 5th April, 2002 rejected all contentions and

reiterated weeding out of all Diesel vehicles. It is material to

record that the reasons and the grounds urged in the instant

M.A. No. 567 of 2016 by Union of India is nothing but

reiterating the same grounds which found no favour with

Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue of banning use of diesel as

a fuel in vehicles.

17. Subsequent to those proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, the National Green Tribunal Act was enacted which

came into force on 18th October, 2010 and the cases pertaining

to environment has been transferred from Supreme Court and

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 other High Courts to this Tribunal and many new actions have

also been initiated.

18. Mr. Vardhman Kaushik, the applicant in O.A. No. 21 of 2014,

claiming to be public spirited person initiated these proceedings

in which this Tribunal has passed several orders right from

2014 till now. Among various orders passed by this Tribunal in

O.A. No. 21 of 2014 of Vardhman Kaushik, the order dated 7th

April, 2015 and the recent orders dated 18th July, 2016 and

20th July, 2016 are relevant as the applicants are seeking

modification of those orders.

Main Case

19. With this prelude we shall now advert to the contentions of the

Learned AAG Ms. Pinki Anand on factual and legal issues, the

sum and substance of which is as follows:-

I. That the scientific reports of IIT Kanpur, the DPCC and CRRI Report
of 2002 brings to surface the ill-effects of fossil fuel as compared to
diesel emission on the ambient air quality. That, the scientific
studies done favour proposition that the diesel fuel could be
permitted to be used for automobiles.
II. That this Tribunal has not given due credence to scientific study
material.
III. This Tribunal, before reaching conclusion that the vehicles more than
10 years using diesel and vehicles more than 15 years using petrol
shall be banned has neither ordered conduct of any fresh scientific
study nor it has given credence to the report and data submitted by
CRRI in 2002, report of IIT Kanpur, Report of DPCC and other
material produced by the Central Government.
IV. The Tribunal has ignored that there is no provision in the Indian
Motor Vehicle Act to ban vehicle depending upon the fuel it consumes
except as envisaged in Sections 53, 55, 59 of the Motor Vehicle Act,
the exercise of which power to ban motor vehicles vests only in the
Central or State Government as the case may be and no Court or the
Tribunal has any jurisdiction to issue any mandate/directions like
the direction issued by this Tribunal.
V. This Tribunal has no jurisdiction to ban the vehicle fixing the age on
its own conclusion as such order could be passed only under section
(59) of the Motor Vehicle Act by the Central Government by virtue of
the power thereby conferred.
VI. That, the Motor Vehicle Act is not one of the enactment included in
the Schedule 1 of the NGT Act and therefore this Tribunal does not
have jurisdiction to fix age or ban vehicles according to its age.

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VII. The order in question infringes the right to property guaranteed
unsustainable under Article 14 of the constitution of India and
therefore it is and needs modification.
VIII. The order in question imposes conditions which are difficult to
perform and if performed would lead to several repercussions,
disadvantageous to environment and create uncontrollable adverse
impact on transport sector.
IX. The order in question defeats the principle of sustainable
development.

In support of the aforesaid points, Ms. Pinki Anand, the leaned

AAG, would rely on the study report data from CRRI of 2002,

the report of IIT, Kanpur of DPCC to submits that pollutants in

the ambient air, is not attributable to the use of diesel; that

diesel is safe and should be preferred against Gasoline.

Commenting on the conclusion of this Tribunal that diesel

vehicles are more polluting than petrol, CNG & electric vehicle,

contends that Government of India has submitted before this

Tribunal that there are various pollutants that cause air

pollution, from the vehicular emissions. Diesel may be inferior

to petrol in some pollutants such as Particulate matter and

Oxides of Nitrogen, but petrol is also inferior to diesel in some

other pollutants. She describes the conclusion of the Tribunal,

that only diesel is polluting fuel as a misconception and relying

on CRRI report contended that diesel vehicles have higher fuel

efficiency which leads to 10 to 15% lower emission of carbon

dioxide (Co2) as compared to petrol vehicle. Assuming 10 %

lower carbon dioxide emission from diesel, diesel passenger

vehicle in India’s fleet would have saved over 1.5millon tones of

carbon dioxide emission a year thereby significantly helping in

the Government’s commitment of reducing country’s emission

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 intensity per unit DGB by 33-35 % below the 2005 level by

2030.

20. She would further contend aforesaid scientific data was

highlighted at the 21st conference at the United Nation

Framework Convention on Climate Change to which India is

party and it is accepted as a scientific certification.

21. That the aforementioned data supports the United Nation’s

Climate Change Conventions policy. She submitted the

reduction in carbon dioxide level in the air by using diesel as

fuel is significant because India like other nations committed at

the United Nation Climate Change convention, to reduce

aggregated percentage of carbon dioxide emissions in India.

Since, Indian Government is committed to reduce the crude

import due to consumption of fossil fuel from the road

transport segment, it is necessary to mandate fuel consumption

standard for passenger vehicle from 2017. Since, lower fuel

consumption leads to lower carbon dioxide emission, by design

the diesel vehicle predominantly have lower carbon dioxide

against petrol vehicle and should be prepared.

22. She further submitted that, as against the material placed by

her there was no better scientific material to negate her

contentions. That, before passing the orders in question this

Tribunal did not have sufficient scientific material to establish

or even to conclude reasonably that use of diesel as fuel is more

harmful than petrol. According to her, before passing orders in

question and imposing complete ban on the diesel vehicle of

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 over 10 years, the Tribunal has acted arbitrarily to impose ban

which takes away the right of parties which are protected under

the Article 51 of Constitution of India. She hastened to add this

Tribunal ought to have obtained fresh study report on the

emission level by the use of diesel as a fuel and as also

emission level from vehicle using petrol. If such a study was

conducted, a clear picture would have emerged that use of

fossil fuel like petrol is more dangerous and causes pollution to

the environment because of the composition of different

pollutants against the use of diesel fuel. She has filed the report

CRRI, Report of IIT Kanpur, Report of DPCC which we have

perused.

23. She submits the NGT has incorrectly noticed that vehicle

density in NCR Delhi is very high whereas the NCR is a very

wide geographical area covering Delhi and parts of Haryana,

Rajasthan and UP. The vehicle density of NCR is much less

than many of the mega cities of the Country and relies on graft

depiction of vehicle density and air quality index (PM 2.5) in

seven different cities during April, 2015.

24. That it is wrongly mentioned in the order that there has been

no study by competent agency not to ban vehicles more than 15

years age while ignoring the fact that ban by NGT on more than

10 years vehicle is also not supported by any authentic study.

25. Summing up grounds on this point she referred to measures

to be taken for controlling air pollution of vehicles in cities. The

Significant steps taken by the Central Government to improve

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 ambient air quality and prevent air pollution. She has listed

out various schemes of the Central Government which

according to her, will bring an atmosphere free of air pollution

thereby achieving the object directly without requiring any

harsh order like the one passed by NGT.

26. She submits providing incentives to the public for changeover

to non-conventionally fuel vehicles like CNG, electrically

operated vehicles is a remedy which is to be implemented. The

Government’ is perusing action for early completion of eastern

and western periphery expressways to reduce vehicular load in

Delhi which is an answer to the problem.

Analysis and our conclusion regarding Maintainability of the

applications.

27. At the threshold itself we find the applications are legally not

maintainable and could have been rejected in limine but we

have considered other aspects as well.

28. We have bestowed our serious concern on all contentions. The

contention so urged may appear impressive, but on the closer

analysis it is only worth rejection.

