CASUALTY REPORT INVESTIGATION DIVISION

38 C, Vermundsgade
P.O. Box 2589
DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø

Phone 39 17 44 00
Fax 39 17 44 16
E-mail oke@dma.dk
www.sofartsstyrelsen.dk

17 October 2002

Case 199923748

Collision between the fishing vessel GULDBORG

and a barge towed by the tugboat BIZON
GULDBORG sank after the collision
On 14th March 2002
 1. The Casualty
Type of casualty: Collision and total loss.
Location of casualty: In the traffic separation south of Falsterbo on position 55°17’ N -
012°47 E.
Date and time: 14 March 2002 at 02.30 (UTC +1) hours.
Weather: The wind ENE 10 m/s. The waves were small. The visibility was approx.
10 nm.

Injured: None.

2. Ship Particulars
Name of ship: GULDBORG BIZON MORVOREN

Registration No: KA 68

Home Port: Havnsø Phnom Penh St. Petersburg

Call sign: 5PAF XUNL9

IMO No: 8884969

Type of ship: Fishing vessel Tugboat Barge

(Danish seine)
Construction 1958 1994 1984
year:
Tonnage: 19,98 Brt 733 BT 3316 BT / DW 3500

Length/breadth/ 14,01 / 4,46 / 1,95 m 49,6 / 10,2 / 3,5 m 116,6 / 16,5 m

draft Freeboard 2,765 m
Engine Power: [Klik her, og skriv] 1030 kW

Crew: 2 9 0

Owner: Owned by the skipper Bizon Shipping Ltd. Bizon Shipping Ltd.

Classification Russian Maritime

Society: Register of Shipping

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 3. Summary
The fishing vessel GULDBORG was on its way home on a northern course east of the traffic
separation gyratory near Falsterborev. The skipper who was on watch went down to the engine room
to grease and he did not return to the wheelhouse until just before the collision. The tug BIZON was
proceeding on a westerly course to the gyratory, when the collision occurred. BIZON was towing a
large loaded barge and showed navigation lights as a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre.
The Skipper on the fishing vessel had seen the tug and the barge on the radar before he went down
in the engine room, but he estimated that the fishing vessel would pass aft of the tug and barge.
GULDBORG hit the port side of the barge and sank short after the collision. The crew of
GULDBORG boarded the liferaft and was later picked up by BIZON.

4. The crew
GULDBORG
Skipper: Born 1962. Certificate as skipper, 3rd class on fishing vessels. He took the skipper’s 3rd class
examination in 1987. He had been owner of and skipper on GULDBORG since 1988.

Fisherman: Born 1962. He had been fisher on board GULDBORG since December 2001.

BIZON
The master: He finished his navigational education in 1990. He has been master since March 1999
and master on BIZON since April 2001. Before he was chief officer on different tug boats for 6
years.

The chief officer: He has a master certificate. He finished his navigational education in 1996. He has
been chief officer on BIZON since December 1999.

5. Collecting of data
The Investigation Division was on board BIZON in Grenaa (Denmark) on 14 March 2002 to receive
statements from the master and the chief officer.

The skipper wrote a report and gave a supplementary statement to the Investigation Division on 18
March 2002.

From the Police Authorities , Malmoe, Sweden – Maritime Crime and Casualties the Investigation
Division has received information, a video of the wreak and radarplot from the radar of the Swedish
marine.

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 6. Narratives
Evidence from the skipper and fisherman of GULDBORG
GULDBORG departed from Gilleleje on monday the 11 March 2002 in the morning. Tuesday
evening they proceed against Darsser Ort near the Kadet Renden, because they did not catch much
off Gilleleje. They arrived to the area off Darsser Ort next morning at 06.30 hours and were fishing
here all day. In the evening they stopped. When the last catch was stowed in the hold, the hatch
cover was closed and batten down. They had approx. 1 ton fish and 1 ton ice on board.

