Laguna v. Manabat

4/23/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 058
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs. Manabat
*
No. L-23546. August 29, 1974.
LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY and BATANGAS

TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, petitioners, vs.
FRANCISCO C. MANABAT, as assignee of Biñan
Transportation Company, Insolvent, respondent.
Civil law: Lease; Reduction of rental under extraordinary

fortuitous events applies only to agricultural leases.—Article 1680
is a special provision for leases of rural lands. No other legal
provision makes it applicable to ordinary leases. Had the
intention of the lawmakers been so, they would have placed the
article among the general provisions on lease. Nor can the article
be applied analogously to ordinary leases, for precisely because of
its special character, it was meant to apply only to a special specie
of lease. It is a provision of social justice designed to relieve poor
farmers from the harsh consequences of their contracts with rich
landowners. And taken in that light, the article provides no refuge
to lesses whose financial standing or social position is equal to, or
even better than, the lessor as in the case at bar.
Same; Same; High costs of spare parts, gasoline, etc. are not
extraordinary fortuitous events that would warrant reduction in
lease ental.—Even if Article 1680 were a general rule on lease, its
provisions nevertheless do not extend to petitioner. One of its
requisites is that the cause of loss of the fruits of the leased
property must be an “extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous
event.” As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the alleged
causes for the suspension of operations on the lines leased,
namely, the high prices of spare parts and gasoline and the
reduction of the dollar allocations, “already existed when the
contract of lease was executed.” The cause
_________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000171a7af5a760a560289003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/14
651
VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 651
of petitioners’ inability to operate on the lines cannot, therefore,

be ascribed to fortuitous events or circumstances beyond their
control, but to their own voluntary desistance.
Same; Contracts; Unforeseen difficulties are not grounds for
reneging upon a contract.—Performance is not excused by
subsequent inability to perform, by unforeseen difficulties, by
unusual or unexpected expenses, by danger, by inevitable
accident, by the breaking of machinery, by strikes, by sickness, by
failure to a party to avail himself of the benefits to be had under
the contract, by weather conditions, by financial stringency, or by
stagnation of business. Neither is performance excused by the fact
that the contract turns out to be hard and improvident,
unprofitable or impracticable, ill-advised, or even foolish, or less
profitable, or unexpectedly burdensome.
APPEAL by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Domingo E. de Lara for petitioners.
M.A. Concordia & V.A. Guevarra for respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the

Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1964, which WE
AFFIRM.
The undisputed facts are recounted by the Court of
Appeals through then Associate Justice Salvador Esguerra
thus:
“On January 20, 1956, a contract was executed whereby the

Biñan Transportation Company leased to the Laguna-Tayabas
Bus Company at a monthly rental of P2,500.00 its certificates of
public convenience over the lines known as Manila-Biñan,
Manila-Canlubang and Sta. Rosa-Manila, and to the Batangas
Transportation Company its certificate of public convenience over
the line known as Manila-Batangas Wharf, together with one
‘lnternational” truck, for a period of five years, renewable for
another similar period, to commence from the approval of the
lease contract by the Public Service Commission. On the same
date the Public Service Commission provisionally approved the

lease contract on condition that the lessees should operate on the
leased lines in accordance with the prescribed time schedule and
that such approval was subject to modification or cancellation and
to whatever decision that in due time might be rendered in the
case.
“Sometime after the execution of the lease contract, the
plaintiff
652

Biñan Transportation Company was declared insolvent in Special

Proceedings No. B-30 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
and Francisco C. Manabat was appointed as its assignee. From
time to time, the defendants paid the lease rentals up to
December, 1957, with the exception of the rental for August 1957,
from which there was deducted the sum of P1,836.92 without the
consent of the plaintiff. This deduction was based on the ground
that the employees of the defendants on the leased lines went on
strike for 6 days in June and another 6 days in July, 1957, and
caused a loss of P500 for each strike, or a total of P1,000.00; and
that in Civil Case No. 696 of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch II, judgment was rendered in favor of
defendant Batangas Transportation Company against the Biñan
Transportation Company for the sum of P836.92. The assignee of
the plaintiff objected to such deduction, claiming that the contract
of lease would be suspended only if the defendants could not
operate the leased lines due to the action of the officers,
employees or laborers of the lessor but not of the lessees, and that
the deduction of P836.92 amounted to a fraudulent preference in
the insolvency proceedings as whatever judgment might have been
rendered in favor of any of the lessees should have been filed as a
claim in said proceedings. The defendants neither refunded the
deductions nor paid the rentals beginning January, 1958,
notwithstanding demands therefor made from time to time. At
first, the defendants assured the plaintiff that the lease rentals
would be paid, although it might be delayed, but in the end they
failed to comply with their promise.
“On February 18, 1958, the Batangas Transportation Company
and Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company separately filed with the
Public Service Commission a petition for authority to suspend the
operation on the lines covered by the certificates of public
convenience leased to each of them by the Biñan Transportation
Company. The defendants alleged as reasons the reduction in the
amount of dollars allowed by the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank of the Philippines for the purchase of spare parts needed in

the operation of their trucks, the alleged difficulty encountered in
securing said parts, and their procurement at exorbitant costs,
thus rendering the operation of the leased lines prohibitive. The
defendants further alleged that the high cost of operation, coupled
with the lack of passenger traffic on the leased lines resulted in
financial losses. For these reasons they asked permission to
suspend the operation of the leased lines until such time as the
operating expenses were restored to normal levels so as to allow
the lessees to realize a reasonable margin of profit from their
operation.
“Plaintiff s assignee opposed the petition on the ground that
the Public Service Commission had no jurisdiction to grant the
relief prayed for as it would involve the interpretation of the lease
contract,
653
VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 653

which act falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the ordinary

courts; that the petitioners had not asked for the suspension of
the operation of the lines covered by their own certificates of
public convenience; that to grant the petition would amount to an
impairment of the obligation of contract; and that the defendants
have no legal personality to ask for suspension of the operation of
the leased lines since they belonged exclusively to the plaintiff
who is the grantee of the corresponding certificate of public
convenience. Aside from the assignee, the Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue and other creditors of the Biñan Transportation
Company, like the Standard Vacuum Oil Co. and Parsons
Hardware Company, filed oppositions to the petitions for
suspension of operation.
“On October 15, 1958, the Public Service Commission overruled
all oppositions filed by the assignee and other creditors of the
insolvent, holding that upon its approval of the lease contract, the
lessees acquired the operating rights of the lessor and assumed
full responsibility for compliance with all the terms and
conditions of the certificate of public convenience. The Public
Service Commission further stated that the petition to suspend
operation did not pertain to any act of dominion or ownership but
only to the use of the certificate of public convenience which had
been transferred by the plaintiff to the defendants, and that the
suspension prayed for was but an incident of the operation of the
lines leased to the defendants. The Public Service Commission
further ruled that being a quasi-judicial body of limited
jurisdiction, it had no authority to interpret contracts, which
function belongs to the exclusive domain of the ordinary courts,

but the petition did not call for interpretation of any provision of
the lease contract as the authority of the Public Service
Commission to grant or deny the prayer therein was derived from
its regulatory power over the leased certificates of public
convenience.”
While proceedings before the Public Service Commission

were thus going on, as a consequence of the continuing
failure of the lessees to fulfill their earlier promise to pay
the accruing rentals on the leased certificates,
“On May 19, 1959, plaintiff Biñan Transportation Company,

represented by Francisco C. Manabat, assignee, filed this action
against defendants Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Batangas
Transportation Company for the recovery of the sum of P42,500
representing the accrued rentals for the lease of the certificates of
public convenience of the former to the latter, corresponding to
the period from January, 1958, to May, 1959, inclusive, plus the
sum of P1,836.92 which was deducted by the defendants from the
rentals due for August, 1957, together with all subsequent rentals
from June,
654

1959, that became due and payable; P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees
and such corrective and exemplary damages as the court may find
reasonable.
“The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, there being
another case pending in the Public Service Commission between
the same parties for the same cause. x x x” (pp. 20–21, rec.; pp.
54–55, ROA).
The motion to dismiss was, however, denied. Meanwhile—
“The Public Service Commission delegated its Chief Attorney to

receive evidence of the parties on the petition of the herein
defendants for authority to suspend operation on the lines leased
to them by the plaintiff. The defendants, the assignee of the
plaintiff and other creditors of the insolvent presented evidence
before the Chief Attorney and the hearing was concluded on June
29, 1959. On October 20, 1959, the Public Service Commission
issued an order the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
‘ln view of the foregoing, the petitioners herein are authorized to suspend
their operation of the trips of the Biñan Transportation Company
between Batangas Piers-Manila, Binan-Manila, Sta. Rosa-Manila and

Canlubang-Manila authorized in the aforementioned cases from the date
of the filing of their petition on February 18, 1958, until December 31,
1959.'" (p. 25, rec.; pp. 60–61, ROA).
Going back to the Court of First Instance of Laguna—
“x x x The motion (to dismiss) having been denied, the defendants

answered the complaint, alleging among others, that the Public
Service Commission authorized the suspension of operation over
the leased lines from February 18, 1950, up to December 31, 1959,
and hence the lease contract should be deemed suspended during
that period; that plaintiff failed to place defendants in peaceful
and adequate enjoyment and possession of the things leased; that
as a result of the plaintiff being declared insolvent the lease
contract lost further force and effect and payment of rentals
thereafter was made under a mistake and should be refunded to
the defendants.” (p. 21; rec.; p. 55, ROA).
The Court of Appeals proceeded to state that—
“After hearing in the court a quo and presentation by the parties

herein of their respective memoranda, the trial court on March
18,
655
VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 655

1960, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, ordering the

defendants jointly and severally to pay to the former the sum of
P65,000.00 for the rentals of the certificates of public convenience
corresponding to the period from January, 1958, to February,
1960, inclusive, including the withheld amount of P836.92 from
the rentals for August, 1957, plus the rentals that might become
due and payable beginning March, 1960, at the rate of P2,500.00
a month, with interest on the sums of P42,500 and P836.92 at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint,
with interest on the subsequent rentals at the same rate
beginning the first of the following month, plus the sum of
P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the cost of the suit.” (pp. 25–26,
rec.)
From the decision of the Court of First Instance,

defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the same in toto in its decision dated August 31,
1964. Said decision was received by the appellants on
September 7, 1964.
On September 21, 1964, appellants filed the present

appeal, raising the following questions of law:
“1. Considering that the Court of Appeals found that

the Public Service Commission provisionally
approved the lease contract of January 20, 1956
between petitioners and Biñan Transportation
Company upon the condition, among others, that
such approval was subject to modification and
cancellation and to whatever decision that in due
time might be rendered in the case, the Court of
Appeals erred in giving no legal effect and
significance whatever to the suspension of
operations later granted by the Public Service
Commission after due hearing covering the lines
leased to petitioners thereby nullifying, contrary to
law and decisions of this Honorable Court, the
authority and powers conferred on the Public
Service Commission.
“2. The Court of Appeals misapplied the statutory rules
on interpreting contracts and erred in its
construction of the clauses in the lease agreement
authorizing petitioners to suspend operation
without the corresponding liability for rentals
during the period of suspension.
“3. Contrary to various decisions of this Honorable
Court relieving the lessee from the obligation to pay
rent where there is failure to use or enjoy the thing
leased, the Court of Appeals erroneously required
petitioners to pay rentals, with interest, during the
period of suspension of the lease from January,
1958 up to the expiration of the agreement on
January 20,1961." (p. 7, rec.)
On October 12,1964, the Supreme Court issued a resolution

dismissing said petition “for lack of merit.” (p. 43, rec.).
Said resolution was received by petitioners on October
16,1964.
656

On October 31, 1964, the day the Court’s resolution was to

become final, petitioners filed a “Motion to Admit Amended
Petition and to Give Due Course Thereto.” In said motion,
petitioners explained—
“x x x The amendment includes an alternative ground relating to

petitioners’ prayer for the reduction of the rentals payable by
them. This alternative petition was not included in the original
one as petitioners were genuinely convinced that they should have
been absolved from all liability whatever. However, in view of the
apparent position taken by this Honorable Court, as implied in its
resolution on October 12, 1964, notice of which was received on
October 16, 1964, petitioners now squarely submit their
alternative position for consideration. There is decisional
authority for the reduction of rentals payable (see Reyes v. Caltex,
47 O.G. 1193, 1203–1204)" (p. 44, rec.).
The new question raised is presented thus:
“x x x x x x x x x x x x x
IV
“This Honorable Court is authorized to equitably reduce the