Maintainability

29. The application in question is not maintainable in law for

following reasons:

a. The order dated 18th July, 2016 and 20th July, 2016

sought to be modified has genesis from the order dated 7th

April, 2015 passed by this Tribunal assigning elaborate

reasons for banning vehicles of more than 10 years using

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 diesel. The applicants in M.A. Nos. 567 of 2016 and 1220

of 2016 have not questioned or assailed the order dated

7th April, 2015 from which the order in question

geminated. The orders in question are in further to it and

the directions issued by this Tribunal are to enforce the

order dated 7th April, 2015.

b. On this ground itself application is not maintainable.

c. Secondly, the prayers in these applications are hit by

doctrine of res-judicata as is spelt out in Section 11 of

Code of Civil Procedure.

d. The records would reveal that the order dated 7 th April,

2015 was brought in question by certain persons from the

category of persons to whom the direction issued on 18th

July, 2016 and 20th July, 2016 apply, virtually on the

same grounds as urged in the present applications.

30. The order dated 7th April, 2015 was questioned by the persons

claiming to be affected by the direction dated 18.07.2016 and

20.07.2016. Two M.A. No. 412/2015 and M.A. No.413/2015

were for the same relief to recall the order dated 7 th April, 2015

as in the present applications. The order reads:

M.A. No. 412 of 2015 and M.A. No. 413 of 2015

The Applicant in either of these applications is not present. We have
heard the Learned counsel appearing for the parties. The prayer in
the application is for setting aside order of the Tribunal dated 07th
April, 2015 by which it was directed that the diesel vehicles which are
more than 10 years old should not be permitted to ply on Delhi roads.
Firstly, this application is mis-conceived in as much as after the
Tribunal passed order on 07th April, 2015, the same was challenged
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the Statutory Appeal
was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The old diesel
vehicles undisputedly are the source of air pollution. It has been
brought on record before us that even during the odd-even
enforcement by the NCT, Delhi the ambient air quality of Delhi was not
found to be much improved. In fact the parameters remained

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excessive. In our order dated 04th July, 2016 in Original Application
No. 179 of 2016 – Mahendra Pandey Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
we had noticed the excessive parameters of the ambient air quality
which reads as under:-
“Learned Counsel appearing for the Central Pollution Control Board
submits that the complete and comprehensive analysis report has
been placed on record. As per this report the ambient air quality in
Delhi during the Odd-Even implementation period is found to be
more deteriorated than the one when the said restriction was not
inforce.
As per the analysis report the average value of PM2.5 is higher
during odd-even phase than pre odd-even period. During the odd-
even period it varied from 63 to 182 as against the pre odd-even
when it which varied from 45 to 143. Similarly other parameters
like PM10, NO2, SO2, CO and Ozone all through the period were
noticed to be higher than the pre odd-even period ambient air
quality.
The Learned Counsel appearing for the NCT of Delhi prays for time
to seek instructions and examine the impact of this report on the
decision of Government of NCT of Delhi. The Counsel would also
require the transport department of NCT of Delhi to give vehicular
data and place the same before the Tribunal in relation to prior and
during odd-even period.
The analysis report even for the first period of odd-even policy, filed
on record, is also showing similar trends.”
This would show that even during enforcement of odd-even, ambient
air quality had hardly improved. This itself is an indicative of the fact
that to the extent of pollution being caused by vehicles, it is the old
vehicles which substantially contribute majorly to the air quality and
therefore they must be stopped. Besides, the fact that the order
passed by the Tribunal on 07th April, 2015 has already attained
finality and has become binding.
We in any case see no reason to vary our said order. In fact that order
requires to be enforced more vigorously and effectively by the
authorities concerned. It is an accepted fact, not only in India but all
over the world, that the emission from diesel vehicle are more injurious
to environment and consequently the health of the people than petrol
or the vehicles being run on other sources of energy like CNG,
Electricity etc. This vehicular pollution could be controlled by not
permitting the vehicles causing emissions which would increase PM10,
PM2.5, SO2 and NOx in the ambient air quality of that place.
Furthermore, it is the NCR Delhi where the vehicular density is very
high, the prohibitory directions have been passed. The same very
vehicles could be driven in other places where there is larger space
available for dispersion and dilution of vehicular emission from such
vehicles.
Be that as it may, we are of the considered view that there is no
occasion for the Tribunal to set aside the order date 07th April, 2015.
It has been pointed out by the various Authorities including Delhi
Traffic Police that they have made definite attempts to stop diesel
vehicles which are more than 10 years old to ply on the road, but
efforts hardly had met with any success. Few challans and fines of a
smaller amount have been made under the Motor Vehicle Act which
has not lead to any tangible impact.
It is also stated that impounded vehicles are released by Learned
Magistrate in exercise of their jurisdiction under the Motor Vehicles
Act.
Consequently, we hereby direct that the RTOs of NCR, Delhi, Haryana,
Rajasthan will deregister all the diesel vehicles which are more than
10 years of age. Upon deregistering such vehicles they will supply the
list of all deregistered vehicles to the Traffic Police which in turn to

15
 take appropriate steps as already directed under the order of the
Tribunal and under the provision of the Motor Vehicle Act.
The Traffic Police and the RTO shall issue public notice of these orders
forthwith. It is to be noticed here that other major sources of air
pollution in Delhi are from dust and burning of waste for which we
have already passed detailed directions separately and we required
Central Pollution Control Board, Delhi Pollution Control Committee,
NCT, Delhi and all other Public Authorities to file the Status report in
relation to compliance of the directions already issued by the Tribunal
in this case vide order dated 10th April, 2015.
M.A. No. 412 of 2015 is accordingly disposed of without any order as
to cost.
M.A. No. 413 of 2015
This application is filed on behalf of DTC praying that it should be
permitted to operate 56 numbers of diesel trucks, out of these 6 trucks
are less than 10 years old and 30 trucks are between 10 to 11 years
old and 20 are between 12-13 years old.
In view of the above order, the trucks which are less than 10 years old
can be permitted to run and utilized by the DTC but only for another
period till they become 10 years old. The vehicles which are more
than 10 to 13 years old or which are above 10 years old should be
replaced immediately by the DTC by new trucks. It is to be noticed
that diesel trucks are the serious contributory of the air pollution and
as their emissions are more injurious to the human health besides
they cause serious ambient air quality deterioration.
With the above directions M.A. No. 413 of 2015 stands disposed of.

31. Now, the question is whether the M.A. No. 567/2016 seeking

similar relief as in the M.A. No. 412/2015 could be granted. The

answer is in negative for the reasons assigned by this Tribunal

on 18.07.2016 to reject M.A. No. 412/2015. It acts as

constructive res-judicata.

32. The provision of Section 11 of the CPC, 1908 reads as:-

Res judicata— No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the
matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and
substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties,
or between parties under whom they or any of them claim,
litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such
subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been
subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by
such Court.

33. Further, the order dated 7th April, 2015 which lead to issue of

subsequent direction which are assailed by the applications

were questioned before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in following

cases Vishaal Shripati Jogdand Vs. Union of India & Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 40853/2014, Union of India vs.

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 Vardhaman Kaushik Civil Appeal No. 3111 of 2015 and

Sheela Yadav Vs. Vardhaman Kaushik & Ors Civil Appeal

No. 11902 of 2015. The order passed in the above mentioned

cases are as follows:

Vishaal Shripati Jogdand Vs. Union of India & Ors. Civil

Appeal No. 40853/2014:
Application for permission to file appeal is allowed. The
Civil Appeal is dismissed as withdrawn, in terms of the
signed order.

Vardhaman Kaushik Civil Appeal No. 3111 of 2015:

The civil appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order.

Sheela Yadav Vs. Vardhaman Kaushik & Ors Civil Appeal No.
11902 of 2015:
1. Heard learned Counsel for the appellant (s).
2. After going through the judgment (s) and order (s) passed by the
National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi and
the material available on record we see no infirmity in the
impugned judgment (s) and order (s) passed by the Tribunal.
Accordingly, the application (s) seeking permission to file the
appeal (s) are rejected.

