Duhok Polytechnic University

College of Technical Engineering

Department of Petrochemical

Process equipment design

Fourth Stage

Name Of student: Dlzar Yousif

Group :B
Safety in refinery
Safety is of extreme importance in all petroleum refineries. Every employee is
involved in developing the regulations and procedures for work safety. In this
way, anyone who works in the refinery is part of the safety system and will
always be sure to work safely and help others work safely. All routine jobs in
the refinery should conform to high safety standards. No work can be carried
out without a permit. This is in order to ensure that personnel always know
where work is being done and, therefore, they can prevent jobs from
overlapping. Whenever workers are in the refinery site, they have to wear safety
clothing known as personal protective equipment (PPE).

Benefits of health and safety

1.Protecting your staff

Following health and safety guidelines is primarily to protect employers and

their staff from injury, illness or coming into any other form of harm in the
workplace. One of the main benefits of following health and safety practices is
to prevent common workplaces injuries such as back pain, falling from height,
asthma, injuries from slips and trips and asbestos-related illness

2.Reducing absences

Following health and safety guidelines and maintaining a safe work place will
reduce the risk of work-related illnesses and injuries, and therefore reduce staff
absences. Employers therefore also save money on the direct costs of absences,
such as paying salaries.
3.Improving productivity

If your colleagues and employees are able to work in a safe environment, this
will improve morale and overall productivity.

4.Saving money

By maintaining health and safety practices in the workplaces, and therefore

reducing absences and improving productivity, you will be saving money by
retaining staff. Money spent on absences and recruitment processes will
decrease, and the business’ profits will increase.

Hazards in Refinery Units

1.Crude Oil Pre-treatment

Hydrogen sulphide, hydrogen chloride and salts in the desalter are the main
causes of corrosion in the unit. Corrosion is the source of leakage of oil and
evaporated hydrocarbons. Low boiling point hydrocarbon leaks can possibly
lead to fires and explosions in the unit. Scheduled maintenance is required to
prevent salt fouling and corrosion.
2.Crude Oil Distillation

Low boiling point hydrocarbons may leak from improper connections between
furnace, heat exchangers and distillation column. When the hydrocarbon leaks
find any source of ignition, a fire and/or an explosion may occur. Thermal
cracking is the source of coke formation which may block lines and connections
leading to over-pressurizing and sometimes unit failure and consequent shut
down. Coke formation can be prevented by controlling the temperature and
pressure. Relief valves should be provided and regularly inspected for over-
pressure. Sour crude distillation, especially at a high temperature of 232 C (450
F), causes severe corrosion. Anti-corrosive chemicals and sufficient wash water
are injected to avoid corrosion.

3. Catalytic Reforming

Catalyst handling and loading should be based on standard operating procedure

so as not to crush the catalyst leading to fine particulates that may either escape
into the atmosphere or be deposited in the reformer lines and connections.
Hydrogen chloride and ammonium chloride may form in the unit pre-heater
which can lead to fouling and corrosion. Scheduled maintenance is required to
prevent corrosion and ensure the temperature is controlled to avoid hot spots in
the reactor.
4.Thermal Cracking

When sour crude is processed in the delayed coking unit, procedures must be
carried out carefully to prevent corrosion, since the unit is working at high
temperatures between 232 and 482 C (450 and 900 F). Above 482 C (900 F)
steam is injected to prevent coke formation in the lines. Scheduled maintenance
is required to ensure that the temperature control units are working properly.
Hydrogen sulphide corrosion may occur in the furnace, coking drums and
reactors. Water jets used for coke removal from the coke drum should be
drained properly and completely to avoid explosion when fresh coke forms
again during operation.

5.Hydrotreating and Hydrocracking

Catalyst handling and loading must be carried out with care so that fine particles
from crushed catalyst are not produced. Fine particulates may result in a dust
explosion. Since hydrogen sulphide is present regular maintenance is required
to avoid corrosion. A high operating temperature leads to coke formation on the
catalyst; therefore, care should be taken during the catalyst regeneration process
to avoid fire and explosion.

