ZACHAR / FOLK TAXONOMIES SHOULD NOT HAVE ESSENCES, EITHER ■ 191

Folk Taxonomies
Should Not Have
Essences, Either:
A Response to the
Commentary
Peter Zachar

I
n my article, I presented an epistemological not organized in terms of natural kinds; that is,
argument for thinking about psychiatric dis things do not have real essences (Dupré 1993).
orders as practical kinds rather than natural According to this argument, essentialism derives
kinds by claiming that scientific thinkers are en- from the idiosyncracies of human psychology.
couraged by the scientific enterprise to adopt In their very interesting and important re-
epistemological fallibilism. In other words, sci- sponse (2000), which has implications that go
entists should be open to the possibility that their far beyond my article, Elizabeth Flanagan and
current models could be replaced (and even elim- Roger Blashfield cite research in developmental
inated) by better models. The problem with the psychology that pertains to the issue of essential-
natural-kind model is that it biases thinkers to ism and scientific conceptualization. According
believe that they have discovered a final God’s- to developmental research, essentialism and the
eye view of their subject matter, encourages them classical category model are common sense mod-
to adopt beliefs about the fixed inherent struc- els. Gelman, Coley, and Gottfried (1994) show
ture of a category, and allows them to maintain that children adopt “the essentialist bias” with
that those beliefs are supposed to be true in all respect to the biological world by the time they
possible worlds. are four years old. Four-year-olds are intuitive
Although I am most comfortable with the Aristoteleans who assume that organisms have
epistemological argument, it is possible to make an internal essence. This essence makes organ-
an even stronger ontological argument against isms be what they are and behave as they do.
natural kinds. This argument would suggest that This bias appears to be somewhat independent
not only does adopting the scientific attitude of parental instruction. Atran (1994) shows that
encourage us to avoid thinking about the world the essentialist bias is maintained into adulthood
in terms of natural kinds, scientific research indi- and exists across cultures. This bias is also in-
cates that there are no such things as natural tractable, meaning that it is adopted so early and
kinds. In this view, the last 150 years of scientific generalizes so easily that evidence against it has
research has taught us that the world is simply limited impact on how people think.

© 2001 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

What Flanagan and Blashfield do not mention revolves around the sun, even though at one time
is that modern science has helped us see that these were paradigmatic common-sense concepts.
essentialism is not as accurate as we are naturally Given my strong support of a levels-of-analy-
inclined to believe. Ernst Mayr (1988) even claims sis approach (chap. 6, 2000), I agree that it
that the essentialist bias is harmful because it can would be useful to think of psychiatric disorders
impede scientific progress. In Mayr’s view, essen- with respect to what Flanagan and Blashfield call
tialistic assumptions about species made it diffi- a hierarchical folk taxonomy, but I do not be-
cult for people to accept Darwin’s explanation of lieve that we should accept all the baggage asso-
the origin of species. From a philosophy of sci- ciated with folk taxonomies—especially the bag-
ence standpoint, it is likely that scientists in all gage of essentialism. Anyone who is willing to
areas of study, like anyone else, are initially in- attribute truth to Darwin’s theory of evolution
clined to think about their subject matter essen- by natural selection cannot comfortably believe
tialistically, but as they gain expertise in their that the species level of organization should be
chosen field, they begin to see that the world is conceptualized essentialistically, at least not since
more complex than the common-sense essential- the evolutionary synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s.
istic model suggests. Ask a physicist what an It may be natural for us to think essentialistically
element is, ask a geneticist what a gene is, ask a about the species level, and it may be difficult to
zoologist what a species is, and they may provide learn to see that level of organization non-essen-
an essentialistic answer because that answer is tialistically, but according to post-synthesis evo-
easier to understand, but they will also add that, lutionary theory, we should be willing to learn to
in truth, what they just said is a simplification see things differently. If this is true for the species
and reality is much more complex. level of organization in a biological taxonomy, it
In my view, philosophical analysis can make may also be true for the species level of organiza-
an important contribution to our understanding tion in a psychiatric taxonomy.
of the relationship between scientific taxonomies The question is, could psychologists and psy-
and folk taxonomies, and I analyze the relation- chiatrists become more intuitive anti-essential-
ship between folk or common-sense concepts ists with respect to psychiatric disorders? Evolu-
and scientific concepts in Psychological Concepts tionists such as Cosmides and Tooby (1994) have
and Biological Psychiatry (chap. 4, 2000). In the pointed out that our natural cognitive architec-
conventional story, science is opposed to com- ture, which may include the essentialist bias, did
mon sense. For example, according to physicists, not evolve in order to solve the kinds of prob-
a common sense “solid” object such as an oak lems that emerge in scientific research programs.
table is mostly empty space. The object is not Because it is so natural to us, the classical catego-
really solid. It just appears solid. Some thinkers ry model is easier to adopt, and anti-essentialism
in philosophy have used examples such as this to is counterintuitive. However, learning to become
declare that there is a rigid distinction between a scientifically informed expert often includes
scientific concepts and common sense concepts. integrating counterintuitive propositions into
A temporary opposition between certain scientif- one’s working model of the domain in question.
ic concepts and certain common-sense concepts, The wonderful thing about brain plasticity is
however, does not demonstrate that there is a that we can learn to use new heuristics, so what
permanent opposition between science and com- was once counterintuitive can become part of our
mon sense. The reason for rejecting the perma- working framework. What I tried to suggest in my
nent opposition thesis is that common-sense con- article is that psychiatry and clinical and counsel-
cepts can be rather plastic. Scientific thinking ing psychology would be better off if their practi-
tends to be incorporated into common sense over tioners reconfigured their common-sense assump-
time. For example, today it would be nonsensical tions and learned to conceptualize psychiatric
to believe that the world is flat or that the earth disorders anti-essentialistically, as practical kinds.
 ZACHAR / FOLK TAXONOMIES SHOULD NOT HAVE ESSENCES, EITHER ■ 193