34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has rejected all the above referred

Appeals affirming the order passed by this Tribunal on 7th April,

2015. Thus, the orders passed by this Tribunal has reached

logical end and finality. Amongst the above said orders, the

order passed in the case of Sheela Yadav is of importance as in

the said case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorical

observed that they find no reason for interfering with the order

passed by this Tribunal. The order has been confirmed by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in unequivocal expression. Thus, the

applications M.A. Nos. 567 and 1220 of 2016 are hit by

Doctrine of Res-judicata and our views finds support from the

following decision of the Apex Court:-

Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil nadu &

Ors. Civil Appeal No. 10620 of 2013 and T. Sivaraman &

17
Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 10622

of 2013 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in similar fact

circumstances, applied the Principle of Constructive Res-

judicata held thus:-

23. The scope of application of doctrine of res judicata is in question.

The literal meaning of “res” is “everything that may form an object of
rights and includes an object, subject-matter or status” and “res
judicata” literally means “a matter adjudged a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgments”. “Res
judicata pro veritate accipitur” is the full maxim which has, over the
years, shrunk to mere “res judicata”, which means that res judicata
is accepted for truth.
24. The doctrine contains the rule of conclusiveness of the judgment
which is based partly on the maxim of Roman jurisprudence
“interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it concerns the State that
there 24 Page 25 be an end to law suits) and partly on the maxim
“nemo debet bis vexari pro uno et eadem causa” (no man should be
vexed twice over for the same cause).
Even an erroneous decision on a question of law attracts the
doctrine of res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or
otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question
whether or not it operates as res judicata. (Vide: Shah Shivraj
Gopalji v. ED-, Appakadh Ayiassa Bi & Ors., AIR 1949 PC 302; and
Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee & Ors., AIR 1953 SC
65).
25. In Smt. Raj Lakshmi Dasi & Ors. v. Banamali Sen & Ors., AIR
1953 SC 33, this Court while dealing with the doctrine of res
judicata referred to and relied upon the judgment in Sheoparsan
Singh v. Ramnandan Singh, AIR 1916 PC 78 wherein it had been
observed as under:
“…….. the rule of res judicata, while founded on ancient
precedents, is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time…..
Though the rule of the Code may be traced to an English
source, it embodies a doctrine in no way opposed to the
spirit of the law as expounded by the Hindu commentators.
Vijnanesvara and Nilakantha 25 Page 26 include the plea
of a former judgment among those allowed by law, each
citing for this purpose the text of Katyayana, who describes
the plea thus: 'If a person though defeated at law, sue
again, he should be answered, ‘‘you were defeated
formerly". This is called the plea of former judgment.’... And
so the application of the rule by the courts in India should
be influenced by no technical considerations of form, but by
matter of substance within the limits allowed by law”

26. This Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi
& Anr., AIR 1960 SC 941 explained the scope of principle of res-
judicata observing as under:
“7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of
giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that
once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again.
Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future
litigation, When a matter - whether on a question of fact
or a question of law - has been decided between two
parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final,
either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or
18
 because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies,
neither party will be allowed in a future suit or
proceeding between the same parties to canvass the
matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in
relation to suits in S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
but even where S. 11 does not apply, the principle of res
judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of
achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the
original court as well as any higher court must in any
future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous
decision was correct.”
A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Daryao & Ors. v.
The State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1457; Greater Cochin
Development Authority v. Leelamma Valson & Ors., AIR 2002 SC
952; and Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar & Anr., AIR 2005
SC 626.

27. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalgamated Coalfields

Ltd. & Anr. v. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara & Ors., AIR 1964 SC
1013, considered the issue of res judicata applicable in writ
jurisdiction and held as under:
“…Therefore, there can be no doubt that the general
principle of res judicata applies to writ petitions filed
under Article 32 or Article 226. It is necessary to
emphasise that the application of the doctrine of res
judicata to the petitions filed under Art. 32 does not in
any way impair or affect the content of the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of India.
It only seeks to regulate the manner in which the said
rights could be successfully asserted and vindicated in
courts of law.”

34. This Court, while considering the binding effect of the judgment
of this Court, in State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta
(Retd.) & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 693, held:
“There can be no dispute with respect to the settled legal proposition
that a judgment of this Court is binding,…..It is also correct to state
that, even if a particular issue has not been agitated earlier, or a
particular argument was advanced, but was not considered, the
said judgment does not lose its binding effect, provided that the
point with reference to which an argument is subsequently
advanced, has actually been decided. The decision therefore, would
not lose its authority, "merely because it was badly argued,
inadequately considered or fallaciously reasoned". (Vide: Smt.
Somavanti & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 151;
Ballabhdas Mathuradas 31 Page 32 Lakhani & Ors. v. Municipal
Committee, Malkapur, AIR 1970 SC 1002; Ambika Prasad Mishra v.
State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1762; and Director of Settlements,
A.P. & Ors. v. M.R. Apparao & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 1598).”

35. The above said decisions aptly apply to the facts of this case.

Besides, the order passed on 7th April, 2015 is not an order

against any individual but is an order passed to be applicable

to certain categories of vehicles and to have effect on category of

persons. Therefore, the decision of this Tribunal on 7 th Aril,

19
 2015 and the directions issued in pursuant thereto dated 18 th

July, 2016 and 20th July, 2016 are judgements and orders in

rem and not in persenem. Thus, when such order have been

affirmed in a legal challenge by the category of persons affected

by it they come within the meaning of “No Court shall try any

suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in

issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former

suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom

they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title”.

36. Also, the rejections of the Appeals by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction under section 22

of National Green Tribunal has given finality to order dated 7 th

April, 2015 from which the order dated 18th July, 2016 and 20th

July, 2016 germinate renders these applications not

maintainable in law under Principle of Res-judicata.

Analysis and conclusion on factual aspect

37. From the tenor and thrust of her contentions on factual

aspects, it is observed that she asserts that this Tribunal took a

view to impose complete ban as spelled out in our order in

question, without scientific study or without sufficient

data/material being available.

38. Such conte4ntion is discounted because there was no need to

order conducting of fresh investigation regarding ill-effect of use

of diesel and petrol in vehicles afresh for the reason there is

already on record sufficient material after investigation by the

Central Pollution Control Board that the use of diesel in

20
 vehicles is highly toxic carcinogenic and leads to untimely

fatality. It is a report published in CPCB magazine “Parivesh”

which deals with diesel exhaust particles and its ill effects. The

report declare as follows:

The popularity of the diesel engine in heavy duty applications in

trucking, rail road, marine transport, DG sets and construction
industry Is due to both its fuel efficiency and long service relative to
the gasoline engine. Compared with gasoline engine, diesel
emissions are lower in carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbon (HC) and
carbon dioxide (C02). but higher in oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and
particulate matter (PM). Diesel exhaust is a complex mixture of both
particulate and gaseous phase. Diesel exhaust has particulate with
mass median diameter of 0.05 to 1.00 micrometer, a size rendering
them easily reparable and capable of depositing in the airways and
alvaoli. The particles consist of a carbonaceous core with a large
surface area to which various hydrocarbons are absorbed, including
carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and Nitro-
PAHs that have elicited the most concern with respect to human
health. The gaseous phase contains various products of combustion
and hydrocarbons including some of the PAHs present in the
particle phase. Once emitted, components of diesel exhaust undergo
atmospheric transformation in ways that may be relevant to human
health. For example. nitro-PAHs, created by the reaction of directly
emitted PAHs with hydroxyl radicals in the atmosphere can be more
potent mutagens and carcinogens and more bioavailability than
their precursor. A study undertaken by a Swedish Consultancy,
Ecotraffic (Peter AnlWk and Ake Branberg, 1999) shows that the
cancer potency of diesel vehicles is more than two times than that of
petrol vehicles in India. But if only the most harmful of the exhaust
emissions, that is particulate emission is considered, the
carcinogenic effect of one new diesel car is equivalent to 24 petrol
cars and 84 new CNG cars on the road.

