The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924

THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT IN INDIA
1919-1924
VERHANDELINGEN
VAN HET KONINKLIJK INSTITUUT
VOOR T AAL-, LAND- EN VOLKENKUNDE
62
THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

IN INDIA
1919-1924
A. C. NIEMEIJER
THE HAGUE - MAR TINUS NIJHOFF 1972

I.S.B.N.90.247.1334.X
PREFACE
The first incentive to write this book originated from a post-graduate

course in Asian history which the University of Amsterdam organized
in 1966. I am happy to acknowledge that the university where I received
my training in the period from 1933 to 1940 also provided the stimulus
for its final completion.
I am greatly indebted to the personal interest taken in my studies by
professor Dr. W. F. Wertheim and Dr. J. M. Pluvier. Without their
encouragement, their critical observations and their advice the result
would certainly have been of less value than it may be now. The same
applies to Mrs. Dr. S. C. L. Vreede-de Stuers, who was prevented only
by ill-health from playing a more active role in the last phase of
preparation of this thesis. I am also grateful to professor Dr. G. F. Pijper
who was kind enough to read the second chapter of my book and gave
me valuable advice.
Beside this personal and scholarly help I am indebted for assistance
of a more technical character to the staff of the India Office Library
and the India Office Records, and also to the staff of the Public Record
Office, who were invariably kind and helpful in guiding a foreigner
through the intricacies of their libraries and archives.
1 also remember with gratitude Miss M. D. Wainwright of the London
School of Oriental and African Studies, who was the first to advise me
in these matters. The staff of the library of the Technological University
at Eindhoven was kind enough to facilitate my contacts with British
libraries. Finally my thanks are due to Mrs. L. F. Richards for correcting
my English manuscript, and to professor Dr. A. L. Vos for his readiness
to supervise her work.
I am most grateful to the "Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en
Volkenkunde" for its willingness to publish my book as one of its "Ver-
handelingen", and to the Foundation "Oosters Instituut" for subsidizing
th is publication. My thanks are also due to the Netherlands Foundation
VI THE KHILAFAT MOVE MENT IN INDIA
for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) which gave me

a grant and thereby made possible my research in London.
Secondly, I should like to say something about the nature of this

book and my object in writing it. Having become interested in Hindu-
Muslim relations as a factor in the Indo-Pakistan issue, I found my
attention drawn to the Khilafat movement in pre-partition India, since
it was instrumental in bringing the two communities together for a short
period. I was thus confronted with the question: what was the Khilafat
movement? I did not find a very clear answer in the current literature.
There are many books devoting a few pages, sometimes even a chapter,
to the Khilafat movement, but none of these is quite explicit about its
background and its importance for Indian Muslims. I set about finding
an answer to these questions myself, and the result is presented in this
book. But because my interest was focused on Hindu-Muslims relations,
my research covers only the period up to the time when the Khilafat
question ceased to be an issue in Indian politics.
Another point is that every student of a subject of Indian history
who conducts his study and research in Europe accepts, by that very
fact, certain limitations, as he is not able to consult archives in India
and Pakistan. In my own case there was also a personallimitation, since
I do not know any Indian languages. On the other hand, the London
archives contain a wealth of material, and many Indians who played a
role of some importance in the history of their country or took an interest
in events, wrote and published their views in English, and this compen-
sated, to some extent at least, for these limitations. But this does not
alter the fact that my study can by no means pretend to be exhaustive;
it cannot be more than a contribution to the study of a subject on which
other historians will be able to throw more light.
A special problem was constituted by the orthography of Oriental
words and proper names. Not being an Orientalist I did not want to
make a false pretence of leaming by borrowing an orthography that
would meet all scholarly requirements; I preferred to adopt a simple
system which has proved its practical usefulness. This I found in the
system used by Sir Percival Spear in the third edition of the Oxford
History of India, which generally consists in the Hunterian system of
spelling but without making use of diacritical marks.
Unpublished materials from the India Office Library and the India
Office Records transcribed in this book, and also transcripts of Crown-
PREFACE VII
copyright records in the Public Record Office, appear by permission

of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
There is one more person I wish to thank: my wife, who encouraged

me to take up these studies and ungrudgingly left me to them for so
many evenings, week-ends and holidays when I might have been with
her and my family.
Eindhoven, January 1972 A. C. NIEMEIJER

CONTENTS
page
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V
I Some Genera! Aspects of Nationalism in India . . . 1
11 Nationalism and Pan-Islamism in 19th-Century India . 22
111 Towards a Hindu-Muslim Entente . . . . . . 49
IV The Khilafat Movement - its Start and Organization 69
V Action . . . . 99
VI Crisis .... 126
VII The Second Blow 144
VIII Evaluation . 164
Samenvatting (Summary in the Dutch language) 179
Notes. . . 185
Abbreviations 252
Bibliography 253
Index. . . 259
CHAPTER I
SaME GENERAL ASPECTS OF NATIONALISM

IN INDIA
Nationalism is generally acknowledged to be one of the great driving

forces - perhaps even the most powerful of them - in modern history.
This statement will probably not meet with much opposition, but it
might very weU evoke a polite question as to its precise meaning, or
even the blunt comment that it has no meaning at all. The problem
is that no concise and acceptable definition of the concept of nationalism
has been formulated thus far, notwithstanding the fact that a good many
historians, and political theorists as weU as practitioners, have attempted
to find one. 1 Probably no definition combining conciseness with relevancy
is possible in the case of a concept which, in common parlance, covers
such disparate phenomena as the nationalism of revolutionary France
about 1800, Italian nationalism about 1860, Indian nationalism about
the beginning of our century, Russian nationalism in the era of Stalin,
and African nationalism at present. For that reason, any general defini-
tion is apt to be lacking in substance, like this one quoted from H. Kohn,
a well-known authority on the subject: "Nationalism is the state of
mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individu al is felt to be due
to the nation-state." 11 Apart from containing the word "nation", badly
in need of definition itself if this definition of nationalism is to be of
any use, this sentence does not convey very much. But this is a fact
of which Kohn is well aware: his definition is not a conclusion, but
only a starting-point for further argument.
But luckily we are not obliged to solve all the problems arising here.
We are not primarily interested in nationalism as a general concept,
but with its concrete shape in the Indian environment. Therefore, we
will feel free to use the term "Indian nationalism" if we are able to
make clear what we mean by it. In other words: we think we may be
content with a very vague definition of nationalism if we are able
to point out the special features of Indian nationalism as we see it.
THE KHILAFAT MOVE MENT IN INDIA
2
We might start from the truism that nationalism is a kind of group

loyalty. But, like every truism, this one, too, poses more questions than
it answers. What exactly is the group involved? And has the loyalty it
commands any special qualities when compared with other loyalties?
The group involved is, of course, the nation, but then, what is a
nation? To this question, there are two kinds of answer, an "objective"
one, defining the nation by more or less outward qualities like the
possession of a territory, of a common language, culture, religion, history,
and so on, and a "subjective" one, stressing the consciousness of a group
that it is constituting a nation because its members wish to do so. In
the first case, the nation is mainly looking backwards for its legitimation.
This attitude suited many European nations which in the 19th century
already existed as fairly homogeneous groups - we are thinking of the
Germans, the Italians, the Hungarians for instance. With them, nation-
alism was an attempt to make the boundaries of the state and those
of the nation coincide. 3 In the second case, however, it is the future
which has to prove the nation's right to exist. This attitude had to be
assumed by many recently acknowledged Asian (and African) nations
made up of rather heterogeneous components, which had been brought
together by foreign domination and were united mainly by the urge
to get rid of it.
In the Indian context, the possibility of these different approaches
is important because the choice between them, to some extent, de ter-
mines whether further analysis will result in one or two (or even more)
nations in India - the "two-nation theory" justifying the demand for
Pakistan was based partly upon the "subjective" theory of the nation.
Therefore, it is not surprising that an adversary of the partition of
India, like A. R. Desai, bases his view on the "objective" theory; he
caUs the Muslim community in pre-partition India "a socio-religious
group", or a "minority", and not a nation because it did not have a
territory of its own, nor a language or an economy which it did not
share with non-Muslim Indians. 4 On the other hand, to a partisan
of Pakistan, like K. K. Aziz, "the first and most prominent" of the
conditions or beliefs making up nationalism is "the common group
feeling which inspires the members of a nation." 5 Several modern
theorists show a tendency to lean towards the latter point of view. One
of them is Kedourie, considering nationalism in the last resort as an
act of the will; 6 another is R. Emerson, writing: "The simplest state-
ment that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people
who feel that they are a nation ; and it may be that when aU the fine-
I. SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF NATIONALISM 3
spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as weIl." 7

Nor could it be contended that these theories are made up to accomodate
the Pakistanis or some other of the "young" nations who recently
claimed their place in the international community; they go back to,
at least, Ernest Renan who, as early as 1882 already, wrote that "the
existence of a nation is a plebiscite of every day." 8 But it is the emer-
gence of Pakistan which, in our opinion, makes it difficult to deny
any relevance to the "subjective" theory when considering nationalism
in pre-partition India.
It is the subsequent history of Pakistan, however, which demonstrates
the restricted validity of the same theory. Evidently, the desire to con-
stitute a nation which is held together only by that desire and by a
common religion, does not provide the new nation with a very secure
basis for further development. Another way of putting this is that the
outward qualities stressed by the "objective" theory are most helpful
in creating the sense of belonging together required by the "subjective"
theory. But we should bear in mind that an imaginary possession of
these qualities may, to some degree, replace their real presence. An
imagined or invented common past may have the same effect as a
common past legitimated by historical research; myth may stand for
reality to a large extent. But it is very much open to question whether
a nation could do wholly without a basis in factual reality.
Possession of a territory is considered as the least dispensabie of these
outward qualities. Territory " ... is the only element, with the will of
the population itself, whose presence is generally considered as the sine
qua non of the realization of a nation." 9 The reason - or one reason,
at least - might be that a territory is necessary for the establishment
of a state, which is the political self-expression of a nation. The doctrine
of nationalism, as Kedourie expounds it, "divides humanity into separate
and distinct nations, claims that such nations must constitute sovereign
states, and asserts that the members of a nation reach freedom and
fulfilment by cultivating the peculiar identity of their own nation and
by sinking their own persons in the greater whole of the nation." 10
It is this separateness of nations that makes it impossible for any of
them to accept being ruled by another nation. Nationalism can never
be a purely "national" matter; it is always, to some degree, setting off
the nation it is serving against other nations, or against foreigners. l l
Remarkably of ten it takes the form of a fight for freedom and indepen-
dence, and quite naturally so in the case of colonial peoples. Anti-
foreignism, notably anti-westernism, has been a clearly visible component
4 THE KHILAFAT MOVE MENT IN INDIA
in Indian nationalism since the days of Tilak at least. A drawback of

this tendency, however, is that the foreigner may become the scapegoat
for all evils besetting the nation. This too may be observed in the case
of Indian nationalism; not a few nationalist leaders told their followers,
and probably thought themselves, that poverty and internal strife would
cease once the British Raj was ousted from power. Anti-westernism, in
most colonial relationships, was intensified by racial antagonism, which
in India seems to have made itself felt, notably since about the year
1890, more strongly than before. l2
The concept of a nation as a separate identity with a character of
its own raises, for those who are becoming aware of this fact, the
question as to the nature of this identity. In plain words: when a man
realizes that he is an Indian and as such fundamentally different from
Englishmen, he will be inclined to ask himself what exactly it means
to be an Indian, or wherein his Indian-ness exists. It is only when some
progress on this road has been made that the fight for political indepen-
dence will make sense. Minogue describes nationalism as a three-stage
process, consisting of an initial stage of stirrings, characterized by the
search for acultural identity, a second stage marked by the struggle
for independence, and a third stage of national consolidation. l3 This
analysis of the process is quite appropriate, we think, in the case of
Indian nationalism. 14 Looking at it this way, we may call Rammohan
Roy, the founder of the Brahma Samaj movement, one of the first
Indian nationalists, representing the initial stage of nationalism.
This observation leads to another, to which we have already alluded
when comparing the two theories of nationalism: that nationalists are
of ten championing nations which do not - or not yet - exist, a problem
confronting nationalism notably in former colonies. l5 Many nationalists,
therefore, have declared themselves to be engaged in "nation-building";
in India we might cite the case of Gokhale, mentioning it as one of the
aims of his Servants of India Society.l6 The British often spoke slightingly
of Indian nationalists as "a microscopic minority" of the Indian people,
or even denied the existence of an Indian nation. In a sense they were
right, for early Indian nationalists were pleading the rights of the Indian
nation in a time when national consciousness had not yet spread among
the masses, and when they spoke about national rights, many of them
probably had in mind only the rights of their own limited group. But
it was not very statesmanlike to act upon the assumption that this
situation would remain the same for ever, because a people not con-
stituting a nation may become one.
Another aspect of the consciousness of a national identity is a sense

of national dignity. Finding their own identity was the only way for
colonial peoples to liberate themselves from the suffocating pressure
exerted upon them by the rulers' example, which always started from
the assumption that the rulers' civilization was a better one than that
of the "natives".u And the feeling of being second-rate subjects of a
foreign power is considered by Emerson to be one of the strongest
motivations of nationalism, far more important than any other kind
(1f oppression or exploitation. 18 In India this tendency is revealed by
Tilak, advocating "militancy - not mendicancy" in dealings with the
British rulers ; it was also one of the prominent incentives of Gandhi's
feelings and actions. Ris first full-time occupation with public work
was occasioned by a law against which he revolted because, as he wrote:
"It strikes at the root of our self-respect." 19
Thus far we have tried to establish some aspects characterizing the
concept of the nation, but it may he useful to ascertain as well what is
not a nation. We started from the statement that nationalism is a kind
of group loyalty - but there are groups other than the nation, also
commanding man's loyalty: the family, the tribe, the caste, the religious
community. In the context of our subject it is important to compare
the nation with the religious community, since nationalism and com-
munalism were riyal forces in the last half-century of British rule
in India.
W. C. Smith defines communalism in India lIO "as that ideology which
has emphasized as the sodal, political and economic unit the group of
adherents of each religion, and has emphasized the distinction, even
the antagonism, between such groups." lil We would like to adopt this
definition, though much is left unsaid by it. Smith follows it up with
the comment that no definition of communalism remains valid for
long, because the phenomenon is changing and developing; in the last
years - he refers to the period from about 1940 tot 1945 - it has
developed into something that might be better called "nationalism".
But unfortunately he does not make quite clear wherein this develop-
ment lies, a question to which we will come back later. The first
problem in our context, however, seems to be the growth of com-
munalism from about 1900, a growth all the more remarkable because,
on the face of it, it would seem that circumstances - foreign oppression
suffered by all Indians alike - were propitious for engendering a sense
of national unity. The explanation given by Smith for this phenomenon
may be outlined as follows: (a) the Muslim middle class was economic-
6 THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT IN INDIA
ally backward as compared with the Hindu middle class, and (b) the
British played off the upper and middle classes of one cornmunity against
those of the other. 22 This last part of his explanation actually means
that he is denying that all Indians were suffering alike. Apart from
British favouritism along cornmunal lines which certainly occurred, but,
in our opinion, was not quite as deliberate and consistent as Smith
represents it, we may think here about the colour bar. Even this, though
operative against all Indians, hampered mainly the westernized élite
in their social and economie aspirations, far more than it did the lower
classes. This may be one reason why nationalism originated among that
élite rather than among the masses.
The explanation Smith gives for the growth of cornmunalism is closely
bound up with the view he takes of the causes of communalism itself.
As such he enumerates "many and intricate factors: economie, religious,
psychologieal, and sa on." 23 But he makes it quite clear that from this
group he singles out economie circumstances as "the efficient cause",
whereas religion is "an accompanying factor." 24 This accompanying
factor, however, is apt to be put forward by cornmunal leaders or other
interested parties (like the British) as the main cause, concealing by
this means the real issue: "In fact ... communal riots have been isolated
instanees of class struggles fought in communal guise." 25
True, these contentions should not be taken in too narrow a sense;
in the course of his elaborate argument he introduces many reservations
and elucidations. So it is clear that by "class struggles" he understands
not only confliets between different classes, like peasants and land lords,
but also competition between various sections within the same class, for
instanee between the Muslim middle class and their Hindu counterparts.
And speaking about religion as an "accompanying factor", he adds:
"In emphasizing the fact that religion is not the efficient cause of
communal riots, we do not mean to deny that when it is an accom-
panying factor it is an exceedingly important one." 26 But all the same,
the tenor of his whole exposition with regard to the growth of com-
munalism is that - apart from the role the British played - economie
factors are by far the most important agents in the process. Here we
think the author is somewhat one-sided, and, as a consequence, is
underrating the part other factors may have played. 27 We consider
religion as one of these; as another, the changes in the structure and
distribution of political power in India. They were apt to he combined
because of the religious aspects of worldly power in Islamic thought. 28
Nevertheless, the analysis given by Smith may contain a good deal
of truth. In the case of any political or religious movement it is very

appropriate to ask: "Who is going to profit by it?", or: "Which result
would be the most profitable for the leaders?" It seems highly probable
that "the leadership of these movements, even though they assume an
idealistic terminology ... may weIl be in the hands of groups which
fight in the first place to oust and supplant those who, in the traditional
structure, had a monopoly of certain prominent functions." 29 These
suspicions may be confirmed by the observation that the purely religious
content of communalism tends to be somewhat meagre: religious prac-
tices, customs, rites, and ceremonies gain importance, at the cost of
genuine convictions and spiritual attitudes. 30 We may safely assume that
many members of the Muslim League were more concerned about
opportunities for the Muslim upper and middle classes than about the
interests of the Muslim community as a whole or about the future of
Islam. The same, however, does not quite apply to revivalist movements.
The Wahabi movement in India, though not communalist, prepared
the way for later communalism by stressing the values of pure Islam
as it saw them. 31 Pan-Islamism in India found its adherents among the
Deoband ulama as weIl as among members of the westernized middle
class; it was not communalist in itself, but it gave an impetus to com-
munal distinctions which could easily lead on to communalism. 32 On
the Hindu side, we may note the same effect with regard to the revivalist
movement of the Arya Samaj which, quite understandably, found its
following mainly in the Punjab, where the Hindus constituted a minority
population. 33 In these cases we see what Dumont calls "the separative
effect of revivalism." 34 Some leaders of these revivalist movements
probably were motivated by genuine religious feelings; we think this
is the case with at least some Khilafat leaders, like, for instance, the
Ali brothers. On the other hand, the revivalist movements may have
been used by politicalleaders who wanted to further their own worldly
interests or those of the group they belonged t~, but the following they
recruited by emphasizing religious values and distinctions might be
motivated by intentions other than those of the leaders. A process of
this kind is, to our opinion, very aptly illustrated by the ultimate
evolution of Muslim communalism in India. If this had not been, or
had not become, anything more than the expression of a class struggle
or of middle class competition, it would be difficult to explain the
religious character Muslim nationalism in India assumed about 1940,
and in this case the religious impulse came from the following rather
than from the leaders. 35 Whether this religious impulse was strong
enough to create a viabie "lslamic state" as Pakistan wanted to be is

another matter - but we think the impulse was a reality, something
more than a "guise". In other words, the following had given the
movement a content other than that which many of its leaders may
have wanted it to have.
Speaking about this development of communalism into nationalism
we must say something about the difference between the nation and
the community. In our opinion, an important point is their relationship
to political power. A nation is considering the state as its natural expres-
sion in the political field, which means that a nation is either wielding
sovereign power or is aspiring to do so. The religious community does
not, as a rule, assume the same attitude. In a multi-communal state,
like India was, the communities acknowledge the sovereign power of
the ruler; in pre-partition India this was either an Indian prince or the
British Raj. This situation influences their mutual relationship ; conflicts
between them are suppressed or settled by the sovereign power, and
therefore the communities live mostly in a condition of enforced or
voluntary compromise. Violence between them may occur, but is
considered reprehensible.
The mutual relationship between nations is not the same. There
is no authority above them. Nations with conflicting interests may
compromise if they think it opportune, but violence is an accepted
means of solving conflicts. The ultima ratio of the nation is war, or, in
the case of a nation under foreign domination, revolt; the use of violence
in the service of a nation is not looked upon as reprehensible, but as
perfectly legitimate or even laudable. 36 The fact that violence became
more and more accepted in intercommunal relations in the last decades
of pre-partition India might perhaps be interpreted in the sense that
the religious community was taking over the role of the nation, wanting
to establish itself as a state.
These considerations may, partly at least, explain why a change in
the structure and distribution of political power could not but influence
the character of Muslim communalism in India. 3T Under the arbitrary
rule of the princes in the pre-British period, and, thereafter, in those
Indian states whieh maintained their "independence" , communal con-
flicts could hardly manifest themselves. 38 When, in British India, princely
rule was replaced by the rule of law, one consequence was that economie
power became independent from political power; it was the middle
class of merchants and bankers, mainly Hindus, whieh profited by this
development, whereas the Muslim élite, whose position had been closely
eonnected with political power, lost its employment. The demand for
privileges from this side was a natural reaction which had not to be.
invented by the British. This was one cause of the growth of communalist
tension. Moreover, the British government, not wanting to interfere with
religious matters - certainly not after 1857 - did not do much to
suppress these tensions which, as a consequence, were able to come out
into the open. But the most radical change was coming when a demo-
cratie government along parliamentary lines came into the offing, at
first advocated only by Congress but, after the announcement of the
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 1917, aeeepted as the aim of govern-
ment poliey. The prince had been replaced by the law; now the making
of the law would - in a future which British officials hoped was very
remote, but which Indians tried to bring as near as possible - be put
in the hands of the Indians themselves.
But of which Indians? The Hindu upper and middle class, or the
Hindu upper caste? The Muslim upper and middle class, or the Muslim
religious leaders? Or an Indian upper and middle class, irrespective
of ereed or easte? These were the parties most likely to make a bid for
power, and the Muslim upper and middle class, being the weakest and
feeling unsafe, beeame intent on getting at least a share in sovereign
power. This made them want an independent state,3D and therefore
they had to eonstitute a separate nation. But they then had to enlist
the masses, and religion proved to be the most effeetive means to get
a hold over them, evidently beeause their Muslim identity eounted most
for them. By this process, however, the nature of the politieal aspirations
of the movement was also determined, to some extent at least: it beeame
tinged with religion. This is how, in our opinion, Muslim communalism
developed into Muslim nationalism.
The Khilafat movement probably did something to promote this
development. In the first plaee, it made Indian Muslims fully realize
what the loss of worldly power meant to them as Muslims; and, in the
seeond place, by their participation in this movement they got entangled
in international polities and therefore beeame aware that they had to
aet as the equals of other nations. This might have been, with regard
to the Khilafat question, within the framework of an Indian nation,
and many leaders, Hindu as weIl as Muslim, intended it to be so.
Nevertheless, the Khilafat movement remained largely a communal
movement; its failure furthered Muslim communalism, and, in its wake,
Indian Muslim nationalism.
On the other hand, we should realize that this whole development
did not present itself at the time as an unescapabie fate, predictabie

from the very beginning, since there were counteracting forces. Indian
nationalism, of which Congress was the main political exponent, was
perhaps the most effective of them. On the Muslim side, part of the
westernized middle class was willing to co-operate with Congress,
especially when, af ter about 1910, they got the impression that England
was an enemy of Islam; we are referring here to men like the Ali
brothers and Dr. Ansari. No less important was that the ulama - at
least those of the famous Deoband school - distrusted the middle class
communalist leaders and were not averse to co-operation with Con-
gress. 40 Eventually they accepted Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's theory
of composite nationalism, aiming at an integrated alliance between
Hindus and Muslims in an Indian nation, in which, however, both
communities would preserve their own identity.41 But these forces op-
posing communalism were, in the last resort, not able to carry the
Muslim masses with them.
Af ter this digression on communalism and some of the problems
related to it, we want to return to the concept of nationalism proper. We
have yet to say something on the kind of loyalty that the nation com-
mands. As we said before, nationalism as we see it is based upon the
assumption that humanity is divided into separate and distinct nations -
a division ordained and willed either by God or by Nature, or by both
of them. 42 The individual is seen solely as a part of the organic entity of
the nation. The nation, or the national state, takes on a quasi-religious
character, and the key-words referring to the relation between the
individual and the nation, or between the citizen and the national state,
are service and sacrifice.
National loyalty was called by Kohn the "supreme loyalty"; Emerson
writes about a loyalty "overriding the claims both of the lesser com-
munities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold
it within a still greater society, reaching ultimately to mankind as a
whoie." 43 Nationalism is always in favour of "desperate struggles" and
"heroic deeds", and often worships violence; it spurns "compromise" and
toleranee. It does fight for national freedom, but individual freedom
often fares badly when nationalism reaches its goa1. 44 The nation is an
imperious master; it is impatient of any rivals which might lay claim
to supreme loyalty themselves, such as the religious community, class,
or the individual conscienee.
This disdain for any compromise and this leaning towards sacrifice
and heroic struggles, condoning even political murder, are clearly to be
noted in Indian nationalism since about 1900 when the Extremists

in Congress and the terrorists in Maharashtra and Bengal came to the
fore. It is their rejection of compromise where the nation is concerned
which surely entitles them to the name of nationalists, whereas Moderate
leaders like Gokhale are sometimes considered as the exponents of
"patriotism" only.45 We do not agree with this latter view. A leader
like Gokhale, devoting his life to the reform of Indian society, which
meant for him at the same time an effort towards nation-building, may
be called a nationalist even if his nationalism had not yet fully devel-
oped. 46 If we want to distinguish between nationalism and patriotism
we should, in our opinion, primarily look out for the ideological back-
ground of the former, which is absent from the latter. We propose to
apply the term "patriotism" to a kind of group loyalty of a more
primitive and universal character, whereas nationalism, as we see it,
is based upon a particular set of ideas. 47 Patriotism, therefore, is easily
compatible with Islam, whereas to reconcile nationalism to Islam is
much more difficult. 48 Patriotism will of ten be one of the elements
contributing to the force of nationalism, and therefore it will of ten be
impossible to distinguish between them in historical reality - but
patriotism does not, by itself, constitute nationalism.
The same could be said of xenophobia or anti-foreignism which, like
patriotism, is a very common reaction in any group brought into contact
with other groups, and is not dependent upon any theory about these
groups. Like patriotism, xenophobia will often be one of the incitements
used by nationalism, but is not the same thing. Xenophobia is described
as a basic trait of Hindu society by Nirad C. Chaudhuri 49 and he even
writes about "xenophobian nationalism" already existing in India by
the year 1000 A.D., but we prefer to omit the term nationalism in that
case, because, from the examples quoted by him, it nowhere appears
that the concept of an Indian nation, in the modern sense of the word,
had been evolved by then.
The modern concept of the nation was introduced into India from
the West in the 19th century. The contents given to the structure were,
to a large extent, also of western origin. In this respect, two trends at
least may be discerned: (a) a liberal trend, emulating the example set
by the British national ideal, notabie for its stress on reverence for the
law, on individual Iiberty, and on the free consent of the governed as
the basis for government, and (b) a revolutionary trend, inspired by
Italian and lrish nationalism. The first trend determined the course
of the leaders of Congress in its first three decades; the second one is
to be found among the Extremist faction which constituted itself

about 1900. It is not surprising that the British rulers in India feIt
much more sympathy with the former than with the latter, and perhaps
not only because it was easier to keep in check, but also hecause it was
in conformity with what the British themselves thought possible or
desirabie in India, whereas they abhorred the revolutionary methods of
men like Parnell and Mazzini. 50
This liheral trend in Indian nationalism decidedly lost much of its
vigour and influence after the Surat split in Congress in 1907, the
occasion of its last complete victory. But it remained strong enough
to provide independent India with a democratie, parliamentary form of
government af ter the western model, working better - at least if we
judge it only according to its political merits - than in perhaps any
other of the colonies which acquired independenee after the Second
World War and tried to set up a government of this kind. But it would
be erroneous to depiet Indian nationalism as a movement borrowing
its orientation from the West only. Nationalism is always apt to look
to the past for inspiration - in the origins of a culture its identity is
most clearly visible, and moreover, by selecting a special part of the
past, one may select just those values one is in need of.
In the nation's history, Indian nationalism found Hinduism which,
from Rammohan Roy's days onwards, became one of the elements
moulding it. 51 This could he a reformist Hinduism like the Brahmo
Samaj's, but since the beginning of our century this has been superseded
by orthodox and revivalist varieties of Hinduism.
There is yet another way in which the impact of the West influenced
Indian nationalism: by making room for it. In the old, traditional
society no nationalism could come into being since the loyalties to the
family, the caste or the religious community were supreme; these loyal-
ties, moreover, were of ten regionally limited. The development of a
capitalist economy provoked new social mobility and gave rise to a new
middle class, while regional frontiers lost something of their former
irnportance. The security of having a traditionally assigned place in
society was lost by people whose lives were influenced by the social
mobility, and they sought for a new security, originating from a new
loyalty. Nationalism may thus be understood as a phenomenon of change
in the social order. 52 There can be little doubt that British trade and
British rule were largely instrumental in bringing about this change in
Indian society, but we should bear in mind that the Indian reaction
to this development was greatly influenced by Indian traditions, and
J. SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF NATJONALISM 13
that possibly the establishment of British rule only accelerated a process

which had already started entirely without its interference. 53 Nor should
we forget that it is not only a change in economic conditions which
may cause the feeling that the social fabric of life has become too
narrow and needs to be widened or even to be set on a wholly different
course. Rammohan Roy's own experiences with child marriage and
suttee probably suffice to account for his reforming zeal, and Shah
Wali-uIlah, in the early 18th century, was not moved by any stirrings
of early capitalism, but by the dilapidation of the Mughul Empire, for
which he sought a remedy by restoring the purity of Islam. 54
If we look upon nationalism as areaction to the extern al pressure
of western economic and political expansion - and this is certainly an
aspect of it in former colonies in general, as weIl as in India's case in
particular - we would see it as an indirect result of British rule. But
another view is also possible: the British may be seen as the rulers who
united India by providing it with modem means of communication
embracing the whole country, by providing it with a language in which
the westernized élite, i.e. the new nationalleaders, could exchange ideas,
by providing it with an administrative and political unity such as it had
hardly ever known before. It is a view held by many British authors,55
and it is not illogical when we consider the state of division characterizing
India when the British entered it, as compared with near-unity when
they left. Nor is it illogical when we consider the many dividing forces
still threatening India's national existence: "communalism, casteism and
linguism" are, in independent India, still denounced as the three threats
to unity.56 Both aspects of this situation are expressed by Amaury de
Riencourt in this way, writing about Indian nationalist leaders: "For-
getting, or wanting to forget, that the real unifying element in India
was precisely English culture, many leading Indians carelessly stimulated
the dividing forces that could tear India apart again; they awakened
all the dormant centrifugal forces that lay deep in India and had been
laid to rest by the unifying action of the British. They encouraged the
profound cultural cleavages th at split the Hindus from the Muslims ...
They alsa awakened the cultural separatism of the various provinces
by reviving the vernacular literatures ... " 5T
With regard to this opinion, same remarks seem to be called for.
First, that "the dormant centrifugal forces" may have been stimulated
not only by "leading Indians", but could also have profited by the
contact with British civilization and culture. Just as same Indian authors
are inclined to ascribe all evils in their country to British rule, in a
passage like the one quoted above there seems to prevail a tendency
to blame the Indians themselves for everything that went wrong during
the period of British rule. Secondly, we should not overestimate India's
lack of unity. At least three times in its long history, India reached
a stage of political unity nearly equalling that of the British period, and
up to the spring of 1947 there seemed to be a fair chance of avoiding
partition. But with respect to one of the dividing factors, linguism, we
should like to point out two facts which, in our opinion, are significant.
The first is that the nationalist movement increased the desire of
linguistic communities to be recognized as separate units. 5S To some
extent we may see here a parallel to the growth of communalism; one
not unimportant difference is th at, to our knowiedge, the British have
never been accused of having deliberately provoked linguistic discord.
And the second is that some of the remedies proposed in thernselves
testify to an essentiallack of unity: pleas were made both for accepting
a "basic Sanskrit" as the lingua franca for India,5o and for assuming
Urdu in that capacity.60
Resuming our argument, we state that some authors considered Indian
national unity as the direct, but unintentional, result of British rule. We
think there is some truth in this opinion, not contending, however, that
it contains the whole truth. But there is yet another way of looking at
it: the British may be seen as deliberate nation-builders. There is, indeed,
a continuous thread running through British-Indian history, at least
from the Mutiny onwards: the growth of representative and, af ter 1919,
of responsible government, training the Indians in a "civilized" way of
handling the country's government and enabling them at last to con-
stitute an independent national state. Naturally, this thesis is to be found
in the works of some British historians. 61 An obvious objection to it
would be that this thread - which is not an imaginary one - may be
eXplained in a quite different way: not as the product of deliberate
British intentions, but as a British reaction to a development the Govern-
ment of India had neither foreseen nor desired, to wit the growth of
Indian nationalism, which forced the government to grant concessions
time and again, however grudgingly.
We think there is some truth in this view too. The objection that it
seerns to be inconsistent to claim two opposite explanations as (partly)
correct, we should like to meet with the observation that British policy
towards India was not always consistent itself. It was a product of rather
heterogeneous forces and tendencies, the strength and character of which
could vary from moment to moment. British policy towards India was,
I. SOME GENERAL ASPEeTS OF NATIONALISM 15
therefore, not constant, nor could it be expected to be so when viceroys

of so different a political outlook and personality as Lord Ripon and
Lord CUI"Zon were, within less than twenty years, relieving each other
at the top of the Government of India.
So far we have discussed two possible explanations of the relation
between British rule in India on one side, and national unity and
nationalism in that country on the other. The latter, as we have seen,
are considered by some to be either the direct or the indirect result
of the former. But the opposite view is held as weil, as we have already
indicated in the previous paragraph. The British, it is then contended,
regarded national unity and nationalism as the gravest dangers to their
position in India and did their utmost to hamper their progress by a
policy of divide-and-rule. It is, by the way, possible to combine these
two views, though they seem to be mutually exclusive. British efforts
to thwart Indian nationalism might be eXplained away as attempts to
delay the advent of Indian national unity and independence until a time
when India would be ripe for it - for India's own good, so to speak.
This theory of a divide-and-rule policy could assume several shapes,
the most common of which are that the division took plaee along class
lines - the British favouring the landlords above the peasants, or the
haute bourgeoisie above the proletariat - or along communal lines, by
playing off Hindus and Muslims against each other. These proceedings
could also be combined, which is the interpretation of Nehru, writing:
"A new class, the owners of the land, appeared; a class created by, and
therefore to a large extent identified with, the British government. The
break-up of the old system created new problems, and probably the
beginnings of the new Hindu-Muslim problem can be traced to it." 6~
In the same context he spe aks about "the deliberate policy, pursued
throughout the period of British rule, of creating divisions among
Indians, of encouraging one group at the cost of the other. This poliey
was openly admitted in the early days of their rule, and indeed it was
a natural one for an imperial power. With the growth of the nationalist
movement, that policy took subtler and more dangerous forms, and
though denied, functioned more intensively than ever." 63 In the same
vein W. C. Smith writes that after a period of having held the Muslims
in disgrace, the India Office changed its attitude about 1870. But, he
continues, "The India Office did not abandon its communal policy.
It continued to play off the middle and upper classes of one community
against those of the other, and in fact has steadily intensified such tactics
ever since." 64 A psychological explanation is offered by Thornton,
arguing that Britsh sympathies in India were more with the Muslims
than with the Hindus and that therefore, whether by poliey or by
instinct, they were apt to side with the former against the latter. 65 But
the reproach could take much cruder forms. Not unfrequently one may
come across the charge that the British instigated Hindu-Muslim riots. 66
And this macchiavellism of the British could, in its turn, use more subtle
devices; Muhammad Ali writes about Hindu leaders displaying "religious
bigotry against Musulmans chiefly as the result of the deliberate mis-
education in the history of Moslem rule over India given by the
British Government." 67
But not only is there a variety of mechanisms seen to be at work in
this connection; it is also the direction of a divide-and-rule policy that
can be viewed in quite different ways. The aforementioned authors put
roughly the following construction upon events: after the Mutiny the
British distrusted the Muslims and consequently favoured the Hindus,
but when, after about 1870, nationalism reared its head among the
Hindus, the Muslims were restored to British favour, with the ultimate
result of partition in 1947. But the opposite view is defended by an
author like A. Aziz, who contends that af ter the Mutiny the Brahmins
were chosen by the British to act as their underlings, and to keep the
Muslims down. This policy was contined up to 1947; "Indian" natio-
nalism was invented and supported by the British as a boon for the
Brahmins, as by this device one hundred and fifty million people of the
old races - non-scheduled castes and aboriginals - were put under
the Brahmins' thumb. 66
Confronted with these rather sweeping statements of a somctimes
diametrically opposed character, we should watch our step before ac-
cepting too readily this theory as an interpretation of British rule in
India. On the other hand, a divide-and-rule policy seems to provide
so obvious a pattern of rule for a foreign conqueror trying to keep his
hold over a population showing a great deal of diversity, that it would
have been amazing if the British Raj in India had not made use of it.
But, if it was sa obvious, why then was it no longer openly admitted? 69
And, if no longer openly admitted, might it be expected to be continued
in fact? To get an answer to these questions, we think it advisable to
examine the concept of divide-and-rule more closely; thus we might get
same idea of the kind of relations it may explain.
A striking aspect of the theory, as it occurs in the historiography of
British rule in India, is the clearly deprecating sense in which it is used;
when mentioned, it is nearly always with a connotation of moral denun-
ClatlOn - it is something like a term of abuse. This meaning is not

necessarily implicit in it. When reading that Talleyrand in 1805 recom-
mended to Napoleon a policy which would drive a wedge between
Austria and Russia as weIl as between Russia and Great-Britain,70 we
do not think him a scoundrel because of it, but a shrewd statesman. 71
In foreign poli tics, nothing seems to be amiss with the maxim. In that
context, it is considered as an obvious expedient, and the more so since
an alliance between foreign enemies would be, just like the divide-and-
rule stratagem itself, an opportunistic move, recommending itself by a
temporary community of interests, but not by any higher principle.
It is only when higher principles are at stake that the divide-and-rule
policy acquires its repellent qualities, and these principles may concern
either the object of the division or the nature of the rule. To begin with
the last: we are not surprised when a despot adopts a policy of divide-
and-rule towards his subjects, because we assume the relation between
ruler and subject to be one of open or latent hostility; a despot has
always to be on his guard against rebellion. 72 In this, a despot's rule
is like foreign rule: there can be no identification between subjects
and ruler. But things are different with a more democratic kind of rule,
which needs the consent of the ruled, and where the principles of
representation, and responsibility of the government lessen the distance
between the government and the subjects. The opposition under a
democratic government has its own place: it will disagree with the
government on certain issues, but it can identify itself with the kind
of government and with the state it belongs tO. 73 The relation between
government and citizens is not that of "foreigners", as it is between
a despot and his subjects, and therefore a democratic government can
hardly "divide" the people it governs. It will, however, try to get as
large a following as possible by persuading people of the correctness
and efficacy of the policy it stands for, by implementing plans taking
the wind out of the opposition's sails, by putting as favourable an
interpretation as possible on the policies it realized thus far, and so on.
By these and similar means it will attempt to win over part of the op-
position, or groups which show a tendency to slide over to the opposition.
These proceedings may occasion rather bitter altercations between the
government and tbe opposition, but the ultimate aim should not be
looked upon as bringing about a "division" of the people by which
the government might ensure its stay in power. A government acting
in that way could not pretend to enjoy the consent of tbe people.
There is, of course, more to be said about this; we do not take into
account here class antagonisms within the people, but a democratic

government acts upon the assumption that these can be solved in a
satisfactory way, and, in a national state, they will indeed yield to the
interests of national unity.
This is bringing up the point we mentioned first in our discussion
of the circumstances conferring arepellent character on a divide-and-
rule policy: the object of the division. In the field of international
relations, a policy creating divisions is not disreputable because no
"sacred unity" is affected by it. In 16th century Europe, in the age
of the wars of religion, it was considered quite normal and not at all
ignominious when German princes sought the support of the King of
France against the German Emperor, or whcn Philip II of Spain backed
the Ligue in its struggle with Henry IV of France. Philip's meddling
with French affairs provoked some French patriotism, but he was never
accused of damaging French national unity, whieh is not surprising,
since the French state depended upon God, not upon the nation. 74 But
Napoleon's meddling with German affairs provoked Fichte's "Reden
an die deutsche Nation". When the nation is acknowledged as the
natural and God-willed division of mankind, and as the organic group
from whieh individuals derive their importance, any attempt to play
off groups belonging to the same nation against each other is thoroughly
reprehensible - it is a crime equal to lese-majesty in former ages.
The above is a very sketchy analysis of very complicated relationships,
but it allows us to draw some tentative conclusions. In the first place,
it explains why a divide-and-rule policy becomes "inadmissible" when
(a) it is put into practice upon a people who are in the process of
developing into a nation, conscious of its national identity and unity,
and (b) when the ruling power is trying, or is pretending to try, to
base its government upon more or less democratie principles. The
question remains whether these conditions were prevailing in India.
We think both of them were, though perhaps not to the same degree,
in the period we are mainly interested in, to wit the first quarter of
the 20th century. We need hardly elaborate the fact that nationalism
in India was, in those years, a growing force, even if it was threatened
by equally growing communalist tendencies. This last circumstance
would have made it particularly easy for the British to rely on the
tactics of divide-and-rule - in fact they are, by some authors, accused
of fostering communalism because they needed it as a prop for their
own position, as we have seen above. But the nature of British rule in
India was changing. Tbe Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 wcre intcnded
by the Viceroy to introduce a "eonstitutional autocracy",75 but they

could not but lead on towards the introduction of a parliamentary
system. 76 The latter was inaugurated, if only in a very modest form,
in 1919.
Probably not a few members of the Anglo-Indian community 77 took
a gloomy view of this development. They looked upon themselves as a
white aristocracy in a foreign country, and, wide as the gulf might be
between civilians and officials, they felt united in this respect. 78 They
could hardly feel much sympathy with democratic institutions which
would play havoc with their privileged position. In a way, the Govern-
ment of India, being the summit of Anglo-Indian society, could not
but sympathize with them.
But from two sides the Govemment was urged in a different direction.
It was not only at the apex of the Anglo-Indian hierarchy; it was also
an extension of the British nation, responsible to the Seeretary of State
for India, and, in the last resort, to the British Parliament. Since about
1900, India's rulers knew their autocratic position was threatened by
political liberalism at home. 79 Moreover, the Govemment of India was
confronted with the aspirations of the new westernized élite in India,
appealing to the same liberal ideas and ideals the British were professing
at home. Leaders like Gokhale, and even Gandhi up to about 1920,
took these ideas seriously,80 and since they were, to some extent, accepted
as spokesmen for the people of India by the Govemment of India, they
could not fail to have some influence on the mind and the behaviour
of their rulers. These circumstances were creating a climate in which
a divide-and-rule-policy could not thrive as it had done before.
No doubt the authoritarian, autocratie trends did not disappear, as
they had a long tradition of colonial rule behind them. They were safe
with the die-hards like Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Sir Reginald Oraddock,
and general Dyer; they found expression in acts of repression 81 like
the Amritsar massacre and the wholesale arrests of November 1921.
But the democratie trends asserted themselves too. Philip Woodruff,
writing about the period after 1909, contends that the majority of the
Indian Oivil Service considered self-govemment as the inevitable and
proper result of British rule in India. 81! A less rosy view is taken by
an Indian observer, H. N. Mitra, editor of The lndian Annual Register.
He argues that the larger part of the 1.0.S. assumed a hostile attitude
towards the reforms of 1919, but even he notes the existenee of a group
of "mujassal moderates" among them, who were ready to give the
reforms a fair chance. 83 The co-existence of these two schools of thought,
both of them represented in high quarters, eonfers a very ambivalent

character on British rule in India during the period we are examining. 84
Therefore, it seems hardly probable that the divide-and-rule theory will
provide a whoUy adequate frame of referenee for interpreting British
poliey during those years; some of its aspeets eaU, we think, for an
explanation in terms of a democratie government. Neither of these
methods of explanation wiU be quite satisfaetory, but to negleet either
of them would probably mar our judgment.
As an example of British poliey the interpretation of whieh would
gain from a double approach, we might cite the reforms of 1909. It is
possible to put forward a case that these were intended to drive a wedge
between the Rindu and Muslim upper and middle classes; 85 but it is also
possible to eonsider them as an attempt of the Government of India
to bring about a "representation of interests" in the best style of Whig
principles. 86 But our whole argument about the twofold frame of
referenee whieh the interpretation of British poliey in India requires
is aimed mainly at the years about 1920, that were taken up, politically
speaking, by the reforms of 1919, the non-co-operation movement, and
the Khilafat movement, eonstituting three closely intereonneeted prob-
lems. The prineipal authors of the reforms and the most important
poliey-makers with respect to British India were then Chelmsford and
Montagu. The former was influeneed by the Round Table group, whieh
held that British eolonial eonquests had to result in liberty and self-
government; 87 the latter had, in his first Indian budget speech in 1910,
already declared 88 th at terrorism had to be fought, but that Ris
Majesty's Government was determined to eneourage "legitimate aspi-
rations" of the Indians. This deeision seemed quite logical to him sinee
he looked upon Indian nationalism as "a movement of Indian thought
whieh had been inspired, direetly or indireetly, by English ideas, to
which the English and the Government of India gave the first impetus."
For men like Montagu and Chelmsford a divide-and-rule poliey along
eommunal Hnes was unaeeeptabie. They tried to get the "Moderates" -
meaning those Indians who wanted to eo-operate with the British
Raj - on their side. But, in our opinion, we should not see this attempt
in the perspeetive of "dividing" Moderates and Extremists, but rather
of "eonvineing" an opposition that it was in the wrong. A refleetion
of Montagu's intentions we find in two letters,89 in whieh he states
that it is his aim to "eonvert" or "reform" the Extremists ; among the
latter he cao discern a group of fine young men, desirous of soeial
reform and a truly self-governing India, and he hopes to win them over
J. SOME GENER AL ASPECTS OF NATJONALISM 21
to co-operation with the recently announced reforms.

This does not mean that other approaches to the problems with which
British rule in India was confronted in those years were lacking. Even
if official British policy was formulated hy men like Chelmsford and
Montagu, it had to reckon with the men who would have to implement
it, and a number of those were at varianee with it. Apart from meeting
with strong opposition on the part of British Conservatives, causing his
downfall in February 1922, Montagu evoked the criticism of many
members of the LC.S. 90 And the tragedy of it is, we think, that even
those Britons who feit genuine sympathy with India and its political
aspirations, could never shake off an attitude of condescension towards
the men they proposed to take on as partners. 91
1t was this condescension, this never-questioned assumption of the
superiority of western culture and western values, which marred the
lofty ideals of a government by consent of the ruled and the granting
of self-government. Indian nationalism was accepted only in so far as
it was nurtured by British ideas; Indians were only thought "fit" to
manage their own affairs after they had adapted themselves to the
standards of the British gentleman. It is hardly surprising that Indian
nationalists did not quite relish the prospect of self-government, if
getting it compelled them to renounce their own identity.
CHAPTER 11
NATIONALISM AND PAN-ISLAMISM

IN 19 TH _CENTURY INDIA
As we observed in the preceding chapter, Indian nationalism started

as acultural movement in the 19th century. This is not surprising;
India's political life being wholly dominated by the British, political
independenee was unattainable, hardly visible even as a goal. This
cultural movement first manifested itself among the Hindus who, having
lost less than the Muslims in the process of subjection by the British,
were in a better position to recover.
As Indian nationalism came into being in an encounter with the
West, it was natural for the Indians to borrow from the West as weIl
as to reject what the West had to offer. This pattern we may discern
in all nationalist movements in India, but the extent to which either
the former or the latter trend dominated them may differ greatly. In
the first of these movements, the Brahma Samaj, founded by the Bengali
Brahmin Rammohan Roy in 1828, western influences are conspicuous:
a rational monotheism, a leaning towards the moral precepts of Christi-
anity/ an aversion from the social evils of latter-day Hinduism, such
as suttee, female infanticide and child marriage. He insisted upon
English as the best medium of public instruction, since the Sanskrit
system of education was full of vain and empty subtleties. 2
It should, however, not be forgotten that he never regarded himself
as anything but a Hindu and wore the sacred thread of the Brahmins
up to his death; 3 he wanted to reform Hinduism, not to abolish it.
Within the Brahma Samaj, this double perspective occasioned tensions
between Hindu conservatÎves and progressive reformers ; the clash
between these two sections led to several secessions and to the founding
of the Sadharan Brahma Samaj in 1878, which took a steady course
towards constitutionalism and social reforms, and influenced Hindu
social thought to a considerable degree. 4
It was protest against this westernizing aspect of the Brahma Samaj
which gave rise to the Arya Samaj, founded in 1875 hy Swami Daya-
11. NATIONALISM AND PAN·ISLAMISM 23
nanda Sarasvati, who for some time had been influenced by Brahma
Samaj leaders. Whereas Rammohan Roy had been attracted by the
Upanishads, Dayananda went to what he considered to be the real
source of Hinduism, the Vedas, looked upon by him as the infallible,
perfect and complete revelation. Whereas the Brahma Samaj leaders
pointed out the defects that Hinduism had acquired in a fossilizing
society, and found their main inspiration in reason and Christian ethics,
the revivalist movement of the Arya Samaj approached morality from
a Hindu point of view and was not willing to acknowledge any debts
to western thought. Whereas the Brahma Samaj held liberal, broad-
minded views with regard to Christianity and western culture, the Arya
Samaj was intolerant in this respect; it held that all knowiedge, secular
as weIl as religious, was to be found in the Vedas.
lts followers believed th at a scrutiny of the sacred texts would reveal
the principles of all modern "western discoveries", such as the steam
engine, the radio and the like, and that all great cultures of the world
had their origin in India. 5 In this hyperbolic pride in Indians and their
culture, and in this total imperviousness to the opinions of modern
western scholarship 6 it is a typically nationalist movement. Wholly
consistent with this judgment on the unique value of the Vedas were
Dayananda's efforts to bring renegades back into the Hindu fold by
means of shuddhi rites. It is not surprising that the Arya Samaj won
its greatest popularity in the Punjab where the Hindus, being a minority,
were more conscious of their identity which they had to defend against
the Sikhs and the Muslims.
These doctrinal differences, however, do not keep the practical mani-
festations of the Brahma and the Arya Samaj from bearing some
resemblance. Both movements devoted themselves to the same kind of
reforms, and both were characterized by a puritanical streak. 7 So it is
understandable that one author compares Rammohan Roy and Daya-
nanda with Erasmus and Luther,8 and stresses Dayananda's stubborn
fight against a degenerated Brahmanism, while another characterizes
the relation between Roy's reformism and Dayananda's revivalism by
drawing a historical parallel with the Dutch Remonstrants and Cal-
vinists, the latter being less optimistic and tolerant than the former, and
more disposed to looking back to a "Golden Age" of their religion. 9
Both movements, the reformist and the revivalist as we may caU them
in a generalizing way, had several ramifications like the Parthana Samaj,
the Ramakrishna Mission and the Theosophical Society, but we do not
intend to go into the details of these. For our purpose it is important
24
to note some aspects of their impact on cultural and political trends of

the first decades of the 20th century. Both of them helped to restore
lndian self-confidence; the reforms they advocated could make Hinduism
acceptable to the western rulers, and western admiration for the richness
and subtlety of Hindu religious thought, as represented by Ramakrishna's
disciple Vivekananda and by Mrs. Annie Besant, were a balm for
battered lndian pride. 10 Furthermore we may state that the revivalist
movement got the upper hand about the beginning of this centuryY
The most notabie consequence of this fact was the steady hinduization
of the lndian nationalist movement, which brought it into conflict not
only with the West, but also with dissentient groups among the lndians
themselves. Muslims, of course, could scarcely be very enthusiastic about
this development - this is an aspect we intend to deal with later - but
neither were all Hindus. The revivalist movement appealed to the more
westernized reformers in so far as it wanted reforms too, just as Luther
appealed to Erasmus, but they could not be its whole-hearted supporters
because of its anti-western and anti-rational tendencies. Moreover,
the revivalist movement displayed a leaning towards violence and
terrorism l!l which the westernizers could admire for its boldness and
its readiness for self-sacrifice, but which in the last resort was unpala-
table to them. And then there were, of course, Hindus who adhered
to orthodox principles and were apt to regard revivalism as heresy.
These tensions found their expression in the relation between Tilak and
Gokhale - the revivalist and the reformer - and in later years between
Gandhi and the younger Nehru. To them we might add Pandit Malaviya
as representing the orthodox group, which organized itself in the Hindu
Mahasabha.
At this point, however, we are approaching the purely political side
of lndia's evolution in the last decades of the 19th century. Here a
landmark is provided by the founding of the lndian National Congress
which met for the first time in 1885 in Bombay. The initiative was
taken by a retired Civil Servant, A. O. Hume, but we should mention
that for a few years some purely lndian political associations had already
been under way, the most important of which was probably Surendranath
Bannerjea's lndian Association, founded in 1876 in Calcutta. Congress,
in its first years, met with active support from the Viceroy Lord Dufferin,
who took an interest in Hume's scheme and even corrected it; English
officials, like Sir James Meston, attended its meetings. But after 1890
British official support was withdrawn; the Viceroy, who first looked
upon Congress as filling the place of Her Majesty's most loyal opposi-
tion;l.3 saon lost faith in it and styled it "seditious". Other Britons,

however, such as Sir William Wedderburn and Sir Henry Cotton main-
tained a very friendly attitude towards Congress.
We have mentioned these origins of Congress in some detail because
of the slur many Indian authors cast on the founding of the Muslim
League in 1906, coming in the wake of the Simla deputation.;l4 British
benevolence towards the Muslim League in these years is treated as
something of an original sin from which the League could never free
itself. In our opinion, Congress got in its first years certainly no less
British, and even official British, patronage than the League, but we
would not think of using this as an argument against the truly nationalist
character of Congress in its subsequent career. Up to about 1905 Con-
gress certainly took a loyal stand. It wanted reforms, but under the
British aegis; it wanted increasing Indianization of the Services; but
it was only in 1908 that it declared its aim to be obtaining "a colonial
type of Self-Government" - a very moderate demand, we should think.
It was not until 1920 that it changed this aim to "Swaraj by all peaceful
and legitimate means", and only in 1929 did it ask for "complete
independence" .;1.5
But in spite of this very moderate character of Congress aims in the
first decades of its existence, the British attitude towards it developed
into one of hostility and contempt. Dufferin already described it as the
instrument of a "microscopic minority" of the Indian people; ;1.6 Curzon
joined him in this opinion and declared it to be hls belief that "the
Congress is tottering to its fall";;l.7 Chirol reproached it with its lack
of interest in social problems. 18 It is curious to note, incidentally,
Gandhi's impression of his first acquaintance with Congress at the
Calcutta session in 1901: he clearly thought it a rather pompous
gathering without any interest for the problems of the common people,19
corroborating in this respect Chirol's estimate.
From its very beginning Congress took the stand that it was a national
organization, representing all communities and condemning commun-
alism. Notwithstanding this creed - and we would not doubt the sincerity
of many who professed it - a certain hinduization of Congress came
about. This was partly caused by the abstention of the Muslims who
were dissuaded by their greatest leader, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, from
participating in Congress activities. The Deoband leader Maulana
Gangohi declared, when Congress started its work, that co-operation
with Hindus was lawful for Muslims,20 but his verdict carried less weight
with the western-educated Muslims for whom it mattered : after some
years in the nineties which were marked by a fairly important partici-

pation of Muslims, their attendance dropped very considerably in the
years after 1900.21 This development might encourage the supposition
that the advice of the above-mentioned leaders was not all-important
and that the Muslim attitude was primarily conditioned by a process
which took place within Congress itself: the growing influence of the
Hindu revivalist movement (increasing revivalism among Muslims them-
selves may have been a factor, too).
An exponent of this trend was B. G. Tilak, a Chitpavan Brahmin
from Poona. Perhaps he should be called neither an enemy of Muslims,22
nor an enemy of Hindu reform,23 but by using communal weapons in
the national struggle, and by subordinating social reform to political
agitation, he came certainly very near to being both. When in 1890
the Age of Consent Bill came up, putting an end to child marriage,
Tilak waged a vehement campaign against it, not because he was an
advocate of child marriage in itself - he did not marry off his own
daughters before they were of age - but because he denied the British
Government of India any right to meddle with affairs that concerned
only the Indians themselves. As a symbol of Indian heroism and fighting
spirit he propagated Shivaji - who was a famous warrior indeed, but
one whose name had a bitter taste for Muslims, since he had treacher-
ously killed his Muslim enemy Afzal Khan.
Tilak's excuse was that Shivaji was a Deccan hero and that, if he
had tried to rouse northern India to political consciousness, he would
have adopted Akbar as his hero. 24 Other instances of his activities which
could not fail to antagonize Muslims were his fervent advocacy of the
Hindu Ganpati festival and the Hindu Anti-Cow-Killing Society. One
might say perhaps that Tilak was, essentially, an anti-British nationalist
but that, by seeking communal support for his political ends, he did more
to further communalism than nationalism. Thus the Muslims were
repelled from Congress when Tilak and his Extremist friends became
the rising force in this organization after 1900. Afterwards, the hindui-
zation of Congress was continued by Gandhi, though in a far less
provocative way. His concept of satyagraha and non-violence, his stress
on hand-spinning and the use of khaddar, his language - he wrote
about the "Cow of Khilafat" - were far more acceptable to Muslims
than Tilak's revivalism, but made them feel uneasy all the same. Gandhi
could, by no stretch of the imagination, be styled a communalist leader,
but he had a greater appeal for Hindus than for Muslims. 25
So Congress, by far the most important political body in India
throughout its entire career, could not be the all-embracing national

organization it claimed to be. In another respect it was very weIl suited
for the part it intended to play. It was, until shortly before Independence,
more a movement than a party and could accommodate several groups
of widely divergent shades of policy and ideology, as long as they sub-
scribed to the general Congress creed. In this way, Congress acted as
the "umbrella" under which various groups and interests could be kept
together, a role it had to fulfil in the years when the élite nationalism
of the westernized minority was replaced by mass nationalism. 26 The
Hindu Mahasabha for instance was a group within Congress until its
exclusion in the mid-thirties because of its clearly communalist character;
the communists formed a unit within Congress until 1945. 27 Certainly
before 1930 Congress was not an exclusive party which admitted only
members of a very definite conviction and so it was possible, even for
leading politicians, to hold positions in Congress as weIl as in groups
outside its fold. 2s
But if these broad views of Congress made possible the co-existence
of several factions within it, they did not prevent quarrels between them
in which control of Congress policy and organization was at stake. About
the turn of the century, Congress witnessed a growing tension between
Moderates and Extremists, leading up to an open conflict and a split
of Congress in 1907. The leaders of the Moderates were Gokhale, Sinha
and Bannerjea; the foremost Extremists were Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai
and Aurobindo Ghosh. These two sections in Congress represented
different views on two main points: the ends of political action in India,
and the means to be used. The Moderates were thinking along purely
constitutionallines; they wanted no revolutionary change in the relation-
ship between Great Britain and India because they feit that India
had a lot to learn from its rulers, but only political reforms, to be got
by means of persuasion and constitutional action. The Extremists wanted
more; they were much more ready to sever the British connection,29
and advocated boycott and passive resistance as the means of attaining
their aims; if they did not recommend terrorism, they did not conceal
their admiration for it. They wanted to assert their rights proudly, and
branded Moderate tactics as "mendicancy". Underlying these attitudes
were, on the Extremist side, a rejection of western values, and, on the
Moderate side, acceptance of them as a model for reforming Indian
society; 30 it was, perhaps, mainly this attitude which separated the
two groups, since in practice their political formulae did not always
widely diverge. 31
28 THE KHILAF AT MOVEMENT IN INDIA
Parallel with the increasing influence of the Extremists in Congress

ran the rise of terrorism in Maharashtra (Tilak's homeland), Bengal
and the Punjab in the years before and during the First World War.
Certainly not all Extremists applauded terrorism, but there was a general
feeling of sympathy with the resolute and self-sacrificing young men
practising it, even among people who could not on principle approve
of their actions. And sometimes one finds indications of something more
than mere sympathy with terrorists on the part of otherwise law-abiding
politicians. 32 We might see in these attitudes a prelude to the problems
which Gandhi's non-violence was to cause for a good many of his
followers.
Another notabie aspect of the terrorist movement was the almost
total abstention from it of Muslims. 33 This should not surprise us when
we realize that the national awakening among Indian Muslims in the
19th century could not follow the same course as it took among Hindus,
owing to its start from a different position. About the middle of the
century the Muslims had to realize that they were in a very critical
situation. They "found their prestige gone, their laws replaced, their
language shelved and their education shorn of its monetary value", 34
and then had to swallow the final blows in the annexation of Sind and
Oudh and the abortive Mutiny, the aftermath of which put an end
to the last shadow of their former rule. Perhaps all this would not have
been so bad if the Hindus had found themselves in quite the same
plight. But the Hindus had, partly at least, only exchanged Muslim
rule for British; they had adjusted themselves better to the new circum-
stances and made better use of new opportunities it offered them in
the economic field; they showed less aversion to English education
than the Muslims and, consequently, were better qualified to get such
posts as government alloted to Indians.
These aspects of the communal tangle in India are too weIl known
for it to be necessary to dweIl on them in any detail. 35 Less attention
has been given to a fact that may very weIl have had a considerable
influence, to wit a quicker rate of growth of the Muslim community
in India than of that of the Hindus. This has been noted by M. L.
Ferrar 36 and Gopal,37 and neither of these authors looks to a higher
birth-rate or lower death-rate for an explanation for this fact; both of
them point to the attraction Islam has for low-caste Hindus and to the
proselytizing character of Islam. This situation might weIl he the prin-
cipal cause of the shuddhi activities of the Arya Samaj - purification
rites by means of which persons who had been converted to other faiths
are readmitted to the Hindu caste system.

At any rate, Hindus and Muslims found themselves in different
situations, and this may explain why, in the last decades of the 19th
century, nationalism made headway among Hindus while Indian Muslims
lagged behind, owing partly to their social and educational backward-
ness, and partly to the shocks which had dazed them and of which the
Mutiny and its aftermath was the worst. It was mainly the upper and
middle class Muslims who were affected by this situation, and the ulama
were hardly prepared to give them very useful guidance in these circum-
stances, since they were not able to formulate new solutions for the
new problems that arose. 38 A more promising lead was given them about
1870 by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the most prominent representative of
Islamic liberalism in India in the second half of the 19th century.
Sir Sayyid, coming from a family of high es teem at the dying Mughul
court at Delhi, feit a hearty and healthy con tempt for the last emperor,
Bahadur Shah. 39 He recognized that Mughul rule had only itself to
blame for its replacement by British power, as the latter was a definite
improvement. 40 He made it his object to dispel British suspicion towards
Indian Muslims - who were mainly blamed for the Mutiny - and
to reconcile his co-religionists with British rule, with a view to enabling
them to profit from the social, economic, and educational possibilities
it opened up. Theoretically, he therefore had to give an interpretation
of Islam as not inimical towards western civilization and Christianity;
by this means he could remove British suspicions,41 and at the same
time do away with Muslim prejudices which he ascribed to Hindu
influence and to corrupt traditions. Here, of course, he was on slippery
ground.
In the educational field his greatest work was the founding of the
Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, which was started
in 1875 with considerable help from the government and private
donations from weaIthy Muslims and Hindus. The college set out "to
procure the acceptance of European science and literature as the basis
of Mohammedan education. It has accomplished this by scrupulously
providing for the religious offices of the pious Mohammedan youth." 42
But another of its stated aims was "to make the Mussulmans of India
worthy and useful subjects of the British crown." 43
In connection with· our subject there are two main questions con-
cerning Sir Sayyid's activities which we should try to answer. The first
one is: what was his attitude towards the Hindu community and towards
Congress? We have already mentioned the support for the Aligarh
project which he got from Hindus; the college was, for that matter,
open to Hindus, as weIl as to Parsis and Christians. Seven years after
its foundation the college had 259 pupils, among them 57 Hindus. 44
When formerly engaged in educational work - a Translation Society
in which he took the initiative in 1864 - he sought the co-operation of
Hindus tOO. 45 So we may conclude that he was certainly no enemy of the
Hindu community. On the other hand, he very soon realized that the
Hindus, being the stronger of the two communities, might easily endanger
the position of the Muslims. This was as early as 1867, when Hindu
leaders in Benares advocated the adoption of Hindu in Devanagari
script in court matters, and the elimination of Urdu in Persian script -
a proposal that was repeated some years later in the Scientific Society
which had replaced the Translation Society.46 Much more important,
however, was the stand he took towards Congress, in which he dissuaded
Muslims from participating. Why did he do so? Various explanations
are given. He looked upon Congress as too critical an organization, too
opposed to the British whose favour the Muslims needed, as is argued
by W. C. Smith 47 and Nehru,48 who deny that he regarded it as too
preponderantly Hindu a body. In the light of his opposition to Hindu
demands in linguistic matters, however, it seems probable that he feared
at least certain sections of Hindu opinion,49 and his rejection of repre-
sentative institutions with elections after the British model, because the
Muslim minority would then he at the mercy of the Hindu majority,50
points in the same direction.
Some authors 51 see in Sir Sayyid's attitude the effect of a sinister
British influence, mainly that of Sir Theodore Beck, principal of Aligarh
College from 1884 to 1893. This explanation, we think, is rather dubious,
since Sir Sayyid must have been a very strong-willed man, with the
courage to oppose not only a considerable part of his own community
but British officials as weIl - not a person to allow others to make use
of him. 52 The most convincing explanation, to our mind, is to be found
in the fact that Sir Sayyid was first and foremost interested in education,
and did not want politics to divert the Muslim mind from this field,53
particularly as he supposed that the Muslims, being the deposed rulers
and inclined to self-pity, would be only too willing to play the part
of critics of the British.
A second question is: what view did his co-religionists take of his
activities ? With his liberalism, Sir Sayyid was not really a man of the
people. His ideas reached the large landowners, the professional class
and the officials - a small but influential group. The peasants did not
IJ. NATIONALISM AND PAN·ISLAMISM 31
come within their reach, and the lower middle dass and the ulama
were opposed to them. 54 Ris rationalism and refonnism provoked
vehement protests: he was called a here tic, an atheist and a Christian;
latwas were issued putting a ban on support for Aligarh College; he
even got letters threatening him with assassination. 55 The most famous
of his opponents was Jamal-ud-din Afghani, who attacked his readiness
to co-operate with the British. 56 Sir Sayyid's admiration for the British,
sometimes bordering on the excessive or even the ridiculous,57 must have
been irritating to some people. Nevertheless, there is no denying that
within the small group of people mentioned before - and they were
people who mattered - Sir Sayyid was held in great revercnce. But
did this influence go deep? W. C. Smith doubts this,58 because the
liberalism of Sir Sayyid and other congenial leaders was only applied
to religion, not integrated with it. Therefore the liberal trend remained
peripheral. Sir Sayyid's successors at Aligarh, Mohsin-ul-Mulk and
Viqar-ul-Mulk, sought doser relations with the ulama, and this resulted
in a strengthening of Sunni orthodoxy in the College and a more
conservative attitude in the first decades of the 20th century.59
Another leader representing this gradual change was Amir Ali. Sir
Sayyid had interpreted Islam in the light of western values, shedding
a good deal of the content in the process; Amir Ali, au thor of The Spirit
ol Islam, tried to prove that authentic Islam and western values coin-
cided. In the words of W. C. Smith, "Sir Sayyid ... had written in his
life of the Prophet an account of what Muhammad was not. Amir Ali
presented wh at he was. Sir Sayyid had maintained that Islam was not
inimical to progress. Amir Ali presented an Islam that is that progress." 60
These different points of view are mirrored by their respective attitudes
towards the Caliphate. Sir Sayyid was certainly pro-Turkish, but mainly
because he admired their efforts towards modernization. 61 But when
the Sultan propagated Pan-Islamism, hoping to interest non-Turkish
Muslims in the maintenance of the Caliphate, Sir Sayyid warned his
compatriots not to foster feelings towards the Sultan-Caliph of their
own time which might have befitted them in the days of the first four
Caliphs. 62 Amir Ali, however, stressed the continuity of the Caliphate,
with all its rights, up to modem times. 63
Sir Sayyid wanted to give a wider range than Aligarh College alone
to his educational work by founding the Mohammadan Educational
Conference in 1886. According to Albiruni,64 this organization became
the political mouthpiece of the Muslims too, but it was Amir Ali who
tried to give Indian Muslims a communal political organization in his
Central National Mohammedan Association, founded in 1877, and this

lead was followed by Mohsin-ul-Mulk with his Urdu Defence Organi-
zation of 1900,65 and by Viqar-ul-Mulk with his Muhammadan Political
Organization of 1903.66
Thus the first years of the 20th century witnessed a slight but clearly
discernible shifting of the balanee between two trends of Muslim opinion:
a liberal, westernizing trend and an orthodox, revivalist trend, with the
latter getting the upper hand,67 just as had happened among the Hindus
some twenty years before.
The main representatives of religious revivalism among Indian Mus-
lims in the 19th century were the so-called Wahabis and the Deoband
school. The Wahabis in India were probably not closely related to their
Arabian namesakes, but were the spiritual heirs of the 18th century
Indian reformer Shah Wali-ullah of Delhi, who wanted to purify Islam
and to return to its origins. But, like those of all early reform movements,
his efforts were aimed in two directions: against internal decay and
against external aggression, and not all adherents accentuated these
aspects to the same degree. 68 Therefore, the name "Wahabis" in India
is applied to men who would not all have liked to be identified with
the same name. Sir Sayyid called himself "a thrice bitter Wahabi",60
and defended the Wahabis against the attacks of W. W. Hunter in The
Indian MusaZmans. In Sir Sayyid's defence of them the Wahabis are
shown as pure reformers: "In my opinion, what the Protestant is to
Roman Catholics, so is the Wahabi to the other Mohammedan creeds." 70
But the Wahabis about whom Hunter wrote Tl were fighters; since
about 1820, certain followers of Shah Wali-ullah, like his son Abdul
Aziz, and Sayyid Ahmad Barelawi, a disciple of this son, had organized
an armed Muslim resistance against the Sikhs and, when the Punjab
had been captured by the British, against the latter. About 1830 they
had succeeded in setting up a little state in the N. W. Frontier region,
with a Caliph of their own. 72 This rebellion against the British, of course,
was something of which Sir Sayyid could never have approved; nor
could he have felt any sympathy with the rigid orthodoxy into which
Shah Wali-ullah's reforming zeal had developed among the Wahabis. 73
So we see that the name "Wahabis" is used in widely divergent senses. 74
About 1870 the rebellion of these fighting Wahabis or mujahidin
was largely suppressed by the British forces which, however, never
annihilated it completely. Their main significance in relation to our
subject seems to be that they operated with the concept of dar-uZ-Islam
and dar-ul-harb, and, declaring India to fall within the latter category,
had no other choice than jihad or hijrat - a theme recurring in the