Then they proceeded towards against a fishingground east of Moens Klint. The fisherman went to
bed at approx. 21.00 hours. When the skipper had heard the weather forecast at 22.45 hours, he
changed plans and decided to go home. He therefore altered course so GULDBORG would pass east
of the traffic separation gyratory near Falsterborev and continue up along Falsterbo east of the traffic
route. The plan was that the fisherman should take over the watch, when GULDBORG had passed
the traffic separation.

The course of GULDBORG was 350°and the speed was 7-8 knots. The vessel was steered by
autopilot. The vessel was equipped with GPS, radar and 2 VHF radios. The distance on the radar was
switched to 3 nm. GULDBORG showed masthead light, sidelights and sternlight. The skipper
believes, that they had switched on a halogen spot aft.

The weather was good and the waves were small.

Approx. 2 nm. before the traffic separation scheme the skipper would go down into the engine room
to grease the stern tube and the engine. It was the skipper who normally looked after the engine. He
wanted to grease the engine before he was relieved and went to bed.

Before he left the wheelhouse he saw two echoes on the radar that looked like a tug with a barge. He
did not see the tug and the barge visually. According to the bearing GULDBORG would pass aft of
the tug and barge. Therefore he did not alter course. He anticipated that it would take 10 minutes to
grease the engine, which was time enough before he was going to pass aft of the other vessel.

The skipper went down into the engine room, where he greased the stern tube. A container for grease
was empty and had to be filled. He thinks, that he was in the engine room for approx. 15 minutes.
When he returned to the wheelhouse, he looked right into a large black side, which turned out to be
the side of the barge. He grab a manoeuvring handle to back the vessel, but he grab the wrong handle
and the propeller was declutched instead of backing. There were three handles for clutch, regulator
and propeller pitch. He believes that there would have been time for backing if he had grabbed the
right handle.

Shortly after GULDBORD hit the barge with the starboard side of the stem. It was not a hard
collision, but before the barge had passed the fishernman came up in the wheelhouse and told that
there was water in the cabin foreward, where he had been sleeping. The skipper went down into the
cabin and saw a half a meter water on the floor. The skipper returned to the wheelhouse, where he
called Lyngby Radio on VHF canal 16 to get pumping assistance. Before the call was over he
realised that they were not able to keep the vessel afloat and he told this to Lyngby Radio. The
skipper tried to back full astern but it did not help. The vessel began to heel over to port. They put on
lifejackets. The skipper went out and closed the door to the engine room. The fisherman went up on
the top of the wheelhouse and began to launch the liferaft. The skipper stopped the propeller. The
vessel was sinking with the bow first. He went up on the wheelhouse to help launching the liferaft.
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They launched the liferaft on the starboard side. When they went into the liferaft, they made sure that
the line would not get entangled with the rig. They slacked the line when the vessel sank and was
then anchored this way until they cut the line.

After they had been 20-30 minutes in the liferaft they fired a parachute. After some time they saw a
tug boat approaching the liferaft. They fired a handflare and 10 minutes later they were picked up by
the tugboat BIZON. A helicopter arrived shortly after. The helicopter picked them up from BIZON
and flew them to Vaerloese in Denmark.

Evidence from the master and chief officer of BIZON

The tug BIZON was towing the barge MORVOREN. The cargo of the barge was loaded in Kalmar.
They had departed from Kalmar on 12 March 2002 at 15.50 hours. The cargo was 1680 tons sawdust
in bulk. Discharging port was Grenaa.

The collision occurred 14 March 2002 at 02.30 (UTC +1) on position 55°17’0 N 012°47’6 E.

At the time of the collision the chief officer was on watch on the bridge together with a lookout. The
chief officer had begun his watch at midnight.

At the entrance to the separation zone BIZON passed the racon buoy (B) Q(6)+LFl.10s at 01.46
hours, and the course was changed to 291°. The towing speed was 4,5 knots.

On board BIZON one radar was in use. The distance on the radar was adjusted to 4 nm.