39. On perusal of the report, it admits of no doubt that diesel

emissions are lower in carbon monoxide (CO), Hydrocarbon

(HC) and carbon dioxide(CO2) but is established to be higher in

oxides of Nitrogen(NOx) and Particulate Matter (PM). Diesel

exhaust is complete mixture of both particulate and gaseous

emission. The diesel exhaust has particulate mass median

diameter of 0.05 to 1.00 micrometer, a size rendering them

easily penetrable and capable of depositing in the airways and

alvovali. The particles consist of a carbonaceous core with a

large surface area in which various hydrocarbons are absorbed,

21
 including carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAHs)

and Nitro-PAHs that have elicited the serious concern with

respect to our health. The report shows that emission and

exhaust of diesel is carcinogenic and causes cancer, thus the

risk of cancer is higher in use of diesel as a fuel.

40. The report speaks loudly, that it is the most harmful of the

exhaust emission, which releases particulate emission, i.e

carcinogenic. The report declares one new diesel car is

equivalent to 24 petrol car and 84 new CNG cars on road. Thus,

the contention that there will be reduction of carbon dioxide

level by use of diesel is not positive factor in favor of use of

diesel as fuel much less a justification that diesel could be

preferred or allowed to be used as a fuel and the cars build to

run on the diesel should not be banned and restriction of 10

years should not be imposed.

41. The above report published by the CPCB binds the

applicant/Union of India and the finding of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court taking into consideration such report estopes

the Central Government from contending to the contrary as is

being done through the instant application.

42. Having found that particular emission from diesel is

carcinogenic, we would prefer to address its ill-effects on the

human life. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken note of this

factor in order dated 5th April, 2002 in MC Mehta Vs Union of

India which is relevant in this case, as extracted below:

During the course of arguments, literature was filed in Court giving

data from cities all over the world which co-relates increased air
pollution with increase in cardiovascular and respiratory diseases
22
 and also shows the carcinogenic nature of Reparable Particulate
Matter (RSPM) - PM10 (i.e. matter less than 10 microns in size). The
scientific studies indicate that air pollution leads to considerable
levels of mortality and morbidity. Fine particulate matter, or
reparable particulate matter (RSPM) - PM10 (i.e. matter less than 10
microns in size) - is particularly dangerous. The Journal of
American Medical Association (JAMA) has published in its recent
issue the findings of a study involving over 500,000 people,
conducted over 16 years, in different cities of the US. The
researchers find that fine particle related pollution leads to lung
cancer and cardiopulmonary mortality. Their research indicates
that with an increase of every 10 microgram me per cum (mg/cum)
of fine particles, the risk of lung cancer Increases by 8 per cent.

In fact the report has received the scrutiny and acceptance by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court as could be seen from its judgment

in the case of M.C. Mehta Vs Union of Inida order dated

05.04.2002. There is direct reference to this report by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court and accepting the said report all

contentions to the contrary urged by the Central Government

were rejected when the Central Government sought

modification of its earlier order.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected all such contentions and

declined to set aside/recall/modify their earlier order dated 28 th

March, 1995 and 9th February, 1996 passed in the case of

Residents Welfare Society Vs State of Delhi 1996 (1) SCC 161

for the following reasons recorded in Para 9 and 10 which is as

follows:

9. One of the principles underlying environmental law is that of

sustainable development. This principle requires such
development to take place which is ecologically sustainable.
The two essential features of sustainable development are
(a) the precautionary principle and
(b) the polluter pays principle.

10. The "precautionary principle" was elucidated thus by his

Court in Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India
and Ors. MANU/SC/0686/1996 : (1996) 5 SCC 647, inter
alia, as follows:

23
 (1) the State Government and the statutory authorities must
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental
degradation.
(2) Where there are threats of serious and irreversible
damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental
degradation.
(3) The "onus of proof" is on the actor or the developer to show
that his action is environmentally benign.
(4) It cannot be gainsaid that permission to use automobiles
has environmental implications, and thus any "auto policy"
framed by the Government must, therefore, of necessity
conform to the Constitutional principles as well as overriding
statutory duties cast upon the Government under the, EPA.
(5) The "auto policy" must, therefore,
(a) focus upon measures to " Anticipate, prevent and attack "
the cause of environmental degradation in this field.
(b) in the absence of adequate Information, lean In favour of
environmental protection by refusing rather than permitting
activities likely to be detrimental.
(c) Adopt the "precautionary principle" and thereby ensure that
unless an activity Is proved to be environmentally benign in
real and practical terms, It Is to be presumed to be
environmentally harmful.
(d) Make informed recommendations which balance the needs
of transportation with the need to protect the environment and
reserve the large scale degradation that has resulted over the
years, priority being given to the environment over economic
issues.

43. It is thus clear that the absence of adequate information or

material data lean in favour of environment protection by

refusing rather than permitting activities likely to be

detrimental. Thus merely because this Tribunal had not

ordered independent study with regard to ill-effects of use of

diesel compared to petrol or any other study report is not a

ground. The burden to establish what is contented about the

beneficial aspect by use of diesel is on the

Government/Applicant/Union of India who seeks modification

of the order.

Contentions on legal Issues :

44. Ms. Pinki Anand Ld. ASG, apart from the relying on factual

aspects as referred to in para Supra, has questioned

24
 maintainability of the order of this Tribunal dated 18.07.2016

and 20.07.2016 on its legality.

45. Referring to directions of this Tribunal, directing de-

registration, she submits the term de-registration is alien to the

provisions of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The Act provides for

“cancellation registration” or “Suspension of Registration”. She

refers to provisions of sub-section 3 of Section 55 of Motor

Vehicle Act which deals with cancellation of registration.

55. Cancellation of registration.—

(1) If a motor vehicle has been destroyed or has been rendered
permanently incapable of use, the owner shall, within fourteen days or
as soon as may be, report the fact to the registering authority within
whose jurisdiction he has the residence or place of business where the
vehicle is normally kept, as the case may be, and shall forward to the
authority the certificate of registration of the vehicle.
(2) The registering authority shall, if it is the original registering
authority, cancel the registration and the certificate of registration, or, if it
is not, shall forward the report and the certificate of registration to the
original registering authority and that authority shall cancel the
registration.
(3) Any registering authority may order the examination of a motor
vehicle within its jurisdiction by such authority as the State Government
may by order appoint and, if upon such examination and after giving the
owner an opportunity to make any representation he may wish to make
(by sending to the owner a notice by registered post acknowledgment due
at his address entered in the certificate of registration), it is satisfied that
the vehicle is in such a condition that it is incapable of being used or its
use in a public place would constitute a danger to the public and that it is
beyond reasonable repair, may cancel the registration.
(4) If a registering authority is satisfied that a motor vehicle has been
permanently removed out of India, the registering authority shall cancel
the registration.
(5) If a registering authority is satisfied that the registration of a motor
vehicle has been obtained on the basis of documents which were, or by
representation of facts which was, false in any material particular, or the
engine number or the chassis number embossed thereon are different
from such number entered in the certificate of registration, the registering
authority shall after giving the owner an opportunity to make such
representation as he may wish to make (by sending to the owner a notice
by registered post acknowledgment due at his address entered in the
certificate of registration), and for reasons to be recorded in writing,
cancel the registration.
(6) A registering authority cancelling the registration of a motor vehicle
under section 54 or under this section shall communicate such fact in
writing to the owner of the vehicle, and the owner of the vehicle shall
forthwith surrender to that authority the certificate of registration of the
vehicle.
(7) A registering authority making an order of cancellation under section
54 or under this section shall, if it is the original registering authority,
cancel the certificate of registration and the entry relating to the vehicle in
its records, and, if it is not the original registering authority, forward the
certificate of registration to that authority, and that authority shall cancel
the certificate of registration and the entry relating to the motor vehicle in
its records.