days of the Khilafat movement. About 1870, this concept lost something
of its sting, because authoritative fatwas had assured the Indian Muslims
that jihad in their case was not justified. One fatwa argued that India
had not become dar-ul-harb; another one contended that it was no
longer dar-ul-Islam, but that in the prevailing conditions Indian Muslims
were bound to obey the new rulers. Hunter, eXplaining these arguments
at considerable length,75 concludes; "The Indian Musalmans, therefore,
are bound by their own law to live peaceably under our Rule. But the
obligation continues only so long as we perfonn our share of the contract,
and respect their rights and spiritual privileges." 76 There was the
danger - changing conditions could revive the theme of dar-ul-harb
and the connected ideas of jihad and hijrat, as happened in the days
of the Khilafat movement.
This was probably the most important legacy the Wahabi movement
bequeathed to Indian politics in the 20th century. Another point to be
remembered, however, is that it kept alive in the minds of Indians and
British the idea of an invasion by the Afghans or the warlike frontier
tribes, a danger that had always lurked behind the Wahabi threat. This
fear may have lost substance in an age of technical warfare, but it could
he revived as late as 1947 when Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, was
threatened by the Pathan tribesmen. 71
Among these mujahidin mingled fugitive rebels from the Mutiny;
in the Mutiny itself traces of Muslim revivalism may be found. 78 But
some of the fonner rebels changed not their place of action, but their
tactics. Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanawtawi, who had fought at
Shamli near Delhi in 1857, became the first head of the religious
seminary founded at Deoband in 1867. The similarity of the aims sought
by the Mutiny and the Deoband School is stressed by Faruqi: "Shamli
and Deoband are, as a matter of fact, the two sides of one and the same
picture. The difference lies only in weapons. Now the sword and the
spear were replaced by the pen and the tongue. There, at Shamli,
in order to secure political independence and freedom for religion
and culture, resort was made to violence; here, at Deoband, a start
was made to achieve the same goal through peaceful means. There,
for the cause of religio-political freedom individuals were used; here
for that purpose individuals were to be produced." 79 The programme
of Deoband may be outlined thus: the education of students in strict
observance of Sunni orthodoxy of the Hanafi School and the seeking
of closer relations with the Turkish Sultan-Caliph.80 So the Deoband
School stood for orthodoxy and rigid tradition,81 but politically, by its
anti-British attitude, it was apt to be drawn towards Congress. 82 Bath
these attitudes gave rise to an estrangement between the westernizing
followers of Sir Sayyid and his Aligarh College on the one hand and
the Deoband ulama on the other hand. It was only when Pan-Islamism
became an important issue that they were able to find common ground,
but it was to be expected that their alliance could never be quite cordial.
And it was precisely in the last decades of the 19th century that
Pan-Islamism came to the fore, at least in all political discussions,
speculations and calculations. Defining it, in a very general way, as
a sense of unity of all Muslims, we may note at the same time th at it
existed mainly as acultural, sodal and religious phenomenon, but that
as apolitical reality it led a rather dubious existence. A sense of unity
is natural to Islam; from this point of view Pan-Islamism may be called
as old as Islam itself, being based on Quranic injunctions. 83 In the same
vein Muhammad Ali treated it in his Comrade: 84 UIf Pan-Islamism is
anything different from every-day Islam, the Mussulmans do not believe
in it." This view is more or less corroborated by assertions that, except
for language, Muslims from different parts of the Muslim world feit
at home within its whole reach: "The whole Dar-al-Islam was his
country, other country he had none. Ris affections might centre on
his native land, but his loyalty, and all the other sentiments which
we associate with patriotism, were given to the Moslem world and its
religious culture as a whoie. " 85 On the other hand, even in the religio-
cultural and sodal field there existed animosities or more or less latent
differences, as is stressed by Sir Rarcourt Butler: "I have always main-
tained that pan-Islamism is a feeling and not a force. The Arab, the
Turk, the Punjabi Muhammadan, the class that go to Aligarh and
the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal have very little in common with
each other and mostly despise each other." 86 But anyway, we may
probably assume that the religious, sodal and cultural unity was more
real than the political one.
So we are faced with a problem: was Pan-Islamism a reality or not?
Butler's verdict: "a feeling and not a force", is not a very clear one, as
a feeling may very weIl have great force. 8T We think the situation might
be better expressed in this way: Pan-Islamism was a sense of unity, but
not that unity itself,88 and the sense was prevented from taking on full
reality because it was based on a past and on a theory which had long
since been caught up with by modern practice. Unity had been in full
bIoom in the days of the Prophet and the first four Caliphs, but after-
wards political unity was definitely lost and religious unity - with all
its cultural and social aspects - began showing fissures like the Sunni-
Shia schism. But nevertheless the old concepts were maintained 89 and
kept the way open for a possible revival to take effect.
Another aspect of tbe problem is brought out by the question: was
Pan-Islamism compatible with nationalism or not? We do not want to
take into account here the larger question of whether Islam and natio-
nalism could go together, and so we are confronted with a problem of
much the same kind as would be posed by the relationship between
Pan-Germanism or Pan-Slavism and nationalism. Then it is obvious
that in a defensive phase, when Muslim peoples were trying to protect
themselves from foreign domination, and when the position of Muslim
power in general was so weak that the frequent incursions of foreign
powers into Muslim territories could be interpreted as evidence of a
great conspiracy against Islam as a whoie, national resistance against
these aggressions would welcome help from other Muslims. But when
freedom from foreign domination and aggression was regained and
sovereign Muslim states had been restored or had sprung into existence,
as was more or less tbe case af ter 1920 - then the national egoism of
these states would make Pan-Islamism a difficult goal to attain. Then,
too, the special relationship between Islam and nationalism would come
to the fore as a new problem. As Rosenthal puts it: "The real problem 90
only emerged on home ground after the extemal enemy. " had been
cleared from the old/new fatherland." 91 This would explain why Pan-
Islamism, af ter a period of relative strength between 1880 and 1920,
lost ground to national aspirations after World War I. But it was, as
we remarked before, in the nature of Islam that it would never be
entirely lost sight of.
This situation must have made it rather difficult, for Muslim re-
formers and revivalists as weIl as for European observers, to get a clear
view of the prospects of Pan-Islamism in the last decades of the 19th
century. Af ter about 1880 there was a tendency to activate Pan-Islamic
sentiment for political purposes. These efforts came from two sides.
The Sultan of Turkey, who was steadily losing territories and influence
in Nortb Africa and the Balkans, saw an opportunity of making good
these losses on the Asian side by stressing his religious authority over all
Muslims in his capacity of Caliph.1I2 At the same time certain reformers,
troubled by the attacks on the Muslim world, looked for redress not
only by means of intemal reforms of Islam, but also by restoring the
lost political unity of all Muslims.
Of the latter, the most notabie was J amal-ud-din Afghani who,

incidentaIly, was not an Afghan but an Iranian by birth. 03 Alarmed
by the encroachments of western imperialism on the Muslim world, he
rejected mere Islamic traditionalism as weIl as imitation of the West
as the means of stopping this process, but aimed at a reinterpretation
of Islam, emphasizing a freer use of human reason and activism within
the Islamic tradition. 04 Time and again he urged the Muslims to take
their fate in their own hands, referring to Quran 13-11: "God changes
not what is in a people, until they change what is in themseIves." 95
Pointing out the necessity of political and military strength, he counte-
nanced nationalism among single Muslim peoples as weIl as Pan-
Islamism.
One thing about Jamal-ud-din is certain: he was anti-British. In
many other respects he is enigma tic. The impression he made, and
wanted to make, on the general public in Muslim countries was that
of an orthodox and devote Muslim. But there are good reasons to think
that his innermost thoughts and his ultimate aims were quite different;
that his orthodoxy and his show of devotion were intended to screen
from the public eye his real convictions, which were those of a freethinker
and a revolutionary.o6 Part of that screen seems to have been constituted
by his well-known Refutation of the Materialists (1881), directed mainly
against Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. o7 Nor is it quite cIear how far his
influence with Sultan Abdul Hamid II went, but probably it was a
good deal less than his own utterances, and those of his friends and
admirers whom he inspired, seem to suggest. 08 This may be eXplained
partly by his character - he was an intriguer who was likely to see
his own role in practical high polities as much more important than
it reaIly was - and partly by his disposition to speak and write in one
tone when addressing himself to an élite or a western audience, and
in quite another when seeking contact with the general public.OlJ But
even if his direct influence during his lifetime was more modest than
is of ten believed, his influence afterwards certainly should not be
underestimated, impressing itself as it did on the Islamic liberalism
of his disciple Muhammad Abduh as weIl as on the more conservative
revivalism of Rashid Rida,100 and on the Indian poet and philosopher
Iqbal toO. 10l But in most cases it was an influence emanating not from
his deepest convictions but from his myth, as created by himself and
his friends: the image of an activist but orthodox Afghani. By his
teaching and his activity he made Islam the mainspring of solidarity,
which was of the utmost importance in an age when ideologies like
Il. NATIONALISM AND PAN.ISLAMISM 37
Arab nationalism were not yet acceptable. 102 The same might be said
about Indian nationalism, though for different reasons, and Jamal-ud-
din's influence on Abul Kalam Azad and the Khilafat movement is
unmistakable. 103
Some of his success is very likely to have been due to the attitude
of Sultan Abdul Hamid 11. In the Turkish constitution of 1876 the
latter stressed his role as Caliph,t°4 and after the Turkish losses at the
BerIin Congress of 1878 he sent out emissaries to Egypt, Tunisia,
Afghanistan and India, and even to China and Java, to win the active
support of the Muslims in those countries. It is difficult to evaluate
the success his efforts met with; whereas Arnold does not tbink much
of it/05 Stoddard holds the opinion that he got results with many
Muslim princes and notables, and certainly witb the Muslim masses. 106
A cÏrcumstance adding to the difficulty is that several cross-currents
cxisted in Pan-Islamism. The natural centre of the movement was to
be found in Turkey, the largest Muslim power in the 19th century, but
the traditional centre should be looked for in Arabia, the fountain-head
of Islam. Jamal-ud-din did not even entirely rule out the possibility
of an Arab Caliphate. Turkey was a westernizing power and therefore
held a certain attraction for Muslims in European colonies, who had
some knowledge of western institutions and admired them - but tbe
very same fact made Turkey unpalatable for religious revivalists like
the Senussis. 107 And on tbe other hand, the Sultan's government was,
despite a show of liberalism, despotic and therefore unacceptable to
liberal reformers. Even Jamal-ud-din Afghani, who centred his efforts
round Turkey, thought Abdul Hamid unfit for this reason. 108 And when
in 1908 Abdul Hamid lost his power to the Young Turks, the new
rulers started with a Pan-Turanian orientation, but soon tried to
drive Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism in double harness - a dif-
ficult task. 109
Once more we return to our question: was Pan-Islamism a reality?,
but now in anotber form: how real was it, and what results did it have?
There are reasons for asking this question again: tbe various and
sometimes conflicting sources from which the movement originated,
and tbe fact that the same question was posed repeatedly in the years
after 1900.
Those writers who pOinted, as we have seen, to tbe natural tendency
of Islam towards Pan-Islamism, declared too that Pan-Islamism as the
West understood it, was "a bogey". Muhammad Ali concedes only the
existence of a defensive reaction towards western attacks on the Muslim
38 THE KHILAF AT MOVE MENT IN INDIA
world, but not of an aggressive movement. 110 His anonymous biographer

goes one step further and asserts that it is an exclusively religious, social,
and commercial movement - perhaps, in a way, political, but without
any diplomatic designs and never politically aggressive. 111 The same
aspects of Pan-Islamism were accentuated by the Pan-Islamic Society
in London, founded in 1903, and in connection with this tendency an
inquiry among missionaries is mentioned which failed to produce any
indication of an organization with clear aims,112 We have already noted
Sir Harcourt Butler's opinion on Pan-Islamism, and RonaId Storrs
thought Pan-Islamism "mainly the creation of the India Office." 113
In this dubious state of affairs we might turn to practical results, but
there again we do not find much clarification. One may point to the
Hijaz-railway, the construction of which between 1901 and 1908 was
financed with contributions from the whole Muslim world, to the
medical aid Turkey got from Indian Muslims during the Balkan wars
in 1912 and 1913,114 and to the stand the Libyans took when Turkey
was attacked by Italy in Tripoli. Precisely these facts may have induced
the Young Turks to accept Pan-lslamismY5 On the other hand, the
declaration of jihad by the SuItan-Caliph in 1914 had scarcely any
effect,116 and this was a test case of Pan-Islamism if there was one.
In the light of this conflicting evidence and the difference of opinions
we might offer the following, tentative conclusion : in the years between
1880 and 1920 the Muslim world was drawn towards Pan-Islamism
because circumstances were favourable. Muslims feIt threatened, and
religion was for them the first thing to turn to when seeking unity and
support. In this respect, Pan-Islamism played a role analogous to
nationalist movements- it acted as an "umbrella" under which various
ethnic groups, class interests and shades of opinion, conservative as weIl
as reformist, could assembIe themselves when unity was the first thing
that mattered,117 But it lost its appeal when nationalism came to the
fore, a process already set in motion before World War I in countries
like Egypt and Turkey, but accelerated, intensified and widened greatly
by that war. Therefore it is understandable that in the first decades of
the 20th century different views prevailed with regard to the prospects
of Pan-Islamism; those who looked upon it as a force to be reckoned
with had their good reasons, but those who thought its importance was
being exaggerated had so too. It is only our hindsight which enables
us to state that the latter view would in future be proved true, at least
for the time being: the idea of Islamic solidarity did maintain itself as
an undercurrent in Muslim nationalism,11s
We said the Muslim world felt threatened, alluding to the fact that
in the years between 1880 and 1920 it was everywhere on the defensive
against western imperialismYo We should now see how this fact affected
Indian Muslims who where not directly threatened themselves. Even
though they were not directly threatened, indirectly they were involved
in several ways. Having lost their own independence, they must have
felt sympathy with other peoples losing theirs; when these were Muslim
peoples, a sentiment of Muslim solidarity was aroused in addition. But
they felt concerned perhaps most strongly because of the part played
by Great Britain, their own sovereign, in the attacks on the Muslim
world. Notably the British attitude towards Turkey had changed for
the worse and, Turkey being for many Muslims a symbol of Muslim
power, this was particularly resented by Indian Muslims too. Through
most of the 19th century England had acted as Turkey's ally - for
instance during the Crimean War and even at the Berlin Congress,
where Russian claims were rejected (not quite disinterestedly on Great
Britain's part, since Disraeli brought home "peace with plunder" 120).
In those years, Britain tried to stave off the partition of the inheritance
of Europe's sick man. Gladstone, however, took the lead with a definitely
anti-Turkish policy and this course was continued, with less moral
indignation but with the same results, by the Conservative Foreign
Secretary, Salisbury. So Turkey lost in the last decades of the 19th
century part of its Balkan territories, Egypt and Tunis.
The anti-Turkish policy was part of a wider re-orientation of British
foreign policy by which England sought an accommodation with Russia
and France in view of increasing German influence in the Middle
East. 121 That this accommodation came about at the oost - partly -
of Muslim territories like Persia, Turkey and Morocoo was probably in
the main accidental, but Muslims could hardly be expected to take a
quite detached view of things. At the same time there was, for that
matter, something of a change in the British attitude towards Islam,
as Norman Daniel sets forth: more than in the previous period Muslim
fanaticism, cruelty and despotism were decried, and an influential
statesman like Lord Cromer pictured Islam as a primitive creed, utterly
failing as a social system. 122 In this picture Pan-lslamism figured as
a sinister trait - and not the less so when it appeared to be irreligious
into the bargain. That 'was the view Mark Sykes - a diplomat with
access to the inner circle of British policy-makers - took of the Young
Turks in 1915: " ... cosmopolitan knaves ... who believe neither in Allah
nor the Koran ... ", but driving " ... a revolutionary, anti-theological
pan-Islamic machine ... " At the same time he expressed his doubts as
to whether the Government of India were fully abreast of these trends. 123
In Pan-Islamism the Caliphate was apt to play a central role, since
it was certainly the most obvious rallying point when it came to uniting
all Muslims. 124 But before discussing the appeal it had for Indian
Muslims in particular, we must say something about the Caliphate
in genera!.
The institution of the Caliphate dated from the death of the Prophet
(A.D. 632), when Abu Bakr was chosen as his successor. In 661
Muawiyah, the Umayyad Caliph, founded a hereditary monarchy in
practice, but in theory the principle of the election of a successor was
maintained. 125 In 750 the Abbasids took over rule from the Umayyads,
but at the same time the splitting up of Muslim power began. The
Abbasid Caliphate could not maintain itself either; it disintegrated, was
brought down finally by the Mongols, and entirely independent Muslim
kingdoms sprang up in India, Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey and Egypt,
to mention only some.
The purpose of the original Caliphate had been "to maintain the
unity of the Arabs, to retain divine guidance in their government, and
to lend both unity and guidance a new continuity." 126 The theory on
which these aims were based was relatively simpie: sovereignty belonged
to God but the practical exercise of it, meaning authority on earth, was
vested in the Prophet Muhammad, and after him in his vicegerent, the
Khaiifa. It was his duty to implement the sharia, to defend the faith
and the faithful, and to ensure their ability to live by the prescriptions
of the sharia. 127 Muhammad being the last Prophet, whose message
replaced all former revelations, there could be only one Caliph, im-
plementing the one Divine Law. 128
Muslim political thinkers could not but see that a rift had opened
between the theoretical ideal and historical reality. They held up the
ideal, remote and faded though it might seem, and found means to
interpret historical reality in terms of the ideal. Thus, when Abbasid
power declined, they condoned usurpation of the Caliph's office and
stressed the importance of the ulama as interpreters of the sharia. 129
Perhaps the most daring adjustment was Ibn Khaldun's, who saw the
transformation of the Caliphate into the muik, or temporal rule, as a
sociological inevitability, but contended that even the muik could
preserve qualities of the former ideal 130 and accepted a plural Cali-
phate. 131 But his ideas did not find favour with the ulama who could
not accept petty dynasties as the partial heirs to the Abbasid Caliphate. 132
When in 1258 Baghdad was sacked and the Caliph put to death by
the Mongol prince Hulagu, the Abbasid Caliphate was "restored" by
the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt, but without any real power; it served
only to legitimate their own position. Other Muslim rulers, toa, sought
an investiture by these "Egyptian" Caliphs, but not a few Muslim
sovereigns took for themselves the title of Caliph. "The title of Khalifah
seems ... to have assumed a new significance; it certainly no longer
implied descent from the house of Abbas or any claim to belong to
the tribe of the Quraysh. The Muslim monarch now claimed to derive
his authority directly from God, to be vicegerent of Allah, not a mere
successor of the Prophet. " 133
The rise of the Ottoman dynasty and the weakening of its riyal
powers in Persia and India restored former conditions to a certain
degree: there was one great Muslim power and its ruler recovered
some of the prestige of the universal Caliphs - he was no longer
considered a Caliph among others. The rule of the ulama was fully
acknowledged and orthodoxy was insisted upon; in return, the ulama
became the staunch supporters of Ottoman rule. The classical theory
of the Caliphate was revived. 134 But we do not think it necessary to
give here a complete exposition of the theory of the Caliphate - nor,
for that matter, would we consider ourselves competent to do so. But
we do have to go into some of its aspects, because they received much
attention at the time of the Khilafat movement.
The first of these is the question of whether the Caliphate should
be looked upon as a politicalor a religious concept. It is difficult to
give an absolutely unequivocal answer to this. Islam does not know
the strict dividing line between religion and politics th at is drawn by
Christianity, nor the conflict between State and Church - if only
because no Church in the proper sense exists in Islam. The Prophet
Muhammad, at first the spiritual leader of the believers, became their
temporal and politica! ruler as well, and that this new role was not
a burden he had to take on by accident, but the fulfilment of his
mission, is symbolized by the fact that Islamic chronology starts with
the establishment of his community at Medina, where Muhammad had
to fill both functions. 135 In this light it would seem logical to consider
the Caliphate a concept in which the political and religious aspects
were blended into complete unity. When after Muhammad's death,
however, Abu Bakr became his Caliph (vicegerent or successor) and
took over authority, it was with one exception: he succeeded him only
in his capacities of ruler, judge, and commander-in-chief, but had no
spiritual powers, as Muhammad had been the last Prophet. 136 When
it came to ascertaining the true meaning of Quran and hadith, revealed
and transmitted truth, the community resorted to ijma (consensus),
first of the community itself, then of the ulama. 13T The Caliph's role
became that of defending the faith and implementing Divine Law; he
had no religious but only political authority, though he certainly had
religious functions.
After the first four "rightly guided" Caliphs - Abu Bakr, Umar,
Uthman, and Ali - the different aspects of the office became less
closely linked, and in the Umayyad Caliphate military power became
the real basis of rule, but this actual disestablishment of the political
and religious foundations of the State was never admitted theoretically.138
This meant that the various Caliphs could (and did) emphasize the
various aspects of their office in different ways. The early Caliphs held
three titles: Khalifa, Amir ul-Muminin, and Imam; 139 the first stressed
his relation to the Prophet, the second accentuated his supreme authority
as warlord and head of the civil administration, the last his religious
functions. But not all Caliphs laid the same emphasis on each title.
The Umayyad Caliphs were in the first place Amir ul-Muminin; the
Abbasids, however, stressed their title of Imam. Sceptre and seal were
the symbols of the Umayyads; for the Abbasids it was the mantle
of the Prophet. 140
And it was not only the Caliphs who viewed the exact meaning of
their office in different ways; European theorists were apt to do so too.
So Gibb, for instance, writes: "The Caliph, by position and function,
is the temporal embodiment of the Sacred Law in Islam; he is the
person who is charged with the duty of maintaining its supremacy both
against external enemies and internal rebels. Being himself bound by
the Law, he may neither modify it nor interpret it in his own respon-
sibility, but is concerned solely with the task of applying it, and in the
carrying out of this purpose he is entitled to claim from all Moslems
the same unhesitating obedience as they owe to the Law itself. His
office is thus essentially apolitical one, but the sanctions on which his
authority is based are primarily religious." 141 There is no great dif-
ference between this characteristic of the Caliphal office and the one
given by Arnold: "For the understanding of the status of the Caliph,
it is important therefore to recognize that he is pre-eminently a political
functionary, and though he may perform religious functions, these
functions do not imply the possession of any spiritual powers setting
him thereby apart from the rest of the faithful." 142 Yet the attitude
of these authors is not quite the same; Gibb recognizes the claims the
Caliph has to support from aU Muslims, owing to the religious aspects
of his office, whereas Amold stresses the religious equality of the Caliph
and other Muslims. 143
The point may be, in this case, that Amold wanted to refute certain
claims the Ottoman Caliphs had put forward since the 18th century,
using to their advantage the fact that Europeans were inclined to think
in terms of entirely separate functions between which Muslims never
made sharp distinctions. By this means, they succeeded in getting
accepted the contention that they held religious authority over Muslims
outside their territory, since European powers supposed these claims
to have no political consequences. When the Russians perceived that
this religious authority, acknowledged by themselves in the aforemen-
tioned treaty of Küchük Kainarji of 1774, did have political implications,
they wanted to delete the relevant clauses of the treaty in 1783. 144
Nevertheless, in the first decades of the 20th century the Sultan succeeded
in getting similar clauses into his treaties with Austria (1908), Italy
(1912), and Bulgaria and Greece (1913).145 When after World War I
the Ottoman Empire was carved up, whether these claims should be
met or not became an important issue, and the India Office - one
of whose top advisers in these matters was Amold - wanted to exclude
from the treaty of Sèvres any article on which the Sultan would be
able to base pretensions to obedience of Muslims outside Turkey. This
may explain why Amold - and other contemporary authors like Snouck
Hurgronje and Nallino, who were aware of the dangers of the position-
assumes a very strict attitude, whereas Gibb, writing ten years later
when Caliphal pretensions were no longer to be feared, used a less
exclusive formula. And even in the years about 1920 not everybody was
fuUy aware of the political implications of recognizing some kind of
religious authority of the Caliph: the Govemment of India, for instance,
was ready to give in to Muslim desires in this respect, and some Cabinet
ministers in London at first took the same position. 146
Related to this whole problem is the question of whether the Caliph's
position could be compared with the Pope's. Though this comparison
had forced itself on many authors as early as the Crusades/47 there
seems to be an overwhelming case against it: the Caliph is not a priest
working the miracle of the mass; he has no power to absolve sins; he
has no authority to create, to judge, or to interpret religious dogma. 148
Considering this state of affairs, the Caliph could hardly be styled
the "spiritual head" of Islam. Yet this was what was done by many
Muslims after the Ottoman Sultan had put forward his claim in the
18th century. This idea - encouraged by western misunderstandings
about the nature of his position - found support with many Muslims,
both inside and outside Turkey.149 And if this view was correct, then
the Caliph had to be "something more than a Pope"/50 because of the
close relations between religion and polities in Islam, and the Caliph's
obligation to defend the faith as a temporal ruler too.
Nor could the Caliph, if he was something more than a Pope, be
"vaticanized": the close interconnection of religion and temporal power
did not permit this solution. And yet this was exactly what the Turkish
government did in 1922. How could this come about? We will examine
this question in fuller detail later, but we would like here to say one
thing about it: the main reason seems to be that westernized Muslims
clearly saw the drawbacks of the close connection between religion and
polities, and since a constitutional and responsible government would
be incompatible with the traditional conception of the Caliphate, they
wanted to separate religion from temporal power. We may observe this
trend with the Young Turks 151 and, in a far less outspoken form, with
Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who warned his co-religionists not to confuse
religious and political issues. 152 This view was one of the causes of the
neutral attitude most Muslims assumed when in 1914 the Sultan-Caliph
called on their loyalty.
Thus we have established, if we may sum up the foregoing in a very
generalized way, three views on the nature of the Caliphate. Western
scholars, in conformity with orthodox Muslim opinion, regarded it as
a predominantly political office, having religious implications but no
religious authority. Westernized Muslims - though not all of them,
certainly, - reached the conclusion that the Caliph should be "vatica-
nized" and his office be deprived of all political meaning. And lastly
the Pan-Islamic view wanted to restore the Caliphate to all its possi-
bilities, investing it with political and religious authority. But we should
bear in mind that the attitudes asswned in practical polities do not
always correspond to the theoretical views of those professing them.
So the Agha Khan writes: "According to the Sunni School - the
majority of Muslims - the Prophet's religious authority came to an
end at his death, and ... Abu Bakr assumed only the civil and secular
power." 153 But in the same book he teUs us how in 1920, together with
Amir Ali, he advocated recognizing the Sultan's "spiritual suzerainty"
in the provinces the Ottoman Empire was going to lose. 154 On the other
hand, as we will see later, many Indian Muslims who had been the
staunch supporters of the view that the Caliph needed sufficient tem-
poral power to enable him to fulfil his religious duties, rather easily
accepted the fact that the Angora govemment deprived him of all
temporal power. It is clear that political expedience often got the
upper hand over theoretical objections.
Another question was whether the Ottoman Sultan rightly claimed
the Caliphate or not: a somewhat complicated problem because several
factors could be taken into account. A first point to consider is the
attitude of the Shias, who generally hold that the Imamate descends
by divine appointment in the apostolical line; they repudiate the
authority of the believers to elect a spiritual head, and reject also
military power, or conquest of de facto power as claims to religious
leadership. They do not acknowledge the Prophet's successors as Imams;
in consequence, to them the Sultan-Caliph of Turkey was nothing more
than the ruler of a Muslim state. It was only the twelfth Imam, having
disappeared but still living on "unseen but seeing", who could reappear
and could re-establish the universal Caliphate. 155 This, howcver, is the
theoretical position. In practice, the Shias were less averse to acknow-
ledge the Sultan of Turkey as their leader. Abdul Hamid tried to win
a following among Persian Shias and Jamal-ud-din made some efforts
in that direction too; 156 we have already observed how the Agha Khan,
the religious leader of the Shia Ismaili sect, supported the claim of the
Turkish Sultan to religious suzerainty over Syria, Arabia and Mesopo-
tamia: two indications that the Sunni-Shia schism was not too important
wh en af ter 1880 the advocates of Pan-Islamism centred their efforts
round the Sultan-Caliph of Turkey.
But there were other things to consider. Very general among Muslims
was the special admiration they feIt towards the Caliphate of the first
four "rightly guided" Caliphs. 157 This in their eyes was the ideal Islamic
state, the "golden age" when Islamic ideals of democracy and social
justice were realized - two values they felt Muslim society in the last
part of the 19th century was badly lacking.
But when the fourth Caliph, Ali, met his death by murder, the
Umayyads founded a temporal monarchy. Now two lines of reasoning
could be followed. Even when realizing that the true Caliphate belonged
to the past,t5S it was possible either to accommodate some of the facts
to theory, or to formulate a new theory that better fitted in with the
real facts. The first course was chosen by traditional Muslim thinkers,
the second by Ibn Khaldun. 159 But then there was still another solution:
if only the "rightly guided" Caliphs were true on es, they were succeeded
46
by rulers not deserving the titlel In support of this view a saying of the
Prophet could be referred to, that the Caliphate was to last for thirty
years after his death. This argument was advanced by Sir Sayyid Ahmad
Khan, and he concluded from it that certainly the Ottoman Sultan was
no Caliph of Indian Muslims. 160
But even when accepting the view that the Caliphate in a more or
less corrupted state had survived af ter its spell of pristine glamour and
purity, one could raise other objections to the Ottoman claim on it.
Did the Ottoman Sultans meet the requirements of a Caliph? There
were quite a few of these, like being of blameless character, having
sufficient knowledge of the sharia, being brave and intelligent, and so
on 161 - qualifications that were as reasonable to demand from, as they
were easy to ascribe to, any candidate. But two requirements were of
special significance: the Caliph should possess sufficient power to be
able to protect the faith and the faithful, and he should belong to the
tribe of the Quraish. The first condition constituted a strong argument
in favour of the Ottoman Sultan; about the year 1900 he was the only
Muslim sovereign who, to some extent at least, could shoulder this task.
This was one of the grounds on which, twenty years later, the Khilafat
leaders based their demand that the Sultan-Caliph should not lose too
large a part of his territories, for if he did, he would no longer be able
to perform the duties that went with his exalted office.
The second condition certainly made the Sultan's claim somewhat
dubious, the more so because there was another ruler who did satisfy
it: the Sharif of Mecca. But the Sultan's partisans could point out some
facts in his favour. History had legitimated the position of Caliphs who
did not belong to the Quraish, and secondly, it was not the Prophet
himself who had said that the Caliph should be of this tribe, but Abu
Bakr, and he had said so because in his time only a member of this
tribe would command sufficient prestige. 162 So it was possible to treat
this requirement as a "technicality" which could not be a serious
objection to the Sultan's claim/63 and to most Indian Muslims some
kind of allegiance to the Sultan-Caliph was fully acceptable. l64
Another fact - to be correct: an illusion, but an illusion one thinks
to be true has all the appearances and effects of a fact - stimulating
Muslim loyalty towards the Ottoman Sultan was the transfer of the
Caliphate by the last Abbasid Caliph Mutawakkil to the Ottoman
Sultan Selim I in 1517. After the sack of Baghdad the Abbasid Caliphate
had been "restored" in Egypt, but the Caliphs in the next two and
a half centuries were mere showpieces, serving only to legitimate the
actual Mamluk rolers. The Caliph's name was not even mentioned in
the khutba (the Friday prayer), nor did his effigy appear on coins. 165
This restored Caliphate lasted until 1517, when Selim conquered Egypt
and Mutawakkil handed over his office and its symbols - th.e Prophet's
mantle, some hairs from his beard and the sword of Umar - to the
victor. Thus, at least, rons the story of these happenings as accepted
by Muslim historians in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 166
Even when accepted in this form, some objections could be raised -
and in fact were raised by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and some of his
followers - against the proceedings. Selim became master of Egypt
by murder and treason; he waded through a sea of blood of troe
believers to reach his goaL167 Moreover, Mutawakkil, a puppet of the
Mamluks, having no real power, was no true Caliph - so how could
he hand down an office he never really held? 168 And then there was
the attack of modern western scholars who proved that the story of a
formal deed of transfer in 1517 was a fiction, dating from the last part
of the 18th century and propped up by the Ottoman Sultans because
it served their political interest. 160
But notwithstanding these possible objections, the official story was
generally accepted in the Muslim world, unshaken. It is curious to note
how relatively little use was made of these arguments against it by
Muslim adversaries of the Khilafat movement. Therefore we may
assume that, on the whoie, Indian Muslims in the late 19th and early
20th centuries considered the Ottoman Caliphate as valid. Once more
we conclude that political and sentimental arguments counted for more
than theoretical considerations.
This brings up a last question related to the Caliphate: why were
Indian Muslims attracted by the idea of the Ottoman Caliphate, and
wh at did it mean to them? In the Khilafat movement Indian Muslims
played a more important role than any other Muslims outside Turkey;
in the 19th century pro-Turkish sentiments were fairly common among
Indian Muslims, as we pointed out in connection with the Deoband
school. It was also the Pan-Islamic enthusiasm of his compatriots which
prompted Sir Sayyid's warnings against confusion of political and
religious issues. So we may assume that Turkey, the Caliphate and
Pan-Islamism - three closely interrelated issues between which often
no clear distinctions may be made, not even by the people attracted by
them - held some significanee for them.
One reason why Indian Muslims were perhaps more pro-Turkish
than Muslims elsewhere, may be that Indian Muslims did not know
the Turks very weIl. Tbe Arab peoples knew them better, and their
acquaintance with Turkish rule could hardly make them love it. But
side by side with this explanation there is probably another one, to
which maqy authors on the subject call attention. Gopal writes: "The
Turkish Empire, ruled by a Muslim Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, who also
enjoyed the unique position of the Khalifa (Caliph), was the pride of
most Muslims of tbe world, especially those whose primary loyalty was
to the Khalifa, and not to the nation of which tbey were citizens." 170
Here it is suggested that an unsatisfactory situation with respect to
national feelings could make Muslims susceptible to an extra-territorial
allegiance. Now the identity of Indian Muslims was tbreatened by
dangers from two sides: from tbe British, who had put an end to
Mughul power, but also from the Hindus, who could smother the
Indian Muslim minority if ever India became independent. Bath
dangers were apt to strengthen feelings of Muslim solidarity without
regard to state frontiers, and to make Indian Muslims look for help
and sympathy from Turkey. A dear example of the high hopes cherished
by them in this respect was given by Amir Ali, who in 1909 told Morley
that "any injustice and any suspicion tbat the British were unjust to
Mohammedans in India would provoke a serious and injurious reaction
in Constantinople." 171 And though admiration for Turkey and Pan-
Islamism, and attachment to the Caliphate are certainly not one and
the same, the Caliph was the most obvious symbol to embody Islamic
solidarity.
It is, of course, very difficult or even impossibie to discern which
of the two dangers mentioned figured primarily in orientating Indian
Muslims towards an extra-territorial allegiance. 17!l The subsequent
history of the Khilafat movement will produce evidence of the inextric-
able tangle of anti-British and anti-Hindu feelings in Muslim India.
CHAPTER III
TOWARDS A HINDU-MUSLIM ENTENTE
In the preceding chapter we established the fact that since 1885

Congress had tried to give shape to a truly Indian nationalism but -
partly at any rate - was prevented from doing so because the neo-Hindu
renaissance brought an unmistakably communal trend into it. 1 This
was the main reason why Muslims abstained more and more from
participating in Congress.
In thc first decade of the 20th century several things happened
which could not but intensify the Hindu-Muslim antagonism. The first
of these was the partition of Bengal in 1905, the scheme of which was
announced by Lord Curzon in 1903. By 1900, the province of Bengal
had 78 million inhabitants, and East and West Bengal contrasted sharply
in economie development as weIl as in religion, East Bengal being poor
and Muslim and West Bengal predominantly Hindu and more pros-
perous. In our opinion, Curzon's first intention was probably to realize
an administrative improvement, wholly in keeping with his saying that
"efficiency of administration" was "a synonym for the contentment
of the governed." 2
But it was not received in this spirit. Bengali politicalleaders regarded
it as an attempt to crush the rise of Bengali nationalism and to alienate
the Muslims from the Hindus. 3 There was some reason for this sup-
p03ition, as the Lt. Governor of Bengal, Sir Andrew Fraser, recommended
the scheme for the political profit that might be gained from it: it
would liberate East Bengal from the political influence of Calcutta with
its Hindu Congress lawyers. 4 And at any rate, a consequence of the
partition was that a new province, preponderantly Muslim, was created,
and so the Muslims gained influence in the process. Curzon must have
been acquainted with the Lt. Governor's suggestion - but that does
not prove that he adopted it himself, and certainly not that it became
his main motive. His private letters to Hamilton, 5 the then Secretary
of State for India and an old friend of Curzon, never show any allusion
to a secret aim of dividing Hindus and Muslims on this question or
anything of the kind, and Curzon does not seem to be the man to hide
any such considerations if he had them, at least not in his private
utterances. 6 One striking aspect of the partition was that the opposition
against it rose rather unexpectedly; it was only after it started that
Curzon toured East-Bengal. Had Curzon been planning his measure
as a subde move in a political game, one would expect him to have
prepared the whole business politicaIly. One may wonder, of course,
why he did not mind public opinion when it manifested itself rather
loudly against partition, the more so because he used to defend his
plans in London with an appeal to public opinion. Here we think
Ronaldshay's explanation very plausible: Curzon had not much respect
for Indian public opinion. He would decide for himself whether it had
any value or not - if it was in conformity with his own opinion it had,
and he would use it as an argument, but if it went against his own
opinion it had not, and he feit entitled to ignore it. 7
But whatever Curzon's intentions may have been, one effect of the
partition certainly was that the Hindu-Muslim antagonism was stimu-
lated. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who at this time made his first
contact with Bengali revolutionaries like Aurobindo Ghosh, found them
hostile towards Muslims because they lent themselves to the British
political game. 8 Nirad C. Chaudhuri mentions that it was in those years
th at something changed in the personal relations between Hindus and
Muslims in Bengal, even among schoolboys: the Hindu boys did not
look upon the Muslims as their comrades any longer, but as the
representatives of a hostiIe groUp.9 Moreover, the partition promoted
the alliance between westemized Hindus and religious revivalists, and
therefore could not but repel the Muslims. 10
A second event with most fateful consequences was the granting of
a new instalment of reforms, known as the Morley-Minto reforms of
1909, involving the institution of separate electorates and bringing in
its train the founding of the Muslim League. It would not do here to
go into aII the details of this story, and we will confine ourselves to a
brief exposition of some of the facts.
When Curzon left India in November, 1905, he was replaced by the
Unionist Lord Minto. But Minto had hardly left England when
Balfour's Conservative govemment lost office and so for the next five
years Minto had to team up with the Radical Lord Morley as a Secretary
of State for India. They inaugurated a new period in British-Indian
history which Spear calIs "Edwardian India" (1905-1914), character-
izing it by two watchwords: "Freedom rather than discipline, autonomy
111. TOWARDS A HINDU·MUSLIM ENTENTE 51
rather than efficiency"Y Morley, who had discussed the situation in

India with Gokhale several times, announced, on July 20, 1906, that
reforms were being contemplated. 12 As it was clear that these would
tend towards an enlargement of the elected element in the legislative
councils, the Muslims realized that they should do something to safe-
guard their position. The Secretary of Aligarh College, Mohsin-ul-Mulk,
wrote to Archbold, the College principal, expressing their wish to plead
their cause with the Viceroy. On October 1, 1906, Minto received a
deputation of thirty-five prominent Muslims, headed by the Agha Khan,
at Simla. They urged the institution of separate electorates 13 to ensure
a fair representation 14 of the Muslim minority and Minto gave them a
reassuring answer.
In these circumstances the Muslim leaders feit that a political or-
ganization was needed too. For the time being, the Secretary of State
and the Viceroy had only more or less vague plans, the definite moulding
of which might call for Muslim pressure. 15 At any rate, reforms would
increase the importance of elections and so an organization was wanted
to manage them. But apart from these considerations of current interest,
Hindu revivalism had made the Muslims look for organization in order
to safeguard what they felt to be their rights. As early as 1900, when
Urdu lost its privileged position in the u.P., Mohsin-ul-Mulk founded
the Urdu Defence Association, which was not merely a linguistic and
cuItural body but had political significance as well. 16 In 1903 the
Muhammadan Political Association came into being in the U.P.p and
in the spring of 1906 Fazli-Husain founded in Lahore a Muslim League,18
which a year later was merged into the All-India Muslim League. This
latter body had been founded at Dacca on December 30, 1906, by the
same group of men who had taken the initiative for the Simla deputation.
lts first secretaries were Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-Mulk, and from
March, 1908 the Agha Khan was its Permanent President. 10 One might
say the League was characterized by this choice: an upper class Muslim,
on excellent terms with the British.
Finally the proposed reforms took the form of the Indian Councils
Act of 1909. The long lapse of time between the first plans and their
final execution suggests some difficuIties, which indeed did exist. Minto
and Morley did not have quite the same ideas on the measures that
were to be taken; in particular, Morley developed misgivings about
separate electorates. This explains why it took a long time for the plans
to mature and why a man like Gokhale, who as late as 1908 had
welcomed the reforms,20 denounced the Act in its definite shape, and
especiaIly the regulations attached to it by the Government of India. 21

The main interest these developments have for our subject may be
expressed in two questions: what were the British intentions behind
them?, and: how did they effect Hindu-Muslim relations?
Quite a few authors answer the former question in approximately
the following manner:
1. The Simla deputation was engineered by the Government of India;
2. The founding of the Muslim League was prompted by the same;
3. The granting of separate electorates to the Muslims was inspired
by the British desire to intensify communal tension between Hindus
and Muslims.
These contentions of course are interrelated; they constitute the
expression of a certain view of British policy in those years. 1l2 The
discussion in this case centers round two crucial points: Who did take
the initiative for the deputation?, and: What did Minto aim at when
he insisted on creating separate electorates?
As to the first point: none of the writers that suppose that the
initiative came from Simla - or from Mr. Archbold, the then principal
of Aligarh College, who was in close touch with Simla - is able to give
definite proof of this assertion. The reception the deputation got from
Minto proves that he welcomed it, but that in itself does not prove he
provoked it. The first known letter referring to apossibie deputation
is one from Mohsin-ul-Mulk to Archbold 23 and it does not contain
any evidence of being sollicited by the recipient. A previous verbal
request not alluded to is, of course, not out of the question, but if the
deputation came about by deliberate British planning, it is hardly
probable that no clear and unambiguous testimony to such a request
should have emerged. As it is, accusations of this kind are conspicuously
vague. Muhammad Ali, being among the first members of the Muslim
League,24 might have been in the possession of the facts and would
not have desisted from making them public, but he substantiates his
accusation that the deputation was a "command performance" only
with the words: "From whatever source the inspiration may have
come ... " 25 And did the men who went to Simla and afterwards founded
the Muslim League, need much British prompting? We should think
not, since the desire for privileges and the wish to organize politically
had already existed for some years. 26 Therefore, we doubt whether
deliberate British scheming may be assumed to be at the root of the
Simla deputation and the subsequent founding of the Muslim League. 27
The question of British aims and intentions in creating separate
electorates is, of course, another matter, but in this respect too absolute
proofs are not to be expected. We think the following interpretation 28
is, in itself, plausible. Separate electorates were planned and put through
by Minto; Morley, who had at first approved of them,29 afterwards had
his doubts about the wisdom of the proposal and put forward another
scheme. That Morley finally gave in to Minto in this respect may be
caused by the fact that he did not see the reforms as a definite step
towards parliamentary democracy; he looked upon the councils as a
kind of durbars, where subjects could bring their wishes and grievances
before the ruler. 30
Minto, however, in conformity with Whig principles, was looking for
representation of the various interests. This was why he wanted to take
into account not only the vocal middle class which mainly constituted
the Congress, but other groups too. At first he considered a Council of
Indian Princes; only later did he develop his scheme of separate elec-
torates for the Muslims, the big landowners and the Chambers of
Commerce. Repeatedly he said that he wanted to create a counterpoise,
but this should not be eXplained in the sense of a Muslim counterpoise
against Hindus, but as a counterpoise against the professional middle
classes, which tended to monopolize the political voice of India. 3l Minto
was certainly suspicious of Congress, but it was especially the Extremist
group in it that he distrusted.
On the other hand, Minto's remarks about the "counterpoise" might
be interpreted 32 in the sense of a Muslim counterpoise against the
national movement of Congress, into which the emerging Muslim middle
class would irresistibly be drawn if there were no separate electorates.
It is clear that at least some people in government circles were thinking
along these lines; Lady Minto's well-known entry in her diary 33 proves
it. In our opinion, it is not at all impossible that these different intentions
mingled in Minto's mind. Af ter all, it must have been attractive for
him to do what he thought was good for India as weIl as for the
British hold over it.
The question remains: how were Hindu-Muslim relations affected
by the founding of the Muslim League and the reforms? Here the
answer is less difficult, as most authors agree on this point: they
deteriorated. The Congress press criticized the birth of the new party 34
and in 1909 Congress passeä four resolutions disapproving of the creation
of separate electorates on the basis of religion. 35 These were to remain
a stumbling block in Hindu-Muslim relations throughout the next
decades - the period from 1917 until about 1925 excepted. Even
Gokhale, who tried to co-operate with the government and to work

the reforms, and who acknowledged that provisionally separate elec-
torates might be needed, thought that the reforms went too far in this
respect. 36 But tensions increased not only between Hindus and Muslims,
but also between Muslims themselves: the pro-British attitude displayed
by the League did not find favour with the Deoband ulama,37 and
Jinnah, who was a member of Congress and in the next few years was
going to eam for himself the reputation of being a champion of Hindu-
Muslim unity, was considered by the Agha Khan as "our doughtiest
opponent in 1906." 38
The Muslim League had set itself three tasks: promoting 10yaIty
towards the British govemment, advancing the political rights and
interests of lndian Muslims, and fostering good relations with other
communities. But this did not mean that all its members intended
meekly to accept everything that came from government; 39 men like
Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-Mulk were high-spirited enough to voice
a strong protest whenever they feit that justice was not being done to
their cause. And precisely in the years preceding W orld War I they
of ten experienced such a feeling. We have already mentioned how the
Govemment of the U.P. in 1900 accepted Hindi as an officiallanguage
and how consequently Urdu lost its privileged position. Mohsin-ul-Mulk
reacted by founding the Urdu Defence Association, but by doing so
incurred the anger of the Lt. Govemor Sir Antony Macdonnell, who
threatened to withdraw the govemment grant to Aligarh College 40 (of
which Mohsin-ul-Mulk was the Secretary). The latter then wanted to
resign from his post at Aligarh, but was finally persuaded by his friends
to withdraw from the Association, which meant the early end of this
movement. This conflict, and in particular the high-handed manner in
which govemment handled it "hurt all self-respecting Muslims and paved
the way for the success of those who were opposed to Sir Syed's policy." 41
Aligarh College, originally intended to be a stronghold of Anglo-
Muslim friendship, in the next few years became the centre of more
confliets. The first concemed the competence of the Principal and the
European staff, and finally caused the retirement of Mr. Archbold
in 1908. An interesting aspect of this struggle was that a society of
former Aligarh pupils, the "Aligarh Old Boys", of which Shaukat Ali
at that time was the Honorary Secretary, took the lead in the opposition
- but it was not only the younger generation which took offence at
British tutelage, for they were suported by Viqar-ul-Mulk (who had
succeeded Mohsin-ul-Mulk af ter the latter's death in 1907), by the
Agha Khan and Amir Ali. 42 And a few years later a scheme for raising
the College to university status occasioned fresh difficulties with British
authorities. 43 Aligarh College, in those years, certainly did not wholly
deserve Shibli's abuse, who onee called it "an institution for the training
in slavery." 44
But in the meantime a more important matter had come up: the
partition of Bengal was annulled. This setback to the Muslims was
compensated for by the removal of the capital to Delhi, the ancient
centre of the Mughul Empire, but nevertheless many Muslims were
highly indignant at the proceedings; moreover, they feIt that the Hindus
by bitter and sometÎInes even violent opposition had got what they
wanted, whereas Muslim loyalty had been rewarded by betrayal. 45 Some
Muslim leaders tried to calm their followers down; the Agha Khan,
Viqar-ul-Mulk and Amir Ali advised them to refrain from any protest
against the decÎsion. 46 The consequence was that younger and more
radical elements - probably also representing a shift from Muslim
upper class towards middle class 47 - got the upper hand in the Muslim
League: the Agha Khan resigned as its President in 1912.48 Influential
Muslim leaders like Shibli and Abul Kalam Azad, both of them con-
nected with the Deoband school, poured out their scorn and satire over
the old Aligarh leaders. 49
All these happenings, by the way, do not suggest a divide-and-rule
policy of the British in those years. If they had tried to unite Hindus
and Muslims in an anti-British front, they could hardly have done
better than rebuff the Muslims in the way they did. This, of course, is
no proof as to their intentions, since the effects of a policy are not
always those that are hoped for, but it is scarcely probabie that British
policy-makers, had they been intent on keeping Hindus and Muslims
at daggers drawn, would have. acted as they actually did. Rather than
accuse them of malice, we might blame them for a certain naÏveté or
clumsiness, as was displayed by Lord Hardinge, Minto's successor as a
Viceroy, advocating the reversalof the partition of Bengal by pointing
out to Lord Crewe, the then Secretary of State for India, that this
might bring Hindus and Muslims doser together. 50 He would not have
expected that this unity was going to be of an anti-British disposition.
Nor was this all. In the same years British foreign policy left Turkey
in the lurch and threw otner independent or semi-independent Muslim
states to the wolves. This of course is a very one-sided view of the facts,
but it was the way Indian Muslims looked at things. As an example
we quote Shaukat Ali: "England deliberately in the last few years
56
conciliated her European neighbours and brought them to her side, thus
isolating her great riyal Germany, but at the expense of the weak
Muslim states. France was givcn a free hand in Morocco and Northern
Africa, Persia was thrown over to Russia and she hers elf took the dainty
morselof Egypt. Turkey and the Moslem World were watching this
change with pain and wonder. The result of all this was that gradually
Moslems all over the world felt that they could not rely on England
as a friend. The last Balkan War cleared the vision and gave unmistak-
able proofs of how things were being arranged. 51
On the other hand, we should probably not exaggerate the anti-British
feeling behind such utterances. Faruqi explains them 52 as a composite
reaction to Hindu revivalism, the Hindu solidarity which had been
greatly increased by the partition of Bengal, the British policy with
respect to Turkey, and the nationalist movements in Persia and Turkey
which inspired Indian Muslims. This strange mixture of motivations
may have caused some of the inconsistencies of Muslim behaviour.
While denouncing British policy towards Turkey, Muhammad Ali in
1911 opened a relief fund for Turkish victims of the war over Tripoli
(and later on of the Balkan wars). When he got news that medical aid
would be particularly welcome, the fund was used to equip a medical
mission headed by Dr. Ansari, who left India in December, 1912 and
came back in July, 1913. 53 But it is interesting to note how Muhammad
Ali, at every step he took with respect to his fund and the mission,
sought official and personal co-operation from the British side, going
as far as enlisting the Viceroy as a Patron of the Delhi Red Crescent
Society and organizing his relief work through British consular officers.
And when World War I broke out, the field hospital which had been
financed out of the Comrade Turkish Relief Fund was presented to the
Medical Service in India! This hardly suggests a consistent anti-British
feeling - even though this was certainly one of the components of
Muslim sentiment in India in those years. 54
This is not surprising when we realize that Muhammad Ali, like many
of the young Muslim leaders who came to the fore shortly before the
war, was an Aligarh pupil, and even if Aligarh had changed, it retained
much of its founder's spirit. ss Bom in 1878 into a fairly weIl-to-do, but
not rich, family of Muslim landowners in Rampur State, he went to
school at Bareilly and afterwards to Aligarh, where he joined his six
years older brother Shaukat. It was Shaukat who, af ter Muhammad's
first success at Allahabad University, collected the money that enabled
hls younger brother to go to Oxford -- a feat "nothing short of a
miracle", as the latter said. 56 At Oxford he failed to pass the LC.S.

examination and he left in 1902. It is, by the way, remarkable that
quite a few young Indians who later came to the fore in the nationalist
movement were unsuccessful I.C.S. candidates. 57 It must have been
a painful experience for these young men, intelligent, ambitious, and
enthusiastic, first to opt for identification with their foreign masters
and then to be rejected.
Muhammad Ali got a second rebuff when in 1902, on his return to
India, he tried to get a post at Aligarh College, but was rejected by
the Principal, Morison, who thought him too self-willed and head-
strong. 58 He then entered the service of the Gaekwar of Baroda, which
he left in 1910 to set out on a journalistic career by starting the Comrade.
"The Comrade - 'comrade of all and partisan of none' - was to ...
prepare the Musalmans to make their proper contribution to territorial
patriotism without abating a jot of the fervour of their extraterritorial
sympathies which is the quintessence of Islam." 59 These lines suggest
the blend of Muhammad Ali's motives in this period of his life: com-
munal, national and Pan-Islamic. 60 He wanted to serve the secular
interests of his community, aspiring at the same time af ter good relations
with the Hindu community, but warning the leaders of both communities
that they should not think too much of inessential successes in this
respect, nor "mistake aspiration for achievement." 61 Sometimes he was
rather bitter in his criticism of Hindu practices 62 and he certainly did
not fail to back up Muslim demands, for instance when arguing that
Urdu should be the lingua franca of India. 63 After all, he was among
the first seventy members of the Muslim League. That was why for
some time to come he could not strike a definitely anti-British note;
this is attested even by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who in 1910 advised him
to go through with his Comrade project and in his memoirs wrote about
it: "At first the tone was extremely humorous, but not anti-British." 64
Muhammad Ali made a good journalist. His arguing is clear and his
style shows a happy blend of rational thinking, passion and wit. Even
now some of his contributions make very pleasant reading, which can
hardly be said about all journalistic production of some fifty years ago.
His articles give evidence of an intelligent probing of the European
press (British, French, German and Austrian newspapers) and of his-
torical knowiedge, but, remarkably enough, he seems to have lacked
direct information from Muslim countries like Egypt, Turkey, Morocco,
etc. 65 In addition to the Comrade, he published an Urdu paper, the
H amdard, and both of them met with a good reception, and not only
among the middle class; they must have evoked some interest among
the lower classes toO. 66
It was only during his internment from 1915 to 1919 that religion
became important for him, and then all-important. From his Auto-
biography one gets the impression of a conversion. 67 He describes how
the undisturbed calm of his enforced retreat, coinciding with a nearly
fatal illness suffered by his wife from which she recovered "as by a
miracle", brought him to introspection. "For the first time in my life
I read the Quran through in an intelligent and comprehending man-
ner . . . I could . . . truly say that a compensating Providence had seen
to it that in losing almost all else 1 should at long last find life rich
in content and purposeful, the real thing for the first time and no sham
or simulacrum." 68 He calls himself "a convert", ad ding that precisely
for this reason he was possessed by enthusiasm and wanted to preach
Islam, the true faith of universal fratemity, exposing nationalism as
"a narrow prejudice".69 When he discovered similar ideas in the work
of Wells, he "felt an inconquerable craving to go to Europe and preach
Islam to these heathens who had set up races and nationalities and
States as idols to worship in the temple that should have been dedicated
to the one God, the ruler of an undivided mankind." 70 President Wilson's
message confirmed his belief that a new era was dawning af ter the
terrible nightmare of the war. Tl An expectancy of salvation rings through
his words. In the years to come the Caliphate was to him in the first
instance a religious concept. His burial at the Mosque of Umar at
Jerusalem on January 23, 1931 was truly in keeping with his personality.
His brother Shaukat, who with him became a leader of the Khilafat
movement, was inspired by mainly the same ideals. Of more robust
health - his brother Muhammad was a diabetic and often incapacitated
by his ailment - he was certainly a competent organizer and capable
of great devotion to a cause, but he was not a bom leader; whereas
Muhammad Ali might be called a general, "Shaukat Ali was a soldier
and disdained the responsibilities of a commander." 72
Having taken his degree at Aligarh in 1896, he became an officer
of the Opium Department where most of his colleagues, with whom
he had very friendly relations, 73 were British. This is according to
his own words, but that he cannot have been really anti-British in those
years is corroborated by the fact that in 1911 and 1912 he acted as
private secretary to the Agha Khan, who then toured India to collect
money for raising Aligarh College to the status of a university.74 He
then left the Opium Department altogether, since, to quote his own
lil. TOWARDS A HINDU·MUSLIM ENTENTE 59
words, "I had set my heart on devoting the rest of my life to the service
of my faith and my country."
We consider it significant that "faith" precedes "country"; it would
seem that with Shaukat the religious bent developed somewhat earlier
than with his brother. In 1913 he founded together with Maulana Abdul
Bari of Farangi Mahal at Lucknow the Jamiat-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba
(Servants of the Kaaba Society),75 which stated as its object "the
preservation of the sanctity of the Sacred Places from violation, serving
in every way the first centre of the Unity of Godhead ... and safe-
guarding it from non-Muslim usurpation." 76 The means to attain this
end would be mainly: the preaching of Islam, the establishment of
Muslim schools and promotion of the haj. There would be members,
contributing one rupee per year, and shaidais (votaries), who would
be fuIl-time workers for the Society. From the funds, one third should
"be sent every year to the independent Moslem Government that is the
Guardian of the Sacred PI aces on the strict condition that it shaIl be
spent only on the service of such places ..." 77 In about a year the
Society got over 20,000 members, including about 2,000 women. 78
Clearly the Khuddam-i-Kaaba could not but raise some suspicion
with the Government of India. It was a religious society, but not without
its political implications. This was evident from a contribution by the
founders in the Comrade,19 in which they stated as their motive that
Turkey was growing weaker and weaker, and that consequently the
Holy Places were increasingly endangered. Moreover, one third of its
funds would be made over to Turkey, as the Guardian of the Sacred
Places, and who could guarantee that this money would not be spent
on other purposes? And lastly, an organization with 400 "votaries" at
its disposal - this was the number aimed at - would make an excellent
instrument for espionage and illicit propaganda. So it is not to be
wondered at that his Khuddam-i-Kaaba activities were the main reason
for Shaukat Ali's internment. It is difficult to ascertain how good the
grounds for these suspicions were 80 - but at any rate, becoming the
collaborator of Abdul Bari and Mahmud-ul-Hasan after having been
secretary to the Agha Khan is evidence of a notabIe shift of sympathies.
But anti-British feeling was a much stronger motive in the activities
of Abul Kalam Azad. Bom in 1888 at Mecca - his father had left
India shortly af ter the Muûny - he received a throroughly traditional
Muslim training, at which he excelled. About 1905 he became acquainted
with the works of Sir Sayyid; he soon realized that knowledge of modern
science, philosophy and literature was indispensabIe. He went through
60
what he himself caUs "a spiritual crisis" 81 when he had to break away
from his traditional religious upbringing. This was the time when he
became a member of the Muslim League 82 about which, however,
he soon lost his illusions. 83 He was then strongly influenced by Shibli,
a fonner Aligarh professor who had left the college in 1898 to devote
himself to the Nadwat al-Ulama, an organization of orthodox scholars
opposed to Aligarh's liberalism in theology.84 Shibli considered Abul
Kalam Azad his disciple, his younger colleague and his successor. Both
of them evinced the same blend of modernism, Islamic romanticism
and Pan-Islamism which made them detractors of the Aligarh policy
and anti-British, and therefore the potential allies,85 politically, of
Congress and Deoband but, with regard to religion, too modernistic
to establish close ties with Deoband. 86
In 1908 Azad made a long journey through Iraq, Egypt, Syria and
Turkey where he had contacts with the Young Turks. Back in India
he started the publication of an Urdu weekly, Al Hilal (The Crescent),
reaching in two years a circulation of over 25,000 copies. From the
outset its trend was anti-Aligarh, anti-British and Pan-Islamic; it devoted
much attention to events in the Muslim world in genera1. 87
As a religious scholar, Azad was far more competent than Muhammad
Ali 88 and he became the principal theoretician of the Khilafat move-
ment. To him, one of the essentials of Islam is the international solidarity
of all Muslims, and the Caliph is the instrument through which this
solidarity is to be maintained. Aziz Ahmad summarizes his views on the
Caliphate as follows: "The foundations of Pan-lslamic society rest on
five sociological pillars: its adherence to a single caliph; its rallying to
his caU; its obedience to him; emigration from a dar al-harh, including
a former Muslim territory occupied by non-Muslims; and jihad which
could take several fonns."89 In Azad's view, the Caliph should be elected
by all Muslims, but if an election is impossible, power may legally invest
him; " ... a de facto Caliph, in the eyes of Azad, enjoys all the prerog-
atives of a de jure Caliph." 90 Azad does not think that one family or
race only is entitled to the Caliphate, and he is convinced that in 1517
Sultan Selim I legally took over the office from his last Abbasid pre-
decessor. Indian Muslims owe allegiance to the Ottoman Caliphs; the
Mughul Emperors were only "regional Caliphs" and when their power
came to an end in 1857, the universal Caliphate of the Ottoman Sultans
remained unshaken. 91
The concepts of hijrat and jihad indicate that Azad's notion of Mus-
lim solidarity was political as weIl as religious,92 and that his approach
III. TOWARDS A HINDU·MUSLIM ENTENTE 61
to the problems of Indian Muslims was not an altogether realistic one.

Together with Dr. Ansari, Abdul Bari and the Ali brothers he is num-
bered among the "Islamic romanticists" 03 who, however, played an
ever greater role in Muslim India in the first two decades of this century.
The personal relations between the foremost leaders, Azad and Muh-
ammad Ali, probably were not always of the best. Bamford supposes
that Muhammad Ali and Abdul Bari were jealous of Azad's growing
influence,94 and in a letter 95 to his brother Shaukat, Muhammad Ali
complains of not wholly fair and charitable criticisms from Azad. On
the other hand, Azad in his book on India's fight for freedom gives
the impression of being utterly convinced of hiw own importance,96
and quite capable of belittling his political friends. 91
One more Muslim leader who played an important role in those
years was Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan, also known as the Shaikh-ul-
Hind, who from 1905 was in charge of the Deoband seminary. He
realized that the younger generation of Aligarh pupils showed a less
subservient spirit, and acknowledged the ability of coming men like
Muhammad Ali and Azad 08 whose support he wanted to enlist. In 1909
he founded the Jamiat al-Ansar, an organization of former Deoband
pupils, directed by his disciple Obaidullah Sindhi, and in 1910 a mass
meeting of about 30,000 Muslims was staged where Aligarh people met
Deoband leaders. oo But Mahmud-ul-Hasan's ultimate aim was to expel
the British from India, with military support from Turkey and in close
co-operation with Iran and Afghanistan; 100 he also kept in touch with
the mujahidin on the Afghan border. His was a very militant brand
of Pan-Islamism.
Surveying Muslim reactions in India in those years preceding W orld
War I we may discern three main groups. First, the westernized middle
class influenced by the Aligarh tradition, men like the Ali brothers,
Dr. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan who, disillusioned by the set-backs
of the past few years, lost faith in British intentions and sought com-
pensation in a feeling of Islamic solidarity. These were the men who
came to the fore in the Muslim League after the Agha Khan had
resigned as its President, without however wholly dominating it. Islamic
solidarity brought them nearer to orthodoxy,1°1 and so they became the
potential allies of the second group - the ulama, led by men like Abdul
Bari and Mahmud-ul-Hasan, who wielded a much greater influence
among the Muslim masses. Both groups by their anti-British feeling -
much stronger with the second than with the first - were drawn towards
the third group: westernized Muslims whose outlook was not communal,
but national and secular, and who sided with the Congress. About 1910
the leadership of this group had fallen to Jinnah. 10\1
In the prevailing circumstances it became obvious that politically
minded Hindus and Muslims could join hands. In 1913 Wilfrid Scawen
Blunt advised Indian Muslims to do so in a long letter to Sayyid
Mahmud, which was widely published in India (first in the C omrade )
and had a great impact on the Muslim mind. 103 It was, however, Jinnah
who became the great "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity". In 1913
he met Muhammad Ali and Sayyid Wazir Hasan in London and was
persuaded by them to join the Muslim League; they wanted him "to
bring the policy of the League into line with the progressive and national
aims of the Congress." 104 In the same year the League's constitution
was altered; henceforth it stated as its object "the attainment under the
aegis of the British Crown of a system of self-government suitable to
India." 105 This was not quite what Congress wanted; the words "suitable
to India" meant that the Hindu-Muslim problem required continuation
of the separate electorates. Only a few years later this obstacle was
overcome.
But though we may note an increasing feeling of irritation against
the British on the part of Indian Muslims, their reaction at the outbreak
of the war was very satisfactory to their foreign rulers, as they them-
selves acknowledged. 106 The latter may not have been amazed at the
loyalty of the Indian Princes, who gave substantial support in money
and men; one of them, the (Muslim) Maharajah of Bikaner, even went
with his troops to Europe. 107 But that the medical outfit financed out
of the Comrade Turkish Relief Fund was handed over to them, might
have caused them some surprise; it proved that Pan-Islamic sentiment
could yet be combined with pro-British sympathies.
But soon the question arose as to whether Turkey would participate
in the war, and this meant quite a lot to Indian Muslims. Most of them
probably wanted it to stay neutral; this at least is the purport of an
article by Muhammad Ali, The Choice of the Turks. 10s Even if he told
the British some disagreeable truths in it, its whole tenor was not anti-
British; it was quoted with approval by the New Statesman and some
other English papers. 109 And yet this article was made the reason for
confiscation of the Comrade's security, which caused the New Statesman
to publish an editorial on "Encouraging Mohammadan Loyalty". It was
on Muhammad Ali's advice that Abdul Bari sent a telegram to the
Sultan, begging him "either to support Britain or to keep neutral in
this war",110 while Dr. Ansari and Muhammad Ali himself sent a similar
telegram to the Turkish Minister Talaat Bey.lll

When, however, Turkey entered the war in November 1914, it was
as an enemy of Britain, and this put many Muslims in a quandary. In
the third week of November the Sultan even declared jihad,1l2 but this
move met with remarkably little success. Some prominent Indian Muslim
leaders declared it to be not a religious war at all, but a political one;
consequently, Indian Muslims had to obey their sovereign, the King-
Emperor. 113
But nevertheless, this development put a severe strain on the Indian
Muslims' loyalty, especially when Asquith in a speech used strong
words and did "not hesitate to predict that (the Ottoman) Govern-
ment will perish by the sword. It is they and not we who have rung
the death-knell for Ottoman Dominion, not only in Europe but in
Asia. With the disappearance of Turkey, there will disappear, as I hope
and believe, the blight which for generations past has withered some
of the fairest regions." 114 Af ter all, the Sultan of Turkey was the Caliph
to whom most Indian Muslims feit that they owed at any rate a religious
allegiance; 115 it was exactly the fact of his being Caliph that was
affirmed by most of them and questioned only by a fewy6 To this
reason was added disgust at Russia's alliance with the British Empire.
Memories of British friendship for Turkey still existed, while Russia
was looked upon as the arch-enemy of freedom and humanity, and the
hereditary foe of Islam. l17
From this moment we may date the Khilafat movement, in so far
as some men centred their activities round the idea of assisting the
Caliphate in its troublesYs For the time being it was hardly organized
and not co-ordinated. Khaliquzzaman mentions 119 the isolated activities
of Maulana Abdul Bari at Lucknow, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad at
Calcutta, Mahmud-ul-Hasan at Deoband, and Hakim Ajmal Khan,
Dr. Ansari and the Ali brothers at Delhi.
Their action certainly made sense in that these men rightly suspected
that the Ottoman Caliphate was in very serious danger - more serious
indeed than most Indian Muslims realized, or than the British wanted
them to realize. Lord Crewe stated this in a letter to the Nation's editor,
Mr. Massingham: " ... we camlot by any means afford to dispense with
the advantage that we get - perhaps not quite legitimately - from
the fact that Mahomedan opinion in India remains fairly steady simply
because it is in a state of confusion about the future, and has by no
means squarely faced the prospect, tolerably obvious and not unwelcome
to us, of the final exit of the last great Moslem secular Power." There-
64
fore he did not want to clarify Britain's objects with regard to Turkey
too soon, in order "to have it both ways", as he himself expressed it. 120
Now the Caliphate could very weIl be at stake in an action against
"the last great Moslem secular Power." For quite a few years past
Britain - or at least some Britons - had already been playing with the
idea of an Arab Caliphate. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt was one of them, and
the Ottoman Sultan in 1891 suspected that malicious plans were being
hatched between the British government and Pan-Islamists like Jamal-
ud-din Afghani. 121 In 1906 the question was raised by an article in the
Spectator which caused the Government of India to ask some authorities
for an opinion; these, however, strongly advised against bringing up the
matter of the Sultan's title to the Caliphate, sinee most Muslims would
be suspicious of the intentions behind a move of this kind. 122 In those
years ideas like this were wholly speculative - but they took on a
colour of alarming reality af ter the outbreak of the war, and especially
when the British Government entered into negotiations with Sharif
Husain of Mecca. As early as December 1914, Lord Kitchener told
Husain's son, Amir Abdullah: "It may be that an Arab of the true
race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina and so good may
eome by the help of God out of all the evil which is now occurring." 123
Not a month later a former Second Secretary to the ex-Sultan Abdul
Hamid approached the British Foreign Office and suggested that Britain
should support the creation of an Arab Caliphate under the Sharif of
Mecca. The Foreign Office proposed to the India Office that they
answer him along these lines: "His Majesty's Government would will-
ingly give their support, if desired, to an Arab Caliphate of the true
race, but the question of the Caliphate is regarded as a very sacred
matter by Mussulmans and must therefore, in the opinion of His
Majesty's Government, be left entirely to Mussulman opinion to decide,
without any outside interference which might naturally be resented by
Mussulman sentiment." 124
The India Office, however, was far from happy with these proposals ;
a minute 125 drafted by Sir Alfred Hirtzel and J. W. Hose is written
in a very critical tone. They considered the suggested declaration
"unwise" as it would surely cause trouble with Indian Muslims, and
probably with the lesser Arab chiefs too; they "doubt if the Foreign
Office quite realizes wherein the Caliphate consists and what it implies."
Aecordingly, the reply of the Undersecretary of State for India was in
the negative and stated that Lord Crewe "would be most unwilling
that H.M.G. should commit themselves" in this way.126
Apart from the more practicalobjections raised in the minute we

would say that the Foreign Office seems to have overlooked - if only
for convenience's sake - the contrast between "willingly giving support,
if desired", and "leaving the matter entirely to Mussulman opinion to
decide"; it is not quite clear how both ambitions could be pursued
at the same time. And yet this was exactly the pattern that British
policy towards the Sharif of Mecca was to follow in the next years:
giving him military and political support, thereby strengthening his
chances and his desire to proclaim himself Caliph - and at the same
time maintaining that it did not want to interfere in the matter, as
Muslims should be absolutely free to decide on it as they liked. The
adoption of this paradoxical position may weIl have been caused 127 by
the misapprehension that the Caliphate had religious implications only.
Thus, notwithstanding the objections of the India Office, Sir Henry
McMahon in August, 1915 assured Sharif Husain of the British Govern-
ment's "approval" of an Arab Caliphate, resumed by an Arab of the
true race (and these words alluded to Sharif Husain himself, being
a member of the Quraish). This declaration, however, met with rather
sharp criticism; Chamberlain, Lord Crewe's successor at the India
Office, noted on November 15, 1915: "I grow more and more uneasy
about Sir H. McMahon's proceedings. I presurne that the Foreign
Office are satisfied that he will not under any circumstances allow
himself to be drawn into any intrigues about the Caliphate." 128
Indian Muslims could hardly be acquainted with every detail of these
goings-on, but neither could they be entirely kept secret. The Agha
Khan protested to the Foreign Office and the India Office that Indian
Muslims were not weIl disposed towards an Arab Caliphate. 129 But the
Khilafat leaders mentioned before considered other possibilities of a
more violent nature. Khaliquzzaman narrates 130 how in December 1914
he joined the Ali brothers in an excursion to the tribal area on the
North-West Frontier, in order to explore the arms factories in th at
region. These young men, as weIl as Mahmud-ul-Hasan, Obaidullah
Sindhi and others were certainly thinking in terms of jihad. In the
second half of 1915 Obaidullah left India and went to Kabul where
he set up a "Provisional Government of India", of which a Hindu,
Mahendra Pratap, was to be the President. This Provisional Govern-
ment of course contacted the German mission at Kabul and also Ottoman
authorities; they kept in touch with these latter through Mahmud-ul-
Hasan, who had gone to Mecca and there had met Enver Pasha, the
Turkish War Minister. The whole thing resulted in what became known
66
as the "Silk Letter conspiracy".131 The Government of India may weIl

have had same suspicions which they could not prove,132 but the con-
clusion of the Rowlatt Report's chapter on this matter is probably
correct: "The facts narrated in this chapter establish clearly the anxiety
of some Muhammadan fanatics to provoke first sedition and then
rebellion in India. For the purpose of accomplishing their objects they
seek to co-operate with the enemies of Britain." At any rate, this
conclusion perfectly fits in with a conversation Khaliquzzaman reports
having had with the Ali brothers in March 1915.133 Muhammad Ali
gave it as his opinion then that Germany's only chance of success lay
in attacking the Suez canal and India: "Every bullet used in western
trench warfare by Germany was money and energy wasted." It alsa
tallies with Faruqi's opinion of the aims of Mahmud-ul-Hasan: "His
progamme consisted of . .. seeking the military support of Turkey to
attack India through Iran and Afghanistan." 134
In these circumstances it is not surprising that the Ali brothers were
interned in May 1915.135 In March 1916 Abul Kalam Azad was exiled;
in his case too, relations with the conspirators at Kabul were suspected. 136
Matters did not get any better when in June 1916 the Arab revolt and
Sharif Husain's declaration of independence became known. Mahmud-
ul-Hasan, being at the time at Mecca, declared the Sharif to be a rebel
and was promptly arrested, handed over to the British and interned in
Malta. 137 When a British-owned newspaper, the Calcutta Statesman,
stated that "Muhammadans generally were delighted with the news",
this provoked strong protests from Abdul Bari as president of the
Khuddam-i-Kaaba, and from the Council of the Muslim League, pre-
sided over by the Rajah of Mahmudabad. 138 But on the whoie, the
Government of India seems to have considered Muslim reactions to the
event as not too unfavourable. Sir Vincent Lovett held that protests
were "confined to the educated and politically advanced Muhamma-
dans", but were "not taken up by the religious leaders." 139 This opinion
was probably correct for the time being, but he underrated the pos-
sibilities of a future expansion to the masses, an error O'Dwyer admits. 140
The Muslim League's attitude in this matter was significant in that
it made clear how far the League had evolved from its original stand
of putting its trust in the British. Thus the chances of co-operation with
Congress were increased. In 1915, Jinnah took the initiative in holding
the Congress and League annual sessions at the same time at Bombay,
where it was resolved that Congress and League together should draft
a scheme for constitutional reforms af ter the war. H1 This was done in
lIl. TOWARDS A HINDU·MUSLIM ENTENTE 67
the next year, and at their Lucknow sessions in December 1916 the plan
was adopted by both Congress and Leaguey2 On the whole it meant
a further development along the lines of the Morley-Minto reforms,
with legislative councils, the representative character of which was
stressed to a considerable degree, but an executive not responsible to
these councils. Separate electorates were accepted by Congress and an
agreement was reached as to the distribution of seats for the communities
by which the Muslims got a weightage in the provinces where they
constituted a minority, but abandoned their majority In Bengal and
the Punjab. Moreover, they also gave up their right to vote in the
general electorates.
Thus concessions were made by both sides, but the Muslims got the
best of it. We think Coupland is right when he writes that it was mainly
the Muslims who were shy of adopting aresponsibIe government on the
British parliamentary pattem, because in such a case they could be
crushed by the Hindu majority.143 On the other hand, Hindu Congress
leaders like Gokhale - who died in 1915 - and Tilak, who once more
came to the fore in Congress when Moderates and Extremists were
reconciled, supported the plans. 144
The scheme was certainly set up with the best intentions as to fostering
Hindu-Muslim unity and bringing Indian politics to an anti-British and
national level, not a communal one. We may conclude this from the
kind of opposition it met with. In the Punjab provincial branch of the
Muslim League aquarrel broke out when the secretary, Sir Muhammad
Shafi,145 opposed the League's policy of co-operation with Congress as
weIl as the League's denunciation of Sharif Husain's rebellion in 1916.
The dispute caused a split in the Punjab Muslim League and Muham-
mad Shafi's party was disaffiliated at the Lucknow session. 146 Nor were
all Hindus enthusiastic about the new policy; in Congress itself the
concessions to the Muslims were opposed by some older leaders,14T and
the Hindu-Muslim entente was also condemned at a meeting of the
All-India Hindu Sabha at Lucknow. 148
One might, however, weIl ask oneself whether the Lucknow pact did
not contain some elements which could aggravate communalism. It
was not based on a fusion of Hindus and Muslims into one political
community; it was an agreement recognizing them as two distinct
communities. One result of proceeding on this footing was that Congress
would evolve in the direction of a communal Hindu organization,149
although, according to Coupland, some Muslims did not dislike their
concessions in the Lucknow pact because the communal character of
lndian polities was accentuated this way.150 But at any rate, in 1916
the co-operation of the communities was placed on a practical basis;
it was made conditional on certain agreements about which future
negotiations were possible. This possibility was to be lacking when, m
the years to come, their unity was to be put on a sentimental basis.
CHAPTER IV
THE KHILAFAT MOVE MENT - lTS START