6.Fluid Catalytic Cracking

Catalyst handling and loading should be based on the standard operating

procedure to prevent catalyst dust explosion. Oil coating the spent catalyst
should be stripped out in the stripper section of the reactor before sending it to
the regenerator. If not removed, the presence of this oil will cause explosion
during contact with air in the regenerator. Hydrocyclones must be carefully
operated, otherwise catalyst fines will be carried out over to the distillation
column. These fines will be concentrated in the decant oil
7. Alkylation

In the alkylation unit, two systems are used, either sulphuric acid or
hydrofluoric acid, which are both considered hazardous chemicals. Material
handling with extreme care is required especially the hydrofluoric acid during
cleaning processes in which water is used. Improper contact of the acid with
water may lead to an explosion. A concentrated acid is used with small amounts
of water to avoid corrosion. Acid effluent must be neutralized before it is sent to
the sewers

8. Hydrogen Production

Scheduled maintenance is required to prevent corrosion and ensure that

temperature and pressure are controlled. This must be done in order to avoid hot
spots in the reactor. Low boiling point hydrocarbons released from a leak may
lead to a fire and/or an explosion. Inspections for piping and connections should
be done regularly to assure hydrogen production quality.
Example:
In the reformer unit, a reactor works at high pressure and temperature. The reactor contains
two control units (see the attached figure). The first unit consists of a high pressure alarm to
alert the operator in case of any emergency increase in pressure and a pressure relief switch.
The second control unit consists of pressure controller connected to a solenoid valve to close
the feed supply to the reactor. Estimate the probabilities of process failure due to high
pressure.

Solution:

Failure rate for each component is selected from Table1. The probability P is then calculated
using equation . An increase in pressure occurs when both (AND) the alarm and the shut
down system fails in supplying feed. Failure in the alarm unit is in a series (OR) with a
pressure switch and assuming t = 1 year. Therefore,

Table 1

Failure rate data for commonly used process components (Crowl and Louvar, 2002; Lees,
1986)
Fire and Explosions

Accidental vapour cloud explosion hazards are of great concern to the refining
and chemical processing industry, and a number of catastrophic explosion
accidents have had significant consequences in terms of death, injury, property
damage, loss of profit, and environmental impact. Fuel-air explosives (FAE)
disperse a cloud of fuel which is ignited by a source to produce an explosion.
The main destructive force of FAE is high over-pressure. For fuel vapour cloud
explosion, there is a minimum ratio of fuel vapour to air below which ignition
will not occur. Also there is a maximum ratio of fuel vapour to air, at which
ignition will not occur. These limits are the lower (LEL) and upper explosive
limits (UEL). For gasoline vapour, the typical explosive range is from 1.3 to 6.0
mol% vapour to air, and for methane, this range is 5–15 mol%. Flammability
limits are related to explosive limits since most explosions are followed by fire.
The mass and type of material released contribute to the potential damage from
a vapour cloud explosion.
Safety Considerations in Plant Layout

Plant layout is often a compromise between a number of factors, including

safety aspects such as:

 The geographical limitations of the site.

 The distances for transfer of materials between plant and storage units to
reduce costs and risks.
 Interaction with existing or planned facilities on site such as existing
roadways, drainage and utilities routings.
 The spaces for plant operability and maintainability.
 The hazardous and flammable material storages.
 Emergency services and escape routes for on-site personnel.
 The need to provide acceptable working conditions for operators.
 Preventing and/or mitigating the escalation of adjacent events (domino
effect).
 Ensure that safety within on-site and off-site occupied buildings is
maintained.
 Controlling the access of unauthorized personnel.
Plant Layout design techniques applicable to the reduction of the risks
from release of flammable or toxic materials include:

 Locating the storage of flammable/toxic material outside process areas.

 Locating hazardous plants away from main roadways through the site.
 Fitting remote-actuated isolation valves where high inventories of
hazardous materials may be released into vulnerable areas.
 Allowing for the provision of dykes and sloping terrain to contain
releases, increase the safety and reduce environmental effects.

Figure1 Typical refinery layout

 Siting of plants within buildings as secondary containment.
 Siting of plants in an open air environment to ensure rapid dispersion of
minor releases of flammable gases and vapours and thus prevent
concentration build-up which may lead to flash fires and explosions.
 Hazardous area classification for flammable gases vapours and dusts to
designate areas where ignition sources should be eliminated.

Figure1 :shows typical refinery layout based on the above instructions

for minimizing risks. The distance between occupied buildings and plant
buildings will be governed by the need to reduce the dangers of
explosion, fire and toxicity. In particular, evacuation routes should not be
blocked by poor plant layout, and personnel with more general site
responsibilities should be housed in buildings sited in a non-hazard area
near the main entrance.
Safe Operation Systems

The refinery must provide a safe workplace and safe products. All
accidents can be preventable. Safety regulations and procedures address
employee health through working in the proper environment. In addition,
the refinery is responsible for the nearby environment, which includes
residents and properties. Typical systems to maintain safe operations
include pressure relief, flare relief and air, water and solid emissions
monitoring systems.