25
 (8) The expression “original registering authority” in this section and in
sections 41, 49, 50, 52, 53 and 54 means the registering authority in
whose records the registration of the vehicle is recorded.
(9) In this section “certificate of registration” includes a certificate of
registration renewed under the provisions of this Act.

46. According to her, even this provision does not provide any

power to the state or Central Government to cancel the

registration without examination of the vehicles and thus she

contended cancellation of registration of the Motor vehicle

cannot be ordered by the State or Central Government without

re-examination of the vehicle to test its road worthiness and

consequently this Tribunal has no such power to impose

general ban. The paramount consideration is whether the use

of the vehicle is dangerous to human life.

47. Further, she submits the orders of the NGT in question (18 th

July, 2016 and 20th July, 2016) which directs diesel vehicles of

more than 10 years to be scrapped after deregistration,

registration is illegal and in violation of law. There is no

authority under law for scrapping the vehicles whose

registration is cancelled. Cancellation of registration would not

permit only plying of the vehicle on roads but does not take way

right of the owner to retain it.

48. Scrapping order is an infringement of right to property

guaranteed under Section 14 of the Constitution of India.

49. Referring to Section 59 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, which

confers power on Central Government to fix age of the vehicle,

she contends the power is exercisable only by the Central

26
 Government and even the State Government has no power to fix

the age of the vehicle. She relies on Section 59.

59. Power to fix the age limit of motor vehicle.—

(1) The Central Government may, having regard to the public
safety, convenience and objects of this Act, by notification in the
Official Gazette, specify the life of a motor vehicle reckoned from the
date of its manufacture, after the expiry of which the motor vehicle
shall not be deemed to comply with the requirements of this Act and
the rules made thereunder: Provided that the Central Government
may specify different ages for different classes or different types of
motor vehicles.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the
Central Government may, having regard to the purpose of a motor
vehicle, such as, display or use for the purposes of a demonstration
in any exhibition, use for the purposes of technical research or
taking part in a vintage car rally, by notification in the Official
Gazette, exempt, by a general or special order, subject to such
conditions as may be specified in such notification, any class or
type of motor vehicle from the operation of sub-section (1) for the
purpose to be stated in the notification.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 56, no prescribed
authority or authorized testing station shall grant a certificate of
fitness to a motor vehicle in contravention of the provisions of any
notification issued under sub-section (1).

50. According to her, under this provision the power to fix the age

of vehicle being only with the Central Government and that to

only after issuance of notification and publishing in Official

Gazette, no power is conferred even on the Central Government

to fix the age of the vehicle by a general order. The Order of the

NGT directing banning of diesel vehicles of more than 10 years

and directing it to be scrapped is violation of Motor Vehicle Act,

1988 particularly, section 59, and is thus unsustainable.

51. On this point she would further contend that cancellation of

registration as provided section 55 of the Motor Vehicle Act can

be done only for each of the vehicle on individual assessment as

provided by the provisions of Motors Vehicle Act, 1988 and that

to only after first giving notice to the owner and giving him a

reasonable opportunity of being heard and on proof the vehicle

is beyond repair and dangerous to be used on roads. No other

27
 factor permits cancellations of registration of vehicle based on

the age. Any order passed fixing age of the motor vehicle

without following the procedure prescribed in Section 59 will be

non est and cannot be enforced.

52. She further submitted that globally, end of life of vehicles is

decided not by age of vehicle but by determining its condition

and road worthiness. Determining end of life of the vehicle by

fixing age limit unilaterally results in several loss of vehicle

particularly the personally owned vehicles which has been

maintained very well in de-registration will ultimately lead to

national waste and effects the right to property individual rights

of the people guaranteed by the constitution and pushes them

to face in-compensable loss.

53. Referring to the data from the automobile manufactures and

the specification with regard to life of engine, she submits

vehicles which have not covered the prescribed life mileage

would be legally entitled to ply on roads even if they have been

poorly maintained and is not road worthy. This is protection

under law for the reason no order could be passed except in

terms of the provisions of Section 55 and 59 of the Motor

Vehicle Act, 1988. Arbitrarily banning of vehicles based on age

would cause economic hardship to the owners of the vehicles

whose very livelihood may depend on these vehicles leading to

social injustice. It dissuades the potential customers to buy

diesel car as compared to petrol cars whereby discriminating

the citizens based on the type of fuel consumed without any

28
 legal sanction. The directions of the NGT in order in question

will suddenly throw lakhs of vehicles for scrapping without any

proper provision, and will lead to unorganised dismantle of

vehicles and imbalance environment adversely denting

vehicular operations in Country further aggregating economic

loss.

Analysis of other grounds and our conclusion on legal issues

54. The term cancellation and term suspension of registration

used in the provision of Section 53 and 55 of the Motor Vehicle

Act is in different context and is situation based.

53. Suspension of registration.—

(1) If any registering authority or other prescribed authority has reason
to believe that any motor vehicle within its jurisdiction—
(a) is in such a condition that its use in a public place would constitute a
danger to the public, or that it fails to comply with the requirements of
this Act or of the rules made thereunder, or
(b) has been, or is being, used for hire or reward without a valid permit
for being used as such, the authority may, after giving the owner an
opportunity of making any representation he may wish to make (by
sending to the owner a notice by registered post acknowledgment due at
his address entered in the certificate of registration), for reasons to be
recorded in writing, suspend the certificate of registration of the vehicle—
(i) in any case falling under clause (a), until the defects are rectified to its
satisfaction; and
(ii) in any case falling under clause (b), for a period not exceeding four
months.
(2) An authority other than a registering authority shall, when making a
suspension order under sub-section (1), intimate in writing the fact of
such suspension and the reasons therefor to the registering authority
within whose jurisdiction the vehicle is at the time of the suspension.
(3) Where the registration of a motor vehicle has been suspended under
sub-section (1) for a continuous period of not less than one month, the
registering authority, within whose jurisdiction the vehicle was when the
registration was suspended, shall, if it is not the original registering
authority, inform that authority of the suspension.
(4) The owner of a motor vehicle shall, on the demand of a registering
authority or other prescribed authority which has suspended the
certificate of registration of the vehicle under this section, surrender the
certificate of registration.
(5) A certificate of registration surrendered under sub-section (4) shall be
returned to the owner when the order suspending registration has been
rescinded and not before.

55. The phraseology of section is clear. It operates in the

circumstances if the vehicle is found to be in a condition that

its use in a public place would constitute a danger to the public

29
 or fails to comply with requirements of this Act or when it is

used for hire or reward without a valid permit for being used as

such. In such circumstances the registration authority named

in this Act has the power to “suspend” for a limited period until

the defects are rectified to its satisfaction and in any other case

falling under clause (b) for a period not exceeding four months.

Thus, the provisions are intended to put a temporary restrain

on use of vehicles and in this regard to suspend the

registration. The power conferred on the registration authority

by section 53 is also exercisable by other authorities other than

issuing authority and if they make such an order for

suspension which it is to be intimated to registering authority

in whose jurisdiction vehicle is found at the time of such order.

Any order passed under section 53 “suspending registration” of

vehicle is subject to further orders to be passed. Thus, this

provision is not attracted in the circumstances in which this

Tribunal has passed the order issuing directions to deregister

the 10 years old diesel vehicles.

56. Section 55 deals with “cancellation of registration” this

provision also operates in different circumstances. If the motor

vehicle has been destroyed or has been rendered unless the

owner of the vehicle shall be required to intimate about it to

registration authority within whose jurisdiction the owner

resides or has place of business where the vehicle is normally

kept, and in such case the registration authority may order

examination of vehicle and if it is satisfied the vehicle is

30
 incapable of use, or its use in public place would constitute a

danger accept the request of owner.