AND ORGANIZATION
In the preceding chapter we noted, as early as the fint months of

1915, something in the nature of a Khilafat movement, but without
any organization to give it a definite form. It took shape only at the
end of the war, but before turning our attention towards this develop-
ment we have to consider the situation which had come about in India
at this time.
It was a complex situation because the war had loosened many old
ties. Perhaps the most familiar factor in it was economic stress. Prices
of various necessaries of life leapt up, partly owing to British war
demands on the transport system, partly to a series of bad harvests
af ter 1917. We may safely suppose some connection between this situation
of scarcity and high prices, and the death-rate of the epidemie of
influenza whieh carried off millions of people. 1 The war had made
a few Indians rieh, but in general even the shopkeepers and the business
community were quite dissatisfied with the economic and financial
measures of the government.lI
But though we need not doubt the economie pressure to which the
Indian people was subjected in those years, it is another question to
what extent this fact was responsible for political unrest in the same
period. In our opinion Bamford, the official historian of the non-co-
operation and Khilafat movements, is rather simplifying things when
in his Pre/ace he writes: "There is ... no greater proof of the hollow-
ness of these agitations than the manner in which they succumbed to
improved economie conditions. The crops during the years 1922 and
1923 were good and financial stability was beginning to reappear. The
result was the total failure of the agitations to survive the set-backs they
incurred in 1922 ..." 3 Here the soil of economic discontent which it
seems reasonable to assume for these movements is given an importance
which it would be difficult to prove it really had. True, economic
grievances were vented,4 but they were never referred to in a marked
70
manner. 5 Probably, the economic background of the agitation should

not be overrated; at least, the public in those days were not greatly
conscious of it. Another aspect of this situation is, we think, that political
movements in those years did not - and could not - want to emphasize
economic issues affecting the various classes in different ways. Congress
wanted to be a "national" organization, and therefore avoided direct
involvement in industrial strikes or agrarian agitation. 6 The same
probably holds good for the Khilafat movement too, originating in the
Muslim community and trying to assembie all Muslims, irrespective of
their social position. This being the structure of political life, there
would not be much room in it for social or economic agitation.
Another factor was the mental climate created by the war and its
aftermath. India had not been devastated like northern France, but it
too had carried its burden of human losses and economic hardship. This
was what Europe had made the world suffer, and civilized peoples in
particular subjected by the West were quick to realize this. Malaviya,
presiding over the Congress session of 1918 at Delhi, said: "The world,
in particular the European world needed a correction and a change.
It had been too much given up to materialism, and had been too much
estranged from spiritual consideration." 7 President Wilson's messages
about a peace without victory and the principle of self-determination
of course raised very practical hopes, but there was an expectation of
something else, something more than practical results. Muhammad Ali
expected that "after the terrible nightmare of this war it (i.e. Europe)
could be easily awakened into a recognition of the kingdom of God in
which every man would be a brother and a fellow-subject of God ... " 8
A Khilafat deputation that in January 1920 addressed the Viceroy said
that if its demands were complied with, the world would be safe "not
only for democracy but for God." 9 These, we think, are chiliastic accents,
which we will meet time and again in the Khilafat movement. 10
India, however, had its particular reasons to expect a new era. Mr.
Edwin Montagu, who in the summer of 1917 had succeeded Sir Austen
Chamberlain as Secretary of State for India, on August 20 announced
in the House of Commons that "the policy of His Majesty's Govern-
ment, with which the Government of India are in complete accord,
is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the
administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions
with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in
India as an integral part of the British Empire." This announcement
was followed by Montagu's visit to India 11 between November 1917
IV. START AND ORGANIZATION 71
and April 1918, by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 and the

Government of India Act of 1919.
We do not intend to go into the details of this instalment of reforms
but some of its aspects deserve an examination in our context. First
of all: why did the government make concessions to Indian demands?
Undoubtedly, many British people considered it just and necessary to
reward India for its war effort,t2 but Montagu had already been thinking
along the lines evidenced by the recent announcement for some years,
as appears from his Indian budget speeches in 1910, 1911 and 1912.13
And it was not Montagu alone who advocated reforms; Hardinge had
done so in March 1916, and his successor Chelmsford had followed suit
in November of the same year. He did so "in order to support Moderate
Reformers, such as Sinha, and detach them from extremist Home Rulers,
such as Mrs. Besant." 14
This does not mean that the urge for reforms was unanimous in
England. About the same time that Montagu declared in a speech that
the trend of British policy in India was towards provincial autonomy,
his direct superior, the Secretary of State Lord Crewe, accused by
Curzon and Lansdowne in the House of Lords of aiming at a kind of
federal Home Rule in India, had denied this. 15 It is clear that at least
two trends in British policy in India existed: some wanted to maintain
a constitutional autocracy, and others, like Montagu, wanted to import
a more or less democratic government on a western pattern. 16 By an
irony of fate it was Curzon, certainly not a champion of democracy
for India, who introduced the formula "responsibie government" in
the declaration of August 1917.17
Montagu himself had his doubts as to the practicability of western
democratic institutions in India. Touring India in 1912-13 he wrote
from Madras: ClOne has here, as elsewhere among the majority of the
educated Indians, a desire for more power. Not, I think, for more
democracy; for, however horrible it may be for an Englishman of my
way of thinking to learn, the clever Indian wants executive power and
executive opportunity, but he is not ademocrat." 18 In the Montagu-
Chelmsford Report of 1918 he expressed another view: democratic
institutions had to be tried, evenjf many considerations could be invoked
against them. 19 He looked upon the Hindu-Muslim problem as the most
serious of these objections; 20 the Muslims, Montagu wrote in a paper
for his cabinet colleagues, "have not yet learned to find themselves
whole-heartedly Indian." 21 In his view, parliamentary democracy for
India was a goal it would take many years, many generations even, to
72
reach. 22 And at the end of 1917, the Russian revolution was considered
by him as a factor retarding Indian reforms: the revolution showed
that the use of parliamentary democracy was something to be leamt;
if not, all would go wrong. 23 We think it difficult, therefore, to maintain
that the announcement of August 1917 was inspired by fear of the
Russian revolution. 24 In the summer of 1917, the subsequent radi-
calization of the revolution was not quite to be foreseen, and when
this quality manifested itself fully, the effect this had on Montagu was
not apparently to precipitate the reforms in India.
At any rate, the announcement of reforms had come, and the long
time elapsing between this and the moment of their realization kept
India in a state of suspense in which at first a note of hope may have
been prevalent. But the publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report
nearly coincided with that of the Rowlatt Report and, whereas it took
over a year for the reform proposals to be translated into the Govem-
ment of India Act, the Rowlatt Report was followed by the Rowlatt
Act within a few months. lts aim was to give the Govemment of India
a free hand in dealing with revolutionary activities when the Defence
of India Act expired, six months after the concluding of the peace.
Perhaps the govemment's desire to have at its disposal the legal means
for dealing efficiently with conspiracy was, in itself, not unreasonable,25
in view of the troubles caused by the Ghadr movement 26 during the
war and the relations between Indian revolutionaries and Afghanistan,
though, on the other hand, in the year 1919 "anarchical crime" was
reported to be declining. 27 And bearing in mind that the special powers
endowed by the Rowlatt Act were never made use of,28 we might weIl
ask whether this piece of legislation was so badly needed as to justify
its enactment at a very inopportune moment. For it must be admitted
that the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and the Rowlatt Report, regarded
in their connection as being two expressions of the British view of Indian
affairs, made rather odd reading: the former expressing faith in Indian
possibilities for a democratic form of self-govemment, the latter being
a clear indication of distrust. 29
The Indian reaction to the Rowlatt Act proved that this was very
keenly felt. When the bill was introduced at the Legislative Council,
all the non-official Indian members voted against it. Among others
V. J. Patel, Malaviya, Surendranath Bannerjea and Jinnah took the
floor 30 and the gist of their arguments may be summed up as follows:
the bill was fundamentally wrong, giving powers to the executive that
only the judiciary should hold, and it was highly inopportune after the
expectations that had been raised. Gandhi's response was to inaugurate

a satyagraha campaign, now for the first time on an all-India scale.
March 30 was fixed as the day for a general hartal. 31 Agitation against
the Rowlatt Act was one of the causes 32 of the Amritsar tragedy, when
General Dyer had his soldiers fire on a crowd and stopped only for
lack of ammunition after 379 people had been killed. This "demon-
stration of force" was followed by utterly humiliating measures, such
as floggings and the notorious crawling order.
These facts should, however, not only be seen as proofs of British
colonial brutality but also of British fear. The Punjab Lt. Governor,
Sir Michael O'Dwyer, looked upon the troubles at Amritsar, Lahore
and other towns as the signs of a "widespread and well-organized move-
ment"; 33 he does not write about the Punjab "troubles" but about the
Punjab "rebellion",34 and about "the treacherous Afghan aggression
of May, 1919 - intended to synchronize with the Indian rebellion of
April, 1919." 35 O'Dwyer had been confronted with the Ghadr conspiracy
in the Punjab during the war which may have made him over-anxious
about conspiracies in general. However that may be, his statements are
not free from exaggeration; even if there was a "movement" , it certainly
was not "well-organized", as is proved by the fact that the initial
eruptions did not coincide on one or two days, but were dispersed over
ten days. But neither were his suspicions wholly unfounded; even the
Hunter Committee, which denied the existence of an organized con-
spiracy admitted connections with the Afghan invasion. 36 All this,
however, may explain to some extent Dyer's and O'Dwyer's drastic
action, but does not excuse it and quite understandably no Indian was
inclined to do so. On the contrary, the absence of an unequivocaJ
condemnation on the British side 37 infuriated India.
The Amritsar massacre certainly impressed itself very strongly on
the Indian mind. By several authors it is looked upon as a turning-point
in Indo-British relations "almost as important as the Mutiny".38 To
Gandhi, after Amritsar, the British government in India was a "Satanic
Government" even if he had not lost all faith in the British constitution. 39
But probably for many Indians Amritsar was the startling event which
brought out in full vigour feelings that had already been more or less
openly revealing themselves for some years. At about the end of the
war " a change of heart" took place. Woodruff expressly states that this
had already happened before the Rowlatt Act had been drafted, and
analyses it as a feeling of distrust. 40 The same phenomenon is noticed
as early as June 1918 by Montagu in a Cabinet Paper: "Among the
74
politicians there is unfortunately a marked diminution in the belief in

our sincerity and honesty of purpose ... A belief that we make pronoun-
cements that we do not carry out is rife in India." 41 And Reading,
in 1922, wrote about "the change which the last six or seven years have
produced in the general feeling of Indians. Racial hostility is perhaps
less acute, and is certainly less obtrusive, than it was a year ago, but
we still have to contend with the tendency to subject the intentions of
Government to criticism tinged with suspicon." 42
Moreover, there are indications that the "change of heart" came
from both sides, British as weIl as Indian. The British perhaps lost
something of their faith in themselves and in their imperial mission.
One may ascribe this to the war that had corroded their strength and
their morale; 43 one may see the cause in the liberal tradition that had
"sapped and mined the colonial structure"; 44 one may, with moral
indignation, blame the trend towards democracy, with its tendency "to
shirk the responsibilities of Empire".45 Whatever the reasons, we think
Nicolson is right when writing that af ter the war "a large number of
British citizens suddenly ceased to believe with absolute conviction in
the theory of Empire." 46 Nor was it only the theory they ceased to
believe in, it was the practice too. Woodruff points out that not only
the Indian public feIt aggrieved by the Amritsar massacre, but a con-
siderable part of the British community did too - because they realized
that no longer would the government shield its officials unconditionaIly,
nor would England he ready to defend its colonies at any price. 47 This
feeling found an emotional outlet in the subscription in favour of the
dismissed General Dyer, but it manifested also itself in the form of a
well-considered judgment, for instance when Sir Claud Jacob, a high
official, stated "that he understood the policy of His Majesty's Govern-
ment was ultimately to hand over India to the Indians and surrender
British rule in India." True, this remark provoked astrong denial from
Lloyd George in a cabinet session - but all the same, this denial was
necessitated by the Prime Minister's opinion that this misapprehension
about British intentions in India "had now permeated through the whole
of the British community in India, commercial as weIl as officia!." 48
Another disquieting element in the situation was the attempted
Afghan invasion of May 1919. During the war, the Amir Habibullah
had maintained an attitude not inconsistent with British interests. He
tolerated a German mission at KabuI, and the aforementioned Provi-
sional Government of India as weIl, but he did not actively support
them and, as Chelmsford wrote to Montagu, "foreign missions in that
capital have not got an encouraging record." 49 But it was not without
difficulty that the Amir maintained his neutral position, for jihad was
reputed to be popular among the Afghans. 50 In February, 1919 the
Amir was murdered, and succeeded by his son Amanullah who did not
continue his father's prudent and opportunist policy but, under pressure
from the orthodox and Pan-Islamic war party,U embarked upon a war
with the British. After a few weeks the Afghans asked for peace and a
provisional agreement was reached at Rawalpindi on August 8, 1919,
but after that negotiations dragged on for more than two years before
a definite peace was concluded at Kabul in November, 1921. It was
rather favourable for the Afghans and the Government of India, which
had handled the negotiations, was severely criticized for its mildness. 52
So we are confronted with a rather odd spectacle: a little country
attacks its big neighbour, is defeated in a few weeks time and has to
sue for peace, but gets off remarkably weIl af ter prolonged negotiations.
The explanation seems not to lie in proportions of military strength, but
in the political and psychological circumstances. For one thing, the
British could only guess at consequences in India. There was a long
tradition of unrest in the N.W.F.P., backed up by an organization
in northem India. During the Great War, the idea of jihad had come
more to the fore, and it was propagated now by the Amir. 53 What
would be its effect in India? In 1919, it did not prove to be great, as
we have seen; even a Khilafat leader like Dr. Ansari in May, 1919
recommended loyalty towards the Government 54 - but there remained
an uncertain element in the situation. The Viceroy, in 1919, expected
the Afghan invasion to improve the political climate in India, as neither
Hindus nor Muslims would prefer Afghan rule to the British Raj,55
but local authorities in the N.W.F.P. were less optimistie. Nor coule'
their warnings be wholly flouted, as was proved when in the next
years - from 1920 to 1922 - Khilafat leaders became less and less
restrained and threw about suggestions of an Afghan-supported holy
war. So during the whole period of the Indo-Afghan negotations, an
invasion remained something to be reckoned with and the government
could not ignore it. 56
Finally, a circumstance that \n the next few years became of para-
mount importance in Indian polities was Gandhi's en trance into them.
It would, of course, be preposterous to try and pass judgment on so
complex and exceptional a personality as Gandhi in a few pages, but
all the same we have to point out some of his qualities as they affected
the political scene of India.
It was m 1915 that Gandhi returned to India, having acquired

prestige as weIl as self-confidence by the success his satyagraha cam-
paigns in South-Africa had met with. 57 In any case he had evolved
a technique enabling the masses to hold themselves against a powerful
government, "by fearlessness and truth and action allied to these." 58
On his return, however, he did not plunge himself into poli tics at
once but founded his satyagraha ashram near Ahmedabad, where he
took up two themes dominating the rest of his life: untouchability and
hand-spinning, regarded by him not only as moral challenges, but as
the levers with which to reconstruct the social and economic structure
of Indian life. But in 1917 and 1918 he conducted some minor
satyagraha campaigns, from Gandhi's own review of which 59 it appears,
strikingly enough, that (a) not all of them were directed against tbe
British, but at least one of them against Indian mill-owners, and (b) the
ideal of absolute non-violence dictated by the concept of satyagraha
could not be entirely maintained.
These actions gave him an enormous prestige with younger Indian
nationalists like Vallabhbhai Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru, and contact
with the peasants. From this time onwards political action in India
tended to become a mass movement, not confined to an élite of well-
to-do intellectuals. Then came his action against the Rowlatt Act: a
hartal throughout India on April 6, 1919. 60 But in this case too the
masses could not be restrained and Gandhi confessed his "Himalayan
miscalculation" in calling upon the people to offer civil disobedience
before they had learnt tbe lesson of non-violence - a pattern which
was to repeat itself in the years to come. But nevertheless, Gandhi's
leadership was consolidated, and confirmed at the Amritsar Congress
session in 1919, where he was even assigned the task of revising the
constitution of the Congress.
Gandhi's ascendancy in the nationalist movement meant an intensifi-
cation of the Hindu element in it. Congress leaders up till then were
westernized to a great extent. Though it should not be forgotten that
laying stress on things Hindu already dated from the Arya Samaj
movement and Tilak's appearance on the political scene, there is no
doubt th at Gandhi by his person and his action strengtbened this trend.
Gandhi was among the first leaders to speak in his mother-tongue,
Gujarati, or in Hindi, at gatherings where other prominent nationalists
only spoke English. 61 The hand-loom, the spinning wheel and khaddar
became the symbols of his action. In 1909, in his booklet Hind Swaraj,
he had completely condemned all western civilization. Yet this does not
mean that he was wholly anti-British. When in London as a young

man, he tried to identify himself with the ruling race by taking dancing
and music lessons, by dressing in fashionable English style, and so on. 62
Even when he gave up his attempt and had spent many years in giving
battle to British oppression, in 1918 he supported the British war effort
by recruiting in Gujarat, in the very district of Kheda where he had
recently conducted a satyagraha campaign against the fiscal policy of
government! 63 Moreover, his whole philosophy of life forbade him
to hate. Shortly before his imprisonment in 1922 he wrote an article:
"Do I hate Englishmen?" 64 - a question he answered in the negative:
he hated their system of government in India, not the men. For many
of his followers this may have been too subtle a distinction, and even
with Gandhi himself, who probably made his point in complete honesty,
we think an utterance of this kind is evidence of an ambivalent attitude
towards the British.
One of the big issues in Gandhi's political life became Hindu-Muslim
unity. It would be hard to say what his motivations were - political
necessity or his conviction that every true religion held eternal values
not irreconcilable to each other. 65 Some incidents in his youth may be
pointers to a much deeper psychological motivation, his search for
masculinity.66 But at any rate Indian unity and, in other words, the
fight against communalism was one of his first concerns, to which he
dedicated the very last years of his life leading up to his violent death
in 1948. This does not mean that Gandhi wanted to give up anything
of Hinduism; he did not want Hindu-Muslim unity to include inter-
dining or intermarriage,67 and in his language and actions he always
remained a true Hindu. 68
But Gandhi was an extraordinary man and as such he provoked
opposition as weIl as admiration. In our opinion, it is quite remarkable
th at Gandhi, who is praised by all other leaders who came into contact
with him, never received unconditional praise. He is called a saint, a
hero, an astute as weIl as a courageous politician, a sincere and uncor-
ruptible leader - but there is always a "but". Jawaharlal Nehru, who
in the early twenties was completely under Gandhi's spell, recorded
later on "his distress at the religious overtones '" and the strange
admixture of politics and religion." 69 Rammanohar Lohia, who certainly
admired Gandhi greatly, writes: "On the other hand, I am now some-
what suspicious of certain aspects of Gandhi's philosophy or at least of
some of his modes of action and organisation. These appear to have
turned other men into he roes or extraordinary men of the flashy moment,
but to have brought out the worst in them in the normal routines
of life ... Was there an evil core of unbalance in Gandhiji's modes of
action?" 70
It has of ten been said that Gandhi tried to be a saint and a politician
at the same time, and that it is asking too much of a man to be both.
But Gandhi himself proclaimed his ends to be primarily religious: "What
I want to achieve - what I have been striving and pining to achieve
these thirty years - is self-realization, to see God face to face, to at ta in
Moksha. I live and move and have my being in pursuit of this goal.
All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in
the political field are directed to this same end." 71 We should not
wonder, therefore, that his political action sometimes annoyed his more
exclusively politically-minded friends, and that words like "crank" and
"faddist" have been used with regard to him. 72 It is no use denying
Gandhi's enormous influence on Indian politics after World War I but
he aroused opposition too, even among his own followers. This may be
one cause why his influence was not whoIly unequivocal and why he
could not be a truly stabilizing factor in Indian politics, bringing with
him a feeling of triumph as weIl as of disillusion.
This, of course, may have been caused not only by his personal
qualities, but also by the historical setting he had to operate in. Gandhi,
as we already noted, inaugurated in India the era of mass movements.
Congress had been an organization of the upper and middle classes;
its nationalism had been the nationalism of a westernized élite. Tilak's
communal agitation had already tended to engage the masses, but it
was Gandhi who reaIly introduced the masses as an active force in
Indian politics. Consequently, Congress leaders were confronted with
a new kind of nationalism, in which social and economic issues got
another meaning than that which they used to have. The problem for
the nationalist movement became, to quote Worsley, to provide an
"umbreIla" 73 under which the various classes could be kept together.
Class issues, therefore, could not be stressed; we have already noted
th at about 1920 economic grievances hardly figured in political propa-
ganda. 74 But the fact that conflicting class interests were not accentuated
does not mean that they did not exist. Broadly speaking, we think that
the westernized élite might have been content if they could have taken
over political power, but that the masses would benefit from that change
only if it were attended by a change in the social and economic structure
of society. Or in other words: the élite wanted merely a political
revolution, whereas the masses were in need of a social revolution.
Another question, however, would be whether all parties concerned

were aware of this, and we are inclined to doubt it. True, there were
signs betraying uneasiness among the upper and middle classes with
respect to the consequences of mass action, but they remained rather
vague: anarchy, defiance of all authority and violence we re apprehended,
but specific actions or issues were not mentioned. A case in point is the
development of the no-tax campaign (directed against government)
into a no-rent campaign (directed against the landlords ), which seems
to have been something of a surprise. 75 A surprise of this kind was
facilitated by the fact that, in a colonial society, class antagonism could
be argued away as an imperialist intrusion, alien to the society,76 just
like the Hindu-Muslim problem was dismissed by Congress leaders -
and, in the years about 1920, by Khilafat leaders too - as the product
of the British divide-and-rule policy, an evil legacy which would dissolve
once British rule was overcome. Probably men like Gandhi, Nehru and
Muhammad Ali believed this when they held out the glorious future
to their followers - but this means that they were not aware of the
real conflicts hidden beneath the surface of national unity. A similar
lack of understanding on Gandhi's part may explain some of his errors,
and some of the criticisms raised against him, too.
But we return to the 1ndian situation at about the end of World War 1.
1t was made up of all the aforementioned factors - economic stress,
hopes raised by the war and by the announcement of reforms, distrust
of British intentions awakened by the Rowlatt Act and the Amritsar
massacre, a shift in the psychological relations between British and
1ndians, the threat of an Afghan invasion, Gandhi's entrance on the
political stage, the development of élite nationalism into mass nation-
alism. And then, lastly, one more question was looming up, primarily
affecting 1ndian Muslims but soon forcing itself on all 1ndians: the
treatment of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate af ter the war.
There certainly were reasons for their anxiety. Turkey had been
completely beaten: when on the last day of October, 1918 the Sublime
Porte capitulated, British armies - consisting, by the way, largely of
1ndian regiments that were made up mainly of Muslims - were
occupying Palestine, the larger part of Syria and Mesopotamia. Allied
war aims with regard to Turkey were not such as to reassure the Muslim
mind. We have already noticed Asquith's speech of November 9, 1914,
predicting the ruin of the Ottoman Government not only in Europe,
but in Asia too. 77 Nor were some statements of a later date likely to set
the Muslims at ease. Balfour had named as one of the British objects:
"The setting free of the populations subject to the tyranny of the Turks;
and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly
foreign to western civilisation ... " 78 - an object publicly confirmed
by the Allied powers in an official communication to the American
Presiden t. 79
But more hopeful declarations were not lacking. Immediately af ter
the outbreak of the war with Turkey the Viceroy, authorized by His
Majesty's Government, had declared that the Holy Places of Arabia,
the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jedda would be
"immune from attack or molestation by the British Naval and Military
Forces so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to
the Holy Places and Shrines in question. At the request of His Maje!'ty's
Government, the Governments of France and Russia have given them
similar assurances." 80 Balfour's statement of British war aims had been
substantially altered by a speech of Lloyd George on January 5, 1918,
in which he said: "Nor are we fighting ... to deprive Turkey of its
capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace,
which are predominantly Turkish in race ... While we do not challenge
the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish
race with its capital at Constantinople ... Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia
and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their
separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition
in each particular case should be need not here be discussed, beyond
stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty
the territories to which I have already referred." 81
Finally, this passage corresponded with number twelve of Wilson's
famous fourteen points,82 which also stated that the Turkish regions
of the Ottoman Empire should remain Turkish, but that the subjected
peoples should get "autonomy". Wilson's formula was somewhat more
elastic than the one used by Lloyd George.
Certainly these pledges were reassuring. A consequence in India was
that recruiting for the army suddenly got better results; it leapt from
an average of not quite 20,000 per month in the last three months
of 1917 to more than 26,000 in the first three months of 1918. Whatever
the correct explanation of this fact may be, it was looked upon as resuIt
of Lloyd George's declaration: " ... the improvements may not unfairly
be ascribed in some degree to the increased confidence resuIting from
the Prime Minister's pledge." 83
Nevertheless, Muslims feit uneasy about Turkey's fate. Did Lloyd
George's declaration really amount to a "pledge"? India Office func-
tionaries tended to deny this 84 and the Government of India took a

similar line when in a circular letter to all Local Governments 85 it
stated that it had been an offer of peace terms which, having been
rejected by the Turks, was no longer operative. This rather dubious
reasoning was kept up for two years, but at last it was disavowed by
Lloyd George himself. 86 Thus a pledge it was - but what exactly did
it mean? It could refer to the whole of Thrace and Asia Minor, or to
those parts only which were inhabited predominantly by Turks. Nor
did it shed much light on the future relations between the subject
peoples whose national aspirations would be acknowledged in some
form, and the new Turkey. This gave rise to the frequent use in the
next years of the term "suzerainty" which may aIlude to very real power
as weIl as to the mere shadow of it. 81
This mixture of weIl-founded anxiety and ambiguous assurances -
which, since a settlement of the Turkish problem was delayed by the
peacemakers at Paris, had ample time fuIly to develop - kept Indian
Muslims in a state of incertitude. On the one hand they took British
assurances to mean that the Ottoman Empire would not be "dismem-
bered"; this view was taken by very loyal and pro-British Indian Princes
like the Begam of Bhopal who wrote to the Secretary of State: "The
speeches of some of the responsible ministers of the Crown were, further-
more, so worded that they were generaIly understood to mean that the
Ottoman Empire was in no danger of dismemberment ..." 88 On the
other hand, they had good reasons to fear the worst for Turkey, as it
was clear that not only England, but France and Italy as weIl looked
upon Turkey as a victim ready for total plunder. In the spring of 1919
I taly invaded Adalia, France disembarked troops in Cilicia and the
Greeks landed in Smyrna, advised to do so by Lloyd George. 89 It was
impossible not to see the glaring discrepancy between British pledges
and the facts.
This state of things, causing anxiety as weIl as a feeling that their
war efforts had been completely forgotten by the British once they had
emerged as victors, prompted the Indian Muslims to proceed to action.
Their worry about Turkey's fate first sought expression by way of their
existing organization, the Muslim League. In its Delhi session of Decem-
ber 1918, a lot of attention was paid to the Caliphate question. Dr. Ansari
was chairman of the reception committee and delivered a speech in
which he qualified Sharif Husain of Mecca as a rebel, asserted that the
Sultan-Caliph had discharged his duties to the satisfaction of the Muslim
world, and that he was the only Muslim ruler capable of doing so in
82
the modem world. Therefore the Jazirat-ul-Arab was to remain under

his rule. Fazl-ul Huq's presidential address contained only a few refer-
ences to Turkey and the Caliphate, but on the second day a speech of
Abdul Bari was read, in which he seconded aresolution asking for the
evacuation of the Holy Places. oo
As Bamford remarks, the interest of the meeting lay in its display
of Pan-Islamic enthusiasm and in the fact that the moderates in the
Muslim League had obviously lost all con trol. 91 The Rajah of Mahmu-
dabad left the meeting after Dr. Ansari's speech "in disgust" ; 92 when
the latter moved a resolution asking the British Govemment to protect
the Caliphate, Jinnah "raised a point of order and gave his opinion
that under the Muslim League constitution it had no right to dabbIe
in the foreign politics of the Govemment", and when the resolution
was passed he too left the meeting. 93 And another remarkable fact was
the role of the ulama, represented by Abdul Bari and a written message
from Deoband. The (anonymous) author of the "Confidential Ac-
count",04 referring to this fact, adds: "I was told by Khaliquzzaman ...
(one of the chief members of the Ansari-Sind party) that they were
playing with fire in uniting with the Ulemas." He also points to the
fact th at some leaders considered Ansari to go too far, and continues:
"It is believed that efforts would be made to carry on this agitation
at a very high pitch with the Ulemas as their tools. Some even talked
of making Maulvi Mahmud Hasan (who they said was retuming ) a
vice-president of the League." And lastly Hindu-Muslim unity was
stressed; a speaker mentioning Hindu acts of violence was "hooted
down".
We have dwelt on this meeting at some length because we may
already discern here some of the characteristics of the Khilafat move-
ment, and at the same time perhaps find an explanation why this
movement had to create its own apparatus: because the Muslim League
sheltered too many trends of Muslim thinking th at could not wholly
approve of the movement, of its anti-British and Pan-Islamic aspects,
and of its refusal to act politically on a narrow communal level only.
The latter trend found, at the same time, another way to vent itself:
the Congress. Simultaneously with the League session the Congress
session of 1918 took place at Delhi. Here Hakim Ajmal Khan was
chairman of the reception committee and in his speech he laid emphasis
on Hindu-Muslim unity and spoke at some length on the Caliphate
question, offering thanks to Gandhi who had already written about it
to the Viceroy, and had exprcssed his solidarity with Muslim feeling
in this respect. 95
Shortly afterwards another organization came into existence, the
Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind. On ce they had entered polities - we noted
their appearance at the Muslim League session of 1918 - the ulama
wanted to operate in the political field in their own right. 96 Their
attitude was decidedly anti-British. They considered that it was the
possession of India which made England extend its influence to the
Muslim countries in the Near East; so there was no better way of
liberating these countries from British interference than by expelling
the British from India. To that end they wanted unconditional co-
operation with Congress; as communalism was caused largely by British
rule, the Muslims need not fear Hindu domination once India was
free. 07 For some years ulama of different origins co-operated in the
Jamiat-ul-Ulama,98 but afterwards the Deobandis took hold of the
organization. 90
The delay in settling the Turkish peace terms gave Muslim opinion
ample time to get worked up. About September, 1919 Indian Muslims
appear to have felt the need to make tbemselves heard by means of an
organization created especially for the purpose of supporting the Cali-
phate. A Conference which met at Lucknowon September 21, or
otherwise one meeting at Delhi on September 23, might be called the
first Khilafat Conference; 100 both of them clearly did not emanate
from the existing organizations like the Muslim League or the Jamiat-
ui-Ulama, and at both of them the main topics of discussion were the
fate of Turkey and the Caliphate. Shortly afterwards the Central Khila-
fat Committee was founded,l°l with its seat at Bombay and Seth Chotani
as president. On November 23 and 24 an All-India Khilafat Conference
met at Delhi, presided over by Fazl-ul-Huq.l02 Prominent participants
were Hakim Ajmal Khan, Sayyid Husain and Abdul Bari, but it was
not yet really an All-India affair, since the majority of the delegates
came from the V.P., Rajputana, Sind and Delhi. l03
But once again Hindu leaders were present: Gandhi, who presided
over the meeting on its second day, and Swami Shradanand, tbe Arya
Samaj leader. l04 Resolutions were passed to boycott British goods and
the peace celebrations. With respect to these resolutions Bamford points
out "the commencement of Gandhi's influence over the Khilafat leaders",
but a detail related by Khaliquzzaman indicates tension between Gandhi
and militant Muslims: "A resolution for the boycott of peace celebrations
was opposed by Gandhiji who said that boycott was not the proper
remedy. Maulana Hasrat Mohani said that we were not Satyagrahis; he
wanted to hurt the British by boycotting peace celebrations. The boycott

of peace celebrations was accepted next day." 105
Once more the Caliphate question was broached at the end of the
year, when in December 1919 the annual sessions of the Congress and
the Muslim League were held at Amritsar. At the Congress session the
main issue was whether Congress would co-operate with thc govem-
ment in working the reforms. This problem had already creatcd a split:
most Moderates had left Congress when it condemned the reforms as
being "inadequate, disappointing and unsatisfactory." 106 Gandhi and
Malaviya, however, still wanted to compromise and succeeded in
obtaining a resolution to work the reforms on the basis of offering
co-operation in the measure in which Govemment co-operated with the
people. 107 But Gandhi also showed his sympathy for the Khilafat cause,
even when other Congress leaders were still reserved about it. 108 At the
Muslim League session, presided over by Hakim Ajmal Khan, the Cali-
phate question got much attention. The Ali brothers, recently set free,
were among the principal speakers; Shaukat Ali reiterated his Khuddam-
i-Kaaba vow, and Muhammad Ali too made a fervent religious appeal
to the meeting. 109 And in the same week a Khilafat Conference was
held at Amritsar, of which Shaukat Ali was nominated president. Here
it was resolved to send a deputation to the Viceroy and another to
England, headed by Muhammad Ali. 110
In the first part of 1920 the organization of the Khilafat movement
assumed a more definite shape. On February 15, 16 and 17 an All-India
Khilafat Conference met at Bombay, presided over by G. M. Bhurgri
of Hyderabad, Sind. 1l1 A constitution for the C.K.C. was accepted. It
should consist of 200 members and have its headquarters at Bombay.
There should be provincial committees, but wherever these did not
exist, the C.K.C. should work. Their task would be the collecting of
funds - provisions were made for book-keeping, and the publication
and examination of accounts - and the organization of conferences.
There should be a quorum of 25 for the meetings of the C.K.C., special
as weIl as ordinary ones. Of the members 54 should be from Bombay,
20 from Sind, 15 from Madras, 25 from Bengal, and the rest from other
provinces. The president was to be Chotani; Shaukat Ali was one of
the four secretaries.
The constitution was accepted in resolution no. 8, reading as foIlows:
"That this Conference accepts tbe 'Constitution' of the Central Khilafat
Committee for the next year, as approved by the Subjects Committee,
and recommends that the 'ConstÎtution' be accepted by all Muham-
madans." Resolution no. 9 reads: "That this Conference re-affirms all

the resolutions hitherto passed by all the previous Conferences, and
urges upon the Central Khilafat Committee to give practical effect to
them without any further delay."
These resolutions and the constitution, considered together, suggest
rather a loose organization. Clearly neither the Khilafat movement nor
the Khilafat Conference was a party in the modem western sense of
the word, as it did not seek acceptance of the C.K.C.'s constitution by
"members" but by "all Muhammadans". On the other hand, it was
something more than a trend in public opinion, since it established more
or less regular meetings to give expression to public opinion, and an
executive centre to give effect to resolutionsY2 But no party in the
modern western sense would consider it necessary to reaffirm previous
resolutions, for these would remain in force unless expressly revoked.
The Conference and the Committee, however, were not the only
organs created by the movement. We hear about bureaux opened by
committees; 113 before long Khilafat Workers were mentioned, and
presently Khilafat Volunteers too. An intelligence report from the
U.P. 114 reads as follows: "Enlistment forms for the Khilafat Workers'
Association or the Anjuman-Khuddam-i-Khilafat are in circulation in
many districts. They are signed by Hasrat Mohani. A person desirous
of becoming a member has to sign a contract in four parts and to specify
the amount of work he could do under six heads:
1. Swadeshi;
2. Resignation of titles, membership of Councils, etc.;
3. Resignation of service to the English, including police and military
service, stoppage of payment of taxes;
4. Propaganda in villages;
5. Recruitment for the Association;
6. Hijrat or pecuniary help to the Muhajirin."
And then there were Khilafat "members". Mention of them is made,
for instance, with respect to a Khilafat Conference held in April, 1920
at Manjeri in Malabar, where "certain men were appointed to collect
4 annas a head from those who wished to style themselves Khilafat
members." 115 The same source, however, points out the very fluctuating
character of the organization : Khilafat committees were founded without
giving any further sign of life, and people signing on four annas
took no further notice of the movement. 116
We think the difference between the members of the Anjuman-i-

Khuddam-i-Khilafat and those mentioned by Hitchcock in Malabar was
the same as practised in Congress between the mass membership of the
"primary" members and the far more restricted group of the "active"
onesy7 On the level of mass membership we get the impression that
no clear distinction was made in those years between Congress and
Khilafat adherents. As we established before, it was not uncommon even
to combine offices in the Congress organization with similar ones in the
Muslim League, and the same rule applied to Congress and the Khilafat
Conference and the C.K.C. Nor was this an incomprehensible situation,
since Congress in the summer of 1920 fully accepted the Khilafat
demands. This motivation is apparent in a letter 118 Muhammad Ali
wrote in May 1921, in which he gives a recapitulation of events since
the summer of 1920. "The Khilafat question", he writes, "which began
with the Musulmans (only ~ of the Indian population) gradually
became, along with the Punjab atrocities question, a national question,
and the greatest National Assembly in India (which had become truly
National only now that the Musulmans toa had come to join it nearly
35 years after its foundation) adopted the first steps of non-violent
non-co-operation." Some pages further on he alludes to the so-called
"Bezwada programme", accepted in a session of the A.I.C.C. on
April 1, 1921, where it was resolved to enlist before June 30 one crore
(= 10,000,000) of Congress members,119 and then continues his letter
by describing his own efforts (and those of Gandhi and his brother
Shaukat) in winning over these recruits. But one week af ter the Bezwada
meeting, on April 7 and 10, an All-India Khilafat Conference met at
Meerut which passed resolutions "binding Mussalmans to adhere to
Non-co-operation and requesting them to join the Congress", and
"urging the enlistment of one crore of Muhammadans and five crores
of Hindus as members of the Khilafat and Congress organisations." 120
Though the organizations are named separately, it is remarkable that
Muslims are "requested to join the Congress"; it would, moreover, have
been most difficult to separate the enlistment of members at mass
meetings harangued by Gandhi as weIl as by the Ali brothers. We may
conclude that mass membership was considered to support Congress as
weIl as the Khilafat movement.
Consequently, membership does not give us a very good clue as to the
extent of the movement. Other indications in this respect might be the
number of people attending meetings and the amount of money collected,
but unfortunately these too cannot be given with any claim to exactness.
It is often impossible to discern which attendants at meetings had been

drawn there by enthusiasm for the Khilafat movement, and which were
primarily motivated by enthusiasm for swaraj or purely Congress aims;
this, however, would seem to be tho lesser handicap, since in those days
many people did not make a very clear distinction between these them-
selves. But even the total numbers of persons attending meetings we
know only byestimate, and then it is impossible to ascertain how far
the numbers mentioned were influenced by propagandist intentions,
either exaggerating or reducing them.
Numbers given in lndian sources tend to be very vague. A telegram 121
from Madras on the second Khilafat day spe aks about "the Hindu and
Muslim citizens of Madras assembIed in tens of thousands"; Muhammad
Ali writes 122 about his visit to Calcutta with Gandhi: "While there we
addressed dozens of meetings (in one day no less than 8 or 9) and were
listened to by hundreds of thousands of people." British estimates about
the attendance at meetings vary greatly. Punjab intelligence reports of
May 1920 123 mention Khilafat meetings at Multan on May 16 and 19,
the first attended by only 150 persons, the second by about 4,000, but
without giving any explanation for this difference. A Khilafat meeting
at Bombay 124 was estimated at 10,000 Muslims. But while lndian es ti-
mates may tend to exaggerate numbers, British ones may tend to scale
them down. Very of ten in British reports we find utterances like this
one about the second Sind Provincial Khilafat Conference in February,
1920: "The attendance on the first day numbered about 15,000, but
this number diminished considerably on the second and third days to
about 7,000 and 4,000 respectively." 126
Observations of this kind might result from "wishful counting" but
in many reports a context from which this might be surmised is
lacking. 126 Therefore, even approximately accurate information as to
the extent of the movement is not to be expected from these numbers.
We may only say that many indications point to the fact that the
movement met with broad sympathies, and that not only educated or
well-circumstanced Muslims took part in it, but that it assumed the
character of a mass movement. This is apparent from the large audiences
at meetings, from the many places where these took place - mostly
located in the Punjab, Sind, Bombay, the u.P., Bihar, Bengal and
Madras - and from the observation that the movement was spreading
to the villages too. 121
Nor is exact information as to the amount of funds collected available.
References 128 to "a crore of rupees" probably refer to the Tilak Swaraj
Fund, for which the Bezwada programme had asked. 129 And though
probably a considerable part of this sum came from Muslims,130 and
the money was at least partly spent on the Khilafat cause, we cannot
look upon it as purely collected by Khilafatists for the Khilafat. But
the Khilafat Committees also collected money for financing their own
work and for assisting the Turks by means of issuing "Khilafat receipts"
repayable when swaraj was attained. At the outset this work did not
run very smoothly, at least according to British sources,131 but af ter some
time it yielded better results. The All-India Khilafat Conference at
Karachi in July 1921 passed aresolution "to collect 40 lakhs of rupees
through sale of Khilafat receipts for aid of sufferers from Smyrna and
Muhajirin and other national requirements." 132 The Nizam of Hyde-
rabad and other Indian Princes probably also contributed large sums. 133
According to a notice in the press 134 the total Khilafat receipts amounted
to Rs.643,000 in 1920 and Rs. 2,100,000 in the next year. But the way
in which the money was collected as well as the way in which it was
used met with rather sharp protests af ter some time.
But perhaps a more interesting question would be what kind of
Muslims supported the Khilafat movement. Our materials do not permit
us to draw clear-cut conclusions, but it is possible to say something about
it. We have already noted that the movement started as a communal
one, trying to enlist the support of the whole community,135 and we
think it succeeded to a remarkable degree in doing SO.136 An indication
as to the origins of its leadership is given by the list of 82 memorialists
who sent a representation to the Viceroy, warning him that the Muslim
community would stop co-operation with the government as of August 1,
1920.137 Among them, we find 21 maulanas, 27 merchants and 2 con-
tractors, 4 vakils and 9 barristers, 3 landholders, 3 joumalists and
9 former magistratesPs In this list, the ulama and the merchants are
conspicuous; 139 professional men are not lacking, but the number of
landowners is small.
The movement itself was not confined to these upper and middle class
MusliIllS. At an early stage, it got the support of low class townspeople,140
and later on we are informed that it spread among the peasantry.141
When, however, we hear about opponents, they come from the upper
strata of society 142: "leading Lucknow maulvis"; 143 "leading Muham-
madans of Nagpur"; 144 "local Khans" in the N.W.F.P. opposing the
hijrat movement; 145 "the educated classes"; 146 "the Cawnpore Chamber
of Commerce" .147 A correct inference, perhaps, would be that the most
clear and frequent signs of aversion to a movement endangering not
only British mIe in India but also the social order it had established,
were to be found among those Muslims whose position was dependent
upon that mIe. We have already ohserved how the Rajah of Mahmuda-
bad left a Muslim League session in disgust when Dr. Ansari all too
clearly attacked British policy.148 Another instance is offered by the
Nizam of Hyderabad, who in the second half of May 1920 prohibited
all Khilafat meetings in his state. 149 In a letter to Lord Chelmsford he
eXplained his reasons. As a Muslim mIer, he wrote, he could not but
feel sympathy for Turkey and the Khilafat, but, he continues, " ... it is
impossible for me to countenance proceedings that have avowed inten-
tions of resistance, euphemistically called 'passive', to British authority -
indeed against all authority." Public disorder and "lawlessness" were
causing him grave anxiety, "both as an Ally and as a Ruler." 150
Some Muslim groups deserve our special attention in this context.
The first are the ulama, whose attitude was important because it was
they who could reach the Muslim masses. We have already seen that
the Jamiat-ul-Ulama supported the Khilafat movement; this would
seem, perhaps, to be a matter of course, but it was not quite so. Binder
points out 151 two practical reasons for the attitude they assumed: they
wanted to safeguard the Holy Places of Islam against Christian influen-
ces, and to protect the Muslim community from any westernizing trends
which might easily follow in their wake. But on the theoretical plane
their support was less secure: their concern was the sharia 152 in the first
place, and to equate the Sultan-Caliph's mIe with that of the sharia
was hy no means easy, sin ce he had given in to westernizing trends in
many respects. Some considerations which made the Indian ulama
withhold their support from the Pakistan movement in the forties might
have made them do the same with regard to the Khilafat movement in
the twenties. 153 The Khilafat movement had strong roots among the
westernized Indian Muslirns. In 1916, when Sharif Husain rebelled,
the protest against him had been confined to the educated and politically
advanced Muslirns; it did not then spread among the masses because
most religious leaders kept aloof. l54 It was only when some prominent
ulama, like Mahmud-ul-Hasan and Abdul Bari, took up the Sultan-
Caliph's cause that the rest gradually took their cue from them.
Furthermore, whereas generally the ulama favoured an alliance with
Congress against the British, some distmst and fear with regard to
Hindu intentions were perhaps never wholly lacking in their midst.
Even when their meetings resulted in resolutions which took Hindu-
Muslim unity for granted, in the discussions an anti-Hindu attitude
sometimes made itself felt. 155 That is, informers of British intelligence
reported this to be the case, a fact which may cause some doubt as to
the reliability of these rumours. But we would not dismiss them as
completely false when we realize that Uongress accommodated com-
munalist as weIl as nationalist Hindus.
We need not doubt that most Indian Muslims sympathized with the
cause of Turkey and the Caliph. That the Muslim masses, following
the lead given by the ulama, showed their sympathy is not to be won-
dered at, but Muslim liberals too reacted in this way. Sir Theodore
Morison, the former Aligarh Principal, wrote in 1919: "Possibly the
most serious aspect of the situation is that the Moslem liberals are being
driven into the camp of political Pan-Islamism. Receptive though the
liberals are to Western ideas, and averse though they are to Pan-
Islamism's chauvinistic, reactionary tendencies, Europe's intransigence
is forcing them to make at least a temporary alliance with the Pan-
Islamic and Nationalist groups." 156 This analysis would perfectly fit
Amir Ali, a Khilafat leader without becoming an Indian nationalist; 157
to alesser degree perhaps the same might be said about the Agha Khan
and a member of the Viceroy's Council, Muhammad Shafi, both of
them pleading for Anglo-Turkish friendship which they regarded as
being in the interest of Islam and the Muslims as weIl as in the interest
of the Empire. 158 But some of these liberals were deterred from sup-
porting the movement by the fact that it had recourse to "illegal" action
and mass agitation. Jinnah should probably be placed in this category;
he is characterized as a constitutionalist who did not feel at home in an
ambiance of non-co-operation and Khaddar-bearers. 159 Maybe another
circumstance also had something to do with Jinnah's attitude: that he
considered the Khilafat movement to be "a false religious frenzy" of
which no good could ultimately come, either for India in general or for
the Indian Muslims in particular. l60 A similar attitude was adopted
by Fazli-Husain, who "was convinced that unconstitutional agitation of
the kind conceived in the non-co-operation programme was to a large
extent useless, and fraught with grave dangers", and who was "free
from the hysterical bias which prevailed in some quarters." He resigned
from the Muslim League when it accepted the principle of non-
co-operation. 161
Men like Jinnah and Fazli-Husain in a way might be considered as
heirs to the political legacy of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Even when
they took a course far more independent from British patronage than
Sir Sayyid had done, in the last resort they wanted co-operation with
the British. At the same time, Sir Sayyid's views on Turkey, the Caliphate,
and Arabian claims to it reverberated in contemporary pamphlets. In
them we find opinions like these: Turkey and Islam are not identical,
and other powers have diplomatic and commercial intercourse with the
Sultan of Turkey, not with the Caliph; 162 the institution of the Caliphate
is not a fundamental principle of Islam, because it is dependent on the
will of the people, which Islam is not; 163 the last Abbasid Caliph was
not entitled to give away his office to Sultan Selim; 164 why should the
Sharif of Mecca not succeed to a title which the Sultan of Turkey had
not been able to defend? 165
The fact, however, that we may signalize some pamphlets turning
against the Khilafat movement does not prove anything about the
response they met with, and we doubt whether it was very great. 166
An interesting instance is offered by Faizul Karim's pamphlet we quoted
above - interesting because we know some of the reactions it provoked.
It was rather sharply attacked in two other pamphlets 167 and its au thor
was accused of having written it at the instigation of the Government
of Sind which also financed its publication and distribution, and of
having acquired declarations of agreement from other ulama "by most
crooked and questionable tactics." 168 Though we do not get any further
than accusations and counter-accusations and cannot therefore give a
definite judgment on what precisely were the true facts of the case, we
want to make some observations. Firstly, that it is quite possible that
the government tried to mobilize anti-Khilafat propaganda; efforts of
this kind are known. 169 Secondly, that these pamphlets contain - as was
to be expected - a lot of very personal attacks; it is difficult to judge
how much truth accusations of that kind hold, but one gets the im-
pression that old feuds and rivalries were being settled under the cloak
of political convictions. Similar considerations may have determined
attitudes towards the Khilafat movement in other cases too where no
evidence of it has been left. And thirdly, it is most remarkable that in
these early manifestations of the Khilafat movement no mention is made
of co-operation with the Hindus or of swaraj. Almost on the contrary,
Seth Haji Abdullah Harun, president of the Khilafat Conference in
Sind - a man who in the years 1911-1913 was prominent in the Sind
Red Crescent Society 170 - is now complaining bitterly of having been
lumped together "with extremists and Home Rulers. This, to say the
least, is the unkindest cut of all." 171
Here we are touching on another theme claiming our attention in
this context: the Hindu-Muslim fraternization, which was one of the
92
most striking features of this period in Indian poli tics. GeneraIly Gandhi
is reputed to have cemented this Hindu-Muslim unity by taking up the
Khilafat demands, which he declared to provide "such an opportunity
of uniting Hindus and Muhammedans as would not arise in a hundred
years." 172 Whether we consider this to be a "clever stroke" 173 or what
his moral duty prescribed him to dO/ 74 we should remember that Gandhi
found his ground prepared by the Lucknow pact of 1916, at the same
time admitting that what Gandhi attained went much further than this
pact. The entente achieved in 1916 was a rational political agreement,
but the years from 1920 tot 1922 offered thc spectacle of an emotional
breaking up of traditional barriers of dis trust and fear and religious
practices, which can be described only by the word "fraternization".
But was this fraternization a reality? For some people we may assume
it was - for those who had learnt to approach Indian poli tics on a
national level, for men like Gandhi and the Nehrus on the Congress
side, and Dr. Ansari, Abul Kalam Azad and the Ali brothers on the
Khilafatist side. But for those Indians - Hindu or Muslim - who
approached politics on a communal level, there could be an alliance
but no true "fraternization" ; one cannot escape the impression that
when they went through the motions of fraternization, it remained
at a superficial level. It is remarkable how much attention was paid to
the problem of cow-killing. We here put forward two examples. One we
borrow from Mahadev Desai who, writing about Abul Kalam's publica-
tions in Al Hilal shortly before the war, relates: " ... the Maulana boldly
told the Mussalmans that their insistence on the right of cow-slaughter
was far from conducive to communal peace. His view was so strange
in those days that even his intimate friend Hakim Ajmal Khan feIl foul
of him ... It was only in 1920 that the good Hakim Saheb saw his
error, confessed it to the Maulana, and became a whole-hogger in the
matter like the Maulana himself." 175 The second is to be found in
a message from Abdul Ghani,176 assistant secretary to the C.K.C. at
Bombay. It reads as foIlows: "Letters are received in Central Khilafat
Committee office pertaining to strength of Hindu-Muslim unity. At
Rangoon besides Muslim volunteers, twenty Hindu volunteers coIlected
subscriptions for Khilafat Fund on occasion of Id and same was done
in many other towns. But living example of Hindu-Muslim unity at Old
Basti is remarkable in Indian history. Hindus of this town raised sub-
scriptions. Purchased fat and beautiful cow and in big meeting presented
it to Muslims. Muslims were so much impressed with it that they also
purchased a cow. And presented both cows to Hindus to be kept in
Gaooshala as mark of Hindu-Muslim unity. This demonstration of

feelings of brotherhood displayed by residents of Old Basti has set
practical illustration for others. And if both communities entertain
feelings of regard and respect for each other, our difficulties would soon
be solved and with united efforts we shalI be able to achieve our com-
mon object." Events like these may be significant symbols - but they
are significant only when they represent a lasting reality. Whether they
did this is, to say the least, open to doubt when we hear about the case
of Swami Shradanand. He was an Arya Samaj leader who up to 1919
was hated by Muslims because of his attempts to win back Rajput
Muslims to Hinduism, but who in May 1919 even addressed the Muslims
in the Juma Mosque at Delhi. 177 Four years later, however, his work
in the shuddhi movement was to cause his death at the hands of an
outraged Muslim.
It might be supposed th at we are quoting these examples to ridicule
this aspect of the movement, or because of their special appeal to the
westerner who is unable to see how important such pathetic expressions
of good-will were in the lndian setting. We would like to answer, firstly
th at in our opinion this shalIowness, this lack of reality belying the high
hopes pinned on Hindu-Muslim unity, presents rather a object of
tragedy than of ridicule, and secondly that same lndian observers see
it in the same way. Muhammad AH in 1913 had warned Hindu and
Muslim leaders alike against "mistaking the accidental for the essential"
and "drowning the problem in a deluge of words." 178 Khaliquzzaman
in his memoirs speaks of "the silly excitement" of the Muslims who took
Swami Shradanand inside the mosque at Delhi. l7O
Nehru spoke - same thirty years af ter the events - about "the
artificial unity Gandhi had forged out of diverse discontents." 180 Cer-
tainly these authors did not judge things in the same way when they
were actualIy happening, but even in 1921, when fraternization was in
fulI swing, signs of distrust were never lacking. Distrust found its way
too into historical reflection on the period; it is evident in the writings
of R. C. Majumdar, stating that "the policy of Hindu-Muslim entente
was merely an ingenious device on the part of the Muslim leaders to
secure help against British imperialism ... There was no reason to
suppose, as subsequent events clearly proved, that the Muslim leaders
were inspired by a genuine desire to make up their differences with
the Hindus ... " 181
Distrust was to be found on both sides. Many Hindus feared the
Muslims' willingness to resort to violence. Muslim leaders realized this
and tried to reassure them; this is clearly one of the intentions of the
Khilafat Manifesto issued by the C.K.C. in May, 1920, declaring: "We
wish to state in the most emphatic terms that in the joint Hindu-Muslim
scheme of action there is at no stage of it any idea of doing violence
secretly or openly. We recognise that the pressure must be peaceful and
moral. We must evoke a sympathy by suffering. We wish to cultivate
a world opinion in favour of our cause by inviting suffering on our-
selves." 182 Apparently Gandhi's teachings had not been lost on the men
who put out the Manifesto. A little further on they declared: "The
Mussulmans of India will fight to the last man in resisting any Mussul-
man power that may have designs upon India" - hinting, undoubtedly,
at the possibility of an Afghan invasion, which was not a gTatifying
prospect for Hindus. But only a few weeks before, Shaukat Ali had
spoken at a Khilafat Conference at Patna 183 where he professed him-
self to be a humbie follower of Gandhi, at the same time, however,
noting one difference between the Mahatma and himself: "The Ma-
hatma was absolutely committed to Ahimsa and he would never deviate
from it come what may. But they, the Mussalmans, could not bind
themselves absolutely to the doctrine to that extent. According to their
religion to kill and be killed in the name of God were alike Satyagraha.
Their great prophet had practised Ahimsa for full 13 years and then
he was given the strength to conquer his enemies by force of arms.
The speaker felt it would be a crime in deed if their prowess were exer-
cised for personal gain and aggrandisement, but if it was in the sacred
cause of religion it was not only not a crime, but an obligatory duty.
However, despite these differences they had decided to work together
and eschew violence in every shape as long as joint action lasted.
Mahatma Gandhi had told him that if he failed in his endeavours he
would teIl them so." And then Shaukat Ali went on to say " ... that
there were but two courses open to them in case of their failure -
jehad or hijrat."
It is evident from the whole speech that non-violence was stressed,
but with two reservations. It was not a matter of principle, but of
tactics, just as in the case of the Prophet who practised Ahimsa only
for lack of strength. And secondly, non-violence was adopted as long
as joint action lasted, and this would come to an end if Gandhi's tactics
failed to succeed. Once this point was reached, the ominous word of
jihad reared its head. These conceptions recur in Khilafat declarations ;
the stress laid on the various elements in the policy may change, but
violen ce as a possibility is never absent.
Unfortunately for Hindu-Muslim unity, occasions suited to the mate-

rialization of this possibility were not lacking either. In the summer of
1919 an Afghan invasion was imminent and, even after its failure, the
idea kept haunting the Indian scene; in 1921, the Moplah rising stirred
up emotions - here we are anticipating events which will be related
later. Both occurrences were reported to lead to acrimonious altercations
between Hindus and Muslims. To mention only two of them: in a
meeting of the G.K.G. in 1920 "extremist Moslem leaders advocated
joining any Afghan army that might invade India to drive out the
British. Hindu leaders demanded explanation and made it clear that
at first sign of such danger Hindus would cease to co-operate." 184
And in a meeting of the G.K.G. on November 3, 1921 at Delhi, " ... a
heated debate was started by Hindu members regarding attitude of
Khilafat leaders towards Moplah rebellion, and alleged tendency of
Muslims towards violence. Report of debate discloses serious apprehen-
sions on part of Hindus, especially in Sind. Ajmal Khan and Abul
Kalam Azad assured Hindu members that they would ask all Mohame-
dans to observe non-violence, but could give no further assurance." 185
Even if the Moplah rising was caused mainly by harsh demands by
Hindu landlords and moneylenders, the victims were surely not all of
this class, and consequently it raised fears not confined to this class
either.
On the Muslim side the big fear seems to have been that they were
just used by the Hindus. We might quote two instances. The first one
occurs in a report 186 on an article contributed by "A Muhammadan
of Delhi" to the Paisa Akbar of May 6, 1919. He complains that the
boycott of British-made cigarettes has worked out to the disadvantage
of the Muslims who commanded the traffic, but in favour of the Hindus
who fairly monopolized the traffic in biris to which the public has
changed! Perhaps a more serious matter is signalled in an anti-Khilafat
pamphlet 187: the Muslims think that non-co-operation is planned in
their favour, but in Gandhi's speeches the Punjab wrongs come first. 188
Indian Muslims now lead the way and are ready to sacrifice Aligarh
University, but did the Hindu Benares University follow their example?
"The Mohammedans, the weakest community, should think twice before
plunging themselves heart and soul into non-co-operation", the pamphle-
teer concludes his warning. Both stories are specimens of communalist
thinking to which the motive of competition is not foreign, but we want
to make the point that such tales evidently found a public in those days.
Before tu ming our attention to the act ion of the Khilafat movement
in the next years, in this chapter we want to establish the objects with
which it started out. In a very general way we might say that its object
was to safeguard Islam, represented by the Caliph and Turkey's secular
power, but a more specific answer to the question seems to be caUed
for. We propose to look for it mainly in the address presented by
the Khilafat deputation before the Viceroy on January 19, 1920. 189
This deputation, created by the Amritsar Khilafat Conference of Decem-
ber 1919 was considered as the Indian counterpart to a Khilafat miss ion
going to Europe. It wanted "to give a fuU and clear statement of the
obligations imposed on every Muslim by his faith and of the united
wishes cherished by Indian Musalmans regarding the Khilafat and
cognate questions, such as those relating to Muslim con trol over every
portion of the Jazirat-ul-Arab, the Khalifa's wardenship of the Holy
Places, and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." In a nutshell this
one sentence contains the whole Khilafat programme. We want to caU
attention to the distinction made between "obligations imposed on every
Musalman by his faith", and the "cherished wishes" of Indian Musal-
mans, for, as is eXplained in a passage further on: "Even the most
cherished Muslim sentiment may be sacrificed in subservience to im-
perial demands ... but the requirements of Islamic law are so definite
and of such a binding nature that they cannot be reduced by a hair's
breadth to suit the desires of the Allied and Associated Powers any more
than they ean be enlarged to further the mundane ambitions of Musal-
mans themselves." The last part of the sentence no doubt aUudes to the
"mundane ambitions" of Sharif Husain of Mecca which are repudiated.
Stress on the religious character of the Muslim demands runs like a
thread through the whole address; it begins in the sentence quoted when
they are said to regard "the Khilafat and cognate questions" - appar-
ently the Caliphate is what reaUy matters, while the more tangible
points are only its consequences. Or to express it more accurately: wh at
a westerner would look upon as the practical consequences of a religious
principle, in the Muslim mind is integrated in the principle itself: "The
preservation of the Khilafat as a temporal no less than a spiritual
institution is not so much a part of their faith as the very essence thereof
and no analogies from other creeds that tolerate the lacerating and
devitalizing distinction between things spiritual and things temporal,
between the Church and the State, can serve any purpose ... Temporal
power is of the very essence of the institution of the Khilafat, and
Musalmans can never agree to any change in its character or to the
dismemberment of its Empire. The no less important question of the
jazirat-ul-Arab 190 over no portion of which can any kind of non-Muslim

con trol be tolerated is equally clearly not one of Muslim sentiment but
of Islamic faith. Similarly Islam also declares and defines the sanctity
of the holy pi aces of Islam and places th is and similar matters beyond
the uninformed interpretation of people of alien faith."
The religious character of Muslim demands, which made itself felt
in aspects that by western standards would be considered to be purely
temporal and political, explains their absolute and rigid nature. Montagu
complained about th is to Muhammad Ali, saying "that we had put our
representative, as he apologetically called himself, in the most difficult
position, because all representatives could negotiate and compromise,
whereas in the case of our representative it was a case of satisfaction
of every demand otherwise the alternatives of Jehad and Hijrat." 191
It also explains why western political leaders and diplomats could not
get up much understanding for them.
Nevertheless, on some points the Khilafatists were ready to make
allowances for other views. Integrity of the Ottoman Empire was im-
portant in more than one aspect. It concerned not only European Turkey,
but also the non-Turkish minorities in Asia Minor and, lastly, the Arabs
who had during the war proclaimed their independence. The Khilafat
deputation spoke only about the Arab problem, but not in a way likely
to raise much hope of a compromise: "As regards the integrity of the
Khalifa's dominions we are painfully aware that some sections of the
Musalmans of Arabia have in clear defiance of the laws of Islam stood
out from the solid mass of the rest of the Muslim world. But instead
of this being any argument against the latter it furnishes it with one
more compelling reason for proclaiming the truth and in accordance
with the divine declaration th at all Musalmans are brothers, one to
another, and the divine injunction to make peace between brothers,
Indian Musalmans must seek to remove every existing misunderstanding
and eliminate every cause of friction that may tend to separate Arab
from Ajam, and Turk from Tajik. And it is the logical consequence
of Islamic brotherhood ... th at principles of such universal application
as that of self-determination should be applied to the Muslim no less
than to the Christian and to the Asiatic no less than to the European."
The meaning is clear: the Arabs must remain under Ottoman domi-
nance and Indian Muslims should exert their strength to attain this
end, on religious grounds. Only the last part of the passage points to
a possible compromise: self-determination is a principle applying to the
Arabs as weIl.
Two months later Gandhi formulated the same thoughts far more
elasticaIly: "Briefly put the claim is that the Turks should retain
European Turkey subject to fuIl guarantees for the protection of non-
Muslim races under the Turkish Empire and that the Sultan should
contral the Holy Places of Islam and should have suzerainty over
Jazirat-ul-Arab, i.e., Arabia as defined by the Muslim savants, subject
to self-governing rights being given to the Arabs if they so desire." 192
And Muhammad Ali gave his opinion on the problem in the same
sense: "The sum total of our claim is the restoration of the territorial
status quo ante bellum. But we do not want to rule out political changes
which would guarantee not only security of life and praperty to non-
Turkish races, whether Muslim or Christian or Jew, but also opportu-
nities of autonomous development." 193
But among these claims which whoIly fitted in with the pattern of
Pan-Islamism another note faintly made itself heard - th at of nation-
alism. The Khilafat deputation concluded its address in the foIlowing
way: Muslim loyalty to the Empire is conditional on the preservation
of their religious freedom. A settlement unacceptable "alike to Muslim
and non-Muslim Indians, now happily reunited shoulder to shoulder",
would bring no peace because it would not be based on justice. "But if
on the contrary India is won by a generous recognition of her fitness
for managing her own affairs as a member of the British Common-
wealth", Muslims will back Great Britain. Again the meaning is clear:
severing the connection with the Empire is as yet out of the question;
only in a somewhat later ph ase will the demand for swaraj be taken
up. But the British are warned not to overlook the nationalist demands
with which the Muslims are associating themselves.
CHAPTER V
ACTION
Naturally enough, in the period when the movement was taking shape
and organizing itself, plans had been put forward as to what action
could be taken to obtain its objects. Roughly, these plans could be put
under two headings: persuasion and coereion. Under the first came
the organizing of Indian public opinion and informing the government
of it by publishing resolutions and addressing authorities; under the
second came non-co-operation and, in particular for the Muslim com-
munity, hijrat and jihad.
But decisions would be made in Europe. Beyond the Government of
India the British Government, British public opinion and even world
opinion and the governments of the allied powers had to be reached.
So at an early stage it was mooted 1 to send a deputation to Europe to
explain the Muslim point of view and to convince the British cabinet
of the gravity of the situation. This idea materialized in the appointment
of a delegation, consisting of Muhammad Ali, Sayyid Husain, Sayyid
Sulaiman Nadvi and Abul Kasim, which sailed from Bombay in
February, 1920.
The deputation was granted two official interviews with cabinet
ministers. On March 2 it was received by Lord Fisher, standing in for
Montagu who was i11 at the time, and on March 19 by Lloyd George
and Lord Fisher ; on both occasions India Office functionaries like Sir
William Duke and Mr. Shuckburgh were present.~ The first interview
passed off in a very courteous way, since it consisted mainly of an
exposition of the Muslim view by Muhammad Ali and provoked only
slight objections on the British side; it ended on Lord Fisher's assurance
that the British Government fully appreciated Muslim services in the
war and would take the religious feelings of its subjects into account.
"Indeed it is no secret", he concluded, "that the decision which has
recently been taken by the Allied and Associated Powers to retain Turkish
sovereignty in Constantinople has been to a large extent influenced by
the desire of the British Government to meet the religious feelings of its
Muslim subjects in India." The second interview was pitched in a

sharper key, as Lloyd George pressed Muhammad Ali to acknowledge
th at he was opposed to Arab independence, brought up against the
Turks the atrocities in Armenia and Greece, and generally evinccd no
conciliatory attitude. Muhammad Ali afterwards complained about
the Prime Minister having been "showing impatience throughout the
hearing".3
The Khilafat demands put forward by the delegation did not differ
from those discussed in the preceding chapter. Their religious foundation
is again remarkable, the more so because on the British si de therc was
little readiness to accept this view as the correct one. Officials at the
India Office ciearly considered the delegation's real object to be not
so much to obtain better terms for Turkey - whatever the inspiration
of this desire might have been - as to make politica! capital for
purposes of agitation in India. 4 Lord CUlozon at about the same time
looked upon the Khilafat movement in India only as "the result of a
prolonged and desperate agitation". 5
Muhammad Ali in his Autobiography rather convincingly describes 6
the inspiration of his mission in another way: "It was certainly not
poli tics that had lured me this time to Europe. The impulse was purely
religious." He was advised by friends not to touch upon religious matters
in Europe, since he would not meet with much understanding of them
over there. "But how could we do that? We were not Turkish nationalists
fighting for a little space in which their race could breathe and live.
We were Indians ... we were Muslim subjects of a Christian sovereign
to whom we had tendered our temporal allegiance on the clear under·
standing that he would respect our religious obligations, and it was
only our religious obligations that had compelled us to voice our protest
against the annihilation of a temporal power which our religion required
to remain unseparated from the spiritual head of the Islamic world.
Religion, therefore, was the one thing that gave us a locus standi in
the Council of the Allied and AS30ciated Nations ... " Moreover, he was
convinced that the hatred of the Turks was basically an aversion to
Islam, which Europe considered " ... as a confused jumble of spiritual
tags plagiarised from the older Semi tic creeds of Moses and Jesu5, and
of oriental licentiousness, intolerance and tyranny."
This exposition, of course, as weIl as similar ones occurring in
speeches delivered in England and France at the time/ might be thought
to have been made up for foreign consumption and not to reveal the
author's true convictions. In the case of the Autobiography, however,
V. ACTION 101
we do not think this very plausible, and it does not apply at all to an
Appeal to the Khalifa,8 since its publication was avoided at the time
for fear of causing difficulties to the addressee. It was actuated by the
announcement of the draft treaty of Sèvres to the Turkish Peace
Delegation at Paris, and the purport of the document was to implore
the Sultan-Caliph to make his decision on acceptance or rejection of
the treaty "not as the Padshah of Ottoman Turks but as the Captain
of Allah's Army of the Moslems of every country and the Last Prophet
of God." And the same might be said about Muhammad Ali's letter
to his brother Shaukat from London in which he gives an account of
his interview with Montagu, ten days before. He expressly states that
this account is not to be published, since Montagu had made this a
condition for talking freely. The questions that came up at this talk
would be considered political by a westerner, but is is clear that to
Muhammad Ali their significance was based on his religious convictions.
It is hard to tell whether the delegation scored any success. Muham-
mad Ali felt Montagu to be sympathetic to their cause but it was not
him he had to win over, for Montagu had already been advocating
a policy less hostile to Turkey.9 But he failed to convince Lloyd George
and Curzon; the latter heeded French designs with regard to Constan-
tinople far more than Muslim susceptibilities. 10 As a staff member of
the delegation puts it: the delegation "had the impression that nobody
understood the Muslim point of view better than Mr. Montagu ... But
Lloyd George, Curzon and the gang composed of men like Bryce, Robert
Cecil, Asquith and others who follow the traditions of Old Gladstone,
are too strong for him." 11
In his Autobiography, when writing about his tour in England and
France/2 Muhammad Ali declares that he met with more attention
and understanding than he had expected. Having visited the French
author Claude Farrère, he wrote: "M. Claude Farrère, at least, under-
stands that this is not a struggle only between Imperialistic exploitation
and the Muslim faith, but between Mammon and God. He acknow-
ledged to us that the battle we were fighting was not the battle of Islam
alone, but of all religion; and that if the Khilafat was dismembered, it
meant the negation of all faith." 13 But this might well, on Mr. Farrère's
part, have been an effusion of high-flown sentiment, and not a reality
with any political consequences. Perhaps we had better listen to an
estimate from the other side. A political intelligence officer giving an
account of Muhammad Ali's political activities in Europe 14 concludes
that he sought the help of the Labour Party,15 but in vain; that he
found it impossible to gain the support of the French government; that

he got some help from the Italians - his contacts with Turkey were
assured via the Italian diplomatic bag - and had in Switzerland and
Rome contacts with Muslims from Persia, Turkey and Egypt, with the
purpose of getting in on an intrigue with Russia, Turkey and Germany.
But these plans did not materialize. 16
Nevertheless, while in Europe the delegation sometimes expressed its
hope that things would take a more favourable turn. Shortly before
the San Remo conference, Shaukat Ali announced 17 that he had
received a telegram from his brother from Rome that the situation was
"more hopeful", and on June 17 Muhammad Ali despatched another
telegram: "Withdrawal of Treaty now confidently expected in England.
God willing, Indian leaders' courage, sacrifice and perseverance will
yet win back the Khilafat Empire." When this message, however,
circulated in the Indian press, it provoked an official reaction from
Lloyd George, saying: H • • • there is no intention of modifying the Turkish
Treaty ... In any case, the policy of the British Government will not
be affected in the least by agitation in India." 18
On the whole it must have been with a feeling of having failed that
the delegation returned from Europe. One of the consequences was that
the Khilafat movement was going to lean more towards the nationalist
side. 19 But before paying attention to this development we must discuss
a phenomenon in which the religious background of the movement
appeared very clearly: the hijrat to Afghanistan in the summer of 1920.
The idea of hijrat was far from new since it had its roots in the
sharia. It was based upon the distinction between dar-uI-Islam and dar-
ul-harb. According to the classical theory of Islam the world is divided
into two parts: one where Islam is established, and another where this
is not yet the case. The latter is dar-ul-harb (= realm of war), and
generally it is not permissible for Muslims to live in it, as they cannot
do so according to the prescripts of Islamic law. So they should emigrate
from it or make jihad. This, of course, is a simplification of a much
more complicated matter; there existed many shades of opinion on the
interpretation of these precepts, for instance as to the question whether
everyone was obliged to take his leave from dar-ul-harb or that certain
categories were exempted from this obligation, and also with regard
to the nature of jihad, for the means of warfare could be taken to be
spiritual as weIl as material, and a war could be a purely defensive
or an offensive one. But for Indian Muslims the first question was:
should India, after the British had destroyed the last vestiges of Mughul
v. ACTION 103
power, be considered as dar-uI-Islam or as dar-ul-harb? And in the

latter case, were the aforementioned obligations relevant to the situation?
In the years af ter 1870, the general tendency among them had become
to look upon India as not dar-ul-harb, or to consider jihad as not
obligatory, provided the new rulers did not interfere in religious mat-
ters - as was solemny promised in the Queen's declaration of 1858.20
But the question posed itself afresh when the war in November 1914
found Turkey and the British Empire on opposite sides, and when the
Sultan-Caliph proclaimed jihad. Could a country ruled by infidels who
made war on the Caliph of Islam be styled dar-uI-Islam any longer?
Many Indian Muslims escaped from this quandary by declaring the
proclaimed jihad to be no true jihad, but not all of them were inclined
to take this line of reasoning. 21 And when af ter the armistice Indian
Muslims became more and more convinced that Great Britain was the
enemy of Islam, it got ever more difficult for them to remain loyal to
the British government. The Muslim deputation to the Viceroy 22 clearly
stated Muslim loyalty to be conditional on the preservation of religious
freedom, and in guarded terms warned him that Indian Muslims had
to follow "the dictates of Islam, however the consequences may be."
But Shaukat Ali, in his speeches in the first months of 1920, put things
more bluntly: if the Caliphate was tampered with, there were but two
courses open to them, jihad or hijrat. 23 And Abul Kalam Azad, together
with other religious leaders, in 1920 issued a fatwa 24 declaring: "All
Moslems who would like to fulfil Islamic obligations must quit India.
Those who cannot migrate immediately should help the migrants as
if they were themselves migrating from the country. The Sharia gives
us no alternative course, except migration. Emigration from India before
the war was desirabie, but now it is mandatory. Only those Moslems
can remain in India who are needed to carry on the struggle or have
acceptable reasons against migration."
These exhortations were taken to the letter by a good many Indian
Muslims. They were stimulated by a declaration from the Amir of
Afghanistan who promised them an asylum in his country and every
kind of help,25 and the Afghan delegation at Mussoorie encouraged the
movement. 26 The hijrat started in the spring of 1920; in the first days
of Mayahijrat office had already opened at Delhi. 27 The Government
of India regarded it as a dangerous development, because all kinds of
expectations and passions were roused in this way. At first the partici-
pation seems to have been rather unimportant; in June about 50
muhajirin 28 were reported to be in Peshawar, the main rallying-point
for people going to Afghanistan. But in July mention is made of 750

muhajirin arriving at Peshawar,29 and one month later the governmcnt
reported that thus far 18,000 of them had started on their way, at the
same time, however, detecting indications of a check in the movement. 30
This check again seems not to have made itself really felt before the
end of the month, as another report mentions 30,000 muhajirin who
had started for Afghanistan. 31 There is some reason to suppose that
even a considerably greater number set out for Afghanistan, but we
do not feel quite sure about that. 32 It is certain, however, that not many
of them reached their goal. The last Weekly Report referred to mentions
a stream of returning emigrants who had found a "strong barrier across
Khyber pass to prevent further unauthorised entry into Afghanistan."
Apparently the Afghans had got alarmed at so great an influx of immi-
grants for whom they could not provide food and shelter. The whole
movement collapsed in the next months and we hear mainly about the
resettlement of disillusioned returning muhajirin, whose number was
estimated at 75 % of those who had set out. 33
What kind of people had responded to the call for hijrat? Most of
them came from Sind and the N.W.F.P., but the Punjab, the U.P., and
Bihar and Orissa were represented too. They mostly belonged to "poorer
classes", is the opinion of one author,34 which might correspond with
the "simple Moslems" about whom another writes. 35 Official reports
give a somewhat more detailed picture: "At outset emigrants came from
poorer classes with sprinkling of intelligentsia chiefly from towns, but
movement has since spread to other classes" - but just which classes
has been omitted, unfortunately. The same source mentions 1,000 mu-
hajirin from Sind: "95 % labourers, loafers, and broken men." But not
all of them were men of no consequence at all: "Religious excitement
caused by stream of emigrants has begun to affect Government servants.
One batch of emigrants included six sepoys and one havildar ... " 36
In the Punjab a few governments clerks and minor officials resigued
from their posts to perform hijrat, but were reinstated when they
retumed. 37 Briggs writes of " ... comparatively few town-dwellers ... but
every type of agricultural Moslem." He adds that sometimes the popu-
lation of whole villages went, but sometimes only "the young and unruly
rather than the older and steadier portions of the population." 38 But
we mayassurne it was mainly men without property who went; land-
lords were even excused by the advocates of hijrat from participating
in it. 39 This is suggesting that either the propertied classes were weIl
represented in the Khilafat leadership or that, at least, the leadership
V. ACTION 105
did not want to alienate those classes from the movement. But the failure
of hijrat was to same extent ascribed to the fact that the emigrants
were such as brought no economic gain to Afghanistan. 40
So the hijrat movement ended in failure and for a good many
emigrants even in disaster. This brings up the question of responsibility.
Who were the men stimulating the movement, and could they foresee
the unhappy results? To begin with the last question: we think they
could, for even if the Amir had tried to make good his promises, it is
doubtful that he would have been able to do so on a large scale. Perhaps
responsible leaders realized this; even Abul Kalam Azad, who is con-
sidered the chief theoretician of the Khilafat movement was reported
as late as June 1920 to have opposed execution of the hijrat idea. 41 A few
days earlier Dr. Kitchlew also declared that only Abdul Bari was in
favour of migration whereas he himself, sin ce the C.K.C. had not yet
come to a decision in the matter, was against it. 42 Gandhi as late as
July 1920 expressed himself as opposed to hijrat.43 It seems that Abdul
Bari, and perhaps the Ali brothers - but in their case reports are
conflicting - were the most forceful supporters of the movement, and
once the migration was weIl on its way other men could hardly dissent
since it was a matter of religion. 44 So, even when the failure - and
in many cases a fatal failure at that - was known, the C.K.C. did not
disavow it, but even talked of resuming it af ter better preparations. 45
Jinnah's judgment on the Khilafat movement (Ua false religious frenzy")
might weIl have been caused by an episode like the hijrat to Afghanistan.
The hijrat movement, however, though at first causing the govem-
ment some alarm, was of limited proportions as compared with the
non-co-operation movement which started a few months later. More-
over, while the hijrat certainly had political consequences it must be
regarded as primarily religiously motivated: Muslims had to migrate
since they were not aIlowed to live according to the sharia under the
infidel government which curtailed their religious freedom. It was
surely a case where no sharp line might be drawn between religion and
politics, but in our opinion the accent lay on the first aspect. 46
In the non-co-operation movement things were probably just the
other way round. It certainly would not do to deny the religious under-
current manifesting itself in it. 47 Gandhi's concept of satyagraha perhaps
should be caIled a moral concept, but one based upon religion; the idea
of non-violence coupled with it surely had its roots in religious views. 48
These ties with religion may explain the way non-violent non-co-
operation took hold of the masses, but the objects it mapped out for
itself were plainly of a primarily political nature, such as righting the

Punjab wrongs and obtaining swaraj, and its mode of action too lay
mainly in the political sphere.
Some of the hesitation of Hindu leaders to accept non-co-operation
may even be connected with its political character. Politics, af ter all, is
mostly a question of obtaining practical results and seeking the best
means to get as much as possible of wh at you want. So dissensions as
to what means will give the best results are to be expected. In religion,
however, everything is at stake; there is not much choice between eternal
salvation and damnation, and therefore a willingness to go to extreme
lengths is to be expected.
The Khilafat question for the Indian Muslims was a politico-religious
one, and so it is not surprising that they were more ready to take bold
steps than many Hindus. This at any rate, whatever the correct ex-
planation may be, was the case. At the Khilafat Conference at Delhi
in November 1919 Gandhi for the first time introduced the concept
of non-co-operation/ 9 when the Khilafat leaders were taking counsel
together about the means of putting pressure on the government. But
they disagreed on the point of non-violence, and Gandhi did not have
his way in all respects. 50 It was only after deliberations between Gandhi
and the foremost Khilafat leaders in January, 1920, that the Muslims
were convinced that non-violence was not forbidden to followers of
Islam. 51 At the Khilafat Conference at Bombay in February, moderate
Khilafatists like Bhurgri and Chotani still prevailed with their proposal
to postpone a resolution on non-co-operation until the results of Muham-
mad Ali's mission to Europe were known,52 but at C.K.C. meetings at
Bombay in April and May, 1920, the principle of non-co-operation was
accepted and a committee was appointed to work out a scheme for its
initiation. 53 In June, an All-India Khilafat Conference at Allabahad
resolved to give effect to non-co-operation "without further delay"; the
Viceroy, however, was given "a month's warning". 54
It is clear that in Khilafatist circles there existed some hesitation
about setting in motion a machinery of such a nature that no one could
exactly predict what results it would produce, whereas the risks incurred
could not but be grave. We have already remarked 55 upon a certain
reserve towards the movement among the higher strata of the Muslim
community. Majumdar characterizes the mood prevailing in the C.K.C.
in June as weary, timid and not at all bellicose; it was Gandhi and
Shaukat Ali who spurred them on, and under the pressure of mass
opinion they voted for the struggle. 56 And some leaders who at first
v. ACTJON 107
played a role of some importance in the Khilafat movement now shrunk

back from it. Abdullah Koor, an honorary secretary to the C.K.C.,
resigned from this post, giving it as his reason that he considered the
last stages of non-co-operation as unconstitutional and impracticable.
Moreover, he argued, resigning from government posts would be suicidal
to Muslim interests, since rnembers of other communities would rush
in to fill the vacancies. 57
But the fact remains that, whereas the Khilafatists accepted the
non-co-operation programme without too much opposition towards it
and in rather a short time, Congress took a longer time to do so, and
was largely driven on by Gandhi's personal ascendancy and the help
of his Muslim allies in Congress. The causes for this perhaps may be
found by considering what the concept of non-co-operation meant, and
especially what it meant to which people, since it is evident that not
everyhody saw it in the same light.
When the C.K.C. in April 1920 accepted the principle of non-co-
operation, it did so in the following words: 58
"It was decided that, when further action would become necessary,
it should take the form of withdrawal of co-operation with the Govern-
ment, step by step, in the order shown in the following plan which was
drawn up by a special Committee of which Gandhi was the principal
member:
( 1) All titles and honours to he relinquished.
(2) Resignations by members of Councils.
(3) Private servants to give up their jobs.
(4) Resignations of subordinate Government servants including the
Police.
(5) Resignations of superior Governrnent servants.
(6) Withdrawal of Musulrnans from the Army.
(7) Refusal to pay taxes."
In a somewhat abbreviated form the same programme was accepted
at Allahabad in June, where non-co-operation was envisaged as follows: 59
"( 1) the resignation of titles and honorary posts.