Elizabeth Flanagan and Roger Blashfield make someone is mentally retarded is a false claim.
an interesting point with respect to the utilitari- With a cut-off of 70, we are not carving nature at
an-intellectualist debate in anthropology, and I the joints, but that does not mean that the rules
would also like to clarify my position with re- for deciding who and who is not mentally retard-
spect to that debate. Obviously since I wrote the ed are arbitrary. For example, why pick 70 rath-
article from a pragmatist’s viewpoint, I am sym- er than 105? That is not an arbitrary distinction.
pathetic to utilitarianism. William James dedi- It is not random. Even the distinction between
cated Pragmatism (1907) to John Stuart Mill, a 69 and 70 is not random. There are practical
famous utilitarian, and Mill’s (1859) On Liberty reasons for making the cut-off at 70; for exam-
contains one of Western philosophy’s most com- ple, 70 is two standard deviations below the
pelling defenses of epistemological fallibilism. mean. Wakefield (1999) makes a similar point
On the ontological question, my inclinations with respect to the “symptoms present for at
lie with Ian Hacking (1995, 1999), who does not least one month” criterion for PTSD. The one-
believe that adopting nominalism requires one to month duration criterion clearly does not carve
be an anti-realist with respect to categories. For nature at the joints, but there are pragmatic rea-
this reason, I do not think that the practical sons for picking one month—it is not just an
kinds model should be placed in the same logical arbitrary number.
space as the space occupied by those thinkers Although in my article I suggested that the
who believe that psychiatric disorders are arbi- practical-kinds model is not nominalistic, what I
trary or artificial kinds.1 should have said is that its nominalism is not of
The use of the word arbitrary often assumes the anti-realist variety. With respect to the medi-
the essentialist bias. For example, using the es- eval problem of universals, where the question is
sentialist bias, thinkers may believe that depres- “do essences exist?,” nominalism is an anti-real-
sion exists only if it has a fixed internal essence ist position because it claims that essences do not
that necessarily and sufficiently makes it be the exist. With respect to classification, nominalism
kind of state that it is. Like proponents of the is the claim that our categories do not have fixed
Big-five model, they are willing to believe that inherent essences that make them be what they
cross-cultural consistency in use of the depres- are. That kind of nominalism leaves open the
sion category confirms that it really exists, and question of whether or not the categories can be
since it really exists, it must have an essence. said to exist.
According to this logic, the category of depres- I would go even further than Flanagan and
sion is therefore non-arbitrary—as opposed to Blashfield in stating that the practical kinds model
social constructions such as conversion hysteria will not provide clinicians answers to gritty em-
or dissociative personality disorder which are pirical questions such as: “Does this person have
not “really real.” I think this logic is awkward schizophrenia? How should I treat them? Or,
and invite readers interested in this issue to look should insurance companies have to pay for this
carefully at Hacking’s (1995) persuasive argu- treatment? Furthermore, the practical-kinds mod-
ments that (a) dissociative identity disorder as el is not meant to define explicitly what we might
we know it today came into existence in the last mean by “psychiatric disorder”; rather, it sets up
100 years, (b) that its construction is partly at- some parameters for thinking about these and
tributable to the mental health profession, and other relevant questions.
(c) that it really exists. I do believe that the practical kinds model
The practical-kinds model suggests that the may have at least prima facie heuristic value for
term arbitrary has a limited use in psychiatric the social constructionist research program sug-
taxonometrics. To illustrate with respect to cut- gested by Flanagan and Blashfield. For example,
off points, the claim that an IQ score of 70 is an it might be interesting to investigate the internal
arbitrary cut-off for deciding whether or not (scientific) factors and external (cultural and his-
194 ■ PPP / VOL. 7, NO. 3 / SEPTEMBER 2000