rentals payable by the petitioners, should this Honorable Court
adopt the position of the Court of Appeals and the lower court
that petitioners have not been relieved from the payment of
rentals on the leased lines.” (p. 7, Amended Petition for
Certiorari, pp. 46, 52, rec.).
On November 5, 1964, the Supreme Court required

respondents herein to file an answer to the amended
petition. On the same date, respondents filed, quite
belatedly, an opposition to the motion of the petitioners.
Said opposition was later “noted” by the Court in its
resolution dated December 1, 1964.
First, it must be pointed out that the first three questions

of law raised by petitioners were already disposed of in Our
resolution dated October 12, 1964 dismissing the original
petition for lack of merit, which in effect affirmed the
appealed decision of the Court of of Appeals. Although, in
their motion to admit amended petition dated October 31,
1964, petitioners sought a reconsideration of the said
resolution not only in the light of the fourth legal issue
raised but also on the said first three legal questions, the
petitioners advanced no additional
657
VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 657

arguments nor cited new authorities in support of their

stand on the first three questions of law. They merely
reproduced verbatim from their original petition their
discussion on said questions.
To the extent therefore that the motion filed by the
petitioner seeks a reconsideration of our order of dismissal
by submitting anew, through the amended petition, the
very same arguments already dismissed by this Court, the
motion shall be considered pro forma, (See Estrada v. Sto.
Domingo, 28 SCRA 890, 905–906, 911) and hence is
without merit.
Consequently, we limit the resolution of this case solely
on the discussions on the last (fourth) question of law
raised, taking into consideration the discussion on the first
three questions only insofar as they place the petitioners’
discussion on the fourth question in its proper context and
perspective.
II
The undisguised object of petitioners’ discussion on the

fourth question of law raised is to justify their plea for a
reduction of the rentals on the ground that the subject
matter of the lease was allegedly not used by them as a
result of the suspension of operations on the lines
authorized by the Public Service Commission.
In support of said plea, petitioners invoke article 1680 of
the Civil Code which grants lessees of rural lands a right to
a reduction of rentals whenever the harvest on the land
leased is considerably damaged by an extraordinary
fortuitous event. Reliance was also placed by the
petitioners on Our decision in Reyes v. Caltex (Phil.) Inc.,
84 Phil. 654, which supposedly applied said article by
analogy to a lease other than that covered by said legal
provision.
The authorities from which the petitioners draw
support, however, are not applicable to the case at bar.
Article 1680 of the Civil Code reads thus:
“Art. 1680. The lessee shall have no right to a reduction of the

rent on account of the sterility of the land leased, or by reason of
the loss of fruits due to ordinary fortuitous events; but he shall
have such right in case of the loss of more than one-half of the
fruits through extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous events,
save always when there is a specific stipulation to the contrary.
“Extraordinary fortuitous events are understood to be: fire,
war, pestilence, unusual flood, locusts, earthquake, or others
which are
658

uncommon, and which the contracting parties could not have

reasonably foreseen.”
Article 1680, it will be observed is a special provision for

leases of rural lands. No other legal provision makes it
applicable to ordinary leases. Had the intention of the
lawmakers been so, they would have placed the article
among the general provisions on lease. Nor can the article
be applied analogously to ordinary leases, for precisely
because of its special character, it was meant to apply only
to a special specie of lease. It is a provision of social justice
designed to relieve poor farmers from the harsh
consequences of their contracts with rich landowners. And
taken in that light, the article provides no refuge to lessees
whose financial standing or social position is equal to, or
even better than, the lessor as in the case at bar.
Even if the cited article were a general rule on lease, its
provisions nevertheless do not extend to petitioners. One of
its requisites is that the cause of loss of the fruits of the
leased property must be an “extraordinary and unforeseen
fortuitous event.” The circumstances of the instant case fail
to satisfy such requisite. As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, the alleged causes for the suspension of operations
on the lines leased, namely, the high prices of spare parts
and gasoline and the reduction of the dollar allocations,
“already existed when the contract of lease was executed”
(p. 11, Decision; p. 30, rec.; Cuyugan v. Dizon, 89 Phil. 80).
The cause of petitioners’ inability to operate on the lines
cannot, therefore, be ascribed to fortuitous events or
circumstances beyond their control, but to their own
voluntary desistance (p. 13, Decision; p. 32, rec.).
If the petitioners would predicate their plea on the basis
solely of their inability to use the certificates of public
convenience, absent the requisite of fortuitous event, the
cited article would speak strongly against their plea.
Article 1680 opens with the statement: “The lessee shall
have no right to reduction of the rent on account of the
sterility of the land leased x x x.” Obviously, no reduction
can be sustained on the ground that the operation of the
leased lines was suspended upon the mere speculation that
it would yield no substantial profit for the lessee bus
company. Petitioners’ profits may be reduced due to
increase operating costs; but the volume of passenger

traffic along the leased lines not only remains the
659
VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 559

same but may even increase as the tempo of the movement

of population is intensified by the industrial development of
the areas covered or connected by the leased routes.
Moreover, upon proper showing, the Public Service
Commission might have granted petitioners an increase in
rates, as it has done so in several instances, so that public
interest will always be promoted by a continuous flow of
transportation facilities to service the population and the
economy. The citizenry and the economy will suffer by
reason of any disruption in the transportation facilities.
Furthermore, we are not at all convinced that the lease
contract brought no material advantage to the lessor for
the period of suspension. It must be recalled that the lease
contract not only stipulated for the transfer of the lessor’s
right to operate the lines covered by the contract, but also
for a forbearance on the part of the lessor to operate
transportation business along the same lines—and to hold
a certificate for that purpose. Thus, even if the lessee would
not actually make use of the lessor’s certificates over the
leased lines, the contractual commitment of the lessor not
to operate on the lines would sufficiently insure added
profit to the lessees on account of the lease contract. In
other words, the commitment alone of the lessor under the
contract would enable the lessees to reap full benefits
therefrom since the commuting public would, after all, be
forced—at their inconvenience and prejudice—to patronize
petitioner’s remaining buses.
Contrary to what petitioners want to suggest, WE
refused in the Reyes case, supra, to apply by analogy
Article 1680 and consequently, WE denied the plea of
lessee therein for an equitable reduction of the stipulated
rentals, holding that:
“The general rule on performance of contracts is graphically set

forth in American treatises, which is also the rule, in our opinion,
obtaining under the Civil Code.
“Where a person by his contract charges himself with an
obligation possible to be performed, he must perform it, unless the
performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, by the law,
or by the other party, it being the rule that in case the party
desires to be excused from the performance in the event of

contingencies arising, it is his duty to provide therefor in his
contract. Hence, performance is not excused by subsequent
inability to perform, by unforeseen difficulties, by unusual or
unexpected expenses, by danger, by inevitable accident, by the
breaking of machinery, by strikes, by
660

sickness, by failure of a party to avail himself of the benefits to be

had under the contract, by weather conditions, by financial
stringency, or by stagnation of business. Neither is performance
excused by the fact that the contract turns out to be hard and
improvident, unprofitable or impracticable, ill-advised, or even
foolish, or less profitable, or unexpectedly burdensome. (17 CJS
946–948)" (Reyes vs. Caltex, supra, 664. Underscoring supplied).
Also expressed in said case is a ruling in American

jurisprudence, which found relevance again in the case at
bar, to wit: "(S)ince, by the lease, the lessee was to have the
advantage of casual profits of the leased premises, he
should run the hazard of casual losses during the term and
not lay the whole burden upon the lessor.” (Reyes vs.
Caltex, supra, 664).
Militating further against a grant of reduction of the
rentals to the petitioners is the petitioners’ conduct which
is not in accord with the rules of fair play and justice.
Petitioners, it must be recalled, promised to pay the
accrued rentals in due time. Later, however, when they
believed they found a convenient excuse for escaping their
obligation, they reneged on their earlier promise. Moreover,
petitioners’ option to suspend operation on the leased lines
appears malicious. Thus, Justice Esguerra, speaking for
the Court of Appeals, propounded the following questions:
“If it were true that the cause of the suspension was the
high prices of spare parts, gasoline and needed materials
and the reduction of the dollar allocation, why was it that
only plaintiff-appellee’s certificate of public convenience
was sought to be suspended? Why did not the defendants-
appellants ask for a corresponding reduction or suspension
under their own certificate along the same route? Suppose
the prices of the spare parts and needed materials were
cheap, would the defendants-appellants have paid more
than what is stipulated in the lease contract? We believe
not. Hence, the suspension of operation on the leased lines
was conceived as a scheme to lessen operation costs with

the expectation of greater profit.” (p. 14, Decision).
Indeed, petitioners came to court with unclean hands,
which fact militates against their plea for equity.
WHEREFORE, THE ORIGINAL AND AMENDED
PETITIONS ARE HEREBY DISMISSED, AND THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED
AUGUST 31, 1964 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS.
661
VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 661

Vega vs. Lopez
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Muñoz

Palma, JJ., concur.
Esguerra, J., no part.
Petitions dismissed, decision affirmed.
Notes.—Reduction of rentals due to loss. Loss of crops

during the war years could not be ground for reduction of
rent to a tenant of agricultural land where the lessor
offered to rescind the lease early in 1942, before the
planting season commenced and after the country was
already at war, but the tenant nevertheless clung to the
land during that and the following years. Cuyugan vs.
Dizon, 79 Phil. 80, L-208, Aug. 29, 1947.
A lessee of agricultural land claiming a reduction of rent
because of loss of fruits of the land under article 1575 of the
old Civil Code has the burden of establishing that the loss
was more than one-half of usual production, and his failure
to produce evidence as to the ratio of loss necessarily
defeated his claim. ibid.
Where a seven-year lease of agricultural land, entered
into before the war, called for payment by defendant, as
tenant, of an annual rental of 1,000 piculs of export sugar,
the rent provision called for delivery of a generic thing
within the meaning of article 1096 of the Civil Code, and
defendant was none the less liable for its payment because
of his inability to produce sugar during the war or in the
post-war years when no sugar mills were operating. Lacson
vs. Diaz, L-2837, Aug. 4, 1950.
———o0o———
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4/23/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 058

650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY and BATANGAS

Civil law: Lease; Reduction of rental under extraordinary

VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 651

Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs. Manabat

of petitioners’ inability to operate on the lines cannot, therefore,

APPEAL by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the

“On January 20, 1956, a contract was executed whereby the

date the Public Service Commission provisionally approved the

652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Biñan Transportation Company was declared insolvent in Special

Bank of the Philippines for the purchase of spare parts needed in

VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 653

which act falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the ordinary

function belongs to the exclusive domain of the ordinary courts,

While proceedings before the Public Service Commission

“On May 19, 1959, plaintiff Biñan Transportation Company,

654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The motion to dismiss was, however, denied. Meanwhile—

“The Public Service Commission delegated its Chief Attorney to

between Batangas Piers-Manila, Binan-Manila, Sta. Rosa-Manila and

Going back to the Court of First Instance of Laguna—

“x x x The motion (to dismiss) having been denied, the defendants

The Court of Appeals proceeded to state that—

“After hearing in the court a quo and presentation by the parties

VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 655

1960, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, ordering the

From the decision of the Court of First Instance,

On September 21, 1964, appellants filed the present

“1. Considering that the Court of Appeals found that

On October 12,1964, the Supreme Court issued a resolution

656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On October 31, 1964, the day the Court’s resolution was to

“x x x The amendment includes an alternative ground relating to

The new question raised is presented thus:

“This Honorable Court is authorized to equitably reduce the

On November 5, 1964, the Supreme Court required

First, it must be pointed out that the first three questions

VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 657

arguments nor cited new authorities in support of their

The undisguised object of petitioners’ discussion on the

“Art. 1680. The lessee shall have no right to a reduction of the

658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

uncommon, and which the contracting parties could not have

Article 1680, it will be observed is a special provision for

increase operating costs; but the volume of passenger

VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 559

same but may even increase as the tempo of the movement

“The general rule on performance of contracts is graphically set

desires to be excused from the performance in the event of

660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

sickness, by failure of a party to avail himself of the benefits to be

Also expressed in said case is a ruling in American

was conceived as a scheme to lessen operation costs with

VOL. 58, AUGUST 29, 1974 661

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Muñoz