(2) the resignation of posts in the Civil services of the Government,
the Police heing excluded.
(3) the resignation of service in the Police and the Army.
( 4) the refusal to pay taxes."
These programmes differ not insignificantly from what, a few months

later was accepted by a special session of Congress at Calcutta: 60
" (a) surrender of titles and honorary offices and resignation from
nominated seats in local bodies ;
(b) refusal to attend Government levees, durbars and other official
and semi-official functions held by Government officials or in
their honour;
(c) gradual withdrawal of children from Schools and Colleges owned,
paid or controlled by Government, and in place of such Schools
and Colleges, establishment of National Schools and Colleges in
the various Provinces ;
(d) gradual boycott of British courts by Lawyers and litigants, and
establishment of private arbitration courts by their aid, for the
settlement of private disputes;
(e) refusal on the part of the military, clerical and labouring classes
to offer themselves as recruits for service in Mesopotamia;
(f) withdrawal by candidates of their candidature for election to the
Reformed Councils and refusal on the part of the voters to vote
for any candidate who may, despite the Congress advice, offer
himself for election ;
(g) boycott of foreign goods."
It is evident from these texts that the Khilafatists at that moment
were prepared to go a good deal further than Congress. Their program-
me, including resignation from the police and the army and refusal to
pay taxes, could bring about a revolutionary situation and was sure to
evoke strong government opposition, whereas the Congress programme
in this respect went no further than advising people not to offer them-
selves as recruits for the army, and then only for service in Mesopo-
tamia - nothing like resignation from the police and the army, as the
Khilafatists were planning. Nor did Congress at that moment talk about
non-payment of taxes. These widely differing programmes reflect, we
think, the differing attitudes of the Khilafatists and the majority of
Congress towards non-co-operation and so may explain the wavering
of Congress when it came to accepting non-co-operation or not.
To explain the situation we have to go back somewhat in our story.
At the Amritsar session of Congress in December, 1919, the issue had
been whether or not to co-operate with the government in working the
reforms. Non-co-operation in that case would mean a purely constitu-
tional opposition which was quite acceptable to many Congress-men and
V. ACT ION 109
to a leader like C. R. Das. 6l But Gandhi and Malaviya at that moment

were in favour of a compromise with government, and tbey got their
way against a fairly strong opposition in Congress; it was resolved to
offer the government conditional co-operation. 62
But in the next months non-co-operation acquired a wholly different
meaning. In tbe shape it was now given by Gandhi and his Khilafat
associates it would mean mass agitation, which the old Congress leader-
ship did not like at all. 63 This was the concept of non-co-operation
Congress was confronted with at the Calcutta session and to get it
accepted, even in a mitigated form, Gandhi had to fight the resistance
of leaders like C. R. Das, Lala Lajpat Rai and B. C. Pal. 64 Gandhi won,
but some authors think that he would not have gained this "personal
triumph" if Tilak had not died one month earlier. 65 The Muslim vote
must have counted for something, and there is a story about Calcutta
taxi drivers having been smuggled in to decide the vote. 66 The casting
of the votes was remarkable: there were over 5,000 delegates at that
session, of whom, however, not quite half voted. The resolution on
non-co-operation was passed by 1,826 to 804 votes. 61
There may have been more than one reason for the negative attitude
of some Hindu leaders. Lack of sympathy for the Muslim cause that
was linked with the new tactics was probably not absent; in Khaliquzza-
man's account of the Calcutta session the theme of Hindu distrust
towards Muslims is evident. 6S But avers ion to embarking upon a revo-
lutionary course that they would not be able fully to con trol themselves
may weIl have been the main factor determining the attitude of the
old élite.
Vet another striking aspect of the Calcutta session's resolutions was
the introduction into them of the concept of swaraj.6D In the preamble
of the resolution on non-co-operation its reasons were stated: (a) tbe
Khilafat question, in respect to which "both the Indian ~md the Im-
perial Governments have signally failed in their duty towards the
Mussulmans of India", and (b) the Punjab troubles, after which
the same governments had failed to punish the officers and officials
responsible but had, on the contrary, exonerated O'Dwyer, while "the
debate in the House of Commons and specially in the House of Lords
betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India." These
resasons led up to the subsequent conclusion : "This Congress is of
opinion that there can be no contentment in India without the redress
of the aforementioned wrongs, and that the only effectual means to
vindicate national honour and to prevent a repetition of similar wrongs
in the future is the establishment of Swarajya." Therefore non-co-

operation was to be adopted "until the said wrongs are righted and
Swarajya is established."
One might argue that the acceptance of the idea of swaraj showed
no less revolutionary a tendency among Congress leaders than among the
Khilafatists. This, we think, would not be quite correct; as long as
swaraj was not defined and the possibility of retaining the British con-
nection was not excluded, it could mean something like dominion status,
or even full responsible govemment in the provinces, which would not
create a revolutionary situation directly affecting the masses, important
as it might be for the old élite. In our opinion the important thing is
that in this way non-co-operation was linked with a nationalist aim,
and that this was accepted by the Khilafatists who at this time played
a considerable part in Congress ; vindicating national honour, af ter all,
was definitely something other than making the world "safe not only
for democracy but for God", as the Khilafat deputation to the Viceroy
had described its ultimate goal. We do not mean to say th at the Khilafat
movement lost its religious character; the Jamiat-ul-Ulama in Novem-
ber, 1920, even evolved its own religious basis for non-co-operation by
issuing the Mutafiqa fatwa which declared that co-operation with the
British, being enemies of Islam, was haram - forbidden by the sharia. 70
Here national honour was not hinted at! But all the same, the Khilafat
leaders in Congress - the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad, Hakim Ajmal
Khan, Dr. Ansari and Umar Sobani among them - accepted that thcir
religious demands were considered as being dependent upon securing
recognition of India's national status. This means that at least among
Khilafat leaders a considerable shift towards Indian nationalism had
taken place.
It is difficult to assess how far non-co-operation was successful. It
certainly found a propitious psychological climate. Resignation of titles
and honours had already occurred before it had come up as the first
item of the programme: Rabindranath Tagore had renounced his knight-
hood af ter the Amritsar massacre,71 and Hakim Ajmal Khan was the
first to renounce his titles when doing so was only considered as a policy,
but had not yet been resolved upon. 72 And yet even th is part of the
programme, affecting not too drastically the lives of those falling in
with it, was not an overwhelming success: in February, 1921, only 21
of over 500 titles and honours had been sent back. 73 The explanation
might be that this part concemed men from the upper strata of society
who were on good terms with the British - a group giving no proof
V. ACTION 111
of the greatest enthusiasm for the nationalist cause or the Khilafat

movement.
The boycott of schools was denounced as rather unpractical 74 in the
press, but it certainly obtained some results. No doubt many people in
those years were ready to make sacrifices, like the Hindu and Muslim
teachers in Bombay municipal vernacular schools who were willing, we
are informed, to work at a lower pay in national schools. 75 The biggest
success was scored at Aligarh where, af ter a visit of Muhammad Ali
and Gandhi, about 100 - possibly even 200 76 - students with same
teachers left the Muslim university to found a National Muslim Univer-
sity, of which Muhammad Ali temporarily became the Shaikh. But
Gandhi's efforts to obtain a similar success at the Hindu University of
Benares failed completely because Malaviya and other Hindu leaders
strongly opposed his plans. 77 And on the whoie, Muhammad Ali con-
fessed, "the success with the students was less than we expected." 78
Then there was the boycott of law-courts and of elections. Some
prominent politicians gave up their practice as barristers, among them
Motilal Nehru, C. R. Das, and Khaliquzzaman. 79 In November-Decem-
ber, 1920, elections were held for the Provincial Legislative Councils,
the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. The boycott of these
elections is described as "moderately successful",80 with great local dif-
ferences: in Bombay only 8 per cent of the voters went to the polls,
but at Lucknow some 60 and at Madras about 50 per cent. S1
So we get, by and large, the picture of an action that was not an
outstanding success, but on the other hand we should not form too low
an opinion of it. It is hardly probable that, had it been an evident
failure, the Nagpur session of the Congress and the Khilafat Conference
in December, 1920, would have upheld the programme formulated four
months ago. 82 Perhaps its greatest success was that it created a state of
mind which opened up other possibilities much more threatening to the
government. This is expressed by Muhammad Ali, who writes: "The
success of our movement can be measured partly by the love and affec-
tion inspired by Gandhi and his co-workers in millians of people - nay
scores of millions if not hundreds of millions who had for centuries never
been inspired by any personality or any propaganda. Our movement is
the only live movement of the last two generations at least for it has
moved the masses in their millions. But our movement is chiefly to be
measured by the amount of teaT that it has succeeded in removing.
It was fear that had made 320 millions of people the slave of a hundred
thousand Englishmen. That fear, thank God, is fast disappearing. India's
112 THE KHiLAF AT MOVE MENT IN INDIA
thraldom is sure to disappear af ter that. This is the truest measure." 83

Another measure perhaps was the growth of the volunteer movement.
The volunteers were by no means a new phenomenon; the Congress
and the Servants of India Society had already made use of volunteer
corps for same years. The All-India Khilafat Conference at Allahabad
on June 2 and 3, 1920, resolved: " ... that a Khilafat volunteer corps
be organized, and its branches be established all over India so that they
may collect subscriptions for the Khilafat fund ... and also prepare the
Indian public for the non-co-operation movement." 84
These objects, however, differed from the tasks usually assigned to
volunteer corps and the Government of India was cIearly samewhat
alarmed. It addressed a circular letter to all Local Governments, calling
attention to the fact that formerly volunteer corps used to do social
work, assisted the police in guiding processions, and sa on, but that this
year the movement had assumed "a somewhat sinister character": it
took to military discipline and was politically employed. Volunteers were
drilled by former N.C.O.s from the Indian Army; " ... officers were
dressed in Turkish military uniform, i.e. khaki tunic and trousers, red
tarbush with acrescent, Sam-Browne belts and swords." The letter
concIuded by asking for the opinions of Local Governments. 85
At the same time the Government of India tried to reassure the
Secretary of State about these developments. 86 But Montagu felt less
secure about them; with reference to these reports he noted: "And
volunteers in Ireland (North and South) started all the trouble", and:
"I am alarmed about these volunteer associations or what they may
grow into." 87 But the reports of the Local Governments 88 confirmed
the Government of India's opinion. Bombay expected some trouble from
the volunteers, but the Punjab, Delhi and the V.P., where the movement
was reported to be largest, still considered them as more or less harm-
less. Moreover, since the volunteer corps in former years had built up
a good reputation, Local Governments thought it difficult to decIare
them unlawful. Montagu, however, continued to feel alarmed and
considered it necessary to warn the Government of India against the
dangers of the movement,89 and in the last months of 1921 his anxieties
proved to be well-founded.
Meanwhile, we should not forget that the Khilafat movement was
caused in the first place by the dangers be setting Turkey and the
position of the Sultan-Caliph. As we have seen, the attitude of the
Khilafatists towards the British government hardened in the summer
of 1920, and this probably resulted, at least partly, from the aggravation
v. ACTION 113
of Turkey's plight. In Mareh, Constantinople and the shores of the

Bosporus had been occupied by the Allies,90 and in May the peace terms
were made known. On this occasion the Viceroy addressed a message
to the Muslims of India, expressing his sympathy with their feelings, and
the Government of India issued a statement eXplaining why the peace
terms could not have been more favourable for the Turks - but both
Gandhi and Shaukat Ali declared that the time for non-co-operation
had now arrived. 91 And there was worse to come: in June and July,
Greek troops occupied Eastern Thrace and advanced into Anatolia, and
in August the Sultan's government signed the treaty of Sèvres.
But these events roused nationalist Turks. Kemal Pasha, who had
been sent to Anatolia to control unruly troops, assumed leadership over
them and in April, 1920 set up a counter-government at Angora. The
events of the summer increased his following and all real authority in
Turkey shifted from the Sultan and the allied military forces towards
the new Angora government. 92
In the next months the position of the new Turkish régime was
strengthened in several ways. In November, 1920, Venizelos was beaten
at the polls and the following month a plebiscite was held in Greece,
resulting in the return of ex-king Constantine. This was where the ways
of the Allies parted. Lloyd George decided to go on backing the Greeks,03
but France "had seen the significanee of Turkish nationalism and
changed sides." 04 The Angora government, moreover, since September
1920 was in contact with Soviet Russia and had got access to a souree
of supplies; this led up to a Turco-Russian treaty, which had already
been preceded by a Turco-Afghan treaty and an Afghan-Russian treaty.05
And meanwhile the French and the I talians were negotiating with
Angora. It was only a matter of time before this development in favour
of the new Turkey produced tangible results.
Two aspects of this development are of particular interest in this
context. The first is that the British Empire had now manoeuvered
itself into the position of being the only ostensible enemy of the Turks.
It had never been easy for the Indian Muslims to believe that Turkey
should have had to accept the harsh peace terms arrived at in the treaty
of Sèvres if England had not really wanted it that way.oa Initially,
however, there seemed to be some excuse for it; when in Europe in the
first half of 1920, Muhammad Ali had found no support among Great
Britain's allies. But now, France and Italy were seen to be the friends
of Turkey, whereas Great Britain concentrated its mediterranean fleet
at Constantinople and assisted the Greeks. 97 The second aspect is that
what, strictly speaking, were successes for the Angora government, in

India were considered at the time to be successes of the Ottoman
Empire, and consequently of the Sultan-Caliph. Kemal Pasha could
still be regarded as defending the latter's rights; the gap between their
régimes was not yet evident.
Pan-Islamic and nationalist sympathies were curiously intertwined
here. In the Turco-Afghan treaty, Turkey - Kemal Pasha's Turkey! -
was complimented for having "set the example as the Guide of Islam",98
and Khilafat meetings spoke about thc Sultan-Caliph and Mustapha
Kemal Pasha as allies. 99 So it is understandable that Kemal's successes
put he art into the Khilafatists, but they had the same effect on all
nationalists in the Middle East. lOO And in India the issue of swaraj in
these months was accentuated, which means that Indian nationalism
and Muslim solidarity at that moment coincided. We may witness this
trend at a Lucknow Khilafat Conference in February 1921 and at the
All-India Khilafat Conference held at Meerut in April of the same
year. At Meerut the " ... prevailing no te was that Khilafat question had
to be settled in India itself, Swaraj alone could solve problem. Indian
Moslems should concentrate energies on winning freedom of India and
then liberation of holy pI aces would follow as natural course." 101 But
about the same time the incompatibility of Indian nationalism and
Pan-Islamism was demonstrated in a speech of Muhammad Ali 102 in
which he declared that an Afghan invasion, if undertaken with a view
to destroy the oppressors of Islam, would be supported by Indian Mus-
lims - a pronouncement which caused a considerable stir. 103
Now that we have considered in some detail the Khilafat movement
in action, we should pay attention to the government's policy with
respect to it. But when speaking about "the govemment's policy" we
should realize that the Government of India was not one person ; it
was an organism composed of several persons and official bodies. lts
head was thc Govemor-General "in Council", which means th at the
members of his Executive Council had an important voice in many
matters, and he also had to reckon with Local Govemments, whose
advice he sought when momentous decisions regarding the whole country
had to he reached. And then the Government of India was not indepen-
dent; it was, via the Secretary of State, responsible to the Westminster
Parliament. 104 So when considering "the govemment's policy", we are
dealing with a notion always subject to change under the various
pressures to which it was exposed. It is not surprising that the govern-
ment's policy was not always invariable; on the contrary, we think it is
V. ACTJON 115
far more amazing th at with regard to the Khilafat movement it was

as stcady as we will find it.
Generally speaking we think that four ways were open to the Govern-
ment of India when confronted with the political unrest in India af ter
the war. It could resort to repression of the non-co-operation movemcnt,
into which the Khilafat movement and Congress were now merged to
a great extent; it could reconcile the opposition by making concessions;
it could do nothing and simply await the moment when the movement
would collapse or peter out; and lastly, it could try a combination
of some of these tactics. This last was the way the Government of
India chose to follow. The ma in trend of its policy became "non-
interference,,/o5 but parallel with it ran an attempt to reconcile Muslim
opinion by specific concessions.
The first alternative, repression, was hardly compatible with the
general trend of British constitutional policy in India which, af ter
having stressed in the Morley-Minto reforms in 1909 the representative
character of the Govemment of India, was now about to launch an
experiment in responsible govemment. These changes in both the
political and administrative machinery of govemment presupposed
something like the consent - given either grudgingly or enthusiasti-
cally -- on the side of the govemed.
But this does not mean to say that there were no men in high office
who would not have preferred repressive measures. We should look for
them among those who thought British rule a blessing for India, since
Indians were not fit to govem themselves. 106 Therefore, a democratie
govemment in India was impossible,107 and the autocracy it needed was
apt to regard all opposition or even criticism as "seditious".108 Hand in
hand with this judgment went the disposition to consider all agitation
as "artifieial"; therefore the government should suppress it before it
eaused misehieP09 A cri tie of th is kind was Sir Miehael O'Dwyer, who
defended General Dyer, the "hero" of Amritsar.11o He compared the
handling of the Moplah rebellion in 1921 with his own handling of the
Punjab troubles in 1919: in Malabar the govemment hesitated to use
force, with the result that the rebellion claimed some thousands of vic-
tims, whereas in the Pun jab, where repression was resorted to at onee,
the total number of casualties remained under 500.111 He aeeused the
Government of India of aeting weakly beeause it did not want to
endanger the reforms.112 One year after Amritsar he asked the govem-
ment to empower him to apply the Seditious Meetings Act of 1911 to
the Lahore area, a demand, however, which the government refused
to sanction, considering it desirabie to avoid repressive measuresy3 For

this was what the Government of India wanted. They were "bad
oppressors", as Low puts it,1l4 and did not want to rely on force only.
Or, in the words of Sir Valentine Chirol: "Force alone is no remedy" -
that being the lesson he had learnt from the war and the years af ter
it. 115 Or, to quote Montagu in a letter to Lord Reading: "After all,
we are governing human beings and not cattle ... " 116
Repression evidently was not the way the Government of India was
going to deal with the situation. Were concessions to be made then to
reconcile the opposition? Here we should distinguish between the two
categories their demands could be classified under: the nationalist
demands and the specific Muslim claims with regard to the Caliphate
and the position of Turkey. We should, in our opinion, make this distinc-
tion though we cannot wholly separate the two, because the nationalist
movement had adopted the Muslim demands, whereas the Khilafatists,
by joining Gandhi's Congress, were coming into the nationalist camp.
The nationalist aims were perhaps not very clear, as swaraj was their
avowed but not yet defined object. Since, however, the Congress' op-
position towards the reforms of 1919 was mainly directed against the
very limited character of the delegation of power - finance, justice and
the police remained under the con trol of the provincial governors, while
only the provincial departments of agriculture, education, public he al th
and local self-government we re alloted to responsible ministers 117 - it
would seem possible to extend the scope of this delegation. Only in
practice it was not. Even a champion of Indian self-government like
Montagu thought it would take a very long time before India could
be wholly self-governing, and the Government of India Act of 1919
itself contained a clause setting a period of ten years before a new
instalment of reforms would be considered. 118 Moreover, concessions of
this kind would mean a diminution of British power in India. It is
difficult to ascertain to what extent the British administration in India
was willing to give up its position. It is possible to contend that, " ...when
the final Act (of 1919) was promulgated, the Government of India was
able to relax in the knowledge that the actual effect of the reforms would
be to leave authority where it had always been - in the hands of the
British",110 but also that the greater part of the I.C.S. looked upon
the transfer of power which started in 1919 as something inevitable
and right. 120 But however this may be, it was certainly much more
attractive for the Government of India to make concessions with re gard
to the Caliphate and Turkey which would hardly affect their own
V. ACTION 117
posltlon, than to give in to nationalist demands which would be at

their own expense. This at any rate was what was done: there was
no question of concessions to the nationalist demands, but the Govern-
ment of India was quite ready to support the Muslim claims.
This was evident from the very beginning. In the spring of 1919
Montagu accompanied the Indian delegation - consisting of Lord
Sinha and the Maharajah of Bikaner - to the Paris conference, where
the Indian Muslims' demands were put forward. 121 But he did not feel
that their wishes were really paid heed to, and in a letter to Curzon 122
he complained about this: "I cannot convince myself that the Indian
delegation at the Peace Conference has ever been seriously treated as
they were promised they should be, for they have no opportunity of
influencing the decisions about the teITÏtories they are interested in. You
will find recorded in the British Empire Delegation Minutes in Paris
that a promise was given that on any Commission or international body
discussing the future of Turkey, the claims of India to representation
would be met. They never have been ... " In the same letter he objects
to the fact that the Sultan's independence and sovereignty are not
expressly acknowledged; if the treaty is going to mention only the King
of Hijaz as an independent mIer, England will be accused of trying to
substitute this king as Caliph for the Sultan. 123 Then he comes to the
question of Constantinople and the Straits: "Is it absolutely impossible
to convince you of the necessity for keeping our pledges? Are you
unmoved by the united evidence which comes from India without
exception that a form of peace such as you con temp late (in which you
said at the Cabinet you were thinking of India) is likely to be disastrous
to India in the present circumstances?"
When at about the turn of the year a decision on these questions was
due, he bombarded the Cabinet with memoranda/ 24 stressing again and
again the Muslim susceptibilities which would be hurt by harsh peace
terms, and referring to similar opinions expressed by the Viceroy and
other authorities in India. In his weekly telegrams the Viceroy had indeed
often pointed out the bad effect the treatment of Turkey had on
Indian Muslims. 125 In January, 1920, a conference of Heads of Provinces
was called at Delhi, where the Muslim situation was reviewed and
which resulted in a report to the Secretary of State. 126 It was not an
alarmist report; most governors and lieutenant-governors anticipated
some trouble, but not very serious. All the same, the general feeling
was expressed that concessions over Turkey and the Caliphate would
clear up the Indian situation a good deal as far as the Muslims were
concerned. Even Sir Harcourt Butler, who in April, 1919 had expressed
his desire of severe terms for the Turks, since these would put an end
to any pretences of Pan-Islamism,127 at the Delhi conference conceded
that "the temperature was rising" and that possibly the army might be
affected by the agitation.
That the Government of India did not disclaim the Khilafatists'
demands mayalso be inferred from their readiness to facilitate the
departure of the Khilafat deputation to Europe and to make it a some-
what official affair by receiving in audience a delegation from the
C.K.C., the body that had resolved to send the deputation on its way.128
In 1921 a second Khilafat deputation left for Europe and this one had
an even more official status, since the initiative for sending it was taken
by the Government of India itself.129 The Khilafatists themselves - or
at least same of them - were not entirely pleased with its constitution,130
but it is clear that the Government of India wanted to impress the
Indian Muslims' wishes on His Majesty's Government in London.
But in the British cabinet these views and the policy which would
result from them had powerful enemies. Lloyd George was definitely
anti-Turkish and CUI"Zon, who held less rigid views about Turkey's
future place in the world, at any rate wanted to expel the Turks from
Europe. l3l When on January 6, 1920, the cabinet decided that it would
agree to Constantinople remaining Turkish, Curzon wrote: "I believe
this to be a short-sighted, and, in the long run, a most unfortunate
decision. In order to avoid trouble in India - largely manufactured
and in any case ephemeral - ... we are losing an opportunity for
which Europe has waited nearly five centuries ..." 132 It was Montagu
and often Churchill who were pleading a revision of the treaty of
Sèvres soon after its ratification, but the Prime Minister and Lord
Curzon wanted to keep it. 133
So this is the picture we get of the Government of India's policy
towards the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements : it did not want
repression if it could be avoided, nor did it contemplate concessions to
the nationalist demands, but it did advocate concessions to the Muslim
claims and more or less championed the cause of Turkey and the
Caliphate. But before turning our attention to the policy of non-inter-
ference we mentioned before, we think we should answer two questions
with regard to the policy of concessions just discussed: (a) did the
Government of India advocate acceptance of everything the Khilafatists
wanted, and (b) was this readiness to meet, to some extent at least, the
Muslim demands, an attempt to split up the Hindu-Muslim unity, or
v. ACTION 119
in other words, was it an instance of the notorious divide-and-rule policy?

As for the first question, we have seen that the Khilafatists' demands
went a long way. Their most extreme formula was Muhammad Ali's:
"restoration of the territorial status quo ante helium" in order to main-
tain the Caliph's power as a defender of Islam, but, if need be, he was
willing to accept some form of autonomy for his non-Turkish subjects.
In practice this would mean: (1) preservation of the Sultan-Caliph's
sovereignty in Eastem Thrace (Adrianople!), Constantinople and the
Straits, and the whole of Asia Minor, and (2) some kind of suzerainty
over Arab territories like Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and the Arabian
Peninsuia where the holy places of Islam are located. The first item
had Montagu's and the Govemment of India's support/a4 but the
Sultan's suzerainty over the Arab peoples was a vexed problem.
The attitudes assumed with regard to it may be summed up as follows.
The Govemment of India advocated recognition of the Sultan's nominal
suzerainty over the pre-war Turkish Empire in Asia; 135 this was the
line taken by Chelmsford who pointed out that, as things stood, the
Sultan was considered to be a passive instrument in the hands of
the Allies, and that by not recognizing him as the suzerain over his
former empire the election of the Amir of Afghanistan was made a very
real possibility, which would create potential dangers to India. It was
also the line taken by Lord Reading who wrote that "Indian Moslem
opinion, though becoming reconciled to fact that Arab portions of the
Turkish Empire must remain autonomous, would like to see Turkish
suzerainty restored over them in some visible shape, however shadowy
in substance." He understood that territorial suzerainty was impossible,
but suggested recognition of the Sultan's "religious suzerainty ... over
Mecca and Medina." 136
This proposal, however, was most positively contested by the India
Office and the Secretary of State. They argued that to give the Sultan
any kind of "spiritual" or "religious" authority over territories he would
be losing, would open the door to political claims, as the distinction
between temporal and spiritual authority was foreign to Islam; therefore,
recognizing his spiritual authority would be repeating the very error
committed by the Austrians, the Greeks and the Italians in their pre-
war treaties with Turkey.137 But matters were complicated by a pledge
Lloyd George gave, probably unwittingly, to the second Khilafat de-
putation in March, 1921, when declaring: "You can assure the Moslems
of India that there is not the slightest intention to interfere with the
spiritual power of the Caliph in any part of the world." 138 Sir Alfred
Hirtzel of the India Office was evidently far from pleased with these
words and wrote: "The Prime Minister had evidently been misinformed,
and he gave this pledge without, probably, having all the facts before
him. But a pledge is a pledge, and it will have to be kept. The question
now is, hOW."139
We may conclude from our summary that the Govemment of India
was willing to satisfy most of the Khilafat demands, whereas policy-
makers in London were less compliant. Now we come to our second
question: how should we interpret this willingness? Was it an attempt
to break up Hindu-Muslim unity? In our opinion, an absolutely un-
equivocal answer to this question cannot be given. Some indications
might make us answer it in the affirmative. For one thing, it is so of ten
that "a growing cleavage of the Hindu-Muslim unity", or "a rift in the
Hindu-Mussalman lute", and the like are announced in reports, that
one is tempted to suppose that these observations express their authors'
wishes, in which case it would be quite possible that they lent a hand
to provoke a development they desired. 140 Undoubtedly there were men
pursuing this line of thought, as is testified by a letter from Montagu
to Chelmsford. The latter had reported friction between Congress and
the Muslim League,141 and Montagu answered 142: "I hope you will
be able to follow up and let me have current news of everything tending
towards friction inside the Congress itself. There is nothing I ha te more
in the ordinary course than harping on these differences between Hindu
and Mohammedan out of which your and my opponents in policy have
made their capita!. But when on the other side we find the Congress,
as it now is, pushing the doctrine of unity to an extreme for the sole
purpose of embarassing the British Government, we must make ourselves
masters of the real facts."
A similar indication might be seen in a paper submitted to a con-
ference of Heads of Provinces. 143 lts au thor suggested that Local Govem-
ments should arrange interviews with leading Hindus and Muslims: to
exhort the latter to accept the Turkish peace terms, and "to wam the
Hindus of the danger of displaying too much sympathy with the Khilafat
movement, pointing out the encouragement which this movement, if it
produces outbursts of intemal disorder, will afford to the Bolshevik and
Pan-Islamic forces outside India which coupled with tribal hostilities
and the uncertain attitude of Afghanistan constitute such a formidable
menace to the peace and prosperity of India. It may be noted in this
connection that there is reason to believe that the Afghan Consul at
Bokhara has been talking freely of the coming conquest of India by the
v. ACTION 121
Afghans. In these conditions it is the duty of the Hindu not to excite

with over-sympathy the fanaticism of his Moslem brother but rather
to appeal to his common sense and the joint interest of India, Muslim
and Hindu ... " This harangue might be eXplained as a perfidious
attempt to promote mistrust and discord between the two communities,
but it should, we think, be read in another sense: the govemment does
not advise the Hindus to withhold their sympathy from the Khilafat
cause - it could hardly do so, since it professed such sympathy itself -
but only their "over-sympathy" by which "Muslim fanaticism" might
be excited, resulting possibly in "intemal disorder". This explanation
is supported by a change in the proposed text when the Viceroy sent
a circular letter to all Local Govemments. 144 Here the first sentence
quoted reads: " ... to wam the Hindu of the danger of supporting the
Extremist Khilafat movement" , suggesting that they should detach
themselves from the extremists among the Khilafatists.
We consider this change in the text to be significant, for, whereas
the indications for a divide-and-rule policy along religious lines are few,
those pointing in another direction are abundant. In our opinion, the
main object of the Government of India was to get the support of
the "moderates", detaching them from the "extremists" - meaning
those who would in any case side with maintaining law and order as
opposed to those who would, if need be, resort to violence. 145 This, af ter
all, was a traditional British policy towards the nationalist movement,
ever since the extremists made their appearance in it about 1900, or
at least since Minto's Viceroyalty.
Montagu had outlined it as early as 1910 in his first Indian budget
speech when he spoke about "separating legitimate from illegitimate
unrest" as "the root principle of government in India." 146 The fact that
in those years most extremists were to be found among the Hindus and
that the Muslims - at least those politically interested - were almost
without exception moderates, could cause a semblance of a policy of
playing off one community against the other.
- In this respect, by the end of the war the situation had changed:
"extremism" was to be found among the Muslims no less than among
the Hindus. Hindu-Muslim unity, however, by now had asserted itself
by the Lucknow pact and Gandhi's action, and this fact might have
suggested a policy of dividing the communities more strongly to the
British than ever since the days of the Mutiny. But again we find
Montagu expounding the necessity of "preventing the alienation of
many, if not all, the Moderates", without any mention of Hindus and
Muslims.14 r The same theme was set forth by Sir Harcourt Butler in
the summer of 1918: "It is our business to rally the moderates and those
who are really anxious that some practical scheme of reform should
be introduced at an early date. Otherwise the moderates will in all
probability be swamped by the extremists. .. Of the extremists again,
there are two parties. One, which has definitely made up its mind that
the Europeans should leave the country; and the other, which cannot
foresee when this will be possible. The lat ter may, by judicious handling,
become moderates." 148
Time and again this idea is expressed or hinted at in the Weekly
Reports.14 g Clearly the Government of India sought support among the
moderates of both communities and did not coax only the Muslim
moderates: Lord Reading gladly accepted Malaviya's intervention in his
dealings with Gandhi and the Ali brothers, when in the summer of 1921
it became more and more evident that extremist Khilafatists would not
stop at having recourse to violence, while it could still he hoped that
Gandhi would keep his followers on the path of non-violence. 15o The
Viceroy obviously regarded the Ali brothers as the most dangerous
element in the situation, while co-operation with Gandhi was not yet
out of the question. 151 Playing off the Muslim community against the
Hindu community, moreover, was on principle unacceptable to men
like Reading and Montagu. Even when in December 1921 a crisis was
impending, the latter wrote to the former: "Your letter shows, and I am
grateful for it, how much you realise that it is my ambition to do all
we can do for India in her aspirations towards nationhood." 152 Indian
nationalists of course might hold greatly different opinions about what
could and should be done to promote Indian nationhood, but by no
stretch of imagination could the Viceroy and the Secretary of State
suppose that Hindu-Muslim discord would advance its cause.
Retaining and, if possible, increasing the support of the moderates was
the object of the Government of India in those years, and the ways to
obtain it were (a) concessions towards the Khilafatists, among whom
were undoubtedly many "loyal" 153 Muslims, and (b) non-interference,
an aspect of policy we still have to discuss. Non-interference as an
answer to the rather violent speeches of Congress and Khilafat leaders
was a policy decided upon in the spring of 1920. It was a new policy,
as compared with the repression which had prevailed during the war/ 54
culminating in the Rowlatt Act and the Amritsar tragedy. But this very
climax made the Government of India realize that they did not want
to rely upon "force, naked and undisguised". Moreover, Gandhi's creed
V. ACT ION 123
of non-violence did not call immediately for repression, and, lastly, the
introduction of the new refonns made it imperative not to lose any
goodwill the British Raj still possessed among Indians. So Chelmsford
could write to Montagu in the spring of 1920: "I have pursued the
deliberate policy of letting people talk, and I think it has resulted in
the moderate portion of the community being thoroughly frightened
by the speeches made by some of the fanatical extremists." 155 This
motivation we meet again and again in the documents of those years:
the plans of the extremists are so dangerous and so hopelessly impractical
that more sober minds will turn from them, and so the agitation will
dig its own grave.
Generally, the Govemment of India remained throughout convinced
that they had hit on the right idea, as is evident from reports in the
spring of 1920 and 1921.156 In the last one, however, a certain reserve
is noticeable: "We have decided that for the present no radical change
in policy is required, but that Local Govemments should be urged to
instate prosecutions more freely under the ordinary law, not only against
those guilty of incitements to violence, but also against persons whose
speeches are calculated to produce feelings likely to lead to violence in
the near future." And in a retrospective view on the whole episode of
the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements,t5T the Govemment of
India motivated non-interference in a slightly altered way: "We were
deeply impressed by the necessity ... of carrying with us Indian opinion
in the measures which we employed in dealing with the non-co-operation
agitation. This agitation had its origin in feelings, sentiments and as-
pirations, which to some extent were shared too by its opponents, the
moderates. lts goal, the attainment of swaraj, was also theirs; they too
had been deeply affected byevents in the Punjab, and the Mohamme-
dans among them were in full sympathy with the aim, though not with
the methods of the Khilafat movement. While we never lost sight of
paramount necessity for the maintenance of law and order, we were
convinced that, in the long run, a policy of combining patience, con-
ciliation and the finn suppression of violence and disorder would
eventually defeat a movement whose impracticable character was realized
by all sensible men."
We have quoted this document at some length for two reasons. The
first is that it testifies to the Govemment of India's realizing that non-
interference was also called for because repression of the extremists
would have alienated the moderates, being in sympathy with the aims
of the latter. And secondly, it was this very aspect of the situation which
may have caused the near-failure of the government's policy to win the
moderates over to its own side.
For it is evident th at in this respect the Government of India and
the Secretary of State were disappointed. 158 Repeatedly they pointed out
that their "policy of allowing non-co-operation making itself ridicu-
lous" 159 was rather successful, and we think it indeed was, in that more
serious disorders were avoided - but the extremists in Congress and
among the Khilafatists did not ridicule themselves so thoroughly as the
government had hoped for. Therefore, the moderate element was prob-
ably prevented from siding with the extremists, but it did not side with
the government either. The disappointment among the rulers was
translated into complaints about the Indians being so "unreasonable",160
or about their "racial consciousness" ,161 or about Indian unrest being
"engineered".162 All these pronouncements in our opinion reveal that
the men who made them underrated the force of the nationalist urge,
or, in the case of the Khilafatists mainly, of religious feelings, which
caused even moderate men to feel sympathy for the very extremists
whose methods they abhorred.
But though non-interference did not bring all the profit the Govern-
ment of India had expected from it, we think it was the wisest course
they could have taken. And they did so against increasing opposition.
The Viceroy and his Council 163 adhered to it, and by and large they
got the support of the Local Governments. Not from all of them, how-
ever. The Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Craddock, did not stint
his criticism of the government's policy, and Lord Ronaldshay of Bengal
and Lord Willingdon of Madras also gave vent to a feeling of uneasiness
about it. 164 One may discern a growing tendency on the part of Local
Governments to have recourse to repression. In August, 1920, the
Government of the Punjab asked for permission to put into effect the
Seditious Meetings Act, but the request was refused by the Government
of India. 165 In the same month, the Government of Madras wanted to
refuse admittance to Gandhi, Shaukat Ali and Dr. Kitchlew, but was
instructed to let them enter. 166 In April, 1921, the Government of the
U.P. wrote that a prosecution of the Ali brothers was thought necessary:
the policy of non-interference had been accepted in the hope that the
trouble might abate, but this was not what had happened. 167 Low may
be right when he writes th at in Mareh, 1921, " ... however much Local
Governments might have said that they agreed with the instructions
they had received, they would almost certainly have fallen into line with
the Government of India if it had gone over to a policy of repression. 168
v. ACTION 125
And then, lastly, there were the British Govemment, the British
Parliament and British public opinion. In the cabinet it was the
Secretary of State who had to stand up for the policy of the Govem-
ment of India. And though Montagu no doubt agreed with it on broad
lines, he felt uncertain as to how far toleration of revolutionary speech-
making should go. When the Govemment of India reported that Shaukat
Ali, with respect to a possible Afghan invasion, had used language which
would justify criminal prosecution, but at the same time announced
that it was not going to take action against him, Montagu noted:
"I should have thought that immediately a speaker, whatever his
backing, recommends helping an invader, he should be prosecuted by
ordinary law."169
About the same time, he had to answer awkward questions in the
House of Commons about Gandhi's not being arrested,170 and when
two months later in the House of Lords the govemment's proposal to
condemn General Dyer's action at Amritsar was defeated, this meant
an open denunciation of the Government of India's policy. But for
some time to come the Westminster govemment accepted the principle
that the way of enforcing law and order was something for local
authorities to decide. l71 It was only when things headed towards a crisis
that it made ready to take matters in hand directly.
CHAPTER VI
CRISIS
One of the reasons why the Govemment of India was able to pursue
its policy of non-interference towards the non-co-operation and Khilafat
movements was, as we have seen, their non-violent character. Another
was that the movement proceeded step by step: the first items of its
programme, like the boycott of law-courts, schools and elections did not
present any serious dangers to the govemment. When, however, the
non-co-operators and the Khilafatists came nearer to violen ce and
especially when they tumed to the last item, non-payment of taxes, the
govemment could hardly maintain its waiting attitude. In consequence
of this development an extemal crisis was bound to come. But at the
same time - we are speaking about the second half of 1921 - there
were indications of a possible intemal crisis threatening the unity of
the movement, and partly for the same reasons.
Non-violence was the creed the movement professed, but it did not
have the same meaning for all individuals and groups concerned. For
Gandhi, we think, its meaning was predominantly moral and religious.
Violence he regarded as evil, and since means and ends were "con-
vertible terms" 1 in his philosophy of life, no good could come from the
use of violent means. 2 Non-violence for him was also something positive;
it was not the "weapon of the weak" as even same of his sympathizers
might think,3 nor was it an expedient only, to he discarded when a better
one came to hand - it was a value in itself.
A good many of his followers may have been moved by the same
sentiments, but less strongly than he. This was why Gandhi experienced,
from the very beginning of the non-co-operation movement, disappoint-
ments with respect to non-violence. He knew, from the moment he had
confessed his "Himalayan" blunder with respect to the first big hartal
in March-April, 1919, that he was playing with fire because the masses
were not ready for a wholly non-violent movement. For some time the
violence could take the relatively innocent shape of social boycott and
the picketing of liquor shops and so on, but even this was sure to evoke
VI. CRISIS 127
ill-feeling and might easily lead further on towards a slippery slope,

ending in downright violence. The non-co-operation and Khilafat move-
ments steadily came nearer to this danger, if only because of their
growth; in the summer of 1921 they had, coupled together, truly become
a mass movement. 4
This brings us to another group of Gandhi's followers - the majority
of Congress leaders, who had taken some time to be converted to the
non-co-operation programme. They had, by accepting this programme,
accepted the fact that poli tics in India were no longer the monopoly
of their own élite from the upper 6lnd middle classes but had come
within the reach of the masses. But actual politicalleadership remained,
for the time being as least, in the hands of the old leaders, or younger
men who came, however, from the same group. Though the number
of peasant delegates increased about 1920 5 the leadership, to be found
in the A.I.C.C., was recruited from the same groups as before; " ... upper
caste Hindus and a fair number of upper class Muslims; most of them
had had a Western education and followed the new professions."
The number of landlords was relatively small and tended to become
even smaller in these years. 6 Gopal Krishna, from whom we borrow
these results of an analysis of Congress leadership in the period 1918-
1923, sees one significant change: before 1920, Congress leadership was
based upon social position, but after that year upon the willingness to
renounce social position. We may assume, however, that in individual
cases this change did not come about quite abruptly; the choice between
social position and political leadership for many of these men may not
have been an easy one and it would be only natural if some of them
had tried to make the best of both worlds. This situation must have
caused tension between leadership and following. Would the foIlowing
dictate to the leadership the course of the movement, or would it be
the other way round? In this state of things, the leadership must have
been looking for a means to keep con trol over the mass movement, and
non-violence may have been just what they wanted.
This aspect of political developments about 1920, to wit increasing
tension between politicalleadership and mass following, has been stressed
by R. Palme Dutt,7 and we think his analysis contains a good deal of
truth. It is confirmed, to some extent, by facts we have already observed:
the reluctance, especially among weIl-to-do Muslims on good terms with
the British, to support the Khilafat movement when it turned out to be
a rather radical mass movement ; the relative lack of success of the
boycott of honours and titles. We do not, however, entirely adopt his
analysis; his emphasis on class interests as the motive determining the

attitude of the leadership is, we think, rather one-sided. No doubt, this
motive was not absent; we will come across an instance where it is
quite obvious. But other considerations very likely had same part in it,
too. One of them was that a violent conflict with the British Raj would
probably end in failure, perhaps in disaster. Another might have been
that control of the masses was necessary for maintaining national unity;
everything tending to bring out class antagonism had to be avoided.
H, as Dutt contends, non-payment of taxes would "inevitably mean
a No-Rent campaign",8 then it is.hardly probable that this item could
have been accepted at all by the Congress leadership at the Nagpur
session in December, 1920.
It is curious to observe just how this item got on to the programme.
As we have seen, it was not included in the non-co-operation programme
accepted at Calcutta in September, which had met with considerable
resistance. But at Nagpur, th is rather important extension of the pro-
gramme was announced in a very casual way,O and it was advocated
by C. R. Das, who moved the resolution in question, only as being
"stronger, fuller and bolder than the Calcutta resolution." 10 The ques-
tion of its potential dangers to class interests does not seem to have
come upY We might infer that the point concerning non-payment of
taxes was regarded as an additional weapon with which to fight govern-
ment, and when the resalution was carried by acclamation we think we
have to consider this a triumph for unity in the national struggle -
Congress now had taken exactly the same stand as the Khilafatists in
this respect - rather than a defeat for class interests. This does not
mean to say that, as a matter of fact, class interests were not put in
jeopardy by the decision but only that, in our opinion, the participants
did not, or not primarily at least, consider things in that light. For the
time being, national enthusiasm silenced the doubts they may have had.
Thus far, we have discussed Gandhi's attitude towards non-violence
and also the view of Congress leaders with regard to it. Another impor-
tant group whose attitude we must consider are the Muslim Khilafatists.
To same degree, the motives determining Congress leadership must have
held good for them also but, in our opinion, the religious character of
their movement tended to make them less cautious with regard to mass
action, eventually of a violent nature; especially the ulama wing may
be supposed not to be afraid of losing their grip on the masses. Generally
speaking, to the Khilafatists non-violence was not the same as to Gandhi;
it was an expedient, to be used only because they were too weak to use
VI. CRISIS 129
force. 12 They had accepted non-violence conditionally; they would ding

to it only if it brought results.13 Their temper rose; the Angora govern-
ment - which they still regarded as defending the Caliphate - was
the ,,;hole time beset with dangers,14 and there was as yet no question
of any willingness to revise the treaty of Sèvres. The threat of violen ce
was always looming up in their dedarations, and this might mean an
assault on Hindu-Muslim unity since it was apt to assume communalist
forms. H, as we have contended, control of mass action and the violence
that might attend it, was necessary to maintain national unity in the
teeth of dass antagonisms, one might say the same with respect to
communal antagonisms.
In the summer of 1921 the tone of speeches by some Khilafat leaders
became ever more violent; this tendency was displayed at any rate by
the Ali brothers, Hasrat Mohani and Yakub HasanY It is hard to say
wh ether their object in this was "forcing Mr. Gandhi into a campaign
of violence",16 but it certainly put Gandhi in a quandary. If he wanted
to save Hindu-Muslim unity he could not wholly disavow them, but by
taking their side he would frighten away those Hindus who feit alarmed
at the prospect of Muslim violence degene rating, possibly, into com-
munalist violence; moreover, he would endanger a principle very de ar
to himY But he took this risk. In this connection we must pay attention
to some conspicuous events of this episode, since they caused a consider-
able stir at the time: the talk about an Afghan invasion, the apologies
of the Ali brothers, and their arrest.
In April 1921 Muhammad Ali delivered a speech at Madras 18 on
the duties of Indian Muslims in the case of an Afghan invasion. He
said that if the Amir invaded India aiming at its subjection, Muslims
should resist the attack; but if his object were to defeat the oppressors
of Islam and the Caliphate, then it would be the duty of Indian Muslims
to withhold all assistance from the Government of India, and even to
fight the good fight for Islam side by side with the Afghans. This
opinion, of course, caused a good deal of uneasiness among Hindus.
Probably for th at reason, some time later Muhammad Ali formulated
his advice in a more cautious way: if any Power waged war against the
Government of India to make India free, they would not render help
to the government but would simply watch the fight, since they did not
believe in violence. 19 This corresponded with Gandhi's view, who wrote
in Young India: "I would, in asense, certainly assist the Amir of
Afghanistan if he waged war against the British Government; that is
to say, I would openly teil my countrymen that it would he a crime
to help the government, which has lost the confidence of the nation to
remain in power. On the other hand, I would not ask India to raise
levies for the Amir." 20 But not even this reassured all Hindus; Malaviya
was reported 21 to scorn any idea of accepting Afghan help.
Muhammad Ali's recanting probably should be seen in connection
with his apologies. Very soon af ter his arrival in India Lord Reading
had, in May 1921, six interviews with Gandhi 22 in which he pointed
out to the latter that, notwithstanding his professed creed of non-violence,
some of his followers and close associates were using violent language,
inciting other people to violence. Gandhi had to acknowledge that this
interpretation could be put on some speeches of the Ali brothers, where-
upon he told the Viceroy that he would ask them to put things right,
as he was convinced that they did not really mean violen ce but merely
had not been cautious enough in choosing their words. Af ter that the
Viceroy told him that should they apologize, he would stop the pro-
ceedings which the government was considering to institute against them.
When the Ali brothers declared that they regretted that some of their
speeches might have been interpreted as inciting to violence, which had
not been their intention, and when the Government of India made
known that in the light of these apologies it had decided not to arrest
and prosecute them, the construction the public put upon these events
was, naturally enough, that the Ali brothers had apologized in order to
escape imprisonment. 23 Reading was very pleased at his success, and
considered that he had "seriously damaged" the reputation of the Ali
brothers. 24 He went, however, a bit too far in exploiting his success,25
and then found himself compelled to issue a declaration 26 stating that
Gandhi had promised to use his influence upon the Ali brothers before
the Viceroy had mentioned any intention of prosecuting them; "there
was no desire to bargain." 27 The real motive of the Ali brothers for
apologizing probably was, as Muhammad Ali wrote: " ... not to avoid
prosecution, but to allay Hindu suspicions and in particular to prove
to Gandhi that we have no personal pique ... " 28 At any rate, Muham-
mad Ali had openly declared that he owed apologies only to his friends
and not to the government,29 and in his subsequent speeches he showed
no less violence. The effect of his apologies upon Indian public opinion
was considerably less than at first had been believed. 30
The rising temper of the Khilafat leaders and their readiness to
challenge the government were demonstrated once more at an All-India
Khilafat Conference held at Karachi on July 10, 1921; it was presided
over by Muhammad Ali, but Gandhi was not present. Thirteen resolu-
VI. CRISIS 131
tions were passed, most of tbem dealing with Khilafat matters. 3t The
conference professed its devout allegiance to the Caliph-Sultan, at the
same time begging him to appreciate the services of Mustafa Kemal
Pasha; it repeated the known demands of tbe Khilafatists and decIared
(resolution no. 7): " ... that in the present circumstances the Holy
Shariat forbids every Mussalman to serve or enlist himself in the British
Army or to raise recruits for it, that it is incumbent on all Muslims in
general and all Ulemas in particular to carry this religious command-
ment to every Muslim soldier in the British Army." It was this passage,
coupled with the fact that by means of leaflets the Army was al ready
being worked upon in this sense by some Khilafat leaders, which ac-
counted for the arrest of the Ali brothers, Dr. Kitchlew and four
co-workers in September. In November they were tried and sentenced
to two years in prison. 32
The Congress ac ti vi ties of boycott of liquor shops and foreign cIoth 33
and the use of khaddar were mentioned in only two of the resolutions
of the Karachi conference; it does not seem to have had much use for
these innocent forms of action. Nor did the word swaraj occur in the
resolutions, but the notion did, and in a rather radical form. For
resolution no. 7 went on: "This meeting further decIares that in case
the British Government directly or indirectly, secretly or openly, resumes
hostilities against the Government of Angora, the Indian Muslims will
be compelled in co-operation with the Congress to resort to civil dis-
obedience and at the next session of tbe Congress at Ahmedabad to
decIare India's independence and the establishment of an Indian
Republic." Whereas Gandhi had never defined swaraj and thus had
kept open many possible interpretations of the concept, here it was
given an interpretation, and an extreme one at that. It may have been
no accident that Gandhi did not attend the Karachi conference. He
could hardly have endorsed a resolution of this kind without frightening
tbe more conservative among his Congress followers. They might have
objected as much to tbe fact that an open conflict with tbe British was
courted as easily as that, and without their having been consulted about
it, as to the occasion chosen for it - peace or war with the Turks whose
fate was not the first concern of all Indians.
The Ali brothers' arrest and trial constituted, to some extent, a change
in the policy of non-interference which the Government of India had
pursued thus faro But tampering witb the army was considered a serious
matter; the C.-in-C., Lord Rawlinson, asked for action on the part of
the authorities, and the Viceroy and his Council could not but agree. 34
Local Governments concurred with that view, though two Indian mem-
bers of the Government of Bombay advised against it. They argued, th at
just at the moment when the Greeks were pushing on in Anatolia, this
prosecution would give the impression that England was bent upon
the annihilation of Islam, and that, moreover, prosecution was not
necessary since the force of the non-co-operation and Khilafat move-
ments was already on the wane. 35
So in the summer of 1921 we get the following picture of the relations
between the Khilafat leaders and the ma jority of Congress leaders: the
Khilafatists, besides concentrating on their special programme, were
urging a more extremist line in the nationalist movement, while Congress
was pressing for a more cautious advance and was more ready to com-
promise. 36 But the need for unity was acknowledged by both of them,
as was evident from the stand Gandhi took with regard to the Afghan
question, and the Ali brothers' readiness to pipe down somewhat on
their former speeches; it was also the purport of talks at a meeting
of the Congress W orking Committee at Patna in August,37 and of the
resolutions of a C.K.C. meeting at Delhi in September. 3S But about
this time Hindu-Muslim unity was heavily damaged by the Moplah
rising which broke out in August. 3D
The Moplahs (or Mappillas) were a community of very poor Muslim
peasants on the coast of Malabar, living side by side with a nearly
equally strong Hindu element, except in the district of Ernad where
a sizable Muslim majority existed. 40 This district, the poorest of the
whole area, became the centre of the rebellion 41 af ter a period of
agitation in the whole area. The Hindus, among whom nearly all of the
landlords were to be found, were generally better educated and better
off economically, many of the Muslims being low-caste Hindu converts.
It was an area characterized by repeated troubles, the last important
ones dating from 1894 and 1896, for which mainly poverty, ignorance
and fanaticism were held responsible. The 1921 rebellion was preceded
by some months of agitation during which riots occurred, as weIl as
several cases of violen ce against people who refused to join the Khilafat
movement or to close their shops when a hartal was proclaimed. On
August 20 the police, assisted by soldiers, tried to arrest some people,
which caused bloodshed and subsequent open rebellion. A "Khilafat
King" proclaimed himself (for a time there were even two of them) ,
setting up a reign that to some people meant terror - defiling of Hindu
temples, forced conversion of Hindus, murder of Europeans, Hindus,
public women, and some Moplahs who assisted the British - but to
VI. CRISIS 133
others the elevation of Islam and social justice. Several regiments had
to be called in and martial law was proclaimed, but it was not until
January, 1922 that the worst was over, and for more than sÏx months
af ter that bands of armed rebels had to be rounded up. The official
number of casualties was over 2,300; about 40,000 persons were arrested,
of whom over 24,000 received varying sentences.
In the context of our subject some questions regarding this episode
demand an answer. The first one is: does a "Khilafat King" mean that
this rebellion was, purely and simply, a result of the Khilafat movement?
Understandably enough, Congress and Khilafat leaders denied this,
since nobody wanted to be held responsible for this outbreak of violence.
Tbe Working Committee of Congress declared that the forced con-
versions - of which it acknowledged only three cases - were the work
of fanatical gangs opposed to the Khilafat and non-co-operation move-
ments, and that the disturbances had only taken place in areas where
Congress and Khilafat propaganda had been prohibited. 42
Muhammad Ali condemned the Moplahs in two speeches, and said
he did not know the cause of the rising: agrarian troubles or provo-
cations by the government. 43 W. C. Smith looks upon the Moplah
revolt as "a class struggle fought in communal guise",44 as essentially
the fight of poor peasants (who happened to be Muslims) against
oppressive landlords (who happened to be Hindus). Hitchcock does not
suppose the Hindu landlords to have been especially oppressive at the
time, but calls attention to a rise in the population about 1920. 45 This,
in a poor agrarian area, is synonymous with extreme poverty and shortage
of arabIe soil, and, whether oppressive or not, the landlord class may
attract the wrath of the poor landless peasants. But, as Smith writes,
the religious factor in cases like this is probably often the most conscious
one, and is important because it embitters tbe conflicting parties. There-
fore, the Moplah revolt, whatever its deeper roots may have been,
manifested itself as a politico-religious outburst, fiercely anti-British
and anti-Hindu.
This seems to be confirmed by the victims it claimed. About these,
W. C. Smith writes: " ... they (i.e. the Moplahs) attacked the police
and the military . .. they attacked their landlords and moneylenders,
they attacked everyone in sight." 46 Hitchcock, who reproduces some
fifty pages of what he calls typical Moplah trials, reaches the conclusion
th at "the Hindus were murdered as they refused to accept Islam and
the Muhammadans for helping the troops." 47 In the trials quoted by
him the killing of only one landlord is mentioned as such, but many
cases occur of Hindus who saved their lives by embracing Islam. The
motives given by the accused are always related to the Khilafat cause
and the expected downfall of the British Raj - oppressive landlords
are not mentioned. 48 The Moplahs themselves seem to have experienced
their revolt as nationalist (anti-British), as religious (they were "de-
stroying sin and establishing a kingdom of good" 49), and as communalist
(under Moplah mIe there would be "no place for the Hindu" 50).
Perhaps we may sum up the case as follows. It would be absurd to
say that what happened in Malabar was wished for by either the
Khilafat or Congress leaders, but it would be equally absurd to contend
that it was in no way connected with the Khilafat and non-co-operation
movements, as a Congress enquiry concluded. 51 This particular rising
showed certain characteristics that were absent from former risings in
the same area, like the burning of toddy and arrack ShOpS,52 which
was quite in line with non-co-operation propaganda. And Khilafat
slogans, distorted in the simple Mappillas' minds, certainly influenced
the revolt. The ambiguous way in which Khilafat leaders spoke about
non-violence was understood by the Moplahs as an advice to fight if
they were strong enough; 53 the Afghans were supposed by the Moplahs
to be already engaged in the conquest of northern India; 54 the British
were reported to be bent on destroying the holy places. 55 The men who
let loose these slogans, even if worded a bit more cautiously, among
these ignorant people cannot entirely wash their hands of it - they
were playing with fire. 56 And when the anti-government part of the
movement gravitated towards violence, it was the better situated people
- predominantly Hindus in this area - who dissociated themselves
from it.
Another question is, whether the Government of India used the
Moplah rebellion for widening the gulf between Hindus and Muslims,
as has been asserted. 57 This certainly cannot be said about its official
history. Hitchcock begins by stating: "But to call this a Mappilla rebel-
lion is misleading, partly because of the large share some Hindus had
in bringing it about, and partly because of the many Mappillas who
had no share in it." 58 He discerns 59 two phases in the troubles: (1) the
Hindu phase, during which non-co-operation was stressed and it was
mostly volunteers who were active, the Mappillas only helping them;
the main object of the movement was then to damage the government;
and (2) the Mappilla phase, when the Mappillas started an armed
revolt against the British Raj, but soon turned also against the Hindus.
This story could hardly reassure the Hindu community elsewhere in
VI. CRISIS 135
India, but if the au thor had been trying to sow discord between the
communities, he would not have divided the blame as he more or less
does, moreover partly excusing the worst offenders, the Mappillas, by
pointing out repeatedly their extreme poverty and ignorance.
This was a confidential account appearing only in 1925, but at the
time of the troubles we do not find in official statements a tendency
towards setting up one community against the other. When Sir William
Vincent expounded his view on the events in the Viceroy's Council, he
gave a carefully balanced picture, not putting all the blame on one side
and explicitly discerning between extremist Muslim agitators whom he
held responsible, and other Khilafatists whom he exonerated expressly
from any guilt in the matter. 60 In our opinion, his speech constitutes
another instance of the government's policy of drawing a line between
moderates and extremists, but not between the communities. And when
in the Madras Legislative Council the matter came up in September
1921, Lord Willingdon in a long speech only once mentioned serious
Hindu-Muslim enmity, but emphasized the looting and destruction of
public buildings, and the numerous cases of arson, extortion, robbery
and murder. 61
All the same, the whole episode could not but increase communalist
feelings among the Hindus, and in our context perhaps the most im-
portant effect of the Moplah revolt was that it put a heavy strain on
Hindu-Muslim relations. 62 It represented a kind of violence which was
the very thing many leaders feared a mass movement might lead them
into. Mr. Andrews, Gandhi's close friend, explicitly stated that the very
popularity of the movement brought out its defects and caused social
tyranny against people who refused to participate in it. He disapproved
of the burning of foreign cloth as giving proof of narrow nationalism
and racism, and reports Tagore's profound disappointment with the
movement: it "shouted" to him, Tagore said, and did no longer "sing".63
On the Muslim side too, critical voices could be heard: the loose talk
about jihad and an Afghan invasion were denounced, as weIl as the
role Khilafat agitators had played in the Moplah rising.64
On the other hand, the Congress machinery in the summer of 1921
came ever more under control of men ready to go extreme lengths,
especially owing to the growing influence of the Working Committee. 65
At the same time, the number of volunteers increased and their activities
became more alarming. In April, 1921, the Government of India con-
sidered enacting a law against "illegal drilling" and "the carrying of
swords in urban areas, or by men in company, or on occassions of
meetings."_66 In October the Viceroy informed the Secretary of State

that volunteers grew in numbers, but that he saw no dangers in this as
yet. U7 Nevertheless, ten days earlier he had issued a letter to all Local
Governments an~ Administrations, asking for information and their
opinions on the volunteer movement. 68 Their answers to these questions
were compiled into a lengthy report. 69 We quote here from the answer
Delhi sent 70; "Present day volunteer movement is subtle in its working.
Some general or special form of social service is the lure by which young
men are induced to join a new formation. Where, as sometimes happens,
this social service is rendered in a manner really helpful to public to
which little or no exception can be taken, such as assisting strangers
at fairs and places of pilgrimage, or helping in regulating processions,
popular sympathy sides with volunteers, but experience has shown that,
with few exceptions, organisers of these formations, having obtained
adherents under the cloak of social service, and having inculcated a
certain amount of cohesion and discipline, soon begin to divert their
activities to directions in which they become a nuisance to law-abiding
citÏzens and a danger to public peace. These activities have hitherto
taken the form of attempts to usurp the functions of police, intimidations
to enforce hartals and social and commercial boycotts, and organised
demonstrations in the streets. Some of the corps are formed with no
other intentions than these from their inception; others gradually develop
these undesirable functions . .. In Delhi there can be no doubt that the
ultimate objective is to combine the various 'volunteers' corps into one
definite semi-military organisation. This is still a long way ahead. But
the intention may be divined from their adoption of military titles, from
Lieutenant to Colonel, for their leaders, and the general aping of military
formations. A few of the corps occasionally turn out for drill in small
batches under a paid retired drill instructor or an ex-constable of police.
This is restricted to infantry drill without arms of any kind, and the
drills are attended with great irregularity."
Even if the worst features of reports like this proceeded more from
surmise than from solid fact, it is small wonder that dangerous develop-
ments were feared and Montagu repeatedly expressed his anxiety with
regard to them. 71 Gandhi, who surely realized that he was playing with
fire, did tread warily and shied back from declaring general civil dis-
obedience implying non-payment of taxes. This, in its turn, would
certainly lead to an open conflict with government and might prepare
the way for social troubles from which all vested interests would suffer,
thus endangering national unity in the struggle with the British. The
VI. CRISIS 137
great thing was to restrain the mass movement which was being urged
upon him.
At an A.LC.G. meeting at Delhi on November 4, 1921, it cost him
an effort to prevent the assent for starting the last phase of non-co-
operation in such districts or provinces as would like to do so. Notably
Hasrat Mohani advocated this, and at last Gandhi was compelled to
announce its start in one district, that of Bardoli, for November 23. 72
This would constitute a erucial test as weIl as a valuable object-Iesson
for further actions. In government circles the question was raised - not
for the first time - whether Gandhi should not be arrested, but the
Government of India decided that the time had not yet eome; it wanted
to wait for a moment when Gandhi had put himself palpably in the
wrong. 73
But the situation got out of hand when the Prince of Wales visited
the country in November. Some months before, Congress and Khilafat
organizations had resolved to boycott his visit and to effect a general
hartal throughout India. 74 On the one side, they seem to have been
fairly suecessful in doing so 75: when the Prince disembarked at Bombay
on November 17, they suceeeded notably in that city and in Calcutta in
paralyzing public life. On the other side, however, the principle of
non-violenee was, on this occasion, completely forgotten by the volunteers
as weIl as the masses, and serious riots ensued: in Bombay alone there
were 53 dead in a few days.76 Onee more Gandhi was proved to have
overestimated the capacity of his followers for non-violent action; the
Bombay riots broke out "eontrary to all his eonfidence and almost
triumphant expeetation of a peaceful boyeott." 77 Again he repented,
announeed that he would fast until the Hindus and Muslims of Bombay
made their peaee with the other eommunities - and suspended the
preparations for the civil disobedienee campaign in Bardoli. 78 But yet
again he was driven on by his following: the Congress Working Com-
mittee, summoned by Gandhi to consider the situation, resolved that
eivil disobedience was postponed, but not abandoned and that "all
Non-Cooperation Volunteer Corps, Khilafat Volunteer Corps, and other
non-official volunteer bodies, should be brought under central control
and named National Volunteer Corps." 79 The C.K.C. was asked to
eoncur with this resolution.
But these very events - the inereasing violenee and the stronger
organization of the volunteer movement - forced the government's
hand. It feit that it had to take action. Still refraining from wholesale
arrest of all leaders for their part in the non-co-operation movement,
the Government of India could no longer completely adhere to the