At about 02.00 the chief officer visually saw a small vessel approx 20° on the port bow of BIZON.
The small vessel later turned out to be GULDBORG. The distance to GULDBORG was more than 4
nm. He saw masthead light and red sidelight on GULDBORG. Five minutes after the chief officer
visual had seen GULDBORG, he saw it on the radar in distance 4 nm. He took bearings and
distances on the radar and made a plot on paper. The plot showed, that the CPA (closest point of

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approach) was 0,6 nm between the tug and GULDBORG. According to the plot the course of
GULDBORG was 076° and the speed 5,0 knots. The chief officer began to plot approx 20 minutes
before the collision.

When the distance to GULDBORG was approx 1 nm. the chief officer switched on the big
searchlight, which is placed on the top of the wheelhouse, and pointed the light on the barge. The
light has 1 kW.

When GULDBORG came closer the target on the radar on board BIZON was lost due to swell. The
distance to GULDBORG was approx 0,6 nm., when they lost the target.

Few minutes before the collision, when the chief officer saw that GULDBORG was coming close to
the barge, he called the master to the bridge. The standing order is, that the chief officer must call the
master, if any problems arise.

When the master came to the bridge, he saw a vessel (GULDBORG) behind the tug, near the port
side of the barge. He saw a red sidelight and a white masthead light on GULDBORG.

When GULDBORG was approx 4 cables (0,4 nm.) away and aft of the tug the chief officer flashed
the hand searchlight against GULDBORG. Five flash each time. They did not use the whistle and
they did not try to call the vessel on the VHF radio. They were listening to the VHF radio on canal
16.

It was at this point impossible to manoeuvre the tug and barge in order to avoid collision.

At approx. 02.30 GULDBORG hit the barge aft on the port side.

After the collision GULDBORG switched on the light on deck, and the master now saw, that it was a
small vessel, which had a list.

The master activated the “man over board” alarm on board BIZON. He heard communication
between a vessel and Lyngby Radio on VHF canal 16. The master received the distress call from
Lyngby Radio. When the master heard the position he understood, that the distress call was about the
vessel hitting the barge. The master then called Lyngby Radio and informed about the collision. This
radio communication took place only few minutes after the collision.

Lyngby Radio told the master to proceed to the area of the collision and start searching. The master
turned the tug to port and went back on the opposite course. During the turn all lights disappeared
from GULDBORG. After returning to the position of the collision, they saw a flashlight from a
liferaft and a red handflare from the raft. The master reduced the speed of the tug and approached the
raft. The raft then drifted the last short distance to the tug. The raft drifted in a southwest direction.
From the tug a heaving line was thrown to the raft and the two fishermen were picked up at approx
03.25 hours.

Lyngby Radio was informed about the rescue of the fishermen. A helicopter arrived to the area. The
fishermen were picked up from the tug by the helicopter.

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 7. Further investigations
Supplementary information from the skipper of GULDBORG
• When the collision occurred the skipper had been at work and watch for 12-14 hours.

Supplementary information from the master of BIZON

• The towing line was 209 meters long at the time of the collision. The barge is 116 meters
long.
• The barge was showing sidelights and sternlight.
• The tugboat was showing sidelights, 3 masthead lights, sternlight, yellow towing light and
light as a vessel restricted in its ability to manoeuvre (red-white-red).
• The tugboat was steered by autopilot. When the small vessel came close the chief officer
shifted to steering by hand
• The master had watch from 06-12 and from 18-24 hours. The chief officer had watch from
00-06 and from 12-18.
• They used the Danish chart no 188, printed in February 2001 on board the tug. Last
correction was 6/2001.
• Last class survey of BIZON was in September 2001.

Supplementary information from the chief officer of BIZON

• On 13 March the chief officer was on watch from 00-06 hours and from 12-18 hours.

Information from the Police Authorities , Malmoe, Sweden – Maritime Crime and Casualties
The staff on Drogden lighthouse has told, that both BIZON and the barge were showing navigation
lights when passing DROGDEN lighthouse shortly before sunrise. When the Swedish police came
on board BIZON on 14 March at 11.30 hours the navigation lights were still on.