Provision of sub-section 1, 2 and 3 refers only to the owner of

the vehicle seeking cancellation of registration on his own

volition in the circumstance numerated therein. Registering

Authority by itself does not initiate order in those

circumstances. However, sub-section 5 of Section 55 authorise

the authorities, if it is satisfied that the registration of the motor

vehicle has been obtained on the basis of documents which

were, or the representation of facts which was, false in any

material particular, or the engine number or the chassis

number embossed thereon are different from such number

entered in the certificate of registration, the registering

authority shall after giving notice to the owner and opportunity

cancel the registration for the reasons to be recorded. Sub-

Section 1, 2, 3 and 5 of Section 55 are not attracted in the fact

situation this tribunal has ordered deregistration.

57. As regards Section 59 of the Motor Vehicle Act is concerned it

provides the central Government, having regard to public safety

convenience and objects of the act, by notification in a official

Gazette specify the life of the motor vehicle reckoned from its

date of manufacturing after expiry of which motor vehicle will

not be deemed to comply with the provision and rules made

thereunder.

The question for consideration is if in a given circumstance

Central Government fails to discharge its statutory obligation to

31
 invoke section 59 of the Motor vehicle Act should the citizen

suffer and the courts or the Environmental Tribunal be a silent

spectator. The answer is in negative for the reason assigned by

us in the following paragraphs.

58. We have already referred to section 53, 55 to hold that these

provisions operate in different fact situation and are not

attracted to the facts and circumstances in which directions in

question dated 18th July, 2016 and 20th July, 2016 are issued

by this Tribunal. However, for clarity it is necessary to observe

that the word suspension would mean the act of temporarily

restricting, interrupting or terminating a person’s power or

privilege or temporary deprivation of a person’s powers or

privileges in respect of other property or rights to office etc. the

order of suspension is temporary and is subject to further

orders which to recall the suspension. The word cancellation

used in language of Section 55 of Motor Vehicles Act is a order

by which the grant of registration under the Motor Vehicle Act

is obliterated i.e. cancelled thereby completely depriving the

person’s right of user etc. in respect of vehicle subject to Motor

Vehicles Act i.e. right to ply on roads. The word de-registration

in simple terms has the same effect like cancellation. De-

registration is triggered when facts and circumstances are such

which justify terminating right which a person could claim by

virtue of registration, that means, in relation to motor vehicle it

could be said that de-registration would have the effect as

cancellation of registration which word is used in the statute

32
 (Indian Motor

Vehicle Act)

59. The fact of de-registration and cancellation being the same,

the use of word de-registration in the order in question has no

adverse legal consequence on the legality of the order, as, what

was intended is to ensure that the vehicle of particular age,

using a particular fuel, shall not be used or to plied on roads

impacting the air quality in determent to the interest of

humanity. Therefore, even though the Tribunal may not have

used word cancellation of registration the object being same the

use of word de-registration does not result in creating any

blemish in law on the order in question. The dictionary

meaning of the word cancellation or registering being the same,

it has to be understood in that sense.

60. We shall now consider the scope of the section 59 of the Motor

Vehicle Act, 1988. It is undisputed position of law that Article

39, 47 and 48 (a) of the Constitution Act, in unequivocal terms

collectively caste a duty on the State to secure the health of the

people, improve public health and protect the environment (as

observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in W.P No. 13029 of

1985 M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India).

61. Hon’ble Supreme Court expressing its anguish on the failure

of the state to fulfil its constitutional obligation to protect the

health of the people and to improve environment, intervened

and issued directions to the Government. Though the Hon’ble

Supreme Court was exercising its civil writ jurisdiction by

33
 passing the orders in the Public Interest Litigation, justifying

the intervention by the Courts, has clearly expounded the

position of law that when the Government machinery fails to

discharge its constitutional obligation, the courts would

intervene and issue directions to achieve the objective to

safeguard the life and health of the people. Emphasis being that

the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of

India is uninfringeable and needs to be protected and State has

no excuse except to fulfil its Constitutional Obligation.

62. It is relevant at this juncture to refer to series of orders passed

by Hon’ble Supreme Court, first being on 23rd September, 1986

directing the Delhi Administration to specify the steps taken by

it for controlling pollution, emissions of smoke, noise etc. from

vehicles plying in Delhi. That followed several subsequent

orders by which Supreme Court noticing the adverse effect and

serious impact on environment by use of particular type of fuel

i.e. diesel directed State fleet at the first instance to be

converted to CNG and then the other vehicles. All such orders

are dehors the provision of the Motor Vehicle Act and any other

law in force.

63. However, presently the position is quite different in view of the

establishment of National Green Tribunal by Act of 2010

statutorily conferring the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter

relating to environment, its protection and enforcement of

national laws on Tribunal leading transfer all cases from the

Constitutional Courts.

34
64. The question as to whether the Courts/Tribunal can issue

direction to the Government in the matter which are statutorily

covered under the provision of the Motor Vehicle Act,1988 by

implications has been dealt with in the case of M.C. Mehta vs.

Union of India particularly in the order dated 5th April, 2002. To

emphasise this point we may extract the observations of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in para nos. 26 and 27 which throws

sufficient light. It reads as hereunder:-

26. The statistics show that the continuing air pollution is

having a more devastating effect on the people, than what was
caused by the Bhopal gas tragedy. In that case, the nation,
including the Union of India, was rightly agitated and sought
action and compensation from the multinational company, who
was held to be responsible for the same. Here, in the case of
CNG, the shoe is on the other foot because the government is
not facilitating measures for clean air and water including the
supply of CNG or any other clean unadulterated fuel. It is due
to the lack of proper concern on the part of the governmental
authorities that people are suffering from respiratory and other
diseases. The Bhopal gas tragedy was a onetime event which,
hopefully, will not be repeated, but here, with not enough
concern or action being undertaken by the Union of India, far
greater tragedies in the form of degradation of public health are
taking place every day.
27. Under these circumstances, it becomes the duty of the Court
to direct such steps being taken are necessary for cleaning the
air so that the future generations do not suffer from ill-health.

Thus, it is seen that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had issued

directions to direct the steps to be taken by the Government for

cleaning the air, so that future generation do not suffer. The

directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are relating to

subjects which are covered under the provisions of the Motor

Vehicle Act, 1988, the observation in para 1 and 2 of the

Judgment (referred to above by the Hon’ble Supreme Court)

spells out that environmental laws shall prevail over other

common law regulations, including the provisions of the Motor

Vehicle Act,1988.
35
65. Besides, We have the Judgment of the High Court of

Karnataka with regard to justification of the courts to issue

directions regarding fixing of age of the vehicles and banning

vehicles capable of using diesel which is an answers the

question raised by Ld. ASG. We may refer to the decision in the

case of Karnataka Lorry Malikara Okkuta (R), by its

General Secretary and ors. vs. The State of Karnataka, by

its Chief Secretary and ors. observed as follows:

15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a number o f cases has

observed that the Government can take appropriate action to
ensure safety and welfare of the public. More, particularly, the
Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta’s Case Supra has held that
directions that are issued under the Environment Act are for
protecting and safeguarding the health of the people, a right
provided and protected by Article 21 of the Constitution and
would override the provisions of every statute including the Motor
Vehicle Act, if they militate against the Constitutional mandate of
Article 21. It is also observed that the norms fixed under the
Motor Vehicles Act are in addition to and not in derogation of the
requirements of the Environment Act.
16. In view of the above, said provisions of the Environment Act
and the Air Act and the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in M.C. Mehta’s case, it is clear that there is no merit in the
contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
that the State Government has no power to issue directions under
section 5 of the Environment Act and Section 20 of the Air Act. The
argument is rejected.
17. It is well settled that it is always open to the State
Government, which has authority under Section 5 of the
Environment Act and Section 20 of the Air Act and to issue
necessary directions. By the said notification, only the entry of
vehicles aged more than 15 years within the city of Bangalore
from the outer Ring Road has been prohibited, fixing the Schedule.
It is seen that as per the counter, the State Government, after
consulting the Board, has take necessary steps having regard to
the ground realities and the position prevalent in Bangalore,
which is within its competence as stated, and therefore, the
argument that the said steps taken in other cities would ipso facto
enable the Government to issue directions to prohibit the entry of
transport/commercial vehicles aged more than 15 years, has no
substance. Anyhow, the notification has not been given effect to.
The facts placed as per the affidavit is an on 1.1.2003. Now 18
months have passed and more vehicles must be on the road.
Certainly, there is increase in the pollution in the city due to
emission of toxic fumes by plying such vehicles. However, these
facts are to be ascertained by the respective authorities
concerned.
18. Under the circumstances, it will be appropriate to direct the
respondents to evolve some scheme after considering the details.
Government should also give sufficient time to the vehicle owners

36
 for replacement of the old vehicles, in a phased manner, to make
available the CNG fuel and to have the vehicles converted to it in a
phased manner. The authority concerned should overall monitor
and check the two wheelers, four wheelers and other types of
vehicles including commercial/transport vehicles as well as
passengers vehicles, at important functions, and to see that they
do not violate the prescribed norms of pollution and the traffic
rules and to ensure the safety and welfare of the public. The
authorities concerned are also free to take note of the direction
issued by the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta’s Case Supra.

66. In the instant case series of orders passed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court referred to above Supra were sought to be

either modified or recalled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has

discounted all such contentions and issued directions to

impose. Despite such clarification no fruitful purpose has been

served.

67. In these circumstances, in this case i.e. Vardhman kaushik vs.

Union of India & ors., this Tribunal by its judgment dated 07th

April, 2015 directed banning of the diesel vehicles which are 10

years old and petrol vehicles which are 15 years old. The

directions so issued undoubtedly are directions for effective

implementation of the provisions of the Air (Prevention and

Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. The Air Act is one of the

enactments included in Schedule I of the National Green

Tribunal Act, 2010 Section 59 of the Motor Vehicle Act is

therefore subject to the provisions of the environment laws likw

Air and water. Section 14 of the deals with the Jurisdiction,

NGt is established as a specialized environment Tribunal. Its

jurisdiction is spelt out in Section 14 to 18. Section 14

envisages “The Tribunal shall have the Jurisdiction over all civil

cases where a substantial question relating to environment

(including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment),

37
 is involved and such question arises out of implementation of the

enactments specified in Schedule I.” Sections 29 ousts the

jurisdiction of all civil courts retaining the appellate jurisdiction

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as envisaged in Section 22 of the

Act. The Phraseology used in Section 14 leaves no scope of

doubt that NGT is conferred with exclusive jurisdiction to deal

with cases where the substantial question relating to

environment and includes questions relating to enforcement of

any legal right relating to environment spelled out in the

enactment referred to in Schedule I .

68. Air Act which is one of the enactment specified in Schedule I

mandates steps to be taken by authorities its section 17 and

20 are relevant.

69. Thus, enforcement and implementation of provisions is a clear

legal mandate which the Centre and State Government through

the modes as specified in the Act must take appropriate steps,

but when the Centre and State Government fail to fulfil its

statutory obligation and allows the situation to be created

affecting the environment adversely and consequently infringes

the right to life of the people guaranteed under Article 21 of the

Constitution, the jurisdiction of the NGT could be invoked. In

other words if the circumstances so created results in raising

substantial question relating to environment arising out of the

implementation or non-implementation of the enactment like in

this case, the Air Act. The Tribunal Jurisdiction is triggered.

38
70. The words used in Section 14 “question arising out of the

implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I”

would mean and include “non implementation of the enactment

specified in Schedule I” To repeat, the word implementation

would include questions arising out of non implementation. In

this instant case we are concerned with non implementation of

the mandate of Air Act which is an enactment specified in

Schedule I and therefore, the substantial question relating to

environment arises. The legal position when such question

arises is that, it is NGT can invoke its exclusive jurisdiction to

pass such orders as are justified in law for enforcement of the

provisions of the enactment relating to protection of

environment notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any

other laws. Thus, the reasonable conclusion would be that

anything contained to the contrary in the Motor Vehicle Act will

not affect the jurisdiction exercisable by Tribunal under Section

14 to deal with cases where substantial question relating to

environment arises.

71. We have already observed that provision of Motor Vehicles Act

is regulatory in its mechanism and such provisions are

supplementary and not in derogation of the mandate of the

provisions in the NGT Act.

72. Undoubtedly facts in this case are that despite the direction of

Hon’ble Supreme Court to ensure clean air and improve the

Ambient Air Quality in Delhi and NCR, the State Machinery has

failed. It is evident that the Central Government and State

39
 Administration failed to take such steps as are necessary

including examining the ill effect on the environment by use of

diesel vehicles which are old and have impacted the air quality

adversely, though the provision in Section 59 conferred

discretion on the Central Government to specify age it has

failed to exercise such power. The circumstances and the

relevant material data relating to consequences resulting from

the degradation in ambient air quality necessitated action by

this Tribunal.

73. Though it was urged right to property guaranteed by the

Constitution cannot be infringed by the order of the Tribunal, it

is necessary to record that the right to property guaranteed is

not an ambulate and subject to reasonable bal restriction as

provided by Article 300 A of the Constitution of India. The said

right is subject to reasonable restrictions under law either by

legislative power or by legally permissible process of law.

Similarly, the right guaranteed by under Article 19 (1) (g) is also

subject to reasonable restrictions as envisaged under Article 19

(6) of the Constitution of India. This opinion finds support by

catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the other

constitutional Courts thereby rendering the order passed by

this Tribunal on 7th April, 2015 fully sustainable. To aid further

we have the decisions of the Apex Court vide order dated 5th

April, 2002 in the case of M.C. Mehta and the decision of the

Divisional Bench of Karnataka High Court, which declare

enactment dealing with environment have over riding effect on

40
 the Motor Vehicle Act. Therefore the question posed regarding

jurisdiction of this Tribunal has to be answered in negative.

74. We affirmatively hold that provision of Motor Vehicle Act and

such other enactments are subject to Environment Protection

Act as the provisions of enactments dealing with environment

are in furtherance to protecting right to life guaranteed by

Article 21 of the Constitution.

75. The Environment (Protection) Act came into force with effect

from 23rd May, 1986. Section 5 of the Act begins with non

abetante clause “notwithstanding anything contained in any

other laws but subject to the provisions of this Act, the Central

Government may in exercise of its powers and performance of

its functions under this Act, issue directions to any person,

officer or authority and such person, officer or authority shall

be bound to comply with such directions. Therefore, it is very

clear the power conferred on Central Government to issue any

direction to any person or authority in the matter relating to

environment has an overriding effect on the other enactments

and in this context of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. Besides the

provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 the

provisions of Air (Control and Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1981

and Water (Control and Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1974 are

legislation which deals with environment and the provisions of

these enactments also have overriding effect on the provisions

of other enactments which includes Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

For instance the Air (Control and Prevention of Pollution) Act,

41
 1981 came into force 29th March, 1981. Section 17 defines the

functions of the Board and further empowers the Board- with a

view to ensuring that standards for emissions of air pollutants

from automobiles laid down by the State Board under clause (g)

of sub-section 1 of Section 17 is complied with the State

Government shall, in consultation with State Board, give such

instruction as deemed necessary to the concerned Authority

incharge of registration of Motor Vehicles and such Authority

shall not withstanding contained in the Act or rules.

Therefore, it could be seen that the main aim and object in

enacting the Air (Control and Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1981

to safeguard environments.

