1. Delfina Santiago vs. Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty.

Nicomedes Tolentino
A.C. No. 3921; June 11, 2018
Leonardo De-Castro, J.

TO JUSTIFY DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION, THE CASE AGAINST THE LAWYER MUST

BE FREE FROM DOUBT, NOT ONLY TO THE ACT BUT AS TO HIS MOTIVE AS WELL

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of an administrative case for disbarment where complainant
Judge Delfina Santiago seeks to reverse the decision of the IBP denying her complaint
against respondents.

Complainant was a City Personnel Officer while respondents were City Legal Officers in
the City Government of Caloocan. In 1988, complainant applied for, and was granted, a
sick leave of absence with commuted pay covering 240 days. Within the period,
complainant received a memorandum from then Mayor Asistio, Jr., cancelling all leaves
of absence of city officials and employees. She received a memorandum detailing her to
the Office of the Secretary to the Mayor, but she paid no heed to such. She was later
directed to return to work in a letter signed by Atty. Tolentino, but she did not return to
work. At the end of her leave, she tendered her resignation. She subsequently received
a memorandum from Mayor Asistio terminating her employment. Enclosed with the
memorandum was a resolution signed by respondents, which recommend her dismissal
from service.

Complainant filed the present case, accusing the respondents of making deceitful
statements in said resolution, committing gross misconduct and violating their
Attorney’s Oath for recommending her dismissal without just cause and due process. In
respondent Santiago’s comment to the complaint, he argued that the allegedly deceitful
statements in the resolution were not malicious imputations of falsehood. The IBP
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Did complainant present sufficient evidence to prove gross misconduct and violation of
the Lawyer’s Oath?

RULING:
No, the complainant failed to prove her allegations.

In Osop vs. Fontanilla, the Court ruled that charges meriting disciplinary action against
a lawyer generally involve the motives that induced him to commit the act charged and
that, to justify disbarment or suspension, the case against the lawyer must be clear and
free from doubt, not only as to the act charged but as to his motive. In here, except for
complainant's allegations, however, she failed to present sufficient evidence to
substantiate her complaint. Complainant has not proffered any evidence that tended to
show that respondents intentionally and deliberately made false statements in the
Resolution in order to deceive and induce Mayor Asistio to dismiss complainant from
service. She neither offered any documentary evidence to buttress her arguments nor
presented any witness to corroborate her claims. Complainant failed to discharge
burden of proof to warrant the imposition of administrative liability against respondents.

Hence, for insufficiency of evidence to prove the respondents’ alleged act of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, the complaint is dismissed.
2. Heirs of Juan de Dios E. Carlos vs. Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan
A.C. No. 11494; July 24, 2017
Tijam, J.

THE PROSCRIPTION ON NON-PURCHASE OF INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF

LITIGATION STILL APPLIES IN CANON 1 IN RELATION TO ART. 1941(5) OF THE CIVIL
CODE

FACTS:
The present case is a disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Juan de Dios E. Carlos
against Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan for allegedly forcing them to sign pleadings and
documents, for selling their parcel of land without authorization, and for evasion of
income taxes. Linsangan was the counsel for the complainants’ late father in several
cases involving a certain parcel of land. During the pendency of the cases, Linsangan
and Juan Carlos entered into a contract, which stipulated that the latter bounds himself
to pay the former a fee amounting to 50% of what they would be able to recover.
Linsangan and the heirs of Juan Carlos, despite the pendency of the other cases,
subsequently submitted a supplemental compromise agreement equally dividing
between them the latters’ portion in the previous compromise agreement earlier
approved by the court. Thereafter, Linsangan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying the entire parcel of land to a certain Perez purportedly on the strength of the
special power of attorney executed by the individual owners in the agreements.
Respondent refused to remit to the parties their individual shares.

Complainants averred, among other things, that Linsangan connived with their mother,
in submitting the compromise agreement and in selling the subject property. The Heirs
of Juan de Dios also assailed the supplemental compromise agreement and proposed
that the respondent be paid based on quantum meruit instead of the 50% stipulated in
the contract. By way of comment, Atty. Linsangan averred that the supplemental
compromise agreement was never questioned by the complainants until now. He also
admitted that the subject of the sale is property, which is under litigation.

ISSUE:
Does the supplemental compromise agreement, which conveyed a portion of the
subject property to the respondent while still under litigation in other cases, violate the
Lawyer’s Oath?

RULING:
Yes. The supplemental compromise agreement is a breach of the Lawyer’s Oath. While
Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics is no longer reproduced in the new
CPR, such proscription still applies in Canon 1, which clearly requires that “a lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land…”, in relation to Art. 1491(5) of
the Civil Code, which forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the
property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue
of their profession. In the present case, Linsangan violated Art. 1491(5) of the CC,
which, in turn, is a transgression of his oath to uphold the laws of the land. The facts
reveal that the transfer to Linsangan was made while the subject property was still
under litigation in other cases. Therefore, in view of this, respondent violated the
Lawyer’s Oath by conveying to himself through the supplemental compromise
agreement a portion of the subject lot under litigation.
Manuel L. Valin vs. Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz
A.C. No. 10564; November 7, 2017
Gesmundo, J.

FALSIFICATION IS AN ACT OF FALSEHOOD, REPREHENSIBLE UNDER THE CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LAWYER’S OATH

FACTS:
Complainants Manuel and Honorio Valin filed an administrative case against respondent
Atty. Rolando Ruiz with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for committing
forgery and falsification of a deed of absolute sale, in breach of his lawyer's oath and in
violation of the laws. The complainants averred that they are two of the surviving
children of their deceased parents, spouses Pedro F. Valin and Cecilia Lagadon. Pedro
was the original registered owner of a parcel of land. Pedro died while he was in
Hawaii. Several years later, complainant Honorio discovered that the land has been
transferred to Atty. Ruiz, the godson of Pedro. He learned from the Register of Deeds
that the subject land was conveyed to respondent by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale,
and executed in Cagayan purportedly by Pedro with the alleged consent of his spouse,
Cecilia. Complainants alleged that the subject deed was falsified and the signatures
therein of Pedro and Cecilia were forgeries because Pedro was already dead and Cecilia
was in Hawaii at that time. The complainants pointed to respondent as the author of
the falsifications and forgeries because he was the one who benefited from the same.
Respondent denied having knowledge regarding the execution of the document. He
insisted that he neither falsified the said deed and nor forged the signatures of Pedro
and Cecilia.

The IBP found respondent to be unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney. It
reasoned that as the beneficiary of the falsified deed, respondent was presumed to be
the author thereof.

ISSUE:
Is respondent Atty. Ruiz unfit to be a lawyer for being a beneficiary of a falsified deed?

RULING:
Yes, Atty. Ruiz is unfit for the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and the Lawyer’s Oath.

Rule 1.01 of the CPR states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only
to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of
court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according
to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as
to his clients. The Court is convinced that respondent was the author or, at the very
least, has connived with the author of the subject deed and Pedro's CTC for his
personal benefits. Respondent incessantly closed his eyes until he became blind to the
anomalies surrounding the sale of the subject land.

Thus, Atty. Ruiz is guilty of violating the CPR and Lawyer’s Oath warranting his
suspension from the practice of law.
Henry Samonte vs. Atty. Gines Abellana
A.C. No. 3452, June 23, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his
clients on the status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member of
the Law Profession. This is because he is always expected to be honest and forthright
in his dealings with them. He thereby merits the condign sanction of suspension from
the practice of law, if not disbarment.

FACTS:
Complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative complaint against
respondent Atty. Gines N. AbelJana who had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil
Case entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.

In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional

misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:
1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil
Case No. CEB- 6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the
complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988;
2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to:
(a) file the reply vis-à-vis the answer with counterclaim, with his omission having
delayed the pre-trial of the case;
(b) inform the trial court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a
scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for the plaintiff’s side an unexplained
absence detrimental to Samonte as the plaintiff; and
(c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it
three months later;
3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings; and
4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte
for his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.

In his comment, Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of documents,

clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June 14, 1988
instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover
the filing fees and other charges.

On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash from Atty. Abellana, seeking
the dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the lack of interest on the part
of Samonte. On May 1, 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty.
Abellana negligent in handling certain aspects of his client’s case.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana,
observing that apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said
respondent has shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to
cover-up his delay and lack of diligence in pursuing the case of his client. On June 5,
2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one year.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Abellana shall be upheld.

RULING:
YES.

A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his
clients on the status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member of
the Law Profession. This is because he is always expected to be honest and forthright
in his dealings with them. He thereby merits the condign sanction of suspension from
the practice of law, if not disbarment.

In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be
honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and
demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine
Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of
this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession.
By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but
also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the
doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. It is by no
means a coincidence; therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are
emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness
in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He
resorted to outright falsification by superimposing “0” on “4” in order to mislead
Samonte into believing that he had already filed the complaint in court on June 10,
1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had actually done so.
Atty. Abellana’s perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued misleading
Samonte in explaining his mishandling of the latter’s civil case. Worse, he also foisted
his dishonesty on the Court no less. The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the
handling of Samonte’s case was entirely warranted. He admitted being tardy in
attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf of
his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the
RTC Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the order issued in the
case.

In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty.
Abellana challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte,
contending that such proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving evidence.
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers. Preponderant evidence
means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. In order to determine if the evidence of one party is
greater than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that
the court may consider the following, namely: ( a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; ( c) the witnesses’
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not
mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number. The complainant’s
evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of Atty. Abellana.

The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and
the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's
case, were unmitigated. Still, the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty.
Abellana actually finished presenting his client's case; and that the latter initiated the
termination of Atty. Abellana's engagement as his counsel only after their relationship
had been tainted with mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper sanction. For Atty.
Abellana, therefore, suspension from the practice of law for six months with warning of
a more severe sanction upon a repetition suffices.
Presiding Judge Jose Madrid vs. Atty. Juan Dealca
A.C. No. 7474, September 09, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high
sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient
or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by
any taint of insincerity or self-interest.

FACTS:
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No.
2006-6795, entitled “People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault ” presided by
complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel
for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-
raffled to another Branch of the RTC “c onsidering the adverse incidents between the
incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned,” where “he does not appear before
the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersigned.” Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar Confidant
citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for
the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents
between them. We treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint. On July
17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation, report
and recommendation.

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madrid dismissed for its lack of merit the
administrative complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842
entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity of
Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him and
his clients.

In compliance with the referral, the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report. The
documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S.
Dealca filed by himself five (5) cases which are factual evidence of the cases that
respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the complainants against court
officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in
cases that respondent had handled as counsel for the parties in the said cases. All these
cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of
the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of
Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal case
against the judges and personnel of the court. All these documentary evidence from (a)
to (e) are helpful in determining the “PROPENSITY” of the respondent as a member of
the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures
provided for by the Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of
the court.

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and

Recommendation finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminal
complaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law
for one year because. In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41, the IBP Board of Governors
modified the recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of
merit.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Atty. Dealca filed frivolous administrative and criminal complaints
against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility
(2) Whether or not Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of
Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795.

RULING:
Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits Although
the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of
vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or
undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any
taint of insincerity or self-interest. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint
against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any
trace of idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca
exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering
that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out, his bringing of charges against judges,
court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from
decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. The Lawyer’s Oath is a
source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an
attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.
These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable. As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty
under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has
also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper
administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded
complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the
Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to
litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith. Atty. Dealca’s bringing of
the numerous administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel
and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that he
made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially prove, and are
rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious
consideration.

Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have
promulgated in frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing
would not advance his cause now. He thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of the
rules of procedure applicable to the Court. The minute resolutions have been issued for
the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court. Whenever the Court then dismisses a
petition for review for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is understood that
the challenged decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and law, is
deemed sustained or upheld, and the minute resolution then constitutes the actual
adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or its denial of due
course indicates the Court’s agreement with and its adoption of the findings and
conclusions of the court a quo.
The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute
resolutions that the Court issues in disposing of a case. The Court explained why in
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its
cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case
is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the
decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the
facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the
petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for
noncompliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the
petition always gives the legal basis.
Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo vs. Atty. Aristedes A. Maramot
A.C. No. 9067; January 31, 2018
Bersamin, J.

A LAWYER MUST BE A DISCIPLE OF TRUTH OTHERWISE HIS COMMISSION OF

FALSEHOOD CAN BE CONDINGLY SANCTIONED

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo against Atty.
Aristeredes A. Maramot. According to Atty. Maramot, Margarita wanted to donate her
property in favor of her two grandnieces who were only 12 years old and 16 1/2 years
old, at the time of its execution. Upon learning of their minority, Atty. Maramot advised
Margarita that they had to be represented by their parents. However, Margarita
persisted and prevailed over him, so he prepared a deed of donation but left the date,
document number, and page number in blank, and reserved the notarization for later
after the parties had signed the document. Atty. Maramot adverted to Margarita's
assurance that she would herself procure the signatures of the parents of Princess Anne
on the document.

Atty. Maramot further alleged that there was nothing illegal in the said deed of donation
as Margarita had the right to dispose her property by donation. Complainant alleged
that Atty. Maramot consented to, abetted and participated in the illegal act of falsifying
a deed of donation executed by her aunt, Margarita Apolinar, in favor of Margarita’s
grandnieces, by preparing a deed of donation, and indicating that the donees were of
legal age despite knowing that they are minors.

ISSUE:
Did Atty. Maramot, commit an act of dishonesty, in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, when he falsified the age of the donees in the
Deed of Donation?

RULING:
Yes. Atty. Maramot committed dishonesty when he prepared such Deed of Donation,
and thereby violating his Oath and the CPR. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He
swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.
He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly
inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice
and arriving at correct conclusion.

Here, Atty. Maramot prepared the deed of donation and at the time of his preparation
of the document, he actually knew that Princess Anne and Mommayda were minors. His
doing so, being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer not to utter
a falsehood. He thereby consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest conduct,
defying the law and contributing to the erosion of confidence in the Law Profession.
Hence, Atty. Maramot committed dishonesty when he prepared the Deed of Donation
knowing fully well that the donees were minors.
In Re: G.R. No. 157659 "Eligio P. Mallari vs. Government Service Insurance
System and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga."
A.C. No. 11111; January 10, 2018
Jardeleza, J.

THE FILING OF MULTIPLE PETITIONS CONSTITUTES ABUSE OF THE COURT'S

PROCESSES AND IMPROPER CONDUCT

FACTS:
This is an administrative case involving Atty. Eligio P. Mallari, wherein the Supreme
Court directed the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP to investigate Atty. Mallari to
investigate Atty. Mallari for violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Atty. Mallari obtained two loans, which were secured by two mortgages over two
parcels of land registered under his and his wife's name, from GSIS. Despite repeated
demands, Atty. Mallari failed to settle his account. This prompted GSIS to commence
the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him. In turn, the validity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings was upheld by the Court, and the issuance of titles
in the name of the GSIS was proper. Upon application of GSIS, the RTC issued a writ of
execution cum writ of possession in its favor. The Sheriff failed to serve the writ,
because Atty. Mallari requested him for an extension of time to vacate the premises.
However, Atty. Mallari filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of
execution. This case was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

Subsequently, Atty. Mallari filed two motions to hold GSIS in contempt of court for
painting the fence and for cutting off electric services on the properties. The RTC
denied the motions for contempt of court, and ordered the re-implementation of the
writ of execution. The Court then directed the Committee on Bar Discipline for alleged
infractions of Atty. Mallari in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In his answer, Atty. Mallari claims that as lawful owner of the said
properties, he has the right to exclude other persons from his properties.

ISSUE:
Is the act of stalling the execution of the decision of the court by employing dilatory
tactics constitute as a violation of the duty of fidelity to the courts?

RULING:
Yes. Atty. Mallari’s acts of stalling the execution of the decision of the court by
employing dilatory tactics is a violation of the duty of fidelity to the courts. He
deliberately abused court procedures and processes, in order to enable himself to
obstruct and stifle the fair and quick administration of justice in favor of mortgagee and
GSIS.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court's
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. The Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and
good faith to the court; Rule 10.03- A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice; Rule 12.02 – A lawyer shall not file
multiple actions arising from the same cause; and Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
In this case, the judgment in favor of the GSIS concerning the validity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings had long became final and executory. Despite this,
Atty. Mallari, with the purpose of delaying the execution of the judgment by the winning
party, took the series of actions which effectively obstructed the execution of a final and
executory judgment. Hence, Atty. Mallari’s acts of stalling the execution of the decision
of the Court by employing dilatory tactics constitutes a violation of his duty of fidelity to
the Courts.