There were light blue marks on the aft part of the port side of the bark. The hull of GULDBORG was
light blue.

BIZON was equipped with a hand searchlight/signal light. The wheelhouse of BIZON has windows
360 degrees around and there is an open outlook looking astern.

Outlook astern from the wheelhouse on BIZON

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Video of the wreak
The video of the wreak shows that the wooden stem is broken under the waterline and has been
pushed inward. Because of this the planks have been detached from the stem over and under the
waterline.

In port side most of the planks over the waterline are broken approx. ½ to 1 meter aft of the stem,
because the stem has been pushed inward.

Radarplot from the Swedish marine

The radarplot shows that GULDBORG’s course over the ground was approx. 000° until the
collision. BIZON’s course over the ground was approx. 290° until the collision.

8. Comments made by the Investigation Division

GULDBORG
The skipper of GULDBORG was on watch alone. He left the wheelhouse approx. 15 minutes before
the collision and before the vessel was going to cross the traffic separation. Before he had seen two
echos on the radar, which looked like a tugboat towing a barge, on the starboard side of
GULDBORG. The skipper estimated, that GULDBORG would pass aft of the barge and he therefore
did not alter the course.

GULDBORG was at the time of the collision a power-driven vessel underway. GULDBORG should
according to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea rule 18 (a) have kept out
of the way of BIZON. BIZON exhibited lights as a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre.

The collision occurred because the skipper on GULDBORG had left the wheelhouse. Therefore
prober look-out was not maintained according to rule 5 and it could therefore not be determined if
risk of collision existed according to rule 7. Also he could not take action to avoid collision
according to rule 8. The skipper did not return to the wheelhouse until few seconds before the
collision.

The collision occurred in a traffic separation scheme, where BIZON was following the route and
where GULDBORG was crossing the route. The Investigation Division finds it unwarrantable to
leave the wheelhouse, so it is unmanned, and particular when the vessel is going to cross a traffic
separation scheme short after.

BIZON
The chief officer told, when he gave his statement, that he at approx. 02.00 hours first time saw
GULDBORG in bearing 20° to port in a distance of more than 4 nm. He saw the red sidelight on
GULDBORG. According to the radarplot the chief officer made on plotting paper, the course and
speed of GULDBORG should have been 076° and 5 knots.

According to the radarplot of the Swedish marine the course of GULDBORG was approx. 000° and
the course of BIZON approx. 290°. If this radarplot is connected with BIZON’s speed on 4,5 knots
and GULDBORG’s speed on 7-8 knots, the bearing from BIZON to GULDBORG must have been
approx. 70° on port side and not 20° on port side as the chief officer on BIZON has explained. The
vessel the chief officer first observed and plotted can not have been GULDBORG. At this time
approx. a half hour before the collision GULDBORG must have shown the green sidelight to
BIZON.

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The opinion of the Investigation Division is, that the plot of the chief officer is wrong, maybe
because the first bearings and distances were taken to another ship. However it is also the opinion of
the Investigation Division, that the chief officer observed GULDBORG some time before the
collision, that he found, that there was risk of collision between GULDBORG and the barge, and that
he called the master, who arrived on the bridge before the collision.

The chief officer gave warning signals with a light, but he should also have given warning signals
with the whistle according to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea rule 34
(d), and he should have begun to give warning signals earlier. The chief officer should also have
tried to call the fishing vessel on the VHF radio, notwithstanding that this probably would have no
practical importance, because the skipper was in the engine room.

9. Conclusion made by the Investigation Division

Cause
The collision occurred because the skipper on GULDBORG approx. 15 minutes before the collision
left the wheelhouse, so it was unmanned. Out-look was therefore not maintained, and it was not
determined, that there was risk of collision with the barge.

17 October 2002

Lars Gerhard Nielsen

Ship Surveyor

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 10. Enclosures
Section of chart (Danish chart no. 187) with the vessels proceedings drawn according to the radarplot
of the Swedish marine.

Collision
BIZON

GULDBORG

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