76. The resultant position is that this Tribunal has exclusive

jurisdiction to decide cases where substantial question relating

to environment arises including enforcement of any legal, where

such question arises out of implementation or regarding non

implementation of enactments specified in Schedule I and this

justifies issuance of directions by the Tribunal imposing

reasonable restriction on the right of person in relation to

vehicle or any property which is likely to infringe and adversely

affect the right to life guaranteed under Article 21.

77. Consequently, we hold that the directions issued by this

Tribunal on 18th July, 2016 and 20th July, 2016 are legal and

suffer from no legal infirmity or lack of jurisdiction.

42
 Contentions to the contrary urged in this regard are therefore

discounted.

78. The Tribunal has assigned sufficient reasons in order dated 7th

April, 2015 from which the orders dated 18th July, 2016 and

20th July, 2016 have resulted and have stood the test of judicial

review by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in exercise of its statutory

power of Appeal. Thus in no circumstances the orders in

question are assailable.

79. Before be part we would refer, in brief the fact situation and

the circumstances in which the order in question was passed

by this Tribunal. It is as follows:

a. Despite directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, State and

Central Government had failed to act and take steps to

improve the ambient air quality in the country and

particularly, in the NCT Delhi and the capital states of the

Country.

b. The parameters of the ambient air quality remained

excessive. In the order dated 04th July, 2016 in Original

Application No. 179 of 2016 in the case of Mahendra Pandey

Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors, this Tribunal has noticed

that the excessive parameters in ambient air quality even

during implementation of the odd even period performed to

be more deteriorated than the one when the said restriction

was not inforce. As per the analysis report the average value

of PM 2.5 is higher during odd-even phase than pre odd-even

period. During the odd-even period it varied from 63 to 182

43
as against the pre odd-even when it which varied from 45 to

143. The parameters like PM10, NO2, SO2, CO and Ozone all

through the period were noticed to be higher than the pre

odd-even period ambient air quality. Thus, statistics

indicates the fact that the extent of pollution being caused by

vehicles was primarily by the old vehicles which substantially

contribute majorly to the air quality and therefore requires

measures to be initiated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was

seized of the similar issue in the case of M.C. Mehta. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of National Auto Fuel

Policy announced by the Government of India for

implementation of Bharat Stage norms for vehicular

emissions. The policy was based on the recommendations of

the Mashelkar Committee constituted in 2001which provided

nearly a road map for achieving vehicular emission norms

over a period of time and the corresponding of the fuel

requirement. The process of implementation of Bharat Stage

(BS Norms) was taken note of and directions were issued

concerning the registration of motor vehicles the first point

communicated dated 23rd March, 2005 issued by Ministry of

Shipping, Road Transport and Highways, Government of

India related to registration of vehicles from April, 2005. In

this context the introduction of BS-III compliant vehicles in

the cities of Delhi, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Mumbai, Pune

and Kolkata was undertaken however, the communications

clarified that only BS-III manufactured on or after 1st April,

44
2005 could be registered in these cities. But it permitted BS-

I and II compliant vehicles could be registered in the rest of

the areas of the States and in these cities for some time till

accumulated stock is exhausted. Further the Hon’ble

Supreme Court took note of the fact that the Office

Memorandum was issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Road

Transport and Highways, Government of India on 3rd March,

2005 apparently in response to the issue raised by EPCA

wherein though the intent is to have only BS-IV

manufactured after 1st April, 2017 but the inventory of old

vehicles manufactured by 31st March, 2017 would need to be

protected and registered. It was clarified that there is not bar

on sale or registration of vehicles produced prior to the

aforesaid and this was procedure to be followed when

country migrated to BS-II and BS-III emissions norms in

2001 and 2005. The Government issued subsequent

clarification in 2005 and 2010. The Hon’ble Supreme Court

took note of the standing committee’s 5th report to the Lok

Sabha secretariat in which it was observed as follows:

Greenhouse gases induced global warming and subsequent

climate change are some of the perils threatening the survival
of present day generation. The process of industrialization
and development has caused innumerable changes in global
climate. These climatic changes, which have occurred
principally through the burning of fossil fuels such as gasoline
and diesel in the transportation sector and automobile
industry have led to an increase in the concentration of green
house gases such as Carbon Dioxide, Methane, Nitrous Oxide
and Hydro Fluoro Carbons in the atmosphere, thus disrupting
the ecological and social systems across the globe.
1.2 The rapid growth in automobile industry and the
increasing number of vehicular pollution have become one of
the major causes in the phenomenal rise of air pollution in
India. Though air pollution is caused by several factors, the
dramatic rise in the vehicular emissions has compounded the
problem.
45
80. The contention on behalf of the Central Government was that

Central Government through its refineries had incurred an

expenditure of 30,000 crores to make available BS-IV fuel from

1st April, 2017 all over the country and this was in reaffirmation

of submission made on 5th January, 2016 that BS-IV fuel would

be available by 1st April, 2017.

81. The Hon’ble Supreme Court though took note of submission

but did not find favour to postpone but ban on the age of

vehicles which use diesel as fuel. Thus, by its Judgment dated

13th April, 2017 extracted below the Hon’ble Supreme Court

imposed complete ban:

“Accordingly, for detailed reasons that will follow, we direct that:

(a) On and from 1st April, 2017 such vehicles that are not
BS-IV compliant shall not be sold in India by any
maufcturer or dealer, that is to say that such vehicles
whether two wheeler, three wheeler, four wheeler or
commercial vehicles will not be sold in India by the
manufacturer or dealer on and from 1st April, 2017.

(b) All the vehicles registering authorities under the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988 are prohibited for registering such
vehicles on and from 1st April, 2017 that do not meet
BS-IV standards, except on proof that such a vehicle
has already been sold on or before 31st March, 2017.”

82. The applicant was duly represented and heard by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court before passing the said order. What has been

addressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court through the aforesaid

order and what this Tribunal has addressed through its order

dated 7th April, 2015 is the issue relating to deterioration of

ambient air quality consequent to which innocent life have been

lost and the disastrous effect of poor air quality was likely to

create divesting effect on the life of the people. It undoubtedly

46
 infringed right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of Constitution of

India. The Precautionary Principle which is salutary principle in

dealing with protection of environment is justifiable invoked by

the Tribunal as envisaged under Section 20 of National Green

Tribunal. It is now well settled that threat to environment is

threat to life. The right to life guaranteed by Constitution of

India and consequent threat to life. To avert and prevent the

danger of loss of life and its ill effect on the future generation all

concerned have to visualise and adopt means and methods and

take necessary measures to deal with the most unexpected

situation. This Tribunal by its order dated 7th April, 2015 and

subsequent directions dated 18th July, 2015 and 20th July,

2016 has exactly done the same. Undisputedly, the applicant

(Central Government) had failed to substantiate before passing

of the order dated 7th April, 2015 that use of vehicles of more

than 10 years using diesel as fuel will not be detrimental to the

health of people and further failed to negate statistical

information that the PM level in vehicular emissions consequent

to diesel as fuel was scientifically proved to be carcinogenic

leading to fatality and undetectable set back in health

shortening the life span and render the living being particularly

the human being and infant physically infirm and victim of poor

health.

83. Besides the above, legal and technical aspects on which we

hold the applications are not maintainable we have

dispassionately examined each factual aspect and other

47
 grounds canvassed by Learned Counsel Ms. Pinki Anand and

Harvinder Sekhon and find no merit to accept it as sufficient

ground to interfere with our orders.

84. For the above said reasons assigned by us M.A. No. 567 of

2016 and 1220 of 2016 are rejected with no order as to cost.

Justice Swatanter Kumar

Chairperson

Justice Dr.Jawad Rahim

Judicial Member

Justice Raghuvendra S. Rathore

Judicial Member

Mr. Bikram Singh Sajwan

Expert Member

48