policy of non-interference. Local Governments were told that action
on a more drastic and comprehensive scale was now required. In several
provinces the volunteer corps were declared unIawfuI, and numerous
political meetings were prohibited. Those who defied these orders were
arrested, and in a few weeks some 30,000 people were imprisoned, among
them prominent leaders like Lajpat Rai, Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das. sO
The greatest number of arrests, however, were made among the Khila-
fatists, who constituted the most turbulent element in the agitation and
were consequently the greatest souree of anxiety to the government. S1
These large-scale arrests, however, provoked areaction the govern-
ment had not expected. S2 They thought that moderate opinion would
support these measures; af ter all, in Bengal the moderates had called
for strong government action after the Calcutta riots. S3 It seems that
here again the Government of India underrated the national character
of the movement. The difference between moderates and extremists was
mainly one of method, not of ultimate aims; therefore the moderates
too resented the stern measures taken against the extremists. Moreover,
government action was not leveled directly at violence, but at the volun-
teer corps and the political meetings from whieh government thought
the violence originated; therefore the volunteers were outlawed and
meetings probitited. But in this way the issue had become one of freedom
of association and of speech, and thereby the moral advantage had
shifted, from a government that hitherto had pursued a wise policy of
non-interference, towards a movement which defended democratie free-
dom. Another aspect of the development was that non-co-operation took
on another appearance in the moderates' eyes: as a violent mass move-
ment it was something fraught with social dangers, but now it presented
itself as a respectable, purely political movement. Therefore the mode-
rates, who for quite a time had been sitting on the fence, now seemed
ready to come down on the extremists' side. 84
Reading had to try and recover some support from the moderates.
This was essential to the continued existence of constitutional govern-
ment in India and to the working of the reforms; moreover, it could put
.a check upon the plans of the violent extremists. S5
The situation was complicated by the impending visit of the Prince
of Wales to Calcutta on December 24, which might lead to hartals and
riots as serious as those of the previous month. The prospect did not
appeal to either the Viceroy or the moderate leaders. Some of these,
headed by Malaviya,86 in mid-December approached Reading and
VI. CRISIS 139
proposed the summoning of a Round Table Conference of nationalist

leaders (moderates as weIl as extremists) and the Govemment of India,
with a view to finding some compromise, and the Viceroy was inclined
to embark on this course. This would mean that the govemment would
set free the arrested volunteers, while the non-co-operators would stop
agitation. But Reading realized quite weIl that there would be another
price to pay. The proposed conference could not but confront his govem-
ment with a de mand for some kind of swaraj, and concessions in this
respect were inevitable if it came to a conference at all. He told
Montagu 87 th at his immediate aim was to prevent demonstrations or
hartals when the Prince was visiting Calcutta; but, however guardedly
he was expressing himself, it was also clear from his message that he was
considering amendments of the Govemment of India Act of 1919 -
embodying the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms - speeding up the pace
on the road towards Dominion status for India. Evidently he was willing
to let Gandhi emerge the victor from the struggle, which proves th at
he feIt he was fighting with his back to the wal!.
But precisely the momentous character of the move he contemplated
caused considerable opposition from some govemors of provinces, 88 and
also from the British cabinet. Montagu, though in favour of the proposed
conference, at the same time wanted to wam the Viceroy against the
danger of committing himself and the Imperial Govemment too faro
Curzon and Churchill, however, were ad amant in their rejection of what
they characterized as something like a bargain: a good reception of the
·Prince of Wales for swaraj. It was they who carried the day: the cabinet
resolved that no conference could be sanctioned for the time being. 89
Reading must have felt himself comered, but he was saved from this
impasse by Gandhi who, having at first consented to a conference
without preliminary conditions,90 now wanted the release not only of
all arrested volunteers but also of the Ali brothers without giving any
promises himself. 91 By doing sa he put himself in the wrong with the
moderate leaders 92 and, though they kept trying to bring about the
desired conference, they became less inclined to slide over towards
the extremist wing of the non-co-operation movement. 93
Nevertheless, the waves of political tension still ran high, as is evident
from the tone prevailing at the annual sessions of Congress, the Khilafat
Conference and the Muslim League, all of them meeting in the last days
of December, 1921, at Ahmedabad. 94 In Congress, where Gandhi ob-
tained a position of nearly absolute power,95 on the one hand a trend
was perceptible towards coaxing the moderate element by assuring them
that they were not obliged to subscribe to the whole programme of

non-co-operation, and yet would be welcome in the movement. But on
the other hand, the volunteers' pledge was altered. Thus far they had
promised to maintain non-violence "so long as the policy of non-violence
is continued by the nation" ; henceforth they should deciare that non-
violence was the correct mode of action "as India is circumstanced".
The new formula was less rigid and set the door ajar for violent action,
since circumstances are more easily changed - or may be considered
by individuals to have changed - than is the policy of a nation.
The government felt this to be an important development because,
although violence was not advocated openly, there was strong pressure
for taking actions which would almost certainly involve violence. o6 Con-
gress adopted a resolution that individual and mass civil disobedience
were the only means by which the existing government could be dis-
lodged. Significantly, it was one of the Khilafat leaders who tried to
urge Congress one step further. Hasrat Mohani put forward a motion
at the Congress session that henceforth the Congress programme should
be attainment of swaraj "by all proper and possible means".
At the Muslim League and the Khilafat Conference sessions the same
Hasrat Mohani tried to put through a resolution declaring Indian
independence. At the Muslim League his attempt was warded off in
the Subjects Committee, while at the Khilafat Conference it was ruled
out by the president, Hakim Ajmal Khan - an action for which the
latter was bitterly blamed. 97 Vet in his address to the Muslim League,
Hasrat Mohani urged his audience to ask Gandhi that he should deciare
India an independent republic on January 1, 1922. At the same time
he suggested changing the League's constitution in order to make it a
mass organization. It is not surprising that both Reading and Montagu
regarded the situation as most alarming, the more so because they were
of the opinion that Hasrat Mohani's propos als feil through only on
grounds of expediency, not of principle. os
And while the various groups were still fencing for position - the
extremists ready to risk violence, the moderates still trying to bring about
a Round Table Conference, the Government of India hesitating whether
it should arrest leaders like Mohani for mere speeches or not, and
Gandhi being driven on by his followers but trying to hold them back -
something had to happen, some action became inevitable because of the
ever rising political temperature. One gets the impression of being a
spectator of a war of nerves: whoever made the first move would give his
opponent an advantage, but neither of the two principal parties in the
VI. CRISIS 141
struggle could wait indefinitely. The Government of India had to reckon

with the impatience of Local Governments 99 and the British cabinet,100
whereas Gandhi's difficulty was, as Bamford puts it, of keeping the pot
boiling without allowing it to boil over. 101
It was Gandhi who lost the game. He was hard pressed from two
sides: on his right by the moderate leaders, on his left by impatient
extremists. In mid-January Malaviya and Jinnah convened a meeting
at Bombay of about 300 Indian leaders, representing all shades of
opinion. They still aimed at a conference with the government but
Gandhi, who was attending as an observer, was not willing to make
substantial concessions and so the meeting feil flat. lts president, Sir
Sankaran Nair, left before the meeting was finished, issuing a letter to
the press in which he stated his reason: talks with Gandhi and his party
were useless, since Gandhi made demands which no government could
admit. 10\l But from the other side Gandhi was urged to sanction the last
phase of non-co-operation: the no-tax campaign. Preparations for it
were already in progress in some districts in South-India, the Punjab,
and the C.P.,103 and it had actually started in the district of Guntur in
Madras. 104 At the same time, however, it became evident th at it would
develop into something more than a move in the political game against
the government, and that the landlords were threatened as welp05
Gandhi instructed the Guntur district to stop the campaign, but he felt
he could no longer wait; he was going to try out the no-tax campaign
in the carefully prepared district of Bardoli where he could hope to
remain in control. 106
In the first days of February 107 he issued something like an ultimatum
to the Government of India, announcing his intention to launch civil
disobedience at Bardoli within a week if the non-co-operators who where
under arrest had not been released from jail by then. This was the move
the government had waited for. They feit pretty sure that over the issue
of civil disobedience, endangering the whole fabric of society and the
state, they would find the moderates behind them; the outcome of the
"Malaviya Conference" had given an indication to that effect. They
issued a communiqué declaring their resolution to repress mass civil
disobedience, and asking for the support of loyal citizens. 108 The hour
of the great struggle had arrived at long last.
But events had already overtaken these moves. On February 5, a mob
led by volunteers attacked a police station at Chauri Chaura in the
D.P., killing and burning the entire staff of 23 men. 109 Gandhi repented
publicy in Young India 110 and, at the instance of moderate leaders/ l l
called a meeting of the Working Committee, where civil disobedience

was suspended until it could be trusted to maintain a completely non-
violent character. At the same time, all action against the zamindari
was explicitly repudiated; they were assured that "the Congress move-
ment is in no way intended to attack their legal rights." 112 At the end
of the month, the A.I.C.C. confirmed the Bardoli resolutions.
The motives for th is decision may be interpreted in various ways. That
the Congress leaders wanted an excuse for calling off an action the
consequences of which they were fearing 113 seems to be probable. But
just which consequences did they fear? Was it the need to maintain
non-violence at every price which inspired the Bardoli resolutions? 114
R. P. Dutt argues 115 that there was no question of violence or non-
violence, because the non-payment of rent could not be called a violent
action; he neglects, we think, the fact that if non-payment is not in
itself violent, it will certainly cause violence, since neither the govern-
ment nor the landlords could be expected to accept it meekly. The real
issue, according to Dutt, was the protection of class interests : "The
dominant leadership of the Congress associated with Gandhi called off
the movement because they were afraid of the awakening mass activity;
and they were afraid of the mass activity because it was beginning to
threaten those propertied class interests with which they themselves were
still in fact closely linked."
There is probably a great deal of truth in this, at least as far as "the
dominant leadership of the Congress" is concerned. The "moderate"
leaders, as we have called them in the preceding pages, may weIl have
been motivated by this fear, though we would not proclaim it as their
only motive. For one thing, they probably anticipated that no good
could come from a violent conflict with the British Raj. Non-violence
for them may have been something else than "petty-bourgeois moralising
speculation and reformist pacifism" as Dutt considers it,116 but rather
an expedient to be used by people without force at their disposal.
But we think it unlikely that Gandhi's case may be entirely thrown
in with theirs. To begin with, non-violence had a special meaning for
Gandhi and it seems to be questionable if, in his case, it may be wholly
eXplained away as "a cover, conscious or unconscious, for class in-
terests."117 And next, if Gandhi had been as intent as were the moderate
leaders on eliminating the dangerous mass activity, why then did he not
jump at the opportunity of reaching a compromise, which arose in
mid-December? 118 To a rational and realistic politician, this would have
presented so obvious a chance to escape - and with honour - all
VI. CRISIS 143
difficulties, that we are inclined to think that Gandhi's motive perhaps

should be looked for not in the rational, but in the irrational sphere.
In our opinion, one of the most remarkable features of Gandhi's public
apology for what happened at Chauri Chaura is th at he treated the
whole matter as if it were something between God and himself: "God
has been abundantly kind to me ... I retraced my steps ... I humbied
myself ... He (i.e. God) made me eyewitness ... The humiliation was
greater than in 1919. But it did me good ... ", and so on. Gandhi is
speaking here not as a political leader, not even as a religious leader,
but as a man mainly interested in his relation to God. Bearing this in
mind, we are inclined to look for an explanation of Gandhi's part
in the Bardoli resolutions in his feelings of guilt and his desire for
punishment. 119
But whatever the correct explanation may be, there can be little doubt
th at these events dealt a shattering blow to the non-co-operators' morale.
The more moderate among them, those who had already doubted the
desirability of civil disobedience, were confirmed in their doubts by the
Chauri Chaura tragedy and the agrarian unrest connected with the
no-tax campaign, and now questioned the soundness of Gandhi's whole
strategy.120 On the other hand, the extremists were deeply disappointed
by Gandhi's sudden change of policy, and notably the Khilafatists felt
that they had been betrayed. 121 The non-co-operation movement, already
endangered from within by increasing Hindu-Muslim distrust, now
disintegrated as a consequence of the outburst of violence, of the class
antagonism that had come out into the open, and of the ensuing Bardoli
resolutions. The Khilafat movement, which had almost completely
merged with the non-co-operation movement under Gandhi's leader-
ship - and thereby with the nationalist movement - now disentangled
itself, and in the next stage we will see it operating much more on its
own. How fast the process of disintegration took place is proved by the
fact that when Gandhi was arrested, four weeks after Bardoli, the event
caused no stir at all,l22 The crisis in India was over.
CHAPTER VII
THE SECOND BLOW
In the preceding chapter we nearly lost sight of the Khilafat

movement as such since we were considering it mainly under the aspect
of its merger with the non-co-operation movement under Gandhi's
leadership. This simplification may be excused as it was this merger
that made the political situation in India as explosive as to constitute
a real threat to the Government of India, which came very near to
capitulating before the nationalist pressure, or at least to considering
a compromise which would have meant a victory for the non-co-
operators. We should bear in mind, however, that the Khilafat and
non-co-operation movements, though they had joined forces temporarily,
were, in their origins, far from being one. So, when Gandhi was defeated
in February, 1922 certainly this meant a severe blow to the Khilafatists,
but not a deadly one. Swaraj which, for a short time, had seemed to be
almost within reach of the nationalists, had receded again into the realm
of unattainable illusions for the time being and by the end of March
non-co-operation, to all intents and purposes, was no more,! even if the
Congress leadership tried to salvage parts of the wrecked programme.
But for the Khilafatists, non-co-operation and its main goal, swaraj, had
been essentially no more than means, and their own specific objects
had not vanished into thin air.
Therefore the Khilafat movement did not subside as promptly. It had
provided the most violent and turbulent wing of the combined move-
ment, and the position of the Angora government which, in the Indian
Muslims' mind, was still identified with the defensor of Islam and the
Caliphate, was far from secure. A great deal of activity was devoted
by them to the collection of subscriptions for the Angora Fund,2 and
at the end of the year 1921 an amount of Rs 375,000 had already been
remitted to Angora. 3 About the same time, enthusiasm for the Khilafat
cause was stimulated by a turn for the better in the situation of Turkey.
Kemal Pasha, whose position had already been strengthened by Russian
friendship, in October 1921 was backed by a more powerful ally: France,
VII. THE SECOND BLOW 145
with whom the Franklin-Bouillon agreement was reached. 4 French troops

evacuated Cilicia and Turkey recovered the Baghdad railway as far as
it had been completed in the direction of Mosul. A few weeks later the
Greek army on the Anatolian highlands was being shelled by Creusot
guns and bombarded by plan es made available by French sources. 5 In
the long run, of course, the improvement of nationalist Turkey's pre-
carious situation was apt to lessen the tension between Indian Muslims
and the British Government, since the former would no longer feel that
their active support was badly needed. The first consequence, however,
was that, from the moment of the Turco-French agreement, Great
Britain appeared as the villain of the piece: the only great power still
hostile to the new Turkey and backing its foes, the Greeks. 6
But Great Britain showed two faces at least to the Indian Muslims'
eyes: those of the Delhi and of the Westminster governments. The
Government of India was in no doubt about the necessity of placating
its Muslim subjects with regard to Turkey. Time and again Lord
Reading emphasized the need to come to terms with Kemal Pasha and
give in to the Indian Muslims' demands with respect to Thrace and
Smyrna. Should Great Britain follow another course, he argued,7 the
moderate Muslims' friendship would be lost. A clear and favourable
definition of Great Britain's attitude was considered so urgent by the
Viceroy, that he wanted to press his view on the Home Government
in an unequivocal way. In a telegram to Montagu 8 he summed up
the three minimum Muslim demands which, in his opinion, should
be granted: (1) evacuation of Constantinople; (2) acknowledgement
of the Sultan-Caliph's suzerainty over the Holy Places, and (3) resto-
ration of Thrace - including Adrianople - and Smyrna to the Turks.
Moreover, he asked for permission to publish his telegram in India, in
order to convince the Indians of the pro-Turkish attitude of the Govern-
ment of India. Montagu wired his permission, thereby causing Curzon's
wrath," and a few days later was forced to resign from the Cabinet.
He was succeeded by the Conservative Lord Peel.
Why was Montagu dropped by his colleagues? The official reason
was that he had acted contrary to the doctrine of cabinet responsibility
by not consulting his colleagues when he granted the Viceroy's request.
This, however, in a cabinet headed by Lloyd George, who had something
of a reputation for acting without referring matters to his colleagues,
could be no more than a pretext in Montagu's eyes. 10 The real motives
he saw in his Near-Eastern policy, which was at variance with the course
the P.M. and Lord Curzon were steering, and in the political situation
146
at home: he feit he had been "thrown to the wolves", tbe latter being
the die-hards among the Conservatives who resented the Irish settle-
ment assented to by the government in December, 1921,11
But though by Montagu's resignation Turkey and the Khilafat move-
ment certainly lost an able advocate, Reading's action, in a certain sense,
put the Government of India on a somewhat better footing with its
Muslim subjects: the latter supposed that Montagu's dismissal was due
to the British cabinet's dislike of his pro-Muslim policy/2 and conse-
quently were convinced that the Secretary of State and the Government
of India had realIy tried to further the Muslim cause. This opinion
persisted when in the next summer another crisis occurred in Turco-
Bri tish relations. 13
In the meantime the British cabinet was, to some degree, changing
its attitude towards the Turkish problem. This, however, was probably
due to the fact that it feit itself to have been outmanoeuvered by thc
French, rather than to any sympathy for the Turks or consideration
for Muslim feeling in India. At the end of 1920, tbe cabinet still
persisted in its position th at no revision of the treaty of Sèvres was to be
sought/4 but when it became evident that the change in power relations
in Asia Minor necessitated a change in the political relations as weIl,
the problem came up again in the cabinet. Here, to be sure, Montagu
argued that the effect in India should be taken into account, but for
CUI'Zon British interests and British prestige in the Near East were
clearly far more important: the Franklin-Bouillon agreement exposed
Mosul to threats from the Kemalists, and an evacuation of Constanti-
nople by the British forces was unadvisable because it would create an
impression of weakness. 15 When a meeting of the British, French and
Italian ministers for Foreign Affairs was proposed in order to tackle
the problem, Curzon circulated a paper among his cabinet colIeagues
in which he summed up the elements determining the coming negoti-
ations: the attitude of France and Italy, the forces of tbe Greeks and
the Turks, thc willingness of the AlIies to enforce a solution, the attitude
of Russia, " ... and lastly, the possible reactions in Irak and the Moslem
world to an active support of Greece against Turkey, however arrogant
and unreasonable the attitude of tbe latter may have been." 16 When
in March, 1922, this conference did meet in Paris, he showed himself
once more a champion of astrong policy towards Turkey, whereas it
was Poincaré who pointed out the bad effects harsh treatment of this
country was bound to have on the Muslims in Morocco and India;
again, when CUJ'zon mentioned the Allied duty to protect Christian
minorities in Asia Minor, it was Poincaré who spoke about the necessity
of special safeguards for the Muslim minority in Adrianople. But all
the same Curzon was, by now, ready to restore Smyrna to the Turks
and to divide Western Thrace between Turkey and GreeceP
The Paris conference did not have any practical results because
neither the Greeks nor the Turks accepted the Allied proposals. In the
summer of 1922, however, the shift in power relations materialized
in a heavy defeat of the Greek forces in Anatolia; they were routed
completely, and Smyrna was recovered by Kemal Pasha's army in
August. But the Greek army had acted as a shield between the Angora
forces and the very thinly manned British occupation zone on the Asiatic
shore of the Bosporus; now that this shield was broken, a clash between
Kemal's troops and the British seemed to be imminent.
This development provoked the Chanak crisis of September, 1922.
If the nationalist Turks were to attack the British positions, war was
quite possible, if not unevitable: the British cabinet resolved to resist
any attack and asked its Allies as weIl as the dominions for assistance
in that eventuality.18 As a matter of fact, the Turks did not advance
against them and war was avoided, but the whole episode became one
of the final straws causing Lloyd George's downfall; 19 a month af ter-
wards, the Conservatives rebelled against him and Baldwin formed a
Conservative cabinet, including Curzon for Foreign Affairs. Arevision
of the treaty of Sèvres could no longer be put off, and in November
the Lausanne conference met.
This was the background of international events against which the
development of the Khilafat movement in 1922 should be seen: the
defeat of the Greeks and the gradual slackening of British resistance
to Turkish demands. This picture of the international background should
be completed with the main event on the Indian national level, which
was Gandhi's defeat and the collapse of the non-co-operation movement.
This state of affairs resulted in a certain disarray among the Khila-
fatists. Their movement lost its unity and its purpose. The movement's
leaders tried to keep it up by (a) stating Khilafat demands in an
uncompromising way, and (b) upholding, as far as possible, Hindu-
Muslim unity. But evidently it became less easy to maintain mass
agitation at its former level,20 and this may account for another fact -
some readiness on the part of other people to endorse Khilafat demands.
There are signs that the category of Muslims who in the previous period
had dissociated themselves from the movement now openly supported
its demands concerning Turkey and the Caliphate; 21 the reason might
be that they perceived a less radical atmosphere among the members

of the Khilafat Conference. That in May, 1922, the Muslim League
could propose a joint special session of the League and the Khilafat
Conference 22 suggests the same.
The official line taken by the C.K.C. appears, however, from a state-
ment issued on March 21, 1922, concerning the Khilafat demands. 23
It treated the restoration of Smyrna and Thrace as almost granted but
laid special emphasis on a wholly unconditional restoration, without
any financial or military con trol by the Allies ; likewise, the independence
of the Jazirat-ul-Arab - preserving the Sultan-Caliph's suzerainty over
the Holy PI aces - while it was expressly stressed th at this region too
should be completely free from non-Muslim contro!. These demands
were not new, except that in the acknowledgement of independence for
the non-Turkish subjects of the former Ottoman Empire it was less
equivocal than, for instance, the C.K.C. Manifesto of May, 1920. 24
From a sub tie shift of emphasis like this it appears that the Khilafat
leaders were not wholly unaware of what the nationalist Turkish victory
meant for Ottoman and Caliphal pretensions in Arabia. But they for-
mulated their demands in a way apt to keep up tension; the reason
may have been that they wanted to exert pressure on the Paris con-
ference which was about to start.
The second aim of the Khilafat leaders was to preserve Hindu-Muslim
unity. This was the general tenor of resolutions passed at an All-India
Khilafat Conference at Delhi on February 25 and 26, 1922, and at a
Jamiat-ul-Ulama meeting at Ajmere in the first week of March. 25 But
these resolutions were passed only af ter proposals of another purport
had been jockeyed away; at Delhi " ... another resolution, the effect
of which was th at Khilafat Committee should confine its activities to
religious duty of upholding the Khilafat movement, while Muhamma-
dans who also desired to take part in Swaraj movement should do so
from platform of Congress, was deferred for consideration ... " 26 We
take this to mean that part of the Khilafat leadership wanted to loosen
the alliance with Congress but failed to carry through their design. And
the official line was again stressed when in May 1922 Motilal Nchru
was e1ected as a member of the Working Committee of the C.K.C. in
the place of Hasrat Mohani who had been arrested, while V. J. Patel
was elected onto the C.K.C. in Gandhi's place. 27
But about the same time we find signs of growing Hindu-Muslim
distrust in an increasing number. In the summer Abdul Bari gave it as
his opinion that non-co-operation as a means for supporting Turkcy was
no longer any use, and that swaraj would prove beneficial to the Hindus
but not to the Muslims. 28 The Government of Bombay reported that
the Provincial Khilafat Conference was no longer willing to co-opera te
with Congress,2U and according to the Government of India the Khilafat
leaders were suspected of being the tools of Hindu politicians. 30
But Muslim disappointment over Congress politics also took the shape
of inciting thc latter to adopt a more radical policy. At a joint meeting
of the Working Committees of the lamiat-ul-Ulama and the c.K.C.,
the more fanatical members, "disgusted with the failure of the non-
co-operationist movement to secure redress of the Khilafat grievances,
were in favour of action on more drastic lines than hitherto attempted",31
and a resolution was passed that Congress should be asked to define
swaraj as "complete independence".32
It is clear that the Khilafat movement no longer presented itself as
asolid bloek; several sections were contesting with each other for the
upper hand. This may have been due, partly at least, to the disarray
the movement was brought into by the failure of the non-co-operation
movement, but another reason was, we think, that it was rapidly losing
its character of a mass movement. We do not have at our disposal
figures concerning the membership,33 but if government interest in the
movement is taken as an indication in this respect, there cannot have
been much of it left in 1923: in an official account of the state of Indian
affairs for that year 34 the Khilafatists were not even mentioned. This
development meant that the leadership was no longer under pressure
from the masses who had urged it on. Part of the leadership wanted
to keep up an unvarying course of co-operation with the more radical
among the Congress leaders; in this section we find the larger part of
the ulama wing and most of the top leaders who had come to the fore
in the years 1919 and 1920. But another section, including some of the
top leaders - like Chotani - but more strongly represented in the
lower echelons of the organization, was more inclined to give up Hindu-
Muslim co-operation, and in consequence was dissociating itself from
Indian nationalism. 35 At any rate, there came into being a gap between
those who wanted to stay in the nationalist camp and those who had
let themselves be carried away in that direction, but who now wanted
to retrace their steps towards the religio-political origins of the move-
ment. 36 An accidental cause of friction among the Khilafatists may have
been the suspicion of misappropriation of considerable sums destined
for the Angora Fund,37 an affair causing some stir in the summer of
1922 and dragging on until 1924.
Further developments in Turkey could not really stimulate the Khila-

fat movement, although Turkish victories in the summer of 1922 and
the ensuing Chanak crisis presented it with what seemed good oppor-
tunities. Many meetings were organÏzed to discuss events in Turkey,38
and steps were taken to set up an Angora Legion, to be drafted to
Turkey.39 But this plan seems not to have materialized, for in the last
days of December it had to be resolved again to start the Legion, and
a comrnÏttee was elected to see to this. 40 So when the India Office
inquired with some anxiety if nothing should be done about it, the
Govemment of India, with perfect peace of mind, could announce that
it had resumed its policy of non-interference. 41 It was, by the way,
hardly to be expected that af ter the meeting of the peace conference
in November, 1922, the Angora Legion would be requested to take the
field, and it is not surprising that the Govemment of India treated the
Indian Muslims' protestations of willingness to take up arms as being
of a purely verbal character.
Even if the Khilafat movement had not entirely collapsed, its sting
had clearly been removed. And in the last months of the year events
were coming which reduced its effectiveness further. On November 1,
1922 the Sultanate in Turkey was abolished; the Turkish nation was
declared to be sovereign and the Turkish state to constÏtute the basis
of the Caliphate. A fortnight afterwards the Caliph - former Sultan-
Caliph - Mehmed VI was deposed, and was succeeded by his nephew
Abdul Majid. Being no longer a Sultan, he was invested with the Mande
of the Prophet, but not girded with the sword of the founder of the
Ottoman dynasty.42 To the untrained eye it would seem that he had
lost all temporal power and had been "vaticanÏzed".
This view would, in our opinion, have been very near the truth, too,
but for a small possibility of looking at things in another way. True,
the Turks had deposed a Caliph but this did not matter since they had
elected a new one in keeping with traditional ways. That the Turkish
constitution took away all temporal power from him was an entirely
intemal matter on which the Turks had to decide themselves. Their
decision had no binding force for Muslims outside Turkey; the latter
were free to interpret the new Caliph's power as they wanted, in con-
formity with Islamic Law. On the basis of this argument the ulama
of the Azhar University at Cairo acknowledged Abdul Majid one month
after his accession. 43
Indian Muslims went a bit further along this line of reasoning. In
the first weeks of November they had been perplexed by the Kemalist
VII. THE SEeOND BLOW 151
poliey towards the Sultan-Caliph, and evidently not all of them were
quite ready to accept what had been done. 44 Generally the fact was
stressed that dethroning a Caliph and electing another one was perfectly
within the rights of the Turkish people, but that separating temporal
and spiritual power was quite un-Islamic. Was that, however, the
intention of the Turkish people and its leaders? Chotani said he had
full confidence in the doings of Kemal Pasha and the Angora Assembly,
and men like Dr. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan defended it openly.
Their thought ran, we think, along the same lines as those sketched by
Dr. Abdullah Suhrawardy from Bengal, who " ... did not believe that
Kemal Pasha aimed at the severance of the temporal and spiritual
powers of the Khilafat, but rather desired the severance of the Rulership
of Turkey (the Sultanate) from the Headship of Islam (the Khilafat).
The Khilafat, liberated from the restraints and burdens of the Sultanate,
would be stronger than before; the Khalifa would be enabled to claim
the allegiance to his spiritual suzerainty of other Moslem States, and
would have the support of the Turkish State in his demands for the
maintenanee of the dignity of the office of the Khalifa." 45 Similarly,
the vice-president of the Madras Khilafat Committee hoped for the
establishment of "a Muslim League of Nations" upon which the Caliph
could call for assistanee, if need be. 46
In our opinion these arguments are, to say the least, far-fetehed, for
who could guarantee that the Caliph would get "the support of the
Turkish State"? The gist of what had happened was precisely that he
could not be sure of this, since it was for the sovereign Turkish people
to decide whom to support or not to support. And of course the Caliph
might call for the assistanee of a - for the present non-existent -
Muslim League of Nations, but what power would he have to press
his demands? These conceptions were, we think, based upon wishful
thinking. Nevertheless, these views prevailed, at least in official Khilafat
circles. The All-India Khilafat Conference at Gaya accepted what had
been done and continued to profess its confidence in nationalist Turkey
and its leader Kemal Pasha. 47 But the fact that in their first resolution
they still used the title "Sultan", and that the withholding of temporal
power from the new Caliph was passed over in silence reveals same
embarassment on their part. We think it is very much open to doubt
whether many educated Muslims in fact believed what they said when
evincing their confidence that all would be weIl with the Caliphate.48
Khaliquzzaman reports a conversation he had, at the beginning of 1923,
with Muhammad Ali on the new position of the Caliph. He himself
doubted whether the Khilafat organization should be maintained when

the Turks were throwing away the essence of the office; the Arabs too
were in agreement with the newly created situation - so what could
Indian Muslims do about it? "The Maulana agreed with most of what
I said, but he was not a man to accept facts as facts. " He did not
share my pessimism. He said, 'Keep the Khilafat Committee alive and
continue to fight against the British to concede real independence to
the Arab world with a view to "liberating the liberated".' 49
Disagreement among the Khilafatists with respect to the stand their
organization should take in Muslim politics went together with dis-
agreement on a matter of Indian polities. When the issue of the
continuation of the boycott of councils came up at the Gaya sessions
in December 1922, Congress was divided, and the Khilafatists in
Congress were to be found on both sides of the fence: Abul Kalam Azad
and Dr. Ansari were "no-changers" - i.e. among the party not wanting
to abandon this item of the non-co-operation programme - whereas
Hakim Ajmal Khan and Khaliquzzaman joined the Congress Khilafat
Swaraj Party of the "pro-changers", headed by C. R. Das and Motilal
Nehru. 50 The Jamiat-ul-Ulama session categorically condemned council
entry,51 and the Khilafat Conference too declared against it, but this
decision "was due no doubt to the unbending attitude of the Muslim
divines who constituted the Jamiat-ul-Ulema." 52
On the whole we get the following picture of Indian Muslim leader-
ship at this moment: the middle class leaders were divided, some of
them wanting to abandon the Congress alliance, others wanting to stick
to it, but divided again as to which section of Congress to support; the
ulama, however, were decided on keeping up an uncompromising stand,
together with the more radical section of Congress. The ulama, more-
over, seem to have been moving towards the position of exclusive Muslim
leaders, putting aside the westernized middle class element; this, at least,
is how we think we may interpret a passage in the presidential address
given by Maulana Habib-ur-Rahman of Deoband at the Jamiat-ul-
Ulama session, which is reported by H. N. Mitra as follows: "The
Maulana next dwelt upon the special responsibilities of the J amiat-
uI-Ulema. He claimed for it superiority over allother Muslim organi-
zations or conferences in India and declared that in time to come it
would represent a unique position in the world so as to lead Muslim
opinion in religious matters, but as politics and religion were inseparable
in Islam, the Jamiat was also competent to give the lead on political
issues." 53 Mitra traces their "stubborn" attitude with regard to the
boycott of councils to the fact that at that time the Lausanne negotiations
seemed to be reaching a deadlock.54
But in the first half of 1923 the Lausanne Conference did its work
and produced on July 4, 1923 the treaty to which it gave its name.
Smyrna, Constantinople and the greater part of Thrace - including
Adrianople - were restored to Turkey, and its Syrian border was, in
conformity with the Franklin-Bouillon agreement, shifted southward.
Turkey, however, did not have its way with respect to Mosul which
was assigned to Iraq, and to the Dardanelles, which were demilitarized.
But on the whoIe, the new treaty fully honoured Turkey's military
successes. Perhaps the most important aspect of the treaty was its
constituting the first case of a post-Versailles treaty not dictated by the
Allies, but achieved by discussion and compromise between powers
meeting on terms of equality.55
In our context, however, its most important aspect is the influence
Indian Khilafatists had - or did not have - in bringing about this
result. Opinions on this question differ. Lord Reading's biographer
answers it in the affirmative, commenting upon the Viceroy's represen-
tations about Indian Muslim opinion, and judging it hardly exaggerated
to say that " ... Lord Reading played as important a part in shaping
British policy towards Turkey as if he had been sitting at the actual
Conference-table at Lausanne." 56 In the same vein, Chirol speaks
about the Khilafat agitation as "one of the decisive factors" 57 of the
Turkish success at Lausanne. A more recent au thor, K. K. Aziz, thinks
that the pressure exerted by Indian Khilafatists forced the British
Government to revise its attitude. 58
In our opinion, these statements are grossly exaggerated. The Khilafat
agitation and protestations influenced, it is true, the Government of
India, but had only a slight effect on the British Government. We have
already referred to the stand CUI-zon took when a revision of the treaty
of Sèvres was no longer avoidable,59 and nothing leads to the conclusion
that he changed this. Nicolson, who discusses the Lausanne settlement
and Curzon's role in bringing it about in detail,60 never once records
that he took the Indian Muslims' susceptibilities into account. Enumer-
ating Curzon's aims in the negotiations he mentions : the freedom of
the Straits, retaining Mosul for a British mandate in Iraq, and breaking
up the Turco-Russian friendship. This account is corroborated by
Curzon's communications to his cabinet colleagues on the negotiations,61
in which the Indian Muslims' feelings are not considered, and the same
observation may be made with regard to cabinet meetings where the
progress of the negotiations was discussed. 62 And lastly Muhammad Ali,

who might be expected to brag about results of the movement of which
he had been the foremost leader, in his Cocanada Congress speech came
to the same conclusion : "The Turks secured what they did at Lausanne
not because of any regard on the part of England for justice to the
Turks, or for the religious obligations and sentiments of Indian Muslims
with regard to the Khilafat, but in spite of England's open hostility
towards the Turks and utter disregard of the requirements of Islam." 63
Anyhow, the treaty of Lausanne must have provoked in a good many
Indian Khilafatists the feeling that much of their programme had been
granted and that more was not to be expected. 64 Muhammad Ali
admitted that many of them thought that the peace of 1923 left them
without any further task. 65 He himself denied this: England persisted
in its anti-Islamic policy and had not honoured Muslim demands
regarding the Jazirat-ul-Arab. So the Khilafat leaders tried - partly
perhaps against their own better judgment, but partly in good faith -
to keep up the movement. lts purpose in the new circumstances could
be seen either as Indian nationalist - hence the attempts to maintain
the alliance with Congress - or as Pan-Islamic, as is suggested in
Muhammad Ali's exhortation "to liberate the liberated". But the move-
ment had lost its capacity for carrying away the masses; henceforward
it was a source of possible trouble for the Government of India, but it
no longer constituted a real and direct threat. 66
Six months later, however, the final blow fell on the Khilafatists.
Since the end of the 18th century the Ottoman Sultan-Caliphs, taking
advantage of the fact that the distinction beween temporal and spiritual
powers of the Caliphate was accepted in Europe,67 had tried to retain
some political sway over former subjects now outside their territories
by stressing their religious authority over them. 68 Notably Sultan Abdul
Hamid IJ had done this, and not entirely without success. Now the
Kemalists, who had seized upon the same conception of the Caliphate
in order to deprive the Caliph of all temporal power, fell into the trap
the Ottoman Caliphs had set for western powers. Non-Turkish Muslims,
by their religious allegiance to the Caliph Abdul Majid, felt themselves
entitled to meddle with what the Turks considered to be essentially
Turkish affairs. In November, 1923, the Turks got two indications of
this. The C.K.C. asked for passports for the members of three delega-
tions which were to visit Turkey, the Hijaz and Iraq and Persia, in
order to work out a common Muslim view on the situation of the
Caliphate. These delegations, however, could not set out from India
since passports were refused to them. 69 But in the same month the Agha
Khan and Amir Ali addressed a letter to Ismet Pasha, the then Prime
Minister of Turkey, urging him to reconsider the situation of the Caliph
and to place it on a basis which would restore the confidence of other
Muslim peoples. 70
One month later, a more or less similar action was taken by the Jamiat-
uI-Ulama which in aresolution, though declaring its confidence in the
Angora government, suggested the meeting of an international con-
ference of ulama to settle the status of the Caliphate. 71
This was more than the Turks were willing to put up with. On
March 4, 1924, the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished by the Turkish
National Assembly, an action quite in line with the secularization of
Turkey's political structure which had been the aim of the Young Turks
and the Committee for Union and Progress. It meant that henceforth
Turkey's political outlook would be purely political and national, not
religious or Pan-Islamic. The reasons for Kemal Pasha's new policy
were made known in India by means of an interview with one of his
friends. 72 He said that Kemal Pasha considered the Caliphate as a
danger to Turkey: it entailed the obligation to defend Islam, a task for
which Turkey was not strong enough since Islamic solidarity was a word
without practical consequences. In the last war the Arabs had fought
the Sultan-Caliph, and Indian Muslims had given no more than verbal
help, no actual support. So it was clear that Turkey should mind its
own interests. 73 To the C.K.e. Kemal Pasha sent a formal explanation:
"In fact Khilafat means Government which means State", he wrote,
and so there was no need for an extra Caliphate office in the Turkish
State. Moreover, he continued, " ... the Khilafat office idea which has
been conserved since ages to realise the basis of a united Moslem Govern-
ment in the world, has never been realised, and on the contrary has
been a constant cause of strife and duplicity among the Moslems,
whereas the real interests accept as a principle that the social associations
may constitute themselves into independent governments." 74 In plain
words this seems to indicate that henceforward Turkey would mind its
own interests and turn its back upon any kind of Pan-Islamic endeavour.
It is evident that this attitude came as a very nasty shock to the men
who formerly had taken it for granted that Kemal Pasha's aims and
those of the champions of the Caliphate were identical. They had done
so on unsound grounds: in the Turkish National Pact of January, 1920,
the Caliphate had been mentioned only once, and then incidentally in
connection with Constantinople, which was called "the seat of the
Caliphate of Islam." Besides, had they paid attention to the relations

between the nationalist government at Angora and the Sultan-Caliph's
government at Constantinople, they would have found them very
strained. Mehmed VI had lost a war, but hoped to win the peace by
freeing himself from the power of the Committee for Union and
Progress ; he had lost no time in declaring the conduct of Kemal and
his partisans contrary to religion. It is small wonder that the nationalists
decided to depose Mehmed VI and to cut down the powers of his office,
even if for the time being they did not advertise their designs, since
the Caliphate was an instrument with which to rouse Pan-Islamic
feelings and get the support of non-Turkish Muslims. 75
But the Indian Khilafatists, in their enthusiasm, did not stop to
consider details like these. Therefore, when Mehmed VI was deposed
and the Sultanate abolished, for the sake of appearances, we think, they
displayed a cheerful mien; they were able to do so all the better because
the Caliphate was a symbol of Pan-Islamism, but not Pan-Islamism
itself - even if the symbol lost some of its outward glory, the thing
itself might be thought to be unimpaired. But now the substance of
Pan-Islamism was thrown away by the very men who had been considered
as Pan-Islamic heroes, but af ter all turned out to be nationalist villains.
We should not be surprised, therefore, that comments of Indian
Khilafatist leaders were bitter. The Muslim masses in India were not
moved very deeply,76 but the Khilafat leaders unanimously denounced
the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate. 77 Once more they professed
that they were not objecting to the deposition of a Caliph since they
were not partisans of the hereditary principle, but the abolition of the
office was called "fatal to the Moslem World solidarity" and "an act
against the religion of Islam". The Angora government was asked to
promote the election of a new Caliph "possessing temporal and spiritual
powers",7S and was warned that probably "a bloody revolution" against
its own régime would be the consequence of its rash action. AIso, an
international Muslim conference was proposed to decide on the matter
of the Caliphate. 79
All in all, their reactions were completely negative. Outside the
Khilafat movement, it is true, some Indian Muslims approved of
developments in Turkey. The poet-philosopher Iqbal thought the Turks
were quite justified in taking this step, since they had done so by using
the door of ijtihad,So and Khuda Bakhsh welcomed it as ending a fiction,
and ushering in modern as opposed to medieval ideas. SI But these
modernists did not constitute an important section of Indian Muslims
in those days. The Khilafat movement as a political force had already

lost its mass appeal; now it also lost its very raison dJ être and J conse-
quently, its aim. lts leaders lost their following 82 and became divided
among themselves.
Theoretically, some roads were open to the Khilafatists, but in practice
these did not lead anywhere. They could take the course indicated in
Muhammad Ali's words 83 about continuing the fight against the British
with a view to "liberating the liberated". But any endeavour in this
direction was rather problematic. In the first place: Indian Muslims
did not have much understanding for Arab nationalism. Their condem-
nation of the Arab revolt of 1916 had, to be sure, veered round gradually
to accepting "self-goveming rights" or "autonomous development" for
Arab peoples under Ottoman suzerainty,84 and then to "complete in-
dependence, preserving the Sultan-Caliph's suzerainty over the Holy
Places." 85 But "complete independence" in the second formula only
meant elimination of British influence; it is evident that Indian Khilafat
leaders never accepted Arab independence in as positive a sense as the
Turkish nationalist régime had done as early as January, 1920. 86 And
second: how many Indian Muslims really wanted to continue the fight
against the British? Anti-British sentiment, though by no means absent,
was, as we see it, perhaps not the most essential element in the Indian
Khilafat movement. 87 Moreover, the Lausanne settlement had largely
satisfied many Indian Muslims. A majority among the upper and middle
class Muslim leadership were inclined to seek support in the British
connection once more. 88 The Muslim League, which had lapsed into
relative insignificance in the preceding years, came to the fore again
and it was no longer opposed by the Khilafatists when it concentrated
on communal demands. 89
After the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, however, the question
of Arab independence became mixed up with the question of reviving
the Caliphate. The Ottoman Caliphate had met an important require-
ment : it commanded sufficient temporal power to defend Islam. This,
at least, was what Indian Muslims thought or pretended to think; we
have already seen th at the leaders of the Turkish successor state were
of a different opinion. But in the treaty of Lausanne this successor state
had also definitely given up another and no less important prerequisite :
sovereignty - or even suzerainty - over the territories where the Holy
Places were located. After the deposition of Abdul Majid the possibility
of an Arab Caliphate - looming in the background even since Sharif
Husain's revolt 90 - had suddenly acquired a character of reality.91
Or perhaps, it only seemed to do so. Of the Arab princes, the king

of the Hijaz was the prominent candidate, being a member of the
Prophet's tribe of the Quraish and holding the dominion of the two
most venerated Holy Places, Mecca and Medina. But his pretensions
to being a leader of all Arabs were taken in the wrong way by other
Arab chiefs, the most important of whom was the Wahabi roler of Najd,
lbn Saud. And to many Muslims Husain was stigmatized as a tooI of
the British and a traitor to Pan-lslamic solidarity. This feeling was
particularly strong among lndian Muslims, but was not lacking among
others. 02
Husain's hand was more or less forced by the abolition of the Cali-
phate: a few days after this event, he accepted an election to this office
by Transjordanian and Palestinian Muslim notables. 93 But this step met
with vigorous protests from the Wahabis, and from Egypt and India
too. This was the moment lbn Saud had waited for to secure his own
dominance in Arabia; moreover, since the British cut short their sub-
sidies to Najd, he had nothing to lose by taking action against his riyal
for supremacy.94 Under the pretext of wanting to ensure the pilgrimage
to Mecca he attacked the king of Hijaz, and after a campaign of less
than two months had occupied all his adversary's territories, except for
Medina and two ports.
lbn Saud's action was applauded by the lndian C.K.C. 95 Up to a
point their attitude was quite consistent with their former denunciations
of Husain. 96 But on the other hand, the puritanical Wahabis were not
very suitable allies for lndian Muslims, either westernized and modernist,
or conservative. In particular the Wahabis' aversion to certain rituals
and religious monuments could easily hurt Muslim sentiment in India
and elsewhere. 97 Once more the Khilafat leaders became divided among
themselves on the occasion of the conflict between the Arab rolers.
Sufis and Sufi ulama became the partisans of Husain, whereas a Sunni
section backed lbn Saud. 98 Or, as another author puts it, the "secular
section" of the Khilafatists, led by Muhammad Ali, became opposed
to the "theological section" led by Abdul Bari. 9o But we do not think
the dividing lines between the groups were very clear; from Khaliquz-
zaman's account we get the impression of quarreis rather than a conflict
over principles, and personal likes and dislikes may have played their
role. At any rate, the approval lbn Saud's action met with at the
Belgaum Khilafat Conference session in December, 1924, and the
Moradabad Jamiat-ul-Ulama session in January 1925 seems to have
been far from unanimous. 100
The tensions provoked by the struggle for supremacy in Arabia resulted

in the complete failure of an lslamic congress which lbn Saud tried to
convene at Mecca in the last month of 1924. Egypt, Palestine, Syria,
Turkey and lraq declined his invitations ; the lndian C.K.C. was the
only official body to send a delegation. 101 The C.K.C., however, was
absent from the Caliphate Congress meeting at Cairo in May, 1926. 102
So, after the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, the whole question
of restoring the office became mixed up with inter-Arab rivalries. Now,
by its very nature, the Caliphate was apt to constitute not only a theo-
retical and theological issue, but a practical and political one as weil.
I t was connected with political realities and therefore influenced, to
some degree, by power relations. This had been the case in the years
before 1924 too, only then it had been connected with an anti-western,
anti-British policy which appealed to lndian Muslims as it called on
Muslim solidarity. After 1924, however, becoming entangled with inter-
Arab conflicts, it was not Muslim solidarity which was at stake, but a
variety of ramüications of Arab nationalism and dynasticism, which
could hardly be of great importance to lndian Muslims. Khilafat leaders
who had dug their heels in over the problem could continue to trouble
themselves about it, but the Caliphate question ceased to exist as a
factor in lndian poli tics.
We conclude: there was no longer any future for the Khilafat
movement in lndian Muslim politics. The issues had changed, and
lndian Khilafatists could not adjust themselves to the new situation
without giving up principles constituting the foundations of their
movement. We should bear in mind, however, that another important
characteristic of the movement had been its leaning towards lndian
nationalism and Hindu-Muslim unity. Could it not turn down a road
towards that goal?
Once more we turn towards Muhammad Ali's Cocanada speech 103
for a first analysis of the feasibility of a programme based on Hindu-
Muslim unity af ter 1923. His audience at the Cocanada session, we
imagine, cannot have been very optimistic af ter his exposition. The
speaker begins by observing that something has changed for the worse;
he refers to communal riots in Multan, Agra, and Saharanpur. Then
he points out how futile the quarreis leading up to such frightful blood-
shed mostly are: they centre round alams, and pipal trees, and so on;
Hit is not the love of our religion that makes us quarrel with our fellow-
countrymen of other faiths, but self-Iove and petty personal ambition."
But the remedies he recommends are not very impressive. One of them
is to lower the price of mutton, so as to diminish the Muslim demand

for beef. When swaraj is attained, the government should economize
on military expenditure, and use the savings to promote the breeding of
sheep and goats. But for the time being he advises the Muslims to give
up cow-killing voluntarily. Not without suspicion he mentions the
shuddhi and sanghatan movements/04 denouncing all conversion under
pressure. On the other hand, as a follower of Islam, itself a proselytizing
religion, he has to acknowledge every religion's right to do mission work,
and as a tentative solution he suggests dividing India into missionary
regions.
His whole treatment of the subject gives the impression, not of an
inspired leader trying to find new and bold solutions/0 5 but rather of
a man baffled by a problem and polishing up old devices to find a way
out of an impasse. We do not say this in an attempt to ridicule him:
it was a problem baffling all Indians trying to solve it/06 and Muham-
mad Ali's attitude of all but despondency was not to be wondered at.
All authors on the subject of Hindu-Muslim relations in those years
agree to the fact that communal riots were increasing sharply from
about 1923, or 1922 even. 10T lts main causes they see in the possibility
of self-government, which made leaders in both communities realize the
interests that were at stake; 108 in the failure of Congress leaders to offer
an inspiring lead after the collapse of non-co-operation; 109 in the failure
of the united Hindu-Muslim efforts to attain either swaraj or the rescue
of the Ottoman Caliphate, resulting in frustrated emotions discharging
themselves in riotsYo None of these explanations, of course, excludes
the others, nor can any of them be proved strictly, but all of them are,
in our opinion, plausibleYl And anyway, the increasing number of riots
was a sure sign pointing to a deterioration of Hindu-Muslim relations.
Another sign, perhaps even more ominous, was that Gandhi in May,
1925, declared himself incompetent to do anything about itY2
Another aspect of the same phenomenon was constituted by the
revival or founding of communalist organizations. The Muslim League,
which had led a shadowy existence between 1920 and 1924, held a
meeting at Lahore in May, 1924, with Jinnah, who had never supported
Khilafat action, as president. Nevertheless, a good many Khilafatists
were present, feeling that their own movement was "on its last legs".113
Muslim fear with regard to Hindu dominance found expression in
resolutions that (a) swaraj should have the form of a federal central
government with autonomous provinces, and (b) no re-arrangement
of provinces should be allowed by which the Muslim majorities in
Bengal, the Punjab and the N.W.F.P. might be impaired. ll4 Both of
these resolutions point to the communalist re-orientation of the Muslim
League, as compared with its attitude at the time of the Lucknow pact.
Nor was communalism absent on the Hindu side. The Hindu Maha-
sabha 115 - dating from 1906 or 1907 - had not been influential thus
faro The Congress policy of seeking an alliance with the Muslims, how-
ever, drew the more communally orientated Hindus in Congress towards
the Mahasabha, which called its first major sessions in 1923 and 1924.
lts main object was to stress Hindu traditions and principles, but, as
these had played a large part in Indian nationalism since the days of
the Arya Samaj and Tilak,116 it could for quite a long time defend
itself against the accusation of communalism by styling itself nation-
alist. 117 lts anti-Muslim sentiment, however, was unmistakable, and
could not fail to provoke Muslim distrust. 118
The Hindu Mahasabha was active in the field of mission work too,
which in Hinduism took the form of shuddhi (purification), intended
to reclaim Hindus converted to Christianity or Islam. This had been
for a long time one of the objects of the Arya Samaj, which now was
joined by the Mahasabha in this activity. The latter organization also
promoted the sanghatan movement, encouraging drill and athletic
exercise, in order to train a rising generation that would be able to
defend Hindu interests against the Muslims.u° Undoubtedly, the sang-
hatan movement's scope was wider than that; generally, its aim was to
strengthen the cohesion of the Hindu social structure,120 but it did show
a military trait - not unexpectedly, one might add, at a time when
communal rioting became a constant danger, and when the bugbear
of Indian Muslims assisting an Afghan invader was still alive. 121
Since the Mahasabha leaders remained in Congress and were even
playing an important role in it, the Muslims' faith in Congress protes-
tations of goodwill towards them could not be great. And it was not
only communally orientated Muslims who gave vent to suspicions; we
have already observed a man like Muhammad Ali showing them, and
at last even Deoband, despite its deep-rooted nationalist sympathies,
was effected by the shuddhi and sanghatan movements. 122
Therefore, the developments in Hindu circles provoked reactions
among the Muslims - the tanzim and tabligh movements. 123 T anzim
(organization ) was started by Dr. Kitchlew in the summer of 1923 and
adopted by the C.K.C. in 1924; beside Dr. Kitchlew, Shaukat Ali
became its foremost leader. It was not anti-Hindu on principle, but,
being the counterpart of the sanghatan movement, it could easily slide
THE KHILAF AT MOVEMENT IN INDIA
162
in that direction and it did create unrest among Hindus. The tabligh
movement, also organized in the summer of 1923, was the counterpart
of the shuddhi movement: it promoted Muslim missionary activities. It
assumed larger proportions than the tanzim movement ; only the most
stalwart Khilafatists, like the Ali brothers and Abul Kalam Azad, kept
aloof from it.
Generally speaking, we think we may observe in those years some
disposition of nationalist feelings, both among Hindus and Muslims,
to a polarization towards communal feelings, apt to develop into down-
right communalism. It would, in our opinion, he senseless to put the
blame for this deplorable process 124 on one side. Calling the tanzim
and tabligh movements Muslim "reactions" towards the Hindu shuddhi
and sanghatan movements, we might seem to put the blame on the
latter. The use, however, of the word "reaction" is only justified by the
fact that the latter movement started first, but we should bear in mind
that Hindu "action" , in this case, might very weIl be considered an
answer to the fear of what Muslims might do eventually. Therefore it
is, we think, impossible to decide which party started all the trouble;
it is, probably, erroneous even to think in terms of "starting trouble",
since the resulting trouble was not intended.
But it is not surprising that various efforts to restore unity 125 feIl flat
in this political climate. The contemporaries were not able to take a
dispassionate view of the process, and accusations were brandished about.
Muhammad Ali, still loyal to Gandhi, attacked Lajpat Rai and the
"moderate" Congressmen who, lacking contact with the Indian people
themselves, had followed Gandhi because of his appeal to the masses;
they had never really supported the Khilafat cause, and now, by joining
the Hindu Mahasabha exposed themselves as communalists. 126
Stumbling blocks on the road towards unity were chiefly the kind
of future govemment the parties would tie themselves down to - federal
or not - and the form of electorates - joint or separate. That questions
like these, having been settled in the Lucknow pact, came up afresh
is in itself a sign that communal tension had reappeared. The hesitating,
wavering attitude of an Indian nationalist like Muhammad Ali con-
ceming these problems is evinced by two articles he published in the
Comrade a month apart. 127 In the first, he proposes joint electorates
as the ultimate goal, but considers separate ones indispensable for the
time being; in the second, however, he advises his co-religionists to
abandon communal representation from now on. Swaraj will prove to be
the remedy for all ills from which communal relations are suffering
in the present situation. But if Muslim hopes on these points should

be belied under swaraj, " ... there is nothing that can prevent the Mus-
lims from seeking and securing justice through Civil War or through
Civil Disobedience." If leaders had to advocate unity by pointing out
such means of redress, it is small wonder that they did not succeed.
So the Khilafat movement, having lost its primary goal, the Caliphate,
now found the road towards its secondary one blocked too. Of its
prominent leaders, Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Ansari remained within
the Congress fold; 128 the Ali brothers in the long run severed their
relations with it and became its virulent critiCS. 129 The movement went
to pieces in an atmosphere of disputatious squabbles. 130 Significantly,
it was a question in which Indian nationalism was at stake - the Nehru
report of 1928 131 _ which caused so much discord among the remaining
Khilafatists that no All-India Khilafat Conference could be called
afterwards. 132
We intend to conclude our account of the Khilafat movement by two
quotations from Muhammad Ali, demonstrating how difficult it was
to reconcile this movement with Indian nationalism. The first one 133
is borrowed from his address to the last All-India Khilafat Conference,
presided over by himself: "Islam means peace, and nationalism means
war. God made Islam to link all mankind in one family and one com-
munity. This is my communalism. All mankind is divided into nations
each being enemy of others. This is your nationalism which leads to
war ... My communalism is to bring all into the fold of Islam by loving
persuasion and service. The Koran says that there is no government
but the government of God."
The second is far more matter-of-fact and brings home its truth very
effectively. It comes from the last address he delivered in his life, at the
Round Table Conference in London, on November 19, 1930. Referring
to "the old maxim of 'divide and rule''', he told the British: "But
there is a division of labour here. We divide and you rule" 134 - the
words of a man completely disillusioned in his fight for unity.
CHAPTER VII I
EVALUATION
In this, the last chapter of our study, we want to discuss some general
questions like: what was the nature of the Khilafat movement, what
were the reasons of its collapse - questions very much interrelated -
and what were its results?
In order to come to grips with these problems, we might start from
one the answer to which would not seem to be at all in doubt: was the
Khilafat movement anti-British? If we pay attention to the vehement
language in which British policy was denounced by, for instance, the
Ali brothers, we can weIl understand that the Government of India's
officers were complaining bitterly of their "objectionable", "inflamma-
tory" and "seditious" speeches. They had good reasons to stress the
anti-British character of the movement - if the intention to oust all
British power from India 1 is not to be called anti-British, what else
might be? And yet there is something more to be said about it.
In the first pI ace, the Khilafat movement and the upsurge of Indian
nationalism which it helped to reinforce in the years between 1920
and 1923 are not to be considered as isolated events. They had their
place in a movement of a far wider range: the anti-western reaction
among several Asian and, to a lesser degree, some African peoples after
the war of 1914-18. 2 The ensuing conflicts coincided with religious and
racial contrasts, but these differences, according to Toynbee, masked
the real conflict which he considered to be one between different cul-
tures. Perhaps we should view the situation in a still wider perspective,
and look upon these conflicts as originating in an effort towards eman-
cipation from foreign domination, 3 an effort availing itself of all possible
conflict-matter: economic, political, religious, cultural, and so on what-
ever presented itself. It was areaction turning mostly against western
powers, those being the foreign masters to get rid of, but it could also
turn against Asians, as is proved by the Arab revolt against Turkish
rule, and anti-]apanese sentiment and action in China. For this reason,
the new nationalism in Asia and Africa was charged with dangerous
VIII. EVALUATION 165
possibilities for all minonhes, except those that deliberately threw in

~heir lot with the majorities among whom they lived. 4
It is in this perspective that we should see the situation of Indian
Muslims about 1920. They were, considered in the structure of India
as a whoie, a minority - and were they willing to throw in their lot
unconditionally with the Hindu majority? In the non-co-operation
movement a good many of them did: religious and middle class leaders
as well as the masses. As we have observed, among middle class and
notably among upper class Muslims there was some reserve in this
respect. But, whatever other reasons for an anti-British attitude they
may have had, the immediate cause of their alliance with the Hindus
was British policy towards the Sultan-Caliph and Turkey, which roused
their anger as Muslims. This reason, however, would for the most part
disappear if Great Britain and Turkey were to bury the hatchet, as they
did at Lausanne in 1923. For many Khilafatists, we think, the anti-
British tendencies of their movement were more or less accidental. This
does not apply to all of them - not to those who had other reasons as
well: middle class Muslims who felt thwarted by British rule and British
exploitation of India, 5 and Muslim divines who rejected British ruIe
and British civilization as inimical to Islam. 6 These leaders contended
that the only means of saving the Caliphate and Turkey would be Indian
independence. 7 But by 1923 this assumption had proved to be only
partly correct, for Turkey at least was saved - and the stubbom Khila·
fat leaders lost their following.
Indian Muslims, certainly, could take up the Indian national cause
for its own sake. They were Indians too, and an effort to expel the
British from India would be quite in keeping with the general anti-
foreign trend. But who would succeed to British rule? The Indians -
or the Hindus? Would ousting one foreign master from power not mean
setting up another "foreign" master in his place? This fear, it seems,
was never wholly absent from the Indian Muslims' mind; we find it
even among :those who were willing to co-operate with the Hindus.
Therefore their alliance with the majority was never unconditional: it
started with the Lucknow pact, carefully stipulating the rights of both
communities in a future, self-goveming India, and when in 1928, with
the Simon Commission in sight, an effort was made to resume Hindu-
Muslim unity, it was the Nehru report, envisaging a change in these
conditions on which the attempt broke down. The Govemment of India
may have done something to promote discord by encouraging the setting
up of a "loyal" separate Muslim League,8 but it was able to do so
166
because many Muslims resented the Nehru report. Distrust with regard
to Hindu aims was never absent on the Muslim side. 9
In this situation, the British foe might become a British ally. The
vast majority of the Indian Muslim community probably never lost its
awareness of this fact, even though it was, temporarily, drowned in the
tumult of protestations of Hindu-Muslim unity and anti-British sen-
timent - a sentiment which was not lacking either among Indian
Muslims. But it is exactly the temporary character of these anti-British
cries which makes us doubt, not their sincerity, but their essential quality.
The Ali brothers, as young men, had admired the British and from
about 1930 onwards sided with the British again. 10 Some Khilafatists
took their leave from the movement at an early stage, perhaps partly
because they did not want to be mixed up in a mass movement, but
also partly because of the anti-British attitude it displayed openly; other
men, like Amir Ali and the Agha Khan, fully sympathising with Turkey
and the Caliphate and pleading their cause, wholly abstained from the
Khilafat agitation in India; others again, like Chotani, did play an
important part in this agitation, but were considered by the Agha Khan
not to be unreservedly anti-British. l l Their attitude may have to do, in
most of these cases, with the fact that these men belonged to the upper
strata of Muslim society, and their position was more or less dependent
on the British-established order in India. But there are indications that
other men, too, could at least consider striking a less anti-British attitude
than they did in public.
An unexpected example is offered in this context by Maulana
Mahmud-ul-Hasan, the head of the Deoband seminary. Mr. Silberrad,
the Collector in Saharanpur, had an interview with him in August,
1920, and af ter the Maulana's death in November, 1920, another with
Habib-ur-Rahman, head of the Arabic school at Deoband, in January,
1921. Mahmud-ul-Hasan was reported to have said, Cl • • • that the real
and only essential grievance is as regards the Hedjaz, that rightly or
wrongly the Mahomedans have it firmly fixed in their minds that the
Sharif of Mecca is merely a puppet of the English, and that consequently
the Holy Cities are practically under our control; and that if they would
be convinced otherwise all the life would be taken out of the agitation,
and that he himself, if Government would take steps to convince them
of this, would exert all his influence to support Government both in
India and across the frontier." Asked as to how he and the Indian
Muslims generally could be convinced of this, he replied, " ... that the
Sharif must be told to make peace with the Caliph, and accept in some
VIII. EVALUATJON 167
measure at least his suzerainty ... He said that all the rest of the late
Turkish Empire, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Syria, Palestina, etc., did not
matter in his eyes, or in the eyes of the genuine Mahomedan, and that
he would say so clearly and publicly once there was a definite promise
about the Hedjaz. That Shaukat Ali and Mahomed Ali's influence was
a very ephemeral matter compared with his. His suggestion was that
he should moot the idea to his immediate friends, and let it spread
gradually, but he was most insistent that no word of it was to be made
public through Government or otherwise than through him, as in such
case much of his influence as the author of the arrangement would be
gone; also the extremists would oppose it, as depriving them of the power
of making political capital out of Mahomedan religious discontent."
In the second interview, Habib-ur-Rahman corroborated the Mau-
lana's opinion. "Given assurances on these points ... he says the ulemas
would support Govemment, and would be followed by all the religious
Mahomedans; he does not pretend that it would reconcile the irrecon-
cilable element, such as the political (as opposed to the religious) leaders,
e.q., Ansari, Ajmal-ul-Mulk and Shaukat Ali, but he says th at all the
real sting would be taken out of the agitation among the Mahomedans."
This second interview added one note lacking in the first: "Habib-ur-
Rahman told me that he and the Ulema generally strong(ly?) objected
to action of some of the leaders in subordinating their religion to Hindu-
Mohamedan unity; e.q., he specially mentioned with strong disappro-
bation Shaukat Ali's wearing a tilak of sandalwood at Madras, and the
proposal to abandon qurbani."
We have no reason to doubt the authenticity of the reports on these
talks, but their significanee is less certain. 12 They might be taken as
a shrewd attempt to hoodwink a government official with regard to
genuine opinions and intentions, but they mayalso point to the fact
that even among prominent religious leaders the possibility of calling off
the anti-British policy could be considered. And we take it th at the
reasons hinted at were real: they distrusted the more westernized
"extremist" leaders of the "politicai" groUp,t3 and they feared to lose
something of their own Muslim identity in the alliance with the
Hindus. 14 It is, af ter all, hardly probable th at a movement of such
momentum would have been sustained only by negative - in this case
anti-British - feelings; its very volume and intensity justify a search
for some positive contents. Of what nature were these? We think it
was a movement of a group searching for its own identity and trying
to assert it. In the words of Binder, the Khilafat movement was "a
supraterritorial justification of the separateness of Islamic society in

India." 15 Or, to quote an expression from Watson, it was "the struggle
of the Indian Muslims to create a world in which they could live
Islamically as Indians". 16
But both of these definitions 17 point to some troubles lying ahead
for the Khilafatists. They were not only Muslims and, on that account,
Pan-Islamists, but Indians too - they were bound by two loyalties. Was
it possible to combine these? Some leaders, evidently, thought they could
do so. As an instance we quote from Abul Kalam Azad's presidential
address to the Ramgarh Congress session in 1940: "I am a Musalman
and I am proud that I am a Musalman. I have inherited the glorious
traditions of thirteen centuries of Islam. I am not prepared to see an
iota of this perish. The teachings of Islam, its history and traditions, its
art and sciences, and all that can be epitomized as Islamic culture is
my treasure; and it is my bounden duty to protect and preserve it. As
a Muslim in a particular religious and cultural sphere I possess an
individuality on which no encroachment is acceptable. Vet, with all
this, I have another feeling too, and this feeling is the creation of the
realities of my life. Islam is in no way opposed to this. It is, as a matter
of fact, a guide on this path. I feel with pride that I am an Indian. I am
an element of the indivisible United Indian Nation; an inalienable
element, without which the image of its greatness remains incomplete;
and, in no circumstances, can I give up this position." 18
For the Maulana, evidently, there existed no conflict between his first
loyalty, towards Islam, and his second, towards India; on the contrary,
the former was "a guide on the path" towards the latter. But Abul
Kalam Azad was a complex personality who could combine Pan-Islamism
with Indian nationalism, and even he had not always seen fit to do
so - in 1913 he had still rejected political co-operation with the
Hindus,19 and it was only in the days of the Khilafat movement that
he had developed his ideas about composite nationalism.
Not all Indian Muslims, however, could follow him along this path.
The Deoband ulama and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama did,20 but when the
enthusiasm of the years 1920-1922 had died away, the Muslim intel-
lectual élite as weIl as the masses refused to take this lead,21 since it did
not offer them much guidance in the tragic conflict of communalism
in the face of Hindu revivalism and superior strength. 22 Even in the
Khilafat days most of them probably had not been able wholly to
identify themselves with India. The emblem of the Khilafat delegation
stationery was made up of two overlapping circles of equal size, with
the word "Khilafat" in one, and the word "India" in the other. 23 In
this emblem we see a clear indication of a potential conflict of divided
loyalties - a conflict which, some years afterwards, was also expressed
in words by Muhammad Ali: "I belong to two circles of equal size, but
which are not concentric. One is India, and the other is the Muslim
world." 24
If we were to apply this metaphor to Abul Kalam Azad's view of
the same problem we would see concentric circles. Though we have
no reason to doubt the sincerity of Muhammad Ali's declarations of
Indian nationalism in his Khilafatist years, we think it probable that
he never went quite as far in this respect as Abul Kalam Azad; in his
heart he always remained "Muslim first, Indian afterwards." 25 Perhaps,
if the combined effort of the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements
had resulted in some definite success, Indian nationalism might have
got more firmly entrenched among Indian Muslims. 26 The failure of
this effort, however, was an impediment to the realization of this
possibility.
In these observations we have, strictly speaking, already given our
answer to the question of whether the Khilafat movement was natio-
nalist or not, and mainly in the negative, at least when we think in
terms of Indian nationalism, thou1h we admit that it may have presented
chances in this respect. One might call it nationalist in a very general
way, in that it was anti-foreign, and strove for independence, and
wanted to decide by itself its relations to other nations - but it had
not quite decided which specific nation to set up in independence.
Therefore, its relation to Indian nationalism was never a perfectly happy
one, even if some of its leaders wanted to direct it on that course and
their adherents were not unwilling to follow them.
The Caliphate, however, was something affecting the Muslim com-
munity in India primarily, but in itself it held no importance for the
Hindus; for the latter, it derived its importance from the fact that it
offered them an opportunity of gaining Muslim friendship. Gandhi,
explaining his attitude concerning the Khilafat movement in a letter
to the Viceroy,n wrote: "I consider that as a staunch Hindu wishing
to live on terms of the closest friendship with any of my Mussalman
countrymen, I should be an unworthy son of India if I did not stand
by them in their hour of trial." The Khilafat movement was for Gandhi,
we cannot but conclude, an opportunity to cement Hindu-Muslim unity.
However sincere his sympathy for his Muslim compatriots may have
been, even in his case an element of opportunism was not lacking, and
undoubtedly with many of his co-religionists the ratio between sineere

friendship and opportunism - men like Lala Lajpat Rai and Malaviya
- will have been less gratifying. This makes us understand why the
word "artificial' 'is so of ten used with regard to Hindu-Muslim unity
in those years. 28 It might have been a natural unity if it had been
focused on ends purely Indian - always supposing that both com-
munities could agree on what the desirabie ends were - but aimed at
the preservation of the Caliphate and the power of Turkey, it certainly
did contain an element of artificiality.
If for these reasons Indian nationalism was a difficult proposition
for the Khilafatists, their Pan-lslamic starting-point also kept them from
accepting other nationalisms - at least to some degree. Their repudi-
ation of Arab nationalism as led and exploited by the Sharif of Mecca
may partly be eXplained by their disgust for his British advisers in Cairo,
but it also had to do with their indignation over the Sharif's betrayal
of the Sultan-Caliph. It is remarkable that Turkish nationalism met
with their complete approval as long as it maintained a semblance of
Pan-Islamism and, when exposing its secular aims, was not at once
vehemently condemned. The Arab conqueror Ibn Saud, too, found
favour with many of them because he was expelling indirect British
influence from the Holy Cities, but without any Pan-Islamic intentions.
In both of these cases, however, they accepted the facts not as
Khilafatists but rather as ex-Khilafatists, when their movement was
disintegrating. Therefore these instances might constitute an indication
that the Pan-Islamic feelings of the Khilafatists were less strong and
pure than they would have had it appear - and perhaps sincerely
believed themselves. This was another reason for British observers to
dub the Khilafat agitation as "artificial" 29 - an opinion which, by the
way, was very apt to make them underrate its force. Perhaps we may
characterize this aspect of the Khilafat movement as follows: it was
a movement which might have taken the road towards some form of
Muslim nationalism, if it had not started on the wrong - i.e. Pan-
Islamic - foot.
By this we mean: the Indian Khilafat movement started as a com-
munal movement trying to consolidate Muslim solidarity. Byemphasizing
this solidarity it strengthened the group conciousness of the Indian
Muslim community. But since its direct object was a question of foreign
policy - or at least a question that was treated as such by other in-
terested parties, like Great Britain and Turkey - it stressed the need
for an Indian Muslim foreign policy of its own. It questioned the validity
VIII. EVALUATJON 171
of British supremacy in this respect. Muslim loyalty to the Empire was

declared to be "conditional" on the preservation of their religious
freedom,a° which in this case compelled Indian Muslims to repudiate
British foreign policy. In other words, their need for independence was
stressed, their need to acquire a status that would enable them to act
in their own right in international relations. This status might have been
won by Indian independence if Indian Muslims had felt that they could
rely on the good faith of their Hindu compatriots. As it was, however,
distrust with regard to Hindu intentions never wholly disappeared, and
therefore the Indian Muslims were more or less thrown back on them-
selves. This feeling may not have been equally strong in all sections of
the Muslim community; the middle class leaders probably were more
open to it than the ulama, but it determined the attitude of the larger
part of the community. In this situation they might have developed the
feeling of being a nation, with a right to complete independence, if they
had not been hampered by their Pan-Islamism, which prevented them
from concentrating on their own particular interests and on their own
identity as a specific group of Muslims. 31
The next question we must pay attention to is whether the Khilafat
movement was primarily a religious or a political movement. In a certain
sense, this is a sham problem because of the inseparability of these
categories in lslamic thought; we have observed, for instance, how the
demand for "religious suzerainty" was taken up by the Sultan-Caliph
precisely for the sake of its political implications. Vet we cannot ignore
the question completely, since at the time the problem was put in
those words.
But we consider it mainly a terminological problem. We refer to the
case of Muhammad Ali, stating that religion was his sole locus standi
when pleading the cause of the Khilafat 32 - whereas Lord Curzon was
of the opinion that " ... Constantinople is the symbol to the East not
of spiritual predominance, but of political power." 33 The contradiction
implied in these assertions arises from the fact that the former is using
the word religion in an Islamic sense, including things temporal as weIl
as spiritual, while the latter is using the word political in a western sense,
which is completely secular.
Not quite the same case is offered by the interviews between Mr.
Silberrad and the Deoband leader Habib-ur-Rahman,34 when the latter
distinguished between religious as opposed to political leaders. Here the
difference is, it would seem to us, related to the question of ends and
means. "Politicai" should be understood as referring to leaders whose
protestations of Islamic faith masked their true end, Indian nationalism,

and who subordinated their religion to Hindu-Muslim unity, while
"religious" is the characteristic reserved for leaders for whom Indian
independence was a possible, an ultimate means to ensuroe the freedom
of the Indian Muslims to live according to Islamic law. In this case it
would, in our opinion, be appropriate to speak about Khilafatists who
identified themselves with their fellow-Indians, Hindus and Muslims
alike, and those who clung primarily to their Muslim identity. In this
sense, we think, the words are also used by Muhammad Shafi, a member
of the Viceroy's Council, writing 35 about the "complete misapprehen-
sion" prevailing in certain quarters in England, " ... that the Khilafat
movement in India is not religious but is part of the political movement
for Indian Swaraj." He adds that, if the Caliph's religious suzerainty
over the Holy Places of Islam were recognized, " ... the religious senti-
ment of at least the vast majority of the Indian Mussalmans will thereby
be satisfied and an immediate split between Gandhi's Swarajists and
the Khilafat Party will almost automatically follow." 36
Discussing the nature of the movement we have, at the same time,
approached a solution of the problem of its sudden and complete col-
lapse. This is a subject on which many authors make some observations ;
we found a coherent treatment of it only in Watson's study. The remarks
most often to be met are (a) that Gandhi's sudden cancelling of the
non-co-operation movement caused a fatal frustration, and (b) that
the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate deprived the movement of its
very base. Both observations are, in our opinion, undoubtedly correct,
but we do not think they explain everything.
One might try to distinguish between external and internal causes
of the movement's collapse. Under the first head would be listed, prob-
ably, both factors just mentioned because both of them could hardly
be influenced directly by the Indian Khilafatists. But considering them,
therefore, as external causes would betray a shallow judgment; af ter
all, the choosing of an ally whose aims differ from one's own - accepting
even the leadership of this ally - and of a cause the survival of which
one may oneself hardly influence, is not a wholly external factor, but
one pertaining to one's own ature. A really extern al cause might be
found in the improvement of economic conditions,37 and we would not
deny the possible influence of this factor,38 but there is no proof whatever
that the Khilafatists were aware of it themselves and therefore we are
not inclined to attach too much importance to it. We think we should
look for the causes of its downfall mainly in the nature of the movement
itself. Another reason for seeking the cause of the Khilafat movement's
demise in the patient's constitution itself is the fact that its fellow-
patient, the non-co-operation movement, did survive, and af ter some
years arose from its sickbed, to confront the Government of India with
fresh troubles.
In Watson's opinion, the Khilafat movement was realistic in its
approach to communal relations in that it correctly appraised the
necessity of Hindu-Muslim unity if it wanted to wrest any concessions
from the British; 39 on the other hand, he admits that he Khilafatists
judged the problems arising from this attempt at unity hopelessly im-
practically, acting as "visionaries" or in an "intoxication".40 We are
inclined to agree with him on both points, but subject to the reservation
that the latter restriction deprives the first statement of much of its
worth. According to him, the movement's failure was mainy due to the
fact that its stated objectives: the rescue of the Caliphate and swaraj
for India were unattainable at short notice; it was lack of any short-
term achievements that killed the movement. 41
Here we do not quite agree with him. We think he is right when he
declares that the Caliphate was not to be saved, because it was an
antiquated notion in which the majority of the Muslims outside India
was no longer interested; we will return to this point later. Nor was
swaraj to be attained in those years as Watson defines it: he is thinking
in terms of complete independence, and it seems improbable that Great
Britain could be forced to concede this to India at this juncture. But
the notion of swaraj was a very elastic one. If the combined Hindu-
Muslim effort had succeeded in wresting major concessions from the
British - and in December, 1921, it came very near to this 42 - these
might have been conceived as representing swaraj. Looked at in this
way, swaraj was not as unattainable as Watson considers it, and the
problem becomes one of why the movement proved unable to obtain
this limited form of swaraj. In our opinion, the reasons should be sought
in the vulnerable character of Hindu-Muslim co-operation, and in the
tensions arising from the fact that what had developed into a mass
movement was comanded by a middle-class leadership not quite happy
about the kind of following it had got.
But first we will discuss why the Caliphate and Pan-Islamism no
longer constituted suitable objectives for a religio-political movement
in those days. Several authors remark upon the disparity between the
sphere of thought and sentiment the Khilafatists were moving in, and
their sphere of action. 43 Their ideal of Pan-Islamism was based upan
a romantic view of Islamic unity at the time of the four "rightly guided"
Caliphs,44 but they had to act in a world where this unity was hailed
from motives which had little to do with Islam, and therefore stunted
a healthy growth of Pan-Islamism. In this respect, the Indian Muslims
were out of tune with their age and their environment, without however
realizing this.
A disparity of this kind will always be, to some degree, the lot of a
revivalist movement, but it may be lucky enough to strive for the
realization of its ideals in a world not wholly unsympathetic to them.
But Pan-Islamism was a dying cause,45 or perhaps we had better say that
it was fading away from the realm of realities into that of remote possi-
bilities. 46 This was why the abolition of the Caliphate was a death-blow
to the Khilafat movement: if Pan-Islamism had been a reality in the
Muslim world at large, the Khilafatists might have found another outlet
for their endeavours, another symbol for their aspirations. But they were
out of touch with the religio-political realities outside India. 4T They
did not know that Abdul-Hamid 1I, as weIl as his enemies, the Young
Turks, thought only about the safety of his own throne and the preser-
vation and greatness of Turkey, when propagating Pan-Islamic unity.
We have already noted that Muhammad Ali's Comrade, before the
Great War, was not well-informed about other Muslim countries; 48
also there was the complete lack of knowledge among Khilafatists with
regard to the secular turn taken by Turkish nationalism, and about the
force of Arab nationalism. Even an observer like the Agha Khan, who
was in a position to have access at every kind of information, was
surprisingly ill-informed about these matters, and consequently could
blunder naïvely.49 Thus the extra-territorial Muslim loyalty was limited
to "a one-way traffic" 50: neither Turks nor Arabs cared much about
the troubles of their co-religionists. On the other hand, their attitude
was perhaps not quite undeserved: the Indian Muslims' Pan-Islamism
was, probably not to a little degree, inspired by selfish motives. They
wanted solidarity to profit by it, for they felt in need of support against
British power, and insecure vis-à-vis the Hindu majority. In Turkey, at
least, there was a feeling that Indian Muslims had not given any support
to the Turks in their hour of need. 51 So the Indian Pan-Islamists could
hardly complain about not finding much understanding of their needs
outside India. The argument may be not quite correct, since Indian
Khilafatists really did exert themselves to help Turkey af ter the war,
but if this was the way the Turks looked upon it, it proves once more
the disparity between the Indians' own view of their role and its
appraisal by other Muslims.

Another instance of the erroneous estimate the Indian Muslims made
of the world they were actually living in is shown by the high hopes
they pinned on Afghanistan. This was understandable in 1919, when
Amir Amanullah encouraged them and made war on the British power
in India. But even then Indian Khilafat leaders might have realized
that the Afghans stood no chance against a modern, well-equipped
army, and the masses might have gathered as much from what demo-
bilized soldiers told them. And when we see talk of an Afghan invasion
still being raked up in 1925, we may state once again: the Khilafat
leaders were out of tune with the world they were living in. The same
circumstance, we think, partly explains the Khilafat leaders' encouraging
the hijrat to Afghanistan. They were taking a grave responsibility, for
they should have known bet ter than to send their followers on this quest,
but we should see their attitude in the context of the climate of self-
delusion prevailing in their midst.
Perhaps the most fatal error resulting from their roman tic illusionism
was constituted by their supposition that Hindu-Muslim unity had only
to be proclaimed to be a fact. The alliance with Gandhi and Congress
was hailed as Hindu-Muslim unity achieved, but this rosy picture was
revealed to be largely fictitious. In our opinion, B. M. Chaudhuri's
statement that this alliance showed "the realities of Hindu-Muslim unity
when it is based on action and struggle and the tremendous possibilities
of that unity when the communities realise that they are bound by ties
of common sorrows and sufferings and actuated by the spirit of nation-
alism",52 is a little off the mark: it takes for granted that conditions
were fulfilled which actually were not, or at least not sufficiently. Hindus
and Muslims were suffering only partly from the same wounds, and the
spirit of nationalism was not absent, but it did not prove strong enough
to overcome the spirit of communalism. A common success might have
given them a tremendous push towards nationalism, but this did not
materialize. On the other hand, the same common success might have
constituted the starting-point for a further struggle between the poor
masses and the propertied classes, and this may have been a reason why
these classes preferred communalism to nationalism.
Thus far, we have been stressing the "roman tic" aspects of the
Khilafat movement, the aspects which made it lose touch with the
realities of its own age and environment. But it would not do to describe
the Khilafatists as out and out romanticists, living wholly in a world
of their own making. Had th is been the case, they would probably have
scored no more than a literary or a verba! success. As it was, they led

a movement of great, if temporary, force, and therefore they cannot
have been completely unaware of the world around them. For a long
time, polities in India had been the province of the upper and middle
classes only; it was only about 1920 that the masses were drawn into
them, and it was the merit of the Khilafat leaders that they were able
to rouse the Muslim masses. Mass participation proved to be an effective
means of pressure upon the British Raj. But it would seem that the
Khilafat leaders were not able to handle their own success in this respect.
Roughly dividing the leaders into two groups - the westernized middle
class group and the ulama - we think that the former shied back from
the unruly character of its own foIlowing, whereas the latter were too
deeply and too exclusively immersed in religious issues (or the religious
aspects of political issues) to keep a hold on them. These inner contra-
dictions, provoking tensions even during the movement's heyday, made
it disintegrate when the hopes of a startling success had been lost.
How far, actuaIly, did its success go? We should distinguish here
between at least two fields in which the Khilafatists sought success. The
first was that of the Allies' policy towards Turkey and the Caliphate.
We need not dweIl on this subject very long, because we have discussed
it in the preceding chapters. Our conclusion is that the Khilafatists
succeeded by and large in bringing the Government of India to taking
up their demands. This in itself, perhaps, would not have needed much
Khilafatist pressure, but at any rate it was due to that pressure that
the Government of India expressed Muslim feelings with great em-
phasis in London.
The Khilafatists, however, failed almost completely in impressing
their views on the British Government, which was the authority that
reaIly mattered. Khilafat agitation probably counted for something
in the British decision regarding Turkish rights in Constantinople in
January, 1920, but we have our doubts concerning the veracity of
British declarations that this decision was largely influenced by the
desire not to hurt Muslim susceptibilities. 53 In the cabinet meeting
deciding this question,54 the Indian Muslims' feelings were certainly
taken into account, but we get the impression that military considerations
and rivalry with France were of no less, probably even of greater im-
portance. At any rate, British aIlowances for Muslim feeling were not
great enough to keep the British Government from occupying the same
city two months later. And the change-over from the treaty of Sèvres
to that of Lausanne was entirely due to Turkish military successes and
the British desire to restore British influence in the Near East. 55

The second field to consider is that of Indian polities. On this account
the judgement will be influenced by what one thinks to be the essential
aim of the Khilafatists. On the face of it, this would seem to be the
achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity, in order to strengthen Indian
nationalism - irrespective of whether Indian nationalism was, for the
Khilafatists, and end in itself or a means to get a stronger lever on
the British policy regarding Turkey and the Caliphate. If considered
this way, there is no reason for exultation. Notwithstanding its promising
start, Hindu-Muslim unity was fatally injured by the riots the masses
indulged in, and by the mutual dis trust caused by the failure of their
combined efforts. Congress, it is true, did retain a prominent Khilafat
leader like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad who was no mean asset to his
party; some other Khilafat leaders constituted the Nationalist Muslim
Party, operating within Congress, but often in conflict with majority
decisions about Congress policy.56 But these leaders did not, in the long
run, succeed in retaining their following. 57
Thus far, our account of the Khilafat movement's success has not
been impressive - rather distressing, one would think, when considering
the sacrifices made in its name, and the expectations it provoked in its
heyday. This, we think, is the reason why not unfrequently it has been
judged succinctly in words like "tragic", "fantastic self-sacrifice", "wasted
energies", and so on. 58 But, as we argued before, the Khilafat movement's
aims in Indian polities were too complicated to be expressed in the one
notion of "Indian nationalism"; it contained germs not only of this, but
also of some kind of Muslim nationalism. Indian Muslims themselves
could hardly be aware of this, and certainly not be articulate about it,
since no adequate theory of nationalism, reconciling their Pan-Islamic
sentiment to the exigencies of a world in which nationalism was the
coming force, had yet been offered to them. They had to wait for Iqbal,
who argued that " ... in the existing world situation Islam could best
survive neither by narrow nationalism nor in the naive dream of re-
establishing a universal state, but in a multi-national free association,
in something like a League of Nations of Islam." 59 This "multi-national
pan-Islamism" 60 was perhaps what some Khilafatists had dimly en-
visaged in the early twenties. Reacting to the abolition of the Turkish
Sultanate, by which the Caliph lost his temporal power, they had voiced
the idea of a "Muslim League of Nations", still linking it, however,
with the institution of the Caliphate,61 whereas Muhammad Ali, some
years later, showed himself to be as averse to nationalism as ever. 62 So
we need not wonder that Iqbal, though attracted at first to the Khilafat
movement, was soon repelled by the naiveté of its leaders. 63 But we do
not think it improbable th at this movement may have prepared the
Indian Muslims for taking up Iqbal's ideas and the movement for
Pakistan in the thirties. 64
This we may consider a success of the Khilifat movement, but we
should bear in mind that this success was no less devoid of tragedy than
the lack of success we were pointing out before. One aspect of the
movement was its highly emotional character,65 which made it unruly,
undisciplined and apt to get out of hand - qualities not recommending
it to middle-class leaders. This, we think, was one reason why Jinnah
abstained from it. "Jinnah's ideas about Muslim nationalism can be
judged by his neutralist attitude towards the Caliphate movement which
had affected virtually all Moslems. He believed that a false religious
frenzy coloured Indian political activity, which would ultimately do
more harm than good to India in general and Moslems in particular" 66
- this is Malik's opinion, the key words of which are "religious frenzy".
As a westernized Muslim leader, Jinnah did not care for a great in-
fluence of the traditional religious leaders in polities; but as a man
of compromise - and his subsequent career should not make us forget
that he was a man of compromise until about 1930 - he had no less
dislike of the passions which would upset cautious and reasonable
solutions of complex problems. And lastly, Jinnah had entered polities
as an Indian nationalist and a member of Congress. He may weIl have
feared that religion by itself did not constitute a sufficient basis for any
nationalism. We have characterized the Khilafat leaders as men living
in dreams and illusions - and the kind of Muslim nationalism which
throve on the soil prepared by their movement may weIl have inherited
something of their lack of realism. The subsequent history of Pakistan
proves that the problems it provoked were at least grossly underestimated.
But Muslim League leaders may weIl have drawn from the events
between 1919 and 1924 the conclusion that, in order to get a hold on
the Muslim masses in India, one had to make an emotional appeal
to Islam. This could not fail to bring about in their following enthusiasm,
but hatred as weIl. In preparing the way for Muslim nationalism the
Khilafat movement was pointing to the future, but also to its ugly
aspects.
SAMENVATTING
Ter inleiding bespreken wij enkele algemene aspecten van het natio-
nalisme zoals zich dat in Brits-Indië ontwikkelde. Daarbij komt met
name aan de orde de verhouding tussen nationalisme en communalisme,
als een belangrijk facet waarvan wij de relaties zien tussen deze stro-
mingen enerzijds en de staat anderzijds, waardoor het aannemelijk wordt
dat communalisme zich ontwikkelen kan tot nationalisme als de rol
die de staat speelt in de samenleving verandert. Tevens komt ter sprake
de houding die het Britse bestuur aannam tegenover het opkomende
nationalisme. Een veelvuldig voorkomende opvatting is dat het een
verdeel-en-heers-politiek voerde maar wij betogen, zonder het bestaan
daarvan te ontkennen, dat een dergelijke politiek moeilijk te verenigen
was met de democratiseringstendens die sinds Curzons bewind het
bestuur over Brits-Indië begon te kenmerken.
Daarna volgt een schets van de opkomst van het Indisch nationalisme
in de 1ge eeuw, voornamelijk onder de hindoes en leidend tot de stich-
ting van het lndian National Congress. Bij de Indische moslims, althans
bij de onder westerse invloed komende elite, bestaat in diezelfde periode
de neiging toenadering te zoeken tot de Britten; dit is de weg die Sir
Sayyid Ahmad Khan hun wijst. Deze meent dat de moslims hun culturele
en maatschappelijke achterstand ten opzichte van de hindoes moeten
inhalen en sticht daarom het Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College te
Aligarh. Daarnaast ontstaat bij de moslims een groeiende belangstelling
voor het Pan-Islamisme; dit krijgt aanhang zowel onder de eerder
genoemde groep als onder de ulama, met name die van Deoband. In
het Pan-Islamisme neemt de idee van het Kalifaat een voorname plaats
in als symbool van eenheid, van vroegere macht en van een islamitische
renaissance, waarbij men vooral teruggrijpt op het voorbeeld van de
eerste vier "recht geleide" kaliefen.
In deze situatie verslechtert omstreeks 1900 de verhouding tussen
hindoes en moslims. Een symptoom is dat de moslims zich steeds minder
inlaten met het Congress ; factoren die de verwijdering bevorderen zijn
o.a. de verdeling van Bengalen en de door Morley en Minto ingevoerde
hervormingen van 1909. De moslims stichten in deze periode een eigen
politieke organisatie in de Muslim Lffague. Na ca. 1910 echter wordt

de verhouding tussen de beide groepen beter. Een belangrijke rol speelt
hierbij het feit dat de verdeling van Bengalen in 1911 ongedaan wordt
gemaakt, als ook de Engels-Russische toenadering, waarna Engeland
Turkije niet meer steunt in zijn conflicten met Italië en de Balkanstaten.
De Indische moslims gaan Engeland zien als een vijand van de Islam.
Een eerste climax bereikt deze ontwikkeling als Turkije in 1914 de
zijde der Centralen kiest. Dan reeds ontstaat er, doch voorlopig nog
vormeloos en ongeorganiseerd, een begin van de Khilafat-beweging in
acties van de gebroeders Ali, Abdul Bari, het hoofd van de Deoband-
school Mahmud-ul-Hasan, e.a. In deze Khilafat-beweging verbindt zich
de wens om steun te verlenen aan het Kalifaat en Turkije met natio-
nalistische tendensen. De beweging krijgt een verdere stimulans door
de Arabische opstand tegen Turkije in 1916, waardoor het Osmaanse
Kalifaat bedreigd wordt en een herstel van het Arabische Kalifaat, maar
dan geheel onder Engelse invloed, naderbij lijkt te komen. In de Muslim
League, die tot omstreeks 1910 vertrouwd had op het Engelse bewind,
breekt de opvatting door dat toenadering tot het Congress noodzakelijk
is, en in het Lucknow Pact van 1916 worden deze beide organisaties
het eens over de hervormingen die zij samen zullen nastreven: een
programma van grotere invloed van de Indiërs in het Brits-IndÏl.che
bestuur, waarbij echter de communale rechten van de moslims gewaar-
borgd worden.
Als in 1918 de oorlog beëindigd is spitsen de verhoudingen zich toe.
Factoren die hierbij een rol spelen zijn de economische moeilijkheden
en de prijsstijgingen in de jaren 1917-1921, de bij de moslims heersende
angst dat Turkije geheel verdeeld zal worden door de Geallieerden waar-
door het Kalifaat alle feitelijke macht zal verliezen, de vijandelijkheden
met Afghanistan, de hoop die Engeland wekt door de Montagu-Chelms-
ford-hervormingen aan te kondigen, daartegenover de dreiging van
onderdrukking van alle Indisch nationalisme door de Rowlatt Act, en
tenslotte het optreden van Gandhi, onder wiens invloed de politieke
activiteit in Brits-Indië een ander karakter krijgt.
Nu organiseert de Khilafat-beweging zich in de Khilafat Conference
en het Central Khilafat Committee, die in nauwe samenwerking met
Gandhi opereren. De Muslim League, die zich gematigder opstelt, treedt
politiek op de achtergrond, maar naast deze organisaties ontstaat de
Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, een organisatie waarin de ulama van Deoband
de toon aangeven en die nauw samenwerkt met de Khilafat-beweging
en het Congress. Deze samenwerking krijgt gestalte in de non-coöperatie-
DUTCH SUMMARY
181
beweging, die in de loop van 1920 haar programma formuleert en leidt

tot een voor Brits-Indische verhoudingen vrijwel unieke verbroedering
tussen hindoes en moslims. De moslims, wier meest op de voorgrond
tredende leider in die tijd Muhammad Ali is, komen steeds dichter bij
het Indisch nationalisme te staan, daar zij bij de Britse regering geen
gehoor vinden voor hun eisen betreffende Turkeije en de positie van
de kalief.
Deze non-coöperatie-beweging wordt een echte massabeweging. Deze
ontwikkeling roept spanningen op. De leiding blijft grotendeels nog in
handen van figuren uit de middenklasse met gevestigde belangen welke
direct of indirect samenhangen met het Britse bewind, terwijl een groot
deel van de volgelingen minder behoefte heeft die gevestigde belangen
te ontzien. Er ontstaan interne tegenstellingen zowel in het Congress
als onder de moslims, blijkend o.a. uit het feit dat juist hooggeplaatste
moslims zich weer van de Khilafat-beweging gaan distanciëren. Ook
de verhouding tussen hindoes en moslims wordt weldra op de proef
gesteld, onder meer doordat de Khilafatisten de neiging vertonen in
hun acties verder te gaan dan het Congress. Dit blijkt bij voorbeeld uit
hun bereidheid om de non-coöperatie uit te breiden tot de weigering
om belasting te betalen - een stap die door het Congress pas later in
het non-coöperatie-programma wordt opgenomen. Ook zijn het vooral
de Khilafatisten die aandringen op een volledige onafhankelijkheids-
verklaring en de uitroeping van een Indische Republiek als de Britse
regering hun eisen niet zou inwilligen. Ook spelen zij met de gedachte
van jihad met hulp van Afghanistan. Tenslotte vormt de Moplah-
opstand in 1921 een belasting voor de relaties tussen hindoes en moslims.
De Brits-Indische regering neemt tegenover de non-coöperatie- en
Khilafat-beweging in hoofdzaak een afwachtende houding aan, in de
hoop dat de beweging zich belachelijk zal maken door de extravagantie
en onuitvoerbaarheid van haar eisen. Lord Chelmsford bepaalt zijn
houding duidelijk in deze zin en Lord Reading, de nieuwe onderkoning
sinds april 1921, tracht aan deze lijn vast te houden. Er zijn zeer weinig
aanwijzingen dat de Brits-Indische regering getracht zou hebben hindoes
en moslims tegen elkaar uit te spelen in een verdeel-en-heers-politiek;
daartegenover is het zeer duidelijk dat Chelmsford, Reading en de
Engelse minister voor Brits-Indië, Montagu, geprobeerd hebben de
gematigde elementen uit beide groepen voor zich te winnen door niet
repressief op te treden, door te wijzen op het belang van de heIVormingen
die Engeland in de Government of India Act van 1919 toch al door-
voerde, en door tegemoet te komen aan de eisen van de Khilafat-
182
beweging waar dit kon. Met name betrof dit de Britse houding jegens
Turkije en het Kalifaat; de Brits-Indische regering en Montagu be-
pleiten voortdurend een milde behandeling van Turkije en herziening
van het verdrag van Sèvres. In het Britse kabinet vinden zij echter
vooral Lloyd George en Curzon tegenover zich.
Dat de Brits-Indische regering zich deze houding veroorloven kan
komt o.a. door de geweldloosheid die Gandhi predikt en van zijn volge-
lingen en bondgenoten eist. In de herfst van 1921 echter lijkt deze
geweldloosheid in het gedrang te komen. Congress- en Khilafat-vrijwil-
ligers treden agressiever op; het bezoek van de Prins van Wales aan
Bombay leidt tot ernstige onlusten. Dan kan de regering haar afwach-
tende houding moeilijk langer handhaven, temeer daar zij kritiek ont-
moet bij conservatieve elementen in eigen kring, in de Britse regering
en in het Parlement. In november gaat zij over tot massale arrestaties,
die vooreerst echter geen ander resultaat hebben dan dat de gematigde
elementen in Brits-Indië naar de zijde van de extremisten overhellen.
Reading heeft dan ook het gevoel met de rug tegen de muur te staan
en is medio-december tot onderhandelingen bereid, waarop ook ge-
matigde leiders als Malaviya en Jinnah aandringen die in een openlijk
conflict met de Brits-Indische regering geen heil zien en de revolutio-
naire tendenties in de massabeweging vrezen. Vooral door Gandhi's
hardnekkige houding echter komt het niet tot onderhandelingen; het
blijft overigens de vraag of de Londense regering Readings politiek
gedekt zou hebben, daar onderhandelingen tot duidelijke concessies
aan de nationalisten zouden moeten leiden. Een aanwijzing voor de
verhoudingen binnen het Britse kabinet vormt Montagu's ontslag in
februari 1922.
Wanneer Gandhi dan de actie om geen belasting meer te betalen
aankondigt voor het district Bardoli neemt de Brits-Indische regering
aan dat de gematigden haar zijde zullen kiezen en verklaart zich hier-
tegen met alle middelen te zullen verzetten. Vóór het evenwel zover
komt, vindt het incident van Chauri Chaura plaats, waarop Gandhi
de non-coöperatie-beweging voorlopig afgelast.
De non-coöperatie-beweging stort nu volledig ineen. De Khilafat-
beweging, die er nauw mee verbonden was, krijgt ook een ernstige
klap, maar kan zich toch langer handhaven. Haar specifieke doeleinden
immers lagen grotendeels buiten de nationalistische beweging, en Turkije
en het Kalifaat hebben nog steeds hulp nodig. Wel is inmiddels de
situatie van Turkije minder benard geworden. Het regiem van Kemal
Pasha heeft het verzet georganiseerd tegen het verdrag van Sèvres en
OUTCH SUMMARY
183
alle daannee samenhangende inbreuken op Turkse rechten, zoals de

Griekse inval in Smyrna en Anatolië. Het heeft daarbij de steun ver-
worven van Sovjet-Rusland en eveneens, zij het in mindere mate, van
Frankrijk en Italië.
Wanneer in de zomer van 1922 de Grieken verslagen worden dreigt
er even een gewapend conflict tussen Engeland en de troepen van Kemal
Pasha. Dit wordt voorkomen, maar deze crisis wordt wel een van de
oorzaken van de val van Lloyd George's coalitie-regering. Nu verzet
Engeland zich niet langer tegen herziening van de vrede van Sèvres,
en in 1923 wordt dit verdrag vervangen door dat van Lausanne.
In deze situatie kan echter de tegenstelling tussen het oude Turkse
bewind van Sultan-Kalief Mehmed VI en het nieuwe van Kemal Pas ha
niet langer verborgen blijven. Kemal Pasha zet de seculaire politiek van
de Jong-Turken voort, een feit dat tot dusver aan de aandacht der
Khilafatisten ontsnapt was. Op 1 november 1922 wordt het Sultanaat
in Turkije opgeheven; de scheiding tussen wereldlijke en geestelijke
macht van de kalief, waartegen de Khilafatisten zich altijd verzet had-
den, werd daannee een feit.
Anderhalf jaar later wordt ook het Kalifaat in Turkije afgeschaft,
waarna koning Husain van Hidjaz zich tot kalief laat uitroepen. Husains
pretenties echter vallen in de Arabische wereld niet in goede aarde en
de Arabische vorst Ibn Saud verovert Husains koninkrijk.
Daarmee wordt de Kalifaatskwestie losgemaakt van een anti-westerse
tendens en komt te liggen in een sfeer van inter-Arabische rivaliteiten.
Zij verliest haar belang voor de meerderheid der Indische Khilafatisten,
afgezien van enkele hardnekkige leiders zoals de gebroeders Ali. Daar
de inmiddels - na het falen van de non-coöperatie-beweging - toege-
nomen spanning tussen hindoes en moslims ook een concentratie op
het Indisch nationalisme voor de Khilafatisten bijzonder moeilijk maakt,
verloopt de hele beweging in de jaren 1922-1924. Enkele leiders vinden
aansluiting bij het Congress, andere bij de Muslim League, die haar rol
als representatieve moslim-organisatie weer gaat hervatten.
In het laatste hoofdstuk trachten wij de plaats te bepalen die de
Khilafat-beweging inneemt in de Brits-Indische politieke geschiedenis.
Wij zien haar als een beweging welker anti-Britse karakter sterker leek
dan het was, daar dit grotendeels veroorzaakt werd door de anti-Turkse
politiek van Engeland; als deze laatste herzien werd, kon ook de anti-
Britse tendens van de Khilafatisten minder op de voorgrond treden.
Wij zien haar verder als een duidelijk religieus-getinte beweging -
daardoor met de mogelijkheid om in communalistisch vaarwater terecht
te komen - maar ook als een beweging die duidelijke nationalistische

trekken vertoont. Dit nationalisme echter kon zich moeilijk ontplooien,
doordat het licht in conflict kon komen met de Pan-Islamitische tendens
van de beweging, en tevens doordat het op een tweesprong stond tussen
Indisch nationalisme en moslim nationalisme. Als de non-coöperatie-
beweging succes had opgeleverd, was de Indisch-nationalistische tendens
onder de Khilafatisten misschien versterkt, maar het falen van die
beweging had een averechts gevolg: het leidde tot onderling wantrouwen
en tot gevoelens van frustratie.
Tenslotte stellen wij ons de vraag, in hoeverre de Khilafat-beweging
succes had. Dit lijkt ons zeer gering. De concessies die Turkije verwierf -
en die het Kalifaat niet redden - waren eerder te danken aan Engels-
Franse (en later ook Engels-Russische) rivaliteit, en aan de militaire
successen van de Turkse nationalisten, dan van een wens van de Britse
regering om rekening te houden met de gevoeligheden van haar moslim-
onderdanen in Brits-Indië. Het blijvend belang van de Khilafat-beweging
lijkt ons voornamelijk, dat zich hier voor het eerst sinds lange tijd een
politieke massabeweging onder de Brits-Indische moslims had geopen-
baard, en dat hierbij een beroep op de Islam zulk een grote rol speelde.
Het lijkt ons dan ook waarschijnlijk dat zij een zekere invloed had op
de latere beweging ten gunste van Pakistan.
NOTES CHAPTER I
1 For an anthology of their endeavours see L. L. Snyder, The

Dynamics of Nationalism: Readings in its Meaning and Development,
Princeton N.]., 1964.
2 H. Kohn, Nationalism, its Meaning and History, Princeton N.].,
1955, p. 9.
3 K. R. Minogue, Nationalism, London, 1969 2), p. 12.
4 A. R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism, Bombay,
1948, p. 351.
5 K. K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan, A Study in Nationalism,
London, 1967, p. 13.
6 E. Kedourie, Nationalism, London, 1966 3), p. 81.
7 R. Emerson, From Empire ta Nation; the rise to self-assertion of
Asian and African peoples, Cambridge Mass., 1960, p. 102.
8 Quoted by Kedourie, op. cit., p. 80.
9 L. Dumont, "Nationalism and Communalism", in Contributions
to Indian Sociology, no. 7, March 1964, p. 66.
10 Kedourie, op. cit., p. 73.
11 As is argued by K. R. Minogue, op. cit., p. 26.
12 Agha Khan, The Memoirs of Agha Khan, World enough and
Time, London, 1954, pp. 24-28.
13 Minogue, op. cit., pp. 26-28.
14 We do not, however, agree with Minogue when he writes that in
India the third stage hardly existed at all; the reorganization of the
states in the mid-fifties was, we think, a crucial point in the consolidation
of the nation.
15 Emerson, op. cit., pp. 94-95. For Dumont (op. cit., p. 47) this
fact even constitutes one of the differences between nationalism and
communalism: the latter always refers to existing communities, while
the former may refer to a nation in the making.
16 T. V. Parvate, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Ahmedabad, 1959, p. 191.
17 As is argued by A. P. Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism, New
Vork, 1965, pp. 158-59. The same point is stressed by N. Daniel, Islam,
Europe and Empire, Edinburgh, 1966, pp. 467 and 480.
18 op. cit., pp. 54-55.
19 Gandhi, An Autobiography, paperback ed., London, 1966, p. 116.
20 We wish to point out here that we are speaking throughout about
communalism in India only. Communalism may, perhaps, occur in every
186 NOTES PP. 5-7
multi-communal society, but, according to circumstances, it will acquire

other connotations than it has in India.
21 W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, a social analysis, London,
1946 (sc. 1947), p. 157.
22 ibid., pp. 163 and 166.
23 ibid., p. 158.
24 ibid., p. 176. The difference between these denominations is not
very clear. Perhaps the tenn "accompanying factor" was chosen only
because a "non-efficient cause" would reveal the confusion too clearly.
But confusion there is, we think, and it may be occasioned by the fact
that, in the course of the chapter, the au thor changes roles. When writing
about the "many causes" of communalism (p. 158), he goes on: "The
question as to which of these factors is the most important, presumably
means which is the most accessible to change. Given any other meaning,
the question is both unanswerable and unimportant." This observation,
we think, would fit in with the argument of a politician who is deploring
communal discord and is trying to change the situation. Then indeed
he should have the economie factor in mind as the most accessible to
change, since he is looking for a solution, a remedy. But in the ensuing
analysis the author assumes the role of the theorist, who is out for truth,
for an explanation, and then other factors might be brought into
prominence with good reason. As it is, the comparative "importance"
of the different "causes" and "factors" gets a double meaning, which
makes for confusion. This confusion, in its turn, gives rise to a certain
one-sidedness.
25 ibid., p. 175.
26 ibid., p. 176.
27 We should mention here at once that Smith has revised his
opinions about communalism in India. We think it necessary, however,
to set forth our objections all the same, (a) because his book is enjoying
great authority (and rightly so, we would like to add if it would not
seem too arrogant on our part), and (b) because to our knowledge he
has expressed his own criticism with regard to his fonner theories about
communalism only incidentally in two footnotes in a later work (Islam
in Modern History, Princeton N.J., 1957, p. 53, fn. 19, and p. 210, fn. 5).
There he treats his fonner explanation of the growth of communalism as
"perhaps not invalid as far as it went", but "one-sided".
28 An aspect stressed by W. C. Smith in Islam in Modern History,
ch. I.
29 We are quoting here from W. F. Wertheim, "The Trading Minor-
ities in Southeast Asia", in East-West Parallels, Sociological Approaches
to Modern Asia, The Hague, 1964, p. 77. In two chapters in that book
he treats questions closely related to that of communalism in India, but
drawing his materials mainly from other Asian countries.
30 This point is stressed by C. Manshardt, The Hindu-Muslim
Problem in India, London, 1936, pp. 122-23. Cf. W. C. Smith, Modern
Islam in India, p. 182, and L. Dumont, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
NOTES PP. 7-10 187
31 W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, p. 162.

32 We intend to use the term "communal" in a neutral sense
(pertaining to a community), whereas the words "communalist" and
"communalism" always have a connotation of aggressiveness against
other communities. The words are used in the same way by W. C. Smith
(Modern Islam in India, p. 226), and by D. E. Smith (India as a Secular
State, Princeton N.]., 1967 2), p. 454). Another author on the subject,
Clifford Manshardt (op. cit., pp. 51 and 120) writes about a "healthy"
communalism as opposed to a "narrow and selfish" one, a terminology
which for clarity's sake we do not adopt. - Another matter is that in
everyday polities it may be difficult to distinguish between "communal"
and "communalist" policies and politicians; Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan
offers an instanee of a man in dealing with whom many authors are
confronted with this problem (Cf. R. Gopal, Indian Muslims, a political
history (1858-1947), Bombay, 1959, p. 53; B. M. Chaudhuri, Muslim
Polities in India, Calcutta, 1946, pp. 8-9; Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan
and Modern Muslim India, Lahore, 1950, pp. 39 and 76; W. C. Smith,
Modern Islam in India, pp. 25-26 and p. 169).
33 B. N. Pandey, The Break-up of British India, London, 1969, p. 33.
34 Dumont, op. cit., p. 59.
35 As is stated expressly by W. C. Smith, Islam in Modern History,
pp.209-1O.
36 There is, of course, the concept of a supra-national authority like
that of the League of Nations and the u.N.O., based upon a sense of
supra-national unity, but it was, certainly in the period up to 1945, a
concept rather than a real force. Nationalism was hardly, if at all,
cramped by it. It is only when this sense of supra-national unity and the
corresponding authority grow strong enough th at violence will no longer
be accepted in international relations.
37 We follow in part the argument of L. Dumont, op. cit., pp. 53-56.
38 This cause of the (relative) absence of communalist troubles in
the states is also put forward by Sir Reginald Craddock, The Dilemma
in India, London, 1929, pp. 13-14, and by W. R. Smith, Nationalism
and Reform in India, New Haven, 1938, pp. 334-35.
39 This, of course, was the last phase of the process. It was preceded
by the desire to get an independent India with a federal structure and
a weak centre.
40 See Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand
for Pakistan, London, 1963, pp. 43 and 70.
41 See A. Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, Lon-
don, 1967, pp. 188-90.
42 Kedourie relates these ideas to the thinking of Kant, Fichte and
Herder; op. cit., pp. 29-55.
43 op. cit., p. 96.
44 Kedourie, op. cit., pp. 106-7; cf. Kohn, op. cit., pp. 51-52, quoting
John Stuart Mill.
45 As is suggested by D. Argov, "Moderates and Extremists; Two
188 NOTES PP. U-l4
Attitudes towards British Rule in India", in S. N. Mukherjee, ed., The

Mouement for National Freedom in India, London, 1966, p. 20. Argov's
contribution abounds in quotations proving the self-assertive, aggressive
and uncompromising qualities of the Extremists' nationalism.
46 Gokhale and his political friends did not yet think in terms of
"independence", but only of "colonial self-government".
47 This is the distinction made by Kedourie, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
48 In the latter case, two ideologies are confronted with each other.
In a national state, Islam is no longer the all-pervading spiritual force
in state and society since national unity may overrule it, for instance
when all citizens, whether Muslim or not, are placed on an equal footing
in their relation to the state. See E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern
National State, Cambridge, 1965, p. 65.
49 The Continent of Circe, London, 1967, pp. 408-420.
50 This point is stressed by Kohn (op. cit., pp. 51-52 and 123-25)
as weIl as by Kedourie (op. cit., pp. 131-32).
51 This is one of the theses of S. N. Mukherjee in his "Introduction"
to the aforementioned volume edited by him (see pp. 14-15). Cf. Nirad
C. Chaudhuri, The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian, London,
1951, pp. 436-40, giving as his opinion that the liberal tradition in Indian
nationalism was weak and gave way increasingly to Hindu traditions.
52 This is done by Kedourie, op. cit., p. 101; cf. Minogue, op. cit.,
pp. 83-85 and 149-52. See also W. F. Wertheim, writing: "Nationalism
is not a 'universalist' ideology; but it does express the sense of living
in an 'expanding universe' to those whose outlook formerly did not
extend beyond the restricted 'universe' of their tribe or local community."
(op. cit., pp. 93-94).
53 As is argued by S. N. Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 16. He points to the
fact that the ownership of land as a de facto right already existed in
many parts of India before the British land regulations. But when he
writes that "the growth of the market society in India ... was somewhat
related to the establishment of the British Raj in Bengal" , we think he
is grossly understating the facts. A country where the economic and
social conditions favourable to the growth of nationalism did arise far
more independently of the western impact would seem to be Japan (cf.
E. O. Reischauer, Japan, Past and Present, London, 19643), eh. VIII).
54 See Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 185.
55 K. K. Aziz, in Britain and Muslim India, London, 1963, p. 19,
refers to this theory as one of the "myths" into which British thinking
about India was canalized and stereotyped.
56 D. E. Smith, op. cit., p. 454, fn. 1.
57 Amaury de Riencourt, The Soul of India, London, 1961, p. 294.
58 In conformity to what Emerson (op. cit., p. 329) states as a
general phenomenon in plural societies when nationalism enters the
scene. The Home Rule League and Congress accepted linguistic bound-
aries defining their "provinces" about 1920, and after independence the
same principle was applied to the administration of the country. See
NOTES PP. 14-17 189
also B. G. Gokhale, The Making of the Indian Nation, London, 19602),

p. 168.
59 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, New Vork, 1946,
p.159.
60 By Muhammad Ali; see Rais Ahmed Jafri, ed., Selections from
Mohammad Ali's Comrade, Lahore, 1965, pp. 281-94 (hereafter referred
to as Selections from Comrade).
61 See S. N. Mukherjee, op, cit., pp. 13-14.
62 Nehru, op. cit., p. 303. Nehru's views on the origins of landlordism
are somewhat at variance with those of Mukherjee quoted above (fn.
53). The former, blaming the British for the abuses in Indian society,
has to stress the importance of their interference with it; the latter,
attaching more importance to purely Indian factors in Indian history,
is not able to lay everything at the door of the British.
63 ibid., p. 305.
64 Modern Islam in India, p. 166.
65 A. P. Thornton, op. cit., pp. 174-76. This sympathy would be
based upon their appreciation of the "military races" who were pre-
dominantly Muslims - a judgment which in itself might constitute
another of the "myths" summing up Indo-British relations.
66 See for an outright accusation Nehru, op. cit., p. 381. But it is
suggested too by T. V. Parvate (op. cit., p. 47) and by B. M. Chaudhuri
(op. cit., p. 30). R. Gopal declares (op. cit., pp. 158-59) that police
instigation is not to be proved, but that Jinnah held the opinion that
the police provoked the riots of 1922, 1923 and 1924. But when he is
quoting Jinnah, it appears that the latter mentions misunderstandings
and partial behaviour on the part of the police - which is not the same
as "provoking" and "instigating" riots.
67 In a letter dated May 1921 to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said (enclosure
to a private letter from Montagu to Reading, dated 26.1.1922; Mont.
Coll., vol. 13).
68 See A. Aziz, Discovery of Pakistan, Lahore, 19642), pp. 310-24.
A similar view is held by A. B. Rajput, Muslim League - Yesterday
and Today, Lahore, 1948, pp. 15-16. We do not think this theory has
much value as an interpretation of the historical facts, but signalize it
as a ramification of the divide-and-rule thesis.
69 At first it certainly was. For some instances see W. C. Smith,
Modern Islam in India, p. 162, and B. N. Pandey, op. cit., p. 20.
70 See Duff Cooper, Talleyrand, ch. VI, para. 2.
71 That TaIleyrand is usually looked upon as a highly immoral man
is for quite different reasons.
72 A curious instance is provided by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who
told the British that the Mutiny was caused in part by their army poliey:
they did not keep Hindus and Muslims apart in their native regiments.
And then he pointed to the example given by the Persian ruler Nadir
Shah, maintaining Afgh~n as weIl as Persian armies, and playing them
off against each other. Now Nadir Shah's rule is known as an example
190 NOTES PP. 17-20
of despotism, which makes it an appropriate illustration of our case.

See G. F. ]. Graham, The Lile and Work ol Syed Ahmed Khan, Edin-
burgh, 1885, pp. 54-55.
73 As is indicated by the "governments of national unity" springing
up in war time, like Viviani's Cabinet of the "union sacrée" in August
1914, and the Coalition Cabinet in Great Britain in the spring of 1915.
Opposition groups outside the pale do occur, of course, like the com-
munists were, to some extent, in many western democracies before
World War II and once more after the beginning of the Cold War. But
these groups are tolerated by reason of their relative insignificance; if
they were too large they would explode the democratic framework.
74 See R. Mousnier, L'assassinat d'Henri IV, Paris, 1964, p. 104
and app. 9.
75 R.]. Moore, Liberalism and Indian Polities 1872-1922, London,
1966, p. 88.
76 See R. Coupland, The Indian Problem 1833-1935, London, 1942,
p.44.
77 We are referring to the Englishmen in India, who, during the
period of British rule, spoke about themselves as "Anglo-Indians".
78 An aspect stressed by Francis G. Hutchins, The Illusion ol Perma-
nence, British Imperialism in India, Princeton N.]., 1967, especially in
ch. V, "British Indian Society: A Middle Class Aristocracy". Cf. B. N.
Pandey, op. cit., pp. 21-22.
79 See Hutchins, op. cit., pp. 199-200. Cf. R. Iyer, Utilitarianism and
All That, The Political Theory ol British Imperialism in India, London,
1968, p. 56.
80 For Gokhale, see Parvate, op. cit., pp. 39 and 154. As for Gandhi
and other Congress leaders, see Penderel Moon, Gandhi and Modem
India, London, 1968, pp. 85-86.
81 "The Shadow of Reform and the Substance of Repression" is the
title given by R. ]. Moore to the chapter he devoted to the period of
Lord Minto's viceroyalty (op. cit., pp. 80-101).
82 Philipp Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India, vol. 2, The
Guardians, London, 1954, pp. 219 and 225.
83 In an article, "The I.C.S. Revolt", I.A.R. 1920, pp. 211-23. With
the word "mulassal" he is denoting those members of the I.C.S. who
were posted in the in land districts.
84 See R. Iyer, op. cit., p. 52, writing about the period af ter 1870,
and noting the "sharp contrasts between Lytton and Ripon, Dufferin
and CUl"Zon, Reading and Irwin".
85 As is done by W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, p. 171, and,
more recently, by B. N. Pandey, op, cit., pp. 73-79.
86 This thesis is held by R. J. Moore, op. cit., pp. 121-22.
87 This definition of their aims is Iyer's, op. cit., p. 56.
88 In 1910 Montagu was Under-Secretary of State for India. For
an account of his speech see S. D. Waley, Edwin Montagu. A Memoir
and an Account ol his Visits to India, Bombay, 1964, pp. 39-44.
NOTES PP. 2lf-21 191
89 Letter of 4.3.1919 to Lord Ronaldshay, and letter of 8.3.1919 to

Lord Chelmsford; quoted by Waley, op. cit., pp. 199-203.
90 See for instance a letter from Sir Harcourt Butler, then Lt.
Govemor of the U.P., to Geoffrey Dawson, chief editor of the Times.
He is stating that many I.C.S. officials consider Montagu as "dishonest" ,
a judgment which he himself does not share. But he is leaving no
doubts that he thinks the reforms "hopelessly impracticable" (letter of
4.12.1918; Butler Coll., vol. 50).
91 We may observe this attitude even with Montagu, who on the
one hand condemned the haughty "bridging-the-gulf" parties organized
by hls compatriots (Waley, op. cit., p. 310), but on the other hand
could not discern any truly lndian, un-English elements in lndian
nationalism as far as he wanted to patronize it (ibid., p. 293). See also
N. Daniel, noting a growing condescension towards Muslims, once fear
of the Turks had vanished (op. cit., p. 65). Cf. Nirad C. Chaudhuri's
absolutely negative judgment on E. M. Forster's novel, A Passage to
India (in The Continent ot Circe, p. 93).
NOTES CHAPTER II
1 In 1820 Rammohan Roy published a tract, The Principles of Jesus:

The Guide to Truth and Happiness.
2 B. Walker, Hindu World, an Encyclopedie Survey of Hinduism,
London, 1968, vol. 2, pp. 311-12.
3 R. C. Majumdar a.o., An Advanced History of India, London,
19673), p. 872.
4 ibid., p. 875.
5 B. Walker, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 270.
6 An illustration is to be found in R. M. Agarwala, The Hindu-
Muslim Riots, Their Causes and Cures, Lucknow, 1943, p. 34, writing
that Dayananda has "conclusively proved" that the Aryans were the
original inhabitants of northern India.
7 Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian,
pp. 213-15.
8 P. Spear in The Oxford History of India, Oxford, 19674), p. 731.
9 W. F. Wertheim, "Religious Reform Movements in South and
Southeast Asia", op. cit., pp. 140-41.
10 See R. C. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 881, on Vivekananda. The theme
is more elaborated by J. N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements in
India, London, 1918, pp. 354-64.
11 See Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Alltobiography of an Unknown
Indian, p. 206, and R. C. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 879.
12 This aspect of the revivalist movement has been amply treated
by Sir Valentine Chirol in his Indian Unrest, London, 1910. He may
not he the most impartial judge of terrorist theories and activities, but
the passages he quotes from journals like the Kesari and the Yugantar
(pp. 16-23 and 91-95) make us understand th at the Government of
India took repressive measures (pp. 96-99). Even Gokhale "accepted the
Press Act as inevitabie" (S. R. Wasti, Lord Minto and the Indian
Nationalist Movement 1905 to 1910, Oxford, 1964, p. 115).
13 See Satyapal and Prabodh Chandra, Sixty Years of Congress,
Lahore, 1964, p. 183. Some of Dufferin's successors, like Minto and
Hardinge, took his lead and called Gokhale "leader of the opposition",
a name against which Gokhale protested, because the Indian "op-
position" never had any chance of replacing the government, as is the
case in western democracies (see T. V. Parvate, op. cit., p. 287).
14 See Faruqi, op. cit., pp. 48 and 104-5; also R. Gopal, op. cit.,
pp. 97-101.
NOTES PP. 25-27 193
15 Pattabhi Sitaramayya, The History ol the Indian National Con-

gress, Bombay, 1946, vol. 1, p. 53.
16 R. C. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 889.
17 Ronaldshay, The Lile ol Lord Curzon, London, 1928, vol. 2,
p. 15l.
18 Chirol, op. cit., pp. 154-57. Ris reproach is a consequence of his
view that Congress represented not the people, but only the western-
educated middle class. Ris opinion, however, that political agitation was
something quite different from the social and religious reform movement
of the preceding years (p. 199) does not seem to he to the point; we
prefer to regard both of these activities as the expression of a process of
national awakening. On the other hand, we think him to be quite right
when he writes that the attention paid to politics hampered the move-
ment for purely social reforms.
19 These are not Gandhi's exact words but it certainly is the im-
pression he conveys in his Autobiography, pp. 186-9l.
20 Faruqi, op. cit., p. 43.
21 See S. R. Wasti, op. cit., p. 2 and app. I, p. 221, where the number
of Muslim participants in Congress sessions in the years from 1885 to
1910 is given. Cf. D. E. Smith, op. cit., p. 89, who certainly is not set
upon decrying a communalist attitude of Congress.
22 W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, p. 170; cf. Gopal, op. cit.,
p. 116.
23 D. M. G. Koch, Herleving; Oorsprong, Streven en Geschiedenis
der Nationalistische Beweging in Britsch-Indië, Weltevreden, n.d.
(1922); (Renaissance; Origin, Endeavour and History ol the Nationalist
Movement in British India), pp. 229-30.
24 R. Gopal, op. cit., p. 88.
25 This, of course, is only a sketchy comparison of Tilak and Gandhi,
about which more could be said. Gandhi may be said to have taken
over Tilak's role by laying stress on the mass character of the nationalist
movement, but differed from him in that he abhorred violence and
considered Rindu-Muslim unity as being of paramount importance.
See D. S. Sarma in M. D. Lewis, ed., Gandhi, Maker ol Modern India?,
Boston, 1965, pp. 10-11.
26 P. Worsley, The Third World, London, 19672), p. 62.
27 See Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation, the Indian
National Congress, Chicago, 1967, p. 40. M. Brecher, in rus Nehru, a
Political Biography, holds that even in the mid-fifties Congress kept this
character of being a movement (p. 495).
28 Jinnah, for instance, who was already a member of Congress, in
1913 became a member of the Muslim League too; Choudry Khaliquz-
zaman was in 1917 Joint Secretary of the Muslim League, and was at
the same time elected a memher of the All-India Congress Committee.
29 Tilak did not go so far, his aim heing swaraj within the Empire;
Aurobindo Ghosh and Lajpat Rai advocated complete independence.
See D. Argov, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
194 NOTES PP. 27-28
30 This point is stressed by Sir Valentine Chirol, op. cit., pp. 156
and 199.
31 1t would not do to emphasize the difference between the two
groups too strongly. Tilak, convicted in 1908 for writing articles inciting
to violence in his paper Kesari, was, according to Parvate (op. cit.,
pp. 260-61), not an advocate of violence on principle, while Gokhale
gave a very broad meaning to the concept of "lawful and constitutional
action", including passive resistance and even non-payment of taxes
(ibid., p. 459).
32 Something like a working agreement between constitutionalists
and extremists plus terrorists in the years before 1918 is suggested by
Rammanohar Lohia, Guilty Men of India's Partition, Allahabad, 1960,
p. 70. Jogesh Chandra Chatterji, in his In Search of Freedom, Calcutta,
1967, sketches asometimes very vivid, if somewhat incoherent, picture
of the Bengali revolutionary movement since about 1910. The exactness
of his memories, committed to paper almost half a century after the
events took place, is of course questionable, but his narrative rings true.
He mentions, among others, Choudry Khaliquzzaman and C. R. Das
as men who were inclined to help the terrorists (pp. 205, 211). Nirad C.
Chaudhuri notes "the existence of a tradition of private murder for
revenge among the Bengali gentry", which might have influenced this
tendency (The Continent of Circe, p. 103). So we are inclined to view
with some caution the assertion of The Oxtord History of India that
"the movement naturally caused alarm, but it was in fact the work of
very small bodies unsupported by the main mass of political India"
(p. 772). The fact that Congress afterwards adopted non-violence as its
creed may weIl have made us lose sight of the importance of violent
groups.
33 This is the generally accepted opinion of writers on the subject.
See Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, an autobiographical
narrative, Bombay, 1959, p. 4; J. Ch. Chatterji, op. cit., p. 57; Sir
Valentine Chirol, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
34 As the editor puts it succinctly in H. A. R. Gibb, ed., Whither
Islam?, London, 1932, p. 190.
35 By this we do not mean to say that these aspects are without their
problems. Why, for instance, did Muslims show less inclination than
Hindus to attend English schools? Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan stated four
reasons : their political traditions, sodal customs, religious beliefs, and
poverty (G. F. 1. Graham, op. cit., pp. 319-20). R. Gopal (op. cit., pp.
31-35) argues that, firstly, Muslim backwardness with regard to edu-
cat ion did not apply to the whole community, but only to the aristocracy,
who were landowners and as such less interested in modern education
than the rich Hindu middle class in the tOWllS. The poorer classes of
Muslims, however, did not keep themselves aloof from English education,
but they could not pay for higher education. Faruqi (op. cit., p. 14)
mentions still another factor which kept well-to-do Muslims away from
the new schools: government policy, which did not give them jobs even
when they were qualified for them.
NOTES PP. 28-31 195
We do not feel able to decide how much weight should be attached

to each of the causes to which these authors refer for an explanation.
For our purpose it is enough to establish that, at least among those who
mattered in politics in those times, Muslims, as compared with Hindus,
dropped behind in this respect.
36 See the chapter contributed by him to H. A. R. Gibb, op. cit.,
pp. 180-81. He quotes the Agha Khan, who rather optimistically sup-
posed that he could see the day coming when the Muslims would
constitute one-third of the Indian population.
37 op. cit., pp. 5-11.
38 As Faruqi (op. cit., p. 37) states with regard to the founders of
the Deoband school. We could see as an instanee the difficulties a
cautious modernist like Shibli met with in his own circles (ibid., p. 51).
39 Graham, op. cit., p. 34.
40 See J. M. C. Baljon, The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Leiden, 1949, p. 4, quoting Sir Sayyid's Urdu
biographer, Hali.
41 As an instance of this we may mention his theory of jihad; see
Graham, op. cit., pp. 209-10, and Baljon, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
45 Albiruni, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
46 ibid., pp. 25-26.
47 Modern Islam in India, p. 25.
48 Nehru, op. cit., p. 347.
49 This is suggested by Faruqi, op. cit., p. 44.
50 Albiruni, op. cit., pp. 41 and 44.
51 Faruqi, op. cit., mentions it as a possibility. Far more posluve
about it are B. M. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 9, and Mahadev Desai,
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Agra, 1940, p. 43.
52 This view is shared by Albiruni, op. cit., p. 43; Baljon, op. cit.,
p. 93; Gopal, op. cit., p. 73.
53 This is the motive stressed by Baljon, op. cit., pp. 88-89, and by
Muhammad Ali in his presidential speech at the Cocanada Congress
session in 1923; see Afzal Iqbal, ed., Select Writings and Speeches of
Ma1l1ana Mohamed Ali, Lahore, 1954, p. 251 (henceforward referred
to as Select Writings and Speeches).
55 Baljon, op. cit., p. 70, and Graham, op. cit., pp. 201-4.
56 Jamal-ud-din's attack was not directed against Sir Sayyid's reli-
gious liberalism, as is argued by Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response
to Imperialism, Berkeley, 1968, pp. 67-73.
57 Examples to be found in Graham, op. cit., pp. 183-85, in his long
letter from London to his friends of the Scientific Society at Aligarh,
dated 15.10.1869.
58 W. C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, pp. 59-68.
196 NOTES PP. 31-33

61 Albiruni, op. cit., p. 57. See also Sir Sayyid's aforementioned letter
to his friends at Aligarh: "The Mohammedans of Egypt and Turkey
are daily becoming more civilised, and it is matter for congratulation
th at the bigotry of the Turks - bigotry which is the cause of foolishness,
barbarism and decay - is daily decreasing ... in Turkey and Egypt the
women are daily becoming better educated." (Graham, op. cit., p. 90).
62 Baljon, op. cit., p. 76, fn. 27.
63 Amir Ali, T he Spirit ot Islam (ampl. and rev. ed. of 1935),
London, 19648), pp. 122-33.
64 op. cit., p. 35.
65 ibid., p. 88.
66 Wasti, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
67 Cf. W. F. Wertheim, "Religious Reform Movements in South and
Southeast Asia", op. cit., p. 141.
70 Quoted by Graham, op. cit., p. 208.
71 W. W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans: Are they bound in
conscience to rebel against the Queen?, London, 1871, is still an essentiaI
work on the Indian Wahabi movement. Qeyamuddin Ahmad (The
Wahabi Movement in India, Calcutta, 1966, p. 329) criticizes Hunter
on the ground th at the latter characterizes it as communal, whereas he
himself stresses the assistance of Hindus in the remittance of money to
the frontier (p. 327). In our opinion, he puts too much stress on this
help, which was of secondary importance, in his endeavour to depict
the Wahabi movement as a national movement. The conflict with the
Sikhs may have been rather accidental, as he contends (pp. 324-25),
and their anti-British disposition was what really mattered, but all the
same it was a movement which had its roots in a puritanical Islamic
ideology.
72 Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan,
Washington, 1963, p. 170.
73 ibid., p. 175.
74 A. Aziz, op. cit., pp. 301-2, alleges that the British gave the name
of Wahabis to the fighters to make them repulsive; cf. Malik, op. cit.,
pp. 189-91. These authors prefer to call them mujahidin, but assure us
at the same time that Shah Wali-ullah was their spiritual father.
75 op. cit., pp. 123-38.
76 ibid., p. 143.
77 This contingency was notably stressed by V. P. Menon. British
correspondents even wrote about the planned capture of Amritsar and
New Delhi (quoted by Sisir Gupta, Kashmir, A Study in India-Pakistan
Relations, Bombay, 1966, p. 121, fn. 32).
78 According to Faruqi, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
79 ibid., p. 23.
NOTES PP. 33-36 197
80 To whom they could give aIlegiance since the death of the Caliph
of the mujahidin in the N.W. Frontier region in 1831, who had no
successor; H. Malik, op. cit., p. 193.
81 This is stressed by Faruqi, op. cit., notably pp. 79-80.
82 ibid., p. 43.
83 As is pointed out by Zafar Ali Khan in an article in Comrade of
14.6.1913; see Selections from Comrade, pp. 297-99.
84 A survey of his articles on this subject is given by himself in his
Written Statement, filed during his detention in 1918 (ICP 206 of
Jan., 1919).
85 As Gibb (op. cit., p. 21) writes about the Muslims and the Muslim
world before World War I. The same assertion is made by W. W. Cash,
The Moslem World in Revolution, London, 1926, p. 10. But after the
War he notes a distinct change: the concept of nationality is establishing
itself, superseding the concept of Islamic unity (ibid., p. 12).
86 In a letter to Lord Chelmsford of 7.7.1916 (Butler Coll., vol. 49).
Butler's judgment may weIl be influenced by his wish to take astrong
stand against what he regarded as Muslim pretensions in those years,
but we do not think that we may whoIly dismiss it as accidental; it is
an opinion he repeats over and over again in bis letters, and he was
certainly a man with wide experience of the Indian Muslim world. At
the time he was Lt. Governor of the U.P.
87 As Butler admits himself in India Insistent, London, 1931, p. 38:
"Panislamism is perhaps a feeling rather than a force ... but it is un-
questionably a sentiment which, at times, produces powerful reactions in
India."
88 W. C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, p. 82.
89 See Gibb, op. cit., p. 36, and L. Binder, Religion and Politics in
Pakistan, Berkeley, 1961, pp. 20-21.
90 i.e. of the relationship between Islam and nationalism.
91 Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 4.
92 This policy may already be dated from the Turco-Russian treaty
of Küchük-Kainarji in 1774 (see Gibb, op. cit., p. 35, and T. W. Arnold,
The Caliphate, Oxford, 1924, p. 165), but in connection with India it
seems to be of no importance before about 1880. Another question is
whether any, and if so how much, religious authority over non-Turkish
Muslims was the Sultan-Caliph's due. This aspect wiIl be discussed later.
93 Keddie, op. cit., pp. 5-7. It is a matter of some importance in
connection with bis religious background - Sunni-orthodox or Shia.
95 We are quoting after A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted,
London, 19642).
96 E. Kedourie, Afghani and Abduh, An Essay on Religious Unbelief
and Political Activism in Modern Islam, London, 1966, p. 45.
97 This is one of the main theses - and argued very convincingly -
of Keddie's book, where a fuIl translation of the Refutation mayalso
he found.
198 NOTES PP. 36-38
98 Keddie, op. cit., pp. 30-31; Kedourie, Afghani and Abduh, pp. 5-6.
99 Keddie, op. cit., pp. 18-19 emphasizes this point.
100 ibid., p. 3.
101 W. C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, p. 51.
102 As is argued by Sylvia Haim, quoted by Keddie, op. cit., p. 35.
Kedourie's opinion is that Afghani's action resulted in "the trans-
formation of religion into apolitical ideology"; op. cit., p. 63.
103 Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-
1964, London, 1967, pp. 129-30.
104 Arnold, op. cit., p. 173.
105 ibid., p. 175. He gives two reasons: the Caliph's ambassadors
often did not know the language of the countries they visited and their
propaganda was contrary to Sunni orthodoxy, which holds that the
Caliph should be of the Quraish. This second argument may be valid
in Arab countries, but in our opinion it is hardly so in India, where
Sunni Muslims certainly did not press this point.
106 Lothrop Stoddard, The New World of Islam, New Vork, 1921,
p.67.
107 The Rise of the Turks. The Pan-Turanian Movement (Hand-
books prepared under the direction of the historical section of the Foreign
Office), London, 1919, p. 25.
109 The Rise of the Turks. The Pan-Turanian Movement, pp. 64-68.
110 Select Writings and Speeches, p. 55.
111 Muhammad Ali: His Life, Services and Trial, Madras, 1921,
pp. 58-59. The rather confused distinction between political and diplo-
matic activity might mean that, according to the au thor, it will not
meddle with practical politics.
112 The Rise of Islam and The Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Move-
ment (Handbooks prepared under the direction of the historical section
of the F oreign Office), Londen, 1918, pp. 59 and 63.
113 Ronald Storrs, Orientations, London, 1937, p. 96. This opinion
may reflect the animosity between the India Office and British officials
in Egypt, where Storrs made bis career.
114 Though these facts are belittled by some authors (e.g. The Rise
of Islam and The Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Movement, p. 63),
and positively valued by others (e.g. Gibb, op. cit., p. 43). We prefer to
share the latter view, as financial aid proves something more than
spirited declarations.
115 This explanation is suggested in The Rise of Islam and The
Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Movement, p. 68.
116 In our opinion Stoddard exaggerates the results of this declaration
(op. cit., p. 73-74). The way he explains its relative ineffectualness -
many influential Muslims realized that this Holy War was "made in
Germany", and the Young Turks were looked upon as Europeanized
renegades - means in fact that Pan-Islamic solidarity did not stand up
against other considerations.
NOTES PP. 311--43 199
117 This observation is made by Keddie, op. cit., p. 26.

118 This is the conclusion reached by Gibb when speculating in 1932
on the future of the Muslim world (op. cit., pp. 338-45).
119 ibid., p. 41.
120 The expression is Wilfrid Scawen Blunt's, quoted by the Earl of
Lytton, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, A Memoir by his Grandson, London,
1961, p. 23.
121 See A. P. Thornton, For the File on Empire, London, 1968,
pp.235-39.
122 Norman Daniel, op. cit., pp. 423 and 469-70.
123 Policy in the Middle East, Memorandum by Sir Mark Sykes to
Director of Military Operations, p. 5 (PSM, B 217, lOR).
124 With the possible exception of the Shias - a point to which we
will return.
126 Binder, op. cit., p. 13.
127 Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
128 H. Malik, op. cit., p. 20.
129 Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 15.
130 See Ibn Khaldun, The Muqadimmah, transl. by Franz Rosenthal,
3 vols., New Vork, 1958-1960, vol. 1, pp. 427-28 and 448-49. For Ibn
Khaldun's theory of the Caliphate and the muik, and its implications
for modern theories of the Islamic and the Muslim state, see E. I. J.
Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 17-27.
131 Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 338 and 392-94.
134 Binder, op. cit., pp. 20-21.
136 C. Snouck Hurgronje, "The Caliphate" in Verspreide Geschrif-
ten, vol. 6, p. 439 (earlier published in Foreign Affairs, 111, 1, Sept.
1924).
137 H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism, London, 19532), pp. 95-96.
138 ibid., p. 109.
140 ibid., pp. 26-31.
141 Gibb, Whither Islam?, p. 36.
143 For instanee when writing that the Caliph in his role of Imam
may lead the faithful in their prayers, but that any believer might do
the same (ibid., p. 14).
144 ibid., p. 166.
145 ibid., pp. 177-78.
146 They might have referred - as do some Indian Muslim authors
- to the example set by the British Government in 1857, when Sultan
Abdul Majid was asked for a fatwa inciting Indian Muslims to loyalty
(cf. H. Malik, op. cit., p. 234). I t was, of course, a case often mentioned
by the Khilafatists.
200 NOTES PP. 43-47
147 Amold, op. cit., pp. 167-69.

148 ibid., pp. 170-71; cf. Snouck Hurgronje, op. cit., pp. 437 and 445.
149 Amold, op. cit., p. 173; cf. Albiruni, op. cit., p. 57. We find this
view expressed by Amir Ali, writing about the Caliph: "He combines
in his person the spiritual and temporal authority which devolves on
him as the vicegerent of the Master." (op. cit., p. 125). Further on
he caUs him "the supreme Pontiff".
150 As Muhammad Ali put it to Lord Fisher, when received hy the
latter in London on March, 2, 1920; see Mohammed and Shaukat Ali,
For India and Islam, Calcutta, 1922, p. 31.
151 See Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 51-61, on the thinking of Ziya Gökalp.
But the same conclusions could be reached by other ways tOD; see ibid.,
pp. 85-102 for an orthodox Islamic argument to the same effect.
152 Albiruni, op. cit., p. 58.
153 op. cit., p. 179.
154 ibid., p. 154. This inconsistency is not to be explained by the
Agha Khan's not being a Sunni.
155 Amir Ali, op. cit., pp. 318-19 and 346.
156 The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Move-
ment, pp. 44 and 58.
157 This was especially the case of reformers like Iqbal (W. C. Smith,
Modern Islam in India, pp. 12-13 and 117), but Smith is showing it as
a general trend tOD (Islam in Modern History, p. 35. Cf. Binder, op. cit.,
p. 39).
158 As the jurists of the Hanafi School and the historian al-Maqrizi
did; see Amold, op. cit., p. 107.
159 See above, p. 40.
160 In a series of six Urdu articles, written in connection with the
Greco-Turkish war of 1897. Translation into English to be found in Kazi
Siraj-ud-din Ahmed, The Truth about the Khilafat, Lahore, 1916; see
pp. 3 and 11.
161 An enumeration is to be found in The Rise of Islam and The
Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Movement, p. 42 and in M. H. Abbas, All
about the Khilafat, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 16-21.
162 M. H. Abbas, op. cit., p. 23. The argument is already to be found
with Ibn Khaldun (op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 396-402). He links up the con-
ditions of having sufficient power and being of Qurashite origin; when
the Quraish no longer fulfilled the former, the latter became void,
according to him.
163 M. H. Abbas, op. cit., p. 26. It might also be called an "aca-
demic difficulty" (Muhammad Ali, Select Writings and Speeches,
p. 178).
164 H. Malik, op. cit., p. 193.
165 Amold, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
166 We find it for instance with Amir Ali (op. cit., p. 132).
167 See Kazi Siraj-ud-din Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 44-47.
168 This argument is used by Abdul Ghani, Thoughts on Caliphate,
Karachi, 1919, p. 8.
NOTES PP. 47--48 201
169 A clear exposition of the facts is to be found in Arnold, op. cit.,

pp. 142-47.
170 Gopal, op. cit., p. 121.
171 ibid., p. 110.
172 Various authors hold different views on this question. The motive
of Hindu danger is stressed by K. K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan,
p. 116, and by Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Continent of Circe, pp. 238-39,
whereas the anti-British trend of Indian Pan-Islamism is brought out by
Gopal, op. cit., p. 128, Nehru, op. cit., pp. 408-9, and W. W. Cash,
op. cit., pp. 25-29.
NOTES CHAPTER 111
1 This is the opinion of Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Autobiography ot

an Unknown Indian, p. 232, and Faruqi, op. cit., p. 81, Faruqi is quoting
Nehru's Towards Freedom: " ... many a Congressman was a commu-
nalist under his national cloak."
2 Ronaldshay, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 328. M. Edwardes supposes the same
intention on Curzon's part (High Noon ot Empire, India under Curzon,
London, 1965, p. 211).
3 As is also done by B. M. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 12. W. C. Smith
(Modern Islam in India, p. 170) is more cautious and says that this
effect "had perhaps been planned". Gopal (op. cit., pp. 92-95) sees the
motive as the wish to hold Hindus and Muslims apart, but his argument
is not convincing. On the one hand he contends th at prominent Muslims
were also opposed to the partition, but on the other he admits that
"politically the educated people of the two communities had been falling
apart for several years before the Partition."
4 D. Dilks, Curzon in India, 2 vols., London, 1969-70, vol. 2, p. 201.
5 As quoted by Ronaldshay, op. cit., vol. 2, ch. XXIV, "The Partition
of Bengal" , pp. 320-29.
6 Dilks' judgment on the matter (op. cit., p. 204) is as follows: "The
extent to which CUI'Zon and his colleagues were swayed by political
motives will remain a subject of argument. Partition had first been taken
up to secure more efficient administration. Probably that desire domin-
ated throughout."
7 Edwardes (op. cit., p. 214) mentions another fact which may have
been of some influence: it was only after October, 1905 that the real
effect of revolutionary propaganda in Bengal manifested itself in mur-
derous assaults. K. K. AzÏz (Britain and M uslim India, p. 38) offers
another explanation : Curzon toured East Bengal to sound public opinion,
and in these Muslim districts did not meet with much opposition. But
we think it highly improbable that Curzon or his advisers did not realize
that in West Bengal public opinion would not be the same.
8 "The revolutionaries felt that the Muslims were an obstacle to the
attainment of Indian freedom and must, like other obstacles, be
removed." (Abul Kalam Azad, op. cit., p. 4).
9 The Autobiography ot an Unknown Indian, p. 233.
10 Edwardes, op. cit., p. 213. Wasti (op. cit., pp. 30-31) comes to
the same conclusion.
NOTES PP. 51-52 203
11 op. cit., p. 771.

12 R. J. Moore, op. cit., p. 83.
13 I t was, incidcntally, not the first time that these had been
suggested: Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan had done so as early as 1883 (Coup-
land, op. cit., p. 36 fn. 1). L. Dumont (op. cit., p. 58) even mentions
the demand for special privileges as early as 1852.
14 They even wanted something more than that: the number of
Muslim representatives should not only take into account their numbers,
but also their political and military importance (Coupland, op. cit.,
p. 34). Now this argument about their importanee could be used by the
Hindus, or any other community, equally weIl, if we replace "military"
by "economie" of "cultural", and so on. Another argument they put
forward was better: the system of mixed electorates Ie ft the Muslims
under-represented in the councils (as is conceded by Gopal, op. cit.,
p. 109), and in the Senates of the lndian universities (Wasti, op. cit.,
p. 76). And above all, they wanted to be represented by true Muslims,
and not by "a Hindu with a beard", as it is put by Woodruff, op. cit.,
p.209).
15 Which was certainly exercised, as the Agha Khan testifies: "For
Syed Amir Ali and myself, 1907 was a period of wh at I can best describe
as guerrilla warfare, whose aim was to keep Morley up the mark. We
won in the end, but it was hard going." (op. cit., p. 104).
16 Albiruni, op. cit., pp. 87-90.
17 Wasti, op. cit., p. 59.
18 Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain: a political biography, Bombay, 1946,
pp. 95-96. Fazli-Husain was not a communalist, but opposed the opinion
of Hindu revivalists th at lndian nationalism required "a revival of the
Aryan religion and Nagri characters." (p. 65).
19 A fairly detailed account of the founding of the Muslim League
is to be found in Wasti, op. cit., pp. 77-83; App. III lists the members
of the Provisional Committee appointed at the Dacca session of 1906.
20 W. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 29.
21 Moore, op. cit., p. 93; Parvate, op. cit., p. 319. Some details on
the regulations are given by D. Rothermund, Die Politische Willens-
bildung in Indien 1900-1960, Wiesbaden, 1965, p. 64. He stresses the
influence of the l.C.S. on the reforms.
22 As is to be found with Gopal, op. cit., pp. 97-98; B. M. Chaudhuri,
op. cit., pp. 14-16; Satyapal and Chandra, op. cit., p. 178; W. C. Smith,
Modern Islam in India, p. 171; Faruqi, op. cit., p. 48. Muhammad Ali,
in his presidential speech at the Cocanada Congress session of 1923,
declared: "There is no harm in saying now that the Deputation was a
'command' performance". (Select Writings and Speeches, p. 254).
23 Dated 4.8.1906; quoted in its entirety by Wasti, op. cit., pp. 61-63.
24 Wasti, op. cit., App. lIl.
25 Select Writings and Speeches, p. 254. Another instance of vague-
ness is constituted by S. A. Husain, writing about a "secret message",
204 NOTES PP. 52-55
but not mentioning from whom or to whom it went (The Destiny ot

I ndian M uslims, London, 1965, p. 55).
27 We concur with Wasti, who devotes a long passage of his book
to the history of the Simla deputation (op. cit., pp. 61-76). Astrong
point in his case is that Minto on 19.9.1906 wrote to Morley that he did
not yet know what the deputation was going to ask on 1.lO! A letter
from Minto's private secretary Mr. Dunlop Smith to Mohsin-ul-Mulk,
dated 13.9.1906, points to the same direction.
28 Which is the one given by Moore, op. cit., ch. VI; cf. Wasti,
op. cit., p. 163.
29 As is evident from some documents referred to by Wasti, op. cit.,
p.72.
30 Coupland, op. cit., p. 26.
31 Rothermund (op. cit., p. 64) reports that Muslim as weIl as Hindu
barristers were eliminated from the political stage by expert handling of
the regulations. He characterizes the result of the reforrns as a Stände-
staat (p. 78), which corresponds to the "representation of the various
interests" we referred to.
32 As was recently done by B. N. Pandey, op. cit., pp. 72-79.
33 Referring to the deputation and mentioning an official who had
written her that the Viceroy had pulled back 62 million people from
joining the seditious opposition; cf. S. A. Husain, op. cit., p. 56; Gopal,
op. cit., p. 100.
34 Wasti, op. cit., p. 78.
35 Sitaramayya, op. cit., p. 27.
36 Parvate discusses Gokhale's views in detail (op. cit., pp. 311-19).
38 op. cit., p. 94.
39 A comparison with the first years of Congress forces itself on the
student and has, for that matter, of ten been expressed. Loyalty did not
mean servility. In the case of the Muslim League the evolution towards
an attitude of criticism seerns to have been even more rapid than with
Congress.
42 On these conflicts see ibid., pp. 102-8.
43 Mentioned by the Agha Khan (op. cit., p. 114), and In more
detail by Muhammad Ali in a contribution to Comrade of 2.8.1913
(Selections trom Comrade, pp. 300-304).
45 K. K. Aziz, Britain and Muslim India, p. 78; he quotes a very
succinct summary of their feelings by Sir Reginald Craddock in the
words: "No bombs, no boons". See also Choudry Khaliquzzaman, Path-
way to Pakistan, Lahore, 1961, pp. 17-18; Faruqi, op. cit., p. 48.
46 This is how K. K. Aziz, Britain and Muslim India, p. 82,
represents the facts. In respect of the Agha Khan his view is undoubtedly
NOTES PP. 55-57 205
correct. In his own Memoirs the latter tells the story of the Delhi Durbar
of 1911 without any heat (pp. 120-21); Khaliquzzaman (op. cit., p. 18)
mentions him as the only leader approving of the revers al of partition.
As to Viqar-ul-Mulk, we have some doubts. Albiruni (op. cit., p. 111)
quotes an article of his in the Aligarh Gazette of 20.12.1911, in which
he strongly denounces the reversal. But at the same time he is trying to
dissuade the Muslims from joining hands with Congress, and this may
have put him in the wrong with the younger radicals in the League.
Notabie, on the other hand, is a contribution of Muhammad Ali in
Comrade of 6.4.1912 (Selections trom Comrade, pp. 266-73), written in
a very objective tone and trying to weigh the benefits of the decision
against the losses.
47 Cf. W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, p. 195.
48 Agha Khan, Memoirs, p. 95.
50 Bis letter of 25.8.1911 to the Secretary of State is quoted by
K. K. Aziz, Britain and Muslim India, p. 78.
51 AuthorÏzed version of the presidential address delivered in Urdu
by Shaukat Ali at the Khilafat Conference, Madras, 19.4.1920 (HDP
100 of Sept. 1920, app. V, p. 11). This view, expressed in 1920, does
not substantially differ from contributions by Muhammad Ali in Com-
rade before the war, for instance an editorial of October, 1911: "Great
Britain and the Moslim Kingdoms" (Selections trom Comrade, pp.
250-56). The same sentiments are given vent to by Khaliquzzaman,
op. cit., p. 17. A more realistic view regarding the Balkan wars was
expressed by the Agha Khan (op. cit., pp. 127-29), but he mentions
"a storm of protest from Muslims all over India" evoked by his com-
ments.
52 op. cit., pp. 53-54.
53 Disillusioned, according to W. C. Smith (Modern Islam in India,
p. 197). One of the mission's members was Khaliquzzaman in whose
account (op. cit., pp. 20-26) no disillusion is noticeable. But then he was
at the time a young man of about 23 years old, who perhaps was more
interested in action for its own sake than in results.
54 A good deal of information on the organization of the Relief
Fund and its medical mission to Turkey is to be found in Muhammad
Ali's Written Statement filed during his internment in December, 1918
(ICP 206 of Jan. 1919, pp. 34-40). He had, of course, every reason
then to put the most favourable interpretation on his actions, but on
the other hand he quotes abundantly from letters, publications and
official sources and could not permit himself to tamper with the facts.
55 Muhammad Ali never wholly condemned Sir Sayyid's policy,
even if he found fault with it. See his Cocanada Congress speech, 1923
(Select Writings and Speeches, pp. 251-52) and his contributions to
Comrade of 23.1. and 1.2.1926 on "National Muslim Education" (ibid.,
pp. 413-31).
56 Most of these particulars are borrowed from Muhammad Ali's
206 NOTES PP. 57-58
Autobiography, to be found in Selections trom Comrade, pp. 29-94. As

a prisoner in Karachi (1922) he wanted to write a life of the Prophet,
but lacking the necessary materials he ended by writing his own life.
57 Azim Husain, whose father Fazli-Husain was one of them, lists
some examples, op. cit., p. 27.
59 Autobiography, in Selections trom Comrade, p. 39.
60 Albiruni (op. cit., pp. 154-55) contends that originally he did not
plan to give much attention to events outside India, and that his attitude
changed under the influence of Abul Kalam Azad. But in its first year,
when Azad had not yet started publication of Al Hilal, the Comrade
contained already quite a number of editorials on foreign affairs. More-
over, at Aligarh Muhammad Ali had been an admirer of Shibli, who
glorified Islam and its past outside India (Faruqi, op. cit., p. 49; Auto-
biography, in Selections trom Comrade, p. 34).
61 "Hindu-Muslim Relations", in Selections trom Comrade, p. 296.
62 "Anti-Cow-killing Agitation", ibid., pp. 257-58.
63 "The Lingua Franca of India", ibid., pp. 281-94.
64 Sir Michael O'Dwyer, India as I Knew It, 1885-1925, London,
19263), p. 175. The author was not the man to miss any "seditious"
intentions in an Indian press organ.
65 This may explain his sometimes erring judgment on Muslim
affairs outside India. He thought, for instance, that the Young Turk
movement had altered the "balance of power" in the Levant, and that
consequently the Turks would no longer be willing to put up with
trespassing upon their rights in Egypt (articles in Co m rade, 1911, on
Albania and Egypt, Selections trom Comrade, pp. 232-38 and 239-44).
66 When in 1914 the securities for both papers were confiscated,
"a house to house canvass (was) conducted among butchers and low
class Muslims, and I understand that about Rs. 4,000 has so far been
collected." (Fortnightly Report trom Delhi Province, 19th November,
1914; PSP 4265/2/1914). In our view a considerable amount of money.
67 Muhammad Ali was certainly an emotional man. When in 1912
he got news that Bulgarian troops stood 25 miles from Constantinople,
he considered suicide (Autobiography, in Selections trom Co m rade,
p. 40). Nehru, who feit much affection for him, called him "most
irrationally religious" (quoted by Brecher, op. cit., p. 94).
68 Autobiography, in Selections trom Comrade, p. 52.
69 ibid., p. 60.
70 ibid., p. 63.
71 ibid., p. 65.
72 This judgment is Khaliquzzaman's, who knew the brothers in-
timately (op. cit., p. 169). At the Karachi trial in 1921 and also when
requesting release from their internment in 1918, it was clearly the
younger brother who took the lead, while the elder followed suit.
73 For most of these and following particulars we have to relyon his
Written Statement filed in November, 1918 (ICP 206 of Jan. 1919).
NOTES PP. 58---60
207
One might wish for a more impartial source, but its bias is to some
extent neutralized because it answers the Statement of the Charges
against M ahomed and S haukat Ali (ibid.).
74 The Agha Khan, op. cit., p. 115.
75 The Deoband authorities promised to help the Society if it
succeeded in establishing itself. Abdul Bari and Shaukat Ali conferred
about it with Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan (Record of Interview with
Shaukat Ali at Chindwara on the 6th December, 1918, ICP 206 of
Jan. 1919, p. 4).
76 Shaukat Ali, Written Statement, p. 6.
77 ibid., p. 7.
78 ibid., p. 9.
79 Quoted at length, ibid., pp. 3-5.
80 The Statement of the Charges against the brothers (pp. 10-11)
mainly rests on suspicions but refers to two "proofs" which unfortunately
are not added to the document. In the Record of Interview with Shaukat
Ali in 1918 the whole question of the Khuddam-i-Kaaba was gone into
in detail, but the internee was not confronted with any proofs, and so
we consider it likely that suspicions were the only thing to go by.
81 Abul Kalam Azad, op. cit., p. 3.
82 In 1906, according to Nehru, op. cit., p. 351.
84 Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 191-92.
85 According to Aziz Ahrnad it was only about 1920 that Azad
participated in the nationalist movement (op. cit., p. 187).
86 Abul Kalam Azad considered Aligarh an institution for "job
hunters", according to Albiruni, op. cit., p. 123. Albiruni may not be
the fairest critic of Shibli and Azad, as he wrote his book, we feel safe
in saying, "in defence of Pakistan". In his picture Azad and Shibli figure
as shrewd and ambitious politicians. But in our narrative about their
activities and attitudes we rely on Faruqi (op. cit., pp. 49-53) and
W. C. Smith (Modern Islam in India, pp. 211-12) as weIl.
87 M. Desai, op. cit., p. 27; Albiruni, op. cit., p. 155.
88 According to S. A. Husain, op. cit., p. 88. Since Azad wrote
almost exclusively in Urdu, we have to depend on second-hand know-
ledge in his case. An exposé of his religious thinking is to he found in
Husain's book, pp. 93-98; his political ideas are rendered more fully by
K. K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan, pp. 175-76; Aziz Ahmad, op. cit.,
pp. 136-37, and H. Malik, op. cit., pp. 232-34. Azad himself, in his
India Wins Freedom, hardly touches upon his activities regarding the
Khilafat movement. An interesting characteristic of his personality and
his career is given by Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 192-94.
89 Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 137.
91 ibid., p. 234.
92 In our opinion, Husain's interpretation (op. cit., p. 89) th at Azad
looked upon the Caliphate as the religious centre only of the Muslim
208 NOTES PP. 61-62
world, is not plausible. It may be correct after 1922, when Turkey

abolished the Caliph's political functions, but not before then.
93 By H. Malik, op. cit., p. 229. But Azad was probably too complex
a personality to be labelled in this way, as Rosenthal suggests, op. cit.,
p. 193.
94 P. C. Bamford, Histories of the Non-Co-operation and Khilafat
Movements, Delhi, 1925, p. 169. The author was Deputy Director of
the Intelligence Bureau, Home Dpt., and composed th is confidential
publication by order of the Government of India.
95 Dated 6.5.1920 from London, and endosed in a letter from
Chelmsford to Montagu; Mont. Coll., vol. 10.
96 See for instance pp. 84-85 and 88, where he gives details about
his arrest in 1942, the only relevance of which is that Azad figures in
them.
97 This opinion is Khaliquzzaman's (op. cit., p. XII). The author
knew Azad well, but when he wrote his book had become the latter's
political adversary. But the same trait is suggested by Rammanohar
Lohia (op. cit., pp. 42-43), whose book was originally intended to be a
review of Azad's autobiography.
99 The aim of the ] amiat al-Ansar, according to Malik (op. cit.,
p. 229) was to bring about doser relations between Deoband and Aligarh
and to sap Aligarh's loyalty. Faruqi (op. cit., p. 56) holds that its aims
never became quite dear, but he too mentions in this context the efforts
towards a better understanding between Deoband and Aligarh (ibid.,
p. 58).
100 Faruqi, op. cit., p. 55; Malik, op. cit., p. 229. See also Report of
the Sedition Committee (commonly referred to as the Rowlatt Report),
Calcutta, 1918, pp. 126-27. It is, by the way, remarkable that only
10 out of about 130 pages of this Report dealing with sedition before
and during the war are devoted to Muslim activities.
101 On this development at Aligarh College see Albiruni, op. cit.,
p. 113.
102 S. A. Husain, op. cit., p. 67.
103 The Earl of Lytton, op. cit., p. 191; Blunt's letter is quoted in
full, pp. 182-90. Sayyid Mahmud was a young Indian Muslim who,
having finished his studies in England, came back to India in 1912.
After 1946 he was a Minister of State in India.
104 S. A. Husain, op. cit., p. 68.
106 For instance the then Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, in his My lndian
Years 1910-16, London, 1948, p. 88, and O'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 215.
107 K. M. Panikkar, His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner, London,
1937, pp. 150-62.
108 In the Comrade of 26.9.1914 (Selections from Comrade, pp.
498-524).
109 ibid., p. 43.
NOTES PP. 62-65 209
110 Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 28.

111 Quoted in full in l\1uhammad Ali's Written Statement, p. 34.
112 Full text of the declaration in J. C. Ker, Political Trouble in
India, Calcutta, 1917, pp. 297-98.
113 See W. W. Cash, op. cit., p. 28; the Agha Khan, op. cit., p.
134-35; a declaration of the Ali brothers, Hakim Ajmal Khan and
Dr. Ansari, made in November, 1914 (PSP 4265/2/1914). But there
were differences; the latter only denounced disobedience to the British
Raj and did not mention active help, whereas the Agha Khan urged
Muslims "to stand loyally by the western Allies", and accepted political
missions on their behalf himself.
114 Speech of 9.11.1914 at the Guildhall Banquet, as reported in
The Observer (Lahore) of 18.11.1914.
115 This is clear from press comments in the Muhammadi (Calcutta)
of 13.11.1914, the Mussalman (Calcutta) of 12.11.1914, and Al Hilal
( Calcu tta) of 11.11.1914.
116 The Dainik Chandrika (Calcutta) of 15.11.1914 mentions Dr.
Suhrawardy as denying the Sultan's title to the Caliphate, and the afore-
mentioned issues of the Muhammadi and the Mussalman clearly were
written to combat views like his.
117 Sir Muhammad Shafi, in a memo of 1921, states that in 1912
he had already expressed this view towards Lord Hardinge (memo
enclosed to a letter from Reading to Montagu, 3.11.1921, Mont. Coll.,
vol. 14). See also Statement of the Charges against Mahomed Ali and
Shaukat Ali, pp. 6-7.
118 Throughout this study we use the word "Caliphate" to designate
the institution, and the word "Khilafat" when we mean the political
movement which aimed at supporting the Caliphate, but had at the
same time other ends in view, even if the latter were not always
explicitly stated, or even realized by its adherents.
119 op. cit., p. 30.
120 Letter of 5.1.1915; PSP 4786/1914.
121 N. R. Keddie, op. cit., p. 30.
122 Sir Alfred Lyall a.o., The Sultan and the Khaliphate; PSM D 178,
lOR.
123 See Minute by Mr. Clarke of the India Office, summarizing some
records on this question; PJP 1951/1917.
124 Letter from Foreign Office to Undersecretary of State for India,
dated 4.1.1915; PSP 53/1915.
125 Of 5.1.1915; ibid.
126 Draft of letter to the Foreign Office, 6.1.1915, ibid.
127 As is suggested by D. G. H. (Hogarth) in Arab Bulletin 49 of
30.4.1917, pp. 191-92.
128 For these particulars see the aforementioned Minute by Mr.
Clarke.
129 ibid.
130 op. cit., pp. 30-32. He does not offer any proofs, but his rather
circumstantiaI narrative is not in itself improbable.
210 NOTES PP. 66-67
131 See Rowlatt Report, pp. 124-27; Bamford, op. cit., pp. 122-25.
132 For instance when they accused Muhammad Ali of having
written a letter in Persian to the Amir of Afghanistan, which he denied
(Written Statement, pp. 46-47 and 53). In the Rowlatt Report this
accusation is not mentioned, and Muhammad Ali supposed that the
Rowlatt Committee had found it untenable, or at least unprovable. The
Government of India realized that many Indians "appointed" by the
Provisional Government at Kabul could not have been consulted as to
their appointments (Rowlatt Report, p. 126).
133 op. cit., p. 34.
134 op. cit., p. 55.
135 The main charge against them was: anti-British and pro-Turkish
activities, and it was stated th at, had they desisted from these after the
outbreak of the war, taking action against them would not have been
necessary (Statement of the Charges against Mahomed Ali and Shaukat
Ali, p. 1). Muhammad Ali himself declares th at his having incurred
the severe displeasure of Sir James Meston, Lt. Governor of the U.P.,
was the principal cause of his arrest (W ritten Statement, pp. 43-45).
The various motives do not exclude each other.
136 H. Malik, op. cit., p. 230.
137 Bamford, op. cit., pp. 125-26.
138 ibid., p. 127. The Rajah of Mahmudabad was an influential
taluqdar in Oudh.
139 Sir Vincent Lovett, A Short History of lndian Politics, Govt.
Press of the U.P., 1918, p. 115. The same opinion is voiced by Bamford,
op. cit., p. 127, admitting however th at "the general feeling seems to
have been one of depression and fear."
140 O'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 18l.
141 The initiative in these years came from the Muslim side. Coup-
land (op. cit., p. 47) mentions "the younger members of the League";
according to Muhammad Ali (Select Writings and Speeches, p. 270),
his brother Shaukat and he himself proposed the simultaneous Bombay
sessions. Jinnah's role is stressed by S. A. Husain (op. cit., p. 68) and
by Rothermund (op. cit., p. 73). Support of Azad is mcntioned by
Albiruni (op. cit., p. 196) and by Azim Husain (op. cit., p. 99).
142 Full text in Sitaramayya, op. cit., App. 1I, pp. 623-26. He no-
where mentions Jinnah's name in connection with the "Lucknow pact",
but then Jinnah was no longer popular with Congress leaders when
this book was written.
143 op. cit., p. 48.
144 Rothermund, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
145 Muhammad Shafi, who became a member of the Viceroy's
Council, was for years to come the leader of the Muslims supporting
government.
146 Bamford, op. cit., pp. 121-22; Azim Husain, op. cit., p. 99.
147 Sitaramayya, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
NOTES PP. 67-68 211
148 Bamford, op. cit., p. 128. We suppose the Hindu Mahasabha is

meant, or a group eonneeted with that body. Bamford eharaeterizes the
members as Hindus "who put their religion before polities".
149 This judgment is Gopal's, op. cit., p. 132.
NOTES CHAPTER IV
1 The cost of living index (1914 = 100) rose to 154 in 1918 and
to 173 in 1921, only descending to 154 again in 1923 - and wages were
lagging behind (India during the Year 1923-1924, pp. 185-86). For
some more details on the situation see Sir Valentine Chirol, India,
London, 1926, p. 183, and D. M. G. Koch, op. cit., pp. 383-84.
2 Rothermund, op. cit., p. 93.
3 Bamford, op. cit., p. XIII.
4 See for instance the report on a meeting at Sialkot on 27.6.1920,
attended by about 10,000 Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, with as principal
speakers Lala Lajpat Rai, Dr. Satyapal and Maulvi Zafar Ali Khan;
HDP 71 of Aug. 1920, pp. 27-46.
5 If they had indeed been important, one would expect them to have
been referred to in documents like Gandhi's Khilafat Manifesto of March
1920 (HDP 100 of Sept. 1920), or in the Khilafat Manifesto of May
1920 issued by the Central Khilafat Committee (Bamford, op. cit.,
pp. 154-57). But they were not. Boycott of British goods, already con-
sidered in November 1919 (Bamford, op. cit., p. 145), should be seen
mainly as a political weapon; it was discouraged in Gandhi's Manifesto
as a form of violence. In India during the Year 1920, p. 142, mention
is made of nearly 200 industrial strikes, of which "same probably were
not unconnected with non-co-operation", but the vast majority were
thought to have only economic origins.
6 Gopal Krishna, "The Development of the Indian National Con-
gress as a Mass Organization, 1918-1923", in Journalof Asian Studies,
XXV,3 (May 1966), p. 429.
7 Quoted by Satyapal and Chandra, op. cit., p. 215.
8 Autobiography (Selections from Comrade, p. 65).
9 As quoted in the Justice (Madras) of 26.1.1920.
10 As Rothermund (op. cit., p. 95) observes with regard to the
non-co-operation movement.
11 It was his second visit to that country. Extracts from his Indian
Diary were published in 1930, and are inserted in his biography by
S. D. Waley.
12 This was admitted by Montagu himself (Waley, op. cit., pp. 118-
19) ; it was alsa a reason for Indian nationalists to support the war effort
(M. Edwardes, British India 1772-1947, London, 1967, p. 197). Perhaps
the most famous nationalist to take this line was Gandhi, admitting as
NOTES PP. 71-73 213
much in a letter to Lord Chelmsford (quoted by Pende rel Moon. op. cit.,
p. 73).
13 Ris budget speeches as Undersecretary of State for India are
quoted at some length by Waley, op. cit., pp. 39-44, 48-50 and 53-54.
14 ibid., p. 132.
15 This was in the spring of 1912. Ibid., p. 51; cf. Moore, op. cit.,
p. 106.
16 Among them could be reckoned the men of the Round Table
group, like Lionel Curtis, Sir William Marris and Lord Meston (see
W. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 86).
17 Ronaldshay, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 164-76.
18 Waley, op. cit., p. 328.
19 Coupland, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
20 ibid., p. 56.
21 CP G.T. 4877 of 15.6.1918.
22 Montagu to Lloyd George, 17.7.1917, quoted by Waley, op. cit.,
pp. 130-31.
23 Waley, op. cit., p. 147.
24 As is done by Zafar Imam, "The Effects of the Russian Revolution
on India, 1917-1920", in S. N. Mukherjee ed., op. cit., pp. 78-79.
25 This is the opinion of Woodruff, op. cit., p. 228.
26 This was a revolutionary movement, mainly operating among the
Sikhs. But how dangerous was it for the British Raj? The Rowlatt
Report expatiates on it, but in the Oxford History of India it is called
not a movement, but a conspiracy, "troublesome rather than dangerous"
(p. 780).
27 India during the Year 1919, p. 152.
28 R. C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India,
vol. 3, Calcutta, 1963, p. 4; cf. Oxford History of India, p. 785.
29 This view is also taken by Woodruff (op. cit., p. 228), and by
Edwardes, British India 1772-1947, p. 200.
30 Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council of 6.2.1919.
31 Is was put off for a week, but in Delhi by a mis take the original
date was maintained. The first casualties were in Delhi.
32 Report on the Punjab Disturbances, p. 8.
33 O'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 273.
34 The title of ch. XVII of his book, pp. 263-317.
35 ibid., p. 118.
36 Report on the Punjab Disturbances, p. 29. O'Dwyer's thesis
throughout his whole book is that the Government of India's mild
attitude towards the troublemakers in 1919 and af ter was inspired by
their anxiety not to spoil the climate for the reforms, and that in par-
ticular an investigation that might reveal treason was suppressed for
reasons of political "expediency". For the first part of this thesis textual
proof is easily to he found, but not for the second. Confidential public-
ations (India and Communism, Govt. of India press, Simla, 1933, p. 20,
quoting a former publication by Sir David Petrie, Communism in India
1924-1927, Simla, 1927) confirm that the Intelligence Bureau did not
214 NOTES PP. 73-76
really believe that external contacts had much to do with the Punjab
troubles in 1919.
37 An official censure of General Dyer by the British Government
was carried in the House of Commons by 247 to 37 votes, but failed
to pass in the House of Lords by 86 to 129 votes. And a public sub-
scription to compensate the General for his dismissal brought in about
!: 25,000.
38 Thompson, Edward and Garatt, quoted by Brecher, op. cit., p. 63.
Edwardes expresses himself still more strongly: " ... even more decisive
than the Mutiny"; British India 1772-1947, p. 202.
39 According to C. F. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas, London,
1929, p. 64. We should remember, though, that even after Amritsar
Gandhi advocated co-operation with the reforms.
40 Woodruff, op. cit., p. 227.
41 CP G.T. 4877 of 15.6.1918.
42 Reading to Montagu, 6.12.1922, quoted in CP 4378. One might
object, however, that Reading was not in the best position to compare
the situation in 1922 with that in 1915 or 1916, as he did not have
first-hand knowledge of India then.
43 As is suggested by A. P. Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism,
p. 204. He is quoting A. T. Wilson's book on his experiences in Mesopo-
tamia between 1917 and 1920.
44 ibid., p. 195. Thornton is speaking there about decolonization
af ter World War II.
45 As is done by Lord Lloyd in his Egypt since Cromer, quoted by
Sir Harold Nicolsan, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925, A Study in
Post-War Diplomacy, London, 1934, p. 21.
46 Nicolson, op. cit., p. 53.
47 op. cit., p. 242.
48 Cab. Cond. of 10.2.1922, app. lIl; Cab. 23/29.
49 In a letter of 8.10.1919. Cf. another letter from Chelmsford to
Curzon, of 6.9.1919 (both letters in Mont. Coll., vol. 9).
50 Hardinge, op. cit., p. 131.
51 R. C. Majumdar a.o., An Advanced History of India, p. 899.
52 See for instance same letters from Montagu to Chelmsford, dated
11.6.1919,31.7.1919, and 1.11.1919 (Mont. Coll., vol. 3). Cf. the judg-
ment of Nicolson, op. cit., pp. 159-60.
53 Bamford, op. cit., p. 141. The Viceroy, in a prodamation of
10.5.1919 with regard to the Afghan invasion, accused the Amir of
solliciting support from a rebellion in India. Cf. India during the Year
1919, p. 9.
54 Bamford, op. cit., p. 142.
55 Chelmsford to Montagu, 14.5.1919, and 21.5.1919 (Mont. Coll.,
vol. 8).
56 Cf. Weekly Report of 28.4.1920, on contacts between Khilafat
agitators and the Afghan delegation at Mussoorie.
57 Though perhaps his success was in no small part due to Gokhale's
intervention, and to a railway strike the government of Smuts had to
NOTES PP. 7~81
215
cope with at the time - as is intimated by Penderel Moon, op. cit., p. 64.
58 This is how Nehru characterizes Gandhi's message to the Indian
people (op. cit., p. 361).
59 Quoted by Andrews, op. cit., pp. 226-26.
60 Sitaramayya, op. cit., p. 162, reports it as being successful, except
at first in Bengal.
61 Penderel Moon, op. cit., pp. 64 and 67.
62 E. V. Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky,
Gandhi, Princeton, N.]., 1967, p. 139.
63 Penderel Moon, op. cit., pp. 71-72; Gandhi, op. cit., pp. 370-72.
64 Quoted by Andrews, op. cit., pp. 245-47.
65 Both motivations are to be found ibid., pp. 56-57 and 62-64.
66 This interpretation is given by Wolfenstein, op. cit., pp. 77, 81
and 85. Strangely enough, the author pays no attention to Gandhi's
alliance with the Muslims about 1920.
67 Andrews, op. cit., pp. 58-59.
68 Nehru, op. cit., p. 365.
69 Brecher, op. cit., p. 74. Cf. Walter Crocker, Nehru, A Contem-
porary's Estimate, London, 1966, pp. 63 and 141.
70 op. cit., p. 43.
71 Gandhi, op. cit., p. XII.
72 It is not surprising that an English biographer like Penderel
Moon should use such words, but we find them also used by Nirad C.
Chaudhuri, The Autobiography of an Unknown lndian, p. 401, and the
Congress leaders' disgust at Gandhi's stress on khaddar is recorded by
Sitarramayya, op. cit., p. 274.
73 op. cit., p. 62.
75 This point will be discussed in more detail in eh. VI.
76 See Worsley on the general aspects of populism, op. cit., pp.165-66.
78 In a letter to President Wilson, dated 18.12.1916; quoted by
Nicolson, op. cit., p. 98.
79 Quoted by Lord CUI"Zon, CP 392 of 4.1.1920.
80 Declaration of November 2,1914. Indian Muslims regarded this as
a pledge which would affect post-war conditions too; it was repeatedly
referred to after the armistice, for instanee in Dr. Ansari's presidential
address to the Muslim League session of December, 1919 at Delhi (PJP
1424/1919).
81 As rendered by the Times, 6.1.1918.
82 Contained in his message to the U.S.A. Congress, 8.1.1918.
83 These were the words used by an I.C.S. official in a report on
Muslim opinion (PSP 1491/1920).
84 They considered it not a "pledge", but "an explanation of war
aims to the Labour Party" (PJP 7596/1919).
85 Letter of 10.2.1920 (PSP 1822/1920).
86 In a speech in the House of Commons, 26.2.1920; this was only
after the cabinet had agreed to letting Turkey retain Constantinople.
216 NOTES PP. 81-83
In the cabinet meeting of 6.1.1920, when this question was being dis-
cussed, a very curious argument regarding this "pledge" of Jan. 5, 1918
had been introduced: "It was recalled, however, that this statement had
been made with a view to its effect on the war rather than on an
eventual peace, and that it contained offers to other Governments
besides the Turks which had not been fulfilled." (Cab. Cond.; Cab.
23/20).
87 A Madras Khilafat meeting on 20.3.1920 sent a telegram to the
Secretary of State, expressing its hope of peace terms "that will fully
insure the integrity of Turkey and the suzerainty of the Sultan Khalifa
over the federated autonomous Muslim states of Arabia Syria induding
Palestine and Mesopotamia." But what interpretation should be put on
the words "suzerainty" and "autonomous" in this text? (PSP 380/4/
1919) .
88 In a letter of 15.3.1920 (PSP 380/4/1919). A letter from the
Nizam of Hyderabad, dated 16.3.1920 (ibid.) is written in the same
vein. Mr. Shuckburgh, a high official at the India Office, noted in a
minute covering these letters that, if "loyal" and "sensible" persons like
the Begam and the Nizam speak in this way, it should be dear that
generally far too high hopes had been raised, with the consequence that
later on England would be accused of a breach of promise.
90 These details are borrowed from Bamford, op. cit., pp. 131-33.
91 ibid., p. 135.
92 "A Confidential Account of the Proceedings of the Session", PJP
1424/1919.
93 Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 43. The author's narrative of the
events is largely corroborated by Bamford's account as well as by the
"Confidential Account"; only it is striking that Khaliquzzaman in his
own report plays a far more important part than in the other two. He
may have had a tendency to overrate his own importance.
94 Referred to in fn. 92, above.
95 In a letter of 27.4.1918, quoted by Bamford, op. cit., p. 135.
96 K. K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan, p. 179.
97 Faruqi, op. cit., p. 70, outlines their programme and their ideas
in this way.
100 Khaliquzzaman (op. cit., pp. 47-48) gives this name to the
Lucknow Conference which, according to him, he himself organized.
It is called a "Muslim Conference" by Bamford (op. cit., p. 140) and
by H. N. Mitra who dates it Sept. 22 (I.A.R. 1920, pp. 250-51).
According to Khaliquzzaman, at the Lucknow Conference "practically
every province and city was represented", and a resolution was passed
to form an All-India Central Khilafat Committee.
The Delhi Conference is listed by Mitra as the first Khilafat Con-
ference (pp. 251-52); he gives the text of aresolution to send a depu-
tation to England and, if need be, to America. Mitra, composing his
NOTES PP. 83--85 217
review at the time of the events, may be a more reliable witness than
Khaliquzzaman, writing some 40 years after them.
Bamford dates the first real Khilafat Conference Nov. 23, at Bombay.
On the other hand, he admits that provincial Khilafat Committees had
already been founded before this.
Other authors, like S. A. Husain (op. cit., p. 70) are vague about the
date of the first Khilafat Conference, while Aziz Ahmad (op. cit., p. 135)
mentions Muhammad Ali as its founder "after his release from prison".
This cannot be quite correct, since Muhammad Ali was still under arrest
in November 1919. His anonymous biographer (Muhammad Ali. His
Life, Services, and Trial, p. 125) also states that an organization had
already been set up before the Ali brothers were set free.
101 Hereafter to be referred to as the C.K.C.; Bamford gives the
name of its president as Mahomed Jan Mahomed Chotani (op. cit.,
p. 73).
102 A Bengali Muslim League leader; see above, p. 82.
104 These are mentioned by Bamford; Khaliquzzaman (op. cit.,
p. 49) also lists Motilal Nehru and Malaviya.
105 ibid. These different interpretations Khaliquzzaman and Bamford
put on the relations between Gandhi and his Muslim friends will return
later: some authors look upon Gandhi as the agitator who led the
Muslims on, others consider Gandhi to have been carried away by
Muslim fanatics.
106 Majumdar a.o., An Advanced History of India, p. 980.
107 Sitaramayya, op. cit., pp. 179-80.
108 It is hard to say exactly when Gandhi resolved to espouse the
Khilafat cause. His letter of 27.4.1918 to the Viceroy was couched in
rather general terms. Bamford (op. cit., p. 143) quotes an intelligence
report according to which in March 1919 he came to an understanding
with Abdul Bari about Hindu support for the Caliphate, but we do not
find any other mention of this. At the Delhi Khilafat Conference and
at Amritsar, however, he openly showed his sympathy.
109 On this session see Bamford, op. cit., pp. 146-7. He states th at
the Ali brothers "quickly indicated that they had no feelings of gratitude
towards Government" - but one might weIl ask why they should have
had them!
110 The Amritsar Conference is not mentioned by Bamford, but
only by Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 52. His account, however, is cor-
roborated by the text of the address of the Khilafat deputation which
waited on the Viceroy on 19.1.1920 (PJP 3723/1920). There is only a
personal detail which is not confirmed: that the Ali brothers congratulated
Khaliquzzaman on his initiative in founding the Khilafat Conference.
111 A fairly substantial report on this meeting is contained in a
telegram, dated March 1, 1920, from the Secretary to the Government
of Bombay, Special Dept., to Mr. McPherson, Secretary to the Govern-
ment of India, Home Dept. (PJP 3723/1920). See also Bamford, op. cit.,
pp. 149-50.
218 NOTES PP. 85-88
112 We do not think this an uncommon situation under Indian

conditions ; this kind of organization broadly followed the pattern of the
early Congress organization and of the Muslim Educational Conference,
a creation of Sir Sayyid dating from 1886. It is only to prevent mis-
apprehension on the part of the western reader th at we remark upon it.
113 The Provincial Khilafat Committee in Bengal, for instance,
opened a bureau headed by Abul Kalam Azad, at a salary of Rs. 800
per month; but this is mentioned only at a later date (Tel. from Viceroy
to Secretary of State, 24.10.1920; PJP 150/1921).
114 Dated 19.5.1920; HDP no. 345 of Febr. 1921.
115 According to R. H. Hitchcock in a confidential publication,
A History of the Malabar Rebellion, 1921, Madras, Govt. Press, 1925,
pp. 18-19. The author was a District Superintendent of Police in the
Malabar region, but his official history of the rebellion gives the im-
pression of aiming at a certain detachment and of being reliable. Thc
four-annas membership was a well-known phenomenon in Congress too.
116 ibid., p. 20.
117 See Myron Weiner, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
118 To Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome; enclosure to a letter from
Montagu to Reading, dated 22.12.1922 (Mont. Coll., vol. 13).
119 See on tbe Bezwada programme also Bamford, op. eit., pp. 26-28,
quoting the resolutions of the A.LC.C. meeting. It is expressly stated
that "four-annas members" are meant.
120 ibid., p. 166.
121 Mentioned above, fn. 87.
122 In his letter mentioned in fn. 118.
123 Quoted HDP 345 of Febr. 1921, pp. 72-82.
124 On Sept. 18, 1919; mentioned in a telegram from Viceroy to
Secretary of State, of 15.10.1919; PJP 5450/1918.
125 In the report mentioned before, fn. 11l.
126 In the case quoted above it is fairly clear that the purpose is
not to belittle the force of the movement, and so we are inclined to
accept the numbers given.
127 As reported from the Punjab (HDP 71 of Aug. 1920, para. 4),
from the U.P. (HDP 345 of Febr. 1921), and from Bihar (HDP 100
of Sept. 1920, app. VI).
128 By Zia-ud-din Ahmad Barni (Selections from Comrade, p. 198),
and by Mahadev Desai, op. cit., p. 43.
129 And had this amount really been collected? Gandhi announced
that it had on June 30, 1921, but Bamford writes: "There is good
ground to discount a considerable proportion of these claims" (op. eit.,
p. 31).
130 Zia-ud-din Ahmad Barni (op. cit., p. 198) contends that they
were foremost in contributing this sumo
131 See Weekly Reports of 29.1.1920; 25.2.1920; 26.6.1920. In the
report of 25.2.1920 the sums are mentioned which each province pro-
mised to contribute: Sind and Bengal 5 lakhs of rupees each, the u.P.
4 lakhs, and Bombay 11 lakhs.
NOTES PP. 8&-90 219
132 Bamford, op. cit., p. 171. Forty lakhs equals 4,000,000 rupees,
which would be 1: 400,000 (the exchange rate in 1921 was Rs. 10 to
1: 1; cf. India during the Year 1921).
133 According to a press notice mentioned by Bamford, op. cit.,
p. 182.
134 The Bombay Chronicle of Febr. 1, 1922.
135 "All Muhammadans"; see above, pp. 84-85.
136 W. J. Watson notes "a striking degree of unanimity among the
Muslims" in this respect (W.J. Watson, Muhammad Ali and the Khilafat
Movement, p. 30; unpublished M.A. thesis of 1955, available at McGill
University Library, Montreal).
137 Letter of 22.6.1920; HDP 101 of Sept. 1920, app. IX. It is,
unfortunately, only one specimen, and its composition is to some degree
obviously a product of chance, since 23 of the signatories come from
Trichinopoly, among whom were 15 merchants. As Trichinopoly was
not the main centre of the Khilafat movement, this must mean that in
this case there was a very active member who made as many people
of enough importance sign as he could lay hands on.
138 Four signatories did not list their occupation.
139 The president of the C.K.C., Chotani, also was a wealthy
merchant.
141 See above, fn. 127; also Weekly Reports of 15.1.1921 and
21.6.1921.
142 The reason for this might be, of course, that opponents from
among the lower classes were of little interest for our informants, but
if there had been considerable numbers of them, we feel that official
observers would have remarked on this.
143 Reported by Sir Harcourt Butler in a letter to Lord Chelmsford
of 20.4.1919; Butler Coll., vol. 49.
144 In July 1920; HDP 27 of Nov. 1920.
145 Weekly Report of 4.6.1920.
146 ibid., 21.6.1921.
147 ibid., 13.11.1921.
149 PSP 5313/1920. The contents of this letter mayalso explain his
ambiguous attitude, viz. opposing a movement to which he had con-
tributed money.
150 Letter of 13.6.1920; PSP 5825/1920.
152 Faruqi, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
153 Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 193-94, suggests this comparison. Cf.
Faruqi, op. cit., pp. 117-18, writing about the attitude of the Deoband
leaders who, however, were the Jamiat-ul-Ulama's leaders too.
155 For instance at an Ulama Conference at Delhi in Nov., 1920;
see CP 2220 of 27.11.1920. This source reported H • • • much acrimonious
discussion as to co-operation with Hindus and as to Moslem attitude
220
towards Gandhi."
156 In a contribution "England and Islam" in The Nineteenth Cen-
tury and After of July, 1920; quoted by Stoddard, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
158 See Agha Khan, op. cit., pp. 149-62, and Muhammad Shafi's
memo on "The need for Anglo-Mahomedan Union in the interests of
the British Empire", mentioned before, p. 209, fn. 117.
159 Nehru, as quoted by Gopal, op. cit., p. 148.
160 H. Malik, op. cit., p. 250. His biographer M. A. H. Ispahani, in
Qaid-E-Azam as I knew Him, hardly mentions Jinnah's attitude towards
the Khilafat movement, but quotes (p. 122) as a very characteristic
opinion of Jinnah's that "sentimental nonsense and emotion have no
place in polities".
161 Azim Husain, op. cit., pp. 104-6.
162 The Khalifate Agitation in India; by a Student of History,
Madras, 1922, p. 1I.
163 Abdul Ghani, Thoughts on Caliphate, Karachi, 1919, p. 3.
164 ibid., p. 8. Cf. Agha Mohammed Sultan Mirza, An essay towards
a better understanding of the Caliphate, Delhi, 1920, p. 17. The same
opinion is held by Maulana Faizul Karim, Facts about the Khalifate,
Karachi, n.d. (1919), p. 8.
165 The Khalifate Agitation in India, pp. 12 and 33.
166 To denounce Khilafat in those days is considered "certain politi-
cal suicide" by Azim Husain, op. cit., p. 106.
167 The Khilafat Day in Sind, Karachi, n.d. (1919), and Shaikh
Abdulaziz Mahomed Soleman, Anti-Khalif Intrigues in Sind, Sukkur,
1919.
168 Soleman, op. cit., p. 12.
169 See for instance a letter from Sir Harcourt Butler to Lord
Chelmsford, dated 20.4.1919; Butler Coll., vol. 49.
170 Soleman, op. cit., p. 3.
171 ibid., p. 29.
172 Quoted by Coupland, op. cit., p. 73.
173 W. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 312. For British authors this is a com-
mon way of looking upon his decision; cf. Bamford, op. cit., p. 150.
174 As Gandhi did himself in his Khilafat Manifesto of 10.3.1920.
He does not use the words "moral duty", but calls it a just cause which
he could not but support.
175 M. Desai, op. cit., p. 29.
176 Date uncertain, but very probably from the summer of 1920, as
it figures among reports on events in June and July of that year in HDP
25 of Nov. 1920.
178 In an article on "Hindu-Moslem Relations"; Selections trom
Comrade, pp. 295-96.
179 op. cit., p. 45.
180 Quoted by Brecher, op. cit., p. 75.
181 History of the Freedom Movement in India, vol. 3, p. 63.
NOTES PP. 93-98 221
182 Full text of the Manifesto in Bamford, op. cit., pp. 154-57.
183 A detailed account of this meeting and Shaukat Ali's speech in
RDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. VI.
185 Weekly Report of 9.11.1921. One might ask, of course, how far
these reports are to be trusted since they could only have been put
together with the aid of informers. But then the Government of India
had little reason to give these reports if they did not feel fairly sure they
were reliable, and the matters reported are quite probable in themselves.
186 Given in a letter from Government of India to Secretary of State,
2.6.1919; PJP 4002/1919.
187 Agha Mohammed Sultan Mirza, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
188 It is curious to note that Majumdar (History of the Freedom
Movement in India, vol. 3, p. 76) reproaches Gandhi for subordinating
his whole policy to the Khilafat cause; the Punjab wrongs and swaraj
were aims only hitched to it later on!
189 Full text given in Justice of 26.1.1920; PJP 3723/1920. Members
of the deputation were, among others, the Ali brothers, Rakim Ajmal
Khan, Dr. Ansari, Ahdul Bari, Seth Chotani, Abul Kalam Azad, Rasrat
Mohani, Dr. Kitchlew, Gandhi and Swami Shradanand. It had heen
actuated by information coming from the Agha Khan, to the effect that
Turkey's fate was to he decided in the next month (Bamford, op. cit.,
p. 148).
190 The meaning of this term is eXplained hy Muhammad Ali as
follows: it is the "!sland of Arabia", surrounded by the Mediterranean
and the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and the rivers
Euphrates and Tigris. So it contains not only Arahia, but also Mesopo-
tamia, Syria, and Palestine ("India's Message to France", text of an
address given in Paris on 21.3.1920, Select Writings and Speeches,
p. 159).
191 In an interview on April 26, 1920, reported by Muhammad Ali
in a letter to Shaukat Ali dated London, 6.5.1920 (enclosure to a letter
from Chelmsford to Montagu; Mont. Coll., vol. 10).
192 In his Khilafat Manifesto of 10.3.1920.
193 In "India's Message to France", Select Writings and Speeches,
p. 160.
NOTES CHAPTER V
1 The first mention we found of this was at the Muslim League

session at Delhi, December 1918 (Bamford, op. cit., p. 134), but the
proposition was repeated at several meetings in the autumn of 1919. In
one of these, the Delhi meeting of September 23, reported in I.A.R. 1920,
pp. 251-52, even the members of such a deputation had been designated,
among them Dr. Ansari, Abdul Bari and Chotani. But a definite appoint-
ment of the members of the first Khilafat deputation took place at the
Amritsar Khilafat Conference of December 1919 (see Muhammad Ali,
Autobiography, in Selections trom Comrade, p. 69; cf. Bamford, op. cit.,
p. 148).
2 Verbatim records of both interviews in Muhammad and Shaukat
Ali, For India and Islam, pp. 27-50 and 51-61.
3 In his letter to Shaukat Ali, referred to above, p. 97.
4 See minute of 3.3.1920 by Mr. Shuckburgh on the reception of
the Khilafat delegation by Lord Fisher (PSP 380/5/1919), and a memo
by the Political InteIligence Officer attached to the India Office, dated
10.1.1921 (PSM B 361, lOR).
5 CP 392 of 4.1.1920.
6 Selections trom Comrade, p. 70.
7 At Paris on 21.3.1920; London, 22.4.1920 (a meeting presided
over by George Lansbury); Scarborough, 2.7.1920 (Select Writings and
Speeches, pp. 157-62; 183-93; 197-204).
8 Addressed to the Sultan-Caliph by the Khilafat delegation from
Paris, 28.5.1920. It was published only in 1924 in the Comrade (fuIl
text given by Bamford, op. cit., app. F, pp. 243-50).
9 In a War Cabinet meeting of 14.8.1919 (Cab. 23/11) he opposed
taking away Adrianople from Turkey; in CP 326 of 18.12.1919 he
adjured his coIleagues to let Turkey retain Thrace, Constantinople and
Anatolia without any restrictions.
10 As is evident from CP 392, Curzon's answer to Montagu's afore-
mentioned paper.
11 In a letter to Shaukat Ali of 29.4.1920; enclosure in a letter from
Chelmsford to Montagu, Mont. Coll., vol. 10.
13 Quoted by M. H. Abbas, op. cit., p. 255.
14 See above, fn. 4.
15 Reasonably enough, since in the summer of 1920 the Labour
NOTES PP. 102-104 223
Party opposed, forcefully as weIl as successfully, the government's anti-

Soviet policy (see L. C. B. Seaman, Post-Victorian Britain 1902-1951,
London 1967 2), pp. 112-13). But Muhammad Ali may have reached
the same conclusion as Nehru did, that the Labour Party's anti-impe-
rialism did not quite apply to the British Empire (Nehru, op. cit., p. 292).
16 These intrigues are not mentioned in his Autobiography, nor by
his anonymous biographer in Muhammad Ali; his Life, Services and
Trial, nor by M. H. Abbas in All about the Khilafat. The latter pays
a lot of attention to the delegation's doings in Europe and does mention
Muhammad Ali's visit to France, but he does not breathe a word about
his contacts in Rome and Switzerland. The explanation might weIl be
that it was considered unwise to advertise these activities, and their not
being talked about is hardly a proof against their existence. The above-
mentioned memo for the India Office in our opinion is quite reliable;
several times its author states that he could not check a certain item,
which makes us all the more ready to accept as true the facts he does
have no doubts about. The part on Muhammad Ali's visit to Switzer-
land and his connection with Russia are confirmed by another report
for the India Office, Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia by Major Bray
(in CP 1990 of 18.10.1920).
17 At a meeting in Patna on 25.4.1920 (HDP 100 of Sept. 1920,
app. VII).
18 Muhammad Ali's telegram and Lloyd George's reaction in PSP
5080/1920. Bamford too notes (op. cit., p. 158) this revival of optimism
among the Khilafat delegation, ascribing it to their confidence that
France and Italy promoted a less anti-Turkish policy than did Great
Britain.
19 See W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, p. 200; S. A. Husain,
op. cit., pp. 82-83.
20 See for Hunter's exposition of these problems above, p. 32; cf.
Arif Hussain, Pakistan, lts Ideology and Foreign Policy, London, 1966,
pp. 12-13.
21 See for instance the records of the interviews with the Ali brothers
in November and December, 1918; ICP 206 of Jan. 1919.
23 Speeches at Patna on April 24 and 25; HDP 100 of Sept. 1920.
24 Full text in English in H. Malik, op. cit., app. B, pp. 343-44.
25 Bamford, op. cit., p. 158. We have not found the text of the
Amir's declaration, but this was how at least one Maulvi represented
it in a meeting attended by over one thousand Muslims at Amritsar in
May 1920: "Amir Aman Ullah had declared that every muhajir would
be given 8 jaribs of land free of revenue for 3 years, one mound of fiour
monthly and free quarters." (HDP 71 of Aug. 1920).
27 ibid., 7.5.1920.
28 ibid., 4.6.1920.
29 ibid., 17.7.1920.
30 Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12.8.1920.
224 NOTES P. 104
31 Weekly Report of 21.8.1920. It is hard to say if these numbers

are correct, but the reports do not give the impression of either belittling
or exaggerating the movement; they seem to aim at an objective presen-
tation of facts. Some authors (A. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 136; H. Malik,
op. cit., p. 238) quote the number of 18,000 as the total of emigrants;
A. Hussain, op. cit., p. 17, gives the number of "about 50,000 people",
but without mentioning any source; Bamford, op. cit., p. 158, reports
a total of about 20,000, which also figures Ïn a letter from Lord Chelms-
ford to Montagu (of 11.8.1920; Mont. Coll., vol. 11). But since evidently
the movement was rapidly expanding in July-August 1920, it is not at all
improbable that in the ten days af ter Lord Chelmsford wrote his letter
another 10,000 Muslims were swept away by it, bringing the total up
to the 30,000 mentioned in the Weekly Report of 21.8.1920.
32 W. C. Smith (Modern Islam in India, p. 203) quotes, without
any further comment, an article by F. S. Briggs ("The lndian Hijrat
of 1920", in The Moslem World, vol. XX, 1930, pp. 164-68) writing
th at "the numbers have been variously estimated between five hundred
thousand and two million", but without mentioning sources of these
"various estimates". He adds: "The latter estimate is certainly beyond
the mark, but there is little doubt that the numbers were considerably
over the lower estimate."
Briggs, living at the time at Peshawar, was an eyewitness to the hijrat
and we do not entirely reject his testimony, but the data his estimate
is based upon may easily have misled him. The only facts mentioned
by him are (a) that for days the passenger traÏns arriving at Peshawar
were full of muhajirin, and (b) that for more than a week the muhajirin
were setting off in groups of varying strength, on foot but with bullock
carts carrying the old and the infirm, and more than half of them
passed in front of the author's bugalow.
We consider it as hardly probable that something like half a million
people, traveling leisurely (in companies and with bullock carts) could
have passed that bungalow in something like ten days - but it is easy
to misjudge the total number of people marching in not strictly organized
formations. Moreover, if really considerably more than half a million
people had concentrated in Peshawar before starting on their journey,
would not a serious food problem have arisen? Briggs does not mention
that, but writes about "villagers from the neighbourhood, who offered
food to the Muhajirin" - a casual statement which would fit in far
better with some tens of thousands than with hundreds of thousands
of people.
33 Weekly Reports of 2.10 and 9.10.1920.
36 Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12.8.1920.
37 Tel from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27.11.1920.
38 op. cit., p. 165.
39 Report on a Khilafat meeting at Amritsar on May 28, 1920;
HDP 71 of Aug. 1920.
NOTES PP. 10:;-107
225
40 Weekly Report of 8.11.1920 on a meeting of the C.K.C., where

the situation was talked about in this way.
42 At the aforementioned Amritsar Khilafat meeting; HDP 71 of
Aug. 1920.
44 This is suggested by Kaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 56, and Gopal,
op. cit., pp. 145-46.
45 Weekly Reports of 27.8.1920; 11.9.1920; 8.11.1920.
46 Lord Chelmsford in a letter to Montagu put it differently: "The
movement has been - though no doubt initiated from political mo-
tives - a religious one, and the poor misguided folk who have left their
homes have left them because they genuinely thought that they were
bound to do so on religious grounds." (Letter of 19.8.1920; Mont. Coll.,
vol. 11).
47 We have already pointed out the "chiliastic" trend Rothermund
discerns in it; see above, p. 70.
48 Especially in Jainism, which was firmly entrenched in Gujarat
where Gandhi grew up.
49 Gandhi, op. cit., pp. 401-2. Majumdar (History of the Freedom
Movement in India, vol. 3, p. 57) mentions Gandhi's Khilafat Manifesto
of March, 1920, as containing the first definite elaboration of the
doctrine.
50 See above, pp. 83-84.
51 Accounts of these talks are somewhat conflicting on personal
matters. It seems to be clear that Azad, Abdul Bari, the Ali brothers,
Ajmal Khan and Gandhi took part in them, but just who of them
pleaded the acceptability of non-violence for Muslims remains a matter
of doubt. See M. Desai, op. cit., pp. 42-43; Abul Kalam Azad, op. cit.,
p. 9; Gandhi, op. cit., p. 414; Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 52.
52 See Bamford, op. cit., pp. 149-50, and the circumstantial account
of this meeting in PJP 3923/1920.
53 ibid., p. 152; cf. Gopal, op. cit., p. 143. According to Khaliquzza-
man, it was accepted at a Khilafat Conference in Meerut in the first
week of Febr., 1920, but this cannot have been definite, since a decision
was still postponed at the February meeting in Bombay, some ten days
later. The Meerut meeting is also mentioned by Abul Kalam Azad,
op. cit., p. 9, but not by Bamford.
54 HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. IV, contains a circumstantial report
on this meeting. HDP 101 of Sept. 1920 gives the text of the ultimatum
the G.K.C. sent to the Viceroy on June 22, announcing the start of the
action on August 1 if their demands had not been met by then.
56 Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, vol. 3,
pp. 73-74.
57 Koor's letter of resignation was published in the Amrika Bazar
Patrika of 24.5.1920. Cf. HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. 1I, where the
names of some more Muslim dissentients are mentioned.
226 NOTES PP. 107-111
58 According to an account in HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. II.

60 ibid., p. 17. The text is also to be found in Majumdar, History
of the Freedom Movement in India, vol. 3, pp. 84-87.
62 Gandhi, op. cit., pp. 402-5; Sitaramayya, op. cit., pp. 179-80.
63 Koch, op. cit., p. 428. He states this with reference to the Amritsar
Congress, but this aspect was then not yet as important as it became
in the summer of 1920.
64 Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 55; Bamford, op. cit., p. 18; Sitar a-
mayya, op. cit., p. 189. Montagu stated: " ... some men are leaving the
Congress as a result of the decision", but these were not the renowned
leaders (CP 987 of 15.10.1920).
65 Koch, op. cit., p. 426; Moon, op. cit., p. 100; Bamford, op. cit.,
p. 15.
66 See Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India,
vol. 3, p. 828, fn. 24 a. He does not absolutely reject the story, but
doubts whether the aid of the taxi drivers could have been decisive.
67 Koch, op. cit., p. 429; cf. Montagu in CP 987.
68 Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., pp. 55-56; cf. Gopal, op. cit., p. 146.
69 According to Khaliquzzaman the concept of swaraj was intro-
duced by B. C. Pal, "under amisconception th at the Muslims would
not accept it" (op. cit., p. 55).
70 Full text of an English translation of this fatwa to be found in
Bamford, op. cit., app. G, pp. 251-55. Cf. Weekly Report of 5.12.1920.
71 Nehru, op. cit., p. 342. Tagore, however, later on expressed him-
self critically with regard to the non-co-operation movement.
73 According to Koch, op. cit., p. 432. An official account the
Government of India forwarded to the Undersecretary of State in
March, 1921, gives a similar picture; PJP 150/1921.
74 There may have been another side to this disapproval: fear of
the radicalizing influence the students might have on politics. Something
like that comes through in the presidential address of C. Vijiaraghava-
chariar at the Nagpur Congress session of 1920; I.A.R. 1920, pt. lIl,
pp. 138-39.
75 PJP 150/1921.
76 This number of 100 students - out of a total number of 1,500 -
is given in a government report (Weekly Report of 27.11.1920) and
by Khaliquzzaman (op. cit., p. 57). Muhammad Ali himself, in his
letter of May 1921 to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome, speaks about
200 to 250 students; Watson (op. cit., p. 63) gives the number of 250.
The National Muslim University was soon afterwards called the Jamia
Milliah and later on was removed to Delhi.
77 Weekly Reports of 27.11 and 5.12.1920.
78 In his aforementioned letter to Dr. Said in Rome.
79 Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 59. After giving up his practice he
invested some 50,000 rupees in a cloth emporium, but th is proved a
NOTES PP. 111-113 227
failure; his political friends bought quite a lot, but only on credit.
80 By W. R. Smith, op. cit., pp. 117-18. He specifies that it was
more successful in the towns than in the countryside, more among
Muslims than among Hindus, and more for the Legislative Councils
than for the Council of State (where the census was extremely high).
81 Weekly Report of 5.12.1920. Koch (op. cit., p. 433) also mentions
Bombay's 8 per cent., but reports also 32 per cent. in the Punjab and
33 per cent. in the U.P. He considers these results satisfactory for the
government. After all, at the 1952 elections the percentage of voters
was only about 50! (Oxford History of India, p. 786, fn. 2).
82 On these sessions Bamford, op. cit., pp. 21-25 and 163. Montagu
expressed hope that the limited success of the action would lead to a
reversalof the policy at the Nagpur session (CP 987 of 15.10.1920).
He evidently underrated the success.
83 Postscript to his letter to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome.
84 An account of this meeting in HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. IV.
This was resolution no. 6. But in January, 1920, a Khilafat Volunteer
Corps was already mentioned at Delhi (Gazette of India of 9.12.1920).
85 Letter of 22.10.1920 to Local Governments and Administrations;
PJP 570/1921.
86 Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24.10.1920 and 15.1.1921;
ibid.
87 The first note is not dated ( probably Jan. 1921); the second one
is of 7.2.1921; ibid.
88 Compiled into an account dated 17.2.1921 ;ibid.
89 As appears from an annotation on a minute of 1.4.1921; ibid.
90 M. Beloff, Imperial Sunset, vol. 1, Britain's Liberal Empire 1897-
1921, London, 1969, p. 303.
91 Their statements in The Pioneer Mail of 21.5.1920, which also
contains the full text of the Viceroy's message and the communiqué of
the Govemment of India.
92 Beloff, loc. cito
93 The main responsibility on the British side was probably his. For
the Turks, "Curzon's own recipe was force in Europe: consent in Asia"
(E. Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956, London,
19653), p. 53). So he had not favoured the Greek occupation of Smyrna
nor their action in the hinterland (Ronaldshay, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 271).
94 Monroe, op. cit., p. 54.
95 On these treaties see A. J. Toynbee, "Relations between British
India, Soviet Russia, and Afghanistan, 1919-1923", in Survey of Inter-
national Affairs 1920-1923, London, 1927, pp. 385-87 (henceforward
referred to as Survey 1920-1923); cf. Nicolson, op. cit., p. 160.
96 This was the gist of a speech delivered by Chotani at the Khilafat
Conference at Bombay on 16.2.1920; Weekly Report of 19.2.1920.
97 This at least was what Chotani complained about; Weekly Report
of 9.11.1921.
99 Thus for in stance a conference at Lucknow in February 1921, and
228 NOTES PP. 114-116
one held at Karachi in the same month; see Bamford, op. cit., pp. 164-65.
100 Monroe, op. cit., p. 54.
102 Delivered by him at Madras on 2.4.1921; Bamford, op. cit.,
pp. 28-29.
103 Which will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter.
104 This enumeration contains only the most important officials and
bodies involved in the process of policy-making in India; in the back-
ground was the less easily traceable and definable factor of public
opinion, in England but also in India, where matters were complicated
further because there was not only British and Anglo-Indian public
opinion, but Indian public opinion as weIl. Some part of this found
expression in the Legislative Assembly.
105 This is the main thesis of a seminar paper by D. A. Lowon The
Government of India and the First Non-Co-Operation Movement 1920-
1922, delivered in October 1963 at the Australian National University;
a copy of this paper is available at the I. O. L. Low relies largelyon
materials in the National Archives of India and reaches conclusions
confirmed in broad lines by those in the London archives. But his
attention is mainly focused on Gandhi and the Congress leaders, whereas
ours is more concentrated on the Khilafatists and the government's
attitude towards them. This circumstance mayalso explain why Low
hardly mentions the attempts to reconcile Muslim opinion by meeting
the Muslim demands (see Bibliography).
106 Like Sir Reginald Craddock, the then Governor of Burma, after
having been the Home Member on the Viceroy's Council from 1912-17.
His book The Dilemna in India (London, 1929) is one song in praise
of the British Raj, the protector of the poor.
107 As is set forth by Craddock, op. cit., pp. 14-15 and 136-37. But
we noted some doubts with regard to this point even with the very
liberal-minded Montagu; see above, p. 71.
108 Cf. Chirol, India, p. 104. The number of files indexed under the
head "sedition" in the Judicial and Public Papers is indeed amazing!
Chirol, by the way, should not be identified with this brand of criticism
himself.
109 Craddock, op. cit., pp. 184 and 191-92.
110 O'Dwyer, op. cit., pp. 318-25.
111 ibid., pp. 306-8.
112 ibid., p. 318. It is one of the theses of his whole book.
113 HDP 71 and 72 of Aug. 1920. ü'Dwyer's request was dated
12.7.1920.
114 op. cit., p. 4.
115 In a letter to Sir Harcourt Butler of 15.9.1921 (Butler Coll.,
vol. 52). Chirol, of course, was not the Government of India but,
repeatedly contributing to The Times on Indian affairs, he may be
taken as representing astrong current in English public opinion.
116 Letter of 1.9.1921; Mont. Coll., vol. 13.
117 The distinction made could be defined as between "lawand
NOTES PP. 116-120 229
order" and "nation-building" departments; Oxtord History ot India,

p.788.
118 And when in December 1921 Lord Reading contemplated
speeding up this process, he was rebuffed by the govemment in London,
as we will see in the next chapter.
119 Edwardes, British India 1772-1947, p. 199.
120 Woodruff, op. cit., pt. I1, eh. I.
121 Waley, op. cit., p. 209; cf. Agha Khan, op. cit., p. 153.
122 Dated 28.8.1919; PSP 380/4/1919.
123 He had already raised this point in a War Cabinct meeting on
20.8.1919, as appears from an Extract trom Minutes appended to the
letter.
124 CP 326 of 18.7.1919; CP 382 of 1.1.1920; CP 432 of 6.1.1920.
125 Weekly Reports of 18.2.1919; 17.4.1919; 6.5.1919; 26.6.1919;
13.7.1919; 15.9.1919; 29.9.1919; 15.10.1919; 20.1.1920; 19.2.1920.
126 An account of this meeting in Mont. Coll., vol. 10.
127 In a letter to Lord Chelmsford of 22.4.1919; Butler Coll., vol. 49.
129 The Agha Khan (op. cit., p. 155) writes that it was proposed
in the Viceroy's Legislative Council, whereas Muhammad Ali (Selections
trom Comrade, p. 72) speaks about the Govemment of India.
130 As appears from Muhammad Ali's artide "Save us from our
Friends" (For India and Islam, pp. 70-84), where he judges Mr. Hasan
Imam, the deputation's chief spokesman, rather harshly. But he con-
sidered it a success that the govemment was compelled to indude
Chotani and Dr. Ansari among its members (see his letter of May, 1921,
to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome).
131 He expounded his views at length in CP 392 of 4.1.1920, which
was a refutation of Montagu's CP 382 of 1.1.1920.
132 Quoted by Ronaldshay, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 270.
133 Cab. Cond. of 2.12 and 13.12.1920; Cab. 23/23.
134 As is evident from the documents referred to above, fns. 124,
125, 126.
135 Telegrams from Viceroy to Secretary of State of 2.9.1920 (CP
2209) and 23.9.1920; PSP 3324/1920.
136 Telegram of 22.4.1922, quoted in a memo by Sir Alfred Hirtzel
(PSM B 372, lOR).
137 This position is outlined in two memoranda by Sir Alfred Hirtzel,
one of 13.9.1922 (referred to fn. 136), the other of 7.4.1922 (PSP
4995/4/1919). He refers to reports of Dr. Amold on the matter, who
held the same opinion (see above, p. 43).
138 A verbatim account of its reception by the P.M. (accompanied
by Mr. Philip Kerr) in PSP 4995/4/1919.
139 In his memo of 7.4.1922.
140 On the other hand, local authorities could hardly want serious
trouble between the communities, and might try to bring about a modus
vivendi when tension rose too high. This course of events was reported
from Bihar and Orissa (Weekly Report of 25.2.1920).
230 NOTES PP. 120-124
141 Letter to Montagu, 5.1.1921; Mont. Coll., vol. 5.

142 On 25.1.1921; ibid.
143 Held on January 22, 1920. A copy of the proceedings and of
the paper in Mont. Coll., vol. 10.
144 Text to be found in telegram from Viceroy, Home Dept., to
India Office, of 2.2.1920; PSP 380/5/1919.
145 It was this aspect of the antithesis between the two groups which
was increasingly stressed in these years. But the concept of "moderates"
and "extremists" it always somewhat hazy; for another definition of it
see below, in the quotation from Sir Harcourt Butler's letter of 3.7.1918.
146 See Waley, op. cit., p. 43.
147 In two letters written in the summer of 1917 to his predecessor,
Sir Austen Chamberlain; quoted by Waley, op. cit., p. 133.
148 Confidential letter to all Commissioners of Divisions (i.e. of the
D.P., where Sir Harcourt Butler was Governor) of 31.7.1918; Butler
Coll., vol. 49.
149 Weekly Reports of 4.12.1919; 18.3.1920; 13.8.1920; 21.6.1921;
18.11.1921.
150 Reading did not doubt Gandhi's sincerity when professing non-
violence. See his letter of 19.5.1921 to Montagu; Mont. Coll., vol. 14.
Cf. Reading, Second Marquess of, Ru/us Isaacs, First Marquess ot
Reading, 2 vols, London, 1942-45, vol. 2, pp. 196 and 304-5.
151 See his letters of 7.7. and 14.7.1921 to Montagu; Mont. Coll.,
vol. 14. Cf. Reading, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 199.
152 Montagu to Reading, 15.12.1921; Mont. Coll., vol. 13; cf.
Reading, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 191-92.
153 We mean "loyal to the British connection", as this was the kind
of loyalty that counted for the Government of India.
154 Mainly in the period 1912-1917 when Sir Reginald Craddock
was Home Member, as is set forth by Low, op. cit., pp. 2-3. We follow
here his exposition of the change of policy about 1919-1920.
155 In a letter of 19.5.1920; Mont. Coll., vol. 10.
156 Weekly Reports of 28.4.1920 and 20.4.1921.
157 Circulated among the British Cabinet as CP 4378 of 28.12.1922.
158 And this means that the insight exhibited in the document
quoted above was, to some extent, wisdom af ter the event.
159 Montagu in CP 987 of 15.10.1920.
160 Montagu to Reading, 1.2.1922, quoted by Waley, op. cit., p. 264.
Cf. another letter from Montagu to Reading of 6.7.1921 (Mont. Coll.,
vol. 12) about Malaviya's attitude: "It really is astonishing to me that
intelligent persons like Malaviya can still harp on their ambition to
have a definite time limit announced for Swaraj."
161 Montagu in a letter to Lord Willingdon, 9.9.1920, quoted by
Waley, op. cit., p. 235.
162 Chelmsford to Montagu, 23.4.1919 (Mont. Coll., vol. 8). He
admits that he does not know how or by whom it is engineered.
163 In the Council, an important part in these matters feIl to the
NOTES PP. 124-125 231
Home Member, Sir Williarn Vincent. The Finance Member, Sir Mal-
colm Hailey, expressed doubts as to the wisdom of the policy; see Low,
op. cit., pp. 8 and 10.
164 ibid., p. 9. Lord Willingdon even went to the length of writing
"a private letter in scathing terms" to the Secretary of State on the
subject (CP 987).
165 HDP 71 and 72 of Aug. 1920.
166 HDP 127 and 128 of Aug. 1920. For two more similar cases see
HDP 423 and 424 of April 1920, and HDP 252 and 253 of Jan., 1921.
167 Letter of 25.4.1921; PJP 3469}192l.
168 Low, op. cit., p. 10. On the other hand Lord Reading, shortly
after his arrival in India, had the impression that no local Government
was very willing "to bell the cat" (to proceed to action ) in case the
Government of India wanted to institute proceedings against men like
the Ali brothers or Gandhi (Letter of 12.5.1921 to Montagu; Mont.
Coll., vol. 14).
169 In a Minute of 12.5, covering Weekly Report of 7.5.1920; PJP
5450}1918.
170 Waley, op. cit., p. 233.
171 CP 987 of 15.10.1920.
NOTES CHAPTER VI
1 Gandhi, as quoted by W. J. Watson, op. cit., p. 61.

2 Wolfenstein (op. cit., pp. 211-12) emphasizes this point in his
analysis of Hind Swaraj which he considers a basic text of Gandhism.
3 Moon, op. cit., p. 42.
4 In April 1921 the so-called Bezwada programme had been ac-
cepted, stating as one of its aims to enlist 10 milIions of Congress mem-
bers before June 30 (see above, p. 86). The Government of India were
weIl aware that this changed the situation (see Low, op. cit., p. 10; cf.
Weekly Reports of 15.1.1921 and 8.2.1921). Another matter is that the
objects aimed at in this programme had not been realized in full. But,
according to Gopal Krishna (op. cit., pp. 419-20), "the achievement
was not small": by the end of 1921 Congress had about 2 millions of
members.
5 Gopal Krishna, op. cit., p. 419.
6 ibid., pp. 424-25, where an analysis is given of the professional and
social status of A.I.C.C. members in the period 1918-1923.
7 R. Palme Dutt, India To-Day, London, 1940, pp. 305-7.
8 ibid., p. 306. We doubt whether this "inevitably" is quite correct.
Gandhi had, as early as 1918, in the Kheda district conducted a limited
no-tax campaign with some success, but there had been no question of
a subsequent no-rent campaign; see Gandhi, op. cit., pp. 362-67, and
Moon, op. cit., pp. 71-73. Moon calls it the Kaira district.
9 Vijiaraghavachariar, in his presidential address, said about the
programme only: "As we all know it consists of several items and a few
more items are also intended to be added to them"; boycott of schools
was, according to him, "the most important item in the programme" .
10 ibid., p. 181.
11 Specific objections may have been raised, of course, in private
talks and closed committees. Something of the kind may be suspected
when we hear about Gandhi (ibid., p. 183), declaring that he had
received a message from Malaviya, who because of illness could not
attend the second day's meeting. "The Pandit had seen a copy of non-
co-operation resolution but he was not all in favour of it and if he had
been in Congress he would have noted his respectful protest."
12 A clear pronouncement of this in Muhammad Ali's letter of
May 1921 to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome: "We acknowledged that
with our limited resources in arms. " and our demoralised condition
NOTES PP. 12'}-131 233
as a slave nation, we could not challenge England with the weapon of

brute force." Lack of sufficient force was anormal excuse releasing
Muslims from their obligation to wage jihad.
13 See for Shaukat Ali's views in this respect p. 94, above.
14 Khilafat leaders like Abdul Bari, Abul Kalam Azad and the Ali
brothers stressed the need of hel ping the Angora government. See Weekly
Reports of 1.7.1921; 11.7.1921 and 9.9.1921. Cf. Bamford, op. cit.,
pp. 168 and 176.
15 Complaints about them in Weekly Reports of 7.3.1921; 20.4.1921;
22.5.1921 and 9.9.1921. Cf. Bamford, op. cit., pp. 173-74.
16 As is supposed by Lord Reading's biographer; op. cit., vol. 2,
p. 194.
17 This is also the view taken by Sir Penderel Moon, op. cit., p. 107.
18 Bamford, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
19 Weekly Report of 22.5.1921. But according to Weekly Report of
1.7.1921, he returned very nearly to his original words in an article in
the Bombay Chronicle.
20 Quoted by Bamford, op. cit., p. 166.
22 A detailed account of these talks in Reading, op. cit., vol. 2,
pp. 197-99.
23 This was the course of events suggested by Reading (ibid., p. 198),
and expressly stated by Low (op. cit., p. 11).
24 See his letters to Montagu, of 9.6.1921 and 14.7.1921; Mont. Coll.,
vol. 14. The same opinion was held by Koch, op. cit., p. 457.
25 This is the opinion of an anonymous author belonging to the
Anglo-Indian community, expressed in an article "An Artful Apology"
by A Sahib (National Review, Oct. 1921). It is also the view taken by
Muhammad Ali in his letter of July 23, 1921 to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said
in Rome.
26 Full text in tel. of August 2, 1921; PJP 1724/1921.
27 That there was indeed no bargain is borne out by another private
letter from Muhammad Ali to the same friend in Rome (of May, 1921),
when he clearly did not yet know the outcome of the interviews, but
awaited "either a conference with the Viceroy preparatory to a setde-
ment as we desire or arrest and transportation for life - if not death!"
28 See his aforementioned letter of July 23, 1921. Avoiding prose-
cution would, by the way, hardly be in line with his usu al behaviour.
31 Full text in Bamford, op. cit., pp. 169-72.
32 Full text of the judgment in PJP 4946/1921. A verbatim record
of Muhammad Ali's defence in Selections trom Comrade, pp. 97-128.
This defence was based throughout upon the protection of religious
beliefs and practices promised in the Queen's proclamation of 1858 and
the King's proclamation of 1908. Muhammad Ali declared that his trial
centred round the question: "Is God's law for a British subject to b~
more important than the King's law - a man's law?"
234 NOTES PP. 131-134
33 Congress at this time wholly concentrated on these items of its

programme, and on "the imprisonment, without defence, of innocent
men and women" as the means to attain swaraj. See the resolutions of
the A.I.C.C. in July 1921 at Bombay; Bamford, op. cit., pp. 32-34.
34 Low, op. cit., p. 1I.
35 Their objections in a telegram from Govemment of Bombay to
Govemment of India, dated 26.8.1921; PJP 4946/192I.
36 This view is in conformity with rumours reported by Bamford
(op. cit., pp. 29-30) that the Reading-Gandhi talks in May would
possibly lead to a compromise, that Gandhi and Motilal Nehru were
in favour of this, but that Lajpat Rai was less keen and that Muhammad
Ali's minimum demands were very high. Compromise was also hinted
at in Muhammad Ali's letter (see above, fn. 27), which proves that the
rumours reported by Bamford were not quite unfounded.
38 Here extremists urged the adoption of civil disobedience at once,
but were persuaded to wait until the Hindus and Congress supported
them; ibid., pp. 176-77.
39 For our account we rely mainly on Hitchcock's aforementioned
confidential publication, A History ol the Malabar Rebellion, 1921,
which gives the impression of being a well-informed as weil as a fair
narrative. Besides this we consulted a parliamentary paper, Telegraphic
inlormation, etc., regarding the Moplah Rebellion, 24th August to 6th
December, Cmd. 1552 of 1921.
40 Hitchcock (op. cit., pp. 15-16) gives the following numbers: in
the whole area 705,000 Hindus to 600,000 Muslims, but in the Emad
taluq 165,000 Hindus to 240,000 Muslims.
41 ibid., p. 18.
43 For India and Islam, pp. 2 and 5.
45 Hitchcock, op. cit., pp. 11, 17, 175-76. H. N. Mitra, however,
writes about "Hindu Zamindars making new dispositions of their land",
by which the poor peasants were hard pressed; I.A.R. 1922, pt. I,
p. 187.
46 op. cit., p. 203. There seems to be some contradiction in these
pronouncements; the last part of the sentence suggests that the killing
was quite indiscriminate, which is belied by the first part. From Hitch-
cock we get the impression that British and Hindus were indeed in-
discriminately killed. This impression is confirmed by H. N. Mitra's
account, quoted above.
47 Hitchcock, op. cit., p. 192.
48 Though Hitchcock reports that the tenancy question played some
part in the agitation.
49 W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 203. He is also referring to the "chiliastic"
character of the revolt.
50 Hitchcock, op. cit., p. 190. Cf. Gopal, op. cit., p. 156, reporting
that the Moplahs rejected Gandhi's leadership because he was a kalir.
NOTES PP. 134-137 235
51 Gopal, op. cit., p. 156.

52 Hitchcock, op. cit., p. 280.
53 ibid., pp. 19 and 27.
54 ibid., p. 21.
55 ibid., p. 19.
56 Khaliquzzaman (op. cit., p. 58) admits realizing this - but in
an account written some 40 years af ter the events.
57 In the declarations of the Working Committee of Congress, quoted
without any comment by Sitaramayya (op. cit., p. 216). It is also sug-
gested by Muhammad Ali in the speeches referred to above (fn. 43),
by Faruqi (op. cit., p. 74) and by W. C. Smith (op. cit., p. 176).
58 op. cit., p. 3.
59 ibid., p. 48.
6Q He delivered his speech on Sept. 5, 1921; fuU text in Cmd. 1552
of 1921.
61 FuU text of his speech in PJP 4946/1921.
62 On this effect of the Moplah revolt see Weekly Report of 9.11.
1921, reporting discussions in the C.K.C. Cf. Gopal, op. cit., pp. 156-57,
and O'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 331, quoting Gandhi and Sankaran Nair.
63 Andrews, op. cit., pp. 255-57.
64 The Khilafat Agitation in India, pp. 40-42 and 58-63.
65 According to Bamford, op. cit., pp. 33, 38, 40.
66 Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16.4.1921; PJP 570/1921.
67 Tel. of 21.10.1921, ibid.
68 Letter of 11.1 0.1921; ibid.
69 Forwarded to Sir William Duke, the Undersecretary of State, on
8.12.1921; ibid.
70 Which the Government of India considered as "probably typicaJ
of conditions in other large towns in Northern India."
71 Notes of Montagu, dated 12.10.1921 and 14.11.1921, ibid.
72 For an account of the Delhi meeting see I.A.R. 1922, pt. I,
pp. 208-14; cf. Low, op. cit., p. 12.
73 ibid.
74 Bamford, op. cit., pp. 32, 39, 178.
75 As usual, it is difficult to assess just how far their success went.
Reading tended towards thinking the visit a success (letters from Mon-
tagu to Reading, 24.11.1921, Mont. Collo vol. 13, and from Reading
to Montagu, 28.11.1921, ibid., vol. 14). But he may have sought to
minimalize the boycott's effectiveness, like the press in England did
(letter from Chirol to Sir Harcourt Butler, 24.11.1921, Butler Coll.,
vol. 52). The prince himself certainly did not consider his visit a big
success (see his letters of 1.1.1922 to Montagu, and of 28.12.1921 to
Reading, quoted by Waley, op. cit., pp. 262-66). It was probably a case
of the Government of India having feared worse, and the prince having
expected better. On the other hand, the riots in Bombay and Calcutta
were directed against people who did not boycott the visit, and there-
fore the boycott's success cannot have been complete (Bamford, op. cit.,
pp. 42-43).
236 NOTES PP. 137-139
76 Sitaramayya, op. cit., p. 221, specially mentioning the "militant"

Khilafat volunteers.
77 Andrews, op. cit., p. 276.
78 Moon, op. cit., p. 109.
79 Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State of 25.11.1921; PJP 570/
1921. The meeting was attended by, among others, Hakim Ajmal Khan,
Abul Kalam Azad, Umar Sobani and Dr. Ansari.
80 See Bamford, op. cit., p. 43, and Low, op. cit., p. 13. Both authors
agree that tbe riots constituted the cause of the new stage of govern-
ment policy.
81 Weekly Reports of 18.11.1921; 6.12.1921; 12.1.1922; 26.1.1922.
82 Low, op. cit., p. 14.
84 This interpretation of the moderates' attitude in broad outline
corresponds with the one given by Bamford and Low. Something of the
kind was, at the time of the events, foreseen by Montagu (letter of
30.11.1921 to Reading, Mont. Coll., vol. 13). Majumdar (History ot the
Freedom movement in India, vol. 3, pp. 139-40) lists some branches of
the Liberal League who, impressed by the repression since November,
were leaning towards non-co-operation.
85 Cf. Reading, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 242: "The Viceroy was indeed far
from dismissing as unfounded the opinion held by many competent
observers, notably Sir George Lloyd, that Mr. Gandhi's preaching of
non-violence was no more than a cloak for plans aimed at an ultimate
revolution by violence." From his correspondence with Montagu we do
not get the impression that he regarded a development of that kind as
very probable, but he certainly appreciated the importance of Indians
objecting against the extremist proposals which could lead towards a
revolution (see letter from Reading to Montagu, 5.1.1922, Mont. Coll.,
vol. 14).
86 Malaviya's is the name mentioned most of ten in this connection,
but Bamford lists Jinnah also as one of the men involved in these
negotiations (op. cit., pp. 44, 46, 67). H. N. Mitra mentions Mrs. Besant
and Fazl-ul Hug as members of the deputation (I.A.R. 1922, pt. I,
pp. 260-61).
87 In a lengthy telegram of 18.12.1921.
88 Low, op. cit., pp. 14-15, gives details regarding this aspect.
89 In a conference of ministers on 20.12.1921; see Cab. 23/29, con-
taining also the full text of Reading's telegram of 18.12 to the Secretary
of State, and of the Imperial Government's answer of 20.12.1921. Mon-
tagu's draft for this answer was considerably altered. He had his dissent
from the opinion of his colleagues put on record.
90 According to Reading's telegram of 18.12.1921.
91 Bamford, op. cit., p. 44; Sitaramayya, op. cit., p. 222.
92 Majumdar, History ot the Freedom Movement in India, vol. 3,
p. 145, mentions especially Das as being angry that Gandhi had lost
this chance.
93 Low, op. cit., p. 15.
NOTES PP. 13!'-141 237
94 Detailed accounts of these sessions in I.A.R. 1922, pt. I, pp. 393-

453; see also Bamford, op. cit., pp. 44-48 and 179-81.
95 The word "dictatorship" is used by Bamford, but also by Reading
and Montagu in their letters. Majumdar (An Advanced History of India,
p. 982) spe aks about Gandhi's "sole executive authority".
96 Bamford (op. cit., p. 47) even writes about the appearance of a
"violence party".
97 From H. N. Mitra's report on this conference (I.A.R. 1922, pt. I,
pp. 452-53) it appears that the motion was ruled out on account of
a technical objection, and th at nearly half of the delegates were in favour
of accepting it.
98 Letter from Reading to Montagu, 5.1.1922 (Mont. Coll., vol. 14).
99 Sir George Lloyd of Bombay was the most insistent of the Gover-
nors; Low, op. cit., p. 17. Cf. Reading's letter of 5.1.1922 to Montagu.
100 The cabinet was already pressing for Gandhi's arrest in October
(Cab. Cond. of 12.10 and 20.10.1921; Cab. 23/27), but in January it
did so again (Cab. Cond. of 20.1.1922; Cab. 23/29; cf. Waley, op. cit.,
p. 264). The reason why the Government of India did not comply with
these wishes was that they feIt the time had not yet come; they were
quite willing to arrest Gandhi, but wanted to do so at the most propitious
moment. O'Dwyer's allegation that "it was the threat of resignation by
two Governors that compelled Lord Reading's Government to enforce
the law in 1922 against the arch-criminal, Gandhi" (op. cit., pp. 393-94)
is not sustained by the private correspondence between Reading and
Montagu, where so serious a threat would almost certainly have come
up. Bamford's contention (op. cit., p. 75) that "Government had held
their hand in the hope that his (i.e. Gandhi's) indination towards non-
violence would deter him from a path leading to violen ce" , sounds very
benevolent, but rather hypocritical : it was only a quesion of picking the
right moment. We should be ar in mind that Gandhi was at long last
arrested only in March, four weeks after having called off civil diso-
bedien ce for an indefinite time because of the violence it would entail.
101 op. cit., p. 68.
102 An account of this meeting (the "Malaviya Conference") in
I.A.R. 1922, pt. I, pp. 276-86; Sir Sankaran Nair's letter is reproduced
pp. 286-90. Cf. Low, op. cit., p. 15; Reading, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 243.
103 I.A.R. 1922, pt. I, pp. 302-3.
104 ibid., p. 305; cf. R. P. Dutt, op. cit., p. 313.
105 This is evident from the so-called Bardoli resolutions (no. 6):
"Complaints having been brought to the notice of the Working Com-
mittee that ryots are not paying rents to the zamindars ... " At the
"Malaviya Conference" such specific complaints had not been raised;
there had been only talk about "impending chaos and disorder".
106 Not only because this district had been carefully prepared, but
perhaps also because the ryotwari system prevailed there, under which
land revenue is paid by the cultivators directly, and not by the interme-
diary of the landlords or zamindari. So no damage to the position of the
landlords was to be feared. This consideration may have played a role in
238 NOTES PP. 141-143
Gandhi's choice, but there is no evidence that this point had been raised
in previous discussions. And could Gandhi hope that the no-tax cam-
paign would not spread to other districts where zamindari interests
would be injured? Or that success in the district of Bardoli only would
be sufficient to bring the government to its knees?
107 He sent a letter to the Government of India on Febr. 1, and
issued a manifesto on Febr. 4. See Majumdar, History ot the Freedom
Movement in India, vol. 3, pp. 151-53; I.A.R. 1922, pt. I, pp. 292-95;
R. P. Dutt, op. cit., p. 313. Both Majumdar and Dutt speak about an
"ultimatum", though the wording was rather moderate in tone.
108 Full text of this communiqué of 6.2.1922 in I.A.R. 1922, pt. I,
pp. 295-97; cf. Bamford, op. cit., p. 69.
109 The volunteers were on their way to picket a bazaar, owned by
a loyal zamindar, but proceeded through the police station grounds;
see tel. of 9.2.1922 from Viceroy, Home Dpt., to Secretary of State,
quoted in I.A.R. 1922, pt. I, pp. 348-49.
110 Full text of his article in I.A.R. 1922, pt. I, pp. 310-15.
111 Majumdar, History ot the Freedom Movement in India, vol. 3,
p. 156, mentions Malaviya and Jinnah among the leaders with whom
Gandhi consulted.
112 Full text of the Bardoli resolutions in I.A.R. 1922, pt. I,
pp. 307-8; also in Bamford, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
113 This is Bamford's explanation, op. cit., p. 70.
114 As is suggested in resolutions nos. 1 and 2.
115 op. cit., pp. 317-18.
116 ibid., p. 307.
117 ibid., p. 317.
118 It is, of course, uncertain what results the non-co-operators could
have gained by negotiations with Reading. We have already observed
(see above, p. 139) that Reading met with opposition in the British
cabinet and among his Governors. But Indian leaders at the time prob-
ably thought their chances of obtaining a substantial gain pretty strong.
119 An aspect of his personality that is stressed by W olfenstein,
op. cit., pp. 149-50.
120 See Low, op. cit., pp. 19 and 21.
121 Sitaramayya, op. cit., p. 237; cf. Weekly Report of 1.3.1922. In
the same sense also Bamford, op. cit., pp. 190-91, and Andrews, op. cit.,
p. 279.
NOTES CHAPTER VII
1 This is Low's opinion (op. cit., p. 20), corroborated by CP 4378

of 28.12.1922, in which the Government of India looked back on politi-
cal unrest in the last years. At the time of the events, however, the
government was less sure about their adversary's demi se, and supposed
th at the non-eo-operators wanted only a few months' rest and then
would start afresh (Weekly Report of 26.3.1922). Nor, of course, was
Congress immediately ready to acknowledge its defeat.
2 Manifestos of Abul Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari to support the
Angora government are mentioned in Weekly Report of 1.7.1921; the
first explicit mention of the Angora Fund we found in Bamford (op. cit.,
p. 190) in September 1921. At that time the despatching of volunteers
to Angora was also being discussed, but it was not until a year later
that this matter became of some importance.
3 Bamford, op. cit., p. 190, quoting a statement of accounts by the
C.K.C.
4 On this agreement see A. J. Toynbee, "The Islamic World since
the Peace Settlement", in Survey of International Affairs 1925, vol. 1,
pp. 457-64 (henceforward referred to as Survey 1925). On Curzon's
reactions to it Cab. Cond. of 1.11.1921 and 22.11.1921 (Cab. 23/27).
6 That Khilafat leaders took this view was observed in Weekly Report
of 9.11.1921. That this was realized on the British side too is proved
by a telegram from the Viceroy to Montagu (dated 11.10.1921, even
before the agreement had materialized; full text in CP 3412), and from
the trend of discussions at the cabinet meeting of 1.11.1921, referred
to above.
7 In the above mentioned telegram in CP 3412. Sir George Lloyd
addressed Montagu in a telegram of 15.10.1921 (CP 3423) in the same
sense, and we also find this line of thinking in a letter from the Com-
missioner of Sind to the Bombay Government (circulated by Montagu
in CP 3592). Cf. Weekly Reports of 9.11.1921; 18.11.1921; 6.12.1921;
11.2.1922.
8 Dated 28.2.1922 (PSP 4995/4/1919). Before despatching it he
had asked all local Governments to give their opinion on the step he
was about to take. All of them dutifully concurred, except Sir Reginald
Craddock who, however, had no Muslim problem worth speaking of
in Burma.
240 NOTES PP. 145-147
9 See Nicolson, op. cit., pp. 267-68, quoting a letter from Curzon
to Sir Austen Chamberlain.
10 He said so in an address to his constituency at Cambridge, as
reported by the Times of 13.3.1922. There was something more to it
than that, however. 1ne Government of India publidy propagated a
policy conflicting with the line taken by the British Government. From
a dominion this might have been acceptable, but India was not a domi-
nion - that is, not yet. One might see in this affair one of the steps
by which British India was going to assert its dominion status.
11 In the main we think this explanation correct, but why was it
Montagu who had to be sacrificed? In this connection the attacks on
his Indian policy might be more telling than the general Conservative
loathing of the way the Irish problem had been handled. Some two
weeks before his dismissal he had been exposed to fierce criticism in
the House of Commons by Joynson-Hicks and Rupert Gwynne, two
Conservatives conspieuous for their support for General Dyer (see Waley,
op. cit., p. 269). Generally, the die-hards thought the Government of
India's and Montagu's policy far too lenient (see K. K. Aziz, Britain
and Muslim India, p. 107), and this view was gaining ground in the
cabinet as weIl (see Cab. Cond. of 20.12.1921 and 9.2.1922; Cab. 23/29).
The cabinet may have thought that Montagu was no longer an asset;
this, exactly, was how Sir Valentine Chirol thought the land lay (letter
of 18.1.1922 to Sir Harcourt Butler; Butler Coll., vol. 52). Moreover,
the Conservatives may have jumped at the opportunity to get rid of a
Liberal in the Coalition government; this was what Lord Reading
thought (Reading, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 228). And lastly, there was no love
lost between the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and for India:
their relations were of ten rather strained (Ronaldshay, op. cit., vol. 3,
p. 216; Nicolson, op. cit., p. 30; Waley, op. cit., eh. XII).
12 K. K. Aziz, Britain and Muslim India, p. 101; Reading, op. cit.,
vol. 2, p. 230; Bamford, op. cit., p. 197, quoting a resolution of the
C.K.C. The same opinion was expressed by Muhammad Ali in his
presidential address to the Cocanada Congress session in December 1923
(Select Writings and Speeches, p. 286).
13 K. K. Aziz, Britain and Muslim India, p. 100.
14 Cab. Cond. of 13.12.1920; Cab. 23/23.
15 Cab. Cond. of 1.11.1921 and 22.11.1921; Cab. 23/27.
16 CP 3571 of 19.12.1921. It would seem to be significant that Iraq
was mentioned by name, but that India was not!
17 Minutes of the Paris conference on 22-26 Mareh, 1922; PSP
1503/1922. Cf. Nicolson, op. cit., pp. 268-69; Ronaldshay, op. cit., vol. 3,
pp. 287-88.
18 Nicolson, op. cit., pp. 271-73.
19 Seaman, op. cit., p. 149.
20 The Government of India observed "an almost equally marked
dedine" of the Khilafat agitation as in the case of the non-co-operation
movement (CP 4378 of 28.12.1922). Cf. Weckly Reports of 11.4.1922;
3.7.1922; 18.7.1922.
NOTES PP. 147-149 241
21 The Agha Khan in January, 1922, had already written Montagu

a letter offering his help in bringing about a better understanding over
Turkey between Indian Muslims and the British Government, and told
him that, to this end, he would try and get the support of "people like
Chotani, Ansari, Kidwai and no end of other sincere Turcophiles like
myself and yet not fanatics" (letter of 14.1.1922, Mont. Coll., vol. 13).
On 25.2.1922 the Agent in Baluchistan forwarded a strongly pro-Turkish
address from the sardars of Baluchistan, pointing out at the same time
that these men were thoroughly loyal subjects (PSP 4995/4/1919). The
same might be said about the non-official members of the Punjab
Legislative Council who drafted a Memorial dated 27.3.1922 (ibid).
23 Text ibid., p. 195.
24 Text ibid., pp. 154-57. Here "retention of Turkish suzerainty over
Jazirat-ul-Arab with self-Government for the Arabs if tbey so desire"
was demanded.
25 On these meetings Bamford, op. cit., pp. 191-92.
26 Weekly Report of 11.3.1922. Bamford reports similar difficulties
in tbe ulama conference at Ajmere.
27 Bamford, op. cit., pp. 199 and 201.
28 In a letter to Chotani, quoted by Bamford, op. cit., p. 204. Letters
of similar purport from Kidwai to Chotani and Ansari, ibid., p. 206.
30 As reported in a lengthy telegram, dated 3.10.1922, from Viceroy,
Home Dept., to Secretary of State; PJP 6080/1922. One might remark
that all those reports came from thc British side. But probably the British
themselves thought they were reliable - the documents quoted above
were not for publication.
32 Bamford, op. cit., p. 201, giving an account of the same meeting.
33 Such as we have for Congress, the membership of which dropped
between tbe end of 1921 and March 1923 from nearly 2,000,000 to a
good 100,000 (Krishna, op. cit., pp. 419-420). Possibly the falling off
in the number of Khilafat adherents was less abrupt, but according to
the government it was considerable (CP 4378 of 28.12.1922).
34 India during the Year 1923-1924, Cmd. 2311 of 1924.
35 The different attitudes of top leaders and those lower down in
the organization are suggested by thc participation of Muslims as dele-
gates at Congress sessions and as members of the A.LC.C. The percen-
tage of Muslim delegates at Congress sessions dropped from 10,9 in
1921 to 3,6 in 1923, but the percentage of Muslim members of the
A.LC.C. in the same years rose from 10,2 to 25,2 (Krishna, op. cit.,
p. 422).
36 Weekly Reports of 26.3.1922 and 3.7.1922.
37 This might, of course, be a symptom rather than a cause of fric-
tion. Information on these financial irregularities and Chotani's part in
them in Bamford, op. cit., pp. 203 and 207-8, and in Weekly Reports
of 1.9.1922 and 16.11.1922. It is hard to discern how much of allegations
242 NOTES PP. 150-153
like these would be slander, and how much was based on truth. But
probably Chotani's handling of the fund was incorrect, as appears from
a circumstantial article in the Bombay Chronicle of 17.2.1924 about the
way things were settled at last, and the notes of an India Office official
on the matter (PJP 1471/1924).
38 Bamford, op. cit., p. 207, and Weekly Report of 18.10.1922.
39 lts first mention we found in Weekly Report of 29.9.1922.
40 Telegram of 6.1.1923 from Viceroy, Home Dept., to Secretary
of State, reporting on the All-India Khilafat Conference at Gaya; PJP
6082/1922.
41 Telegrams of 18.12.1922 and 2.2.1923 from Viceroy, Home Dept.,
to Secretary of State, ibid. In the same vein a letter from Sir William
Vincent to Muhammad Faiyaz Khan, a member of the Legislative
Assembly, ibid.
43 Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 53.
44 See Weekly Reports of 16.11.1922; 4.12.1922 and 17.12.1922. Also
a telegram from Viceroy, Home Dept., to Secretary of State, dated
16.11.1922, sampling a good many tentative opinions offered by pro-
minent Indian Muslims. One not acquiescing in the fait accompli was
the Agha Khan, who proposed sending a committee to inquire into the
Turkish government's intentions (PJP 1651/1922).
45 ibid.
46 ibid.
47 On the Gaya meeting see I.A.R. 1923, pt. I, pp. 917-29; cf. tel.
from Viceroy, Home Dept., to Secretary of State, dated 6.1.1923 (PJP
6082/1922), and Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 54.
48 W. C. Smith writes that af ter the decision of the Turkish
National Assembly most educated Muslims understood that the Khilafat
had gone (Modern Islam in India, p. 205).
49 op. cit., pp. 68-69. These recollections, of course, may be coloured
by the author's afterthoughts but their trend is, on this point, in keeping
with the opinion of W. C. Smith, and also with the contents of Mu-
hammad Ali's address at the Cocanada Congress session in December
1923.
50 An account of the Gaya Congress session in I.A.R. 1923, pt. I,
pp. 872 a - 872 o.
51 ibid., pt. I, p. 940.
52 ibid., pt. 1I, p. 55.
53 ibid., pt. I, p. 939.
54 ibid., pt. 1I, p. 56.
55 See Ronaldshay, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 324, and Muhammad Ali in
his Cocanada Congress address, quoting Curzon (Select Writings and
Speeches, p. 289).
56 Reading, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 232.
57 India, p. 222. A similar judgment, but less incisive, in W. R.
Smith, op. cit., p. 319.
58 The Making of Pakistan, p. 36.
NOTES PP. 153-155 243

60 op. cit., pp. 282-349.
61 Notably CP 46/23 and CP 63/23.
62 Cab. ConcI. of 5.2.1923 and 6.2.1923; Cab. 23/45.
63 Select Writings and Speeches, p. 290. His tone may be influenced
by his tendency to paint England as black as possible, but the factual
contents of his statement are correct, we think.
64 Both Ronaldshay (op. cit., vol. 3, p. 343) and Nicolson (op. cit.,
p. 349) decIare that the treaty restored Anglo-Turkish friendship and
had a good effect on the attitude of Muslims in other countries; cf.
Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 374-76. Indian Muslims, however, did not
show much enthusiasm. A batch of expressions of thanks for the treaty
(PSP 4995/7/1919) is not impressive by its numbers, and most of them
originated either with persons or bodies of an official character (e.g.
the Nizam of Hyderabad, and the Muslim members of the Legislative
Assembly), or with Indian communities outside India (e.g. Hindus and
Muslims in Mozambique!).
65 Select Writings and Speeches, pp. 286-87.
66 This is indicated too by the frequency of reports from the Govern-
ment of India to the India Office in London. At first these were fort-
nightly; from December 1919 onwards they became Weekly Reports;
in the summer of 1922 these became fortnightly again, but from March,
1923, onwards the series was stopped. It had been, as the Under-
secretary of State remarked in a note (PJP 1358/1923) an arrangement
made in a time of great anxiety, and now that the situation was more
norm al - writing this, we take it, with regard to both the non-co-
operation and Khilafat movements - the expenditure for these long
telegrams was no longer necessary.
67 Arnold, op. cit., pp. 170 and 17S.
69 One of the reasons the Government of India gave for th is refusaI
was that it was uncertain whether these delegations would be welcome
in the countries referred to (PJP 2074/1924).
70 On this letter Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 57-58. It provoked
sharp protests in Turkey; Ismet Pasha denied its authors any com-
petence in the matter broached, as they were (a) foreigners, and
(b) Shias.
71 ibid., p. 59.
72 Published in the Daily Telegraph of 14.3.1924, and circulated by
the Indian press.
73 The same argument is repeated by Khaliquzzaman (op. cit.,
p. 202) as given to him some 15 years afterwards in a conversation with
the Turkish ambassador in London.
74 Text of Kemal Pasha's letter in the Pioneer Mail of 14.3.1924.
The first reason he gives is the only one mentioned in the Turkish law
embodying the abolition of the Caliphate (text in Toynbee, Survey 1925,
p. 575). It is a very succÏnct way of expressing the completely secular
character of the Turkish republic.
244 NOTES PP. 156-158
75 On the relations between Mehmed VI and Kemal Pasha and

his followers see Toynbee, ibid., pp. 47-48.
76 Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 276. It is also the main tenor of the
answers the Government of India got af ter having asked on 12.3.1924
for the opinions of all Local Governments on the impression created by
the Turkish National Assembly's action (PSP 1135/1/1924).
77 A good many of their comments were collected on 14.3.1924 from
the Pioneer Mail (PSP 1135/1/1924). The collection contains the views
of, among others, the Ali brothers and Dr. Ansari, and the answer the
C.K.C. sent to Kemal Pasha when the latter had notified them of
the events.
78 This demand proves that, although Indian Khilafatists had
resigned themselves to the severance of temporal and spiritual powers
in November, 1922, the matter still rankled in their mind.
79 A conference had already been mooted by the deposed Caliph
Abdul Majid himself; see Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 61.
80 See M. L. Ferrar in Gibb, Whither Islam?, p. 207.
81 S. Khuda Bakhsh, "The Awakening of Islam", in Moslem World,
vol. XX, 1930, pp. 5-15. On the au thor and his pi ace in intellectual
Muslim India see W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, pp. 32-35.
82 The Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State th at by 1925 the
Ali brothers had lost nine-tenths of their influence (Reading, op. cit.,
vol. 2, p. 308). Gopal (op. cit., p. 128) states that about this time most
Muslim leaders and the Muslim masses as weil gave up the idea of the
Caliphate, as being a lost cause.
83 Quoted above, p. 152.
86 On the Indian and Turkish reactions towards Arab nationalism
see Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 47-48; cf. above, p. 65.
87 In tbe next chapter we will discuss this aspect in some detail.
88 Toynbee, op. cit., p. 63, writing about "the moderate majority
of Indian Muslims".
89 H. N. Mitra, I.Q.R. July-December 1924, p. 12.
91 A clear exposé of developments in Arabia since about 1900 in
Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 271-324, to which we owe much in the next pages.
92 Storrs (op. cit., p. 178) estimated that "90 per cent. of the Mos-
lem World must call Husain a renegade and traitor to the Vicar of God."
93 Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 64-65. Liddell Hart, in his T. E.
Lawrence: In Arabia and After, paperb. ed., London, 1965, pp. 393-94,
holds a different opinion with regard to the role that Husain's son, Amir
Abdullah, played in his decision.
94 From the accounts of both Toynbee and Liddell Hart it seems
to he clear that the British dropped King Husain when he assumed the
Caliphate, though formerly they had encouraged him to do so. Probahly
they considered his alliance no longer an asset hecause of the rivalries
he provoked.
NOTES PP. 156--161 245
95 Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 297 and 304.

96 For instance in a message to all pilgrims to Mecca and Medina
in the summer of 1920; HDP 27 of November, 1920.
97 Shaukat Ali, though supporting Ibn Saud, protested vehemently
against Wahabi offences in this respect at the Islamic congress at Mecca
in 1926; Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 314.
98 According to Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
99 A. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 139. This distinction probably coincided
to some degree with the one made by Khaliquzzaman, since the theo-
logians of Deoband as weIl as those of Farangi Mahal were close to
each other in their veneration of orthodox Sufis and opposition to
Wahabis (ibid., p. 107).
100 H. N. Mitra in I.Q.R. July-December 1924, pp. 493 and 509.
101 Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 304.
102 ibid., pp. 84-86. Neither did delegations from Turkey, Persia,
Afghanistan and Najd appear at this congress.
103 In which a lengthy passage was devoted to this subject (Select
Writings and Speeches, pp. 291-311).
104 About which we will say more below, pp. 161-62.
105 According to Watson (op. cit., p. 73), he was in this speech
"unable to offer any new constructive program for achieving Indian
aims."
106 Even Abul Kalam Azad had, a few months earlier, declared in
Congress that "Hindu-Muslim unity was only seen on the surface and
in the Congress, and that the real work was still to be done in the
country and outside the Congress pandal." (I.A.R. 1923, pt. II, p. 208).
107 S. Abid Husain, op. cit., p. 92; Coupland, op. cit., p. 75; W. C.
Smith, Modern Islam in India, p. 172; W. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 350.
108 Coupland, op. cit., p. 75; Chirol, India, p. 289; Clifford Mans-
hardt, op. cit., pp. 74 and 84.
109 Brecher, op. cit., p. 84. He might have quoted Muhammad Ali's
Cocanada speech!
110 Brecher, op. cit., p. 84; W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India,
p. 172.
111 Yet another explanation is given by Gapal, op. cit., p. 158: the
police were instigating the riots. He admits that na praaf of this can be
offered, but in our opinion it is not even quite plausible, at least not as
an explanation pointing to a really important factor in producing the
phenomenon. Af ter all, the riots increased only when the gravest danger
to the British Raj had passed and when, therefore, the tuming on of
sa poisonous a tap had become more or less superfluaus.
112 Sitaramayya, op. cit., p. 298.
113 The expression is Khaliquzzaman's, who was one of them
(op. cit., pp.76-77).
114 Khaliquzzaman mentions that Muhammad Ali and he himself
were among those opposing the latter resolution.
115 A useful précis of the Hindu Mahasabha's early development
in D. E. Smith, op. cit., pp. 454-60. He dates its first manifestation 1907;
246 NOTES PP. 161-163
Faruqi, Op. cit., p. 48, dates it 1906. At any rate its birth nearly coin-
cided with that of the Muslim League, to which it more or less con-
stituted areaction.
116 V. D. Savarkar, the Mahasabha's most prominent theorist in the
twenties and thirties, had started as a protégé of Tilak (D. E. Smith,
op. cit., p. 455). About 1924, the organization's foremost leaders were
Pandit Mohan Malaviya and Lala Lajpat Rai.
117 D. E. Smith, op. cit., p. 455; W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in
India, p. 186.
118 As is clear from Muhammad Ali's Cocanada speech, referring
to the founding of Hindu akharas (training institutes), which at the
Hindu Mahasabha session had been advocated by Malaviya (Select
Writings and Speeches, pp. 306-7).
119 This is the way Chirol (India, p. 292) formulates its object.
120 D. E. Smith, op. cit., pp. 457-58.
121 See Gopal, op. cit., pp. 165-6, quoting a letter from Lajpat Rai
in 1924 and a speech of Dr. Kitchlew in 1925, proving that such ideas
were still toyed with among Muslim leaders, and feared by their Hindu
counterparts - who, two or three years before, had stood on the com-
mon platform of the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements !
122 A. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 107.
123 On these movements see an article by Dr. Y. B. Mathur, "Tan-
zim and Tabligh Movements in Modern India - Before its Partition into
India and Pakistan", in The Islamic Review, Nov.-Dec. 1968, pp. 22-25
and 40-43. Cf. Chirol, India, p. 292, and Manshardt, op. cit., p. 151.
124 Deplorable, that is, both from a nationalist and a humanitarian
point of view. Downright communalists, of course, should have ap-
plauded it, but as a matter of fact most Indian leaders deplored, if not
the process itself, then its results.
125 An account of the All Parties Conferences trying to patch up
Hindu-Muslim unity in the years 1924-1928 in Manshardt, op. cit.,
pp. 76-80, and in Gopal, op. cit., pp. 205-7.
126 In an article "In Defence of Gandhiji's Leadership", published
in the Comrade; in Select Writings and Speeches, pp. 373-89.
Another notorious case of reciprocal accusations occurred when af ter
the communal riots of 1923 Gandhi and Shaukat Ali were designated
by Congress to investigate the causes - they could not agree on which
party the main blame should be put (Sitaramayya, op. cit., p. 275).
127 Muhammad Ali, "The Challenge to our Love of Freedom" (Jan.
1925, Select W ritings and Speeches, pp. 329-51), and "Communal
Representation" (Febr. 1925, ibid., pp. 355-69).
128 Although Dr. Ansari became a very critical member, several
times on the point of leaving CongTess: in 1929 (see Khaliquzzaman,
op. cit., p. 108), and again in 1932 (see W. C. Smith, Modern Islam
in India, p. 215).
129 K. K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan, p. 175. Cf. S. Abid Husain,
op. cit., pp. 73 and 85. Two other leaders had died in 1926: Abdul Bari
and Hakim Ajmal Khan.
NOTES P. 163 247
130 On these intemal quarrels in the last years of the organization

see Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., pp. 97-98, and Gopal, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
131 The Nehru report was presented by a Congress committee pre-
sided over by Motilal Nehru, instructed to draft the principles of an
Indian constitution. Two important features of the report were that it
proposed a central govemment only federal in name and joint elec-
torates. On th is report and the debates it provoked see Coupland, op. cit.,
pp. 87-96; Sitaramayya, op. cit., pp. 325-34; Gopal, op. cit., pp. 197-202
and 211-13.
132 S. Abid Husain, op. cit., p. 85.
133 Gopal, op. cit., p. 206.
NOTES CHAPTER VIII
1 See above, p. 140, on Hasrat Mohani's motion.

2 See Toynbee, Survey 1925, pp. 1-2. Nicolson, op cit., pp. 157-58,
writes about " ... six separate revolts ... of the East against the West" -
the Egyptian revolt of March 1919, the Afghan War of May 1919, the
hostilities with Kemal Pasha from 1919 until 1923, the Iraq rebellion
of July 1920, and the Persian nationalist movement from 1919 until
1925; he did not consider these events to be co-ordinated, but neither
were they unrelated. He sums them up under the head of "the Islamic
revolt" (p. 167), which, however, does not account for anti-western
movements in Russia and China in the same years.
3 On anti-foreignism as a feature of Asian nationalism see J. Kennedy,
Asian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, London, 1968, pp. 83-85.
4 As is pointed out by Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 19. He is referring
to the fate of, among others, the Armenians and the Kurds. As a lucky
exception he mentions the Kopts in Egypt, who took to the Egyptian
nationalists' side unreservedly.
5 W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, pp. 171 and 195.
6 On the attitude of Abul Kalam Azad and the Deoband ulama see
Faruqi, op. cit., pp. 51 and 55.
8 The foremost leader of which was Sir Muhammad Shafi. S. Abid
Husain (op. cit., p. 73) observes British interference with respect to this
development, but he leaves no doubt that the government was able to
interfere because many Muslim Leaguers were suspicious of Hindu
intentions. Cf. K. K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan, p. 40.
9 See above, pp. 93 and 148-49.
11 See above, p. 241, fn. 21.
12 The accounts of these interviews, dated 1.11.1920 and 16.1.1921,
are enclosed in two letters from Lord Chelmsford to Montagu, dated
17.11.1920 (Mont. Coll., vol. 11), and 2.2.1921 (Mont. Coll., vol. 5).
The Viceroy, evidently, was in no doubt about the reliability of these
reports; it is highly probable that the first account was referred to as a
"suggestion ... secretly made to local authorities by Maulana Mahmud
Hasan" in a telegram from Viceroy, For. and Pol. Dept., to the Secre-
tary of State, dated 23.11.1920 (PSP 3324/1920). This reference is
introduced with the observation th at " ... loyal Indian Muslims are
NOTES PP. 167-170 249
groping for solution which will enable them to reconcile loyalty with
religion. "
On the other hand, it might be argued that Maulana Mahmud-ul-
Hasan was a tired and sick man at the time of the interview, and there-
fore was not himself. This, however, would not explain that in the
second interview another leading Maulana of Deoband pursued exactly
the same line of thinking.
Vet another explanation might be that, on the Deoband side, these
talks were not in earnest, since they started from assumptions the
Deobandis thought would never come true. In this case the talks would
only prove that the British supposed that they had better chances with
Deoband than they really had. But even then the talks may contain
opinions not entirely alien to the Deoband leaders; there is no reason
to doubt their reserves with regard to the westernized middle class
leaders and to some sections of Hindu opinion.
13 The opposition between these two sections of the Indian Muslim
community: the orthodox ulama and the westernized leaders of the
Aligarh type, was an old one; see above, p. 34.
14 Even on the part of Mahmud-ul-Hasan some reserve with respect
to Hindu-Muslim unity is noted by Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 190.
16 Watson, op. cit., p. 56.
17 Which, of course, are not identical; the former stresses the
"separateness" of the Indian Muslims more strongly than the latter.
18 Quoted by Faruqi in D. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian Polities and
Religion, Princeton, N.]., 1968, p. 138. Though dating from a later
period than that of our study, we think the Maulana's words in 1940
express the attitude he developed in the early twenties, as is also the
opinion of Aziz Ahmad (op. cit., p. 187).
19 A. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 188.
20 ibid., p. 190.
21 ibid., p. 189 and 193.
22 This is how Rosenthal (op. cit., p. 193) puts it.
24 Quoted from his Round Table Conference address (Selections
trom Comrade, p. 138).
25 This is stressed by Watson, op. cit., p. 56.
26 This is also Watson's opinion, op. cit., p. 86.
27 Dated 22.6.1920; HDP 101 of Sept., 1920.
28 Not only by the British officials who had to cope with it, but also
by more recent authors like Nirad C. Chaudhuri (The Continent ot
Circe, p. 241) and Faruqi (op. cit., p. 67). Majumdar (History ot the
Freedom Movement in India, vol. 3, pp. 60 and 65) explicitly dis-
approves of Gandhi's policy on this account; he accuses Gandhi of
having "forsaken the ideal of Indian nationalism" by giving his support
to an extra-territorial, Pan-Islamic movement. Nehru (as quoted by
Brecher, op. cit., p. 75) judged less harshly, but also spoke about "the
artificial unity which Gandhi had forged out of diverse discontents."
250 NOTES PP. 17G-174
29 Chirol, India, p. 221; Curzon, quoted approvingly by Nicolson,

op. cit., p. 99; Lord Chelmsford called it "engineered" (see above,
p. 124).
30 In the address of the Khilafat deputation to the Viceroy; see
above, pp. 96-97. The same theme recurs in Muhammad Ali's defence
in the Karachi trial in 1921 (Selections trom Comrade, pp. 100-102).
31 This is, perhaps, not too far from the meaning of W. C. Smith's
statement: "The Khilafat Indians were in fact struggling for something;
yet they thought they were struggling for something else, for the Turkish
Khilatah about which they really knew little. The trouble with a wrong
ideology is that it is inefficient." (Modern Islam in India, p. 207). If
their real aims were not clear to them, we think this was caused by the
fact that they were wavering between Indian nationalism and some
form of Indian Muslim nationalism.
33 In CP 392 of 1.4.1920.
35 In his memorandum of 2.11.1921, enclosed in a letter of 3.11.1921
from Reading to Montagu (Mont. Coll., vol. 14).
36 This is about the same expectation as professed by the Deoband
leaders quoted above, pp. 166-67.
37 This factor is mentioned by Bamford, op. cit., p. XIII. The index
for the cost of living (1914= 100) descended from 173 in 1921 to 154
in 123; see above, ch. IV, fn. 1.
38 Which, by the way, would only be extemal if bad economic con-
ditions were not instrurnental in causing the movement itself.
40 ibid., p. 85.
41 ibid., p. 84.
42 Here, of course, we are speculating about what might have hap-
pened if something had occurred which in fact did not occur. We feel
entitled to do so because Indian leaders in those days had the feeling
that their goal was within their reach. When the talks between Malaviya
and Reading in December, 1921 broke down on Gandhi's adamant
attitude, C. R. Das is reported to have said that the chance of a lifetime
had been lost (according to Majumdar, History ot the Freedom Move-
ment in India, vol. 3, p. 145).
43 Cf. H. Malik (op. cit., p. 228), writing that in the years between
1912 and 1935 the Muslims " ... toyed with the seemingly grand, but
actually futile ideas of Pan-Islamism"; he lists the Khilafat leaders
among the "romanticists" (ibid., p. 229). A. Hussain (op. cit., p. 17)
describes their outlook on life as "a kind of dream reality", and charac-
terizes the movement as "perilously roman tic" (p. 153). Cf. also Faruqi
(op. cit., p. 54). We have already noted the "wrong ideology" W. C.
Smith ascribes to the Khilafatists (see above, fn. 31).
44 According to Watson, Muhammad Ali's interpretation of the
Caliphate was based upon the pattem of the "rightly guided" Caliphs
(op. cit., p. 53).
NOTES PP. 174-178 251
45 See W. W. Cash, op. cit., pp. 12, 50 and 72.

46 See Gibb, Whither Islam?, p. 345.
47 This is also Watson's opinion (op. cit., p. 81).
49 See Toynbee, Survey 1925, p. 57, about his and Amir Ali's inter-
vention in favour of Abdul Majid in November, 1923. In his Memairs,
the Agha Khan speaks of Arab nationalism as being fostered artificially
(p. 152).
50 B. M. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 1.
52 B. M. Chaudhuri, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
53 As was declared by Lord Fisher, see above, p. 99; cf. Lord
Curzon's complaints, p. 118 above. Lord Fisher, however, was trying to
convince the Khilafat deputation of Great Britain's noble intentions,
and Lord Curzon was venting his annoyance at not having got his way
with regard to ConstantinopIe; he may have been inclined to lay th is
at the door of what he thought the least reasonable considerations.
54 Cab. Concl. of 6.1.1920; Cab. 23/20.
56 See W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, pp. 213-15; K. K. Aziz,
The Making ot Pakistan, p. 192; Gopal, op. cit., p. 294.
57 It is hard to arrive at an exact picture of the influence they
exerted on the Indian Muslim community in the late twenties and the
thirties; W. C. Smith thinks more of it than does K. K. Aziz. But there
can be not much doubt that, when their influence was put to the test
in the years before partition, they could not commend a following car-
rying real weight.
58 B. M. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 1; Chirol, India, p. 222; H. Malik,
op. cit., p. 238; A. Aziz, op. cit., p. 324.
59 This is a summary of Iqbal's thinking on this account as given by
Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 140.
60 ibid.
64 This is, we think, also what is meant by K. K. Aziz, writing (The
Making ot Pakistan, p. 115): " ... it was only now that they felt, with
unprecedented intensity, that they were Muslims first and Indians
afterwards. This was a triumph for Muslim nationalism, for it provided
a base on which other unities could be built. And this, as far as we can
see, was the only permanent contribution of the Khilafat movement to
the larger problem of nationalism. It was a contribution, however, which
no historian can afford to underestimate or to ignore."
65 This is also remarked upon by Watson, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
ABBREVIATIONS
Butler Collo - Sir Harcourt Butler Collection, lOL

Cab. Cond. - Cabinet Condusions (followed by number of series
and volume in PRO)
CP Cabinet Paper, PRO
HDP Home Department Proceedings, Politica!, lOR
ICP India Confidentia! Proceedings, Politica!, lOR
lOL India Office Library
lOR India Office Records
Mont. Collo - Montagu Collection, lOL
PJP Judicial and Public Department Papers, lOR

(followed by number of file and year)
PRO Public Record Office
PSL Political and Secret Department Library, lOR
PSM Political and Secret Department Memoranda, lOR
PSP Political and Secret Department Papers, lOR
(followed by number of file and year)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The year of publication mentioned is that of the edition we consulted, which is

not always the first edition.
A. OFFICIAL RECORDS
1. India Office
Judicial and Public Department Papers, 1918-1924.
Political and Secret Department Papers, 1914-1924.
Political and Secret Department Memoranda.
Home Department Proceedings - Politica I, 1918-1924.
India Confidential Proceedings - Political, 1918-1923.
2. Public Record Office

Cabinet Conclusions, 1917-1925.
Cabinet Papers, 1917-1925.
B. PRIVATE PAPERS
Papers of Sir Spencer Harcourt Butler.

Papers of E. S. Montagu.
C. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
1. confidential
Bamford, P. C., Histories of the Non-Co-Operation and Khilafat Movements,
Delhi, 1925.
Hitchcock, R. H., A History of the Malabar Rebellion, 1921, Madras, 1925,
PSL/F 207, lOR.
Intelligence Bureau, Home Department, India and Communism, Delhi, 1933.
Ker, J. C., Political Trouble in India, Calcutta, 1917.
Lovett, V., A Short History of Indian Polities, Govt. Press U.P., 1918.
The Rise of Islam and The Caliphate: Handbook prepared under the direction of
the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, London, 1919, PSL/G 77, lOR.
The Rise of the Turks. The Pan-Turanian Movement: Handbook prepared under
the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, London, 1919,
PSL/C 191, lOR.
2. non-confidential
Report on Indian Constitutional Reform, London, 1918 (Montagu-Chelmsford
Report).
Report on the Punjab Disturbances, Calcutta, 1919 (Hunter Committee Report).
Sedition Committee Report, Calcutta, 1918 (Rowlatt Report).
Statement exhibiting the moral and material progress of India during the year
1919, Cmd. 950 of 1920 (etc., 1919-1925; referred to as India during the
Year ... ).
Telegraphic information, etc., regarding the Moplah Rebellion, 24th August to
6th December, Cmd. 1552 of 1921.
D. BOOKS AND ARTICLES
Abbas, M. H., All about the Khilafat, Calcutta, 1923.

Agarwala, R. M., The Hindu-Muslim Riots: Their Causes and Cures, Lucknow,
1943.
Agha Khan, The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World Enough and Time, London, 1954.
Ahmad, Queyamuddin, The Wahabi Movement in India, Calcutta, 1966.
Ahmed, Kazi Siraj-ud-din, The Truth ab out the Khilafat, Lahore, 1916.
Aiyangar, S., ed., Message of the Martyrs, Madras, 1922.
Albiruni, A. H., Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India, Lahore, 1950.
Ali, Muhammad, The Khilafat in Islam according to the Holy Quran and the
Sayings of the Holy Prophet, Lahore, 1920.
Selections from Mohammad Ali's Comrade, ed. by Rais Ahmad Jafri, Lahore,
1925.
Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali, ed. by Afzal Iqbal,
Lahore, 1944.
Ali, Muhammad and Shaukat, For India and Islam, Calcutta, 1922.
Ameer Ali, The Spirit of Islam, ampl. and rev. ed., London, 1935.
Andrews, C. F., Mahatma Gandhi's I deas: Including Selections from his Writings,
London, 1929.
Arnold, T. W., The Caliphate, Oxford, 1924.
Asad, Muhammad, Islam at the Crossroads, Lahore, 1932.
Azad, Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative, Bom-
bay, 1959.
Aziz, A., Discovery of Pakistan, Lahore, 1964.
Aziz, Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964, London, 1967.
Aziz, K. K., Britain and Muslim India, London, 1963.
The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism, London, 1967.
Baljon, J. M. S., The Reforms and Religious I deas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan,
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1969.
Binder, L., Religion and Polities in Pakistan, Berkeley, 1961.
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Briggs, F. S., "The Indian Hijrat of 1920", Moslem World, XX, March 1930.
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Coupland, R., Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, pt. I, The Indian
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Craddock, R., The Dilemma in India, London, 1929.
Crocker, W., Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate, London, 1966.
Daniel, N., Islam, Europe and Empire, Edinburgh, 1966.

Desai, A. R., Social Background of Indian Nationalism, Bombay, 1948.
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Storrs, R., Orientations, London, 1937.
Student, A of History, The Khilafat Agitation in India, Madras, 1922.
Thomton, A. P., Doctrines of Imperialism, New York, 1965.

- For the File on Empire, London, 1968.
Toynbee, A. J., "Relations between British India, Soviet Russia and Afghanistan,
1919-23", Survey of International Affairs 1920-1923, London, 1927.
"The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement", Survey of International
Affairs 1925, vol. I, London, 1927.
Vencam, Facts Unveiled, Bombay, 1920.
Waley, S. D., Edwin Montagu: A Memoir and an Account of his Visits to India,
Bombay, 1964.
Wasti, S. R., Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905 to 1910,
Oxford, 1964.
Watson, J. W., Muhammad Ali and the Khilafat Movement, unpubl. M.A. thesis,
McGill University, Montreal, 1955.
Weiner, M., Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress,
Chicago, 1967.
Wertheim, W. F., East-West Parallels, The Hague, 1964.
Wolfenstein, E. V., The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi,
Princeton, N.J., 1967.
Woodruff, Ph., The Men Who Ruled India, 2 vols., London, 1963.
Worsley, P., The Third World, London, 1967.
INDEX OF NAMES AND ORGANIZATIONS
Abbasids, 40, 41, 42, 60, 91 Aligarh Old Boys, 54

Abduh, Muhammad, 36 Amanullah, Amir of Afghanistan, 75, 103,
Abdul Aziz, 32 105, 119, 129, 175
Abdul Bari, 59, 61-63, 66, 82, 83, 89, Amir Ali, 31, 44, 48, 55, 90, 129, 155,
105, 148, 158, 221 n. 189, 222 n. 1, 166, 203 n. 15
239 n. 2 Andrews, C. F., 135 '
Abdul Hamid 11, 35-37,45-47,64, 154, Ansari, M. A., 10, 56, 61-63, 75, 81, 82,
174 89,92, 110, 151, 152, 163, 167,221
Abdul Majid J, 199 n. 146 n. 189, 222 n. 1, 241 n. 21
Abdul Majid 11, 150, 154, 157 Anti-Cow-Killing Society, 26
Abdullah, Amir of Transjordania, 64, Archbold, W. A. J., 51, 52, 54
244 n. 93 Argov, D., 187 n. 45
Abu Bakr, 40-42, 44 Arnold, T. W., 37, 42, 43
Afghani,Jamal-ud-din, 31, 36,37,45,64 Arya Samaj, 7, 22, 23, 28, 76, 83, 93,
Afzal Khan, 26 161
Agha Khan, 44, 45, 51, 54, 55, 58, 59, Asquith, H. H., 63, 79, 101
61,65,90, 155, 166, 174, 195 n. 36, Azad, Abul Kalam, 10, 37,50,55,59-61,
203 n. 15, 239 n. 2, 241 n. 21, 242 63, 66, 92, 95, 103, 105, 110, 152,
n. 44 162, 163, 168, 169, 177, 206 n. 60,
Ahmad, Qeyamuddin, 196 n. 71 218 n. 113,221 n. 189, 239 n. 2
A.I.I.C., see Congress Aziz, A., 16, 196 n. 74
Ajmal Khan, Hakim, 61, 63, 82-84, 92, Aziz Ahmad, 60, 217 n. 100, 245 n. 99
95, 110, 140, 151, 152, 167, 221 Aziz, K. K., 2, 153, 204 ns. 45 a. 46,
n. 189 251 ns. 57 a. 64
Akbar, 26
Albiruni, 31, 205 n. 46, 206 n. 60, 207
n. 86 Bahadur Shah, 29
Ali, Caliph, 42, 45 Baldwin, Lord Stanley, 147
Ali brothers, 7, 10, 61, 63, 65, 66, 92, Balfour, A. J., 50, 79, 80
105, 110, 122, 124, 129, 130, 139, Bamford, P. C., 61, 69, 82, 83, 141, 208
162-164, 166, 221 n. 189 n. 94, 217 n. 108, 234 n. 36, 236
Ali, Muhammad, 16, 34, 37, 52, 56-62, n. 84
70, 79, 84, 86, 87, 93, 97-102, 106, Bannerjea, Surendranath, 24, 27, 72
lIl, 113, 114, 119, 129, 130, 151, Barelawi, Sayyid Ahmad, 32
152, 154, 157-163, 167, 169, 171, Baroda, Gaekwar of, 57
174, 177, 229 n. 130 Beck, Sir Theodore, 30
Ali, Shaukat, 54-56, 58, 59, 61, 84, 86, Besant, Annie, 24, 71, 236 n. 86
94, 101-103, 106, 113, 124, 125, 161, Bhopal, Begam of, 81
167, 246 n. 126 Bhurgri, G. M., 84, 106
Aligarh, College or movement, 29-31, 34, Bikaner, Maharajah of, 62, 117
51,52,54,55-59,61,90,95, 111,179 Binder, L., 89, 166
BIunt, W. S., 62, 64, 199 n. 120 Deoband, 7, 10, 25, 32-34, 47, 54, 55,
Brahmo Samaj, 4, 12, 22, 23 60, 61, 82, 83, 152, 161, 166, 168,
Briggs, F. S., 104 171, 179, 245 n. 99
Bryce, J., 10 1 Desai, A. R., 2
Butler, Sir Harcourt, 34, 38, 118, 122, Desai, Mahadev, 92
191 n. 90 Dilks, D., 202 n. 6
Disraeli, 39
Cash, W. W., 197 n. 85 Dufferin, Lord, 24, 25, 190 n. 84
Cecil, Lord Robert, 101 Dumont, L., 7, 185 n. 15, 203 n. 13
Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 65, 70 Duke, Sir William, 99
Chatterji, J. C., 194 n. 32 Dutt, R. Palme, 127, 128, 142
Chaudhuri, B. M., 175, 202 n. 2 O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, 19, 57, 66, 73,
Chaudhuri, Nirad C., 11, 50, 191 n. 91, 109, 115, 237 n. 100
194 n. 32, 215 n. 72 Dyer, Genera!, 19, 73, 74, 115, 125, 214
n. 37
Chelmsford, Lord, 20, 21,70,71,74,75,
89, 119, 120, 123, 225 n. 46
Chirol, Sir Valentine, 25, 116, 153, 192 Edwardes, M., 202 ns. 2 a. 7, 214 n. 38
n. 12, 240 n. 11 Emerson, R., 2, 5, 10, 188 n. 58
Chotani, Seth, 83, 84, 106, 149, 151, Enver Pasha, 65
166,219 n. 139, 221 n. 189,222 n. 1, Erasmus, 23, 24
241 ns. 21 a. 37
Churchill, Sir Winston, 118, 139
Committee for Union and Progress, 155, Farangi Mahal, 59, 245 n. 99
156 Faizul Karim, 91
Congress, Indian National passim Farrère, Claude, 101
- All-India Committee (A.I.I.C.) , 86, Faruqi, Z. H., 33, 56, 66, 194 n. 35,
127, 137, 142,241 n. 35 202 n. 1, 208 n. 100
- sessions of, at Ahmedabad, 131, 139, Fazl-ul Huq, 82, 83, 236 n. 86
140; Amritsar 76, 84, 108, 226 n. Fazli-Husain, 51, 90, 206 n. 57
63; Bombay, 66; Calcutta, 25, 108, Ferrar, M. L., 28
109, 128; Co canada, 154, 159; Delhi, Fichte, J. G., 18, 187 n. 42
70, 82; Lucknow, 67; Nagpur, 111, Fisher, Lord, 99, 251 n. 53
128; Ramgarh, 168; Surat, 12 Forster, E. M., 191 n. 91
- Khilafat Swaraj Party, 152 Fraser, Sir Andrew, 49
- Working Committee of the A.I.I.C.,
132, 133, 135, 137, 142
Constantine, King of Greece, 113 Gandhi, 5, 19, 24, 25, 28, 73, 75-79,
Cotton, Sir Henry, 25 82-84, 86, 87, 93-95, 98, 105, 106,
Coupland, Sir Reginald, 67, 203 n. 14 108, 109, 111, 113, 116, 121, 122,
Craddock, Sir Reginald, 19, 124, 187 124-131, 135-137, 139-144, 147, 148,
n. 38, 204 n. 45, 228 ns. 106 a. 107, 160, 162, 169, 172, 175, 212 n. 12
239 n. 8 Gangohi, Rashid Ahmad, 25
George, D. Lloyd, 74, 80, 81, 99-102,
Crewe, Lord, 55, 63, 64, 71
Cromer, Lord, 39 113, 118, 119, 145, 147
Curtis, L., 123 n. 16 Ghani, Abdul, 92, 200 n. 168
Ghosh, Aurobindo, 27, 50
CUl"Zon, Lord, 15, 25, 49, 50, 71, 100,
Gibb, H. A. R., 42, 43, 197 n. 85, 199
101,117,118,139,145-147,153,171,
n. 118
190 n. 84, 251 n. 53
Gladstone, 39, 101
Gokhale, G. K., 4, 11, 19, 24, 27, 51,
Daniel, N., 39, 185 n. 15, 191 n. 91 54, 67, 214 n. 57
Das, C. R., 109, 111, 128, 138, 152, 194 Gopal, R., 28, 48, 189 n. 66, 194 n. 35,
n. 32, 236 n. 92, 250 n. 42 202 n. 2, 245 n. III
INDEX
261
Great Britain, Govemment of passim Jacob, Sir Claude, 74

- Foreign Office, 64, 65 Jamia Milliah, 226 n. 76
- India Office, 15, 38, 43, 64, 65, 81, Jamiat-al-Ansar, 61
99, 100, 119, 120, 150, 198 n. 113, Jamiat-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 59, 66, 84
243 n. 66 Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, 83, 89, 110, 148,
Gwynne, R., 240 n. 11 149, 152, 155, 158, 168
Jinnah, M. A., 54, 62, 66, 90, 105, 141,
Habib-ur-Rahman, 152, 166, 167, 171 160, 178, 189 n. 66, 193 n. 28, 236
Habibullah, Amir of Afghanistan, 74, 75, n. 86
210 n. 132 Joynson-Hicks, Sir William, 240 n. 11
Hailey, Sir Malcolm, 230 n. 160
Hamilton, Lord, 49 Kant, 1., 187 n. 42
Hardinge, Lord, 55, 71, 192 n. 13, 208 Kasim, Abul, 99
n. 106, 209 n. 117 Kedourie, E., 2, 3, 187 n. 42, 188 ns. 47
Harun, Seth Haji Abdullah, 91 a. 52, 198 n. 102
Hasan Imam, 229 n. 130 Kemal Pasha, 113, 114, 131, 144, 145,
Hasrat Mohani, 83, 85, 129, 137, 140, 147, 151, 155, 156, 248 n. 2
148, 221 n. 189 Khaliquzzaman, Choudry, 63, 65, 66, 82,
Herder, J. G., 187 n. 42 83, 93, 109, 111, 151, 152, 158, 193
Henri IV, King of France, 18 n. 28, 194 n. 32, 205 n. 53, 208 n.
Hindu Mahasabha, 24, 27, 161, 162, 211 97, 225 n. 53, 243 n. 73
n. 148 Khilafat, Central Committee (C.K.C.),
Hindu Sabha, All-India, 67 83-86, 92, 94, 95, 105-107, 118, 132,
Hirtzel, Sir Alfred, 64, 119, 120 137, 148, 149, 152, 154, 155, 158,
Hitchcock, R. H., 86, 133, 134, 218 n. 159, 161
115 Provincialor Local Committees, 84,
Home Rule League, 188 n. 58 85, 88, 151
Hose, J. W., 64 Conference, 85, 86, 148, 163
Hulagu, 41 - - , All-India sessions at, Ahmedabad,
Hume, A. 0., 24 139, 140; Allahabad, 106, 107, 112;
Hunter Committee, 73 Amritsar, 84, 96, 221 n. 1; Belgaum,
Hunter, W. W., 32, 33 158; Bombay, 84; Delhi, 83, 106,
Husain, S. Abid, 203 n. 25, 207 n. 92, 148; Gaya, 151, 152; Karachi, 88,
248 n. 8 130, 131; Lucknow, 83; Meerut, 86,
Husain, Sharif of Mecca (aftezwards King 114,225 n. 53; Nagpur, 111
of Hijaz) , 46, 64-67, 81, 89, 96, 157, - - , Provincialor Local sessions at,
158, 166, 170 Bombay, 87,106,149; Lucknow, 114;
Hussain, Sayyid, 83, 99 Manjeri, 85; Multan, 87; Patna, 94;
Hyderabad, Nizam of, 88, 216 n. 88, Sind,87
243 n. 64 Khilafat, first deputation to Europe, 84,
96, 99-102, 106, 118
Ibn Khaldun, 40, 45, 200 n. 162 - second deputation to Europe, 118,
Ibn Saud, 158, 159, 170 119, 168
India, Govemment of passim - deputation to Viceroy, 70, 84, 96-98,
- Office, see Great Britain 103, 110, 118
- Provisional Govemment of, 65, 74 - "King", 132, 133
Indian Association, 24 - Manifesto, 94, 212 n. 5
Indian Civil Service, 19, 21, 57, 116 - movement passim
Iqbal, Muhammad, 36, 156, 177, 178, - Volunteers, 85, 112, 135-141
200 n. 157 - Workers' Association, 85, 86
Irwin, Lord, 190 n. 84 - Working Committee of C.K.C., 149
Ismet Pasha, 155 Khuda Bakhsh, 156
Ispahani, M. A., 220 n. 160 Kidwai, R., 241 ns. 21 a. 28
Kitchener, Lord, 64 Montagu, E. S., 20, 21, 70-74, 97, 99,

Kitchlew, Dr., 105, 124, 131, 161, 221 101, 112, 116-123, 125, 136, 139,
n. 189,246 n. 121 140, 145, 146
Kohn, H., 1, 10 Moon, Sir Penderel, 215 n. 72
Koor, Abdullah, 107 Moore, R. J., 190 ns. 81 a. 86
Krishna, Gopal, 127, 232 n. 4 Morison, Sir Theodore, 57, 90
Morley, Lord, 48, 50, 51, 53
Muawiyah, 40
Lansdowne, Lord, 71 Muhammad, the Prophet, 31, 34, 40-42,
League of Nations, 187 n. 36 44-47, 94, 150, 158
Liberal League, 236 n. 84 Muhammad Faiyaz Khan, 242 n. 41
Liddell Hart, B. H., 244 ns. 93 a. 94 Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College,
Lloyd, Sir George, 236 n. 85, 237 n. 99, see Aligarh
239 n. 7 Muhammadan Political Association, 32,
Lohia, Rammanohar, 77, 194 n. 32 51
Lovett, Sir Vincent, 66 Mukherjee, S. N., 188 ns. 51 a. 53
Low, D. A., 116, 124, 228 n. 105, 236 Muslim League, 7, 25, 50-54, 57, 60-62,
n. 84 66, 67, 81-84, 86, 89, 90, 120, 139,
Luther, M., 23, 24 140, 148, 157, 160, 161, 165, 222
Lytton, Lord, 190 n. 84 n. 1
Muslim League of Nations, 151, 177
Mutawakkil, 46, 47
Macdonnell, Sir Antony, 54
Mahendra Pratap, 65
Mahmud Sayyid, 62 Nadir Shah, 189 n. 72
Mahmud-ul-Hasan, 59, 61, 63, 65, 66, Nadvi, Sayyid Sulaiman, 99
82, 89, 166, 207 n. 75 Nadwat-al-Ulama, 60
Mahmudabad, Rajah of, 66, 82, 89 Nair, Sir Sankaran, 141
Majumdar, R. C., 93, 106, 221 n. 188, Nallino, 43
236 ~ 84, 249 ~ 28 Nanawtawi, Muhammad Qasim, 33
Malaviya, Pandit Mohan, 24, 70, 72, 84, Napoleon, 17, 18
109, 111, 122, 130, 138, 141, 170, Nationalist Muslim Party, 177
230 n. 160, 232 n. 11, 246 n. 116 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 15, 24, 30, 76, 77,
Malik, H., 178, 196 n. 74 79, 91, 93, 249 n. 28
Mamluk Sultans, 41, 47 Nehru, Motilal, 91, 111, 138, 148, 152,
Manshardt, C., 186 n. 30, 187 n. 32 234 n. 36, 247 n. 131
Marris, Sir William, 213 n. 116 Nicolson, Sir Harold, 74, 153, 248 n. 2
Massingham, 63
Mazzini, 12
McMahon, Sir Henry, 65 Obaidullah Sindhi, 61, 65
Mehmed VI, 150, 156 Ottomans, 41-43, 45-47, 60, 150, 154
Meston, Sir James (afterwards Lord
Meston), 24, 210 n. 135, 213 n. 16
Minogue, K. R., 4 Pal, Bipin Chandra, 109
Mitra, H. N., 19, 152, 216 n. 100, 234 Pan-Islamic Society, 38
n. 45 Parnell, 12
Minto, Lady, 53 Parthana Samaj, 23
Minto, Lord, 50-53, 55, 121, 192 n. 13 PateI, Valabhbhai, 76
Mohammadan Educational Conference, PateI, Vithalbhai, 72, 148
31, 218 n. 112 Peel, Lord, 145
Mohammedan Central National Associ- Philip II, King of Spain, 18
ation, 32 Poincaré, R., 146, 147
Mohsin-ul-Mulk, 31, 32, 51, 52, 54 Prophet, the, see Muhammad
INDEX 263
Rai, Lala Lajpat, 27, 109, 138, 162, 170, Suhrawardy, Abdullah, 151, 209 n. 116
212 n. 4, 234 n. 36, 246 n. 116 Sykes, Sir Mark, 39
Rajput, A. B., 189 n. 68
Ramakrishna, 24
Ramakrishna Mission, 23 Tagore, Rabindranath, 110, 135
Rashid Rida, 36 Talaat, Bey, 63
Rawlinson, Lord, 131 Talleyrand, 17
Reading, Lord, 74, 116, 119, 122, 130, Theosophical Society, 23
138-140, 145, 146, 153, 231 n. 168, Thornton, A. P., 15, 185 n. 17
235 n. 75 Tilak, B. G., 4, 5, 24, 26-28, 67, 76, 77,
Red Crescent Society, 56, 91 109, 161
Renan, E., 3 Toynbee, A. J., 164
Riencourt, A. de, 13 Translation Society, 30
Ripon, Lord, 15, 190 n. 84
Ronaldshay, Lord, 50, 124, 243 n. 64
Rosenthal, E. I. ]., 35, 188 n. 48 Umar, 42, 47
Rothermund, D., 203 n. 21, 204 n. 31 Ummayads, 40, 42, 45
Round Table Group, 20, 213 n. 16 U.N.O., 187 n. 36
Roy, Rammohan, 4, 12, 13, 22, 23 Urdu Defence Organization, 32, 51, 54
Uthman, 42
Sadharan Brahma Samaj, 22

Salisbury, Lord, 39 Venizelos, 113
Sarasvati, Swami Dayananda, 23 Vijiaraghavachariar, C., 226 n. 74, 232
Satyapal, Dr., 212 n. 4 n. 9
Savarkar, V. D., 246 n. 116 Vincent, Sir William, 135, 230 n. 163,
Sayyid, Sir Ahmad Khan, 25, 29-32, 34, 242 n. 41
36, 44, 46, 47, 54, 59, 90, 91, 189 Viqar-ul-Mulk, 31, 32, 51, 54, 55
n. 72, 203 n. 13, 218 n. 112 Vivekananda, 24
Scientific Society, 30 Viviani, 190 n. 73
Selim I, 46, 47, 60, 91
Servants of India Society, 4, 112
Shafi, Sir Muhammad, 67, 90, 172, 209 Wales, Prince of, 137-139
n. 117, 248 n. 8 Wali-Ullah, Shah, 13, 32
Shibli Numani, 55, 60, 195 n. 38 Wasti, R., 203 n. 14, 204 n. 27
Shivaji, 26 Watson, J. W., 168, 172, 173,219 n. 136
Shradanand, Swami, 83, 93, 221 n. 189 Wazir, Sayyid Hasan, 62
Shuckburgh, W., 99, 216 n. 88 Wedderburn, Sir William, 25
Silberrad, C. A., 166, 171 Wells, G. H., 58
Simla Deputation, 25, 51, 52 Wertheim, W. F., 186 n. 29, 188 n. 52
Simon Commission, 165 Willingdon, Lord, 124, 135
Sinha, Lord, 27, 71, 117 Wilson, President, 58, 70, 80
Smith, D. E., 187 n. 32 Wolfenstein, V., 215 n. 66, 232 n. 2
Smith, Dunlop, 204 n. 27 Woodruff, Ph., 19, 73, 74
Smith, W. C., 5, 6, 15, 30, 31, 132, 202 Worsley, P., 77
n. 3, 224 n. 32, 242 ns. 48 a. 49,
250 n. 31, 252 n. 57
Smith, W. R., 187 n. 38, 227 n. 80 Yakub Hasan, 129
Snouck Hurgronje, C., 43 Young Turks, 37-39, 44, 60, 155, 174,
Sobani, Umar, 110 206 n. 65
Spear, P., 50
Stoddard, L., 37, 198 n. 116
Storrs, R., 38, 244 n. 92 Zafar Ali Khan, 212 n. 4

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THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT IN INDIA

THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

THE HAGUE - MAR TINUS NIJHOFF 1972

The first incentive to write this book originated from a post-graduate

for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) which gave me

Secondly, I should like to say something about the nature of this

copyright records in the Public Record Office, appear by permission

There is one more person I wish to thank: my wife, who encouraged

Eindhoven, January 1972 A. C. NIEMEIJER

SaME GENERAL ASPECTS OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism is generally acknowledged to be one of the great driving

We might start from the truism that nationalism is a kind of group

spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as weIl." 7

in Indian nationalism since the days of Tilak at least. A drawback of

Another aspect of the consciousness of a national identity is a sense

of truth. In the case of any political or religious movement it is very

enough to create a viabie "lslamic state" as Pakistan wanted to be is

did not present itself at the time as an unescapabie fate, predictabie

noted in Indian nationalism since about 1900 when the Extremists

to be found among the Extremist faction which constituted itself

that possibly the establishment of British rule only accelerated a process

therefore, not constant, nor could it be expected to be so when viceroys

ClatlOn - it is something like a term of abuse. This meaning is not

account here class antagonisms within the people, but a democratic

by the Viceroy to introduce a "eonstitutional autocracy",75 but they

both of them represented in high quarters, eonfers a very ambivalent

to co-operation with the recently announced reforms.

NATIONALISM AND PAN-ISLAMISM

As we observed in the preceding chapter, Indian nationalism started

to note some aspects of their impact on cultural and political trends of

tion;l.3 saon lost faith in it and styled it "seditious". Other Britons,

years in the nineties which were marked by a fairly important partici-

throughout its entire career, could not be the all-embracing national

Parallel with the increasing influence of the Extremists in Congress

are readmitted to the Hindu caste system.

Central National Mohammedan Association, founded in 1877, and this

had no other choice than jihad or hijrat - a theme recurring in the

Of the latter, the most notabie was J amal-ud-din Afghani who,

world, but not of an aggressive movement. 110 His anonymous biographer

TOWARDS A HINDU-MUSLIM ENTENTE

In the preceding chapter we established the fact that since 1885

rather than efficiency"Y Morley, who had discussed the situation in

especiaIly the regulations attached to it by the Government of India. 21

Gokhale, who tried to co-operate with the government and to work

miracle", as the latter said. 56 At Oxford he failed to pass the LC.S.

to the problems of Indian Muslims was not an altogether realistic one.

telegram to the Turkish Minister Talaat Bey.lll

Apart from the more practicalobjections raised in the minute we

as the "Silk Letter conspiracy".131 The Government of India may weIl

THE KHILAFAT MOVE MENT - lTS START

In the preceding chapter we noted, as early as the fint months of

manner. 5 Probably, the economic background of the agitation should

and April 1918, by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 and the

expectations that had been raised. Gandhi's response was to inaugurate

politicians there is unfortunately a marked diminution in the belief in

It was m 1915 that Gandhi returned to India, having acquired

mean that he was wholly anti-British. When in London as a young

Another question, however, would be whether all parties concerned

tionaries tended to deny this 84 and the Government of India took a