1. Pressure Relief Systems

Over-pressurization can upset normal operating conditions. Relief valves

are installed in the lines where over-pressurization is possible. The relief
device has a set point pressure which is below the maximum allowable
working pressure (MAWP). The pressure accumulation is the percentage
increase above MAWP, while the over-pressure is the percentage increase
in pressure above a set point
2. Flare Relief System

Flares are sometimes used after knockout drums. The objective of a flare
is to burn the gas to produce combustion products that are neither toxic
nor combustible. When operating conditions change, flares may be used
as part of the process to ensure that refinery equipment is operated safely.
In most cases, hydrocarbons are recovered and reused in the refining
process. However, in some cases, residual hydrocarbons are burned off.
The flares combust hydrocarbon vapours into water and carbon dioxide.
This is the most proper method of preventing hydrocarbon vapours from
escaping into the atmosphere.
3. Air Emission Monitoring

The refinery maintains the commitment to reduce and eliminate

emissions to the atmosphere. By running plants safely the amount of
pollutants emitted into the air are reduced. Regular inspection of pumps,
compressors, valves and flanges ensure that hydrocarbons do not escape
into the atmosphere. To meet clean air standards, emissions from furnaces
must be monitored and controlled.

4. Water Emission Monitoring

Any water that comes into contact with any raw material, product,
byproduct or waste is known as process water. All process water from the
refinery must receive extensive treatment and be in compliance with all
local regulatory requirements. Water is used to keep the refinery product
streams and equipment cool. By cooling the water in large cooling towers
and re-circulating it, the amount of fresh water needed is minimized.

5. Solid Waste Monitoring

At the refinery, proper waste minimization and management is a high

priority. Refinery solid wastes are typically in the form of sludge, spent
process catalysts, filter clay, and incinerator ash. Sludge is generated
from the gravitational separation of oil/water/solids during the storage or
treatment of process wastewaters. Sludge is also generated from cooling
waters segregated for treatment from other process or oily cooling waters
 Emergency Alarms

Alarm systems alert operators to plant conditions, such as deviation from

normal operating limits and to abnormal events, which require timely
action or assessment. Alarm systems are not normally safety related, but
they do have a role in enabling operators to reduce the demand on the
safety related systems, thus improving overall plant safety.
 The alarm system should be designed in accordance to the designated
reliability.
 The alarm system should be independent from the process control system
and other alarms unless it has also been designated safety related.
 The operator should have a clear written alarm response procedure for
each alarm (simple, obvious and invariant) on which he is trained.
 Each alarm should be distinguished from other alarms and remain on
view at all times when active.
 The operator responsible for responding to the alarm should not be
overloaded.

Type of alarm:
Noise in Refinery

A noise impact assessment measures the amount of noise (a noise level)

coming from a particular work and compares it against a noise limit.
Noise limits are usually compared to the Environment Protection Agency
(EPA) guidelines. Further, assessing noise is a complex process and
involves measuring background noise so that noise limits can be
determined. Then the work noise levels should be measured to see its
impact on the background noise levels. Background noise is measured at
various locations during the daytime, evening and night time.
Background noise in a refinery is basically all the noise a person can hear,
other than noise coming from the industry. For example, noise from the
highway is considered background noise, but noise from a nearby factory
is not. Once the background noise is measured, consultants then calculate
the noise limit for each location. It is important to note that noise limits
change depending on the time of the day and also on the area location and
activities.
Conclusion

The oil industry has made obvious progress in the field of environmental
protection, safety management, and social responsibility in recent years.
However, there is still much room for improvement in terms of
sustainable safety development. Human factors are often defined as the
root cause of incidents leading to oil accidents. The oil industry is
becoming more employee-centered and must make efforts to improve
safety performance.
This study shows the importance of human factors to sustainable safety
development in the oil industry
This paper proposes a comprehensive safety performance assessment
model based on human factors, FAHP, and FCE. Experts; knowledge and
experience are systematically combined to determine the weight of
factors and sub-factors based on FAHP. Weight ranking can also help
leaders and managers with their safety strategy, reducing potential risk
factors by implementing the BBS approach. Furthermore, the combined
method can also be applied in the chemical and gas industry.
Reference

1. FAHIM, M. A.; TAHER, A.; ALSAHHAF, A. E. Chapter 14-Safety in

petroleum refineries. Fundamentals of petroleum refining, 2010, 357e76.

2. API (1999). ‘‘Sample Calculation for Sizing a Flare Stack,’’ C52104,

American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC.

3. API 520 (1994). ‘‘Sizing Selection and Installation of Pressure-

Relieving Devices in Refineries,’’ pt. 2 Installation, 4th ed. American
Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC.