Alternative Dispute Resolution
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Basic Concepts
Harm under ADR
Harm is conceptualised as something affecting that particular person and also the society at large. The conception
of harm is contextual and there cannot be a one-size-fits-all remedy. Instead, the remedy must be tailor-made. The
impact of the harm on the victim as well as the reintegration of the wrongdoer must be considered. At this stage
of resolution, community-involvement is important for the reintegration process, as it concerns them. This is why
ADR is called “participative process of resolution”. The State is however not concerned about things beyond
punishment, ADR is different because it is a creative process and take the reintegration into consideration.
Conception of justice
Justice is contextual, it is geared towards India’s Rule of Law. Fairness and equality without consideration for social
standing. The ADR processes incorporate social equality and are not just considered with formal equality. Justice
shouldn’t be just responsive/reactive, but must be geared towards equal well-being. This is why out-of-the-box
and creative solutions are allowed and encouraged.
Flexibility in ADR
It looks at the actual impact of the problems on the needs of the people. People might require different remedies
and not just what is given by the law. Example: Western countries encourage face-to-face interaction between the
victim and the criminal because this might help reintegration, and also allow assistance by local officials. ADR
processes provide a participatory platform and act as a liberating process for the victim. Because in the normal
court system there is no participation in the healing process. Allowing people to speak in the ADR process can be
an empowering experience.
ADR aims to achieve results in cordial manner and reduces or at least maintain the level of animosity as it is and
not increase it.
The court system entirely focuses on the facts of a past incident. They do not focus on the future. They assume that
by making an example of one person, they would prevent wrongs from happening in the future (deterrence). ADR,
however, believes that humans always have existing relationships with each other. They look into the past to learn
from mistakes and attribute liability but the focus is on the future of the relationship between the parties.
Even in cases of one-time short relationships, a person will work towards resolving his or her issues within that
short period relationship. Parties must explain their perspectives and needs in detail. The individual’s future and
growth must also be considered the ADR process.
In ADR, the parties are the primary focus as their participation is key to justice.
(a) parties have a voice in how the dispute is presented. This is entirely for the parties.
(b) feeling of being heard. They get the feeling of validation and acknowledgement for their experiences.
(c) Having control over the process – it is an underlying need in all dispute resolution processes, people want
to have control over everything around them. In the court system there is no control over the processes
and the parties usually are not able to decide on any action to be taken. In ADR, the parties can decide the
place, time and procedure of dispute resolution. They are empowered and given the capacity to take
control and big rational decisions. It is a very party-dependent process. Participation gives them control and
reduces negativity.
(b) Fairness
ADR ensures fairness. Fair treatment in court - the impartial procedure ensures fair treatment. In ADR, the degree
of involvement and participation gives the parties feeling that they have been fairly treated. If there is this sense of
fair treatment, the parties are more likely to follow the ultimate decision that was a result of the ADR process.
Respect, etc.
(c) Flexibility
Of process and of the outcome. ADR lacks the rigidity and tyranny of the law. The court system is very lengthy.
ADR allows you greater confidentiality. The laws can also be decided by the parties. This allows greater freedom in
deciding what laws govern them.
Criticisms of ADR
(a) Resources:
lack of ADR professionals, lack of training funds.
(1) Disagreement
We give permission only to some to comment on us/personal life/professional life. We set boundaries, which are
either drawn explicitly or declared. If someone crosses it, it causes disagreement. Boundaries also keep shifting on
an almost daily basis depending on our frame of mind. Intervention of third-party/prudence on one’s part
necessary for an amicable resolution at this stage.
(6) Polarisation
last stage at which intervention is possible. You
are entrenched in your position
(legal/otherwise) and court process is the only
way out. Parties are virtually unable to coexist
with one another.
Conflict Management
Two approaches
a. Co-operative
b. Assertive
Variables
Depending on these you can decide how which or to what extent will you choose (a) or (b) from the aforementioned
list.
1. Importance of the relationship
2. Importance of the issue
3. Leverage over each other
4. Time available
Models
Collaborative Model/Corroborative Bargains
Harvard Project; Maximum interest of the people will be achieved. The distributive process makes it a win-win
situation. However, the main problem is that it requires sincere effort and maximum concern from all people
involved.
Competing Model
Can be used when the issue is more important than the relationship. Maximum assertiveness, not recommended
for interpersonal disputes. If you need to take an unpopular decision for the greater good or in case you have more
power and time is also a constraint. (??)
Accommodating Model
You are not taking care of your personal interests, maybe when you have less bargaining power. High on
compromise and very low on assertiveness. The issue is not as important as the relationship. Maybe the dispute is
at a time when building goodwill is very important. This is not a good response because in the long run it may lead
to frustration and you may be taken for granted.
(a) Separating the persons from the issue- As representative is not personally concerned with the dispute, they
can handle it objectively.
Problems
(a) Emotional Aspect: We have to confront the emotions as they are. We must not react to the emotional
outburst.
(b) Perception: We need to understand the process of perception of the other person.
(c) Communication: Parties quibble to other parties, leading to confirmation bias, instead of talking to each
other. You should talk to each other instead.
(d) Over-blaming: For allocation and attribution of responsibility, blaming is required but you should not over
blame the person by attacking him. Blame game clouds your rationality.
(e) Empathy and Sympathy: if you have a fear that the other person will leave you, it will colour your
interpretation of his/her acts. You need to understand the perception of the other person so that you do
not misunderstand their words and actions.
(f) Secrecy: Negotiators never reveal their underlying intent. So you have to figure them out yourself. A lot of
brainstorming is spent out figuring out intentions.
Other Concepts
Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) must be refined and used in the other situation.
Negotiation Jujitsu
They do not use their force in attacking an opponent, they simply direct and flip the opponent’s attack on them.
The principled party may use "negotiation jujitsu" to bring the other party in line. The key is to refuse to respond in
kind to their positional bargaining. When the other side attacks, the principles party should not counter attack, but
should deflect the attack back onto the problem. Positional bargainers usually attack either by asserting their
position, or by attacking the other side's ideas or people. When they assert their position, respond by asking for the
reasons behind that position. When they attack the other side's ideas, the principle party should take it as
constructive criticism and invite further feedback and advice. Personal attacks should be recast as attacks on the
problem. Generally the principled party should use questions and strategic silences to draw the other party out.
Integrative Bargaining
If the opponent is trying positional bargaining, you must question and focus on the underlying intent and press for
soft positional or integrative bargaining. Even then, if the opponent refuses to focus on interests, then you can use
negotiation jujitsu and flip the attack on the issue.
Then the party gets locked into the position they are taking and try to defend it. They try to save face. If you do the
same thing (i.e. play hard and do positional bargaining, I guess), then it simply becomes a clash of ego and
personality. They then become positional bargainers and do not reach a
solution. It is better to use negotiation jujitsu and try to explore their interests
and help them move form their position by pointing out their underlying Argumen
Defense
t
interests.
Hard positioners usually rejects all proposals to discourage the negotiators, you
must psychologically deflect this and ask them for the reasons for not accepting
things, that way you can disarm them. Even when they personally attack you,
Counter
you must not react and you must remain poised. That way you can use the Attack
attack
pressure against the problem.
Problem of Bluffing
A main issue in negotiation is the lack of trust. There is a problem of communication. You can ask them questions
and make sure that you are actively listening. Non-verbal cues must be observed. The body language of the parties
+ the skill of asking the right questions at the right time can really change the direction of the negotiations.
Venue
Usually people say that you must just pick a neutral zone, but some negotiators pick the home turf of the other
party to ensure that they are relaxed and ready to make concessions. Sometimes they make the temperature
extreme so that people can finish the negotiations fast. The seating arrangement also really impacts the quality of
the negotiations. It should not be confrontational but must be collaborative.
Personal Psychological Attacks
This is often made to discourage the other negotiator and can either lead to quick completion or hostility.
Threats
No successful negotiator will use threats. Instead they should warnings which are not very negative. In case there
is a deadlock, compare, even after using the problem solving model of negotiations.
Failed Negotiation
A negotiation is said to have failed when either of these are the outcomes: -
(1) Where you can’t enter into any agreement.
(2) Where the agreement entered into is not the best possible agreement.
Barriers to Settlement
(a) Strategic Barrier
Maximum information must be given to enlarge the size of the pie. Then the pie must be distributed where one
must maximise his/her own interest. There is often a conflict between these two. Negotiators have the dilemma
about how much information they should reveal. If a negotiator tries to act strategically and guard information, and
the outcome will not be the best possible outcome.
Loss Aversion
Between a sure loss and one fifth chance of winning, what do you choose? The gambling is that there is a chance
to lose the entire amount. We reacting makes it likely that we will choose the one fifth option.
Risk aversion
Between a sure win and the gamble letting you gain more, people go for the sure win.
Together, these cause cognitive barriers during negotiation.
Cognitive Barrier
Mediator can help parties overcome the problems of risk and loss aversion, and help parties appreciate the trade-
off, help them arrive at a rational settlement.
Good Faith
Litigation usually breaches the confidentiality agreement between the parties. Civil law has confidentiality clauses,
however they aren’t present in common law. Cultural sensitivity really helps in understanding the other party and
adds to your negotiation style.
Client Counselling
The client believes that the advocate is an expert and expects an immediate answer to their problems.
Preventive Law
Aims at preventing disputes and focuses on legal opportunities. It aims to avoid litigation by delineating the rights
and duties in advance.
Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Look at the emotional ramification of any action, not just the legal ones. Ultimate thing is satisfaction and happiness.
Mediation
Mediators are trained third-parties, with no decision making power, they help the clients solve issues amicably.
Earlier the notion was that if the person was close to both parties and not neutral, then he could help them better.
[Eg: most respected or oldest person in the society].
Eg, Panchayat was a med-Arb situation. The Panchayat had decision making power if mediation failed.
Neutrality: You do not bring your own values to the table. You are not concerned with the outcome of the DR or
with the parties. It is essential in the present system of mediation.
The voluntary nature of mediation is one of the mediation is one of its biggest attractions. However, the
requirement of mandatory mediation is criticized for being against such feature of mediation.
Models of Mediation
1. Transformative Model (facilitative)
Unlike problem-solving mediation, transformative mediation does not seek a solution for the immediate problem.
Instead transformative mediation uses empowerment and mutual recognition of the parties involved in order to
understand the problem on many levels.
Through empowerment, parties are encouraged to examine their issues and develop their own solutions. Through
recognition, the involved parties are encouraged to understand the other party’s point of view, and why they seek
the solution they do. In transformative mediation, the mediator plays the role of a neutral third party and the
involved parties are responsible for all the outcomes.
If in the PSM, the mediator’s goal is only to reach a settlement then it is not any different from a Judicial Settlement
Conference. The judge in a JSC can predetermine the stand of the court and is well versed with the law. If JSC exists,
then why do you need PSM. Evaluative mediation can be compared to expert opinion in early neutral evaluation.
Mediation must aim to transform people, relationships and society. This is met by TM.
Responses
1. Mediator can refuse to sign the agreement if he feels that it is one sided.
2. BATNA is a tool against powerful parties, the mediator can help the parties work on their own and each
other’s BATNA
3. The mediator can give hints and help the parties during the caucus.
Confidentiality
Most important in PSM, because they need a free flow of information. It must be present at all stages. In the
Transformative mode, again confidentiality is very important. But it is said that they don’t need any confidentiality
because they discuss only emotional aspects of the dispute and n disclosure is made as such that it might prejudice
them in the trials.
Legal Expertise
Must in evaluative model; PSM requires legal advice only at the 4th stage of mediation- using objective criteria-Ruhi
feels they need legal knowledge at all stages because they need to understand their rights and liabilities and not
just at the distribution stage. In TM there is no discussion of the law, and therefore anyone can be a mediator. It is
a pure facilitative model of mediation. There is no need of any legal expertise.
Rule 1A: After hearing admissions and denials, court to ask parties to pick from any settlement method given in
Section 89 (1).
Rule 1B: Parties to appear before appropriate forum on decided date as per Rule 1A.
Rule 1C: If presiding officer of the forum referred to is of the opinion that it would not be just to move on with
settlement, then matter would be sent back to the Court.
Referring of Disputes
Stage of Referral
The Law Commission suggested that reference as per Section 89 must be made after the framing of issues.
(a) Early reference: Early mitigation lowers cost and time taken. Prevents the parties’ stance from hardening
(especially in adversarial). Ideal stage is once pleadings are done.
(b) Late reference - Not ideal point of time, they might not be ready to settle.
Everyone wants a day in Court. They have high expectations from the court system and aren’t ready for ADR, they
might not be willing to experiment. At a later stage, they will realise the inefficiency of the court and will probably
opt for ADR. Thus, the ideal stage is after settlement of issues between the parties, especially because after the
stage of interrogation, the parties might actually be willing to settle.
Arbitration is a form of alternative adjudication, and the award is usually binding on the parties. All the other
methods are those of conciliation and the parties can approach the court again.
3Sidenote about Judicial Impact Assessment, when a Bill is introduced, the cost of establishing a new court should be decided
by the government.
Under S. 89, the Court should look at whether settlement under S. 89 will be possible or not. They said different
judges sit in the court and bias can’t be assumed.
Four Tracks
1. Maintenance, divorce, child custody [family matters]: 9 months
2. Money suits: 12 months
3. Trademarks and copyrights: 24 months
4. All other cases: 24 months
Some officer must be given the task of tracking each case and must inform the judge of the time schedule. The
nature of dispute and quantum of court resources must be also factored in. Judge has the discretion to change the
case to different tracks.
Bottleneck 2: Serving of Summons
(a) The notice of when written statement must be given should also be given along with summons
(b) The timeline must be followed at every stage
(c) The calling of cases - cases should go to court only if judicial application of mind is necessary
(d) File for injunction or interim injunction. Tactics used by parties to get adjournments delay the case. Court
should make a strict timetable and follow it so that this is avoided.
Bottleneck 3: Interim orders/injunctions
Parties often seek a stay order as a strategy to suspend litigation for a long time.
Eg., whenever an Order 39 application is filed, on the hearing of the admission, the Court first listens to interim
applications. The rule says that if the court passes an ad-interim injunction, if it is passed in the absence of the
party, notice should be given to the opposite party. Defendant can then immediately come to contest the grant of
ad-interim injunction and Court can vacate it at the earliest if needed.
Eg., When defendant objects, plaintiff can file a rejoinder, but to keep injunction going plaintiffs file for
adjournments. The court must take strict notice of this
Costs
LCI said that the rule as to Costs in Section 35 of the CPC is not followed in most cases. Encourages frivolous litigation
without punishment. Court management rules require strict application of Sections 35, 35A and 35B of CPC.
Commencement of Conciliation
Parties may have a prior agreement providing for conciliation in case of dispute, or parties may first try to resolve
it using Arbitration and Conciliation Act, and if it fails, use the institutional rules. Conciliation is voluntary and in
even in case of an existing agreement, a party can refuse conciliation.6 The procedure for starting conciliation is as
follows: -
1. Sending of Notice
2. Deemed refusal in case of failure to respond within reasonable time
Relevant Sections
Court-annexed Mediation
Started when Roscoe Pound gave a lecture in 1906 in which he criticised the legal system of America. He said that
the quest for justice is lost and the court is more concerned with whether the rules of procedure are followed or
not. He called the legal system a game and said that one can win by following the rules. He said that judges are not
doing anything and advocates behave like ‘hired guns’ and not like the officers of the court. They are manipulating
the law to the maximum extent possible. In 1976, in Minnesota, USA, in the Pound conference.
Before this, ADR was only in the private realm. This attitude was changed after this conference. They tried to
understand the alternative systems available, to combat the disaffection that people have with courts. The courts
are not ideal for taxation and family matters. This way they realised that type of dispute must be matched with the
5
Lack of judicial/coercive powers of the commissions, led to the frequent non-appearance of Parties.
6
Similar refusal cannot be made w.r.t Arbitration Agreement. See Section 8, Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
7 The presiding conciliators view is only to be taken into consideration in case of a difference of opinion amongst the other two
India
We have not followed case management, despite opting for court annexed ADR and other recommendations made
by Woolf. Court annexed mediation is followed in Delhi, mediation centres in courts provide mediation services to
parties. MCPC overlooks the functioning of such centres all over India. They mostly come in after the initiation of
litigation. Other bodies like women’s commission and samadhan provide pre-litigation services.9
Mediation Rules
Important Mediation Rules, have been discussed below.10 Mediators are paid in honorariums, only paid for cases
successfully settled. Ideally, however, it should be pro bono. In Delhi Dispute Resolution Society, any person can
become a mediator.
9 Salem Advocates Bar Association - II case deals with post-litigation stage of the cases.
10 Part II of the The Delhi High Court’s Mediation and Conciliation Rules, 2004, they can be found here.
Rule 4 - Mediator Training (40 hours)
Rule 12 - Representation
One school of thought says that mediation doesn’t require advocates. Second school of thought says that
settlement arrived at will be better because advocates can clarify positions and provide a reality check to the clients.
Now parties can choose to come with advocates or not.
Rule 13 - Non-attendance
The mediator has no coercive power and he/she must refer the case back to the court, and it shall be deemed to
be ‘no settlement’. Parties often take mediation for granted, as there is no serious consequence for non-
attendance.
The mediator can be changed in case of any conflict of interest. Even though mediation is said to be flexible, in
court-annexed mediation, the court and the judge coordinator will decide the dates according to the mediation
centre schedule. The parties may choose the timings sometimes.
Rule 13 - Non-attendance
The party or mediator can inform the court of any non-attendance or disrespect. The court has the power to make
appropriate directions, which include (1) Summons, (2) Costs, (3) Sending of files to court before lapse of 90-day
period.
However, (1) and (3) are punitive in nature and are against the voluntary nature of mediation processes (unlike the
negative obligation in arbitration). However, Rule 13 is not followed properly.
Rule 13 allows the courts to encroach on the voluntary nature and confidentiality of any mediation. Refusal of
mediation also becomes questionable in court. Purpose was to reduce litigation, not to increase the grounds for
litigation. Professor Frank says that mandatory mediation is mandatory only at the beginning stage. Whether the
party participates or not should still remain voluntary. It should only be mandatory to opt for mediation,
participation should be voluntary.
Rule 17
Mediator only facilitates in arriving at a decision
(neither can impose any settlement on the parties, or any term of settlement on the party)
- But there is a conflict of interest as mediators get paid only on settled cases. So the mediator might dictate
terms to them. Rule 17 tries to prevent this
- S. 73 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act says that concilators can draft the terms of settlement for the
parties and they may accept or reject them.
- Family disputes are tougher and their settlement means that the mediator will get higher honorarium.
- The new model is to pay for unsettled cases but pay lesser than if the case were settled. The model in the
Delhi Dispute Resolution Society - the mediators get paid for the duration they sit in the mediation centre,
whether cases are settled or not is immaterial. This is called payment of sitting fees.
Sometimes, there’s a zeal to achieve something. Eg: family litigation, no of forums provided: (matrimonial home,
where the parties last resided together: lots of options). No of transfer petitions filed thanks to this (even at the SC
level).
R 21: Privacy
Students also can shadow mediation only w consent of parties + mediator. Privacy is important.
R 22: Immunity
Mediator given immunity for bona fide acts/omissions. Done so she can perform her job properly, done only when
mediation is done free of cost for the parties. Does not necessarily apply for pvt mediation (bet 2 or more pvt
parties) where the contract can create some liability for the mediator.
Rules provide for deletion of the mediator’s name from the panel of mediators. There are no sub-rules for detailed
procedure of de-empanelment. In mediation centres, there is a feedback mechanism for clients and parties can also
file anonymous complaints against mediators on the basis of which it’s possible this is done.
There is a requirement for no communication b/w court and mediator: if at all needed, must be in writing and this
communication ka copy must be sent to both parties.
Rule (c) : what kind of communication can happen. (In actual practice, no real punishment.)
Karnataka, Mumbai HC Mediation Rules: provide for imposition of cost if the parties fail to attend. Mediator will
inform court u/R 23 of the parties’ failure to attend. Chandigarh HC said recently that if parties don’t attend
mediation proceedings, contempt proceedings can be initiated. Stricter measure. Parties are referred to mediation
centre by order of the court.
What if parties have settled some/all issues amongst themselves? In such cases, court will give a date and O 23 R 3
will apply (consent decree). Any settlement arrived at during mediation needs court approval to become a decree
-- does not become a decree on its own. (R 24 and 25)
R 26: Fees
SC: K Srinivas v Deepa: lot of pre-lit mediation for family disputes -- in such cases, parties must pay fees for mediator
+ fee for using mediation centre facilities. Gen free of cost.
Problems w s 89: Definitions jumbled up. In (c), says any institution. But (b) says court will effect settlement. These
defs are not in line w terms of mediation and jud settlement used abroad. Interchange (b) and c.
Is consent necessary?
Conciliation
If it is authenticated by the conciliator, then it is also at par with the decree of the civil court. The parties have to
come to the court, to inform that they settled, only after which the case will be disposed of.
Lok Adalat
At par with the civil court decree, however they will have to come back and inform the Court of their settlement.
External Threat
Because of burden of the criminal justice system, the government wants to divert funds from the civil justice system
to the criminal justice system. The state has only created the hype of crisis in the civil justice system so that people
bear the cost of their own trials.
(a) Lack of access to justice: in spite of so many laws, Woolfe Committee said there should not be too many
laws governing the people.
Internal Threat
(a) Judges themselves are promoting ADR processes because they are looking for a market for their newly
acquired skills
(b) ADR processes must be voluntary in nature, and it is then a problem when the court mandates it,
(c) Mediation can’t supplant/go over the court system,
(d) System must be promoted on its own qualities and not as a last resort after the lack of efficiency of court.
14 https://www.cedr.com/news/?item=Master-of-the-Rolls-urges-the-legal-profession-to-use-mediation
15 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/78.html
see if already existing mechanisms can solve the problem. MTNL and DDA were saying to legislate and pass one
more law is problematic when other fora exist.
Delhi HC rejected their contentions (without reasons). They say that the mandate under Article 39A is bigger and
that’s why it stands rejected. The real reason is that when you create an authority, PNJs have to be followed and
some provision for appeal/review has to exist for adjudicatory processes. They said that regular disputes happen
with public sector authorities and therefore need for permanent Lok Adalat.
1999: Justice AK Anand also reiterated need for PLA cause if one of the parties is adamant without reasons,
settlement will never be possible. LAs cannot do anything because they have no power. (Sections 19 and 20: Lok
Adalats only help parties reach a settlement. Conciliatory role. Part III of Arb and Conc Act applies but no powers
beyond that). In certain cases, some power should be given to Lok Adalats to settle the dispute. (Anand’s
suggestion) Similar to mandatory ADR, or rather the Med-Arb hybrid that has been discussed earlier.
Jurisdiction
LAs have unlimited civil jurisdiction. If Lok Adalats are given power to decide cases, only one appeal from the LA
should be allowed. Appeal will be to court to whom the original application could have been filed (if Lok Adalats
function at a pre-lit stage). If it is a post-lit stage, possible to work out appropriate court to appeal to.
Chapter VI-A (establishment of PLA) added subsequent to all of this. It was the first initiative in pre-litigation
settlement of disputes. Once the case starts, Chapter VI will apply. Chapter VI-A provides for the establishment of
PLAs, which were different from normal LAs due to its permanent.
Subject-matter
Only compoundable disputes involving Public Utility Services. It parties do not the reach to a settlement, it can
only pass an adjudicatory award if the dispute does not involve an offense.
Pecuniary
According to Section 22, the pecuniary jurisdiction is upto Rs. 25 lakhs.