torical) factors that lead thinkers both to at- S. A. Gelman, 316–40. New York: Cambridge Uni-
tribute utility to specific kinds of categories and versity Press.
to decide what counts as utilitarian from one Cosmides, L., and J. Tooby. 1994. Origins of domain
specificity: The evolution of functional organiza-
generation to the next.
tion. In Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in
On re-reading my article, which I initially cognition and culture, ed. L. A. Hirschfeld and S.
wrote several years ago, I find that some of the A. Gelman, 85–116. New York: Cambridge Uni-
sections meander too much for my comfort, sug- versity Press.
gesting to me that the model needs work. If I or Dupré, J. 1993. The disorder of things. Cambridge:
someone else can make the practical kinds model Harvard University Press.
intuitively plausible, and psychologists and psy- Flanagan, E., and Blashfield, R. K. 2000. Essentialism
and a folk taxonomic approach to the classifica-
chiatrists begin thinking about psychiatric disor-
tion of psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry,
ders as practical kinds, several more conven- and Psychology 7.3:183–89.
tional empirical questions would arise, such as Gelman, S. A., J. D. Coley, and G. M. Gottfried.
determining which of the diagnostic categories in 1994. Essentialist beliefs in children: The acquisi-
use have high utility and experimenting with tions of concepts and theories. In Mapping the
new categories that may have even better utility. mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture,
The goals of taxonometric research would be to ed. L. A. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman, 341–65.
develop practical kinds that have high utility. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. 1995. Rewriting the soul: Multiple per-
Traditionally, psychologists have defined utility sonality and the sciences of memory. Princeton:
with respect to psychometric properties such as Princeton University Press.
reliability and validity, and physicians have de- ———. 1999. The social construction of what? Cam-
fined utility with respect to the availability of bridge: Harvard University Press.
etiologically based treatments. Integral to this James, W. [1907] 1978. Pragmatism: A new name for
program would be having a more sophisticated some old ways of thinking. Cambridge: Harvard
understanding of utility, so there would be some- University Press.
Lilienfeld, S. O., and L. Marino. 1999. Essentialism
thing for philosophers to do as well.
revisited: Evolutionary theory and the concept of
mental disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
Note 108:400–411.
1. I have some sympathy for the analysis of Lilien- Mayr, E. 1988. Toward a new philosophy of biology:
feld and Marino (1999), but like many thinkers with Observations of an evolutionist. Cambridge: Har-
University of Minnesota pedigrees, they are subject to vard University Press.
the ironically anti-Popperian belief that both Truth and Mill, J. S. [1859] 1989. On liberty. Cambridge: Cam-
nature’s joints are necessary for something’s being “Sci- bridge University Press.
entific.” Wakefield, J. C. 1999. Evolutionary versus prototype
analyses of the concept of disorder. Journal of
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