In re LUIS B.

TAGORDA
G.R. No. 32329, March 23, 1929

DOCTRINE
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension that should be
distinctly understood.

FACTS
Luis B. Tagorda admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card listing his services
as a notary public and his services as a lawyer. The card also states that one can come or write him in his
town, that he offers free consultation, and that he is willing to help and serve the poor. Respondent also
admits the he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of the barrio in his home municipality, asking his
suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general, before his induction into office of
the Provincial Board. In the same letter, respondent also made mention of his legal profession as a lawyer
and notary public, his legal services and availability, and requested the lieutenant to transmit the said
information to his barrio people in any of his meetings or social gatherings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tagorda’s solicitation would be a ground of his disbarment

HELD:
No. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension that should be
distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and canons. The commission of offenses of this
nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as of the respondent there are, first,
his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience
mistake in the future.

Respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the
period of one month.

Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie

DOCTRINE
An alien law firm cannot practice law in the Philippines

FACTS:
In a letter, respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the
names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products
International, Inc. H.E. Gabriel, a client. Complainant Attorney Adriano E. Dacanay, in his reply dated
December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel and requested that he be informed whether
the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie and if not questioned the purpose of using the letterhead of
another law office. Having received no reply, complainant filed a complaint seeking to enjoying Juan G.
Collas and nine other lawyers from practising under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in
Illinois.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents should be enjoined from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie,
a law firm organized in Illinois.

HELD:
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a
professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities
around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm
name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents'
memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here.

Uy v. Dizon-Capulong
A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, April 7, 1993

DOCTRINE
A judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. If the judge is already aware
of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying them, otherwise such omission can never
be excused.

FACTS:
Respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong is charged with gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law
and grave misconduct in a complaint filed by spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, relative to a special
proceedings for settlement of the estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco.

In their complaint, the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy claim that despite the Decision of the Court of
Appeals and the pendency of the petition for review by way of certiorari before this Court, respondent
Judge continued issuing various orders resulting in the issuance of new titles to the properties in the name
of persons stated in the project of partition, to the damage and prejudice of complainants.

Complainants further contend that even after this Court had affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings concerning the ownership of the
properties, respondent Judge still, in an attempt to defeat the proscription imposed by higher judicial
authority, issued, orders approving the sale of the properties to the further prejudice of complainants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct.

HELD:
Yes. A judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. If the judge is already
aware of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying them, otherwise such omission can
never be excused.

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In cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of a party and without
affording them due process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and
promote the administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to
act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the
Decision of the Court of Appeals which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants. This utter
disrespect for the judgment of a higher court constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the
public, the bench and the bar.

Moreover, the total disregard by respondent Judge of Our Resolution of 8 March 1991 cannot be condoned.
Therein, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring her to have exceeded her jurisdiction in
cancelling the titles of complainants. Nonetheless, respondent Judge chose not to heed our
pronouncement. She issued two (2) more orders approving the sale to other persons of the remaining
properties which were titled in the name of complainants.

We consider this willful disobedience and continued disregard of Our Resolution as grave and serious
misconduct. Indeed, respondent Judge displayed open defiance to Our authority and utterly failed to show
proper respect for, and due and needed cooperativeness with resolutions of this Court.

Omar Ali vs. Atty. Mosib Bubong

DOCTRINE
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined
the government service.

FACTS:
A verified petition for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been
found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. The
disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against
respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of the Baudali Datus who were relatives of repondent; and manipulating the
criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government.

HELD:
Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has
joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the
conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks."
Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as
a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be

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disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath as a member of the legal
profession.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the
intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

Suarez vs. Platon

DOCTRINE
Under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce
the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he should be exculpated.

FACTS:
Lieutenant Orais arrested Attorney Suarez for the alleged offense of uttering seditious words. He filed an
information against Attorney Suarez for uttering seditious words. On the day following, Lieutenant Orais,
acting under the instruction of his superior, moved for the dismissal of the case. Thereafter, the deputy
provincial fiscal of Tayabas, at the instance of Attorney Suarez, filed an information against Lieutenant Orais
and Damian Jimenez for the crime of arbitrary detention.

Respondent Judge Servillano Platon was appointed to preside over the said criminal case. Respondent
judge, after consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted in the case, reconsidered the court's order
and dismissed the case, holding that the evidence was insufficient to convict the accused of the crime
charged. From this order, the petitioner herein appealed to this Court but was dismissed.

Thereafter, an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. Suarez with this
court, to compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. 6426 of the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas so that the case may proceed to trial in the ordinary course.

ISSUE:
Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued?

HELD:
Considering all the circumstances, we cannot say that Judge S. P., in granting the motion for the dismissal of
the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant O and the justice of the peace of Lopez, abused his
discretion so flagrantly as to justify, in the interest of justice, a departure from the well-settled rule that an
inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot
be controlled by mandamus. This is especially true in a matter involving the examination of evidence and
the decision of questions of law and fact, since such duty is not ministerial.

Upon the other hand, it should be observed that in the case of Lieutenant O, in the face of the
circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the provincial fiscal of
Tayabas, which facts and circumstances must have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by
the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the arrest effected by Lieutenant O cannot
be said to have been entirely unjustified. If, "under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the
orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he

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should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers
through a fear of themselves violating the law.

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al.

DOCTRINE
"matter" is any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

FACTS:
The General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financialdifficulties. The Central Bank issued
a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was
held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General EstelitoMendoza filed a petition
with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated
by RA 265.

After EDSA Revolution I, Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former PresMarcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al.
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of
their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et.
al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify
respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that
Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et.al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the
prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."
1. Whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
included within the concept of “matter” under Rule 6.03.
2. Whether the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial.
HELD:

1. "matter" is any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a
particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
"matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is
"advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the

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 petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act
of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in
Republic Act No. 265, section 29.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may,
the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

2. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has
to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is
arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed,
the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early
termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in
the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist
the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is
not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims
of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that
of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.