Composition
One judicial and two non-judicial officers (tend to be members of PSUs which are a part of the case. Nomination
can be made by Central Government and must be approved by the state, or central LSA). Reason for introducing
two people from there is to make the idea of PLA accessible.
People should not have to pay for services of PLA. Government servants are appointed so the government can pay
them. Further, these individuals have experience within PSUs. Their inclusion will prevent proceedings from being
mired in legal technicalities.
Procedure
When a dispute is filed before Lok Adalat, there is a hearing done before submission. Questions will be whether it
is a case in relation to PSU, compoundable or non compoundable, etc. It is similar to Part III of the AC Act.
Documents have to be filed regarding issues and facts, it is then the duty of the LA to help them reach a conciliation.
Mediation is used only in Section 89, and even Family and ID uses the word ‘conciliation’. Part III of Arb and C Act
applies.
The last clause of Section 22C is important. If parties can still not reach a settlement, then the PLA can decide the
case if the parties reject drafted agreement of PLA. They are not bound by law or CPC, and they can simply decide
on PNJ. All decisions are final and binding. They shall not be questioned in any original suit, as per Section 22-E(4).
And can only challenged by way of Writ Petition. The words ‘original suit’ are used instead of ‘non-appealable in
nature’ because the entire thing is pre-litigation, and hence it hasn’t yet entered the civil-court sphere.
Bar Council of India Case
All provisions of Chapter VI A were challenged as unconstitutional.
Objections:
1. Composition of PLA: said that it was suited to creating bias towards PSU. They are all non-judicial members,
and they are from PSUs. So they will be biased towards PSU because of composition/
2. Requirement of decision of majority. There are members of PSUs present on PLA, which might tilt favour
towards the PSU in the case.
3. Its pecuniary jurisdiction is upto Rs. 25 lakhs, however the government has the power to increase it.
2. Better remedies under other laws such as COPRA: According to the BCI, there are che wider too. The
approach of the COPRA is pro-consumer and the fora have wide powers of granting compensation.
3. Chapter VI-A violates Art. 14 and 21: It was alleged that services under VI-A are part of the right to life
under Article 21, and that people cannot be prevented from approaching better fora for their remedies.
PSUs may preempt the private parties from approaching these better fora by first approaching the PLA, and
Chapter VI A says that once an application is filed, the other party cannot go to court/any other forum. This
will also violate the right of the person under Article 14 and 21 (Court decided this is in National Seeds
Corporation case). If the party has approached the consumer forum, there is no need to refer parties to
arbitration because remedies under COPRA are in addition to other remedies, but not in derogation of any
other remedy.
16 LA Cases go to Court upon non-settlement, orders in PLA cases will be passed by them regardless.
17 See Chapter IV and IVA
Counter-arguments
1. No right to have the case heard in court: Parliament can create a tribunal. Statistics do not show that cases
filed with the PLA are by PSUs, but rather that it is done by private parties. Chapter VI A merely proposes
another forum, and does not bar the jurisdiction of any other for enacted under Tribunal laws. The usage
of the word may shows that it is not a mandatory pre-litigation procedure.
2. This is not the first tribunal exempt from CPC and Evidence laws, as long as principles of natural justice are
followed, there is no problem. The rights granted under these services all come from Article 21 and are
such that they require speedy remedy (eg electricity cut). This was not happening under normal LA, which
is why PLA was created. PLA is only applicable to such disputes, so the creation of the tribunal under PLA is
not a problem.
3. With respect to the efficacy of an Article 226 remedy, the court said that parties are always free to approach
the HC.
United India Insurance Company vs Permanent Lok Adalat
The petitioners made various objects regarding the PLAs, which were as follows: -
1. Inefficient as failure of settlement leads to adjudication, hence parties might not reveal factly openly during
settlement proceedings. Settlement requires openness, admissions, confessions, offers and proposals, with
the promise that they will not be used against them at a later stage [rejected],
2. Parties may enter into sub-optimal settlement in the fear of the PLA deciding the matter against them
[rejected],
3. Not knowing how PLAs work might disincentivize parties from approaching PLAs in the first place [rejected].
The Supreme Court, rejecting the petitioners arguments, said the following: -
1. MedALOA is followed all over the world, bodies have to appoint one 3rd party rather than two, save costs,
time and effort. Lesser chances of breaches of confidentiality. Positive effects outweigh the negative.
2. Non-availability of Appeal from PLA is fine as grievances fall within writ jurisdiction. After the BCI
judgement, there was lot of opposition on this issue. Some people have creatively interpreted Chapter VI
A. The award of the PLA is a deemed decree, even that of a normal LA is a deemed decree. The difference
is that, LA’s decree is my mutual consent and so it is treated like a consent decree (Section 96 of the CPC).
But PLA has adjudicatory powers, and can pass non-mutual decrees as well. Law also says all decrees are
appealable unless they are made non-appealable. Chap VI-A says it cannot be challenged in execution/at
the stage of filing a suit, but not at the stage of appeal. [what]
Arbitration
For clarity on ICA- read this [disclaimer, these are many a times wrong]
As seen for Order XXXVII (Summary Suits) even the CPC recognizes that the procedure laid down is not apt and fast
enough a system to work for commercial disputes. Arbitration is the most appropriate for commercial and other
disputes where speedy justice is required. The 1996 ACA is a modified version of the 1940 Act, with inputs from the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration.
UNCITRAL adopted a model law in an attempt to unify the laws of arbitration around the world, which becomes
necessary due to the transnational character of commercial disputes. Aim was that the signatories will adopt the
same as their model law. India modified it a little and passed the new Act in 1996.
What is Arbitration? No specific definition in the Act. Section 2(a) only says it includes both domestic and ICA.
What is institutional arbitration? Arbitration proceedings are submitted to a permanent arbitration institution,
which has its own arbitrators, own structure, etc, and might even have its own appellate process. It is a complete
package. Cost is a problem in institutional arbitration, since you let the institution manage the entire thing. And
when you institutionalise anything, it becomes rigid. So the institution now offsets the original advantage of speed.
In ad-hoc, you may be able to negotiate cost to a certain extent, but then you’ll have to manage everything.
What is Ad-hoc arbitration? It gives complete party autonomy. Parties can tailor make any of the proceedings. In
institutional arbitration, everything is taken care of by the institution. Institution takes care of everything after
reference has been made to it. Arbitrators will expect parties to have to come together and agree on several details
like venue, arbitrators, etc., which might be difficult due to strained relations between parties because of the
dispute. This might delay the conduct of arbitration. So parties should detail everything in the agreement itself.
Other types of Arbitration? Statutory arbitration, as provided for by lots of Central and State Acts. This can be
viewed in context of the Pound conference.
What is an Arbitration Agreement? Mentioned in Section 7, but not specifically defined. It has to be in writing,
other than that there are no other requirements regarding form. 18 It can be through any of the forms mentioned
there. Disputes already arisen can be submitted to Arbitration by way of a Submission Agreement. Other way is
when there is Arbitral Clause in the main contract in the agreement between parties. This clause will give power to
parties to submit dispute to arbitration. Can also be done via incorporating through previous agreement which had
arbitral clause.
Why is there a requirement of writing and sign? Due to the importance of Section 28 of the Contract Act, any
exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court has to be put in writing.
Are there requirements for capacities of parties? The AC Act does not specifically talk about capacity of parties,
but since the Contract Act will apply, all its capacity requirements will be applicable too.
Advantages
1. Confidentiality
2. Choice of Venue
3. Free-er representation
4. Easier enforcement, lesser appeals after award passed.
Disadvantages
1. At times, the Cost of arbitration proceedings is much more than the civil proceedings as some arbitrators
take a share of the award.
2. Procedural uncertainty
3. Harder to join parties to the proceedings
4. Supremacy of courts still present, dependence on them for a lot of things
5. Injustice under the garb for confidentiality
International Conventions
- Conventions to facilitate international trade law: New York (“NY Con”) and Geneva (“GC”)
- Laid down ground rules to give validity to institution of arbitration.
- NY convention widespread, although some still prescribe to Geneva convention as well
- NY Con lays down certain principles mostly applicable to ICA, but has further wider implications
Validity of Arbitration Agreement
The Indian Contract Act has Section 28 which says that agreements in restraint of legal proceedings are void. An
arbitration exceptions was later added, which makes it relevant during each arbitration agreement. In the Specific
Relief Act, Section 14 talks about agreements not specifically enforceable, wherein the Section 14 (2) deals with
Arbitration Agreement
Objections to an Arbitration Agreement
There are problems when it comes to the enforcement of arbitration clauses which are defective (or pathological).
One of the type of pathological clause is when it is indefinite or unclear. An intention to arbitrate has to be made
out from the agreement. Eg, the language “want to arbitrate in London” does not express any specific intention of
the parties to the contract. Enforcement of such clauses depends on the jurisdiction wherein it is sought to be
enforced. Countries which has a pro-arbitration civil justice system will generally enforce it, while the other might
interpret it conservatively.
Indefinite Clause
Often, the question of the validity of clauses comes up between courts/tribunals. 21 If the arbitration agreement is
indefinite, courts will try to give effect to the arbitration by falling back on default procedure, as long as a clear
intention to arbitrate can be made out. Clauses’ validity will usually depend on the extent of the pathology of the
clause.
Outdation
Sometimes, parties may refer to institutions that no longer exist/have merged with other institutions/that have
changed their name, etc and sometimes refers to arbitrators who subsequently are found to be dead, or having a
conflict of interest. For institution: courts try to enforce the agreement by substituting the new name for the old,
and for arbitrators try to get parties to decide on a new arbitrator.
Questions as to Validity
When such question regarding the validity of the Arbitration Agreement comes up before the Tribunal, they are
allowed to decide the same under Section 16 of the Act and Article 16 of the UNCITRAL model law. There are two
main approaches regarding the Court’s determination of such questions, (1) prima facie determination, and (2)
final/conclusive determination.
France
Being a pro-arbitration regime, the KK principle is highly respected and so is the jurisdiction of tribunal to decide. It
follows the prima facie determination approach. Courts will only see if the agreement is valid prima facie, following
which the rest of the dispute will be decided by the Tribunal. Any orders then passed by the Tribunal, however, will
be subject to the judicial review of Courts.
United States
Not a signatory to UNCITRAL model law. Their Federal Arbitration Act allows interlocutory jurisdiction of civil courts
on issues of jurisdiction. Courts can conclusively decide issue of jurisdiction before referring the matter to
Arbitration. One major advantage of this is that there is a lower probability of these subsequent awards being set
aside. Furthermore, if they do not adjudicate on issues of jurisdiction, parties will go to the tribunal, which may
accept/reject the jurisdiction and in both cases it’s just a waste of time. However, there riders to this. The objections
have to pertain to the validity of the arbitration agreement only, and no to the entire agreement. Questions of the
Recognition of Awards
Judicial Scrutiny
Any award passed in an ICA happening in India, will be treated as a domestic award. Civil courts will have the power
of judicial review over them under Part I of the 1996 Act. Only after judicial scrutiny, does it becomes final and
binding. (see from Prashasthi 19th april)
Recognition of Foreign ICA Awards
The Part II of the AC Act, which deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards, comes into play
when a party seeks to execute a foreign ICA order against the Indian properties of a company, or against any
Company based in India. By default, only awards passed by tribunals in India are at part with the decree of a civil
court, and not foreign awards, and hence, such foreign awards will have to be recognized by the courts of India
(under Part II of the AC Act), by way of an application for recognition of the award, following which it will have legal
effect. It can then be executed under Order XXI of the CPC. If courts in India do not recognize the award, it still
remains a valid award between the parties, but just has to be enforced in another country. While if a domestic
award is not recognized by Indian courts, the award does not exist any longer at all and will be void ab initio.
Pre-Arbitration Litigation
As under Section 8, 9 and 11, the parties may have to approach the court prior to arbitration proceedings. The court
can either conclusively decide the issues, or just get prima facie satisfaction as to validity of the agreement. If the
issue is that of the agreement being null and void, the court will not look into it if the tribunal has already been
constituted.
UNCITRAL
Pre-arbitration court proceedings are provided for in Article 8 of the Model law. It is not clear on the point of it
being conclusive or prima facie adjudication.
India
The same has been provided for in Section 8 of the 1996 Act. However, the words ‘prima facie’ have been explicitly
used, and so the power and duty of courts is very clearly mentioned. In the new act the words “unless it is null and
void” were removed, and the words “judicial authority” have been used to fully recognize the KK principle, and to
give broader power to the tribunals. Original copy of the agreement has to be submitted to the Court as under
Section 8(2).
Section 8
If one party to the agreement (which has an arbitration clause) moves the civil court, the other party can, under
Section 8 move the court to refer the dispute to arbitration. It is common for the former party to claim that there
is no arbitration agreement, or they aren’t a party to it, or that the dispute falls outside the scope of the agreement.
The court will then see if there is a prima facie valid agreement, if the both the parties are parties to the agreement,
and whether the subject matter is included within the arbitration clause; and whether the application filed has been
filed not later than the first statement of the dispute, under Section 8(1).
Arbitrability
Disputes of all subject matters cannot be arbitrated, only those as provided by the State, due to public policy, etc.
Article 2 of the New York Convention says that there is a presumption of arbitrability of an agreement unless the
dispute is such that it cannot be arbitrated. However, the similar Section 8 of the Indian Act does not talk about
arbitrability, but the lack of it is a valid ground for its setting aside under Section 34(2)(b).
National Insurance corporation vs, Boghara Polyfab (SC 2009)
SC held that the court should not go into the issue of arbitrability as it requires the court to go into the merits of
the case.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton vs SBI Home Finance Ltd. (SC 2011) (Also, here)
It was laid down that Courts at Section 11 stage should not look at the issue of arbitrability, as the scope of the
same is smaller than that under Section 8 (in case of an application under which arbitrability is to be checked too).
Many rules regarding arbitrability are not finely defined and hence, even at a later stage lack it can checked under
Section 34 as a ground for setting it aside. Saying so, the court laid down a three-facets of arbitrability in paragraph
21: -
1. Whether the dispute is such that is capable of adjudication by way of arbitration, i.e. is it private in nature
or is it public in nature and hence falls within the domain of the public for?
2. Whether such disputes are covered by the arbitration agreement, i.e. whether the agreement enumerates
or describes or explicitly excludes its arbitrability?
3. Whether parties have jointly referred to the tribunal, such matter for adjudication?
Rights in rem cannot be arbitrated, only rights in personam. Hence, sale, redemption and foreclosure of mortgages
cannot be arbitrated. Same test is used to see if settlement in private for is allowed or not.
Sukanya Holding v Jayesh H (2002 SC)
Held that in case the disputes includes parties which are not party to the arbitration agreement, the dispute should
then not be referred to arbitration, as it would be bad for non-joinder of the necessary parties. Bifurcation of parties
is not allowed, and instead of reference, the case should be decided by the Court itself. Also lays down that subject
matter cannot be bifurcated. [This case was problematic because the CPC has allowed for the bifurcation of subject
matter.]
Fraud
Ruhi thinks that the public connotations of the allegations of fraud should be considered before deciding whether
the case is arbitrable or not. In case the allegations only affect the private parties, then the case should be allowed
for arbitration.
Abdul Khader v Madhav Prabhakar (1962 SC)
Held that if there is a serious allegation of fraud involved, the court should not refer the case to arbitration and
itself decide it, as opposed to any allegations of misconduct/dishonesty amounting to fraud. The ratio of the case
of Russell v Russell was followed, holding that a serious allegation of fraud is something that one should defend
before a public fora only.
N Radhakrishnan v Maestro Engg (2009 SC)
Ratio of Abdul Khader case was upheld as under the 1996 Act as well.
Bharat Rasiklal v Gautam Rasiklal (2012 SC)
Not all issues of fraud vitiate the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Only if the allegation of fraud is specific to the
arbitration agreement, should the court decide the issue. If, on the other hand, the allegation of fraud is regarding
the main agreement, then the case should be referred to the tribunal as the the KK principle allows them to decide
such dispute.
Swiss Timing Ltd v Organizing Committee (2014 SC)
Held that the law laid down in case of N Radhakrishnan was bad in law. Allegations of fraud which might render the
main contract null and void, do not preclude the dispute to be referred as the arbitration clause of contracts is
severable and has a life of its own. Hence, as long as there is a prima facie arbitration agreement between the
parties, the dispute should be referred. Further the court also said that arbitration and criminal proceedings can
run parallely.
World Sports Group v MSM Satellite (2014)
Regarding Part II of the Act, i.e. International Commercial Arbitrations. Court here held that fraud is arbitrable, and
will not preclude reference to foreign-seated arbitration, as long as valid under Section 45 of Part II of the 1996 Act.
A. Ayyasamy v A. Paramasivam (2016 SC)
Cases of fraud simpliciter can be arbitrated, however cases of serious fraudulent activities which has public
connotations (including forgery and fabrication), where voluminous evidence has to be taken and examined, virtual
criminal case is made out, and fraud permeates the arbitration-related provision as well the case should be
adjudicated upon by the court. Further stated that IP matters, competition law matters, insolvency, bribery, trusts,
matrimonial/conjugal/guardianship, fraud and criminal matters should be handled only in the public fora.
Fiona Trust and Holding Co v Yuri Privalov
Only express provisions can give quasi-judicial bodies the power to take evidence, etc. Tribunals are not even
statutory in nature, but are completely private. There is a provision in the Act (Section 27) regarding them being
able to ask the assistance of the court for taking evidence, but for practical reasons they don’t do that.
Consumer Disputes
Each country does deals with the arbitrability of consumer disputes differently, eg, USA allows arbitration of
consumer disputes as long as it is not unconscionable. Contracts with unfair terms are not referred to arbitration.
In India, consumer courts are not obliged to refer the cases to arbitration under Section 8, before hearing them.
Section 12(1) of the CP Act specifies the manner in which consumer complaints are to be made, it makes no mention
of Arbitration. Claims under Section 12 (1) (c) and (d) might be non-arbitrable in light of it being in public interest,
however those under 12(1)(a) can be arbitrated upon. There could have been better judgment which discussed
arbitrability of rights in rem in detail.
The CP Act allows for simultaneous court proceedings (civil court and NCDRC), can arbitration not be allowed in the
same way? This judgment is not so good. Right now arb’s main problem is secrecy and the court is only looking at
this. Current position is that the Consumer disputes are all non arbitrable.
Trans Mediterranean Airways v Universal Exports Case
Dispute covered by two laws. Court held that consumer remedy under COPRA is separate and can be undertaken
notwithstanding the arbitration agreement. Followed in National Seeds Corporation Case.
Rosedale Developers Private Limited v. Aghore Bhattacharya (SC)
It upheld the NCF decision wherein it was held that it is not the duty of the consumer to refer matters to arbitration,
and they can directly go to the Consumer Court. Upheld again later by the case of National Seeds Corporation v
Madhusudhan Reddy.
Aftab Singh and Ors v Emaar MGF land Ltd. & Ors
There was a complex which was to be constructed by a particular date. The builders could not deliver possession
by the previously stipulated date and the owners filed for a refund. The builders applied under Section 8 of the
1996 Act. All courts decided in favour of the buyers. The national consumer tribunal then said that such consumer
dispute is not arbitrable. The case then went to the Supreme Court in 2018, which while hearing it said that apart
from the Booz-Allen Test we should also look at the purpose of creation of the law (w.r.t the CP Act), which was to
protect consumer rights. Such social legislations aim to protect the people and must be decided only in a public for,
as the claims involve rights in rem and have social ramifications. The adjudicatory right of other bodies is recognized
in Section 2(3) of the Act, and such consumer fora need not refer the disputes to arbitration.
Competition Law
Competition law is all about protecting the rights of customers against anti-competitive behaviour of businesses.
The earlier global trend was that competition law was a social welfare legislation, and dealt with rights in rem,
making it non-arbitrable. However, USA has allowed arbitration for antitrust claims after 1980.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
Federal antitrust claims are arbitrable if they accrue from an international transaction. Laid down the second look
doctrine, according to which the Courts can fully look at and examine the merits and validity of the award during
its enforcement.
Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV (1999, EU)
Same ratio as case of Mitsubishi.
Union of India v Competition Commission of India (2012 Del HC)
The Competition Act (2002) created the CCI which prevents anti-competitive behaviour and promotes the interest
of consumers in the Market. In this case, there was application filed under Section 8, which was rejected, and
appealed to the High Court. The HC said that the CCI functions differently from tribunals and the commission does
not have to mandatorily refer parties to arbitration. CCI can investigate a complaint, and pass a cease and desist
order, which an arbitration tribunal cannot do. Thus, the nature of work was held to be different from tribunals.
Earlier, the idea was that judicial authority should mandatorily refer parties to arbitration. However, it was a
common fear that arbitrators are usually pro-business and will give verdicts in favour of corporations.
Possible change: Disputes under Section 53N of the Competition Act are actually disputes in personam. Remedies
to these disputes are compensation and damages which can be given by arbitration tribunals as well. On the other
hand, disputes under Section 19 are regarding rights in rem, any order given by CCI in such cases will impact
everyone. Such cases can be made non-arbitrable. This is also the global trend.
Parties in ICAs often choose their own substantive law which will govern their rights and liabilities. However, such
right of parties is not unrestricted. They cannot opt out of the mandatory laws of the country.
(Eg, even if ICA is happening in India and parties have chosen substantive law of UK, competition law dispute will
be decided by applying Competition Act of India).
Further, whenever arbitration tribunals decide antitrust claims, the competition commission often act as amicus
curiae in those cases. In this way, indirectly there’s a balance between arbitrability and public interest.
Labour Disputes
Under Section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, parties can voluntarily refere their dispute to arbitration. Common
legal issue is if the Labour Court upon Section 8 application is obligated to refer to arbitration.
Kingfisher Airlines v Capt Prithvi Malhotra and Ors (2012, Bom HC)
Pilots moved the labour court for arrears of salaries. Employer (petitioner) filed a Section 8 application before
Labour Court, relying on Section 10A of the ID Act. The Booz-Allen test was applied. The HC said that even if rights
are in personam, they have to see if there is a special law or forum having exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute in
light of public policy. Court said ID Act allows arbitration, but under its own provisions. And, even if arbitration is
allowed under the ID Act, only provisions of the ID Act will apply and not that of the 1996 AC Act.
Rajesh Korat v Inovati (2017, Karnataka HC)
On the same logic as Kingfisher Airline, Court said that such industrial disputes are non-arbitrable under the AC Act.
Even under the ID Act, there are disputes which cannot be referred to arbitration. Those which can be arbitrated,
are to be done by the procedure laid down in Section 10A(3).
Mohan v Co-op Society of Ambala (SC) [Ruhi unsure of name]
Workman should not be put under onerous procedures, just because there is an alternate forum. Once it is known
that party is a workman and the dispute is Industrial under the ID Act, the labour court cannot absolve itself of its
responsibility to adjudicate the same. Similar to the status under CP Act, existence of alternative forum is irrelevant
to the question of reference.
Present Situation
Non-signatories can be forced to arbitrate using the conventional principles of Contract Law like Lifting of corporate
veil, agency, estoppel etc. But the doctrine of group of companies is still being debated and is not applicable to
domestic arbitrations. In case of companies which could not produce the original agreement then they can produce
the copy of the agreement. Parties which are non signatories have the burden to prove how they are claiming that
they are person through or under the party.
Interim Relief
Section 9 provides for Interim measures which parties can seek from the courts during ongoing proceedings. There
have been changes made to the Section 9 by way of the 2015 Amendment Act.
An important recent question is if the Court is to be bound by the rules and principles of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is important as it raises the issue of judicial minimalism.
Two Approaches
The Tribunal has already been given equal powers regarding interim measure in Section 17. The Court will only
grant interim measure before the Tribunal is constituted or if after being constituted it feels that the remedy of
Tribunal will not be efficacious, as per Section 9(3). This section recognizes the principle of Judicial Minimalism from
Section 5 of the AC Act. There are two main approaches regarding how much the procedure laid down in the CPC
should be followed.24
1. Inclusive Approach: Principles, and standards are contained in the Code under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 and
Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 as specified above in Point 4.1 would apply to the grant of interim measures under
Section 9 of the Act.
2. Exclusive Approach: Not all technical rules verbatim, but only well known principles and spirit of the Code
has to apply so as to expedite the process and not render the ADR infructuous.
And for review by higher courts, certain procedure needs to be followed by the lower courts, or it risks the possibility
of being struck down when it comes up for review or appeal in the higher court.
ITI v Siemens Public Communication (2002 SC)
SC held that there was no evidence in the Act which binds the Tribunal to it, but the Courts were to follow it in their
proceedings.
Arvind Construction v Kalinga Mining Corporation (2007 SC)
Standards and well recognized principles of the Code are to be followed.
Most HCs follow inclusive approach. But if we see later two judgements, it's more along the amendment of the
UNCITRAL model law. Amended version is very detailed. Approach of SC is now in line with amended UNCITRAL
model law (though it is for tribunals there). Courts and tribunals should be on the same page. There is only a hairline
difference when we say CPC applies or spirit of CPC will apply. Order 39 specifically doesn't mention the three
requirements, but it is just a judicial requirement.
Court should be guided by principle that they do not need to decide rights and liabilities. They should expedite &
support proceedings, and not hold it up. Court can exercise discretion, and doesn't need to be held up by
technicalities. Even under Order 39, there is discretion because the requirements themselves there are not clear
cut (prima facie, irreversible damage, etc). It is more dependent on the other side saying it should not be granted,
and these interim measure are usually granted. There is a mentality of judiciary feeling that they should protect
rights of parties, and not let arbitration interfere with it. So Section 9 amendment was introduced to combat it.
Even if court rejected it, it would waste a lot of time.
Recently, after third parties have been included by way of Section 8, a question has been raised if they can also
move court for interim relief under Section 9. And if interim relief can be granted against such third parties. The
answer is in the language of the Section 9 itself. The definition of party in itself has not changed, only the entire
wording of the clause of Section 8 has changed. Section 9 only uses the word ‘party’ and hence they are excluded.
24 http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research%20Papers/Interim_Reliefs_in_Arbitral_Proceedings.pdf
Value Advisory Services v ZTE Corporation (2009 Delhi)
It said that interim measures can be passed by third parties. Tribunal may not have power over third parties, but
courts do. So it logically follows that such third parties can approach the court for such measures.
By way of the recent 2015 Amendment, Section 2(2) was added which provides for Section 9 (Interim measures),
27 (Assistance of court in taking evidence), and 37 (Appeals) being applicable to ICAs even if they are seated outside
India, as the subject matter of the suit might be located in India and the protection of the same or some other
assets during the pendency of the suit might be necessary.
1. Lex loci arbitri: the procedure of arbitration will be governed by law of arbitration of that country,
2. Court-Tribunal Relationship: Regulates the relationship of the forum with the Country and its civil courts
(Section 8, 9, 11, 27, 34; enforcement and recognition of awards),
3. Tribunal-Public Policy Relationship: It will relate arbitral tribunal with public policy of country (arbitrability
of dispute - fraud, corruption, etc).
As for the internal procedure of arbitration, there are some mandatory and some non-mandatory provisions.
Parties can deviate away only from the non-mandatory provisions of lex arbitri, by way of their own tailor-made
procedure, or by arbitrating under an arbitral institution (which have their own rules of procedure). They cannot
however deviate from the mandatory provisions of the lex arbitri. In case there is a gap in their new or custom
rules, they are to fall back on the default non-mandatory provisions given under the code of the Country.
Note: Very few countries, like England, have demarcated the mandatory and non-mandatory provisions, In India, it
is only the interpretation of the Court which will decide whether a provision is a mandatory or non-mandatory
provision.
Implication: Too many laws will apply and parties will cherry pick provisions from the laws of different countries
and try to enforce them based on their case and convenience, it can also give multiple states jurisdictions
jurisdiction over the same case, creating a mess.
Lex Arbitri
Most countries follow the Seat Theory of Arbitration (which is also recognized by the UNCITRAL Model Law), and
only a few aspects of the Delocalized theory are followed, i.e. giving parties the autonomy of choosing internal
procedure and custom rules regarding the non-mandatory provisions of the laws. As for the internal arbitral
proceedings, there are only basic principles and guidelines given, detailed procedure can be created by the parties
for themselves.
(1) If a country is not a signatory to either the Geneva or NY Conventions, then there is no way the India AC
Act will apply (as Part II only applies to signatories)
(2) Section 2 says Part I will not apply to any ICA held outside India
(3) If the law is interpreted to allow for jurisdiction of India, then there is a clash between 2(2) and 2(4) & (5).
(4) Court cannot change the law, it is the duty of the legislature. 2(2) is very clear and part I will not apply to
ICA happening outside India.
(1) The court must provide remedy to the party and cannot wash its hands off the matters
(2) The word ‘only’ of the UNCITRAL model law Article 1 (2) was omitted in the Indian Act in Section 1 (2), which
implies that Part I will apply for arbitration not held in India
(3) India follows the seat theory of arbitration according to the arbitration act. But some HC’s have held that
even in case of domestic arbs, some partial application of the delocalised theory is allowed.
The Supreme Court held that Section 2(2) is not exhaustive but inclusive in nature, and therefore Part I will apply
to arbitrations which are happening outside India because it does explicitly not bar such application.
a) Art 1 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for the exceptions, i.e. the provisions which would apply to
arbitrations not taking place in the State. India at the time did not have such exception clause, which Sen
argued was a conscious decision and India completely followed the Seat Theory.
b) To interpret Section 2 (4) and(5) (which say that each and every arbitration will be bound by part I) to mean
that Part I is applicable to even ICA would cause section 2 (2) to become redundant.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the if the exceptions are applied, the country where the property is located will
have the jurisdiction to grant interim measures. If country of origin is barred from granting the same, they will have
to get a decree from the seat-country, get it recognized as a foreign decree in India and then get it enforced, which
is too long a process. Some countries will not even recognize it as it is not a final order. And hence, Part I will apply
to arbitrations happening outside India also.
Para 40: Application of Sen’s interpretation of Law, that party cannot come to India. However, it’ll be a problem if
the award is passed in a non-signatory country and lead to an anomaly between Section 1 and 2 of the AC Act. SC:
Something has to be done about Section 1 and 2, its a hasty piece of legislation, and hence have to read into the
Act.
Para 16: Arguments seen in favour of the Delocalized Theory of Arbitration; (1) Section 2(f) which defines ICA makes
no difference based on it being inside or outside India. (2) There will be a presumption in favour of the award if the
passing country is a signatory to the Conventions, if not then there’s a gap in the law because neither Part I or Part
II will apply.
Para 17: If it followed that Part 1 applies to ICA which occur only in India, there will be a contradiction between
Sections 1 and 2(2), and will lead to differential application of law to different parts of the country, which could not
have been the intent of the legislature.
Para 20: In the Acts definition of ‘Court’ (Section 2 (e)), it can not be made out that the Indian Courts will have no
jurisdiction when the arbitration takes place outside India.
- In section 2(4) and (5), the use of ‘every arbitration’ and ‘all arbitration’, shows that it includes all
arbitrations even if it it is seated outside India.
- Section 2(5) is subject to sub-section 4, because the latter says ‘every arb’, and Section 5 is not made subject
to Section 2. Part I mandatorily applies to ICAs in India unless the parties have explicitly or by necessary
implication excluded such application of Indian law for ICA, it will apply.
Para 23: Section 2(7) is important, as there is no point having it as otherwise it is implied from the scheme of the
legislation. But there has to be a reason for its existence. If ICA award passed in India, it is implied that it is a
domestic award. This needs to have a more nuanced interpretation. Section 2(7) tells us that if the ICA happens in
a non-signatory country, it is deemed to be a domestic award, to maintain checks, as Part II is only applicable with
respect to Signatories.
Para 24: In the Section (and Articles) 5 and 8, UNCITRAL uses the word court, while the Indian Act uses judicial
authority. The Court says that we have deviated from the same as to include the jurisdiction of the foreign courts
(foreign courts are not courts under Indian law). This is another proof that we use the delocalized theory.
Para 25: Section 2(7) and 28, use the words ‘where the place of arbitration is situated in India’ which would not be
needed if Part I only exclusively applied to ICA in India only; this is evidence in Part I which shows that it was to
apply to ICA held outside India:
According to Mr. Sen, there is an equivalent for Section 8 in Part II but none for Section 9 and 17, which shows that
such relief cannot be claimed for ICAs which are happening outside India. The drafters consciously omitted such
provision and this proves his contention. Act has to be read as a whole and not feel that there are general provisions
that will be repeated in all parts of the Act. Section 9 and 17’s omission from Part II makes no difference. Even
Sections 8 and 45 are different from each other too.
Court on why Section 2(2) drops the word “only”: Such omission is made so as to make Section 2(2) inclusive, it
would’ve been closed if used. According to the UNCITRAL rules, it applies only when the seat is in a particular
country and not otherwise. By such omission, we leave the room open for expanding and applying the exception to
not only Section 8, 9, 35 and 36, but to all other Sections of Part I. For arbitration (and ICA) in India, all provisions
of Part I will apply, and if outside, any provision from it can apply. If the Indian party is arbitration outside India,
they can ignore even mandatory provisions under the AC Act. [what?]
Para 28, 29: According to Sen, Section 9 subscribes to the seat theory of arbitration as it says that the award should
be enforced as per Section 36. Foreign award cannot be enforced that way, and hence Part I excludes its applicability
to ICAs outside India. [rejected] Court say that ‘award enforced in accordance with Section 36’, is only for the 3rd
relief under Section 9, after passing the award. The legislature has excluded the application of Section 9 only wrt
the 3rd stage. Parties can use Section 9 before the constitution of the tribunal, when it is functioning and has not
yet passed the award.
Both, the Seat Theory and Delocalized theory allow the parties to deviate from the lex loci arbitri.
Para 33: Nothing in Article 22 of the ICC Rules prevents parties from approaching Courts in India, “Parties may apply
to any competent authority” which does not exclude, and would include Indian courts. Hence, we follow the
Delocalized Theory of Arbitration.
The only problem with the law laid down in Bhatia was that it was applied to different circumstances, i.e. under
Section 11 and 34. Other than that, it was good law.
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd vs General Electric Co. (SC 1994) [before the 1996 Act]
In the context of Private International Law, the narrow view of defining public policy was opted for, thereunder
public policy included: -
1. Fundamental policy of Indian law
2. Interest of India
3. Justice and morality
In case of non-conventional countries, the court said that there are set procedures and you have to file a civil suit
to enforce these awards. There is no need to interpret the arbitration act to include non-conventional country. They
said that Seat Theory is the most accepted and logical theory of arbitration. The parties will have to approach the
court of the seat for any remedy.
Read this:
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/09/26/the-bharat-aluminium-case-the-indian-supreme-court-
ushers-in-a-new-era/
Section 10
Petitioners
1. Section 4 and 10 are very clear, and the latter is mandatory as it codifies the public policy of India (as we
deviated from Article 10, reason being the arbitrators should not be deviated in their opinions so as to
waste money, time and effort)
2. Case does not fall into either Section 4 (a) or (b)
3. Section 34(2)(v) simply means that the parties can have any procedure and composition but it must be in
composition with the mandatory provisions of the Part I.
Respondents
1. Unless the objection is raised before the tribunal, you cannot approach the court under Section 34. Inherent
lack of jurisdiction (as composition against policy of India), hence no need to raise it there first [this is a bad
argument].
2. Upon a conjoint reading Sections 4, 10, 16 and 32; even though the number of arbitrators is not odd, if the
party refrains from objecting to the same, arbitration can continue regularly, showing that Section 10 is a
derogable provision of the Act (Paras 12 - 17).
3. Section 11, which talks about appointment of arbitrators, talks about three arbitrators, but doesn't talk
about other odd numbers, all eventualities are not covered by the Act, and if the arbitrators could have
appointed a third arbitrators if they felt that it was required (as per section 11) but as they were in
consensus, a third arbitrator was of no use.
Held, that Section 10 is a derogable provision of the Act, if the composition and the tribunal is in consonance with
the agreement, then it is allowed. Section 10 is not mandatory. It would render almost everything as non-
mandatory. Furthermore, their interpretation does not take into consideration Section 10 (2).
As of now, parties are free to choose an even number of arbitrators as Section 10 is not a mandatory provision. This
decision is in line with the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Section 29 talks about how all decisions by panels of arbitrators are to be made by a majority among them, however
with this decision that too is now interpreted loosely. The way in which the SC arrived at this decision, is wrong as
they have effectively re-written the provisions.
Section 10 (2) deviates from the model law by providing for a sole arbitrators appointment, the logic behind this is
that the decision should be fast and cost effective, which would be much harder for a three-member tribunal.
UNCITRAL allows for a sole arbitrator from a neutral country, but usually the two parties appoint an arbitrator each
and they then appoint another arbitrator, this is because of the International Nature of the Arbitration [the
arbitrator shouldn’t be acting on behalf of the person who appoints him].
The 1996 act used the words CJI and CJ of HC instead of Court as given in UNCITRAL model. When the application
was filed before the CJ, should he decide the jurisdictional issues or just look at the procedural formalities. This
changed and the SC said that the judicial mind must be applied and jurisdictional issues must be decided before
referring the case under section 8.
Konkan Railway vs. Rani Construction (SC 2002) (admin duty under section 11)
A. We have departed from the UNCITRAL Model law because the word court has a specific meaning in our Act.
Due to the importance given to Arbitration in India, the legislative intent was to only give higher judicial
officers the power to appoint arbitrators.
B. The words used are Chief Justice of India/High Court, instead of Supreme Court and High Court as the
legislature wanted to differentiate it from other normal court proceedings, to preclude it from being subject
to appeals and unnecessary rules. This language makes it part of the CJ’s administrative duties, and is not
a judicial proceeding but an administrative one. There are fewer remedies [Art. 226], which do not include
SLPs, etc.
C. It is an administrative duty as it does not do any adjudicatory task, just helps the parties in the
administration of their adjudication.
Principles used to arrive at the decision: -
1. Judicial Minimalism
2. Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine
The work of the CJ is to simply decide the appointment of the arbitrator, the tribunal will decide everything else.
There is no need to send a notice [where a right of hearing is given to the opposite side] but an intimation can be
given to the opposite side to say that the CJ has been approached for appointing the arbitrator. The only remedy
available is under Art. 226.
The CJI and CJ of HC were just delegating this power the district court, and the district courts were not looking at
the jurisdictional issues but were simply appointing the arbitrators. But they do look into the qualifications of the
arbitrators. It is unlikely that the DJ will not go into these aspects, especially when the agreement specifies some
qualifications and the other party challenges the appointment.
Para 8: When a tribunal is created, it has the power to decide jurisdictional issues. The appointing authority of such
tribunal is the office of the CJ. There is finality attached to their decision, and hence it is a judicial power.
Para 10: Section 11 (6) and (7) use the words decision, which shows some level of application of judicial mind and
adjudicatory characteristic of the decision, furthering the decision that it is a judicial power. Furthermore, the CJ
should look into the jurisdictional issues of the case also before appointing the Tribunal. Otherwise it’ll be a waste
of time as the tribunal might decide very similarly to the CJ.
Para 12: The reason for departure from UNCITRAL is not the definition of court, it also unlikely that the CJ is
supposed to act in a solely administrative manner.
Para 13 & 14: It should not be expected that the CJ is to be a persona designata in section 11, because persona
designata will continue in his employment even after leaving that particular post. Once he exits the office of CJ, he
can no longer appoint arbitrators. The persona designata can also not delegate the power given to him because it
is given particularly to him, section 11 however does allow the CJ to delegate the power to someone else. The CJ
therefor cannot act as a persona designata.
Para 15: It is assumed that when a case comes up before the Court under Section 8, it will have to go into the
preliminary aspects of the Agreement. [Anand raju and pinkcity midway petroleum case]. In this light it is weird to
say that the judicial authority can decide jurisdictional issues but the CJ and CJI cannot look into the jurisdictional
issues. Since it is allowed in section 8, it should be allowed in section 11.
Section 8 requires both parties to be on record, while Section 11 says only that the party who is aggrieved can
approach the CJ to appoint an arbitrator.
Delegation can be only to the brother judges of the same court, and the power exercised will be said to be that of
the CJ.
Para 18: The concept of kompetenz kompetenz was not accepted by the court. The SC said that it does not mean
that the tribunal has sole jurisdiction to decide jurisdictional issues. If the parties have directly approached the
tribunal then it has the power to conclusively decide the issues. The reason is that if we accept the ratio of Konkan
Railways which subscribes completely to the KK doctrine, it would be unacceptable that if the CJ decides the
jurisdictional issues, and only the tribunal would be able to (like the USA). The decision of the CJ is conclusive and
binding, the tribunal can then look only into the substantive issues.
a. Minimal judicial interference as these issues will have been finally decided by the court
b. Remedy only under Art. 136 if it a CJ, and none if it is the CJI.
c. Art. 226 might lead to peculiar situation where lower officer will review the decision of a higher judicial
officer
d. Infructuous reasoning in Konkan as right to hearing must be given to both parties even in non-judicial
administrative actions.
Why was the phrase ‘notwithstanding any judgment, decree...agreement’ added in Section 11? This has been
introduced because the SC and HC is supposed to look at the existence of the arbitration agreement, but under
Section 8 they simply have to prima facie check whether there is a valid arbitration agreement. The SC and HC under
section 11 need not check the validity of the agreement. [Patel Engg wrongly held that the same scheme must be
applied to section 8 & 11. Which Boghara Polyfab then corrected]
As there is no recourse by way of SLP, as in Section 11 Clause 7, the issues should go directly to the tribunals and
the decision of the SC and HC should not final.
Section 11(6B)
- There is a limitation within many questions of Category II, most questions are mixed issues of laws and fact.
They cannot be decided at a preliminary stage,
- In a question under Category II where there is an allegation of fraud, the CJ should decide that question
and then refer the matter to arbitration,
- The Category I issues revolve around ascertaining the existence of a valid arbitration agreement which will
decide how everything in the future will pan out.
This decision was criticised in Chloro Control (2013). SC said that the decision in Shriram is contrary to the Consti
Bench decision of Patel Engg. In Chloro Control, they said even the court deciding under s 45 is a conclusive
determination by application of the ratio of Patel Engg.
Patel was confined to Section 8, 9 and 11. In Chloro Control, the SC applied it to Section 45 which is a Part II provision
because it is similar to Section 8. Section 8,9, 11 focus on jurisdiction, and such analogizing should not have been
done.
Can the CJ’s decision under Section 11(6) be reviewed? Code of Civil Procedure does not apply, Higher Courts are
bound by their own rules of procedure.
Rode Madan India v Int’l Expo (SC 2005) [overruled by Jain Studio]
Power under Section 11(6) is a statutory power and cannot be said to be a Constitutional power exercised by the
CJ.
Art. 137 says it is subject to any law made by Parliament, this is an important. This is then subject to the AC Act, and
the power to the CJ becomes a statutory power. SC Rules also say that for something to be called a supreme court
decision there should be a minimum of two judges and then only then Article 137 can apply. The equating of CJI as
SC is messed up, but in the lack of any overruling, this is the law at the moment.
Named Arbitrators
There are certain contracts in which the arbitrators, or the officers who will appoint them are named (?). This is
very common in Government contracts. The Govt. will many a times appoint its own people as officers. Hence, a
sole arbitrator appointed like this cannot be said to be deciding fairly and impartially. Reasons for these contracts,
is that the private parties don’t pay for arbitration because the agents will be paid by the government. Intention
was good, but led to problems.
The terms ‘Chief Justice of India’, and ‘Chief Justice of the High Court’ (as seen in the judgment of the cases Konkan
railways and Patel Engineering) were replaced by way of the Amendment Act by the term ‘Supreme Court’ and
‘High Court’. The main reason was to clarify the position on which there was till date no consensus amongst courts.
The change of terms makes it clear that they both are judicial bodies and there is no doubt about the nature of
their power.
Section 11(6B) also clarifies that the delegation will not be considered to be judicial in nature, and will not be open
to any appeal. Further, this also allows them to delegate it to ex-judges. The guidelines laid down in Patel
Engineering have been followed.
Implications of Section 11 power being judicial: -
1. Cannot be delegated
2. Multiple avenues of Remedy available
3. Application of Judicial Mind
If the court decides that there is no arb agreement and the HC and SC refuse to appoint an arbitrator, the parties
can still come to a mutual agreement and form an arbitration tribunal and arbitrate the dispute.
Section 11(4)
The party must appoint an arbitrator within 30 days, however the Supreme Court has said that Section 11 does not
prescribe a time limit within which an application must be made to the CJ. Even if the parties appoint an arbitrator
after 30 days of the notice being given but before the application is made to the CJ, it is a valid appointment. The
residuary clause of the limitation act will apply to applications under section 11, 6 etc.
In the new act there is a strict timeline that must be followed. Section 29A, lays down a 12-month period from the
date of the appointment of the arbitrator to pass an award.
The LCI report said that the parties have no bargaining power in govt. contracts and the principles of contract will
not apply. The IBA guidelines on the conflicts of interest [red, orange and green lists] should be followed by the
Indian Government to see what is waivable and what is not. The Indian Govt. has included schedules 5, 6 and 7
which list out some of the categories under the IBA guidelines and give a proforma that must be filled by the
arbitrator.
Independence and Impartiality
LCI suggested that in the old times, there was a tendency to appoint the third party who was a person known to
both disputants due to the importance given to familiarity and integrity. Neutrality is defined in a different manner
now, they must not have any relationship with the people. The parties however are free to waive the requirement
that the arbitrator should not be known to the parties.
Independence is an objective test, it is a matter of fact and is based on the relationship between people, while
Impartiality is a subjective test and is harder to prove.25
Section 12, 13, 14 & 15 must be read together. Para 3 of article 13 is a mandatory provision, all other are not. If a
challenge under section 13 is not successful, the parties have a right to go to the court within 30 days.
Section 11
Talks about appointment of arbitrators. If the court does it on its own, it should not just confine itself to jurisdiction
issues but should look at qualifications also.
Duty to disclose is before appointment but what about cases where he has already been appointed? The grounds
given in the fifth schedule will be used to determine if a conflict of interest exists. (Read (a) along w lists in the
schedule)
Test of bias was laid down by SC in several cases.
Gov contracts: named arb situation. They may say that the other party waived the right to raise the objection. They
may have an arb known to them. However, the duty is on the arbitrator even during the proceedings.
View that there should be an exception for gov contracts cause arb can be a high ranking official from the dept.
Certain people think there should be an exception for pub sector contracts. LCI said creating this exception
undermines party autonomy and the party’s right to a fair trial. S 12 gives grounds for challenging mandate of
arbitrators. (Read 12 w 13, 14 and 15)
Section 13
According to Article 13, UNCITRAL, parties can have their own procedure for challenging the mandate (subject to
Para 3 of the Article). If a challenge is not successful, parties can approach the court or any other authority (if it’s
institutional arbitration).
Section 13 of the AC Act talks about the same. Only Section 13 (3) however is mandatory. Either the arbitral tribunal
withdraws or other party accepts the challenge. If it’s a sole arbitral tribunal, it can be tricky. If the tribunal doesn’t
withdraw, the act of not withdrawing is in effect rejecting the objection. Having a hearing on the objection is then
a time waste.
Departure from UNCITRAL: if challenge not successful, arb tribunal may continue arb proceedings and pass an
award. UNCITRAL gives an immediate relief, but our law is pro-arb and wished to prevent hampering of arb
proceedings.
Disqualification [Time]
What will happen if a time limit is given in the agreement for the tribunal to decide the case? If the arbitration is
time bound, the parties can extend the time of the arbitration . The court can also extend the time in exceptional
circumstances. Section 29 A remedies this problem and fixes a standard time under the act, it also says that the
time may be extended by the parties mutually and gives the tribunal the ability to expedite the matter as they
can get some additional fees.
In some cases, the tribunal was taking too much time and the court extended the time, otherwise the parties would
have to initiate the proceedings all over again. The previous decision of the HC does not stand after the new
amendment, Now the court can extend the time after imposing some nominal penalties on the parties under
section 29A. The penalty is imposed on the tribunal if the tribunal caused the delay or if the parties caused the
delay then a hearing is conducted to see who is responsible and penalties are imposed on that person.
The new proposed amendment of 2018 says that the time limit should start after the parties complete the pleading
because it is only after that the work of the tribunals starts.
Failure to act- Section 14- substitute arbitrator should be adopted. It can be decided whether he starts de novo or
continues. Withdrawal by the arbitrator does not mean he is accepting the allegations against him.
How will time ka ground come u/13? Cause 13 is more about prelim objection.
Sec 14(1): Before amendment, this provision was already there. There was however no corresponding penalty to
this provision. (Section 29-A handles this now)
Other Grounds
De facto inability
Unable to get outta bed/physical inability, etc.
De jure inability
Legal incapacity by way of insanity, insolvency, moral turpitude, conviction, etc.
Obj of s 13 differs from s 14: see 14(2). S 13 stops any recourse to courts—gives only tribunals right to decide. 14
says unless otherwise agreed, parties can go to court. No party autonomy in s 13. Obj was grounds of independence,
impartiality can be raised only in s 13—if it could be raised in s 13, what was the need for s 14?
Some HCs said inability to raise it u/s 13 does not bar party from raising it u/s 14 under the head of de jure inability.
13, 14 and 15 are a scheme.
New Act: Time comes u/s 12. (?) This comes u/s 13. Technically, correct thing to do is to raise it u/s 13. The broad
interpretation of de jure given to s 14 is legally correct, but remember that u/s 13 there can be no recourse to court.
Section 13 speaks only of preliminary issues, while 14 speaks of the entire proceedings (eg, if the arb died after
proceedings). She thinks s 14 and 13 speak of different situations.
What if the tribunal does not follow the Terms of agreement? Then it is a disqualification, even though it is not a
ground under section 12, 13 & 14. It is a violation of Section 28(3), previously it used to say “all cases”, it was
amended after ONGC vs Saw Pipes [wanted to include patent illegality as a ground under section 34, if the tribunal
does not follow any provisions, then there should be some remedy to set aside the award] to say that the tribunal
has to take into account the terms of the agreement only at the stage of making of the award. If the arbitral tribunal
does not follow the terms of the agreement, it loses its mandate.
The SC decided in the Lohiya case that it is not provided in section 16 and 34 that objection should be raised
before the tribunal and they cannot raise it before the court for the first time. In exceptional circumstances when
the circumstances are know after the award has been passed, the parties can go to court directly.
Section 18
Speaks of equal treatment of parties. Mandatory provisions, almost everywhere. PNJ has to be included, and cannot
be subject to party autonomy.
Section 19
Tribunal not bound by CPC or Evidence Act. Incorporates something from seat theory. Parties are free agree to
procedure to be followed, and if they don't choose, the tribunal can. But they cannot deviate from Part I (i.e the
mandatory provisions of Part I). See clause 4 as well.
Section 20
Has no qualification attached to clause, just says that parties can choose the place of arbitration. If they don't
decide, the tribunal will. Clause 3 says there can be various venues of arbitration.
Section 21
Has to be read with Section 3, 29A of the Act. Different dates wrt the latter. Read Section 22-26 on your own.
Amendment to Section 2 (f)
Omission of the Company from the Section 2(f)(iii). Place of incorporation can be different from the place of central
management and control (as raised by the Court in TDM), Legislature accepted this and incorporated it into the Act.
[Relevant for subsidiaries]
Section 25
Default ex parte award in of the absence of the respondent, if the claimant is absent then the mandate of the
tribunal comes to an end.
Section 27
Parties can opt for Section 9 and 27 to apply to them. [Read Order XVI CPC] Similar power Tribunals do not have,
they can apply to the court to get the same done. Taking evidence, coercive power to mandate attendance, etc.
Summons and Punishment too. There is extraterritorial application wrt assets or evidence which is located in India.
Sasan Power Ltd., v. North American Coal Corporation India Private Limited
MP High Court: ICA classification depending on nationality only for the purposes of Section 11, relevant criteria is
the chosen seat of arbitration. Once seat is foreign, Part II will come into effect. Intention is to be respected. Hence,
possible for parties to choose a seat outside india.
Addhar Mercantile Pvt Ltd v Shri Jagdamba Agrico (Bom HC)
Arb Agreement says that it will happen in India or Singapore, substantive law will be England. To interpret solving
the pathology, seat will be India, Indian party will be governed by the laws of the India.
Section 28
Five laws which can be chosen by the parties to the Arbitration are as follows: -
1. Substantive law
2. Procedure to be applied
3. Law which will apply to the arbitration agreement
4. Law regarding capacity
5. Law regarding enforcement
Section 28(b)(iii)
Section 28 talks about the substantive law which is applicable to the dispute. (b)(iii) talks about the procedure to
follow in the lack of a designation of one in the agreement.
Few approaches: -
1. Many a times the tribunals apply the conflict of law rules of the seat, so as to arrive to a convenient
substantive law to apply. [Ancient]
2. Follow the law of the Seat (as there is an implicit choice within the choice of seat as well).
3. Specialized laws of the Seat: Sometimes national laws say that the conflict of law rules of country which
has the highest connection and relevance (Swiss).26
4. Based on the conflict of law rules of the most appropriate state as chosen by the Tribunal (USA and India).
5. Mandatory law rules of the Arbitration statute of the Seat.
Tribunals have power to impose exemplary cost (Like civil court, to make the arb a speedy process in reality)
They can choose any law to apply to the substantive law in India.
If an ICA is happening in India, the parties can choose any substantive law. If two Indian companies are arbitrating
in India, the law must be the substantive law of India.
Principles: -
- Parties can choose any law to govern the substance of the dispute.
ONGC case- criticised because it expanded the scope for interference when the award is being challenged. It has
basically converted a section 34 proceeding to an appellate proceeding.
Public policy- Amendment to Section 34. People say that court can’t go into merits because of the amendment,
but according to 34(2A) brings the doctrine of patent illegality back which was a part of the 1940 act. Now lawyers
can use the pre 2015 cases to interpret patent illegality, and the court takes jurisdiction which was not
contemplated and they can go into the merits of the award. Even though the proviso says that you can’t re-
appreciate the evidence, looking at the evidence and finding evidence lacking is not considered re-appreciation.
This is the dichotomy because things aren’t really clear.
Independence of arbitrators-
Section 11, before the amendment, Bogara polyfab divided a category of disputes which the court could go into at
the stage of appointing an arbitrator, the court could then go into the question of appointing an arbitrator and this
would lead to years of lit.
Now the section says that the court will only go into the existence of the arbitration agreement. This ensures that
an arbitrator is appointed and things are sped up.
Section 29A- Provides time limit. The issue is that cultural changes take time in India and in some arbitration in India
involving the govt takes 15 years for pleadings. Despite 29, in the Srikrishna committee report, they have given
more suggestions which will work in the litigation culture.
Section 36- before the amendment, if you file a petition before 120 days after the award, there would be an
automatic stay on the award no matter what is that merit of the petition. Application under Section 36 will now
have to show prima facie case to be made.
The amendment act under section 12 says that if you have any disqualifications under schedule 5 & 7, you are
disqualified and if there is institutional bias (?). It imposes on the arbitrator the duty to disclose for all the elements
that exist under schedule 5 & 7. There must be no doubt about his independence and impartiality. But in case of
arbitration agreements which give one of the parties the power to appoint an arbitrator, this power is not taken
away by section 12 because the power to appoint is distinct from the actual person appointed. As long as someone
qualified is appointed, there is no issue.
W/in 12/18 months, he has to pronounce an award (can be shifted by 6 months w consent and beyond that if the
court permits).
Eg: There are judgements dealing with prolongation of costs. Contracts may contain provisions saying even if the
contract is prolonged, no compensation will be provided. Some judgements say that if arbitrators award
compensation despite this provision in the contract, it is patently illegal, while other judgements say the existence
of such a provision violates contract and constitutional law.
S 36: Stay on enforcement: now amended to say that you will not get a stay on arb award at your whim and fancy.
A party should be able to get fruits of the award at the initial stage. Lacunae: BALCO is universally praised cause it
whittled down scope of interference by Indian courts in ICA. But in its blanket exclusion of Indian courts, it left a
gap.
Eg: Imagine a case where there’s an ICA where 1 Indian party’s assets are in India. Pending this arbitration if you’re
worried something will happen to your property, why will you go to a British court, for eg?
Arb amendment act says even in ICA if the assets are in India, for this limited purpose S 9 is still available to the
party.
SC said that just because people in the list are ex-perm employees, that in itself doesn’t mean they can’t be
arbitrators. But the people on the panel of DMRC must represent a wide set of professions and backgrounds.
Issued a writ of mandamus to DMRC saying that there must be people from eco background, accounting
background, ex jud and pvt sector in the panel considered. Act must be complied with in spirit.
This case gives you the power to ask a PSU to give you a panel that is all-encompassing.
In some contractors, it is mentioned in the arb clause that either party or party’s employer will be arbitrator. So in
12 (5), this is remedied. But there is an provision which says this can be waived, after the dispute has started.
Section 26 said that the amending act will not apply to pending arbitral proceedings, invoked under section 21
before 23 October 2015. But the term used is very loose, so in an argument made before Cal HC, they said this
would apply to litigation proceedings ? (clarify?)
Can the tribunals apply non national laws? Uniform laws adopted by several countries (eg CISG) these are
principles of general application across nations.
A. Difference between the terms “law or legal system” and “rules of law” in Sub clause 1-3 in section 28, some
say that the rules of law is used in clause 1 to indicate non-national laws, therefore parties are free to
choose non national laws but the tribunal under clause 2 can only choose national laws;
B. Another school of thought said that the purpose of international principles is so that they can be applied
when the parties do not decide what to apply, this does away with the enquiry regarding conflict of law
rules etc.
Section 28 Clause 2- Also known as equity clauses, says that the tribunal can only decide in equity when the parties
have expressly authorised it to do so. Unlike CPC section 151, no tribunal automatically has the discretion that
courts have. This discretion has to be given by the parties to them. These equity clause originated in france, earlier
the substantive law was applied and principles of equity were applied to the result of the substantive law in order
to soften the decision and not make a rigid award. This clause again shows that the tribunal is a creation of the
agreement.
In India, even if equitable jurisdiction is given to the tribunal they have to follow section 18 and must abide the
public policy of India (Section 34). They must also take into account the terms of contract and the trade usages
applicable to the dispute (Clause 3 of section 28). Clause 3 has been amended because of the ONGC judgment, the
SC held that section 28(3) is mandating following all terms of the agreement.
The amendment diluted this to makes it ‘take into account’ and not mandatorily follow the terms of the agreement.
They must give reason for deviation but its not like the earlier situation where the award could be set aside for non
compliance with the terms of the agreement.
Practice in India
SC held that if there is no choice regarding the arbitration agreement, it should be the law governing the main
agreement. The principle of implied intention is to be applied because the arb agreement is usually a part of the
main agreement and if no clear choice is made, then it must be looked at as one bigger agreement and the same
law should be applied.
The SC said that the separability clause is only for section 16 for the jurisdiction of the tribunal and should not be
applied to say that both agreements should have different laws.
Another school says that the separability clause and party autonomy should be paramount and the parties should
be choosing the law governing the arbitration agreement, this law should be found by using the different principles
that were discussed under section 28.
In India, section 28 only embodies the principle of appropriateness, the other principles have been read into it by
the court.
The third school of thought is that law of the seat should be applied if the parties have not made a choice regarding
the law. This is for countries which don’t believe in delocalised theory of arb.
Another school of thought says that the law of the Country with which the arb agreement has real and closest
connection should be applied.
Another school of thought is that the Rome I rules should be applied, which excludes arbitration agreement from
the scope and this means substantive law cannot be assumed to be the same as the main agreement and
substantive rights and liabilities of the parties . This is only an reinforcement of the first point.
Issues under an arb agreement- [different laws that can applied to a single agreement] [it is upto the parties to
What if no seat is mentioned? The tribunal can decide the seat of arbitration. In some rules a default seat is given.
But this might violate the principle of party autonomy because then they have no choice in such a situation. Find
the default seat in India and hong kong (not sure is important)
Section 29A
Subject to penalties, the parties can approach the court for an extension in time.
Section 29B
Fast tract procedures are only through documents and there is no opportunity for the parties to plead or have an
oral hearing. The section just details how the procedure is done.
Section 30
[Similar to Order 23 Rule 3] First time mediation was used in an act. Irrespective of choosing arbitration, the tribunal
may refer the parties to mediation or conciliation. Ruhi says that the reading can also mean that the tribunal itself
can try for settlement by using mediation, conciliation to encourage the parties to settle.
Whether the same adjudicator can be used for settlement and if that fails, then adjudicate the dispute? (use
previous discussion around PLA Chapter 6A and med arb) In case they settle, the can terminate the proceedings or
get the tribunal to pass an award in the same vein as their settlement. It must follow the substantive and formal
(section 31) of an award.
If this is like a consent decree because they both consented to it, can it be appellable or set aside? Section 96 in
the CPC excludes consent decree. No such exclusion of consented award under section 34 of the arb act. Ruhi says
that since no provision is excluding it, it is possible but the practice should be discouraged.
Section 31
Before the 1940 act, the award wasn’t clearly said to be in writing but was to be signed. This was pretty confusing
because if even one arbitrator is not signing the award, it was still valid. The legislature has cleared this by clause 1
of section 31 in the new act and said that all members should sign the award, if someone doesn’t sign, the reason
should be mentioned.
Confidentiality of the award: They don’t want the court to go into the reasoning of the award. This is a departure
from principles of fair trial because it prevent appeals.
Now the rule is that they should give reasoning, not giving reasons is an exception.
Sufficiency of reasoning
Courts should not go into the merits of the dispute. In ONGC vs. Saw pipes, section 31(3) seems to be a mandatory
clause but there is nothing under section 34 which allows for this reason and this is why patent illegality should be
added under section 34 because insufficiency of reasoning can be read into that into order to set aside the award.
Another thought is that the arbitrator cannot be expected to write a judicial reasoned award and the standard must
be the expertise of the arbitrator and the reasoning from his side must be looked keeping his qualification in mind
and the facts and the circumstances of the case.
The tribunal must give reasoning now because it is essential when approaching the court under 34 to point out
grounds for challenging the award. A refusal to sign the agreement (reasoned) is taken to mean that the arbitrator
disagrees with the majority.
Section 31
Talks about form and content of the arbitral award. Date and place of arbitration must be mentioned in the award,
this is because it must be clear what is the seat of arbitration and when exactly it was passed because sections like
29 A give a timeline for when things should be concluded.
(Section 34 gives a limitation of 3 months for an application. Mentioning the date is important even for this section)
Place: Has to be mentioned to figure out whether something is a domestic or international award.
Recitals of the award: all facts, issues raised and the award must be mentioned in the award.
Publication of the arbitral award is important and it must be delivered to each party, it should be handed over to
the party (delivery is not when you just send it and its in transit).
Any order which does not affect the rights and liabilities of the parties (the disputes which are referred to the court
by party) is not challenged under section 34, no appeal available (procedural decisions like language etc other than
decisions under section 16 and 17 which are appellable under section 37.)
Section 31A- Interests like pendente lite interest and pre-litigation interest can be awarded by the civil court and
the tribunal can award such interest under section 31A, but this is subject to party autonomy. If the parties do not
specify anything then the tribunal has the power to award interest from any point of time. However the parties can
take this power away and can specify if the tribunal can grant simple/compound interest and from what time to
what time.
Section 31 Clause 2 (b) mentions that the interest granted will be 2% more than the current rate of interest
according the interest act? From the date of cause of action to date of payment. This is an incentive not to elongate
the arb proceeding.
In the post award period, the tribunal has the power to award 2% more than the interest. The tribunal may give
lesser rate of interest and post the award the party cannot by agreement change this. Post award rate of interest
is not subject to party autonomy, it is statutory in nature.
Section 31 A
Allows the tribunal to grant costs to the parties. Tribunal has limited jurisdiction unlike the civil courts which have
extraordinary powers. The general rule is the the loser pays the costs, but the tribunal can refuse to award the
costs.
This embodies the good faith participation that is valued in ADR processes. Section 31 A is not subject to any party
autonomy, the parties by agreement cannot take the right of the tribunal to impose cost on the parties. They can
only take away the power to impose interest on the pre award amount.
Additional Award- this is subject to party autonomy. It may elongate the process, this may be undesirable.
The tribunal can correct any errors that it may have committed in the award. Ambiguous parts of the award can be
interpreted by the tribunal at the request of the parties.
The Court can look into the award under Sections 34 (2)(b), 2A and 4. Clause 3 says that the application for setting
it aside must be made within three months of the award. The Limitation Act will not apply at it is a special
provision.27 Due to the usage of the words not thereafter the court can condone delay only upto 30 days from the
end of 3 months, and any application for condonation of further delay, regardless of grounds has to be rejected.
Cases
Fiza Developers & Inter-Trade v AMCI(I) Pvt. Ltd.
Section 34 proceeding is a summary proceeding so evidence will be only on documents and affidavits. The SC later
says that parties can be cross examined. It was criticized because it gave two positions in the same judgment. But
this is the valid law now. Now the court just treats it as a summary proceedings.
Corresponds with UNCITRAL Art 34. The difference is that 34 (a) (ii) of our act says under the law for the time being
in force
It it not explicitly mentioned that only an Indian Court can set the award aside. However, the same can be inferred
from a joint reading of Section 2 and 34, as only Indian Courts are recognized under the definition of courts.
Article 5 (1)(e) of the New York Convention recognizes as a ground of the refusing recognition, the fact that the
award has been set aside by competent authority of the state in which the award was made. [The usage of of
country of which furthering the Seat Theory] The same article also mentions order from the competent authority
of the country under the law of which the award was passed, signalling a delocalized approach. The latter came in
relevance after the Bhatia. Post-Bhatia Indian parties are clear that Part I shall not apply by way of express
exclusions.
However, Implied exclusions began to develop as a response to the same. After BAlCo the confusion regarding the
setting aside of the award was sorted. Country whose lex arbitri was chosen will also get the power to set aside
the award. The number of proceedings will go up as well, as `multiple States may have jurisdictions in the such
cases.
Practice in India
In India, upon a joint reading of Section 2 (Court) and Section 34, it can be seen that the Seat Theory is followed.
Ideally, the approach of the court with respect to Domestic Arbitration and ICAs should be different. However, due
to the UNCITRAL Model Law subscribing strictly to exhaustive and exclusive reasons for setting awards aside, and
India not doing so, the level of discretion is much higher here.
As per Section 34(2), the burden of furnishing proof lies on the party applying for such setting aside. Furthermore,
as per the new Amendment, notice of the same has to be given to the other party as well.
Incapacity
Setting aside awards on the ground of incapacity of the parties is provided for in Section 34(2)(a)(i), and corresponds
to Section 7 of the Act. Should this ground be raised before the tribunal at the stage of setting it aside? In Narayan
27 Which by explicitly providing for a limitation period, overrides the application of the Law of Limitation.
Prasad, it was held that such grounds should be raised before the Tribunal at an earlier stage. In most cases, this
will be the ground taken up by the party, since it is a root problem, and will invalidate proceedings. But unlikely that
this will only come up at such a late stage.
Invalidity of Agreement
Second ground mentioned under the same first clause. Pretty straightforward. If no law has been specified, it will
be the law of India (as per Section 28). Because we apply 34 to ICAs as well, cuz it is not necessary that the law
being applied is just the law of the state.
Notice
UNCITRAL, Clause ii:
the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case;
Purely procedural ground, similar to those of the AC Act.
Composition Bad
Fourth clause as given in the Model Law. Similar to Section 16 of the Act, should usually be taken up before the
Tribunal. Can go to court as under Section 13 as well.
In Narayan Prasad, court interpretation differed w.r.t clause (v). The composition of arb tribunal was not in
accordance with agreement of parties. If it is in agreement with parties, they said you need not go further. They do
not look at Part I, say that only comes into play when there is no law. This is a flawed reasoning in (v), considering
that SC has already said Section 10 is non- mandatory in nature. (cross check).
Arbitrability
It is a ground under Section 34 (2A) Grounds under 34- In 2A the party who is alleging the existence has the burden
to prove the grounds. Arbitrability of the dispute is a jurisdictional dispute and can be brought under section 16
also. Under the new amended section 8, the court should only do prima facie satisfaction with the agreement. The
court should not hold a very detailed procedure to check the validity of the arb agreement.
After the SPB case, they go into the arbitrability of a dispute now. The ground of arbitrability is not enough for it to
be made invalid. In boghara polyfab, they held that arbitrability is something that the tribunal should decide.
However, under section 8 the SC does sometimes decide the arbitrability of the agreement. Section 37 says only
one appeal is allowed, so sometimes applications under section 34 goes straight to the SC. The amended section
11 doesn’t allow court to decide on arbitration.
If the objection to jurisdiction is rejected by the tribunal under section 16, then AFTER the award is passed, the
court can be approached for setting aside the award on the same ground under section 34.
Chloro Control and the amendment of section 8 allow non signatories to be made parties to the arb proceeding and
this makes the reasoning of sukanya holdings case invalid. In case of fraud its the ayyaswamy case ratio and not the
severability doctrine reasoning that is followed.
A. Narrow View: Judicial minimalism is the guiding principle and the duty of the court is limited to expounding
and not expanding the law. The legislature is the appropriate body to decides the heads of public policy,
the courts should only attempt to see if the cases fall within the same. It is similar to the system of writs in
India. This view was first propounded by Subba Rao in the case of Gherulal Parakh v Mahadeodas Maiya
(SC 1959).
B. Broad View: Public policy is and should be a dynamic concept and no legislature can forsee everything. If
the court doesn’t step in, then there will be a gap in the law. Therefore, the court should be creating new
heads of public policy in line with the time and the changing needs of society, the legislature can then
incorporate it into the law later as well. This view was propounded by the SC in the case of Central Inland
Water Transport Corporation v Brojo Nath (SC 1986).
Cases
1. Fundamental Policy of Indian Law (should be something more than a mere error or misapplication of the
substantive law of India, rather a violation of fundamental policy)
2. Against the Interest of India (Violation of FERA, against economic interests, etc.)
3. Contrary to Justice and Morality
Three grounds not needed, (b) and (c) can be subsumed within the first category.
Third view: There was no need to create third head, as violation of law could be read into violation of the
fundamental policy of Indian law; or even justice & morality.
Any errors made by the court in the case of Saw Pipes, were further aggravated by the court in the following
case of Venture Global.